THE
CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY
PLANNED BY the late LORD ACTON
VOLUME VI
PREFACE.
THE present volume covers a section of time falling far short of that
implied by the literal meaning of the word. But it seems hardly necessary to defend
the use of the term “the Eighteenth Century,” as denoting a period of Modern
History with characteristics peculiar to itself and exhibiting a more or less
self-consistent development of its own. We have accordingly, without doing much
violence to ordinary usage, restricted the application of the term to the years
reaching from the Peace of Utrecht and the supplementary pacifications to the
outbreak of the French Revolution. Moreover, the original design of this work
has made it necessary, not only to discuss in the volume dealing with the
Revolution itself those earlier aspects of the political and social condition
of France and of her administrative and financial system, as well as those new
currents of philosophical thought and literary effort, which have to be taken
into account in tracing its origin; but also to devote a large part of another
volume, concerned with the history of the United States, to a narrative of the
War of Independence and an examination of its causes. It has therefore been our
desire to avoid whatever recurrence to these topics was not needed in order to
make clear the course of European history, and of the history of particular
States, within the limits deliberately chosen from the outset for the present
volume.
Nevertheless, as it seems to us, these limits may be justly designated
“natural”; in other words, they are prescribed by the nature of the subject,
and not only by our desire to adhere, in essential matters, to the original
scheme of this History. In the political annals of Europe, and of those other
parts of the world whose progress was directly affected by that of the European
States, a new epoch unmistakably begins with the Peace of Utrecht, which is our
starting-point, though, strictly speaking,
that settlement can be called definitive only after the Treaties of 1725 had
confirmed those of 1713, 1714 and 1718. A solution had at last been found for
the great problem of the partition of the Spanish inheritance between the
Houses of Habsburg and Bourbon, and at the same time for that of the Balance of
Power which had long been, to all intents and purposes, identical with the
question of their historic rivalry. During the whole of this epoch, down to the
outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars, the Utrecht Treaties (if this name
may be given to the whole group) remained the established basis of the
relations between the European Powers. The Quadruple Alliance of 1718 and the
Anglo- Spanish War of 1719 enforced the Utrecht policy with not less rapidity
than success; nor can there be any doubt but that, in its broad results, the
foreign policy of Stanhope and Dubois, and the long pacific entente between
England and France under Walpole and Fleury, were
alike in thorough consonance with the system carried through, notwithstanding
so many obstacles, at Utrecht. The eighteenth century witnessed repeated
departures from that system, and successive interruptions of the Peace of
Europe caused by a series of wars extending from that of the Polish to that of
the Bavarian Succession; but, with certain exceptions, the several Congresses
which met in turn to bring about the conclusion of these wars reestablished
that Peace without great difficulty on the general basis of the Utrecht
arrangements. The most signal exception was the appropriation of Silesia by
Prussia in the War of the Austrian Succession, and the maintenance of that
conquest after the tremendous struggle of the Seven Years’ War; but it should
be pointed out that the House of Austria had laid itself open to such a loss
when it had sought to settle its succession by means of a series of treaties
negotiated separately between itself and the other European Powers, instead of
by seeking to bring about a common agreement between them. The escheat of
Lorraine to France—an event of even greater moment for the destinies of Europe
than the transfer of Silesia to Prussia—was an event stipulated by treaty a
generation before it came to pass; but it was none the less a contravention of
the Utrecht settlement, destined to avenge itself bitterly upon both the Powers
which were the true principals in the bargain— upon Austria as well as upon
France.
In eastern Europe, a new epoch begins after the Moslem advance had been
finally driven back at the gates of Vienna. The Turkish Power henceforth virtually
stood on the defensive against the European Powers; and
the Eastern Question became, what it has since remained, the problem of
restricting—perhaps ending—the dominion of the Turks in Europe. The Turkish
Wars of the eighteenth century ceased to exercise any direct influence upon the
general course of European affairs after the Peace of Passarowitz had reduced the limits of the Turkish empire, even as compared with those
assigned to it at Carlowitz. Henceforth, it was no
longer in Austria, but in Russia, that the Porte found its most determined foe,
against whose advance it had to stand on the defensive both before and after
the new ambition of Joseph II had fallen in with the plans inherited by
Catharine II from Peter the Great. That the Eastern Question was not solved in
this century, was due to the complications and jealousies of Western rather
than Eastern politics, and specially to the fact that the Eastern Powers were
preoccupied by their Polish schemes. The intervention of Russia in the concerns
of Poland, facilitated by the unpatriotic selfishness of native partisanship,
gave Frederick II his chance of pressing on a series of annexations which he
regarded as indispensable to the security of the Prussian monarchy. Austria
felt herself obliged to follow suit; and the First Partition of Poland, by
which the Republic was shorn of nearly one-third of its territory, proved the
first step towards a consummation not less subversive of the paramount
authority of public law in Europe than the French Revolutionary propaganda
itself. But of the story of the Partitions of Poland only the opening chapter
properly appertains to our present volume.
Among the principal European Powers, Great Britain is found, at the
outset of our period, and during by far the greater part of its course,
exercising an influence upon European public affairs such as she was again to
exercise, and then for a shorter time, only at the close of the Napoleonic
Wars. The primary cause of this influence is to be sought in the leading part
which Great Britain had played, through the armed forces which she had sent
forth or equipped, and by the way in which they had been led to victory, in the
great Spanish Succession War; but that she maintained her political position so
long was due to further reasons, which it is part of the task of this volume to
discuss. The traditions of a free parliamentary government prevailed in England
more potently than ever before; but they were no longer associated, as they had
been during most of the preceding century, with a mutability of political
system for which this nation had become proverbial. The “principles of 1688” as
formulated by Locke, to the origins of whose political philosophy a separate
section is devoted in this volume, had become, in Sir Leslie Stephen’s words,
“the political bible of the eighteenth century”; and they remained such till
the French Revolution changed both scope and method of modem political thought.
To the strength of constitutional, aided by that of dynastic, stability—for Jacobitism had ceased to be a political force even before
its final effort—was added the stimulating influence of a well-considered
foreign policy far removed from insularity, and already conscious of the
demands of a world-empire. The power of Great Britain was already expanding
into that of a British empire extending from the East Indies to the New World;
and British enterprise was depriving Dutch and French rivals of most of their
share of the field, as it had of old aimed at driving out the Spaniards and drove
them out again when, after the close of Ferdinand I’s prudent reign, they had
once more begun to aspire to a revival of their old colonial power. Thus, under
Chatham’s inspiring guidance, and in alliance with a King after Chatham’s own
heart, Great Britain’s star rose to an unprecedented height. Meanwhile the
“sister island” long remained down-trodden; nor was it till the close of our
period that Irish loyalty, in a season of danger to the empire, led to a
relaxation of some of the disabilities imposed upon the country, and even
obtained for it a transitory legislative independence. Before this, Great
Britain had to confront the rebellion of her American colonies, the armed
intervention of France and Spain, and the armed neutrality of Russia and her
allies. Some of the noblest representatives of English parliamentary
statesmanship had sought to withstand the coercive legislation which had given
rise to the colonial crisis; and its termination was thus made easier. No
general view of the history of Great Britain during this period would be
complete which should leave out of sight the religious condition of its
inhabitants. Without the renewal of its religious life from within, no
soundness of mind or muscle could have arrested the decay into which, in the middle
of the eighteenth century, factiousness, frivolity, and vice seemed to be
hurrying large sections of the population.
While, until towards the close of this period the power and influence of
Great Britain steadily progressed, and even in the Peace of Versailles (1783)
her losses, with the one great exception of the insurgent colonies, were
relatively small and in respect of her colonial cessions to Spain were morally more than compensated by her
retention of Gibraltar, the European prestige as well as the maritime and
colonial power of France no less manifestly declined. Her struggle with Great
Britain for naval and colonial supremacy was decided in the course of a
stirring series of conflicts, treated partly in the chapter on the Conquest of
Canada which finds its proper place in our seventh volume, partly in the
portion of the present volume which offers a connected account of Indian
history from the days of the Moghul empire to those of the rule of Warren
Hastings, the first Governor-General of India. The failure of the policy of
Louis XV (which was far from being always the policy of his Ministers) must be
ascribed, partly to the personal shortcomings of the sovereign himself and some
of those whom he trusted in Court or camp, partly and chiefly to the excessive
strain put upon the resources of France by the efforts which she made
simultaneously in the European conflict and in the struggle for supremacy
beyond seas. Whether the “ reversal of alliances ” in the middle of the
century, which on the part of France implied a renunciation of her ancient
policy of antagonism to the House of Habsburg, was in itself irrational and
inopportune, or whether its breakdown was due to the conduct, rather than the
conception, of the new “system,” there can at least be no reason for regarding
that breakdown as the result of internal rottenness in a State whose
administration was in many respects unsurpassed, or a people whose inborn vigour was, under the guidance of genius, to shake the
world.
To no Government was the superiority of French administrative methods
better known than to that of the great Prussian King, and by none was it more
openly acknowledged. To Frederick II his father had bequeathed the sinews of
war in the shape of an army incomparably disciplined and a well-filled
treasury; and thus he was enabled to put into execution his design, conceived
with unexampled audacity and carried out with wonderful determination, of
raising his poor and straggling kingdom to the position of a great European
Power. The story of this achievement will be found narrated in this, volume
without the distortions of either apotheosis or apology; and, where the views
of historical scholars differ as to the immediate motives of Frederick the
Great’s action, room has been found for an expression of this difference. Alike
when he first invaded Silesia, and when he fell upon his Saxon neighbour, as when he thwarted the dynastic ambition of
Joseph II on behalf of the
Princes of the Empire, Frederick the Great’s plan of action lay clear before
his eyes both in war and in peace; and it was one from which the State that
through him had taken its place among the chief motive forces of European
political life could not swerve with impunity. For a time it seemed as if his
successor were, without any strain upon the military and financial resources of
a State of mettle so proved, to add fresh laurels to those of the great King;
and the politically effete Dutch oligarchy collapsed among its canals and
counting-houses, when, in 1787, a Prussian force invaded the Low Countries to
vindicate the honour of the House of Orange.
To the history of the Austrian Netherlands—down to the time of their
complete alienation from a Government whose intentions with regard to them they
with reason suspected, and for whose domestic reforms they had nothing but
distaste—attention is directed elsewhere in this volume, in which it has been
sought to include some notice of every European State whose progress or decline
affected the general course of European history. In that course there has not
often been a time when the several members of the European family were less
disposed to acknowledge among them any principle of unity or paramount
authority ; and the system of a concert of Powers was still in an imperfectly
developed stage of recognition or acceptance. Religious differences had almost
(though not quite) ceased to count; and the diplomacy of each State, or of each
dynasty, was single-mindedly confined to the advance of its particular
interests. The Austrian dominions had been kept together by the ceaseless
anxiety of Charles VI for the maintenance of their cohesion; nor was it on the
accession of Maria Theresa permanently disturbed except by the loss of a single
province. Once again, and more seriously, imperilled by the ambition of Joseph II, whose miscalculations of season and method should
not be allowed to detract from the honour due to the
nobility and humanity of his purpose, the power of the House of Habsburg held
out, as it was to hold out for many a generation afterwards, though the
Imperial Crown still worn by its chief seemed to have become little more than a
highly respectable ornament. Russia, diplomatically speaking a member of the
family of European States only from the Treaty of Amsterdam (1717) onwards,
virtually decided the issue of the greatest continental struggle of the
eighteenth century—the Seven Years’ War—and, under the rule of the “most
political woman” that any
century (unless it be that of Semiramis) has
produced, appeared ready to arbitrate in the still more critical conflict of
the French Revolutionary War. The northern neighbours of Russia had sunk into Powers of the second and third rank—Sweden paralysed by the selfish contests of rival oligarchical
factions; Denmark under an absolute monarchy tempered by ministerial wisdom or
endangered by ministerial rashness. In the south, Spain under her first Bourbon
King, after a passing effort towards better things, sank back into the
condition of misrule and bankruptcy in which she had been left by her last
Habsburg sovereign. And though, under the second Bourbon King, a further
fraction of her former Italian dominions, which Philip V’s ambitious consort
had succeeded in recovering as a Spanish appanage,
was restored to the dynasty, it was not till the reign of Charles III that
Spain seemed for a time about to assume a place among the progressive States of
Europe. But neither the reforms of Florida Blanca and his colleagues, nor even
the expulsion of the Jesuits, which here and in Portugal seemed more astounding
than it did in contemporary France, could change the economic condition of the
nation; and the foreign policy of Spain, after finally settling down into a
willingness to fulfil the obligations of the Bourbon
Family Compact by means of which Choiseul had hoped to revive the political
ascendancy of France, ended in a peace which left Gibraltar still in British
hands. In Italy, the Papacy passed out of the tenure of an adversary of the
Bourbons and a friend of the Jesuits into that of a pontiff pledged to the
overthrow of the Order. But neither the Papacy nor any other Italian Government
exercised any considerable influence upon the course of European politics; and
it was only the mutual jealousy of foreign Powers that stayed the immediate
downfall of Venice and Genoa as independent States. Switzerland, though largely
dependent upon France through her unhappy foreign-service system, contrived to
preserve her so-called neutrality and, amidst an endless succession of
“class-wars,” her existing political institutions, till the advent of the
French Revolution.
The intellectual note of the “eighteenth century” is that of
“enlightenment”—in other words, the self-confident revolt of the trained human
intellect against tradition for tradition’s sake, and against whatever that
intellect holds to be superstition or prejudice. In the great majority of
European States, which had passed through the stage of the diminution of
oligarchies, based on the rights and liberties of particular classes, and were under strong monarchical
rule, it was unavoidable that enlightenment, if it asserted itself at all,
should prevail through the authority of a benevolent despotism; but, as the
example of English society in the eighteenth century shows, there was no
exclusive connexion between the methods of despotism
and the principles of enlightenment. Of the enlightened absolute monarchy of
the period examples will be found in many of the chapters succeeding each other
in the present volume—from great historical figures like those of Catharine II
and Frederick II, and above all that of Joseph II, the true protagonist of the Aufklärung, to
lesser potentates or their Ministers—Charles III in Parma and the Two Sicilies, and his reforming Administration in Spain,
Leopold II, more especially as Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the Bernstorffs and the unfortunate Struensee in Denmark. But an age of despots, whether it be also an age of enlightenment
or not, must always exhibit both sides of the medal; and thus we find here, on
the obverse, a prince whose ambition it is, like that of Frederick the Great,
to be nothing more than the first servant of a State upon all of whose members
rests the same duty of self-devotion to the welfare of the whole; and on the
reverse—Sardanapalus in the shape of Louis XV. It was
Goethe, bom in the middle of the eighteenth century,
who drew this latter parallel, while at the same time reverencing no type of
humanity so highly as that of conscious beneficence to the world around it.
And, as the commentator who recalls these traits in Goethe reminds us, it was
he again who with unerring finger pointed to the most signal weaknesses in the
century from which he came forth—its contempt for true originality, its lack of
compassion for failure, and its impatience at the inevitably slow process of
historic growth.
In issuing the present volume at a rather later date than we had.
intended, we desire to tender an apology to those of our contributors who had
some time ago sent in the chapters written by them, and who may have been inconvenienced
by the delay in publication. In no instance had any of the contributions to
this volume reached us more punctually, or been prepared for publication with
greater care and completeness, than the three chapters written by the late Mr.
Robert Nisbet Bain, Assistant Librarian at the
British Museum, whose lamented death occurred after this Preface was already in
type. Mr Bain was one of the contributors selected by
Lord Acton at the inception of the
present work, as a historical writer who had few rivals in his intimacy with
the languages and the historical literature of northern and eastern Europe;
and, as our readers are aware, this History is deeply indebted to him for the
ample share he has taken in its production.
We wish to express our obligations to Mr. J. F. Chance, who, besides
contributing an important section with its bibliography, has permitted us the
free use of a comprehensive Bibliography compiled by him for the political
history of Europe during a considerable part of the period covered by this
volume. We have also to thank Mr H. G. Aldis, of Peterhouse and the
University Library, for the compilation of the Index and for other services
rendered in connexion with this volume, Miss A. D.
Greenwood for drawing up the Chronological Table, and Mr A. T. Bartholomew, of Peterhouse and the University
Library, for aid in the matter of the Bibliographies.
A. W. W.
G. W. P.
S. L.
May,
1909.
CHAPTER I. GREAT BRITAIN
UNDER GEORGE
(1)
The Hanoverian Succession By A. W. Ward
(2) The Foreign Policy of GeorGe I(1714-21.) By J. F. Chance
CHAPTER II. THE AGE OF WALPOLE AND THE PELHAMS.
By H. W. V. Temperley
CHAPTER III. JACOBITISM AND THE UNION.
By C. Sanford Terry
CHAPTER IV. THE BOURBON GOVERNMENTS IN FRANCE AND SPAIN. I. (1714-26.)By Edward
Armstrong
CHAPTER V. THE
BOURBON GOVERNMENTS IN FRANCE AND SPAIN. II. (1727-46.)By Edward Armstrong, M.A., F.B.A.
CHAPTER VI.
FINANCIAL
EXPERIMENTS AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT. By E. A. Benians
CHAPTER VII. POLAND UNDER THE SAXON KINGS. By the
late R. Nisbet Bain
CHAPTER VIII. THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.
(1) The Pragmatic Sanction. By C. T. Atkinson
(2) Prussia
under Frederick William I. By Dr Emil Daniels.
(3) The War. By C. T. Atkinson
CHAPTER IX. THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR. By Dr Emil Daniels.
CHAPTER X. RUSSIA UNDER ANNE AND ELIZABETH. By Nisbet Bain.
CHAPTER XI. THE REVERSAL OF ALLIANCES AND THE FAMILY COMPACT. By Jean Lemoine.
CHAPTER XII. SPAIN AND
PORTUGAL. (1746-94.) By the Rev. George Edmundson
(1) Spain
under Ferdinand VI and Charles III.
(2) Portugal. (1750-93.)
(3) Brazil. (Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.)
CHAPTER XIII. GREAT BRITAIN. (1756-93.)
(1) William Pitt the Elder.
(2) The King’s Friends.
By J. M. Rigg
(3) The
Years of Peace, and the Rise of the Younger Pitt. (1782-93.) By Martin J. Griffin
CHAPTER XIV. IRELAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By Robert Dunlop
CHAPTER XV. INDIA.
(1) The Moghul Empire.
(2) The English and French in
India. (1720-63.)
By P. E. Roberts
(3) Clive
and Wabren Hastings.
By P. E. Roberts.
CHAPTER XVI. ITALY AND THE PAPACY. By Mrs H. M. Vernon.
CHAPTER XVII. SWITZERLAND FROM THE TREATY OF AARAU TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.
CHAPTER XVIII. JOSEPH II. By Professor Eugene Hubert
CHAPTER XIX. CATHARINE
II. By Dr Otto Hotzsch,
CHAPTER XX. FREDERICK THE GREAT AND HIS SUCCESSOR.
(1) Home and Foreign Policy. (1763-97.) By Dr Emil Daniels.
(2) Poland
and Prussia. (1763-91.) By Professor Dr Otto Hotzsch.
CHAPTER XXI. DENMARK
UNDER THE BERNSTORFFS AND STRUENSEE. By
W. F. Reddaway
CHAPTER XXII. THE HATS AND CAPS AND GUSTAVUS III. (1721-92.) By Nisbet Bain.
CHAPTER XXIII. ENGLISH POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE SEVENTEENTH
AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES. By Arthur Lionel Smith
CHAPTER XXIV. THE
ROMANTIC MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN LITERATURE. By C. E. Vaughan
CHAPTER I.
GREAT BRITAIN UNDER
GEORGE I.
(1)
THE HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION.
Happily for England, the Hanoverian Succession was, so far
as the predominant partner in the Union was concerned, accomplished without
bloodshed; and, happily for the continental Powers of Europe, they were not
drawn into a direct settlement by arms of the question of the British
Succession, as they previously had been in the case of the Spanish, and
afterwards were in that of the Austrian. This result was by no means reached as
a matter of course, or in accordance with common expectation ; it was due to a
combination of causes, among which not the least effective lay in the sagacity
and self-control shown by the members of the House of Hanover in the crisis of
its fortunes.
Without again going over ground covered as part of English and European
history in a previous volume, it may be convenient to note briefly the
principal phases through which the question of the Hanoverian —or, as it may
from first to last be called with perfect propriety, that of the Protestant—Succession
in England passed, before, after long years of incubation, that Succession
became, with a suddenness more startling to contemporaries than to later
observers, an accomplished fact. This summary may furnish a suitable occasion
for recalling the personalities of those members of the Hanoverian dynasty who
were immediately concerned in the transactions preceding its actual occupation
of the English throne, and of some of the counsellors and agents with whose aid the goal of their labours was attained. And it may be permissible to add a word as to the antecedents of
a House about whose earlier history the English people knew little and cared
less, but which was never truer to its past than when it assumed the
inheritance of a great future.
In the critical year 1688 Sophia, the youngest daughter of the Princess
Elizabeth of England who during the long years of her exile continued to call
herself Queen of Bohemia, was fifty-eight years of age; she was thus senior by
eight years to Louis XIV, whom accordingly she
was, as she says, always accustomed to regard as “a young man.” She had been
married for thirty years to Ernest Augustus, the youngest of the four brother
Dukes who in their generation represented the Luneburg branch of the House of
Brunswick, and whose territories included Luneburg-Celle and Calenberg-Gottingen. In 1662 Ernest Augustus, in accordance
with the alternating arrangement made in the Peace of Westphalia, became Bishop
of Osnabruck, and in 1679 he succeeded to the rule of the principality of Calenberg (Hanover). His and Sophia’s eldest son, George
Lewis (afterwards King George I) was in 1688 a man of twenty-eight years of
age, to whom a son, George Augustus (afterwards George II) and a daughter
(afterwards Queen of Prussia) had already been bern.
Besides George Lewis, five younger sons and a daughter (Sophia Charlotte,
afterwards the first Queen of Prussia) were living to Sophia and her husband in
1688. Thus her family was numerous; nor were her husband’s prospects of
territorial dominion less promising.
The historic grandeur of the House of Guelf dates from a very remote
past; and the laborious investigation of its antiquities which at this very
time was being commenced by Leibniz (though, so far as is known, this was the
only research conducted by him which ever engaged the attention of the future
George I) could have possessed only a very academic interest for Englishmen.
What had been left of the vast possessions of Henry the Lion, or had been added
to the remnant by his descendants, had been partitioned and repartitioned by
them on innumerable occasions. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the
efforts of the Princes of the House of Guelf had raised it to a position of
importance and influence at least equal to that of any other princely family in
northern Germany; but the two main, or Brunswick and Luneburg, branches, which
had separated in the thirteenth century, were never actually reunited, and even
the dominions of the Luneburg branch were never united as a single inheritance.
Although of the five elder brothers of Duke George, who in the latter part of
the Thirty Years’ War so signally asserted the position of his House, four in
succession held undivided sway over the territories which formed their joint
inheritance, on his death in 1641 his will established an exception to the
principles of unity of government as well as of indivisibility of territory
formerly observed by the Luneburg Dukes. Calenberg (Hanover), where he had ruled independently of his brothers since 1636, was to
remain separated from the more important Luneburg-Celle; while the principle of
primogeniture was only to be applied so far as to give the eldest brother the
right of choice between the two divisions. In obedience to this rule, the
eldest of Duke George’s four sons, Christian Lewis, after first holding sway at
Hanover, succeeded his uncle Frederick at Celle in 1648. On his death, without
children, in 1665, the second brother, George William, who had ruled at
Hanover, succeeded to Celle, where he
carried on the government till his own death in 1705, having been followed at
Hanover by his younger brother John Frederick (Leibniz’ Roman Catholic patron),
who ruled there till he died, leaving only two daughters, in 1679. In that year
came the turn of the youngest brother, Ernest Augustus, the Bishop of
Osnabruck, Sophia’s husband, who now succeeded at Hanover, from which his line
took the name generally used in England.
But before this long-delayed rise took place in the fortunes of the pair,
a more important advance had been prepared. Ernest Augustus’ elder brother
George William (who had himself been at one time affianced to Sophia, then a
poor Palatine princess at her brother’s Court in Heidelberg) had long since
gone back from his undertaking to remain unmarried during the lifetime of
Ernest Augustus and his consort, and thus to secure to them or their offspring
the succession in Celle. In 1676 he married the daughter of a Poitevin nobleman, Eleonora d’Olbreuse, who had already borne to him several children.
Only the eldest of these, Sophia Dorothea, who had been legitimised five years before her mother’s marriage, survived; and the right of any issue
from that marriage to succeed to George William’s inheritance during the
survival of any descendant of Ernest Augustus was expressly barred. But the
marriage of Sophia Dorothea to Ernest Augustus’ eldest son, George Lewis, in
1682, followed by the birth in 1683 and 1687 of the two children already
mentioned, furnished a final safeguard that the union of Celle-Luneburg and Calenberg-Gottingen would ultimately be carried out. And
thus in 1683 the imperial sanction was obtained for the testament “ set up ” by
Ernest Augustus (i.e. promulgated by
him in his lifetime), which established in all the dominions of the line the
twofold principle of indivisibility and succession by primogeniture.
The marriage of George Lewis and Sophia ended in infidelity on both sides
and in a sentence of divorce (1694); and the rest of her life (which lasted
thirty-three years longer) was spent by the unhappy Princess in custody at Ahlden. The proclamation of primogeniture was bitterly
resented by the younger sons of Duke Ernest Augustus, and one of them, Prince
Maximilian, contrived a plot (with some dangerous ramifications), on the discovery
of which (1691) he was exiled, and his chief agent put to death. But the unity
of the dominions of the Brans wick-Luneburg line was now assured, and, although
it was not actually accomplished till the death of George William of Celle in
1705, a sufficient basis had been secured for the protracted efforts of Ernest
Augustus to bring about his recognition as an Elector of the Empire. In
December, 1692, he actually obtained investiture as such from the Emperor; but
his admission into the Electoral College took sixteen more years of
negotiation; so that it was not till 1708 that George Lewis, who had succeeded
to his father ten years before, reached this consummation.
The electoral investiture accorded to the House of Brunswick-Luneburg was
the avowed reward of the services which it had rendered to the Empire and the
House of Austria during the whole of the period between the Peace of Westphalia
and the crisis of 1688. In the early part of this period the foreign policy of
that House was chiefly intent upon preventing France and Sweden from breaking
through the limits within which the Peace of Westphalia had sought to confine
them. The Triple Alliance (1668) in some measure shifted the relations between
the leading European Powers; and, for a time, the goodwill of the
Brunswick-Luneburg Dukes was solicited—and not by means of fair words only—by
both France and her adversaries. But, in 1672, the policy of George William of
Celle was, by the advice of his Minister von Schutz, definitively emancipated
from French influence; and both he and his brother Ernest Augustus were now
gradually gained over to the political system devised by George Frederick of Waldeck and adopted by William of Orange. A loyal adherence
to the House of Austria was henceforth the guiding principle of the policy
consistently pursued by the two brothers, and by Ernest Augustus’ son and
grandson, both before and after the accession of the former of these to the
English throne, and was handed down by a series of trusted advisers, from the
elder Schutz to his son-in-law Andreas Gottlieb von BernstorfF,
and from Bernstorff to Munchhausen.
The Treaty of 1674, by which all the Brunswick-Luneburg Dukes except John
Frederick of Hanover (whose death, five years later, ended this schism in the
politics of the House) joined the coalition against France, bound them to
furnish 15,000 men, in addition to 2000 maintained at their own cost, in return
for subsidies paid by the States General, Spain and the Emperor; and in August,
1675, the Brunswick-Lunburgers under their Princes
gained the brilliant victory of the Bridge of Conz.
They then returned home to protect the dominions of the House against the
Swedes; but of this enemy a sufficient account was given by the Great Elector
of Brandenburg, between whose dynasty and its Brunswick-Luneburg kinsmen
relations of intimacy and of jealousy alternated in rapid succession. When,
after the Peace of Nymegen (1679), the chief anxiety
of the House of Austria was the Turkish peril, Prince George Lewis and the
Hanoverian Life-guards rendered important service at the siege of Vienna
(September, 1683), and he and four of his brothers took an active part in
several campaigns against the Turks (the importance of which for the Empire has
often been underrated) both in Hungary, where in 1685 George Lewis particularly
distinguished himself at the taking of Neuhausel, and
in the Morea; two of the Princes laid down their
lives in these conflicts. When, partly in consequence of the Imperialist
successes in the East, the armies of France invaded the Empire in the West,
Celle and Hanover joined in the Magdeburg Conference (October, 1688), and
contributed to the forces which
secured the middle Rhine 8000 men under the command of Ernest Augustus, George
Lewis taking an active part in the operations.
Such was, in bare outline, what may be called the political record of the
House of Hanover at the time of the English Revolutionary settlement of 1688-9.
Curiously enough, the House which had rendered and was prepared to render
excellent service in the struggle against the political predominance of
France—of which struggle the accession of William and Mary might justly be
called an incident—was in the persons of its reigning Dukes ardently attached
to French modes of life and thought. By a combination of military discipline
with an easygoing freedom of thought they had been trained to habits of mind
in better accord with the conditions of benevolent despotism than with those of
a steady regard for constitutional rights and liberties. These tendencies were
united to a love of social dissipations of which Venice, a favourite resort of the Brunswick-Luneburg Dukes, long remained the most fashionable
scene; but George Lewis, though, like his father and uncle before him, a lover
of licence, was from first to last as little French
in his tastes as he was in his politics; and his wife’s French blood did not
tend to soften his antipathy to her nationality. The descendant of the
Stewarts, through whom the House of Hanover had become connected with the royal
family of England, differed entirely in her intellectual tastes and principles
of conduct from her husband and her eldest son, but she was not less alien to
the principles than they to the ideals and usages of recent English politics.
Accustomed at once to a free view of life and to a frank and cheerful
acceptance of its responsibilities, high-spirited and courageous, but in
nothing more shrewd than in her self-knowledge, the Electress Sophia (as she
was already called) was, like her sister Elizabeth and her brother Charles
Lewis, Elector Palatine, the friend of philosophers—and at least in so far
herself a philosopher that she could shape her course according to principles
transparently clear and definite, and sufficient to enable her to meet with unbroken
serenity the varied troubles of more than fourscore years. Inasmuch as throughout
her life the question of the form of religious faith professed by princes as
well as by peoples was still a very important factor in politics, it seems
strange that neither then nor afterwards should the
confessional position of the House of Hanover have been very clearly understood
in England. The Electress Sophia (though as a child she had been accustomed to
attend the services of the Church of England at her mother’s Court) had been
brought up as a Calvinist, and adhered through life, in no half-hearted way, to
that “ religion ”; but the Elector and his family were steady Lutherans.
Neither in them, nor most certainly in her, was there a trace of bigotry or
intolerance; and, while detestation of Popery was part of her nature as well as
of her training, she not only was quite ready to do what was expected of her in
the way of Protestant conformity, but sympathised cordially with those schemes of religious reunion
which were among the noblest aspirations of the greatest minds of the age—of
Leibniz above all.
As there was a great deal of piety in Sophia’s heart, she could not but
take as she did a continuous interest both in the dynasty from which her mother
sprang and in the country with which its connexion remained unsevered. In her girlhood there had been
some passing talk of her becoming the bride of the banished Charles II; and, in
1681, the design of marrying her eldest son to Princess Anne of England was
approved by William of Orange, though it does not seem to have been favoured by Sophia herself. As it came to nothing, George
Lewis was not to anticipate Monmouth as a Protestant candidate for the English
throne. When the Revolution of 1688 was at hand, Ernest Augustus displayed no
eagerness such as was shown by most of the German Protestant Princes, including
his own elder brother and notably the Elector of Brandenburg, to associate
himself with the English project of William of Orange; and his consort
manifested sympathy with her kinsman James II, though the statement that she
supported his appeal to the Emperor for mediation cannot be proved. At no time
would she listen to the doubts cast upon the genuineness of the birth of the
Prince of Wales. But her own position in the matter of the succession to the
English throne she neither did nor could ignore. When the Declaration of Right,
which settled the Crown, after William and Mary, upon the posterity of Mary,
then on Anne and her posterity, and then on the posterity of William was, in
1689, turned into the Bill of Rights, the additional proviso was inserted that
no person in connexion with the Church of Rome or
married to a member of it should be capable of inheriting or possessing the
Crown. By this clause, it has been calculated, the eventual claims to the
succession of nearly threescore persons were taken away. In the Lords, Bishop
Burnet by the King’s desire proposed, and carried without opposition, an
amendment naming the Duchess Sophia and her descendants as next in the
succession; but it was rejected in the Commons, on the ground of its injustice
to claimants nearer in descent who might have become Protestants in the
interval. As a matter of fact, the birth of the Duke of Gloucester in the midst
of the discussion (July 24, 1689) removed one reason for pressing on the
amendment; but, whatever the reason why the Government gave way, Sophia’s name
was not mentioned in the Bill or in the Scottish Claim of Rights. The whole
transaction had, as she warmly acknowledged, revealed the goodwill of King
William towards the Hanoverian Succession, and this goodwill he steadily
maintained. He cannot, as has been supposed, have seriously favoured the pretensions of the House of Savoy-Carignan, in
the absence of any assurance of a change of religion in that quarter; and in
any case those pretensions would have been relegated into limbo, when, in 1696,
Savoy deserted the Grand Alliance.
1689-1707]
George Lewis and the English Succession.
In general it may be said that the policy of the House of Hanover as to
the Succession in the years which ensued was one of waiting—patiently on the
part of the Electress Sophia, and with something very like indifference on the
part of her son. Her consciousness of the uncertainties of fortune at her time
of life suffices to account for her tranquillity;
George Lewis never cared to conceal his dislike of the possibilities before
him, though he would at any time have made it give way to his sense of duty
towards his dynasty. The English throne seemed to many of his contemporaries
the most uncertain of royal seats, and the English nation the very exemplar of
mutability. Though a British envoy extraordinary was from 1689 accredited to
Hanover and Celle among other north German Courts, that of Hanover was during
the last decade of the century almost absorbed in its own intimate troubles and
immediate ambitions. The electoral dignity, which as has been seen was not
acknowledged by the Electors of the Empire at large before two of them—Saxony
and Brandenburg—had each compassed a royal crown, had been secured from the
Emperor by means of the Kurtractat of 1692, by which
the new Elector undertook to furnish a force of 6000 men for service against
the Turks, and, should this be no longer required, against the French, as well
as to support the Habsburg interest both in coming imperial elections and in
the matter of the Spanish Succession. It may be truly said that George Lewis
was as cordially interested in what his dynasty gave as in what it took; and
even the additional importance which the prospect of the English Succession
gave to his House he would seem to have chiefly valued because it enabled him
to take a prominent part in military operations. After he had succeeded his
father at Hanover in 1698, not only did he and his uncle at Celle join the
Grand Alliance reknit by William III, but they obliged their kinsmen at Wolfenbuttel
to throw up their alliance with France. When the War of the Spanish Succession
broke out, Hanover and Celle placed under Marlborough’s command more than
10,000 troops, which fought with distinction at Blenheim and elsewhere, though
(as the Electress Sophia complained) no notice was taken of them in the
gazettes; and, after George Lewis had (in 1705) become ruler of the entire
dominions of his House, he asserted himself by strongly opposing the first
suggestions of a pacification (1706); and his most cherished ambition was
fulfilled when (1707) he was appointed to the command of the army of the Rhine.
It was his misfortune, not his fault, that in this position he was unable to
accomplish any military results of much importance.
Meanwhile, in England the death of Queen Mary (1694) could hardly fail to
bring the Succession question forward again. In 1696, the Brandenburg scheme of
a marriage between Princess Louisa Dorothea and King William III had come to
nothing; and, in 1698, he paid a visit to Celle and its neighbourhood,
during which his conversations with the (now
Dowager) Electress Sophia and her clever sister-in-law at Celle beyond a doubt
revived his interest in the Hanoverian Succession. But neither he nor English
politicians had just then much time to occupy themselves with the question,
which only became one of general interest when the death of the young Duke of
Gloucester (August 7, 1700) left no life between the Electress Sophia and the
throne but that of Queen Anne herself.
In the course of the autumn the Electress Sophia paid a visit to King
William at the Loo, in which she was accompanied by her daughter the Electress
of Brandenburg and her grandson the young Electoral Prince (afterwards King
Frederick William I of Prussia). Curiously enough, the idea seems to have
crossed King William’s mind of placing this young Prince (whose father had
claims upon the King’s own inheritance as Prince of Orange) in the position
left vacant by the Duke of Gloucester—though, as is pointed out by Onslow, he
never had it in his power to nominate any one to the English throne; and the
Brandenburg (soon to become the Prussian) Court was quite awake to what, as it
seemed, might happen. So late as 1699 the Elector Frederick Ill’s sagacious
Minister Fuchs was pressing his master “to aim at the English throne.” The
episode is curious; but there is no reason for assuming, either that a letter
written by the Electress Sophia to Stepney shortly
before her visit to the Loo was really “Jacobite” in
intention, or that at their meeting the Electress, by opposing the wishes of
William III, led him to turn his thoughts to the rival electoral House.
Already in January, 1701, it was known that a new Act of Settlement
would be proposed by the Crown to Parliament, in which the Electress Sophia and
her descendants would be named; and, notwithstanding the rumours of intrigues in which Marlhorough was believed to be
involved, an excessive display of zeal on the part of the indefatigable
Leibniz, and a protest on behalf of Duchess Anna Maria of Savoy, the Act which
in default of issue of the Princess Anne or King William settled the English
Crown upon “the most excellent Princess Sophia and the heirs of her body, being
Protestants,” on June 12,1701, received the royal assent. On August 14, the
Earl of Macclesfield, with the voluble Toland in his train, arrived at Hanover, to present a copy
of the Act of Succession to the Electress, and to bring the Garter to the
Elector. They were treated with much honour, but more
significant is the fact, long concealed, that the Committee of the Calenberg Estates secretly furnished the Hanoverian
legation in London with a sum of 300,000 dollars for any unforeseen emergency.
At an interview which King William immediately afterwards had at the Loo with
George William of Celle, he promised to try to obtain an annual income for the
Electress from Parliament, and to invite her and the Electoral Prince to
England in the coming spring.
That spring William III never saw, and during the whole of his successor’s reign no part of the obviously
appropriate arrangement suggested by him was carried out. In the last days of
August, 1701, the new Grand Alliance against France was concluded; and a few
days later, by the deathbed of King James II, his son was recognised by Louis XIV as successor to the English Crown. The “indignity” (the word is
Bentley’s) filled all England with wrath; and, beyond all doubt, the
magnanimous action of Louis XIV helped to bring about, if it did not actually
cause, the insertion in the final form of the instrument of the Grand Alliance
a provision binding the contracting Powers not to conclude peace with France
until the King of England should have received satisfaction for the grave
insult implied in the recognition by the King of France of the “ pretended
Prince of Wales ” as his father’s successor on the English throne. The War of
the Spanish Succession thus, in a sense, became a war of the English Succession
also; and, though during its earlier years the victories of the Allies added,
as it has been happily expressed, a guarantee of their own, no sooner were
conditions of peace under discussion than this clause could not but again come
to the front. Those interested in the Hanoverian Succession could then hardly
fail to ask themselves in what way it would be advanced— or peradventure
endangered—by the conditions proposed for the peace itself. Meanwhile, in
January, 1702, was passed, together with an Act attainting the Pretender, the
Abjuration Act, which made it obligatory to abjure him and to swear fidelity to
the King and his heirs according to the Act of Settlement. Somewhat ominously,
the clause making this oath obligatory was carried in the Commons only by a
single vote.
Shortly afterwards (March 8) King William died; and a period, in some
respects obscure, began in the history of the Hanoverian Succession, which
extended over thirteen further weary years. But this obscurity was due neither
to the conduct of the heiress presumptive of the English throne nor to that of
her son. The Electress Sophia continued to remain true to herself and to the
line of conduct which her judgment had marked out for her, in her conduct
towards the English Crown and Parliament, and in her daily intercourse with
friends and well-wishers, sincere or insincere. Occasionally her tranquil
interest in a drama of which she scarcely expected to see the denouement was
quickened into some measure of precaution, as when (in June, 1703) she signed
three forms for the Hanoverian envoy extraordinary in London (Baron Ludwig
Justus von Sehutz), authorising him to claim the throne on her behalf in the event of the Queen’s death; but,
while she at no time concealed her conviction as to what would be the
appropriate way of recognising her position, she made
no demand, and still less allowed herself to be seduced into manoeuvres or intrigues with any English party or
individual politician. Her eldest son only gradually, and never quite
completely, suppressed his reluctance to move in the matter; but, while plainly
resolved to do nothing prematurely, he was as a matter of duty towards the interests of his House and of the
Empire resolved to use all due means of preparing and, when the time came, of
asserting a claim not of his own seeking, but now interwoven with the whole
political situation of Europe in which he had become an important factor. That
he now saw matters in this way was largely due to Andreas Gottlieb von Bernstorff,
since 1705 (on the death of George William of Celle, whose affairs he had
directed for more than a quarter of a century) George Lewis’ chief political
adviser (with the title of Prime Minister from 1709), and his confidential
adviser long after the Elector’s accession to the English throne, until his own
political downfall in 1720. Bemstorff’s training was
that of a territorial or particularist statesman; and
in the earlier part of his career his jealousy of the Danish and more
especially of the Brandenburg Government seemed to be the guiding principle of
his policy. These tendencies, and his personal connexion with Mecklenburg, he never forgot or repressed; but he had a great grasp of
affairs as well as singular acuteness of insight; and the charges of venality
brought against him were largely if not wholly attributable to spite. Of the
policy which he in a great measure inspired more will be said hereafter.
The darkness in which the progress of the Succession question in these
years is shrouded is, of course, mainly caused by the insincere and tortuous
conduct of Queen Anne, her Ministers and the political parties out of whose
jealousies and ambitions the inner history of the reign evolved itself. Their
proceedings, and the motives by which they must be concluded to have been
actuated, have been discussed, in their relation to the fallen Stewarts and to
the general progress of affairs in other passages of this work; here it only
remains to note their direct bearing upon the Succession which according to Act
of Parliament was to follow, should the Queen die without leaving any
descendants of her own.
Queen Anne—no longer hopeful of issue, and from October, 1708, a
widow—very naturally felt a certain measure of sympathy for her half-brother as
to the genuineness of whose birth she had at first been so demonstratively sceptical. But the really dominant motive of her behaviour (a few unavoidable civilities apart) in the
matter of the Hanoverian Succession, was a deep, not to say a superstitious,
aversion from the whole topic and its associations. In the earlier years of her
reign she did nothing in recognition of the “ Princess Sophia’s ” claims beyond
ordering the insertion of her name in the liturgy. She would at no time hear of
carrying out King William’s intention of inviting the Electress Sophia and the
Electoral Prince to England, or grant a specific title to the former; nor would
she approve of an annual income for the heiress to the Crown sanctioned by
Parliament. Sophia on the other hand declined to entertain the idea of a
private allowance from the Civil List, which would merely oblige her to
surround herself with expensive English servants. The Electoral Prince was
created Duke of Cambridge, and Knight of the Garter like his father—and that
was all. Coolness thus came to be returned for coolness; and it
was only in the last four years of the Queen’s reign that the relations between
her and the old Electress assumed a friendlier aspect—till at last the
explosion came.
With the English political leaders and factions the Electress and, till
nearly the last, her son forbore from entering into intimate relations. To
Marlborough they were alike attracted, and he was always ready with judicious
advice; but he was not the man to mortgage his future by identifying himself
with either side, more especially so long as he was the first man in the State
and controlled the action of the Queen. But on the other side there was equal
caution. At what date he offered to the House of Hanover a loan of £20,000, in
return for a blank commission signed by the Electress confirming him in the
command of both army and navy, is uncertain ; on the other hand, when in 1710
it was expected that the new Ministers proposed to offer the chief command in
the field to George Lewis in Marlborough’s place, the Elector had,
notwithstanding his military ambition, made up his mind to decline it.
Godolphin was less accessible; he was always suspected of partiality for the
House of Stewart, with which he is known to have been in communication ; and
for the royal assent to the Scottish Act of Security (1704), which seriously
endangered the Hanoverian Succession beyond the Border, he was mainly
responsible. The Whigs proper could not but consistently maintain the
principle of the Hanoverian Succession except in a moment of factious
aberration (Sophia said that they would always be for it “ so long as it suited
their purpose ”); but it was not till a discontinuance of the War became an
integral part of the Ministerial policy that the Elector began to take special
thought of securing the support of the party in the matter of the Succession.
To the Tories—whether or not of the so-called “Hanover” section which upheld
the Succession—the behaviour of both the Electress
and the Elector always remained frank and courteous; and even the duplicity of
the game played, first by Oxford and then more persistently and for a time more
audaciously by Bolingbroke, though perfectly well known to Sophia and to her
son, was met by them with an unruffled front.
Thus, the main incidents in the history of the Succession in Queen Anne’s
reign may be very rapidly reviewed. In 1704-5, when party relations in England
were much confused, and Buckingham and Rochester were in correspondence with
the Electress Sophia, the “High-flier” section of the Tories, headed by
Rochester, sought to assert their power by means of an address urging that the
Electress should be invited to take up her residence in England. The address
was thrown out in the Lords (November, 1705), the Whigs voting against it; but
their leaders adroitly seized the occasion to introduce two Bills, which
signified a real step forward in the interests of the Hanoverian Succession—the Naturalisation Bill, which made an Englishwoman of
the heiress to the throne, and the Regency Bill, which empowered her to appoint
twenty-one
Lords Justices, who, in addition to the great officers of the Crown, were
to carry on the government of the country in the event of her absence from it
at the time of the Queen’s death. The Earl of Halifax was appointed to announce
the passing of these Bills at Hanover; but it cannot have been very agreeable
to his personal feelings that the Electress struck his name with six others out
of the list submitted to her, or acceptable to his Whig principles that she
insisted to him on the hereditary character of her right to the throne.
In 1708, when the death of Prince George of Denmark had removed the last
possibility of further issue from the Queen, the Whigs were fully established
in power; but the Electress was by no means thrown off her balance by the
enthusiasm of her Whig visitors at Herrenhausen, and
the Elector was much out of humour at the lack of
confidence shown to him in connexion with the conduct
of the War. But a more critical period soon drew near, and it was not without
reason that the Elector went out of his way to remonstrate with Queen Anne on
the Ministerial changes reported as imminent in the early part of 1710. After
these changes had been actually accomplished, Earl Rivers was sent to Hanover
by the Queen to explain her view of them, and made a favourable impression. In December the Electoral Prince was installed Knight of the Garter
by proxy—somewhat tardily, as he had been invested with the insignia of the
Order some four years earlier. In 1710—a few months before, in May, 1711,
Harley became Lord Treasurer with the title of Earl of Oxford—Hans Caspar von Bothmer, Hanoverian Minister plenipotentiary at the Hague,
arrived at the Court of St James, to take the place of the envoy Schutz (who
had died in the previous February). Bothmer, who was
more directly and effectively instrumental than any other man in bringing about
the Hanoverian Succession, had, like Bernstorff, been originally in the service
of George William of Celle, and had when Minister at the imperial Court been
sent as a plenipotentiary to the Peace of Ryswyk. He
had acquired the complete confidence of the electoral family and of the
Electress Sophia in particular, whose letters show her appreciation of his
great ability, except as the executant of feminine commissions. He had been
active in the electoral interest already at the Hague whither he returned for
part of 1711; and both here and in London, which he again quitted for a time to
act as plenipotentiary at Utrecht, he laboured incessantly in the main task of his life. He failed indeed to secure the
goodwill of the Queen, to whom his very presence was a memento of the future to
which she desired to shut her eyes, or of her Ministers—Bolingbroke declared
that, notwithstanding his air of coldness and caution, he was “ the most
inveterate party-man ” of his day—but he was praised by the Electress for being
on friendly terms with both parties, without compromising himself with either.
His management of the funds placed at his disposal appears to have been
discreet and well-proportioned; some peers were to be had cheap. When the crisis came, he rose to the full height
of the situation, and for a moment commanded it, assuming even such a
responsibility as that of the destruction of the Queen’s private little packet
of papers. When all was happily over, and his services had been acknowledged by
his being made a Count of the Empire, he remained for some time in active
service, retaining his post of the Elector’s Minister to the Court where the
Elector was now King. But as the influence of Bernstorff rose to its height
that of Bothmer, whose views began to diverge from
his, waned, and he supported Stanhope against Bemstorff in some of the transactions which preceded the fall of the latter in 1720—a
fact which shows the term “Hanoverian Junta” to be hardly more accurate than
the expression “Stanhope’s German Ministry.” Bothmer died in 1732, leaving large estates in Mecklenburg.
Bothmer had made it clear from the first that in matters of European policy, and
in the question of war or peace with France in particular, his master was by no
means disposed to fell in tamely with the system of the Queen and her
Ministers. Already, when, in the autumn of 1711, Rivers paid a second visit to
Hanover, and his customary assurances of the Queen’s benevolent intentions were
met by the Electress with the observation that it seemed to her quite natural
that “ the Queen should be more in favour of her
brother than of us,” the real object of his mission broke down on the Elector’s
steady refusal to declare himself in favour of the
British overtures of peace to France. In November, 1711, Bothmer,
who had returned to London with fresh credentials, brought with him a
memorandum against the conclusion of peace which in England was ascribed to
Whig influence, but which as a matter of fact developed principles of action of
far more importance to the Elector than the interests of any English
party-principles, and from his point of view dominating the question of the
Succession itself. Both sides were now competing for the goodwill of the
electoral House. When, in January, 1712, the Whigs through the Duke of
Devonshire proposed to give the Duke of Cambridge precedence over other peers,
the Ministry at once overbid them by rapidly carrying an Act securing
precedence to the entire electoral family. Oxford sent his kinsman Thomas
Harley to Hanover to present a copy of this Act, and to utilise the opportunity for laying, if possible, the belligerent spirit which possessed
the Elector. But Bothmer still pressed his master’s
point of view, presenting a letter from him to the Queen on February 14.
At Utrecht, whither Bothmer soon repaired to
watch the progress of the peace negotiations, the policy of the Elector was in
many respects deliberately calculated to thwart that of the English Ministry.
More significant, however, than even his wish to continue the Dutch Barrier
Treaty and to promote a good understanding between the Dutch and imperial
Governments, was the order given by him to General von B'ulow,
the commander of his contingent in the Low Countries, to pass from under the command of Ormond,
Marlborough’s successor, and to unite with the imperial troops under Prince
Eugene, on the day on which Ormond should conclude a truce with the French
(July). There was no difference of opinion as to the mention in the Treaty of
Peace of the Hanoverian Succession; but the addition, suggested by Leibniz, of
a clause securing to the Elector and one or more members of his family a residence
and annual income in England, was never seriously entertained. As an Estate of
the Empire the Elector of course withheld his signature from the Peace.
After Bothmer’s recall Baron Thomas von Grote,
who belonged to a family distinguished in the service of the Elector’s House,
was sent to London (December, 1712). His instructions were drawn up by Jean de Robethon, a Hanoverian official of French Huguenot descent,
who has been justly described as the very soul of George I’s diplomatic
chancery, and who continued in favour so long as Bernstorff
maintained his ascendancy in the counsels of his Prince. Grote carried with
him, besides elaborate instructions from both Elector and Electress, lists of
the best friends of the House of Hanover in England, most of whom were Whigs;
but he was also told to make friends with the clergy. He found no opportunity
of urging the establishment for the Electress, the provision of which would
have furnished the best proof of the sincerity of the Queen’s and Oxford’s
professions, and in February, 1713, sent home to Hanover a very gloomy account
of the situation. The hopes of the friends of the Succession in England were,
for reasons which it is not very easy to assign, once more sinking. It is idle
to ascribe the fact to the “unpopularity” of a House practically unknown to all
but a few English men and women. The Electress had offended nobody, and, so
long as the War had continued, the Elector had been a faithful and a zealous
ally. But it was the time when both Oxford and Bolingbroke, whose mutual
rivalry was becoming more intense, were seeking to intrigue with Berwick and
the Jacobites at Paris, and trying to accommodate
their attitude at home to the wishes of the Queen, which seemed by no means to
point towards Hanover; Bolingbroke not only going further than Oxford in his
overtures to the Jacobites, but occasionally treating
the Elector’s envoy with insolent brusqueness. In March, 1713, Grote died; and
in the same month Oxford, who could never continue long without trimming, appears
to have sent his useful kinsman to make the customary meaningless declarations
at Hanover. The Whigs were anxious that the Elector should force the situation,
and at the same time exercise an influence upon the elections that were to
follow on the dissolution of Parliament in July, by sending over a member of
his family, preferably the Electoral Prince, who in the new Parliament would as
a matter of course take his seat in the Lords. Bothmer favoured the step, but Bernstorff was unluckily ill,
and in his absence the Elector decided against sending his son—whom for reasons which have been guessed but cannot be
determined he cordially detested. Thus, though Parliament was duly dissolved in
July—the Queen in her closing speech ominously omitting the usual friendly
reference to the Hanoverian Succession—nothing was done; while the Whigs were
so enraged at the conduct of the Ministry as to be ready to tamper with the
Union with Scotland, provided nothing else could be done to secure the
Hanoverian Succession in that kingdom. Thus matters stood, when in September,
1713, Baron Georg Wilhelm Helvig von Sch'dtz (a nephew of Bemstorff)
arrived in London as Hanoverian envoy. It may be noted that he was expressly
instructed to abstain from any sort of interference in British affairs.
The new Parliament assembled (February, 1714) without either any
representative of the Hanoverian family, or (as Berwick had suggested) the
Pretender, putting in an appearance. But the situation had become more strained
than ever, more especially when, in the last days of 1713, the Queen had fallen
ill. Had things then come to a crisis, it would, owing to the great age of the
Electress, and the unwillingness of the Elector to take a step in advance, have
found the Whigs and the friends of the Succession at large ill prepared to meet
it. Their best security lay in the fact of Oxford and Bolingbroke’s perfectly
clear perception that, while it would at any time have been impossible to
persuade the Queen to summon the Pretender to London, it would have been
madness to bring him into England from Scotland; and that, so long as he
refused to cease to be a Roman Catholic, he had no chance of the English
throne. On the other hand, Bolingbroke was convinced that a German Prince such
as George Lewis could never permanently occupy the English throne. But, now
that the chance had gone by, Oxford lost himself in renewed duplicities which
revealed only too clearly his uncertainty of mind. At one moment, he proposed
to alter the Regency Act, so as to give to the Electress Sophia the nomination
of the entire body of Regents—which would have enabled Parliament, if so
disposed, to rescind the Act altogether. At another, he invited Parliament to
declare it treasonable to introduce foreign troops into the country—a
prohibition which might, have been worked either against the Pretender or
against the House of Hanover. Thus the feeling that Ministers were allowing
things to drift—possibly into disturbance and civil war—operated in favour of the only interest in which there was certainty of
purpose; and in the early months of 1714 Tories as well as Whigs, clergy as
well as laity, began to lay themselves at the feet of the electoral House.
Though in the new House of Commons the Tories outnumbered the Whigs by at least
two to one, a large section of the former party, the so-called “ Hanover
Tories,” had made up their minds in favour of the
Protestant Succession. In April, Oxford himself thought it well to make another
of his “hedging” movements; and Thomas Harley appeared at Hanover once more,
with a bland enquiry on the part of the Queen as to whether anything could be done to further the Hanover Succession, arid
the old offer of a private pension for the Electress; but without a word as to
a member of the electoral family coming to England. Harley brought back with
him a reply, dated May 7, pointing out the desirableness of a parliamentary
income for the Electress, and of the sojourn in England of a member of the
electoral family (the Electoral Prince being probably intended).
In the meantime it became known that the action of the Elector’s Minister
in London had with quite unexpected suddenness transformed the situation. In
the ordinary course of things the Electoral Prince would as Duke of Cambridge
have received his writ of summons to attend the House of Lords like any other
English peer; but Lord Chancellor Harcourt, being like his Ministerial
colleagues afraid of nothing so much as of offending the Queen, had
indefinitely delayed its issue. Schiitz had become very uneasy, when he
received a letter from the old Electress requesting him to inform the Lord
Chancellor of the great astonishment at Hanover caused by the fact that the
writ had not yet been sent to the Prince. “ As he (the Lord Chancellor) has
always been friendly to me.. .1 think that he will not consider it
objectionable que vous le
ltd demandiez et la raison.” Schiitz could hardly
conclude otherwise than that he was desired to demand the writ as well as the
reason for its having been withheld; and the Whig leaders, to, whom he showed
the Electress’ letter, took the same view. He therefore asked for the writ from
the Lord Chancellor, who replied that it was quite ready, but that, the custom
not being for peers to demand their writs except when present in London, he
would mention the matter to the Queen.
When, on April 26, Schiitz made it known that he had carried out the
instructions of the Electress, the effect was electrical. Marlborough,
Townshend, and Cadogan expressed their delight at the
envoy’s action; Bothmer wrote from the Hague in the
same strain; and at Hanover, where Leibniz’ exultation was unbounded, it was
thought that the opportunity should be seized, and the Electoral Prince sent to
London at once. But the Elector demurred—most fortunately, for Queen Anne was
deeply angered at the action of his envoy. At first she was for refusing the
writ, and Bolingbroke dared to be of the same opinion. But the Cabinet decided
that the demand could not be refused, and on April 27 the writ was handed to
Schiitz by the Chancellor. The envoy was, however, speedily advised by Oxford
not to show himself at Court, and was soon formally prohibited from appearing
there. On May 2 he took his departure, leaving the Resident, Kreyenberg, to carry on diplomatic business. On Schiitz’
arrival at Hanover the Elector, in pretended displeasure, refused to receive
him, and told Thomas Harley who was on the eve of returning to London that the
envoy had acted without orders from his sovereign.
The Elector and his mother, had they really been afraid of any action on
the part of the Queen, would not have despatched to
her by Thomas Harley
the very outspoken memorandum of May 7 mentioned above; and the Electress’
account of the whole matter to Leibniz was perfectly cool. But the letters in
which Queen Anne—or Bolingbroke, who held her pen—expressed her annoyance to
the Electress, the Elector, and the Electoral Prince, were—especially the
first-named—couched in terms of intolerable arrogance and violent menace. When
they were, with the exception of the letter to the Elector, surreptitiously
published by a Whig scribe (whom Bolingbroke immediately clapped into prison)
the mistake made by the Queen was at once patent; and Oxford seems at once to
have ceased intriguing for the Stewart cause and to have begun protesting at
Hanover. Bolingbroke could think of nothing better than to seek to implicate
his rival in the demand for the writ.
But the Queen’s
letters had another effect. They arrived at Hanover on June 5, and on the 6th
the missive to the Electress Sophia was delivered to her at Herrenhausen.
On the evening of the 8th, when walking in her beloved gardens, she was
suddenly overtaken by death. Since the arrival of the letters, she had never
lost her self-control or even her high spirit; but the shock had been too
severe for her aged frame. On her death the ^lector at once took the threads of
the conjuncture into his own hands, addressing a conciliatory letter to the
Queen and once more sending over Bothmer, furnished
with full instructions for the event of her death. Whatever secret orders Bothmer may have had for his dealings with the Whigs, he
was told to avoid all appearance of partisanship and took with him a letter to
Oxford, insisting on the advisability of the presence in England of a member of
the electoral family. On the part of Queen Anne, however, her relative the Tory
Earl of Clarendon was sent over to Hanover with instructions to place a
negative upon the proposals of the memorandum of May 7.
The events
which now took place in England have already been narrated in this History. No
sooner had Oxford been dismissed from office (July 27) than he at once offered Bothmer to keep him confidentially au courant with
Bolingbroke’s proceedings. Yet the Elector was of course completely in the dark
as to whether Bolingbroke, at last in possession of full power, intended in the
event of the Queen’s death to risk a coup d'etat on
his own account or to ask for the aid which Louis XIV had promised to give. The
Elector was determined at least not to be taken by surprise. He promptly caused
a fresh instrument of Regency, comprising his own nominations, to be prepared
(Marlborough’s name being left out from this, whether or not only because he
happened not to be in England); while at home he received assurances of support
from his nephew Frederick William I of Prussia and other German Princes. With
the Whig project of an outbreak during the Queen’s life the Elector had no
concern.
Then came the
startling news of Queen Anne’s illness, and of her death. The Elector’s
commission of Regents (in which 13 of his 18 nominations were Whigs) was
opened, and he was proclaimed King on the day of the Queen’s death (August 1)
in London, and again a few days later there as well as in Edinburgh and Dublin.
King George I, who received the news informally on August 6, and formally three
days later, though he kept up a correspondence with Bothmer,
gave no sign of his intentions as to English affairs before leaving Hanover Bat
Bolingbroke was dismissed from office, Townshend taking his place on the day of
the King’s departure (August 31). After spending a fortnight at the Hague,
George I arrived at Greenwich on September 18, and two days later held his
entry into London. It was now made quite manifest that he had elected to break
completely with the late Queen’s Government. He took no notice of Ormond or
Harcourt on land’"g; and, when next morning
Oxford (who during the Queen’s fatal illness had been at the pains of sending
an express messenger to summon the Elector immediately to London) kissed hands,
he was received in silence. Bolingbroke, though as yet he kept a bold front,
had absented himself on both occasions. His day was over. The King’s action was
confirmed by the elections for the new Parliament, which assembled on March 15,
1715, and in which the Whigs commanded a large English majority, while of the
Scottish seats the Jacobites, then on the eve of a
rising, had only been able to secure an insignificant fraction.
Bothmer’s vigilance and the Elector’s self-contained
but intrepid conduct had triumphed; but Fortune had had her hand in the game.
The Queen’s illness had taken Bolingbroke by surprise, though not in the sense
that he would in any case have joined with the Hotspurs of his party in
proclaiming the Pretender. And the rapid close of that illness in death had
prevented the Elector from responding to Oxford’s summons, as, there is reason
to think, he might have done in apprehension of immediate Jacobite action. Had he come while Queen Anne lived, tumult and bloodshed might have
followed; and, though resolute in action, George might not have proved the man
to conjure the furies of civil discord—perhaps of civil war. For the nation’s
trust in the new dynasty was still a thing of the future; and the consensus of
all but the extreme factions in Church and State to accept it was no guarantee
that this acceptance would prove enduring. Had the Electress Sophia, the
heiress presumptive of the British throne during so many years, been called to
it in her earlier days, she might conceivably have attained to something of the
popularity which has surrounded more than one English female sovereign; for
none of our Queens has surpassed her in intellectual clearness and courage, in
geniality of disposition, and in loyalty of soul. But in her son, who mounted
the throne in her stead, there was little to attract, though there was much to
command respect; for he was cast in a manly mould,
and veracity and trustworthiness were inborn in his nature. He had given
abundant proof of military ability and courage, and he was fond of the pastimes
which in his day commended themselves to his class. On the other hand, he was
too old to shake off the absolutist habits of thought and conduct which had
long become incompatible with; the conditions of English political life; and he
was wholly devoid of literary or scientific tastes—quite the last man to have
considered that the union of Great Britain and Hanover represented in his
person was “the union of Leibniz with Newton.” Fortunately for the King’s fame,
he took Handel again into favour (out of which he had
fallen for doing honour to the Peace of Utrecht, or
for some other reason) almost immediately after his accession to the English
throne. For the rest, it is well known that, while his mother spoke English as
well as Dutch with perfect ease, the new King of England never acquired the
English tongue; in return it is doubtful whether more than one of the leading
English statesmen of his reign could speak to him in his own language. It may
have been partly due to George I’s ignorance of the English tongue that he
dropped the habit of presiding at Cabinet Council meetings (though, of course,
continuing to preside at Privy Councils)—and that, as was unavoidable, he
resorted instead to private consultations with advisers whom he could uniformly
understand, and who could understand him in return.
George I,
unhappily, brought no consort to England, and the cloud of scandal which
enveloped the story of his past married life did him much harm with many besides
his son, with whom he was ostensibly on better terms since the death of the old
Electress. The Prince of Wales resembled his father in his military ambition
and absolutist convictions; but to him as a younger man wider hopes attached
themselves, and to the intelligence and charm of his Princess prejudice alone
could fail to succumb. Instead of a wife, the King brought with him a mistress,
in accordance with the almost imperative fashion of the day. The legend that
Countess Melusina von der Schulenburg (afterwards
Duchess of Kendal) had a rival in Baroness Sophia Charlotte von Kielmannsegge (afterwards Countess of Darlington), the
daughter of Countess von Platen, who had been the mistress of King George’s
father, Ernest Augustus, can be traced back to the malicious pen of the Margravine Wilhelmina of Baireuth;
as a matter of fact George I acknowledged and honoured his half-sister as such. For the rest, though the style of the Hanoverian
Court, magnificent under Ernest Augustus and Sophia, had become less
ceremonious and restrained under George Lewis, it had not much to learn in the
way of refinement from that of St James.
Of the
political counsellors who accompanied George I to
England, or whom, like Bothmer, he found awaiting him
there, something has already been said; and of their advice and its effects
note will be taken in another section. Possessed as they were of their Prince’s
well-earned confidence, the continuance of their influence depended on himself
alone, and on his and their power of shaping in new conditions the foreign
policy of which he would never change the main purposes, and of which his
succession to the throne of Great Britain had always seemed nothing more than
an important incident. With Bemstorff and Robethon, no other Hanoverian councillors of much mark came to England. Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Schlitz-Gortz, who was in the Elector’s suite and bore the
reputation of a grand seigneur as well as of a valuable official, returned to
Hanover as head of the electoral Chamber of Finance. Jobst Hermann von Ilten, under both Ernest Augustus and
George Lewis one of the most capable servants of the electoral Government,
remained behind to preside over it at Hanover, where he died in 1730. Among
other trusted followers of the King were Baron von Kielmannsegge,
whose Mastership of the Horse gave much offence in England; and Privy Councillor. Johann Ludwig, von Fabrice (a son of Weipart Ludwig, who held a high judicial
office at Celle)—it was either in his arms, or, more probably, in those of his
brother, Chamberlain Friedrich Ernst, that George I died. In the course of the
reign, Philip von Hattorf, a man of great ability and
tact, was Hanoverian Minister in attendance—an office which soon became one of
high importance.
No account can
be given here of the adjustments made on the accession of George I between the
administrative systems of his kingdom and his electorate; but it is worth
pointing out that the Hanoverian Chancery in London was at no time a branch of
the Foreign Office, but always concerned with purely Hanoverian business. For
the rest, the prohibitory clause of the Act of Settlement as to the employment
of foreigners in civil or military offices, and as to the granting of pensions
to them, was observed in the spirit as well as in the letter; and while it is
not easy to find even isolated cases in which Germans were admitted under
George I into the service of the British Administration, the very few pensions
granted to others than Englishmen or Englishwomen were of a wholly exceptional
nature.
The title of
the new dynasty was (notwithstanding what the Electress Sophia thought) parliamentary
in its essence as well as in its basis, and therefore implied the assurance of
a rule which, if only for the sake of the rulers, might be, whatever their own
traditions, depended on to respect the. principles and the practice of
parliamentary government. But the Succession was not merely an incident in the
conflict of English political parties. It was something more, and as such of
vital importance to the national life and history. The Hanoverian was the
Protestant Succession, both by Act of Parliament and by the whole history of
the process of its accomplishment. The House of Hanover as represented by the
Elector had adhered staunchly to the Protestant traditions of both his father’s
and his mother’s line, while many of the members of both had fallen away from
them. The attempt made in England both before and after the accession of George
I to depreciate, as it were, the quality of Hanoverian Protestantism, by emphasising or exaggerating differences between it and that
of the Church of England, had to be met
by a great deal
of unavoidable argument. But, if it took time to convince the beneficiaries of
the Schism Act, that the Tories—and the Jacobite Tories
in particular—could claim no monopoly in the protection of the rights of the
Protestant Church of England, on the other hand the goodwill of the English
Nonconformist body was very effectually assured to the Hanoverian dynasty; and
their attachment was won for a sovereign who approved, and with the traditions
and principles implanted in him could not but approve, the proposed abrogation
of the Test and Corporation Acts. Elsewhere it will be shown that in Scotland
the results of the Succession were on this head even more complete; for with
the rising of 1715 episcopalian Jacobitism ceased to have any significance as a political force. But in England, without
the drawing of a sword from its scabbard, the will of the nation had been
vindicated, and a new security gained, as to that which the nation as a whole
held most dear.
(2)
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GEORGE I.
(1714-21.)
The first years
of the reign of George I form, in the history of European politics, a period of
transition from old principles and conditions to new. The necessity of
combination against France passing out of date, a novel alliance ensues between
that Power and Great Britain. Spain is roused to new life. On the conclusion of
the long war in the north, the European circle is forced open to admit the
new-born Empire of Russia, while the Swedish yoke is broken. For Prussia her
new King marks out the path which is to lead her to dispute ultimately with
Austria the hegemony of Germany. Holland and Turkey pass, with Sweden, from the
front rank among the Powers. Europe in 1721 is not the Europe of 1714.
Great Britain
was first of all concerned to establish firmly the Protestant Succession. But
her sovereign had a second preoccupation : to secure for his electorate the
Swedish provinces of Bremen and Verden—the former, at
the time of his accession, occupied by Denmark. For both these objects the
support of the Emperor, while France remained hostile, was absolutely
necessary; and, to obtain it, George was willing to connive at Austrian
expansion in Italy. But, when the Triple Alliance, as shown below, had secured
him in England against “ James III,” and in Hanover against the Northern
Powers, the old principle of the Balance of Power, that principle which aimed
at peace and produced constant war, resumed its sway. The danger, however, to
Europe was no longer from France, but from Austria and Spain. To settle the
affairs of the south, and so to remove that danger, Stanhope devised the plan
which developed into the Quadruple Alliance of 1718. Disagreement between
Austria and Great Britain marked the negotiation of this compact, and grew
greater during the execution of its provisions. One cause of this was the
accord reached in 1719 by Great Britain and Hanover with Prussia, the product
of French interest and French influence. Alliance with Prussia meant alienation
from Austria; but it was the necessary preliminary to George’s pacification of
the north.
The
circumstances in which George I ascended the throne of Great Britain
necessitated the recall of the Whig party to power. There were at this period
two Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, charged with the direction of the
two “provinces,” into which foreign countries were, for convenience, grouped.
Their authority was nominally coordinate, but the business of the two
departments was always intermingled, and in practice the stronger Minister
prevailed. The two men chosen by George for the charge had little in common but
high principle. Charles, Viscount Townshend, secretary for the Northern province
and head of the Ministry, was a moderate Whig of excellent record and
sufficient but not dominating importance. He was chosen, probably, for these
reasons. His colleague for the Southern province, General (afterwards Earl)
Stanhope, imported into state affairs the energy and dash which had marked his
conduct in the field. He was an accomplished diplomatist and linguist, who
could undertake embassies to foreign capitals in person; a man of wide views
and with a fine conception of the part proper to be played in Europe by Great
Britain. During his lifetime he was the real Minister for Foreign Affairs, even
while temporarily occupying another office.
But, during the
earlier part of the reign, it was not the Whig leaders only who directed
foreign policy. George had always with him in London the Hanoverian Ministers
previously noticed, whose tried fidelity he repaid with complete confidence. To Bemstorff English Ministers deferred as to a recognised authority on European politics, while foreign
representatives resorted to him preferentially. The interests of Hanover were
by him consistently placed in the forefront. He appreciated the danger
threatening them from the rise of Prussia, and insisted upon the necessity of
maintaining the old devotion of the House of Brunswick to the Emperor. His
influence was strongest after the Whig schism at the beginning of 1717 had
removed from the Ministry his principal opponents, Townshend and Robert
Walpole.
George himself
took the keenest personal interest in European politics, and Whig tradition
accorded with his desire that Great Britain should once more take an active
part in them. The first consideration determining her action was the renewed
hostility of France. For nearly two years a fresh outbreak of war was thought
likely and at times even desirable, the principal subjects in dispute being the
protection afforded by Louis XIV to the Pretender, and the evasion of that
article of the Treaty of Utrecht which stipulated the dismantling of Dunkirk,
by the preparation of a new war-port at Mardyk, hardby. It appeared to be of the first importance to revive
the alliance with the United Provinces and the Emperor, which the Peace of
Utrecht had destroyed. To George and his Hanoverian Ministers such views were
entirely congenial; their Government had always been the most steadfast in
Germany in loyalty to the Emperor and the most zealous in the war with France;
and its close relations with the Hague were unimpaired.
On George’s
accession the breach with Holland closed, indeed, of itself. But the Emperor
could not readily forget the betrayal, as he deemed it, of 1712. And with the
Dutch he was at special issue about their so-called Barrier—the line of
fortresses in what were now the Austrian Netherlands, which, as has been seen
in a previous volume, they had the right to garrison. That right Charles VI
obstinately repudiated. George was readily accepted as mediator in the dispute
by both sides, and appointed General Cadogan to
conduct the mediation at Antwerp; but all that could be obtained at Vienna in
regard to a renewal of alliance with Great Britain, although Stanhope repaired
thither in person, was the expression of a desire for it, after the Emperor’s
demands in regard to the Netherlands should have been satisfied. Cadogan, however, sent to Vienna in February, 1715, had the
boldness to represent how, in England, Stanhope’s failure had inspired the
belief that the Emperor was engaged in negotiations of a wide-reaching
character with France; and Charles thereupon declared himself faithful to the
old system, conceding also the three points about the Barrier which it was the
object of Cadogan’s mission to carry. Yet it was not
till the prospect of the Jacobite rebellion reduced
the British Government even to entreaties, that a solution in this matter was
reached. A Barrier Treaty was signed at Antwerp by the representatives of the
three Powers on November 15, 1715. But its provisions remained inoperative for
three years, nor could a reconciliation between Austria and Holland be carried further.
In the north
the situation was as follows. The occupation of the Swedish duchy of Bremen and
its fortress-capital Stade by the Danes in 1712,
following upon the failure of the Neutrality Convention of 1710 and the threats
of Charles XII, had finally decided George, though hitherto reckoned the
principal ally of Charles in Christian Europe, to turn against him, and he had
entered into negotiations with Frederick IV of Denmark and Frederick William I
of Prussia for the division of the Swedish provinces in Germany among
themselves, his own share to be the duchy of Bremen and the principality of Verden. But, the Danes refusing to give up what they had
won, and the demands of Hanover upon Prussia being too great, the negotiations
bore no fruit until it was known that Charles was about to return from Turkey.
Then, George concluded with Frederick William a “punctation”
for a convention (November 11, 1714), which appointed the permanent possession
of Bremen and Verden to Hanover and that of Stettin
and its district, also Swedish property, to Prussia. Negotiations during the
winter between Frederick William and Charles, who had returned to Stralsund,
having proved fruitless, war broke out between them in April, 1715. And,
Denmark now consenting to receive the north-western portion of Swedish
Pomerania (Vorpommern), and a sum of money from
Hanover, in exchange for Bremen, treaties between the three Powers were shortly
concluded, distributing the Swedish provinces in Germany among them. That
Hanover should possess Bremen and Yerden was
agreeable enough to the merchants of Great Britain; for greater commercial
advantages might be expected from the rule of George than from that of either
Sweden or Denmark.
The part
allotted to George under the treaties was nominal, namely, to prevent aid from
coming to Stralsund, while besieged by the Danes and Prussians, from other
German States or from France. He did not actually declare war against Sweden
till Stade had been given up to him in October. But
the real service demanded from and explicitly promised by him was, that the
British squadron proceeding to the Baltic for the protection of trade should
prevent the relief of Stralsund by sea. It was the commercial interests of
Great Britain which made this service possible.
After Peter the
Great had conquered from Sweden the eastern ports of the Baltic, Charles XII
had prohibited all trade to them. This trade was of essential importance to the
Maritime Powers, because only from the Baltic could a sufficient supply of
materials for ship-building at this time be obtained. The damage done by the
Swedish privateers, even while Charles remained in Turkey, was sufficient to
provoke the pacific Ministry of Queen Anne to equip a small squadron for the
Baltic— a useless demonstration, since the ships dared not pass the Sound, and
only by grace of the Swedes were permitted to return home. Charles, when he
came back, increased the stringency of his prohibition. In February, 1715, he
issued an Ordinance of Privateers, which, in the words of the British resident
at Stockholm, rendered it impossible for a merchant-ship to enter the Baltic
without being made a prize. Great Britain and the United Provinces thereupon
agreed to send a joint fleet thither to convoy the traders. But the
instructions given to Sir John Norris, the British Admiral, authorised him, beyond protecting commerce, to make reprisals upon Swedish shipping, if
opportunity offered; and George gave his allies to understand that this power
would permit an attack upon the Swedish fleet, if it were encountered.
Circumstances prevented this consummation, in spite of urgent personal appeals
to Norris from the King of Prussia; and vehement complaints came in consequence
from Berlin and Copenhagen. As a compromise, Norris was ordered to leave behind
him, on his return, eight ships to act in conjunction with the Danish fleet—the
first definite act of hostility towards Sweden on the part of Great Britain.
When Stralsund fell, Charles XII escaped miraculously to Sweden, falsifying the
hopes which had been placed upon his death. And thus, at the beginning of 1716,
King George found himself confronted by rebellion at home, and an unconquerable
enemy abroad.
On the other
hand there was a prospect of improved relations with France and Spain. Louis XIV
had been succeeded in September, 1715, by the boy-king, Louis XV. The next
heir, Philip V of Spain, though he had renounced his right to the succession,
disclaimed the validity of the renunciation. In defiance of his pretensions his
cousin, Philip Duke of Orleans, had seized the Regency. Confronted by powerful
opposition at home, Orleans was driven to seek allies abroad. Overtures which
he made to the Dutch Government were a principal cause of its resoluteness in
resisting the Emperor’s demands in the matter of the Barrier. With George, his
near relative on their mothers’ side, he had exchanged strong assurances of
friendship already during the last year of Louis XIV, and though these were
suspended on the outbreak of the Jacobite rebellion,
they were renewed on its suppression. On the part of Spain, previously not less
hostile than France, a new policy was begun by Alberoni,
the obscure minister of Parma at Madrid, who was beginning to rule the country
through the new Parmesan Queen. With the consent of the sovereigns, and in
opposition to the views of the Spanish Ministers, he offered a commercial
treaty of the most favourable character. It was
signed on December 14, 1715, and was followed in May by a revision of the Asiento, which allowed Great Britain to export negroes to
the Spanish Indies. The provisions of the treaty were not, indeed, carried out;
after it was signed, oppression of British trade continued as before. Alberoni’s intention would seem to have been to quiet
England, in order to get rid of opposition on her part to his Italian schemes;
for his objective was the replacement of Austrian rule in Italy by Spanish.
But the
Austrian alliance was far more important to George than any advantages which
Spain could offer. And, on his side, the Emperor was realising that he could not carry out his designs upon Sicily without the aid of a
British fleet. The Spanish treaty disturbed Vienna for a while, as also did
another British treaty with Holland, renewing former treaties of alliance and
commerce, concluded on February 6, 1716. But at length the Treaty of
Westminster was signed by the two Powers on May 25 (O.S.). The peculiarly
phrased second article stipulated the mutual protection and maintenance of the
kingdoms, provinces and rights actually enjoyed, and the defence,
if either party were attacked, both of these possessions and of such as might
be acquired by mutual consent during the continuance of the treaty. The parties
to it being Great Britain and the Emperor only, it could not extend, formally,
to the new acquisitions of Hanover in the north; but this subject had been brought
forward in the negotiations, and much in regard to it was implied.
Definite
overtures from the Regent Orleans were again made in March. In June he sent his
confidant, the Abbe Dubois, to the Hague, to confer personally with Stanhope,
then travelling with the King to Hanover. But George and his advisers were not
at this time anxious to come to the proposed understanding; and they insisted
upon the demolition of the works at Mardyk, and the
expulsion of the Pretender and his adherents from France, as preliminary
conditions. The interviews were not, however, without fruit; they were
accompanied by negotiations in London, and were followed by a yet more secret
visit of Dubois to Hanover in August. As the result, a preliminary convention
was signed; and on October 11 Dubois took his departure, in order to complete a
treaty with Great Britain and Holland at the Hague.
This outcome
was principally due to developments in the north. The plan of war against
Sweden in this year (1716) had taken the form of a Russo-Danish invasion from
Zealand, while a joint British, Danish and Russian fleet blockaded the Swedish
in its harbours. Pending the completion of the
Danish preparations, the Russian force intended for the attack took up quarters
in Mecklenburg. Its doings there, and the support which Peter the Great gave to
Duke Charles Leopold of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, as described in a previous
volume, roused the violent resentment of Bemstorff and other Mecklenburgers in the service of Hanover
and Denmark; and the good relations established between Peter and George by
their Treaty of Greifswald of October, 1715, were seriously impaired. And when,
on September 17, all being at last ready for the invasion, Peter suddenly
declared that the season was too late, and showed his intention of quartering
his troops again in Mecklenburg for the winter, an all but open hostility
supervened; while in England jealousy of Peter’s rising power and the fear of
his supremacy in the Baltic increased from day to day. Furthermore, the gravest
anxiety was aroused by the doings of Charles XII. The belief obtained that his
invasion of Norway was but preliminary to a descent upon Scotland from its
ports. He left the remonstrances addressed to him
through Sir John Norris simply unanswered. In July, Baron Gortz,
whose enthusiasm and resource alone made it possible for Charles to carry on
the war, arrived in Holland, the principal object of his mission being to raise
money for his master’s service, in order to procure for him ships and sailors.
He was suspected of secret negotiations with the Jacobites,
and his doings confirmed the belief that Charles intended to take revenge upon
George in Great Britain—a revenge the justice of which was recognised.
Under these circumstances, anxiety to conclude the alliance with France had
replaced the former lukewarmness. Orders were sent to
the British envoys at the Hague (October 9) to sign a preliminary treaty with
France only, if the Dutch were not ready to join in it. Later, the anxiety was
increased. Gortz was found to be approaching the
Russian Ministers at the Hague and communicating with Paris. It began to be
believed that a great league in the interests of the Pretender was in course of
formation. Peter proceeding to Holland in December, George refused to meet him
on his way, and rejected the conciliatory proposals of Russian envoys sent to
Hanover.
The completion
of Dubois’ work was delayed by several causes. Full powers for the British
envoys, Horatio Walpole and Lord Cadogan, had to be
obtained from England; and these were twice objected to by Dubois as not in
strict form. The Dutch Ministers were not satisfied with the terms of the
convention, and were bound, besides, by a resolution of the States General, not to enter into alliance with France, unless a treaty with the
Emperor could be concluded at the same time. Nor could the Pretender be
expelled from France, because he lay dangerously ill at Avignon. At length,
however, a treaty was signed by Great Britain and France on November 28, and on
January 4, 1717, there was substituted for it one signed by the three Powers.
This “Triple Alliance” brought the accord between Great Britain and France
designed at Utrecht into real existence. Great Britain need no longer seek to
restore the Grand Alliance, nor France encourage the Pretender. The security of
the House of Orleans in France and of that of Hanover in England became a
mutual interest. France could enjoy the repose of which she stood so urgently
in need. Together, George and the Regent could direct the affairs of Europe.
The alliance between them was genuine and proved lasting.
For the delays
at the Hague Townshend was held responsible, undeservedly. But he had differed
from the King and Stanhope in their recent policy, and there were other reasons
for the royal disfavour. He was relieved of his
office, and shortly, as is detailed elsewhere, the Ministry was reconstituted,
with Stanhope at its head. His ideas on foreign policy agreeing in the main
with those of his German colleagues, their influence rose to its height.
George returned
to England at the end of January. Immediately was put into execution an act
which awaited his coming. The Swedish envoy, Count Gyllenborg,
was arrested, and his papers seized. Gortz also was
arrested in Holland, and kept in prison till August. The so-called conspiracy
was published to the world. It is probable that, but for the Whig schism at
home, war with Sweden might have been declared. Charles XII, when the news
reached him, retorted by putting the British resident at Stockholm under arrest
and forbidding his Dutch colleague the Court. In the course of the summer the
quarrel was arranged by the interposition of the Regent, and though the
settlement was little to George’s satisfaction, he was obliged to accept it,
owing to growing discontent in Holland. But, before its terms could be carried
out, Gortz was released by the independent action of
the States of Gelderland; and, instead of being sent back to Sweden, as had
been intended, he was left free to pursue his schemes in Holland and Germany.
In May Peter
the Great visited Paris. His proposals of alliance with France only resulted,
as has been seen in a previous volume, in a colourless treaty of friendship between France, Russia and Prussia, signed on August 15 at
Amsterdam, which admitted French mediation in the north and put an end to the
payment of French subsidies to Sweden on the expiration of the existing treaty.
One consequence of the negotiations was the withdrawal of the-Russian troops
from Mecklenburg.
A British
squadron again visited the Baltic this year. The principal instructions giyen to Sir George Byng, who was in command, were to
prevent a Swedish descent on the British coasts. He would, with the Danish
fleet, have assaulted Karlskrona, had not the help of
a land-force been required. A Swedish frigate was attacked and destroyed.
Furthermore, trade with Sweden was prohibited, in order that the country might
be reduced by famine. This measure, however, recoiled upon its authors ; for
the Dutch, whose Baltic trade was twice as great as the British, declined, in
spite of all possible "persuasion, to follow suit, and British merchants
saw their trade cut off only to benefit their chief rivals. Frederick IV of
Denmark also prohibited trade to Sweden, but failed in his attempt to conclude
treaties with Great Britain and Hanover for the prosecution of the war.
Final
negotiations with Peter the Great took place at Amsterdam in August. They were
conducted by his old acquaintances, Sir John Norris and Charles Whitworth, the
latter, perhaps, the ablest of British representatives abroad. But the aim on
both sides seems to have been less to arrive at an understanding than to
discover intentions. The conferences led to nothing. In fact, both George and
Peter were now separately engaged in private peace negotiations with Sweden.
These had been opened by George in the spring through Landgrave Charles of Hesse-Cassel (whose eldest son had married Ulrica Eleonora, sister of
Charles XII), and through the Regent’s envoy, Count de La Marck.
Then, while his British Ministers were busy at Amsterdam, George arranged very
secret conferences between his Hanoverian Councillor, Weipart Ludwig von Fabrice (Fabricius), and Count Vellingk,
the Swedish governor of Bremen. The negotiations failed, for the cession of
Bremen and Verden was refused. But early in 1718 Fabrice’s son, Friedrich Ernst, in the service of the Duke
of Holstein-Gottorp, who, after acting as intermediary
between his father and Vellingk had been summoned to
England in great secrecy, was sent on a private mission to Sweden. On Peter’s
side there were conferences with the Swedish resident at the Hague and others,
and with Gortz after his release. In consequence, Gortz was accorded Russian and Prussian passports to return
to Sweden through those countries. Evading certain British cruisers on the
look-out for him, he arrived safely at Lund, the bearer of proposals which led
to the Aland conferences of the following year. His do: gs gave King George special anxiety, on account of events of the first importance,
which had happened in the south.
All this time, Alberoni had been quietly but unceasingly at work on the
regeneration of Spain. He had succeeded in creating a fleet, and in August,
1717, suddenly put the weapons which he had forged to their trial-stroke. A
Spanish expedition sailed from Barcelona for Cagliari; and by the end of
November all Sardinia, then belonging to the Emperor, was in Philip’s hands.
Austria,“-having no ^hips, could not retaliate without the aid of a British
fleet. But the Emperor’s demand that a fleet should be sent, in accordance with
the Treaty of Westminster, was met by the reply that nothing could be done while
he remained at issue with Holland, the British Government being well aware that
the nation would not submit to see its Spanish and West Indian commerce imperilled, unless the Dutch undertook an equal risk,
friendly expostulations were made at Madrid; but Alberoni,
who was supposed to lay value on the friendship of England, unexpectedly proved
defiant.
The Treaty of
Westminster, indeed, and the Triple Alliance were antagonistic to each other.
The latter was as little relished at Vienna as the former had been at Paris.
But now the two were to be combined in a great scheme which had for its object
the settlement of affairs in southern Europe. Charles VI was not only still at
war with Philip V of Spain, and claimed his crown, but was bent on depriving
the House of Savoy of its recent gains in Sicily and the Milanese, and on
succeeding to the dominions of the expiring dynasties of the Medici in Tuscany
and the Farnesi in Parma and Piacenza. Philip V,
besides claiming the succession in France, aimed at the recovery of the old
possessions of Spain in Italy. The “ Plan,” as it was called, confirmed and
confined him in Spain, gave Sicily to the Emperor and Sardinia to Savoy in
exchange, and settled the succession in Tuscany and Parma and Piacenza upon the
Duke of Parma’s great-nephews, the sons of Philip V by his second, marriage.
Such a settlement, it was thought, would at once set limits to Spanish and
Austrian ambition, and secure the position of the House of Orleans in France
and of that of Brunswick in Great Britain and in Hanover.
The Plan had
been opened in November, 1716, at Vienna and pursued in conferences at Hanover
with the Austrian envoy, Baron von Penterriedter. On
his way back to England, Stanhope communicated it to Dubois at the Hague. But
the Emperor refused to renounce either his Spanish claims, or his designs
against Savoy; and negotiations halted until the news arrived of the invasion
of Sardinia. Meanwhile, efforts on Alberoni’s part to
conciliate the Regent, aided by the strong influence of the Spanish party at
Paris and by increased jealousy of Austria consequent upon Prince Eugene’s
great victory at Belgrade, all but brought about an alliance between Spain and
France. To prevent this, and to keep his master in the right path, Dubois, who
was in London, came back hurriedly to Paris at the end of November. His
arguments prevailed, and the Regent definitely rejected Alberoni’s overtures.
Besides ships
for the Mediterranean, the Emperor urgently needed money. In 1716, after the
Turks had conquered the Morea from Venice and had
advanced into Dalmatia, he was compelled by his treaty engagements and by the
danger which threatened Hungary to declare war upon them. Its course brought
fresh laurels to Prince Eugene; but it cost much money, and detained on the
Turkish frontier armies that were wanted in Italy. Although this War was
specially excepted from the Treaty of Westminster, George was ready to provide
funds, on condition that the Belgian ports should be forbidden to furnish
transport vessels to the Swedes or give protection to their privateers, and
that all Jacobites should be expelled from the
Emperor’s dominions upon request—these demands to be embodied in an additional
secret article to the Treaty of Westminster. In return, Great Britain was to
find ,£130,000, nominally in satisfaction of arrears from the Spanish War.
Though the Emperor long held out against the mention of the Pretender by name,
in the end the article was signed, in December, 1717. In order that the
concessions might not appear to have been bought, it was antedated September 1.
The money was paid in January.
Meanwhile, a
new project for the Plan had been handed to Penterriedter in London (November 23). Although he expressed doubts as to its being worthwhile
for him to remain in England, he was in February, 1718, ordered to renew the
conferences. But the British Government thought it better to transfer them to
Vienna, and sent thither the able Swiss diplomatist, Luke Schaub,
with a draft for a treaty between Great Britain, France, Austria and
Holland—the “Quadruple Alliance.”
But a new
complication now appeared. Charles VI had entered into negotiation with the
King of Sicily (Victor Amadeus II of Savoy). The Prince of Piedmont was to
marry an Austrian Archduchess, and Italian questions were to be settled by a separate
agreement. Schaub’s proposals were rebuffed, and it
seemed as though all would fail. He and his fellow-countryman, St Saphorin, the British Minister at Vienna, were therefore
surprised, when on April 4 they were informed that the Emperor would accept the
treaty in its main points. Discussions, however, dragged on for seven further
weeks before reference could be made to Paris. At the beginning of April
Stanhope resumed the office of a Secretary of State, while the very capable
James Craggs (the younger) took the place which had
been unsuitably filled by Addison.
To endeavour to persuade the Spaniards to accept the Plan, the
Regent sent the Marquis de Nancre to Madrid in March.
But Alberoni had schemes now on foot beyond conquest
in Italy: nothing less than to combine Sweden, Russia and Prussia, when they
had concluded the peace expected, and France too, if the Regent’s Government
could be upset, in a great league to oust George I from the British throne in favour of James III. Spanish emissaries were busy in
Holland trying to buy ships and munitions of war, and in the north. Overtures
too were made to the Transylvanian Prince, Francis II Rakdczy,
formerly leader of the insurrection in Hungary, inviting him to raise fresh
difficulties for the Emperor there. On the news of naval preparations in
England, Alberoni threatened to seize British ships
and merchandise in Spain. When the terms proposed were handed to him they were
indignantly refused. He declined even to consider the restoration of Gibraltar,
offered as the price of commercial concessions and peace.
Schaub was back in Paris on June 18,. but found the
situation altered; the French were now unwilling to enter into the treaty.
Proceeding to London, he found Dubois, who had returned thither, in despair. It
was decided as a last hope to send Stanhope in person to Paris. He arrived
there with Schaub on June 29, and learnt that another
Spanish armament had sailed from Barcelona.
It was now,
after much resistance, resolved to draw up an ultimatum to the Emperor, in the
form of a convention between France and Great Britain. But when the convention
was ready, the president of the Council of Foreign Affairs, Marshal d’Huxelles, refused to take the responsibility of signing
it, or at least its secret articles, which provided for compulsion upon Spain
and Savoy, if required. In this emergency Stanhope proposed to submit the
convention to the whole Council of Regency, and, due preparatory measures
having been taken, the bold stroke succeeded. It was signed on July 18, and
Charles VI accepting it, the Quadruple Alliance was at last concluded in London
as between Great Britain, France and Austria, on August 2,1718. In part a
treaty of mutual defence and guarantee, it also
dictated to Spain and Savoy the terms, in substance, originally proposed. While
to Stanhope should be given the chief credit of success both in the conception
and execution of the Plan, it must be allowed that he could hardly have
achieved it, but for the special influence enjoyed at Vienna by the Court of
Hanover.
The Dutch
Republic was a party to the Quadruple Alliance in nothing but name. The British
Government made the greatest efforts to obtain the accession of the States General; but there was always a strong party in
Holland objecting, in the interests of trade, to war under any circumstances.
Grand Pensionary Heinsius had been able for many years to stem its arguments, upholding the traditions of
the Stadholders; but he was now old and ailing, and
there was no man to take his place., The efforts of the British envoys failed,
even when they seemed to be successful. At first the Dutch required from France
and Austria conditions extraneous to the Spanish question. When these had with
difficulty been obtained for them by King George, they found other pretexts for
evasion. A resolution to accede was adopted by the States General at the end of
January, 1719; but, when the time for signature came, it was found that the
powers provided did not extend to the essential secret articles. On a like
occasion, in June, the cunning insertion of a word or two was held to render
the accession valueless. And, though, on December 16, 1719, it was resolved to
sign, after an interval of three months for the exertion of good offices,
without reserve, the signature was still withheld.
William III had
made the Hague the political centre of Europe. The
enforcement of the doctrine of peace at any price by a minority of merchants,
enabled to do so by the formalities of the constitution, forfeited that high
position. . Perhaps their policy was necessary, for the Republic was almost
bankrupt. The United Provinces fell to the second rank among the Powers. The
date of the death of Heinsius, August 8,1720, may be
taken to mark this fall.
Shortly before
the Quadruple Alliance was signed, the Turkish War ended. George all along had
watched its course with anxiety, for it grievously weakened his ally,. The
victory of Belgrade (August 16,1717) was hailed in England as a success of the
greatest consequence, affecting both north and south. Immediately thereon
George offered his mediation. The Dutch followed suit, and a congress was
opened at Passarowitz. The first exorbitant demands
of the Emperor were reduced under the pressure of the Italian crisis, but
Austria gained greatly. The prestige of the Peace, sighed July 21, 1718,
accrued to George, whose plenipotentiary, Sir Robert Sutton, had carried it
through with little aid from his Dutch colleague, Count Colyer.
With the Quadruple Alliance and the Turkish mediation, George’s European ascendancy
reached its zenith. He assumed the position, says Ranke, which William III held
after the Peace of Ryswyk, with the French alliance
to boot.
The destination
of the Spanish armament which sailed from Barcelona in June, 1718, was Sicily.
Palermo and the greater part of the island were rapidly conquered with the
willing aid of the inhabitants. Hereupon, however, in compliance with the
Emperor’s demands, a British fleet appeared in the Mediterranean; and Colonel
Stanhope at Madrid was ordered to use firm language to Alberoni,
in regard both to the oppression of commerce and to the prosecution of the war.
Admiral Sir
George Byng, after changing garrisons in Minorca, sailed straight for Naples.
Here he learnt that Messina was partly taken, that the citadel must fall unless
assistance could be sent, and, further, that the King of Sicily had expressed
his desire to join the Quadruple Alliance, and asked for help. If Messina fell,
the Spaniards would have a secure port from which to transfer their army to Calabria.
Byng was instructed to prevent a Spanish invasion of Italy, or of Sicily with
that object, by force, if negotiation failed. He proceeded, at the request of
the Austrian Viceroy, to act accordingly. Arrived at Messina, he found that the
Spanish fleet had retreated before him down the Straits. Landing an Austrian
force,, which he brought with him, at Reggio, he sent to request the Marquis de Lede to agree to a suspension of arms, pending
receipt of further instructions. This being refused, he started in pursuit of
the fleet, and on August 11 utterly destroyed it off Cape Passaro.
That he had done right, he learnt from instructions received later, ordering
him not to content himself with driving the fleet away with the loss of a ship
or two, but to annihilate it.
Great Britain
was not at war with Spain; her fleet acted as auxiliary to the Emperor.
Diplomatic relations were not broken off for some months. Stanhope himself
arrived at Madrid the day after the battle had been fought. He could effect nothing; Alberoni curtly
intimated that Byng might carry out his instructions. The news of the capture
of the town of Messina and the arrival of a large sum of money from America
fortified Philip’s resolution. When the news of Cape Passaro came, early in September, orders were issued to seize all British ships and
merchandise in Spanish ports, as had been threatened. Byng was ordered to make,
in return, the severest reprisals.
One result of
the attack on Sicily was the submission of Victor Amadeus. After vain efforts
on his part to obtain better terms, his plenipotentiaries acceded to the
Quadruple Alliance in London on November 8. In exchange for his title of King
of Sicily he received that of King of Sardinia.
Alberopi would not submit. His Italian enterprise
frustrated, he turned to attack Great Britain and France. Feigning
conciliation, he set on foot a plot against the Regent. The Spanish ambassador
at Paris, Prince Cellamare, concerted it with the
Court of the most active of the malcontents, the Duchess of Maine. Their doings
were known, or at least discovered when matured; Cellamare was conducted to the frontier, the other conspirators imprisoned. On Great
Britain Alberoni’s attack was overt. The Atlantic
ports of Spain resounded with the equipment of a second Armada. To meet the
danger, the British Government got ready every available ship and arranged for
the help of Dutch, French, and other soldiers and sailors. Parliament by a
large majority authorised a declaration of war on
December 17 (O.S.). And, in consequence of the strong reaction against Spain at
Paris, resulting from the Cellamare conspiracy, the
Regent was enabled to carry out his promise of like action, although the
Quadruple Alliance only obliged France to furnish subsidies. France declared
war against Spain on January 9,1719.
Alberoni’s scheme comprised a Swedish descent on
Scotland and an attack by Sweden and Russia upon Hanover, in combination with
the Spanish invasion of England. It was fully believed that Charles XII had
concluded the peace with Peter the Great which would render this possible;
indeed, on September 6, 1718, the latter actually signed a treaty for a joint
invasion of Germany. In self-defence George, as
Elector, concluded with Austria and Saxony the Treaty of Vienna of January 5, 1719.
It engaged the parties to mutual defence and to
offensive diversion into neighbouring countries of
the enemy. This provision could, in the case of Hanover, only apply to
Brandenburg or Mecklenburg, and, indeed, the treaty was directed against
Prussia as well as against the dreaded Tsar, and was so understood at Berlin.
Its chief object was to prevent the passage of Russian troops through Poland
into Germany.
The year 1718
had in the north been devoted to negotiation. Fabrice arrived at Lund at the end of February, and, when nothing was heard from him,
was followed by another emissary, Schrader, conveyed: to Sweden on a British
man-of-war. Fabrice saw Gortz and Charles himself, and believed that he had obtained acceptable terms. The
negotiation was purely Hanoverian; it was kept as secret as possible from the
English Ministers, though confided to Count de La Marck.
Nothing came of it; Charles would not cede Bremen and Verden;
George was in a sufficiently strong position to be able to await events. Sir John
Norris, instructed as Byng had been in the previous year, conducted a squadron
to the Baltic to act as he had done. Meanwhile, Peter was occupied with the
conferences at the Aland Isles. Four times Gortz repaired thither; three times he brought back proposals which Charles rejected.
On his last return, at the end of November, he learnt that a British envoy was
going to St Petersburg. He then decided to support the plan of Chancellor Mullem for peace with Hanover. But on December 11 Charles
XII met his fate at Frederikshald, and three months
later Gortz perished on the scaffold.
The mission to
St Petersburg was the consequence of amicable assurances given by the Russian
resident in London. In the place of Sir John Norris, who had been appointed to
it, but evaded the task, it was undertaken by Captain James Jefferyes,
who had been with Charles XII at Poltawa, and
accredited to him at Bender and in Stralsund. Jefferyes found that the Russian professions were illusory; all that was presented to him
was a draft of the defensive treaty proposed and rejected in 1716. Instead of a
desire for amity, he could only report extensive armaments by sea and land.
With the death
of Charles XII, the hopes of Alberoni and the Jacobites from this quarter vanished into air. So great was
the relief in England that Craggs saw in the
catastrophe the hand of Providence. But the new Spanish Armada sailed, only to
be defeated, even more conclusively than the old, by the elements. Violent
storms dispersed it before it ever reached English waters. A separate force,
which landed in the Western Highlands, was easily mastered. Later, a French
army entered Spain. Philip V could not believe that it would fight against the
next heir to the French throne, or the Duke of Berwick conduct it against the
interests of his brother. He tried seduction, but failed; nor had he troops fit
to oppose the French; the army that should have defended Spain was locked up in
Sicily. Fuenterrabia and San Sebastian fell;
Catalonia was then invaded; an English expedition under Lord
Cobham captured Vigo. These successes did not end
the war, but they decided the fate of Alberoni,
against whom, rather than against Spain, it was waged- Philip and his Queen
protracted it, but its author had to bear the blame of its failure. In December
he was dismissed by a palace intrigue promoted by his own patron, Francis Duke
of Parma.
Before
submitting to peace, Philip demanded extravagant concessions. His prospects
were now brighter: the French army had been obliged to retire from Catalonia;
the Marquis de Lede was holding out well in Sicily; a
private settlement with Austria was possible. But Great Britain and France
insisted upon accession to the Quadruple Alliance without reserve, before
further terms could be discussed. In January, Philip reduced his demands to the
restoration of the places taken— including Gibraltar—and the occupation of the
Italian duchies by Spanish troops and their complete independence of the
Emperor, as conditions for the evacuation of Sicily and Sardinia. But he was
still met with firmness; and at length his ambassador at the Hague signed the
Quadruple Alliance on February 17,1720.
By this time
George had almost completed that pacification of the north, which the support
of the Regent enabled him to carry out. When, after the death of Charles XII,
it became obligatory on Sweden to make peace, and in the first place either
with Hanover or Russia, George’s plan was that Hanover, Denmark, and Prussia,
in return for the cession to them of the Swedish provinces in Germany, should
combine with the Emperor and the King of Poland to force the Tsar to restore
his conquests on the eastern coast of the Baltic. But the Powers concerned had
different views. Sweden was ready to make peace with Russia, if Peter would
restore Livonia and the Port of Reval as well as
Finland. Denmark was for prosecuting tte war to its
extremity, in order to win back provinces in Sweden lost sixty years before.
Frederick William of Prussia was closely allied with Peter, and was resolved
upon maintaining the alliance. Finally, France insisted that Sweden must
preserve a footing in the Empire, in order that her voice might be used, as of
old, against the supremacy of Austria. The Regent advocated, as a first step, a
reconciliation between Hanover and Prussia.
Bemstorff, ever loyal to the Emperor, threw the whole
weight of his authority against this suggestion, but was overruled; the French
alliance was indispensable. The Regent’s policy was accepted; Whitworth was
sent back to his old post at Berlin to conduct negotiations for treaties with
Great Britain and Hanover. These were protracted for three months by
difficulties of Hanoverian origin, and by Frederick William’s hatred of the
King of Poland, whom George desired to include in the latter treaty. Twice
Stanhope and the French ambassador, Count Senneterre,
fought pitched battles with Bemstorff at Hanover, and
were victorious. In spite of the angry reluctance of Frederick William,
continued to the end, the treaties were forced upon him. They were signed on
August 14, 1719. The Hanoverian treaty guaranteed Bremen and Verden to Hanover, and Stettin and its district to Prussia.
In the meantime
the young Lord Carteret, ambassador from Great Britain, and Colonel Adolphus
Frederick von Bassewitz on the part of Hanover, had
been busy at Stockholm. Under the pressure of the simultaneous Russian and
Danish invasions, the Swedes signed a convention ceding Bremen and Verden (July 22). This was received at Hanover on August 5,
but contained nothing about a cession of Stettin, Carteret having been
forbidden to make any mention of this. In order that the cession might appear
to have been agreed upon at Berlin before the Swedish convention reached
Hanover, the Prussian treaties were antedated by ten days. A clause providing
for it was sent to Stockholm to be inserted in the British treaty.
The main
condition for the cession of Bremen and Verden was
that the British squadron, now at Copenhagen, should proceed up the Baltic to
protect Sweden from the Russian attack. But the Russian men-of- war were twice
as many as the British, and might be reinforced by those of Denmark. Not until
Prussia had been secured and other ships had arrived, was Sir John Norris
allowed to sail. Anxiety was expressed that he might meet with the Russian
fleet and destroy it, as the best possible service to his country. But it was
already safe at Reval, and the galleys could not be
reached among the northern shallows. The news of Norris’ sailing, however,
enabled Carteret to obtain the reluctant cession of Stettin; the preliminary
convention with Great Britain embodying it and confirming that with Hanover
was signed on August 29. Carteret’s success was due less, perhaps, to his great
diplomatic talents than to lavish bribery of the Swedish senators. Essential,
too, was the promise of British and French subsidies. The first of the latter,
obtained by George’s influence, was brought to Stockholm by the French envoy, Campredon, at the end of August.
Norris stayed
on in Stockholm waters till November. Threatening letters, pressing mediation
on the Tsar, were sent to the Aland Isles, but unceremoniously returned. Final
treaties with Hanover and Great Britain were signed on November 20, 1719 and
February 1, 1720, the latter binding Great Britain to aid Sweden against
Russia. On that day also the Swedish plenipotentiaries signed, and Carteret and Campredon, as mediators, accepted a treaty between
Sweden and Prussia. They adopted this course in order that the Riksdag, about to meet, might not interfere. The Prussian
envoy, Knyphausen, could not sign, being bound by
orders from home on minor points. But the King of Prussia was persuaded to
accept the treaty. A preliminary convention with the King of Poland was signed
on January 18.
There remained
the peace with Denmark; but to bring this to a conclusion seemed impossible.
The Danes were throughout as insistent on their full demands as the Swedes were
determined on yielding nothing.
1719-21] End of the Northern War.-Discord with
Austria.
With great
difficulty an armistice had been forced upon Denmark as from October 30. When
after six months it lapsed, little progress had been made. Frederick IV, in the
end, was driven from his position, not by the threats of George, but by the
action of the Emperor in taking up the cause of the dispossessed Duke of
Holstein-Gottorp. It appeared that, if he persisted,
Denmark might even lose Schleswig. By May, 1720, disputes were narrowed down to
the amount of money to be paid by Sweden for the restoration of Stralsund and Riigen. On June 14 Carteret accepted, as before, terms
signed by the Swedes alone. With these he repaired to Frederiksborg,
and persuaded the King of Denmark to accept them (July 3). All that Denmark
obtained by her ten years’ war was a payment of 600,000 crowns, the abolition
of the Swedish exemption from the Sound dues, and British and French guarantees
for the retention of her conquest of Gottorpian Schleswig.
Besides
George’s plan of peace there was his plan of war, and this failed utterly. No
Power would join him in offensive action against Peter the Great. British
squadrons again entered the Baltic in 1720 and 1721, but they could not attack
the Russian ports, or even prevent fresh incursions. The men-of-war could not
penetrate among the rocks and islands to the north of Stockholm ; when four
Swedish frigates made the attempt, they ran aground and were destroyed. Already
in October, 1720, George advised the new King of Sweden (Frederick I) to
conclude with the Tsar on what terms he could. He offered ,£20,000 for distribution
among the senators, and a subsidy of £100,000, if the cost of another
expedition to the Baltic could be saved. But the Swedes held him to his
engagements, and were consequently forced to accept the Peace of Nystad (September 10,1721). Peter the Great kept all the
coast from Finland to Courland, and Sweden passed finally from her high estate.
While Great
Britain was thus working in accord with France both in north and south, her
relations with the Emperor were changing for the worse. He resented King
George’s alliance with Prussia and the disposal of provinces in Germany without
reference to himself. In the attacks which were being made upon Protestant
liberties in the Palatinate and elsewhere his sympathy was with Rome, while
George and Frederick William were strenuous in their defence.
It was believed that the Pretender’s bride, Clementina Sobieska, had escaped from Innsbruck with the
connivance of the imperial Court. The Spanish party at Vienna, headed by the “favourite,” Count Althan, and
supported by the papal Court and by that of Turin, was employing every means to
subvert the policy of the Quadruple Alliance. The Piedmont marriage mentioned
above was again in contemplation, and Charles was only dissuaded from its
accomplishment by George’s personal appeals. And, lastly, there was the
question of the succession to the Italian duchies. Strictly speaking, Spain not
having acceded to the Quadruple Alliance within the allotted term of three
months, the Queen of Spain’s sons had forfeited those “expectatives,”
as they were termed. Charles VI claimed them, but his allies resisted the
claim, demanding an extension of the term of grace. The Dutch insisted on this
as a condition of their accession to the Quadruple Alliance. It came to be
believed at Vienna that France and Great Britain were prompting these delays
for the sake of conciliating the Duke of Parma, who, on the other hand, was
looked upon by the Emperor as his principal opponent in Italy. In the end, a
convention was signed on November 18, 1719, obliging Spain to accede within
three months, or forfeit the expectatives. The
Emperor was forced to submit by his inability to expel the Spaniards from
Sicily and Sardinia without the aid of a British fleet, and by his want of
money.
Spain, as has
been seen, acceded within the term. But now Great Britain and France, unanimous
during the War, disputed the conditions of the Peace. The principal subject of
their quarrel was Gibraltar. The Regent supposed that the offer of the
restoration of the fortress, made before the war, still held good, and pledged
himself to it. Both George and Stanhope approved, the latter more than once
expressing the opinion that possession of the place was a burden to England
rather than an advantage. But the suggestion was met in Parliament by so
violent an outburst of resentment that he was glad to let the subject fall,
fearing a formal resolution to the contrary. Furthermore, the vigilant Lord
Stair at Paris, always suspicious of the Regent’s good intentions, was sending alarming
reports of military and naval preparations, and of favour shown to the Jacobites. George went so far as to fit
out a squadron for defence against France, under
pretext of danger in the Mediterranean. The strain was increased by the conduct
of Law, described elsewhere in this volume. Dubois, his personal antagonist,
strove earnestly for the maintenance of good relations, yet so critical was the
situation in March, 1720, that Stanhope had to repair to Paris a second time
that year. Stair, who had attacked Law violently, had to be recalled.
Stanhope’s arguments were fortunately supported by the discovery, or belief, of
the Regent that Philip V was playing him false. It was agreed to send special
envoys to Spain to treat conjointly. Moreover, the unsoundness of Law’s System,
as it had now been developed, was becoming evident. So greatly had its success
been previously feared, that Stanhope wrote that if it took root, as appeared
probable, the Emperor, Great Britain and Holland, even with Prussia on their
side, would not be able to stand against France; and Stair’s last service at
Paris was to demonstrate to the Regent that it must be abandoned. Sir Robert
Sutton, who replaced him in June, adopted a different line of conduct. He
showed confidence, instead of withholding it. Having investigated the reports
of French armaments, he declared his belief that they were unfounded. Yet, in
July, Craggs detailed to him a list of grounds of
suspicion still entertained, and the French ambassador was informed of the real
reason for the equipment of the squadron of defence.
But at the end of the month George decided that it might be laid up, and the
autumn saw a restoration of amity. The case against Law was quietly but firmly
pressed; in December he was dismissed from his employments. Great Britain and
France could now pursue amicably the consummation which both desired,
reconciliation with Spain. It was decided to refer the question of Gibraltar
and other matters in dispute to the Congress appointed to meet at Cambray, though it seemed desirable to arrive at an accord
upon them in advance, in order to oblige the Emperor to adhere to his
engagements. Stanhope held out to Spain the definite expectation that Gibraltar
would be restored, after the Government should have extricated itself from the
difficulties due to the failure of the South Sea Company.
By this time
the Emperor was looked upon at the English Court almost as an enemy. Bernstorff,
still faithful to him, had lost his credit—the result of his opposition to the
Prussian alliance and of Court intrigues consequent upon the reconciliation of
George with the Prince of Wales, and promoted by Walpole, his determined enemy,
whom the South Sea catastrophe called to power. George and Frederick William
not only refused to send plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Brunswick—that
shadowy Congress which had been sitting in form for the settlement of northern
affairs since 1712—but dissuaded the King of Sweden from doing so. The Emperor
persisted in refusing to invest the King of Prussia with Stettin; and the
refusal obliged George to decline for the present the investiture of Bremen and Verden. Protests addressed to Vienna against the impolicy of driving Prussia, possibly, to raise a storm
within the Empire, were in vain. Further, the homeless Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, having repaired to Vienna, was favourably received there, and, through him, an approximation ensued between Austria and
Russia. In November, 1720, Cadogan was recalled from
Vienna in anger, and St Saphorin was ordered to speak
no more about northern affairs.
On March 27,
1721, a treaty was signed at Madrid between Spain and France. It was a treaty
of mutual defence and guarantee, the King of France
promising his most pressing offices for the restoration of Gibraltar and for
the regulation of questions concerning the Italian duchies. Stanhope had died
on February 16, but his policy was pursued by his successors under the
direction of the King, who wrote to Philip promising to restore Gibraltar, in
return for certain concessions, so soon as the consent of Parliament could be
obtained. On June 13, the Treaty of Madrid was extended to include Great
Britain. There followed the betrothals of the Infanta of Spain to Louis XV, and of the Regent’s eldest daughter to the Prince of
Asturias. A new system of European politics was set on foot. At the beginning
of Walpole’s term of power the conduct of foreign policy by Townshend and
Carteret was based on a grouping of Great Britain, France, Spain and Prussia
against the Emperor and the Tsar.
CHAPTER II.
THE AGE OF WALPOLE AND THE PELHAMS.
Chateaubriand once caustically declared that the Revolution of
1688, which Englishmen termed the “glorious,” would be more fitly entitled the
“ useful.” This epigram is less applicable to the age of William and Anne than
to that of Walpole. Under William and Anne the wars, the conspiracies, the
executions, the victories, remind us that we are still, in some sort, in a
heroic age; under Walpole idealism or self-sacrifice is absent, the scene reveals
few great events or great figures. His period is one of peace, uneventful,
almost undisturbed; its chief crisis was due to stock-jobbing, its chief
disputes are about currency and excise, its chief victories those of commerce,
its type, if not its hero, a business man. The age has changed; the claims of
rival merchants, not the sermons of rival preachers, are the incentives to
strife; to the wars for religious or political rights succeed the wars of
dynastic or commercial ambition. The tyranny of ideas, which had caused the
religious contentions of the seventeenth century, yields to the tyranny of
facts and materialism, which causes the political strife of the eighteenth.
England, exhausted by two generations of civil strife, at length learns to
acquiesce patiently in a dynasty that is foreign, in rulers who are opportunist
and uninspiring, and in standards that are low. No one, indeed, will deny that
the age of Walpole brought many benefits to England—a long peace which enabled
her to recover from effort and overstrain, to gamer the spoils won for her by
the diplomacy of William and by the sword of Marlborough, to fill her coffers
with gold and to cover the sea with her ships. Few ages have been more useful
to England in the narrowest sense, few more materially prosperous; yet few have
been less productive in the nobler and more ideal elements of national life. We
are only saved from describing the age in the words which Porson once applied to an individual—as “mercantile and mean beyond merchandise and meanness,”
by the reflexion that the age of Sunderland, of the
second George, and of Walpole is also that of Berkeley, of Wesley, and of Pitt.
The period
opens, perhaps a little too characteristically, with the hideous scandals of
the South Sea Bubble. This gigantic crisis of stock-jobbing, which is described
elsewhere, was perhaps less serious for England than was the national decadence
to which it called attention. The politicians had revealed their widespread
corruption, directors and business men their unscrupulous greed, and the
public, as a whole, hardly appeared in a better light. The fury which it showed
in its pursuit and punishment of the directors, was little less discreditable
than its previous avarice and credulity. In the midst of this turmoil, persecuted
directors, hard-pressed politicians, and a public thirsting for their blood,
alike turned for salvation or counsel to the shrewd and experienced statesman,
who had once been First Lord of the Treasury, but who since April, 1720, had
held the quite insignificant post of Paymaster of the Forces. Walpole, as the
one prominent man in the Ministry responsible for the disaster who had
disbelieved in the success of the Bubble, was therefore the only politician to
improve his reputation by its failure. As a private individual he had profited
largely from the credulity of the public at the time of the Bubble; he was now
to profit yet more from it as a statesman. The universal recognition of his
business ability, of his massive common sense, of his political moderation,
marked him out as the one man fit to cope with the disaster and to minimise its ill-effects. His plan for restoring the
tottering credit of the nation was accepted by Parliament, and its success
secured him in power. He had indeed no rivals to fear or to face among the
Ministers; Earl Stanhope and the two Craggs were
dead; Aislabie was in the Tower; Sunderland and
Charles Stanhope, though acquitted by Parliament, had not been absolved by the
nation. Feeling his unpopularity to be insuperable, Sunderland resigned in
1722, and Walpole succeeded him in office as First Lord of the Treasury,
becoming also Chancellor of the Exchequer (April, 1722). As Townshend—Walpole’s
brother-in-law—had already (February) become Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
Walpole found it easy to grasp the chief power in the State. So long as he
agreed with Townshend, he needed only the favour of
his sovereign, in order to remain supreme.
In some
respects the character of George the First—as of his son— has been wronged,
for, though their standard of private conduct may have in some respects been
low and their view of human nature not high, they had genuine merits. Each
showed a judicious patronage towards learning both in England and in Hanover,
and, though they have been accused of despising the arts, few of their English
subjects had so genuine a love for music, or showed so good a taste in
appreciating it. With regard to their public conduct, it can hardly be denied
that they were in many ways superior to the average English politician of the
age. Each did his best to stop the infamous traffic and sale of commissions in
the army and something to check the prevalent political corruption. With little
knowledge of English ways and much innate aversion from constitutional
government, they both consented to be directed by their English Ministers, and
honestly observed the bargain between themselves and the English people. It is
true that their foreign policy sometimes showed an intelligible bias towards
Hanoverian interests; but this defect was more than balanced by their avoidance
of vexatious interference in domestic policy, and by the zeal with which they laboured to compose differences between rival religious
sects and rival political factions. The safe mediocrity of the first two
Georges was indeed their salvation, for it induced the English people to avoid
pressing further a conflict between Crown and people, which could only have
endangered the one and demoralised the other. Great
as were the restrictions imposed upon the sovereign’s power, his influence was
still real, and might have been dangerous, if unscrupulously used. Eighteenth
century statesmen were so deeply conscious of this fact that they continually
suspect or accuse one another of intriguing in the closet, or of trying to
catch the ear of the King; Walpole spent hours daily in the boudoir of Queen
Caroline, telling her what policy he desired George II to pursue; and to the
same King’s mistress, Lady Yarmouth, Pitt actually submitted his military plans
and the proposed list of his administration. Such facts draw the curtain aside,
and show but too clearly the influence of court intrigue and of the King’s will
on the determination of public policy, and on the rise and fall of Ministries.
Though Anne and
the third George did not hesitate to make full use of their opportunities, the
authority of the two first Georges was exercised with less frequency and effect
by reason of their ignorance of English parliamentary methods. Nevertheless, in
his relations with his sovereign Walpole was anything but the autocrat that
fancy has often supposed. In 1725, he reluctantly yielded to the royal will and
permitted the recall of Bolingbroke to England; in 1728, he only secured his
power over the new King, George II, by obtaining for him the substantial
gratuity of an additional ,£100,000 yearly for the Civil List. Subsequently,
the favour of the able and enlightened Queen Caroline
assured Walpole’s supremacy over the mind of George II; but her death in 1737
brought about a visible decline of his influence, which contributed, in some
degree, to his subsequent fall.
If Walpole
sometimes found it hard to win over his sovereign, still less easy did he find
it to prevail on his colleagues in the Cabinet or on his party in the House.
More will be said below as to the working of party government in this period.
Here it is? enough to say that, though Walpole ruled long, and though his
majority was sometimes large, his tenure of office was never so secure as to
enable him to persist in an unpopular course. On many occasions, he bowed
before a storm of popular abuse, which was sometimes as fleeting as it was
violent, and the usual cause of his surrender was instability, not of
conviction, but of position. From a Minister, who felt himself so unsafe during
each one of his twenty years of rule, bold initiative and far-reaching reform
could not come. A careful stewardship of the national resources, an unwearied
energy in promoting English industry and commerce, a good-natured tolerance of
rival political and religious opinions, so long as they were not too
extreme—these were the elements of that Walpolian system, which carried out the Revolution of 1688 to its logical conclusion, by
developing the power of Parliament and assuring the Protestant Succession.
Bolingbroke had
thought that England would never submit to be governed by a German; and the
quiet acceptance of an uninspiring ruler by a proud and patriotic people,
accustomed to kings of marked personality, is one of the wonders of English history.
The character and policy of George I, the scheme of alliances which he reared
to prevent interference from abroad, the errors of the Jacobites which enabled his Ministers to preserve his regime at home—all these have been
discussed elsewhere. Here, it is needful to touch upon the difficulties of that
energetic clique of Whig oligarchs, who had selected a king for themselves and
who had to force their choice on the reluctant masses of the English people.
The body of James II lay in state in the Church of the Faubourg St Jacques, unburied and surrounded by flaming tapers, awaiting the day when
the Jacobites could lay it to rest in English earth.
They had some justification for their hope, for the sentiment for the exiled
Stewarts was always strong and often dangerous during the first fifteen years
of the new dynasty. Even after the suppression of the Earl of Mar’s rising in
1715 and the conclusion of the French Alliance of 1717, contemporaries thought
that George I sat, not on a throne, but on a rocking-chair. The Septennial Act
(1717), that extraordinary exercise of power by which the existing Parliament
extended its term to seven years, can only be justified, as it was obviously
prompted, by fear of Jacobite interference. In 1718
the Bishop of Salisbury quarrelled with his Dean and
Chapter, on the ground that their singing “ By the waters of Babylon ” as an
anthem was a sign of their attachment to the King over the water. In 1721 Floridcmte, an opera in which a rightful heir is restored
to his own after misfortunes, was received in London with thunders of applause,
not all intended for the composer, even though he happened to be Handel. More
significant perhaps than any ebullitions of popular feeling is the fact that
most prominent statesmen, even Walpole himself, deemed it prudent to indulge in
secret, if not always sincere, correspondence with the exiled Stewart. That the
Hanoverian Succession became infinitely more secure during Walpole’s tenure of
office was, in no small degree, due to his; policy of cautious temporising, and to his deliberate conviction that, the
less he harassed people with new taxes or new laws, the more likely would they
be to acquiesce in a new dynasty. 'Tranquilla non movere was his motto and his policy; and for the moment it
could claim an unusual justification. The country gentry—so powerfully
represented in Parliament— were the most important class attached to the
Stewarts, and the most
innately
conservative section of the community; and they could only be conciliated by
the absence of innovation. Hence, though the statute book during this period is
barren, its sterility was more productive of genuine result than have been some
periods of legislative fertility. Old abuses and a new dynasty alike remained
unchanged, and Walpole tolerated the one to secure the other.
Even in
religious policy Walpole suffered his personal views to be determined by his
political necessities. After the discovery of the not very transparent Jacobite treason of Francis Atterbury,
Bishop of Rochester (1721-2), Walpole exacted a special tax from the Catholics
to the extent of £100,000, on the ground that they had disturbed the country,
and must therefore pay an indemnity. Here, the desire of securing a round sum
in a manner agreeable to the majority of his countrymen overpowered his love
of justice and his notions of policy, for the Exchequer’s gain was the
dynasty’s loss. But there is no more reason to doubt the genuine religious
tolerance of Walpole than that of the Georges, and the efforts of King and
Minister were mainly instrumental in securing alleviation for the Dissenters.
By the Indemnity Acts, passed annually from 1727 onwards, Nonconformists,
except Catholics, Jews, and Quakers, were practically relieved from the civil
disabilities which a score of oppressive Acts had imposed. But Walpole’s zeal
for religious tolerance, as might be expected, was more practical than
theoretical. When measures were brought forward in Parliament for the more
complete relief of Dissenters (1730, 1734,1739), he wavered and temporised. He received meetings of Dissenters in private, sympathised, held out hopes, and expressed desires; but he
would risk neither his parliamentary majority nor his personal credit in trying
to secure measures of full legal tolerance for Dissenters from a house full of
country squires, to whom the high church parson was not only a fellow believer
but a brother sportsman.
Political
considerations and the need of defending the Ministry entered even into
Walpole’s dealings with the financial world, that world which he best
understood and where he was best loved. “No man,” all Lombard Street admitted,
“had his equal in figures”; and this admission was the more remarkable, since
some of his best-known financial schemes were not entirely original. Nevertheless,
Walpole was able to kindle in merchants some of that enthusiasm which Carteret
was to inspire in diplomatists, and Pitt in the people as a whole. He gauged
their wishes with perfect accuracy and knew that the moneyed classes must be
reconciled to the new dynasty by administrative activity, just as the country
gentry were to be won by legislative sloth. The squire wanted the old laws and
the old taxes to remain; the merchant wanted new trade regulations, new
bounties for his exports, and new tariffs against his foreign rivals. Walpole
was as ready to comply with the one as with the other, and the most cautious of
legislators became the most daring of financiers. England had possessed great
finance Ministers in Burghley, Montagu, and Godolphin; but no man before
Walpole had ever so comprehensively grasped the whole economic system of
England or had so decisively left his impress upon it. From the very moment of
his accession to office we note a thorough change and improvement in every
department of national finance. His earliest financial scheme marked the
character of future effort, for his plan for the settlement of the South Sea
Company (in which he persisted despite great opposition) eventually succeeded.
He brought the Bank of England and the East India Company to the rescue of the
South Sea Company, and provided eventually for the sale or redemption of about
a quarter of its stock. It was impossible to restore the South Sea Company to
complete health, but Walpole kept it alive by cordials from the Sinking Fund
until it gained convalescence.
In pure finance
the Sinking Fund is at once Walpole’s chief achievement,and the chief illustration of the political difficulties which hampered his
financial reforms. During his first tenure of the Treasury, in the years
1716-7, he had devised a scheme for reducing the National Debt, by the
formation of an annual sinking fund for the purpose of paying it off in instalments. There was to be a general reduction of
interest on the various types of national securities (averaging six to five per
cent.), and the surplus thus gained was to be formed into a sinking fund for
the annual reduction of the debt. There is no indication that Walpole intended
this surplus to accumulate at compound interest; and the comparison between his
sinking fund and that of the younger Pitt is not to Walpole’s disadvantage. His
sinking fund scheme was actually introduced by him after he had resigned office
in 1717. Its principle was extended in 1727, when he further reduced the
interest on the various types of national securities (five to four per cent,
average), and thereby raised the contribution to the sinking fund to an average
of about a million a year. The sinking fund contributed directly to debt
reduction, indirectly to the stability of public credit. Unfortunately, it
formed a convenient fund to be appropriated or raided in case of necessity.
Thus, for instance, when in 1728 Walpole granted George II one hundred thousand
pounds more for the Civil List than had been allotted to George I, this
addition was to be annually charged on the sinking fund. This particular
instance of a raid on the sinking fund is not to Walpole’s credit, for there
can be no doubt that it was connected with his desire to ingratiate himself
with the new King. A still worse, though an unimportant, instance of
appropriation, occurred in 1729, when the sum of £4200 (which thieves had
stolen from the Exchequer) was made good from the sinking fund. Other
arrangements for diverting the sinking fund, between 1733 and 1737, are also
not very defensible, and incurred the weighty censure of Adam Smith. Moreover,
the genuine fear with which the increase of the debt was then regarded, which
pictured it as a vampire sucking away the life of the State, as a cell disease
slowly subduing its victim, makes these attacks on the sinking fund even less
creditable than they would seem to-day. What was intended to be a cash reserve
was treated as if it were a Fortunatus’ purse. But the matter cannot be settled
wholly on economic grounds, for the annual sinking fund surplus was an almost
irresistible temptation to a Minister like Walpole, who was unwilling to risk
an insecure position by imposing new taxes. The only other way of getting money
except by new taxes was by raising new loans; but the sinking fund had been
intended to prevent national loans, and direct appropriation from it might
avoid a loan altogether. Such seems to have been the argument, and it is one
which makes Walpole the victim rather than the dupe of circumstance. It should
be remembered, however, to his credit that, while he sometimes robbed the
sinking fund to avoid raising a loan, he never raised a loan without devoting
some part of it to pay off that part of the National Debt, which bore the
highest rate of interest.
If Walpole had
been asked for his ideal of a golden year in finance, he would probably have
answered “a year with the sinking fund at a million and the land tax at a
shilling.” The land tax was a lucrative direct tax; but, if he ventured to
raise it, Walpole risked the alienation of the country gentry, and, not
improbably^ his own overthrow, or even that of the dynasty. All his efforts
could not prevent the land tax from standing at an annual average of two
shillings, though he got it down to a shilling in 1732-3. Probably with the
same view of not irritating the Stewart-loving squires, Walpole never proposed
a reassessment of the land tax, though such a measure was obviously in the
interests of the National Exchequer and an act of justice to particular districts.
The land tax was borne chiefly by the gentry ; but indirect taxation of the
moneyed classes likewise yielded good results. As Walpole said in his coarse,
humorous way, the landed gentry resembled the hog, squealing whenever you laid
hands on him, while the merchants were like a sheep, yielding its wool
silently. Excise and customs were the two blades which shore away the
commercial fleece. Walpole recognised that the fleece
would be the richer if he could devise effectual checks upon smuggling. The
severest laws and penalties were enacted in vain, for reasons which are not far
to seek. No one who is acquainted with the traditions of Romney Marsh, or of
the Welsh or Cornish coasts, can think that either Revenue officers or
regulations availed against old traditions, excellent opportunities, and the
cooperation of whole countrysides in the extensive
industry of smuggling. The chaos was indescribable ; the regulations were
waste paper; the Exchequer must have lost hundreds of thousands yearly, Walpole’s
only chance of reducing the smuggling was either to lessen the huge customs
duties on tea, coffee, and wine, or to replace these duties by excises, which
should be chargeable on the commodities sold for home consumption. In 1724, he
introduced an excise in the place of customs duties on tea and coffee; but,
though the result increased the revenue, he was very cautious about extending
the principle. In 1732, he revived the excise on salt, and on March 14, 1733,
he opened his famous Excise Scheme in the House of Commons. It simply consisted
in the imposition of an excise on wine and tobacco, which was to be levied on
the goods after they had been placed in English warehouses, in order that the
chief possibilities of smuggling might be prevented. Besides this, there was a
further plan of allowing all raw materials to receive a drawback on reexportation, and thus make London a “free port” and the
market of the world. This scheme, he contended, would increase the revenue and
benefit the honest trader at the expense of the smuggler.
There had been
ominous mutterings already; now there were loud cries of indignation. Pulteney led the opposition in the Commons, denouncing the
excise as a monster, as injurious to liberty, as the greatest exercise of
arbitrary power ever attempted by a tyrant. A vast mob surged round Westminster
Hall, penetrated to the Court of Requests and the Lobby, howled insults at the
Ministers, and tried to tear Walpole from his carriage as he left St Stephen’s.
Pamphlets of the coarsest abuse and the wildest imagination abounded; mobs
paraded the streets; Walpole was burnt in effigy in dozens of bonfires. People
saw in imagination the tyrannical excise officers entering the Englishman’s
castle, and beheld Magna Carta trampled beneath the
feet of merciless uniformed bureaucrats. Jacobites openly spoke of the return of the Stewart; Whigs whispered that they would
resist excise officers by force of arms. Though the Venetian ambassador wrote
that the pension list was increasing, Walpole’s majorities diminished, the
tables in the Commons were weighed down with petitions, Ministerial speakers
were hissed and abused in the lobbies, howled down when they rose to speak in
the Commons. Queen Caroline feared for the loyalty of the army and the safety
of the dynasty, and gave a tearful consent to the abandonment of the Bill.
After the session of April 10, Walpole announced this decision in a short
speech to a private meeting of his supporters—“ This dance, it will no further
go.” The words disguised his emotion, and observers noted that his voice
trembled and that his eyes filled with tears. The abandonment of a cherished
scheme of finance probably meant as much to this coarse-fibred man as the
failure of a negotiation to Carteret, or the loss of a regiment to Pitt.
That Walpole,
cautious and placable, would not persist in a scheme
which threatened him, that he refused to “enforce taxes at the price of blood,”
is not surprising. The whole course of this movement illustrates the strange
and feverish agitations which sometimes suddenly gripped the English people
during this century, disorganising policies, changing
Ministries, and making England’s Governments a proverb for fickleness and an
object of pity to foreign diplomats. But the Sacheverell agitation, the South Sea Bubble, the putcry against
Wood’s Halfpence, the
Jenkins’ Ear
frenzy, the Porteous riots—all these are, to some
extent, more intelligible than the tempest which raged over the excise. It is a
commonplace among modem historians that there was nothing in the actual scheme
to cause alarm, that the measures proposed were at once just and practicable,
and that, half a century later, they were, in large part, adopted by the
younger Pitt without protest from anybody and with an enormous resultant gain to
the revenue. But the circumstances of the time must be considered—the genuine
hatred of unjustifiable state interference that existed among all parties, the
real belief in the rights of liberty and property in their narrow and
individualistic sense. Moreover Walpole’s actions and utterances on the excise
question looked somewhat equivocal; before 1732, he seems to have supported the
principle of an excise on salt, because it imposed a small duty on a necessary
which all could pay; in 1733, he seems to have advocated the excise on wine and
tobacco, on the ground that these were luxuries on which a few paid. That the
agitation was, in a large measure, fictitious, that the Opposition arguments
were due partly to pure malice, and partly to impure self-interest, ought not
to obscure the fact that Walpole’s actions gave cause for suspicion. Why, asked
his opponents, why did he revive the salt excise and reduce the land tax to a
shilling in 1732, unless he had in contemplation a scheme of general excise for
1733? In introducing the excise scheme, he declared roundly that he had no
intention of extending the excise to articles such as bread or common
necessaries, and that no such scheme as a general excise had ever entered his
head. That posterity accepts his assurances without question is not necessarily
a reason why. contemporaries should have shown the same recognition and
confidence.
After the
failure of the great Excise Scheme, Walpole seems to have lost interest, as
well he might, in the essentially internal problems of trade and finance. The
regulation of internal industry, the inspections to secure purity of goods,
and the like, fell into some disuse in his later years, and he made no serious
attempt to better the condition of industrial or agricultural workers. Indeed,
the masters were supreme in the Commons, and Walpole would never have imperilled his own interests for the workers, against whom
various Acts prohibiting combination were passed in this period. It may be
urged that this epoch was the golden age of English agriculture, that the rate
of industrial wages, relative to that in other times, has seldom stood higher,
and that the worst evils of the capitalised industrial system were still to come. There can be little doubt, moreover, that
Walpole genuinely believed the development of capitalism to be the source of
all wealth and the remedy for all evils. Agriculture, manufactures and
commerce, in this view, could be best improved by capitalistic development,
for, as nothing else so quickly increased the sum total of national wealth,
nothing else could provide so effectual or so speedy a remedy for poverty,
unemployment, in a word for all economic ills. Hence the Corn Bounty Act of
1690, which had encouraged the capitalistic landowner at the expense of the
yeoman, was now supplemented by bounties on exported manufactures, which gave
advantage to the merchant with the large purse over the merchant with the
small.
Mercantilism—of
which Walpole was a convinced disciple—assumed that the State should stimulate
national wealth, to the best of its, ability. An export bounty had already been
applied to corn by the Com Bounty Act of 1689, and there had been a few export
bounties upon manufactures; but these were now extended as a matter of general
principle. Bounties and encouragements given to English-made gunpowder, worked
silk, sailcloth, and refined sugar, attest the wide and diverse range of his
efforts. Characteristically, he made no change in the bounties affecting the
landed gentry, but bent all his energies to assisting the commercial classes.
But with Walpole, as with all true mercantilists, it was not enough to bring
the State to the assistance of those industries which most obviously increased
national wealth: it was necessary to encourage and support others, which
increased national power.
Bounties were
given on whale fisheries in Greenland and on herring busses in the North Sea;
subsidies flowed out to great trading companies in Africa, in the Baltic, or in
the Levant, to encourage our sailors to seek distant seas, and to create a
large commercial marine as a reserve from which the royal navy could be
indefinitely increased. Under Walpole, the navy itself was not only kept up at
its full standard, but the number of ships was even increased, though its administration
left much to be desired. It is worthy of note that, except in cases where the
object was purely to increase national power, Walpole seems to have granted
bounties, drawbacks, and the like, not with the view of protecting infant
industries at home, but in order to enable well-grown industries to capture
foreign trade. Such a policy flowed necessarily from the ideas of the age; for,
as the tariff wall was supposed to be high enough to enable England to retain
her internal trade, an increase to her external trade was the only way of
adding to the store of national wealth. Thus it was on commerce, that, as the
King’s Speech of 1721 put it, “ the riches and grandeur of this nation chiefly
depended.”
Every effort
was used to develop commerce, and to secure a favourable balance of trade—attempts which often began in commercial and ended in actual
warfare, for the tariff-war was often the precursor of the trade- war, and,
where the duty failed, the sword might succeed. The Methuen Treaty with
Portugal in 1703, the commercial clauses of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, were
universally regarded as concessions to English trade which only arms, or the
threat of arms, could have extorted. Much as Walpole himself loved peace, he
was at one time ready to go to war with the Emperor, unless he abolished the
Ostend Company—which threatened a formidable rivalry with England’s East India
Company.
The balance of
trade actually became as great a fetish as the balance of power, and demanded
from its votaries as many sacrifices and as much blood. In 1721, the King’s
Speech referred to the necessity of securing a “favourable balance of trade” by increasing our commerce. It proposed, as the most
effectual means towards this end, to facilitate the import of foreign raw
materials and the export of home manufactures. In accordance with this
principle, the export duties, which had weighed heavily on the development of
our external trade, were almost entirely swept away, with the exception of that
upon white woollen cloth. At the same time and on the
same principle, while import duties on manufactures were rigidly maintained or
even raised, those on raw materials were almost totally abolished. Walpole was
far too wise not to understand that a too rigid system of monopoly defeats itself,
and that his repeal of duties on incoming raw materials would allow a far freer
circulation to capital and to trade.
The great aim
of Walpole’s policy, whether we look to his tariffs against foreign or his
bounties on home manufactures, was to secure a favourable balance of trade. Mercantilists held that, in commercial dealings between two
countries, one nation invariably got the best of the bargain. The balance
between the imports and exports of England to Holland, in the years 1720-2 for
example, indicated according to the figures that England had gained £1,526,682
in the three years. It was believed that a good deal of this amount had passed
in hard gold to England, though the figures were in any case somewhat dubious,
and important factors were entirely omitted from consideration. The chief
defect of the theory was that each particular countiy was isolated, and treated as an economic island : thus, in the case of a
country like Holland, through which German goods filtered, England’s tariff for
Dutch goods remained intact because the balance was favourable to her, whereas the German share in effecting that result was entirely ignored.
The rigidity with which this theory of balance of trade was held at this time,
is of great importance, because it helps to explain the great and increasing
attention which England paid to her plantations and colonies. The course of
trade, as well as of empire, set westward. Joshua Gee, the most popular
mercantilist writer of the age, corrected the official figures from the best
evidence, and showed that, in reality, the trade balance from the Continent
obstinately inclined against England. In her colonies the case was otherwise;
they are, wrote Horace Walpole the elder, a wise and experienced statesman,
“the source of all our riches, and which preserve the balance of trade in our favour, for I don’t know where we have it but by the means
of our colonies”; and this conclusion found general acceptance. Investments of
colonial money in English concerns, and the like, together with actual cash
remittances, were probably the real cause of this favourable balance, but no means, whether by legislation or regulation, were left untried
to produce it.
A scheme
clearly floated in Sir Robert Walpole’s head, of making a self-sufficing empire,
to which the colonies would supply raw materials and the mother country
manufactures. The bargain was not entirely unequal. It is true that the British
merchant got Parliament to forbid the colonies to manufacture those articles
which threatened to compete with his own manufactures. Such prohibitions were
extended during this period to copper smelting (1722) and the manufacture of
hats (1732); but, insomuch as the colonies were as yet chiefly agricultural,
these measures seem to have caused comparatively little grievance till 1750. In
the period 1720-50, certain commodities—tobacco, indigo, dyeing woods, rice,
molasses, sugar, furs, copper ore—were “ enumerated,” i.e. were not allowed to be exported from the colonies, except to England and the other
colonies. In passing through England they were obliged to pay duties ; and this
burden, together with the restriction to English markets, reacted unfavourably on colonial manufactures. At the same time
there was some return for this injustice—bounties were given on many materials
which the colonies produced, various exceptions were made and relaxations
permitted. In 1721, in order that England’s naval stores might be obtained from
the colonies rather than from the Baltic, bounties were given on various kinds
of naval materials which the colonies might supply, and all their hemp, timber
and lumber were allowed to come in duty free. To encourage the colonial fishing
industries, salt was allowed to be imported from any part of Europe directly to
Pennsylvania (1727) and to New York (1730). In 1729 the rice of Carolina, which
had hitherto, as an “enumerated” commodity, been forced to touch at an English
port and pay a duty, was allowed to proceed direct to any part of Europe south
of Cape Finisterre, subject to the payment in Great Britain of the amount equal
to English duties less the drawback. The principle was also extended to the new
colony of Georgia in 1735, with the result that the colonial growers speedily
ousted the rice of India and of Egypt from Mediterranean markets. In 1739 the
same principle was applied to sugar from the colonies with a corresponding
increase to their sugar trade with southern Europe. Meanwhile, the English
manufacturer rubbed his hands, the greater the wealth of the colonists through
the sale of raw materials, the more would they be obliged to purchase of the
English manufacturers. The preamble to the Rice Act of 1729 expressed this
conception in a somewhat nobler way, by declaring that the prosperity of the
colony must be considered as well as that of the mother country.
The scheme of a
self-sufficing economic empire—which appears in this period—is of peculiar
interest. The policy which put it into execution afterwards brought upon itself
the denunciation of Adam Smith, on the ground that there had been an entire
sacrifice of colonial interests to those of the mother country. Indeed, it can
hardly be denied that the object of the policy was to procure a “favourable balance” to England, whatever .night happen to
colonial trade, and that, in this sense, the policy was really adverse to the
colonies. But, when that balance was once secured, encouragements could be
really given to the colonies. The economic interests of the colonies were,
therefore, in some degree, subordinated to those of the mother country; but
they were not absolutely disregarded. The encouragements given to colonial raw
material were a direct gain to the colonial producers, to English manufacturers
only an indirect one. Again, in certain cases, as in the prohibition of tobacco-growing
in England and Ireland, the home producers were sacrificed to the interests of
planters in Virginia and Maryland. In addition, the Navigation Act of 1662
forced all foreign goods from Asia, Africa, or America to be imported in
bottoms that were British—a designation which covered colonial as well as
English ships. Under the influence of this Act and designation many of the
colonies, especially those of New England, had created veritable commercial
fleets of their own. Thus, in this respect, they benefited largely as against
the foreigner; and their gain from the shipping and the bounties was a great
compensation for the loss occasioned by the restrictions on certain colonial
manufactures. It is difficult to estimate that loss, because, as was inevitable,
a vast illicit trade sprang up, which was systematically connived at by the
mother country, and, in those good easy days, a kind-hearted Government at home
and tolerant officials in the colonies often did away with much actual
injustice.
Nevertheless,
the theoretical grievance remained; and, when any dispute between the interests
of colony and mother country came up for public settlement, it was not the
latter who suffered. For instance, though encouragement was given to colonial
raw sugar, a high duty was placed against their refined sugar for the benefit
of the sugar refineries of England proper. Again, in 1733, the British sugar
colonies petitioned Parliament, because the New England colonies were importing
sugar and other commodities from the French and Dutch sugar isles, to the
detriment of the British colonial sugar trade. Parliament contained many
persons with interests or estates in British West Indian islands, not so many
with a stake in New England; accordingly, it replied by the famous “ Molasses
Act,” imposing heavy duties on foreign sugar, rum and molasses imported into
British plantations. The preamble falsely stated that her sugar isles were the
mainstay of England’s commerce, but, even if they were, their chief industry
was not in sugar but in slaves. Had the “Molasses Act” ever been seriously
enforced, the economic grievances of New England would have been heavy;
fortunately, its application was lax, and the cloud, for the moment, passed.
Nevertheless, the Act made it clear that, when the interests of colonies and
mother country formally conflicted, those of the former had to give way. The
economic grievances under which the colonies laboured at this time were probably not as yet serious, except in theory; until 1750 the
prohibitions on colonial manufactures caused comparatively little
inconvenience; the Molasses Act was inoperative, the bounties and the
Navigation Acts favoured the colonies. It would seem
that the various restrictions were felt but slightly in communities that were primarily
agricultural, and whose political self-consciousness was immature. It was not
the presence of oppression, but the absence of foresight, which was the evil; tranquilla non movere was perhaps a policy for Old England—it was hardly such for New. The industrial
developments and the increase of population, which were completely transforming
the more northerly American colonies, were putting the old colonial system out
of date; and the policy of drift served for the moment, though it was fatal for
the future. Moreover, colonial grievances were aggravated by the fact that the
French treated their colonies with more insight and sympathy, and deferred more
obviously to their trade interests. During this period a judicious spirit of
moderation, shown by the various concessions in bounties and the like, the connivance
at the irregular trade, appeased colonial discontent; but there were not
wanting signs of that intense resentment of a grievance, always in theory
acute, and destined to become, in no distant hour, a deep cause of that
internecine strife which tore asunder the Anglo-Saxon
race.
Such was the
Colonial System as Walpole left it; but our view of it would be incomplete, if
we did not anticipate the developments which took place after his fall. It was evident
that the demands of English and colonial merchants must sometimes conflict, and
that, as one side had the ear of Parliament and the other had not, the latter
must suffer. No Minister in the eighteenth century found it easy to resist parliamentary
supporters, and only the utmost amount of prudence, or of far-seeing
statesmanship, could have averted this result. Unfortunately, neither was at
hand in the crucial year 1750, which is a milestone in colonial policy. In that
year, English ironmasters clamoured against the
colonial competition, and Henry Pelham decided to appease them by an Act,
exactly as Walpole had appeased English capitalists, with West Indian
interests, by the Molasses Act of 1733. The Colonial Manufactures Prohibition
Act of 1750 sternly forbade the manufacture of bar or pig-iron in the American
colonies, and provided for the abolition of colonial slitting-mills, tilt-
hammers, and iron furnaces. The measure was to be rendered palatable by the
granting of a preference to colonial raw iron as against continental, i.e. by
the removal of duties on colonial bar and pig-iron, though these duties were
retained on iron from the Baltic and elsewhere. But the concession was useless;
the preamble of the Act announced that the production of raw iron was to be
encouraged in the colonies, and its working prohibited, in each case for the
benefit of the English manufacturer. This conception—familiar to English
statesmen and statutes—was now at last brought home to the colonies, for, while
earlier Acts had either been inoperative or had caused little practical
grievance, the new Act was effective and obnoxious from the beginning. The old
Acts had applied to young countries primarily agricultural, and rich only in
raw materials; the new Act bore hardly on countries which were beginning to be
industrial; and it was unfortunate that Puritan New England was now the home of
colonial industry, as it had always been of colonial independence. It was easy
to put out a New Englander’s furnace, but the act lit a smouldering fire in his heart, for he now realised—in his own
case and for the first time—that the commercial interests of a colony must be
sacrificed to those of the mother land, and arguments as to the tyranny of
tariffs easily led a Puritan community on to arguments about the tyranny of
kings.
In his speech
in 1749 Pelham declared himself a foe to monopoly and a disbeliever in the
efficacy of human regulation to stay the currents of labour or of trade. His successors were to find that, while it is hard to check
economic movements, it is easy to arouse political, and chat the date 1750,
which marks the beginning of industrial strife between Old and New England, is,
in its way, as significant as 1783, which marks the close of military conflict.
There is no indication that Pelham realised that
colonial policy was entering on a new phase, and the Molasses Act is an
apparent anticipation of the Colonial Manufactures Prohibition Act. The wisdom,
which refused to enforce the one, and the energy, which made the other
practicable, are characteristic of Walpole and Pelham. Neither had the genius
and imagination to see the dawn of the new day; but, at least, Walpole was not
responsible for the more portentous change in policy.
Politically,
the colonies had few grievances to allege until 1750, for most of them were
governed on principles more liberal than any known or practised elsewhere. Newcastle, otherwise energetic enough, was justly accused by the
elder Horace Walpole of neglect of colonial business, though his attention to
it was greater than has sometimes been supposed. Sir Robert Walpole contented
himself with economic interference, and is said to have waved aside the not
infrequent suggestion for taxing the colonies with this sentence of shrewd and
homely wisdom: “ I have Old England set against me for taxes, do you think I
will have New England likewise ?” Outside Downing Street, there were signs that
the importance of colonial politics was increasing, that the conception of
colonies as the local branches of a central business firm was giving way before
ideas (ess mercantile and more political. Colonial
particularism grew; local patriotism stirred; possession of vast trade was
ceasing to be the one source of colonial pride or existence; pride of territory
or of race was beginning. England herself witnessed Berkeley’s great scheme for
planting a spiritual Utop*' in the Bermudas, and beheld the dream, whose ideal was to provide
a money-ridden empire with a conscience, end with a present of books to a
poverty-stricken library. About the time (1732) when the failure of Berkeley’s
scheme was announced, the new color 7 of Georgia was founded, on a scheme which
appealed more to the aspirations of the patriot than to the desires of the
business man. The scheme, in brief, was a charitable device for settling poor
emigrants in a new land; it was started by private charity and aided by
contributions from the state exchequer. There wanted not noble patrons of the
Georgian plantation, and the King himself had smiled upon Berkeley’s plan; but
Walpole was indifferent, if not actually hostile, to both, and his delay in
paying Berkeley the sums promised by the Treasury certainly wrecked the Bermudas venture. For the gentle religious idealism of
Berkeley was almost as suspect to this genial materialist, as were any
political schemes which looked for economic support to the State and to the
future instead of to shareholders. It would be wrong to deny that the
conception of an empire, based on an economic unity, floated before England’s vision
as before that of France; but Walpole conceived that unity, in the main, as
resting on the broad interests of the mother land, while the French conception
implied a bond of mutual benefit and obligation. Walpole recognised what appeared to be, the French what ought to have been, the facts; neither saw
the facts as they really were. Walpole’s aim was mainly economic, and his
calculations were therefore too short—the French mainly political and their
calculations therefore too long; in the one case the ideals were too low, in
the other too high. Both schemes ended in disaster; but Walpole was nearer to
the facts, and hence, when the catastrophe came, France lost all, and England
only half, of the North American continent.
Walpole’s
economic policy, though everywhere defeated and marred by political
considerations, has nevertheless a remarkable unity and harmony of aim. The
Sinking Fund, which was to redeem the National Debt; the excise policy, which
was to destroy smuggling; the colonial policy, which was to unite the
Empire—all these achieved useful results, though political necessities sadly
restricted and hampered their operation. Elsewhere, Walpole had a freer hand,
and won such decisive success in his policy of encouragements to English trade,
of placing tariffs on foreign manufactures and taking duties off foreign raw
materials, that he might claim to be the first of financiers, if the evidence
either of figures or contemporaries could pass without criticism. Walpole had
produced a system which was a model of balance and consistency; he had imposed
his bounties and prohibitions for short periods, and had made constant revision
and adaptation of the tariff the very essence of his policy. Unhappily, the
system was never simple, and its increasing elaboration and complexity
prevented speedy revision, and annually increased the strength of the vested
interests concerned. Under his successors, Walpole’s system fared badly:
bounties, once imposed to develop living, remained to prolong the agonies of
dying, trades; prohibitions formerly effective became meaningless; the
empiricism of one age had become the dogmatism of the next, with the result
that contradiction, contusion, obsolescence reigned everywhere. Under these conditions,
the system which Walpole had fathered encountered the most brilliant and
destructive criticism that economic science has known.
Adam Smith’s
attacks on the Mercantilist System require some qualification, for they fail to
do justice to the ideals and objects which it pursued, nor do they recognise that, because that system had ceased to be of
service in 1776, it was not necessarily an anachronism under Walpole. Adam
Smith undoubtedly proved that the system was not the easiest way of increasing
national wealth; but Walpole would have replied that, none the less, it was the
easiest and perhaps the only way to secure national power and wealth at the
same time. Adam Smith rightly contended that colonial trade had been
overdeveloped to the detriment of foreign; but this view marked a revolution in
economic theory, so that a practical business man like Walpole may be excused
for acquiescing in a view almost universal even among theorists in his own day.
So long as the balance of trade was a fetish, it was only reasonable to develop
trade with the colonies, where that balance could be regulated so as to be
especially favourable to the mother land.
On the more
purely economic side, however, some aspects of Walpole’s policy are open to
severe criticism, even after every allowance has been made. Thus, for example,
the production of corn was encouraged by bounty to the detriment of turnip and
grass cultivation, and at the expense of the small farmer; in other cases, one
industry was selected for encouragement, without regard being paid to the fact
that such forcing might have a bad effect on other industries indirectly
associated with it. An industry— like a country—was regarded as an economic
island, with results often serious in each case. Such measures, however
erroneous in theory, were still more erroneous in fact; and the criticism of
the practical man would be more severe than that of the theorist. The main evil
of the system, however, was that it tended to monopoly, and monopoly always has
its victims and its penalties; but Walpole’s resolute insistence on the
principle that raw materials from foreign lands should enter English ports duty
free prevented the price exacted from being higher. His errors resulted from a
too complete adoption of mercantilist theory, which made him as much the idol of
contemporaries as it has rendered him the target of subsequent criticism. But,
after every deduction has been made, when we regard the immense range and scale
of his achievement, he must be deemed worthy to rank beside the great financier
at the beginning, and the great financier at the close, of his century. It is
an irony in which Swift would have delighted that the white staff of Lord High
Treasurer, bestowed thrice during the eighteenth century, was never grasped by
the hand either of Montagu, of Walpole, or of Pitt, whose supreme financial
talents most justly entitled them to that reward.
During the early
years of his government, Walpole exercised comparatively little influence over
foreign policy, though he kept a watchful eye from the Treasury on subsidies
and commercial negotiations. For our purpose, England’s foreign policy begins
in the early twenties, when Townshend was First Foreign Secretary, and when the
diplomatic world was yawning over the Congress of Cambray.
England was still reaping the fruits of her French alliance of 1717, which,
combined with a resolute diplomacy, had given her German ruler, in the years
that followed, a diplomatic position no less commanding than that which her
Dutch “Deliverer” had enjoyed. George I had mediated between Emperor and Sultan
in 1718, and had been the arbiter of the Baltic in 1721; at the Congress of Cambray, summoned for 1722, he seemed about to settle the
affairs of Habsburg and Spanish Bourbon, as he had settled those of Turkey and
Sweden, and to become the universal pacificator of Europe. Unfortunately,
George I’s resemblance to William III was now to cease, and, after giving the
law to the east and to the north, he was to suffer a diplomatic defeat in the
west. English diplomatists thought that the beginning of the Congress of Cambray was too dull—they discovered that its end was too
exciting. Under the influence of the fiery Elisabeth Famese,
Queen of Spain, who blamed England and France for the endless delays of the
Congress, Spain and the Emperor drew together; and these two disputants, for
whose reconciliation France and her ally Great Britain had, in the end, laboured, made a formal agreement to unite against the
peacemakers. The Treaty of Peace signed at Vienna by Austrian and Spanish
representatives on April 30, 1725, announced to the world the reconciliation of
the two quondam rivals, and, as a consequence, the dissolution of the Congress
and the discomfiture of France and of England. George I, formerly the arbiter
of Europe, found his projects dissolved in air, and himself threatened by a
positive danger. He had only the dubious friendship of France on which to rely,
and an Austro-Spanish combination might have to be met in the field.
The chief
aspects of the Vienna Treaties are described elsewhere, but their English side
concerns us here. The Treaty of Peace of April 30 had announced that Spain had
accepted the Pragmatic Sanction (thus guaranteeing the complete succession to
the Austrian possessions of the Emperor’s daughter, Maria Theresa). Two supplementary
and secret Treaties, of Alliance and Commerce respectively, signed on May 1,
bound the Emperor Charles VI, in return, to use his good offices to induce
England to surrender Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain, and engaged the Spanish
Government to encourage and assist the Emperor in developing the commerce of
the Austrian Netherlands, and in promoting the Ostend Company, a corporation
already licensed with a view to trading in the East Indies. These provisions
were alarming enough; but the sense of danger was increased by a further, and
most secret, agreement between the two Powers (November 5,1725), which
provided, in certain eventualities, for marriages between two Austrian
Archduchesses and two Spanish Infants. A secret article arranged for a partition
of French territory between the Habsburg and the Spanish Bourbon, in case they
defeated France in war. English diplomats persisted in thinking (quite
incorrectly) that there was another secret clause arranging for the joint
support of James Edward’s claims to the English Crown. English popular opinion
was thoroughly alarmed, as a passage in a pamphlet published near this date
shows: “ The Archduchesses are destined to the Infants of Spain, and such a
Power arising from this conjunction, as in all probability may make the rest of
Europe tremble.” Clearly, the wedding-bells of Austria and Spain were the
passing-bells for England and for France. The Peace of Utrecht, which had
asserted the balance of power by separating the Crowns of France and Spain, would
have been in vain, if Europe was to be overshadowed by a Spanish-Austrian
alliance, and threatened by a union of the forces of the two monarchies. In
that case the balance of power was overthrown once more. France saw Austria and
Spain dominating Italy, and their armies on the road to Paris; England beheld
Spanish fleets ravaging the coast of Scotland, and Austrian merchantmen sailing
up the Hooghly. A common danger threatened the allies of 1717, which only
resolution could meet. It was necessary to face the Austro-Spanish danger; and,
though French diplomacy was wavering, Townshend was not the man to hesitate.
The substance of the secret articles had filtered through to the British
public, and England, touched in her pride by the Gibraltar, in her pocket by
the Ostend, article, was ready to support her Minister.
The
instructions issued by Townshend to Stanhope at Madrid on June 28 (O.S.), 1725,
after the Emperor had formally announced his wish to mediate between England
and Spain on the subject of Gibraltar, mark the proud and resolute character of
his policy. “ The Imperialists are thoroughly sensible of the great fondness
the Parliament and even the whole nation have for Gibraltar; they likewise know
that by our laws and Constitution the Crown cannot yield to any foreign Power
whatsoever any part of his dominions without consent of Parliament, and that
Gibraltar being yielded to Great Britain, by the Treaty of Utrecht, is as much
annexed to the Crown as Ireland, or any part of England; they are also convinced,
that even the bare proposing the delivering up this place to the Parliament
will put the King’s affairs into the utmost confusion, and therefore are sure
the King is not to be prevailed upon to mention it to them. They are in like
manner persuaded that all the discerning men in England are at this juncture so
irritated with the slights, and indignities that have been put upon the King’s
mediation by the Crown of Spain and the injuries done the nation by the Treaty
of Commerce, lately concluded by Spain with the Emperor at Vienna, in which
amongst other things, there are so many manifest favours and partialities shown to the Ostend Company, that they are firmly persuaded if
they could by their dexterity throw in, at this time, the affair of Gibraltar it
would raise such a flame in the nation as would certainly bring things to the
greatest extremities between the two Crowns, and this is beyond all dispute,
the point at which the Emperor does at present drive.” It is difficult to read
this passage without perceiving that it vibrates with a national and patriotic
feeling rare indeed in this age.
But, though
Townshend relied on national feeling to support him, he tv as not blind to the further necessity of dynastic alliances. So early as
February 4, 1725, when the Austro-Spanish union was first suspected, Newcastle,
the Second Secretary of State, had suggested that it could be countered by a
league of Northern Powers, a policy which Townshend now adopted in full.
Proceeding to the Continent, he signed the Alliance of Hanover (or Herrenhausen; September 3, 1725) between England, France
and Prussia, in order to provide guarantees of mutual defence,
to arrange for the destruction of the Ostend Company, and to form a union which
should balance the overwhelming predominance of the Austro- Spanish alliance.
Frederick William I of Prussia showed duplicity, and, after hesitating for
about a year, finally retired altogether from the Hanover Alliance and made an
agreement at Wusterhausen with the Emperor (October
12,1726). But, by a lavish use of bribes and subsidies which caused growls from
Walpole at the Treasury, the complicated network of a vast alliance was
gradually woven together. Imposing demonstrations were made to impress the
smaller Powers; French troops were massed on the Rhine; English fleets paraded
up and down the Channel, the Spanish coast, the Baltic, and the Caribbean Sea.
Sweden and Denmark came into the Alliance; the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel
and other smaller German Princes were also swept into the net. In 1727 Europe
was an armed camp. France had raised nearly 100,000 additional troops, Holland
30,000, Denmark and Sweden were prepared to contribute handsomely. On the sea
France and England were enormously superior, and, though on the land the
Emperor and Spain had the predominance in mere numbers, the treasury of the
former was wholly empty, that of the latter wofully bare. An alliance more formidable, because more united, than that which had
defeated Louis XIV and Philip V was now facing this same Philip and his new
Imperial ally, and, as the main architect of the first structure had been
William III, so the main contriver of the second was Townshend.
The need of
disbursing large sums for Townshend’s subsidies and bribes seems to have
awakened Walpole, who from this time forward exercised considerable influence
in foreign affairs. Townshend resented his interference, and there were many
quarrels before the final one of 1730. The strength and use of the Alliance
were soon tested, for Spain (to whom Townshend’s alliances and despatches must have been alike objectionable) declared war
against England in February, 1727. The value of Townshend’s diplomacy was
speedily revealed, for the Emperor was far too impressed with the power of the
counter-combination to join his ally. Gibraltar endured a languid siege; but
the chief interest lay in the stopping of the Spanish treasure fleet. If Spain
could get home her usual amount of bullion, she might bribe her Imperial ally
into action. To prevent this eventuality, Admiral Hosier had been blockading
Porto- bello in the West Indies so early as September, 1726; and in 1727 Sir
Charles Wager cruised up and down the Spanish coast for the same purpose. They
did not succeed in stopping the treasure fleet; but the Spaniards managed to
bring only a small part of the usual supply of bullion into Cadiz. Since there
was no decisive action at sea, and as each belligerent had a pacific and
timorous ally on her flank urging her to peace, an accommodation was soon
reached. Hostilities were suspended at the end of 1727, not very much to the
taste of the English people—“it’s like God’s peace; it’s both long in coming
and passes all understanding,” wrote a witty lady to Lord Carlisle; in fact,
there supervened, as usual, tedious delays, solemn trifling, and ineffective
congresses. This time a settlement was ultimately arranged, owing to the sudden
interference of Elisabeth Farnese, whose policy was always unconventional and
sometimes, as in this case, highly effective. In December, 1728, Elisabeth had
learnt that the project of Austrian marriages was ruled out on the Austrian
side. She was furious, and determined on revenge. In 1725 she had rejected the
friendship of France and Great Britain for that of the Emperor; now, in her
bitter anger, she reversed the process. On November 9, 1729, the
representatives of England, France, and Spain signed at Seville a Treaty, which
they agreed to force on the Emperor. The two allies, neatly profiting by
Elisabeth’s anger against the Emperor, induced Spain to grant, for the first
time, a frank and ungrudging recognition of the full consequences of the Treaty
of Utrecht, in so far as it secured commercial advantages to England and to
France, and the English possession of Gibraltar. In reton,
England and France promised to aid in the introduction of Spanish garrisons
into Tuscany and Parma. These stipulations, together with the suppression of
the Ostend Company, were eventually ratified by the Emperor in the (“ Second ”)
Treaty of Vienna (July 22,1731). This agreement marks the culminating point of
the union between England and France, and the greatest material advantage
derived by the former from that alliance: namely, the final abolition of the
Ostend Company.
The Treaty of
Seville is a landmark in the history of diplomacy, more decisive and important
than the Pacte de famille of
1733. It marks the breakdown of one new combination—the Austro-Spanish
Alliance, and the beginning of the collapse of another—the Franco-British. The
Confusion introduced by the Peace of Utrecht was beginning to disappear, and
events were gradually reverting to the European System at the beginning of the
eighteenth century—that of a union between France and Spain, opposed by the
combination of England, Holland, and the Emperor. Townshend, who had specially favoured friendship with France and had looked coldly on
the Emperor, was dismissed in 1730; and, from 1731 onwards, the estrangement
between England and France becomes evident and decisive. When historical
writers speak of the “Hundred Years’ War between England and France on the
sea,” which lasted from the days of the third William to those of the third
George, they omit the interlude of fourteen years (1717-31), when England and
France were not only at peace but in alliance. During this period there was a
real chance that the two nations, by careful avoidance of difficulties and by
joint pressure upon Spain, might pursue lines of territorial expansion and
commercial development, which ran close to one another, but never intersected.
When England began to draw back from this alliance, her position was
fundamentally altered, and the old forces, hitherto suspended in their action,
began again to exert their influence.
A new age now
opens for English diplomacy: national influences strengthen, dynastic ones
weaken. The place of the resolute, adroit Townshend with his eye ever on the
least movement among the Princes of Germany, is taken by the fussy, impulsive
Newcastle, with his ear carefully trained to public opinion in England. Hanover,
King George, and the Balance of Power fall in importance ; the South Sea
Company, the West Indies and the Balance of Trade rise. Newcastle, now
Principal Secretary, was without steadiness though not without insight; but he
was steadied by William Stanhope (Lord Harrington), whose skill in negotiating
the Treaty of Seville had been rewarded by a peerage and the seals of the
second Secretaryship of State. Behind the pair stood
Walpole, whose calm judgment, shrewd wisdom, and increased prestige now gave
him an influence in foreign affairs, to which he had never before attained,
Both by predilection and by the pressure of the forces beh u d them— popular, commercial, parliamentary—Newcastle and Stanhope were driven
to the new policy which Townshend had denounced with his last diplomatic
breath. That policy was one of accommodation with the Emperor, an accommodation
which , was bound eventually to provoke French hostility. It is by no means
certain that they were wrong in the new move; but the balance of probability
seems against them. The Emperor proved to be restless, impotent, and unstable;
England’s danger in estranging France was that she might in consequence turn to
Spain. A Franco-Spanish Alliance was really far more dangerous to England’s
position in the New World than an Austro-Spanish combination against her could
have been. The joint action of England and France had secured the English
commercial privileges in the New World in 1729; when France and England were at
enmity, it seemed as if France and Spain might settle the future of the New
World by friendly arrangement or alliance. When Spain gravitated towards
France, England could rely only upon the Emperor—an ally whose power, interest
and authority were purely territorial—and had consequently to face in the New
World the combined fleets of the two strongest naval Powers except herself. The
danger was at once real and new, for it was only gradually that English
diplomatists began to perceive and to fear that their country might fall
prostrate before the House of Bourbon—an issue which the genius of the elder
Pitt averted, but which came to pass in 1783. The true point of departure,
which rendered this combination possible, was taken in the momentous decisions
of the English Cabinet during the years 1731 to 1733 —decisions in which the
voice of Newcastle and the hand of Walpole are specially to be discerned. At
first, the consequences of the separation from France were not realised. The sturdy good sense of Walpole did not
penetrate deep into the future: it saw clearly that the French alliance might
mean continental entanglements and campaigns on the Rhine; but it did not
perceive that combination with the Emperor, though perhaps less dangerous in
this direction, would not be of much real value to England when the question
was one of supremacy in the Caribbean Sea or the Indian Ocean; or that the
abandonment of direct interference in the Old World did not secure
uninterrupted expansion in the New.
No better
example of the benefits of non-interference in the affairs of the Old World
could have been supplied than when, in 1733, England deliberately refused to
take part in the War of the Polish Succession, waged between Russia and the
Emperor against France and Spain. England’s view is put tersely enough by Newcastle
in a Memorial written not long after November 1,1733. “ They [the English
Ministers] were apprehensive of being involved in a War, on account of the
Polish Election, in which neither his Majesty nor the [Dutch] States were,
either by interest or engagements, at all concerned.” As a matter of strict
fact, his Majesty was very much “concerned” both in and about the Polish
Election, for the Emperor had offered him a command on the Rhine, and the
martial little monarch was burning to wear his Oudenarde coat and display his military valour in a campaign
against the French. But his Majesty’s Ministers thought otherwise, and Walpole
was the most urgently pacific of them all. His policy won the day, and his
famous boast to Queen Caroline, that fifty thousand men had been killed in
Europe that year (1734) and not one Englishman, marks the nobler side of his
enthusiasm for peace. Other considerations, however, drove home the
humanitarian argument for peace; the Whig advocates of liberty were not
particularly desirous of military glory; reduction of the army and withdrawal
from the Continent were not less popular with those who liked to flout Hanover,
than were the increase of the fleet and of enmity towards Spain congenial to
the passions of Protestantism and the interests of commerce. The English
Ministers and people had alike decided to disregard the Polish War. That
Russian troops and Russian diplomacy made their first appearance in western
Europe, that Don Carlos’ Garibaldi-like conquest of Naples meant the substitution
of Spanish influence for German in southern Italy, or that the conquest of
Lorraine opened one more French gate into Germany—all these changes affected
the balance of power, indeed, but not sufficiently to cause England’s
interference.
Very serious
differences had already arisen between England and Spain; they were naturally
not lessened by a war in which England took no part, except by showing a
diplomatic bias in favour of the Emperor. It was,
however, of unspeakable importance to her that French and Spanish Bourbons drew
together, for their union might disturb England’s commerce, and threaten the
New World where her favourable trade balance was
assured. On March 22, 1733, Newcastle wrote to Earl Waldegrave,
British ambassador at Paris, that “French Ministers...will give the worst turn
they are able to the conduct of England towards Spain, in order to create a
breach or at least a coldness between us.” His foresight was justified: the
prospect of war drew France and Spain closer together, and the breach between
Spain and England was completed by the signing of the Treaty of the Escurial (November 7, 1733). This famous Treaty, usually
called the first of the three Pactes de famille, was signed amid precautions of the most
extraordinary secrecy; nevertheless, its substance, or even its full
provisions, were known to Newcastle in February, 1734. It began by describing
the union between the two branches of the House of Bourbon as eternal and
irrevocable; France engaged to provide an army of 40,000 at need, and agreed to
help Spain to recover Gibraltar; and Spain, in her turn, consented to abrogate,
on the first favourable opportunity, the special
commercial advantages given to England by the Treaty of Utrecht. Such was the
famous Pacte de famille,
further discussed elsewhere, and often described as the main origin and cause
of that Franco-Spanish alliance which was to be so prominent in continental
diplomacy until it produced the humiliations undergone by England in 1783. But
such an estimate of this treaty is based on the words of the document, rather
than on the intentions of its signatories. The Treaty between Spain and France
in 1721 contained the words “ eternal and irrevocable union,” and, within four
years, the two countries were the bitterest of foes. In a precisely similar way
and in about the same period of time, the eternity and irrevocability of the
union in 1733 was dissolved. The truth is that the importance of the Bourbon
Alliance in 1743,1761, and 1783 has caused the same importance to be attributed
to that of 1733. Family connexions did not always win
the day even in the eighteenth century, when weighed in the balance with what
rulers considered to be their own or their country’s interest; and within four
years Louis XV was to illustrate this truth very strongly in his attitude
towards Spain. The Pacte de famille,
accordingly, is interesting rather as indicating the unconscious tendency of
events than as the definite starting-point of an epoch in foreign policy. If
any such definite starting-point is to be found, it must be fixed either in
1730, when the tendencies, which drew France and England definitely apart, were
first manifested; or in 1743, when the tendencies, which drew France and Spain
definitely together, exercised a commanding force. In any case, the Pacte de famille of
1733 must not be regarded as the mainspring of the future policy of France and
Spain.
England and
Spain had rarely been without disputes in the past; and, though the Treaty of
Seville in 1729 had improved matters, the Commission—appointed in connexion with it to settle disputes between the two
Powers—had made little headway. The grievances of both sides centred round the South Sea Company, which was to inflict
no less political than financial misfortune upon England. By the Treaty of
Utrecht the South Sea Company had acquired from Spain the very valuable
privilege of the Asiento, or contract for supplying
the annual quota of negroes imported from Africa to work the plantations of
Spanish America. Their further privilege of sending annually one large trading
ship to the Spanish possessions had been grossly abused, and a large illicit
trade had sprung up, partly under cover, partly independently, of the South Sea
Company. Smugglers plied between the Spanish possessions and Jamaica with great
frequency. Spain replied by sending out ships as guarda-costas to arrest and
punish smugglers. These guarda-costas seem, on occasion, to have behaved with needless brutality, as in the case of
the Rebecca (1731), when the famous Jenkins was forcibly deprived of that ear,
the display of which subsequently occasioned much sympathy in the House of
Commons and did something to cause the war. In any case, a number of vessels
were wrongly seized and confiscated on the plea of carrying smuggled goods—in
some cases, because Spanish privateers were masquerading under the guise of guarda-costas; in
others, because Spanish governors readily winked at a practice profitable to
themselves. But the brutalities and the grievances were not wholly of Spanish
origin; if there were Spanish privateers off the coast of Jamaica, there were
English off Havana and Honduras. If Jenkins lost his ear and some other
captains their goods, Spanish shipowners had suffered
in their turn; if Englishmen had been seen working in irons in the harbour of Havana, Spaniards had been publicly sold as
slaves in the British colonies. To these facts popular fancy in both countries
had stitched a rich embroidery of fiction, so that, in England, it was believed
that hundreds of sailors were rotting in Spanish dungeons; in Spain, that an
English captain had made a certain noble Spaniard cut off and devour his own
nose.
In truth both
sides had real grievances; the English Government, however, complained most
vigorously as to various outrages, especially that of Jenkins’ ear, but without
satisfactory result. Patino—the chief Minister of
Spain from 1726 to 1736—was not very compliant, and Spanish diplomacy always
moved slowly. Even with the best will in the world, it was extremely difficult
to control quasi-independent Spanish governors at the other side of the
Atlantic, who, for their part, found it equally impossible to line their coasts
with troops to check smuggling, or to prevent an occasional Spanish privateer
from raiding an English ship. The truth seems to be that, despite the Spanish guarda-costas,
the illicit trade went on with undiminished vigour.
This fact is at once Spain’s defence and England’s
condemnation. Even if England had more injuries of which to complain, she had
continued the illicit trade1. What was the use of Patino punishing Spanish governors, if English smugglers
continued to deprive Spanish trade of real sources of material wealth P The
value of the smuggling trade was the real key to England’s secret desire to maintain
it, and Spain’s open resolution to suppress it. Unpublished records show
clearly that England made far less effort to suppress her illicit trade with
Spanish America, than did either France or the Dutch Republic. Such action must
have been particularly annoying to a commercially minded Minister like Patino, who wished to revive the trade of Spain, and who
knew that Walpole himself showed especial and increasing severity towards all
smugglers on English coasts. With these causes for irritation, it can hardly be
surprising that Patino should have kept a map of
Gibraltar open on his table; that war should be said to have been, in 1732,
only averted by the bad health of King Philip; or that Newcastle should be
found writing to Keene on June 29, 1733, that “ such enormities for the future
” (as some of the late outrages) “ .. .could not fail of bringing on a war
between the two nations.”
It is a
singular commentary on the Pacte de famille that within a very short time from its
signature Anglo-Spanish relations actually improved. During 1737, the Spanish
Court was on exceedingly bad terms with the French, and their relations with
England improved in a corresponding ratio. The scene was again changed towards
the close of the year, when Newcastle grew impatient at the Spanish disregard
of his petitions and, under pressure from West Indian merchants, made formal
demands for reparation to various English vessels and seamen. The popular voice
began to be heard on both sides, Spaniards complaining of the outrages and
insolence of the heretical English dogs, Englishmen dreaming of the days of the
“ great Eliza,” and the short way Drake and Ralegh had with the tyrants who flayed Indians alive and put Protestants to the rack.
Public opinion was somewhat divided in Spain; in England it was united and the
agitation grew rapidly to be serious under the influence of a rabid
Protestantism and of a raucous patriotism. In 1738, the hope that war would be
averted rested solely with the Ministers of the respective countries, for the
peoples had already announced their views. After Patino’s death in 1736, his place had been taken by La Quadra (subsequently Marquis of Villarias), stubborn and obstinate, full of true Spanish
pride, and yet a mere tool in the hands of Elisabeth Farnese, whose fiery
temperament was no longer curbed by a great Minister. On the English side was
Benjamin Keene, ambassador at Madrid, a resolute diplomatist, and yet easy in
his ways, and one who knew how to make himself liked by the Spanish royalties;
Walpole, anxious as always for peace, and Newcastle too prone to give way to
popular clamour. Unfortunately the latter was not
decreasing in England, for the South Sea Company was busy trumpeting its
grievances. There were the old quarrels about the Asiento,
smuggling, and the right of search on suspicion of smuggled goods exercised by
Spaniards over English vessels; and fresh disputes about the frontiers of
Georgia and the British right to cut logwood in Honduras had come to the front.
These might well have been settled, had there not been a general impression
among Englishmen that their Government was supine and inclined to truckle to
Spain; “The crowd must not be suffered to know, that many tuns of logwood, and even the ears, or even the life of a man (whatever compassion
he deserves) are not worth a general war.” Parliament met raging in March,
1738. Jenkins presented his ear and his grievances at the bar of the Commons;
violent speeches were made—Pulteney breathing
defiance, the young Pitt declaring our trade and our honour to be at stake, the Prince of Wales looking down sympathetically from the
gallery; and violent resolutions were within an ace of being passed.
The British
Ministers had neither been as pacific nor as idle as journalistic charity
implied. On March 2 (O.S.), Newcastle had instructed Keene that the British
Government intended to issue letters of reprisal on Spanish vessels. On March
30 (O.S.), Captain Clinton, “Commander-in-chief in and about the
Mediterranean,” was ordered to proceed to Minorca with his squadron. La Quadra
was indignant, and sent haughty letters to Keene; but the resolutions of
Parliament and the anger of the British public undoubtedly impressed while they
irritated him. On May 9 (O.S.), the British Government ordered a reinforcement
to the Mediterranean, and placed Admiral Haddock in command. On May 18 (O.S.)
Keene transmitted a violent letter from La Quadra, but informed Newcastle that
the Spanish Minister had verbally expressed his sovereign’s desire for an
amicable settlement of outstanding differences. This commendation came just in
time to avert war; the violence of the letter was set on one side by the
British Government, and arrangements were made to accept the verbal overture.
Negotiations, already put in hand between the British Ministers and the Spanish
ambassador in London, Sir Thomas Fitzgerald (Don Geraldino),
were now pushed forward. England owed Spain a debt of £180,000 at this time,
while she claimed from Spain £343,277 for damages to English vessels and the like,
so that, on the balance, Spain owed her about £160,000. After a great deal of
haggling, it was provisionally arranged that, in return for a speedy payment,
Spain should pay £95,000 as a discharge for all debts. This arrangement was
finally embodied in the Convention of the Pardo, signed
by Keene and La Quadra on January 14 (N.S.), 1739, with the addition that Spain
should pay the money in four months after ratifications were exchanged.
Concessions had been made on both sides; Spain, by agreeing to pay the £95,000,
acknowledged what she had never acknowledged before, that wrongs had been
inflicted on British vessels; England, by abating her terms, admitted that some
of her claims for injured vessels might have been too large. Neither can there
be any doubt but that the Convention was intended on both sides as preliminary
to a genuine settlement of all outstanding grievances, on which a Commission
was appointed to sit. This is proved by the fact that Spain proceeded
immediately to disarm her fleet and disband her regiments, and that Newcastle
actually wrote to Keene on January 26 (O.S.) to suggest the possibility of an
Anglo-Spanish alliance.
Unfortunately
for the intentions of Ministers, a number of most delicate negotiations
remained to be adjusted, and unhappily this had to be done just at the time
when English public opinion was expressing its disapproval of the Convention.
But this was not the only difficulty. The South Sea Company and their claims
had been left out of the Convention by La Quadra for separate settlement. The
King of Spain claimed £68,000 as a fourth share of the profits from voyages of
the annual ship trading in Spanish waters; this sum the South Sea Company were
unwilling to pay, because, as they alleged, the King of Spain owed them thrice
as much for damages to their ships, though they refused to produce their
accounts on this head. It was unfortunate that Keene was not only British
ambassador, but agent for the South Sea Company, for he thus spoke with two
voices, as a diplomatist with responsibility, and as a merchant angry at the
loss of goods and desirous of driving a hard bargain. In private, he complained
of the unreasonableness of the South Sea Company, and thought them foolish, and
even dishonest. The quarrel between the South Sea Company and the Spanish King,
which ended on May 6 (O.S.) by the latter’s declaration that he would revoke
the Asiento, unless the £68,000 were paid to him at
once, contributed greatly to aggravate the situation.
When the news
of the Convention arrived, a storm of abuse broke out in the Press. One
quotation from a pamphlet may serve to typify many: “ Jack English truly makes
a fine figure and is of great weight in the balance of power, when he is forced
to come cringing up to a Convention.” Amid much violence and dwindling
majorities, the Convention was ratified by both Houses in February, 1739. But
the clamour had not missed its effect. Newcastle—ever
willing to give way to popular feeling—was thoroughly frightened. “ We must
yield to the times,” he wrote on February 24 to Lord Hardwicke, and Keene was
instructed to press Spain to abandon the “right of search.” Whatever intention
Newcastle had of yielding to the current of popular feeling, after this display
of it the South Sea Company had no idea of yielding to the King of Spain. La
Quadra, like a true Spanish Grandee, was inexpressibly disgusted by the
violence of both company and of public, and Keene soon experienced a new
hauteur and defiance in his tone. Walpole was, however, still desirous of
peace, and Spain, being disarmed, was not anxious for war. But, if there was
any possibility of a pacific solution, it was now removed by the action of the
British Ministry. On January 29 (O.S.), 1739, orders had been sent to Admiral
Haddock to recall his fleet from the Mediterranean and “forthwith to repair to
England.” In February, the British Government became anxious, partly because it
feared that the public clamour might produce war,
partly because their information led them to suspect that a secret alliance of
France and Spain was on the point of being signed. At any rate, the Admiralty
records show that, on March 10, the January orders were revoked, and that
Haddock was commanded to remain at Gibraltar. In some way, which is not
discoverable, the Spaniards came to suspect the fact that these counter-orders
had been issued, though Newcastle denied (falsely) that there were any, and
instructed Keene to that effect. La Quadra naturally regarded this strange
counter-order as a menace, to which Keene’s bland innocence only added mystery.
On May 8 (O.S.) Newcastle wrote to Keene that he was certain that some sort of
alliance, had taken place between France and Spain, and that, therefore, the
fleet must remain at Gibraltar. On May 15 (O.S.), at the conference of Commissioners,
Keene was officially informed that the £95,000 (due the day before) would not
be paid, unless the counter-orders to Haddock were revoked. Keene was
smooth-spoken, and replied that this matter was not within his competence; but
the time was past when fair answers would turn away wrath, for each party had
obviously reached a point from which it was impossible to recede. Spain had no
intention of paying the £95,000, being very short of money and fearing that war
would break out immediately; Newcastle did not mean to recall Haddock’s fleet,
because then Gibraltar and Minorca would be defenceless.
La Quadra justly suspected Newcastle of issuing counter orders to the fleet;
Newcastle unjustly suspected Spain of having made an alliance with France against
England. On June 14 (O.S.) Newcastle wrote to Keene to decline any further
conferences with the Spanish Commissioners, and henceforth war became only a
question of time and opportunity. In August Keene was recalled from Madrid, and
at length, on October 19, the King’s heralds passed through the City to Temple
Bar and proclaimed that war with Spain had begun. The Prince of Wales, in the
Bose Tavern hard by, drank to the success of the War against Papists, and the
church bells rang merrily out from the steeples.
Every reader of
English history knows how passionately Walpole regretted the War, and of his
bitter epigram when he heard the bells ringing for joy; and every sympathy must
be extended to a reluctance as sincere as it was humane. The War, which owed so
much to the hot-headed young Prince, and the frenzied crowd, was not, however,
indefensible on the grounds of national self-interest, though it certainly was
on those of justice and right. Walpole thought that we should gain by peace and
an accommodation with Spain; Newcastle was partly driven to war by his
information as to a Franco-Spanish alliance. The public thought it better to
fight Spain so long as she stood alone; and, as a matter of fact, the public
instinct was right and Newcastle’s information was wrong. Whatever causes of
suspicion there might be, no actual agreement between France and Spain existed
at this time, except the inoperative Pacte de famille.
Fleury, in France, loved peace as genuinely as
Walpole, but, unlike him, had made genuine sacrifices at the shrine of his idol
by allowing the French fleet to dwindle. Fleury saw
that it was not in accordance with French interests to help Spain against
England, until the French fleet was better able to defend her commerce. Hence,
to the no small amazement and delight of Newcastle, France remained neutral,
until the War of the Austrian Succession, as related elsewhere, forced her to
engage in the struggle, and converted the existing strife in American waters
into a struggle for the mastery of the sea, which carried with it supremacy in
the West and the East Indies, and the dominion over the whole continent of
North America. Whether South America was to remain Spanish, whether North
America was to become English or French—these were the great questions first
raised in 1738 and 1742. The raising of them forms the first act of a great
drama, which extends over ninety years and only closes with the proclamation of
the Monroe doctrine by the United States and with Canning’s recognition of the
Spanish-American Republics in 1823.
Two great
events of the period—namely, the securing of the Hanoverian Succession, and the
development of England’s commercial greatness—have already been noted in this
chapter. The third great event—the less obvious and perceptible development of
England’s parliamentary system—can only be briefly summarised.
Walpole’s position was throughout insecure, depending on delicate balances, on
obscure negotiations and skilful combinations between
groups, for the homogeneity of the Cabinet and of the party in office were
alike imperfectly recognised. After the accession of
George I, the avowed Jacobites gradually sank into a
minority, the dualistic party system broke up, the great dividing lines between
Whig and Tory became blurred and confused. The struggles under Walpole were not
between two distinct parties with different views of prerogative, but between a
Ministry and an Opposition, holding the same views as to the advantages of
office. The members, no longer divided into parties, were separated into
groups, and this disunion was increased by the growth of corruption and by
undue influence at elections. By these means many constituencies, especially borough
ones, fell entirely under the control of a few persons. These “ boroughmongers,” as they were called, appointed their own
candidates to seats in Parliament, and called on them to resign when they
disagreed with their views. Hence Walpole found himself ruling not over a large
compact party, but over a number of patrons, each of whom possessed a large
parliamentary following. Under these circumstances, the individual views of a
powerful patron might be of great importance; for example, the defection of the
arch “boroughmonger” Newcastle would have meant a
loss of near fifty votes to the Government. To adapt a happy comparison, the
difficulties of Walpole might be likened to those of Charles Edward; he had to
deal with a number of proud and resolute chiefs—powerful, because they had many
followers who slavishly obeyed them; dangerous, because their personal quarrels
threatened to make the execution of united movements impossible.
A relative
independence of patrons and boroughmongers was
secured to the First Lord of the Treasury by his control of the place-holders
under the Crown. So long as the King and the First Lord agreed, at least a
hundred members of Parliament depended absolutely on the Minister for their
places, and a further number could be secured by a more indirect patronage. The
place-holders were not always a source of strength, for they did not desire to
lose their places; and, when a Minister grew unpopular, his majorities fell
because the place-holders were anxious to make terms with a possible successor
to the First Lord’s officership, and therefore either
abstained from voting, or attacked the Government. Hence a Minister with a
large majority was not secure, and a Minister with a falling majority was
doomed, unless he took drastic measures. The history of the Excise Bill well
illustrates this point. Walpole’s majorities fell from 100 to 16, upon which he
dropped the Bill. But he struck hard against the place-holders, who had tried
to make fair weather with the Opposition. Chesterfield, Stair, Cobham, the Duke of Bolton, and a crowd of lesser victims,
suffered loss of place or regiment. The system was very bad, and, in depriving
officers of their commissions, Walpole undoubtedly went too far. But, in the
imperfect state of parliamentary discipline, it would seem that indirect
bribery at any rate was a necessity. The only alternative was parliamentary
reform, which would have enabled electors to check members’ corruption; but
hardly anyone thought of this remedy, and, in any case, legislative innovation
was not in Walpole’s line. Direct bribery has been proved against him in a few
cases, but the evidence suggests that it was not common, and most of Walpole’s
“ corruption ” consisted in the use of indirect means of securing party
allegiance which every parliamentary leader employs. The scale on which it
prevailed was far too large, but the influence of the Crown had been regularly
employed by the Minister since the days of William III. Onslow, who had every
reason for knowing, said that it was Sunderland who extended and systematised corruption. Walpole did little or nothing to
check the system; but he did not carry it further—here at least the policy of tranquilla non movere showed its good side. The Secret Committee of Enquiry (which consisted, with
two exceptions, of political opponents) failed to produce evidence against him
of an impressive character. It is usually forgotten that the officials of the
Secret Service Fund (out of which direct bribes would be paid) refused to give
evidence to the Committee; but there is not much reason to suppose that an
unusual amount of money went in this way. After Walpole’s fall, parliamentary
corruption greatly increased under the Ministries of Wilmington and Pelham,
though they contained several men who had frequently stigmatised Walpole as the master and origin of all such practices.
During the
early twenties, the Opposition groups were so divided, and Walpole’s prestige
so great, that his task was simple. But, after Bolingbroke’s return to England
in 1725, Walpole’s difficulties grew; he had done his best to form a
homogeneous Cabinet and a compact Ministerial party, and Bolingbroke replied
by forming a compact Opposition, which should comprehend not only Tories but
malcontent Whigs. The Jacobites he threw over
altogether, and formed the basis of his homogeneous Opposition by calling for
a national party of “ Patriots.” His project succeeded, and he was eventually
joined by Whigs out of office like Pulteney and
Carteret, by Tories like Sir William Wyndham, and, later, by young enthusiasts
like George Lyttelton and his friend William Pitt.
After the party was formed, the public remained to be won ; and for this
purpose a journal, The Craftsman, was started on December 5, 1726, to which Pulteney and Bolingbroke alike contributed. It ran for ten
years, and was remarkable for its immense effect upon public opinion.
Bolingbroke’s invective was terrific, his declamations against corruption
popular, his designation of Walpole as the “ brazen image the king had set up
”—and the like—amusing. It was in vain that the Government subsidised pamphleteers, that Walpole even took the pen himself— “railers on one side, writers on the other,” said Swift.
The first great
victory of the Opposition over Walpole was the abandonment of the Excise Bill
(1733), due to the fury into which they had lashed the public. In the next year Pulteney denounced Walpole in Parliament, under a
transparent disguise, as the plunderer of the nation; Walpole replied, in a
strain of extraordinary bitterness, denouncing Bolingbroke, in the same manner,
as having gained over persons of fine parts and as having moved the whole
Opposition to Jacobitism, and warning them that he
had betrayed every master he ever served. In 1735 Bolingbroke and Pulteney quarrelled, with the
result that the former practically retired from active politics. The Patriot
King (written 1738, published 1749) continued the influence which a ready wit,
an unscrupulous courage, and a golden eloquence had never failed to exercise
upon a generation to whom all three qualities were dear.
In 1737
Frederick, Prince of Wales, joined the ranks of the Opposition, and thus
redeemed it from the charge of Jacobitism, which had
been Walpole’s chief weapon against its members. The disputes with Spain in
1738-9 gave the Opposition their chance, and landed Walpole in a war of which
he never pretended to approve. The gleam of success at its opening, when Vernon
took Portobello (1739), was followed by a series of thoroughly mismanaged
operations, which offered a glorious opportunity to an Opposition destitute
alike of mercy or scruple. In 1741, Walpole was fiercely attacked on the ground
that the Constitution abhorred the idea of a Prime Minister, which office he
had assumed. The charge seems to have meant that he aimed at being sole
Minister or Mayor of the Palace, and had used the royal authority to override
the rest of the Cabinet. It was a singular irony that, a year or two before,
his colleagues had forced him into a war which he detested, and that they had
continued to overrule him in directing its operations. The charge was fantastic,
and the attack failed, Walpole being supported by a large majority. But the end
was not far off; the debates had shown that Walpole was the enemy for whose
blood the Opposition thirsted, and Newcastle was not unwilling to make terms
with them by throwing his colleague to the wolves. In February, 1742, after
debates of extraordinary heat and violence, Walpole was defeated on a petition
relating to a disputed election at Chippenham. The “Robinocracy” was at an end, and Walpole resigned, taking to
himself the earldom of Orford.
Few English
Ministers have ruled so long as Walpole, few have shown such contemptuous
indifference to criticism, or suffered so much from its influence on posterity.
The facts as to his corruption have already been made clear; and, though he did
well for himself, for his family and his friends, it is preposterous to
describe him as the plunderer of his country or to speak of the “True Sinking
Fund” as the “bottomless pocket of Robin.” After twenty years the corruption
of Parliament was no worse, the general state of the finances infinitely
better, than when he became Premier. As a Minister of finance and commerce his
genius is unquestionable; his claims to the same tribute in other directions
are dubious. He had a shrewd insight into mankind, especially into their
weaknesses, and much tact and skill in the management of men or of parties. His
firm grasp of practical politics enabled him to see and to develop the
principle that Ministries must be homogeneous and parties united—services of which
the importance can hardly be overemphasised ; but he
did not shrink from depriving political opponents of military posts, or from
appropriating the Sinking Fund—actions which alike demoralised public life. Onslow touches another side of him, when he calls him “the best
man from the goodness of his heart...to live with, and to live under, of any
great man I ever knew.” Even Bolingbroke wrote of him that his “ greatest
enemies have allowed him to my knowledge the virtues of good nature and
generosity.” But, unfortunately, Walpole’s easy good nature was the complement,
perhaps the result, of an easy virtue; he seldom failed to ridicule high aspirations,
and seems genuinely to have suspected noble enthusiasms. There is indeed a
certain large simplicity in his utterance, a magnanimity in his indifference to
calumny and in his freedom from cant, which wins admiration. But he wanted,
wrote Chesterfield, a certain elevation that is necessary both for great good
or great mischief, and he was not the man to die for a cause, or to live for an
ideal. One who had assailed him in his declining years was now to show that
there were other ways of governing England than by lulling her to sleep, other
ways of dealing with corruption than by sneering at virtue, and another way to
popularity than that of following the people’s wishes.
The chief
interest of the years 1742-57, otherwise barren in our internal history, lies
in the fact that they describe the gradual rise to power of the most
extraordinary genius of the age. The early career of William Pitt was not
always creditable to him; his oratory was impassioned, but theatrical; and his
violence against Walpole was not by any means uninspired by self-interest. On
the fall of Walpole, Newcastle' and his brother, Henry Pelham (who was
Paymaster of the Forces), opened the Cabinet door wide enough to admit Pulteney (Lord Bath) and Carteret, but remorselessly
slammed it upon Pitt. Meanwhile Carteret, with the King’s favour to back him, launched England into the turmoil of continental warfare (1743).
Pitt wreaked his vengeance on the Ministry by stigmatising Carteret as a Minister who had drunk of the potion “causing men to forget their
country.” His attacks, though immeasurably violent, were not absurd, he had
never been acquainted with official secrets from the inside, and throughout his
speeches on the Spanish War of 1739 and on the Continental War of 1743-4 ran a
sound vein of strategy, and a genuine, if not quite accurate, apprehension that
British and colonial interests were being sacrificed to those of Hanover— “ the
despicable electorate.” Throughout them can be discerned, together with an
ardent ambition and a boundless love of fame, the yearnings of a lofty spirit
and the glow of an unquenchable patriotism. Pitt’s eloquence from the
Opposition benches, and Newcastle’s intrigues in the Cabinet, finally drove the
high-minded but imbalanced Carteret (now Earl Granville) from office (November,
1744). As Henry Pelham had already in July, 1743, succeeded to the First
Lordship of the Treasury on the death of the amiable cipher—the Earl of
Wilmington, who had held it since February, 1742—the Newcastle interest became
supreme. But there was now a new force to be reckoned with, for Pitt’s oratory
could not be withstood in the Commons. In 1745, it was, for the first time,
employed on behalf of the Government, and Newcastle and Pelham, hoping to
silence Pitt by office, prayed the King to admit him to the Ministry. George II
was inexorable; he had never forgiven the attacks upon Carteret or the sarcasms
about Dettingen. When the King definitely refused
this request, Newcastle, Pelham and the other Ministers took the rather
unpatriotic step of resigning in a body (February 10, 1746), just at the height
of the agitation caused by Charles Edward’s successes in Scotland. The King
sent for Lords Bath and Granville, who formed a Ministry which lasted
forty-eight hours. “Bounce went all the project into shivers,” wrote a
well-informed contemporary, “like the vessel in the Alchymist,
when they are on the brink of the Philosopher’s Stone.” Granville retired,
laughing at the whole fiasco as an excellent joke, and the King sulkily
capitulated; Pitt became Joint Vice-Treasurer for Ireland and (May 6)
Paymaster-General. This incident has sometimes been claimed as the definite
precedent for the establishment of the joint responsibility of the Ministry. It
is difficult to view it altogether as such ; in this case some of the
resignations were calculated, some spontaneous, and later history shows several
instances in which the principle has been ignored that Ministers ought to
resign in a body. The incident of 1746 is less important because it asserted a
principle in the Constitution than because it admitted a man into the Ministry.
From 1746 to
1754 the land had rest from party bickerings; Pelham,
the head of the Ministry, was a sort of lesser Walpole, an excellent financier,
and a shrewd and amiable party leader. His Ministry witnessed the Reform of the
Calendar (1751) and the foundation of the British Museum (1753), but for
neither of these measures can he claim the chief credit; the reduction of the
National Debt and the prohibition of the right to manufacture certain articles
in the colonies (elsewhere described) are measures more truly his, and give Pelham,
in the one case a genuine, in the other a sinister, renown. In 1748—at the end
of the war—the National Debt stood at near eighty millions; Pelham, imitating
Walpole’s measures of 1717 and 1727, reduced the rate of interest on it to
three per cent, average, and the gain to the Treasury was substantial. The
unfunded Debt was paid off, the Sinking Fund (sadly depleted of late) was
replenished, credit soothed, and the merchant world flattered. Pelham has been
praised for his careful stewardship and for his economic reform in all
departments; but this praise requires qualification. Genuine love of economy,
in the main, prevailed; in particular, a reduction of the army and navy was
carried by him, despite bitter fraternal opposition from Newcastle. His discouragement
of payment of subsidies, on the grand scale, to foreign Princes, for the use of
their armies, is balanced by an encouragement of payments to members of
Parliament for the use of their votes: subsidy treaties were fewer, pensions
more numerous. This, however, is not the most serious charge against his
conduct of affairs: after all, the demands of the T'.npTisVi place-hunter were not too excessive a burden on the Treasury under Pelham,
while his measures towards American manufactures began to place a heavy strain
on the loyalty of the empire. A reduction of the National Debt, an increase of
the Pension List, and a diminution of colonial loyalty—these are the main
features of Pelham’s Ministry, and the ultimate logic of the policy of tranquilla non movere.
Pelham’s errors were due to the fact that he had too faithfully followed
Walpole, at a time when his master’s policy was becoming more and more antiquated.
The new age was not to be one of peace, indolence, and materialism, but of war,
adventure, and idealism ; and for inspiration it was to turn—not to a shrewd
and cautious financier, but to a passionate orator, who struck chords to which
Pelham was deaf, and followed ideals to which he was blind.
Pelham’s death
in March, 1754, left his brother, the hasty and fickle Newcastle, to succeed
him at the vacant Treasury. The Duke foolishly appointed Sir Thomas Robinson
(afterwards Lord Grantham)—a diplomatist quite fresh to party politics—leader
in the Commons, and tried to manage everything himself from the Lords. Unlike
Pelham, he could not command respect from his subordinates; and Pitt and Henry
Fox openly ridiculed their nominal leader in the Commons, and their real leader
in the Lords. After agonies and distractions of no common kind, even Newcastle recognised the inevitable, dismissed Pitt, and won over the
war party by .offering Fox a seat in the Cabinet (April, 1755). But he soon
found himself weaker than ever, for a crisis was at hand, war was inevitable,
subsidy treaties must come before the Commons, and there Pitt was supreme. Pitt
was finally dismissed from office in November, 1755, after he had not only
ridiculed but vehemently denounced Newcastle. His language in private was
equally contemptuous, and, in a secret interview with Newcastle on December 22,
1755, he belaboured him with all the force of his
eloquence, rejecting all his terms. In November, Robinson had been succeeded by
Fox as Secretary of State; but even he could not face Pitt’s invective in the
Commons, and at last, after having been in office for a generation, Newcastle
resigned (November, 1756). A short-lived Ministry, under the Duke of Devonshire
as nominal head with Pitt as guiding spirit, endured from 1756 to April, 1757.
It took vigorous measures and won much outside popularity, as was shown by the
shower of gold boxes with which patriotic corporations veiled the fall of Pitt.
After eleven weeks’ interregnum, Lord Hardwicke, the sage and veteran
Chancellor, brought about an accommodation between Pitt and Newcastle (June
11,1757). Newcastle had the largest following, Pitt the most commanding voice,
in the Commons; and the one neutralised the other.
Pitt sought power, Newcastle office, for its own sake, and the compromise of a
coalition Ministry enabled each to win his desire. But Pitt, though the
greatest, was not the only man in the Government; the diverse talents of
Granville, of Anson, of Fox, of Ligonier, and of Hardwicke, contributed largely
to make the Ministry of 1757 the most glorious and successful in English
annals.
Though Pitt had
been greatly aided by his popularity outside Parliament in the period
immediately preceding 1757, it is wholly inaccurate to say that he ascended to
power on the shoulders of the people. He owed his early rise to his
parliamentary success, which had been established by conventional means. At
first he had been supported by the influence of connexion,
by the help of the Lytteltons and the Cobhams, by the favour of the
Prince of Wales. Later, he had been aided by the Grenville interest, and by
certain intrigues with Lady Yarmouth, George II’s reigning mistress, which were
of an unusually degrading character. In the sense that the people directly
aided a statesman in rising to power, Pitt—the friend of peers, of a royal
mistress and of a prince—was less truly their choice than Walpole, who had been
but a plain country squire. In 1720, the popular voice had called for him far
more loudly than it had called for Pitt in 1746, and his bluff manners, coarse
accent, and homely acquaintances, never ceased to distress patrician taste.
Pitt’s influence from connexion had been strengthened
by his influence in the House of Commons and by office, before the people began
definitely to support him. Despite some equivocal actions due to an exorbitant
ambition, his hatred of corruption was sincere, his objects were pure and
patriotic. His genuine moral enthusiasm, joined to extraordinary powers of
oratory, made him resistless in the Commons, and eventually forced Ministers of
that day, always insecure, to make terms with him. But, though Pitt had secured
power by oratory in the Commons and influence with boroughmongers,
he was the last man to despise popularity. He thought himself called to office
in 1757, “in some sort by the voice of the people,” and he understood how to
kindle their enthusiasm, though he was not afraid, on occasion, of resisting
them. Of his powers as a great war Minister, of his deep knowledge of foreign
politics, of the needs of England’s commerce, and of the wishes of her
colonies, no mention has to be made here. It is sufficient to say that, for the
first time in this period, England possessed a Minister with the majority which
Carteret, and the ideals which Walpole, had lacked. The heroic age had come
again, and a dominating figure was not wanting to it. His oft-quoted utterance
that he alone could save his country was no arrogant boast at this moment, for
Pitt’s actions support these haughty words. His matchless energy, no longer
confined to empty invective, was at length to be translated into action, and
was to awaken the admiration alike of generals and admirals, parliament and
people, in the crisis of the world struggle which gave England her empire.
(2)
The earlier
half of the eighteenth century in England is an age of materialism, a period of
dim ideals, of expiring hopes; before the middle of the century its character
was transformed, there appeared & movement headed by a mighty leader, who
brought forth water from the rocks to make a barren land live again. Dropping
allegory, we can recognise in English institutions,
in English ideals, in the English philosophy of this age, the same practical
materialism, the same hard rationalism, the same unreasonable self-complacency.
Reason dominated alike the intellect, the will, and the passions; politics were
self-interested, poetry didactic, philosophy critical and objective. Generalisations such as these are but rough approximations,
for no age is without its individual protests and rebels, without men who seek
to dam or to divert the streams of tendency. Of these men, Chatham among
politicians, Thomson among poets, Berkeley among philosophers, Law among
divines, all derived new thoughts, evoked new harmonies, or caught new
inspirations from the age. But more important than any of these in universality
of influence and in range of achievement were John Wesley and the religious
revival to which he gave his name and his life.
The history of
thought and action—always closely interwoven—in this age is inextricably
intertwined. The framework of the national life appears to be entirely
political, the civil revolution of 1688 has vanquished the religious revolution
of 1642. Even the most abstract of thinkers and the most unworldly of clerics
have a mundane and secular stamp upon them; even Butler is a courtier, even
Leibniz is a wit. Religious, social, and literary influences show but as the
tiny satellites of a political planet, to which they owe their warmth and their
light. When, in 1727, Caroline, Princess of Wales, became the Queen of George
II, all these political influences were intensified, for the Court became the
chief centre not only of power, but of learning. She
loved at all times to surround herself with learned men—profound theologians
like Butler and Berkeley, deep-read divines like Clarke and Potter, wide-minded
philosophers like Leibniz, cultured Deists like Chesterfield. The Queen’s
interest in theology and the Establishment was keen; but it was primarily
intellectual. She loved theological arguments rather than good works, and
valued divines for depth of learning or subtlety of metaphysic rather than for fervour of piety. Deism—never popular with the masses or
the country gentry—had immense vogue at Court; and it implied a vague
monotheism for the educated few, with a very definite dogmatic system for the
ignorant many. The notion that it was necessary to preserve the Establishment
in order to secure the obedience of the vulgar was accepted by Walpole, who
confessed himself a sceptic in private, while
publicly proclaiming his adherence to the Church, and by Bolingbroke, who
outdid him alike in the secret fervour of his
freethinking and in the open passion of his orthodoxy. When Bolingbroke and
Walpole agreed on a principle, it is hardly rash to conclude that the
governing classes as a whole acquiesced in it. Nothing, indeed, could be worse
for a religion or a Church than a public adherence to its forms and a private
ridiculing of its substance by a large proportion of the governing class. They
might almost consider themselves as beings of another race and religion; the
classics had taught them their creed of isolation and their doctrine of Deism,
and the weeping classical nymphs and cupids who support Latin inscriptions on
their tombs in many a church are true witnesses to their half-unconscious adherence
to the ideals of Greece and of Rome. A Roman noble of the age of Horace, with
his vast estates, his nominal adherence to Augustan morality, and his playful
hesitance between rival philosophies, is, indeed, no inapt prototype of his
English brother in the age of Walpole, with his broad acres, his lip-service to
the Establishment, and his benevolent neutrality between rival religions. Such
a society was perfectly self-sufficient and perfectly self-contained, and, had
not new and mighty influences arisen to overthrow class barriers, the chasm
between the few and the many might have given birth to revolution.
The danger to
orthodoxy was, not that its precepts were ceasing to be avowed, but that they
were ceasing to be believed among the upper class; and it was unfortunate that
the Establishment, at the moment when it was most open to attack, had provided
for its defence only in the least adequate way.
Pluralism and indolence were frequent among the clergy; the age was active only
in religious controversy, and the generation between 1710 and 1740 witnessed
works of real importance by such men as Clarke, Butler, Berkeley, Wake, and
Warburton. But the controversies were in the main barren and dusty, and were
handled in too arid and hard a fashion to win the recognition of posterity;
there is a fine harvest of wit, of learning and of intellect, a rank crop of
abuse, partisanship, and acrimony, and an utter dearth of moderation and
sympathy. Noble exceptions are to be found in men like Law and Butler; but even
these seem to have viewed controversy or religious meditation rather as
comforting to themselves than for the sake of its immediate benefit to the
world. Despairing of the general attitude towards religion, they walled
themselves up in an intellectual city, where they could exert but little
influence on the general run of men. With lesser and baser men, controversial
theology served not spiritual but worldly interests, and a clever religious
tract or sermon availed as much for ecclesiastical, as did a smart pamphlet for
political, promotions. The famous Sacheverell trial
is the most important instance of the way in which ecclesiastical controversies
shifted into partisan politics, and the Non-Jurors, the Bangorian,
and a score of other controversies, are more typical if less striking examples.
The process of secularisation is apparent in other
directions. Political considerations dominated ecclesiastical patronage and behaviour; and, while the Church became more and more
political, the State became less and less religious. Episcopal politicians
forgot their fervour in the presence of the cultured sceptics of the Court, and learnt the mundane lessons of
corruption and venality from the place-hunters of Parliament.
Among the
parochial clergy, as a whole, there was a frequent reaction against episcopal
dominance, which had in it the symptoms of a healthy revival. In the country
parishes there were, indeed, a number of too worldly clergy. Smollett spoke of
“rosy sons of the Church,” who quaffed too much ale in ingle corners; Cowper of
“ cassocked huntsmen,” who set horse and hound before parish; and, in general,
Georgian wits made the parson as much of a butt as ever Elizabethans did the
friar. But satire is not history, and there is evidence that many country parishes
were well served by their incumbents. The habits of the town clergy gave the
satirist more justification for his wit; for they were often indolent and
worldly, their sermons were often directed only to the refined understanding,
the presence of the “unsavory multitude” was sometimes resented or discouraged.
When a popular preacher brought the poor flooding into his church, the
wealthier members fled, locking their pews behind them to keep out the poor,
the churchwardens would cut off the lights, and the pulpit be illumined by a
solitary candle in the hand of the preacher. Such was the recorded experience
of William Romaine, lecturer at St George’s, Hanover Square, and at St
Dunstan’s, Fleet Street—a man of blameless life and devoted character. Even if
this incident is not typical, it is difficult to ignore the force of the
opinions held by serious men as to the conduct and usefulness of the Episcopal
Bench, of Chesterfield’s solemn private warning to his son that it was a vulgar
error to regard clergymen as necessarily hypocrites—or of Voltaire’s published
assertion that England was the most irreligious of countries
If we were to
rely upon the amount of churchbuilding under Anne,
the number of charity schools founded both by Church and Chapel, and the amount
of poor-relief subscribed by voluntary effort under the Georges, we might think
the age not deficient in religious vitality. But the deficiencies in religious
force, at any rate in the early Georgian period, are attested by witnesses more
powerful than statistics. Butler and Berkeley both publicly confessed—with
melancholy and sorrow—the too common indifference to religion and the general
ridicule of clergymen, and betrayed signs of this conviction in their works.
Butler’s Analogy and his theory of Probabilism exhibit religion on its last line of defence—he
appeals to reason and common sense, and substitutes the proof by induction and
the external senses for the proof from internal conviction and faith.
Berkeley’s practical efforts to create a religious imperialism in his Bermuda
Scheme met (as told above) with a disastrous check from the indifference of the
age; and his theoretical attempts to recreate the imagination by proclaiming
the reality of ideas, were in large measure a reaction from contact with too
materialistic an age. One virtue—a rare virtue indeed—this age possessed, that
of tolerance. Clergy whose opinions approached Deism were not inhibited from
preaching; controversies which led to advocacy of quasi-scepticism were not openly suppressed; and the bands of ecclesiastical discipline and
political control were often amiably relaxed. That there was a real advance
towards the greatest of religious blessings—respect for the individual
conscience—was due at least in part to indolence, and yet more to political
considerations; but the notion that persecution for religious opinions was bad
in itself undoubtedly gained ground at the same time. Thus, in 1753, the
Bishops showed real zeal in supporting the Act for the Naturalisation of Jews, and only capitulated to the furious outburst of indignation from the
lower clergy and the mob, which secured the repeal of the Act in 1754.
The religious
and social condition of the masses under the two Georges is the severest
condemnation of the religious life of the period. The masses were ignorant and brutalised, and their numbers and demoralisation rapidly increased. The medieval corporations in town or city were powerless to
cope with the growing evils of industrial life; the Government pandered to mob
passions by public executions or by unworthy concessions to mob violence, and
insulted humanity by-the brutal ferocity of its criminal code. A governing
class, intent only on pleasure or politics, a Church occupied chiefly with
patronage and controversy, were now to feel the force of a great religious wave
which was to beat on every wall of privilege.
The real ulcer
of the age lay in its uncompromising individualism, and in the inadequacy of
existing social organisations to cope with those
evils. Political and religious institutions had crystallised into a species of hereditary or privileged oligarchy, into an officialdom
which, though not entirely exclusive or unsympathetic, seemed incapable of
change or advance. That nothing but reform from the outside would avail to
alter the existing system, had already been demonstrated by the politics of the
age. Its most characteristic decisions—Sacheverell’s acquittal, the rejection of Wood’s Halfpence, and of the Excise Bill—owed much,
if not everything, to the stormy outbursts of national feeling or of mob
violence. So, again, the most effective attempts at church reform were to come
from without; for it was only an outside organisation,
unaffected by existing institutions, which could break free from the traditions
of stagnation and appeal to the vast mass of the people. This unconscious
tendency is exhibited by the number of religious societies, which anticipated
the work of Wesley by sixty years. So early as 1678, small societies, composed
of orthodox Churchmen, sought by intimate religious intercourse “ to quicken
each other’s affections towards spiritual things.” All these societies were
primarily formed by men who sought to save their own souls, and it marks a
serious reaction against the selfish individualism of the age, that they were
all eventually directed towards saving the bodies and souls of others, to
relieving unemployment, to promoting education, or providing for the needs of
the poor. During the first thirty years of the century their numbers increased,
and they became an active and important religious force; but, by the middle of the
century, their vitality gradually sank, though they had borne a brave witness
for religious idealism at a time of need. All these societies were, without
exception, composed of members of the Established Church; but official prelacy
chilled, if it did not disavow, them. Anything that savoured of originality, of indecorous fervour, was an object
of alarm and suspicion, and was denounced as “enthusiasm.” If this was the
attitude of church dignitaries towards movements and associations which were unquestionably
orthodox, it is no wonder that they showed more hostility to the movements
heralded by such men as Griffith Jones, George Whitefield, and John Wesley.
The Welsh
Revival of the period beginning with 1735 (which was due, in large part, to
Griffith Jones) is a singular, and an almost exact, anticipation of Methodism.
Griffith Jones experienced a spiritual conversion about the same time as
Whitefield, and was moved to preach the tidings to others. All the signs of
intense emotion, which Wesley and Whitefield were to awake in thousands of
meetings at a later date, were present among the congregations of Griffith
Jones, and of his fellow- evangelists, whom he raised up and trained. His organising skill was manifested in the foundation of a
system of circulating schools, and in general the Welsh Revival is of great
importance, because it foreshadows most of the peculiar developments of
Methodism, and because it marks the beginning of an even more formidable
secession from the Establishment than that which Methodism brought about in
England.
As the Welsh
Revival anticipates one aspect of Methodism, the early writings of William Law
(whom John Wesley at one time “took for an oracle”) foreshadow another. Indeed,
the deepest source of religious inspiration in the eighteenth century seems to
be reached in this passage in his Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life: “ If,
therefore, persons of either sex...desirous of perfection, should unite
themselves into little societies, professing voluntary poverty, virginity,
retirement, and devotion, that some might be relieved by their charities, and
all be blessed with their prayers, and benefited by their example;.. .such
persons would be, so far from being chargeable with any superstition, or blind
devotion, that they might justly be said to restore that piety, which was the
boast and glory of the Church, when, its greatest saints were alive.”
The revival of
religion in England will always remain linked with the names of George
Whitefield and John Wesley, each an ordained clergyman of the Church of
England, and each, despite himself, the founder of a sect in separation from
it. They were closely associated with each other; each admired the other’s gifts
and loved his friendship ; but—except for their earnest piety—no two men were
ever more dissimilar. Whitefield was the first religious preacher of his age,
an unexampled orator, impetuous and earnest, emotional rather than thoughtful,
a revolutionary who broke through old forms before he realised the consequences of his action. John Wesley was of another type; he was a great
preacher, but a far greater organiser; his nature was
the reverse of sentimental; his cold, keen intellect contrasts with the warm
impulsiveness of Whitefield, as did his dislike of mysticism (for all his
dependence on superstition), his hatred of irregularities, his appreciation of
scholarship, order, and refinement. The respective evolution of the two great
branches of Methodism—Calvinistic and Wesleyan—harmonises closely with the character and views of these two men. Whitefield is ever in
the van, leading forlorn hopes or exploring new continents; Wesley is more slow
and calculating, advancing oftener along trodden paths, reaping from fields
already sown, and, for that reason, making his influence the more enduring and
momentous.
The origin of
Methodism is ascribed to the year 1729, when the name was bestowed on a small
society at Oxford of whom the best known were Charles Wesley, his elder
brother, John, and Whitefield, who joined in 1733. The society, though it
differed little from the preceding private religious societies, encountered
such scorn and abuse at Oxford that even Whitefield confesses to having often
visited the Wesleys in secret. Private prayer,
religious communings with one another, visitation of
the sick, of the poor, and of criminals in gaols:
these were the aims of the society and the cause of the ridicule to which it
was exposed. By the end of 1737, when Whitefield started for America, he had
not only experienced a spiritual conversion whose effects on his life were to
be permanent, but had already become a very famous preacher. The two Wesleys (John and Charles) had preceded him to Georgia
(October, 1735) in the brave hope of converting the “ poor heathen ” in
America. On the voyage, John Wesley came into contact with some pious Germans;
on his return to England (after a not very successful ministry in Georgia) he
encountered the Moravian preacher Peter Bohler, whose
earnest simplicity produced a spiritual revolution in him (May, 1738), and
induced him to journey to Herrnhut, where for three
months he studied Moravian principles at their fountain- head. His career, up
to this point, as he frequently assures us, had been principally marked by a
desire to save his own soul. Henceforward, he was assured of his own
salvation, but “ felt his heart burn within him ” to tell his message to other
men; and he soon found an opportunity for doing this on a scale unknown to the
religious life of the age. At Oxford, Whitefield tells us, “the Wesleys were the first who openly desired to confess
Christ”; but, in 1739, says John Wesley, it was Whitefield who reconciled
“myself...to this strange way of preaching in the fields.”
Whitefield was
anxious to go to America, but wished to find someone to continue his work at
Bristol, where he had excited extraordinary enthusiasm by preaching in the
fields among the colliers of Kingswood. These
men—hitherto the most neglected and degraded of humanity— had shown real signs
of amendment under Whitefield’s charge, who now persuaded the hesitating John
Wesley to undertake their care. While Whitefield was sailing to Georgia, John
Wesley “proclaimed in the highways the glad tidings of salvation, speaking from
a little eminence in a ground adjoining to the city (Bristol), to about three
thousand people.” From this day, April 2, 1739, may be reckoned a new era in
the religious history of England; for her greatest religious leader between
Cromwell and Newman had found his way to the hearts of her people.
To narrate in
detail the further experiences of Wesley and Whitefield is impossible, but a
few words may indicate their influence, their methods, and their triumphs. Both
were consumed by a burning desire to save souls, to go on “spiritual huntings” for the welfare of all mankind; and, since the
days of St Francis Xavier, none had journeyed so far or toiled so earnestly to
win the fame of Evangelists. These devoted men travelled five thousand miles a
year, rode fetlock-deep in snow or mud on English roads, journeyed wearily
afoot over trackless Scotch moors or by blazed paths in American forests, and
shrank from no toil and no danger in order to preach their personal Gospel.
Wesley traversed the British Isles from North Scotland to Land’s End (not
forgetting Man and the Scilly Isles), whilst
Whitefield was more often seen in America than in England. Unimagined numbers
in two hemispheres must have listened to their words, for each was accustomed
to preach twenty times a week, and to audiences that were claimed to have
sometimes reached to thirty thousand. At first they endeavoured to preach in churches; but, when incumbents forbade them, they took to
preaching in the fields, now speaking on a bare hillside, now in a gaol, now in a back street in a crowded city, now on a
village green, now from a tombstone in a churchyard, now even on the roof of a pigstye. Nothing deterred them or lessened their
congregations. Wesley preferred to preach at five in the morning, without ever
lacking auditors at that time, any more than when he preached in the evening in
the open during torrents of rain, his face illumined by lightning-flashes. They
feared the fury of mobs even less than that of the elements, and stood unmoved when
crowds rushed on them, now impelled by sectarian bitterness, now drawn by mere
curiosity, now merely riotous and drunken. Often the preacher was struck with
stones, jostled or crushed by the crowd, his clothes tom, his body bruised, his
face battered with blows; often, again, his fearless demeanour awed a hostile crowd into silence, and then into shamefaced reverence. As the
sermon progressed, the crowd underwent extraordinary emotions, some shouting
out boastfully that they were kings, others confessing themselves sinners; yet
others burst into songs of thanksgiving and praise, writhed in convulsions,
foaming at the mouth, or dropped down motionless as dead. Results such as these
were produced by the sermons of both men; but the effects of Whitefield’s oratory
were sometimes even more extraordinary. Despite Dr Johnson’s sneer, Whitefield was able to impress the educated; he won admiration
from so complete a technical master of rhetoric as Garrick; he carried away
such convinced worldlings as Pulteney and Chesterfield; and, when he addressed a less cultured audience, thousands
were sometimes bathed in tears, while the fainting and the convulsed were
carried away like the “ wounded from a battlefield.” His farewell sermon in
America on September 29, 1770, spoken with a premonition of coming death, “I
go, I go to a rest prepared; my sun has arisen”—has no parallel and no equal
for immediate effect in the clerical oratory of modem times.
That enormous
influence may be exerted by a great orator on an audience highstrung by an appeal to its deepest emotions is a familiar fact in spiritual
psychology, and Whitefield is only remarkable for the degree of emotional
response which his preaching produced. Wesley, not the equal of Whitefield as
an orator, could exercise in the intimate circle of his friends, in small
meetings of committees, on the conference of his preachers as a whole, an
influence perhaps more remarkable and. certainly more unique. None of his
followers questioned his decisions, and, even if he sought (and he very seldom
sought) to devolve some of his authority, they persisted in referring
everything to him. This faculty of commanding obedience, of awaking
inspiration, and his general aspect of imperious tyrannic strength, has induced a not very apt comparison between him and two of the
greatest of statesmen. Wesley was deficient in imaginative power, and in his
creative genius and capacity for organisation he
resembles Loyola or Colbert far more than Chatham or Richelieu. It is strange
that a man, whose objects were so disinterested, lofty and pure, should have
had so firm a grasp of the realities of life, of business, finance, and
administration. Wherever Whitefield passed he left memories of overwhelming
passion and eloquence, wherever Wesley passed he left more enduring memorials
in the shape of schools, mission- rooms, meeting-places, and unions for prayer,
for charity, and for self-help. Not one of his creations was original; but he
lent a new meaning and force to them all, especially to the class meeting, the
most peculiar and characteristic feature of Methodism. A vast organisation of lay preachers—constructed on a system
acknowledged to be a model for ecclesiastical institutions—is the most
remarkable result of his work; and to this more than anything else is due the
fact that it has endured, and that the waves of religious emotion were not lost
in space.
The relations
of Whitefield and Wesley to the Establishment have an interest and a pathos
rarely equalled; for the one seceder left it only with the greatest sorrow, and the other always denied that he had
left it at all. The general attitude and character of Whitefield, his utter
scorn of conventions, his generous rashness, his serious doctrinal differences
with the orthodox theology, make it impossible to suppose that he could have
permanently remained in a Church so wedded to tradition and the existing order
of things. The case of Wesley is very different; much of the atmosphere and
doctrine of the Church of England was congenial to him, and, during his later
years, hostility towards him so declined that many clergymen allowed him to
preach in churches from which they had once excluded him. This fact suggests
that a separation, though probable, was not inevitable. Such a separation was
certainly not directly sought by either Wesley or by the established hierarchy,
which never took any collective action against him. It was, indeed, rather
their indifference to the institutions which he was creating than their active
opposition which had so large a share in producing separation. Wesley’s lay
preachers were very carefully supervised by him, were distinctly limited in
their functions, and rigorously subjected to those of the ordained clergy, who
cast in their lot with Methodism. Had more care been taken to regularise this institution of lay preachers, as might have
been the case had there been an English episcopate in America, separation might
have been averted. As it was, the lay preachers felt bound to trespass on the
functions and influence of the incumbents of parishes, whenever these proved
hostile, or the bishops indifferent; and they thus supplied the strongest
material incentive to separation. An organisation external to the Church, having failed to reform, was logically bound to
abandon, it.
Wesley had
created an imperium in imperio, and had caused a
contest between two different kinds of organisation within the limits of one Church. But, paradoxically enough, this was not the
most powerful cause of separation, for the spirit is more important than the
letter and the form. Wesley’s whole spiritual development was, in reality, a
slow emancipation from the conventions and organisations which history and tradition had furnished to the Establishment. Wesley’s father
had bequeathed to his son a passionate devotion to the Church, but the son’s
spiritual awakening had taught him the relative unimportance of forms and
rules— in comparison with direct spiritual appeals. Even in his early days he
had declared that power could be given to a presbyter to act as a bishop over
the souls of men, and in his unrivalled religious experience he beheld simple
appeals to faith working apparently miraculous changes in hundreds of men. It
is therefore small wonder that he gradually began to cast aside his old love of
order, regularity and form, and sought to judge everything by its simple
apparent worth as an instrument of righteousness. Lord Acton has placed the
crucial date in this spiritual transformation at December 1, 1767, and Wesley’s
journal of that day shows clearly (though almost unconsciously) that he had
begun to conceive salvation as outside the Church, that he desired a return to the
simplicity of evangelical days, and to the “plain word, He that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with Him.” Henceforth, more than ever, his lay organisation was to him the heart and soul of his religion,
the ecclesiastical one the mere frame and body of it. He who thinks on the real
significance of things will place the act of separation in 1767 rather than 1784.
Thus the two
strongest motives of separation were present and working towards fissure, the
external difficulty of reconciling two opposed organisations,
and Wesley’s inward spiritual conviction that righteousness lay in the heart of
man rather than in the mechanism of his faith. During the sixties his lay
preachers began to administer the sacrament, and, finally, in 1784, Wesley,
taking on himself the episcopal function (there being still no bishop in
America), ordained ministers to that continent, and shortly afterwards also to
Scotland. No Church which holds strongly to episcopal ordination could suffer
this, and the highest legal authority of the eighteenth century pronounced that
“ ordination meant separation.” Wesley—with a logic consistent with this
spiritual position—refused to admit that a mere external act could thus affect
his spiritual relations to the Church.
On Wesley’s
death (March 2, 1791) his followers speedily acknowledged a separation which
the majority of them both approved and desired. Wesley during his last years
had stood almost alone in his desire to preserve the union, and, with an
amiable inconsistency, had never shown more outward devotion to the
Establishment than in the years after 1767. Perhaps an extract from his journal
(of January 2, 1748), when he was refused the sacrament at Epworth, where his
father had once been rector, may typify, as in allegory, his personal attitude
on the whole question of his relations with the Establishment: “ How wise a God
is our God! There could not have been so fit a place under heaven, where this
should befall me first as my father’s house, the place of my nativity, and the
very place where, ‘according to the straitest sect of
our religion,’ I had so long ‘lived a Pharisee’! It was also fit, in the
highest degree, that he who repelled me from that very table, where I had
myself so often distributed the bread of life, should be one who owed his all
in this world to the tender love which my father had shown to his, as well as
personally to himself.”
All the great
changes of the eighteenth century, religious or social, political or
industrial, profoundly as they differed in character, were similar in that they
were produced by a resolute minority of men, pessimistic as to the past and
present, and optimistic as to the future. Hence, they had no hesitation in
applying unsparing criticism to existing conditions, or in constructing ideal
plans for future ages; and this fact accounts alike for their extraordinary
triumphs and equally extraordinary failures. The men who produced the religious
revival in England were really only three—Whitefield the orator, John Wesley
the organiser, and Charles Wesley the poet of the
movement. All of them were profoundly impressed with the blackness and despair
of the past and the present, all hoped, desired, and believed that the future
would be rich in promise, that their triumphs would be great, and the sway of
their gospel irresistible. As in all other cases, their achievement fell far
short of their ideal; but they effected a transformation at once so sudden in
its appearance and so far-reaching in its effect, that what would have been a
marvel in any age appears a miracle in this.
No great
personality in this age came into such vivid and direct contact with the masses
as John Wesley; hence, his general social and political influence is of more
importance than is usual with religious leaders. He was, indeed, too much a
child of his age—in some of its faults—not to exercise great influence upon it,
and the unworldly part of his character is strangely mingled with a singular
practical shrewdness. For instance, his politics were very definitely partisan;
but he had a strange independence of outlook. The King in his coronation robes
excited in him no awe, and was described by him as swathed in ermine blankets,
adorned with a huge heap of borrowed hair, and with glittering baubles; the
nobles were triflers unaware of their latter end; the lawyers were dishonest
and self-seeking; British landlords in Ireland were absentees, careless of
their tenants, and working for the depopulation of the country; the Slave Trade
(which even Chatham defended) was that “execrable sum of all villainies.” It
may surprise anyone who reads these opinions in his journal to discover that
his general views were strongly conservative, and that he was not only a Tory,
but even supposed to support the Divine Right of Kings. He never ceased to
denounce all disobedience to the law and to the sovereign; his condemnation
descended upon Jacobites and American Revolutionists;
and his fiercest invective was poured upon the smugglers and wreckers of
Cornwall. As he never had the slightest fear or reserve in proclaiming his
views, and as he appealed most particularly to the poor and ignorant, his
influence must have contributed most powerfully towards preserving the existing
frame of society, especially when the shocks of the French Revolution were
already being felt. Dissenters of other kinds were inclined to favour the Revolution; from the first, Wesleyans met it
with rigid hostility—an attitude of which it is difficult to exaggerate the
national importance. The teaching of the one man who had really stirred the
masses in the middle of the century went all towards allaying their excitement
at its close, and the Duke of Wellington found no better soldiers than those
that were Methodists.
The general
influence of Wesley was far less happy. He was descended from a stern and
heroic race, and inherited a singular fervour and
sense of duty, as well as a curious hardness and rigour.
Some of these faults he was never able to conquer, and his denunciations of
harmless gaieties and of art show some inconsistency, exceptional narrowness,
and a curious Puritanism. He advocated card-playing, but denounced dancing and
ordinary pleasures; desired toleration, but refused to extend it to Catholics;
had some enlightened views on education, but wished to establish schools where
there should be no vacations, and universities where there should be lectures
for every day in the year. All these singular eccentricities (which were of no
very amiable kind) were due to his defects in imaginative vision, which could
not break entirely free from the trammels of tradition and environment.
The religious
effect—which Wesley produced upon the Establishment—was neither obvious nor
immediate. Religious thought, instead of growing more liberal, became more
narrow, controversy more embittered and sterile; and we pass from the
philosophic temper and literary grace of Butler and Law to the dreary aridities of Paley. Religious life in the Establishment
underwent no immediate marked improvement; rather— by reaction against Wesleyanism—it deteriorated. It became even more formal and
less emotional, and the worship of decorum and etiquette was more pronounced
than ever—even Butler telling Whitefield that pretending to be inspired by the
Holy Ghost was “a horrid thing, a very horrid thing.” None the less, the leaven
was slowly penetrating, and the Wesleyan emotional influence worked within as
well as without the Establishment. The Evangelical movement, which began about
1780, and which profoundly influenced every side of the national life, was
mainly an adaptation of Wesley’s methods and ideas by men who remained inside
the pale of the Establishment; and his direct influence is apparent in many of
the Evangelical aims, especially in their noble desire to abolish the Slave
Trade, and in their general humanitarian impulses.
On the general
religious life of the country, so far as it lay outside the Establishment, both
Whitefield and Wesley made the profoundest impression, and the followers of
both—counted by thousands at their deaths—are now reckoned by millions. Not
only the Church of England, but the Dissenting bodies likewise, had been
affected by the prevailing materialism and stagnation of the age. Methodism
mediated between the two religious bodies, brought them more into harmony with
one another, and gave to each the breath of a new and invigorating life.
Congregationalism, like the Establishment, had worked by old methods, and had
leaned too near the doctrines of religious individualism. Wesley and Whitefield
changed all this, when they showed an astonished world that souls could be won
in the hedges and the byways, and that the people, who had displayed a remarkable
susceptibility to political, made a still further response to religious,
agitators. Introspection—the value of knowing one’s own soul aright—the
blessedness of religious certainty and conviction—all these came with a rush of
force and passion to untaught minds and untutored impulses. To the upper
classes, in part over-educated and in part unspiritual, Wesleyanism never ceased to be something of a mystery. Wesley was thought an actor by
Horace Walpole, whose class as a whole despised “enthusiasm,” and loathed a
movement which sought to raise the “ common wretches ” above their station.
Whitefield and
Wesley had to face the formidable hostility of many members of the upper class;
but, on the other hand, the unconventionality of their methods aided their
success among the poor. Bolingbroke— when the House of Lords was closed to
him—spoke no more in public; Wesley, when the churches were shut, preached in
the fields. As the medieval scholastic thinker anticipated the modem democratic
philosopher, so the eighteenth century field-preacher may claim to have
foreshadowed the modem platform speech and mass meeting. The whole population
of a remote village or country town, where strangers were very rare, came out
to hear the far-travelled preacher, and were under the spell of excitement
before he had uttered a word. The disorder thus occasioned affords a poor and
partial excuse for the severity which induced magistrates to press, fine, or
imprison offending preachers. The mob in many towns—with a less calculating
brutality— enabled Wesleyans (like Anglicans and Jesuits in other days) to
claim the title of martyrs, though in this case they only beat, stoned,
flogged, or flung them into water. In a brutalised age the spectacle of men— and even of delicate women—willing to endure these
cruelties for the sake of their faith, must have been impressive enough.
Indeed, the real reason of the success of Methodism was that its teachers, and
especially its chief leader, were ready to endure anything to bring home the
glad conviction of salvation to all minds. In the most intellectual of ages, it
is the glory of Methodism to have appealed to the heart, and to have restored
emotion—not always indeed the best kind of emotion— to its rightful place in
religion. Such an effect as this upon a people may not he weighed in the
statistical balance or measured with the numerical rod.
Wesleyanism was partly Puritanical in its effects, and
opposed outbursts of emotion except when they followed certain recognised channels. Hence, it was generally unfavourable to art and literature—with one conspicuous
exception. Many of its converts were hymn- writers, who expressed themselves in
words as simple and touching as their thoughts, and of these far the greatest
was Charles Wesley the brother of John. His hymns—besides being something new
in eighteenth century literature—are the purest revelation of its religious
feeling, and embody, far more fitly than any recorded words of Whitefield or
Wesley, the truest and tenderest aspects of
Methodism. Hymns like Jem, Lover of my Soul are worth
all the histories that have ever been written, as a revelation of the true
power of Methodism, and teach us the secret, which brought men—degraded and brutalised beyond expression—to listen to John Wesley, as
if he were a prophet of God, and to Whitefield as though he were an angel from
Heaven.
JACOBITISM
AND THE UNION.
In
an earlier volume the history of Scotland has been followed to the point at
which her political fusion with England in 1707 promised identity of activity
based upon uniformity of interest and outlook. In fact, the half-century that
followed the Union tested its reality and permanence almost to the
breaking-point. The Union of 1608 had produced a similar crisis. Menacing the
distinctive Protestantism adopted by Scotland as most consonant with her
national temperament, it excited opposition in a true sense national. The Union
of 1707 eventually satisfied the commercial ambitions to satisfy which Scotland
had sacrificed her separate political entity and had placed her Church, by
association with the southern Establishment, in danger of a renewal of the
Stewart policy of harmonisation. The magnitude of the sacrifice, together with
the failure of the Union at once to yield the anticipated results, again
stimulated national sentiment. But, as the century proceeded, the danger of
nationalism repeating the menace of the Covenant vanished—a result due less to
a dulling of sentimental retrospect, than to a recognition that Protestantism
itself was involved in the permanence of the Union. Had Jacobitism raised a
Protestant banner, the conflict between sentiment and material interests must
have been acute. But it presented itself in the guise of the
Counter-Reformation : France and Spain stood behind it: its Pretenders were
pensioners of the Vatican, and the last of its titular kings was a Cardinal of
the Roman Church. Jacobitism depended also upon other forces which may be
termed reactionary, inasmuch as Celticism and Stewartism were practically synonymous.
Hence, a cause which offered to rally Scottish nationalism furnished the most
convincing reason for the Union’s continuance, and provoked measures which
completed it by extending to the Highlands social and political systems which
for centuries the Lowlands and England had followed in common.
The Act of
Union took effect on May 1,1707. Anticipating it, and taking advantage of a
tariff lower in Scotland than in England, Scottish merchants had warehoused
imports, particularly French wines and
spirits, in
readiness to launch them lucratively into England after May 1. The House of
Commons (April 7, 1707) passed a measure to prohibit the speculative traffic,
and though the Lords did not proceed with the Bill, Scottish resentment was not
appeased. The tardy payment of the “equivalent” also caused annoyance. It was
payable on May 1, 1707, but did not reach Edinburgh until the following August
5. The fact that only £100,000, roughly one-quarter of the amount, was in
specie and the remainder in Exchequer bills roused suspicion. But the prompt
and easy conversion of the bills, and the restitution of the capital of the
ill-fated “ Company of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies,” restored
confidence in England’s intention to observe the conditions of the Union. The
adjustment of Scotland’s fiscal system to that of England had been provided for
in the sixth article of the Act. The Scottish farmers of the Customs and Excise
were replaced by two mixed Commissions, while the adjustment of the Excise to
English measures and methods of collection confirmed apprehension that the
Union would entail upon Scotland a contribution to the Exchequer out of
proportion to her resources. Smuggling elevated itself forthwith to the plane
of patriotism. Side by side with irritating fiscal innovations, and to a large
extent to support them, the institution of Justices of the Peace, whose
functions had been defined in a Scottish Act of 1661, was revived as from
September 2 or 16, 1707, according as the locality was south or north of the
Tay, with the powers conferred by English pre-Union Acts of Parliament. The
abolition of the Scottish Privy Council as from May 1, 1708, which passed
(February 13, 1708) in the form of an “ Act for rendering the Union of the Two
Kingdoms more entire and complete,” deepened the popular impression of the
Union as the surrender of Scotland’s independence and sovereignty, and was
protested against as an infringement of the treaty, since the powers vested by
the Act in Justices of the Peace were held to trespass upon the heritable
jurisdictions confirmed in the twentieth article. A Court of Exchequer in
Scotland was constituted as from May 1, 1708 (6 Anne, cap. 26).
Events in
Scotland had been followed closely at Saint-Germain, where the titular James III
and VIII resided. Without the strenuous qualities of his son Charles Edward,
James was eager to attempt the recovery of the kingdoms his father had lost,
and France’s fortunes in the War of the Spanish Succession inclined Louis to
stimulate James’ adherents to activity. In August, 1705, his agent, Colonel
Nathaniel Hooke, arrived in Scotland. Louis professed lively interest in the
maintenance of Scottish autonomy. But Jacobitism for the moment preferred to
remain passive, at least until sympathy took material shape. Marlborough’s
victory at Ramillies, Eugene’s at Turin, and the progress of the Archduke
Charles in Spain, revived Louis’ scheme to exploit Jacobitism: Hooke again
arrived in Scotland, in April, 1707, shortly before the Union came into effect.
He found the party divided as to
the wisdom of
a resort to arms. The Duke of Hamilton, who had received Hooke in 1705, now
pleaded illness as an excuse for refusing an interview. He intimated that a
rising would be futile unless James secured a considerable party in England,
and was liberally supported by French troops. Hooke’s instructions (March 9,
1707), however, were to commit Louis to no conditions. From Ker of Kersland he
received an egregious assurance that a supply of gunpowder, James’ presence, and
his undertaking to secure the Protestant religion, would bring out 5000 Came-
ronians and 8000 “ other Presbyterians.” Hooke, in his own words, “ now thought
only of rendering the design more general,” approached the Duke of Atholl’s
section of the party, and obtained from them an engagement (May 7, 1707) to
raise 30,000 horse and foot to march into England with James upon his arrival.
The strength of the force to accompany the Prince was left to Louis’
discretion; 8000 men were asked for in the event of his landing near the
English border. Arms, money, and officers were requested, and James was urged
to denounce the Catholic policy of his father. Hooke returned forthwith to
France to report the result of his mission.
James’
arrival in Scotland was looked for in August, 1707. The opportunity was
favourable; for, though the secret of Hooke’s negotiations had passed to the
Government through Ker of Kersland, no measures had been taken to meet the
threatened rebellion. The castles of Stirling, Blackness, and Dumbarton had but
three barrels of powder between them : the guns of the last two fortresses were
either unmounted or unserviceable: in Edinburgh Castle the “equivalent” was
feebly guarded: and the Earl of Leven, commanding-in-chief, could muster only 1500
“almost naked” troops. Not until January, 1708, however, were James’ adherents
informed that Louis XIV, influenced, according to Saint- Simon, by Madame de
Maintenon, had resolved to place troops at their disposal. On February 29
Charles Fleming was sent from Saint-Germain to announce the French expedition
as on the point of sailing, and to arrange a service of signals and pilots in
preparation for its arrival in the Firth of Forth. On March 1 James drafted a
proclamation “to his good people of his ancient kingdom of Scotland.” He
reminded them that “ Usurpations have always been fatal and ruinous to the
liberty of Scotland,” and promised to annul the Union, to sanction an Act of
Oblivion, to maintain Protestants in the free exercise of their religion, and
to submit “differences about Church government” to a Scottish Parliament for
settlement. On March 7 James left Saint-Germaiu for Dunkirk, where a fleet of
five men-of-war with transports under Count de Forbin, and an expeditionary
force of six regiments and the Irish corps, numbering 5100 in all, under
Marshal de Matignon (Count de Gace), had assembled. The expedition had been
planned to start on March 11; but James inopportunely developed measles, and
was barely convalescent when Forbin loosed anchor on March 17. Closely pursued
by Sir George
Byng, Forbin
made the Firth of Forth at nightfall on March 23 (March 12, O. S.). The
following day Byng hove in sight. Forbin’s signals were not answered from the
shore: Byng threatened an engagement. The French therefore dashed for the open
sea and coasted northward. James importunately demanded to be put on shore, but
Forbin refused in view of Byng’s close pursuit. On April 7 (March 27, 0. S.),
after a stormy passage and with only nine ships in company, James returned to
Dunkirk.
Three months
after James’ abortive attempt, a general election (June 17, 1708) gave Scotland
her first opportunity of sending to Parliament members elected by the
constituencies. The election raised important constitutional questions. Two shires
(Aberdeen and Linlithgow) returned a peer’s eldest son. In accordance with the
practice of the Scottish Parliament the Commons (December 3, 1708) declared
them ineligible, and ordered (December 6) new elections in both counties. In
the election of the sixteen representative peers Queensberry’s vote was
challenged on the ground that he was also a peer of Great Britain. The votes of
the few Scottish peers who were peers of England prior to the Union were also
objected to, and minor irregularities were alleged to disqualify the votes of
others. Upon the petition of four defeated candidates the Lords conducted an
enquiry, and ruled (January 21,1709) that a Scottish peer advanced to a
post-Union peerage of Great Britain was not entitled to vote in his own name or
as a proxy at the election of the representatives of his order. When two years
later Hamilton was created Duke of Brandon in the peerage of Great Britain,
apprehension of an enlargement of Scotland’s influence in the Upper House
caused the Lords to resolve (December 20, 1711), by 57 to 52 votes, that
Scottish peers created peers of Great Britain after the Union were unable to
sit in the latter capacity. A majority of the Scottish representatives
condemned the resolution as a violation of the Union and as reducing their
order “ to a worse condition, in some respects, than the meanest or most
criminal of subjects.” The Queen sent a message to the Lords on the matter
(January 17, 1712); but the order was not reversed until June 6, 1782.
The French
attempt of 1708 was followed by the arrest of suspected sympathisers.
Hamilton’s opportune agreement with the Whigs procured the release of all but
five, who had drawn together under arms in Stirlingshire in anticipation of
James’ landing. They were indicted for High Treason at Edinburgh, but were
discharged (November 22, 1708) upon a verdict of “not proven.” The verdict
suggested that the Scottish law of treason required adjustment to the English
code. On March 28,
1709, an “Act for improving the Union of the
Two Kingdoms” reached the Commons from the Lords. It enacted (as from July 1,
1709) that crimes regarded as High Treason by the law of England should be
regarded as such in Scotland; transferred the jurisdiction of the High
ca. hi.
Court of
Justiciary over such offences to special Commissions of Oyer and Terminer, and
established identical penalties for both countries. In the Commons the measure
was opposed by the Scottish members, but was carried (April 9, 1709) with two
amendments. By the first, estates in land were dedared non-forfeitable for
treason beyond a single life. By the second, the names of witnesses for the
prosecution and a copy of the indictment were to be submitted to the accused
ten days before his trial. With the addition of a clause providing that the
amendments should not come into force until the death of the Pretender and the
completion of three years of the reign of the Queen’s successor, the measure
became law (April 21, 1709).
The Scottish
Church meanwhile had reason to consider the conditions of the Union
disregarded. Such of the episcopal clergy as had qualified under the “Act
concerning the Church” of July 16, 1695, were excluded from Church Courts and
ordinations, but were free to conduct public worship in their own way. Others,
more numerous, were debarred by an earlier Act (June 28, 1695) from
administering the rites of marriage and baptism, but (provided they had taken
the Oath of Allegiance, and the Assurance) were not expressly forbidden to
minister in conventicles. Their public ministrations were tolerated by
connivance, not by law. English Protestant nonconformists enjoyed security of
worship under the Act of 1689. It had been foreseen that, although Scottish
nonconformity was riddled with Jacobitism, the Union would make it difficult to
withhold from it a legal status; since, apart from the plea of symmetry, the
Union drew the two episcopal communions into more intimate relations. The
English Book of Common Prayer was increasingly adopted in Scotland, where
episcopal worship was as yet non-liturgical, and the General Assembly (April
21, 1707) passed an Act condemning “set forms.” The order was challenged by
James Greenshields, an episcopal minister. In 1709 he opened a chapel in
Edinburgh and used the Book of Common Prayer. Summoned by the Presbytery for
“presuming without authority to exercise the office of the holy ministry,” he
exhibited his letters of ordination by the Bishop of Boss in 1694, proved that
he had taken the oaths, and denied the Presbytery’s jurisdiction over him. The
Presbytery, contending that he was “within their bounds,” suspended him for
introducing a form of worship “contrary to the purity and uniformity of the
Church established by law,” and on September 15, 1709, the magistrates
convicted him for continued contumacy. He remained in prison for seven months,
and twice appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Session. On February 13,
1710, he entered an appeal in the House of
Lords, and obtained (March 1, 1711) a verdict reversing the decision of the
Courts below.
Greenshields’
case corrected the claim of the General Assembly to exercise national
jurisdiction, and was exploited to capture the sympathy of English episcopacy
for the sister communion in Scotland. On
March 3,
1712, the royal assent was given to a Bill securing Scottish episcopal
nonconformists in the exercise of public worship and use of the English
liturgy, and repealing the Scottish Act of June 28, 1695. The Bill passed the
Commons (February 7, 1712) by 152 to 17 votes. In the Lords, though the
Commission of Assembly was heard by counsel (February 13), their proposal that
abjuration of the Pretender should be required from tolerated episcopalians was
extended to the Established clergy as well. The former, provided they had taken
the oaths and produced letters of ordination from a Protestant Bishop, were
given liberty to conduct public worship, marriages, and baptisms. Tolerated
episcopacy was objectionable to Presbyterianism, but the Abjuration Oath was
trebly offensive. It submitted the Church to Erastian discipline: imposed a
test and thereby infringed the liberty which the Union had guaranteed to the
Establishment: and bound the subscriber to maintain the succession “ as the
same is and stands settled ” by the Act of 1701 (12 and 13 William III, cap.
2), which required the sovereign to “join in communion with the Church of
England.” Scottish Protestantism resented a demand to maintain the exclusive
claims of the other Establishment, and the Government did not venture to force
the oath upon ministers who refused to take it. In 1715 (1 Geo. I, stat. 2,
cap. 13) the oath was redrafted with verbal alterations which allowed the
subscriber to hold himself non-committed to the conditions of the Act of 1701.
In 1719 (5 Geo. I, cap. 29) reference to that Act was omitted altogether from
the oath.
Ten days
after the Toleration Act received the royal assent, the Commons gave leave
(March 13, 1712) to introduce a Bill “ to restore the patrons to their ancient
rights of presenting Ministers to the churches vacant in Scotland.” The measure
commended itself to episcopal and Jacobite patrons as a means to exclude
ultra-Presbyterians from the pulpits of the Church. But Jacobitism failed to
capture them. On the contrary, the moderatism which the Act encouraged contributed
to consolidate the Union. Patronal appointment to church livings had been twice
abolished, in 1649 and 1690. The latter Act offered patrons compulsory
compensation for renunciation of their right of presentment: vested the
patronage of country benefices in the elders and Protestant heritors, and of
town benefices in the heritors and magistrates. The new Act, which passed the
Commons on April 7, 1712, restored to such patrons as had not taken advantage
of the Act of 1690 the patronage of benefices in their gift after May 1, 1712,
provided they had taken the oaths and were purged of suspicion of Popery:
conveyed to the particular presbytery the patronage of a benefice to which the
patron failed to nominate within six months of a vacancy occurring: and reserved
to the Crown the presentation to benefices in the gift of the Bishops before
the abolition of Episcopacy in 1689. Notwithstanding a petition of the
Commission of Assembly, representing the measure as
violating the
rights of which the Church was possessed at the Union, the Act received the
royal assent on May 22, 1712. On the same date was repealed part of the
Scottish “Act discharging the Yule Vacance” (1690). The Court of Session and
inferior judicatories were now hidden to observe the Christmas vacation from
December 20 to January 10 inclusive yearly, a vexatious attempt to adjust
Scottish to English practice. This amending Act was repealed three years later
(September 21, 1715).
Since 1707
the United Parliament, in which Scotland’s representation was fractional, had
passed Acts running counter in varying degrees to principles which Scotland as
an independent kingdom had deliberately adopted. A measure of another character
excited a demand for repeal of the Union itself. By Article XIV of the treaty Scottish
malt was exempt from duty “during this present war.” Although on May 9, 1713,
the Queen informed Parliament that the treaty with France had heen signed,
peace with Spain had not been concluded formally. The point was seized as a
pretext for opposition to a proposal (May 18) to subject Scottish malt to a
sixpenny duty per bushel, uniform with the English rate.' The Bill passed the
Commons (May 22) with a majority of 197 to 57 votes, the Scottish members
opposing it as an infraction of the terms of the Union, and as imposing a duty
heyond what Scottish malt was able to hear. Two of their number, with Argyll
and Mar from the Lords, waited upon the Queen (May 26) to represent that a
motion for the dissolution of the Union was contemplated. Anne’s timid hope “to
make all things easy” did not discourage a campaign of somewhat inflated
protest. On June 1, the Earl of Findlater in the Lords moved for leave to
introduce a Bill to dissolve the Union. He instanced the quashing of the
Scottish Privy Council, the Treason Act, the barring of the peerage of Great
Britain against Scottish nobles, and the threatened malt duty as grievances
which justified disruption. Mar seconded, and Argyll and the Whigs supported,
the motion, chiefly as a tactical move against the Tories. Findlater’s motion
was lost only by four votes. Its single result was that the duty on Scottish
malt, though agreed to by the Lords (June 8), was suspended until 1724, when
the proposal was revived in another form.
In the last
Parliament of Queen Anne, which assembled on February 16, 1714, the Queen’s
recent illness focused attention upon the crisis threatened by her death. The
Queen was petitioned to demand James’ removal from Bar-le-Duc in Lorraine,
whither the Treaty of Utrecht had driven him. A proclamation (June 23) offered
£5000—increased in August to £100,000—for his apprehension should he attempt to
land in Great Britain. Both Bolingbroke and Oxford had been in touch with him
since the autumn of 1712. But James imposed conditions which made it futile to
act in his behalf. Rejecting Oxford’s advice, he declared (March 13, 1714) his
resolution neither to change nor to dissemble his
religion. To
Cardinal Gualterio, his agent at Rome, he expressed himself at the same time
with similar emphasis.
The premature
death of the Queen in her forty-ninth year (August 1,
1714) disappointed the vague hopes of James
founded upon her affection for him. The English Tories feared to move for a
Roman Catholic claimant, and preferred to assume that a Hanoverian dynasty
would immediately collapse. The European situation also was discouraging. The
Hanoverian Succession had been recognised in the Utrecht pacification, and
there was for the moment no disposition in any quarter to disturb it. Clement
XI, intent upon the eastern assault of Islam rather than upon the problematical
chances of a western crusade, refused (August, 1714) to approach the European
Courts in James’ behalf. With difficulty James’ appeal (March, 1715) drew a
subsidy of 30,000 crowns from the Vatican. From the Emperor James received a
clear rebuff; and efforts made in 1714 and 1715 to secure the hand of the
Emperor’s sister, or that of one of his nieces, daughters of the late Emperor
Joseph, or of the daughter of Charles Philip of Neuburg (brother of the Elector
Palatine), failed to ensure to the Pretender a backing from Catholic Germany.
An appeal to Charles XII of Sweden (July, 1715) promised better results. A
Swedish descent upon Newcastle was planned, and 50,000 crowns were transmitted
by James to support it. But in spite of Denmark’s cession of Bremen to Hanover,
Charles refused (August 3) to take action. Most discouraging of all was the
attitude of France. A loan of 100,000 crowns was obtained upon Louis’
guarantee, and no objection was offered to the purchase of arms and secret
preparations in James’ behalf. But Louis refused (February, 1715) to take any
course which would prejudice the maintenance of peace; and, despite James’
protest (July, 1715), Berwick’s services were denied him. The death of Louis
(September 1, 1715) handed over France to the Duke of Orleans, who held it more
vital to exclude the Spanish Bourbons from the French succession than to
encourage a Stewart restoration in England. On December 6 the Irish officers in
the French service were forbidden to proceed to Scotland. Spain was as cautious
as France, and James was surprised (December 12,
1715) at receiving so much as a subsidy.
In these
disheartening circumstances James countered George I’s accession with no more
effectual measure than a proclamation (August 29, 1714) asserting his
hereditary right. But the vindictive spirit of the Whig Parliament brought him
adherents whose attachment so far had been secret. Early in April, 1715,
Bolingbroke fled to Paris. On June 10 the Commons resolved to impeach him; and,
there being no longer need for caution, he accepted (July) the seals as James’
Secretary of State. The Duke of Ormond, whose impeachment the Commons voted on
June 21, and Mar, whose professions of loyalty failed to gain George’s favour,
remained in England to concert
98
measures.
Their plans were marked by the ineptitude inseparable from Jacobite enterprise.
About July 15, a verbal communication from England determined James, without
consulting Berwick, Bolingbroke, or Torcy, the French Foreign Minister, to
appoint July 31 for a rising and to give it the encouragement of his presence.
Shortly before his proposed departure (July 28) from Bar, James received a
joint report from Mar and Ormond, representing that unless an army accompanied
him a general insurrection was impracticable. On August 3 Bolingbroke therefore
conveyed to James the unanimous opinion of Berwick, Torcy, and himself that the
situation was not ripe for action. Ten days later (August 2, O. S.) Mar boarded
a collier in the Thames and sailed to Scotland. Before he reached his
destination, Ormond had taken flight and was in Paris.
Mar arrived
at his Castle of Kildrummy in Aberdeenshire on August 20, 1715. Berwick’s
accusation of collusion between James and Mar to .force the situation must be
dismissed: but Mar cannot escape censure for precipitately plunging Scotland
into civil war. Before he left London he was aware that James had cancelled his
order for an immediate rising, and the Prince’s instructions only empowered him
to take the field in “ the last extremity.” On September 6 he raised the
standard at Braemar. The ceremony was repeated at Aberdeen by the Earl
Marischal, at Dunkeld by the Marquis of Tullibardine, at Gordon Castle by the Marquis
of Huntly, at Brechin by the Earl of Panmure, at Montrose by the Earl of
Southesk, at Dundee by the titular Viscount of Dundee, and at Inverness by
William Mackintosh of Borlum. The Jacobites of Perth mastered the town
(September 18) and proclaimed James there also. A plot to seize Edinburgh
Castle had all but succeeded (September 8). On September 28 Mar entered Perth.
By October 9 the accession of Farquharsons, Atholl Highlanders, Robertsons of
Struan, Gordons, Breadalbane’s Campbells, Mackintoshes, Drummonds, and Lowland
contingents, brought Mar’s strength to 6000 foot and about 600 horse. In the
west, Macdonalds, Macleans, Macgregors, and Glenmoriston Grants were in arms to
harass the Campbell country. In the south, on both sides of the border, the
Jacobites were stirring: James was proclaimed at Warkworth on October 9, and at
Lochmaben on October 13.
Meanwhile the
Government showed none of the lethargy of 1708. On July 20, 1715, the royal
assent was given to an “Act for preventing tumults,” which obliged an
assemblage of twelve or more persons to disperse upon proclamation by a single
magistrate. On July 23 the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended; and, a month later
(August 30), the royal assent was given to an Act which decreed the penalties
of High Treason against owners and occupiers of land in Scotland supporting the
Pretender by acts committed in or out of the country; the loyal vassals of ft
rebellious superior were converted into tenants of the Crown; his
1715-6]
99
loyal tenants
and tacksmen were released for two years from paying rent; the lands of a
rebellious vassal reverted to his loyal superior; collusive settlements made
since August 1, 1714, were declared void; and from September 1,1715, until
January 23, 1716, the Commissioners of Justiciary were empowered to summon
suspected persons of Scottish domicile to Edinburgh or elsewhere to find bail
for their peaceable behaviour. About September 8 a camp was formed at Stirling
to secure the fords of the Forth. The Duke of Argyll, commanding-in-chief, set
out thither from Edinburgh on September 16, and found himself at the head of
some 1800 men. Reinforcements were ordered from Ireland; and the United
Provinces were called upon under treaty obligations to furnish eight regiments
of foot and one of horse, 6000 in all. Parliament had already (July 25 and 26)
sanctioned the raising of 7000 horse and foot and the calling-up of half-pay
officers. An addition of 6000 men to the fleet was also agreed to (August 11).
In Scotland Argyll’s appeal for volunteers met with a loyal response on the
part of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and the towns of the south and south-west. On
September 28, the Earl of Sutherland arrived at Dunrobin to raise the loyal
northern clans; and, about October 6, Argyll’s brother, the Earl of Islay, was
sent into the west to rally the Campbells.
In spite of
his numerical superiority, Mar remained inactive at Perth. His commission
(September 7, 1715) as Commander-in-chief reached him on October 6; and the
capture at Burntisland (October 2) of arms and powder destined for Sutherland
partially stocked his empty magazines. But he preferred to play a waiting game
until James’ arrival, and meanwhile to implicate English Jacobitism. In the
first week of October the coast towns of Fife and their shipping were secured.
On October 12 Mackintosh of Borlum, embarking detachments at Pittenweem,
Crail, Elie, and other ports, crossed to North Berwick with about 1100 men. On
Max’s western front the appearance of Macdonalds and others before Inveraray
(October 19) threatened an enveloping movement which would make Argyll’s
situation precarious. But the withdrawal of the clans from before Inveraray
(October 25) destroyed the symmetry of Mar’s tactical design, and Mackintosh
imperilled the execution of his mission by a dash upon Edinburgh (October 14).
He was within a mile of the city when the arrival of Argyll, and the militant
posture of the citizens, caused him to take shelter in Leith fort. On the
following morning (October 15) Argyll summoned Mackintosh to surrender; but,
having no artillery, he withdrew to make preparations for dislodging the
insurgents next day. Before daybreak (October 16) Mackintosh transferred his
force to Seton Castle. A few hours later Mar, apprised of his subordinate’s
situation, advanced upon Stirling, thereby compelling Argyll’s return. A week
later (October 22) Mackintosh joined the Northumberland and Galloway insurgents
at Kelso.
100
Three weeks
of inaction followed Mar’s return to Perth (October 18). His feint upon
Stirling might have become a general advance but for Argyll’s timely
reinforcement and the failure of the clans in the west. On October 25 they
retired from before Inveraray towards Strathfillan, Thence, reinforced by the
Camerons and Stewarts of Appin, who had refused to appear against Inveraray,
they marched to join Mar, and encamped at Auchterarder about November 1. In
number they were about 2500. A week later Seaforth’s Mackenzies, Sir Donald
Macdonald of Sleat’s following, and others, in all about 2000, arrived at
Perth. Mar’s levies were now complete, and a general advance against Argyll was
resolved upon (November 9). Assuming incorrectly that Argyll would not move
from Stirling, Mar on November 10 marched from Perth, about 8000 strong, horse
and foot, with eleven cannon, indifferently supplied with powder and
ammunition. On November 12 the clans, marching in advance, were a little
beyond Ardoch when Mar learnt that Argyll was already between him and Dunblane.
Mar hastened up his main body, and that night the whole army encamped at
Kinbuck.
Late in
October Argyll had received the reinforcements summoned from Ireland. Upon the
news of Mar’s advance from Perth, he resolved to give him battle in front of
Dunblane; for the slopes of the Ochils favoured the operations of cavalry, and
Argyll doubted the ability of his small numbers to hold the Forth river-front,
especially as frost threatened to make the fords passable. On November 12 he
marched from Stirling and encamped before Dunblane, his right resting on
Sheriffmuir. His army numbered eight battalions of foot and five regiments of
horse, in all about 3000, with six three-pounders. Before sunrise on the 13th
Mar advanced from Kinbuck. Argyll’s position, sloping from his right on Sheriffmuir
towards Dunblane, drew the Highlanders’ attack on his left centre. Mar’s horse
bungled in taking their position, and further weakened the force opposed to
Argyll’s right. At the first onrush the Highlanders drove back Argyll’s left
upon Dunblane, while the Duke, commanding in person on his right, scattered and
pursued the force opposed to him to beyond Kinbuck. Those of Mar’s army who had
neither joined in the pursuit to Dunblane nor had been scattered by Argyll’s
right drew up on the hill of Kippendavie and confronted Argyll upon his return.
But neither side ventured to renew the attack, and towards evening both
withdrew, Argyll to Dunblane, Mar towards Perth. Mar’s timidity in refusing to
engage Argyll’s right, wearied by pursuit, left the battle indecisive. As it
was, Argyll lost about one-fifth of his army killed, wounded, or captured.
Almost
simultaneously with Sheriffmuir, two disasters elsewhere rendered James’ cause
hopeless even before he embarked for Scotland. Seaforth had left a garrison in
Inverness, after driving off Sutherland’s force of Mackays, Rosses, and
Munroes. On November 5 Simon Fraser of Beaufort, intent upon securing the
Government’s favour and the
1716]
Forster's surrender at
Preston.
101
Lovat title,
arrived in the north. Except those of his name who had marched to Perth—who
also deserted Mar (November 10) upon news of Beaufort’s arrival—the clan
rallied to him. At the head of a force of Frasers, Forbeses, and Rosses he
drove the Jacobite garrison from Inverness on November 10, after heading off
Macdonald of Keppoch, who was marching ostensibly to its relief. Sutherland
joined Beaufort a few days later (November 15), and the control of the north
passed conclusively to the Government.
In England
the prospects of a Jacobite rising were extinguished by Forster’s surrender at
Preston on November 14. On October 22, at Kelso, the Galloway Jacobites under
Kenmure, Nithsdale, Camwath and Wintoun had joined Mackintosh of Borlum and the
Northumberland contingent under Thomas Forster, Derwentwater, and Widdrington.
Their combined force, ten troops of horse and six regiments of foot, numbered
less than 2000 men. The Scots urged a junction with the dans in Strathfillan
and an attack upon Argyll’s rear while Mar assailed his front. The English desired
to encourage the Jacobites of Lancashire by marching thither. The appearance of
Lieutenant-General George Carpenter and three regiments of horse at Wooler
(October 27) forced the insurgents to a resolution, and in spite of protests,
desertions, and even mutiny on the part of the Highland foot, the march into
Lancashire was agreed to (October 29) and began forthwith. Advancing through
Jedburgh, Hawick and Langholm, the force crossed the Esk (November 1) and
entered England. Forster, whose Protestantism was his only recommendation to a
place of prominence, assumed the chief command under Mar’s commission. On his
advance to Penrith on the 2nd, the insurgents scattered a force of militia
without striking a blow, and, after a day’s halt at Appleby, entered Kendal on
the 5th. In Lancashire the Jacobite gentry showed a disposition to join them;
and at Lancaster, where they continued from the 7th to the 9th, they captured
six cannon. Encouraged by assurances of a welcome in Manchester, Forster pushed
on his cavalry to Preston on the 9th, and his foot entered the town on the
following day. On the 11th Major-General Wills reached Wigan from Manchester
with six regiments of horse and the Cameronian foot. Forster took no measures
to impede his advance. Upon his arrival at the Ribble, about midday on the
12th, Wills found the bridge giving access to Preston unguarded. Within the
town the insurgents had erected four barricades. Wills ordered an immediate
assault; it was stubbornly met and at nightfall was abandoned. Next morning
(November 13) Carpenter came up with three regiments of horse. The insurgents
were trapped; resistance, however prolonged, could not avert ultimate
surrender; to break cover with nine regiments of horse in pursuit would be
madness, and Forster acted sensibly in proposing surrender. Terms were refused;
and early on the 14th the insurgents, 1500 in number, laid down their arms.
Six weeks
after Sheriffmuir, the loss of Inverness, and the Preston surrender, James
arrived in Scotland to head a beaten cause. Other discouragements had failed to
deter his coming. France had not been stirred to more active sympathy, and
Berwick (November 3) decisively refused to serve James as Captain-General.
Ormond, who on October 24 left Paris to raise the south and west of England,
found his plans betrayed, and the persons and places he designed to employ
arrested or alert. Before November 8 he returned to St Malo. On November 27 he
again sailed for Cornwall, but returned by December 12 without having effected
anything. Meanwhile James, chafing at inaction, had set out from Lorraine for
the coast. He reached St Malo on November 8, and designed to sail thence to
Dunstaffnage. But, the wind remaining contrary, he set out on December 2
overland to Dunkirk, to take ship for the east coast of Scotland. Three weeks
later (December 27 or 28) he sailed; on January 2, 1716 (December 22, 1715,
O.S.) he landed at Peterhead.
Since
Sheriffmuir Mar’s position at Perth had steadily deteriorated. Keppoch brought
his clan; but the Highlanders deserted in large numbers, and Seaforth, who
returned to the north after the battle, made his submission to Sutherland. On
January 9, 1716, James made a public entrance into Perth. His arrival did not
improve the situation, though he appointed January 23 for his coronation.
Huntly, who left Perth before James’ arrival, and Seaforth, who again took
arms, were unable to restore the position in the north. On the other hand
Argyll was incomparably stronger: he had recovered Burntisland (December 19,
1715) and other Fifeshire ports:
reinforcements, including the Dutch contingent, joined him; and, soon after
James’ arrival, he was at the head of 9000 horse and foot and a powerful
artillery train. His failure to push the campaign to a conclusion had roused suspicion;
and, upon emphatic instructions from Townshend (January 10, 1716), he began his
advance in a season exceptionally severe. On January 24 he reconnoitred towards
Auchterarder. Undecided whether to retreat or give battle, Mar took futile
measures to hinder Argyll’s advance. On the 25th the clans burnt Auchterarder
and Blackford; by the 29th Crieff, Dunning, Muthill, and Dalreoch had been
dealt with similarly. On the 29th Argyll advanced in force from Stirling, along
roads cleared of snow in advance, and on the 30th halted at Auchterarder.
Within Perth all was confusion. The Highlanders were impatient for battle; the
cautious proposed to withdraw to more advantageous ground; Mar himself was bent
upon abandoning a hopeless enterprise. On the 30th it was resolved to retreat,
and early on the 31st the army withdrew towards Montrose. Argyll hotly pressed
the pursuit. On February 4 his vanguard was at Arbroath. James was at Montrose
on the same day. He had written (February 3) to the French Regent to beg for succours,
and to assure him of the vitality of his cause. But an alarm of Argyll’s
advance from
Arbroath compelled James to consider his safety. A ship, named the Forerunner,
was in Montrose harbour. On the 4th James went on board, accompanied by Mar,
leaving General Alexander Gordon of Auchintoul to command the retreating army,
and a farewell letter to his adherents representing his departure as necessary
to promote “a more happy juncture for our mutual delivery.” On February 21
(February 10, O.S.) James landed at Gravelines. Scotland he never saw again.
Gordon led his troops to Aberdeen, thence to Badenoch, and from Ruthven on
February 15 petitioned Argyll for clemency. By July the leaders had made their
escape to France.
Severe
punishment was dealt out to those who had placed the Union and the Hanoverian
Succession in jeopardy. On March 6, 1716, an Act empowered the withdrawal of
persons in custody for High Treason (committed before the previous January 23)
from the shire in which the crime had occurred for trial before special
Commissions of Oyer and Terminer. Of those made prisoners in England, 738 were
transported ; 53 died in prison; 57 (including Derwentwater and Kenmure) were
executed. Derwentwater, Widdrington, Nithsdale, Carnwath, Kenmure, Nairne, Wintoun,
Forster, Mackintosh of Borlum, Mar, Tullibardine, Linlithgow, Drummond,
Marischal, Seaforth, Southesk, and Panmure were attainted. The policy of a
later date was adumbrated in an Act (June 26, 1716) which forbade the
inhabitants (except peers and commoners qualified to exercise the parliamentary
franchise) of all counties north of the Forth and Clyde estuaries (except Fife,
Clackmannan and Kinross) to carry arms on or after November 1,1716, and
empowered the Lords Lieutenant to appoint centres for the surrender of arms,
and to pay the full value of their forfeited weapons to those who had remained
loyal in the late rebellion. The Act also directed that after August 1, 1717,
the claim of a superior upon his tenants for “ hosting, hunting, watching, and
warding ” should be commuted in money. But in this, and in the attempt to
disarm them, the Act had little effect upon the clans most deeply tinged with
Jacobitism. The rebellion had revealed another menace to the established
Government. While Mar was at Perth, in his rear episcopacy frankly avowed
itself Jacobite. Over 200 loyal clergy, according to Wodrow, had been ousted
from their pulpits. Their places were taken by episcopal nonjurors, who as a
body, while accepting the liberty conferred by the Toleration Act of 1712, had
been careless to fulfil the conditions upon which it was granted. Episcopacy
paid the penalty for the manifestation of its political bias. By an Act of 1719
(5 Geo. I, cap. 29) nonjuring ministers were forbidden to conduct public worship
where more than eight persons, not being members of a single household, were
present.
I'or a
generation after the ’15 the Union was not seriously assailed. Jacobitism never
again rallied the forces which Mar controlled so inefficiently. As the material
benefits of the Union were recognised, the
Lowlands were
tempted to break away from the separatists; and the Stewart cause found support
chiefly among the dans, who correctly interpreted the Act of 1716 as the
beginning of a determined attack upon their distinctive polity. Jacobitism was
further weakened by the cessation of intimate relations with France. James,
excluded from France and Lorraine, arrived at Avignon on April 2, 1716. Driven
thence (February 6, 1717) by the Triple Alliance, he crossed the Alps to Italy,
and accepted a hospitality which identified his cause with the Papacy and
confirmed the conviction that his restoration would endanger the Protestant
settlement.
Yet the
European situation produced two crises of which with indifferent success
Jacobitism sought to take advantage. Sweden, as shown in the previous chapter,
viewed the Triple Alliance (January, 1717) as a formidable obstacle to her
recovery of Bremen and Verden. Jacobite intrigues with Charles XII, abortive in
1715, were accordingly renewed in 1716 through Gortz. The scheme contemplated
coincident insurrections in England and Scotland. Baron Sparre, Swedish
Minister in Paris, was in communication with James; and Count Gyllenborg,
representing Sweden at the Court of St James’, was in touch with the English
Jacobites, who subscribed over £30,000. Stanhope got wind of the intrigue, and
on January 29, 1717, exposed it to the Privy Council. Gyllenborg was arrested;
his papers were impounded; and Gortz was seized in Holland at the request of
Great Britain. Both were released soon after, and the sole result of the plot
was the prohibition of commerce with Sweden (February 28, 1717), and the
postponement to the end of the parliamentary session of an Act of Pardon (July
15, 1717) covering the recent crisis.
France being
now allied with Great Britain, and all hope of Sweden’s help having been dashed
by the death of Charles XII (November 30,1718), every direction whence
Jacobitism could draw support seemed closed. Opportunely Alberoni offered the
resources of Spain. Resolved to free Italy from the Imperial yoke which the
Treaty of Utrecht had laid upon her, Alberoni viewed Great Britain, doubly
pledged to enforce that treaty by the Triple Alliance and the Treaty of
Westminster (May,
1716) and withal a maritime Power, as the most
serious obstacle in his path. After Byng’s destruction of the Spanish fleet off
Cape Passaro on August 11, 1718, the Cardinal—he owed his hat (July 12, 1717)
to James’ interest at Rome—turned to the Jacobites to avenge frustrated
projects. In November, 1718, the Duke of Ormond was summoned from Paris to
Spain. Alberoni undertook to send him to England with 4000 foot, 1000 horse,
besides artillery, and with two months’ pay for the force. He agreed also to
equip a small expedition for Scotland, and Ormond invited (December 8) the Earl
Marischal from Paris to take charge of it. Of these motions in his behalf James
received information on January 26,1719, with an intimation that Alberoni
deemed it advisable
for him
either to accompany or to follow the English expedition. A fortnight later
(February 8) James left Rome, embarked at Nettuno, and on March 9 landed at
Rosas in Catalonia, whence he proceeded to Madrid. Meanwhile, after a month’s
delay, the Spanish fleet, consisting of five men-of-war and twenty-two
transports with 5000 men on board, sailed from Cadiz (March 7). Ormond since
February 24 had been waiting to join it at Corunna. But it met the fate of an
earlier Armada. On March 29, when about fifty leagues west of Cape Finisterre,
a violent storm scattered the vessels to such sheltering ports as they could
reach. In August, finding that Philip V would make no further effort in his
behalf, James sailed to Italy and his marriage (September 1, 1719) with Maria
Clementina, grand-daughter of John Sobieski, the warrior-king of Poland.
Once more
Scotland was invited single-handed to uphold the Stewart cause. On March
8,1719, the Earl Marischal sailed from Pasajes with two frigates bearing arms,
money, 288 rank and file and 19 officers of Don Pedro de Castro’s regiment of
foot. The Earl’s brother, the future Marshal Keith in the Prussian service, had
already (February 19,1719) set out from Madrid to engage the Jacobite exiles in
France. With Seaforth, Tullibardine, and Colin Campbell of Glendaruel, he
sailed from Havre on March 19. By March 24 (April 4, N.S.) they reached the
Lewis, and a week later (March 30) joined Marischal’s frigates at Stornoway,
The two parties differed regarding the course to pursue. Marischal advocated
the immediate seizure of Inverness; Tullibardine thought it folly to take
action until Ormond’s landing in England was announced. The decision rested
with Tullibardine, who exhibited a commission as commander-in-chief from James.
Marischal, however, refused to part with the control of the Spanish frigates.
On April 4 the three vessels sailed to- Gairloch, Upon a rumour that Ormond was
in England, Glendaruel was despatched to rouse the clans. On the 13th the ships
anchored off Ellandonan, a rocky island, crowned by the castle of the
Mackenzies of Kintail, at the forking of Loch Alsh into Lochs Long and Duich.
Arms and ammunition were landed and the Spaniards formed a camp. The rumour of
Ormond’s landing had not been confirmed; without that assurance the Lowland Jacobites
would not rise; Glendaruel returned with a similar message from the clans. By
the 20th Clanranald, Lochiel, Mackinnon, and Chisholm of Strathglass arrived,
and a council of war was held. The majority favoured Fabian tactics. Marischal,
who still urged an immediate stroke against Inverness, suspected that
Tullibardine intended to reembark, and despatched the two frigates to Spain on
the 30th. On May 4 news of the dispersal of Ormond’s fleet arrived, and five
days later three British men-of-war entered Loch Alsh. On the 10th they
compelled the surrender of Ellandonan, its garrison, arms, and ammunition.
There was no course open to Tullibardine save to withdraw. On the 13th he
skirted Loch Long towards Glen Elchaig,
and thence
marched to the Croe at the head of Loch Duich. Inaccurate news arrived, that
the Spanish fleet was repaired and on the point of sailing. Tullibardine
thereupon (May 21) sent an urgent summons to the clans. With about 1100
men—Mackenzies, Camerons, Macgregors, Mackinnons, and the Spaniards—Tullibardine
on June 9 took position in the Pass of Glenshiel, whither Major-General
Wightman with 986 foot (including 136 Munro Highlanders), 120 horse and 4
cohoms, was advancing from Fort Augustus. On the 10th he appeared, shelled the
insurgents’ position, and after a stubborn resistance put them to flight. On
the following day the Spaniards surrendered, and the rising. was at an end.
One by one
every ally of Jacobitism had been detached. France and the Channel had been
secured by the Triple Alliance. The Quadruple Alliance secured Austria. The
Treaty of Stockholm (November 20,
1719) gained Sweden’s support for the
Hanoverian dynasty and closed the Baltic. Finally, Spain’s adhesion to the
Quadruple Alliance (January 26,
1720) closed the Mediterranean to Jacobite
enterprise and relegated James to Italy and isolation. His domestic troubles,
and the small repute of those who controlled his affairs after Mar’s
supersession in 1724, filled his Scottish partisans with dismay. George II’s
accession passed unchallenged, and Lockhart of Camwath in 1728 regarded James’
cause as one which “ must in process of time be totally forgot.” None could
discern in the youthful Prince Charles Edward (bom December 31, 1720) the
champion who was to resuscitate it.
In 1719,
Jacobitism was dormant; but the unpopularity of the Union was not encouraged to
diminish. The Peerage Bill could be regarded as a violation of the Union
inasmuch as it substituted twenty-five hereditary for the sixteen
representative peers elected by their order. In the Lords, where the measure
passed (November 80, 1719), the' Scottish peers welcomed a proposal to convert
their elective into a hereditary status, and, on broader grounds, supported it
as freeing them from the influence of English political parties. In the Commons
the Bill was lost (December 8,1719) by 269 to 177 votes. Vastly more unpopular
was a proposal in the Commons (December 10, 1724) affecting Scottish beer and
ale. The resolution of 1713 to impose a duty on Scottish malt had never been
acted upon. In order to balance the immunity which Scotland had enjoyed, it
was now proposed to levy an additional excise of sixpence per barrel on
Scottish beer and ale, and to withhold from Scotland the bounty that England
enjoyed on the export of grain. Considerable clamour was raised against a
proposal which was declared to violate the Union’s promise of fiscal
uniformity, and a threepenny duty on malt, being half of the English duty, was
substituted. In its new form the impost was not less unpopular. An inaccurate
statement was put abroad, that the Convention of Royal Burghs encouraged nonpayment
of the duty; and, on June 24, 1725, Captain Bushell and two
companies of
infantry were drafted , into Glasgow to support the excise officials in valuing
the maltsters’ stock. They were received with shouts of “ No malt tax ”; the
Guard-house was locked against them ; and the mob gutted the house of their
Member of Parliament, Daniel Campbell. On the 25th, encouraged by the
inactivity of the soldiery, the rioters stoned them and drew a volley. Bushell
thereupon sought safety in Dumbarton Castle, and informed General Wade at
Edinburgh of his predicament. On July 10 the General, with the Lord Advocate
(Duncan Forbes of Culloden) and a considerable force of horse and foot, entered
Glasgow. Four men and one woman implicated in the riot were sentenced, the
former to whipping and transportation, the woman to the pillory. Glasgow was
fined £6080 to make good Campbell’s losses. The Duke of Roxburghe, suspected of
sympathy with the demonstrators, was removed from the Scottish Secret&rysJ
p (August, 1725).
While the
Lowlands were in a ferment, measures were being taken to settle the Highlands.
Wade reported (December 10, 1724) that the Disarming Act of 1716 had failed in
effect. The loyal clans, numbered at 10,000 men, had more or less obeyed the
injunction to disarm; the disloyal, 12,000 in number, as Wade estimated, had
surrendered old and useless arms, their effective weapons remaining hidden and
within reach. Wade therefore recommended (April, 1725) that the disarming of
the clans should be prosecuted vigorously, that six Highland companies should
be raised, an armed barque launched upon Loch Ness, and forts and barracks
provided at Inverness (Fort George) and Cillachiumein (Fort Augustus). On May
31,1725, a new Disarming Act received the royal assent. The surrender of arms
in the shires scheduled in the Act of 1716 was ordered under the penalty of
forcible enlistment for military service in the colonies; women concealing arms
were liable to two years’ imprisonment and a fine not exceeding £100; peers,
their sons, and commoners qualified to vote for or sit as Members of
Parliament, were exempt from the Act. The disarmament of the disaffected clans
was undertaken systematically by Wade, but, as the future proved, not
effectually. Fort George and Fort Augustus were built, and from Inverness to
Fort William, and from Stirling to Inverness, military roads were constructed.
The Highland Watch, or police, had been disbanded after the ’15. Six companies
were now raised, and in 1739 were embodied as a regiment of the Line, the 42nd
(Black Watch). It was the good fortune of England to enlist the commercial
ambition of the Lowlands and the military aptitude of the Highlands in behalf of
an Empire which both had entered reluctantly.
At the moment
when Parliament was considering the pacification of the Highlands, the trustees
of the estates forfeited after the ’15 presented their final report. By an Act
of June 26, 1716, a Commission had been constituted to ascertain the extent and
value of the property of persons who had been attainted since June 29, 1715;
and a further
108 Forfeited estates.—The Porteous mob. [ms-37
Act (March
21, 1718) vested the forfeited estates in trustees, to be sold to Protestant
purchasers for the public use and to provide a capital sum not exceeding
<£20,000 for the erection of schools in th6 Highlands. The operations of the
trustees terminated on June 26,1724; and on April 17, 1725, their final report
was presented to Parliament. Of thirty-nine Scottish estates vested in them
they had sold thirty-four, and had paid over to the Receiver-General £295,926.
14s. 9c?., debited to the extent of £234,517. 1Ss. 7d. due to creditors of the
estates, and leaving a meagre balance of £61,409. 1«. 2d. which was further
diminished by the expenses of the trust and by grants to the widows and
relatives of forfeited proprietors. Only £27,616. 10s. had been remitted to the
Treasury; and the unsold estates were entrusted (13 Geo. I, cap. 28) to the
Scottish Court of Exchequer to be sold and applied according to the directions
of the Act of 1718.
Scott has
immortalised an event of 1736—a year otherwise memorable in the history of the
Scottish Establishment for the publication of their Judicial Testimony by
Ebenezer Erskine and his associates, the beginning of a movement which
developed leisurely towards Voluntaryism. On April 14,1736, Andrew Wilson, a
smuggler, was hanged at Edinburgh for robbing the Customs. His case roused
sympathy; his sentence was excessive in relation to an offence which the
general community held venial, if not praiseworthy; and at their public
churching before the execution Wilson had aided the escape of his confederate
in the crime. An attempt to rescue him at the gallows was anticipated, and
precautions were taken. Seventy of the City Guard, under Captain John Porteous,
were on duty round the scaffold; a detachment of the 23rd foot was stationed
close by. The execution was not interrupted; but, after it, the mob stoned the
guards and cut down Wilson’s body. The guards replied with promiscuous
shooting; six persons were killed and about twenty were wounded. Public
indignation was intense; and, three months later (July 5), Porteous was
arraigned on a charge of murder. Conflicting evidence was offered, both as to
his having fired upon the crowd himself, and as to his having ordered his men
to fire. He was found guilty, however, and his execution was appointed for the
following September 8. Porteous petitioned the Queen, in the King’s absence,
and obtained a respite till October 20. It was suspected that respite was
preliminary to pardon; and on the eve of the day originally appointed for his
execution Porteous was dragged from the Tolbooth by a mob and was hanged on a
dyer’s pole in the Grass-market. The outrage roused lengthy debates in the
Lords, who on May 13, 1737, passed a Bill to imprison and incapacitate the
Provost of Edinburgh from municipal office, to remove the gates from the Nether
Bow of the city, and to disband the City Guard. In the Commons the Bill was
severely criticised and barely survived. In the form in which it received the
royal assent (June 21, 1737), it imposed upon Edinburgh a fine of
1737-43]
109
£2000 in
behalf of Porteous’ widow (who accepted £1500 in full payment), and disabled
the Provost from holding magisterial office. Scottish nationalism was roused by
the measure; the Church was inflamed by a supplementary and futile Act (June
21, 1737), ordering the clergy on the first Sunday of each month for one year
to summon the persons implicated in Porteous’ death to surrender themselves.
When Walpole
declared war upon Spain (October 19, 1739), and the death of the Emperor
Charles VI, a year later, opened a wider warfare, the common interests of
France and Great Britain had isolated the Pretender in Italy for more than
twenty years. But the crisis created by the Emperor’s death caused France and
Great Britain to drift apart; while the fall of Walpole (February 2, 1742) and
the death of Cardinal Fleury (January 29, 1743) surrendered both countries to
warlike influences. So soon as war with Spain seemed imminent, and Walpole’s
position precarious, Jacobite intrigues were set on foot. Francis Sempill, the
son of an officer in the French service and resident in Paris, and William
Macgregor (or Drummond) of Balhaldie, were employed to solicit France. From
July, 1739, when the storm clouds were lowering, Sempill acted as the secret
channel of communication between James at Rome and the cautious Fleury.
Balhaldie visited the latter in the spring of 1740 and returned to Scotland
with vague and verbal promises. To watch the situation, an “ Association ” was
formed, whose members were Lovat (angling for a dukedom), Lochiel, the Earl of
Traquair, his brother John Stewart, Lord John Drummond, Sir James Campbell of
Auchinbreck, and the titular Duke of Perth. Balhaldie again visited France with
a signed assurance (March 13, 1741) of their readiness to resort to arms, and
with a list of Scottish partisans whose names, according to John Murray of
Broughton (acting since about August, 1740, as James’ correspondent in
Scotland), he used with uncommon freedom. Though Balhaldie asserted a French
expedition to be imminent, Fleury was cautious and undecided. In December,
1742, Balhaldie announced a French descent for the following spring, and the
Associators were directed to have everything in readiness. But France was not
yet in earnest; and the intrigue lapsed with Fleury’s death. The Cardinal had
confided to Amelot, the Foreign Minister, that he was in communication with
James. To Amelot, therefore, Sempill and Balhaldie turned.
Amelot
satisfied himself that the Scottish Jacobites were ready to take arms. They on
their part were sceptical as to Balhaldie’s representation of France’s
attitude. In February, 1743, Murray of Broughton went over to Paris, where he
received from Amelot only a vague assurance of Louis’ support “ as soon as the
situation of his affairs would permit.” Circumstances hastened that
eventuality. Breaking his neutrality, George II placed himself at the head of a
Pragmatic Army in the Netherlands, and fought the French at Dettingen (June 27,
1743).
Amelot
thereupon awaited only an assurance of the party’s vitality in England to
commit himself, and sent over an agent to make enquiries. Taken in hand by
Balhaldie and others whose object was to bluster France into action, Amelot’s
agent returned in October, 1748, with eulogistic reports of the strength of
English Jacobitism. Amelot hesitated no longer. On November 18, 1748, he told
Sempill that France was prepared to strike for James’ restoration. Louis
informed Philip of Spain to that effect on December 10, 174S; and, a week later
(December 17), Balhaldie reached Rome with the news. James’ correspondence
(December 4, 1748) proves that he already discerned an opportunity for sending
his elder son from Italy. With the connivance of Cardinal Aquaviva, Spanish
Protector at the Vatican, and of de Tencin, representative there of the Knights
of Malta, Charles left Rome secretly on January 9,1744, landed at Antibes on
the 23rd, and reached Paris by February 10. He carried a commission (December
23, 1743) to act as Regent in his father’s behalf. The Prince’s presence in
France was likely to be, and actually proved, embarrassing. Amelot declared
Charles’ departure from Rome to have taken place without the knowledge or
connivance of France. The Vatican likewise remained uninvolved. James, in fact,
was anxious to have some personal share in any attempt on his behalf, but
chiefly to seize the opportunity for affording Charles the chance of the action
for which he longed and the experience which he needed.
On November
15, 1743, orders were given to prepare transports to convey the French expeditionary
force. Early in December they concentrated at Dunkirk, 38 in number, to embark
Maurice de Saxe and a force numbering 9274 infantry, 622 dragoons, 133 gunners,
and six twelve-pounders. A fleet of 22 sail of the line under Count de
Roquefeuil assembled at Brest. It was intended to launch the expedition early
in January, 1744; but the English Jacobites advised the postponement of the
attempt until February, by which time the members of the party in Parliament
could withdraw to the provinces. The arrival of Charles in France made it
necessary to strike before the British Ministry could avert a danger whose
proportions were now revealed. On February 2 Saxe was instructed, on the
arrival of an escorting convoy under Admiral de Baxailh, to land in the Thames
and occupy London. Roquefeuil set sail from Brest on the 6th, to clear the
Channel. Barailh parted company with him off the Isle of Wight on the 28th, and
reached Dunkirk by March 3. Meanwhile Admiral Norris and a powerful fleet
appeared in the Downs; and the news from England suggested that Balhaldie and
Sempill had exaggerated everything except the number of troops available to
oppose a landing. On March 6, Argenson instructed Saxe that the expedition was
indefinitely postponed, and the equinoctial gales enabled the French Government
to retire plausibly from an enterprise already regretted. A violent tempest
on the night
of March 6-7 drove on shore eleven transports and damaged others. A second
storm, on the 11th, inflicted further losses. On the same day Saxe was informed
that the enterprise was abandoned. Jacobitism looked vainly to Prance until the
clans under Prince Charles had proved the vitality of the Stewart cause.
Meanwhile
Charles remained in France. Louis rejected Great Britain’s demand for his
expulsion; but the Prince received neither official courtesies nor the
hospitality of Versailles. In September, 1744, Murray of Broughton visited him
in Paris. He found him full of exaggerated ideas of the latent loyalty which
would spring into life if he appeared among his father’s subjects, and longing
to be himself in action. If, as he had declared to SempiU (March 15,1744), he
withdrew without achieving something, his party would hold him inheritor of the
ill-fortune of his father and grandfather, and would forsake a cause
persistently unfortunate. He therefore informed Murray that, even though he
were unattended, he would come to Scotland in the summer of 1745. Murray
thereupon returned to Edinburgh, and founded the “ Buck Club ” to organise the
party. Excepting the Duke of Perth, all concurred as to the rashness of the
Prince’s resolve. Early in 1745, a representation to that effect was entrusted
to Traquair for Charles; though Lochiel, Glengarry, Clan- ranald, Keppoch,
Glencoe, Stewart of Ardshiel, and other members of the Club declared their
readiness in any circumstances to give proof of their loyalty. Traquair’s
despatch never reached the Prince, nor did Young Glengarry with a later
message. Charles would certainly have been deterred by neither. The news of the
battle of Fontenoy (May 11,
1745) conveyed to him an absurdly ill-informed
impression of the precarious footing of his Hanoverian rival; and he forthwith
despatched Sir Hector Maclean of Duart to Scotland to announce his imminent
arrival. On such haphazard foundations was raised the last Jacobite effort.
With Charles chiefly rests the blame for its rashness.
For months
Charles had been preparing for his enterprise. He had procured nearly =6*4000,
arms, and ammunition. Anthony Walsh, a Nantes shipowner, lent him the frigate
Du Teittay, 18 guns. Walter Rutledge, an Irish merchant in Dunkirk, provided
her escort, the war frigate Elizabeth, 60 guns. James was ignorant of Charles’
project: the Prince’s letter (June 12, 1745) announcing it was intentionally
not despatched to Rome until Charles was on his way to Scotland. On July 2,
Charles embarked on the Du Teillaiy at Bonne Anse, at the mouth of the Loire.
He was accompanied by Tullibardine (titular Duke of Atholl), Sir John Macdonald
(an officer in the French service), iEneas Macdonald (a Paris banker), Francis
Strickland, who had been Charles’ companion on his Italian tour eight years
before, Colonel O’Sulivan, his former Governor (Sir Thomas Sheridan), and
George Kelly—the “Seven Men of Moidart.” On July 13, in the roads of Belle
Isle, the Du Teillay was joined by the Elizabeth. The two vessels set sail
for Scotland
on the 15th. On the 20th, before rounding Land’s End, the Elizabeth was engaged
by H.M.S. IAon, and returned to Brest in a shattered condition. The Du Teillay
proceeded alone, and on July 23 (August 3, N. S.), at Eriska in the Outer
Hebrides, Charles first trod Scottish soil. On July 25 the Du Teillay crossed
to the mainland and anchored in Loch-na-Nuagh. In spite of Charles’ meagre following,
Lochiel, Keppoch, Glencoe, Clanranald, Glengarry, and Stewart of Ard- shiel
agreed to bring out their clans. Like Marischal in 1719, Charles resolved to
force a campaign by sacrificing the means of retreat. On August 8 the Du
Teillay weighed anchor for France, bearing an appeal to Louis XV for
assistance. Ten days later (August 19) Charles raised the standard in
Glenfinnan at the head of Loch Shiel, and by the 27th commanded a little over
2000 men, of whom more than half were Macdonalds.
Meanwhile,
the Government had proclaimed (August 1) a reward of £30,000 for Charles’
capture; and Sir John Cope, commanding in Scotland, prepared to act vigorously
with the unpromising material at his disposal. The military establishment in
Scotland consisted of three- and-a-half battalions of infantry and two
regiments of horse: all, save one regiment of foot (Guise’s, the 6th), being
either newly raised or inexperienced in active warfare. Leaving Gardiner’s
horse (13th Hussars) at Stirling and Hamilton’s (14th Hussars) at Leith, Cope
advanced from Stirling with twenty-five companies of foot (August 20). His
objective was Fort Augustus; but, finding the clans in position to contest the
Pass of Corryarrack, he changed his route and pushed on to Inverness (August
29). The south lay open to Charles, and thither he marched. On September 4 he
entered Perth, and was joined by the Duke of Perth (Lord James Drummond) with
200 of his clan, and a contingent of Robertsons and Macgregors. More important
was the accession of Lord George Murray, a man of military ability to whom,
with Perth, Charles committed the command of his army. Lord George had taken
part in the ’15 and ’19; but his recent relations with the Government, the
sanity of his judgment, and his refusal to countenance enterprises patently
futile, gained him the suspicion of Charles and of the Irish dare-alls whom
Charles chiefly trusted. His inability to subordinate his judgment to the
Prince’s inexperience drew upon him, when the adventure was ended, ungenerous
accusations of treachery. On September 11 the southward march was resumed, a
proposal to meet Cope, hurrying to Aberdeen and his transports, having been
wisely rejected. The Forth, so obstinately held by Argyll in 1715, was crossed
at Frew without opposition on the 13th, Gardiner’s regiment falling back on
Falkirk and Coltbridge, where Hamilton’s joined it. On the 16th Charles halted
at Gray’s Mill, two miles from Edinburgh, and summoned the city. The Provost,
Archibald Stewart, was irresolute; the volunteers who had been enrolled
disbanded in the crisis of danger; the dragoons again turned tail—
the “canter
o’ Colt-Brig.” Cope’s arrival from Aberdeen was imminent; the Provost therefore
manoeuvred for time. But in the small hours of the 17th the Camerons rushed the
Nether Bow, and seized the guardhouse and the gates. At noon Charles entered
the city. James VIII was proclaimed forthwith, and Holyrood, after more than
sixty years, again housed a royal Stewart.
Striking as
was Charles’ occupation of Edinburgh, his march through the Lowlands revealed
how firm a hold the Union had secured. The squadrons which the Lowland gentry
provided in 1715 were represented now by a single troop of 36 horse, the
“Perthshire squadron.” The Highland infantry still numbered few more than 2000,
many of whom carried guns of dangerous antiquity, Lochaber axes, pitchforks,
and scythe-blades mounted on poles. Edinburgh was requisitioned for arms,
ammunition, tents, and shoes for naked feet. On September 18 Lord Naime, with
700 Atholl and 300 of Menzies of Shian’s men, joined Charles. The reinforcement
was opportune; for, on the 17th, Cope disembarked at Dunbar and, on the 19th,
advancing towards Edinburgh, encamped westward of Haddington. Charles, on the
20th, led his army from Duddingston. He expected to engage near Musselburgh;
but, learning that Cope was at Tranent, he ascended Carberry Hill, associated
now for a third time with the fortunes of the Stewarts. Cope, a little over
2000 strong, lay on the sea-ward plain below, a broad ditch intervening. The
night passed, with the two armies half-a-mile apart. Before sunrise on the
21st, the Highlanders descended and hurled themselves on Cope’s left flank,
almost before he had time to re-form. In fifteen minutes the battle was over:
six guns and Cope’s military chest were the prize of the victors.
For a month
after his victory Charles remained inactive at Edinburgh. The protest against
the Union in his father’s proclamation had roused little response. But Charles,
like his father, viewed Scotland as the stepping-stone to an English
restoration, and France was relied on as accessory. On August 11, 1745, James
wrote to Louis XV to place his younger son Henry at the disposal of France. A
fortnight later Henry (August 29) left Borne for France. A scheme of Maurepas
(October 13) to convey him with 10,000 French troops to England came to
nothing; but on October 14 the Marquis d’Eguilles arrived at Edinburgh With
instructions (September 24,1745) as Louis’ secret ambassador to Charles. Money,
arms, and six four-pounders also arrived, and on October 24 Argenson signed the
secret Treaty of Fontainebleau, binding Louis to render Charles assistance.
Encouraged by these marks of French interest, Charles resolved to rouse his
English adherents. His proposal to advance upon Newcastle was strongly opposed
by Lord George and others, who were incredulous of the effect which Charles
anticipated from his appearance in England. They objected that, if his
adherents there were in earnest, they ought not to need the encouragement of
his presence;
while, if a
French landing in England was imminent, as was asserted, it was sounder
strategy to draw off English troops to Scotland. As a compromise Lord George
proposed an advance into Cumberland, where the ground was more suitable for the
Highlanders, and Charles reluctantly agreed.
On October 31
Charles marched from Edinburgh upon an enterprise bravely executed, but as
futile in result as Mackintosh’s a generation earlier. Since Cope’s defeat, the
Prince had received reinforcements. Mackinnons, Macphersons, Ogilvies, Gordons,
and Grants of Glen- moriston swelled his infantry; Elcho, Balmerinoch,
Pitsligo, Kilmarnock, and Murray of Broughton commanded five troops of horse.
Charles marched to the border with 5000 foot, 500 horse, and 13 guns. On
November 8 he crossed the Esk, his force lessened by about 1000 through
desertion. On the 15th, Carlisle and its castle capitulated after a two days’
siege; Wade, who marched from Newcastle on the 16th, got no further than
Hexham, the roads being impassable. Cope’s successor, Lieutenant-General
Handasyde, had already reached Edinburgh (November 14), with two regiments of
foot and Hamilton’s and Gardiner’s dragoons. In the south, Sir John Ligonier
was massing an army about Lichfield, of which the Duke of Cumberland took command
later (November 27). In these circumstances Charles’ council vgreed (November
18) to advance into Lancashire, and rouse the west of England before Cumberland
and Wade could unite. At Preston, where (November 26) the Prince received his
first enthusiastic welcome in England, the Highlanders were marched across the
Ribble to dispel the sombre memory of that stream as the terminus of earlier
invasions in 1648 and 1715. Manchester (November 29) surpassed Preston in the vigour
of its welcome, and about 200 recruits were formed into the Manchester Regiment
under Francis Townley. Charles was elated: “his conversation that night at
table was, in what manner he should enter London, on horseback or afoot, and in
what dress”—he had marched from Scotland on foot, and in the Highland habit.
His officers did not share his elation, and retreat was already discussed among
them. It was resolved, however, to march to Derby, so as to avert any complaint
that England had not been encouraged to rise or France to send troops*
Advancing on December 1, Charles’ cavalry was speedily in touch with the
outposts of Cumberland, whose army, over 10,000 strong, rested on
Newcastle-under-Lyne, Stafford, Lichfield, and Coventry. Wade, who had set out
from Newcastle on November 24, was advancing through Yorkshire; a third army
was forming on Finchley Common. On December 4 Charles entered Derby. On the
next morning, Lord George and other officers waited upon him with a reasoned
refusal to advance further. Three armies were in the field against them; they
had entered England to encourage the English to rise, and to support a French
landing; but the, country had not risen, and had given no encouragement
to suppose it
would do so, while a French landing seemed equally remote. Mindful of the
disasters which had attended similar endeavours in 1648 and 1715, they refused
to force upon England a king whom she had given no sign of desiring. Charles
protested angrily, though it is patent that a further advance must ultimately
have proved futile. On December 6 the retreat began. Cumberland’s cavalry and
Wade’s horse under Oglethorpe followed in close pursuit. At Lancaster (December
13) a proposal to give battle to Cumberland was abandoned; and, after fighting
a rearguard action on the 18th at Clifton, near Penrith, the whole army on the
20th crossed the Esk into Scotland. Ten days later (December 30), Cumberland
compelled the surrender of the Manchester regiment which Charles had
senselessly left behind in Carlisle, and the winter campaign ended.
From December
27, 1745, to January 3,1746, Charles and his army rested at Glasgow after eight
weeks of almost continuous marching. During his absence the position in
Scotland had improved in his favour. On November 22, 1745, Lord John Drummond
had arrived from France with 700 of the Royal Scots and Irish regiments, and
six heavy field-guns. His arrival put out of action the Dutch auxiliaries, who
before their arrival in England were on parole not to fight against French
colours. In the north, Lord Lewis Gordon had raised a force of 800 Gordons,
Farquharsons, and Moir of Stonywood’s men, and at Inverurie repulsed (December
23) Loudoun’s attempt to recover Aberdeenshire. The Frasers had at length come
out, and, after an unsuccessful attempt upon Fort Augustus (December 3),
marched to Perth, where, before the end of the year, detachments of
Mackintoshes and other clans were assembled, to the number of 2400. Charles had
at his disposal a total force of 8000 men and 19 guns.
While Cumberland
was in England to confront the threatened French landing, and Hawley,
superseding Handasyde, was bringing up Wade’s command from Newcastle, Charles
evacuated Glasgow (January 3,
1746).
Stirling surrendered t
on the 7th, and trenches were opened (January 16) before the castle. Hawley had
already advanced from Edinburgh and on the 14th was at Linlithgow. Charles
proposed to engage him near Bannockburn ; but, on the 17th, Hawley not
advancing, the clans surprised him at Falkirk, and after an indiscriminate
engagement reminiscent of Sheriffmuir, put him to flight with the loss of his
camp and seven guns. Jacobitism had won its last victory. Charles returned to
the siege of Stirling Castle, and, a week later, Cumberland took over and
reinforced Hawley’s demoralised army at Edinburgh. Charles was anxious to meet
him and confident of the issue; but Lord George and the principal chiefs
advised a retreat. They alleged (January 29) the desertion of a “ vast number ”
since the recent battle, and urged withdrawal to the Highlands, whence in the
spring the clans would draw together in greater strength. Other motives
inspired their
116
[l746
communication.
Possessed of extraordinary driving power, and making no demand upon his men
that he would not obey himself, Charles inherited the rashness of his
grandfather and the obstinacy of Charles I. To the Stewart belief in inspired
ability he added a masterful self-reliance which encouraged courtiers and
looked askance on advisers. After his disappointment at Derby he declared his
intention to act without consulting his council, and fulfilled his threat till
the eve of Culloden. The Scots also resented the Prince’s reliance on his
companions from France, who had little at stake in the country which provided
them with adventure, rather than on the men who gave him the army he commanded.
Nor did the abrupt transition from the dull stagnation of Italy to the keen
activity of high adventure tend to encourage the qualities of tact and judgment
in which he was by nature lacking.
On February 1
the army crossed the Forth in confusion, and with the sacrifice of heavy guns
and ammunition. Charles and the clans retreated along Wade’s road to Inverness;
Lord George with the horse and the French auxiliaries followed the coast to Aberdeen.
The Prince’s immediate object was to dissipate Loudoun’s force in the north,
reduce the Government’s forts in the Highlands, and secure the coast route
along which Cumberland would probably advance. After an ineffectual attempt to
surprise Charles at Moy Hall (February 16), Loudoun abandoned Inverness and
withdrew into Sutherlandshire. Fort George surrendered on February 20, and Fort
Augustus about March 1. Fort William offered a prolonged resistance, and the
siege was raised on April 3. Since it was important to keep open a route to the
Lowlands, Lord George appeared (March 17) before Blair Castle, into which
Cumberland had put a garrison. Lord Crawford and the Hessians moved to its
relief. Failing to entice them into the Pass of Killiecrankie, Lord George
abandoned his investment of Blair on April 2 and rejoined the Prince.
Meanwhile, Cumberland had been heavily reinforced. On February 8, 500 Hessian
foot arrived at Leith to replace the Dutch. Settling them at Perth to secure
the south against Charles’ possible return by Wade’s road, Cumberland advanced
along the coast and on April 11 united his columns at Cullen—15 battalions of
foot, 3 regiments of horse, and Highland auxiliaries, in all 8811 strong.
Charles awaited him at Culloden, with a shrunken force of 6700 foot and 240
horse. A mismanaged attempt to surprise Cumberland at Naim during the night of
the 15th brought the army back to Culloden tired and famished. Not more than
about 50Q0 were present in the ranks when Cumberland a few hours later (April
16) opened the engagement with his artillery. Some of the clans charged
heroically, but in vain, against regiments schooled by the experience of Cope’s
and Hawley’s disasters. No measures had been concerted for a rendezvous in case
of defeat, and the Prince thought only upon escape. After five months of
wandering, hardship borne heroically, and experience of loyal devotion, the
French
1746-1807] Jacobite forfeitures.
117
frigate
VHeureux bore him on September 20,1746, from Loch-na-Nuagh to France, whence
the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) expelled him. His later disreputable life,
and his brother’s acceptance of a Cardinal’s hat (July 3, 1747), extinguished
Jacobitism as a national force. In February, 1800, the Cardinal received a
pension from George III; and George IV contributed to Canova’s monument in St
Peter’s to the joint memory of James and his two sons, of whom the Cardinal,
the younger, died on July 13, 1807.
The Jacobite
assault upon the Union and Protestant settlement invited severe reprisals. On
May 24, 1746, Cumberland established himself at Fort Augustus; the soldiery
swept the glens of the disaffected clans; the Campbells were let loose upon
Appin, Loudoun’s Highland companies upon Badenoch and Lochaber; those found
with arms were summarily shot; houses whose inmates had absconded were burnt;
their cattle were raided. After Cumberland vacated (July 18) his command the
storm of vengeance slackened. Of those indicted at Carlisle, York, and
Southwark for rebellion, 73 paid the death penalty. Kilmarnock, Balmerinoch,
Cromarty (August 1,1746) and Lovat (March 19,1747) were found guilty of treason
by their peers, and, excepting Cromarty, were executed. An Act of Attainder was
passed (June 4, 1746) against Lords Kellie, Strathallan, Pitsligo, and forty
others. A year later (June 17, 1747), the estates of those attainted were
forfeited to the Crown; their revenues to be applied to “ civilising ” the
Highlands and Islands. Friction such as that which had arisen with the trustees
of the Act of 1718 was avoided by vesting the administration of the forfeited
properties solely in the Scottish Court of Exchequer. The rental of the 46
forfeited estates amounted to £16,285. 17s. Id., the personalty to £19,345. 14a
4c?. But creditors advanced claims amounting to £277,127. 4s. 8d., and on
February 28, 1752, the Exchequer reported that the estates had yielded nothing
to the Treasury. The Act, in fact, was leniently interpreted, and permanently
affected few families; though the Lovat, Cromarty, Barrisdale, and Lord John
Drummond’s estates were annexed to the Crown (March 26, 1752).
The Scottish
episcopalians had refrained from overt expressions of Jacobite sympathy such as
had come from them in 1715: but they remained non-juring. James’ patronage of
their hierarchy further prejudiced them; and many of their meeting-houses had
been burnt during Cumberland’s campaign. On August 12, 1746, the royal assent
was given to an Act which empowered the local authorities to close
meeting-houses attended by five or more persons whose minister had failed to
take the oaths by September 1, 1746; disfranchised and disqualified for a seat
in Parliament peers and commoners who had attended an unlicensed meeting-house
more than once within the year preceding an election; and condemned unlicensed
officiating ministers to six months’ imprisonment for the first, and
transportation for life for
a second
offence. The Scottish episcopate being deeply suspect, ordinations by an
English or Irish Bishop were alone recognised. By a later Act (May 13,1748)
ministers who had been ordained by a Scottish Bishop and had qualified before
September 1, 1746, were expressly debarred (as from September 29,1748) from a
continuation of their licenses. The deaths of James (January 1, 1766) and of
Charles (January 31,1788) enabled episcopacy to purge itself of Jacobitism: but
it was not even partially relieved from the penal laws pressing upon it until
the Act of June 15,1792.
In dress,
tongue, and polity the Highlands stood apart—the “ barbarous part of the
island, hitherto a noxious load upon the whole,” as a Scotsman described them
in 1747. The Union of 1707 represented a compact between two races whose
political institutions, differing in particulars, were traceable to a common
origin. But, if the Union was to cover both kingdoms, the Highlands needed to
be purged of characteristics which made one half of Scotland foreign to the
other. A policy of harmonisation was therefore attempted. The first of the
legislative measures to this end was a Disarming Act (August 12, 1746), that of
1725 having expired. While reenacting the procedure whereby to procure
surrender of arms, the Act differed from its predecessor in two particulars. It
offered a fine of £\5 sterling alternative to military service in America for
those convicted of bearing arms—a concession likely to relieve few. The second
point of difference concerned all. Under penalty of imprisonment for six months
for the first, and transportation for seven years for a second offence, it was
forbidden from August 1, 1747, to man or boy in Scotland (the King’s forces
excepted) to wear “ the plaid, philebeg or little kilt, trowse, shoulder-belts,
tartan or party-coloured plaid or stuff for great-coats or for upper coats.”
The period of grace proved inadequate and was extended (landowners and their
sons excepted) to August 1,1748 (20 Geo. II, cap. 51), and eventually to
December 25, 1748, for the plaid and kilt, and to August 1, 1749, for the other
proscribed habiliments, under penalty of enforced enlistment (21 Geo. II, cap.
34).
More
decp-reaching in purpose were legislative measures which removed survivals of
feudalism long since discarded in England, where jurisdictions dangerously
interfering between the Crown and its subjects had been abolished. In Scotland
the provincial administration of justice in the Lowlands was still the
heritable privilege of individuals, and its exercise a source of emolument. In
the Highlands tenure “ in ward ” permitted the chiefs to require the military
service of their tenants, and prevailed in spite of the license granted by the
Disarming Act of 1716 to commute the claim for money. Two Bills were framed for
the abolition of these survivals of medievalism; and, on June 17, 1747, both
received the royal assent. The first abolished (from March 25, 1748) all
heritable offices of justiciary, regalities, baillieships,
1747-53]
Heritable jurisdictions abolished.
119
constabularies
(the High Constable of Scotland excepted), sheriffships, stewartries, and
vested them in the Crown. The Courts of Barony were restricted to jurisdiction
in minor charges of assault involving a maximum penalty of £1 sterling or one
month’s imprisonment, and to civil causes where the debt or damages at issue
(the recovery of rent excepted) did not exceed £2 sterling. Compensation was
offered to the owners and officials of the forfeited jurisdictions, who were
directed to enter their claims in the Court of Session before November 11,
1747. Claims were recorded by 161 claimants in respect of 250 heritable or life
jurisdictions and 15 dependent clerkships. Of the former offices 117, and of
the latter 9, were allowed and were commuted for £152,037. 12?. 2d.,
considerably less than one-third of the total amount (£583,090. 16s. 8d.)
demanded. The second Act abolished tenure “ in ward ” from March 25,1748.
Tenures “ in ward ” of the Crown were converted into tenures “ in blanch,” and
of superiors below the Crown into tenures “ in feu,” the amount of the feu-duty
or rent being left to agreement according to a rule to be laid down by the
Court of Session.
The
legislation of 1747, concluding a long series of enactments “for rendering the
Union of the two Kingdoms more complete,” was accompanied by an Act of Pardon
(June 17, 1747) for offences committed before June 15, 1747. From its operation
exiles who on that date were in the service of the Pretender, France, or Spain;
estates forfeited and persons attainted before June 15, 1747; and those
concerned in the late rebellion and in the intrigues which (since July 1, 1742)
had prepared the way for it, were excepted. The Macgregor clan and 87 persons
were expressly barred. Ample opportunity remained for further vengeance; but
the law claimed only one more victim, Archibald Cameron, implicated in the
hare-brained Elibank Plot, who was executed on June 7,1753, under the Attainder
of 1746. With the Elibank Plot, serious only by reason of Frederick the Great’s
suspected connivance, Jacobitism as an active force expired. It had failed as
an effective national movement in protest against the Union. It had failed as a
weapon in the hand of European Powers, who, employing it for their own ends,
had the opportunity to impede Great Britain in the attainment of her own. Freed
from the incubus of civil commotion, Scotland realised the material prosperity
which had tempted her adherence to the Union. England, on her part, benefited
not merely by the conversion of a suspicious neighbour, but obtained a valuable
partner in the development of Greater Britain, the most signal creation of the
century in which the permanence of Great Britain was for a time in jeopardy.
THE BOURBON
GOVERNMENTS IN FRANCE AND SPAIN. I.
(1714-26.)
Absolute to the end as Louis XIV had been, a
single day sufficed to annul the testamentary provisions of the dead hand. The
problem of the Regency during his great-grandson’s minority was the main preoccupation
of the old King’s last year. He loved his bastard, the Duke of Maine, and
disliked the character of his nephew, the Duke of Orleans; but he was too
scrupulous wholly to ignore the claim of the latter. The Regency was assigned
to Orleans, tied down by a cooptative Council, which controlled patronage; to
Maine was confided the guardianship of the child-King, and the command of the
household troops. This, hoped Louis, would secure his great-grandson’s safety,
his son’s prestige, and the satisfaction of his nephew’s reasonable
expectations.
On September
1,1715, the King died; by the evening of September 2 the Regent was as powerful
as he cared to be. The coup <Tetat, sudden as it seemed, had been sedulously
prepared. Orleans had long lived in dissipation and disgrace. He was suspected
of clearing the path to ultimate succession by poisoning all who stood before
him ; his unquestionable vices debarred him from decent society. Such energy
as his mistresses and champagne suppers left him he wasted on what were
regarded as frivolous pursuits—painting, music, carving, and chemistry. Yet in
Italy and Spain he had shown marked ability both as strategist and
administrator; his liberality of thought and freedom from prejudice well suited
a new age. The short stout figure, the bad eyesight, the contrast of black hair
and a complexion fiery from excess, were redeemed by a pleasant, open face, an
easy dignity, an irresistible gaiety. He never lost his rapid insight into men,
especially into their weaknesses. The more he promised, the readier were his
petitioners to believe.
Orleans cared
little for power, and would have gladly been left alone. But disgraced men are
often sensitive of their honour, and at this one crisis he displayed the
courage, the resource, the reserve of power which intelligent idlers take long
to lose—and the Regent was only forty-two. Thus, then, he had wormed the dead
King’s testament out of Chancellor
1715]
121
Voisin, had
bought the colonels of the household troops by cash, the political and military
magnates by promises of office, the princes of the blood by the humiliation of
the bastards, the higher nobility by expectations of an oligarchical
constitution, the Parlement by hopes of restored prerogatives. He could rally
round him persecuted Jansenists and Quietists, all those who writhed under the
austerity of the Maintenon repression, all who wished France rid of Jesuits.
The Parlement
was summoned for the morrow of the King’s death. In direct contravention of the
testament, Orleans appeared unaccompanied by Louis XV. His speech consisted of
an imaginative embroidery on his uncle’s last wishes, and an attractive
programme. He claimed the right to command the royal guards, to nominate or
dismiss members of the Council of Regency, to monopolise royal patronage.
Harmony was only marred by an altercation with the Duke of Maine, and even this
turned to the Regent’s advantage, for Maine refused the guardianship if
deprived of the command of the household. The Spanish ambassador, Cellamare,
had instructions to create a party and present a protest, claiming the Regency
for his master. The party was unformed, and the protest remained unread. Ten days
later the proceedings were confirmed in a lit de justice, in the presence of
the grave and feeble child-King of four, who raised and replaced his cap as he
was told. The Regent’s success was popular in Paris. The people felt the load
of discipline removed, and believed that the burden of taxation would be
lightened. They admired the sudden courage, the unexpected ability, of the long
calumniated debauchee. There was, perhaps, a generous reaction in his favour.
He had, writes Lemontey, the merit of having tired out the satirist and the
scandal-monger.
The Regent’s
triumph necessarily affected European politics, and especially the relations of
France and Spain. But for the Treaty of Utrecht, Philip V came before Orleans,
as being Louis XIV’s direct descendant. He had indeed most solemnly renounced
his claims to the French Crown, but in his supersensitive conscience
self-interest disguised itself as duty, whose call could loose the binding
power of oaths. Orleans had fought bravely for him in Italy and Spain; but he
was too popular and independent to please the inept, shrinking King, and had
been recalled to France. Stories of plots to replace and even to poison Philip
created an atmosphere of horror and suspicion. Everywhere Orleans seemed to
stand just before or behind him. He blocked the way to the French throne, and
trod upon his heels in the succession to the Spanish. Political grievances were
aggravated by the personal contrast between the sociable, liberal Orleans, lax
in morals and cynical about religion, and the proud, morbid Philip, obsessed by
the dignity of kingship, absorbed in marital duties and pietistic practices.
Before Louis XIV’s death the rivals had been formally reconciled, and Orleans
bore no malice; but Philip brooded on his wrongs, and the clash became
inevitable.
122
Italian
aims of Elisabeth Farnese. [i7i5
Philip V had
now been for nine months married to his second wife, Elisabeth Famese of Parma.
This girl, undistinguished by beauty, education, or experience, had on her
entry into Spain given proof of the masterful temper, which for thirty years
kept Europe in unrest. Madame des Ursins had been sent by Louis XIV as Camarera
Mayor to the late Queen. Since then, save for a temporary recall, she had ruled
King, Queen and Government. Philip’s new bride had been her choice.
Nevertheless, on the very stairs of the wayside inn where she first met Madame
des Ursins, Elisabeth picked a quarrel, and despatched her shivering over the
snowy mountains to the frontier. By next morning Philip was his wife’s slave
for life. This strange consort had been suggested on the day of the late
Queen’s funeral by the Parmesan agent Giulio Alberoni, son of a gardener at
Piacenza. He, too, had urged her to rid herself of a rival influence, and thus
he naturally became the new Queen’s confidential adviser. While Alberoni
controlled the ante-chamber, Elisabeth’s nurse, Laura Pescatori, commanded the
backstairs. There was already a powerful Italian party composed of Philip’s
adherents from the lost provinces, and this now gained consistency.;
The aim of
the Italo-Spanish Government was the undoing of the Treaty of Utrecht. The
immediate object was to secure for Elisabeth the successions to Parma and
Piacenza, at present occupied by her uncle and stepfather, Francesco Famese,
and to Tuscany by virtue of her descent from the Medici, who in the male line
seemed drawing towards extinction. A substantial wedge would thus be thrust in
between the Austrian possessions in northern and southern Italy. The motive was
strongly personal. It seemed probable either that Philip would die early, or
that the Spanish Court would be a nursery of Princes. The fate of a Queen
Dowager was a suttee of impecunious ennui, while it was not the custom, as in
France, to parcel out royal domain among younger sons. Italy therefore must
provide a retreat for Elisabeth and portions for her children. Such a project
dovetailed into Alberoni’s dearest interests—his typical Italian love for his
own little State, and his passion for Italian liberation from the Austrian. The
Duke of Parma was peculiarly exposed to Imperial buffetings; and, even before
Elisabeth’s marriage, was the only Italian Power prepared to run some risk for
national independence.
Such then was
the situation when Orleans became Regent. Being himself the creation of the
Treaty of Utrecht, he would naturally defend its provisions, while Philip must
sooner or later adopt the offensive, in pursuance of either his own aims or his
Queen’s. Unfortunately these were incompatible. If he could frankly have
accepted the territorial rearrangement, he might more safely .have intervened
in France, or, if he had honestly abandoned his French claims, he might have
won support from France in Italy. Insistence on both aims involved twofold infraction
of the treaties. For success in Italy the favour or neutrality of the Western
Powers was essential. Alberoni hoped to have secured
England by
the favourable commercial treaty of December, 1715. He had no belief in the
Pretender’s success: his intention was to go behind the rival dynasties, and
propitiate the nation and the Parliament. But George I, tied tightly by his
German interests to the Emperor, made in June, 1716, a defensive alliance with
Charles VI.
The Regent
and Alberoni had been well disposed towards each other, for the latter had
contributed to the outward reconciliation with Philip V. In alarm at the
Anglo-Austrian treaty Orleans turned definitely towards Spain. Here he took his
first false step by identifying the objects of the Italian party with Philip’s
French ambitions. He instructed his envoy, Louville, to divide and overthrow
this party. Alberoni had recently contrived the dismissal of its ostensible
chief, Cardinal Giudice, and now controlled the Government. Divining Louville’s
instructions, he refused him a royal audience. In this he, in turn, overstepped
the mark, for Orleans, flouted by Spain, was thrown back on England.
Genuine
friendship between France and England was difficult indeed. The Whig Government
was traditionally anti-French, while all French sympathies were with the
Stewarts. Orleans himself had no prejudices against the Protestant
establishment, no sympathy with the decorous dulness of the Pretender’s Court.
The aristocratic constitutionalism of Hanoverian England attracted him; his
disgrace had given him distaste for the war, perhaps even a fellow-feeling for
the enemy. The Orleanist and Hanoverian dynasties were secured by the selfsame
treaty. But the Regent was easily led, and his Council was anti-English and
pro-Stewart. Alliance even with the Emperor would have been less unpopular, and
Philip V’s hostility both to Orleans and Charles VI gave hopes of this, until
they were damped by demands for Strassburg and Alsace.
The isolation
of France gave the Regent’s humblest but cleverest adviser, his old tutor
Dubois, his opportunity. Dubois supplied backbone for his master’s flexible
volitions, and led him to the Triple Alliance of January, 1717, elsewhere
explained. Doubt remained whether the Triple would become a Quadruple Alliance
by inclusion of the Emperor or Philip V, with both of whom England, which held
the key of the situation, had recently made treaties. A general pacification
was impossible, while sanguine Neapolitan exiles predominated at Madrid, and
Catalan refugees had influence at Vienna.
Alberoni,
meanwhile, was feverishly reforming Spain. He pared away ineffective elements
in the services, ships useless in the fighting line, superfluous officers of
rank. The bureaucracy was reduced, waste and corruption in financial departments
severely controlled. Along the Spanish sea-board fortresses, arsenals, and
shipbuilding yards were rising. Above all Alberoni relied on colonial revival,
and was untiring in improving communications, and regularising trade. That
Spain might not have only a market but products to sell therein, and so retain
the precious metals perpetually drained abroad, he stimulated native
manufactures.
The
improvements ascribed to him might seem exaggerations but for Stanhope’s
evidence that no power could resist Spain after a few years more of such
advance. These few years were not vouchsafed. Alberoni had prayed for five,
wherein to organise resources and equip armaments; he had at most two before
his hand was forced.
Aggressive as
Spain now became, it was not without provocation. No sooner had Sicily been
granted to Savoy than the Emperor intrigued for its possession. His scheme was
in flagrant contradiction to the treaties. It was one thing that Sicily should
be held by a weak Power with little or no marine, another that it should serve
the Emperor’s intelligent naval and commercial projects, and directly menace
Spain’s Mediterranean coast line. To Spain, moreover, had been conceded the
reversion to Sicily in default of the House of Savoy. She was therefore not unreasonable
in forestalling a policy unjust to herself and destructive of recent treaties.
The Austro-Turkish War expedited the opening of hostilities. It would be
perilous to wait till Austria’s victories set her arms free for Italy.
Alberoni’s promise to the Pope of a squadron to cooperate with Venice against
the infidel provided a pretext for mobilisation, while rupture was provoked by
the insolent arrest of Cardinal Molines, the new Inquisitor-General, by
Austrian officials in Lombardy. Alberoni privately threw the blame on the
stupid octogenarian Cardinal. He was scarcely ready for war, and was awaiting a
Cardinal’s hat, his reward for reopening friendly relations with the Papacy
which his French predecessors had suspended. The Inquisitor’s arrest, however,
acted powerfully upon Philip’s pugnacity, and Alberoni, securing his hat, had
no sufficient motive for postponement.
Alberoni, by
seizing Sardinia, deprived Charles VI of the equivalent which was to be granted
to Victor Amadeus for Sicily. It was, moreover, a convenient half-way house to
the Spanish fortress of Porto Longone in Elba, and a stepping-stone for
Tuscany. This easy success and the fluttering anxiety of the Western Powers
encouraged the bolder move on Sicily. Both islands were old possessions of
Aragon, older than the union with Castile or the conquest of Granada or
Navarre, of Naples or Milan. Their character was more Spanish than Italian, and
Spanish rule was infinitely less unpopular than Austrian or Savoyard. It was
argued that, as they were not parts of Italy, their occupation was no
infringement of treaties. To the last moment the Powers doubted whether Spain
was acting as Victor Amadeus’ ally or enemy: he was treating both at Vienna and
Madrid.
The landing
of Spanish troops near Palermo on July 1, 1718, settled the conclusion of the
Quadruple Alliance. Savoy acceded to it, and Spain was completely isolated.
Alberoni’s hopes had heen placed on France and Holland, and, indeed, Dubois had
with the utmost difficulty kept Orleans true to England. On the night of August
10-11 an English squadron, acting as the Emperor’s auxiliary, destroyed the
Spanish fleet,
laden with
troops and unprepared for action, off Cape Passaro. Alberon? was now reduced to
his more fanciful expedients, to risings of provincial malcontents and
disaffected legitimists against the Regent, attacks on Charles VI by the Tsar
and Prussia, and a landing in England by the King of Sweden, combined with an
expedition from Spain. But Alberoni’s tools all broke in his hand. Charles XII
was killed; the Tsar remained inactive; the Turks were forced to the Peace of
Passarowitz. The dramatic disclosure of the Duchess of Maine’s intrigues with
the Spanish envoy Cellamare, who was totally incredulous as to their utility,
gave Orleans the much needed pretext for declaring war in January, 1719.
England had already done so in December.
French armies
invaded Spain from the west and the east of the Pyrenees, and in the
disaffected north-westem provinces made rapid progress. The considerable expedition
which sailed for England under Ormond was wrecked off Finisterre. The new
arsenals at Vigo and Ferrol were destroyed by English ships aided by French
soldiers. Alberoni clutched, as a last straw, at the preparations for a Breton
revolt. But the auxiliary Spanish squadron was blockaded by the English in
Corunna; and, when it reached Santander in November instead of September the
Admiral refused to sail. The best Spanish troops, locked up in Sicily without
hope of reinforcement, won a brilliant victory over the Austrians at Franca
Villa, but in October held little more than Palermo. Peace was essential, and
Alberoni knew it. The combination against Spain was turning into a conspiracy
against himself, in which France and England, the King and Queen of Spain, and
even the Duke of Parma, all took a part. On December 15, 1719, Philip condemned
him to immediate banishment. He took refuge in Genoese territory at Sestri
Levante, and afterwards lay hid in Austrian Lombardy; whence, on Clement XI’s
death, he travelled in disguise to Rome to take part in the Conclave.
Alberoni was
the scapegoat who bore with him the sins of all whom he had served, or whom he
had opposed. But memory is an optimist, and whenever the Spanish Court was in
difficulty there were schemes for his recall. Elisabeth confessed as late as
1743 that he was a great minister, and that she might have pardoned him but for
the King’s dislike. As a diplomatist Alberoni was over-subtle and
over-sanguine, not sufficiently patient and too hot-tempered. He lacked the
sense of the relative possibilities which opportunities offered. But for Italy
he had genuine patriotism, and for Spain a sense of duty. If he was an
adventurer, self-interest was not his strongest motive. His chief personal aim
was the cardinalate, because this alone gave him adequate security, and the
status which enabled him to control the government of a foreign country. But it
was also of value for Spanish and Parmesan interests. Without any
administrative training he believed in his own power of revival and reform. His
results were considerable, nor did they quite die with him. He had given a
stimulus to Spanish-American trade, and
prestige to
Spanish arms, in spite of their reverses. From the first he had realised the
value of Patino, who was to be the greatest Spanish minister of the century.
The story of the Triple and Quadruple Alliances is that of a duel between the
sons of a French chemist and an Italian gardener, between scientific
opportunism and constructive imagination. Dubois won; but, within Alberoni’s
life-time or soon after, the greater part of his Italian projects found
fulfilment.
The
pretensions of Philip V delayed his accession to the Quadruple Alliance until
January 26, 1720. Sardinia was transferred to Victor Amadeus, and Sicily to
Charles VI. Philip renewed his renunciation of the French Crown, and recognised
the Emperor’s claim to the Italian provinces which he now occupied. Charles VI,
less honest, continued to thwart the succession of a Spanish prince to Tuscany
and Parma. Relations between Spain and France grew closer, and on March 27,
1721, a formal alliance was concluded, which England joined in June. France had
ceded all places captured in the war, induing Pensacola, to which much
importance was assigned. George I, not to be behindhand in generosity, wrote
that he would take the first opportunity of surrendering Gibraltar. England and
France resolved to press in concert the claims of Spain at the coming Congress
of Cambray.
Disquietude
was still caused by rumours that Philip V was negotiating the marriage of the
Infants with Austrian Archduchesses, an expedient suggested by Alberoni. He
gave the lie to these reports by suddenly offering the Infanta’s hand to Louis
XV, and by the yet more surprising proposal that his own heir should marry the
Regent’s daughter, Mademoiselle de Montpensier. The princesses were exchanged
on January 9,1722. A year later Mademoiselle de Beaujolais followed her sister
to Spain as jumcke of Elisabeth’s eldest son Don Carlos. Philip’s motives are
to be found in his intended abdication. He wished to leave his children
securely guarded by French protection. The Angevin claims to the French
succession would at least be realised in his daughter’s line. Should Louis XV
die before a son was bom, the Infanta might be strong enough to overthrow the
Orleanist succession in her father’s or her brother’s favour. The marriage of
the Regent’s daughter with Don Carlos would secure French support for
Elisabeth’s Italian schemes. For Orleans the prospects were yet more brilliant.
Don Luis and his father were, said Schaub, as like as two drops of water, both
in body and mind, so that the prince would let himself be governed by his wife,
who would prevent him from disputing the Orleanist claims to the French throne.
The Regent’s influence would prevail in Spain, while in France the Opposition
would receive its coup de grace.
Orleans could
now stand without Hanoverian support. An Orleanist Family Compact might even
have forestalled those of the later Bourbons. England feared this French
predominance at Madrid, and her ambassador, Colonel Stanhope, watched the
Pretender’s partisans. The policy of Dubois
seemed to be
veering towards the Vatican. Death came to England’s aid. Dubois died in
August, 1723. When, in December, the Regent was struck down, the family
alliance was imperilled. It is said that Philip showed unseemly pleasure at the
death of his old rival and new connexion. He could never forget his own
forsworn claims to France or his ridiculous fears of poison.
The hopes of
reform which Orleans had inspired were not fulfilled. With all a drunkard’s
optimism, he probably himself mistook a programme of promises for a scheme of
government. Though he worked laboriously to redeem his pledges, excess had
weakened the power of continuous will and consecutive thought. Even the art of
pleasing needs perpetual pains. Brave enough for momentary action, Orleans had
not the courage of his convictions, nor always the convictions. Yet failure was
mainly due to his heritage of national debt. But for this his honesty of
intention, his liberal instincts, and quickness of vision might have carried
him creditably through his short lease of power. His first measures were
auspicious. The establishment of the young King in the Tuileries propitiated
the capital. Taxes were lowered, and the army reduced by 25,000 men, who were
settled on uncultivated lands. The Parlement recovered its ancient right of
remonstrance. Immensely popular was the release of persecuted Jansenists from
the Bastille; yet Orleans would not curry favour by counter-persecution of the
Jesuits.
The Council
of Regency included almost all those whom Louis XIV had nominated. Orleans,
perhaps imprudently, gratified the faithful Saint-Simon’s darling wish by
adopting the late Duke of Burgundy’s scheme for departmental Councils, to
lessen governmental centralisation, and provide scope for the more ambitious
or industrious nobility. Louis XIV had condemned the project as incompatible
with the French character. It was, indeed, exotic, imported from Spain at the
moment when she had substituted the French absolutist plan for this very
system, whereby the nobles had dominated the bureaucracy. After all, the idea
had its merits. Men were looking in all directions for relief from the strain
of absolutism. An elaborate representation of the Parisian and provincial law
Courts had been suggested, and also a revival of the Estates General. Nobody,
however, believed in the utility of Estates General, and few besides lawyers
admired the Parlements. France was in no danger of reverting to feudalism, and
it might be worth while to raise the nobility from the worthlessness to which
absolutism had condemned it, by opening a career in the national Councils.
Seven
departmental Councils were created, finding a point of contact in the Council
of Regency, where their presidents had a deliberative voice. Saint-Simon wished
membership to be confined to the greater nobles, but Orleans must find place
for the more intelligent of his rouSs, while he knew that between ignorance and
indolence, pride and pleasure, little practical work would- be accomplished
without leaven from the
128
[l715—23
industrious
and experienced bureaucracy. It was a clumsy expedient, intended mainly to win
temporary support. Yet, perhaps, the fault of failure lay neither with
Saint-Simon, nor Orleans, nor the Councils themselves, but with the immemorial
preference for being governed rather than for governing.
Upon
Noailles, president of the Council of Finance, fell the burden of the
accumulating debt. Fertile in expedients as he was, they were but palliatives
for the State, though deadly enough for the capitalists of the late reign. His
final proposal was the least possible or palatable for a young Government—severe
economy for fifteen years. Then Law found his opportunity, and on the
foundations of his bank and his modestly capitalised Mississippi Company reared
the fantastic edifice of credit, which, in the architect’s own metaphor,
reached its seven storeys— a height too stupendous for the sound but slight
substructure, which was built for three. The phenomenal success and startling
failure of Law’s System, which is discussed more fully elsewhere, affected, not
only the character of French society, but the Government’s popularity and
policy. For a time the Regency seemed the realisation of the age of gold, or,
better still, of appreciated paper; but, when the crash came, the Government
had to bear the blame of the nation’s speculative craze. The violent measures
which forced those who had realised their holdings at high prices to disgorge
gratified the populace for the moment, but added to the area of discontent. The
collapse, moreover, coincided with the outbreak of plague which between June
and December, 1720, destroyed one-third of the inhabitants of Marseilles. Aix,
Arles, Avignon, and Toulon suffered scarcely less, and the scourge reached the
northern provinces, though in a mitigated and sporadic form. At the close of
the disastrous year Rennes, the capital of Britanny, was burnt to the ground.
“Fire at Rennes: Plague in Provence: Ruin of Paris” are three headings of the
chapter of Barbier’s memoirs which deals with a single black month.
The
Liberalism of the Regency was short-lived. There was an inevitable, if
unconscious, return to the irresponsible absolutism, which, when at its best,
had suited the national temperament. Liberalism, moreover, is apt to be
absolutist, when once its own ideals of liberty are questioned. Orleans had
imagined that the sources of danger would be reactionary, the claims, that is,
of Louis XIV’s legitimised sons, or of his grandson, Philip V. He soon,
however, discovered perilous progressive possibilities Each of these dangers
had, speaking roughly, its ecclesiastical aspect. Jesuitism allied itself with
the old monarchical party, Jansenism with the new aspirations. Thus the
incidents of the Regency are blows struck alternately or coincidently at both
forms of Opposition, until the Government became outwardly as absolute as that
of Louis XIV himself.
The Duke of
Maine sat still under his first affront; but the Duchess, a tiny elf-like
sprite of mischief, converted her salon into a hot-bed of
intrigue,
unaware that her infantile airs and calculated cajoleries were watchfully
observed. Orleans would have left matters alone; he liked Maine’s brother, the
Count of Toulouse, and was considerate, if unfaithful, towards his own wife,
their sister. But he was pushed by Bourbon and other princes of the blood, and
by the Dukes, who posed as successors of the old Peers of France. The nobility
in general resented the pretensions of the Peers, and supported Maine and
Toulouse. When Orleans forbade their assemblies, they protested before the
Parlement that the status of the legitimised Princes could only be altered by
the King when of age, or by the Estates General. Orleans was annoyed or alarmed
into action, and the Council deprived the Princes of the right of succession
and most of the prerogatives of blood royal. The edict was registered in Parlement
with hesitation. It had little sympathy with the Bastards, but was at issue
with the Peers on the portentous problem when and whether the President and the
Peers should respectively raise their hats. There were symptoms therefore of a
struggle of classes, which the Regency seemed too weak to stifle.
The
friendship of the Regent and the Parlement was soon over. The latter hoped by
refusing to register Edicts to establish a veto on legislation. No King had
tolerated this claim, and Orleans declined to prejudice a minor’s rights. He
braced himself for the conflict by replacing his original triumvirate of
ministers by a second. The liberal, widely read Noailles, who could argue for
and against his own effervescent fads and freaks on successive days, gave place
to Law, whom the Parlement from the first opposed. D’Aguesseau, an honourable
and learned lawyer with Jansenist proclivities, was too favourable to the
Parlement, whereas a Chancellor’s mission was to uphold the Crown’s residuary
jurisdiction against the delegated authority of the Courts. His successor,
d’Argenson, late Minister of Police, was a foe of lawyers and Jansenists,
courageous and industrious, tempering an iron fist by a witty tongue, a
finished student of the weaknesses of French mankind. Finally, to the surprise
of all, Marshal d’Huxelles, Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave place to the
Abbe Dubois, to whose private character gossip has been, perhaps, unfairly
spiteful, but who was gifted with the priceless qualities of persistence and persuasion.
Orleans
provoked the conflict by registering an edict for remintage in the Cour des
Monnaies instead of in the Parlement, which retaliated by forbidding the
manufacture and issue of the coinage (June, 1718). It attacked Law by ordering
the exclusion of naturalised aliens from state finance. Justice was almost
suspended, but the Mint worked quietly under the protection of fixed bayonets.
Pickets watched the circulation of the coinage in the markets; muskets rattled
on the pavement outside the ParlemenCs printing-press. A flood of atrocious
libels against Orleans poured forth from legal circles and from the Duchess of
Maine’s coterie. The accidental discovery of the Memoirs
of Cardinal
de Retz had caused indescribable sensation. The Fronde had returned with the
old combination of prince and lawyer against the Crown.
If the
lawyers had read history aright, they might have realised their powerlessness.
The insignificant Dubois sufficed to shatter the combf- nation. On August 20 he
arrived, having concluded the Quadruple Alliance. Six days later, in a lit de
justice, the Bastards were reduced to their rank as Dukes and Peers, though
Toulouse was granted his prerogatives for life. The Parlement lost its right
of remonstrance, and was degraded to the position held under Louis XIV’s
humiliating ordinance of 1667. Two Presidents and a Councillor, who had been
among the noisiest, were exiled. The Duchess of Maine plunged wildly into the
plot for Philip V, which, though named after Cellamare, was recognised as hers.
This was the final ruin of her cause, for it gave Orleans the justification for
the Spanish War.
More serious
than these Parisian troubles was the threatened revolt of Britanny, for which
the Government was wholly to blame. The relation of this province to France
under the treaties of union was almost federal. The Breton Estates of 1717 were
within their rights in refusing to vote the subsidy without enquiry into
provincial finances. The Government replied by dismissal of the Estates, levy
of tax by edict, illegal garrison, and arrest of members of the nobility and
the Parlement who protested. In 1718 the imposition of a toll on wine was a
formal breach of the Act of Union. The Parlement of Rennes forbade the levy;
the Governor made wholesale arrests; and the nobles formed an association for
resistance.
This
organisation had no connexion with the Cellamare conspiracy, which was over by
the close of 1718, whereas the Bretons only armed in the following spring. Two
nobles, acting on their own initiative, brought in June, 1719, a promise of
Spanish aid. If the Bretons had struck at once, they might have caused serious
embarrassment, especially as the Poitevin gentry felt some sympathy. , The
delay of the Spanish auxiliaries gave time for the conspiracy to leak out. In
September, troops were poured into Britanny, and a penal commission
established. The leaders were executed in person or in effigy, and the province
was treated as a conquest. The suppression of the last genuine provincial
liberties in France must be debited to the Regency. Another step towards
absolutism was the dismissal of the Departmental Councils, which were replaced
by the old Secretarial system. The Parlement had a fresh flicker of courage on
the first symptoms of Law’s collapse, which entailed d’Aguesseau’s
reinstatement, in order to conciliate public opinion. But the Regent went yet
further than Louis XIV, and exiled the Courts to Pontoise for some six months.
The Council
of Regency, next, lost such independence as it possessed —a loss resulting from
the gain of a cardinalship by Dubois. For four
years the
purple was his aim, and he enlisted such heterogeneous allies as George I and
the Pretender, the Emperor and Philip V. As an intermediate step, English
influence helped him to the archbishopric of Cambray. Clement XI was never to
be brought to fulfil his promise of a Eat; but the agents of Dubois, headed by
Cardinal de Rohan, contributed largely to Innocent XIII’s election, and in
July, 1721, Dubois obtained the hat, which is said to have cost Prance eight
million francs. The political object was soon apparent. Rohan on his return was
admitted to the Council. His claim to precedence led to the withdrawal of the
Dukes and Chancellor d’Aguesseau. But Rohan was merely the warming- pan for Dubois,
who now became a member and the Council’s ruling spirit. An all-powerful
Ministry was thus prepared for the cessation of the Regency on the King’s
majority. There was, however, a personal factor which might prove dangerous.
Louis XV seemed attached to his governor, Villeroi, who somewhat posed as a
leader of opposition to Orleans. Personal monarchy might after all be restored
for Villeroi’s benefit. The Regent forced a quarrel upon the old Marshal,
trapped him, and sent him far from Court. Fleury, who was the King’s tutor,
affected to retire, but Orleans could not dispense with the one man who had the
boy’s confidence. A little note from Louis brought the tutor back from his mock
hiding-place.
Dubois now
received the title of First Minister, and the Regency might safely end. The
King was consecrated at Rheims; and, on February 16, 1723, the Regent came to
the royal bedside to resign his office, telling the boy of thirteen that he was
now absolute ruler of the State. The character of the Government remained
unchanged. Orleans was President of the Council. Dubois, aping Richelieu,
monopolised patronage, accumulated benefices, presided over the assembly of the
Clergy, took his seat in the Academy. His vanity was laughable, but his
administration not injudicious. The good humour of Orleans tempered his
outbursts of passion, and his tendency to persecute the Jansenists.
Ultramontanism was advancing step by step with absolutism. Dubois without
scruple threw his weight on the side of Rome, and the Bull Unigenitus was
accepted by the Grand Council: its registration was the price paid by the
Parlement for release from its exile at Pontoise.
Dubois had
not long to live. It is said that his enemies in the Ministry deliberately
killed him, by plying his insatiable brain with business. He died on August 10,
1723, leaving an evil reputation in an age peculiarly debased. Yet there have
been respectable ministers in virtuous epochs who could be better spared. Every
venomous pen in France poisoned the memory of Dubois, but a heavy fall in
Mississippi Stock has been called his funeral panegyric. Orleans became First
Minister, but the work was beyond his failing powers. On December 2 he was
sitting before the fire with the Duchess of Falari, awaiting the King’s
commands, when the apoplexy of which he had been forewarned
struck him
down. He fell with his head upon the knees of this frail and luckless beauty of
his set—a fitting ending.
The liberal
hopes, constitutional and religious, with which the Regency had opened ended in
disillusion. The period is remembered for little else than an overflow of
sensualism and gigantic financial failure. Yet the colours may be unduly dark.
The flaunting vice of a clique is often represented as a natural reaction
against the austerity of Louis XIV’s later years. And, again, the examples of
Orleans and his eldest daughter are made responsible for an epidemic of drink
and lust. This view is, however, too favourable to the French society of the
age, and too hard upon the Regency, The most flagrant sins and the most
notorious sinners existed without disguise under the Maintenon regime. Orleans
himself had been only one of many notable offenders. The change was less one of
nature than of pose. The scandals of the Regency were the outcome of fashion rather
than of passion. Men hitherto respectable appeared drunk in public, and paraded
their mistresses, as a concession to their social standing. Great ladies
surrendered themselves to the Duke of Richelieu, not because they were
enamoured of his silly oval face or brutal impudence, but because their
reputation in the smart set depended on their being the heroines of his
anecdotes of his bonnes fortunes.
The open
vices of Orleans and his daughters doubtless contributed to the prevailing
shamelessness of sin; but he was hardly popular enough to lead the fashion, and
he had some scruples. When the King was taken to Versailles, the Regent kept
his own mistresses at a distance. He had not the brutality of members of the
Houses of Bourbon and Conti.; he treated with respect his indolent, worthless
wife, who, as his mother said, ruined his life, and brought her children to the
gutter from neglect. In the reliable memoirs the vilest stories relate, not to
Orleans, but to other princes; it would be uncritical to credit the farrago of
lustful libels concocted for political consumption by the Duchess of Maine’s
coterie. He was, writes Saint-Simon, bored with himself from birth. He sought
relief in wine and witty women; vice with him was neither passion nor fashion,
but the tiresome habit of a tired man.
The example
of the princes was followed by the dukes, by such of the nobility as came in
contact with society, by lawyers and financiers. As in the sixteenth century
young widows flocked to Paris to find husbands, so in the eighteenth they
crowded thither to seek lovers. In Court circles, and far below them, the
marriage tie was a mere slip-knot, Judicial separation came into use. It was as
easy, wrote Madame, to cast off a wife or a husband as a mistress or a lover;
only among the lower classes did married love still linger. Morality suffered
by the passion for the stage. Actors and actresses, singers and dancers became
the rage. The masked balls at the Opera, a prominent feature of the Regency,
were the usual source of seduction, as in the case of the Regent’s
son, who
afterwards scrambled from the quagmire to the heights of propriety* Gambling
was stimulated by the speculative mania of Law’s period. The King was infected
while still a boy, while the Regent’s daughter, Mademoiselle de Valois, on her
leisurely journey to marry the Prince of Modena, carried the taint into the
provinces. Suicide naturally became a vogue, and was dramatically performed, as
when a young actress destroyed herself in her paint, her beauty-spots, and her
flesh-coloured stockings, or a nobleman plunged into the Seine, with sword in
one hand, and gold-headed cane in the other.
It may be
doubted whether France was really impoverished by the crash of Law’s System,
although she suffered much temporary inconvenience. It was noticed at the time
that the money taken from Peter’s pocket was put into that of Paul. The result
was a redistribution of wealth, and a consequent shaking-up of classes, for all
speculated, and success became the standard of repute. The cook in diamonds who
was recognised at an Opera ball doubtless made a genteel match. Nobles who
disdained to take a direct part in commerce were without shame as shareholders
in joint-stock undertakings, just as, under the Second Empire, leaders of fashion
contributed capital to the great Parisian shops. Country gentlemen, who at the
close of Louis XIV’s reign could not meet their mortgage interest, in the palmy
days of the System paid off their mortgages, and left their property
unencumbered. Agriculture throve, hot merely owing to peace, but to the rise of
prices during the speculative period, which benefited landlord,
peasant-proprietor, and labourer for wage. The rapid growth of Paris was no
unmixed advantage, but a permanent boon was her closer intercourse with the
great seaports. Always the capital of pleasure, she was henceforth also the
capital of commerce. Her material necessities and the very shock of speculation
quickened the inert population of the central provinces.
Orleans, like
the equally abused Napoleon III, did much to revive provincial France. During
his short career he is said to have done more road-making than Louis XIV in his
long reign, while the slower construction of canals owed to him at least the
plans. The Regent was, for his day, a free trader, removing inter-provincial
restrictions, encouraging untrammelled commerce with and between the colonies,
allowing a more liberal export trade to foreign countries. The admixture of
banished salt-smugglers and the sweepings of gaols and hospitals with innocent
girls seized by press-gangs and industrious Swiss and German emigrants, was not
a promising foundation for a colony, and yet New Orleans has perpetuated the
Regent’s name. The settlement of the Mauritius and the fortification of the lie
Royale off Newfoundland bore witness to French activity in southern and
northern seas.
France under
the Regency benefited by a breathing-space from the baleful governance of
women. The English might be ruled by women, scornfully said Madame, but it did not
suit the French. Of all the
Regent’s
mistresses not one had political influence. When Madame de Sabran pressed him,
he took her to a mirror and asked if politics were fit for such a pretty face.
In all his drunken bouts he never revealed state secrets. His intoxication was,
perhaps, rather that of the weak head than of the sot. The first glass of
champagne set his tongue wagging with such blasphemous indecency that his
presence at his wife’s table became impossible. Yet he could cut off, as it
were, connexion of tongue and brain, and drink never obtained complete mastery
of his reason.
The Duke of
Chartres was too young to succeed his father as First vlinister, and it was
therefore impossible to ignore the Duke of Bourbon. Fleury proposed him to the
King, and the silent boy nodded assent. Orleans and Dubois were soon regretted,
for once more a woman was at the helm. The big-boned, one-eyed, brutal Bourbon
was the bond-slave of the aerial sylph-like beauty and engaging mock-modesty of
his mistress, Madame de Prie. Being too stupid for practical administration,
he took as working partner Paris Duvemey, youngest of the four sons of a
Dauphinois innkeeper, who had made fortunes by army contracts, and then
fattened on the national bankruptcy of the Regency. Paris was a capable agent,
with some ingenuity in meeting emergencies, no scruple as to means, and no
outlook on tbe future. This trio now governed France.
Six weeks
after the Regent’s death Spain had its counterpart sensation. On January 10,
1724, Philip V announced his abdication. This was no sudden freak, for in 1721
the King and Queen had bound themselves to retirement by solemn oaths, which
were annually renewed. Philip’s religious mania was the real cause, though
contemporaries attributed his action to a belief that abdication would
facilitate succession to the French Crown. The site chosen for spiritual
preparation was the gorgeous palace of San Ildefonso, constructed in a clearing
of the dense Segovian forest, and surrounded with snow mountains “of a very
hideous aspect.” The sums squandered on the palace and its gardens had been
torture to Alberoni; the approach thereto was martyrdom for elderly
ambassadors.
The close of
Philip’s first reign is a convenient stage at which to take stock of the
character of Spanish administration, and of the personal influences of King and
Queen. A complete contrast to France of the Regency was Philip V’s Spain,
governed from the low four-post marriage bed, four feet in width. Here each
morning the King and Queen in their dressing-jackets received their Chief
Secretary, who wrote his instructions, while Philip read despatches and
Elisabeth worked and commented. The Queen’s will had become her husband’s law,
yet not without humouring and watching, for Philip, though irresolute, was
prejudiced, and indolence was balanced by self-conceit. He must therefore be
coaxed to assimilate her likes and dislikes, to imagine her suggestions to be
his
own ideas. If
once she lost touch of the drift of his mind, if once another influence gained
the mastery, her game was lost. Thus the eternal tete-a-tete was as necessary
to Elisabeth as to Philip, whose uxoriousness was as sensuous as the Regent’s
infidelities. Never for a night did she sleep from his side; never for a day
had she time to herself, save the fifteen minutes when she donned her shoes and
stockings, or the weekly hour in which Philip received the report of the
Council of Castile.
On his wife
Philip depended for appropriate replies when giving audience, while he shifted
from foot to foot, or poised himself upon his heels; a pluck at her gown would
warn her that he wished the interviewer gone. Elisabeth must walk at his side
during his three rounds at mall, applaud the good strokes, and explain away the
bad. With confinement approaching or just past, she must jolt over rough roads
in the seven-windowed chariot to sit for silent hours on rush-bottom chairs in
the shelter, past which the game was ultimately driven, and from which King and
Queen fired shot for shot. For Philip Elisabeth must abandon her favourite
amusements, her cards, and the music in which she excelled. Balls were
forbidden as alien to Spanish character and conducive to impropriety, yet a
Court dance was occasionally permitted. Here her husband and her step-sons were
Elisabeth’s only partners. Fortunately Don Luis danced as divinely as herself;
Saint-Simon alleges that, could the Opera but engage them, the price of stalls
would rise. In meat and drink alone the Queen allowed herself some
independence. She was not content with the soup, poultry, and invariable loin
of veal which formed the King’s daily dinner, preferred champagne to his
burgundy, and, in spite of his wishes, .could not break herself of snuff.
The tragic
monotony of such a life might well have proved fatal to reason or morality.
Elisabeth was saved by natural high spirits, by absence of self-consciousness,
by growing mental activity. Above all, her passion for her children’s
advancement became all absorbing. Thus, notwithstanding outward constraint, she
was never without excitement. She doubtless enjoyed the hot temper, which
ambassadors politely described as vivacity, and which had no slight results on
European politics. Sometimes it was natural, sometimes assumed, but the outbursts
were short and sharp, and anger soon yielded to her own sense of humour or her
husband’s gentleness. Some of the envoys whom she handled most roughly liked
her best; and, indeed, her cheerfulness, her lack of affectation, her natural
conversational gifts must have been a relief in eighteenth century Court life.
Yet her political debut was not promising. Her mode of life, added to some
innate indolence, prevented any possibility of study. The daily experience of
royal audiences taught her in time to judge of men and measures; but the
process was very slow. Hampered by Philip’s presence, she could never talk
freely to ambassadors or ministers. Unpopularity made her suspicious, and thus
in early days she was subject to misconceptions, rejecting straightforward
criticism
and counsel
for the crooked approaches of adventurers. Spaniards respected Philip, but
disliked Elisabeth. They resented her marriage as a mesalliance, and were
further alienated by her favour for Alberoni. She made no concealment of
retuming .this dislike. She was tolerant towards Philip’s personal Spanish
friends and French followers, but her sympathies were with the Italian party,
to which were attached the Flemings, and to some extent the Irish. An entourage
of exiles is a sorry school of politics.
Alberoni’s fall
left Spain virtually without government, Grimaldo was as yet little more than
confidential secretary. He seemed destined to be a stop-gap. His loyalty and
patriotism, capacity and experience, qualified him to steer the State more than
once through the ground- swells which followed squalls. Ambassadors laughed at,
but liked, the bourgeois Biscayan, who boasted of noble Italian origin. He was
fair and fat as a Fleming, with bright blue eyes and a clever, kindly face; his
small hands pressed upon a portly paunch emphasised his arguments or
compliments by appropriate gesticulations of their elastic fingers. The bribes
accepted by him to gratify his grasping wife did not affect his policy.
Of
constitutional machinery little was left. Alberoni’s French predecessors paved
the way towards absolutism by introducing the French secretarial system, with
four Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Marine and Indies, War, and Ecclesiastical
and Judicial Affairs, and an Intendant- General of Finance. Alberoni had
reduced these five to three by accumulation of offices. They referred matters
for discussion to the ancient Councils of Castile, Finance, the Indies, War,
and the Military Orders. On their report the King decided, after consultation
with his confessor and the Queen. Alberoni discredited the once influential
Council of State. The Castilian Cortes were almost as defunct as the French
Estates General. The liberties of Navarre, Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia had
been engulfed by the cataclysm of civil war.
For personal
monarchy Philip’s personality was singularly unfitted. He could never make up
his mind, and, indeed, had little mind to make up, though what judgment he
retained was sometimes sound. The illness of 1718, which ranged from dropsy to
dementia, left its traces. For a superstitious man it was unfortunate that his
shirts and sheets should emit phosphorescent light, even when manufactured by
the holiest nuns, and tended by the Queen’s own nurse. Saint-Simon found him in
1720 sadly altered. His chin projected at almost right angles from his face;
his feet knocked each other in his hurried walk, while his knees were twelve
inches apart. He had a sawny manner and a drawling voice. His clothes did
little to set him off, for he wore his brown serge suits to rags. Conscience
was Philip’s curse. Besides confessing twice a day, he would summon his
confessors at all hours of day or night. In vain they urged that duty had
superior claims to conscience. His only obvious merit was a certain dignity,
which Louis XIV’s descendants found it
hard to lose.
Nevertheless those who knew Philip the more closely loved him best. That he
retained, without a breath of scandal, the affection of his ill-nurtured,
ill-regulated Queen, amid an epidemic of matrimonial infidelity, must be placed
to the credit of both consorts.
Spain was
jubilant over the accession of Luis, a Spanish-born King, but the experiment
proved a dismal failure. It was easier for Philip and Elisabeth to lay aside
their crowns than their habit of command. They kept with them Grimaldo, whose
creatures, interspersed with nonentities, filled the young King’s Council,
while its secretary, Orendayn, had been successively his page and clerk. “In
every petty matter,” wrote the Venetian envoy Bragadin, “the oracle was
consulted at San Ildefonso: it might be said that the royal title was at
Madrid, its essence at San Ildefonso.” Luis, a youth of sixteen, was unfitted
for power by shyness, indolence, and preference for servants’ society. His
Queen had from her first arrival scandalised the Court by her gross vulgarity,
her pronounced dislike for Elisabeth, and her unveiled contempt for Luis. On
her promotion sulkiness yielded to high spirits; her gluttony and indelicacy
passed all bounds. Spanish prudery was shocked by a Queen who scoured the royal
gardens in her night-gown, or was rescued in such costume from the heights of a
ladder by an indiscreet French officer. Luis placed her under restraint by way
of punishment; but the tactful French ambassador, Tess£, contrived a temporary
reconciliation.
On August 81,
1724, Luis died of small-pox, commending to his father his girl-wife, who had
made atonement by her courage in nursing him, when others held aloof. Everyone
hoped that she would die of the penalty which her unusual devotion entailed, but
she recovered, and found recompense in wilder licence. She was but fourteen,
but in wisdom, till her dying day, she never aged.
By the Act of
Abdication the Crown should have passed to Ferdinand, who was not quite twelve.
The nobility desired a long minority which might restore its influence. The
confessor Bermudez implored Philip to keep his oath, and a committee of
theologians opined that he should at most govern till Ferdinand was of age. But
Philip was moved to resumption by Elisabeth’s tears, her nurse’s objurgations,
and Tessa’s ..rguments and entreaties. The Council of Castile recommended this,
though with hesitation, some members thinking that Philip’s absolutism should
be limited. Tesse cleverly suggested an appeal to the Pope, in the person of his
Nuncio, Aldobrandini, who naturally gave the desired reply. Philip was King
again. For Tesse Philip’s resumption was a triumph for French influence. The
President of Castile and others of the national party were disgraced. Grimaldo,
who was thought to have English sympathies, offered passive resistance to
dismissal; but Orendayn was pushed up to an independent position beside him.
Nevertheless, while the old ambassador was pluming himself, this very Orendayn
had signed
the instructions for a diplomatic revolution, which was nothing less than the
reconversion of Spain from a Bourbon to a Habsburg Power. Success would
ultimately have entailed the substitution of a personal union between Spain and
Austria, based on descent through female lines from Charles V, for that between
France and Spain under a male descendant of Louis XIV, which had latterly been
Europe’s bugbear.
The cause of
this was the inconclusiveness of the Congress of Cambray (1724-5), the occasion
the failure to set France and England against the Emperor. It was becoming
clear that Charles VI had no intention of fulfilling his engagements as to Don
Carlos’ admitted eventual rights to Tuscany and Parma. The Grand Duke, Giovanni
Gastone de’ Medici, resenting alien interference, upheld the claims of his
sister, the Electress Palatine Maria Anna Louisa, while a party in the State
desired the revival of the Republic on the extinction of the male line. Siena
was held under a different title, since Cosimo I had received it as a fief of
the Spanish Crown. Both Charles VI and Philip V now claimed its suzerainty. The
Duke of Parma was devoted to his niece Elisabeth, and saw in Carlos the founder
of a great Farnese State. To ensure his succession, he prevented his own
brother Antonio from marrying. Thus the Emperor’s policy was to encourage the
Grand Duke’s resistance to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, to stimulate
Antonio’s matrimonial instincts, and to humiliate Francesco Farnese. Pretending
that the eventual investiture granted to Carlos already made Parma an imperial
fief, he levied contributions and marched troops across the State. On these
questions the mediatory Powers leant towards Spain, England being the more
pronounced, because she wished Spanish attention diverted from Gibraltar, and
had a private quarrel with Charles VI over the Indian trade of his flourishing
Ostend Company.
Elisabeth,
impatient with the shuttlecocks of the Congress, sent a clever Sicilian, the
Marquis of Monteleone, on a secret mission to Versailles and London to demand
that the Swiss garrisons proposed at the Congress should at once escort Don
Carlos to Italy among his future subjects. This overstepped the terms of the
Quadruple Alliance, and meant war with Charles VI, to which Bourbon was
absolutely opposed. England was more ready to take drastic measures, but
Elisabeth, to conciliate her husband, had to combine Spanish with Italian
interests, and requested the fulfilment of the promise to restore Gibraltar.
This was sufficient to make the mission an absurdity, and to court refusal.
The refusal
irritated Philip as profoundly as Elisabeth, and “ in no more time than it took
to drive from Madrid to the Pardo” they determined to approach the Emperor. The
idea was not new; it had been Alberoni’s last suggestion, and under Luis had
found favour with the old Spanish party, at heart devoted to the Habsburgs. The
desire was, at that time, to oust both French and Italian influences by
marrying
Ferdinand to
an Archduchess. On the other hand Francesco Famese, who engineered the Italian
party, had foreseen the necessity of some such scheme, if France and England
refused adequate protection. His envoy, the Marquis Scotti, was during Luis I’s
reign sounded by a certain Ripperdd, and discussed the project with Elisabeth
in the autumn of 1724. Now that she seriously adopted it, her own sons, Carlos
and Philip, aged respectively eight and four, slipped into Ferdinand’s place.
The eldest Archduchess, Maria Theresa, was now seven.
The mission
was now entrusted to Jan Willem Ripperda, a native of Groningen, but
professedly of Castilian origin. Bom a Catholic, he had become a Protestant to
qualify himself for the Dutch public service. While deputy for his province in
the States General he had had communications with Prince Eugene and
Sinzendorff. A knowledge of economics made him of service in the Treaty of
Utrecht. Sent as envoy to Spain in 1715, he subordinated Dutch interests to
Spanish. The States General, highly dissatisfied, recalled him, but he returned
to Spain, was naturalised, and reverted to Catholicism. Alberoni employed him
in commercial matters, and a post in the cloth factory at Guadalajara, in which
Elisabeth was interested, may have brought him to her notice. Ever since 1721,
when he actually wrote to Sinzendorff, his brain was full of an Austrian
alliance. He was now probably chosen because he was obscure, and could be
disavowed, while he had the knowledge of foreign languages which most Spaniards
lacked; Grimaldo, for instance, could not easily speak French.
Ripperd&’s
instructions divide themselves into two sections—those which regarded the
fortunes of Elisabeth’s children, and those which were meant to satisfy Philip
and the nation. Carlos should marry Maria Theresa and ultimately receive the
German territories of the Habs- burgs. He should be educated in Vienna, and in
due course be elected King of the Romans. His present fiancee, Mademoiselle de
Beaujolais, might be transferred to his half-brother Ferdinand. For Philip was
intended the second Archduchess with Milan, the Two Sicilies, Tuscany, and
Parma. The Austrian Netherlands should return to Spain, or else be conferred on
Philip with reversion alike of them, Milan, and the Two Sicilies to Spain,
whereas that of Tuscany and Parma should be granted to Carlos. Charles VI was
expected to buy Sardinia from Savoy by a slice of Milanese territory, and
restore it to Philip V, obtaining also Gibraltar and Minorca from England.
Should the Emperor insist on the indivisibility of his possessions as provided
by his Pragmatic Sanction, Ripperdd might yield, and make sure of the two
marriages. The whole of the Habsburg dominions, with the exception of the
Netherlands as a sop for Philip, would then pass to Carlos, who, in view of
Ferdinand’s weak health, might easily inherit Spain.
The bribe wherewith
to tempt the Emperor was the promise of
Spanish aid
against the Turk and the Protestant Princes, the privileges of the most
favoured nation in the Peninsula, and an opening for the Ostend Company in the
Indies. Outstanding disputet relating to the Golden Fleece, the titles of
Charles and Philip, the restoration of the Emperor’s Spanish partisans and the
King’s Flemish and Italian followers could be amicably settled. From a
matchmaker’s standpoint Carlos was superior to Francis of Lorraine, hitherto intended
for Maria Theresa, especially with regard to Italy. Italy and the Ostend
Company were, indeed, Charles Vi’s chief interests. The religious motive,
moreover, which had almost disappeared from politics, began to reassert itself.
The projected alliance had a distinctly Catholic complexion; it had the Pope’s
favour, and was intended to result in a Catholic restoration in England.
The first
stage in Ripperdd’s mysterious negotiations in Vienna did not reach far. Of the
three members of the Secret Committee, the two more conservative, Princes
Eugene and Starhemberg, were entirely opposed to the more sensational clauses,
and even Sinzendorff, though deeply interested in the Ostend Company,
concurred. Ripperdd could only extract a guarantee of the terms of the
Quadruple Alliance, a commercial treaty, and a mere defensive alliance, which
would free Austria from isolation, and protect her Italian possessions and her
merchant ships. The Emperor merely promised not to oppose the restoration of
Gibraltar and Minorca by friendly arrangement; as to the marriages—the Spanish
Court must rely on his good intentions. These conditions were despatched by
Ripperdd on March 9, 1725, and would certainly have been disavowed but for the
startling news which reached the Spanish Court upon that very day, announcing
the return of the Infanta.
Most good
Frenchmen resented the postponement of their King’s marriage. The Infanta was
under seven, and her physical development was slow, whereas Louis was a
well-grown youth of fifteen. Strong as be was, his intemperate passion for
hunting occasionally caused violent illnesses. His death without heirs would
open possibilities of civil war. Bourbon had every reason for alarm. His hated
rival, the Duke of Orleans, was heir presumptive, and his projected marriage
with a Princess of Baden was believed to aim at English and German support.
Louis himself was obviously indifferent to the pretty, prattling child. There
was no time to lose, for Bourbon had promised that the betrothal should take place
when the Infanta was seven. The young King’s dangerous illness in 1725 hastened
the decision to break the engagement. Tesse, as being a personal friend of
Philip and Elisabeth, was recalled, and the task of breaking the news was
imposed upon the Abbe de Livry, a subordinate diplomat. The King and Queen
received him with dignified anger, and refused his letters. Livry and all
French Consuls were ordered to leave within twenty-four hours. Luis I’s widow
and her sister were, by way
of reprisal,
sent home to France. The fabric reared by the Regent fell with a crash. Troops
marched towards the frontier, and the two nations were on the brink of war.
The rupture
with France made the fortune of Ripperdd,. Philip V accepted the Austrian
proposals; the treaty of peace, the commercial treaty, and the defensive
alliance were signed at Vienna by April 30 and May 1, 1725. The news was
received with jubilation in Madrid, where Frenchmen were stoned in the street.
Orendayn was created Marquis de La Paz, Ripperdd, Duke and Grandee of the First
Class. Philip for the first time in twenty years allowed a bull-fight. Yet,
when the terms of the treaties became known, a revulsion of feeling set in
against a convention so one-sided.
The Powers
were seriously disturbed; they could no longer patronise the Emperor at the
expense of Spain, nor assume the protection of Spain against the Emperor.
English and Dutch merchants saw their privileges extended to the Emperor’s
subjects, while the Spanish fleet was pledged to defend the Ostend Company
against their piratical Attacks. Stanhope was assured that the treaties with
England would be respected, if Gibraltar were immediately restored. RipperdA’s
wild boasts of George Fs dethronement and the dismemberment of France
contributed to the nervous fear of a revived Habsburg predominance. The result
was the Alliance of Hanover (September 3, 1725) between France, England, and
Prussia. It was professedly defensive only, but it provided for the maintenance
of the balance of power, threatened by the supposed engagement of Don Carlos
and Maria Theresa.
Nothing could
have suited Ripperdd better than the Alliance of Hanover. Austria was isolated,
threatened on every frontier; Spain was her only possible ally. Thus, at
length, the Emperor promised that two of his three daughters should marry
Carlos and Philip, and that, if he himself should die before Maria Theresa
became marriageable, she should wed Carlos. These engagements were embodied in
a most secret treaty, providing in case of war for the conquest by Austria of
the Franco-Belgic provinces, Franche Comte, the Three Bishoprics, Alsace, and
Strassburg, while the Spanish share should be Roussillon, Cerdagne, and
Navarre, together with Gibraltar and Minorca. Austria was pledged to find the
men, and Spain the money. The Imperial Government greatly disliked the
matrimonial clauses; but there were many loopholes. Charles VI, being young and
strong, might easily have a son. Much might happen before Maria Theresa was of
age to marry. An escape, moreover, was provided by a clause that the whole
treaty should be voided by failure to execute any single item. Meanwhile,
Spanish subsidies would be invaluable for buying support in Germany, and the
Ostend Company was the Emperor’s pet plaything. Ripperdd’s blatant vulgarity
was only tolerated, because commercial projects were the fashion, and even
Prince Eugene believed him to possess unusual financial knowledge.
The treaty
was not so secret but that its contents were soon bruited abroad—with something
beyond its contents, for the English Government had information that it
included a clause for a Stewart restoration, which was false.
Ripperdd,
left Vienna on November 8, 1725, and hurried, ibooted and spurred, to the royal
presence with his treaty. He persuaded the King and Queen that the Emperor
wished him to be universal Minister. Grimaldo and Orendayn were elbowed out of
office; even the Council of Castile was thrust into a comer, and grace and
justice were in Riripei fl’s sole hands. Castelar, the clever Minister of War,
and Don Jose de Patino, his yet abler brother, were dislodged on the pretext of
missions to Venice and Brussels. But Grimaldo pressed his hands a little more
tightly on his waist, and Castelar and Patino dawdled over their preparations.
Elisabeth
probably hoped to compass her ends by the confusion of a general war. Ripperdi
knew that war was impossible for Spain. He strove alternately to cajole, bully,
and divide the members of the hostile alliance. Alberoni’s schemes for the
resuscitation of Spain were revived as in a nightmare; faint, feverish efforts
were made to fortify the northern outposts, to raise the army to war strength,
to equip a squadron to protect Havana. A Stewart restoration became an integral
part of Ripperdd’s plans. The Duke of Wharton, with his bottle and his pipe,
was invited to Madrid to reinforce the more resped able Jacobite leaders, the
Duke of Liria, Marshal Berwick’s son, and the Duke of Ormond. Alliance with
Russia replaced the hopes which Alberoni had reposed on Sweden. The presence of
Russian ships in Spanish waters caused actual alarm in England. Ripperdd,
believed that war would be here unpopular; but supplies were cheerfully voted;
three squadrons were commissioned, and before long Admiral Hosier was peaceably
blockading the treasure- fleet in Portobello harbour. In vain the Emperor was
urged to invite the Pretender to the Netherlands, and escort him thence to
England. Charles VI showed no interest in Stewart restoration, and to and fro
off Ostend were cruising the English frigates.
The arrival
of the Emperor’s ambassador, Marshal Konigsegg, was the beginning of Ripperdi’s
end. The Imperial Government was determined not to fight, but equally resolved
to handle the subsidies, which alone made fighting possible. Konigsegg exposed
the falsehood of the promises which Ripperdi attributed to the Emperor, and
discovered the virtual bankruptcy of Spain. Lying had carried the adventurer
far in the field of diplomacy, but was inadequate as a permanent principle of
administration. There were stormy scenes, in which the handsome, contemptuous
aristocrat had the upper hand. Elisabeth herself fell under Konigsegg’s
influence, and she throughout had been Ripperdi’s sole support. He was
dismissed suddenly, but kindly, with a pension. Panic-stricken, he took refuge
in the English embassy, where Stanhope read his papers, and elicited a farrago
of facts and fancies. From the embassy he was forcibly
removed, and
imprisoned for two years at Segovia, whence a sentimental maid-servant
contrived his escape. He settled later in Morocco, but the contemporary tales
of his adventures, military, political, amorous, and religious, are now
discredited. It is natural to compare Ripperda with Alberoni; but the Dutchman
does not stand on the same plane with the Parmesan, who possessed the real
talent for administration which the former lacked. Alberoni in hours of
difficulty was always regretted, but never Ripperda. The Italian gardener’s son
was more of a gentleman than the Groningen baron. It was only upon two women,
the Empress and the Queen, that Ripperda had imposed.
The fall of
Ripperdd, was closely followed by that of Bourbon, whose clumsiness had made
the Dutchman’s temporary fortune. It never occurred to Bourbon that it was
easier to dismiss the Infanta than to find a substitute. The essentials were
that the princess chosen should be healthy, well-made, and not too powerful or
intelligent to be independent of Bourbon and his mistress. One hundr:d
marriageable princesses were scheduled, and then sifted down to seventeen.
These comprised Bourbon’s two sisters, two daughters of the Prince of Wales,
two of Peter the Great, a daughter and two nieces of the King of Prussia, four
other Germans, a Modenese, a Portuguese, a Dane, and a Lorrainer. A further
scrutiny was survived by Bourbon’s sisters and the English Princesses only.
Fleury warned Bourbon that, if Louis disliked the selected sister, the failure
would be debited to him, and so too the war which would certainly result from
Philip’s accentuated anger. Thus in January, 1726, George I was sounded, the
only condition being that his grand-daughter must become a Catholic. To
Bourbon’s astonishment, the English Government was opposed to the conversion of
the Princess.
The idea was
now ventilated of a confidential mission to Germany to examine all the
Princesses in that nursery garden of Queens. Suddenly, it occurred to Bourbon
to transfer to the King the lady for whom he had been himself proposing. This
was Maria Leszczynska, daughter of Stanislaus, lately King of Poland, now a
French pensioner living the simplest of lives at Weissembourg. She was
twenty-one, and her portrait, painted for Bourbon, was pleasing. Madame de Prie
had sanctioned the match with Bourbon, because Maria was insignificant. Now,
her lover’s marriage would be postponed, and the future Queen would owe her
splendid position to herself. The Council consented, and so, with much joy, did
Stanislaus. Peter the Great’s widow then proposed that Louis XV should marry
her daughter Elizabeth, who was beautiful, clever, and theologically amenable.
Both Bourbon and Orleans had previously rejected her for themselves, as being
too low-born on her mother’s side, and as probably inheriting her father’s
temper. Russia, indeed, would support French interests in Poland, Germany, and
Italy; but Bourbon feared that England would be alienated, and Madame de Prie
objected to so formidable a rival.
Thus the
marriage with the Polish Princess, the strangest that French King ever made,
was performed by proxy at Strassburg, and consummated at Fontainebleau on
September 5,1725. This beggar maid, who brought no dowry and no political
connexion, but merely the certainty of complications in eastern Europe, was
the butt for pasquinades; but her tact and kindliness were soon to blunt their
edge. She justified the main object of her selection. After bearing three
daughters, she gave birth in 1729 to an heir, the father of Louis XVI.
War with
Spain was now threatening France, and this was attributed to Bourbon’s
blunders. Every act of his government bad reflected his brutality or stupidity.
The two planks of its rickety platform had been fiscalism and ultramontanism.
Dubois had at least been economical; Bourbon and his mistress were more
extravagant than Orleans and his harem, and that too at the State’s expense. To
meet deficits, Duvemey had revived the universal income tax of 2 per cent., and
had, for the last time in French history, levied the old feudal due of joyeux
avenement. The clergy had protested in full session against the breach of their
immunity, the Parlement against registration of financial edicts in a lit de
justice. Bad harvests aggravated discontent. Bread riots broke out in Normandy;
other provinces were controlled by bands of women armed with pitchforks, who
prevented the levy of the taxes. Paris was only saved from revolution by
extravagant measures for feeding the populace. Yet the French people was so
long-suffering that Bourbon’s government might have lasted indefinitely, had he
respectfully treated the mild old tutor, whose influence over Louis was
popularly ascribed to magic. Bourbon tried to eliminate Fleury, as Orleans had
rid himself of Villeroi. By a preconcerted arrangement with the Queen he
detained the King from his invariable interview with his tutor. Fleury sent in
his resignation and retired. The King withdrew to the innermost recess of the
palace, and there sat and sulked until a gentleman-in-waiting ventured to
intrude, and suggest that Fleury should be recalled. Bourbon returned an
ungracious message, which proved the signal of his own dismissal. On June
11,1726, the King rode out, begging the Minister not to wait supper for his
return. Immediately afterwards Bourbon received an order to retire to
Chantilly. His mistress was exiled to her Norman property, where she shortly
died. Duvemey, who had done his best in an impossible situation, was lodged in
the Bastille.
In France, as
in Spain, the sudden fall of the First Minister marks the close of a
distinctive period. The provisional administrations of Orleans and Bourbon were
now to be replaced by the long, uniform ministry of Fleury. In Spain, though
the Queen remained throughout the dominant factor, the reign of foreign
adventurers was over. For the future, however wild might be her dreams, their
workaday execution was controlled by normal, national Ministers.
THE BOURBON
GOVERNMENTS IN FRANCE AND SPAIN. II.
The Austro-Spanish
Alliance seemed only strengthened by Ripperd&’s disgrace. Stanhope
clamoured at the violation of his embassy; war with England seemed certain, and
Spain must cling to her Imperial ally. Konigsegg became, wrote Stanhope, the
idol of their Catholic Majesties. Spaniards chafed at his escutcheon, which
proclaimed the Emperor’s title to the Spanish Crown, and at his team of mules
driven through Madrid in defiance of the bye-laws. But Elisabeth cared little
for Spanish opinion. For her personal ends she would use the Austrian, as she
had used the Italian and the Dutchman. She had, moreover, never met a
personality so imposing, so endowed alike with military and diplomatic graces.
Konigsegg became the fount of honour, while ministers obediently brought their
portfolios to his rooms. Orendayn was merely his instrument. Philip submitted
to the dismissal of Grimaldo, and of his confessor Bermudez, who had handed him
a letter from Fleury behind Elisabeth’s back. His soul was in charge of Father
Clarke, formerly Konigsegg’s confessor, a Scottish Jacobite who could scarce
speak French; his body in that of the Irish Jacobite, Dr Higgins.
In
Jacobite circles at Madrid the fall of the Hanoverians was thought imminent.
The Duke of Liria was sent as the first Spanish ambassador to Russia to arrange
a descent upon the English coast. The siege of Gibraltar was opened, and the
South Sea ship, Prince Frederick, embargoed. The treasure-fleet slipped past
Admiral Wager ; Patino was buying and building ships, and crimping fishermen.
Yet war was not declared, and the trend in Spain was really towards peace.
There was disaffection in Aragon, discontent in the trenches before Gibraltar,
disgust at the subsidies for Austria and at the alien confessor. Patino,
knowing Spain’s weakness, was furtively corresponding with Stanhope; the Infant
Ferdinand made no secret of his opposition to the Austrian Alliance. Above all
Charles VI and Prince Eugene were averse from war, for Spain could give no
adequate protection to the Ostend Company, while Eugene had no belief in the
capture of Gibraltar. ,
Bourbon’s
fall, just four weeks after that of Ripperdd, made reconciliation between
France and Spain more possible. Early in 1727 Philip V expected Louis XV to
die, and he resolved to make a bid for the succession. He chose as his agent
the Abbe Montgon, an amateur diplomatist, whose pretentious piety had appealed
to him during his retreat at San Ildefonso. Montgon was instructed to win the
clergy, the Parlements, the nobles, and above all the House of Bourbon. He was
ordered not to unbosom himself to Fleury, as being opportunist if not
Orleanist, nor to Morville, Minister for Foreign Affairs, as being Anglophil.
His papers included a proclamation for the Parlement of Paris, a scheme for a
Council of Regency, and for the supervision of the Queen’s possible
confinement. Montgon’s disguises and mystifications were worthy of comic opera,
but the results had some importance. Bourbon flung himself into the Legitimist
movement against the hated Orleans succession. Philip’s party gained
consistency among nobles and lawyers, and found support with the Marshals,
Villars and d’Huxelles. But the decisive, result was the unexpected. Fleury at
the very first interview picked Montgon’s brain. Truly or falsely, he then
declared himself in favour of Philip’s succession, and opened a confidential
correspondence with Elisabeth. The Queen was assured that the Emperor never
intended his daughters for her sons, and that he was raking up Imperial
pretensions to the Italian duchies. Simultaneously, Fleury negotiated at Vienna
for a general peace, and Charles VI pressed a more pacific policy on Spain. The
siege of Gibraltar made no progress, while the death-bill daily rose. Elisabeth
cooled towards Konigsegg, and Patino closed the purse-strings, so that the
proud ambassador could pay neither his servants nor his tradesmen. The Emperor
agreed to suspend the Ostend Company for seven years, pending legal enquiry.
Spain engaged to abandon the siege of Gibraltar, restore the Prince Frederick,
and remove the embargo on the cargoes of the treasure-fleet which belonged to
foreign consignees. The Preliminaries were signed at Paris on May 81, 1727, by
representatives of France, England, the Emperor, and the States General. As
there was no Spanish minister in France, a duplicate was executed at Vienna on
June 13, here lacking an English signatory. Hence this compact is called the
Preliminaries either of Paris or Vienna.
Elisabeth
smarted under her dynastic disappointments and the humiliating concessions to
England. Philip’s melancholia was so obstinate that he had appointed her as
Regent. Reconciliation with France was therefore doubly welcome. On the birth
of Don Luis, Louis XV wrote a friendly letter, and she sent a warm reply.
Diplomatic relations were renewed, and the Count of Rothembourg, a strong and
plausible Legitimist, arrived at Madrid. This entailed formal intercourse with
England also. The new envoy was Benjamin Keene, who, as agent for the South Sea
Company and Consul-General, had fathomed the peculiarities of Spanish politics.
His energies were, however, confined
to solitary
walks in the royal garden, for Elisabeth flared up at the very name of England.
She angrily showed Rothembourg George I’s letter promising Gibraltar,
sarcastically asking if it were a forgery. The English people also and their
new King, George II, were dangerously bellicose. Wager cruised off Cadiz, and
Hosier was instructed to chase the galleons. To provide the sinews of war,
which at the close of 1727 seemed inevitable, Elisabeth ordered a levy of 25
per cent, on foreign merchandise in the treasure-fleet. Yet Patino, when asked
if Spain’s resources could bear a war, returned a melancholy negative. In Italy
the outlook was unpromising. The Grand Duke of Tuscany intrigued against the
claims of Don Carlos. Antonio Famese, under Imperial pressure, abandoned his
celibate comforts for marriage with Henrietta of Modena, in the hope of a
successor. It proved impossible to move Fleury from the English alliance, and
thus Spain was isolated at the moment when Philip was carried to the Pardo
desperately ill. Elisabeth had protested that Gibraltar was her only care, but
her Italian interests won the day. The Convention of the Pardo (March 6,1728)
confirmed the Preliminaries with trifling modifications. The European Congress
of Soissons could begin its work.
If
Preliminaries were tedious, Congresses were leisurely; they gave the Powers
plenty of time in which to reconsider their position. Fleury’s task was the
most difficult. He was no religious Liberal like Orleans; he could not but have
visions of a union of the Catholic Powers, of a lasting peace upon the
Continent as the result of reconciliation between Bourbon and Habsburg, of the
consequent revival of French commerce at the expense of the Maritime Powers.
But he saw no element of permanence in the Spanish-Austrian alliance, which depended
on the caprice or fortunes of Elisabeth. Should the Empress die, and the
Emperor marry again, Elisabeth would have no further interest in the alliance.
Should Philip die or abdicate, and Ferdinand succeed, the alliance would vanish
of itself. A breach between Spain and Austria could only be a matter of time,
and then France must make her choice. If she chose Austria, Spain with her
American trade would be thrown into the arms of England; if she selected Spain,
there would be a fresh coalition of the Empire with the Maritime Powers, which
had previously proved too strong for the Bourbon Courts. Fleury therefore
elected to cleave to the alliance of Hanover, and break up that of Spain and
Austria, while honestly striving for European peace.
The situation
of England was somewhat simpler. She must recapture the Spanish-American trade
by peace or war, but the alternative must be rapidly decided, for she was
undergoing the expense of war without its plunder. There was danger from a
coalition of Austria, Russia, Poland, and Prussia, which had early deserted the
alliance of Hanover, or again from a family alliance of the Bourbon Courts. The
growing influence of the new Foreign Minister, Chauvelin, was regarded
with
suspicion, and the British ambassador, Horatio Walpole, had to throw the whole
weight of long-standing influence upon Fleury to keep him true. The Emperor’s
chief aim was to enjoy the benefit of time by postponing a definite answer
either on the subject of his daughters’ marriage, or on the succession of Don
Carlos to the Italian duchies. If, meanwhile, fair words could procure Spanish
subsidies, so much the better; if not, it was Konigsegg’s creditors who mainly
suffered.
Political
problems depended largely upon personal accidents. It seemed impossible that
Philip V should live or recover reason. He had a mania for abdication, and
actually smuggled through to the Council a letter of renunciation, which
Elisabeth was only just in time to recover. His malady took forms aggressive or
absurd. He would scratch his wife, pommel Patino, and bite himself. At one
moment he fancied himself a frog, at another a corpse. Usually the most pious
of men, he now had fits of irreligious mania, rejecting his confessor’s
ministrations and the sacrament. Yet if the Queen ventured to talk politics in
his presence, he became inconveniently sane. Envoys and statesmen began to
worship the rising sun in Ferdinand, and Elisabeth wisely gave him his proper
position, which his tact and kindliness deserved. Yet his health was so bad,
and he was so painfully conscious of it, that excessive adulation was unwise.
The progeny of the Parmesan princess was far healthier than the Savoyard’s, and
behind the valetudinarian Ferdinand was the bonny figure of Don Carlos.
While
politics seemed to centre in the Spanish sick-room, the pustules which had
troubled Louis XV in the hunt and the Council Chamber were diagnosed as
small-pox. Philip, as usual, assumed that the youth was going to die. He was
now in fancy no longer corpse or frog, but King of France: in France he could
eat, drink, and not be poisoned. He would march on Toulouse, have himself
proclaimed Regent by its Parlement, and then move on Paris. He empowered Fleury
to act in his name. At Madrid Louis XV was long believed to be dead. Even when
the news of his convalescence arrived, excitement scarcely subsided. But, after
bearing three daughters, Maria Leszczynska was on September 4, 1729, delivered
of a son, and the ignis fatuus of Philip’s hopes was at length extinguished.
Less
fortunate than the two Kings, the Emperor’s youngest daughter died, and
Elisabeth concluded that the remaining sisters would marry her two eldest sons.
Charles Vi’s scrupulous conscience, however, admitted the argument that
circumstances alter cases, and that arrangements made for three daughters must
be modified in the face of two. Hatred for the Emperor now replaced Elisabeth’s
detestation for England. Not the cession of Gibraltar but the establishment of
Don Carlos became the touchstone. She insisted on Spanish garrisons for the
duchies instead of Swiss. The English Government, to make Gibraltar safe , by
Italian concessions which cost it nothing, extorted Fleury’s reluctant assent.
In
October
Stanhope arrived in Spain; and on November 9 the Treaty of Seville was signed.
English trade was restored to its former footing, the privileges of the Ostend
Company were cancelled, Gibraltar was ignored. The succession of Don Carlos was
secured by the guarantee of the allies of Hanover, and the presence of Spanish
garrisons. The Emperor’s reply was to pour troops into Italy, and to recall
Konigsegg.
Fleury did
not intend to fight. He threw away the fruits of the much desired family
reconciliation by irresolution, which was partly constitutional, partly the
growing result of age. To this must be added the incompatibility of temper
between Elisabeth and himself, which long embarrassed both French and Spanish
envoys. Chauvelin, whose influence was increasing, was resolute enough, but he
lacked tact.. His scheme for a resettlement of Italy, which should exclude
Austria, and establish a balance between Savoy, Venice, the Papacy, and Don
Carlos, was as yet visionary. England, more practical, insisted on immediate
satisfaction for Spain. Tension increased between the Bourbon Courts, and at
length Castelar, sent as envoy extraordinary to Paris, declared the Treaty of
Seville annulled (January, 1731).
For England
meanwhile a decisive settlement was essential. In Spanish-American waters
guarda-costas were at open war with contrabandists and professedly peaceful
English and Anglo-American merchantmen. Now it was that the Spaniards cut off
the celebrated ear of Captain Jenkins, and that an English man-of-war had a
four hours’ fight to protect its convoy. The boundaries of Georgia and the encroachment
of logwood cutters in Campeachy Bay were also subjects of angry correspondence.
In Spain English merchants and sailors were subjected to annoyance from the
Inquisition, from excisemen, press-gangs, and quartermasters. Products of
English colonies were prohibited, and new imposts illegally exacted. Ships
provisioning Gibraltar were overhauled, and works actually commenced against
the fortress. Fortunately Patino was now predominant, and worked in harmony
with Keene, who knew that faults were not all on the Spanish side. But Philip
was dangerously excited about Gibraltar, and Patino professed that he would
sooner face drawn bayonets than broach this topic. England and France
negotiated behind each other’s backs both at Seville and Vienna, but England,
thanks to her ambassadors Keene and Thomas Robinson, was the better served.
The crisis
came with Antonio Famese’s death. His widow believed herself to be with child,
but diplomatists were sceptical. Charles VI occupied Parma nominally on behalf
of Don Carlos. The Maritime Powers offered to guarantee his Pragmatic Sanction,
and in return he made the Treaty of Vienna (March 16, 1731), to which Spain in
July acceded. Spanish troops were to be introduced even if the widowed Duchess’
problematical child should be a boy. The Imperial investiture was to precede
possession of the duchies by Don Carlos. Spain confirmed
the terms of
the Quadruple Alliance and of the Treaty of Vienna of June 7, 1725. Curiously
enough the Spanish signatory was the Duke of Liria, who had left Spain to
provoke a Russian attack on England.
It only
remained for Don Carlos to take possession. He travelled by land to Antibes,
creating a favourable impression by his expansive gaiety, his anxiety to learn,
his industry in mechanical employments. He was his mother’s son, an Italian and
no Spaniard. Elisabeth could not look at her other children without tears
starting to her eyes. He was welcomed by Admiral Wager, who had escorted the
Spanish squadron and the transports which conveyed the much disputed garrisons.
Don Carlos landed at Leghorn on December 7, 1731, at night, and passed through
illuminated streets to the cathedral. In March, 1732, he made his formal entry
into Florence, and was afterwards installed in his capital of Parma. Fleury professed
that, as other people were satisfied, France was content. The only discordant
note in European harmony proceeded from Pope Clement XII, who declared the
installation illegal and claimed Parma as a lapsed fief.
Elisabeth’s
set purpose had outlasted two unsuccessful wars. She had worn down the
resistance of the Powers, disregarded the preferences of her husband, scorned
the protests of the Pope. Her aims were personal —a principality for her son, a
possible retreat for her own widowhood. Yet to her was due the fresh prestige
of Spain, which had regained a foothold in Italy, and thereby became once more
a European Power. She had thrown open to the Bourbons the preserves which all
French dynasties had coveted, had thrust an Italian principality between the
German possessions in the north and in the south, with sufficient power to make
itself fresh elbow-room. Everything, wrote the Tuscan historian Galuzzi,
presaged immediate revolution. The medal struck for Don Carlos had for its
device a lady with a lily in her hand, and for its legend Spes publica. For
Italians this was an auguiy of liberation.
From the
arrival of Don Carlos in Tuscany until the War of the Polish Succession Spain
seemed to set her sails for every course in turn. The immediate object of France
was to gain Spanish support against the ratification of the Pragmatic Sanction.
But Elisabeth bore no gratitude towards France, nor would she needlessly
irritate the Emperor, upon whom her son’s comfort in Italy depended. The mutual
aversion between herself and Fleury became apparent. To Rothembourg, who asked
when she would cease to abuse the Cardinal, she replied truthfully, “Not till
he is dead.” Fleuiy had no strong leaning towards England; but the necessity
for recuperation and distaste for decisive measures led him to propitiate the
Maritime Powers. Peace was his end and aim; even later, when harrying the
Habsburg in Poland, Germany, and Italy, he never quite lost his hold on the
dogs of war. On the other hand, Elisabeth’s further ambitions could only be
realised by war. She scorned an academic alliance; she must have a fighting
friendship. Both King
and Queen
wished to break up the Treaty of Utrecht and the Quadruple Alliance, and throw
their fragments into the melting-pot. They kept proposing a close family
alliance, annulling all previous treaties up to and including that of Ryswyk.
Such a prospect appalled Fleury, for it implied cancellation of Philip’s
renunciations, and consequent war with Europe. Patino himself realised that a
family alliance would ultimately produce a rupture with England, and this he
meant to avoid until he had nursed the navy to maturity.
Philip and
Elisabeth were pugnacious, and the atmosphere electrical, when the Powers were
agitated by the gathering of a large Spanish expeditionary force. Memories of
Alberoni suggested Naples and Sicily as the objective, while English fears
centred on Gibraltar and Port Mahon. The storm broke upon the African coast.
Oran was taken by surprise, and all Spain was jubilant. Moors, however, have a
pillow-like rebound. Aided by warlike Algerians and even Turkish regulars they
swarmed round Oran and Ceuta. Loss of life was great, and among those killed
was the heroic commander, Santa Cruz, the King and Queen’s especial friend, and
the mainstay of the pro-English party. It was once more proved that it was
useless to scratch at the North African seaboard. Doubtless, however, Philip
V’s Government, like that of Ferdinand in 1511, meant Africa to be the “
jumping-off place” for Italy. Spain mobilised, though not without suspicion,
and started the later Italian war with cadres, military and naval,
comparatively complete.
English
cannon were unfortunately discovered at Oran, and powder was shipped by English
subjects at Gibraltar to the Moors besieging Ceuta. This added to the
irritation caused by the increasing enterprise of smugglers, the high-handed
measures of English admirals, and the captious claims of the South Sea Company.
Just as the Spanish people was exasperated with England, Elisabeth was losing
patience with the Emperor. Her son pressed for permission to occupy the duchies
while still under age, and for immediate instead of eventual investiture.
Charles VI, annoyed at the oath to Don Carlos taken by the Florentine Senate,
rudely refused. Upon this Don Carlos made a formal entry into Parma, and
assumed the unauthorised title of Grand Prince of Tuscany. Elisabeth would at
once have allied with France, if she had thought that France would fight. Her
ambitions rose to ideas of Milan for her son, and Naples and Sicily for Spain.
At the close of autumn (1732) the Bourbon Powers were drawing towards a family
alliance. Patino strove to delay it by impossible demands, but was forced to
abandon them; in January, 1733, Liria was recalled from Vienna. George II then
intervened, and, to please the English King, Charles VI granted the
dispensation of age, and immediate investiture, if Don Carlos would drop the
title of Grand Prince. Elisabeth was so grateful that peace seemed assured,
when, on February 1, Augustus II of Poland inopportunely died.
The
succession to Poland was of absolutely no moment to Spain, and
of not much
more to France. “ Must we,” plaintively asked Fleury, “ruin the King to aid his
father-in-law?” His hesitation encouraged Elisabeth to propose the election of
one of her own sons. Her real resolve was, however, to attack the Emperor, if
she were convinced that Fleury meant to go to war for Stanislaus; but this he
would not commit to writing. Another difficulty was her detestation for Charles
Emmanuel, whose house she prophetically regarded as her own descendants’ most
dangerous rival. France had already offered him the whole of the Milanese, on
condition that he should cede Savoy to herself; but Elisabeth insisted that
Cremona and Lodi should be given to Don Carlos. When Charles Emmanuel claimed
Mantua as a set-off to these, Elisabeth rejoined that Mantua was the key of
Italy and must be in her son’s keeping. This remained the stumbling-block
throughout, preventing any alliance of Spain with Savoy.
In August,
1733, news reached Paris that Russian troops had entered Poland, and Stanislaus
set out for Warsaw. War was certain, and this must eventually bring to its slow
conclusion a Bourbon family alliance. On September 26 France signed the Treaty
of Turin with Charles Emmanuel, offensive and defensive as against the Emperor.
He was promised the whole State of Milan, with its boundaries as fixed when
Charles V bestowed it upon his son. Don Carlos should receive Naples, Sicily,
and the curious little State called the Presidi—the Sienese ports which had
been retained by Philip II, when he granted Siena as a Spanish fief to Cosimo
de’ Medici. The Spanish Government mistrusted this treaty, especially as all
mention of Mantua was omitted. Philip V refused assent to Charles Emmanuel’s
claim to the supreme military command, while Louis XV declined to regard
Spanish captain-generals as equal in rank to French marshals. A compromise was
made by the appointment of Villars, whose age and prestige gave him an admitted
precedence. France declared war against Charles VI on October 10; and, ten days
later, Philip, though protesting against the Treaty of Turin, gave the order
for embarkation. On November 7 France and Spain signed the Treaty of the
Escurial. The two Kings pledged themselves and their posterity to eternal
friendship. They guaranteed each other’s possessions in Europe and without. To
Don Carlos were secured Parma and Piacenza, the reversion to Tuscany, and,
subject to the terms of the Treaty of Turin, all conquests made in Italy. Louis
XV would aid Spain if attacked by England, and promised his good offices for
the restoration of Gibraltar; the two Powers were mutually to enjoy the
commercial privileges of the most favoured nation, and the abuses of English
con- trabandism in the Indies were to be checked. The Kings engaged not to
negotiate separately on the Pragmatic Sanction, or on the election of Francis
of Lorraine as King of the Romans, or to lay down arms save by common assent.
All previous treaties were annulled, except in relation to mutual trade—“All
earlier treaties made between France and Spain,
1733-4] First Family Compact.-Don Carlos conquers
Naples. 153
and between
their majesties and other Powers, shall no longer have effect between France and
Spain.” These few words cancelled the obligations of the Treaty of Utrecht and
all subsequent engagements. This high- sounding and far-reaching treaty was
broken almost as easily as signed, but it has importance as being the first of
the three “ Family Compacts.”
Meanwhile in
Italy war went merrily enough. The old year saw the Milanese cleared of
Austrians, and Villars was in touch with the Spanish general, Montemar. But the
incompleteness of diplomatic unity began to obtrude itself. The task assigned
to Montemar was to guard the Po, and prevent an Austrian descent by the
eastward Alpine passes. Charles Emmanuel refused to bridge the river, as a
means of communication with Montemar, unless the Treaty of Turin were signed.
Montemar was therefore ordered to abandon concerted action, and to proceed to
the conquest of Naples. But for this withdrawal and Charles Emmanuel’s sulks
the weak Mantuan garrison must have surrendered, for exceptionally dry weather
had neutralised the protection of the marshes.
Don Carlos
and Montemar justified the new Spanish plan of campaign. Marching southwards in
February they obtained right of passage through the Papal States, and crossed
the Neapolitan frontier on March 26,1734. Public opinion at once declared
itself for Don Carlos. On April 5 Naples tendered its submission: by May 10 all
its forts were taken, and he made his entry. The viceroy, Visconti, left
garrisons in Capua and Gaeta, and withdrew to Bari, hoping to receive
reinforcements from Trieste. But Montemar was on his heels, and on May 25
destroyed his army at Bitonto. By August Capua, defended by Traun, alone held
for Charles VI. Sicily also clamoured to be free from Austria. Montemar sailed
for Palermo, and Marsillac for Messina. Town and country welcomed them. Peasantry
hemmed in the scattered Austrian detachments, while the citadels of Messina,
Trapani, and Syracuse alone offered serious resistance. Montemar was free to
lead his victorious army northwards.
Montemar’s
departure had reduced the Franco-Sardinian forces to the defensive. Their duty
was to guard the States of Milan and Parma, and prevent the Austrians from
slipping round their right flank to Ferrara, and thence gaining the great
southern high-road. Villars, indeed, would have advanced to the Adige, blocked
the Brenner, and destroyed Mantua at leisure. In this he was baulked by Charles
Emmanuel’s refusal to lend artillery, and his own Government’s fear of a
general engagement. Even for the defensive his forces were inadequate. The
Austrians on May 2 crossed the Po near Borgoforte, cut Villars off from
communication with Modena and Ferrara, whence he drew his supplies, and forced
him back on the Oglio. The friction with Charles Emmanuel became intolerable,
and he asked for his recall, leaving Coigni, an officer of only moderate
ability, in command. The old Marshal never saw France again; for, three weeks
after leaving the front, he died at Turin. The Austrian objective was now
Parma, for which they twice
made a
spring. The first attempt was checked by Maillebois near the ducal palace at
Colomo, the second by a hard-won French victory under the walls of Parma, in
which the Austrian general, Mercy, was killed (June 29). Coigni and the King
then resolved to drive the Austrians north of the Po by seizing Borgoforte, but
Konigsegg, acting with great dash, surprised the French camp, and forced Coigni
back on Guastalla. Here on September 19 another French victory was won, as
fruitless as that of Parma. In spite of defeats the strategical superiority was
with the Austrians; Maillebois had to retire hurriedly from before Mirandola,
and Coigni abandoned the Oglio for the Adda, leaving the territories of
Cremona, Parma, and Piacenza open to the enterprising enemy.
The campaign
of 1735 opened with Montemar’s appearance in Lombardy. To prevent his taking
command as senior officer to Coigni, Marshal Noailles, who was also a
Captain-General of Spain, was sent to Italy. Late in May French, Spaniards, and
Sardinians, acting at length in concert, drove the Austrians down the Po, crossed
the Mincio and Adige, and turned the enemy out of Italy. Montemar offered to
besiege Mantua with his Spaniards, if the French and Sardinians, aided by his
cavalry, would cover him from a return of the Austrians. Charles Emmanuel
refused to do anything at all, unless Philip V would sign the Treaty of Turin.
While the Generals were wrangling, the astounding news arrived that France had
signed preliminaries of peace; and Noailles was ordered to conclude an
armistice. So clumsy were the orders that they did not include the Spaniards.
Montemar, on Noailles’ advice, withdrew south of the Po, with the Austrians in
pursuit. He might have been crushed, had not Noailles stretched his
instructions, and .ecured his inclusion in the armistice. As it was, he fell back,
not without loss, on Parma—a cruel termination to his brilliant career.
The Spaniards
had throughout shown the best military qualities of the three armies, alike in
the field and in the siege and storm of fortresses, and had been the most
effectively supported by their Government. The French had fought well in
defensive actions forced upon them; but their discipline was bad, and the
Spaniards expressed contempt for troops which spent their time in pulling off
women’s rings and plundering their allies’ orchards. Villars and Noailles were
both checked by diplomacy at home; but the main cause for comparative failure
was the selfish obstinacy of Charles Emmanuel, who would neither fight a
decisive battle nor lend his artillery for a siege.
On the part
of France the War had been half-hearted, disliked by Fleury, and unpopular with
the nation. A low marriage, it was thought, had dragged the country into
needless war. Fleury was disgusted by his inability to reconcile Spain and
Sardinia. He feared that Charles Emmanuel might be bribed by Milan to change
sides and evict the Bourbons from Italy. Elisabeth was suspected of still
hankering after an archduchess, and of intriguing at Vienna, while the intimacy
of
Patino and
Keene was nervously watched. Elisabeth, half in fun, had prophesied to
Rothembourg the end of the War—“France will have some check or other, and one
fine day we shall be told that you have been obliged to make peace.” The envoy
slily replied that European gossip reported that Charles VI would resort to a
daughter’s marriage to end the War. “The old refrain,” rejoined Elisabeth; “we
are not so keen for a girl without a dower; they can be found anywhere.”
Though peace
came as a surprise, it had been long in the air. In February, 1735, the
Maritime Powers had offered their mediation. Their main proposed was an
exchange between the Emperor and Don Carlos of Naples and Sicily for Parma,
Piacenza, and the reversion to Tuscany. At this Philip and Elisabeth were
deeply offended, and would not hear of peace. It seemed possible that England
might enforce peace by siding with the Emperor. On occasion of a trifling
dispute between Spain and Portugal an English squadron sailed for Lisbon, while
a French fleet prepared to protect Cadiz. Nevertheless, tension between France
and Spain increased. Elisabeth would have none of the French marriages proposed
by Fleury: a scalded cat, she exclaimed, fears cold water. In despair of
reconciling Spain to peace, Fleury negotiated behind her back. At a very secret
conference in the suburbs of Vienna the Preliminaries were drafted. They
corresponded in most respects with the proposals of the Maritime Powers. The
French Government, assuming that Francis of Lorraine would marry Maria Theresa,
and ultimately be elected Emperor, declared that an Emperor holding Lorraine
and Bar would be a standing menace to French security. It was agreed,
therefore, that Stanislaus, renouncing his claim to Poland, should be
indemnified by these duchies, which should revert to France upon his death. To
the Duke of Lorraine, thus dispossessed, the succession to Tuscany was
assigned, and to the Emperor Parma and Piacenza. The share proposed by the
Maritime Powers for Charles Emmanuel was slightly decreased, and that of Don
Carlos increased. The former should have Tortona and either Novara or Vigevano
instead of both, while the latter should receive the Presidi in addition to
Naples and Sicily. France promised her guarantee to the Pragmatic Sanction, and
on October 3, 1735, the Preliminaries were signed, to Fleury’s unfeigned
delight.
Spain acceded
in principle to the Preliminaries of Vienna in February, 1736, with less
difficulty than had been expected. Yet the ensuing treaty of November 18, 1738,
lacked the assent of both Spain and Naples, and it was not until June 28, 1739,
that they became parties to it. Even then the guarantee of Charles Vi’s
Pragmatic Sanction (discussed elsewhere) was withheld. Several causes
contributed to this delay. France and Spain were not wholly fortunate in their
respective envoys. La Mina, who went to Paris in August, 1736, was a known
opponent of French policy, and a scathing critic of French campaigning. Clever
and self-confident, he fought point by point, while his sarcastic
despatches
strengthened Spanish resistance by their exposure of Fleury’s weakness. He
reported moreover that the French Government had an unduly intimate knowledge
of affairs at the Spanish Court. It appeared that the French ambassador
Vaulgrenant was in the habit of entering the royal apartments when the King and
Queen were out, of actually sitting in the royal chair and rummaging all papers
not under lock and key. He was consequently recalled in April, 1738; but his
successor, Champeaux, a mere commercial agent, made matters worse by forwarding
the most disgraceful libels on Philip and Elisabeth. The new Minister, La
Quadra, was no genius, but he was an expert at opening sealed letters, and had
discovered Champeaux’ cypher. Thus, until the phlegmatic and conciliatory La
Marck reached Spain, ambassadors had been rather a hindrance than a help.
A more
prominent rock of offence was the marriage of Don Carlos. The French Government
wished to engage him to a French princess. But the oldest was scarcely ten, and
he was eager for a wife, that within a year he might have an heir as a
Christmas present for his mother. Elisabeth in vain tried for Maria Theresa’s
sister, and Don Carlos then chose Maria Amalia, daughter of the Saxon King of
Poland, the successful rival of Stanislaus. This seemed an intentional insult
to the French Court, and it is surprising that the irritation so soon subsided.
The sweet-tempered Queen, who, on hearing the news, had spoken with unusual
acerbity, at length told La Mina that, though it would be improper to
congratulate, she wished the young couple every happiness. There was
consolation too in the proposals for a marriage between the Dauphin and the
Infanta, on which Fleury had set his heart. The boy sent a pretty picture of
himself, drawn by his own hand, which won the heart of the parents as well as
of the little girl. The negotiations, however, were in October, 1737,
abandoned, to be resumed a year later.
Another cause
of delay had been the death of Patino on November 3, 1736, followed on February
20,1737, by the disgrace of Chauvelin. Patino was succeeded by La Quadra, a
mere head-clerk without initiative; nor had Chauvelin’s substitute, Amelot,
much greater push. Fleury’s main wish was to win Austria to peace, and this
could only be at the expense of Spain. The immediate cession of Lorraine to
Stanislaus had been a point of paramount importance, since it was thought
dangerous to wait for its evacuation by the Duke until the Grand Duke of
Tuscany should die. This point was secured; and Francis of Lorraine was
pensioned from March, 1737, till July 9, when Tuscany fell in. It was also of
consequence that the family property within the duchy of Lorraine should follow
the fortunes of the State. This implied a similar absorption of the allodial
possessions of Elisabeth in Parma and Tuscany. Her very natural opposition to
surrendering her patrimony was the main difficulty in the final conclusion of
the Treaty of Vienna.
Peace in
Europe gave breathing space for war in American waters—
1737-9]
157
war perhaps
inevitable in the end, but which tact and patience might have indefinitely
postponed. The practical grievances on either side have been already mentioned,
but these were not all. Spanish economists, such as Ulloa and Ustariz, were
enamoured of the protective theory, which was the apparent fountain-head of
English and Dutch wealth. Her exclusive colonial market had been of little use
to Spain, when she had no manufacture and no trade. It was otherwise when,
under the nursing of Alberoni, Patino, and Campillo, production and commerce
had been created simultaneously with the instruments of defence. The commercial
privileges contained in the Asiento treaty were a recognition of the Spanish
theory by England for a definite consideration. This consideration was grossly
abused, and the Spanish-American officials were rough-handed in their remedies.
The English nation, feeling itself practically in the wrong, strove to put
itself theoretically in the right by denying the Right of Search—a theory which
it was the first to denounce when against the national interests. Religion came
to the aid of economics, and in the literature of the time Papist and
guarda-costa were almost convertible terms. But for economic pedantry and
public- house Protestantism the two nations might perhaps not have come to
blows. Smuggling, logwood-cutting, and vague colonial boundaries were matters
of course to those who were practically concerned in them.
Spain had
every pretext for a war, and yet she did not want it. It was not a King’s war,
nor a nation’s war, nor even a Queen’s war. On the English side Robert Walpole
at home and Keene in Spain strove hard for peace. But Walpole’s prayer for
peace caused the Opposition to howl for war, and Jenkins became the war-cry of
the hour. The Convention of January, 1739, by which Spain agreed to pay an
indemnity less an off-set for damage done to her fleet in the battle of Cape
Passaro, appeared to exorcise the peril. Unfortunately, two questions remained
unsettled. Admiral Haddock’s fleet, which had deeply wounded national pride by
cruising off southern Spain, was not recalled; while Philip V refused to
include in the Convention the debt due by the South Sea Company to himself. The
Company had been, as Keene believed, shortsighted and dishonest from the
first; it now pretended that it was an act of patriotism to withhold the
accounts stipulated by the contract with the King, who was himself a partner.
Throughout
the negotiations preceding the English War Fleury’s policy had been
characteristic. He blew on the live coals, and yet wished to stay a general
conflagration. If Spanish attention could be diverted westwards, Elisabeth
might cease to harass him on Italian topics. Thus he stiffened the resistance
to England, stimulating La Mina by the sight of an English map of America with
the greater part, so to speak, coloured red. Yet when war became imminent, he
made the sensible proposal that England should withdraw her fleet from
Gibraltar, and Spain pay the sums agreed. La Marck had successfully negotiated
the
marriage of the
Infant Philip with Louise-Elisabeth, which took place on October 25,1739. Both
Courts wished for a yet closer union; but, while Spain was bent on a political
alliance for common action against England, France bargained for a commercial
treaty as the quid pro quo. As monopoly of her markets was the real cause of
the English War, Spain hesitated to open the door to the teeming produce of the
French West Indies. Public opinion in France concerned itself little with
commercial details, and was all in favour of joining hands against the hated
English. La Mina became the most popular man in Paris; even tradesmen shut
their eyes to the growing length of his accounts. At length the impulsive
soldier presumed too far, and, forcing himself upon Louis, denounced Fleury’s
huckstering policy. The impassive King coldly referred him to his Minister, and
La Mina’s recall was the result. His successor, Campo Florido, a subtle,
unscrupulous Italian, was better suited to wheedle concessions out of Fleury.
The two Governments came very near agreement. Fleury declared himself content,
if Spain would admit the sugar and coffee, which were not grown in the Spanish
colonies. He was twitted by Campo Florido with drinking Levantine coffee
himself, and palming off the inferior French article on Spain. At this moment,
to Philip’s delight, Fleury ordered a fleet to American waters, not indeed to
attack the English, but to protect Spanish America from unjust aggression. This
generous action was, however, only meant to sweeten the bitter draught which
followed. The French Minister suddenly declared that both treaties, political
and commercial, must be suspended, lest Bourbon ambition should alarm all
Europe. France and Spain seemed as far as ever from alliance, when on October
20, 1740, at the close of a week’s illness the Emperor died.
Sudden as it
was, Charles Vi’s death found the Spanish Court prepared. Philip at once laid
claim to all the hereditary possessions of the Habsburgs ou the plea of an
alleged arrangement between Charles V and Ferdinand; but his real aim was to
secure the Italian provinces. Fleury was implored to plunge into war, or at
least to give Spain a free hand in Italy. Timid by temperament, and irresolute
from physical decay, he was not to be hurried into a definite policy. He had
none of the bellicose humours of the Spanish Court; he would be content if the
Imperial dignity passed from the House of Habsburg. When, at length, his hand
was forced by Frederick II’s attack upon Silesia, his design was that, as
France acted in support of Prussia in Germany, so Spain in her Italian campaign
should combine with Savoy. On this combination, and on the neutrality of
Tuscany, which had been the equivalent for Lorraine, he continued to insist.
But Tuscany was Elisabeth’s chief desire, and she rightly dreaded the
aggrandisement of Savoy. Fleury himself prophesied that one day a King of
Sardinia would use all his power to eject the Bourbons from Italy; but he
thought the Savoyard alliance indispensable at the present emergency. The interchange
of
compliments,
however, became unusually warm. The new French ambassador to Spain, Vaureal,
Bishop of Rennes, was the Cardinal’s intimate friend, and Fleuiy assured him
that his attachment for Elisabeth was lively and tender, though he afterwards
refused to believe that he had used such warm expressions.
In view of
French hesitation Spain determined to act alone. La Quadra, now Marquis of
Villarias, was supplanted by the more strenuous Campillo, Patino’s best pupil,
who absorbed the ministries of Finance, War, Marine and the Indies, while he
poached on the foreign correspondence of Villarias. The Infant, to whom his
father surrendered his rights in Lombardy, journeyed to Antibes; and Spanish
troops poured through Languedoc into Provence. Montemar had already in December,
1741, landed a division at Orbitello, where it was joined by the Neapolitans.
Nevertheless the Infant’s prospects were not so rosy as had been his brother’s
in 1733. Charles Emmanuel had then been a lukewarm colleague—he was now a
hesitating enemy, protecting Milan and Parma for Maria Theresa. In the former
war England had been neutral; now a Mediterranean war gave a new opening to the
sea power, which she utilised with effect.
The naval and
military operations of France and Spain belong to other chapters; but they are
closely interwoven with political relations. On January 29, 1743, when clouds
hung heavily over the Alps, and the sky in Germany was at its blackest, Fleury
died. Within three months his death was followed by that of his very opposite,
the energetic Campillo. In neither country had these deaths any immediate
effect. Amelot for fifteen months faltered in Fleury’s footsteps, while
Campillo had a worthy successor in Ensenada, who had all the activity of forty
years, and the experience of campaigns in Africa, Naples and Savoy. The
ill-success of the Franco-Spanish arms in Germany and Italy at length induced
Spain to treat for an alliance with Charles Emmanuel. This seemed in September,
1743, to be practically concluded, when his treaty with Maria Theresa was
suddenly made known. The counterblow was the Second, and more important, Family
Compact of Fontainebleau (October 25,1743). This professed to be imperishable;
but, as d’Argen- son later said, it was the fleeting fruit of ill-temper, and
as burdensome to France as it was impossible of execution. The Infant was to be
Duke of Milan, while Elisabeth should receive Parma and Piacenza for her life.
The only territorial gains for which France stipulated were Exilles and Fenestrelles,
ceded to Savoy by the Treaty of Utrecht. France had refused to declare war upon
England; yet England became the first objective of the new alliance. In the
latter part of 1743, Louis XV and Philip V made a personal and secret
engagement to restore the Pretender. Troops were drafted to Dunkirk, which the
Brest and Rochefort squadrons were to convoy to England in January, 1744,
without declaration of war: meanwhile the combined French and Spanish fleets
160
The
Second Family Compact. [1743-5
would attack
Admiral Mathews from Toulon. Exiles are of all friends the most embarrassing.
Success depended on surprise; yet Charles Edward, who was persistently dogged
by English spies, courted publicity by leaving Rome for Antibes. England
demanded explanations; France, in reply, ordered Admiral de Court to attack
Mathews off Hyeres in conjunction with the Spanish admiral Navarro. De Court’s
cowardice or incompetence left the Spaniards to bear the brunt of a well-fought
but disastrous action, which resulted in a honeymoon quarrel between France and
Spain, the presage of divorce. Public feeling in Spain, always at heart adverse
to France, was dangerously roused, in spite of the French Government’s generous
apologies.
Outwardly the
Family Compact was in December, 1744, cemented by the marriage of the Infanta
Maria Theresa to the Dauphin. Yet a disintegrating force was already in
operation, for the Marquis d’Argenson, brother of the War Minister, had the
portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Talents, industry and patriotism would have
fitted him for constructive statesmanship, had be not been a philosopher and
sentimentalist. He invented political formulae, and staked their success on the
honour of Charles Emmanuel and Frederick II. Chauvelin’s wish for an Italy free
of all barbarians, German or Spanish, was now developed into an Utopian
federation of four monarchies and two republics, and Charles Emmanuel as its
sword and shield. For Spain d’Argenson had intense disdain and dislike.
Elisabeth’s chimerical schemes disturbed European peace, and thwarted his
darling project. His prejudices were confirmed by exaggerated reports of
Spain’s military and financial weakness, supplied by Vaureal who also detested
Elisabeth’s personality.
French and
Spanish generals were acting in greater harmony than their Governments. The
brilliant campaign of 1745 was due to the adoption of the Spanish plan, and in
great measure to the ability of the Spanish general Gages. In September Parma
and Piacenza were won, and for a few months Elisabeth was actually sovereign of
her Italian home. The Infant then made a triumphal entry into Milan. If only
its huge unwieldy fortress, and the citadel of Alessandria, could be coaxed or
starved into surrender, the aims of the Family Compact were secured. This was the
moment chosen by d’Argenson to realise his Utopia. Since April he had
negotiated with Charles Emmanuel behind the back of Spain. Her Italian
ambitions had become the main obstacle to his wholesome desire for peace, for
when in September Maria Theresa’s husband was elected Emperor France had no
sufficient motive left for war. Nothing, however, could excuse the manner of
his negotiations, concerted with Louis XV alone, without the knowledge of his
colleagues or of Spain.
Charles
Emmanuel was no Utopian, and d’Argenson had to discard his visionary map of
Italy for an unromantic partition of Lombardy, assigning to the King of
Sardinia the duchy of Milan, which the Family
Compact had
reserved for the Infant. Even these terms were only wrung from Charles Emmanuel
on Christmas night, when the Infant was actually in Milan, and the citadel of
Alessandria on the point of falling. The condition was an immediate armistice,
but, as this could scarcely be granted without the knowledge of Spain,
d’Argenson privately instructed Maillebois to act purely on the defensive. On
January 25, Vaureal divulged the disgraceful treaty to Philip V, adding that
failure to accept it within two days would entail the withdrawal of the French
troops. It was falsely represented that the overtures had proceeded from
Charles Emmanuel, whereas Louis XV had taken the initiative. Philip V was
righteously indignant. It was easy to show that the situation was far more
favourable than at the date of the Family Compact, and that the increase of the
Sardinian State was more dangerous to both Bourbon Powers than the retention of
part of Lombardy by Austria; and the Duke of Huescar was sent as envoy
extraordinary to France to remonstrate against the treaty.
On the day on
which Huescar reached Paris d’Argenson granted a half-hearted armistice which
failed to satisfy Charles Emmanuel. He had concentrated his troops within
striking distance, while his enemies were scattered over a too extended line.
He pounced upon Asti, raised the siege of Alessandria, and forced the Infant to
evacuate Milan. A fortnight in March had lost all the gains of the preceding
year. Disaster convinced Louis XV that he had treated Spain shabbily. He
ordered Maillebois to place himself at the Infant’s disposal, while Noailles
was sent to Madrid to undo d’Argenson’s machinations, and effect a family
reconciliation. The courteous old nobleman was received by Philip as a former
comrade in arms, and clinched success by virulent abuse of d’Argenson. He
returned to France to concert measures for the next campaign, for which the
time indeed was ripe. On June 15 the Infant attacked the Austrian lines at
Piacenza, and was beaten. His mother’s little State was lost by this the last
battle of his father’s reign. On the afternoon of July 9, 1746, Philip V broke
a blood-vessel, and died.
France had
been absolutely ruled for seventeen years by a very old ecclesiastic of no
striking ability, no political experience, and little fixity of purpose. But
there are periods when negative qualities make for statesmanship, and, indeed,
foreigners sometimes regarded Fleury’s administration as a golden age. The
Cardinal was at once hard and soft, anxious not to offend, but difficult to
browbeat or circumvent. More tenacious of office than of principles, he ought
to have resisted royal pressure in the Polish war, and popular clamour in the
Austrian. The former brought France no credit, the latter little but shame; but
Fleury had wanted neither. France was in fact impatient of the rest cure which
he prescribed, and which she truly needed. Perhaps he allowed the regime to
last too long; the national fibres became relaxed ; material
well-being
resulted in moral flabbiness, of which coming conflicts were to give
conspicuous proof.
Fleury was
unfortunate in living just a few years too long, for his senile vitality became
tiresome. Wonder when a statesman is going to die merges in the wish that he
should do so quickly. His most positive quality was economy, untainted by
avarice. Fleury, wrote Voltaire, understood nothing whatever about any
financial question, but exacted rigorous economy from subordinate ministers;
incapable of being an offlce-clerk, he was capable of governing the State.
Though he at once abolished the two per cent, tax and reduced the taille,
receipts rose rapidly. An end was put once for all to the wild fluctuations of
the coinage, which of itself gave stability to commerce. Administration mainly
consisted in doing nothing. This suited the more energetic elements of France:
the larger cities grew apace; Paris became yearly wealthier and more luxurious.
The colonies, less fidgeted by government control than usual, had never been
so prosperous; the wealth of the French Sugar Islands far surpassed that of
other nations’ colonies! A powerful mercantile marine developed, which was,
however, destined to fall a prey to England, owing to Fleury’s lack of interest
in the navy. “ There goes the French fleet! ” rudely exclaimed Lord Waldegrave,
as he watched the pleasure-boats pass under the Parisian bridges.
In the
backward provinces, where the people were used to being drilled, the laissez
faire system had unfortunate results. Prosperity depended upon local weather.
The peasantry were said to be eating grass in Anjou and Poitou, while elsewhere
there was abundance. The famine in Paris during 1740 and 1741 was discreditable
to the Government. The transport system collapsed, and grain was double as
dear in Paris as in Languedoc. The temper of the people was, indeed, dangerous
at this time, and Fleury’s carriage was mobbed. The Bishop of Chartres wrote
hotly that famine would be followed by plague, which would not confine itself
to the lower orders. A law was passed to send back the needy poor who were
overcrowding Paris to their provincial parishes; but it was asked how they were
to get there, and where live when there. Fleury’s efforts to improve
communications took the form of the royal corvee, which forced the peasantry
near the high-roads to employ time, horses and carts on betterments which
profited distant towns, but not small cultivators who consumed what they grew.
Rapid transit injures intermediate districts, which live on the traveller’s
inconveniences.
Of internal
events under Fleury’s administration the most striking was the sudden disgrace
of Chauvelin, his ablest minister, who was generally given the credit of the
acquisition of Lorraine. His rise had been equally rapid. The public was
surprised when he succeeded d’Armenonville as Keeper of the Seals on
d’Aguesseau’s return to Court. He at once became Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and then Fleury’s adjunct. Henceforward he worked with the King and the
Cardinal, or
in Fleury’s
absence with the King. Chauvelin had married a very rich bourgeoise; he knew
much about everything, and had boundless energy and ambition. It was rumoured
that, if his wife died, he would take orders and become a Cardinal, in order to
succeed Fleury. He appeared to be Fleury’s alter ego; together they had taken
part in every step which led to the Peace of Vienna; his disgrace in February,
1787, was a mystery which has never been explained.
If Chauvelin
was guilty of any actual fault, it probably consisted in secret negotiations
with Spain, encouraging resistance to Fleury’s peace policy, from which his own
views were gradually diverging- He was harking back to the traditions of Louis
XIV’s reign, to hostility with Austria and England, and consequent friendship
with Spain, whereas Fleury’s desire for peace insensibly led him towards the
policy of the Regency. It was rumoured that the Emperor and England pressed for
Chauvelin’s removal. Personal reasons no doubt contributed. The Minister was
unmannerly to subordinates, and his colleagues hated him. His strident voice
and vulgar laugh were disagreeable to the King. Fleury himself, tenacious of
the power which he could no longer efficiently wield, was jealous of the one
Minister of sufficient calibre to succeed him. In the ensuing war Chauvelin’s
capacity was greatly missed; but on Fleury’s death he ruined his chance of
restoration by presenting to Louis XV a scathing criticism of the Cardinal’s
administration.
A contrast to
the sudden split with Chauvelin was Fleury’s dragging dispute with the
Parlement, which originated in the Jansenist controversy. After Bourbon’s fall
the persecution of Huguenots slackened. They could only be politically
dangerous in a war affecting southern France. In the War of the Austrian
Succession Fleury expressed some nervousness as to this, giving it as a reason
for non-intervention in Italy. The Jansenists were a source of peril much
nearer home. Whole Parisian parishes, the backbone of Ultramontanism in the
Wars of Religion, were now Jansenist from the priests downwards, and hostile to
the Government which accepted the Bull Unigenitus. Some of the nobility and
most of the wealthy bourgeoisie were covert or overt Jansenists. The party had
ample funds, and its charities nursed political support.
In the
Parlement a large majority was, if not Jansenist, Erastian, and opposed to the
Government’s Ultramontanism. The quarrel, taking shape in 1730, reached its
climax in 1732. The original combatants were the Parlement and the Ultramontane
Bishops, who found support in the Council, and finally in the King. The
Government signally failed to win the Advocates, but somewhat weakened the
solidarity between the senior members who constituted the Grande Chambre, and
the hot- blooded juniors of the Enquites and Requites. Nevertheless the
Parlement showed exemplary courage in face of the pettish violence of the
Crown. In August, 1732, Louis XV withdrew from it the Appel comme (Tabus, the
most effective weapon of the State against church encroachment.
Three-fourths
of the Enquetes and Requites were exiled to the four quarters of France. Then
Fleury, frightened at his own audacity, showed the white feather. The order was
suspended, the exiles reinstated. For once the lawyers won a notable victory,
and it was well deserved.
\j Society
under Louis XV lacked a centre, for there was virtually no Court. The King,
ever restless, wandered round from Versailles to his hunting lodges, or the
luxurious house of his greatest friend, the Countess of Toulouse, at
Rambouillet. His life was absolutely idle, devoted at first to his dogs and
horses, and afterwards shared by them and his mistresses. He had been carefully
brought up after an external, Pharisaic fashion: his confessions were written
out, and corrected by Fleury, as if they were exercises. “ The young King,”
wrote Madame in 1717, “ has a nice face and plenty of sense, but is a
bad-hearted child. He loves nobody except his old governess, takes dislike to
people without any reason whatever, and already likes to say biting things.” “
They let him do everything,” she elsewhere writes, “for fear he should fall
ill; I am convinced that, if he were punished, he would not fly into such
passions.” Louis retained his fear of Hell, and, absolute as he became, never
regarded himself as having a divine right to sin. He would gloomily refer to
rheumatism in his arm as a befitting reminder of his adultery, and was morbidly
disturbed by deaths. On public occasions the silent, impassive youth gave the
impression of stupidity. His ahilities, however, were good. He was a
mathematician and mechanician, and even in state affairs had sound judgment. In
intimate society he was talkative and amusing, and wrote scurrilous chansons
with the worst. This love for friendly, natural society led to the abandonment
of state functions, to the elaboration of petits appartemens, and to the long,
late suppers, where champagne loosed his tongue.
The craving
for amusement probably caused Louis XYs first lapses into the sensuality which
later became a habit. The Queen, with all her pretty little accomplishments and
love for anecdotes, was not amusing. Neither of the two sisters, Madame de
Mailly and Madame de Vintimille, who were the King’s first mistresses, was
young or pretty; but both were gay and conjpanionable. Contemporaries seem
agreed that Louis was pushed into the first connexion, partly perhaps for
political reasons. The Countess of Toulouse, herself virtuous, and the best of
his friends, is credited with this intrigue. No one foresaw the horrible
future; the public was disposed to approve, thinking that Louis might become
less a wild man of the woods, and be weaned from the excessive exercise which
had more than once endangered his life. Even Fleury is said to have welcomed
Madame de Mailly, but was horrified at the extension of the King’s affections
to two, if not three, younger sisters. He had, however, indulged his pupil so long
that he had lost the practice of contradiction and reproach. He did not even
persuade Louis to behave with decency towards his Queen; Madame de Pompadour
first taught him the externals of gentlemanly behaviour.
There were
still respectable circles in high places, such as those of the Dukes of
Noailles and Luynes ; but general society leaves an impression of vulgar
decadence. The abuses in the faster set are peculiarly modem. A young married
Prince of the Blood vies with a middle-aged Dutch Jew for the favours of an
opera-singer. A Duke of Nevers marries a comedy actress, lately mistress of an
elderly financier. Ladies of rank make passionate love to the tenor of the
season. Enormous fortunes made by doubtful means facilitated intermarriage
between blue blood and the underbred. A successful speculator’s widow was
besieged by young sprigs of nobility. The banquets of ‘parvenu millionaires
formed the model for those of royalty itself. Decadence was far from delicate,
for the best society was often drunk. Everyone strove to be amusing, and, to
judge from the rage for tediously indecent chansons, usually failed. Even
Montesquieu first made his reputation by frivolities. The prevailing degeneracy
early affected the army. “That French nobility and soldiery,” said Philip V to
Tesse in 1724, “ which formerly made war on Europe, seems now the captive of
the young ladies of the opera, of the soft life of music and good cheer.” One
noble colonel led his men to steal a neighbouring regiment’s flag; another
outraged a lady’s-maid, because her mistress had refused to bow to his hostess.
Ugly stories came back from the Italian war, and Frederick II described the
French troops under Maillebois by an unprintable dissyllable.
To literature
the social and intellectual laissez faire was probably beneficial, encouraging
the development of the divergent talents of Voltaire and Montesquieu, of
Bousseau and Diderot. The contrast with contemporary Spain is curious. Here
intellectual activity followed the French models of half a century before,
taking corporate and not individualistic shapes. It was the age of cooperative
intellectual labour, of the Spanish Academy and its Dictionary, the Royal
Academy of History, the Academy of Medicine. In literature, as in foreign
policy and constitutional machinery, Philip V’s Spain looked backwards to Louis
XIV’s France.
Philip V’s
reign to the end was really that of Elisabeth, and the comparison must lie not
between Louis XV and his uncle, but between Fleury and the Queen, between the
inexperienced priest and the halfeducated woman, the gentle old humourist and
the vivacious termagant. The advantage was not wholly on Fleury’s side.
Elisabeth knew what she wanted, and got much of it. Spaniards disliked herself
and her policy, but she nevertheless acted as a disagreeable tonic to the
nation, imparting the vigour which France lamentably lacked. Spain created a
fleet which was not afraid to fight the English; her infantry, wrote a French
agent, was inadequately clothed, but its spirit was higher than that of other
armies. In the field the Spaniards were well led by Montemar, La Mina, and
above all by the Walloon Gages, the ablest officer who fought in either of the
Italian wars. Nor must Eslava, the gallant defender of Cartagena de las Indias
in 1741, be forgotten.
Elisabeth is
usually too exclusively associated with the adventurous careers of Alberoni and
Ripperda. These Ministers only covered the twelve first years of her reign,
before she had gained political experience. During the last twenty years the
regime of the foreigner and the adventurer is over. It may be said that
Alberoni was her master, Patino her collaborator, while, after his death, she
was mistress. The administration of Spain by Spaniards began with Patino.
Though he was bom in Milan and educated in Italy, he was of Spanish extraction,
*nd his interests were Spanish. Keene was right in saying that his death left a
gap difficult to fill, and Elisabeth knew it. La Quadra was only her chief
clerk, but an excellent specimen of his class, honest, faithful, sensible, and
industrious. Her good heart regretted the necessity of his displacement; but
when the storm arose she had to choose a more skilful pilot in Campillo, and,
after his early death, in Ensenada, the two best of Patino’s pupils. These
three statesmen were no mere politicians, but administrators with practical
knowledge of military and naval organisation, of finance and provincial
government. Thus they had real creative power, and compare favourably with
other European ministers. To Elisabeth is due the credit of their appointment.
She •supported Patino even against her husband, who so hated him that he drew a
curtain whenever the Minister came to transact business. In diplomacy Castelar,
Montijo, La Mina, and Campo Florido were all on a level with the abler
diplomatists of the day.
Philip Vs
Court, as that of Louis XV, was never the centre of society. For four years,
indeed, its seat was in southern Spain. The immediate occasion of removal was
the double marriage of Ferdinand and his sister with Barbara and Joseph of
Portugal. After the wedding ceremonies at Badajoz in January, 1729, Seville
became the King’s headquarters, whence a long visit was paid to Granada, and
frequent excursions were made to Cadiz. Madrid, which had no trade, became “
little more than a corpse ”; but Cadiz, under Patino’s stirring influence, was
really the centre of what life there was in Spain. Philip’s health showed
little improvement. Either he would only give himself and his wife three hours
of rest, or else he lay in bed for weeks, his eyes fixed, his finger in his
mouth, or his lips moving vehemently, but without sound. Often he refused to be
shaved, to have his hair brushed, or his nails cut. He wore his trousers till
they dropped off; when his valet tired of mending them, he would borrow silk
from his wife’s maids, and essay the task himself. Fits of violence were not
uncommon. Once, when the Duke of Arco tried to save Elisabeth from Philip’s
fists, the King threw the gallant soldier to the ground.
Augustus II’s
death had a most healthful effect on Philip. The Court moved northwards, and
life at Aranjuez and San Ildefonso resumed a more or less normal course.
Elisabeth, whose figure began to unfit her for active exercise, provided indoor
amusements, making her children
act
drawing-room plays, and curing Philip of his dislike for music by the
importation of Farinelli. For some three-thousand nights this incomparable
falsetto sang the same five songs to the infatuated King, who howled them after
him song by song, or repeated the whole selection till the small hours. On the
whole Philip was never so much master of himself as in his last five years;
during the crisis of the Franco-Sardinian treaty (January, 1746), he played,
perhaps for the first time, the leading part.
Elisabeth’s
character never changed. She outlived Philip by twenty years, and till the end
the quality which visitors ascribed to her was vivacity. Her reputation
unfortunately rests mainly on the full despatches of French ambassadors.
Noailles complained that the fault of all French envoys was their ignorance of
Spain—it may be added, of the Italian character. Thus it is that Keene on the
one hand and the Venetian ambassadors on the other are often the safer guides.
Elisabeth was a thorough Italian, practical, material, and natural. She had the
passionate family sentiment of the Italians—“You would get impatient,” she
cried to the professedly celibate Bishop of Rennes, “ if you had a large family
to provide for.” She thought that she ought to have everything that she
desired, and that this everything was possible. The defects of her early
education could never be corrected. Sitting on a stool the livelong day in
front of her husband’s armchair, she could only pick up knowledge at random
from ministers and ambassadors. She acted on impulse rather than reason, but
impulse sometimes possesses a spirit of divination. In both the wars of Polish
and Austrian Succession she prophesied that French professions of eternal
friendship would end in the secret surrender of Spanish interests. She divined
truly that the Savoyard and not the Austrian was to be the real enemy of the
Italian Bourbons. In foreseeing that the Savoyard dynasty, then hated by all
Italy alike, would one day become the national leader, d’Argenson was more
prophetic.
Elisabeth’s
career must be misjudged if viewed from a solely Spanish, and not
Italo-Spanish, standpoint. In wresting Italian provinces from Spain the Treaty
of Utrecht had dealt less hardly with Spain than with Italy. The evils of
Austrian domination were indisputable, and Montesquieu stated in 1729 that
Spanish reoccupation was the only remedy. To put her own Italian children in
the place of the foreigner was no ignoble ambition for an Italian mother. The
enthusiastic welcome of Don Carlos in Naples and Sicily, and of Don Philip in
Parma and Milan, proved that her efforts were appreciated. Tuscany bitterly
resented its alienation to Lorraine. Even for Spain, if she was ever to be more
than a mere peninsular power, this renewed connexion with Italy offered
prospects. It was, after all, a return to the policy of her cleverest and most
successful King, Ferdinand the Catholic.
FINANCIAL
EXPERIMENTS AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT.
The intensity of
national rivalries in the seventeenth century stimulated enquiry into the
foundations of national power. It was easy to see that behind power lay wealth;
and, though the time was not then ripe for a systematic study of “the nature
and causes of the wealth of nations,” economic writers already argued that
wealth depended on numbers of people, their continuous employment, and an
influx of treasure to give life to industry. Thus it was that the competition
for commerce, by means of which the raw materials of many industries were
obtained, their finished products exchanged, and supplies of the precious
metals procured, and for colonies, with the commerce to which they gave birth,
waxed keener and keener, and contributed to cause the long War of the Spanish
Succession. That War marked only one stage in a struggle for commercial and
colonial opportunities prolonged throughout the century; but it bequeathed to
England and France a heritage of financial problems, in the solution of which
both countries ventured on daring experiments, and encountered immense
disasters. The story of these experiments forms an episode, though, in some
respects, an isolated episode, in colonial history; for, while they had their
root in, and drew their character from, the ambitions and theories which
governed commercial and colonial policy, their influence on the course of
events was not commensurate with their intrinsic interest, nor with the resounding
effects which their failure at the moment produced.
In 1715
France, with her rich resources, seemed on the brink of ruin. Since the death
of Colbert the standing debt had been increased to a gigantic height. By its
side was a huge floating debt. The Government was without credit; it raised
loans only at a ruinous cost; its promissory notes, billets d'itat, circulated
at a quarter of their face value, and much revenue was pledged for two years
ahead. Agriculture, commerce, and industry struggled beneath usurious rates of
interest and the accumulating burden of taxation. Recovery along the
traditional lines of French finance opened a long and dreary vista. In the
circumstances,
mi-me]
169
bankruptcy
was boldly proposed as a royal road to solvency, but from considerations of
honesty and policy was reluctantly rejected, and more defensible, though
scarcely less arbitrary, means were adopted, to deprive the financiers who had
battened on the necessities of the State of a part of their ill-gotten gains.
But such measures did not increase a declining revenue, nor facilitate the
raising of funds by an embarrassed Government ; and France cried out for a
great statesman to give her relief*
There was one
man whom the situation did not appal, but who saw in it the opportunity of
realising a life’s ambition, and of putting to the test certain theories of
national wealth and progress which he had developed into a system. This was the
celebrated John Law, already well known to the Regent Orleans and to the
principal Courts of Europe for his personal attractions, brilliant intellect,
and mastery of finance. The son of a goldsmith in Edinburgh, he had gained an
experience of banking in his father’s business, which he had much enlarged by a
study of the banks of London, Amsterdam, and Genoa. Calculation was to him an
absorbing passion, and though he had lived a roving life, and was said to have
built up a fortune by gambling and speculation, he was far from being a mere
adventurer. Ambitious, sanguine and disinterested, with a clear and penetrating
mind, and a grasp of economic principles far in advance of his time, he longed
to give his theories a practical application, believing that he had found a
secret more potent in its influence on the destinies of nations than the
discovery of the Indies with all their silver and gold. But conservative and
impoverished Courts would not stake their fortunes on his principles. In vain
he appealed to the Emperor, the Duke of Savoy, the Parliament of Scotland, the
English Government, the Ministers of Louis XIV. His overtures were always
refused. For years he watched the downward course of France, until, the
accession of his friend the Duke of Orleans to the Regency seeming to open a
new opportunity, he hurried to Paris to offer his services to the French
Government and people. His ardent mind bridged with a single idea the gulf
between national bankruptcy and prosperity; and, under the guidance of his
System, he believed that France might mount at one bound to such a preeminence
of wealth and power in Europe as no nation had ever possessed.
Economics, or
at least finance, he maintained, was a science, resting on fundamental
principles, and capable of supporting a coherent system of policy. The troubles
of France were due to financial mismanagement, to the unscientific policy
pursued. France had all the resources of wealth and power—a favourable geographical
position, fertile soil, pleasant climate, an industrious and active
population—and her prosperity ought to be apparent in the increasing numbers of
her people, in magazines well stocked with home and foreign goods, and in the
cheerfulness, courage, and good nurture of her working classes. But France had
neglected her industry and trade, on which population and commodities
depended.
Now, he argued (and here we reach the point of departure of the System), “
trade depends on money.” What the blood is to the body, that, he believed,
money is to the State, the animating force which gives life and vigour to every
part. “The best law without money cannot employ the people, improve the
product, or advance manufacture and trade.” The first difficulty, then, to be
overcome in the economic regeneration of France was “ the great scarcity of
money ”; and the centre of the problem was to adopt such a kind of money that
the supply oould easily be equalised with the demand. In this respect the
precious metals failed, for, in spite of their many useful qualities, they were
too difficult and costly to procure. Banks had been “ the best method yet
practised for the increase of money,” since by the circulation of their credit
they had multiplied money on a basis of gold and silver. But while they
suggested a solution, they had not attained it. The industries of a country
demanded more money than any bank yet established had been able.to supply.
Banks must therefore work on new principles; and in his proposals to the Scottish
Parliament, Law had suggested that the banks should issue notes secured, not on
the precious metals, but on land. He did not suppose that indefinite quantities
of money could be circulated, or that the mere increase of money was in itself
an enrichment of a country; but he believed that, in most countries at the
time, and particularly in France, the supply of money was much less than the
demand or need for it, and very much less than the demand would be if trade and
industry revived. He appears also to have believed that an inconvertible
paper-money would circulate, so soon as the people became familiarised with the
conveniences of paper, provided that it were not over-issued; and, if this
paper were supplied by the King on his credit, he was confident that it would
not be over-issued, because the King would never be so unwise as to ruin his
own credit and destroy the prosperity he was creating. Hence he concluded that
paper, or, in other words, credit—the credit of the State—could serve as money.
At the centre of affairs, under the royal control, would be a great state bank,
drawing into itself all the specie in the country, and supplying credit money
symbols of transmission—which were all that was required in commerce and
industry, in far greater quantities than the specie received; increasing or
diminishing the quantity as circumstances dictated; in its sovereign wisdom
never over-issuing; and thus satisfying without trouble and cost the great need
of money in accordance with the sure principle of equalising demand and supply.
No longer, then9 would money be withdrawn from circulation and
hoarded. Who would hoard paper? Who would need to hoard when scarcity of money
was never to be feared ? But what if the people were reluctant to use state
notes in the place of gold and silver? On this problem Law’s views oscillated.
In 1716 confidence was a plant of slow growth, and the acceptance of the notes
must be voluntary. In 1720 circumstances, and with them his
i7oo-2o]
Law’s■ financial and commercial ideas.
lTl
opinions, had
changed; the King must use his absolute power to compel the circulation of the
notes; legal compulsion created confidence.
To ensure a
supply of money proportionate to the demands of industry was perhaps Law’s
dominant idea; but, beyond this, the System involved far-reaching changes in
the economic organisation of the State. Law conceived of the nation as a whole,
whose members, though rendering different services and holding different
stations, ought to have a common interest in the national prosperity. But,
looking round, he saw on all sides class struggling against class, and no
consciousness of a common interest. He saw a Government that burdened the
people with oppressive taxation, and shackled industry with needless
restriction, to the detriment of its own and its subjects’ revenues; a class of
capitalists whose gains depended on the distresses of their country, who
stifled commerce with usurious interest; an official hierarchy, ridiculously
large, doubling the weight of taxation by their numbers and their corruption;
many small companies struggling with inadequate capital to hold their own in
the competition of foreign commerce; a labouring class, “the more necessary
part” of the State, unemployed and poverty-stricken. Was it impossible to
create a conception of a united interest and compel all to serve it ? Could not
the national forces be combined, and the striving of individual men and classes
be laid to rest, in some great scheme of cooperation, some giant consolidation
of existing enterprises, which, without destroying individual activity in
certain spheres, would unite competing groups and provide the strength for
vaster undertakings? Law believed that the System could achieve this. A company
could be formed to which the Government should grant all the commercial and
financial privileges then farmed by various bodies; in which the creditors of
the State should receive shares in exchange for their debts; and in which the
public should be induced to invest their savings. The one great organisation
would control the foreign commerce of France, develop the magnificent resources
of her colonial empire, reorganise her fiscal system, and, if necessary,
exercise a controlling influence on domestic producers; by consolidation with
the state bank it would unite the money and trading powers, so that the stream
of money should flow straight into the fields of commerce; by swallowing up all
existing associations, and thus engrossing all large capitals and sources of
revenue, it would enable the French nation to trade as a unit, and “ compel all
subjects to find their fortunes only in the happiness and opulence of the whole
kingdom.” Thus would be reared a giant trust, broad-based as France,
wide-reaching as the realms of commerce and finance. No foreign rival could
withstand such an institution, and English and Dutch would be swept from the
seas. Within the State the old conditions would be completely transformed.
Jarring interests would be harmonised, for all would be concerned in the
general prosperity. No more would the nation lie stricken at the feet of the
money-lender, whose power would be abased.
The
Government, so far from living by loans, would find abundant means in the
growing wealth of the country, and would itself finance industry and develop
the resources of France. The standing debt would be abolished, and the
capitalist, instead of preying on his country, would look to the gains of
commerce for his reward. No more would there be unemployment, for usury would
be extinguished and industry and commerce would not be starved for want of
capital. Restrictions on industry would be removed and the fiscal
administration remodelled. The nobility would be lifted out of the morass of
debt in which they were involved, and the peasantry, instead of being
impoverished by taxation and unemployment, would profit by a reviving
agriculture and lighter burdens. Thus, with abundance of money, a reorganised
commerce, interests harmonised, a united France would become “the mistress of
commerce and the arbiter of Europe.” Such was the glowing vision which Law
conjured up.
The
foundations of the System were laid with difficulty. The Regent, though
convinced himself that Law’s proposals were practicable, was not strong enough
to secure their immediate acceptance, The Council, advised by leading merchants
and financiers, disliked experiment and distrusted Law. Facile and persuasive,
he argued his case in memoranda and letters, and modified his scheme until he
asked simply permission to establish at his own risk a bank, to be worked on
the strictest lines, confident that it would succeed, and prove the
starting-point of the mighty financial revolution he designed. Founded in May,
1716, as a bank of discount and deposit, with the right to issue notes, the
Bank quickly achieved a conspicuous success. Its notes were welcomed, for they
were payable on demand, and represented not the lime toumois, whose value was
liable to sudden fluctuation, but a fixed weight of gold. Its recognised utility
enabled the Regent to extend its privileges. In April, 1717, its notes were
made receivable for taxes, and the provincial collectors, much against their
will, were ordered to use them in making their remittances to Paris.
Law’s second
creation was a commercial company. In the last quarter of the seventeenth
century intrepid adventurers marked out in North America a new sphere for
French enterprise, the great central basin of the continent watered by the
Mississippi. An influential merchant, Antoine Crozat, enjoyed in 1717 the
monopoly of its commerce, with little profit to himself or the country. Law’s
genius perceived that this great region must be capable of immense development;
and he asked and obtained permission to take over Crozat’s monopoly, and to
float a company for the commerce and colonisation of Louisiana. Thus, in
August, 1717, the Company of the West came into being, endowed with liberal
privileges, and possessing a nominal capital of a hundred million livres. But
France had seen too many schemes of colonisation bear no fruit, to regard with
enthusiasm an enterprise over which the
past history
of Louisiana, and of other commercial companies favoured with state patronage
cast a shadow of doubt. Moreover, the capital, like the capital of the bank,
was subscribed in billets d'etat, and was thus invested, not in Louisiana, but
in the state debt, leaving only the interest available for use. None the less,
Law could congratulate himself on the success he had achieved. The two great
organs of the System, the Bank and the Company, had been established—it
remained only to extend their functions and influence until they fulfilled the
promises he had made and achieved the regeneration of France.
In 1718 the
Parlement, always the enemy of the System, after a severe struggle with the
Regent, in the course of which it attacked both the Bank and Law, suffered
defeat and humiliation, and the way was thrown open for fresh advances. In
December the Bank was made a royal bank, and its notes became legal tender throughout
the kingdom, though from this time they represented only current coin. Their
circulation, continually growing with experience of their utility and
confidence in their value, was now quickened by the voice of the law. Gold and
notes alone, which meant in practice chiefly notes, were henceforth to be used
in large payments; and, in expectation of the increased demand for notes,
branches of the Bank were established in five of the principal towns. Thus the
acceptability of the notes was diminished, while at the same time new
facilities were opened for multiplying the quantity, since the dangerous power
of creating money rested virtually in the hands of the Regent.
The extension
of the Company next occupied the mind of Law. It was necessary to enlarge its
operations and increase its profits, in order to attract the capital of the
investor. The manufacture and sale of tobacco was a state farm, whose term was
just expiring. It was obviously of advantage to the Company to acquire a
monopoly which would benefit its colonial plantations; and Law accordingly
offered more than double the two million livres which had previously been paid.
He followed this up in December, 1718, by purchasing the privileges and
property of the Company of Senegal. These measures exercised a stimulating
influence on the fortunes of the Company whose shares began to rise. The
following year Law prepared for vaster operations. In May, the East India
Company and its off-shoot the China Company, neither of which was prospering,
and in July, the Company of Africa, which traded with the Barbary States,
yielded up their rights to the Company of the West, which henceforward took the
name of the Company of the Indies. In 1720, the last two independent commercial
associations, the Company of San Domingo and the Guinea Company, shared the
same destiny. In order to take advantage of the opportunities thus multiplied,
the Company required to raise new capital. The public, which had neglected the
Company of the West, had been profoundly impressed by the great transactions
which had brought into being the Company
of the
Indies. Law was thus able to issue 50,000 shares of 500 livres each, at a
premium of 50 livres, and to add the condition that four of the original shares
of the Company of the West, called meres, must be presented in purchasing a
file, or share in the Company of the Indies. As subscriptions were payable in
twenty monthly instalments, a great impetus was given to speculation, for which
an unrestricted issue of notes gave every facility; and the price of the shares
mounted with great rapidity. In July (1719) the Company bought the right of
coinage for nine years—a profitable right for which fifty million livres was
promised. Another issue of 50,000 shares, petites files, followed this new bargain.
The price was 1000 livres, the price of the existing shares, and four meres and
one file had to be presented by each subscriber for a petite fiUe. At the same
time Law boldly announced that from the beginning of 1720 two dividends of 6
per cent, would be paid annually. The promise fed the fires of speculation;
though it was very doubtful whether the tobacco monopoly, the profits of the
mint and of commerce, and the interest payable by the State could yield the sum
that would be required. Law, however, had other sources of revenue in view. The
farms of the indirect taxes were in the hands of the brothers Paris, powerful
financiers, who, copying Law’s methods, had organised a company known as the
Anti-System, which proved a formidable rival of the Company of the Indies. In
August, 1719, Law, outbidding the Anti-System, secured these farms for
fifty-two million livres a year, and struck down his opponents. To them were
added the general receipts from direct taxation, hitherto collected by
Receivers-General in each generality, so that the whole fiscal administration
was united under a single control. The reforms that followed cannot be
particularised here, but they constitute one of the chief triumphs of the
System. No sub-farms were created; taxation was simplified, and some oppressive
taxes removed; the Receivers-General were abolished; and by various measures
greater order, unity, and economy were introduced into this branch of
government.
It was in
return for these last concessions that Law attempted the greatest of his
financial operations. One by one he had dealt with the worst evils that
afflicted France—the scarcity of money, the floating debt, the paralysis of
foreign commerce, the costly and oppressive fiscal system—he now approached the
problem of the standing debt. The System had made money cheap. Everywhere
debtors were gaining. The seigneurs were clearing off their mortgages. The
moment had come for the State also to liquidate its debt, whose very existence
represented a dominance of private over public interest. So Law maintained; and
he therefore proposed that the Company should lend the Government fifteen
hundred million livres at 3 per cent., with which to pay off the rmfej-holders.
Both parties were to gain—the creditors of the State would find a more
profitable investment in the shares of the Company, while the Government would
reduce the rate of interest on the public
debt by 1 per
cent. Immense financial transactions followed. In four successive issues Law
placed upon the market 324,000 shares of 500 limes at a price of5000 livres
each. The bank poured out notes to meet the demands of speculation, and the
public rushed in and bought the new shares. Their price leaped up and
excitement reached fever pitch. It was only with difficulty and loss that the
rentes-holders made the exchange of their rights from the State to the Company.
For months there continued a madness of speculation which has never been
surpassed. The price of a share was raised to 12,000 livres. Fabulous fortunes
were realised by unknown and low-born men. Foreigners crowded into Paris, and
all classes were mingled in the melee of the Rue Quincampoix. A new and vulgar
passion seemed to have asserted its intrusive presence, and amidst the
excitement men observed a luxury and a depravation of manners that contrasted
strangely with the severities in which the late reign had closed. In such a
tumult of extravagant anticipation the System reached its zenith. Under its
auspices real things had been done, and fruitful enterprises set on foot; but
they were not represented by the milliards of paper values with which a
cosmopolitan throng gambled in the Rue Quincampoix. By conjuring up prospects
of gain, Law had awakened the interest and cupidity of the nation, which took
his vision for a reality, and bought and sold the wealth which he imagined.
Law had now
reached the summit of his fame and power. He was honoured and courted on all
sides. The fashionable world crowded to his levees, dukes and peers waited in
his ante-room. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, passing through France in 1718, found
to her delight “an Englishman (at least a Briton) absolute in Paris.” Foreign
Governments sought his good offices. From Germany, England and Italy came proposals
for the marriage of his children; from Edinburgh the freedom of the city in a
gold box. He was made a member of the Academy of Sciences, and, in January,
1720, after becoming a convert to the Catholic faith, Controller-General; in
March the title of Superintendent of Finance was revived and conferred on him.
But the inevitable reaction was at hand. A share of 500 livres could not be
maintained at 12,000 by a dividend of 12 per cent.; and shrewd men had begun to
realise and invest in real property. The shares showed signs of falling; and,
as speculation ceased, the evil effects of the inflated currency made
themselves felt. The System was threatened by a severe financial crisis, from
which there could be no escape. Uncertain what might happen were confidence
seriously disturbed, Law embarked on a heroic struggle against irresistible
forces, and burdened the System with the impossible task of maintaining the
price of the share and preventing the depreciation of the note. It is
impossible here to do more than summarise the fruitless efforts by which he
prolonged the agony throughout 1720, without staving off a collapse wherein
Bank, Company, and System were involved in common ruin. He declared a dividend
of 40 per cent., and took measures designed to
stimulate the
circulation of the notes, which were becoming suspect in commerce. In February
the Bank and Company were united—perhaps the two struggling swimmers might
support each other. But the effect of this measure, intended apparently to
maintain the credit of the note, was rather to sacrifice the credit of the
share. In March the price of the share was fixed at 9000 livres, and shares and
notes were made interchangeable in this ratio at the Bank. The use of specie
was virtually proscribed, and large quantities were confiscated. The Rue
Quincampoix was closed, and speculators were dispersed by the sabres of the
police. But notes still flowed from the bank presses in an unending stream.
More desperate remedies seemed to be required, and in May, on the ground that
the notes and shares were over-valued in relation to specie and commodities, it
was ordered that by gradual stages their value should be reduced to one-half.
With this the credit of the note was utterly destroyed, and panic complete and
universal reigned. A confused period followed. The edict was revoked, and Law
was superseded, though, with great courage, he remained in France throughout
the year and, fertile as ever in expedients, exerted himself to save the
institutions he had founded. But confidence could not be restored, and various
attempts to call in a part of the notes issued proved unavailing. The enemies
of the System closed in upon it. In October the Bank was abolished and the use
of specie permitted; in December Law went into exile, while the Parlement
returned from it. Early in 1721 the Company was deprived of many of its
privileges, and a severe inquisition made into all the debts of the System. The
creditors were divided into five classes and received compensation according to
the apparent justice of their claims. The inquisition ended, the mighty mass of
records that had been collected was deposited in a huge iron cage and burned in
the Bank court.
Not so easily
could the memories of Law’s work be obliterated or its influence for good and
evil undone. He had struck the note of a more liberal commercial and industrial
policy. He had simplified taxation, removed oppressive duties, broken down
provincial customs-barriers, recalled emigrants, and improved means of
communication by building roads and cutting canals. He had introduced fruitful
ideas into commerce and administration, had laboured hard to promote the
colonisation of Louisiana, and had turned the attention of France once more
towards maritime and colonial enterprise. In addition, he had relieved the
State of a part of its debt, and enabled many of the seigneurs to free
themselves. The price of this was the widespread ruin, the violent
redistribution of wealth which the rise and fall of the System caused, and the
reaction that followed in its train, wherein the benefits of most of his
reforms were lost. The Bank was not reestablished; but the Company, protected
by powerful friends, weathered the violences of the liquidation, recovered some
of its former privileges, and, though never very prosperous, survived until
1769.
Prom the retreat
of exile, his eyes turned on France, in vain hope to be recalled, Law watched
the dissolution of his work. Invincible optimist as he was, his faith in his
principles remained unshaken. He confessed that he had moved too fast, but
attributed the failure to unexpected events which had compelled a departure
from his plans. Montesquieu visited him at Venice, where he died in 1729, and
found him still the same man, still absorbed in projects, still calculating
values. It is no longer necessary to add that he was no charlatan. He was, in
fact, a great man, and of his disinterestedness and integrity there can be no
question. Ambition actuated him; and, playing ever high, he staked and lost his
name and fortune on his System. In character he exhibited the rare combination
of the audacious and brilliant theorist with the cool-headed man of action. His
mind, solely absorbed in economics, was, in some respects, typical of the
commercial spirit of his time; yet, in his sympathy and care for the masses of
the people, he rose above its harder manifestations, and joined hands with
later thinkers. No doubt prudence ought to have restrained him from the attempt
to revolutionise the financial system of a nation in a few brief months; but a
sanguine temper urged him along untrodden paths, whose pitfalls experience had
not then revealed. He brought disaster on France; yet he deserved better of her
than exile, spoliation, and calumny.
It was not a
mere coincidence that events, in some respects similar to those just narrated,
were happening at the same time on the other side of the Channel. England, like
France, was burdened with a heavy debt, and her Government also turned, not for
the first occasion, to a commercial company for aid, and secured financial
assistance by the concession of trading privileges. But the South Sea Company
and its scheme cannot altogether be compared with the Company of the Indies and
the System. The sustained and scientific effort of Law to remodel the economic
life of France has an originality and a scope far beyond the attempt made in
England to lighten a financial burden and to develop a trade with South
America. The same cupidity, the same infatuation contributed to the failure of
both; but the Bubble, inspired by fewer ideas than the System, and less vast in
its ambitions, was also less fearful in the ruin that it wrought. The South Sea
Company owed its origin to a measure of Harley’s for the improvement of the
public credit. In 1710 there existed a floating debt of more than nine millions
sterling, for the repayment of which no provision had been made. Harley offered
to incorporate the proprietors of this debt as a chartered company with a
monopoly of the trade to Spanish America, for which it was expected that
considerable facilities would be granted in the Treaty of Peace then being
negotiated. The rumoured wealth of the Spanish Indies gave to the proposal a
singular fascination, and the Company was formed. It was forbidden to transact
banking business, or to send vessels into Eastern waters, but it was to have
the exclusive
right of
trade with Spanish America, and to be permitted to make discoveries and plant
settlements within the territorial limits assigned. Its privileges were to be
perpetual, but the debt, on which the Government guaranteed an interest of 6
per cent., was to be redeemable at one year’s notice after 1716.
That the
Company thus founded never took a conspicuous place in the annals of our trade
and empire, but had a chequered and unpros- perous career, and sank into an
inglorious decline, was due, not to defects in the scheme or to lack of energy,
but principally to want of opportunity. It never enjoyed any real prospect of
developing commerce with the Spanish possessions, or of planting colonies in
South America, and the enlargement of its trading privileges which it was led
to expect was afterwards refused. The concessions secured by the Treaty of
Utrecht proved very slender, and were hedged about with qualifications which
much diminished their utility. In addition to the famous Asiento, Great Britain
received permission to send for thirty years an annual vessel of 500 tons
burden (Spanish measure) to trade at certain specified ports. Both of these
rights were chiefly valued for the more profitable contraband trade which they
made possible. Troubles gathered thick round the American trade in its infancy.
Unexpected delays, obstacles, charges, and confiscations by Spanish officials,
for which no redress could be obtained, diminished its profits; and, on the-
outbreak of war in 1718, the Spanish Government seized the effects of the
Company, contrary to the original agreement. The Directors, however, had
achieved some success and profit by certain financial transactions which they
had undertaken on behalf of the Government; and they were thus encouraged to
put forward the great scheme which has given to the Company its principal fame.
Their
proposal, after some of its more grandiose features had been removed in
consultation with Ministers, was that the Company should take over thirty-one
millions of unconverted debt, consisting chiefly of irredeemable annuities, by
purchase from the proprietors or by subscription into their capital stock. The
gain to the State was large and evident. An immense debt would be converted
into a redeemable form, while the interest upon it was to be reduced from five
to four per cent, after 1727, and in addition, the Directors offered to pay
£3,500,000 as the price of the contract. The Government accepted the scheme;
but the House of Commons, persuaded that taking over debt was a very profitable
operation, determined “as it were to set the nation to auction," with the
result that the Bank outbid the Company. The Directors hereupon increased their
offer to £7,500,000. This competition, carried far beyond the bounds of
prudence, was fatal to a doubtful scheme. The Company’s stock could never be
worth the high price to which it would have to be raised before the transaction
could be successfully completed, and the project should have been still-born.
But,
unfortunately,
people were deceived by the arts and the rashness of the Directors, with the
extraordinary consequence that “ the more the South Sea Company were to pay to
the public, the higher did their stock rise upon it ” ; and, before the South
Sea Act had passed through Parliament, where it was opposed by Walpole and
others, the price of the stock had risen above 300. Before proceeding to deal
with the annuitants, the Directors issued two money subscriptions, the first at
300, the second at 400, which were eagerly bought. They then proposed what
were, in the circumstances, favourable terms for the exchange of the annuities,
of which considerably more than one-half were immediately subscribed, some
having been deposited at the South Sea House before any announcement had been
made. The price of the stock rose at a prodigious rate, though with strange and
violent fluctuations; the Directors lent out money freely on subscription
receipts and the bankers treated them “as good as land security.” In the
conditions that prevailed, these facilities stimulated speculation until the
course of events became “ ungovernable.” The Directors yielded to the clamour
for a third money subscription, and sold five millions of stock at 1000. In
August, 1720, they received a second subscription of the irredeemables.
But the South
Sea Company did not monopolise the interest of the public. It was the giant
bubble in a sea of bubbles. During the preceding two or three years many
projects of various kinds—industrial, commercial, and financial—had been
advertised; and in the fever of excitement which attended the great operations
of the South Sea Company, their number multiplied with astonishing rapidity.
Every day saw new schemes put forward by enterprising stockbrokers who took
small deposits. The majority at least bore rational titles, and related to
fisheries, insurance, colonisation, land improvement, or the establishment of
some manufacture, though a few were purely fantastic, and one audacious thief
sounded the depth of public credulity with “a certain...design, which will
hereafter be promulgated,” and found it bottomless. Neither promoter nor
subscriber as a rule expected that a business would be set on foot; both wished
to gain by speculating in the shares created. Many of these smaller companies
received the support of distinguished names. The Prince of Wales became a
Governor of the Welsh Copper Company, in spite of the protests of Walpole, and
gained £40,000, before a remonstrance from the judges induced him to resign his
lucrative position. Amid scenes of great excitement the shares were hawked in
Change Alley. At milliners’ and haberdashers’ shops, or in taverns and
coffee-houses, ladies and gentlemen met their brokers. Innumerable transactions
took place, and much money changed hands. People who had made profits in the
smaller ventures hastened to invest them in the older and greater companies,
whose shares rose to an unprecedented height. The Hudson’s Bay Company, anxious
to improve the occasion, prepared to create additional shares for sale to
the public.
“'Hie very bank became a bubble,” and lent out money on its own stock. The
Government remained, in Aislabie’s words, “ only spectators of this melancholy
scheme ”—unable to control the Company from whom such hard terms had been
exacted.
The great
majority of the Bubble Companies had no legal status, being neither
partnerships nor chartered bodies; and the South Sea Directors, believing their
existence prejudicial to the rise of South Sea stock, procured a writ against
some of them by name and against the others in general. The writ struck
consternation on the crowd of operators in Change Alley. The projectors
disappeared, and the orgy of speculation suddenly ceased. But prudent men had
doubted for some time the soundness of the Company’s own policy; and the
extraordinary collapse of the smaller bubbles, with the consequent ruin of many
people, spread distrust far and wide, and the price of the stock fell rapidly.
The Directors sought to sustain it by lavish promises of dividends, but a more
calculating spirit had succeeded to the frenzy of expectation, and men no
longer believed that dividends of thirty and fifty per cent, were possible. By
September 20 the stock had fallen to 410, whence it rose for a moment to 675 on
the rumour that the Bank was coming to the assistance of the Company, only to
fall again with greater rapidity, when the negotiations with the Bank failed,
to 175 by the end of the month. Passion had subsided, and the great delusion
was at an end. Thousands of people of all classes now found that, in a moment
of infatuation, they had been beguiled into surrendering a substance to grasp a
shadow, and that they were ruined.
In the
general confusion and recrimination Walpole found himself summoned by common
consent to propose a remedy. It was no easy matter to mitigate the vindictive
spirit of the Commons, and turn their energies towards practical measures for
the restoration of public credit and the relief of those who had suffered.
Believing that the South Sea scheme, for all the evils that it had entailed,
had achieved a great public end, by transforming the irredeemable annuities
into a redeemable debt bearing a lower rate of interest, he wished to “ rely on
the main foundation” that the contracts made with the Company should be left
untouched. When this had been agreed, he proposed that 18 millions of South Sea
stock should be engrafted into the stocks of the Bank and the East India
Company; that unsold South Sea stock, of which there remained some 14 millions,
should be distributed amongst the existing proprietors as a dividend; and that
money subscribers should be relieved from further payments. In addition part
(afterwards increased to the whole) of the sum promised by the Company , to the
nation was to be remitted. The proposals were accepted by Parliament, but the
engraftment of the 18 millions of stock, owing to the opposition of the other
two Companies concerned, was never carried out.
Meanwhile,
the Commons proceeded with punitive measures. In
January,
1721, a committee was appointed to examine the manner in which the South Sea
Act had been executed. Its report exposed: “ a scene of iniquity and
corruption.” The Company’s books would not bear examination. Some had been
destroyed or secreted. Knight, the cashier, had disappeared with the register
called the green book; in others “ false and fictitious entries,” “ entries
with blanks,” “ entries with rasures and alterations ” were discovered. A
fictitious stock of £574,000 had been disposed of before the South Sea Act was
passed, and “ no mention made of the name of any person whatsoever to whom the
stock is supposed to be sold.” It had helped to promote the Bill. The Directors
had laid themselves open to charges of illegality, corruption, and favouritism;
and some members of the Government -ppeared to have been accomplices. Aislabie,
the Craggs’, father and son, Charles Stanhope, and Sunderland were all accused
of having used their position to make profit from the scheme. The House of
Commons, carried away by the passions of the moment, acted with great severity
and little discrimination and confiscated the greater part of the estates of
the Directors, as well as of Aislabie and the elder Craggs. Walpole moderated
as far as he could the fierceness of the outburst. He defended Stanhope, who
was .acquitted by a majority of three, “ which put the town in a flame ”;
intervened on behalf of Aislabie, who was expelled the House and committed to
the Tower, and saved his old rival Sunderland, and with him the Whig
administration. The Craggs’, father and son, dying suddenly, escaped
condemnation—against the younger little had been proved. Thus the Bubble mania
ended. There had been a widespread overturning of fortunes, many innocent
people had suffered severely, and the collapse of credit injured industry and
trade in all parts of the country. But the nation had gained in having achieved
its ends; and a few more prescient individuals, who sold their stock at the
right moment, reaped immense fortunes.
The
subsequent history of the Company may be briefly outlined. In 1722 it was
permitted to sell four millions of its stock to the Bank, and in the following
year to divide the remainder, nearly 34 millions, into two equal parts, the one
to be annuity, the other tradiug stock. For eight years it made a courageous
effort to revive the Greenland whale-fishery, but without success. Nor did its
American trade prosper. As early as 1732, the surrender of the Asiento and of
the annual ship for an equivalent was seriously discussed; but the irregular
trade connected with these rights was considered too valuable to the nation.
However, the next year, the Company obtained permission to transform
three-quarters of its trading stock into new annuity stock, clear of all
trading risk; and at last, in 1750, in exchange for £100,000 from the Spanish
Government, they abandoned, for the remaining four years of their term, the
concessions obtained at Utrecht, and an end was put to a trade which, “ without
any substantial benefit to Great
Britain, had
given insuperable umbrage to the Court of Madrid.” The surrender virtually
terminated the commercial history of the Company, though its exclusive
privileges were not taken away until 1807. In 1853 the remaining South Sea
annuities were either redeemed or converted into other government stock,
“ National
power and wealth,” wrote Law, “ consists in numbers of people and magazines of
home and foreign goods. These depend on trade....” The statement may serve as a
terse expression of the economic faith and ambition of the early eighteenth
century. It explains the concentration on commercial and industrial expansion,
to which both the Bubble mania in England and the System in France bore
witness. It explains moreover the colonial policy of the older nations. They still
regarded the new lands as plantations, sources whence raw materials were
obtained, markets under control, playing their part in general history by the
services they rendered to their mother States; and remained blind or
indifferent to the significance of the great development these lands were
undergoing. Thus trade increased and flourished; but, save in the case of the
French, colonising energy waned. Between 1713 and the outbreak of the American
War few new colonies were planted; and in the history of maritime exploration,
there is little to record from the voyages of Dampier to those of Cook and his
French and English contemporaries. To the eagerness of the sixteenth century,
and the enthusiasm of the seventeenth, had succeeded, with more knowledge, a
more calculating spirit and more definite aims. It seemed better to develop
existing fields of colonisation than to compass sea and land to find new. With
fewer fresh beginnings there was less unavailing effort; and, save that the
long rivalry of French and English proceeded to its conclusion* less wasting
strife amongst the nations for the ownership of territory. By 1713, their
various spheres of action had been largely determined, either by treaty, or by
the surer arbitration of impregnable possession. In the East, Dutch, English,
and French divided almost the whole of the trade; and, in 1731, the Emperor
Charles VTs endeavour to obtain a share for the merchants of the Austrian
Netherlands by the foundation of the Ostend East India Company, was finally defeated
by their united diplomatic efforts. The political significance of this
transaction is described elsewhere. But, though colonial progress rested
principally on the foundations already laid, it did not slacken. The young
societies of the New World grew rich and strong, enlarged their borders, and
found in their own vigorous life the impetus which the overflowing enterprise
of Europe, now concentrated in narrower channels, had formerly provided. Only
a tew words need here be said as to their expansion, since it resulted in the
founding of new States and a complete transformation of the colonial world,
which are described in later volumes.
On the
continent of North America the great problem of the eighteenth century was, who
should colonise the vast interior—the English, firmly planted on the Atlantic
plains, or the French, strongly posted on the St Lawrence P In favour of the
French were their prior possession, ease of access and unflagging and brilliant
ambition. But they fought against insuperable odds. It was population and
wealth that were to tell, and the adventurous enterprise of their leaders was
fruitless when not backed by the strength of the colonist. Louisiana, indeed,
had struggled painfully into existence, and Canada, in spite of an unfavourable
climate and soil and the dangerous navigation of the St Lawrence, had made real
progress. At a time when kings had ceased to study Canadian censuses, and the
hopes of France were turned towards the Mississippi, a French-Canadian people
was coming into being. But in this competition the English had completely
distanced their opponents. In the growth of their population, the success of
their agriculture, and the activity of their commerce, England’s Atlantic
colonies had more than realised the promise of the preceding century, and
already discerning eyes caught a glimpse of a marvellous future. Rich and
populous, these colonies craved wider boundaries, and threatened to overflow
into the Ohio Valley. Nor was their strength that of wealth alone. They were fully
developed societies. Their self-government was a reality; only in industry and
commerce did they suffer the control of the mother country, and in commerce her
regulations were systematically evaded. They enjoyed a substantial race unity,
and though local patriotism was strong—for differences of religion and of
economic conditions had caused striking diversities in their development—they
were not unconscious of common interests or of a common destiny. Thus economic
strength seemed to be pitted against imperial imagination; but, while the issue
was still doubtful, the fortunes of war over a wider field transferred the
French North American possessions to the English Crown.
In Central
and South America the distribution of power remained unchanged. No further
Teutonic encroachments disturbed the Latin nations in the security of their
vast dominions; save where, in Central America, the persistence of the
logwood-cutters established a right which, recognised and amplified in
treaties, led to the foundation of the British colony of Honduras. The Spanish
Government still continued, but with no greater success, a vain struggle to
monopolise the commerce of its empire; and the strange spectacle was presented
of colonist, foreigner, and official combining to defeat the regulations and
policy of the mother country. Mexico and Peru cried out for freer trade; and
Dutch, English, French, and Danish smugglers bought or forced an entrance for
their goods. Several islands in the West Indies flourished on this contraband, and
Buenos Ayres became a great city. In the latter half of the century, by
cautious and leisurely steps, Spain relaxed her restrictions, to the great
advantage of her colonies, but
without
removing the sense of grievance which her policy had excited. The progress of
Brazil continued, and the southern provinces much increased in wealth and
importance. The discovery of gold and then of diamonds brought settlers and
commerce. Rio de Janeiro became a busier port than Bahia, though the wealth of
the country still rested on sugar and coffee plantations rather than on
minerals.
These great
developments and their consequences form the chief features of colonial history
during the eighteenth century. In the earliest arenas of colonisation, the West
Indies and the African coast, such changes were not possible. Nature fixed
narrow limits to the economic progress of small islands, and hence also to
their capacity of self-defence and their political outlook. And progress was
not only limited; it was also uncertain and fluctuating. Where fertile land was
to be had, thither men hurried; and the growth of an island community might be
rapid in the extreme; but, wasteful methods of cultivation exhausting the soil,
the fortunes of most islands, after a brief period of prosperity, declined to a
certain normal level, varying according to their advantages and the competition
of other islands. Thus supremacy shifted from one to another. Throughout the
West Indies the principal industry was the cultivation of sugar. Cocoa, indigo,
cotton, and coffee plantations also existed; but the exports of these
commodities could not compare in value with that of sugar—and only in the
Bermudas and Bahamas, which were comparatively neglected, were other industries
more important. Yet the anxieties of sugar cultivation were great. A large
capital had to be sunk in land, buildings, and stock, and serious risks of loss
by hurricane, slave revolt, or capture at sea to be faced; though, on the other
hand, could be set the sure market at a high price, and the large returns of a
good season. From the English islands the greater part of the crop was exported
to the mother country; the remainder, together with rum and molasses, to the
English colonies on the mainland, in exchange for horses, lumber, and provisions,
since few of the islands were entirely self-sufficing in their food supplies.
Many of the proprietors were absentees, and much of the capital invested was
raised in England, especially in the case of the Windward Islands. As sugar
production extended, so also did the slavery system. The large plantation
displaced the small freehold, and the negro ousted the white workman. Almost
everywhere the African population out-numbered, and was generally many times
greater than, the European. The social order took the form of a planter
aristocracy resting on slave labour, and the white middle class either
disappeared or lost in status. Hence arose societies fragile in their
structure, limited in their development, and cruel in their laws. The governing
class, exposed to constant danger of an upheaval in the ranks of industry
below, protected itself by stringent and heartless legislation. On the
plantations the slaves appear to have been generally overworked. It was not the
climate, but the system, which decimated the black population, and
rendered its
natural increase so small that an immense annual importation was necessary to
maintain its numbers. Yet the negro was not incapable of freedom, any more than
he was of brutal retaliation. The Maroons of Jamaica, hardy descendants of
Spanish slaves, or of fugitives from English masters, gave an example, before
the day of Toussaint L’Ouverture, of black communities able to assert and
maintain their independence. The Government of the island, unable to extirpate
these troublesome bands, had been compelled to guarantee their freedom and
assign them reserves of land. Thus, in much which represents the triumph of
civilisation over barbarism, the development of the West Indies was slow. In
days of struggle and experiment it was no wonder that life was restless, and
the progress of the arts small. But the eighteenth century saw little
amelioration of these evils. Nature offered no fairer scene of colonisation
than the islands in the Caribbean Sea, but nowhere were manners more unbridled,
slavery crueller, and the higher interests of civilisation more completely
neglected. Commerce, lawful and unlawful —the sugar trade, the logwood trade,
the negro trade, the contraband trade—governed all things. Buccaneering indeed
had ceased; but piracy, mean and cruel, continued. Desperate men still infested
the seas, giving little quarter and receiving less. Slave conspiracies and
revolts darkened the annals of most years. The evils were partly a result of
political and economic insecurity, and partly of a spirit of commercial
exploitation unrestrained in the interests of the general social welfare.
The rivalry
of French and English showed itself as conspicuously in the West Indies as on
the mainland. After 1713 both Powers turned their attention to the Windward
Islands. But their claims collided, and for years little was done, since each
prevented the other from making settlements. The pressure of population, the
impetus of progress, and the attractions of such islands as St Lucia, Grenada,
and St Vincent were, however, certain to break down this policy of mutual
exclusion. A partition was necessary, and fortunately for England, one was
made in 1763, at the close of a war in which she had achieved a decisive
success. France received St Lucia; England, Grenada and St Vincent as well as
Tobago and Dominica, and new fields of colonisation were thus laid open. But
the relative position of the different Powers depended on the development of
the islands which they owned as well as on the acquisition of new territory. In
this respect the French had an advantage. Their islands were larger than those
of other Powers, with the exception of the Spanish, and their policy was wiser.
In the English islands taxation was heavier, and trade was more restricted than
in the French, while the refining industry was discouraged by a high duty on
refined sugar imported into the mother country. In addition, the French were
more successful in the management of the negro, who, under better treatment,
was found more orderly, sensible, and honest. It was generally said that the
energy of the English had declined, and they certainly suffered from
186 European Powers in the West Indies.-West
Africa. [1713-83
a want of
great leaders. In Jamaica much good land lay unoccupied, and, though this
remained the most populous and richest of the English islands, its progress had
disappointed expectations. Both from a military and a commercial point of view
its central position rendered it of great value to the English, and Kingston was
a home of all West Indian trades. In the Leeward Islands there was little
change. The occupation of the Windward Islands proceeded slowly after 1768.
Tobago, which suffered endless vicissitudes of fortune, was ceded to the French
in 1783, though afterwards recovered. Barbados remained throughout the century
an inviolate fortress of British power, and exhibited more of the order and
decency of civilisation than was to be found elsewhere in the West Indies. Of
the political life of the English islands little needs to be said. In 1764 the
Government of Grenada was formed, including also the islands of Tobago, St
Lucia, and, for a time, Dominica, though Dominica in 1770 received a separate
Governor. All the islands enjoyed self-government, and on the whole their
relations with the mother country were good. They had grievances; they complained
that the Governor was sent to make what he could of them, that the civil
establishment was too expensive, and that heavy taxation handicapped them in
competition with the French islands; but they were probably not unconscious
that their interests were carefully regarded in England, and that the mother
country bore the burden of their defence, which the condition of their militia
did little to lighten.
In the West
Indies the activity of French and English always contrasted strongly with the
receding energy of the Spaniards, as did their policy of colonisation with the
commercial policy of Dutch and Danes. Thus the stream of progress scarcely
touched the Spanish islands. Porto Rico remained a penal settlement, and in
Trinidad the cocoa plantations went into decay. Nor did sugar cultivation yet
usurp the upper hand in Cuba, where the whites still outnumbered the blacks,
and the small freeholder held his ground. The Danes in 1733 bought Santa Cruz
from the French, but the progress of their islands was for a long time fettered
by the control of an exclusive company. The Dutch owned but a “ rock or two,”
St Eustatius and Cura^oa with Oruba and Buen Ayre; but frugality, diligence, and
concentration on business brought them wealth. The trade of Cura^oa always
flourished, and in war time it was “the common emporium of the West Indies.” On
the mainland, by persistent industry, they established sugar plantations on the
banks of the Berbice, the Essequibo, and, in 1745, of the Demerara also; whose
courses they followed far into the interior in pursuit of the Indian trade.
The price of
the rapid colonisation of North America was partly paid by Africa, which still
lay under the blighting influence of the slave trade. On the west coast a line
of forts and factories, planted at the mouths of small streams or on adjoining
islands, and much coming and going of vessels, bringing in the varieties of
manufactures required, and
bearing away
their human cargoes, represented the principal activity of Europe. No Power
sought territorial dominion, or attempted exploration and settlement. The
primitive civilisations of the interior offered little opportunity for general
commerce, and though there was a Gum Coast, a Grain Coast, an Ivory Coast, and
a Gold Coast, and these commodities and also redwood were obtained in small
quantities, almost everywhere it was the negro traffic which dominated. From
Cape Blanco in the north to the Portuguese settlement of Loanda in the south,
over a distance of 1300 leagues, the slave trader ranged. In Senegambia control
passed into the hands of the English; the Windward Coast was a Portuguese
sphere; on the Gold Coast the trade belonged chiefly to the English and Dutch;
further south chiefly to the French and Dutch, and south of the Congo to the
Portuguese again, who from here worked across the continent to their
possessions on the east coast. It is difficult to estimate accurately the
volume of a trade which fluctuated from year to year, but certainly it
underwent a continual expansion down to the time of the American War, when it
had probably attained its largest dimensions. The growth of the sugar islands,
the cultivation of tobacco in Virginia and of rice and cotton in the
Carolinas, the development of the Spanish mines, the increasing needs of
Brazil, where Pombal made the freedom of the Indians a reality, all contributed
to enlarge the demand for negroes, until, in occasional years towards the end
of the century, the total export from Africa might exceed 100,000, though the
annual average was certainly very much less. The English alone, at a low
estimate, carried over two million negroes to America in the period between
1680 and 1786. They generally enjoyed the largest share of the trade, but no
one of the colonising nations kept its hands entirely clean. All saw in it “the
chief and fundamental support ” of their American plantations. The Portuguese
drew their slaves from a wider field than the other Powers, from East as well
as West Africa; and they had in Brazil an immense market, whose nearness
diminished the losses of the Atlantic journey, or Middle Passage, as it was
called. The French took a prominent part, until at the end of the century they
were driven from the seas; so did the Dutch, who in 1791 owned fifteen of the
forty stations on the Guinea Coast, and the New Englanders and Danes also had a
share. The encouragement and control of the trade received the most careful
attention of the English Government; and the African Company was described as
“the most beneficial to this island of all the Companies that ever were formed
by our merchants.” A business destined in the course of time to be prohibited
by law seemed in the eighteenth century so important for the development of our
manufactures, shipping, and plantations as to receive, not only national
regulation and protection, but also a national subsidy. In 1730 Parliament
granted the African Company £10,000 a year towards the maintenance of its forts
and
factories, for
the ten per cent, on their exports to Africa paid by private traders had lapsed
in 1712, and the Company could no longer bear its burdens unaided. But the
Company did not recover, and at last Parliament, fearing the injurious results
of a declining negro trade, intervened, and in 1750 wound up the old Company
and substituted a Regulated Company, subject to the control of a managing
committee and including all merchants trading to Africa, to which the annual
grant was continued. This was the third distinct system on which the African
trade had been organised.
It was
impossible that such extensive traffic in the human species by the foremost
nations of the world should continue indefinitely. Even in an age which did not
lend an attentive ear to human suffering, the horrors of the Middle Passage,
and the fearful mortality of the negroes in the process of acclimatisation and
under the rigours of the plantation system, excited protest; and when, in the
latter part of the century, with the progress of the Evangelical party, a
strong humanitarian sentiment gained ground in England, a movement was begun
which, gradually accumulating strength from various quarters, assembled some of
the most distinguished men of the day to battle against the commercial
interests involved. In 1787 was formed the famous committee for the abolition
of the trade, whereon sat many members of the Society of Friends, long to the
front in this fight; Granville Sharp, who had procured Lord Mansfield’s
decision in 1772, putting an end to slavery in England; Clarkson, who as a
Cambridge graduate had written a memorable thesis against slavery; and
Wilberforce. But the fear of injuring the country’s shipping and colonial
trade, and the belief that other nations would continue the business, even if
Great Britain abandoned it, long prevented any change; and it was the Regent of
Denmark who led the way in 1792 by prohibiting the trade in Danish possessions
from 1802; nor was it until 1807 that in England and the United States Acts of
abolition were passed. Meanwhile* other events were changing the relations of
Europe and Africa. In 1795 Mungo Park made his first great journey of
exploration for the African Association. Moreover in 1787 the Sierra Leone
Company was founded; certain philanthropists fathered and the Government
supported a scheme for returning the emancipated negro to the land of his
origin, and for opening the continent to a more civilised commerce than that
which had hitherto darkened its history.
There was one
part of Africa which lay outside the sphere of this desolating traffic. In the
Cape Colony, which had remained a possession of the Dutch East India Company,
settlement had been extended, and, as a result of peculiar geographical and
political conditions and a mixture of races, a new national type had come into
being. The Dutch formed the predominant element, but the French Huguenots, who
came
to Africa at
the end of the seventeenth century, and the Germans, who arrived in
considerable numbers after the middle of the eighteenth, had also contributed.
In 1791 the European population numbered about 15,000 with 17,000 slaves. The
white colonists could be divided into three groups, whose interests were
somewhat separate: the trading classes of Cape Town, the com and wine farmers
of the adjoining country, and the graziers. The latter had penetrated into the
interior. Silently dispersing over the country—their ranches far apart—they had
carried the bounds of settlement north almost to the Orange river, and east to
the Great Fish river, where they had come at last into collision with the Kosa
Kaffirs, then advancing along the eastern margin of the continent. They formed
the Boer people, whose character, fashioned in circumstances of isolation,
hardship and simplicity, was to exert so strong an influence on the course of
South African history. No foreign Power interfered with a colony which seemed
to have only the slenderest resources, and which was in fact a continual source
of expense; but its life was troubled by the economic oppression almost
everywhere associated with company control. The Dutch saw the Cape as part of a
wider dominion, and failing to reconcile the problem of local self-government
with that of imperial development, they ruled it autocratically. A governor,
who was usually seeking promotion to some more lucrative post, advised by a
council of officers, shared with a financial minister, the Independent Fiscal,
the responsibilities of administration. Representative institutions were
wanting, though local boards for the settlement of small disputes sustained in
some degree the spirit and form of local liberty, and, in addition, burgher
councillors sat in the High Court of Justice. The selfishness of the Company’s
rule, especially in the last quarter of the century, and the corrupt practices
of its officials, at last provoked a section of the colonists to resistance;
but, in the midst of their struggle for a greater economic and political
freedom, the Revolutionary Wars began, and the colony passed into the hands of
the English.
The signs of
change visible in Africa were but a faint reflexion of the greater changes
taking place or threatening on the other side of the Atlantic. For the colonial
world an epoch was ending, and a period of great and violent transformation had
begun. In North America the English colonies, easily alienated at the last,
wrested their independence from the mother country, and resisting the
inclination to division, united to form a powerful State. In the West Indies,
incapable of so great an effort and so wide an outlook, voices of sympathy were
raised. In San Domingo a negro republic made itself free. In South America the
hold of Spain on her vast dominions was loosed at last, and they broke up into
a group of States. About the same time, Brazil repudiated the authority of
Portugal. All the great colonising Powers shared the same fate—their offspring
threw off their control. With one mind, the young
nations rose
up and condemned the old colonial system. The South African farmer and the New
England merchant, the Creole of Peru and the emancipated negro, all were
animated by the same spirit. So universal was the movement that it seemed like
a normal and inevitable development. It seemed as though the life of a colony
naturally progressed through certain stages to this final issue—first, the
distant voyage, the perilous exploration, the clash with aboriginal peoples,
the long and painful struggle with nature; then, the young society, embodying
the civilisation and arts of the mother country, with its useful commerce and
its nursery of political posts; and, after that, the growth of its own
characteristics and the increasing sense of power and selfinterest, to be
disregarded and stifled as long as possible, but sure to lead on to the last
act of separation and self-assertion. Certainly, the Governments of Europe were
not unconscious that this might be the end of all their efforts, and France and
Spain denied to their colonies the political life which might hasten its
coming. England to a great extent neglected possibilities and waited to deal
with facts. But all alike were helpless in face of so great an issue, and saw
no alternative line of colonial evolution. In this sphere the political ideas
of the eighteenth century seemed to be exhausted. To develop imperial commerce
had become a less urgent problem than to foster the sense of a common loyalty
in mother country and colony; but no nation proved capable of adaptation to the
new conditions, and no adequate imperial policy was anywhere formulated. The
conceptions of the Old World lagged behind the facts of the New. Where
communities of white men had established themselves and grown strong, political
ambition and self-consciousness were sure to make their appearance, and such
communities would not rest satisfied with a limited economic freedom and a
subordinate political status. With interests and character of their own, they
would not remain the appendages of greater Powers, mere counters in the game of
European preeminence. Either the nature of the relations must change or the
bonds be broken. And, since the mother country offered at best nothing more
than a commercial treaty, whose terms were settled wholly by herself, the
colonists gave play to a more youthful and vigorous imagination, and saw in an
independent national being a more attractive vision. Looking back, then, on the
attitude of Europe to her colonies, with little elasticity, imagination, or
sympathy, and also on the character pf those colonies themselves, strong,
sensitive, and aspiring, the dissolution of their union awakens no surprise. If
it was possible “ to found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a
people of customers,” it was not for this alone that it could be maintained.
Thus the old colonial system collapsed, and an epoch of colonial history ended
in obstinate and fluctuating war, in furious excesses, or in peaceful and
silent transition.
POLAND UNDER
THE SAXON KINGS.
Of
the eighteen competitors for the throne of Poland vacant in 1696 by the death
of John III, Sobieski, the most notable were the Austrian candidate, the
Krdlewicz, or Crown Prince, James Sobieski; the Prussian candidate, Margrave
Lewis William of Baden-Baden ; Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony; and
Prince Henri of Conde and Prince Louis of Conti, successively supported by
France. The chances of James Sobieski, on the whole the most suitable
candidate, were ruined by the hostile intrigues of his own mother the Queen
Dowager, Maria Casimiria, and the jealousy of all the other native candidates.
The Margrave of Baden, ill supported, retired betimes from the contest which
finally resolved itself into a duel between the Elector of Saxony and the
Prince of Conti. At first the Elector was regarded by nobody as a serious
candidate; but his prospects brightened after he had publicly abjured
Protestantism for Catholicism at the crisis of the struggle. He also had a
longer and better administered purse than that of the French Minister in
Poland, Abhe de Polignac; but his chief advantage lay in the fact that all the
neighbouring Powers preferred to see a German rather than a Frenchman or a Pole
on the Polish throne. Tsar Peter even went so far as to threaten the Polish
Senate with an invasion if they dared to choose a Frenchman. Nevertheless, the
Prince of Conti was elected King of Poland by a considerable majority. It was
only as the nominee of a minority, and consequently without possessing any
legal status, that Frederick Augustus, at the head of a well-disciplined Saxon
army which had been patiently awaiting the issue of events close to the Polish
frontier, drove out the lawful sovereign. On September 16 he was crowned at
Cracow as Augustus II; but his title was not generally recognised in Poland
till nearly two years later.
The
determination of the new King to transform, and if possible abolish, the
hopelessly vicious Constitution which was the source of all the calamities of
Poland, furnishes the key to the right interpretation of the events of this
unlucky reign. Augustus judged, rightly enough, that the presence in the
country of a permanent and devoted regular army
192
[1693-1700
was the only
means whereby a coup d'etat could be effected. The Poles, always pretematurally
wary of the least movement on the part of an enterprising ruler, had, indeed,
already bound his hands to some extent, by insisting, energetically, on the
withdrawal from the kingdom proper of all the forces of Augustus except a
body-guard of 1200 men. But they had no objection to his maintaining an army
corps of 7000 in the grand duchy of Lithuania, and with this, for a time,
Augustus had to be content.
During the
last years of the reign of John III Lithuania had suffered from chronic
anarchy, due mainly to the tyranny and violence of the great House of Sapieha
which preyed upon its neighbours, lay and clerical. Casimir Sapieha, Grand
Hetman of Lithuania, in a private quarrel with the Bishop of Vilna, had
devastated the whole diocese and burnt dozens of churches and hundreds of manor
houses. Twice, in 1693 and 1695, John III had been forced to summon Sapieha to
answer for his misdeeds before the one tribunal he could not ignore—the
sovereign Diet. On both occasions the partisans of Sapieha had succeeded in “
exploding1 ” the Diet before it had time to consider the case. In
other words, that palladium of individual liberty, the liberum veto, had sunk
so low that its principal use was to shelter high-placed felons from the
pursuit of justice. In 1700 the insupportable misrule of the Sapiehas provoked
an insurrection of all the other Lithuanian nobles against them, and, with the
assistance of the Saxon troops, they were finally subdued, deprived of all
their honours and dignities and expelled the country. A few months later,
however, they were back again in the track of the victorious armies of Charles
XII. Subsequently they became the chief supporters of the new King, Stanislaus
Leszczynski, whom Charles placed upon the Polish throne.
After the
removal of the Sapiehas, Augustus found a fresh justification for the
continuance of his Saxons in Lithuania, and in Poland also, in the obligations
of the great Northern War, of which he was one of the principal promotersj The
details of that momentous episode, more especially its influence upon European
politics, have already been set forth in this History. It only remains to be
added that, as regards Poland, this war was an unmitigated disaster. The
Republic had emerged from the most terrible of the cataclysms of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, not unscathed indeed, but at least morally chastened
and stimulated. The stress of calamity had invariably rekindled the old martial
spirit of the Szlachta (gentry), and, even in the darkest hours, evoked
national heroes and deliverers. But the ten years’ war which terminated with
the collapse of Charles XII at Poltawa had no such salutary after-effect. It
produced not a single eminent Polish captain, not a single valiant Polish
soldier. Again and again, thousands of
1 I.e. abruptly terminating it
by the “nte poxwulam" (I protest) of a single deputy, instead of letting
it run out its term, which was generally fixed beforehand.
ornamental
Polish cavalry fled before mere handfuls of Swedish and even of Russian troops.
Still worse,,the war left Polish society more demoralised than it had ever been
before. For the first time in Polish history the spirit of the nation
languished hopelessly, the natural elasticity of the most mercurial of nations
seemed broken, its wonderful recuperative energy seemed at last to be
exhausted. Politically, too, Poland gained nothing by this war. Its immediate
result was a degrading dependence on the Tsax, who still further increased his
influence in the country by constantly mediating between Augustus and his
mutinous subjects, The desperate efforts of the King Elector to shake off this
galling yoke, culminating in the defensive alliance concluded at Vienna on
January 5, 1719, with the Emperor Charles VI and George I of England against
“any enemy whatsoever,” with obvious reference to Russia, were frustrated by the
helplessness of the Polish Diet, which, instead of cooperating with the Saxon
Government, allowed itself, notably in 1719 and 1720, to be “exploded” by
Russian hirelings. During the ensuing ten years of peace and material
prosperity, the leading men in Poland, sunk in apathy and inertia, regarded
with indifference the presence and the depredations of their Muscovite “
auxiliaries,” and at the same time rejected every opportunity of concluding
favourable alliances, in nervous apprehension of exciting fresh wars and
complications. Absolute neutrality in any circumstances was now the political
maxim of the Sejm (Diet), In the last years of his reign Augustus endeavoured
to form a Saxon party in Poland itself, with the view of securing the
succession to his son Frederick Augustus. To disarm foreign adversaries he, at
the same time, meditated a partition of Poland between Austria, Prussia, and
himself, whereby the bulk of the territory of the Republic was to be erected
into an hereditary monarchy under the rule of the Saxon House. Nefarious as
this project undoubtedly was, it might, nevertheless, have been the saving of
Poland, if only it could have been carried out. But all the schemes and
intrigues of Augustus were suddenly cut short by his death (February 1, 1733),
The leading
man in Poland on the death of Augustus II was the Primate and Interrex,
Theodore Potocki, a devoted adherent of Stanislaus Leszczynski. He was upright,
conscientious, and a true patriot, but too old to fight effectually for
freedom, and, besides, circumstances were against him; His first steps were to
dissolve the Diet; disperse the body-guard of the late King; order the Saxon
auxiliaries to quit Poland; and put small corps of observation along the
Austrian and Prussian frontiers. He found active supporters in the French
ambassador, Count Monti, in the great Lithuanian family of Czartoryski, and
above all in the Palatine of Mazovia, Stanislaus Poniatowski, the one really
capable statesman Poland then possessed, who had served Charles XII’s protege,
King Stanislaus, with zeal and ability thirty years before, and was now ready
to sacrifice everything for him once more. It was to France that Potocki and
Poniatowski looked for help, nor was France
slow to
champion a cause that was peculiarly her own. For the first time since her
eclipse at the Peace of Utrecht, she saw before her an opportunity of
recovering her hegemony on the continent. It had ever been her interest, as the
arch-enemy of the Habsburgs, to environ the Empire with actual or contingent
foes. Her ideal system, so far as it concerned eastern Europe, was a hostile
combination of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey against the common foe. With the
father-in-law of the French King on the Polish throne (Marie Leszczynska, the
daughter of Stanislaus, had been married to Louis XV on September 5,1725), a
first step would have been taken towards the reestablishment of French
influence on the continent. As a preliminary measure, 4,000,000 livres of
secret-service money were despatched from Versailles to Warsaw for bribing
purposes, and Monti succeeded in gaining over to the cause of Stanislaus the
influential Palatine of Lublin, Adam Tarlo. In a circular letter, addressed to
all its representatives abroad, the French Government formally declared that, as
the Court of Vienna, by massing troops on the Silesian frontier, had
sufficiently revealed its intention of destroying the liberties of Poland by
interfering, with the free election of her King, his Most Christian Majesty
could not regard with indifference the political extinction of a Power to whom
he was bound by all the ties of honour and friendship, but would do his utmost
to protect her against her enemies. On May 8, 1733, the Interrex summoned a
preliminary or “ convocation ” Diet to Warsaw. The temper of the assembly was
unmistakably hostile to any foreign candidate. Indeed, many of its members
declared they would rather see a gipsy on the throne than another German. It
was finally resolved that none but a native Pole, who was a Catholic and married
to a Catholic, should be elected. But, when the Diet was called upon by the
Primate solemnly to swear to observe its own resolutions, not a few deputies
began to raise objections or make reservations, while others quitted the Diet
determined to protest against all its proceedings on the first opportunity.
Thus the chronic and incurable divisions of the Republic encouraged the Powers
opposed to the election of Stanislaus plausibly to come forward as the
champions of a free election, with the certainty of finding partisans among the
Poles themselves.
When the
tidings of the death of Augustus II reached St Petersburg, a grand national
council was summoned, at which it was agreed unanimously that the interests of
Russia would not permit her to recognise Stanislaus Leszczynski, or indeed any
person dependent directly on France (and therefore, indirectly, on Turkey and
Sweden also) as a candidate for the Polish throne. Thereupon, a menacing letter
was addressed to the Polish Primate demanding that the name of Stanislaus
should be struck off the list of candidates, and Count Carl Gustaf Lowenwolde
was sent to Warsaw to reinforce his brother, Count Frederick Casimir, the
actual Russian resident at the Polish capital. The two Ministers,
accompanied
by the envoys of Austria and Prussia, lost no time in waiting upon the
Archbishop; but Potocki was not to be intimidated and their interference only
led to a sharp altercation. Immediately afterwards, the Interrex summoned an
elective Diet, which assembled at Praga, a suburb of Warsaw, on August 26,
1733.
The protest
of Russia and Austria had been bold and resolute; but they were hampered at the
outset by a peculiar difficulty: they had no alternative candidate of their own
to offer. Stanislaus Leszczynski was the only native Pole who had the slightest
chance of being elected King. It was therefore necessary to look abroad for a
candidate. The Infant Emmanuel of Portugal, who had visited Russia in 1731, as
a suitor for the hand of the Empress Anne, was at first proposed by the Court
of Vienna; but his father would not consent to his nomination, and, ultimately,
both Russia and Austria agreed to support the pretensions of the Elector of
Saxony, the late King’s son. Hitherto, indeed, Frederick Augustus had been
regarded at Vienna with no friendly eye. He was suspected of leaning too much
upon France as his father had done before him, and he had always steadily
opposed the Pragmatic Sanction; but, when it became evident that none other but
the Saxon faction was strong enough to oppose Stanislaus, all objections on the
part of the two Courts ceased, and Lowenwolde concluded a treaty with the
Elector (August 14,1733), whereby he acceded to the Pragmatic Sanction,
contracted a treaty of mutual defence and guarantee with Russia and Austria,
and promised to keep inviolate the Constitution of the Polish Republic.
Eighteen regiments of Russian infantry and ten of cavalry were then sent to the
frontier, to be ready, at a moment’s notice, to enter Poland.
But the march
of events had been so rapid that it had now become necessary not merely to
direct, but to reverse, the decision of the Polish nation. Nine days after the
assembling of the Sejm, the vast majority of whose members remained faithful to
the Primate, it issued a manifesto (September 4) solemnly cursing all who
should assist or welcome the Muscovites. On the 9th, Stanislaus himself arrived
at Warsaw, having travelled through central Europe disguised as a coachman. On
the following day 60,000 armed and mounted noblemen assembled on the field of
election. For eight hours the aged Interrex, after disregarding as irregular a
protest from some 3000 malcontents, who were observing the proceedings from the
opposite side of the Vistula, proceeded on horseback through the drenching
rain, from group to group, asking all the deputies in turn whom they would have
for their King, and greeted everywhere with shouts of: “ Long live King
Stanislaus ! ” Finally, after making another vain appeal to the patriotism of
the malcontent minority, the Primate solemnly pronounced Stanislaus the duly
elected King of Poland; while the minority retired to Wongrowa, whence they
issued a countermanifesto, declaring the election null and void.
Thus
Stanislaus had been elected King of Poland for the second time; but his tenure
of that perilous office was to be even briefer than it had been before.
Immediately after his election, he issued a proclamation ordering a levee en
masse of the gentry; but, having no forces ready at hand to support him (the
Polish regular army existing only on paper), he was obliged, twelve days after
his election, to leave the defenceless capital, and shut himself up in Danzig
with the Primate, Poniatowski, the Czartoryskis, and the French and Swedish
envoys. A week later (September 30), General Peter Lacy, at the head of a
Russian army, appeared on the right bank of the Vistula.
Lacy was
speedily joined by the Polish malcontents, who formed (October 6), under his
protection, what they called “ a general confederation,” though it consisted
of only 15 senators and 500 of the Szlachta. This phantom of a Diet forthwith
proclaimed the Elector of Saxony King of Poland, under the title of Augustus
III, amidst loud acclamations. The Empress Anne had hoped to terminate the
Polish difficulty in a single campaign, but the hope had soon to be abandoned.
Almost the whole of Poland was in favour of Stanislaus, the country swarmed
with his partisans, while he himself lay in the strong fortress of Danzig,
awaiting the arrival of the promised succour from France. He knew his
countrymen too well to expect any material help from their guerilla bands, and
his past experience had taught him that the invasion of Saxony was the only way
to make Augustus relinquish Poland. He looked to Louis XV to do for him now what
Charles XII had done for him five and twenty years before. Failing this, he
felt that all was lost. “ I shall be compelled to return to France if the King
does not occupy Saxony,” he wrote to his daughter Queen Marie. On the other
hand it was of’paramount importance to Russia that Stanislaus should be driven,
as speedily as possible, from Danzig, whither help could readily be conveyed
to him by sea. Accordingly, at the end of 1733, Lacy was ordered to invest and
reduce the place without delay. But it soon became evident that the difficulty
of the enterprise had been vastly underrated. After leaving garrisons at
Warsaw, Thorn (which he captured on his way) and some other places, Lacy, on
sitting down before Danzig, found that his army had dwindled to 12,000 men,
whom he was obliged to distribute over an area of two leagues swarming with
more than 50,000 hostile guerillas, while the numerous artillery of the
Danzigers, well served by French and Swedish gunners, did great execution. All
through the winter the siege dragged on, and no impression seemed to have been
made upon the fortress. On March 17,1734, Lacy was superseded by Marshal
Miinnich, who brought with him considerable reinforcements. On the 19th, a
strongly fortified redoubt called “ Scotland ” was captured; but for the next
fortnight the siege languished as the Marshal had no field-pieces with him but
8-pounders, and the King of Prussia refused to allow any artillery to be
conveyed through his dominions to the besiegers.
At one time
an actual rupture with Prussia was feared. Miinnich is said to have threatened
that he would pay a visit to Berlin when he had done with Danzig. He actually
wrote to the Empress that Stanislaus had bought over Frederick William and that
the latter was about “to mediate” at the head of an army corps. At last the
arrival of some mortars from Saxony enabled Miinnich to capture Fort
Sommerschanz which cut Danzig off from Weichselmiinde, its port at the mouth of
the Vistula (May 6-7); but a subsequent attempt to storm the strong redoubt
Hagelburg, the key of the whole position, was repulsed with the loss of 120
officers and 2000 men (May 9-10). On May 20, the long-expected French fleet
appeared in the roads and disembarked 2400 men under the command of Brigadier
La Motte Perouse. A week later, they made a gallant attempt to force the
Russian entrenchments, but were repulsed and forced to take refuge behind the
cannon of Weichselmiinde. This encounter is memorable as being the first
occasion on which French and Russians crossed swords. On June 10, the Russian
fleet, under Admiral Gordon, brought Miinnich the siege artillery, the want of
which had so seriously hampered his operations, and at the same time vigorously
bombarded La Motte’s little army till it was forced to surrender and was
conveyed to St Petersburg on board the Russian fleet. Two days after the
capture of the French army, the fortress of Weichselmiinde also surrendered.
The loss of its port decided the fate of Danzig. On June 30 the city
capitulated unconditionally after sustaining a siege of 135 days, which cost
the besiegers 8000 men. The Primate, Monti, and Poniatowski were arrested. King
Stanislaus, disguised as a peasant, had contrived to escape two days before.
Even after
the fall of Danzig the embers of war continued to smoulder in Poland for nearly
twelve months longer. The fugitive Stanislaus issued, in August, from
Konigsberg, a manifesto to his partisans, urging them to form a confederation
on his behalf; and it was formed accordingly at Dzikowa, under the presidency
of Adam Tarlo, and sent an envoy, Ozarowsky, to Paris to urge France to invade
Saxony with at least 40,000 men, the confederates promising to cooperate
simultaneously on the side of Silesia. In the Ukraine, too, Count Nicholas
Potocki kept on foot a motley host of 50,000 men and entered into negotiations
with the pretender to the throne of Transylvania, Francis R&koczy II. But
nothing came of these isolated and therefore impotent efforts. France was ill
disposed to waste any more men and money on a patently unserviceable ally, more
particularly as she had found ample compensation for her reverses on the
Vistula in the triumphs of herself and her allies in Lombardy and on the Rhine.
The desertion of France sealed the fate of the Stanislausian faction in Poland.
The Primate and Adam Tarlo submitted to Augustus; Stanislaus signed his
abdication (January 26,1736); and the Diet which met at Warsaw (June 25)
completed the pacification of the Republic, the new King
swearing to
withdraw his Saxon and Muscovite auxiliaries within 40 days, and proclaim a
general amnesty.
The new King
was, in every respect, the antithesis of his alert, jovial and dissolute
father. His character has been admirably symbolised in the famous picture which
represents the portly Prince, enveloped in a luxurious dressing-gown, reclining
in an easy chair and holding in his lap a tea-cup and saucer. Pious, pacific,
and thoroughly domesticated, nothing but his one passion, a love of the chase,
was ever able to tear him from the seclusion of his family circle, while a
constitutional sluggishness compelled him to leave everything in the nature of
business to Ministers who virtually ruled in his name. Thus, in Saxony, during
the greater part of this thirty years’ reign, Count Heinrich von Briihl held
absolute sway, while in Poland the Czartoryski family—“ the Family ” as, from
its immense influence and political predominance, it was generally called by
contemporaries—endeavoured to rally round it the most enlightened and
progressive elements of the nation.
The
Czartoryskis were of very ancient lineage. They had held princely rank as early
as the fifteenth century and were akin to the royal House of Jagello which had
ruled Poland from 1384 to 1572. It was only in the middle of the seventeenth century,
however, that they had risen to political eminence in the person of Florian
Czartoryski, who became Primate of Poland during the brief and troubled reign
of Michael Wisniowiecki (1669-73). At the beginning of the eighteenth century
the fortunes of the family were completely reestablished, partly by the
patronage of Augustus II, who exalted them at the expense of the wealthier
aristocracy, but principally through the ability of two brothers, Prince
Michael, who became Grand Chancellor of Lithuania, and was henceforth known as
“ the Prince Chancellor,” and his brother Prince Augustus, Palatine of Russia
(i.e. the Polish province of “ Red Russia "), generally called “ the
Prince Palatine.” These two brothers agreed with each other in all things, politics
included, so absolutely that they must be regarded as a single personality
rather than two separate individuals. The eminently capable Prince Chancellor
was the statesman of “the Family," and as such was always deferred to
without question, while his brother the Prince Palatine, who had served with
distinction in the Turkish wars of the close of the seventeenth century, and
been decorated for valour by Prince Eugene on the smoking bastions of Belgrade,
was its military celebrity. The marriage in early life of the latter with the
fabulously wealthy Pani Sieniawska, the last survivor and sole heiress of the
united possessions of the Sieniawski and Denhof families, finally placed the
Czartoryskis on a level with the mightiest magnates in Poland.
The focus of
the influence of the Czartoryskis was Pulawy, their mansion in Volhynia, which
became as famous in Polish as Holland House was in English' politics, and in
nearly the same period. Again
1736-53] Rise and predominance of the
Czartoryskis. 199
and again,
Pulawy is gratefully described by contemporaries as a “ refuge for learning,”
“an oasis in a desert of savagery.” During three generations it became a
training-school of pedagogues, organisers, and reformers. The most promising
youths in Poland, quite irrespective of rank and birth, were diligently sought
for in the most out-of-the-way places and brought to Pulawy to be educated for
the service of their country. The most advanced foreign scholars and
philosophers were consulted as to the best curriculum to be adopted for the
students there assembled. It was the Czartoryskis who encouraged and assisted
the great educational reformer Stanislaus Konarski, 1700-73 (himself a pupil of
a still earlier pioneer of enlightenment, the ex-King Stanislaus, whose little
Court at Nancy was, for native Poles at any rate, the first nursery of the new
ideas), to establish his Collegia nobilium in Poland. Indeed, it may truly be
said that of the writers on political and social subjects who abounded in
Poland during the latter part of the eighteenth century everyone owed something
to the generous and intelligent assistance of this noble House.
The real aim
and explanation, however, of all the efforts of the Czartoryskis was the reform
of the Polish Constitution, which they rightly regarded as the indispensable
preliminary of any permanent improvement in the condition of the country. To
educate, and thereby transform, public opinion, was the first step towards the
realisation of this noble ambition. It was not enough that the new, saving
ideas should be introduced by books and pamphlets—a new social atmosphere was
to be created in which these ideas might expand and multiply. A new generation,
full of courage and free from prejudice, was to be trained up to furnish the
protagonists of the new ideas.
When the time
came to translate these ideas into action in the field of politics, the
Czartoryskis, at first, looked for assistance to the Saxon Court, where, from
1733 to 1753, their credit was very great. They won the friendship of Briihl by
obtaining, though not without great difficulty, an “ indigenat ” or patent of
nobility and naturalisation for his family in Poland; and, in return for this
extremely lucrative privilege, which opened the door to all manner of honours
and dignities, Briihl, so far as he was able, supported their programme of
reform. The period of comparative tranquillity which immediately succeeded the
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) seemed to favour their views. Two advantageous
matrimonial alliances (the marriage of Augustus Ill’s daughter, Mary •Tosepha,
to the Dauphin Louis, son of Marie Leszczynska, and that of his son Frederick
Christian to Maria Antonia Walpurgis, daughter of the Emperor Charles VII) had
greatly elated the Saxon Court, and induced the King to promise to assist the
Czartoryskis to abolish the liberum veto at the very least. Even when the Court
of Vienna, which was first consulted on the subject, advised strongly against
the attempt for fear of irritating Russia and Prussia, Briihl and the
Czartoryskis still persisted in their efforts to remedy this scandalous abuse.
All their efforts
200 Efforts of the Czartoryskis to depose
Augustus III. [1753-63
in this
direction were frustrated, however, by the determined opposition of the
reactionaries, headed by the powerful Potocki family who, having many ancient
grievances against the Czartoryskis, deliberately exploded every Diet
favourable to them, and nullified all their confederations by
counter-confederations. Then the Saxon Court, fearful of losing Poland altogether,
refused to assist the Czartoryskis any further; whereupon they broke with
Briihl, and began to look elsewhere for assistance. They now proposed to
dethrone the useless Augustus III with the aid of Russia, to whom, in the first
instance, they appealed through Kayserling, the Russian minister at Warsaw, for
help to reform the Polish Constitution, promising, in return, to recognise the
Russian imperial title adopted by Peter the Great and his successors—a thing
the Republic had, hitherto, steadily refused to do. There is no reason whatever
to question the bona Jides, or the patriotism of the Czartoryskis on this
occasion. But that they should seriously have believed that Russia would
consent to strengthen and rehabilitate her ancient enemy (for that is what
their appeal amounted to) is the most cogent proof of their political shortsightedness.
During the hurly-burly of the Seven Years’ War they could do nothing.
Throughout that miserable period the Polish Republic was treated by all the
belligerents as if it did not exist. There was not even a pretence of
respecting its neutrality. Russians, Prussians, and Austrians marched up and
down its territory, fought their battles in it and blackmailed it
indiscriminately without the slightest intention of offering any sort of
compensation. All that the Czartoryskis did during these years was to plot
industriously against Augustus III. In 1755 they sent their nephew Stanislaus
Poniatowski to St Petersburg in the suite of the English ambassador, Sir
Charles Hanbuxy Williams, in the hope that he might gain a diplomatic footing
in the Russian capital. The handsome young fellow won the heart of the
impressionable Grand Duchess Catharine and, in 1757, through her influence, was
accredited Polish ambassador to Russia, from which post he was ignominiously
dismissed, a few months later, by the Empress Elizabeth, for intriguing against
her during her illness. Obviously, the object of this somewhat mysterious
mission was to cultivate the friendship of the aspiring little Grand Duchess
who, four years later, was to mount the Russian throne, in such a sensational
manner, as Catharine II. Immediately after her elevation, the Czartoryskis
formally applied to her for an auxiliary corps; but the new Empress, vhose own
situation, for some months after her accession, was somewhat precarious,
declined to interfere in Polish affairs till after the death of Augustus III.
That event took place on October 5, 1763; whereupon the Czartoryskis
immediately resumed their appeal to the Russian Empress. The result of their
overtures has been elsewhere recorded.
THE WAR OF
THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.
(1) THE PRAGMATIC SANCTION.
The great struggle for the Spanish Succession was
barely over before another succession problem began to occupy the Foreign
Ministries of Europe. Like their Spanish cousins, the Austrian Habsburgs found
themselves threatened with a failure of male heirs; and, to meet this
possibility, Leopold I in 1703 had made definite regulations (pactum mutuae
successions) by which, in default of male heirs, females should succeed, with
the special proviso that the daughters of Archduke Joseph were to take
precedence of those of his brother Charles. But, after 1711 Joseph’s sudden
death had placed Charles on the Imperial throne, this arrangement was altered
in April, 1713; and by a secret family law, known hereafter as the “ Pragmatic
Sanction,” Charles gave his own daughters priority over his brother’s, and at
the same time insisted strongly on the indivisibility of the Habsburg
dominions—a principle now first adopted. In making this change the Emperor was
well within his rights, and circumstances had changed since 1703, when the
renewed establishment of separate branches of the family at Vienna and at
Madrid had seemed probable. Moreover, Joseph’s daughters could hardly claim
former Spanish provinces like Milan and the Netherlands over which their father
had never ruled.
It was not
till the marriage of Joseph’s elder daughter, Archduchess Maria Josepha, to
the Electoral Prince of Saxony (1719), that the question became prominent.
Several children had been bom to the Emperor, but only daughters had survived.
Charles therefore exacted from his niece a formal renunciation of her claims,
and a similar pledge was given by her sister, Maria Amalia, when she married
Charles Albert of Bavaria (1722). Moreover, the Emperor set about obtaining the
formal recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction from the. Estates of his various
dominions, a process begun with Upper and Lower Austria in 1720 and completed
by the adhesion of the Austrian Netherlands in 1724 —even Hungary, though after
some demur, giving her recognition in 1722.
This was an
important step gained; but to secure the recognition of the European Powers was
far more necessary, and by this object the foreign policy of Charles VI was
henceforward dominated.
Curiously
enough, the first guarantor of the Pragmatic Sanction was Philip V, Charles’
successful rival in Spain. On hostile terms with England and Holland, separated
from France by dynastic pretensions, Spain found in the Ostend Company a bond
with the Emperor, whose efforts to shake off the restrictions imposed on the
commerce of the Netherlands and to obtain a share in the lucrative East Indian
trade had embroiled him with the Maritime Powers. Among the stipulations of the
League of Vienna (May, 1725) was Spain’s recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction;
and the adhesions which the League subsequently received increased the number
of guarantors. Russia (August, 1726) was the next; and, before the end of 1726
Prussia (October), Mainz and the four Wittelsbach Electors, Charles Albert of
Bavaria, his brother Clement Augustus of Cologne, and their cousins Charles
Philip of the Palatinate and Francis Lewis of Trier, had joined the League. However,
though Bavaria’s support was thus obtained, the somewhat unnatural
Austro-Spanish alliance soon collapsed without having effected anything.
Charles Albert, regarding himself as thereby absolved from his pledge, with the
assistance of the Elector Palatine Charles Philip and the Elector of Saxony,
vigorously opposed the Emperor’s efforts to obtain the guarantee of the Diet.
This, however, was obtained in January, 1732, Frederick William of Prussia
lending the Emperor his support, while in the same year Denmark became a
guarantor, Cologne having renewed its guarantee in 1731 Long before this,
however, Elisabeth Famese, distrusting the Emperor’s sincerity and seeing no
prospect of the proposed marriages between her sons and Charles’ daughters ever
taking place, had come to terms with the Maritime Powers and France, concluding
in November, 1729, the Treaty of Seville, by which, in return for a guarantee
of Parma and Tuscany to Don Carlos, she withdrew the concessions promised to
the Ostend Company. To this the Emperor would not agree; and in 1730 war again
seemed imminent, when Walpole, by promising to guarantee the Pragmatic
Sanction, induced Charles VI to give way. The Second Treaty of Vienna (March
16,1731) sacrificed the trade of the Netherlands to the needs of the Habsburg
dynasty and to the jealousy between England and Holland, though France refused
to follow her allies in guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction, declaring that to
do so would be as bad as the loss of three battles.
A year later,
the opening of the Polish Succession question afforded Charles an opportunity
of disposing of the most formidable of his daughter’s rivals. To win Austria’s
support in his candidature for the Polish throne, the Elector of Saxony
(Frederick Augustus II, who became King Augustus III of Poland) abandoned his
wife’s claims and recognised the Pragmatic Sanction (1733). But, as the result
1738-40] State of the Austrian monarchy under
Charles VI, 203
of her
intervention in Poland, Austria became involved in a war with France and her
Spanish and Sardinian allies, which went against her both on the Rhine and in
Italy. To purchase the peace which was finally signed on November 8, 1738, she
had to cede the Two Sicilies to Don Carlos and to agree to the annexation of
Lorraine to France, the dispossessed Duke, Francis Stephen, receiving as
compensation Tuscany and the hand of Maria Theresa. At this heavy price Charles
secured from Fleury an ominously guarded recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction,
Sardinia giving her guarantee in February, 1739, when she acceded to the peace,
an example which Spain and Naples followed later in the year.
Charles had
thus attained his object: with the exceptions of Bavaria and the Palatinate,
the Powers of Europe were pledged to support Maria Theresa’s accession, though
their assent had been dearly bought. Judging by the way in which the majority
of the guarantors afterwards treated their solemn obligations, these
concessions would seem to have been made in vain; yet, indirectly, Maria
Theresa’s case was strengthened, when she could appeal to the treaties her
assailants had broken : their faithlessness makes their greed all the more
conspicuous and has enlisted on her side the sympathy of posterity, though in
her own day it only helped to secure her the not altogether disinterested
support of England and the neutrality of the Turks. But, if Charles VI can be
justified of his efforts to secure Maria Theresa from molestation by her
neighbours, it is less easy to refute another charge brought against him—of
having neglected the warning usually attributed to Eugene, that a strong army
and a full treasury would be the best guarantees. In 1740 Austria had neither.
Part of the price paid for the Russian alliance of 1726 had been a promise of
assistance in Russia’s wars with Turkey; and Austria’s share in the
Russo-Turkish War of 1736-9 had served to aggravate her internal disorders and
difficulties, already serious enough after the misfortunes of the War of the
Polish Succession. Apart from costing her Belgrade and the other cessions made
to her at Passarowitz, the Russo-Turkish War left Austria in a sad plight. The
evils normally arising from her lack of unity and cohesion, her obsolete and
inefficient administrative system, her embarrassed finances, and her medieval
social organisation, were aggravated by the inevitable consequences of
unsuccessful wars. The Treasury was all but empty; the revenues had dwindled to
half the income of 1733; while expenditure and indebtedness had increased, and
the taxes, at once oppressive and unproductive, were causing widespread
discontent. The army, demoralised by defeat, with its principal leaders
discredited, its ranks depleted to half their paper strength, urgently needed
reorganisation and reforms which the financial situation forbade. The provinces
enjoyed a local autonomy which, though little more than a survival of feudal
and oligarchical privileges, yet was strong enough to make the control of the
central government weak and ineffective. As the immediate future was to show,
provincialism was
204
Maria Theresa and her
Ministers.
stronger than
patriotism, even in the “hereditary dominions” themselves. Hungary, indeed, was
a source of anxiety : discontent was prevalent; an insurrection was feared, and
no trust could be placed in the inhabitants. Moreover, even Austria itself was
not free from disloyalty ; the Bavarian claim had many partisans; and lack of
zeal for the dynasty and of readiness to make sacrifices on its behalf was only
too general
Yet the
dynasty was almost the only link between the three groups into which it is
natural to divide the Habsburg possessions—the Austrian, including Styria,
Carinthia, Camiola, Tyrol, and scattered fragments of Swabia; the Bohemian,
with which went Moravia and Silesia; and Hungary, with Croatia and
Transylvania. Each of these had its own Chancery, its own quite independent
administrative, judicial, and financial systems. There was not even a federal
union between them and, apart from the dynasty, the only institutions common to
all three groups and to the outlying possessions in Italy and the Netherlands
were the “ State Conference,” a council composed of the principal Ministers,
the War Council (.Hofkriegsrath) and the Treasury (Hof hammer). But the control
of the War Council over the army was considerably limited by the difficulty of
obtaining adequate contributions from the provincial ’Estates, and efficiency
in administration was made almost impossible. Nor was there in the Conference
at the time of Charles Vi’s death (October 20, 1740) any man of real capacity
as an administrator or with any of the qualities of a great statesman, and able
to make good use of such authority and influence as the Conference possessed.
The inexperienced girl on whom the succession devolved found among her father’s
ministers only septuagenarians who had long outlived the days of their
usefulness. Sinzendorff, the Chancellor who acted as President of the
Conference, had experience but no vigour or decision: selfish and indolent as
he was, neither his character nor attainments inspired confidence, and his
implicit belief in the sincerity of Fleury’s professions shows to how little
purpose he had studied foreign affairs. Kinsky, the Chancellor of Bohemia, and
Joseph Harrach, President of the War Council from 1738 to 1763, lacked capacity
and strength; and, though Gundacker Starhemberg, who had charge of the
finances, was honest and patriotic, with an honourable record of good service,
he was long past his prime. Bartenstein, Secretary to the Conference, enjoyed the
distinction of being only fifty-one and had some of the vigour so conspicuously
lacking to his colleagues ; but he was conceited and opinionated, apt to lose
sight of main issues in a mass of detail, and as much at fault as Sinzendorff
in his appreciation of the European situation. In the early years of Maria
Theresa’s reign Bartenstein’s undoubted talents and capacity for hard work made
him the adviser on whom she most relied; but, as experience exposed his
shortcomings, his influence and authority declined. Indeed, at the outset of
her rule Maria Theresa had really to rely on herself alone: the husband she
loved so dearly proved neither a pillar of strength
1713-40] Economic reforms of Frederick William I.
205
in council
nor a capable commander in the field; and, though in the end the Austrian army
produced some admirable officers, it was not till after the war that any
Minister of more than mediocrity appeared. Indeed, though Charles VI had not
been a strong or successful ruler, though he had done little to check abuses or
effect the reforms of which he realised the need, though his foreign policy had
been ambitious, ill-counselled and disastrous in its results, though he was
inferior both in capacity and character to his successor, the peculiar circumstances
of the moment made his death as inopportune as possible. Austria’s most
malevolent enemy could hardly have selected for her a more unpromising
situation at home and abroad in which to be confronted with a disputed
succession.
(2) PRUSSIA UNDER FREDERICK WILLIAM I.
Frederick
William I ascended the throne of Prussia on February 25, 1713, at the age of
twenty-four. His father and mother had maintained a Court of great
magnificence; but Frederick William had inherited Queen Sophia Charlotte’s good
sense without her love of refinement and of tasteful splendour. Immediately on
his accession he cut down the expenditure of the Court so that it scarcely
exceeded the establishment of a wealthy private gentleman. This decision on the
part of the new sovereign almost completely ruined the arts and crafts of the
capital, and several artists of real eminence were compelled to seek a
livelihood in other countries. These rigid economies, which were carried into
all the departments of State, increased the yearly revenues of the Crown so
considerably, that it was practicable to raise the infantry from 38 to 50
battalions, and the cavalry from 53 to 60 squadrons.
The Great
Elector had evolved a model postal organisation, the benefits of which extended
far beyond the disjointed Prussian State. This postal system of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries operated like the railway system of the nineteenth;
and Justus Moser, one of the greatest political economists of Germany in the
eighteenth century, maintains that the postal system had extraordinary results
and in many respects transformed the condition of the world. The young King
took all the more interest in this department because it yielded 137,000
thalers (£20,000) a year to the exchequer, sufficient for the maintenance of
six or seven battalions. On one of his early morning walks Frederick William I
noticed that the postmaster of Potsdam kept the carrier of the night mail from
Hamburg waiting in the street vainly knocking at his closed door. The King
drove the postmaster out of bed with his cane, and cashiered him, apologising
to the mail-carrier that the King of Prussia had such remiss servants.
Frederick
William had himself learnt obedience when as Crown Prince he had served under
Eugene and Marlborough at Malplaquet. The King looked up with admiration to his
best general, Prince Leopold of Anhalt, who was then thirty-seven years of age,
and hoped with the accession of his youthful friend to be called upon to take
the lead in political and military affairs. But, when he attempted to put
himself forward, he was very distinctly sent about his business, “Tell the
Prince of Anhalt ”—so runs one of the first letters written by Frederick
William as King—“that I am the Finance Minister and the Field- Marshal of the
King of Prussia; this will keep the King of Prussia on his legs.”
Soon after
the Prussian Crown had passed to Frederick William I European affairs took a
turn which allowed Prussia to secure an important territorial acquisition. The
Northern War was still in progress. The representatives of Charles XII (who was
away in Turkey), together with Tsar Peter and his allies, offered Stettin to
King Frederick William I. Frederick William’s grandfather, the Great Elector,
had all his life carried on a heroic but ineffectual struggle to wrest Stettin,
the port of Berlin, from Sweden. Under King Frederick William I Prussian troops
seized the emporium at the mouth of the Oder without firing a shot; the sole
requirement was the payment of 400,000 thalers (<£*60,000) to the Tsar and
his allies; and the financial transaction was made possible by the melting down
of the royal plate and other economies. But this quite exceptionally favourable
diplomatic situation did not continue. Russia, indeed, by the Treaty of
Havelberg (May, 1718) guaranteed Stettin to the King of Prussia, who in his
turn guaranteed to Tsar Peter the acquisition of Ingria and Esthonia, and in
certain circumstances also that of Livonia. So far her intimate relations with
Russia were advantageous to Prussia; but Peter I next aimed at making himself
master of Mecklenburg. At that point he was opposed by a counter-alliance
formed between England, Hanover, Saxony and the Emperor. What if Imperial
troops set forth to march from Silesia to Mecklenburg, and Frederick William I,
protesting his alliance with Russia, prohibited their transit ? In that
contingency Austria, Saxony, and Hanover, who had all watched with the keenest
envy the strengthening of the Prussian army, bound themselves to make war upon
Frederick William. The Hanoverian Ministry in particular took up a very hostile
attitude towards the rising House of Brandenburg, and even contemplated a
partition of Prussia between Hanover, Saxony, and Austria. A Hungarian named
Clement, who was at the time paying a secret visit to Berlin as an agent of
Saxony, reported that he had heard bitter complaints how no acceptable posts
were now bestowed on anyone but officers, and how all other persons, especially
men of learning, were passed over, and even well-earned pensions had been
cancelled. Clement concluded that the King of Prussia was not so powerful as it
appeared.
1719-22] British overtures.—The King's testament.
207
The
discontent generally prevailing, and particularly among business people and
officials, and even in the army, notwithstanding its enormous privileges,
would, in Clement’s opinion, make it an easy matter to stir up a rebellion
against Frederick William I. At Court it was considered that the King’s most
distinguished general, the Prince of Anhalt, would with the help of officers
devoted to him be capable of dethroning the King, if Germany were convulsed by
a breach on the part of Prussia with the Emperor and England—capable of the
deeds of a Marius and a Sulla, as Frederick the Great in his History writes of
the victor of Turin, the founder of the Prussian infantry.
The
antagonism between Great Britain and Russia was constantly growing. In 1719 a
British squadron sailed to the Baltic. At the same time Stanhope, the English
Prime Minister, went to Berlin to turn Frederick William from his alliance with
Peter and draw him over to the side of England. But, though Frederick William
acquiesced in Stanhope’s remark that the English had a fine, fleet and he a
fine army, and that these two forces ought to cooperate, he very judiciously
decided not to take part in an English attack on Livonia. All the Powers were
soliciting the friendship of Prussia; and in 1720, when the danger of a general
outbreak of war was past, the Berlin Cabinet by the intervention of England and
with the connivance of Russia obtained the definite cession of Stettin by
Sweden.
In spite of
his physical strength, King Frederick William was subject even in his earlier
years to severe attacks of illness. At the beginning of 1722 the thought of
death possessed his mind, although he was only thirty-four years of age. At
that time he drew up directions for the ten year old Crown Prince, in which he
gave an account of his own reign and pointed out to his son the lines he was to
follow. “ I am at peace with Almighty God,” Frederick William wrote in this
so-called testament. “ Since my twentieth year I have put my whole trust in
God; I have continually besought Him mercifully to hear me, and He has always
heard my prayer.” Rulers, the King continues, who have God before their eyes,
and do not keep mistresses, will be abundantly blessed. His successor is to
order himself thus, and plays, operas, ballets, masquerades, and fancy balls
are therefore not to be tolerated, nor excess in eating and drinking, for all such
things are ungodly and of the Devil. So far the King speaks as might a British
Puritan; but the resemblance ceases when he comes to deal with the standing
army, and threatens to withdraw his parental blessing from his son if he should
reduce the military expenditure. Should the Crown Prince do this, may there
come upon him “ the curse which God laid on Pharaoh : may your fate be that of
Absalom ! ” Later passages of this document continually revert to the army and
bid the King’s successor be indefatigable in his care and discipline of the
troops, now that the King himself has made the Prussian army and artillery
equal in fighting strength to those of any other European Power.
208
Frederick William I's
testament.
“You must
yourself alone superintend the revenue and keep the
supreme
command of the army firmly in your own hands____ Officers
and
officials
must know that you hold the purse-strings.” For the first six weeks of his
reign the King’s successor must, following his own example, devote himself
entirely to the study of the budget; he should then reduce all official
salaries by about 25 per cent., but on no account reduce the income of the
army. In a year’s time he may begin to raise again the salaries of those who
are doing their duty. But, he adds, “ you must work as I have always done; a
ruler who wishes to rule honourably must attend to all his affairs himself, for
rulers are ordained for work and not for idle, effeminate lives such as, alas,
are led by most great people.”
The King
deals next with economic conditions, which, like all his contemporaries, he
judges from the point of view of mercantilist theories. “ If the country is
thickly populated, that is true wealth.” Small towns must be founded where they
are wanting. Industries, more especially the manufacture of cloth and woollen
goods, are to be encouraged everywhere by the Government. “Then you will see
how your revenues increase and your land prospers! ” The French refugees
settled there had first taught the Prussians to become manufacturers in important
branches of industry. “ A country without industries is a human body without
life, a dead country, which is always poor and wretched and never
prospers....Therefore I beg you, my dear successor, maintain the industries,
protect them and tend their growth, establishing them wherever possible
throughout the country,” Warnings followed against listening to flatterers, and
ignoring the corruption still prevalent among Prussian officials, and the
successor is exhorted to pay all salaries promptly, to contract no government
loans, but every year to pay
500,000 thalers (£75,000) into the treasury. Every
year he is to travel through all the provinces to see for himself that
everything is in perfect order. In religious matters, the chief thing is to
build churches and schools. The Reformed Church and the Lutherans must not be
allowed to quarrel, and only a limited freedom is to be granted to the clergy,
because everyone of them would like to be Pope. The Catholics are to be
tolerated, but not the Jesuits, nor foreign Jews wishing to immigrate.
“My dear
successor will think and say: ‘Why did not my late father himself do everything
as stated here?’ When my late father died in 1713, I found the province of
Prussia almost at its last gasp with plague and murrain, most of the domains
mortgaged, all of which I have redeemed, and the finances in such a plight that
bankruptcy was imminent, the army in so bad a way and so low in numbers that
its shortcomings baffle description. It is assuredly a masterly achievement to
have in nine years, by 1722, brought law and order once more as I have done
into all the affairs of State—The Elector Frederick William (the Great Elector)
brought prosperity and advancement to our House; my father
1713-40] Advance of Prussia's position m Europe.
209
secured to it
royal rank; I have regulated the country and the army; your task, my dear
successor, is to keep up what your forefathers have begun and to win the
territories claimed by us, which belong to our House by the laws of God and
men. Pray to God, and never begin an unjust war; but never relinquish what is
justly yours.”
This
memorable testament proves how unjust was the opinion formerly prevalent in
Europe and among historians that Frederick William I was nothing more than a
barbarian with the ideas and gifts of a sergeant. This conception has doubtless
some truth in it, but there is equally good reason for the verdict of Theodor
von Schon, himself an eminent reformer in the days of Stein and Hardenberg, who
described Frederick William I as “ Prussia’s greatest King in respect of
domestic policy.”
The political
situation changed completely soon after the acquisition of Stettin by Prussia.
Though Russia and Great Britain were still enemies, the laitter Power and
Austria were no longer allies but bitter opponents, on account of the Ostend
Company. A joint attack on Hanover by the Austrians and Russians was
threatening. Once again, as had been the case a few years before, the King of
Prussia held a geographically central position between the Great Powers whose
encounter seemed imminent. After considerable hesitation the Prussian sovereign
decided to support Austria; and at the close of 1728 a defensive alliance was
concluded between the two Powers at Berlin.
Besides
France, Prussia was at this time the only civilised country in which an
absolute form of government had been completely established. But it was a
convincing proof of Frederick William’s great force of character that between
1713 and 1740 the material resources of Prussia were placed at the service of
the Government in a far fuller measure than had ever been secured by the French
Crown. To the Cabinets of Europe it was a mystery how the sovereign of a poor
barren State like Prussia was able in 1729 to maintain a standing army of nearly
70,000 men. Added to this, there was a well-filled treasury. Two hundred years
ago a State so organised was a Great Power, even though its population hardly
exceeded two millions.
The change in
the balance of power in Germany brought about by the rise of Prussia was
extremely unwelcome to George I and to George II, who succeeded about this time
(1727), in their capacity of Electors of Hanover. On the other hand the Whigs,
who dominated the public life of England, had strong leanings towards Prussia;
and their leaders complained that the Court was neglecting a Power whose
strength had quite recently doubled. International diplomacy had become so much
alive to the consolidation of Prussia’s position as a Great Power that, when
early in 1730 the English were discussing a plan of campaign with their French
allies, they abandoned the idea of an invasion of Silesia, which could not but
have injuriously affected Frederick William’s
210 English marriage
negotiationsTobacco College.” [i730
kingdom.
Instead of this expedition against Silesia, it was resolved that French troops
should join with the forces of several German Princes at Heilbronn, and thence
march through southern Germany, to attack the Emperor in Bohemia.
King
Frederick William was, not without reason, proud that his internal reforms had
given him sufficient strength to be able to prohibit foreign nations from
fighting their battles on North German soil. “ It is no mere boast,” he said, “
that I have won honour for the House of Brandenburg. All my life long I have
never sought alliances, nor made advances to a foreign Power. My maxim is to
injure no one, but not to let myself be slighted.” Yet, at the same time, his
selfconsciousness as to his achievements in the sphere of foreign policy was
not justified to its full extent. His strength lay entirely in his home policy;
in his foreign relations he felt insecure—and rightly so, for he lacked both
sufficient mental training and the inborn gift of perception which would have
made it possible for him to understand the great affairs of the world.
In 1730 Sir
Charles Hotham arrived at the Prussian Court as British envoy extraordinary to
conclude the negotiations which had been pending five years for the marriage of
Prince Frederick, who had in the meantime become Prince of Wales, with Princess
Wilhelmina, eldest daughter of the King. But his instructions went still
further. He was to propose a further marriage, between the eighteen year old
Prussian Crown Prince and an English princess. Queen Sophia Dorothea, herself
an English princess, and her children, were strongly in favour of Hotham’s
proposals. But a powerful party at the Court opposed this fresh connexion
between the Houses of Brandenburg and Hanover. At the head of this party was
General von Grumbkow, the King’s chief support in his military administration,
and financial and commercial policy. Grumbkow belonged to the “ Tobacco
College,” as it was called, a party of gentlemen in favour with the King who
met regularly in the evening to smoke and drink beer—practices considered very
vulgar by contemporary European society. Other frequenters of the “Tobacco
College were Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau and the Emperor’s ambassador,
Field-Marshal Count Seckendorf, a Protestant, who played a curious double role at
Berlin as friend of the King and representative of the Emperor, but took
advantage of his position with an unscrupulousness beyond ordinary diplomatic
subtlety. Among these associates Frederick William allowed himself the utmost
unconstraint; unsuspicious and docile as he was, he thus afforded his generals
and officials frequent opportunities for influencing him and gaining him over
to their selfish ends. But the Court at large was likewise full of intrigues.
Grumbkow and
Seckendorf, who were both working in the Imperial interests, had enlisted the
services of the Prussian resident in London, Beichenbach, for & very base
transaction. Reichenbach was in cor-
1730]
211
respondence
with Seckendorf, whom he kept informed as to every incident in England
connected with the marriages; and, worse still, Reichenbach allowed Grumbkow to
decide for him of what the King should be apprised. He made his reports
precisely as the powerful Minister directed. Thus the King was deceived, for he
took as true and authentic what Reichenbach wrote or Grumbkow transmitted. The
three never tired of representing to the King that England was urging this
double marriage, in order that the little kingdom of Prussia, having detached
itself from the Empire, might be made into an English province. Frederick
William I was not, like his successor, master of the art of oscillating between
the Powers. Frederick the Great owed his successes almost as much to
negotiation sis to the sword; his father, who was not a whit less eager for the
acquisition of territory, did not know how to lead up to it diplomatically.
Frederick William’s servants and friends in the pay of the Court of Vienna
scored a success, when, Hotham having ventured to show the King an intercepted
letter by which Grumbkow was compromised, the unaccountable monarch was
incensed, not with Grumbkow, but with Hotham, and subjected him to a violent
scene. Hotham, who was a proud man, took his departure without soliciting a
farewell audience.
As the
testament of 1722 proves, King Frederick William I detested loose habits of
life; but in other respects he was unable to control himself. Every man and
woman in Berlin to the best of their power avoided coming across a sovereign
who would strike out blindly with his stick, threatening that he would compel
his subjects “ in Russian fashion ” to observe his edicts. He was on very
unfortunate terms with his eldest son, the Crown Prince Frederick, who in 1730
was eighteen years of age. The son had a quite different nature from the
father’s and obeyed him very unwillingly, showing by his scornful defiance that
he felt himself mentally the King’s superior. In return, Frederick William
boxed the Crown Prince’s ears in the presence of the household, of the officers
of the Crown Prince’s regiment, of the generals—in short, of everybody.
Frederick William I was quite convinced that his son, whom he had detected in
youthful excesses and whose taste for French culture seemed to him sheer
idleness, would on succeeding to the Crown do everything forbidden to him in
the testament of 1722; and that his own death would be followed by the rise in
Prussia of a luxurious Court and a costly rigimeoi mistresses, accompanied by a
reduction of military expenditure. In short, Frederick William anticipated with
the accession of his son the ruin of all that he had called into life and the
abandonment of all the methods of his home government. The conflict between the
monarch and his heir also extended to matters of religion. Frederick William adhered
with all the zeal of a bigot to certain narrow dogmatic conceptions, which
Frederick contradicted with witty effrontery. Regarding the Crown Prince as
certain to bring about the moral ruin of the young
212 The Crown Prince’s escape frustrated. [i7so
Prussian
State, the King on one occasion went so far as to say, after administering a
few of his usual cuffs, that, had he been treated so by his father, he would
have shot himself, but that Frederick had no sense of honour, and would put up
with anything.
The unhappy
Prince now' formed a rash resolve to escape from his tormentor, taking flight
by way of France to England. He applied for aid to Sir Charles Hotham and his
attacte Guy Dickens; but they refused it and discouraged the whole plan.
Nevertheless, when on a journey with his father to the south-west of Germany,
Frederick made every preparation for escaping across the Rhine into France. But
at the last moment, at Mannheim, one of the pages of the Crown Prince, who was
involved in the plan of escape, threw himself at the King’s feet and disclosed
everything. Frederick’s chief accomplice had been Lieutenant Hans Hermann von
Katte, a young man of good family, rather older than the Prince. Most of the
aristocracy detested the institutions of absolutism; “ Court and army teem with
unrest,” wrote Grumbkow. The young officer, though barely of age, was
pronounced guilty of high treason, and, after having been for weeks threatened
with torture, was finally beheaded at Ciistrin; the Crown Prince, who was kept a
close prisoner in the fortress, being obliged to witness the execution from the
window of his prison (November 6). Frederick William’s pitiless action was
universally condemned abroad, particularly in England; but Frederick William
defiantly bade his ambassador in London state that if a hundred thousand Kattes
made their appearance he would have every one of them beheaded. “ He would have
the English know that he would suffer no rule beside his own.” Frederick
William for a time had serious thoughts of compelling the prisoner at Ciistrin
to renounce his birthright, and of transferring the succession to the Crown to
his second son; but, as a matter of course, he soon had to relinquish any
intentions of the kind. It was, however, very slowly and with the utmost
reluctance that he submitted to the necessity of resuming normal family
relations with the Crown Prince. For the next few years the relations between
father and son were rather less stormy; but the Crown Prince still had so much
cause to tremble before the passion of Frederick William that he often desired
his father’s death.
The King was
greatly incensed against England because the members of the British diplomatic
service had not given information of the Crown Prince’s plan of escape, though
they had not furthered it. Confidently expecting the Austro-English war to
break out shortly, he declared: “ I shall not desert] the Emperor, even if
everything goes to the dogs. I will joyfully use my army, my country, my money,
and my blood for the downfall of England.” In one of the most elaborate
memoranda extant from Frederick William’s hand he writes that he wishes his
relations in London every happiness, “ provided it be not at my expense and
intended to upset the whole of my organisation, which
f7i3—3o] Frederick William and the Prussian army.
213
is a stone of
offence to these Anglo-Hanoverian gentlemen. My
organisation, c'est la pierre de touche.""
France was at
this time reckoned to be maintaining land forces to the extent of 160,000
regular troops; the Russian army was estimated at 130,000 men, the Austrian at
from 80,000 to 100,000. Frederick William, with little over two million
subjects, raised the Prussian army to a total of 80,000. At his accession, in
1713, before the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Prussian army
was only 38,000 strong, about equal to the forces of the Kings of Sardinia and
of Saxony and Poland respectively, and, like the troops of these sovereigns,
could only be maintained by means of subsidies from the Western Powers. Since
such payments were only made in time of war, the Prussian army, under both the
Great Elector and Frederick I, was invariably almost entirely disbanded on the
conclusion of peace. Frederick William I, at that time the only real autocrat
in the civilised world besides the King of France, followed the example of
France in creating a large standing army which could be maintained from his
State’s own resources in time of peace and during a certain number of
campaigns. In proportion to the population and wealth of the two countries,
the Prussian army was immeasurably stronger than the French. Consequently, it
was no easy task for the King of Prussia to supply the human material for his
new military creation. He cherished the prejudice that only tall men were fit
to be soldiers. Besides, in his army the troops were treated much as his own
son had been. Whereas in France the punishment of flogging was never inflicted
on soldiers and in England its application was surrounded by protective
provisions, in the Prussian army flogging was as freely used as in the Russian.
According to the King’s notions the stick was an indispensable implement of
military education. After his visit to King George I at Hanover in 1725, he
wrote to Leopold of Dessau in high commendation of the impressive appearance
and the many fine qualities of the Hanoverian troops, but added: “What in my
opinion is wanting is subordination; they do their duty because they delight in
it, not from a sense of subordination, for scarcely a blow can be dealt any man
among them under pain of the King’s displeasure. Every private soldier knows
this, and yet the army is in good order; which greatly surprises me.”
At the King’s
accession there was no conscription in Prussia. The army was recruited by
voluntary enlistment, partly from within the Prussian monarchy, partly from the
rest of Germany, and to a considerable extent also from nationalities speaking
their own languages. As in . other countries, too, when voluntary enlistment
yielded insufficient numbers, it gave place to impressment. There is probably
no doubt that this system has never been resorted to in any country so
extensively and so recklessly as in Prussia and in the petty States of Germany,
which through fear of Prussia had to submit to the
misdeeds of
Frederick William’s recruiting-officers. It was simply kidnapping accompanied
by bloodshed—a sort of slave-hunting. In the Rhenish and Westphalian
possessions of the House of Brandenburg, which consisted of a number of
enclaves, young men could easily escape across the border when pursued by a
recruiting-officer. Accordingly there was here a wholesale emigration of young
men; and townsmen and peasants alike were left without serving-men. In the
compact eastern territories the majority of the young men could not elude the
recruiting-officer by emigrating, so that by force or by stratagem large
numbers could be impressed. King Frederick William I was a very devout man; but
his recruiting-officers were allowed to take the congregations at Sunday service
by surprise and carry off the biggest and strongest young men. The total of the
standing army was so enormous compared to that of the population, and the
methods of recruiting so harsh, that in many parts of the country there soon
began to be scarcity of labour for tillage and for the harvesting of crops. As
a result, nobility and peasants made common cause against the recruiting-
officers, and expelled them by force. The Estates and the magistrate expressed
apprehension lest the proceeds from the land-tax should diminish, trade
decline, and with it the revenue accruing from the excise. These
representations by the authorities produced some impression on the King; for it
was the taxes alone that enabled him to maintain the army.
Frederick
William I’s views as to the treatment of the recruits won by eamest-money, or
by force and cunning, were quite reasonable in theory. He demanded of his
officers that a young soldier should be taught everything without railing and
abuse, so that a man might not turn sullen and timid at the very outset.
Neither was a recruit to be beaten or otherwise ill-treated, particularly if he
was of a nationality other than German. But these wise provisions of the
regulations remained a dead letter in the practice of the service. Frederick
William cared rather more effectively for the comfort of the soldiers than for
their humane treatment; but a good deal of what was intended for the troops was
embezzled by the officers, many of whom were still very corrupt.
Soon after
his accession, the King issued an edict declaring that, according alike to the
natural and the divine order of things, the young men of both town and country
were bound to serve him with their lives. But among the Prussian middle classes
the edict met with almost universal disapproval. According to the conceptions
of humanity then current, it was impossible that public opinion should be in
favour of universal conscription, when discipline was so barbarously enforced
in the army, that during the reign of Frederick William I there were no fewer
than 30,000 desertions, and this in spite of the brutal penalty of flogging
through the line. Moreover, in the King’s eyes it was
of secondary
importance whether the captains, whose duties included recruiting, made up the
cadres of their companies by voluntary enlistment, impressment or
conscription, provided only the prescribed number were obtained. At the end of
Frederick William’s reign half the army, 40,000 men, consisted of foreigners,
while the other 40,000 were drawn from home. Voluntary enlistment and
impressment had been gradually almost entirely abandoned for the native element
in the army, for these were costly methods and inconvenient to manage. But,
without any cooperation on the part of the King, the captains found a way by
which they gradually succeeded in making conscription acceptable to the
population. Eligible lads were already in their tenth year entered on the list
of recruits for their “canton” (the particular district appropriated to every
single regiment for recruiting purposes). They were given a bunch of red
feathers to wear in their hats, and a pass certifying leave of absence, and had
to take the military oath after their confirmation. In this way these
Enrollirte (enrolled) were familiarised from childhood with the thought of
having some day or other to follow the drum; while landowners and parents had
time to prepare for the falling off in labour. In this manner, not as
prescribed by the King but as the result of habit, the edict of universal
conscription was in course of time realised so far as the social and economic
conditions of the age permitted. Very important exemptions from the obligation
of service were allowed; but they were not strictly enough formulated to
protect the middle classes entirely against the imposition of military service.
Through this loophole most abuses crept in, since the officers liberated “
enrolled ” persons from conscription for a money payment, and sold to soldiers
on active service their discharges. Frederick William was aware how widespread
was this extortionary practice among his officers. Just as Napoleon I organised
in France the system of substitution along with universal conscription, so the
practice of buying out of the service existed under Frederick William I, but in
a very crude form. Frederick William manifestly did not proclaim universal
conscription on account of the ideal advantages attaching to a national army,
but only because he required an expedient for filling up the regiments when
voluntary enlistment and impressment appeared inadequate for this purpose.
The
discipline inculcated in the troops alike by the King and by Prince Leopold was
the strictest then in existence anywhere. It can be stated with absolute
certainty that an army so sternly disciplined had not been seen in Europe since
the Roman centurion and his rod had vanished from the pages of history. The
Prussian regulations prescribed that a soldier who on or off duty abused his
superior officer should be rigorously flogged through the line; in the case of
a man on duty, a single word was sufficient to incur this barbarous penalty. A
soldier who resisted his superior officer or threatened him was shot without
further ado. On the parade grounds at Potsdam where the King drilled
216 Military drill.—The King's republicanism.
[1713-40-
his own
regiment, the “Giant Guard,” and at Halle, where Prince Leopold’s regiment was
garrisoned, the men were drilled with incredible perseverance and success. The
Prince of Dessau spoke with justifiable pride of that “marvel, the Prussian
infantry.” Their perfection was least of all due to the much-vaunted iron
ramrod which Leopold introduced into the Prussian army. The strength of
Frederick William’s battalions lay rather in the combination of discipline and
mobility imparted to them by infinitely laborious exercises. The troops had
been accustomed by the use of the stick to such absolute obedience that, even
amid a rain of bullets, they would act with machine-like precision and carry
out calmly and surely the elaborate evolutions commanded.
In 1809
Napoleon wrote to Alexander of Russia that, when they should have jointly
forced England to make peace, they might do Europe the service of abolishing
the system of enormous standing armies begun by Prussia. This statement of the
French Emperor’s is a little biassed, as Louis XlV’s was the first standing
army of any dimensions raised since the days of classical antiquity. But it is,
nevertheless, true that, in proportion to the population and wealth of Prussia,
the army of Frederick William I was of enormous size. The military Powers of
to-day oblige at most 1J per cent, of the population to serve in the army.
Frederick William’s standing army amounted to nearly 4 per cent, during the
three months of the year in which the soldiers on leave (whose numbers at other
times were no doubt very large) were called in.
The royal
Commander-in-chief of this exorbitantly large army was not completely dominated
by the dynastic point of view which still prevailed in the European Courts. He
called himself a Republican, thereby implying his belief in the idea of the
State as the true rule of conduct for all sovereigns. Putting the genuineness
of his religious feelings to a practical test, Frederick William worked for the
good of his subjects in a way which indirectly became a pattern for a whole
generation of princes. His father’s schooling, which was so repugnant to him,
taught the Crown Prince the virtue of application so especially prized by the
royal taskmaster. The father wished to pass for a Republican, and the son
designated himself “the chief servant of the State.” Following the example of
Frederick the Great, numerous German Princes applied themselves diligently to
the political work which their predecessors had neglected. Thus the condition
of Germany benefited largely through the change in the spirit of the government
introduced by Frederick William I.
Yet never had
a Republican less respect than King Frederick William for the freedom of his
fellow-men. From the nobility he exacted without any question of exemption that
compulsory service which he could only partially enforce with the people at
large. He required all able-bodied noblemen to serve as officers till their
physical powers were
iti3-4o] Compulsory service.—The officers' caste.
217
virtually
exhausted. The Land/rathe in the several provinces had to send in lists of the
young nobles between the ages of twelve and eighteen; whereupon, without more
ado, royal orders were issued as to which youths from each district were to
enter the Cadetterihaus (military school) at Berlin. The Great Elector had
broken the political power of the feudal Estates, and Frederick William turned
them into an army-service nobility, who learned, besides military discipline,
that self-subordination in public matters was a sacred duty. Hitherto, the
young nobles of the various territories which happened to be subject to the
House of Brandenburg had been quite as ready to take military service under
alien governments as under their own. Thus, the East Prussian nobility liked
to serve in the Polish or Danish army, that of Cleves in the Dutch. But, now
that the whole nobility of .the Prussian monarchy was forced to undergo
conscription, the King gained for his huge army a supply of officers both
numerous and of high quality.
Where the
aristocracy resisted this compulsory service, Frederick William resorted
without hesitation to dragonnades and kidnapping of children. A certain Herr
von Kleist of Zeblin in Eastern Pomerania would not let his son enter the
regiment of his district; and a widow, Frau von Below, refused to direct her
son, who was away in Poland, to do the same. The King thereupon ordered the
commander of the regiment to quarter a corporal and twelve men on the property
of these two persons until they sent in their sons. In East Prussia boys of
good family were carried off by the soldiery from their fathers’ houses and
sent under escort in bands of 18 or 20 to Berlin, where they were placed in the
military school. Peter the Great had in like manner compelled the Russian
provincial gentry to serve as officers. The Kings of France did not dare to go
to such lengths.
In Prussia
the officers of the army were the ruling caste, like the priests in other
countries. The King insisted on the fact that he stood on a far more intimate
personal footing with the officers than with the rest of his subjects.
Following his example, the officers treated the official classes, the learned
professions, and the upper middle classes generally, with a contempt and at
times a brutality which rendered the position of these classes uncomfortable
and insecure. Prussia was a polity of officers. Their numbers were enormous,
their service monotonous and very rarely interrupted by periods of leave. The
nobility might console themselves for the loss of their freedom by the fact
that, in the main, they made up the whole of this officers’ polity.
Frederick
William was not only the organiser of the Prussian army, but also the founder
of Prussian finance, without a judicious and firm settlement of which a
military State could not have been called into life. He created the royal
Treasure proper. Prussia was not, like England, France and Holland, in a
position to raise war loans; the subjects of the House of Brandenburg were too
poor to advance large sums ; and foreign
countries,
generally speaking, refused to give credit. Frederick William gradually amassed
10,000,000 thalers (£1,500,000) in the royal treasury, in order not to be
dependent in the event of war upon subsidies from the Western Powers, as were
the other German Princes, Austria and Russia—one and all. The yearly revenue of
the Prussian State amounted at the King’s death to 7,000,000 thalers
(£1,050,000). Now, the United Kingdom in 1905 had an income of about
£140,000,000; hence the ready money which lay in the vaults of the castle in
Berlin meant practically what a reserve of £200,000,000 in gold would mean to
the British Government of to-day. No other country in the eighteenth century
possessed an institution combining fiscal and political uses in so peculiar a
fashion. To the Treasury belonged also the silver plate procured ,by Frederick
William to the value of 600,000 thalers (£90,000), after the inherited silver
plate had been melted down and the proceeds used for the acquisition of Stettin.
In those days
a very great deal of the fixed capital in Prussia belonged to the Crown. Even
at the outset of the reign of Frederick William I a quarter, if not a third, of
the peasant vassals consisted of peasants bound to the royal domains. In order
to increase the profits from these domains and generally to raise the
population of the kingdom which was still remarkably small, Frederick William
organised immigration on a large scale. East Prussia and the Mark Brandenburg
were the provinces which offered the greatest scope to foreign settlers. In
1713 the population of East Prussia was estimated at some 400,000; under
Frederick William more than 30,000 new colonists came in, of whom by far the
larger proportion hailed from more highly civilised countries, some of them
bringing money with them. There were south Germans and west Germans, as well as
Swiss. The nucleus of the immigration was formed by 15,000 Protestants from
Salzburg, who had been compelled by Archbishop Firmian to emigrate. The other
colonists whom King Frederick William secured were also to some extent victims
of religious intolerance; but there were likewise many who left their homes for
economic and other material reasons. The King made use of the Dutch Press and
other journalistic agencies to win over the less stable element in any country
within reach. Allowances for the journey, remission of taxes, timber for
building, grants of money, exemption from military service, and every other
imaginable privilege were promised—and good land to boot. But, in reality, the
King took good care not to establish the immigrants on fertile soil. This he
put into the hands of native Prussian tenants of the Crown possessed of
capital, to whom six-year leases only were granted, so that on the expiration
of this short term the rent might be raised whenever possible. Inferior land on
the domains was for the most part allotted to the impecunious among the
colonists; if they were hard-working and managed well, the money advanced by
the King soon yielded a very good interest, often 10 to 12 per cent.
It was no
doubt the fiscal point of view which predominated when this civilising movement
was set on foot. The immediate object was to open up the resources of East
Prussia so that the land might be able to contribute more towards the army. A
report from the Board of Domains of East Prussia to the King states that the
establishment of the Swiss in that province had occasioned no great outlay; for
the horses, oxen and cows supplied to them as an advance in the King’s name had
been charged to them at five to six thalers, whereas they had cost on an
average about three thalers. Hence it came about that many of the settlers who
had been attracted by the King’s promises bitterly repented their coming, the
more so as the effects of this fiscal policy were further aggravated by
corruption in official circles. Frederick William would on no account permit
dissatisfied colonists to emigrate again; in fact, he punished attempts on the
part of settlers to get away from their new homes almost as severely as
military desertion. But, despite all distressing accompaniments, the
resettlement of East Prussia remains a most praiseworthy proceeding. The
province, which lay on the borders of European civilisation, was raised to a
higher plane by the colonists, who were mentally and morally superior to the
original inhabitants. The King, who never succeeded in raising the revenue to
more than seven million thalers a year, is proved to have expended at least
three millions, possibly much more, on the resettlement of East Prussia. It was
a very difficult matter to transplant thirty thousand country people with south
and west German customs to a distant province of widely different character and
devastated by pestilence, and to settle them so that they gradually became
acclimatised and raised the native population to their own level. The whole
movement was personally organised by Frederick William, who visited East
Prussia on six different occasions for this purpose; in accordance with his general
practice of constantly travelling through his State.
The King
managed the Crown lands as a farming enthusiast manages his estate. The
farmers-general, to whom he let the several domains for six years each,
administered police and justice on feudal principles over the “subjects” of the
domain. The fees accruing to them from these prerogatives were taken into
account when fixing the rental. So the masters had a very keen moral sense when
it came to punishing all misdemeanours of the country people; and the fines
imposed on the peasants were far from light, whether for disobedience and
remissness in bearing the feudal burdens or for disorderly conduct and bad
language.
The King was
cautious in espousing the cause of the distressed peasantry. No contemporary
Prince had a greater sense of his duties as a monarch towards the lower
classes; but Frederick William was anything but sentimental, and with him
fiscal considerations almost always predominated. It was not only the peasant
who suffered on this account, but the nobleman and the burgher likewise. Thanks
to their
privileged
position, the farmers-general could carry on breweries and public-houses under
the most favourable business conditions, so as to compete unduly with similar
industries on Ritterguter (knights’ manorial estates) or in towns. By the
extension or introduction of Miihlenzwang, as it was called, the peasants,
whether or not belonging to the domain, were compelled by law to have their
corn ground in the domain mill, whether they had been previously in the habit
of using the landlord’s mill, or hand-mills, as the custom was in backward East
Prussia.
By a
drastically maintained policy of this kind the King during his reign of
twenty-seven years raised the income from the domains from
1,500,000 to 3,300,000 thalers. A host of civil suits
decided by arbitrary administration of justice in a manner advantageous to the
Treasury had contributed to this very large increase.
At the end of
the reign of Frederick William I the Crown lands yielded, as stated, 3,300,000
thalers-, the taxes 3,600,000. This taxation, in Prussia as on the Continent
generally, was borne by the burgher and peasant classes, the nobility being for
the most part exempt. In East Prussia alone was this privilege denied the
nobles; but they resorted to fraud and bribery. They paid no higher tax for
their richest acre of land than for their poorest, and kept no cattle in order
to shift the burden of the cattle-tax upon the shoulders of the peasantry,
which, being held in bondage, must work for the feudal lords. Any deficiency in
the domestic economy of the landlords was made good by demanding an excessive
amount of forced labour from the peasants. Much land belonging to the nobles
was not taxed at all. The King completely overthrew this system. The newly
introduced General Hide Tax (Generalhyfenschoss) imposed on a large number of
the East Prussian noblemen six times more taxes than they had hitherto paid;
fully 34,681 hides of land belonging to the nobility, the existence of which
had been kept secret by the owners, were entered on the tax roll. The increase
in revenue was considerable enough to allow of the formation of three or four
battalions. But, at the same time, owners of moderate and small properties were
sensibly relieved. This was most essential, if the process of absorption of
peasant proprietors by the big landowners was to be stopped. While in Western
Pomerania, under Swedish rule, and in Mecklenburg the class of peasant
proprietors—-living, it is true, as bondmen, but on their own homesteads—almost
entirely disappeared, a class of landless labourers taking their place,
Frederick William I, and still more his son Frederick II, successfully laboured
to preserve the peasant proprietor in their dominions. In East Prussia not only
the reform of taxation but the settlement of 32,000 foreign country-folk
decidedly contributed to securing for the province a tolerably fair
apportionment of the rural landed property.
Both these
Prussian Kings could not but be pronounced opponents of an excessive growth of
large estates, because rural depopulation was
compatible
neither with the cantonment system nor with the system of taxation which in the
rest of the kingdom left the nobility untaxed and in East Prussia still
favoured this above other classes. “ Tout le pays sera mine" the spokesman
of the East Prussian nobility declared, in opposition to the King, in the
course of an attack on the General Hide Tax. Frederick William replied that it
was not the land that would be ruined, but the authority of the Junkers; the
King’s sovereignty he would maintain “like a rocker de bronce.”
Measured by
the standard of the French peasant class of that day, the social and economic
level of the rustic population of Prussia remained, notwithstanding, very low.
The peasants on the Crown lands, who were better off than those on the estates
of the nobility, were often subjected to forced labour for the
Contractor-General for four or more days a week. Then, besides other feudal
burdens, there was the specially heavy obligation on all peasants to provide
teams at the marches and reviews of the troops, and to supply straw for the
camp. To mitigate these impositions, Frederick William instituted in particular
districts “March and Burden (Molestien) Funds” which were to be supplied by the
Estates, not by the Crown; but these afforded nothing like complete relief.
Characteristic of the position of the smaller rural landowners is the principle
laid down by the royal Domains Commission in Lithuania, that a peasant on the
Crown lands having an annual net income of 55 thalers cash should keep 20 and
hand over the rest to the King. The subjects of the nobility were, as has been
seen, in a considerably worse plight. It is therefore no wonder that the
substitution of agricultural labourers for peasant proprietors progressed,
although, as has been seen, in a large portion of the kingdom effective
restrictions were put on this movement which were harmful to the community and
unwelcome to the Crown. The French peasants were in almost every respect better
off than the Prussian ; for most of them there was nothing beyond remnants of
feudalism left to bear, and they were constantly acquiring more land.
The urban
excise, established by the Great Elector as the financial corner-stone of
monarchical authority, had not been introduced in any part of the monarchy
except the Mark Brandenburg, Pomerania, and Magdeburg, when Frederick William
came to the throne. He extended it to East Prussia and the wealthy districts
round Halberstadt and Bielefeld. In the country round Hamm and Crefeld there
was a special form of excise, which treated least effectively those dutiable
articles which happened to be the most valuable. The King exchanged this
relatively unproductive system for that in force in Brandenburg. He likewise
procured fresh receipts by extending the monopoly on salt, introduced by the
Great Elector, to almost the entire State. His system of taxation was most
successful, as he increased the proceeds of taxation from
8,500,000 thalers to 3,600,000.
One of the
most powerful levers worked by the King for raising his
revenues was
the reform of the provincial administration. He adopted the principle of never
stationing an official in his native province. The Pomeranian, the Brandenburg,
and the East Prussian officials and likewise those from Magdeburg, Halberstadt,
Ravensberg, Mark, and Cleves had, in place of a local patriotism, to cherish
the interests of the Prussian State, which this King had been the first ruler
of the House of Brandenburg to make a reality. Under the stem control of
Frederick William I a growing proportion of the official class learnt
honesty—and they all learnt obedience.
Furthermore,
the King completely transformed the organisation of the government authorities.
When he came to the throne, there were working side by side in Berlin a General
Directory of Finance (General- Jmanzdirectoriuni), which managed the receipts
from the Crown lands, and a Chief War Commissariat (Oberkriegskommissariat),
into whose chest the taxes flowed. This historic dualism held good in the
provinces likewise, where the Crown lands pertained to the boards of finance,
and the taxes to the commissariat offices. Frederick William merged these two
branches of the administration in one, in order to put an end to the constant
friction between them. In Berlin the General Directory (Generaldirectorium) was
established as a central administrative department ; in the provinces Chambers
of War and Domains (Kriegs- und Domanenkammern) were formed. This organisation,
instituted in 1723, remained practically unchanged until the extinction of the
old Kingdom of Prussia in 1807. It formed the nucleus of a bureaucracy which
was the finest in the world after the French, and in the end outstripped its
prototype. The General Directory was divided into four departments, to each of
which belonged a Minister and four or five head officials of the Treasury
(Finanzrdthe).
The King
ordained that the members of the General Directory, the Ministers and
Councillors, were not to be expected to be distinguished by special
departmental knowledge. Rather, these officials were all alike to be well
informed as to the whole of the affairs of the public administration. But, in
the case of the provincial administrative bodies, Frederick William I was
inclined to allow greater scope for specialisation to the War and Domains
Offices, and the several Councillors of War (Kriegsrathe) were each to devote
himself to a particular branch of the administration.
But it is
impossible here to enter into all the details of importance in the changes
which the Prussian administration underwent under Frederick William I. Only as
to the Councillors of Taxes (Steuerraihe) and their functions a word must be
said. The Councillor of Taxes was a Commissioner from the War and Domains
Office, who administered six to twelve small and moderate-sized towns, while
large towns had each a separate Councillor. The Councillors of Taxes took rank
after the Councillors of the War and Domains Offices {Kriegsrathe), and were
generally chosen from among the officials of the Military Commissariat
Department.
At the outset
of his reign Frederick William I encountered a corrupt, oligarchical municipal
government, resembling that which the Municipal Reform Bill of 1835 amended in
England. Frederick William cleansed the municipalities of much of their ancient
corruption; but at the same time he almost completely destroyed the
self-government of the towns. The town councils lost the right of cooptation.
They might, it is true, send in to the Government a list of nominations
whenever there was a vacancy on the council; but neither the War and Domains
Offices nor the General Directory took much notice of such lists, and they
created only such people burgomasters and councillors as were in the Government’s
judgment capable, honest, and submissive. The municipalities also might no
longer collect their own taxes. If the municipal revenues were not sufficient
for the maintenance of street pavements, fire brigades, fountains, roads,
bridges, etc., in the condition prescribed by the regulations of the General
Directory and of the War and Domains Office, the latter body voted a special
grant for the purpose out of the urban excise.
At
this point the supremacy of the Councillor of Taxes began. The municipal budget
was under his control; not a groschen might be spent either in accordance with
the regular budget or beyond it without his knowledge. Town councillors were
mostly holders of state appointments who also served the commune; but, even if
the War and Domains Office allowed a few councillors to be taken from the
merchant class or some other independent calling, the municipal authorities
counted for nothing at all as against the all-powerful Councillor of Taxes. He
had a hand in everything. He closely superintended the management of the
municipal property and urged on the city-fathers, who were, generally speaking,
slow to move in economic matters, the draining of marshes and the building of
mills, and the construction of brick-yards and sheep-runs on land belonging to
the municipality. ,
As the income
from an important government tax like the urban excise depended upon the
general prosperity of the community in which it was raised, the Councillor of
Taxes had a far wider sphere of influence. He controlled weights and measures,
and superintended the watch kept over building materials and food-stuffs; the
duties on bread, meat, and beer had to be adjusted in his presence; he had to
see that good beer was brewed; that thatches and shingle roofs were replaced by
tiles, and draw-wells by pumps.
It was the
Councillor of Taxes, not the town council, who suggested to the War and Domains
Office which persons should be appointed as municipal recorders, treasurers,
secretaries and other civic officers, when vacancies occurred. For an
inefficient municipal administration would have been detrimental to the royal
finances, not merely to those of the municipality. Again, in the narrow
conditions of life which then obtained in the towns of Prussia, it seemed to be
most important from an economical point of view that not merely office-holders
but, so far as
possible, all
the citizens should lead moral lives. Otherwise, to begin with, there was a
danger of a rise in the charges for poor relief. This state of things made the
Councillor of Taxes the moral censor of the whole population of the town. . He
summoned before him persons who were leading notoriously wicked lives,
admonished them in the presence of the municipal authorities, and depicted to
them in glaring hues pauperism as the inevitable result of their sins. He was
authorised to banish from the town incorrigible ne’er-do-weels, and under
certain circumstances even to sentence them to imprisonment with hard labour.
Nor was it by any means only the morality and industry of the proletariat which
were taken in charge by the commissioner of the War and Domains Office; he also
concerned himself with the way in which the work at the Rathhaus was
distributed—whether the city-fathers and officials were faithfully observing
the rules, or whether they were being lazy and imbibing too much beer and
spirits.
The
advancement of commerce and manufactures was one of the chief duties of this
representative of the Crown and of Providence. He must endeavour to attract
capitalists and manufacturers to the town. He was commanded to manage the
guilds and to encourage industries. In the Prussia of Frederick William I these
latter were subjected to government inspection, on the principle introduced by
Colbert in France. The cloth-weavers were told how they were to clean, card,
and dress the wool, and any shortcomings in any part of the technical process
were notified by the inspectors for punishment to the revenue official, who had
to see that there were proper fulling-mills, that the cloth-workers possessed
good modem appliances, and that there were proper arrangements for dyeing.
This state socialism even went so far as to impose upon the Councillor of Taxes
the duty of finding employers and constant occupation for the home-workers
among the weavers, and of settling the scale of wages in consultation with both
parties.
This paternal
supervision on the part of the Councillor of Taxes extended to all other
industries. Mercantilism met the needs of the age, notwithstanding the
crudeness which marked that economic theory; and beyond doubt many services
were rendered from an economic point of view by the Prussian Councillor of
Taxes. In particular the stimulus given to cloth-weaving under his auspices was
of lasting benefit to the textile industries of Prussia. The close diplomatic
relations between Prussia and Russia noted above enabled the “Russian Company”
in Berlin to supersede the English contractors of army-cloth for the Tsar’s
dominions; and for many years the stuffs used for the uniforms of the Russian
army were woven in the Electoral and the New Mark. The needy Mark Brandenburg
received more than 1,600,000 thalers for these fabrics, though they were thick
and heavy and not to be compared in quality with the soft English materials; so
that the “ Russian Company" had to be wound up when a coolness set in in
the diplomatic relations between Berlin and St Petersburg, and the English
textile trade regained the
1713-40] Economical and
educational advance.
225
Russian
market. But in the meantime the cloth manufacture in Brandenburg had, over and
above the money earned, made technical progress which was not lost, and there
had been an enduring gain of commercial insight. The cloth-weaving industry of
the Mark survived the loss of the Russian market and flourished anew.
Altogether
the economic advance of the country was unmistakable, though slow—for
statistics from which it is sought to deduce a great rise of prosperity in
reality prove nothing. A mercantilist commercial policy pursued by a monarch
with common sense and energy perhaps suited Germany even better than France,
because the national decline of the seventeenth century had crippled the
enterprise of the German middle class, formerly so alert. Not only was the
progress of this policy carefully regulated from above, but it also received
pecuniary aid. The rigid economy adopted by Frederick William in the interests
of the army did not deter him from making great outlays for productive
purposes. It has already been stated that at least three million thalers were
spent on the resettlement of East Prussia. More than two millions (£300,000)
were divided among the several provinces for municipal improvements. If a town
suffered heavy damages by fire, or by any other serious calamity, which if not
allayed, must entail an appreciable abatement of the royal taxes, the King
would with well-considered generosity open his purse. He left a specially fine
memorial of himself in the Havelland, where he drained the marshy region of the
Luch, employing military labour for the purpose. Thirty-five square miles were
reclaimed for cultivation, after several large canals, numerous trenches, and
more than thirty dikes of considerable size had been constructed.
The
statement that Frederick William made large pecuniary grants to the subjects of
the Crown for his own well-understood advantage, does not imply that the King
incurred these heavy expenses without including, as a secondary consideration,
the furtherance of the well-being of the people committed to him by God. Many
as were the faults attaching to his character, his piety was sincere, deep, and
at the same time practical. In the testament of 1722 the necessity for founding
schools is mentioned in the same breath with the obligation on the Prussian
Government to build churches. It was this ecclesiasticism (to use the word in
no invidious sense) which gave rise to Frederick William’s edict introducing
universal compulsory education. But the Prussian State was not yet ripe for so
sweeping a reform. The edict decreed that the cost of the compulsory primary
schools was to be borne by the parents with assistance from the various
communities. In this period the large wealthy States of western Europe
contributed nothing towards elementary schools, and did not concern themselves
at all with this serious problem. If Frederick William I’s edict bore but
scanty fruit, nevertheless more was done under his rule for the education of
the masses than under any other contemporary sovereign. ,
In everything
which this eminently practical monarch seriously undertook, he was favoured by
fortune, so far as internal policy was concerned. His ecclesiastical policy
also proved successful. He wielded a power over his clergy even more absolute
than that in the hands of the King of France. With the help of the University
of Halle, he used this supremacy to win over the Protestant clergy of his
kingdom to pietistic views. The Pietists were the only party in the Protestant
Church of Germany at that time which was not torpid but full of life and productivity.
Methodism, which was akin to it and which sprang up almost contemporaneously in
England, was rejected by the Established Church of that country. The English
Church accordingly fell into a state of apathy which lasted for a century,
while in Prussia Protestantism continued active and spread its vivifying spirit
among adherents of the same form of faith far beyond the boundaries of the
Prussian monarchy.
Political
equality was not enjoyed by religious minorities of that day in any European
State; and in the dominions of the House of Brandenburg the Catholics were not
on an equality with the Protestants. But the King, if a keen Protestant, was a
practical man; he had Catholic officers and soldiers, and treated his Papist
subjects in general so well that Rome, which at that period indeed could make
no great claims, was satisfied with him. Of course, in a State so rigorously
absolutist as that of Frederick William I there could be no question of liberty
for the Church, whether Catholics, Lutherans, or members of the Reformed Church
were in question. The King would have liked to effect a union of the two
Protestant confessions. He considered it a step in that direction to forbid the
Reformed ministers to preach on predestination, while the Lutheran clergy were
prohibited from chanting in Latin, or introducing any music or the use of
lighted candles on the altar, during the consecration of the elements in the
Eucharist. They had also to give up surplices, stoles, eucharistic vestments,
and the elevation of the Sacrament, and were no longer allowed to pronounce the
benediction, crucifix in hand, at the dose of the service. In these innovations
the King encountered passive resistance, and he died in the midst of this
difficulty before he had been able to come to a settlement with the clerical
Opposition. Otherwise, the clergy as a class rendered absolute obedience to
him. The submissiveness of the Prussian ministers in all political matters was
further increased by the doctrines of Spener and Francke, both of whom considered
that the mission of the clergy consisted almost exclusively in fostering the
spiritual life and in charity.
King
Frederick William I was only fifty-one years of age when he died, on May 31,
1740. He was ill-satisfied with the results of his reign, because all the
Cabinets of Europe denied his claims to the duchy of Berg. Everyone ridiculed
the soldier-king, who was constantly preparing for war and never fought. The
Austrians thought that half theso Prussian soldiers, trained by profuse
thrashings, would desert
when it came
to war. It was not for the last time that the world underestimated the
strength which Prussia had been quietly building up.
Despite all
the repellent traits in his character and in that of a polity of officers
formed in his image, Frederick William remains a historical figure of the
greatest importance. He, and he alone, created the means by which his son
raised Prussia to the level of a Great Power. If Frederick William succeeded in
laying the foundations for the development which was to follow, he owed his
great and lasting achievements to his earnest piety, unsullied reputation, and
eminently practical ability, and to a steadfast diligence which the pleasures
of life were unable to turn aside from the strait path of duty. Last but not
least, we must remember his scrupulous economy. The economy practised by him
would have been superfluous in other countries; but the King of Prussia, a
small and poor State, felt that he must carry the exercise of this virtue so
far, that when writing he used to put on over-sleeves to save the expensive
cloth of his uniform. The King was so absolutely possessed by this idea as to
feel that, if his object were to be attained, he must turn every thaler over
three times before spending it.
Ranke rightly
observes that Prussia might have advanced on other lines than those laid down
by Frederick William I. As a matter of fact, Prussia, more than any other State
in the world’s history, is what her great Kings have made her. After the death
of Frederick William I, when the various classes paid homage to the new
sovereign, they combined with this solemn act the expression of countless
grievances and of , the ill-concealed wish that almost everything that had been
accomplished might be annulled. The tone of the officers was not much more
amicable than that of the civilian population. The most distinguished of
Frederick II’s military subjects, Field-Marshal Schwerin, informed the young
King that he regarded as indispensable a more or less complete return to the
system of feudal estates abolished by the Great Elector two to three
generations earlier. But Frederick II was much more of an autocrat than his
father. He staunchly upheld the unpopular institutions of Frederick William I.
Further, on the Prussian people, or rather on the collection of German-speaking
peoples united by chance under the House of Brandenburg, he imposed two fresh
obligations— the one in respect of home policy, the other in respect of
foreign. The former was a realisation of the ideas of the Aufklanmg; the latter
the enforcement of the hereditary rights belonging to the House of Brandenburg
over a part of Silesia. Public opinion in Prussia was indifferent to the
Silesian claims of the dynasty, and detested the Voltairean innovations. But the
King had absolute power. He ordered the abolition of torture and took other
important measures in the spirit of the Jufklarumg; and on the sudden death of
Charles VI of Austria on October 20,1740, after fruitless negotiations with the
Court of Vienna, the Prussian army advanced into Silesia.
(3) THE WAR.
Had Maria
Theresa merely been confronted with the problems of internal reform which
Charles VI had not attempted, or attempted only to relinquish, her task would
have been formidable enough. But that was by no means all: the chief perils lay
in the possibility that: her neighbours might see in the embarrassments of
Austria a chance of profit; The desperate efforts of Charles VI to induce the
Powers of Europe to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction are some indication of the
danger. The succession of a woman, especially in the unsatisfactory condition
of the Habsburg dominions, was sure to be the signal for the putting forward of
claims which Charles VI had endeavoured to meet in advance. As has been pointed
out, the most formidable claims were those of the husbands of Joseph I’s
daughters, Charles Albert of Bavaria and Frederick Augustus II of Saxony. Those
of Spain and Sardinia were less serious, and only caused anxiety because of the
danger of a combination of claimants against the ill-prepared Habsburg State.
Those of petty principalities like Wiirtemberg were not deserving of serious
consideration. But it was not only from possible claimants that Charles VI had
sought to obtain guarantees: Powers only indirectly interested in the question
had been induced to give their pledges also; and it was really more important
to see what line Russia and France and the Maritime Powers would adopt, for if
they adhered to their guarantees it was unlikely that any of the rival
claimants would endeavour to press their claims. Spain was already engaged in
war with England; Sardinia might fish in troubled waters, but would hardly
venture to disturb an unruffled pool; Saxony actually promised to help in
putting the Pragr-.atic Sanction into force; and, though the Elector of Bavaria
declined to acknowledge Maria Theresa’s succession and laid claim to the
Habsburg territories, he could not dispose of a force strong enough to push his
claims unaided. Indeed) at first it almost seemed that Maria Theresa was to
have an unexpectedly easy accession. England and the United Provinces, Pope
Benedict XIV and the Republic of Venice, all acknowledged her as the lawful
heiress of the Habsburg lands; and, though the death (October 28,1740) of the
Tsarina Anna Ivanovna and the consequent changes at St Petersburg deprived
Maria Theresa of the help which she might have expected from Russia had Anna
lived, nothing was to be feared from that quarter. The new King in Prussia,
Frederick II, sent most friendly letters, containing not merely a formal
recognition of Maria Theresa but an unsolicited offer of military help in case
of need—conduct which effectually concealed his real intentions and made his
subsequent action all the more outrageous. France did not* it is true, give any
formal or definite acknowledgment, though Fleury spoke in the most reassuring
manner to the Austrian ambassador at Paris, Prince Liechtenstein, ascribing the
delay over the
1740]
229
ecognition to
the need for research into the proper ceremonial to he observed. Thus it was
only Bavaria whose attitude could be called hostile; and the claim advanced by
the Elector in virtue of his descent from Anna, daughter of Ferdinand I, to
whose representatives her father was alleged to have promised the succession in
case of failure of his male heirs, was confuted by the production of the
authentic will, showing that the contingency actually contemplated was the
failure of legitimate heirs.
But, while
Bavaria had claims, without the force to render them serious, another Power had
a force so strong as to lend weight to claims which would not otherwise have
been taken into account. Prussia’s pretensions to the Silesian duchies of
Brieg, Liegnitz, Jagerndorf and Wohlau were mainly important as a cloak under
which to attempt to corceal the ambition and rapacity by which Frederick II was
actuated. The falseness of his friendly professions had barely been suspected
at Vienna, before it was published to the world by the invasion of Silesia by
Prussian troops, 30,000 of whom crossed the frontier on December 16, 1740. They
found the province quite unprepared to meet this unexpected attack. The troops
quartered in it were much below even its peace establishment of 13,000, and could
only throw themselves into the fortresses of Brieg, Glatz, Glogau, and Neisse,
letting the Prussians overrun and take possession of the rest of the province,
while the capital, Breslau, hastened to come to terms with the invader.
Simultaneously
with *iis invasion of Silesia Frederick had despatched Baron Gotter to Vienna
to offer Maria Theresa the disposal of his vote at the coming Imperial election
and anned assistance against her enemies, if she would satisfy his claims on
Silesia. Maria Theresa, enraged by this effronteiy, and by the mendacious
proclamation in which Frederick •epresented to the inhabitants of Silesia that
he was acting with her approval and in her interests, would not listen to
Sinzendorff and other timid advocates of surrender; she at once set about
collecting an army with which to expel the invaders from Silesia, and appealed
to the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction for assistance against 1 his
unprovoked aggression. But only England showed any disposition to fulfil her
obligations: elsewhere Frederick found imitators. Augustus III, after much
haggling, withdrew his recognition, alleging objections to the appointment of
Francis Stephen as co-Regent with Maria Theresa. Spain, Sardinia, and Bavaria
prepared to push their claims; and, while Fleury continued \/ to profess friendly intentions,
there were among the counsellors of Louis XY many who urged their sovereign to
put a finishing touch to the work of Richelieu and Louis XIV by seizing this
opportunity of destroying the Power whose dangerous predominance his
predecessors had resisted and reduced. An offer of a defensive alliance put
forward by Frederick at the same time that he invaded Silesia fbund favour at
Versailles; and, though no agreement was at once reached—for Frederick promptly
raised his
terms—France came gradually round to the side of Austria’s enemies. It was
decided that Marshal Belleisle should be sent on a special mission to Germany,
to win over the Spiritual Electors to the side of Charles Albert of Bavaria and
to arrange for Franco-Prussian cooperation in a personal interview with
Frederick (March, 1741).
Meanwhile,
the Austrian force charged with the recovery of Silesia was collecting on the
frontier; but its mobilisation was greatly delayed by manifold defects in the
military administration and by the lack of money which was mainly responsible
for these shortcomings. Before Marshal Neipperg took the field (March 29),
Frederick had been able to storm Glogau (March 9) and to reduce Ottmachau and
other minor fortresses. But Frederick had not yet realised the importance of
concentration: his troops, scattered to a dangerous degree, must have been
caught and beaten in detail, but for Neipperg’s blindness to his opportunities.
Frederick himself at Jagemdorf had barely 4000 men with him ; and, though:he
was fortunate enough to be able to rally
10,000 more under Kalkstein at Steinau on April 6
and to pick up the blockaders of Brieg on the 9th, if Neipperg had used his
numerous and excellent cavalry prcperly, the King might easily have been
crushed before he could have effected these junctions. As it was, the Prussians
lad to relinquish their blockades of Brieg and Neisse; and Neipperg was
actually seven miles nearer Breslau than was Frederick on the morning of April
10, the day on which the armies met near the village of Mollwitz. Had the
Prussian' infantry’s fighting capacities been of the same order as their
monarch’s strategy, Mollwitz would hardly claim to rank among decisive battles.
Yet such it was* for* although the Austrian cavalry, superior in numbers and in
quality, promptly routed the Prussian horsemen and drove them and Frederick
with them headlong from the field, when the victorious troopers turned on the
Prussian infantry, repeated charges on the flank and rear failed to break the
steady ranks. Meanwhile, the Austrian infantry had advanced but could make no
head against the superior artillery opposed to them and the rapidity of fire
which their iron ramrods allowed the Prussians to maintain, and before long Neipperg’s
whole army was retreating in disorder on Neisse.
In the
history of tactics Mollwitz is remarkable as one of the first victories of
infantry over cavalry, of the combined musket and bayonet over the arme
blanche. It was due mainly to the admirable training and fire-discipline
established by Frederick William I, and it took the military profession by
surprise. Its immediate results were insignificant. The defeat of the Prussian
cavalry prevented any pursuit; and Neipperg, retiring to Neisse, took up his
position there and maintained it all through the summer, Frederick making no
effort to attack him, though he resumed the investment of Brieg which fell on
May 4. Indeed, Mollwitz did not seem to have brought Frederick any nearer the
direct conquest of Silesia: it was only its political results which made it
decisive.
Europe had been watching Silesia, and the Austrian defeat promised an easy
victim to those who had hesitated to strike because they did not feel certain
of success. If Maria Theresa could not oust Frederick from Silesia, how could
she hope to resist a cooperative robbery?
Even before
Mollwitz France was all but resolved on adopting the cause of Bavaria:
Belleisle’s influence was now predominant, and Fleury was only restrained from
warmly advocating intervention by his natural irresolution and timidity and by
jealousy of the supporters of the proposal. On March 10 Belleisle set out on
his journey, in the course of which he was able to secure for Bavaria the
support of the Spiritual Electors, though Mainz and Trier had hitherto shown
themselves well fhsposoc! to Francis Stephen’s candidature. At Dresden he was
less successful, for Augustus III was jealous of his Bavarian brother-in-law,
hated and distrusted Prussia, and was anxious to come to terms with Maria
Theresa, could he induce her to make some concessions in Bohemia. Nor was
Belleisle’s first interview with Frederick, at Brieg about the end of April,
any more satisfactory; Frederick was not anxious for French intervention and,
while determined to keep Silesia, would have preferred to come to terms with
Austria on that basis. But, although England (hoping to arrange a combination
of Austria, Hanover, Saxony, and Prussia on the lines of the “Grand Alliance”
of William Ill’s day) sought to induce Maria Theresa to conquer her resentment
and to secure Frederick’s aid against Bavaria and France, not even Mollwitz
could shake the Queen. Rather than make concessions to Frederick, she offered
to the Bourbons substantial gains in the Netherlands, and even made overtures
to Bavaria; but her offers were rejected, and on the last day of July Charles
Albert began hostilities by seizing Passau. He was able to do this, because on
May 18 the Treaty of Nymphenburg had assured him the active assistance of France,
while by Belleisle’s mediation a compact had been made with Spain (May 28) for
the partition of the Habsburg heritage. Moreover, Frederick, finding Maria
Theresa deaf to the counsels of England and prudence, fell back on his
alternative and concluded, on June 5, a treaty at Breslau. By this France
guaranteed to- him Breslau and Lower Silesia, in return for his promise to vote
for Charles Albert and his renunciation of all claims on Julich and Berg in
favour of the Sulzbach line of the Wittelsbachs (the representatives of the
other partner in the Jiilich-Cleves partition of 1666), a pledge which helped
to secure for the Bavarians the support of the Elector Palatine.
It was on
September 11 that Charles Albert’s forces, 50,000 strong, two-thirds of them
French “ auxiliaries,” began their advance down the Danube. Upper Austria
proved an easy prey; few troops were at hand to defend it; Bavarian partisans
were numerous; and the whole province submitted with discreditable readiness,
nobility and officials exhibiting a culpable negligence if not actual
disaffection. Vienna was in the
232 Klein-SchneUendorf.—Charles Albert's mistake,
[mi
gravest
peril. Its fortifications and garrison were weak, its population
panic-stricken; and, though Maria Theresa’s dramatic appeal to Hungarian
loyalty had met with a success which justified her confidence as much as it
surprised her Ministers, the succours promised from this quarter were not yet
in the field. So urgent was the extremity that Maria Theresa had reluctantly to
agree to the conclusion by English mediation of the secret Convention of
Klein-Schnellendorf (October 9) by which she gave up Lower Silesia, including
Neisse, which was to be surrendered to the Prussians after a mock siege. At
this heavy price, Prussia’s neutrality was secured and Neipperg’s army set
free.
But
Klein-Schnellendorf would have been too late to save Vienna, had Charles Albert
been a strategist. When Neipperg left Neisse (October 16) the Bavarians,
despite a quite unjustifiable delay of three weeks at Linz (September
14—October 5), were within a few marches of the ill-prepared Austrian capital.
But from St Polten, which he reached on October 21, the Elector suddenly turned
back and, crossing the Danube at Mauthausen (October 24), directed his march into
Bohemia. Military justification for this step he could not plead; he could gain
nothing in Bohemia that he might not have secured by taking Vienna—the only
possible explanation is that he could not trust his allies and feared they
would forestall him by seizing Bohemia for themselves. He had certainly good
reason for distrusting Frederick, and Augustus III, who after much vacillation
had finally been persuaded by Belleisle to join the coalition against Maria
Theresa (September 19), certainly hoped for part of Bohemia; but the move not
only carried Charles Albert away from Vienna, the critical point where success
might be assured, when the city was absolutely at his mercy—it also exposed
Bavaria to a counter-stroke.
For the
moment, however, all went well with the Bavarian cause. The appearance on the
Lower Rhine of another French army under Marshal Maillebois had deprived Maria
Theresa of the promised assistance of George II, who found himself forced by
the peril which thus threatened Hanover to agree to become neutral (September
27). Bohemia, like Silesia and Upper Austria, was but poorly provided with
troops; the fortifications of Prague were in bad repair, and the Bohemian
nobility somewhat disaffected. Moreover, Neipperg’s movements were so slow that
Charles Albert was able to join a French reinforcement which entered Bavaria by
Amberg, and to unite under the walls, of Prague with the 20,000 Saxons under
Rutowski (November 23), without any interference by the tardy Austrians. At the
instigation of Maurice de Saxe an assault was at once made on Prague (November
25) with complete success, the Austrians being still fifty miles to the
southward. As after Mollwitz, the fall of Prague was followed by a dead-lock,
the Bavarians and their allies making no effort to drive the Austrians from the
strong position near Neuhaus to which they had retired, while they- were
content to keep the main army of their enemies in check and so to, cover
operations in progress elsewhere.
1741-a] Bavaria
overrun.—Frederick in Moravia. 233
One of the
measures adopted by Maria Theresa to provide for the defence of her capital had
been to recall 10,000 men from her Italian [iossessions. These, it is true,
were likely to be attacked before long by Spain and Naples; but for the moment
the troops could be spared, and their arrival at Vienna (December) provided a
backbone of regulars for the wild irregulars whom the Hungarian “ insurrection
” was placing at Maria Theresa's disposal. Under the competent leadership of
Count Khevenhiiller and his able subordinate Barenklau, this force took the
offensive with complete success (December 31). The 10,000 men whom Charles
Albert had left to hold Upper Austria were surrounded in Linz and forced to
capitulate (January 24,1742), after an attempt at relief by the Bavarian
general Torring had been foiled at Scharding (January 17), and the Hungarian
levies overran Bavaria in all directions. There was no little irony in the
coincidence that on the day of the surrender of Linz the Diet at Frankfort
elected Charles Albert to the vacant Imperial throne, and that, while the new
Emperor was being solemnly crowned as Charles VII, Munich was capitulating to
avoid being plundered (February 12). Torring had to retire on Ingolstadt, one
of the very few places in Bavaria which had not passed into Khevenhiiller’s
hands before the end of February. But, once again, the course of events was
changed by what was happening elsewhere.
Frederick II
had had good reasons for making the Convention of Klein-Schnellendorf: after
ten months' campaigning his army sorely needed rest, and to obtain Neisse
without the labours of a siege was a great advantage. But it is probable that
Frederick made the Convention with the full intention of breaking it when he
had profited by it, and found this course convenient. The insincerity of his
attempts) to throw on Austria the responsibility for the failure to keep the
Convention a secret may be gathered from the treaty for the partition of Maria
Theresa’s territories which he concluded with Bavaria and her allies on October
31; and before Khevenhiiller crossed the Enns the Prussians had invaded Moravia
and (December 26) captured Olmiitz. There for the moment they rested; but in
February Frederick took the field again in person, pushing forward to Briinn
and laying siege to that town, while his raiding parties penetrated almost so
far as Vienna. In this operation Frederick had counted on the assistance of his
allies; but only the Saxons gave him any active support—for neither Charles;
Albert nor Marshal de Broglie, now in command of the French “ auxiliaries,”
approved of the invasion of Moravia, being anxious to relieve the pressure on
Bavaria by an advance due south. Furious at the inaction of his allies,,
Frederick found the resistance of Briinn more than he could overcome with the
means at his disposal, while the Hungarian light cavalry operated very briskly
against his communications with Silesia, Thus, no sooner had the Austrian main
army left Tabor for Znaim (April 1) than Frederick abandoned his attempt on
Moravia, moving across into
234
[l742
Bohemia,
instead of retiring on Silesia. The only effect of his attack on Moravia had
been that Khevenhiiller had had to detach some 10,000 men to Bohemia, which
brought his own operations to a standstill. Thus reenforced, Charles of
Lorraine proceeded to take the offensive against the French, hoping to bring de
Broglie to action before he could be joined by further reenforcements from
France. Partly to secure this junction, partly to ensure his own retreat if
necessary, for his army was in a bad condition, de Broglie had just detached
10,000 men to secure Eger; and between his left and the Prussians at Chrudim
there was a gap into which the Austrians proposed to thrust themselves. But,
when on May 12 the Austrian vanguard reached Czaslau, about two-thirds of the
way from Znaim to Prague, it found the Prussians moving westward, evidently to
hinder the Austrian manoeuvre, instead of retiring northward over the Elbe, as
had been expected. On this, Prince Charles resolved to seek an action with the
Prussians. Had he moved with greater speed, he might have caught Frederick at a
disadvantage, for on the morning of May 16 there was a considerable space
between the King, who was with his vanguard, and the main body, which was at
Podhorzan. But an unnecessary halt of twelve hours at Ronnow and the
miscarriage of a night-march, by which he sought to surprise the Prussian main
body, deprived Charles of his chance; while, though in the earlier stages of the
action in which he engaged between Czaslau and Chotusitz on May 17 the Austrian
commander gained some advantage, the balance was soon redressed by the return
of Frederick and his division from Kuttenberg. When Frederick arrived, the
Austrian cavalry, as at Mollwitz though with greater difficulty, had routed the
Prussian horse and was chasing it off the field, while the opposing centres,
composed in each case of infantry, were hotly engaged round Chotusitz. Seeing
the left flank of the Austrian infantry exposed by the absence of their
cavalry, he hurled his division on this critical point; and his success decided
the day. The Austrians withdrew in good order, though they had suffered 7000
casualties, about a quarter of their force. The Prussians, out of about equal
numbers, lost 5000 all told; their cavalry, though beaten, had done better than
at Mollwitz; but so had the Austrian infantry, and Frederick made no attempt to
follow up his success. Indeed, he even remained inactive while the Austrians,
after effecting a junction with the corps under Lobkowitz at Budweis, resumed
the move against the French. Outnumbered by over two to one and in bad
condition generally, the French were somewhat easily driven in on Prague,
suffering several minor defeats and heavy losses. The garrisons left by them at
Frauenberg, Pisek, and Pilsen surrendered at once; and by the end of June the
remnants of the French invaders of Bohemia were cooped up in Prague, their
communications with their friends in Bavaria having been severed by the fall of
Pilsen.
Frederick’s
inaction is easily explained. He had fought Chotusitz
1742]
Peace of
Berlin.—Maillebois' move. 235
for political
not for military objects, and he had gained his end. Chotusitz added the
necessary weight to the arguments of the English envoys, who were as usual
seeking to persuade Maria Theresa to come to terms with Prussia. All Frederick
wanted was the definite cession of the territory surrendered to him at
Klein-Schnellendorf. He had the less compunction about deserting his allies,
because he attributed to them the failure of his invasion of Moravia. Moreover,
the substitution for Walpole’s of a Ministry in which foreign affairs were
entrusted to Carteret promised a more active intervention of England on Maria
Theresa’s behalf, and increased his desire for peace. And, for the moment,
Maria Theresa was more eager for revenge on France and Bavaria than intent on
prosecuting the attempt to recover Silesia, which, to judge from Chotusitz, was
likely to prove a formidable undertaking. Accordingly, after some hesitation,
it was decided to accept Frederick’s overtures, and on June 13 the
Preliminaries of Breslau ceded to him Upper and Lower Silesia, including Glatz,
but excluding Tetschen and Troppau. Six weeks later, a definitive peace was
concluded at Berlin (July 28); whereupon Saxony also withdrew from the
anti-Austrian coalition, having merely ruined her army and her finances by her
effort to plunder Austria.
Prussia and
Saxony thus disposed of, Maria Theresa proceeded to frame schemes for
compensating herself for Silesia by annexing Bavaria, provision being made for
the Elector at the expense of France. Her immediate object was to compel de
Broglie and his army to surrender at discretion, a humiliation France was not
less keen to avoid. Diplomatic measures failing, since Maria Theresa promptly
rejected all Fleury’s overtures, the French Ministry had to utilise the army
under Maillebois which had hitherto been keeping George II in check by
threatening Hanover; for, though Harcourt’s French corps and the Bavarians had
gained ground against Khevenhiiller after he had had to detach troops to
Bohemia, they were not strong enough to effect the relief of Prague unaided. In
August, therefore, Maillebois started for Bohemia, and on September 27 was
joined at Bramahof in the Upper Palatinate by the French corps from Bavaria,
which had moved north to meet him, Khevenhiiller moving parallel and joining
the Austrian main body at Hayd. Charles of Lorraine, on hearing of Maillebois’
march, had moved out to oppose his advance, leaving Lobkowitz and 10,000
irregulars to blockade Prague. A battle seemed imminent, but none occurred.
Maillebois, after some manoeuvring, came to the conclusion that the relief was
beyond his powers, and decided (October 10) to retire into Bavaria to take up
winter-quarters. Charles of Lorraine* content to have foiled the attempted
relief, made no effort to bring Maillebois to action and moved southward to the
Danube parallel with him. Meanwhile, de Broglie had not taken advantage of the
chance of escaping from Prague afforded by Maillebois’ move; to get away would
have been easy, for Lobkowitz and his irregulars maintained a most inefficient
blockade;
236 Belleisle's retreat.—Fall of Prague.—Italy.
[1742-3
but the
French commander was unwilling to acknowledge the failure of the invasion of
Bohemia by abandoning Prague, and still hoped for relief. On the retreat of
Maillebois the investment was resumed, just after de Broglie himself had left
the town (October 27) to replace Maillebois in command of the French army about
to winter in Bavaria. That electorate was once again in Charles Albert’s hands.
After Khevenhiiller’s departure (September), Barenklau had been unable to hold
his ground against Seckendorf’s 15,000 Bavarians, and the Aus- trians had
recoiled behind the Inn, though holding on to Passau, round which town and
Schardi. g their main army took up winter-quarters (November), the French being
at Straubing, the Bavarians at Braunau.
The chief
military event of the winter of 1742-3 was Belleisle’s famous retreat from
Prague. Finding relief hopeless* he manag e cl to force his way out by the
Beraun valley to Eger, which he reached on December 27, after great hardships
and heavy losses. Chevert, left behind in Prague with 6000 men unfit for the
toils of the march, was able by a threat of destroying the town to obtain a
capitulation with the honours of war from Lobkowitz (January 21), whose
interests in the town caused him to grant these eairaordi. arily easy terms*
for which and for permitting Belleisle’s escape he was deservedly blamed. But,
though Belleisle and his army had escaped, all Bohemia except Eger was again in
Maria Theresa’s hands,; and, if she had had to relinquish Silesia, Jie had fair
reason to hope to obtain some compensation for that loss in the coming year.
1742 had also
seen the theatre of war extended to Italy. On the death of Charles VI Elisabeth
Famese had seen a chance of establishing yet another branch of her dynasty in
Italy; and, though Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia, jealous of Bourbon
aggrandisement, preferred assisting Maria Theresa—for a consideration—to
joining the Bourbons in attacking Lombardy, King Charles III of the Two
Sicilies prepai d to assist his mother. But he was not ready to move alone ;
and, as the bulk of the Spanish fleet had gone to. the West Indies, the English
Mediterranean squadron under Haddock was greatly superior to Navarro’s ships in
Cadiz. Thus it seemed as if the Milanese might escape attack. The decision as
to whether this should be lay with France* and Maria Theresa begged Fleury to
refuse the Spaniards passage to Italy by land. But this he would not do, and
when, Haddock having had to withdraw to Gibraltar to refit, Navarro put to sea
(November) and made for Barcelona, the Toulon squadron under de Court came out
and assisted him to escort a Spanish army to Orbitello in Tuscany, Haddock who
was outnumbered by two to one and unwilling to precipitate a breach with
France, offering no opposition. A Neapolitan contingent joined the Spaniards;
and , though operations had to be deferred til) the spring of 1742, Maria
Theresa found her Italian possessions in peril. To save them she had to come to
terms, somewhat distrustfully, with the “ Prussia of Italy.”
1742-3] Italy in 1742.—The
“Pragmatic Army” 237
Charles
Emmanuel’s action in throwing in his lot with Austria was dictated by no higher
motive than self-interest. He carried on simultaneous negotiations with both
parties and decided to support Austria, because he feared the Bourbons more and
could get better terms from Maria Theresa, though the alliance of February
1,1742, left the question of concessions to be settled later, and was mainly
concerned with military cooperation. Thanks to the help thus secured and to his
own energy and resolution, Traun was able to ward off the Bourbon menace,
actually taking (June 28) the capital of their ally the Duke of Modena and
causing the Spanish-Neapolitan army to fall back in order to avoid an action.
Moreover, in August the Neapolitans were recalled, an English squadron having
appeared off Naples and threatened to bombard that city unless Charles III at
once withdrew from the coalition. This was only one of the services rendered to
the allied cause by the English fleet, now reinforced and under a zealous and
active officer, Mathews, who forced the Franco-Spanish squadrons to withdraw
into Toulon and cut off sea communications between Italy and Spain. In August a
second Spanish army under Don Philip invaded Savoy, having been allowed a passage
across France; but it was repulsed from Piedmont (September), and, though the
invasion called off Charles Emmanuel from the Papal States, which caused Traun
also to retire into the Legations, an attempt of the Spaniards to follow him up
ended disastrously for them at Campo Santo (February 8, 1743).
One result of
the advent of the Carteret-Pelham administration to power had been the despatch
to Belgium of some 16,000 British troops (May, 1742), all that Walpole’s
neglect of the army had left available. This force, though reinforced by a
Hanoverian contingent, had remained inactive, a project put forward by Lord
Stair for an invasion of France being rejected by George II, who still posed as
being at peace with France and only a mere auxiliary of Maria Theresa. For
1743, the Austrians were anxious to get King George and this “Pragmatic Army”
into Germany; and, as George was anything but unwilling, the middle of February
saw the British and their auxiliaries starting oh their move up the Rhine. By
May 6 Stair’s headquarters were on the Main; but, just as it seemed that he was
in a position to repeat Marlborough’s stroke of 1704 and push across to Bavaria
to catch the French corps there between two fires, George directed him to
suspend the march. Thus the advantage gained was thrown away, and the sole
effect of the move was to increase de lirogl e’s desire to be gone from
Bavaria. His relations with his Bavarian colleague were greatly strained; his
army was in no condition to resume hostilities, and, when early in May Charles
of Lorraine took the offensive, de Broglie left the Bavarians to their own
resources, and, evacuating Straubing and Ratisbon, retired up the Danube to
Ingolstadt. Thence, on June 23, he fell back to Donauworth uid, though
reinforced by 10,000 men from France, continued his retreat
238
[1743
to the Rhine,
where he posted his forces round Strassburg and Colmar. Deprived of French
assistance, the Bavarians could not resist Charles of Lorraine, who cut off a
corps, 6000' strong, at Simbach and forced it to surrender on May 9, stormed
Dingolfing (May 19), and Deggendorf (27), pushed out a detachment which
reoccupied Munich on June 9, and finally forced Seckendorf and the relics of
the Bavarian army to conclude a capitulation at Nieder-Schonfeld, which allowed
his troops to retire into Franconia and become neutralised, but left Bavaria in
Austrian hands. Braunau, Ingolstadt, and a few other fortresses held out; but
by the end of September they had all fallen.
This success
in Bavaria promised well for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine; and Maria .
Theresa’s prospects were further improved by the victory won by the Pragmatic
Army at Dettingen on June 27. George IPs delay on the Main had not merely
thrown away a good chance of intercepting de Broglie’s retreat, but it had
given time for the collection of a fresh army under de Noailles, which crossed
the Rhine near Worms (May 25) and proceeded to plant itself between the Pragmatic
Army and Bavaria. Encouraged by George’s hesitation, the French pushed closer
to the Main; and their cavalry, crossing to the northern bank of the river, so
hampered the foraging operations of the Allies and curtailed their collection
of supplies that the Pragmatic Army found it necessary to fall back from
Aschaffenburg to its magazines and reinforcements at Hanau. It ought never to
have got through, for de Noailles had it at a grave disadvantage; hemmed in
between river and mountains, with enemies in fiank, front and rear. But the
rashness of a French subordinate officer and the splendid fighting capacity of
the British and Hanoverian infantry gave George a victory which he neither
deserved nor knew how to utilise. Instead of following up his success, he
remained inactive at Hanau till August 10; and, when at last a joint attack on
Alsace by the Pragmatic Army and the Austrians was arranged, the former force
only crossed the Rhine at Mainz to relapse into inactivity at Worms (August
29^—September 24). Charles of Lorraine was more enterprising; but, being
repulsed in an attempt to cross at Breisach (September 3) and finding his
allies inactive, he took up winter-quarters betimes in Austrian Swabia.
Diplomatic
necessities may to some extent explain the failure of the Pragmatic Army to
utilise its opportunities both before and after Dettingen. The old fiction that
England and France were still at peace had not yet been abandoned, though
Carteret was endeavouring to build up a strong coalition against France. To
that end he wished to detach Bavaria from France and to reconcile Maria Theresa
with the Emperor, who was then to assist in the recovery of Alsace and
Lorraine. However, Maria Theresa was reluctant to relinquish Bavaria till she
had some other “ equivalent ” for Silesia, and the “ Project of Hanau” broke
down, though Carteret was successful in concluding a definite treaty with
Sardinia at
Worms (September 13) by which Charles Emmanuel was pledged to assist in the
expulsion of the Bourbons from Italy. The conclusion of this treaty, moreover,
committed Maria Theresa to a policy of hostility to France, one result of which
was to provoke in that country a reaction in favour of the war. France was
heartily sick of the German campaign; but the threat to Alsace and Lorraine,
and the hope of making acquisitions in the Netherlands which would retrieve
Belleisle’s failure in Germany, seemed to have aroused even Louis himself. The
recent death of Fleury (January 29,1743) had removed that Minister’s hesitation
and indecision out of the path of the “ forward party,” while Amelot’s place as
Foreign Minister had been taken by de Tencin, who concurred with de Noailles
and Richelieu in advocating active measures. Thus, within six weeks of the
Treaty of Worms, the Bourbon counterblast was issued (October 25) in the shape
of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, the so-called “Second Family Compact.” This
pledged France to help Spain in the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, to
recognise Don Philip’s rights on the Milanese, Parma, and Piacenza, and to
declare formal war on England and on Austria (March 15 and April 26).
But before
the formal declaration of war important collisions had taken place. Cardinal de
Tencin’s schemes included a vigorous offensive in Italy, as a prelude to which
the blockade established by Mathews over Toulon must be raised, and an invasion
of England on behalf of the exiled Stewarts, to which end de Roquefeuil’s Brest
fleet was to escort 15,000 troops across from Dunkirk. But when de Roquefeuil
had crept cautiously up Channel to Dungeness (February 23), he found NoiTis and
the Channel Fleet in his way, and only escaped an action against superior
numbers by reason of a sudden and violent gale, which enabled him to regain
Brest without a fight. The invasion project was accordingly abandoned, its only
effect haying been to detain in the Channel ships which would otherwise have
reinforced Mathews. That admiral had meanwhile fought his notorious action with
the Franco- Spanish fleet off Toulon (February 22, N.S.), in which, thanks
mainly to obscure and imperfectly understood signals, the British attack
miscarried altogether and resulted in a drawn battle not very unlike a defeat.
But, despite this and the plentiful crop of Courts-martial to which it gave
rise—Mathews himself being tried and cashiered on a technicality, while
Lestock, his second-in-command and the principal culprit, escaped—the battle
did not give the Franco-Spanish fleet the command of the Mediterranean, but
only opened their communications with Italy for a couple of months, after which
Mathews returned to the Gulf of Genoa and forbade passage between Spain and
Italy.
As their
principal objective in 1744 the French had selected the Netherlands, and their
first operations in that quarter quite recalled the triumphs of Louis XIV. A
well-equipped army of 80,000 men, skilfully directed by Count Maurice de Saxe
(the brilliant son of Augustus II of
240 The Austrians in Alsace.—Union of Frankfort.
[1744
Poland and
Aurora von Konigsmarck), had little difficulty in overrunning West Flanders,
for Dutch neglect had left the “ Barrier ” fortresses in an almost indefensible
condition and the Allies had no field army capable of interfering. They were at
odds among themselves, and it was not till after a diversion elsewhere had
called off 25,000 men from Flanders and reduced Saxe to the defensive that they
at last took the field (July). Even then nothing was done; the Dutch were very
lukewarm and still pretended they were not at war with France; Austria sent but
few troops, leaving the defence of the Netherlands to the Maritime Powers; and
Wade, the British commander, an adherent of false principles of strategy, would
not attack the strong defensive position taken up by Saxe on the Lys and failed
to dislodge him by an aimless and feeble move against Lille. Thus the arrival
of winter found Saxe still in possession of Menin, Courtrai, Yprfes, and the
other conquests made earlier in the year.
The diversion
which had checked the conquest of Flanders was the Austrian invasion of Alsace.
On June 30 Charles of Lorraine and Traun forced the passage of the Rhine at
Germersheim, and Coigni had to retire by Haguenau on Strassburg, leaving the
route into Lorfaine open. But, before the Austrians, as usual somewhat
deliberate and cautious, could follow up this advantage news arrived that on
August 7 an ultimatum from Berlin had reached Vienna, and that the invaders of
Alsace must return to defend Bohemia against yet another Prussian attack. On
August 24 the Austrians recrossed the Rhine and, marching with an altogether
unusual celerity, in a month stood at Waldmunchen on the borders of Bohemia.
Frederick’s
action was the natural outcome of the policy he had pursued since the Peace of
Berlin. Never quite comfortable in Silesia, fearing that if successful
elsewhere Maria Theresa would sooner or later turn her arms against Prussia, he
had been negotiating and scheming all through 1743, encouraging Charles VII not
to come to terms with Austria, trying to embitter the Tsarina against Maria
Theresa and even seeking to rouse up the Turks. In May, 1744, his efforts had
taken ,shape in the Union of Frankfort, by which Prussia, Hesse-Cassel, and I
the Elector Palatine bound themselves together to secure the restoration of
Charles Albert to his hereditary dominions, the maintenance of the i Emperor in
his rights and of the Imperial Constitution, and the reesta- 1 bKshment of peace in
Germany. It is impossible to attach much credit to Frederick’s championship of
the Imperial Constitution when it is noticed that this Union was promptly
guaranteed by France, and that an additional compact with Charles Albert
promised Frederick extensive gains in Bohemia. The net effect of it all was the
ruin of the Austrian attempt to recover Alsace and Lorraine, lost respectively
to the Empire in 1648 and 1738.
Frederick’s
invasion of Bohemia opened successfully. On August 15 his columns crossed the
Saxon frontier; on September 2 they joined a
corps from
Silesia under the walls of Prague, and on the 16th that city had to capitulate.
Hereupon, Frederick advanced towards the south-west, hoping to intercept the
Austrians returning from the Rhine and to catch them between his force and the
French, whom he somewhat rashly magi~ied to be in close pursuit of them,
whereas in reality the French had turned aside to besiege (September 18) and
take (November 24) Freiburg in Breisgau, and only a small corps had
accompanied the Imperial army, now under Seckendorf, to Bavaria. Thus
Frederick’s rash advance jrought him into some peril'. His communications with
Prague were threatened; for the Bohemian peasantry and Hungarian .regulars
swarmed round his camp, while before him was a superior force under Traun, now
reinforced by Batthy&ny and 20,000 Austrians from Bavaria, which he was not
strong enougl1 to attack. He had to retire from Budweis to the
Sasawa and thence across the Elbe (November 9). But he could not carry out his
intention of wintering on that river; for Traun, who had been joined by 20,000
Saxons on October 22, crossed it also (November 19), severed him from Prague,
and forced him to beat a disastrous and costly retreat to Silesia, the garrison
of Prague having to do the same. Traun might congratulate himself on having
completely out-manoeuvred Frederick, though he was perhaps overcautious in not
forcing a pitched battle on the exhausted and demoralised Prussians. The. only
effects of Frederick’s move, besides his loss of probably 20,000 men, were to
relieve France; to allow Seckendorf to recover Bavaria once more, the Austrians
retiring behind the Inn in face of superior numbers; and to intensify the
hatred and distrust with which Maria Theresa regarded him, as the man who had
treacherously robbed her of Silesia and had now spoilt a promising jhance of
securing an equivalent. For, while Bavaria had again been lost, her hopes of recovering
Naples had been disappointed. Nothing had been done to follow up the success of
Campo Santo, largely through the obstruction of Charles Emmanuel; but
Lobkowitz, who had taken Traun’s place in October, 1743, had driven the
Spaniards back from- the Pesaro to Velletri on the borders of Naples
(May—Jufie, 1744), where the Neapolitans had joined them; and he was hoping to
raise the numerous Neapolitan partisans of Austria against Charles III, when
the news of a fresh Franco-Spanish attack on Piedmont caused the return home of
the Sardinian contingent, and compelled Lobkowitz to retire to the Adriatic and
to take up winter-quarters on the lower Po (November). Piedmont* meanwhile, had
been de1* rered from its assailants by Leutrum, whose stubborn
defence of Coni lasted till winter forced them to withdraw.
. Before
operations were resumed in the spring, one important event materially altered
the situation. On January 20, 1745, the death of Charles Albert left the Empire
without an Emperor, and gave a finishing blow to the Franco-Bavarian alliance,
already somewhat strained. The new Elector, Maxim .ian Joseph, was a mere
youth, and there was no
242 Bavaria declares herself
neutral.-Sohr.-Fonten(yyf
[1745
prospect of
his reviving his father’s pretensions to the Imperial throne which had not much
benefited Charles Albert or bis Bavarian subjects. Seckendorf was anxious for
peace with Austria; and, when in March Batthy&ny suddenly fell upon the
scattered French and Bavarians with complete success, once again giving Maria
Theresa possession of the electorate, the Bavarian authorities ■ hastened
to conclude the Treaty of Fiissen, by which Maximilian Joseph recovered his
electorate on renouncing all claims upon the Austrian dominions, pledging his
vote to Francis Stephen, and becoming neutral, Hesse-Cassel and Wiirtemberg
promptly acceded to the Treaty; and, with the Ecclesiastical Electors again on
her side, George II’s vote at her disposal, and Augustus of Poland deaf to the
efforts of France and Frederick II to induce him to stand for the Empire, Maria
Theresa could look forward to the gratification of one of her desires, her
husband’s election as Emperor.
To her other
great object, the recovery of Silesia, she was, however, no nearer. In January,
1745, an attempt to follow up the Prussian retreat proved a failure; and, by
the time (end of May) that the Austrians were ready to attempt something more
serious than the raids and forays by their light troops which had kept the
Prussians busy but secured no real advantage, the Prussians had had time to
refit and to recover their moral. Conducted without much skill or vigour, the
Austrian invasion of Silesia met with an abrupt and effective repulse at
Hohenfriedberg (June 4), which Frederick followed up by invading Bohemia. But
the Austrians rallied in a strong position at Koniggratz, which Frederick did
not venture to attack (July), though he maintained his ground at Chlum on the
Elbe for a couple of months, despite the vigorous attacks of the Austrian light
troops on his communications. However, when their capture of Neustadt
(September 16) cut him off from Glatz, he found himself so straitened for
supplies that he had to fall back towards Silesia by the Schatzlar Pass. The
Austrians pursued, profiting by his delay at Straudenz to get between him and
the Pass, and followed up this success by attacking his camp at Sohr at
daybreak (September 30). The Prussians were undoubtedly surprised, and, had not
the Austrian attack been delivered with excessive regard to orderly procedure,
things might have gone ill with Frederick. However, he rallied his men and,
concentrating all available force against a hill which commanded his right,
managed to snatch a victory that allowed him to withdraw unmolested to Silesia.
Shortly
before this, Frederick had concluded an important treaty with George II, who
was for special reasons extremely anxious to end the Silesian wars and so set
free the main army of Austria to defend the Netherlands. There things were
going badly with the Allies. Saxe had, thanks to the failure of the Dutch to
cooperate, repulsed Cumberland at Fontenoy (May 11, 1745), when the Allies’ new
Commander-in-chief endeavoured to relieve Tournay; Tournay had fallen after a
discreditably
1745] Saxe in the Netherlands.—State of Italy.
243
short defence
(May 22); Ghent had been surprised and stormed by Lowendahl (July 11).
Moreover, the Jacobite insurrection in Scotland (July) had compelled Cumberland
to send back to England, in the first instance, ten battalions of the infantry
whom only Dutch misconduct had robbed of victory at Fontenoy, and then almost
the whole of his troops. In their absence, Saxe had a series of easy conquests
in Flanders, including Ostend, the English base; for the Dutch garrisons made
but a feeble defence, and the bulk of the Austrian forces were in Bohemia or
posted round Frankfort-on-Main to protect the Imperial election against Conti
and the French army on the Bhine. Indeed, George feared that the French might
move against his beloved Hanover, now entirely exposed to their attacks.
Frederick, too, in great straits for money and very nervous lest success should
crown Maria Theresa’s efforts to include Russia in her offensive alliance with
Saxony against Prussia, was anxious for any peace which would guarantee him
possession of Silesia. This was the precise effect of the Convention of Hanover
of August 26: Frederick bound himself not to vote against Francis Stephen, and
the two Powers guaranteed each other’s possessions, Maria Theresa being offered
the opportunity of acceding to the treaty within six weeks. Her wrath at the
offer and the faithlessness of her ally King George was natural enough; and she
pushed on her plans for the combined attack in which Russia and Saxony were to
cooperate, at the same time seeking to come to terms with France. Her
proposals, which made over to France the greater part of her conquests in the
Netherlands in return for peace and the recognition of the election of Francis
Stephen as Emperor (September 12), were better than France was to obtain at
Aix-la- Chapelle; but Louis XVs appetite for military glory had been aroused by
Saxe’s successes, and his Foreign Minister, d’Argenson, clung with more
conviction than justification to the Prussian alliance. Hence the offers were
rejected, and d’Argenson devoted his efforts to inducing Charles Emmanuel to
desert Maria Theresa.
The course of
affairs had taken an unfavourable turn for Austria in Italy. Here the adhesion
of Genoa to the Bourbons had opened the Riviera route for the junction of the Spaniards
and Neapolitans with the Franco-Spanish force hitherto engaged against
Piedmont; and in July their joint forces, 70,000 strong, moved north across the
Apennines, driving the much weaker Austro-Sardinians back before them to Bass-
>riaiiO. The numerical superiority of the Bourbon forces allowed of the Duke
of Modena being detached against the Milanese. He took Piacenza (August 6),
Parma, and Modena, thus threatening the communications of the Austrians with
Tyrol and causing them to retire eastward. Left isolated at Bassignano, the
Sardinians were severely defeated by the French (September 27); and the end of
the campaigning season found all southern Piedmont in the hands of Marshal
Maillebois, and the Milanese in the possession of his Spanish colleague, Gages.
The
Habsburgs
seemed about to be expelled from Italy, and d’Axgenson’s overtures to Charles
Emmanuel were favourably received. But neither the peril of the Netherlands nor
that of Italy could alter Maria Theresa’s determination to make another effort
to recover Silesia. Undeterred even by the withdrawal of Russia at the eleventh
hour, she launched her armies again at Frederick in November, hoping by a move
into Lusatia to push in between Silesia and Berlin. But a check at
Gross-Hennersdorf (November 24) was enough to defeat the move; and
simultaneously a Prussian force under the elder Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau
advanced up the Elbe against Dresden. To save the Saxon capital, Charles of
Lorraine moved thither by Aussig and Pima, while Frederick marched across
Lusatia to succour his lieutenant. Had the Austrians moved a little faster,
Leopold might have been crushed; but, as usual, Charles of Lorraine was slow,
and on December 15 the “Old Dessauer” gained a complete victory at Kesselsdorf
over the Austro-Saxon army, which was endeavouring to cover Dresden. This
victory was decisive. Dresden capitulated (December 18); Augustus III acceded
to the Convention of Hanover (December 22); and Maria Theresa found herself
with no alternative but to come to terms with Frederick, since England threat*
ened to discontinue all subsidies if she remained obstinate, while France i
rejected all her overtures. On December 25, the Treaty of Dresden definitely
ceded Silesia and Glatz to Frederick, who in return guaranteed the Pragmatic
Sanction so far as it related to Germany, acknowledged Francis I as Emperor,
and thus finally withdrew from the War of the Austrian Succession, alone among
Maria Theresa’s enemies gaining any substant al share of her dominions. For
this success he had to thank, in the first place, the army which his father had
raised and trained, the treasure which his father had collected, and the
absolute power bequeathed to him by his ancestors. Secondly, gratitude was due
from him to France, Bavaria and all the other enemies of Austria, whom he had
joined and deserted with equal readiness as it suited his convenience. At the
last moment, when he was nearly at the end of his resources and could ill have
supported another campaign, he had derived important indirect assistance from
the Scottish rising. But, above all, it was his own resourcefulness and
resolution, his promptitude to perceive and profit by the necessities of friend
and foe, his energy, determination, and daring} which had given him the coveted
prize.
If the peril
threatening her Italian possessions had contributed to force Maria. Theresa
into giving a reluctant assent to the Peace of Dresden, she was at least to
have the satisfaction of accomplishing her purpose in Italy itself. Charles
Emmanuel had probably been sincere enough in accepting d’Argenson’s overtures,
for, though his severely practical mind was not deluded by the French
statesman’s favourite but quite premature project for the federation of Italy,
he had no intention of sacrificing his domir:ons for the sake of his
Austrian ally, and might have come to
terms, had
not the rivalry of Sardinia and Spain for the possession of Lombardy proved an
insuperable obstacle to agreement. Elisabeth Famese’s refusal to accept
d’Argenson’s draft treaty of December 25 caused a dead-lock; and, though
d’Argenson, still hoping to win her consent, agreed to an armistice with
Sardinia on February 17, that concession was only used by Charles Emmanuel to
gain time for Maria Theresa to despatch to Italy a considerable portion of the
forces set free by her peace with Prussia. Maillebois, lulled into a false
security by a belief that the armistice was but the prelude to peace, was thus
completely surprised when, in March, 1746, Charles Emmanuel threw off the mask.
Eleven French battalions were forced to surrender at Asti (March 8), and the
siege of the citadel of Alessandria had to be raised; while, on the approach of
the Austrian reinforcements, the Spaniards evacuated Milan (March 19) and fell
back to Parma, full of anger against the idealist d’Argenson for allowing
Charles Emmanuel to delude him. But Don Philip could not maintain himself long
at Parma; and, though Maillebois hastened to his aid, their joint attack on the
Austrian position at Piacenza (June 16) was disastrously repulsed. This left
them in an awkward position, for Maillebois’ move eastward from Novi had
exposed his communications to the Sardinians, who seized the Stradella Pass and
cut him off from Genoa. From this plight the Bourbon forces were only
extricated by the daring of Maillebois, who struck boldly at the Milanese,
drawing the Austro-Sardinians after him, and then, recrossing the Po near
Piacenza (August 10), broke through to Tortona (August 14); whence by Novi and
Savona he made his way back to France (September 17), abandoning Genoa to the
Austrians, to whom it had to submit (September 6). Masters of this important
city, and with their Sardinian ally no longer in peril, the Austrians would
have preferred to renew their attempt on Naples, had not England, with whose
Mediterranean fleet they were again in touch, insisted on their invading
Provence. The expedition was, however, brought to an abrupt conclusion by an
insurrection at Genoa (December 5-10), which expelled the Austrian garrison from
the town and compelled the invaders to recross the Var (February 2, 1747) in
order to undertake its reduction. In this task they were aided by the English
squadron; but the Genoese held out stubbornly, and Belleisle, by attacking
Piedmont through the Col d’Assiette, drew off the Sardinian contingent of the
besieging force and so raised the siege (June); though the invaders of Piedmont
were repulsed with heavy loss from Exilles (July 19) and driven back to
Dauphine. With this the war in Italy practically came to an end, though in 1748
the Austrians had renewed the siege of Genoa when the conclusion of peace
stopped operations. Thanks to her own energy and courage, and to the assistance
of Sardinia by land and of England at sea, the Italian campaigns had left Maria
Theresa not merely with undiminished territories but in possession of
those of
Modena also. That at the peace she had to give up this acquisition, and also to
sacrifice Parma and Piacenza, was due to the turd the war had taken elsewhere.
Italy had to pay the debts of Flanders.
Maurice de
Saxe was not the man to miss the opportunity giyen him by Cumberland’s recall.
No sooner had frost made the ground hard enough for troops to move, than he
dashed at Brussels and, after a three weeks’ siege (January 30—February
20,1746)* forced it to surrender. Its fall was followed by that of Louvain and
several other places, and the effect of the blow was seen when Holland hastened
to send Wassenaer to Paris to negotiate a peace. The Dutch had never been
enthusiastic for the war, and it would have been easy for France to close their
ports to England by allowing Holland to become neutral, in which case, with
Ostend lost, it would have been difficult for the English and Austrians to
cooperate. t/But d’Argenson sought instead to arrange a general peace, for
which England and Austria were not disposed. Cumberland’s decisive victory at
Culloden (April 16) and the Austrian successes in Italy improved the prospects
and raised the demands of the Allies, and the whole negotiation broke down.
If France was
not about to detach Holland from her allies by a separate peace, the obvious
step to take was to make the United Provinces, as the point where the Allies
would concentrate, the objective of the next campaign. Saxe urged this
strongly; but political considerations—the wish not to provoke anti-French
feeling among the Dutch or to imperil the negotiations—caused his scheme to be
overruled in favour of the strategically less sound plan of a reduction of the
eastern Netherlands. Saxe therefore, after forcing the Allies to retire from
the Demer into Holland (May), detached Clermont to besiege Antwerp, himself
covering the operation. Meanwhile, Conti’s army, about 25,000 strong, was
brought down from the Rhine and began operations by besieging Mons. It could be
thus utilised with safety, because all the efforts of Maria Theresa and England
to build up a coalition among the minor State9 of Germany had proved futile.
^Bavaria hired out 6000 troops to the Maritime Powers; but the Elector Palatine
and Wiirtemberg were friendly to France, the Spiritual Electors merely cared to
keep the war out of their borders, and the promise of the French envoy at
Ratisbon that France would respect the neutrality of the Empire removed all
chance of operations on the middle Rhine.)
By the
beginning of July a fairly respectable allied force had been concentrated at
Breda, including a few English regiments, 6000 Hessians no longer wanted in
Scotland, and considerable reinforcements from Austria under Charles of
Lorraine. On July 17 the Allies took the field, moving south-eastward by
Hasselt to relieve Charleroi, which Conti was now besieging, Mons having fallen
on July 11. Antwerp too had fallen (May 31), and Saxe was free to move; but, as
Conti continued his siege instead of joining the Marshal as directed, he could
not check
their move,; and only the unexpectedly speedy fall of Charleroi (August 1)
extricated Conti from a position of some peril. When Charleroi fell the Allies
had just reached the Mehaigne, whence they pushed on to the Omeau, taking post
to cover Namur. Saxe, with over 80,000 men to their 60,000, managed to cramp
them into a narrow space in which they were greatly straitened for supplies,
while his numerical superiority forbade them to attack. Later in August* the
capture of Huy threatened Lorraine’s communications and compelled him to retire
east of the Meuse; whereupon Saxe besieged and (September 21) took Namur.
Thence the French moved on Liege, on which town Lorraine also recoiled, standing
at bay with his left resting on Liege while his right stretched to the river
Jaar, the front being strengthened by the villages of Roucoux, Varoux and
Liers. Here, on October 11, Saxe attacked the Allies. A well-contested struggle
followed, in which the Dutch infantry somewhat retrieved the reputation
tarnished at Fontenoy, while the British and Hessians were only ousted from the
villages after. a stubborn resistance which cost the French many casualties.
What decided the action was the surrender of Liege, which turned the Allied
left and compelled them to retire. However, they got off in good order, Saxe
making no effort to follow up his victory. The campaign thus ended with the
middle Meuse in his hands and only Maestricht left to cover Holland. The failure
of the Allies to hold their own is mainly to be ascribed to their numerical
inferiority, due to preoccupations elsewhere, the bulk of the Austrians being
in Italy while the Highlands still absorbed most of the British, 6000 of whom,
moreover, though available for Flanders, were wasted on an abortive attack upon
the Breton port of Lorient (September).
For 1747 the
Allies determined on a great effort, collecting over
90,000 men, more than half of whom were Austrians
and about a sixth British, while Cumberland took the place of Charles of
Lorraine in the command. However, when in February he attempted a dash on Antwerp,
lack of transport ruined the design. Saxe, almost without quitting his
winter-quarters, was able to hold him in check while a detached corps under his
capable lieutenant, Lowendahl, took Sluys and Cadsand and secured the mouth of
the Scheldt. Indeed, so negligent and unprepared were the Dutch that only the
timely arrival of some British regiments prevented Lowendahl from adding
Zeeland to his conquests (April— May). This attack on the territory of Holland
marked the final abandonment of d’Argenson’s policy of sparing the United
Provinces; for Louis had dismissed the discredited Foreign Minister (January),
and now announced that he intended to invade the United Provinces in revenge
for the shelter and assistance they had given to his enemies. One result of
this, predicted indeed by d’Argenson, was a movement in favour of the Orange
party, culminating in the election of William of Nassau-Dillenburg as
Captain-General and Stadholder (May); but
248 . Lauffeldt.—-Affairs
at sea.
;[l747
this
revolution was mainly important from its political bearing and cannot be
alleged to have increased the military strength of the Allies, ;
After various
unsuccessful efforts to entice Saxe from his strong position between Malines
and Louvain, Cumberland suddenly set off south-eastward (June 26), hoping to
fall on a detached corps under Clermont which was operating along the Meuse.
But Saxe was too quick for him, and a brilliant forced march enabled the French
to forestall Cumberland in occupying the Herdeeren heights just to the
south-westward of Maestricht (July 1). The Allies thereupoi. took post on a
lower ridge nearer Maestricht, the Austrians on the fight, the Dutch in the
centre, the British and their auxiliaries on the left, holding the fortified
villages of Lauffeldt and Vlytingen. Here, on July 2, Saxe attacked them.
Trusting to the proverbial immobility of the Austrians, he massed his forces on
his right to attack the villages around which an even and desperate contest
waged, the posts' being several times carried but as often retaken. Indeed,
Cumberland’s left and centre were actually advancing to follow up a repulse of
the French infantry when Saxe launched his cavalry at them to give the broken
battalions time to rally. At the critical moment the Dutch gave way completely,
leaving a gap in the line into which Saxe hastened to pour his reserves, while
their flight threw the Hessians and some - British regiments into disorder and
paralysed Cumberland’s advance. The Austrians, who were at last coming up to
his assistance, halted; the French infantry rallied and again carried
Lauffeldt; and Cumberland had no alternative but to retire on Maestricht,
General Ligonier and the British cavalry sacrificing themselves to secure the
unmolested retreat of their infantry. The French losses had been so heavy that
Saxe did not venture to besiege Maestricht, which the Allies continued to
cover; but they could not prevent him from detaching Lowendahl against the
strong fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, which he stormed on September 16, the Dutch
defence once again proving half-hearted. With Bergen nearly all Dutch Brabant
passed into French hands, and the campaign closed with gloomy prospects for the
Allies. When the ruler of the Netherlands neglected their defence in order to
prosecute her designs on Italy, while Holland was almost as lukewarm in the
cause as she was inefficient, there was little inducement for England to
continue a war in which her expenses were very heavy and her gains quite
insignificant, Though Commodore Warren’s squadron and 4000 New England militia
tiad captured Cape Breton (June, 1745) the French had taken Madras (September,
1746), and had only been beaten off just in time from Fort St David (1747) by
Commodore Griffin. Again, the victories of Anson (May 3, 1747) and Hawke
(October 14) in the Bay of Biscay had prevented French reinforcements from
reaching Canada and the East and West Indies, and had successfully
reestablished England’s naval position and reputation; but they did not do more
than balance Saxe's successes*
But, if
England and Holland were ready for peace, so were their adversaries. The death
of Philip V (July 9j 1746) had diminished the influence of Elisabeth Famese,
whose aspirations were not shared by her pacifically-disposed step-son
Ferdinand VI; while the recovery of naval supremacy by England was making
itself felt in France through the heavy sufferings of the French mercantile
marine, which was almost swept from the seas, with disastrous results to the
French finances.
Thus, when
the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle met (March, 1748) Only Maria Theresa, who had
at last secured a promise of Russian assistance, was anxious to continue the
War. Enraged at finding the Maritime Powers resolved on peacc, she once again
had recourse to separate negotiations with France; but, though Kaunitz really
believed that this time success was his, France was negotia. .ng with England
and Holland at the same time and preferred to come to terms with them (April
30,1748). Several months of complicated negotiations followed; but, finally, on
October 18, a definite treaty was concluded between England, Holland, and
France; Spain adhering to it two days later; and before the end of November
Austria and Sardinia had given their reluctant assent. Unwilling as Charles
Emmanuel was to resign Finale to Genoa and Piacenza to Don Philip, he was
powerless without English subsidies; and, while Maria Theresa could bring no
pressure to bear on England she could do nothing in Italy without the Sardinian
army and the English fleet.
The principal
provisions of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle were those which guaranteed Silesia
and Glatz to Frederick II, the only combatant who gained appreciably by the
contest which his greed and the opportunity of Charles Vi’s death had provoked.
Charles Emmanuel had to content himself with the recovery of Savoy and Nice,
and with securing another strip of Lombardy which brought his eastern frontier
to the Ticino. Don Philip secured Parma and Piacenza, with the proviso
(cancelled, however, in 1752) that he should resign them to Austria, if he ever
succeeded his brother at Naples. Otherwise, the Treaty provided for a return to
the conditions prevailing before the War. France evacuated the Austrian
Netherlands and Madras, recognised George II as King of England, agreed to
respect the Hanoverian Succession, to expel the Pretender, and to dismantle
Dunkirk. England reluctantly gave up Cape Breton, “ the people’s darling
acquisition,” but received a pledge that Spain would fulfil the commercial
concessions promised at Utrecht. The Duke of Modena regained his dominions;
while, despite Maria Theresa’s protests, the Barrier fortresses were again
committed to the proved inefficiency of the Dutch garrisons. Finally, the
Pragmatic Sanction was guaranteed, except as regarded Silesia and Parma and
Piacenza, while Francis I was recognised as Emperor.
That after
eight years of war no greater changes should have been made is in itself
sufficiently characteristic of the nature of the struggle
and of the
indecisiveness of the result. In some respects, indeed, the War may be regarded
as having achieved something definite. The strife, between Habsburgs and
Bourbons concerning Italy came to an end, while the territorial settlement of
Italy was substantially unaltered till the Revolution. The acquisition of
Silesia by Prussia has endured unchanged, if not unchallenged. The Jacobites
ceased to be a factor of any importance in European politics. For the rest, the
Peace merely marks a stage in the rise of Sardinia, in the decline of the power
and importance of the United Provinces, in the relaxation of the old alliance
between Austria and the Maritime Powers, and in the intervention of Russia in
western Europe—factors none of them altogether new, but all destined to develop
further. The struggle for maritime supremacy was, like the Silesian question,
left unsettled.
The repeated
faithlessness of Frederick II filled Maria Theresa with distrustful uneasiness
lest a suitable opportunity might be similarly used, while desire for revenge
was an additional incentive to:putting her house in order with a view to a
renewal of the struggle. But, while Austria had suffered in territory, it may
be questioned whether this loss was not satisfactorily balanced by other gains.
Hungary was no longer a cause for anxiety, but for the future was a source of
strength; the War had done much to weld together the Austrian dominions; Maria
Theresa’s unfailing courage and determination had appealed to the best
instincts of her subjects and awakened in them a fervid loyalty which none of
her predecessors had ever aroused; the Austrian army had been greatly improved;
Bavaria and Saxony, no longer rivals, were now faithful allies; and the drawing
closer of the alliance with Russia had strengthened Maria Theresa’s position.
France, on the other hand, had assisted to place Don Philip on the throne of
Parma and to secure Silesia,for Frederick; yet these were but poor returns for
her efforts and sacrifices. Fontenoy and Lauffeldt had retrieved the disgrace
of Dettingen and Bohemia—but to have been Frederick’s catspaw was of little
benefit to Louis XV. . The attempt to partition the Habsburg dominions had
failed, and France had even lost control of her old clients in south* western
Germany, such as Bavaria. Nor had she gained any success in the struggle with
England; her enemy had not only retrieved a bad start, but had been able to
wring from her the restoration of the provinces which her armies had overrun;
while the War had served to purge the British navy of the ill-effects of peace
and neglect, and had brought to the front many of the men—such as Hawke and
Anson— who were to carry to a triumphant end the struggle whose renewal was
only a matter of time. For, like the rivals for Silesia, England and France had
suspended hostilities, not because they had abandoned their ambitions, but
because they had exhausted their resources.
THE SEVEN
YEARS’ WAR.
On
January 16, 1756, Frederick II of Prussia signed with England the Convention of
Westminster, one of the most important treaties in the whole history of
European diplomacy. England had been at war with France since 1755, and the
King of Prussia in this Convention guaranteed the neutrality of Hanover. Thus
the French, who had for many years been united with Prussia in a defensive
alliance, found themselves prevented by their Prussian ally from seizing the
German possessions of George II. The Ministers at Versailles viewed this clause
in a much more hostile spirit than Frederick had anticipated; and they
forthwith, on May 17,1756, concluded with the Empress Maria Theresa, the sworn
foe of the King of Prussia, the Treaty of Versailles. This was a purely
defensive treaty, and not designed in any way to open up to the French the
forbidden road to Hanover. It simply placed France in an advantageous position,
should her former ally at Potsdam put forth plans which she might feel obliged
to thwart at any cost.
The suspicion
of the French that Frederick II meditated upsetting the European balance of
power was perfectly well founded. The territorial configuration of what was
then the kingdom of Prussia must have seemed intolerable to a monarch like
Frederick the Great, the more so that the Prussian monarchy included some of
the most barren districts of Germany. Four years earlier, when Frederick had
believed himself to be at the point of death, he had drawn up a political
testament for his successor. There were three territories which, according to
this last will and testament, the King deemed it desirable to acquire by
conquest, namely, the electorate of Saxony, Polish West Prussia, and Swedish
Pomerania; but of these three Frederick regarded Electoral Saxony as by far the
most important and urgent acquisition, because it would enable its Prussian
conqueror to readjust the shapeless formation of his State, besides adding
wealth, manufacturing industries, and civilisation. In the spirit of the “
cabinet policy ” of the times, Frederick II intended that the Elector of Saxony
should be compensated by Bohemia, which was to be wrested from the House of
Habsburg, the irreconcilable rival of the House of Brandenburg.
It is true
that Austria, in this very year 1756, protected herself^ as will be related at
length in a later chapter, by the Treaty of Versailles just mentioned; but it
only bound France to come to the aid of Austria with 24,000 men or a yearly
subsidy of 4,200,000 gulden (£400,000), in the event of her being subjected to
attack. The King of Prussia did not believe that the French, involved as they
were in a war with England, would make any sacrifice for Austria beyond what
was entailed by their treaty obligations. That Spain would assist Maria Theresa
with money seemed to him out of the question. Since 1748 a defensive alliance
had existed between Austria and Russia against Prussia, but Frederick reckoned
that the Empress could depend even less on her Russian than on her French
allies. St Petersburg was, it is true, as little inclined as Versailles to
allow the King of Prussia to establish his supremacy on the Continent by
further conquests, nevertheless, Russia appeared to be an uncertain prop for
Austria to lean on. The Empress Eli zabeth had been repeatedly ill: Peter, her
heir to the throne, was among the most fervent admirers of Frederick, and
Russia’s leading statesman, the Chancellor Bestuzheff, was in the pay of
England.
The French
diplomatists were never tired of urging the King of Prussia to abandon the
alliance with George II; and Frederick, who met their representations in a
friendly spirit, could easily have taken this step without breaking his word,
for the Convention of Westminster stipulated for no fixed term. But all the
negotiations between Freder ck and the French led to the same insurmountable
point of differ -i-ce. The precise nature of the gift desired by the King, in
return for his leaving Hanover open to the French, he did not disclose, waiting
for the French on their side to break silence—for they must assuredly know that
his ambition was very far from being satisfied. The Ministers on the Seine,
however, regarded a fresh extension of the Prussian dominions and the
amputation of a second limb from the Austrian monarchy as an overthrow of the
Peace of Westphalia. Any such revolution the Court of Versailles resolved to
oppose, no matter at what cost; and, if its defensive alliance with Austria did
not prove sufficient for the purpose, it was ready to proceed to greater
lengths. As the King of Prussia unfortunately could not be induced to break off
his relations with Great Britain, the French Ministers intimated to the
Austrian ambassador at Versailles, Count Starhemberg, their readiness to accept
in principle the offensive alliance against Prussia for which the Court of
Vienna had long been agitating.
Count
Kaunitz, Maria Theresa’s Chancellor of State, urged the offensive alliance
against Prussia, not solely with the object of reconquering Silesia, but
because he knew that Frederick was only waiting for the most favourable
opportunity to mutilate the Austrian monarchy a second time. Desirous of
forestalling such an enterprise at a convenient season for Austria, Kaunitz
believed that the hour had now
1756] Russian
armaments.—Frederick's preparations. 263
come. In March,
1756, he informed the Russian Court that France was prepared to enter into an
offensive Coalition against Prussia, and enquired whether, in the case of
Russia intending to join it, the Tsarina’s troops would perhaps be able to
march even before the year (1756) was out. In reply, the Russian Ministry
signified their readiness to send an army into the field against Prussia at so
early a date as August, 1756. Russia was absolutely in earnest in this
intention; and the army designed to encounter Frederick was without loss of
time moved towards the western frontier of the Tsar’s dominions. But scarcely
had the Russian marching columns been set in motion, when a serious crisis
occurred in the Franco-Austrian negotiations at Versailles. On May 22,1756,
Kaunitz wrote to the Austrian ambassador at St Petersburg, Count Esterhdzy,
that Frederick II “was exhausting himself with lavish caresses oh the French.”
The Treaty of Versailles, he said, afforded no absolute protection to Austria
against the contingency of Prussia and France renewing their alliance.
Meanwhile, Russia ought to desist from provocative war preparations, and so far
as possible to disarm. At St Petersburg, the march of the Russian forces was
instantly countermanded;' but % Russian Note dated June 10 reproached the
Viennese Court in terms of no little irritation for forcing the Tsarina’s
Government to issue the unnecessary orders.
It was an
unpleasant surprise for Frederick to find that English influence and gold had
no effect in restraining the Court of St Petersburg from hostility to Prussia.
But it seemed to him of greater importance that he now had the pretext for war
which he needed in face of England, and indeed of the world. An English courier
who, on his way from St Petersburg to London, passed through Berlin, related
that he had seen all the roads in Livonia full of soldiers, and that
170,000 regulars and 70,000 Cossacks were marching
against Prussia. Frederick, hereupon, began mmediately to make preparations for
war on his side. On June 25, he informed his ambassador in Vienna that he begin
to regard war as inevitable. To his sister Wilhelmina at Baireuth he wrote
about the same time: “We have one foot in the stirrup, and I think the other
will soon follow.” Notwithstanding the countermanding of the Russian advance,
Frederick’s preparations were continued till more than half the Prussian army
was mobilised. It can be shown that political and not military motives lay at
the root of this semi-mobilisation: some of the cross- and counter-marches for
which orders were given at the time had no object but that of sounding an ilarm
in order to force Austria into warlike measures which might furnish to Prussia
an excuse for attacking. For, as a matter of fact, it is out of the question
that Frederick should have felt himself menaced. He knew, of course, that
som< thing was in progress against him, but he also knew that he had no
reason for apprehending within measurable time the conclusion of an offensive
alliance against Prussia. From certain
254
Attitude of
Austria.—Invasion of Saxony. [i756
documents,
the contents of which the Saxon government clerk Menzel was bribed to betray to
the King, it came out that in St Petersburg English and French influences were
still contending.
As the King
of Prussia, notwithstanding, was making preparations for war, the Empress Maria
Theresa’s private secretary, Baron Koch, urged Kaunitz to permit a few military
precautions to be taken .gainst a Prussian surprise; and Field-Marshal Browne,
who held the command in Bohemia, attempted to influence the Chancellor in the
same direction. But Kaunitz would not listen to the suggestions of these
dignitaries. Premature preparations for war, he observed, might spoil
everything, inasmuch as the negotiations with France did not yet inspire
sufficient confidence. As he took care to explain, the ultimate purpose imputed
by the Protestant party in the Empire to the Convention of Westminster was the
establishment of a Protestant Germanic Empire with the House of Brandenburg at
its head. The French, like everyone else in that age, believed that the era of
religious warfare had not yet finally closed, and credited Frederick with the
design of reopening it. Thus, the Convention which had united Prussia, England,
Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick, was at Versailles regarded in the light of a
Protestant league. The truth was that nothing was further from the mind of the
sceptic of Sanssouci than the wish to pose as the champion of Protestantism in
Germany. Such weapons, he wrote once to d’Argens, were obsolete; no one, not
even women, could any longer be roused to fanat' :al enthusiasm on behalf of
Luther or Calvin. For all this, the King was anxious to conquer, in addition to
Saxony, the territory of the Bishop of Hildesheim and, in general, to secularise
the ecclesiastical States of northern Germany. He believed that he did not need
for this object the assistance of religious ideas, but that he could rely on
the material power of his absolute Crown.
The
diplomatic adviser of Madame de Pompadour, Abbe Bemis, gave Count Starhemherg
to understand that, if Austria met the preparations of Prussia with the
necessary counter-measures, France would not hold her responsible for the
consequences. The Court of Vienna, without quite trusting the Abbe’s promise, now
began to place its army , on a war footing. Hereupon, the King of Prussia, on
July 18, enquired at Vienna whether the Empress’ preparations were directed
against himself. When the relations between two great Powers once pass into
this stage, there is never much hope of successful negotiation; and the
pourparlers between the King and the Empress proved fruitless.
On August 29,
1756, the Prussian army moved into Saxony. Frederick called upon the Elector
Frederick Augustus II to become his ally. At the outset, so the neighbour whom
he had suddenly invaded was informed by Frederick, appearances might be against
him; but, on his honour, he would regard tire Elector’s interests as sacred, if
he would join with Prussia against Austria. To an envoy from Frederick Augustus
1756-7] Capitulation of Pirna.— Winter quarters.
255
the King
declared: “ If fortune favours me, the Elector will not only be amply
compensated for everything, but I shall take as much thought for his interests
as for my own,” Frederick Augustus, however, declined to take advantage of this
unscrupulous assignment of the Bohemian jewel in Maria Theresa’s Crown, and
retired into his kingdom of Poland. The small Saxon army was shut up by the
Prussians in the entrenched camp of Pima. Field-Marshal Browne hereupon
advanced to the relief of Saxony; and Frederick fell in with his troops on
October 1, at Lobositz, in Bohemian territory not far from the Saxon frontier.
The King of
Prussia had pushed on his forces with so much ilan that they assumed the offensive
even before he had positively issued his command to attack. A thick mist
prevented him from reconnoitring. When the sky cleared, he perceived that
Browne’s position was unassailable—a prelude to many other events of a like
nature during the course of the war, inasmuch as the enemies of Frederick
nearly always sought and found their strength in a defensive attitude. With
swift resolve the King stopped the battle, which could only be done with heavy
losses. His opponent, satisfied to have got off so lightly, left the
battle-field to the Prussians and retreated to the other side of the Eger.
Frederick could not deny that the Austrians had fought very well; but, all the
same, they dared not take effective measures for the relief of the Saxons, it
having as yet been impossible to concentrate the military forces levied in the
different parts of the widely extended and clumsily administered Empire, and,
owing to want of money, still unfurnished with the necessary war material.
Thus, on October 16, the Saxons were compelled to capitulate at Pima; and about
19,000 men were made prisoners. By an unscrupulous use of the resources of
Saxony, Frederick increased the army which he had in the field up to 148,000
men.
The necessity
for this was all the greater because the whole continent of Europe united to
withstand the overthrow of the balance of power by a fresh important
aggrandisement of Prussia. Not only Austria, Russia, and France, but the
Germanic Empire and Sweden, resolved to take arms against the disturber of the
peace. The constitution of armies and the general conditions of life in the
eighteenth century involved, as a rule, the necessity of avoiding winter
campaigns. Accordingly, after entering Bohemia, the King evacuated it again and
let his army take up winter-quarters in Saxony and Silesia. Frederick’s
opponents, too, undertook no strategical movement against him during the
unfavourable season of the year; but they used the interval for the completion
of their preparations. During the winter (1756-7) 133,000 Austrians took up
their quarters in Bohemia and Moravia, whereas only 114,000 Prussians were
encamped in Silesia and Saxony. The King of Prussia did not consider this
numerical disproportion as dangerous in itself, inasmuch as he had the fullest
confidence in the superior quality of his troops. He wrote to his meir
apparent: “If you can oppose 75,000
men to
100,000 of the enemy* you must be content.” However, he had in addition to look
for the arrival, in the coming summer, of the Russian army, to meet which he
had only a single corps under arms in East Prussia. France, moreover, had
promised her allies to send an army into northern Germany, and to direct the
operations of part of it, reinforced by the army of the Empire, against
Magdeburg, the most important military centre of the Prussian monarchy.
Frederick resolved, instead of remaining inactive till the Austrian, French,
and Imperial troops bore down on him, to defeat the Austrians before the French
came up.
In the latter
half of April the season seemed to him far enough advanced for militaiy
operations on a larger scale. Starting from Lusatia and Silesia, he invaded
Bohemia with, over 100,000 men. His strategical object was the capture of the
great magazines erected by the Austrians in northern Bohemia as a basis for
their offensive action against Saxony and Silesia. If the Prussians succeeded
in seizing these TTtagaziues, the King might fearlessly detach large bodies of
troops for movements against the French; inasmuch as the Austrians without their
supplies would be unable to march.
Frederick’s
plan of campaign was extremely hazardous.' The Prussians had to penetrate into
a hostile country in three widely separated columns, between which the
Austrians were in command of the inner line of operations. Moreover, a mountain
barrier had to be passed which could be defended by means of a few troops; and
the Prussians had to begin by seizing the magazines containing the supplies on
which they were to live. The worst, however, was that through treacheiy the Court
of Vienna had got wind of the intended Prussian operation. The Austrians still
had time to concentrate their 115,000 men scattered through iiorthem Bohemia,
with every prospect of inflicting a defeat on the
100,000 Prussians invading the country at different
points. But to the Empress generals the plan ascribed to the King of Prussia
appeared so reckless that they would not believe the traitors who announced it,
and gnored -their information although it was correct even in the details.
Field-Marshal Browne, too, seemed perfectly unconcerned, and declared that no
danger existed of a Prussian attack. He even proceeded to inspect once more all
the Austrian stations, and praised what he saw of the disposition—or rather,
scattered distribution—of the forces. Thus the Austrians were everywhere in a
condition of distraction and imperfect readiness, when they were surprised and
systematically attacked by the enemy. Nowhere jould they offer any successful
resistance* but on the contrary, were obliged at all points to retreat
hurriedly and in disorder, abandoning their magazines in the western and
central parts of northern Bohemia.
The two best
generals of the Prussian army, Winterfeldt and Schwerin^ would have prosecuted
the plan of campaign with even more
1757]
The armies meet before
'Prague.
257
audacity than
the King, if they could have had their way. The three Prussian columns which
accomplished the invasion of Bohemia came from Saxony, Lusatia and over the
Riesengebirge. The commander of the last of these columns, the septuagenarian
Field-Marshal Schwerin, seconded by Winterfeldt, asked the King’s permission to
push on to Koniggratz and Pardubitz, where lay the largest of the Austrian
magazines. But Frederick, not thinking himself strong enough to extend his operations
so far, refused, and commanded Schwerin to join him to the north of Prague. He
would be satisfied if the enemy’s magazines in Jungbunzlau, Aussig, Budin,
Lobositz, Leitmeritz, and Teplitz came under his control. A success of the kind
would paralyse the Austrian offensive plans for months; but, if he aimed at
more, his plan might be undone by the superior strength of the Austrians. Here
we recognise the true strategical genius of Frederick the Great. He laid his
plan of campaign with such boldness that his opponents were quite unable to
grasp his audacity; nevertheless, he always kept in view the necessity of
modifying his schemes, of bridling his imagination, and of limiting himself to
the attainable.
King
Frederick, as well as Schwerin and Winterfeldt, expected that the Austrians
would not be forced out of Bohemia by mere manoeuvres, but that they would give
the Prussians an opportunity of engaging in a considerable combat, perhaps a
great battle. To such an event the King and his generals looked forward with
self-confidence and delight. The Austrian army was now under the command of the
brother of the Emperor Francis I, Prince Charles of Lorraine, who was making
ready for battle in the fortress of Prague. On May 1 and 2 the Austrians
crossed over from the left to the right bank of the Moldau and took up their
position, to the east of Prague, on the slopes of the Ziskaberg and Taborberg.
At the same time King Frederick advanced at the head of the column from Saxony
to the White Hill (Weisse Berg). Marshal Schwerin was posted with the Silesian
and Lusatian columns opposite Brandeis on the right bank of the Elbe. If,
therefore, the Prussian forces were to take the shortest way for uniting in
face of the Austrian, a part of them would have to cross the Moldau, and
another the Elbe.
Prince
Charles of Lorraine wrote to the Empress Maria Theresa that, instead of
undertaking so daring a manoeuvre, Frederick seemed to him much more likely to
draw the two columns under Marshal Schwerin in a great curve towards him by way
of Melnik* and then by a second great curve encircle the Austrian position and
cross the Moldau above Prague. Prince Charles hoped to gain a very significant
advantage from the very leisurely manoeuvre which he expected on the part of
his adversary; for the strong division under Serbelloni, numbering 37,000 men,
which had covered the magazines by Pardubitz and Koniggratz against Schwerin,
was now approaching Prague from the east. If he could join forces with
Serbelloni, Prince Charles would have at his
disposal a
fighting army of nearly 100,000 men, while the fortress of Prague was occupied
by 13,000. But Frederick and Schwerin had a force of only 64,000, because more
than 30,000 Prussians were obliged to stay behind on the left bank of the Moldau
to cover the line of communication with the bases of the army. With 100,000
against
64,000 combatants, the Prince of Lorraine might
reckon on gaining the victory; but he underrated the resolution and mobility of
his opponents On May 5, Frederick crossed the Moldau near Selz, an hour’s
distance from Prague—in face, that is, of the Austrian front. The most favourable
opportunity thus offered itself to Prince Charles of punishing the King of
Prussia’s temerity. The transit of Frederick’s 20,000 mer across the Moldau
lasted the whole day; and it was not till the middle of the night that the
heavy artillery reached the camp. To the King’s intense uneasiness, Schwerin’s
44,000 men were still not on the spot; he had, indeed crossed the Elbe on May 4
near Brandeis, but on the 5th, notwithstanding the King’s orders, he had not
ventured to march to the Moldau, because a false alarm led him to fear the
approach of the 61,000 Austrians in the neighbourhood of Prague. Thus, had
Prince Charles cared to look, he might on the 5th have discovered the Prussian
forces in a condition of dislocation. But he lacked the swift resolve and
energy requisite for dealing with so terrible an enemy; moreover, he had no
confidence in the quality of his troops; and, finally, he was without personal
authority over his subordinate generals. After Frederick had spent the whole of
May 5 waiting for Schwerin, he issued an order in the evening that the
Field-Marshal was to join him by means of a night march. Consequently, on the
morning of May 6 the junction of the 64,000 Pruss ,ns took place in front of
the 61,000 Austrians. The King now determined to attack instantly. A direct
attack on the Austrian position being impossible, the only thing that remained
to be done was to turn the enemy’s right wing, where the ground offered no
particular difficulty to the attacking force. Schwerin’s tired troops were
obliged to execute a long flank march through morasses, into which the men
often sai'k up to their armpits; only the best-drilled infantry of the day
could have overcome such hardships, and overcome them rapidly.
The battle
began at ten o’clock with a cavalry engagement on the extreme left wing of the
Prussians. In cavalry they had decidedly the numerical superiority (17,000
against 13,000 Austrians). On the other hand, the Austrian infantry was
slightly superior in numbers to the Prussian (48,600 against 47,000). For hours
the squadrons continued the attack without producing any decisive effect.
Meanwhile, Schwerin had ordered the first divisions of the Prussian infantry
which had come up to attack without waiting for the arrival of the rest. First,
the grenadier brigade* then Schwerin’s regiment and Fouque’s, advanced, without
returning the Austrian fire,, shouldering their guns; but the
onslaught failed,
and the regiments fled. The venerable Field-Marshal dismounted, snatched a
flag, and addressed the troops. He was struck by five case-shot balls, and
fell.
Opposite, on
the Austrian side, the battalions moved resolutely forward to follow up their
success. They were addressed by Field- Marshal Browne, till a Prussian
cannon-ball shattered his leg, and he, too, fell mortally wounded. About the
same time, Prince Charles of Lorraine was seized by a fit of cramp, just as he
beheld his squadrons succumbing at last to the enemy's assault, and remained
unconscious till the end of the battle. Thus the Austrian army found itself
leaderless, no other general taking over the command. The battle on the
Austrian side was continued as a purely defensive action—and this invariably
means defeat. After the Prussian infantry had gradually deployed, the King and
the other generals directed their special attention to the gap in the enemy’s
line of battle occasioned by the advance of Marshal Browne’s battalions. Taking
instant and energetic advantage of the opportunity offered them, the Prussians
poured through the enemy’s dislocated order of battle; and, outflanked by the
victorious Prussian cavalry, and broken asunder by the Prussian infantry, the
Austrian army took refuge within the fortifications of Prague. It was not quite
four o’clock in the afternoon when the last shots were fired. 9000 out of
61,000 Austrians lay dead or wounded on the field; of 64,000 Prussians 14,000
were killed or wounded. Among his losses, which weighed heavily upon him as the
ruler of a small country without allies in the field, Frederick would find it
specially hard to make good that of his 400 officers who had fallen. “The
pillars of the Prussian infantry,” he wrote, “have been swept away.”
After the
victory of their comrades on the right bank of the Moldau, the body of over
30,000 Prussians which had remained behind on the left bank, to cover the
original contact between the army and its magazines, and which was stationed
on the White Hill under the command of MarshiJ Keith, now closed in on Prague
from the “ Kleine Seite,” and prevented the beaten Austrian army from
retreating to the left bank of the river. The main Prussian force invested the
city on the opposite bank. The statement has been frequently, but quite
erroneously, made, that it was a premeditated plan of Frederick’s to drive his
enemies after conquering them in battle, into Prague, and there force them to
capitulate. When he marched against the Austrians, the position of the majority
of Prince Charles’ troops faced to the north, and they had an assured line of
retreat towards the south behind the Sasawa. Not till Frederick found himself
compelled, much against his will, to make so wide a circuit of the Austrian
army, did Prince Charles’ front come to face towards the east. Thus the bulk of
the defeated army was left no choice but to seek refuge in Prague; in the
direction of the Sasawa only a fragment of the Austrian force could escape.
46,000 Austrians, inclusive, of the garrison, were
now shut up in Prague. Their capitulation could only be brought to pass by
starving them out; and the place contained provisions enough to last for eight
weeks. But Frederick’s original plan of campaign had been based on the idea
that by the middle of May he would have finished operations in Bohemia. Now,
the siege of Prague threatened to detain him till far into July and so to
oblige him to postpone for the same length of time his march against the
French. Moreover, the danger threatening from the latter was constantly on the
increase. After the battle of Prague Louis XV had ordained that, besides the
army which was to march against Hanover and- Magdeburg, another was to be
formed to give direct assistance to Maria Theresa in Bohemia. And what if the Hanoverians
now resolved to declare themselves neutral in the Anglo-French War ? The King
of Prussia thought it not altogether improbable that George II, as Elector of
Hanover, might engage in some such ingenious course of political manoeuvring;
in which case Prussia would have to contend singlehanded against the onslaught
of the whole military strength of France. Frederick felt that he dare not put
off taking action against the French any longer than the middle of June, unless
he wished to drive Hanover into a declaration of neutrality. But where was he
to obtain troops for the purpose ? He had at the most 85,000 men in Bohemia,
with which force he had to invest Prague with its garrison of 46,000 Austrians,
guard his military communications, and keep in check Serbelloni’s division.
In the
command of this division Field-Marshal Count Daun was substituted for the not
very capable Serbelloni. Daun’s personal influence proved to be such that he
was able to extinguish in his troops (which had gradually increased to 54,000)
all fear of the victorious Prussians and to inspire them with self-confidence.
He was confronted by a Prussian corps under the command of the Duke of Bevern,
which covered the main army before Prague under the command of the King. As
Bevem’s division was numerically weak, the hope gradually took possession of
its Austrian adversaries that Daun would defeat Bevern and thus relieve the
army in Prague. Maria Theresa sent explicit orders to the Field-Marshal to risk
a battle, pledging her honour as Empress that she would not lay the blame on
him if the result of the action was unfortunate. Thus Daun sought an
opportunity for giving battle—with the excessive caution characteristic of him,
but with true warlike ardour beneath his self-restraint. Such being the
situation, it became an absolute necessity for the King of Prussia to wage
another battle. If he defeated Daun, he could detach troops against the French,
without foregoing the capture of Prague. At the head of a detachment taken from
the investing force, Frederick effected a junction with Bevern, whose numbers
now reached 33,000. With these forces the King hoped to defeat Daun’s 54,000,
who, on June 18, had drawn up on the heights
between Kolin
and Planian. The strength of the Prussian cavalry fell, in proportion, the
least short of the enemy’s; its main body was, as at Prague, commanded by
General von Ziethen; 14,000 Prussian horsemen were opposed to 19,000, and only
19,000 Prussian foot to 35,000 Austrian.
On marching
from their camp towards the Austrian position, Frederick’s troops had, after a
short night’s rest, to accomplish a difficult march of four or five hours’
duration. Although it was still quite early in the day, a sultry heat lay on
the fields, which were overgrown with corn, and proved a great hindrance to
the forward march of the Prussians. The King allowed his weary army a three
hours’ halt immediately in face of Daun’s centre. The Austrians found
themselves again, as at Prague, in a very strong defensive position which could
only be attacked by turning their right wing. It was nearly one o’clock in the
afternoon when there was a sudden renewal of life among the Prussians; and at
two o’clock the battle began. Frederick’s generals made some mistakes, such as
may occur in every battle, and had been much more marked in that of Prague. The
King afterwards accused himself of having erred in not personally reconnoitring
the ground on the enemy’s right wing. But, whatever errors there may have been
in their leadership the Prussians, in spite of these, continued for hours to
advance victoriously. About four o’clock, Daun saw his right wing leavily
pressed and, as it seemed, hopelessly overwhelmed. But, according to the
tribute paid him by Frederick in his History of the Seven Years'1 War, Daun was a “ great general.” He was, in truth, a second Fabius
Cunctator—one of those tough and circumspect strategists whom Frederick the
Great, with his just insight into the age’s methods of carrying on war, valued
so highly. Against the furious onslaught of the greatest captain and the best
army in Europe, he defended himself steadfastly, infusing into his troops
something of his own calm energy. Thus, in the end, the force of the Prussians’
onslaught was broken by the great numerical superiority of their opponents.
When the Austrians in their turn advanced to attack the exhausted Prussians,
they obtained a complete victory. The Prussian army was all but destroyed,
losing
13,000 out of 33,000 men. Of 19,000 foot but 7000
rallied round the flag. Again, as at Prague, 400 officers, the flower of the
Prussian nobility, lay dead on the field. Twenty-two colours fell into the
enemy’s hands. If we can imagine Daun, with his great strategical ability,
transported from the eighteenth into the nineteenth century, conducting war
according to the rules of the later period, in all probability the Prussian
army would have been entirely wiped out. But the military methods of the ancien
regime made the pursuit of a routed army exceedingly difficult; and Frederick
the Great himself accomplished very little in this branch of military
operations. Daun attempted no kind of pursuit.
King
Frederick, quitting his defeated troops, rode through the night by by-ways in
the direction of the Prussian camp before Prague, accom
panied by only
two or three of his body-guard and a few hussars. Except for brief intervals,
he had been in the saddle for thirty-six hours, when on the afternoon of the
day after the battle, half-dead from exhaustion, he reached the besieging army
before Prague. The reproach maliciously brought against him by his own brother
Prince Henry (for Frederick was loved by few among those nearest to him): “
Phaethon is fallen...Phaethon took good care of himself and withdrew before the
loss of the battle was quite decided,” was entirely unmerited. His place ifter
the defeat was not at the head of his beaten forces, when another could lead
them from the field as well as he could, but with the main army before Prague,
where he had to superintend the now unavoidable raising of the siege. “ In
spite of the great disaster of the 16th, I decamped from Prague to-day with
drums and fifes in the most defiant attitude,” wrote the King On June 20 to
Prince Maurice of Dessau, the commander of the beaten troops at Kolin. “ In
this misfortune we must do all we possibly can by our determined demeanour to
retrieve matters. My heart is lacerated; but I am not cast down and shall seek
the very first opportunity of obliterating this reverse.” First of all,
however, not only had the siege of Prague to be raised, but the whole of
Bohemia evacuated. Severely damaged by the skilful manoeuvres of the Austrians,
the Prussian army retired over the mountains of the frontier back into Lusatia.
Owing to their losses on Bohemian soil, the King’d forces had melted to
one-half of their original strength; Nevertheless, King Frederick .ought a
fresh battle with the Austrians, who were pushing into Lusatia after the
retiring Prussians. But Prince Charles and Daun encamped themselves at Zittau,
which was as impregnable as the position at Lobositz. Here they stood from July
24 till August 25. The King of Prussia almost despaired of finding any weak
point at which to attack the Austrians, while the French, Russians, Swedes, and
the army of the Empire were now advancing. France, especially, displayed in her
defence of Saxony a vigour which Frederick had not expected. Louis XV not only
sent a second army into Germany, but concluded on May 1, 1757, a second Treaty
of Versailles, in which the yearly subsidies paid to the Court of Vienna were
raised to twelve million gulden (df?l ,200,000). Thus Maria Theresa was enabled
on her side to pay subsidies to Russia.
While
Frederick waited with feverish impatience for an opportunity of forcing the
Austrians encamped at Zittau to a battle, he composed an JpoLogy, to be made
public in the event of his being struck down. This document, preserved in the
Prussian Archives, was first printed in 1856, In it the King expresses his
bitter repeatance that he had ever begun the war. “ How could I foresee that
France would send 150,000 men into the Emp:re ? How could I foresee that the
Empire would take part in the struggle, that Sweden would mix herself up in
this war, that France would subsidise Russia?”
1757] Battle
of Hastenbeck—Convention of Klosterzeven. 263
The
iri&in army of the French, 110,000 strong, was commanded by Marshal
d’Estrees. On the other side, the Duke of Cumberland was at the head of 45,000
Hanoverians, Hessians, and Brunswickers. The forces contributed by these three
small States went under the suggestive title of the “Army of Observation.” The
Hanoverian Ministers thought that a good Hanoverian had as much reason to fear
the heavy hand of Prussia as that of the French. Moreover, England was
indisposed to make any great financial sacrifices for the sake of the
Hanoverian army, public opi ,>on in that country fearing that the money of
the British taxpayer would be misappropriated for purely dynastic interests. On
these grounds the Hanoverians had really very little inclination to take part
in the war. But Hanover’s whole position was too exposed for the electoral
Ministers to succeed in achieving its neutralisation, which Austria and France
were seeking to bring about. Willing or unwilling, Hanover was bound to fight.
On July 26 a battle took place at Hastenbeck between Marshal d’Estrees and the
Duke of Cumberland, who was beaten and fell back behind the guns of the
fortress of Stade on the North Sea. On September 10 he concluded with Marshal
d’Estrees’ successor, the Duke of Richelieu, the Convention of Klosterzeven,
which meant the disbanding of the Army of Observation. There seemed now nothing
to prevent the French from taking up their winter-quarters on the lower and
middle Elbe and besieging Magdeburg in the course of the next campaign. “If the
French get to Magdeburg,” said the King of Prussia, “ I am lost.” Already
Richelieu was being invited by the Swedes to cooperate with them. Frederick’s
defeat at Kolin had encouraged the Stockholm Government to move 17,000 men into
Prussian Pomerania on September 13. Frederick was afraid that this body of
troops, to which at present he had virtually none to oppose, would also take
part in the siege of Magdeburg. Another consequence of the defeat of the
Prussians was that the Estates of the Empire now ventured to assemble their
contingents at Fiirth in Franconia, Gradually they gathered together here
something like 32,000 Imperial soldiery under Prince Joseph of
Saxe-Hildburghausen. They marched into Thuringia and on September 17 joined at Eisenach
24,000 French under the Prince of Soubise—that second army, which Louis XV had
sent after the battle of Prague, to give direct aid to the Austrian forces.
Frederick now
decided to march at once against the French, without waiting to fight the Austrians.
He indulged the hope that, when the French in their turn had lost a battle,
they would help Prussia to obtain peace on a status quo crnte belhm bas/s.
Indirect overtures of this kind had, it is true, been made by him to the Court
of Versailles, and had been emphatically rejected; but he had other reasons, of
a diplomatic nature, for being specially anxious to obtain a victory over the
French army. In England there was a strong feeling against the ratification of
the Convention of Klosterzeven. Pitt and other Ministers
264
[l757
were
beginning to familiarise themselves with the idea that heavy British subsidies
must be granted to the Hanoverians. The mere fact of Frederick’s march into
Thuringia with 28,000 men to meet Soubise and Hildburghausen materially
strengthened this current of feeling in London. Frederick left the Duke of
Bevem with 41,000 men behind in Lusatia, to oppose the Prince of Lorraine at
the head of not less than 112,000. Charles, counselled by Daun, won Lusatia
from his opponents by a series of manoeuvres, and occupied it with a strong
corps of 22,000 men under General von Marschall. Bevem’s army was driven back
into Silesia and stationed itself at Breslau, thus leaving the greater part of
the province to the Austrians, who detached a column for the investment of
Schweidnitz. In one of the minor combats of this manoeuvring warfare
Lieutenant-General von Winterfeldt, the most competent general in the Prussian
army and a personal friend of the King, fell, near Gorlitz, on September 7.
Meanwhile, on
August 11, the Russians had crossed the frontier of East Prussia at
Stalluponen. The Russian Commander-in-chief, Field- Marshal General Count
Aprakin, advanced with his forces to the Pregel, intending to march along that
river on Konigsberg. In obedience to precise orders from the King, the
venerable Prussian Commander-in-chief, Field-Ma,rshal Lehwaldt, attacked the
Russian army. He did so very much against his will, as the Russians were much
stronger than he was. In the battle fought on August 30 at
Gross-J&gerndorf, on the left bank of the river ?regel, the Prussians
suffered a severe defeat. But, to the indescribable amazement of the defeated
army, it was found, a few days after the action, that Aprakin not only refrained
from following up his victory, but had actually retreated. The Russian general,
like Lehwaldt an old man, had been greatly impressed by the coolness and
discipline with which the Prussian infantry had manoeuvred under hostile fire.
He declared to his subordinate generals that Lehwaldt’s forces were numerous
enough to be able to hold several positions against Russian attack for a
considerable time, while the Russian army could not keep the field any longer.
In fact, the Russians melted away like snow in the sun, for their incapable
commissariat kept them intolerably short of supplies and the ordinary
necessaries of life. For this reason Aprakin began to evacuate Prussia on
September 9. In the middle of May the Russians had entered Poland 88,000 strong.
When, early in November, they had evacuated East Prussia except Memel and had
taken up their winter-quarters in Polish territory, Aprakin had under him
scarcely more than 30,000 or 40,000 combatants fit for service.
In the middle
of September Frederick marched from Lusatia into Thuringia, to meet the armies
of the Empire and of Soubise. But the Princes of Soubise and Hildburghausen,
like the Austrian generals, avoided a decisive combat by concentrating at
Eisenach, at the extreme western limit of Thuringia. On September 10 the
Convention of Klosterzeven
was signed by
the Duke of Richelieu, who then, without waiting for its ratification and the
promised disbandment of the Army of Observation, moved with 94 battalions and
106 squadrons from the lower Aller on Magdeburg. Threatened on his right flank
by so powerful a force, the King of Prussia found it impossible to continue
operations against Soubise. He detached 7000 of his 28,000 men to march under
Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick into the neighbourhood of Halberstadt, in order
to cover this district against Richelieu’s advance column.
While
Richelieu marched on Magdeburg, the Austrian General Marschall had accomplished
in Lusatia a manoeuvre which amounted to a considerable diversion in favour of
Soubise. He ordered Field-Marshal Lieutenant Hadik to march towards the Elbe,
so that Dresden, Torgau and Wittenberg appeared to be threatened. In addition,
Hadik’s hussars and Croats made a series of raids into the Mark Brandenburg. In
view of Hadik’s movements, which might even result in an attempt upon Berlin,
Frederick divided his forces once more, sending a detachment of 8000 men under
Prince Maurice of Dessau to Torgau, to cover the Elbe fortresses in Saxony and
the Mark Brandenburg. In consequence, only 13,000 men remained to the King at
Erfurt. With this handful of troops Frederick, from September 14 to 28, opposed
the vastly superior forces of the “ Combined Army,” as the troops of Soubise
and Hildburghausen were officially designated, while they held their impregnable
position at Eisenach with stubborn tenacity.
They only
ventured on a single reconnoitring expedition in the direction of Gotha; and
this was attended with unfortunate results for those troops of the Combined
Army which took part in it. The Prussian Major-General von Seydlitz, who at the
age of thirty-six had proved himself in the last Bohemian campaign the ablest
cavalry general in the Prussian army, at the head of 1900 dragoons and hussars,
surprised 9500 of the enemy and put them to an ignominious flight, in which
their losses were heavy. Here the extraordinary deficiencies from which the
Combined Army suffered for the first time made themselves evident.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of the enemy’s numbers seemed certain to
overpower the King. During the fortnight in which he was encamped near Erfurt
he was absolutely at a loss as to how he should continue operations. Even at
the time of the battle of Kolin, he had entertained the idea of suicide. Now,
this temptation presented itself more strongly than ever, and he protested that
princes of the eighteenth century would not let themselves be outshone by
republicans of antiquity like Brutus and Cato in loftiness of soul.
In truth, the
war seemed irretrievably lost for Prussia. Frederick had written to his
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Finkenstein, that, if the main army of the
French hurled itself in good earnest on the duchy of Magdeburg, he would need
40,000 more men than he had to escape annihilation. And at that moment, the
French main army was
266 Critical
position of Frederick II. [1757-8
actually
advancing on Magdeburg, something like 60,000 strong. Prince Ferdinand of
Brunswick with his 7000 was of course much too weak to offer resistance; he
withdrew behind the Bode, leaving the rich district of Halberstadt exposed to
the French. They had long since occupied the Rhenish and Westphalian
possessions of Prussia; while the Austrians had overrun Lusatia and Silesia,
and appropriated the resources of those provinces to their own uses. From Lusatia
Austrian, and from Pomerania Swedish, raids laid the Mark Brandenburg under
contribution—for 17,000 Swedes had occupied the whole of Prussian Pomerank with
the exception of the fortress of Stettin.
And now
Frederick was driven to the decision of leaving a great part of his country
open to the enemy. He sent an order on September 29 to Field-Marshal Lehwaldt
to evacuate East Prussia with his force of
29,000 men, and to march on Stettin. Lehwaldt’s
army was to be used for a winter campaign, which the King intended to open in
December against French and Swedes.
. Thus East
Prussia was lost soon after it had been freed from the invasion of Aprakin. In
January, 1758, the Russians took possession of the defenceless province, which
they did not evacuate again till the conclusion of peace. For the rest,
Frederick hesitated as to whether in the winter he should attack the French on
the Elbe or the Austrians in Silesia. He negotiated with Marshal Richelieu for
a truce to last till May, 1758, and to be also extended to the Swedes. Thus he
hoped to obtain a free hand against Austria; but in other respects the truce
could not but be of enormous disadvantage to him. George II was still
hesitating as to whether he should ratify the Convention of Klosterzeven, the
Army of Observation remaining meanwhile, undisbarided, in the environs of
Stade. He informed his Hanoverian Ministers that he was disposed to refuse the
ratification, if the King of Prussia obtained a military success and thus
proved himself able to hold his own. But if, instead of this, an arrangement
was acr?pted by Frederick which would strengthen the position of the French in
Hanover, the effect on George could only be that despair and mistrust would
take absolute possession of his mind; and he would then very probably, in his
capacity of Elector, consent to an understanding with the conqueror of his
German dominions.
Now, France,
since the Convention of Klosterzeven, had already been negotiating with the
Landgrave of Hesse and the Duke of Brunswick as to proposals for taking the
17,000 Hessians and Brunswickers, at present in English, into French pay. The
Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, whose country, like the Elector of Saxony’s,
Frederick wanted to annex, had been the ally of France since the beginning of the
war. He now offered the Cabinet of Vers;.,lies to transfer 6000 men into the
pay of France and to cede to the Most Christian King the fortress of Domitz, on
the Elbe, which, if in the enemy’s hand, would block the trade-communication of
1757] Divergent views of Soubise and
Hildburghausen. 267
Frederick’s
subjects with Hamburg. In this way another severe blow would be struck at the
prosperity of the Prussian monarchy. But, above all, Mecklenburg formed the
connecting territorial link between the army of Richelieu and the Swedish corps
in Prussian Pomerania. The French intended to unite, for,the campaign of 1758,
Hessians, Brunswickers, Mecklenburgers, and Swedes, into an army 40,000 strong.
This would have been a Protestant army, while already there were in the field
against Frederick two Roman Catholic armies and one Orthodox, besides the army
of the Empire, made up of a mixture of Catholics and Protestants. These five
armies would certainly have crushed the King. Every day his hopes sank lower.
“We are doomed,” he said; “but I shall fall sword in hand.”
He drew back
slightly before the advances of the Princes of Soubise and Hildburghausen to
positions near Buttelstedt and Buttstadt, north of Weimar, and here stood still
for another twelve days, without knowing what to do next. Frederick’s slight
backward move had been intended as a trap for Hildburghausen, whom he believed
to be incautious enough to follow him and lay himself open to the danger of a
defeat. In fact, Hildburghausen did urge Soubise to risk a battle. The army of
the Empire was composed in motley fashion of contingents supplied by numerous
small dynasts. This had not hindered Marlborough and Eugene from winning partly
by means of the army of the Empire the battle of Hochstadt; but in their day English
and Dutch subsidies had helped to establish that army on a satisfactory
footing. At present, in consequence of lack of money, such intolerable
conditions prevailed among the Imperial troops that Hildburghausen despaired of
being able to keep his forces together for long, and therefore impatiently
sought a decision by battle. Soubise had no thought of acquiescing in the
wishes of his colleague. The strategical genius of the King and the
incomparable quality of his troops would in all probability turn the scale in a
pitched battle, while, on the other hand, the allies would doubtless annihilate
their opponents, whom they were encompassing on all sides, if they conducted a
judiciously planned war of manoeuvres against them. Soubise therefore showed
extreme caution as he followed the retiring enemy, and ventured no further than
Gotha with the bulk of his army, “ When I advance,” wrote the King of Prussia,
“ the enemy fly; when I fall back, they follow me, but always keeping well out
of reach of shot. Should I leave these parts and, for instance, seek an
encounter with Richelieu in his pride somewhere hear Halberstadt, he would
behave in the same fashion, and the enemy hereabouts, for the moment as immovable
as statues, would soon come to life and nail me down somewhere near Magdeburg.
If I fall back on Lusatia, they will take my magazines at Leipzig and Torgau
and march straightway on Berlin. These moves cannot go on much longer; the game
must shortly come to an end one way or the other.” Prince Henry and Voltaire
reminded him that other
kings before
him had purchased peace and self-preservation by cessions of territory; but his
answer was:
“Pour moi, menaci dit naufrage,
Je dois, en affrontant I'or age,
Fewer, vivre et mourir en roi.n
The King had
spent nearly a month in the neighbourhood of Erfurt and Weimar, trying to force
Soubise’ corps and the Imperial army into fighting, when the news was announced
that the Austrians were marching from Lusatia to Berlin. Reports were
contradictory as to their strength. If it was the whole of MarschalTs corps,
the suspicion was unavoidable that Sweden had part and lot in the enterprise.
Frederick was in the direst distress. Berlin contained invaluable resources for
the defence of Prussia—the arsenal, the foundry, the manufactory of arms, the
powder magazines, and the cloth factories. “ Ah! dear brother, how happy are
the dead! ” the King wrote to Prince Henry. Then, with tremendous energy, he
took his counter-measures. He not only wished to protect his capital, but hoped
that the blow which the French had given him no opportunity of striking might
now fall on Marschairs column. The Prince of Anhalt’s detachment, which covered
the magazines of Leipzig and Torgau, was despatched from Weissenfels on the
Saale by means of quite extraordinary marches to the eastern side of Berlin.
Prince Ferdinand was ordered to lead his. troops from Magdeburg to the western
side of the capital. The King himself moved with the main army from Buttstadt,
and drove his breathless companies on towards the south side of Berlin. “We
must,” he said, “get these people into our power, alive or dead.” But once more
he had been merely fighting the air. Not until his forces had advanced close on
Berlin did it become known that it was not MarschalTs column at all, but merely
a skirmishing party of 3500 men under Count Hadik, which had entered Berlin
and, after levying contributions, had speedily departed. The enormous losses
suffered by the King’s forces on the march had served no purpose.
Frederick
hereupon formed the design of tracking the Austrians in Lusatia and Silesia,
regarding his operations against the French and the Imperial army as finally
wrecked. Then came the announcement that Soubise had advanced to the Saale, and
that Hildburghausen had actually crossed this river and was trying- to get
possession of Leipzig. The King’s hopes of forcing the Combined Army into
action revived, and he moved his troops, instead of on Gorlitz, towards
Leipzig. The army of the Empire retreated very hurriedly behind the Saale, and
the King of Prussia’s forces pushed on over the river in pursuit. During the
operations in Thuringia the numbers of the Prussian battalions and squadrons
had, through the influx of the autumn recruiting contingents, been restored up
to their normal height; but during a period of eight weeks , the counter- and
cross-marches in Thuringia, Saxony,
Magdeburg and
Brandenburg had been unceasing, and, in consequence of the superhuman hardships
endured, the full battalions, consisting of about 840 men, had again already
shrunk to an average of 600. Still, the whole force was held together by the
iron Prussian discipline.
Quite
different conditions prevailed in the French army, where neither officers nor
soldiers observed discipline, although revolutionary ideas proper had not yet
penetrated among the troops. The worst evil, and the root of all the rest, was
the insubordination of the generals. It was precisely in the highest spheres of
the army that the personal weakness of Louis XV, and the disorganised state of
his government, had produced the utmost disorder—in fact, a kind of anarcl'y.
The generals called every field-marshal who held the reins firmly a “ despot,”
and yielded him a doubtful obedience. They were full of jealousy among
themselves; each believing that in battle his fellow would leave him in the
lurch. If Soubise had been perfectly master of his troops, he would not have
made a stand before the King of Prussia, but have moved a couple of days’
marches to the rear, in the same way as six weeks before he had withdrawn
twenty battalions of his advance-guard from Erfurt to Eisenach on Frederick’s
advance from Lusatia to Erfurt. A procedure of this sort had been prescribed to
him from Versailles, and Frederick, as has been seen, was apprehensive of it.
But an army is a complicated and sensitive piece of mechanism. Marching to and
fro demands more sacrifices from troops than a pitched battle; and for a long
time the French had been grumbling at the interminable marches which led to no
decisive result. The French army was without an equal in Europe, in so far as
alone of all the armies of the globe it had abolished the punishment of
flogging; nowhere was the common soldier so humanely treated, or his honour so
generously considered. The French ambulance, too, was unequalled for
efficiency. The system of drill was theoretically the same as the Prussian. In
personal bravery the French soldier was unsurpassed. All the technique, the
materials of war, etc., were first-rate. The commissariat, in spite of corruption,
was without a superior as to ability and resource. Even Soubise, whom critical
history was formerly wont to deride as the inventor of a sauce highly
appreciated by gourmets, has by later research been proved to have been no
insignificant commander. Hitherto, he had carried out his plan of operations
consistently. But now he no longer had his troops in hand. They were eager to
occupy winter-quarters, and resented being subjected by him to the hardships of
a retreat, instead of his bringing the campaign to a quick and glorious close
by a battle in the fine old French style. Least of all would tolerate a
backward movement the twenty battalions and eighteen squadrons which
Lieutenant-General the Duke of Broglie had just brought up from the Richelieu division
of the army! These troops had already shown the utmost exasperation when
carrying out the march from Halberstadt into Thuringia, as they had reckoned on
going into
270
winter-quarters
without further delay. In the French camp, it had come to this: that the
general in command obeyed the army, not the army the commander. Soubise halted
near the left bank of the Saale and occupied a strong position not far from
Miicheln. The King of Prussia led his army against this position; but, discovering
in time that it was too strong, ordered a retreat and encamped himself opposite
the French at Rossbach. He knew that his adversaries, through lack of the
necessaries of life, would soon be compelled to abandon their impregnable
position and either advance against him or retire upon their magazines. In the
latter case, he hoped to force their rear guard to a combat on the march. On
the other side, Soubise was still unwilling to offer battle; his plan was to
outflank the encampment at Rossbach on the left and thus threaten the Prussian
communication with Weissenfels. The Prince hoped that Frederick would then
voluntarily beat a retreat. When the Prussians had been thus manoeuvred away
from the Saale, Soubise would, directed by his Minister, take up winter-quarters
behind this river.
To cany out
these operations, Soubise began his march on November 5, not earlier than 11.30
in the morning. Frederick therefore could not attack on the same day if the
French posted themselves opposite the left wing of the Prussian lines, on the
heights of Obschiitz. The army with which Soubise began his flank march on that
fateful November 5 consisted of 30,000 French troops and 11,000 of the army of
the Empire. Of the latter not less than 7000 were disbanded quite at the
beginning of the battle—a fact which may be verified from the list of
casualties on this day; they are therefore not included in the statistics
concerning the action given in the present narrative, for only 34,000 of the
Combined Army were reckoned on the battle-field as actual combatants. King
Frederick had with him 82,000 men. Soubise’ troops were eager for battle, their
spirits having been raised by Frederick’s retreat on the previous day.
When the King
of Prussia became aware that the enemy was marching upon his left flank, he had
no thought of retreating over the Saale in accordance with the expectations of
the French generals. But he had just as little intention of venturing to attack
the enemy on the heights °f Obschiitz. It was indeed not behind the Saale, but
on Merseburg, that he arranged to fall back. It is generally stated that this
was a feigned retreat, a mere stratagem; but such is not the fact. Cut off from
Weissenfels by Soubise’ flank march, the King of Prussia intended to make
Merseburg the base of his operations. To the victor of Gotha, General von
Seydlitz, was assigned the command of the larger part of the Prussian cavalry,
with special orders to block the road to Merseburg. He was the youngest cavalry
general present with the army.
It was about
half-past two o’clock in the afternoon when the French perceived that the King
of Prussia was falling back. They had now reached the goal of then advance and
were on the heights of Obschiitz..
But, as
Soubise saw that the Prussians were retiring, he resolved to avail himself of
the advantageous opportunity offered and to attack Frederick’s rear-guard.
After the French had once committed the cardinal mistake of lingering in the
neighbourhood of the Saale, one can scarcely blame Soubise for this decision.
For, if the King of Prussia had made up his mind to give battle, the French on
their side were obliged to accept it either on this or some other day. So the
Combined Army continued their march beyond Obschiitz and descended into the
wide trough of land which extends from that village to the north. The King of
Prussia saw the enemy come down from the Obschiitz heights, and at once gave up
the movement to Merseburg—for the ardently desired chance of battle had come.
The Prussian army were ordered to deploy. The undulating country behind
Reichhardtswerben hid from the French the forward march of the Prussians; and
their cavalry, advancing first, surprised and attacked the cavalry of the
Combined Army, which had not yet deployed. The squadrons of Seydlitz maintained
their advantage, but with some difficulty, as the enemy stood his ground for
quite half-an- hour, so that the French infantry g ned time for their
deployment.
Soubise has
been condemned as a careless general, of the superficial, frivolous, grand
seigneur type, because he allowed himself to be surprised. But Frederick the
Great was himself surprised at Hochkirch. So far from being guilty of
carelessness, Soubise, on the contrary, exhibited an excess of anxiety. Already
on the march from Mucheln to Obschiitz he had feared being attacked, and, to
protect the left wing of his marching columns, had left behind detached bodies
of troops—eleven battalions of French and Croats, twelve good French squadrons
and three of Austrian hussars, the last under no less important a leader than
Laudon. These fifteen squadrons might, if used at the right point, have decided
the day to the disadvantage of Seydlitz. Nothing better illustrates the
difference between Soubise and Frederick than that the latter, on withdrawing
towards Merseburg, had only left behind to watch those detachments a quite
insignificant force—a single battalion against eleven, seven squadrons against
fif teen.
It was
chiefly through squandering his cavalry that Soubise lost the battle. According
to the tactics and armaments of those times, cavalry was the most effective of
the three engines of warfare. Soubise had 5500 horse, Frederick 5000. But,
owing to the wrong dispositions of the French Commander-in-chief, his slight
numerical superiority was changed at a critical moment into a pronounced
inferiority; 3800 of the Combined Army were attacked and beaten by Seydlitz’
4600 men. General von Seydlitz had his squadrons so firmly in hand that, after
defeating the enemy’s cavalry, he was able to lead them in good order against
the right wing of the French infantry. His success in this manoeuvre won for
Seydlitz imperishable laurels. Even Prussian troops did not always understand
how to make best use of their victory. But
Seydlitz
possessed the power of maintaining strict discipline in his whole force, from
the major-generals down to the common soldier. He would not permit the pursuit
of the enemy’s cavalry to be continued longer than to the point at which the
French squadrons were rendered harmless; then, his whole thirty-eight squadrons
wheeled round to the right and attacked the French infantry and artillery. The
Prussian cavalry dominating the plain, the French artillery was prevented by
fear of the enemy’s horsemen from falling into position. Consequently, the
Prussian artillery, little embarrassed by fire from the French guns, was free
to direct its own mainly on the enemy’s infantry: which it did with excellent
effect. The Prussian cannonade and cavalry charges shattered the French
infantry so rapidly and so completely that Frederick’s battalions, by that time
deployed and advancing, found little left for them to do. Only about seven
battalions of the Prussian line of battle fired a series of charges; this
sufficed to rout the entire French foot, The whole action lasted only a single
hour.
The Prussian
losses amounted to not more than 550 men. Those of the French army were far
greater, reaching about 7000 men, though certainly not beyond what a great
military Power like France could bear without being shaken in the slightest
degree. Nor did the French at Rossbach forfeit their old reputation for
bravery. One company of the Piedmont regiment was nearly wiped out by Prussian
grape-shot. Of the 3800 cavalry which fought against Seydlitz not fewer than 1000
were killed or wounded. But the insubordination of the army which the Prince of
Soubise had forced, against his will, to stay in the region of the Saale was
notorious and evident. Even on the battle-field there was among the French
forces much disorder, want of guidance, and disagreement. In any case, Europe,
to its astonishment, recognised that the French army was no longer what it had
been. Nowhere was the impression thus created stronger than in London. Pitt
breathed more freely, and the old King seemed to have recovered his youth—it
was long since he had seemed to be in such spirits. The ratification of the
Convention of Klosterzeven and the disbandment of the army at Stade were now
definitely refused. In 1757 the British Parliament had reluctantly voted
£164,000 for the Army of Observation; the grant made in 1758 amounted to
£1,200,000. As Pitt expressed it in the Lower House, the Army of Observation
was to become an “Army of Operations.” That the Minister was able to obtain
money from the representatives of the English people for the unpopular
Hanoverian war, was one of the most important consequences of the battle of
Rossbach. It may be noted here in anticipation that the allied “ Army of
Operations,” which was now commanded by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, drove
and kept the French out of Germany. The Court of Versailles despatched armies
of continuously increasing size against the allies, because the defeat of
Prince Ferdinand was the preliminary
condition of
the participation of France in the military operations against Frederick. For
France the maintenance of the system established by the Peace of Westphalia in
Germany depended on the overthrow of the King of Prussia. Besides, the war
which the French were carrying on at the same time with England had gradually,
both at sea and in countries across the sea, taken a turn unfavourable to
France. The French were threatened with the loss of their colonies. All the
greater was their desire to secure the Austrian Netherlands, which Austria had
promised to make over to France, if Silesia was reconquered for the House of
Habsburg. Once before, at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, her colonies
had been restored to France on condition that she evacuated so much of Belgium
as had been conquered by a French army. For these reasons, the Court of
Versailles, during the whole Seven Years’ War from first to last, made the
greatest possible sacrifices for the sake of the continental war. But Ferdinand
of Brunswick intercepted all these blows. The French vanish almost entirely out
of the sphere of Frederick the Great’s military struggles; and, on this
account, they will not be mentioned again in the course of the present chapter,
except in the way of a single cursory reference.
Such were the
indirect results of the battle of Rossbach; the direct consisted in the retreat
of the Combined Army towards the Main and the interior of Franconia; so that
Frederick’s magazines in Leipzig, Wittenberg, Torgau, Dresden, and elsewhere,
were no longer threatened. The King was now at liberty to march into Silesia
against the Austrians without having any fears for his rear. In Silesia, at the
time of the battle of Rossbach, 43,000 Austrians under General Nadasdy were
laying siege to Schweidnitz, while 60,000 under Prince Charles and Daun
protected the besieging lines. The Duke of Bevem, who was stationed in face of
them with an army which had, particularly by desertions, melted down from
41,000 to 28,000 men, was urged by Frederick to take advantage of the division
in the Austrian forces in order to attack them. But Bevem was no more a great
general than Lehwaldt. He hesitated over the attack, till Schweidnitz, on
November 11, capitulated, six days after the battle of Rossbach. The fortress,
which had been newly built after the King’s own ideas, had been held for seven
weeks against
43.000 Austrians; nevertheless, the defence had
not been conducted with much energy, and within the garrison treachery and
desertion played into the hands of the besiegers. The fall of Schweidnitz cost
King Frederick 7000 men, about the same number as the French had lost at
Rossbach, not counting the losses of the Imperial army. Moreover, Nadasdy
seized in Schweidnitz sufficient provisions to keep 88,000 men for two months,
and helped himself to a war-exchequer containing
330.000 thalers—in the then financial condition of
the King of Prussia a sum of considerable weight in the balance. After the
capture of Schweidnitz almost all the Austrian forces united and marched on
Breslau,
Bevern had
now to contend against 88,000 Austrians instead of 60,000. On November 22, the
Prince of Lorraine and Daun forced their way over the Lohe, and the battle of
Breslau was lost by the small Prussian army. In moderately good order the
Prussians retreated through the town of Breslau to the opposite bank of the
Oder, where their general was during a reconnaissance taken prisoner by Croats.
His
successor, General von Kyau, retreated with the army cowards Glogau and thus
left Breslau exposed. This retreat of Kyau’s was a grave error. The danger of
the cautious and slow-moving Austrians effecting the transit of the Oder was
lessened by the fact that the victors of Rossbach had already advanced as far
as Gorlitz. With a rapidity of which in those days only Prussian troops seemed
capable, the King’s army marched on to Breslau. In spite, however, of
Frederick’s threats and exhortations to his generals, the governor of Breslau,
the aged General von Lestwitz, capitulated without offering any resistance. The
garrison was granted a free conduct to Glogau; but most of the noncommissioned
officers and nearly all the privates had deserted so soon as the Austrians had
entered the city, so that all ten battalions simply ceased to exist. Before
this the Duke of Bevern’s regiments had already been weakened to an
extraordinary degree by desertion. Of the 13,000 men who, before the battle of
Breslau, figured in the official list of Bevem’s army as lost, 6000 were marked
as deserters^ Such were the feelings pervading the Prussian as well as the
Austrian army in consequence of the system of the press-gang, the brutal
treatment of the men, and their indifference to the despotic governments for
which they were forced to spill their blood. A notable exception among the
German troops of that period were the 14,000 men whom Frederick led from
Thuringia into Silesia. Full advantage had been taken of the many opportunities
of desertion offered by the cross- and counter-marches of September and
October, when no supplies were furnished from the magazines; but the soldiery
were billeted on the population, and those who remained might be trusted.
Another force, of an ideal kind, operated in Frederick’s favour. The belief in
Luther and Calvin in Germany had not died out so completely as the King
supposed; and this was the reason why the defeat of the French was hailed with
jubilation by all German Protestants. For in the French army at this time—not
more than a generation before the Revolution—the traditions of Catholic
intolerance were still so alive, that Soubise’ soldiers frequently desecrated
the altars and chalices of the Protestant churches. Even among the cool and
calculating frequenters of the Paris Exchange a fear was expressed, that the
King of Prussia might play the deliverer in a war of religion and thus attain
the headship of Germany. But a consummation of this kind suited neither the
spirit of the times nor the personality of a Voltairean like Frederick. Anyhow,
the aureole which surrounded the head of the victor of Rossbach had the effect
of
inducing a
few thousand soldiers to find , their way into his camp—in part deserters at
the capitulation of Breslau, in part stragglers from the garrison of
Schweidnitz, who had made their escape out of Austrian custody on the way to
Bohemia. Every sort of reinforcement was a valuable gain for Frederick, who had
to face a tremendous task.
Prince
Charles of Lorraine and Daun marched against the King of Prussia with the
object of gaining a position on the Katzbach. Here Schweidnitz could be
covered. With the support of this fortress and of Liegnitz, which they manned
and strengthened, the Austrians might now venture to take up their
winter-quarters in Silesia. But it behoved the Austrian generals, from the
outset, to observe the utmost caution, as against a foe so eager to strike and
so mobile, although they believed him to be still on the other side of the
Katzbach. They therefore, on December 4, occupied the fortified camp at
Leuthen, where their forces numbered 55,000 men. Here Prince Charles and Daun
learned to their amazement that the King of Prussia had crossed the Katzbach
some time before, and was now at Neumarkt. In reality, he was even nearer,
stationed immediately in front of the Austrians. After the junction of troops
from Thuringia with the forces that had carried out the precipitate retreat to
Glogau, he had under him more than 40,000 men. Prince Charles and Daun could be
in no doubt that they would be attacked the next day.
At sunrise on
December 5, the Prussians were on the move and marched upon the right flank of
the Austrians, who had not time to dispose themselves calmly in order of
battle. In the army of Prince Charles and Daun several battalions were not to
be entirely trusted—to begin with, ten Bavarian battalions, for in those days a
bitter antagonism obtained between Bavaria and Austria; further, fourteen
battalions of Wurtembergers, who hated their ruler, the ally of Austria, as the
tyrannical oppressor of the Estates of his duchy, and passionately venerated
the conqueror of Rossbach as the champion of German Protestantism. The Austrian
generals placed these Bavarian and Wiirtemberg battalions on the left wing of
their line of battle.
Frederick
advanced against the right wing, in the direction of Borne; but by means of a
personal reconnaissance he convinced himself of the extreme difficulty of
attacking his adversaries’ right wing, owing to the unevenness of the ground.
The left Austrian wing had taken up a still more favourable position, and
seemed almost unassailable. But Frederick's keen eye observed a weak point in
the left wing of Prince Charles’ position; and, with swift resolve, he led his
army past the enemy’s front (at a distance of not more than 4000 paces) to the
point at which he had espied this flaw. Thus the attack of the Prussian
infantry fell directly on the Wurtembergers; and eleven out of their fourteen
battalions at once fled, leaving behind only a few killed and wounded. The
advance tp the front, by General Nadasdy’s orders, of some Austrian regiments
only
increased the prevailing confusion—Austrians, Bavarians* Wiirtem- bergers, the
whole of the infantry of Nadasdy’s division, were routed, The main body of
Prince Charles’ and Daun’s forces was still intact. But the right Austrian
wing, which now had no enemy in front of it, was obliged to make a very wide
wheeling movement in order to be able to take part in the combat. The training
of the Austrian infantry was not careful enough to enable it to carry out so
complicated a manoeuvre in good order. It closed in towards the centre, where
the regiments were massed in so narrow a space that they were incapable of
action, and in parts stood nearly a hundred deep. The execution done by the
heavy Prussian artillery, which was numerically superior to the Austrian, was
proportionately effective. Nevertheless, the Prussians did not win their
victory with ease. Slow and immobile in the matter of tactics, and
strategically devoted to the system of the defensive pure and simple, the
Austrian army, within the limits of this same system, developed a notable tenacity.
Of 40,000 Prussians over 6000 were killed or wounded in a combat lasting not
more than four hours. But the Austrian losses were enormous. In prisoners alone
they lost 22,000 men. Moreover, Breslau, with a garrison of 18,000 men,
surrendered at discretion. Later, the same fate befell the Austrians in
Schweidnitz. All in all, out of the
90.000 Austrians in Lower Silesia, 55,000 were
killed or taken prisoners. The defeat was nothing short of a catastrophe.
Had Frederick
the Great had modem armies at his command, he would now have marched on Vienna
and there dictated terms of peace. Instead of this, it was high time for him to
occupy winter-quarters. Through the winter* operations on the Prussian side
were confined to Pomerania. Here the Swedes not only retired before the army of
Field-Marshal Lehwaldt, whose forces were greatly superior, beyond the Prussian
frontier, but they also evacuated Swedish Pomerania as far as Stralsund and the
island of Riigen. The Prussians were only prevented from occupying these points
by lack of a fleet: moreover, they 'could now raise war contributions in
Swedish Pomerania and Mecklenburg, and impress recruits. In Mecklenburg they
gathered into the service 4000, no insignificant aid for the small Prussian
State, threatened by nearly the whole continent of Europe. The King summoned
all his energies and worked hard to render his army complete for the coming
campaign. It was not possible to cover expenses by raising taxes, for in this
despotic State the taxes on the unprivileged classes were so high in times of
peace that to put any abnormal strain on the taxation of that part of the
population was out of the question. To tax the privileged classes would not
have been compatible with the spirit of the King’s internal policy.' In this
dilemma Frederick took refuge in the debasement, of the coinage, and in paying
his officials in paper instead of cash. Thus, in 1758, as in1
1757.150.000 Prussian troops were again put into the
field. The Austrian1 army, on the other hand, had shrunk from
183,000 to 85,000 men. In 1757■
1758] Operations against Austrians, Swedes and
Russians. 277
the King of
Prussia had directed his attack against Bohemia rather than Moravia, which he
would have preferred, but which lay too far east to enable him to send
detachments thence against the French. When, at the end of April, 1758,
Frederick opened his new campaign, Ferdinand of Brunswick was trying to come up
with the French on the further side of the Rhine, across which the bulk of
their military forces had been driven back. Frederick, who had now nothing more
to fear from the French, had to prepare to meet, about midsummer, the Russian
army in the Mark Brandenburg and Silesia. The interval he judiciously proposed
to employ in an expedition into Moravia. Here lay Olmiitz, the only important
fortress which the Austrians held against Prussia; moreover, Moravia bordered
on Hungary, where, by taking Olmiitz, the King of Prussia hoped to stir up a
rebellion among the Protestants. Field-Marshal Daun, who after the defeat of
Prince Charles at Leuthen had succeeded him as Commander-in-chief of the
Austrian army, had concentrated his forces in Bohemia and expected to be
attacked there, when he heard that the Prussians were marching on Olmiitz. He
now led his army straightway into Moravia, and encamped on May 24 in an
unassailable position at Gewitsch, two good days’ march from Olmiitz. His
forces consisted of about 70,000 men; those of Frederick before Olmiitz were
not more numerous, for the Prussians had to present a three-sided front. Prince
Henry of Prussia covered Saxony with
85,000 men against General Serbelloni in western
Bohemia, where the army of the Empire was stationed in conjunction with one
corps of Austrians. Serbelloni, if he liked, could also avail himself of a
Saxon corps at Linz, 10,000 strong, composed of men on whom Frederick had
forced the military oath and who had then deserted from the Prussian army.
These Saxons were marching into France, where the Government had taken them
into pay. On the other hand, Soubise’ army was expected in Austria, having
started from the Main in June, 30,000 strong, for western Bohemia. France
having increased her subsidies to Sweden for the coming year, the Swedish army
in Germany was to be raised from 20,000 to 30,000.
For the
present, 22,000 Prussians blockaded Stralsund, commanded by General-Lieutenant
von Dohna, successor to Field-Marshal Lehwaldt. Nevertheless Dohna’s army was
not destined to act alone against Sweden, but also against Russia. The command
of the armies of the Tsar, like that of Maria Theresa’s, had changed. The aged
Aprakin was being tried by Court-martial for evacuating East Prussia, and
Lieutenant- General Fermor, who had been appointed to the command in his stead,
had, after reoccupying East Prussia, advanced with 32,000 men on Polish West
Prussia. He had reinforcements in prospect, and was negotiating with the Swedes
for joint action in Brandenburg and Pomerania. King Frederick, pressed by
adversaries in so many quarters, could, as has been already mentioned, only
muster 70,000 before Olmiitz—a very
inadequate
force; for the fortress had to be invested, the trenches occupied, and the
besieging lines covered against Daun. The inferiority of the Prussians in
numbers prevented the King of Prussia, who never forgot Kolin, from attempting
to attack Daun in battle. He preferred to take up a position south-west of
Olmiitz near Prossnitz, where within three hours he could collect upwards of
30,000 men. If Daun wished to relieve Olmiitz by fighting, he would be obliged
to attack Frederick at Prossnitz. This, however, was not at present
contemplated by the Austrian general, who knew that Frederick’s genius and the
mobility of the Prussian infantry would give them an overwhelming advantage in
a pitched battle, and who looked out for other means of relieving Olmiitz. In
the meantime he calmly and conscientiously drilled his very numerous recruits
at Gewitsch. The Prussians invested Olmiitz on May 8, but only succeeded in
opening their first parallel on the 28th. The great lapse of time between these
two proceedings was attributed to the army’s heavy besieging wagons being
retarded by the badness of the roads, Olmiitz was a good fortress of the second
class, occupied by a garrison of 9000 men under General von Marschall, an
elderly but vigorous commandant.
The King of
Prussia affirmed that his engineers made many grave blunders during the siege;
and it was nearly five weeks before the third parallel was finished, while
several successful skirmishes on the part of the besieged had achieved a
partial destruction of the earthworks. Added to this, the ammunition and
supplies of the besieging batteries gave out. A convoy of 4000 wagons was being
brought to meet the need from Neisse to the army; but near the pass of Domstadtl
General Laudon, who here made himself a name in the world’s history, attacked
the convoy on June 30. The Austrians were not much stronger in numbers than the
13,000 Prussians who escorted the convoy; but the latter had covered a march of
forty miles with wagon-trains. The Austrians, on the contrary, had at their
disposal the Croat light infantry, which seemed created on purpose for such
enterprises and was far superior to the corresponding Prussian arm, the
so-called “free battalions.” These Croat troops were, as Frederick the Great
told the British Major-General Yorke, the best in the Austrian army, which he,
as a rule, estimated highly; and they were very loyal to their flag; they never
deserted, and their mobility was irrepressible. For the attack on the Neisse
convoy 2500 Croats were detached. Thus the combat at Domstadtl was lost by the
Prussians, who were obliged to blow up their wagons in case they should fall
into the enemy’s hand. Of the gunpowder* cannon-balls, and supplies of various
sorts, nothing reached the besiegers at Olmiitz.
“ Convoi
attaque, convoi battu,'" said Frederick the Great, quoting an old military
proverb, and he reproached no one for the mishap at Domstadtl. But the blockade
of Olmiitz was wrecked and had to be
1758]
Russian and Swedish
operations.
279
immediately
raised. The Prussian army turned from Moravia into Bohemia. Its baggage was
enormous. Besides dragging with it its siege-train, it had 2000 sick and
wounded—altogether 4000 wagons, which, stretched out on a single road, made a
line forty miles in length, like the convoy of Domstadtl. The King of Prussia,
in order to cover his train of wagons, was obliged to split his army. In order
to effect his purpose, he detached three divisions of 8000 men, and temporarily
broke up his army into two halves, one of which marched in front, the other
behind, the baggage. This arrangement afforded the Austrians an uncommonly
favourable opportunity for attack. But, owing to Daun’s infinite caution, the
Prussians arrived after a twelve days’ march at Koniggratz without any losses
worth mentioning. Here the King could relieve himself of his baggage. General
Fouque conducted it to Glatz by way of Nachod, where he then took up his own
position to cover the conveyance of provisions into the King’s camp. In
addition, Frederick resorted to a way of feeding his troops which, in a
peculiar way, struck a medium between the requisition and magazine systems. As
July had come and the corn was ripe in the fields, the soldiers were made to
thresh, prepare, and clean the grain and deliver it at the bakery. Each
regiment was allotted a certain number of bushels which it had to deliver, and
immediately after the delivery the com was ground and made into bread. The King
had now 40,000 men in hand for combat; while Daun had at his disposal 50,000
regular troops and 20,000 rregular, who, generally speaking, did not count in a
pitched battle. Avoiding a battle, Daun took up a strong position, opposite the
enemy lying at Koniggratz, at Chlum, which he fortified artistically with
redoubts and barricades. The King of Pmssia, after remaining a fortnight at
Koniggratz without getting a chance of battle, was, when July drew to its end,
compelled to leave Bohemia, as he had left Moravia, without obtaining any
result; in 1757, and in 1758, offensive action against Austria had come to
nothing.
Action
against Russia could no longer be postponed, for General Fermor was now
encamped with his main army at Meseritz, on the frontier between what was then
the kingdom of Poland (to whose territory Russia had free access) and the
Neumark of Brandenburg. “ A terrible time of trial for our poor family and all
who call themselves Prussians...,” Frederick, on evacuating Bohemia, wrote to
Prince Henry. “ But in spite of all that passes within me I put the best
outward face on a bad business, and try so far as I can not to discourage those
whom it is my duly as a general to inspire with hope and generous selfconfidence.”
Fermor advanced into Brandenburg with 50,000 men and marched on Ciistrin, an
important arsenal at the confluence of the Oder with the Warthe. Dohna’s army
had meanwhile given up the blockade of Stralsund in order to stop the way of
the Russians. Thus the Swedes were free. The internal condition of the
Scandinavian kingdoms made oh. ix.
it impossible
that they could put into the field the 30,000 men promised by them. A corps of
16,000 Swedes still continued to occupy Prussian Pomerania and Mecklenburg,
commanded by General- Lieutenant Count Hamilton, a Scotchman by birth. On August
23 there arrived at Hamilton’s headquarters at Friedland in Mecklenburg-
Strelitz a Swedish officer attached to the Russian headquarters. He was
escorted by Cossacks, and his coming was entirely unexpected by. the Swedes. He
brought despatches from Fermor in which Hamilton was informed that the Russians
were bombarding Ciistrin, and that a detached corps under General Rumyantseff
had occupied Schwedt. By means of the bridge there across the Oder, Hamilton’s
16,000 men and the 12,000 belonging to Rumyantseff were to unite, according to
Fermor’s intentions. Hamilton acquiesced in the designs of his Russian
colleague; the Swedish troops evacuated Pomerania and Mecklenburg-Strelitz as
far as the Uckermark and marched on Schwedt, taking Prenzlau by the way. Ciistrin
was not gravely imperilled, because the Russians had with them no siege
appliances. Their bombardment left the fortifications unaffected. All the same,
the town with the arsenal and a large magazine of com was burnt; and such
losses of material of war were grave disasters for Prussia in her actual
condition. The barbarous ravages committed by the Russians, especially by the
Cossacks and Calmucks, in the open towns and plains of the Neumark, were also
injurious to Frederick from a military point of view. The financial position of
the Prussian monarchy was becoming critical. Before the expedition into Moravia
Frederick had very unwillingly concluded a subsidy treaty with England. After
Rossbach and Leuthen, he was again in hopes of annexing Saxony; but he hampered
himself in the achievement of this political end, by making the Prussian State
financially dependent on another Great Power. While still in camp at Olmiitz,
Frederick had written to his ambassador in London that he trusted that for the
present year he would not require to draw subsidies. Now, no choice was left
him but to draw the first £200,000.
The bulk of
his Silesian army was left by the King stationed at Kloster-Griissau in Lower
Silesia against Daun, while he gave over the supreme command to Margrave
Charles of Brandenburg-Schwedt, attaching to him as tactical adviser
Field-Marshal Keith. He himself led a corps on Ciistrin, the men being
subjected to exertions as excessive as those of their cross- and
counter-marchings in the autumn of 1757. Especially the last forced marches
through the deep sandy soil of the Mark reduced the infantry to a state of
utter exhaustion. On August 22, the King’s corps united with General Dohna’s
army at Gorgast, west of Ciistrin. On the 23rd the Oder was crossed, the
barrier which separated the Prussian forces from the Russian army besieging
Ciistrin. Already Prussian hussars came in contact with Russian dragoons and
Cossacks and scattered them right and left. Fermor raised the siege of
Ciistrin,
but refused
to retreat. Moreover, owing to the unwieldy nature of the Russian troops, it
would have been scarcely possible for him to escape Frederick, who was anxious
for battle. He succeeded, however, in finding a defensive position almost as
strong as those selected by Daun with so masterly a discrimination. Fermor, in
posting his army behind the Mietzel, the swampy banks of which are only
passable in certain places, rendered his front and flanks safe from attack. “ I
wish that the King would attack me here,” said he to General Count Saint-Andre,
who was attached to the Russian headquarters as Austrian military adviser; “ I
should beat him.” Frederick had written quite to the same effect a few days
earlier to his sister, the Princess Amalia: “ I am not afraid in the least of
this ragged crew, but only of the streams and swamps amongst which they can
hide.” Unable to attack the enemy either in front or flank, he had to turn them
completely in order to force them to battle. For Fermor’s position, as
Frederick ascertained, was less unapproachable in its rear.
On August 25,
at half-past three in the morning, having drawn up his army, he crossed the
Mietzel with it close to the Neudamm mill by the Kersten bridge, and marched
through the thinly-wooded pine forest of Massin. Thence the Prussians emerged
40,000 strong on to the undulating plain of Zomdorf, where the Russians stood
in about the same strength. After the battle the King of Prussia told his
reader, de Katt, that the Russians might have managed so as to have attacked his
marching columns as they came undeployed out of the swampy wood. But such
manoeuvres presupposed a resolution in the leader and a mobility in the troops
in which the Russians were, like the Austrians, altogether lacking. When the
Cossacks announced to Fermor that the enemy obviously intended to reach the
rear of the Russian position by the wood of Massin, Fermor ordered the army to
turn right about face. How little the Russian general had calculated on the
possibility of his opponent’s daring to turn him is shown by the fact that he
had directed some of his heavy baggage to take up a position at Gross- Kamin,
close to Batzlow, where the Prussian army came out of the wood. Considering the
enormous importance of the provision wagon in the age of the magazine system,
the taking of Fermor’s baggage would in itself alone have signified a victory
for the Prussian army over the Russian.
But the King,
who was weak in infantry, believed at this critical moment that he could not
afford to detach any troops in the direction of Gross-Kamin. The escort of the
Russian baggage was, it is true, not numerous; but they had built a battery and
thrown up earthworks. Furthermore, 2000 Cossacks under Major-General Jefremoff,
coming from Landsberg on the Warthe, were in full march on Gross-Kamin, where
indeed they only arrived on the evening of the day of the battle. At any rate,
Frederick left the Russian baggage on the left untouched, and marched on
Fermor’s army, which, after reversing its position, no
longer had a
safe line of retreat. For the swamps of the Mietzel, which in the eighteenth
century were not even passable by single pedestrians, were now in rear of the
Russians instead of in their front. Fermor himself had destroyed the bridges at
Kutzdorf and Chuartschen, because, according to his opinion, the lower Mietzel
formed the enemy’s line of advance. That in reality his own line of retreat
would be across that river in consequence of the bold evolutions of his
formidable foe, had been as little foreseen by him as had the danger to his
baggage-train at Gross-Kamin. Had Frederick succeeded in actually carrying out
his masterly plan of battle, his success would have been even more complete
than it had been at Leuthen; the entire hostile army must have heen cut off and
annihilated. And he needed, too, to gain a second crushing victory; for the
distressful situation of the autumn of 1757 had returned. Not only were the
Russians and Swedes in the Mark, but Laudon as well, who, with the greater part
of a detachment of some 8000 men, was stationed at Cottbus on the Spree. The
Hungarian hussars, desirous of coming into touch with the Russians, made raids
throughout the south-eastern Mark and the adjoining districts of Silesia,
levying contributions everywhere. Though the excesses they committed were not
to be compared with the atrocities of the Cossacks and Calmucks, they were bad
enough to excite the anger of Daun and the Austrian officers. The Austrian army
was now also encamped on Prussian territory, at Gorlitz in Lusatia. Daun had
already for several weeks thought of leading the main Austrian army by way of
Cottbus to Berlin, so soon as the King of Prussia marched against the Russians.
Qn the
morning of August 25, a burning hot day, Frederick rode forth at the head of
the eight battalions which composed his advance- guard. The Prussian army
carriedfout a flank march past the whole length of the Russian front, now
facing south, and wheeled into order of battle between Zorndorf and
Wilkersdorf. The King’s plan was to attack with his left wing, which marched up
behind Zorndorf, the enemy’s right. The Prussian right wing, made weaker than
the left, was to remain in abeyance; while Fermor had expected the reverse
tactics: namely, that he would be attacked on his left wing while the Prussian
left remained stationary, so as to cover a possible Prussian retreat on
Ciistrin. But Frederick, in projecting his plan of battle, had not thought in
the least of the precautions imputed to him by Fermor, and was far less intent
on preserving at all costs his communication with Ciistrin than on directing
his attack to the weakest spot in the Russian position. Even in the contingency
of his losing the battle and his connexion with Ciistrin, a line of retreat was
open to him through the forest of Massin infinitely superior to Fermor’s
background of Mietzel quagmires.
Fermor’s
error led to considerable mistakes in his dispositions. The heavy artillery
made a much weaker show on the Russian than on the
1768]
283
Prussian
side, Eermor having only 60 heavy guns, Frederick 117. When the Russian general
thought that his left wing would be attacked, he massed nearly the whole of his
heavy artillery there; while Frederick distributed his heavy guns equally along
both wings. The right Russian wing, which Frederick intended to attack,
suffered terribly, being under fire for two whole hours from heavy guns, to
which it could only respond by means of the light regimental cannon. The attack
of the Prussian infantry followed at 11 o’clock, after the battalions had been
on the move since about 4 a.m. in the glaring heat of the sun.
Even after
Frederick had by his turning movement frustrated Fermor’s plan of battle, the
Russians still had an excellent defensive position. At Prague, and especially
at Leuthen, the Prussian infantry had been able to outflank the enemy’s; but at
Zorndorf such a manoeuvre was not to be thought of. The Russian infantry lay
against the Zaber- grund, a ravine which at that time was so swampy that,
though cavalry might possibly get through it, it was impassable for infantry.
The King of Prussia therefore ordered the left wing of his infantry to make a
frontal attack. Herein lay the Achilles-heel of Frederick’s scheme of battle.
The King, who spoke contemptuously of the Russian army as tag, rag, and
bobtail, was severely undeceived on this head at Zorndorf. The Russians fought
very well, although they had been most terribly handled by the opening
cannonade of the Prussian heavy artillery ; but they had a powerful reserve of
regimental cannon which were very skilfully used, and inflicted fearful losses
on the Prussian infantry when it had come close enough.
Shortly
before the battle Fermor had informed his troops that the method of the
Prussian infantry consisted in insolently advancing and beginning to fire
before they reached the proper distance; which habit should be courageously
met, by relying on the effect of the artillery and of reasonable infantry fire
at the correct distance. These instructions were applied with so much success
that the attacking Prussian infantry began to waver. Hitherto, it had not been
supported by the cavalry of Frederick’s left wing; half of which had been
placed behind the infantry. The other half, consisting of thirty-one squadrons,
on the opposite side of the Zabergrund, where Seydlitz was in command, could
not think of taking the ravine so long as the Russian infantry were close to
it. Accordingly, Seydlitz’ instructions forbade his making the attempt till the
Prussian infantry should have shattered the battalions of the right Russian
wing. But, instead of being shattered, they pressed on victoriously, mastered
the heavy batteries of the left Prussian wing, and reduced its infantry to such
a state of demoralisation that only the vigorous intervention of the cavalry
posted behind the infantry saved the left wing of the Prussian infantry from a
complete rout. These advances, which Fermor personally commanded on his right
wing, were supported at enormous sacrifices by the badly-horsed Russian
cavalry. The Prussians
utterly
outnumbered their adversaries in this arm; for, all in all, 12,000 Prussian
fought against 3000 Russian horse—the 3000 Cossacks being of no real
significance in a pitched battle.
After the
victorious advance of the Russian right wing had put an end to its contact with
the Zabergrund, Seydlitz could cross the defile. He did so in good order, and
fell on the enemy’s flank. The infantry of the Russian right wing and its
handful of squadrons found themselves involved in defeat, and fled in the same
state of demoralisation which had taken possession earlier of the Prussian
battalions. But there remained a distinct numerical difference, to the
disadvantage of the Prussians. Of their thirty-eight battalions, twenty-three
were routed; of the Russian fifty-seven, only about eighteen; for one-half only
of the exposed Russian wing had been included in the combat, while the other
had not gone forward with the rest, but had remained quietly in its original
position of defence. The reason was that, in the middle of the right Russian
wing, lay a second watery swamp, called the GalgengruncL Those of Fermor’s
battalions which had not advanced with the rest now stood on the other side of
this ravine, in close contiguity with it and unbroken. For Seydlitz’ squadrons
to capture the defile and to take the Russian infantry in flank was out of the
question. This would have required a frontal attack by Prussian infantry; but
the infantry of the Prussian left wing was now hors de combat.
In a word,
the King’s assault had been beaten off, and his plan of battle absolutely
wrecked. His features revealed his anxiety, when, at one o’clock in the
afternoon, he rode from the beaten left wing of his line of battle to the
right. Maurice of Anhalt-Dessau, fearing that the sight of the King’s clouded,
brooding countenance might discourage the troops, wheeled round with assumed
hilarity, waved his hat and exclaimed, “ Victoria! ” The troops joined in the
cheer, and the English ambassador, Andrew Mitchell, who was present with the King
of Prussia, credulously expressed his congratulations to the sovereign. The
King listened to him politely and exhibited perfect composure; but, when they
had ridden on, he said to Mitchell: “ My good friend, things are going badly
with the left wing. I shall put them straight; but do not follow me.” Then he
ordered the right wing, which hitherto had been inactive, to charge. It was a
desperate resolve, for the Russian left wing was much better protected against
a turning movement than the right. It leant on the village of Zicher and a
series of woods, where neither cavalry nor infantry, fighting in the stiff
linear formation of the eighteenth century, could penetrate. The frontal attack
of the Prussian battalions was repulsed with much slaughter by the guns and
regimental cannon of the Russians; and the handful of Russian cavalry made as
brilliant charges as their comrades had made on the right wing. Thus the
disorganisation of the right wing of the Prussian infantry was complete. The
King, like Field-Marshal Schwerin at Prague, seized a flag, but his heroism was
unavailing;
the men refused to be taken under fire again. The commander-in-chief of the
left Russian wing was Browne, a Jacobite emigrant from Ireland, and the uncle
of the Austrian Field-Marshal Browne who fell at Prague. He made the same
pardonable blunder in tactics which Fermor had committed as commander on the
right. Instead of, after the repulse of the hostile infantry, using exclusively
his cavalry, small though it was in numbers, for rapid pushes, success misled
him into send’^g his iiifantiy also to charge in the open plain, where the King
of Prussia, to paralyse the onslaught of Browne’s battalions, massed almost his
whole cavalry, the bulk of Seydlitz’ squadrons included. The combat now again
took a turn in Frederick’s favour; but the defensive advantages of Fermor’s
position were still not exhausted. As the right wing of the Russian battle line
was traversed by the Galgengrund, so the left was cut into two parts by the
Doppelgrund, Of the twenty-two battalions on the Russian left wing, again only
a portion had assumed the offensive; those which had remained on the right of
the Doppelgrund had not been scattered by Seydlitz’ cavalry, and were able to
arrest its victorious advance, thanks to the difficult lie of the Doppelgrund
itself.
The battle
had begun at 9 o’clock in the forenoon, and only at nightfall did it stop,
without having been decided. The losses on both sides reached an enormous
height. Of 40,000 Prussians (according to published lists) 10,000 were killed
or wounded, including over 300 officers. Yet these numbers are perhaps not
altogether trustworthy, as there are indications that there may have been as
many as 15,000 or 16,000 Prussians killed or wounded. For a small country like
Prussia, such sacrifices were irreparable; a large empire like Russia was
better able to bear losses of officers and men, even if more considerable than
those of the Prussians. Fermor withdrew his forces for the night towards the
Mietzel, near Kutzdorf; the swampy ravines mentioned above separated the
combatants. On the morning of August 26, Russian forces again crossed the
Zabergrund and appeared on the heights of Zorndorf. Bearing with them the light
baggage of the Russian army, they formed the vanguard of Fermor’s retreat,
which he wished to take the direction of Gross-Kamin, where lay his heavy
baggage. The King of Prussia, noticing this forward movement, hoped to find an
opportunity for a fresh encounter; for he was bitterly disappointed by the result
of the day of battle. He personally reconnoitred the enemy’s change of position
at Zorndorf; and his passionate eagerness led him all too near his opponents’
lines, so that' he and his small cavalry escort were suddenly subjected to a
lively cannonade from a hidden Russian battery. By a miracle the King escaped
unhurt.
For the rest,
a repetition of the Prussian attack was not to be thought of seriously. The
immense hardships and losses undergone by Frederick’s troops reduced them to a
condition as disorganised as that of
Fermor’s.
King Frederick was even without sufficient troops fit for action to seize
Fermor’s heavy baggage at Gross-Kamin ; and Brigadier Kokoschkin, who was in
command there, was able to get into communication with the Russian army by way
of Wilkersdorf and Zorndorf. Several messages from Kokoschkin to Fermor told
how severely the Prussian army had suffered; and the Cossacks proved it by
capturing many Prussian soldiers. Thus encouraged, Fermor set out at 2 o’clock
on the morning of August 27 to march past Frederick’s left flank to
Gross-Kamin; though the Russian artillery had lost nearly all their horses or
had to give them up for the transport of the wounded. Prussian historical
accounts, generally so extremely severe in their criticism of Fermor, seem
unable to praise sufficiently his masterly execution of this daring flank
march. But, in truth, another fact is far more remarkable, namely, that on a
fine August day between four and nine in the forenoon, a Russian army could
march past Frederick the Great without being attacked. The Russians had an open
plain over which to move, as the French had at Rossbach, and they were so slow
about it, that to cover a distance of five miles they took quite seven hours.
The Prussian army, even two days after the battle of Zorndorf, was still, as it
were, paralysed. Fermor ordered his heavy baggage-train from Gross-Kamin to
Landsberg on the Warthe, whither he intended to continue his retreat. This time
the King of Prussia sent a detachment to deal the enemy a blow such as he had
himself received at Domstadtl in Moravia. “ This is their richest magazine,”
the King wrote to Maurice of Anhalt; “ they have supplies for months on the
wagons. If I bum them, the army must retire head over heels, and I shall be
certainly rid of it. To effect this I have laid a plan and I will do everything
I can to carry it out; that will be better than a battle.” The last part of
this sentence must, of course, not be interpreted too literally. On the morning
of Zorndorf the King could, if he had liked, have taken the Russian baggage
without a battle. Now, the enterprise failed because the detached troops came
upon Rumyantseff’s corps, which Fermor, after the action at Zorndorf, had
recalled from Schwedt and ordered to proceed, together with his heavy baggage,
to Landsberg on the Warthe. Hither the Russian main army also directed its
march on August 31 from Gross-Kamin.
The King of
Prussia followed the retreating enemy, looking out for an opportunity to attack
him; but Fermor exposed no weak spots, arid, failing these, Frederick felt he
was not strong enough for a conflict, just as already on the 27th he had evaded
risking a renewal of the battle. Unmolested, the Russian main army and its
heavy baggage-train effected their junction with Rumyantseff’s division, which
was unweakened by fighting, at Landsberg on the Warthe. Frederick, after a
violent inward struggle, was forced to acknowledge himself unable to achieve
anything decisive against the Russians, and resolved on a return to the
1758]
Fermor
s operations in Pomerania. 287
southern
theatre of war, where Daun’s operations Were beginning to become dangerous. The
King’s mood was one of extreme irritation; in spite of the enormous losses
undergone by his infantry, he was far from being satisfied by their efforts at
Zorndorf. He wrote to Prince Henry, who was covering Saxony against the army of
the Empire and the Austrians, that he had better inculcate discipline into his
battalions: “N.B. Teach them to respect the stick.” The King’s march, again
accomplished with extraordinary rapidity, was directed to Dresden, for the
capture of which Daun had wished to use the time of Frederick’s absence. But,
as the latter united with Prince Henry just at the right moment, the Austrian
attack on the Saxon capital was averted.
At the same
time, however, the King of Prussia learned that the Swedes had advanced from
Prenzlau to Neu-Ruppin. Though, after Zorndorf, General Hamilton could hardly
hope that Fermor would hold out to him a helping hand, he was not discouraged,
but led his troops into the heart of the Mark and threatened the capital.
Frederick had to detach immediately, from the body of troops which he had
brought1 from Landsberg to Dresden, eight battalions and five
squadrons for Berlin. “Our infantry regiments are becoming postillions and
couriers,” Frederick wrote to his brother. Before the Russian invasion of the
Mark, the King had confronted his Russian and Swedish opponents with, in all,
twenty battalions and thirty-five squadrons. Now, he was obliged to divide,
between General Dohna against the Russians and General Wedell against the
Swedes, twenty-nine battalions and forty squadrons. The King expected that at
least Dohna would succeed in manoeuvring Fermor back across the frontier of the
Polish kingdom, which was quite close to Landsberg. But even this modest
success was not achieved, Fermor remained the greater part of September
stationed at Landsberg and reorganised his army with the help of RumyantsefFs
fresh troops. From Poland came the Russian sinews of war, stores, and
substitutes for a part of the artillery lost at Zorndorf. Fermor, now again
capable of undertaking operations, determined to stay on in the dominions of
the King of Prussia and marched into Eastern Pomerania, where he remained
during the whole of October. Although he failed in capturing the strongly
fortified port of Kolberg, the Russian troops disquieted the whole of Eastern
Pomerania and the Neumark; nor was it till November that they evacuated the
former and withdrew into their Polish and East Prussian winter-quarters.
Meanwhile the Swedes devoured the King’s resources in Prussian Pomerania, in
the Uckermark, and partly even in the Neumark. During the whole of September,
October, and November, Hamilton’s troops had to be fed by the King’s dominions
before they retreated into Swedish Pomerania and took up their winter-quarters
there.
A review of
the results of the battle of'Zorndorf leaves no doubt that Frederick would have
acted more to his own advantage if on the fateful August 25 he had contented
himself with carrying off the
Russian heavy
baggage, instead of aiming at the higher goal of crushing the hostile forces.
But it would have been at variance with a great genius like Frederick’s to act
with that sort of moderation, even though Prince Henry of Prussia, after his
fashion one of King Frederick’s ablest generals, was wont to exhibit it. The
extraordinary force of Frederick’s character is not fully understood till it is
realised what had during his operations against the Russians been his general
conception of his situation. A few days before the battle of Zorndorf he had
been of opinion that Laudon would extend his invasion through Brandenburg to
Berlin, The destruction of the treasure and public buildings of Berlin would be
so heavy a loss, that on the evening of the day of battle, Frederick had
meditated marching on the next morning with a division of his army to Guben,
thence to cover the capital against Laudon and Daun. For the King thought it
possible that the whole main Austrian army might advance on Berlin. When he
saw, on the morning after the battle, how completely disorganised the Prussian
army was in all its divisions, he abandoned the march to Guben. Instead, he
impressed upon the Margrave of Brandenburg-Schwedt, whom he had left behind
with the Prussian main army in Lower Silesia, the necessity of opposing Daun’s
invasion of the Mark by taking up suitable defensive positions till he was
himself able to hurry to the rescue. The following was, accordingly, the
situation of the King of Prussia immediately before the battle of Zomdorf, Not
only was the very nucleus of his power attacked by the Russians and Swedes, but
he further believed that the Austrians were encircling him on all sides and
endangering his possession of his own capital. At such a crisis, he ventured,
in the rage of despair—“with the passion of a desperate gambler,” it was said
in Prince Henry’s entourage—upon attacking the army of Fermor in its
unassailable position at Zomdorf,
In reality,
Daun had given up the idea of a march on Berlin and, as has been related, had
turned against Dresden. The absence of the Eng lasted from August 1 till
September 10; but, before Daun had undertaken any serious enterprise against
Prince Henry, Frederick was back again and had united with his brother.
Margrave Charles also moved towards Dresden with his main army. There were now
80,000 Prussians in the environs of that town under the personal command of the
King. Opposite them were encamped 75,000 Austrians and 15,000 of the Imperial
troops, so that Frederick and his opponents were about equal in strength. No
wonder, then, that the King wrote to Prince Henry that it would be the
salvation of the Prussians if Daun received peremptory orders to attempt some
engagement. But Daun did just the contrary of what Frederick wished. He hid
himself in the camp of Stolpen, east of Dresden, among woods, bog, and
mountains, where the King dared not attack him. From September 5 till October
5, Daun persisted in holding out at Stolpen, while Frederick
was consumed
with impatience. Meanwhile, Russians and Swedes had ravaged a great part of the
Mark Brandenburg and Pomerania. Further, the Austrians, soon after Frederick’s
withdrawal from Olmiitz, had penetrated into Upper Silesia, where they
blockaded the fortresses of Neisse and Kosel, and during the whole of August
and September were a burden on the country. Moreover, their numbers were
increased, by the division commanded by Quarter - Master - General Harsch,
hitherto stationed in Bohemia, and other troops, amounting in all to about
30,000 men. On October 5, Harsch' laid siege to Neisse; on St Theresa’s day
(October 15) he hoped to begin the bombardment. After Neisse, Kosel was to be
bombarded, the capture of which place would complete the Austrian reconquest of
Upper Silesia. “Were it not for the point d'honneur,” wrote the King in
profound depression to Prince Henry, “ I should long ago have done what I often
spoke to you of doing last year. Now, you and I are bound to practise patience;
meanwhile, life is passing, and, when all things are weighed and considered,
what has it been but care, trouble, sorrow and tribulation ? Was it'worth the
trouble to be born?” In this mood the King of Prussia set out on the march to
relieve Neisse. The Prussians, who had started on September 26, found their way
barred at Hochkirch on October 10 by Daun. The position in which the Austrian
Field- Marshal embarrassed Frederick was as impregnable as that of Stolpen had
been. The King determined to turn the Austrian right; but the manoeuvre had to
be postponed for four days, as a supply of bread was momentarily expected from
the Dresden magazine. Meanwhile, the Prussians encamped close to the enemy,
without sufficient support for their right wing, in order to lighten their
intended flanking march. The King’s attention was called by his generals to the
exposure ; but he ignored the timely warnings. Daun had pushed on a corps under
the Prince of Baden-Durlach in the direction of Gorlitz, whither the King intended
to march after receiving his provisions. Frederick hoped to be able to surprise
this detachment, if he retained touch with the enemy’s main army. Instead of
this, however, he was himself surprised. On October 14, at 5 o’clock in the
morning, the exposed right wing of the Prussians was attacked unawares by the
Austrians, whose movements were concealed by a thick fog.. Frederick did not
succeed in asserting the superior quality of his troops, because the tactical
units of his army, roused out of sleep, and in disorder, had not time for any
close formation enabling them to act together. In spite of the efforts of the
King, who exposed himself to the fire of the Austrian guns till a horse was
wounded under him, there was on the Prussian side a general confused attempt at
dispersion. Maurice of Anhalt, in the vain endeavour to form a manageable order
of battle, was severely wounded. James Keith, of old a combatant for the
Pretender in Scotland, met his death as a Prussian Field-Marshal from an
Austrian cannon-ball. The
youngest
brother of the Queen of Prussia, Prince Francis of Brunswick, also fell.
The struggle
surged hither and thither for five hours. Then, the fog cleared and the sun
shone brightly on the field of battle, strewn by
15,000 dead and wounded. Frederick recognised that
the Austrians, by advancing in accordance with a well thought-out plan which
the various divisions of troops had combined to realise, had won an advantage
which it was impossible to make good. He therefore ordered a retreat to the
heights of Doberschiitz, near Bautzen, four miles from the battle-field. It was
accomplished with such calmness and precision that the Austrians praised in the
liveliest terms a manoeuvre of which they said that no army but the Prussian
was tactically capable. The defeated side left the victors the greater part of
their baggage, thirty flags and standards, and a hundred and two guns. A great
many battalions were so shrunk in numbers that one might almost speak of
annihilation. While the King drew upon eight battalions belonging to Prince
Henry’s army to repair in some measure his losses, he impressed upon the Prince
not to send any Silesian battalions. Zorndorf and Hochkirch had somewhat paled
the nimbus of Rossbach. It was to he feared that Silesian soldiers, knowing
every stock and stone of their native province, might desert in too great
quantities. Such was the character of European armies before the French
Revolution.
The next
evening, the King appeared to his reader, de Katt, depressed, not to say profoundly
dispirited. “ I can end the tragedy when I choose,” he said in a low voice.
Then he showed the reader the Apology far Suicide which he had composed in the
autumn of the previous year, and the poison which he had long carried about
with him. Daun wrote to Harsch, that he would now guarantee the King of
Prussia’s failing to relieve Neisse. The Austrian general intended to throw
himself again and again in the way of the enemy, in an impregnable position on
the long road from Bautzen to Neisse. But Frederick, undaunted by his defeat,
marched secretly past Daun’s right flank and got ahead of the astounded
Austrian general in the direction of Gorlitz.
Several
Prussian historians dispute the fact that Frederick made a mistake in encamping
at Hochkirch, where he was surprised. They maintain that he had no choice if he
was to steal a march on Daun in reaching Neisse. The real facts of the case
contradict this view, for after the battle of Hochkirch the King of Prussia
encamped at Dober- schiitz, which lay somewhat further back, and was perfectly
secure against surprise; and from this position he accomplished without much
difficulty the feat of stealing a march upon the enemy. As a matter of fact, he
had selected the perilous position of Hochkirch, not at. all on account of
Neisse, but because he wanted to be near the corps of the Prince of
Baden-Durlach, in order to surprise and scatter it. The more unfavourable the
course of the campaign proved, the more
The Russians in Posen
and the Mark.
291
indomitable
became the King’s eagerness to achieve successes. This wild impulse sprang from
the depths of the soul of this mighty warrior; at other times the source of his
triumphs, it had at Hochkirch carried him into foolhardiness.
Daun was
never foolhardy. After the Prussian army had reached Gorlitz before him, he
felt convinced that the race to Neisse could not possibly be brought to an end
without Frederick sooner or later meeting the Austrians on ground not
absolutely favourable to them. Daun explained to his generals assembled in a
Council of War, that, should Frederick then seize the opportunity for a battle
and defeat the Austrian army, the forces of the Empress would have no certain
line of retreat, and a second edition of the battle of Leuthen (which God forbid
!) would be scarcely avoidable. The result of these considerations on the
Austrian side was the raising of the siege of Neisse. Soon afterwards both
sides retired into winter-quarters. The anti-Prussian coalition could boast no
positive success, but the campaign of 1758, like that of 1757, had effected a
very significant reduction of the King of Prussia’s resources, and his strength
was being visibly exhausted. Instead of 150,000 men, as in the last two
campaigns, Frederick was in 1759 only able to confront his enemies with
110,000. Contrariwise, the Austrians had recovered from the enormous losses of
the year 1757. While in 1758 they could put only
85,000 men in the field, they opened operations in
1759 with 120,000. The King of Prussia was once more eager to find Daun ready
for battle. But the latter again entrenched himself in impregnable places— at
first at Miinchengratz in Bohemia, then at Marklissa in Upper Lusatia. He was
waiting for the Russians.
The end of
June arrived before the slowly-moving Russian forces had concentrated. The
Empress Elizabeth had given her army a new Commander-in-chief in the person of
General Soltikoff; against whom Frederick now determined to direct his first
great blow. Dohna’s army marched from Landsberg on the Warthe to Thorn in
Polish West Prussia, in order to capture the magazines placed in this and other
West Prussian towns, and forming the base of the Russian army. The King
attached to the staff of Dohna, whom he regarded as but moderately gifted, his
own adjutant, General von Wobersnow, with instructions that it was Dohna’s duty
to consider all Wobersnow’s suggestions as if they came from the King himself.
But Frederick had difficulty in finding men among his generals able to satisfy
his exorbitant claims upon them. On June 29 the Russians completed their concentration
at Posen, while the Prussians gave up the march to Thom as impracticable, and
retreated. For the second time there followed a Russian invasion of the Mark
Brandenburg. On July 20, 40,000 Russians were at Zullichau, where 27,000
Prussians confronted them. The King was violently incensed by the proceedings
of his generals. He abused Wobersnow, saying that he was a mediocre commander,
who
could not
have led the army worse if he had been drunk; that he had committed every
blunder conceivable in war, and that the story of his campaign deserved to be
printed as a warning example for all the generals of posterity. He then
transferred the chief command of the army at Ziillichau to Lieutenant-General
von Wedell, promoting him over the heads of four older Lieutenant-Generals, and
impressing upon these officers that Wedell’s position in the army at Ziillichau
was to be that of a “ dictator in Roman times.”
But Wedell,
too, failed to fulfil the hopes set on him by the King of Prussia. On July 23
he attacked the 40,000 Russians with his 27,000 men near the village of Kay,
and was completely beaten. One-fourth of the Prussian army lay dead on the
field of battle; the implacable King, roused to fury by the disaster, scolded
his brave soldiers as a set of rascals. At the head of a division, he quitted
the camp at Schmottseifen where he had faced Daun entrenched at Marklissa, and
had sought an opportunity of battle with passionate impatience. Prince Henry
stayed behind at Schmottseifen as Commander-in-chief.
There was one
distinct point of difference between the situation of
1759 and that of the previous year, when the King
had also advanced against Daun in Lusatia with a corps of Dohna’s army. Daun,
who lay at Lauban, had once more sent Laudon ahead to try to get into touch
with the Russians ; but this time with 18,000 instead of 8000 men. At Priebus
Hadik joined forces with Laudon at the head of a second corps of 17,000 men.
Frederick himself described as “frightful and cruel” the marches which his
troops had to make, to cut off the progress of. the two Austrian corps to
Frankfort on the Oder, whither Soltikoff had proceeded. For six nights the King
never slept. As a matter of fact, Hadik’s corps was pushed away from the Russians
and obliged to move in the direction of Spremberg; but in this position, from a
iangerous proximity, it threatened Berlin, which Hadik had entered in 1757.
Above all, Laudon emerged unchallenged, and effected a junction with the
Russians at Kunersdorf, which is situated on the Oder quite close to Frankfort.
At that time Daun was between Rothenburg and Priebus, near to the south-eastern
frontier of the Mark Brandenburg, and not very far from Schiedlow on the Oder*
where Soltikoff had promised to cross the river and join hands with his
Austrian' ally. Such was the critical condition of things, when Frederick
attacked the Russians at Kunersdorf on August 12. He had 43,000 men, the
Russians and Austrians 53,000 regulars, and 15,000 Cossacks and Croatians. Although
these irregular forces played only an insignificant part in the action, the
numerical superiority of the Russians and Austiians was very
considerable—otherwise than at Zomdorf. The King of Prussia was confronted by a
general of the first rank, in the person of Laudon. Moreover, the Russian
position was once more incomparable.
The King of
Prussia’s attempt to storm this position resulted in one
of the most
horrible massacres recorded in history. Of 43,000 Prussians
19,000 lay dead or wounded on the field, that is
to say, not much less than half. But the hills, swamps, and ravines which
Soltikoff and Laudon defended could not be forced by the Prussians. Finally, a
cavalry charge undertaken at the right moment by Laudon routed the Prussian
army, already tired to death after a fifteen hours’ exposure to the scorching
heat of the sun. Frederick’s heroic example could not avert the catastrophe.
“The King," wrote a Westphalian private after the battle to his people at
home, ■“ was always at the front crying, ‘Boys, don’t desert me’; and at
last he took a flag from Prince Henry’s regiment and said, ‘ Whoever is a brave
soldier, let him follow me ! ’ ” Two horses were shot under Frederick. He would
have met his death from a bullet, if it had not flattened and glanced off the
gold snuff-box in his pocket. He was one of the last to leave the battle-field.
With eyes fixed,, and half-stunned, he exclaimed: “ Cannot some damned bullet
hit me ? ” Close behind him Cossacks galloped in pursuit. He believed that he
was doomed; but the gallantry of his life-guardsmen just succeeded in rescuing
him; and he took up his headquarters in the castle of Reitwein on the opposite
bank of the Oder. Here he transferred his command to Lieutenant- General von
Finck, “because I am attacked by serious illness,” so runs the order. In his
instructions to the new Commander-in-chief, Frederick says: “ General von
Finck’s commission is a heavy one. The unfortunate army which I give over to
him is no longer in a condition to defeat the Russians. Hadik will hasten on to
Berlin, perhaps Laudon also. If General Finck overtakes them, he will have the
Russians in his rear; if he stays on the Oder, Hadik will be upon him on this
side of the river.” The King proceeds to mention that he has nominated Princd
Henry Generalissimo and that the army is to swear fealty to the young heir to
the throne, Prince Frederick William; and then he concludes: “If there had been
any resource remaining, I should have held out." What all this signified
is explained in a letter of the same date to his Foreign Minister von
Finkenstein, which runs: “It is a cruel blow, and I cannot survive it. The
consequences of the affair are worse than the affair itself. I have no
resources left, and, to speak the truth, I consider all is lost. I shall not
outlive the ruin of my fatherland. Adieu for ever! ” Thus it would seem that
the King thought that the hour had come at last to commit the act which had
been in his mind more or less for over two years; believing that Soltikoff and
Daun woUld, at least approximately, turn the victory of Kunersdorf to account
with the energy which he was himself accustomed to display in the waging of
war. But the Russian and Austrian generals showed themselves incapable of any
such resolute action; and, perceiving this not very long after his defeat,
Frederick pulled himself together with his usual elasticity, and carried on the
struggle.
Still, in his
momentary condition of weakness he could not prevent
Dresden from
falling into the hands of the Austrians. This was a heavy loss, not only from a
military but from a political point of view. For at that time England and
Prussia were meditating diplomatic steps towards a general peace. Frederick had
mastered his despair sufficiently to hope that he might claim Saxony when terms
of peace were negotiated. His desire to become possessed of the electorate was
so ardent, that, at a pinch, he would have given East Prussia for it to the
Russians and his Rhenish possessions to the French. Hence, after reorganising
his forces as best he could, Frederick with the utmost energy prosecuted
operations against Daun, who was in any case to be compelled to evacuate
Dresden and take up winter-quarters in Bohemia. But this rash method of
conducting a campaign brought a further terrible misfortune upon the
Prussians. Finck, who had been ordered to Daun’s rear with 15,000 men, was cut
off at Maxen, and his whole corps captured (November 21).
During the
unlucky campaign of 1759, the King of Prussia’s provinces and the electorate of
Saxony had been obliged to support the Russians and Austrians. After the battle
of Kunersdorf the Swedes, too, were Again encamped in western Pomerania and the
Uckermark, and the troops of the Empire temporarily in Saxony. Despite the
great weakening of his resources, Frederick brought together for the campaign
of
1760 about 100,000 men—that is, 50,000 fewer
combatants than in 1757 and 1758, but still an astounding result of
organisation, even in the opinion of his enemies. They had placed in the field
223,000 combatants as against his 100,000. Their first strategical object was
Silesia, the province which had suffered least, so that from it the King drew
his chief supplies of money and recruits.
The Silesian
campaign of 1760 began with a severe reverse for the Prussian troops. On June
23 General Fouque’s corps of 11,000 men, which guarded the passes into Silesia
near Landshut, was attacked by vastly superior numbers, and, after heroic
resistance, entirely annihilated. On July 26, the important Silesian fortress
of Glatz capitulated, after a siege by Laudon of only fifteen days. In the
heart of Silesia, at Liegnitz, gathered 90,000 Austrians, while on the opposite
bank of the Oder
50.000 Russians advanced as far as Breslau.
Soltikoff, at Auras, ordered bridges to be thrown across the Oder, and a
Russian corps of
20.000 men passed the river. Its commander,
Chemuisheff, had orders to pin down Prince Henry, who covered Breslau; in the
meantime the 90,000 Austrians were to attack the King of Prussia who, with
80.000 men, was stationed at Liegnitz. On August
15 this attack took place. Laudon’s corps succeeded in surprising Frederick.
But neither did the much-tried King’s wonderful presence of mind forsake him,
nor did the Prussian infantry fail to give proof of that mobility which had
already triumphed so repeatedly on the battle-field. This time, Frederick’s
adversaries had not the advantage of a strong defensive
position, but
attacked the Prussians on the march, as the French had been attacked at
Rossbach. The Austrians were beaten and lost 4000 prisoners and 83 cannon.
After the many reverses sustained by the Prussian army, the moral significance
for the King of the victory at Liegnitz could not be overestimated. Since
Zomdorf he had often criticised with bitter severity the deterioration of his
infantry. It was a fact that the ranks of the Prussian army were filled with
young inexperienced soldiers. They had been thinned by the loss, at Maxen, of
about eighteen battalions, and thirty-five squadrons. The deficiency of officers
had been even more imperfectly supplied than that of men. The war had played
havoc with the Prussian nobility to such a degree, that boys of fifteen and
even fourteen were taken from the schools to be trained as cadets, and, much to
the King’s disgust, to serve as officers. Frederick’s free criticism of his
troops, sometimes just, but much oftener exaggerated and unfair, had become
known in the enemy’s camp; and, after a whole Prussian corps had surrendered
their arms at Maxen, without firing a shot, Europe thought that the beginning
of the moral break-up of Frederick’s army was in sight. But the day of Liegnitz
put an end to all such misapprehensions. The troops of Frederick the Great
remained, first and last, superior in quality to the Austrians and Russians.
The privates of the Prussian army consisted of mercenaries, enlisted as
voluntary recruits or pressed, partly natives, partly foreigners, with the
addition of rude peasant serfs who bad been levied by conscription; and these
were kept together by the merciless application of the stick. But, besides
these, there was a third and nobler element among the Prussian soldiery. After
the battle of Liegnitz, Frederick spoke to a veteran of the Anhalt regiment,
and praised the behaviour of the troops. The veteran replied : “ What else
could we do ? We are fighting for you, for our religion, and our fatherland.”
Tears came into the King’s eyes, and afterwards, when he narrated the incident,
he was again overcome with emotion. In accordance with these ideals, which
animated a section of Frederick’s soldiers, the army which, fifty years after
the Seven Years’ War, lay ingloriously crushed at Napoleon’s feet, was
reorganised, and, by blending modem ideas with Friderician traditions, has
since marched from victory to victory. To the battle of Liegnitz was due a new
feeling of personal trust between the King and his officers, amongst whom had
arisen a rather dangerous spirit of opposition, encouraged by Prince Henry.
But from a material point of view the victory did very little to improve
Prussian affairs. The Austrians and Russians remained in Silesia, and drained
the resources of that province, which the war had hitherto but slightly
affected. A second Russian corps and the Swedes ravaged Pomerania. The whole of
Saxony was occupied by Austrian and Imperial troops, together with the adjacent
old Prussian territory of Halle, a wealthy district, where large contributions
were raised. A serious invasion of the Mark Brandenburg followed
296 Berlin
occupied.-The Austrians evacuate Saxony. [i760
in the
autumn. The army of the Empire advanced as far as Treuen- brietzen, and the
Swedes had reached the Uckermark. The Russian main army occupied the Neumark,
40,000 Russians and Austrians entering the undefended city of Berlin. Here a
contribution of two million thalers was raised—a sum, the significance of which
for Prussia at that time will be clear when it is realised that Frederick was
drawing from England not more than four and a half million thalers (£670,000)
in yearly subsidies, and that without this sum he could not have carried on his
campaigns. Berlin was in the hands of the Austrians and Russians from October 9
to 13, when the advance of the King from Silesia set it free, though he was
forced to allow the invaders of his capital to retreat unmolested.
Next, he was
obliged to march into Saxony, where Daun had taken up a position on the
Siptitzer hills near Torgau, from which the Austrians disputed his possession
of the electorate. The Siptitzer hills were regardeid as impregnable, and on
November 3 Daun accepted a battle. He had 50,000 combatants, Frederick 44,000.
The King of Prussia’s plan of battle was the boldest that he had ever
conceived. The Prussian army fought in two sections, which, separated by a wide
interval, were out of touch with each other. The one half, personally commanded
by the King, attacked Daun’s front; the other, under General von Ziethen,
assaulted his rear. During the whole combat the King fearlessly faced the
enemy’s fire. His pages and the officers of his suite were for the most part
wounded, and three horses were shot under him. A shell struck him on the chest.
He fell swooning, but soon recovered himself: “ Ce rCest rim,” he said, and
continued to hold the command.
The
dislocation of Frederick’s troops remained unpunished because the Austrians,
according to their traditions, would not depart from the defensive. They would
finally have been beaten; indeed, had they been attacked simultaneously in
front and rear, they must have been annihilated, had but Ziethen brought as
much energy to bear on the combat as did the King. The latter, however, had no
generals at his command able to execute an independent commission with the
highest degree of strategical effectiveness. The Austrians, feeling themselves
somewhat hard pressed in their rear, maintained sufficient order to be able to
retreat under cover of the darkness. Crossing the Elbe, to the right of their
position, they evacuated the whole of Saxony, except Dresden. Owing to linear
tactics (implying the fighting of infantry in close battle-array) nearly all
the battles of the Seven Years’ War were attended by great loss of life, and
Torgau cost the Prussian army more than thirty-three and a third per cent, of
their numbers. The grumbling of his troops had already reached the King’s ears.
Already after the battle of Kunersdorf he had written that he stood more in
fear of his own soldiers than of the enemy; he now forbade his adjutants, under
threats of stringent punishment, to make known the
real figures
of the Torgau losses. The Austrians had lost somewhat less than the Prussians,
but among their losses were 7000 prisoners; 30 standards and 46 guns were also
left behind by Daun in the enemy’s hands. The profound moral depression which
Torgau and Liegnitz had produced in the Austrian camp in some measure
compensated Frederick for the severe material losses of the campaign. He still
had money, though, no doubt, he resorted to means of filling his war chests
which affected injuriously the well-being of his subjects. The coinage was more
unscrupulously debased. For example, when the gold (in which form British
subsidies were paid) came to Berlin, there was added to it so strong an alloy
of copper that one million was converted into two—a depreciation of value like
that effected under Septimius Severus at the beginning of the iron age of the
Roman Empire.
But even such
extreme and desperate measures failed any longer to sustain the King of
Prussia; in the campaign of 1761 his powers deserted him. Laudon, who commanded
an Austrian army in Silesia, accomplished a junction with the Russians at
Liegnitz, the scene of his former defeat. Frederick, who was commanding in
person in Silesia, and had tried in vain to prevent the juncture of Laudon with
the Russians, could for the moment only think of acting on the defensive. He
had 55,000 men, his opponent at least twice as many. On August 20 the King of
Prussia occupied the entrenched position of Bunzelwitz. Laudon and Field-
Marshal Buturlin, who had succeeded Soltikoff in command of the Russian army,
dared not attack the trenches of Bunzelwitz, but on October 16 Laudon conquered
Schweidnitz in addition to Glatz, which had been in Austrian hands since the
last campaign. This new acquisition made it possible for the Austrians to take
up their winter-quarters in Silesia. In Saxony also the King’s supplies for the
most part came to a stop. In November Field-Marshal Daun and the Imperial army
had dislodged Prince Henry from the extensive territory west of Freiberg on the
Mulde. Freiberg, Chemnitz, Zeitz, Naumburg on the Saale, and many other
productive parts of the electorate now supplied the Austrians, instead of, as
hitherto, the Prussians, with recruits, provisions and money.
While the
Austrians were able to take up their winter-quarters for the first time in
Silesia and western Saxony, the Russians were able to do the same in Pomerania.
On December 16 Kolberg capitulated to a Russian corps which had been detached
for Pomerania. Thus the Russians had now, in the heart of Frederick’s monarchy,
a harbour which kept their fleet in communication with Russia and with their
great magazine at Pillau, where were hoarded the supplies which flowed in from
the resources of East Prussia to strengthen the Russian sinews of war. Even
before Kolberg had fallen, the King of Prussia wrote to d’Argens • “ Every
bundle of straw, every transport of recruits, every consignment of money, all
that reaches me, is, or becomes a favour on the part of my enemies, or a proof
of their negligence, for they could, as
298 Fredericks hopeless
situation.-Death of Elizabeth. [i76i-2
a matter of
fact, take everything. Here in Silesia, every fortress stands at the disposal
of the enemy. Stettin, Ciistrin, and Berlin itself are open to the Russians to
deal with at their pleasure. In Saxony, Daun’s first move, so to speak, throws
my brother back over the Elbe....If fortune continues to treat me so
mercilessly I shall undoubtedly succumb. Only she can deliver me from my
present situation ! ”
Frederick the
Great’s most trustworthy political friend, William Pitt, had, six months before
this, begun to doubt the King of Prussia’s ability to hold out, and advised
him, as Voltaire and Prince Henry had formerly done, to purchase peace by
cession of territory. Pitt now quitted the British Cabinet. Bute’s Ministry,
disapproving the eagerness for war which had characterised Pitt’s policy, based
its own programme on the restoration of universal peace; and Bute was of
opinion that it was the King of Prussia’s duty to contribute to the ending of
the European war by some sacrifice of territory to his enemies. The King was to
be forced to do this by the withdrawal of his British subsidies. Frederick
believed that, in the present chaos of his financial affairs, he would be absolutely
unable to dispense with English money. That Maria Theresa was also in desperate
financial straits, and obliged to undertake a considerable reduction of her
army in the middle of the war, made no essential difference, from Frederick’s
point of view, in his own hopeless position. All Europe now called upon him to
renounce the idea that he could preserve the integrity of the Prussian State.
He had not the means for sustaining himself in the coming campaign. Probably,
if he had been ready to cede even the county of Glatz, he would have been
granted a peace. But he determined that not a village under his rule should be
lost to the State; rather would he take his own life. If, he wrote to d’Argens,
he could not use Caesar’s Commentaries as his guide, he intended to follow
Cato.
Among
Frederick’s calculations in August, 1756, when he had regarded the general
situation as propitious to his venturing on an invasion of Saxony, had been the
surmise that the days of the Empress Elizabeth were numbered. But the Tsarina
lived five years and a half longer than Frederick, and with him every European
diplomatist, had thought probable. Not till January 5,1762 (N.S.), did Peter
the Great’s daughter die, of a haemorrhage, in the fifty-third year of her age.
This event brought about an immediate and complete revulsion in the political
state of the world. On May 5,1762, Elizabeth’s nephew and successor, Peter III,
who was not of quite sound intellect, concluded a peace with the King of
Prussia, with whom his aunt had, on public grounds, been irreconcilably at war.
East Prussia and eastern Pomerania were evacuated by the Russians, so that the
resources of those districts could be employed for the immediately imminent
campaign against the Austrians. Sweden, following Russia’s example, also made
peace with the King of Prussia. The agreement was signed on May 22. The great
diplomatic
and military change, which had come so unexpectedly, was accomplished with most
extraordinary speed. On June 16 the new Tsar entered into an offensive alliance
with Frederick against Austria, and ordered that 20,000 Russians should
reinforce the Prussian army in Silesia. By June SO the Russian reinforcement
under General Chemui- sheff had already crossed the Oder, and formed a junction
with the forces of Frederick the Great at Auras. Hereupon, Daun was beaten at
Burkersdorf on July 21, and driven back from Schweidnitz, which he was
covering. At Burkersdorf Frederick was once more able to demonstrate that,
although deprived of English subsidies, he was able to put into the field an
army capable of manoeuvring in the best style. Daun made yet one more attempt
to save the besieged fortress of Schweidnitz. His advance led to the combat of
Reichenbach on August 16. The Austrian outflanking movement was frustrated by
the vigilance of Frederick, who, mounted on his roan Caesar, came up at a quick
gallop at the head of a regiment of Brown Hussars, to take part in the fight.
Schweidnitz
capitulated on October 9. On the 29th of the same month, Prince Henry, who was
commanding on the subsidiary theatre of war in Saxony, at Freiberg defeated
with an army of 24,000 men an equal number of Austrians, supported by 15,000
troops of the army of the Empire. The battle of Freiberg is the only great
action of the Seven Years’ War in which the Prussian troops were victorious
when not under the personal command of Frederick. Unsatisfactory as were the
relations between the two brothers, Frederick never acted with more royal
wisdom than when he frankly expressed to himself and others his sense of Prince
Henry’s great services to the State. “ He is the single Prussian general,” said
the King, “ who has committed no blunder.”
Meanwhile, a
rupture had taken place in the Prussian alliance with Russia, caused by the
assassination of Peter III. But, though the new Russian sovereign, Catharine
II, recalled the reinforcements under Chernui- sheff, she did not reenter the
coalition against the King of Prussia. The Austrians, without the aid of the
Russians, and with only the Imperial troops to help them, could not crush the
Prussian army. To Maria Theresa’s distress, this had been evident enough at
Freiberg, where the Prussians had lost only 1045 men in all, whereas the
Austrians had lost 3385 in prisoners alone, not counting those of the Imperial
troops that had been made prisoners. The French also saw clearly that, after
the withdrawal of Russia from the coalition, there was no hope of regaining
Silesia for the Austrians, and so securing the Netherlands for themselves. On
November 3 the French diplomatists signed at Fontainebleau the preliminaries of
a peace with England, which imposed on France enormous cessions in North
America and India, without giving her any compensation in Europe. Prussia and
France had fought against each other at Rossbach, although war had never been
formally declared between them. Thus, no peace was signed now between Louis XV
and Frederick, though
300
hostilities
ceased defacto. The French evacuated the Rhenish possessions of the King of
Prussia, which they had occupied—Cleves, Gelders, and Mors.
On February
15, 1763, Austria and Saxony likewise concluded a peace with Prussia at
Hubertusburg, a castle used as a shooting-lodge by the Elector of Saxony. King
Frederick, to the last, clung with passionate longing to the idea of acquiring
Saxony. Even when.negotiating terms of peace with Russia, he was willing to
give up East Prussia to the Tsar, Peter III, in exchange for the transference
of the electorate of Saxony to the House of Brandenburg. But, in view of the
issue of the War, there could be no question of any such transaction. The King
was obliged to be content with the return of Glatz by the Austrians, who had
held it for two years and a half. The basis on which peace was concluded was
the status quo ante helium.
Frederick,
though only fifty-one years of age, returned to his capital an old man; from
that time forward the Berliners dubbed him “ Old Fritz.” There was not much
humour for hero-worship among those with whom Frederick came in personal contact;
but all Europe, friend and foe alike, were at one in the conviction that a
greater Prince had never sat on a throne. For all that, the King had certainly
failed in achieving the political object of the war. Prussia remained small,
uncultured, and broken up. The world found it hard to believe that so puny a “
Great Power ” could have any future before it.
RUSSIA UNDER
ANNE AND ELIZABETH.
The government of
Anne (whose accession has been described in a previous volume), prudent,
beneficial, and even glorious, as it proved to be, was undoubtedly severe, and
became at last universally unpopular. The causes of this unpopularity are to be
sought in the character of the Empress and the peculiar circumstances under
which she ascended the throne. Anna Ivanovna was in her seven and thirtieth
year when, in 1730, she came to Russia. Her natural parts, if not brilliant,
were at least sound; but a worse than indifferent education, and a life-long
series of petty vexations and humiliations had dwarfed her intelligence and
soured her disposition. Her past had not been bappy, ard she was very uneasy
about the future. Her earliest experience of the Russian nobility had been
anything but agreeable. They had showed a dangerous disposition to limit, or,
at any rate, to define her prerogatives. It was only the energetic intervention
of the Guards that had saved the monarchy. Suspicious and resentful, Anne felt
that she could never trust the Russian gently with power. She felt that she
must surround her throne with persons entirely devoted to her interests, and
these persons, from the nature of the case, could only be foreigners—Germans,
Livonians, Courlanders. The chief of these was the favourite Ernst Johann
Biihren, or Biren, the grandson of a groom who had risen in the service of Duke
Jakob III of Courland. Biren had supplanted Count Peter Bestuzheff in the good
graces of Anne while she was still only Duchess of Courland. Handsome and
insinuating, with sense enough to conceal his ignorance and roughness beneath a
bluff bonhomie, his influence over his mistress was paramount and permanent. On
the accession of the new Empress, honours and riches were heaped upon him. At
her coronation (May 19,1730) he was made Grand Chamberlain and a Count of the
Empire. During the latter years of the reign, Biren’s power and riches
increased enormously. His apartments in the palace adjoined those of the
Empress; his liveries, furniture, and equipages were scarcely inferior to her
own. Half the bribes intended for the Russian Court passed into his coffers. He
had estates in Livonia,
302
[l732—9
Courland,
Siberia, and the Ukraine. A special department of State looked after his brood
mares and stallions. His riding-school was one of the sights of the Russian capital.
The magnificence of his plate astonished the French ambassador, and the
diamonds of his Duchess (a Fraulein von Treiden) were the envy of princes. The
climax of this wondrous elevation was reached when, in the course of 1737, the
Estates of Courland, under considerable pressure, elected Ernst Johann their
reigning Duke. Henceforth his Most Serene Highness received all the honours due
to sovereigns and, together with his consort, took his seat at the imperial
table.
Another
Livonian, Carl Gustaf Lowenwolde, was created a Count and made Grand Marshal of
her Majesty’s household; while his brother, Reinhold, a few months later, was
(September 30) nominated Colonel of the newly raised regiment of foot-guaxds,
consisting of 2000 gentlemen, mostly Livonians, henceforth known as the
Ismailovski regiment, from Ismailovo, the Empress’ favourite summer residence
near Moscow. The all-important post of Commander-in-chief was (in 1732)
bestowed upon yet another foreigner, the great engineer and contractor of the famous
Ladoga canal, Burkhard Christoph von Miinnich, who had entered the service of
Peter the Great in 1721 and became, in rapid succession, War Minister,
Field-Marshal, a Count, and Governor of St Petersburg. Foreign affairs remained
in the capable hands of a fifth German, Count Osterman, whom everyone now
regarded as indispensable.
Thus the
principle of Anne’s government was a reversal of the patriotic golden rule of
Peter the Great: natives first, aliens afterwards. For the first time in her
history, Russia was now dominated by foreigners. It must be admitted that, to
some extent at least, the Russians themselves were to blame for this unnatural
state of things. No sooner had the controlling hand of Peter been withdrawn
than his pupils began to quarrel among themselves, and. their mutual jealousies
and hatreds had ended in the extermination of the Russian party. Menshikoff had
ruined Tolstoi, the Dolgorukis and the Galitsins had ruined Menshikoff,
Yaguzhinski had destroyed the Dolgorukis and the Galitsins, and now Yaguzhinski
himself, the sole survivor of the little band of capable native statesmen whom
Peter the Great had left behind him, was honourably exiled by being accredited
as Russian ambassador to Berlin, to prevent him from interfering with Osterman.
The cruel persecution of the Dolgorukis and the Galitsins in 1732, and again in
1738-9, carried on chiefly to allay Biren’s craven fears of purely imaginary
conspiracies, exasperated the Russian gentry still more against the German
tyranny; but it is only just to add that the unpopularity of Anne’s rule was
due quite as much to its rigorous enforcement of order and discipline as to its
cruel unfairness to the great Boyar families. The policy of the two preceding
reigns had been purposely and consistently easy-going; and, although such
laxity had been injurious to the State in many ways, it had made Catharine I
and Peter II
extremely popular. Under Anne things were very different. The reins of
government that had hung so slackly before were now drawn tight, and the nation
winced beneath the change. The overdue contributions from the small proprietors
and peasantry were exacted to the last copeck-, the soldier}' were again
compelled to labour in many arduous public works; both the army and the navy
were thoroughly overhauled and placed once more on an effective war footing;
every symptom of insubordination was sternly suppressed; everything like
carelessness was severely punished. It was an additional grievance that the
Court had moved to St Petersburg, where the Russian magnates, far away from
their estates, found life excessively costly and inconvenient.
Anne, it must
also be added, for all her vindictiveness towards individuals, seems really to
have endeavoured to do her duty towards her subjects in the mass. She was, as a
rule at any rate, prudent, careful, and conscientious. She had a natural turn
for business; loved order and method; took some pains to get at the truth of
matters; and was always ready to consult people more experienced in affairs
than herself, notably Osterman and Munnich, both of them men of extraordinary
talent, who—even the patriots could not deny this- devoted all their energy to
promote the honour and glory of their adopted country. At the very beginning of
the reign, shortly after the restoration of the Administrative Senate, Osterman
persuaded Anne to establish an inner Council, or Cabinet, of three persons only
(the Grand Chancellor, Count Golovkin, Prince Alexis Cherkaski, both of them
nonentities, and Osterman himself), which was presided over by the Empress and
acted as the sole intermediary between her Majesty and all the Departments of
State. Established ostensibly for the prompter lespatch of business, it enabled
Osterman, at the same time, to shake off troublesome rivals, and certainly gave
him a free hand in his own special Department of Foreign Affairs, which he
thoroughly understood.
The pivot of
Osterman’s political “system” was the Austrian alliance, of which he was the
original promoter and the most devoted champion. France, on the other hand, he
regarded with ineradicable suspicion. In 1732 he persuaded the Cabinet to
reject the offer of an alliance made by Louis XV, through Magnan, his charge
d'affaires at St Petersburg, on condition that Russia supported the candidature
of the French King’s father- in-law, Stanislaus Leszczynski, for the Polish
throne on the next vacancy. It would be far better, Osterman urged on this
occasion, to bring about a league between the three Black Eagles to protect the
White Eagle. When, after the death of Augustus II, Stanislaus was actually
elected King of Poland, Osterman, with the aid of Austria, drove him out and
procured the election of Augustus III. He also accelerated the pace of the
negotiations which ultimately concluded the War of the Polish Succession, by
despatching Peter Lacy at the head of 20,000 men to unite with the Imperial
forces on the banks of the Neckar—the first appearance of
a Muscovite
army in central Europe. The French Court endeavoured to counter this blow by
promoting a rupture between Russia and the Porte. There were many grounds for a
quarrel between the two Powers— such as the perennial dispute about the
ownership of the Kabardine district and the territories of the Kuban Tartars;
the repeated violation of undisputed Russian territory by Tartar hordes; and,
finally, the Polish question, in which Turkey was deeply interested. The French
ambassador at the Porte, Marquis de Villeneuve, used every effort to induce the
Sultan to declare war against the Russian Empress during the War of the Polish
Succession. Had the Porte been able to attack Russia in 1733, that Power would
have been placed in a very critical position. Fortunately, the effects of
Villeneuve’s intrigues were balanced by the crushing defeats inflicted upon the
Turks at this very time by Kuli Khan in the interminable Persian War. Till the
Persian difficulty had been disposed of, the Turk was inclined to leave Russia
alone; but, in the meantime, the Court of St Petersburg, now triumphant in
Poland, was tempted to reopen the Eastern question on its own account. Ivan
Neplyneff, the exceedingly well-informed Russian ambassador at the Porte, began
to urge his Government “to fall upon these barbarians” while they were still
suffering from the effects of their reverses, and represented the whole Ottoman
empire as tottering to its fall. Towards the end of 1735 the arguments of
Neplyneff prevailed. Osterman counselled immediate war, and, after the
cooperation of Austria had been secured, the Empress was won over to his
opinion. A definitive treaty with Kuli Khan, in the vain hope of whose active
assistance the Russian troops evacuated Peter the Great’s Persian conquests,
Derbend, Baku, and Svyesti Krest, was the first step. Circumstances were
favourable, and everything promised success. The treasury was full, the army in
an excellent condition, no interference was to be anticipated from any foreign
Power. Accordingly, a formal declaration of war, drawn up by the Russian
Vice-Chancellor, was despatched to the Grand Vizier; and, on July 23, 1735,
Miinnich received orders to proceed at once from the Vistula to the Don.
The Turkish
War of 1736-9 marks the beginning of that systematic struggle on the part of
Russia to recover her natural and legitimate southern boundaries, which was to
last throughout the eighteenth century, finally succeeding after the
expenditure of millions of lives and an incalculable quantity of treasure. The
possession of the shores of the Euxine and the circumjacent tracts was as
necessary to the complete and normal development of the Russian Empire as was
the possession of the recently acquired shores of the Baltic. Again, thpsp
regions, infested as they were by the innumerable predatory tribes dependent on
the Porte, were a standing danger to the Russian Government. Moreover, even as
late as the middle of the eighteenth century, Turkey had the entire control of
the five great rivers—rthe Dniester, the
Bug, the
Dnieper, the Don, and the Kuban—that drain southern Russia and, consequently,
could control, and even suspend at will, no inconsiderable portion of her
neighbour’s commerce. The most powerful vassal of the Sultan in these parts was
the Khan of the Crimea, who, from hi$ capital at Bagchaserai, ruled over all
the scattered Tartar hordes from the Dnieper to the Don. The Crimea at this
time was very rich. The Steppes poured the inexhaustible wealth of their flocks
and herds into it, and the trade between the peninsula and Turkey was enormous.
Kosloff, the chief port on its western side, exported 200,000 head of cattle
and an incalculable quantity of grain to Stambul every year, while the still
more prosperous Kaffa on the east coast was, perhaps, the largest slave-mart in
the world. Hitherto the Crimea had been generally regarded as impregnable. On the
land side the lines of Perekop, a deep trench, five-and-twenty fathoms broad,
defended by an earthen wall eight fathoms high, and nearly five English miles
long, protected the narrow isthmus which united the peninsula to the mainland,
while the fortress of Azoff, at the head of the sea of the same name, commanded
the Delta of the Don, and was thought a sufficient defence against any attack
from the north-east. In order to keep out the Tartars from Central Russia, and,
at the same time, to form a base for future operations against them, Peter the
Great had conceived the gigantic project of connecting the rivers Dnieper and
Donetz by a chain of fortifications a hundred leagues in length, to which he
proposed to give the name of the lines of the Ukraine. The work began in 1731,
•six years after the Emperor’s death, and, completed in 1738, only partially
fulfilled its double purpose. The ground covered was too extensive to be
adequately guarded. The forts were placed so far apart that the Tartars were
able to pass and repass the lines continually, despite all the efforts of the
Russians. Nevertheless, this system of fortification was to prove an invaluable
point d'appui for armies operating against the Turks; and here, in the early
autumn of 1735, Marshal Miinnich arrived for the purpose of collecting his
forces.
The plan of
campaign, as finally arranged by Miinnich with his colleague and fellow Marshal
Peter Lacy, was as follows. The enemy was to be attacked from all sides
simultaneously, Miinnich invading the Crimea while Lacy besieged Azoff. So soon
as Miinnich had stormed the lines of Perekop, he was to detach 12,000 against
the fortress of Kinbum on Dnieper to prevent the Budjak Tartars from crossing
that river by way of Ochakoff, whilst Lacy, after capturing Azoff, was to
hasten to the support of Miinnich’s army. On April 20, 1736, Miinnich began his
march across the steppes to Perekop. His army, including the Cossacks, numbered
57,000 men. For 330 miles his way lay through a wilderness. The first brush
with the Tartars, at Chernaya Dolina, was so easily repulsed that for the rest
of the campaign these nomads were treated as a negligible quantity. So long as
the army encountered them in square
formation,
with the field artillery at the corners and in the centre, and the Cossacks
inside guarding the baggage with their long lances, the hordes were found to be
comparatively harmless. The Russian progress was very slow, however, owing to
the enormous amount of its impedimenta. There was not a single town in the whole
region; so that every necessary, even to firewood and water, had to be provided
beforehand. Incredible as it may sound, we are assured by a reliable
eye-witness that Miinnich never entered upon a campaign without dragging at
least
80,000 wagons after him.
On May 15,
Miinnich arrived at the lines of Perekop. On the evening of May 19 its central
fortress, Or-Kapi, feebly defended by Janizaries and other Turkish regulars,
was captured by assault, and the wealthy town of Perekop behind it was
abandoned to pillage. From Perekop the Russians, who now began to suffer
severely from dysentery and other diseases, advanced upon KoslofF, which was
abandoned by the enemy on their approach (June 5). On the 17th the Crimean
capital, Bagchaserai, was captured by the Cossacks, after a sharp fight which
cost them 300 men. Miinnich’s further progress was arrested by a dangerous
mutiny in his own army, which compelled him to return first to Perekop and
thence to the lines of the Ukraine. Lacy, meanwhile, had been equally successful
before AzofF, though there he had encountered a far stouter resistance than his
brother Marshal had met with anywhere in the Crimea. The garrison consisted of
picked men; and the Seraskier inflicted so much damage upon the besiegers that,
after a seven weeks’ siege, they allowed him and his garrison to march out with
all the honours of war (June 30). Then, on hearing that Miinnich had already
quitted the Crimea for the Ukraine, Lacy followed his example.
The campaign
of 1736 had been very costly to the Russians. Miinnich alone had lost no fewer
than 30,000 men out of a total of 57,000, and of these not more than 2000 had
fallen in action. At Court, people naturally began to ask what was the use of a
campaign in which half the: army had been thrown away for next to nothing.
Nevertheless, dissatisfied as she was with Miinnich, the Empress could not
afford to lose him; and, glad as the Russian Ministers would have been to see
an honourable end put to the war (especially in view of the consistent ill-success
of their Austrian ally on the Danube), they were, to quote the English envoy at
St Petersburg, Claudius Rondeau, “ ashamed to own it after all the great things
they had proposed to do.” Their hopes, too, were revived by the assurances of
the new Russian resident at Stambul, Vishnyakoff, that everything in Turkey was
in the utmost confusion, and that the slightest disaster would bring the
crumbling edifice to the ground.
At the end of
April, 1737, Miinnich took the field for the second time. His army now
consisted of 70,000 men, and he was supported by two officers of great ability,
General James Francis Keith, who had
entered the
Russian service as a Major-General in 1728, and Alexander Rumyantseff.
Miinnich’s objective was Ochakoff, the ancient Axiake, situated at the
confluence of the Dnieper and Bug. It was by far the most considerable place in
these parts, and was defended by 20,000 of the best troops in Turkey under the
leadership of the valiant Seraskier Tiagya. On June 29, the Russians crossed the
Bug, and, after forming into three huge squares, followed the course of the
river till they reached the fortress (July 10). The failure of the field
artillery to arrive at the set time at first embarrassed Miinnich seriously;
but the gallant conduct of Keith (whom the grateful Empress raised to the rank
of Lieutenant- General besides sending him a present of 10,000 roubles),
together with an impetuous dash of the Cossacks at the very moment when an
explosion of the largest powder magazine in the fortress had entombed 6000 of
the defenders, brought about the unexpected capture of the stronghold. The
carnage, however, was terrible. Seventeen thousand Turks perished on the walls
or in the ditches, while in the final assault the Russians lost 3000, the proportion
of officers killed being enormous. The remainder of the campaign was
comparatively uneventful. Towards the end of August Miinnich brought back
46,000 men to the lines of the Ukraine. In the late autumn the Turks made a
determined effort to recapture Ochakoff, but were repulsed from its walls with
the loss of 20,000 killed and wounded.
A Peace
Congress, which assembled (1737-8) at the little frontier town of Nemiroff,
having proved abortive, owing, chiefly, to the exorbitance of the Russian
demands, the war had to be resumed. The campaign of 1738 was entirely barren.
Miinnich had intended to invade tbe Danubian Principalities; but an outbreak of
plague paralysed his operations. Indeed, in this campaign, he lost more men,
horses and bullocks than in any other. Lacy was, from similar causes, equally
unfortunate in the Crimea.
In the spring
of 1738 the allies, weary of the war, accepted the mediation of France. But the
Turks, elated by their recent victories in Hungary, and relieved from all
pressure from the east (Kuli Khan, who in 1736 had ascended the Persian throne
under the name of Nadir Shah, having, in the meantime, turned his arms against
the Great Moghul), refused acceptance of the very moderate terms now offered by
the Empress Anne, who would have been content with Azoff and its district. It
was clear, therefore, to the Russian Cabinet that another campaign must be
fought. It was resolved to cooperate, this time, energetically with the
Austrians by invading Moldavia and proceeding to invest the fortress of Chocim
on Dniester. At the end of May, 1739, Miinnich quitted the Ukraine with an army
65,000 strong. On August 27, he defeated the Turks at the relatively bloodless
battle of Stavuchanak, the Russians losing only 70 men during an action which
lasted twelve hours, while the Turks left no more than 1000 dead on the field.
The next day, Miinnich advanced with all his siege artillery against Chocim,
which
surrendered unconditionally at the first summons, the tidings of Stavuchanak
having created a panic in the garrison. On September 9 and 10 Miinnich crossed
the Pruth. On the 19th he entered Jassy in triumph, and reported that the
principality of Moldavia had “ solemnly submitted to the Empress of all
Russia.” The same evening he received from Prince Lobkowitz, the Austrian
Commander-in-chief, “the miserable and crushing” notification of the Peace of
Belgrade, whereby Austria sacrificed all the fruits of the Peace of
Passarowitz. Disgusted as the Russian Ministers were with the conduct of their
ally, they knew it was impossible to continue the struggle single-handed.
Miinnich was therefore recalled, and peace negotiations with the Porte were
opened simultaneously at Paris and Stambul under the mediation of France.
Finally, by the Treaty of Constantinople, 1739, Russia was forced to sacrifice
all her conquests except Azoff and its district, while Azoff itself had to be
dismantled. On this occasion the Porte was induced to change the old title
“Muscovy” into “Russia,” but refused to concede the imperial title to the
Russian Empress.
Nevertheless,
despite its seemingly meagre results, much more had been gained by this five
years’ war than was, at first sight, apparent. Miinnich had, at least,
dissipated the illusion of Ottoman invincibility. The Tartar hordes might
still, for a time, continue to be a plague, but they had ceased for ever to be
a terror to Russia. Again, Russia’s signal and unexpected successes on the
steppe had immensely increased her prestige in Europe. The progress of the
Russian arms had been followed with intense interest both at London and Paris.
Horace Walpole, in acknowledging the receipt of Miinnich’s map of the Crimea
from Rondeau in 1736, remarked that the eyes of all the world were fixed upon
the lines of Perekop. A year later, Rondeau himself observed of Russia, with
some apprehension, that “ this Court begins to have a great deal to say in the
affairs of Europe.” Cardinal Fleury was even more disturbed. “ Russia in
respect to the equilibrium of the north,” he wrote, in his secret instructions
to the Marquis de La Chetardie, the new French ambassador at St Petersburg,
“has mounted to too high a degree of power and its union with the House of
Austria is extremely dangerous.” Indeed, after the Peace of Belgrade, the
Russian alliance alone gave to Austria so much as the semblance of
independence. The obvious way to render this alliance unserviceable to the
Emperor was to involve Russia in hostilities with some other Power. Sweden
which, even now, was, chiefly from her geographical position, of more account
in the European concert than either Prussia or Holland, was regarded by the
Court of Versailles as the instrument most useful for its purposes, especially
after the rise at Stockholm, about this time, of the warlike Hat party,
described below. Instigated by France, whose ample subsidies, paid three years
in advance, replenished their empty coffers, the Hats in 1738 indulged in a
series of warlike demonstrations,
to provoke
Russia to a rupture. A fleet was equipped; troops were nassed in Finland; and
Baron Malcolm Sinclaire, a member of the Secret Committee of the Swedish Diet,
undertook to deliver despatches to the Turkish commandant at Chocim and
secretly investigate the condition of the Russian army as he passed through
Poland. When, at the suggestion of Michael BestuzheiF, the Russian Minister at
Stockholm, Sinclaire was “suppressed”—in other words intercepted, robbed and
murdered on his return from Chocim—war between Russia and Sweden seemed
inevitable; but the bellicose humour of the Hats diminished sensibly after
Osterman had made peace with the Porte.
The Empress
Anne had been more perturbed than her Ministers by the Swedish complication, as
Peterhof, where she resided during the summer of 1740, was within easy reach of
a Swedish fleet. But all her alarms were forgotten when, in August of the same
year, she held in her arms at the font the eagerly expected heir to the throne.
This little Prince was the first-born of the Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin,
the Empress’ niece, whom on the death of the girl’s mother (her own favourite
sister Catharine Ivanovna) she had adopted. From the first, Anne had determined
that this young Princess (who, in 1733, was received into the Greek Church,
changing her German name of Elizabeth Catharine Christina to that of Anna
Leopoldovna) should be the mother of the future Tsar; and in July, 1739, Anna
Leopoldovna was married to the youthful Prince Antony Ulric of
Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel, who was brought to Russia for that express purpose and
educated there at the Empress’ cost. Only six weeks after the birth of the
child the Empress (October 16), while at table, had a fit of apoplexy and was
removed insensible to her own room. On her death-bed, at Biren’s urgent
request, though greatly against her own better judgment, she appointed him
Regent during the minority of her great-nephew, who was proclaimed immediately
after her death as Ivan VI.
Anne died on
October 17,1740. Three weeks later the ex-Regent was on his way to Siberia in
consequence of a smart little cowp d'etat organised by Marshal Miinnich, who
thereupon proclaimed the mother of the baby Emperor Regent, while he assumed
all real power with the title of “ Premier-Minister.” By the ukase of February
8,1741, Osterman, who had been ousted by Miinnich, was reinstated in the
direction of foreign affairs by the Regent, who had begun to dread the
restlessness of the Marshal. Miinnich, in great dudgeon, and believing himself
to be indispensable, hereupon sent in his resignation (March 14), which, to his
chagrin, was accepted on the same afternoon. “ Count Osterman,” wrote La
Chetardie to his Court shortly afterwards, “has never been so great or so
powerful as he is now. . It is not too much to say that he is Tsar of all
Russia.”
The new
Government had scarce been constituted, when it was confronted by a political
event of the first importance, the outbreak of
the War, or
rather Wars, of the Austrian Succession. The necessity, from the French point
of view, of fettering Russia, Maria Theresa’s one ally, now became urgent.
Again, the French influence was exerted to the uttermost in Sweden, and this
time successfully. At the beginning of August, 1741, Sweden declared war
against Russia, and invaded Finland. To embarrass the Russian Government still
further, a domestic revolution in Russia itself was simultaneously planned by
La Chetardie with the object of placing the Tsesarevna Elizabeth on the throne.
The immediate object of this manoeuvre was to get rid of Osterman, the one
statesman in Europe who had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction with the
deliberate intention of defending it. The sudden irruption of the young King of
Prussia into Silesia, the defection of France, and the treachery of Saxony, had
taken him by surprise. Old as he was in statecraft, he had not calculated upon
such a cynical disregard of the most solemn treaties. He stigmatised the
invasion of Silesia as “an ugly business”; and, when he was informed officially
of the partition treaty whereby the Elector of Saxony was to receive Upper
Silesia, Lower Austria, and Moravia, with the title of King of Moravia, he
sarcastically enquired whether this was the way in which Saxony meant to
manifest the devotion she had always professed for the House of Austria. He
shrewdly suspected that the Moravian scheme must, inevitably, bring along with
it a surrender by the Elector of Saxony of the Polish Crown to Stanislaus
Leszczynski, the French King’s father-in-law, in which case the interests of
Russia would be directly menaced. He sent a strong note of remonstrance to the
King of Prussia, and assured the Courts of the Hague and St James’ of his
readiness to concur in any just measures for preserving the integrity of the
Austrian dominions. For the present, however, he was prevented from sending any
assistance to the hard-pressed Queen of Hungary by the Swedish War with which
the French Government had saddled him. Nevertheless, the Swedish declaration
had found him not unprepared. More than 100,000 of the best Russian troops
were already under arms in Finland, and Marshal Lacy’s victory at
Vilmanstrarid, at the end of August, relieved the old statesman of all fears
from without. The French ambassador, profoundly depressed by this unexpected
triumph of the Russian arms, was even disposed to abandon, or at least postpone,
the second part of his scheme, a coup d'etat in favour of Elizabeth Petrovna. “
An outbreak, the success of which can never be morally certain, especially now
that the Swedes are not in a position to lend a hand would, prudently
considered, be very difficult to bring about, unless it could be substantially
backed up ”—such was his official report on December 6, 1741. In the preceding
night Elizabeth, without any help from without, had overthrown the existing
Government in a couple of hours. As a matter of fact, beyond lending Elizabeth
2000 ducats instead of the 15,000 demanded by her, La Chetardie took no part in
the actual coup d’Stat.
Elizabeth
Petrovna was bom on December 18, 1709, on the day of her father’s triumphal
entry into his capital after the victory of Poltawa. From her earliest years
the child delighted everyone by her extraordinary beauty and vivacity. She was
still one of the handsomest women in Europe; and even six years later Lord
Hyndford described her as “ worthy of the admiration of all the world.” Her
natural parts were excellent; but her education had been both imperfect and
desultory. On the death of her mother, and the departure from Russia, three
months later, of her beloved sister Anne, Duchess of Holstein-Gottorp (1727),
the Princess, at the age of 18, was left pretty much to herself. As her
father’s daughter, she was obnoxious to the Dolgorukis, who kept her away from
the Court during the reign of Peter II. Robust and athletic, she delighted in
field- sports, hunting, and violent exercise; but she had inherited much of her
father’s sensual temperament; and her life in the congenial environment of
Moscow had been far from edifying. During the reign of her cousin Anne,
Elizabeth effaced herself as much as possible, well aware that the Empress, of
whom she stood in some awe, regarded her as a possible supplanter. She never
seems to have thought of asserting her rights to the throne till the idea was
suggested to her by La Chetardie and his Swedish colleague, Nolcken, who
communicated with her through her French physician Armand Lestocq. Frequent
collisions with the Regent, Anna Leopoldovna, whom she despised, and with
Osterman, whom she hated for setting her aside in favour of aliens and
foreigners, though he owed everything himself to her father and mother, first
awakened her ambition; but her natural indolence was very difficult to
overcome. Not till December 5, 1741, when the Guards quartered in the capital,
on whom Elizabeth principally relied, were ordered to hold themselves in readiness
to proceed to the seat of war, did she take the decisive step. That night a
hurried and anxious conference of her partisans, foremost among whom were
Lestocq, her chamberlain Michael VorontsofF, her favourite and future husband,
the Cossack, Alexis Razum- offsky, and Alexander and Peter Shuvaloff, two of
the gentlemen of her household, was held at her house. The result of their
deliberations was that Elizabeth buckled on a cuirass, armed herself with a
demi-pike, and, proceeding to the barracks of the Guards, won them over by a
spirited harangue at two o’clock in the morning. Then, at the head of a
regiment of the Preobrazhensk Grenadiers, she sledged, over the snow, to the
Winter Palace, where the Regent lay sleeping in absolute security, arresting all
her real or suspected adversaries, including Osterman and Miinnich, on her way.
The Regent, aroused from her slumbers by Elizabeth herself, submitted quietly
and was conveyed to Elizabeth’s sledge. The baby Tsar and his little sister
followed behind on a second sledge. In less than an hour, bloodlessly and
noiselessly, the revolution had been accomplished. Even so late as eight
o’clock the next morning, very few people in the city were aware that, during
the night, Elizabeth
Petrovna had
been raised to her father’s throne on the shoulders of the Preobrazhensk
Grenadiers.
Thus, at the
age of three and thirty, this naturally indolent and self-indulgent woman, with
little knowledge and no previous training or experience of affairs, was
suddenly placed at the head of a vast empire at one of the most critical
periods of its existence. La Chetardie had already expressed his conviction
that Elizabeth, once on the throne, would banish all foreigners, however able,
give her entire confidence to necessarily ignorant Russians, retire to her
well-beloved Moscow, let the fleet rot, and utterly neglect St Petersburg and
“the conquered provinces,” as the Baltic seaboard was still called.
Unfortunately for his calculations, La Chetardie, while exaggerating the
defects, had ignored the good qualities, of the new Empress. For, with all her
short-comings, Elizabeth was no ordinary woman. Her possession of the sovereign
gift of choosing and using able counsellors, her unusually sound and keen
judgment, and her bluff but essentially business-like joviality, again and
again recall Peter the Great. What to her impatient contemporaries often seemed
irresolution or sluggishness, was, generally, suspense of judgment in
exceptionally difficult circumstances, and her ultimate decision was generally
correct. If to this it is added that the welfare of her beloved country always
lay nearest to her heart, and that she was ever ready to sacrifice the
prejudices of the woman to the duties of the sovereign, we shall recognise, at
once, that Russia did well at this crisis to place her destinies in the hands
of Elizabeth Petrovna.
It is true
that, as La Chetardie had predicted, almost the first act of Elizabeth was to
disgrace and exile all the foreigners who had held sway during the last two
reigns. Osterman could expect little mercy from a Princess whom all his life
long he had consistently neglected and despised. Elizabeth had often declared
that she would one day teach “ that petty little secretary” his proper place.
She was now as good as her word. Osterman was charged with having contributed
to the elevation of the Empress Anne by his cabals, and with having suppressed
the will of Catharine I in favour of her eldest daughter. He replied, with
dignity, that all he had ever done had been for the good of the State. His
principal fellow-victim, Miinnich, was accused of having wasted his men during
the Crimean campaigns. He referred to his own despatches in justification of
his conduct, and declared that the only thing in the past he really regretted was
having neglected to hang Prince Nikita Trubetskoy, the President of the
Tribunal actually trying him, for malversation of funds while serving under him
as chief of the commissariat. Osterman, Miinnich, and four other fallen
dignitaries, were condemned to death; but their sentences were commuted on the
scaffold to life-long banishment in Siberia. Osterman died at Berezoff six
years later. Miinnich was sent to Pelim, to reside in the very house which he
had himself designed for the reception of Biren, whom, by a singular irony of
fate, he
1741J The new Russian Chancellor Alexis
Bestuzheff. 313
chanced to
encounter in the midst of the frozen wilderness, posting hopefully back to all
that his rival, Miinnich, was leaving behind him.
The best
justification of Elizabeth for thus abruptly extinguishing the illustrious
foreigners who had done so much to build up the Russian Empire was that she
placed at the head of affairs a native Russian statesman whom, personally, she
greatly disliked, but whose genius and experience she rightly judged to be
indispensable to Russia at that particular moment. This was Alexis Bestuzheff,
the youngest and most precocious of Peter the Great’s “ fledglings,” who had
begun his diplomatic career at the early age of nineteen, when he served as
second Russian plenipotentiary at the Congress of Utrecht. From 1717 to 1720 he
had occupied the honourable but peculiar post of Hanoverian Minister at St
Petersburg, subsequently representing Russia at Copenhagen from 1721 till the
death of Peter I. For the next fifteen years, for some inexplicable reason, he
fell into the background. Towards the end of the reign of Anne, however, Biren
recalled him to Russia to counterbalance the influence of Osterman; but he
fell with his patron, and only reemerged from the obscurity of disgrace on the
accession of Elizabeth. He drew up the first ukase of the new Empress, and at
the end of the year 1741 was made Vice-Chancellor.
It is
difficult to diagnose the character of this sinister and elusive statesman. He
seems to have been a moody, taciturn hypochondriac, full of wiles and ruses,
preferring to work silently and subterraneously. Inordinate love of power was
certainly his ruling passion, and he hugged it the more closely as he had had
to bide his time till he was nearly fifty. He was a man who remorselessly
crushed his innumerable enemies; yet, in justice, it must be added that his
enemies were also, for the most part, those of his country, and that nothing
could turn him a hair’s breadth from the policy which he considered to be best
suited to the interests of the State. This true policy he alone, for a long
time, of all his contemporaries, had the wisdom to discern and the courage to
pursue. Bestuzheff’s most serious fault as a diplomatist was that he put far
too much temper and obstinacy into his undertakings. His prejudices were always
invincible. On the other hand, he was quite fearless and absolutely
incorruptible.
The first
care of the new Empress, after abolishing the Cabinet system which had prevailed
during the reigns of the two Annes, and reconstituting the Administrative
Senate, as it had been under Peter the Great, was to compose her quarrel with
Sweden. As already indicated, the sudden collapse of Sweden had come as a
disagreeable surprise to the Court of Versailles. To baulk Russia of the fruits
of her triumph, by obtaining the best possible terms for discomfited Sweden,
was now the main object of the French diplomatists in the north. La Chetardie
was accordingly instructed to offer the mediation of France, and to use all his
efforts for cajoling the new Empress into an abandonment
of her rights
of conquest. In February, 1742, therefore, he suggested to Elizabeth, at a
private interview, that the victorious Russians should sacrifice something for
the benefit of the vanquished Swedes in order to satisfy the honour of France !
The Empress, very pertinently, enquired what opinion her own subjects would be
likely to have of her, if she so little regarded the memory of her illustrious
father as to cede provinces won by him at the cost of so much Russian blood and
treasure ? Bestuzheff, to whom the Frenchman next applied, roundly declared
that no negotiations with Sweden could be thought of except on a uti possidetis
basis. “ I should deserve to lose my head on the block,” he concluded, “ if I
counselled her Imperial Majesty to cede a single inch of territory.” At a
subsequent council it was decided to decline the French offer of mediation, and
prosecute the Swedish war with vigour. By the end of 1742 the whole of Finland
was in the hands of the Russians. On January 23, 1743, direct negotiations
between the two Powers were opened at Abo; and, on August 17, peace was
concluded, Sweden ceding to Russia all the southern part of Finland east of the
river Kymmene, including the fortresses of Vilmanstrand and Fredrikshamn.
Bestuzheff would have held out for the whole grand duchy; but the Empress overruled
him. Even so this was a great blow to France. La Chetardie, perceiving that he
was no longer of any use at St Petersburg, obtained his letters of recall, and
quitted Russia (July, 1742).
The French
Government had discovered that nothing was to be hoped from Russia, so long as
Bestuzheff held the direction of foreign affairs. To overthrow him as speedily
as possible, therefore, now became the primary object of the Court of
Versailles and its allies. This determination to rid the league which proposed
to partition the Habsburg dominions of the obnoxious Minister is the only due
to the unravelling of that intricate web of intrigue and counter-intrigue which
has made the seven first years of the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna such a
diplomatic puzzle. Bestuzheff, like Osterman before him, was on principle
opposed to France, as the natural antagonist of Russia in Turkey, Poland and
Sweden, where the interests of the two States were diametrically opposed to
each other. Like Osterman, therefore, he leant upon the Austrian alliance. But
the policy of the alert and enterprising Bestuzheff had a far wider range than
that of the slow and cautious Osterman. Starting from the assumption that the
norm of Russia’s proper policy at this period was hostility to France, he
insisted that all her enemies must necessarily be the friends, and all her
friends the enemies, of Russia. The most active ally of France, the aggressive
King of Prussia, was especially to be guarded against, whereas the friendship
of Great Britain, the secular antagonist of France, must be sedulously
cultivated. Bestuzheff consequently aimed at a combination of all the enemies
of France and Prussia which, in the first instance, was to take the form of a
quadruple alliance between
1743]
The “ Botta-Lopukhina Conspiracy.” 315
Russia,
Austria, Great Britain and Saxony. Here, however, he was on dangerously
slippery ground, where a single stumble might mean irretrievable ruin; for the
representatives of the three Powers whom he wished to bring into line with
Russia had all been active and ardent supporters of Anna Leopoldovna, and as
such had done their best to keep Elizabeth from the throne altogether. Of this
the Empress was, by this time, well aware. Her antipathies, therefore, were
very naturally directed against those Powers which had been her adversaries
while she was only Tsesarevna; and it required some courage on the part of
Bestuzheff to defend a policy which, indispensable as it might be, was
abhorrent to his sovereign for strong personal reasons. Moreover, the intimate
personal friends of the Empress, headed by Lestocq, all of them extremely
jealous of the superior talents and rising influence of Bestuzheff, were now in
the pay of France and Prussia, and ready, at the bidding of the French charge
d’affaires, d’Allion, to embark in any project for overthrowing the
philo-Austrian Vice-Chancellor. The expedient finally adopted was a bogus
conspiracy alleged to be on foot for the purpose of replacing on the throne
Prince Ivan (who, since the revolution, had been detained, provisionally, with
his parents, at the fortress of Dunamiinde)—a conspiracy which, very ingeniously,
was made to include most of Elizabeth’s former rivals at her cousin’s Court,
such as Natalia Lopukhina and the Countess Anna Garielevna, consort of Michael
Bestuzheff, the Vice-Chancellor’s elder brother. The former Austrian
ambassador, Marquis de Botta, was alleged to be the chief promoter of the
affair. This trumped-up conspiracy was “miraculously discovered” by Lestocq and
burst upon the Empress in August, 1743. After a rigid inquisition of
twenty-five days, during which every variety of torture was freely employed
against the accused, “ the terrible plot,” says the new English Minister, Sir
Cyril Wych, “was found to be little more than the ill-considered discourses of
a couple of spiteful passionate women.” Nevertheless, the two ladies principally
concerned had their tongues publicly tom out before being sent to Siberia; and
the Russian ambassador at Vienna was instructed to demand Botta’s condign
punishment. This was done at a special audience; whereupon Maria Theresa, with
her usual spirit, declared that she would never admit the validity of extorted
evidence, and issued a manifesto to all the Great Powers defending Botta and
accusing the Russian Court of rank injustice.
Thus Lestocq,
or rather the anti-Austrian League of which he was the tool, had succeeded in
mutually estranging the Courts of St Petersburg and Vienna ; and the result of
the “Lopukhina trial” was hailed as a great diplomatic victory at Paris. But
the caballers had failed to bring Bestuzheff to the block or even “to drive him
into some obscure hole in the country,” as d’Allion had confidently predicted
they would. At the very crisis of his peril, when his own sister-in-law was
implicated, the Empress, always equitable when not frightened into ferocity,
had privately
316 Frederick II intrigues against Bestuzheff.
[1743-4
assured the
Vice-Chancellor that her confidence in him was unabated and that not a hair of
his head should be touched. But Bestuzheff had now a still more formidable
antagonist to encounter in Frederick II of Prussia.
From the very
beginning of his reign Frederick had regarded Russia as his most formidable
neighbour, especially as being the ally of his inveterate enemy the Queen of
Hungary. So early as June 1, 1743, he wrote to Mardefelt, his Minister at St
Petersburg: “ I should never think of lightly provoking Russia; on the
contrary, there is nothing in the world I would not do, in order always to be
on good terms with that Empire.” A few months later, the neutrality, at least,
of Russia had become of vital importance to him. Alarmed for Silesia by the
Austrian victories in the course of 1743, he resolved to make sure of his
newly-won possessions by attacking the Queen of Hungary a second time, before
she had time to attack him. But how would Russia take this fresh and unprovoked
aggression ? That was the question upon which everything else depended.
Fortunately the “ Botta conspiracy ” provided him with an opportunity of
ingratiating himself with the Russian Empress. He wrote an autograph letter to
Elizabeth, expressing his horror at the plot against her sacred person, and
ostentatiously demanded of the Court of Vienna that Botta, who had been
transferred from St Petersburg to Berlin, should instantly be recalled.
Elizabeth could not refrain from showing her gratification. But Bestuzheff had
yet to be got rid of. “I cannot repeat too often,” wrote the King of Prussia to
Mardefelt (January 25,1744), “ that until that man has been rendered harmless,
I can never reckon upon the friendship of the Empress.” And again (February
29), “ it is absolutely necessary to oust the Vice-Chancellor. So long as he is
in office he will cause me a thousand chagrins.” Frederick’s chief tool at St
Petersburg at this time was Princess Elizabeth of Anhalt-Zerbst, who, in
February, 1744, had brought her daughter Sophia Augusta Frederica to Russia
(received into the Russian Church under the name of Catharine Alexievna on July
8, 1744) to be educated there and ultimately married to the Empress’ nephew and
heir, Grand Duke Peter. Bestuzheff, in pursuance of his political system, would
have preferred Princess Mary of Saxony, but was overruled by the Prussian
party, who advisedly represented to the Empress that the daughter of a petty
German House would be far more manageable, and far less dangerous to orthodoxy,
than a bigoted Catholic like the Saxon Princess. The elder Zerbst Princess very
willingly united with all the other enemies of Bestuzheff, including Mardefelt
and La Chetardie, now back at his post again, to overthrow him. But Bestuzheff
more than held his own against this fresh combination, and in June, 1744,
Frederick urged Mardefelt to change his tactics and attempt to bribe the ViceChancellor.
He was authorised to spend as much as 500,000 crowns for the purpose. Then,
trusting to the savoir-faire of Mardefelt and the potent influence of the
bank-notes, Frederick, at the end of August,
1744-s] Bestuzheff counsels war against
Frederick. 317
threw off the
mask and invaded Bohemia at the head of 60,000 men. By the end of September his
troops had occupied the whole kingdom.
In the
extremity of her distress, Maria Theresa sent a special envoy, Count Rosenberg,
to St Petersburg, to express her horror at Botta’s alleged misconduct, and
placed herself and her fortunes unreservedly in the hands of her imperial
sister. For two months Elizabeth hesitated while the anti-Bestuzheff clique did
all in its power to prevent any assistance being sent to the distressed Queen
of Hungary. But Bestuzheff was now growing stronger and stronger every day. By
the aid of his secretary, Goldbach, he had succeeded in unravelling La
Chetardie’s cipher correspondence and furnished the Empress with extracts
alluding in the most disparaging terms to herself. These Bestuzheff accompanied
by elucidatory comments. Furious at the treachery of the ever gallant and
deferential Marquis, the Empress immediately dictated to Bestuzheff a
memorandum commanding La Chetardie to quit her capital within 24 hours. On June
17,1744, he was escorted to the frontier. Six weeks later Elizabeth identified
herself emphatically with the anti-French policy of her Minister by promoting
him to the rank of Grand Chancellor. Bestuzheff now energetically represented
to the Empress the necessity of interfering in the quarrel between Frederick II
and the Queen of Hungary. He described the King of Prussia as a restless
agitator, whose character was made up of fraud and violence. He had violated
the Treaty of Breslau ; he was secretly stirring up Turkey against Russia; he
had impudently used neutral Saxon territory as a stepping-stone to Bohemia; he
had procured the dissolution of the Grodno Diet to prevent the discovery of his
anti-Russian intrigues, thus aiming a direct blow at the supremacy which Russia
had enjoyed in Poland ever since the days of Peter the Great. The balance of
power in Europe should be restored instantly, and at any cost, by reducing
Frederick to his proper place.
These
representations, all of them substantially correct, profoundly impressed the
Empress. In the beginning of 1745 she gave a clear proof of her reconciliation
with Austria by bluntly refusing Frederick a succour of 6000 men, though bound
by her last defensive treaty with Prussia to assist him. Bestuzheff then
submitted to the British Government an intervention project, which was rejected
as too onerous and exorbitant; while Frederick, thoroughly alarmed, offered
Bestuzheff
100.000 crowns, if he would acquiesce in Prussia’s
appropriating another slice of Silesia, an offer which the Russian Chancellor
haughtily rejected. Frederick’s subsequent declaration of war against Saxony
greatly agitated the Russian Court; and three successive Ministerial councils
(August— September, 1745), inspired by Bestuzheff, unanimously advised an armed
intervention. Elizabeth thereupon signed an ukase commanding that the
60.000 men stationed in Esthonia and Livonia
should at once advance into Courland, so as to be nearer the Prussian frontier
and ready for any emergency. A manifesto was also addressed to the King of
Prussia,
warning him
that Russia would consider herself bound to assist Saxony if invaded by him.
But nothing came of it all. Bestuzheff relied for the success of his plan on
British subsidies; but the British Cabinet, having already secured the safety
of Hanover by a secret understanding with the King of Prussia, had resolved
upon neutrality. A subsequent proposal (January 6, 1746) that, if the Maritime
Powers would advance to Russia a subsidy of six millions, she would at once
place 100,000 men in the field and end the German war in a single campaign, was
likewise rejected by Great Britain.
Bestuzheff
had been unable to prevent the conclusion of the Peace of Dresden, December 25,
1745; yet the menacing attitude of the Russian Chancellor had contributed to
make the King of Prussia, despite his recent victories, moderate his demands.
Moreover, Frederick now played into Bestuzheff’s hands by indulging in one of
those foolish jests for which he had so often to pay dear. Before departing for
Saxony, he had requested the mediation of both Russia and Turkey, at the same
time remarking with a sneer, at a public reception, that, in his opinion, the
mediation of a Turk was every whit as good as the mediation of a Greek.
Elizabeth, promptly informed of this, was wounded in her tenderest point. That
she, the devout mother of all the Orthodox, should be placed in the same
category with the successor of the False Prophet revolted her, and her
sentiments towards “the Nadir Shah of Berlin,” as she called the King of
Prussia, completely changed. Henceforth political antagonism and private pique
combined to make her the most determined adversary of Frederick II.
The political
triumph of the Austrian party at St Petersburg is to be dated from the
conclusion of the defensive alliance of June 2, 1745, whereby each of the
contracting parties agreed to aid the other, within three months of being
attacked, with 30,000 men or, in case Prussia was the aggressor, with 60,000.
Frederick saw in this compact a veiled plan for attacking him on the first
opportunity, and in the course of the same summer formed another plot to
overthrow Bestuzheff, which only recoiled on the heads of its promoters in St
Petersburg. Bestuzheff’s subsequent endeavours to round off his system by
contracting an alliance with Great Britain was partially realised by the Treaty
of St Petersburg (December 9, 1747). The victories of Maurice de Saxe in the
Austrian Netherlands, and the consequent danger to Holland, were the causes of
the somewhat belated rapprochement. By the terms of this Treaty, the Empress,
besides agreeing to hold a corps of observation, 30,000 strong, on the Courland
frontier, at the disposal of Great Britain for £100,000 a year, engaged to
despatch Prince Vasily Repnin with another corps of 30,000 to the Rhine, on
condition that £300,000 a year was paid for these troops by England and
Holland, four months in advance. The tidings of the approach of Repnin’s army
sufficed to induce France to accelerate the peace negotiations, and, on April
30, 1748, a preliminary
1748-55] Political duel between Frederick and
Bestuzheff. 319
convention
was signed between the Court of Versailles and the Maritime Powers at
Aix-la-Chapelle.
Never yet had
Russia stood so high in the estimation of Europe as in the autumn of 1748; and
she owed her commanding position entirely to the tenacity of purpose of the
Grand Chancellor, In the face of apparently insurmountable obstacles,
Bestuzheff had honourably extracted his country from the Swedish imbroglio;
reconciled his imperial mistress with the Courts of London and Vienna;
reestablished friendly relations with these Powers; freed Russia from the yoke
of foreign influence; compelled both Prussia and France to abate their
pretensions in the very hour of their victory; and, finally, isolated the
restless, perturbing King of Prussia by environing him with hostile alliances.
The seven
years which succeeded the War of the Austrian Succession were little more than
an armed truce between apprehensive and dissatisfied adversaries—an
indispensable breathing-space between a past contest which everyone felt to
have been inconclusive, and a future contest which everyone knew to be
inevitable. Both the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and that of Breslau had been
forced from without upon active belligerents. In the first case, the unexpected
intervention of Russia had arrested the triumphal progress of the French
armies; in the second, the sudden desertion of England had compelled Austria to
surrender Silesia to the King of Prussia. The consequences of these prematurely
suppressed hostilities were an unnatural tension between the various European
Powers, a loosening of time-honoured alliances, and a cautious groping after
newer and surer combinations. But Frederick was uneasy in the midst of his
triumphs, and, far from diminishing his armaments after the war was over,
prudently increased them. He had, indeed, nothing to fear at present from
exhausted Austria; but the attitude of Russia continued as menacing as ever. In
the autumn of 1750, Frederick, incensed beyond measure by an imperial rescript
issued by Bestuzheff ordering all Russian subjects natives of the Baltic
Provinces actually in the Prussian service to return to their homes,
deliberately insulted the Russian resident at Berlin, Gross, who was thereupon
recalled (October 25), and diplomatic intercourse between the two countries was
suspended.
All this time
Bestuzheff had been doing his utmost to promote his favourite project of a
strong Anglo-Russian alliance with the object of “still further clipping the
wings of the King of Prussia.” But the Empress, who throughout these protracted
negotiations exhibited a truer political instinct than her Chancellor, was by
no means disposed to tie her own hands in order to oblige England. She
perceived clearly, what Bestuzheff did not or would not recognise, that the
interests of the two States at this period were too divergent to admit of any
alliance profitable to Russia being formed between them. For more than three
years all the arguments of the Chancellor were powerless to move her. At
last, on
September 19, 1755, a new convention was signed at St Petersburg between Great
Britain and Russia, whereby the latter Power engaged to furnish, in case of
war, an auxiliary corps of 30,000 for a diversion against Prussia, in return
for an annual subsidy from Great Britain of £500,000. When, however, two months
later, the ratification of this treaty was in question, Elizabeth still
hesitated to set her hand to it. She suspected, not without reason, that the
English Government would require a large proportion of the Russian contingent
to fight their own battles on the Rhine, or in the Low Countries, and she was
not disposed to direct her troops thither. Finally, on February 1, 1756, the
ratifications were added; but the Empress never forgave Bestuzheff for the
vehemence and petulance by means of which he had forced her hand. Yet the
treaty which it had taken years to negotiate was already waste paper. A
fortnight before the exchange of the ratifications an event had occurred at the
other end of Europe which shattered all the cunning combinations of the Russian
Chancellor, completely changed the complexion of foreign politics, and
precipitated a general European war.
Frederick had
been beforehand with his adversaries. Recognising the fact that decadent France
could no longer be profitable to him, and alarmed by the rumours of the
impending negotiations between Great Britain and Russia, he calculated that the
chances, on the whole, were in favour of the superior usefulness of an English
alliance, and (January 16, 1756) signed the Treaty of Westminster with Great
Britain, whereby the two contracting Powers agreed to unite their forces to
oppose the entry into or the passage through Germany, of the troops of any
other foreign Power. The Treaty of Westminster precipitated the conclusion of
the Franco-Austrian rapprochement which the Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz had
been long preparing. On May 1,
1756, a defensive alliance, directed against
Prussia, was formed at Versailles between the French and Austrian Governments.
To this treaty Russia, Sweden, and Saxony were to be invited to accede.
The position
of the Russian Chancellor was now truly pitiable. He had expended all his
energy in carrying through an alliance with Great Britain which was now only so
much waste paper. He had repeatedly declared that Prussia could never unite
with Great Britain, or Austria with France, and now both these alleged
impossibilities had actually taken place. No wonder that the Empress lost all
confidence in him, especially as he still clung obstinately to a past condition
of things, and refused to bow to the inexorable logic of accomplished facts. He
was well aware that, if Great Britain could no longer be counted upon for help
against Prussia, the assistance of France would be indispensable; yet so
inextinguishable was his hatred of France that he could not reconcile himself
to the idea of an alliance with that Power in any circumstances. Consequently,
his whole .policy, henceforth, became purely obstructive and therefore purely
mischievous.
The course of
events in Russia demonstrated that his influence was already gone. At the
second sitting (February 22, 1756) of the newly established “Ministerial
Conference,” a permanent and paramount Department of State formed early in
1756, to advise the Empress on all matters relating to foreign affairs,
Elizabeth decided that England’s treaty with Prussia had nullified all the
existing Anglo-Russian conventions. At its third session (March 14), the
Conference determined to invite the Courts of Versailles, Vienna and Stockholm
to cooperate with Russia “ to reduce the King of Prussia within proper limits
so that he might no longer be a danger to the German Empire,” thus anticipating
by nearly two months the Treaty of Versailles. It then decreed that the army
should be mobilised forthwith, so as to spur Austria on to more rapid action.
The Austrian ambassador at St Petersburg was, at the same time, instructed to
inform his Court that the Russian Empress was ready to conclude a definite
treaty with France whenever invited to do so. After this the inclusion of
Russia in the grand alliance against Prussia was only a matter of time.
On December
31,1756, the Russian Empress formally acceded to the Treaty of Versailles, at
the same time binding herself, by a secret article, to assist France if
attacked by England in Europe; France at the same time contracting a
corresponding secret obligation to give Russia pecuniary assistance in the
event of her being attacked by Turkey. The secret articles of the Versailles Treaty
of May 1, as between France and Austria, were not, however, communicated to the
Court of St Petersburg.
It is certain
that at this crisis of his life the King of Prussia was by no means so
well-informed as usual. Not till towards the end of June did he suspect the
existence of the Franco-Russian understanding, and, till the end of August, he
flattered himself that British influence would prove stronger than Austrian at
St Petersburg. He was also mistaken, or misinformed, as to the relative
attitudes of Russia and Austria. He was, for instance, under the false
impression that Austria was urging on Russia against him, but that the latter
Power was not prepared and would postpone an invasion till the following
spring; whereas, in reality, it was Russia who was urging on dilatory and
timorous Austria. At the beginning of June Frederick learnt from the Hague that
Russia had definitely renounced her obligations towards England. Early in July
he told Mitchell, the English envoy at Berlin, that Russia was lost to them;
and on August 29, 1756, he invaded Saxony. The Seven Years’ War had begun. It
is beyond the scope of the present chapter to enter into the details of the
struggle. Here only the salient facts, so far as they affected the policy of
Russia and the general situation, can be very briefly adumbrated.
The lack of
good generals, due to the neglect, during the last three reigns, of Peter the
Great’s golden rule of forming a school of native generals by carefully
training promising young Russian officers beneath
the eye of
intelligent and experienced foreigners, was the cause of Russia’s inefficiency
in the field during the first two campaigns. In 1757 the Russian
Commander-in-chief, Stephen Aprakin, accidentally gained the battle of
Gross-Jagemdorf (August 29), one of the most casual victories on record,
through the sheer courage of raw troops suddenly attacked by an enemy whom they
were marching to outflank, During the rest of lie campaign Aprakin did nothing
at all but march and counter-march.
The great political
event of the year 1757 was the resumption of diplomatic relations between
Russia and France. In the middle of June Michael Bestuzheff, the elder brother
of the Russian Chancellor, was accredited to Paris; and, simultaneously, the
new French ambassador, Paul de l’Hopital, Marquis de Chateauneuf, arrived at St
Petersburg at the head of an extremely brilliant suite. His charming manners,
ready wit, and truly patrician liberality made him a persona gratissima at the
Russian Court; and, in conjunction with the new Austrian ambassador, Prince
Nicholas Esterhdzy, he carried everything before him. It was through their
influence that Aprakin and his friend the Chancellor Bestuzheff were arrested,
early in 1758, on a charge of conspiring with the Grand Duchess Catharine and
her friends to recall the army from the field and hold it in readiness to
support a projected coup d'etat in case of the death of the Empress, who on
September 19, 1757, had had a slight apoplectic fit after attending mass at the
parish church of Tsarskoe Selo. BestuzhefF’s enemies had instantly connected
the illness of the Empress with the almost simultaneous retreat of the army;
though we now know for certain. that the two events were totally unconnected
The retreat of the army had been ordered by an unanimous council of war, held a
full fortnight previously to the Empress’ seizure; while it is obvious that the
Chancellor, especially in his own veiy critical position, had no object
whatever in saving his old enemy the King of Prussia. Bestuzheff succeeded in
clearing himself completely of all the charges brought against him; but the
Empress, while accepting his innocence and refusing to allow him to be put to
torture, showed she had lost all confidence in him by depriving him of all his
offices and dignities and expelling him from the Court. He was succeeded as
Grand Chancellor by Michael Vorontsoff, an honest man of excellent intentions
but mediocre abilities.
The campaign
of 1758 was a repetition of the campaign of 1757. After occupying the whole of
East Prussia, Aprakin’s successor, General Count William Fermor, a pupil of
Miinnich and Lacy, on August 25, defeated Frederick at Zorndorf, one of the
most murderous engagements of modern times. But Fermor was incapable of making
any use of his victory, even after being strongly reinforced; and at the
beginning of October, he retired behind the Vistula.
Fermor seems
only to have been saved from the fate of Aprakin
1758—9] Differences between the Allies. . 323
by the
growing conviction of the Empress and her Ministers that the Court of Vienna
was sacrificing the Russian troops to its own particular interests. There can
be no doubt that very little assistance was rendered by the Austrians to the
Russians during the last campaign, and the apologetic tone adopted by Maria
Theresa seems to show that Elizabeth had just cause for complaint. The Empress
Queen pleaded as an excuse for her own remissness the failure of the Court of
Versailles to fulfil its obligations to Austria. France, she said, instead of despatching
the promised auxiliary corps of 80—40,000 men to Austria’s hereditary domains,
had wasted her strength in a fruitless struggle with England- Hanover. There
were, she added, symptoms of growing weakness in the French monarchy. Several
times since the beginning of the year, France had complained that the burden of
the war was growing intolerable and expressed a desire for peace. Elizabeth’s
reply was both dignified and determined; but it also shows that the French
influence at St Petersburg was at this time paramount. She protested that
France had taken a more active part in the war than any other member of the
league, and had, besides, the additional merit of bringing Sweden into it.- The
alleged infirmity of the French monarchy, assuming it to exist, was but an
additional reason for assisting it more strenuously, and not allowing it to be
sacrificed to Englav.d and Prussia. The Russian Empress opined that the war
must be prosecuted till the Most High had blessed the righteous arms of the
Allies with decisive success, and abated the pride and self-sufficiency of the
King of Prussia.
Towards
the end of the year, the hands of the Russian Empress were strengthened by the
accession to power in France of a new and vigorous Minister of Foreign Affairs
who fully shared her sentiments in the person of the Due de Choiseul. The first
act of the new Minister was to notify Michael Bestuzheff that pacific overtures
had been made to Great Britain through the Danish Court with the object of
isolating the King of Prussia, but that the English Ministers had steadily
refused to separate their cause from his. Choiseul further informed the Russian
ambassador that Louis XV had given his solemn word never to make peace without
the consent of his Allies. Alexis Galitsin’s despatches from London were,
naturally, less satisfactory than Michael Bestuzheff’s from Versailles. He
reported “a fanatical enthusiasm of the whole nation for the King of Prussia,”
and a determination on the part of the English Ministers to make Prussia the
leading German Power on the Continent instead of Austria. The damage done by
Frederick II to the French monarchy was, no doubt, at the bottom of England s
respect for him.
_
The
increasing financial difficulties! of the Russian Government in 1759, prevented
the army from taking the field till April; and, on May 19, the incurably
sluggish Fermor was superseded by Count Peter Soltikoff, an officer who
hitherto had been mainly occupied in drilling
the militia
of the Ukraine. Frederick II communicated this new appointment to his brother
Prince Henry with more than his usual caustic acerbity. “ Fermor,” he wrote, “
has received by way of appenr dage one Soltikoff, who is said to be more
imbecile than anything in the clodhopper way which Russia has yet produced.”
Within three weeks this “clodhopper” was to reduce the King of Prussia to the
last extremity.
Although
suddenly pitted against the most redoubtable captain of the age without having
ever before commanded an army in the field, Soltikoff seems to have accepted
his tremendous rasper .ibilities without the slightest hesitation. On July 9,
he reached headquarters; on July 23, he defeated, near Kay, the Prussian
general Wedell, who had attempted to prevent his junction with the Austrians;
early in August he united with Laudon at Frankfort on Oder; and, on August 12,
the allies annihilated the army of the King of Prussia at Kunersdorf. Frederick
was only saved from death or captivity, in the general stampede, by the
devotion of Rittmeister Prittwitz and forty hussars. Late the same evening,
3000 repentant fugitives rallied to his standard, the sole remnant of a host of
48,000 men. Mortal indeed had been the hug of the “ bears of the Holy Roman
Empire,” as he himself dubbed the Russians at the end of the year, when he had
in a measure recovered from the shock of “ that horrible catastrophe.”
“Your
Imperial Majesty must not be surprised at our serious casualties,” wrote the
triumphant Soltikoff to the Empress on the following day, “for you know that
the King of Prussia always sells victory dearly. Another such victory, your
Majesty, and I shall, be obliged myself to plod staff in hand to St Petersburg
with the joyful tidings, for lack of messengers.” Soltikoff received the
marshal’s baton from his own sovereign, and a diamond^ring, a jewelled
snuff-box and 5000 ducats from Maria Theresa. His health was also drunk, “in
imperial Tokay,” at a grand banquet given at Versailles by Michael Bestuzheff
in honour of the event, at which Choiseul and eighty of the most distinguished
men in France were present. Nor were these rejoicings at all exaggerated. At
that moment the ruin of the TTing of Prussia seemed imminent and inevitable;
and, as is related elsewhere, for the first time in his life he despaired. At
the urgent request of Frederick, Pitt at once made pacific overtures to Russia
on behalf of Prussia and proposed a peace congress, to be held at the Hague.
Not till December 12 did the Russian Empress deliver her reply to these pacific
overtures. She declared that she and her allies were equally desirous of peace,
but of a peace that should be honourable, durable, and profitable. Such a
peace, she opined, would be impossible if things were allowed to remain on the
same footing as they were before the war. After this, it was plain to the
British Ministers that no more could be said at present, and that the war must
proceed.
i759-6i] Elizabeth holds the alliance
together.
825
Frederick
was, indeed, only saved from instant destruction by the violent dissensions
between Soltikoff and the Austrian Commander- in-chief, Count Daun, who refused
to take orders from each other, and thus wasted all the fruits of Kunersdorf.
Moreover, Soltikoff was so elated by his astounding victories that he even
refused to submit to the behests of his own Court. In spite of repeated and
urgent orders to follow up his successes without delay, he absolutely refused
to remain in Silesia a day longer than October 15, “ as the preservation of my
army ought to be my primary consideration.” At the begi ining of November he
deliberately marched off to his magazines at Posen.
It is not too
much to say that, from the end of 1759 to the end of 1761, the unshakable
firmness of the Russian Empress was the one constraining political force which
held together the! heterogeneous, incessantly changing elements of the
anti-Prussian combination, and prevented it from collapsing before the shock of
disaster. From the Russian point of view, Elizabeth’s greatness as a ruler
consists in her steady ippreciation of Russian interests, and her determination
to promote and consolidate them at all hazards. She insisted throughout that
the King of Prussia must be rendered harmless to his neighbours for the future,
and that the only way to bring this about was to curtail his dominions and
reduce him to the rank of an Elector. Russia’s share of his partitioned
dominions was to be the province already in her possession—Ducal Prussia as it
was then called—certainly a very moderate compensation for her preponderating
success and enormous sacrifices. On January 1, 1760, the Empress told
Esterh&zy that she meant to continue the war in conjunction with her
allies, even if she were compelled to sell all her diamonds and half her
wearing apparel; but she also declared that the time had now come when Russia
should be formally guaranteed the possession of her conquest, Ducal Prussia.
The Court of Vienna was greatly perturbed. Maria Theresa was well aware that
France would never consent to the aggrandisement of Russia; yet she herself was
in such absolute need of the succour of the Russian troops that she was obliged
to yield to the insistence of Elizabeth. Accordingly, on April 1, 1760, fresh
conventions were signed between Austria and Russia, providing for the
continuation of the war and the annexation of Ducal Prussia to Russia. When
Louis XV categorically refused to accept these conventions in their existing
form, and compelled Maria Theresa to strike out the article relating to Ducal
Prussia, the Empress Queen added to the conventions so amended a secret clause,
never communicated to the Court of Versailles, virtually reinserting the
cancelled article. The British Ministers were not less apprehensive than were
the Ministers of France lest Russia should claim any territorial compensation
from Frederick II; for, in view of the unyielding disposition of the King of
Prussia, such a claim meant the indefinite prolongation of the war, or,
which was
even worse and far more probable, the speedy and complete collapse of the
Prussian monarchy.
Frederick himself
has told us that in 1760 the Russians had only to step forward in order to give
him the coup de gr&ce. Elizabeth was equally well aware of this, and the
New Year was not three days old when she summoned Soltikoff to the capital to
draw up a plan of campaign. The plan he finally submitted was simplicity
itself. It may best be described as an ingenious method of avoiding a general
engagement at all hazards, and keeping out of harm’s way as much as possible.
He was curtly informed that Russia’s obligations to her allies demanded a more
aggressive, adventurous strategy, and reminded that after the experience of
Kunersdorf there was no longer any reason to be afraid “ of hazarding our army
in an engagement with the King of Prussia, however desperate and bloody.”
Elizabeth’s own plan was that Soltikoff should proceed at once to Silesia to
cooperate there with Laudon, who had, at her particular request, been appointed
to an independent command on the Oder, and was there holding Prince Henry of
Prussia in check, while Daun, with another Austrian army, stood face to face
with Frederick in Saxony. Before quitting Posen for Silesia Soltikoff was also
instructed to detach 15,000 men, to besiege for the second time the maritime
fortress of Kolberg, as a first step towards conquering Pomerania. Soltikoff
set out for the army early in the spring; and nothing but captious criticisms,
dolorous grumblings, and perplexing accounts of insignificant skirmishes, was
heard of or from him for the next three months. His absurd caution more than
neutralised the victories of Laudon at Landshut and Glatz, and the mere intelligence
of the battle of Liegnitz drove him back into Polish territory. Simultaneous
reports from General Chemuisheff informed the Empress that the whole army was
in an anarchical condition and that the Commander-in-chief could do nothing but
wring his hands and shed tears. It was now evident that Soltikoff’s mind had
become unhinged by his responsibilities. He was accordingly superseded, in the
beginning of September, by the senior officer in the service, Field-Marshal
Alexander Buturlin, who led the army back behind the Vistula. The closing incidents
of this campaign were the occupation of Berlin (October 9-12) by Chemuisheff
and Todtleben, which caused great rejoicings at St Petersburg and helped to
refill the depleted Russian Treasury, the contributions levied amounting, to
1,000,000 thalers, and the second siege of Kolberg, which proved to be an
expensive failure.
If France and
Austria had only with the utmost difficulty been persuaded to continue the War
at the end of 1759, it may be imagined with what feelings they faced the
prospect of another campaign at the end of 1760. Even in Russia itself there
was now a very general desire for peace. The customary New Year illuminations
in front of the Winter Palace at St Petersburg gave eloquent expression to this
desire.
The principal
transparency represented a winged genius (the New Year) with a gift in his
hand, in the shape of a laurel wreath intertwined with an olive-branch,
standing upon captured standards, cannon, and other military trophies, with the
keys of Berlin in front of him. The contemporary Russian gazettes also
emphasised the rumour that “ Our most gracious Sovereign has expressly stated
that the sole object of the glorious triumph of her arms is the restoration and
the maintenance of peace.” But peace was only obtainable by fresh exertions;
these required plenty of money; and where was the money to come from ? The new
Commander-in-chief had demanded a minimum of 2,031,000 roubles (about 457,000)
for putting the army on a war footing, but only about three-quarters of that
amount was available.
And there was
yet another difficulty. The allies of Russia were fast approaching the limits
of their endurance, and were becoming clamorous for peace. On January 22, 1761,
the new French ambassador at St Petersburg, the Baron de Breteuil, presented a
despatch to the Russian Chancellor to the effect that the King of France, by
reason of the condition of his dominions, absolutely desired peace, especially
as the King of Prussia, being at the end of his resources, would now doubtless
listen to any reasonable propositions. On the following day the Austrian
ambassador delivered a memorandum to the same effect. In her reply of February
12, Elizabeth declared that she would not consent to any pacific overtures
until the original object of the League, “the essential and permanent crippling
of the King of Prussia,” had been accomplished* Even if Austria could not get
back all she had a right to, she should at least retain possession of her
actual conquests in Silesia. The King of Poland should also be compensated for
the inhuman devastation of his lands by the duchy of Magdeburg and all the
Prussian possessions in Lusatia. Sweden’s Pomeranian frontier should also be
“advantageously rectified.” Russia demanded nothing for herself besides Ducal
Prussia, or, in default thereof, adequate compensation elsewhere “ from her
loyal allies.” This reply was accompanied by a letter from Elizabeth to Maria
Theresa rebuking the Court of Vienna for its want of candour in negotiating
with France behind the back of Russia, and threatening, irl case of any
repetition of such a violation of treaties, to treat with the King of Prussia
directly and independently. Elizabeth declared, however, that she was not
averse from a peace congress sitting while the war still went on, though she
was firmly opposed to anything like a truce as being likely to be “ extremely
useful to the King of Prussia.” To these propositions the allies yielded after
some debate. A fresh Russian note, at the beginning of May, laid it down as an
imperative necessity that France should leave America and the Indies alone for
a time and concentrate all her. efforts on the Continent. Thus Russia was
assuming the lead in continental affairs, not only in arms but in diplomacy
also.
The equally
uncompromising attitudes of Russia and Prussia rendered
another
campaign inevitable; and, despite the leisurely strategy of the Russians, it
was to result most disastrously for Frederick. Moreover, in the autumn of 1761
Pitt, his zealous friend, had been compelled to retire from the Cabinet, and
Great Britain, shortly afterwards, had embarked in a war with Spain, so that,
as Galitsin, the Russian ambassador at London, shrewdly observed, she had no
more money to waste on the King of Prussia. Nor could he even dare to reckon,
as heretofore, on the sluggishness of the foes he feared the most —“the bears
of the Holy Roman Empire.” The timid incompetency of the first four Russian
commanders-in-chief had materially simplified his strategy. They had moved with
mechanical deliberation to the wire-pulling of a council of civilians 1000
miles off; they had sustained, stubbornly but unintelligently, the impact of
any enemy that might happen to cut across their line of march; and they had
been amazed after the engagement to discover, sometimes, that they had won a
great victory without being aware of it. But they had never taken any steps to
follow up their purely fortuitous triumphs and, at the slightest rumour of
danger, at the slightest suspicion of scarcity, they had retreated to their
depots behind the Vistula. But now there were ominous indications that even in
the Russian ranks the lessons of a five years’ warfare were beginning to
produce good scholars. Foreign military experts already spoke highly of Zachary
Chernuisheff, who had so brilliantly cooperated with Laudon in the capture of
Schweidnitz, while the talents of young Peter Rumyantseff, the victor of Kolberg,
who had sent the keys of that stubborn fortress to the Empress as a Christmas
gift, were universally recognised. There could be little doubt that Rumyantseff
would be the next Russian Commander-in-chief, and it was equally certain that
his strategy would be of a very different order to the strategy of his predecessors.
Frederick was indeed in evil case and his correspondence at this period is a
melancholy reflexion of his despair. But a fortnight after he had informed
Finkenstein of his determination to seek a soldier’s death on the first
opportunity, and thus remove the chief obstacle to a peace for want of which
Prussia was perishing, he received the tidings of the death of the Russian
Empress who had expired on January 5, 1762—and he knew he was saved. “ Morta la
bestia, morto il veneno," he wrote to Knyphausen on January 22,1762. The
first act of Elizabeth’s nephew and successor, Peter III, a fanatical
worshipper of Frederick, was to reverse the whole policy of his aunt, grant the
King of Prussia prace on his own terms (May 5), and to contract a regular
defensive alliance with “the King my master”—even going the length of placing
at Frederick’s disposal Chernuisheff’s army as an auxiliary corps against the
Austrians. This shameful and unpatriotic subserviency contributed not a little
to the overthrow of Peter III, a few months later (July 9); but the change came
too late to modify the situation. Despite her enormous expenditure of blood and
money, Russia gained nothing except prestige from her participation in the
Seven Years’ War.
THE REVERSAL
OF ALLIANCES AND THE FAMILY COMPACT.
Upon the death of Cardinal Fleury in Januaiy, 1743, it
might have been expected that the King of France, following the precedent set
by his great-grandfather at the death of Cardinal Mazarin, would resolve to
take into his own hands the practical direction of affairs. But, if Louis XV
had as keen a sense as Louis XIV of the prerogatives of the royal dignity, and
was equally jealous for his authority, he had neither the same devotion to
labour, nor the same lofty conception of his duty. He was known on more than
one occasion to grieve over the sorrows of his people; yet he lacked not only
the will to carry out the necessary reforms, but the mere strength to look them
in the face. Indolent to the point of lethargy, he reigned without governing,
suffering himself to be led by his Ministers even while he distrusted them.
Above all, in the matter of foreign policy, he had his own ideas, tastes, and
preferences; but these he expressed half-heartedly, keeping silence as to
whatever he felt most deeply; he had, too, his own agents, his own policy,
which served more than once to paralyse or thwart official diplomacy. These
agents and this policy formed the “ King’s Secret,” famous by reason rather of
the mystery surrounding it than of the importance of the transactions it
covered, or of the influence it exercised upon the politics of France and of
Europe.
The death of
Fleury marks, nevertheless, a date of importance in the history of the reign.
Although he did not boast the title of Chief Minister, the Cardinal had been
the real possessor of power, and when he died no one was capable either of
influencing the King’s mind with equal authority, or of inducing the Government
to follow any consistent course. “ Never,” writes one of the Ministers of this
period, d’Argenson, “have the Ministers been so deeply at variance as now. Each
one is Squally master in his own department....If they are in harmony, it is by
chance—the King is never responsible for their agreement. The least of the
departments is as independent, in its own sphere, as the greatest; and it is
the constant effort of each to persuade the King that on it his
330 The King's favourites. Madame de Pompadour.
[1742-6
greatness and
glory depend. Such mutual jealousy on the part of his viziers would be an
advantage to a Prince who should administer, overrule all others, and make
plans freely on his own account. But, instead
of
those realities, what reigns over us is a vacuum,________ All the measures
taken for the
good of the State are at cross purposes one with another.”
Towards the
end of the Seven Years’ War, there was, it is true, one Minister, the Due de
Choiseul, who, rather through his versatility than through any statesmanlike
qualities, succeeded in maintaining for a time a position of acknowledged
superiority in the direction of state affairs. But neither his intellectual
suppleness nor his patriotic activity, was capable of maintaining him in power.
As his rise had been mainly due to the favour of a royal mistress (Mme de
Pompadour), so his fall was caused by the resentment of another (Mme Du Barry),
whose goodwill he had supposed his past services entitled him to treat with
disdain.
The external
influence needed to dominate the weak character of the King, without in any way
affronting his acute sense of his own authority, not being supplied by his
Ministers or by the members of the royal family, was contributed by the ladies
of his Court. Among the earlier favourites, Mme de Mailly had all the modesty
and the disinterestedness of Mile de La Valliere; her two sisters, Mme de
Vintimille and Mme de Chateauroux, showed a strong determination to arouse the
King from his apathy and to turn his activities in the direction of politics
and of war; but their period of favour was too short for them to produce any
serious effect: the influence of the royal mistresses in the direction of
affairs began in reality with Mme de Pompadour.
Jeanne-Antoinette
Poisson—the daughter of a wine-merchant’s clerk who had been hung in effigy,
and the wife of an official concerned in the collection of the revenue,
Lenormant d’liltiolles—had been brought up in the express and avowed hope of
winning the King’s favour. She was presented at Court in 1745, and created
Marquise de Pompadour a few months later. She had from the first won the King’s
heart by a combination of qualities which made her one of the most fascinating
women in the kingdom; and, by the skill with which she could amuse or divert a
monarch who was a prey to incessant ermui, she succeeded in maintaining her
influence. Although it had not been her desire to take any part in politics,
she was not slow to perceive that in no other way could she make her power
permanent. She had at first to encounter strenuous opposition, on account of
her humble birth; and the resentment thus roused in her reacted more than once
upon the choice she made, when she disposed, after the manner of a queen, of
the highest offices of State. Her appointments, partly for this reason, were
not invariably happy: again and again, at critical moments, certain Ministers
and generals owed their nomination simply to the place which they held in the
favourite’s regard. Nor was this all-powerful influence limited to the
nomination
of men to
fill the public employments and offices, but it was also of the greatest weight
in the whole direction of political affairs. Throughout this portion of the
reign, the whole of the political life of France is dominated by her foreign
policy, which reacts upon her military and naval institutions, and which leads
to the loss of her colonies, the disorder of her finances, and an entire change
in public feeling. With a review of this policy the present chapter may
therefore appropriately legin.
The War of
the Austrian Succession, undertaken by Cardinal Fleury ostensibly in order to
continue the traditional policy of France, of which the aim was the overthrow
of the House of Austria, continued after the Cardinal’s death, having had no
other result than to establish more firmly upon her throne the Empress Maria
Theresa. The struggle was still carried on for several years, although the
contending parties had lost sight of its original object. The endeavours of
France, which since 1745 had been concentrated upon Flanders and the
Netherlands, had led to a series of important successes: victories had been won
at Fontenoy in 1745, at Roucoux in 1746, at Lauffeldt in 1747; and
Bergen-op-Zoom was taken in 1748. France from this time forward could
accept—could even impose—peace; and it was accordingly signed at
Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.
In the
conclusion of this treaty, Louis XV displayed some chivalrous inclinations. He
had declared that he wished to make peace not after the fashion of a merchant,
but like a King. His plenipotentiary, Saint-Severin, was accordingly not slow
in coming to an agreement with his English colleague Lord Sandwich, and the
preliminaries of peace between France and England were signed on April 30. The
establishment of friendly relations with Austria, represented by Kaunitz, was
a more protracted affair, and the general peace was not concluded until October
18 and subsequent dates. So far as France was concerned, the conditions agreed
upon in this Treaty were not in proportion either with the sacrifices entailed
by a long war, or with the successes she had gained during the later campaigns.
The King of France restored all the fortresses captured by his forces in the
Netherlands and in Italy. In America, he regained possession of Louisburg and Cape
Breton. There was no determination of boundaries between French and English
possessions in America, the only stipulation being that matters should be
restored to their original footing, and that the frontiers should remain as
determined by the Treaty of Utrecht. But England obtained the demolition of the
coast defences of Dunkirk and the exclusion of the Stewarts from the realm of
France.
The Peace of
Aix-la-Chapelle, which the imagination of Louis XV had for a moment pictured as
destined, thanks to his moderation, to be a perpetual peace, was to be
short-lived. Between France and England, above all, there were rivalries of
every description, which could not fajl
332 Colonial conflicts. The Boundary Commission.
[1750-5
to provoke a
further conflict. The essential cause of this jealousy was the struggle for
supremacy on the sea and in the colonies—the two being indissolubly linked
together. On the one hand, England was eager to profit ■ by the advantage
already gained and to prevent her rival from reorganising her maritime power.
In France, besides the discontent created by the terms of the Treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle, there was dear comprehension of the fact that a strong navy
was necessary to protect the merchant-service and the colonial trade; and a
strong impetus was thus given to naval reform, while at the same time
praiseworthy efforts were made to restore order in the financial department. In
1754, a Minister belonging to the reform party, Machault d’Amonville, an
ex-Controller-General of finance, was placed at the head of the navy, and began
at once to plan the organisation of an imposing force. The value of his
endeavours was about to be proved by the Minorcan expedition of 1756, when he
was overthrown by a political intrigue.
The ink was
scarcely dry on the Treaty of Peace, when the permanent causes of antagonism
between France and England found fresh fuel and natural opportunities for
breaking forth anew, in the daily conflicts between the colonies of the two
countries, at all their points of mutual contact. These conflicts had been
incessant from the first; but, while in India they were confined to struggles
between rival Companies, in the New World they were becoming more rancorous
from day to day; and, aggravated as they were by the greed of the Companies or
of the settlers, on the one hand, and by the ambition of the military
commanders, on the other, they could not fail to provoke more and more serious
armed encounters and to challenge the efforts of both military commanders and
diplomatists on both sides. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had left undecided
the question of the boundaries of the English and French colonies. This
indecision was the more to be regretted, since, between the possessions of the
two countries stretched vast territories occupied by the Indians—territories to
which neither side could put forth claims that were not highly contentious,
resting on the right of discovery, treaties with the natives, or concessions
granted to particular Companies.
The early
difficulties of the years 1750 to 1754 are described elsewhere. The first
blood having been drawn near Fort Duquesne in June, 1754, the two sides made
open preparation for a sustained conflict. However, a special commission,
called the Boundary Commission, had been appo' ted by the two Governments to
settle these differences; its chief task being to determine the boundaries in
North America and to decide the question of ownership of the islands St
Vincent, Tobago, and St Lucia. Its work was begun in 1750 and continued until
the rupture between the two Powers in July, 1755. But, notwithstanding the
competence of the commissioners, no practical result was gained by their
deliberations; and, in proportion as matters grew more serious in America, it
became more and more apparent that there must be direct
1754-5] Anglo-French
negotiations on American boundaries. 333
negotiations
between the two Governments. These were begun in July, 1754, and were continued
in Paris and at Versailles by Rouille, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
Lord Albemarle, British ambassador in France, until the sudden death of the
latter at the end of the year
1754. In January, 1755, they were reopened in
London, between the Duke of Newcastle and the French ambassador, Mirepoix.
Beneath an appearance of friendliness, expressing itself by repeated presents
to Mme de Pompadour, the attitude of the English Minister, supported by the
wishes of Parliament and by the demands of the colonies, was resolute to the
last degree. The same cannot be said of the French diplomatist. Mirepoix was
severely judged by his contemporaries, even in France, and there was for a
moment some thought of reinforcing him ’ by a colleague. But, though he was
rather a soldier than a diplomatist, his frank and loyal—at times even
ingenuous—disposition accommodating itself with difficulty to duplicity and
finesse, his task was certainly far from easy. Not only had he to take into
account the secret action of the King and Mme de Pompadour, which was not
always in agreement with that of Rouille, but that Minister himself, though
conscientious and honourable, lacked breadth of view and initiative, and was,
partly by his own fault, partly by the force of circumstances, entirely
destitute of authority. When in Februaiy, 1755, the differences between the
claims of the two countries in the matter of the boundaries were intensified,
Rouille still had recourse to dilatory methods, sending to Mirepoix lengthy
monographs on the rights of France, and proposing to refer to the Boundary
Commission the enquiry into the disputed points. Hereupon, as related
elsewhere, Major-General Braddock was sent to America to support the English
claim by force of arms; and, in the following April, Admiral Boscawen sailed,
with secret instructions to intercept the French convoys bound for America.
While Rouille was still hoping to convert the English Ministry to his opinions,
the news reached London, on July 15, that Boscawen’s fleet had seized the
French frigates Leys and Aleide. The negotiations were at once broken off, and
a few days later Mirepoix was recalled. Nevertheless, many long months were
still to pass before the opening of hostilities. This irresolution and evasion
on the part of France, in a situation admitting of only one issue, is explained
by the inferiority of the French naval forces, and by the desire on the part of
the King and Mme de Pompadour to keep the peace at all costs. Hence the
endeavours of the French Government to shift the whole blame on to the
shoulders of their adversary by calling on all Europe to witness their own
peaceful intentions, and further, since the struggle could not continue to be
confined to the two countries, the desire to win for France as many allies, or
at least to secure the neutrality of as many Powers, as possible. Strangely enough,
in this race for alliances, England displayed the greatest eagerness. Her first
step was to secure a friendly neutrality
on the part
of Spain, which the unskilful policy of the Due de Duras failed to win over to
the side of France. In Russia, the British envoy, Sir Charles Hanbury Williams,
after overcoming countless difficulties by means of lavish liberality, at last
succeeded in concluding a defensive treaty, which was signed in September,
1755.
But the
efforts of British diplomacy were directed chiefly towards Austria. If public
opinion in England was indifferent to continental affairs, the same could not
be said of the English King, George II, whose hereditary possessions in Hanover
needed to be protected from any sudden attack on the part of France. Austria,
England’s ally in the last war, was ready and willing to help in the defence of
Hanover, but on condition that the British subsidies should be sufficient to
enable her at the same time to renew her conflict with the King of Prussia. The
conferences on this question, after being prolonged for months, came to
nothing. England thus found herself, at the end of 1755, isolated in Europe,
deprived of the help of Austria, and with but little hope of any change
favourable to her in the policy of Prussia.
During this
period, the behaviour of France presented a most amazing spectacle of
irresolution. The Minister of War, d’Argenson, had at first proposed to extend
the struggle to the Continent, and to secure in Hanover and the Netherlands
compensation for the losses which France could not foil to suffer in the
colonies. But this plan, after being discountenanced by Machault, the Minister
of Marine, was speedily relinquished in consequence of the opposition of Mme de
Pompadour, who feared that a continental war might estrange the King from her,
and of Louis XV himself, who still hoped for a friendly understanding with
England. Secret negotiations were earned on during the dosing months of 1755,
until the moment when the declarations of the English Ministry in Parliament
put an end to all hope of a friendly arrangement. The Treaty between France and
Prussia, the most important of her allies, expired in May, 1756. During the
months following on the cessation of negotiations between England and France,
Frederick had been constantly urging his ally to resolve upon decided action;
but the Court of Versailles had shown no alacrity in profiting by this friendly
attitude. Not only had they apparently resolved not to carry the war into
Europe, but they imagined that any haste in concluding a fresh treaty with
Frederick II would render the latter still more exacting. The Due de Nivernais,
charged with an extraordinary mission to Berlin in August, 1755, did not enter
upon his duties there until the beginning of January, 1756. During this time,
events were following one another in rapid succession, as the outcome of
several months of conferences. Frederick II, whose prindpa! care it was to
secure himself against possible attack on the part of Austria and Russia,
signed with England on January 16, 1756, the Treaty of Westminster, whereby the
two signatory Powers obtained a guarantee of the security of their dominions,
both agreeing to take up
arms against
any Power which should encroach upon Germanic territory. The Due de Nivemais
arrived at Potsdam at the very moment when this arrangement was on the point of
conclusion; and, notwithstanding his evident desire that the previous relations
between Prussia and France should be maintained, he could do nothing but inform
his Government of this decisive event.
>
This sudden change of policy on the part of Frederick II, although it had been
made known for some time past, produced at the Court of Versailles, where up to
the last moment it was regarded as incredible, a proportionately violent
impulse of vexation and wrath. In these circumstances, the negotiations
between France and Austria, begun some time previously, were carried on with
increased eagerness. Austria had now for several years shown a disposition to a
rapprochement: this was the master-thought of Kaunitz, who at that time, with
the full confidence of the Empress, directed the policy of Austria.
Intellectual, eloquent to the point of taking pleasure in hearing himself talk,
and gifted with a marvellous memory, Kaunitz had kept this design before the
Council of the Empire since the year 1749, without finding a single voice to
second him. When, at the end of 1750, he was appointed ambassador at Paris, he
employed himself in laying the foundations of his plan ; but, in face of the
protestations of a loyal adherence to the Prussian alliance, which were at the
time in vogue in France, he could do nothing beyond establishing personal
relations, which were in the end to prove of use. When, in 1753, he became
Chancellor of the Empire, he was succeeded in Paris by Count von Starhemberg;
but explicit negotiations were delayed until the latter part of the year 1755.
In view of the refusal of England to enter into a league against Prussia, an
important council had been held at Vienna on August 19 and 21, which resulted
in a decision to lay certain proposals before the French Court. Mme de
Pompadour was mentioned by Kaunitz to Starhemberg, as likely to prove the best
intermediary with the King. Abbe de Bemis, formerly French ambassador at Venice,
who enjoyed the confidence of the Marquise, was taken into the secret, and
played thenceforth the principal part in the whole affair. The first meeting
took place at Sevres on September 3, when Louis XV lent a friendly ear to the
Austrian proposals, which were soon submitted, not only to Bemis, but to a
Committee composed of Rouill^, Abbe de la Ville, his chief clerk, and Machault.
However, the first negotiations, without touching the real point at issue,
turned only upon a question of reciprocal neutrality, France refusing to enter
upon any engagement hostile to Frederick II, and Austria being unwilling to
take any steps against Hanover. But, when at the end of January, 1756, the news
of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty reached Paris, the views of the French Ministry
underwent a considerable modification ; and, after fresh conferences extending
over several months, the two Powers, recognising that the time was not yet ripe
for a general offensive treaty, came to a
preliminary
agreement, which was practically only the preface to such a treaty, and was
signed on May 1, 1756. This compact, known as the Treaty of Versailles,
comprised a convention of neutrality, a defensive alliance, and a secret
convention in five articles. Under the first of these heads, the Empress bound
herself to observe absolute neutrality in the war between England and France,
and the King of France, on his side, promised to respect the Austrian
Netherlands and other States belonging to the Empress. By the agreement of
union and defensive alliance, the two contracting parties guaranteed to each
other the security and reciprocal defence of their possessions in Europe, and
mutually promised an auxiliary force of 24,000 men, in the case of either being
attacked. Finally, by the secret convention, Austria signified her willingness
to intervene, in case a Power allied to England should invade the territory of
His Most Christian Majesty; and the King of France gave a similar promise.
Thus was
completed that diplomatic evolution which has been called by the well-known
name of the “Reversal of Alliances.” A close examination of the conditions
under which this transaction took place, shows that, except in the case of
Austria, which from the first had a clear view of the object to be attained,
circumstances had as much to do with the new arrangement as had the enlightened
and deliberate resolve of the personages responsible for it. So far, however,
as France was concerned, the shifting of the bases of her policy must be
allowed to have corresponded to certain tendencies and conceptions which,
though still not fully realised by those who entertained them, were far from
new. Louis XV had long been painfully conscious of the comparison which was
being drawn between himself and Frederick II—owing to the contrast between his
own indolence and the activity of the Prussian sovereign, and to the witticisms
which Frederick permitted himself at his royal brother’s expense ; moreover, as
a divot (notwithstanding his immoralities) Louis was pained by his alliance with
a Protestant monarch, who, though privately a sceptic, was capable of
protecting, and defending in case of need, the interests of his religion.
Conversely, in the same line of thought everything attracted Louis XV to the
Court of Vienna—“ the similarity of etiquette and of religious policy, the
prestige of the Imperial dignity, the tone, the ceremonial, nay, the very
proceedings, the actual circumlocutions, of the Empress’ Court”—and many
cognate considerations. The cause of this shifting of the bases of French
diplomacy must be sought in the King far more than in Mme de Pompadour. It has
been alleged that, provoked by the jests and sarcasms of the King of Prussia,
she was responsible for the Austrian alliance, and that the Empress of Austria
wrote her an autograph letter conveying her thanks; but Maria Theresa always
denied most emphatically that such a correspondence had ever taken place, and
it seems that the idea originated in some confusion with the letter written by
Kaunitz to Mme de Pompadour
1755-6] Significance and
reception of Treaty of Versailles. 337
in
consequence of the treaty of May 1. But, great as was the enthusiasm for the
Austrian cause displayed by the favourite after that date, and in spite of her
emphatic demand to be credited with it, the indications of direct intervention
on her part in the preceding negotiations are proportionately scanty. And as
for the Ministry—apart from Bernis, who was indeed an ardent adherent of this
alliance, but had no longer any official status—though the defection of the
King of Prussia had seriously shaken their previous convictions, they would
never have ventured to propose, on their own initiative, so radical a change of
policy.
The new
Treaty contained the germ of most of the military and diplomatic events which
were to follow. This is not intended to imply that in itself it was contrary to
the interests of France and to a reasoned policy on her part. Since the days
when Bichelieu had laid it down as a fundamental maxim of French politics that
the House of Austria must be brought low, great changes had taken place on the
other side of the Rhine; but the French Government, in seeking at the Court of
Vienna a substitute for the Prussian alliance that had come to a sudden end,
had hurried into concessions of the most dangerous order. While Austria,
admirably safeguarded by Kaunitz and Starhemberg, derived unquestionable
advantages from the new combination, in “changing the most important of the
continental Powers from an enemy into a friend, in freeing herself from anxiety
as to her distant possessions in the Netherlands, and in recovering her
freedom of action against the King of Prussia”—France, on the other hand, not
only made it impossible for herself to obtain in the Netherlands any
indemnification for her losses in the colonies, but transformed an ally of
yesterday, who had desired nothing but to remain neutral, into an enemy of
to-morrow. Of these extraordinary concessions on the part of France, which the
later treaties were to aggravate to a still more remarkable degree, there can
be only two explanations: the desire to take vengeance on the King of Prussia
for his recent action, and the fear of a coalition against France of the three
continental Powers, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. But, as a matter of fact,
such a coalition, of which England had indeed dreamed for a moment in 1755,
could never be formed, so long as those three Powers were kept apart by
unconquerable jealousies.
The Treaty of
May 1, 1756, was at first interpreted,, throughout Europe, as certain to ensure
peace on the Continent. After negotiations had been suspended for several
months, France and England at last entered upon open hostilities, in Acadia
(from which country the Acadians were driven out), and in the Mediterranean,
where a body of troops commanded by Marshal Richelieu seized the island of
Minorca. War was at last declared by England and France, but the King of
Prussia was uneasy about the coalition which the Court of Vienna was preparing
against him. In signing the subsidy treaty with England, in
1755, Russia, whose sovereign was entirely
devoted to the interests of
Austria, had
stipulated, by a note secretissime, that the diversion in favour of England,
provided for in the treaty, could only be understood of an attack upon, the
possessions of the King, of Prussia. This essential detail, which made the
Anglo-Russian agreement thenceforth valueless to himself, was not certainly
known by Frederick until June, 1756, when he was apprised'of it byiMitchell,
the new British ambassador at his: Court. He learnt at the same time through
Knyphausen, his ambassador in Paris, that negotiations were still being carried
on between the Court of Vienna and the Courts of Versailles and Russia, and
through various emissaries that .Austria was beginning to place her army on a
war footing. It has been related elsewhere, how Frederick addressed,to the
Empress Maria Theresa an ultimatum as to her armaments and warlike intentions,
and how then, without even waiting for her reply, he. invaded Saxony and forced
the Saxon troops encamped at Pima to capitulate.
This sudden
intervention on the part of Frederick II was destined to work,a radical change,
in the position ofjaffairs and to open a new era in European warfare. The
immediate result was the , rupture between France and Prussia. So soon as the
news of the unexpected invasion of Saxony was known at Versailles, the
Dauphiness Marie-Josephe, daughter of the Electur, had burst into a torrent of
complaints and demanded with tears the help of the King on behalf of her j family; {the lack of consideration
shown by Frederick for the Count de*Broglie, French ambassador in Saxony, and
the active measures of Starhemberg did the rest. Count de Valori, French
ambassador at Berlin, was recalled by a despatch of October 19: Knyphausen, the
Prussian ambassador in France, was not ordered to quit his post till the
beginning of November.
The second
result of the invasion of Saxony was that it gave a fresh direction to the
negotiations between France and Austria. These negotiations had been carried on
throughout the summer at Paris or at Compiegne, and,our chief source of
knowledge respecting them consists in the despatches of Starhemberg to Kaunitz.
On the side of France, Bemis continued to be the most earnest promoter of the
transaction: Mme de Pompadour showed scarcely less enthusiasm, and-multiplied
her interviews with the Austrian ambassador. “She told me,” writes Starhemberg,
‘Hhat she would see me in private whenever I wished; that I must speak with her
often, use perfect frankness, and, above all. lose no time.” But, the
irresolution of Rouille and the opposition of d Argensor had still to be
reckoned with; above all, the deep discrepancy1 between the claims
of Austria and the demands of France, must be i,emoved. At the end
of August, 1756, and a few days1 before the invasion of Saxony,
France consented to include among the objects of the agreement in-course of
negotiation the recovery of Silesia out of the hands,of Prussia, promising
assistance in money as well as an auxiliary force of 30,000 men. She further
agreed not to make any separate
peace witii
England, and undertook to maintain a considerable army to keep watch on the
Rhine. Austria, in exchange for the^e benefits, contented herself with
agreeing to the surrender pf the Austrian Netherlands to the Infant Philip, in
exchange fpr his Italian possessions, apd to the cession to Prance of certain
frontier towns. Kaunitz accordingly could not refrain from expressing his
satisfaction with this arrangement, and he wrote thus to jMme de pompadour: “
The instructions of Count de Starhemberg, the equity and. superior discernment
by which I know the King to lie distinguished, and your indefatigable zeal for
bis trvje interests...l^ad me J;o hope that we shall shortly bring tp
perfection thp greatest achievement for .which any European Cabinet has ever
j^en resppnsible.”
The
intervention pf the King of Prussia in Saxppy changed the immediate purpose of
the negotiations. Before proceeding further wi(th the preparation of
a s^cpiid treaty, Austria, demanded of Fjftnqe that ithe jfprrner agreement
^hquld, be carried out, apd notably th.at .the auxiliaiy provided ,fyy the,
convention of May 1,1756,,^i9,uld jje.sept .at pnce. The reply was #.t first
entirely satisfactory; ]bpt, ,^fhi).e the Court ,pf Vienna demanded tJ,ie
despatch of these troops to Moravia, the Ifyench Government recommended
operations against the principality pf Jiilich or against Hanover, and Marshal
,de Belleisle, though favourable tP the Austrian allianpe, likewise, for
military reasons, opposed the Austrian project. AlS the prolongation of these
disputes made the despatch of the troops impossible, Marshal d’Estrees was sent
to Vienna t,o prepare a plan. pf campaign for the year 1757. Meanwhile,
dqpiestic incidents mentioned b^low—the struggle against the Parlement)
E>amiens’ attempt upon the Jife of the King, and, the important
Ministerial.changes wliicjh ensued in the course of the winter of
1756—7—-contributed to retard the negotiations for the second treaty. This
treaty, known to history as the Second Treaty of Versailles,, was at last
signed on May 1,
1757, exactly a year later , than the earlier
agreement. It comprised a preliminary clause, 32 principal and 10 separate
articles, and prpyided that France, over and above the 24<,Q00 auxiliaries
prescribed by t.he defensive treaty, My as to furnish the Austrian armies with
10,000 German soldiers, equip ^.05,000 men jof her own, and pay to Austria an
annual Subsidy of twelve .million florips. Frapce obtained in exchange merely
the possession of certain fropt^r. towns of the Netherlands, Mons, Ypres,
Furnes, Ostend, and Nieuport: the rest of the Austrian Netherlands, was
assigned to. the infant Don Philip, ip exchange for the Italian duchies, which
reverted to the Empress. ThetwoPowers further promised npt to lay dpwn th^ir
arms until the King .of Prussia should have been fprced to relinquish Silesia
and,the county pf Glatz in fayour of Apsfafja, and Magdeburg and Halberstadt in
favour pf Sweden. As a $et-pff to this, Austria, without actually entering uppn
an agreement hostile to England, merely promised her good offices in preserving
Minorca for France when
peace should
be made, and in putting an end to the stipulations bearing on the
fortifications of Dunkirk.
For several
months previously, the coalition against Prussia had gained strength from
another quarter by the alliance of Russia and Austria. In spite of the opposing
influence of the Grand Chancellor, Bestuzheff, and the Grand Duchess Catharine,
who were entirely devoted to England, and of the Grand Duke Paul, whose
partisanship for the King of Prussia amounted to fanaticism, the Tsarina
Elizabeth, inspired by an inveterate hatred of Frederick II, no sooner learnt
of the Anglo- Prussian agreement of January 16,1756, than she showed herself
entirely ready to renew the former treaties with Austria. The chief difficulty
which had to be encountered in these negotiations consisted in the attitude of
France. The truth was that Russia only displayed readiness to undertake the war
on condition of an enlargement of her dominions, notably at the expense of
Prussia and of Poland, while the traditional policy of France, agreeing in this
particular with the private policy of Louis XV, had two objects to secure in
the East: namely, to prevent any extension of the dominions of Russia, and to
watch with jealous care over the independence of Poland. It is well known that
one of the chief objects of the private policy of Louis XV was to smooth the
way to the throne of Poland for the Prince de Conti. At last, thanks to the
modifications introduced by Austria, these contentions were happily evaded, and
the French Government, while consenting to the stationing of Russian troops
upon Polish territory, actually intervened in Poland to quiet the national
susceptibility. This difficulty settled, the conferences were soon brought to a
conclusion by the Convention of February 2, 1757, which confirmed the compact
of 1746, the two Empresses promising not to lay down their arms until Silesia and
the county of Glatz had been recovered and Prussia finally enfeebled.
Meanwhile, conferences were still in progress between Prussia and England on
both diplomatic and military questions, neither side displaying any great
confidence. The change of Ministers in England, the anxiety of King George to
preserve the neutrality of Hanover, and the negotiations with Vienna carried on
by him up to the last moment with this end in view, had made a sinister
impression upon Frederick II. However, at the end of the winter he had
succeeded in obtaining the appointment of the Duke of Cumberland, well known
for his hatred of France, to command the “ Army of Observation ” levied with
his approval.
The Great
Powers having now definitely chosen their sides, the struggle was to continue
for seven years, at once in Europe, in Asia and in America; but it would be an
entire mistake to suppose that the combinations thus formed were destined to
continue unaltered. The unforeseen course of events provoked, on more than one
occasion, an attempt to evade a promise given, or to conclude a separate treaty
of peace. The first of such attempts took place between Austria and
France at the
end of 1757. It has been related how after the French successes at Hastenbeck
and the capitulation of the Duke of Cumberland at Klosterzeven, Soubise had
been defeated by Frederick at Rossbach, and how, on their part, the Austrians,
after being vanquished at Prague and victorious at Kolin, had eventually been
utterly routed at Leuthen. These disasters had produced considerable
discouragement at Vienna, and above all at Versailles. Bemis, who in his
private letters to Choiseul, the new French ambassador at Vienna, displays a
very pessimistic disposition, enlarged upon the difficulty of adhering to all
the promises made by France, and suggested the idea of negotiations for peace.
An indignant reply on the part of Kaunitz, an eloquent piece of special
pleading from Maria Theresa, and the strenuous efforts of Starhemberg,
conquered the hesitation of the French Court, and Louis XV, in the instructions
sent to Choiseul after a council held on February 8, proclaimed himself a
whole-hearted adherent of the alliance, and ready to satisfy all its conditions
during the forthcoming campaign—namely, the payment of the subsidies, the
upkeep of his army in Germany, and the promise not to conclude any separate
treaty of peace with the King of Prussia.
. The
chivalrous response of Louis XV, though it had triumphed over the opposition of
Bemis, who was before all else a courtier, had not in the slightest degree
changed his personal convictions, which were only still further strengthened in
the course of the campaign of 1758 and the reverses by which it was marked.
Bemis, the chief promoter of the Austrian alliance, in proportion as the
confidence displayed by him before the outbreak of the war had been
precipitate, now showed himself discouraged, and a prey to nervous indecision.
Once more he pictured in the most life-like colours to the Court of Vienna the
financial distress of France, and proposed that the subsidies should be
reduced, and peace negotiations set on foot. When he met with resistance on the
part of Kaunitz and Maria Theresa, he finally proposed to Mme de Pompadour that
Choiseul should act as his collaborator. After much hesitation, the King went
beyond the wishes of his Minister, and sent him, on December 13, notification
of banishment. Among the principal causes of his disgrace were the coldness
which he had for some time displayed towards Mme de Pompadour, his too evident
desire to play the part of Chief Minister, and the fact that he had more than
once exceeded the wishes and the instructions of the King.
The Due de
Choiseul, who succeeded Bemis as Minister of Foreign Affairs, after having
played a distinguished part during the War of the Austrian Succession, and
shown much ability as ambassador at Rome and at Vienna, entered the Council
with the support of Mme de Pompadour. He had originally won her favour by
sacrificing to her a relative of his own, Mme de Choiseul Romanes, who had been
in passing distinguished by Louis XV. Being raised by the King not long
afterwards to
the dignity of duke and of peer, he wafc not slow to accept the part of Chief
Minister, for which he was indeed well qualified % n&ttfre. At once
courtier and statesman, with the gift of combinirfg pleasure with business, he
succeeded in giving a perceptible impulse? to the wheels of government, and
displayed as much tiorisistency in forming his projects as perseverance in
carrying' them intio effect.
By way of
marking his happy advent, Chdiseul threw over the negotiations which had been
carried on by Beriiis, more dr less secretly, with the object of coming to an
understariding with England and Prussia through the medium of Spain. He
affirmed the resolution of France to continue hostilities, and not to separate
h^r cause from that of Austria. By the Third Treaty of Paris, whitih bore the
official date df December 30 and 81,1758, although the signatures were not
affixted until March, 1759, and ratifications were not exchanged until May of
the same year, France undertook the continued maintenance of 10d,000
fighting-men in Germany and the payment of the Saxon and Swedish cdrps. Mme de
Pompadour was equally emphatic. “She is so far from aiiy thought of peace,”
writes Starhemberg to Kaunitz on September 26,1759, “that I have never found
her so resolute and so clear-headed.” The witticisms with which Frederick II
continued to assail Louis XV and his' mis.tress were, again, largtely
responsible for the warlike inclinations displayed by the French Court. It must
not however be hence concluded that Choiseul accepted without reserve the
consequences of th6 Austrian alliance. His language and his actions from this
time forward bear witness to his having considered that alliance rather as a
necessity imposed by the policy of the foregoing years, of which it was his
business to get rifl under the best possible conditions; they show, too, that
he was from the first intent upon preparing a more atid more intimate aiicord
with Spain—an accord which was to: be singularly assisted by the
fdrce of circumstances.
The year 1759
was marked by several important events : chief among these, the disasters
experienced by France in Canada (the loss of Quebec), and in Germany (her
defeat at Minden) ; at home, the fall of credit arid financial distress. In
Spain, King Ferdinand was succeeded by Charles III, formerly King of the Two
Sicilies, who was frankly in sympathy with France. The financial ernbarrassment
in England, arid the exhaustioft of Prussia in the very midst of her victories,
helped to impart manifest sincerity to the negotiations for peace now set on
fbdt. These negotiations assumed the twofold form of proposals of mediation
made by Spain to England, and declarations on the part of England arid Prussia.
From the1 moment of his accession, Charted III had displayed the
most unmistakable dfesire to take an active share in the reestablishment of
peace Igss, indeed, by reason df his sympathy with Frahce and resentment against
England, than because an exclusive English maritime supremacy made him
apprehensive for the Spanish
i7B9-6i] Choiseul and the negotiations for peace.
343
possessions
in the New World. But these tendencies, however skilfully encouraged by
Choiseul and Osuna, French Minister at Madrid, were thwarted by the opposition
of Pitt.
At the same
time, proposals were made by England and Prussia, with the object of assembling
a congress to treat for peace. Austria and Russia looked upon these
propositions with suspicion, thinking that they detected in them a secret
intention of sowing disunion and distrust between themselves; these two Powers,
moreover, persisted in their desire to ding to the advantages they had gained
over Frederick II. The proposals were taken more seriously by Choiseul, who
sought to find in them an honourable means of putting an end to the maritime
conflict between France and England. While the Bailli de Froulay was sent to
Paris to act as an intermediary between Choiseul and Frederick II, a long
conference was held at the Hague, early in 1760, between Yorke, on behalf of
England, and Comte dAffrey, representing France. Once more the efforts of
France were brought to a standstill by the unacceptable terms imposed by Pitt,
who laid it down as a preliminary condition that France should abandon her
allies; but Choiseul had at least succeeded in persuading Russia and Austria to
accept, though very reluctantly, the idea of a separate peace between France
and England.
In spite of
the obstacles encountered in England by the advocates of peace, Choiseul had no
wish to cut' himself off from that Power. During the series of alternate
successes and reverses which marked the campaign of 1760 in Germany, the
conferences were carried on, practically without interruption'. At Vienna,
Count de Choiseul, cousin of the Minister, was engaged in more than one stormy
discussion with Kaunitz and Maria Theresa, who refused to accept the principle
of private negotiations between France and England, and1 preferred
the establishment of‘ a general Congress. Choiseul appeared for a moment to be
resigned to this last: solution, and had even agreed to the despatch
of plenipotentiaries to Augsburg; but the idea of this congress was to prove?
abortive, and the negotiations between France and England were now to assume a
more active character, after the despatch, in the spring of 1761, of Hans
Stanley to Paris and of Bussy to London, as plenipotentiaries of the two
Powers.' The bases of the negotiations had been fixed by the memorandum ssoed
some weeks previously by Choiseul, which provided that each of the belligerents
should retain the conquests made by him during the war; but the first
difficulty arose when it became a question of deciding whether the conquests
made by France in Germany came under that head. Many other difficulties
retarded the legotiations: thte quarrels about the fisheries in the New World,
the possessions of England and France in the Indies, and the evacuation of
Germany by the1 French troops; further, the' opposition of Kaunitz,
and above all, the introduction into the negotiations, at the instigation of
Choiseul, of the question of the Spanish grievances.
For many
months, in truth, while the negotiations between France and England were being
carried on, Choiseul had been holding with Spain certain conferences which were
destined to bring about, under the name of the “Family Compact,” a diplomatic
event of equal importance with that “Reversal of Alliances” which had marked
the beginning of the war. Since his accession, the new King of Spain had not
made any effort to conceal the signs of his sympathy with France. Under his
influence, his advisers, and especially Wall, his Minister of Foreign Affairs,
who had been quite recently a devoted partisan of England, had notably modified
their attitude. These new tendencies found another explanation in the
discontent aroused in Spain by the action of England—the capture of Spanish
vessels, on more than one occasion by the British squadrons, disputes about the
right of fishing in the waters of Newfoundland carried on between England and
the fishermen of Biscay and Guipuzcoa, and quarrels on the subject of the trade
in logwood, had given rise to more and more vigorous protests on the part of
the Spanish Cabinet. These protests had invariably been met in London by an
obvious determination to disregard them. Osuna, the French Minister at Madrid,
was consequently received with favour when he proposed, in the name of his
Government, a project of offensive alliance against England (November, 1760);
this project, which began, in the mind of Choiseul, at the time of his entry
into the Cabinet, was supplemented by a close economic alliance between the two
countries. Charles III showed great readiness to accept both proposals, only demanding
time to put his colonies in a fit state for defence and to equip a fresh army
and navy for Spain, before entering on the campaign. But it was not long before
the progress of the negotiations between France and England completely changed
the aspect of affairs. Charles III began to fear that peace between; France and
England might enable the latter country to steal a successful march on the
Spanish possessions in the Philippines and the New World, and he soon showed
himself most eager to come to an agreement. The conditions proposed by Choiseul
were accepted practically entire, and formed the principal bases of the
treaties signed in Paris on August 15,1761, and ratified at San Ildefonso on
the 25th of the same month. By the first of these treaties—known as the
“Family, Compact”—“any Power which shall become the enemy of the one or the
other of the two Crowns” was declared the enemy of both ; the advantage of this
protection was further extended to the King of the Two Sicilies and to the
Infant Don Philip, Duke of Parma. The aid to be furnished by each of the two
Powers consisted of 12 ships of the line, 5 frigates and 24,000 men—a number
which in certain contingencies might be reduced, for Spain, to 12,000. The two
Powers were not to treat for peace “save by mutual and common agreement and
consent,” and on the basis of an equitable balance of losses and gains. In
another section of the treaty the political and commercial
i76i] The Family Compact and the peace
negotiations. 345
relations
were defined in the most liberal spirit: the Spaniards and Neapolitans were no
longer to be accounted aliens in France, and the French were to benefit by
similar advantages, having the right to dispose of all their property by will,
donation, or any other method. Further items were: liherty of import and export
for subjects of either Crown in the dominions of the other; equal treatment in
the matter of trade, taxes, and navigation, and finally, union and friendly
understanding between the representatives of the two Crowns in their attitude
towards foreign Powers. The name of “Family Compact” was justified by the
stipulation: “ no other Power than those of this House (the House of Bourbon)
shall be either invited or permitted to give adherence to this compact.” As a
matter of fact, the Princes reigning at Naples and at Parma joined this
alliance shortly afterwards.
This Compact
was supplemented by a secret Convention bearing the same date (August 15,
1761), whose principal stipulations were that Spain should undertake to declare
war on May 1, 1762, if peace had not been concluded before that date; that
France should from that time forward incorporate the complaints of Spain with
her own grievances, and make no treaty on her own account, unless those
grievances were remedied by it; and, finally, that Portugal should be
compelled, if necessary by force, to embrace the cause of the two Powers.
The “Family
Compact” thus comprised two divisions—the one relating to affairs of war, the
other to politics and trade. We shall have occasion below to speak of the
advantages and the importance of the latter division, which, for the rest,
possessed by far the most enduring significance. The other was of far more
doubtful value. Choiseul’s great mistake was that he was deceived about the military
resources of Spain. In 1761, the forces of France were too much exhausted, and
those of Spain too little inured to the discipline of war, for the union of the
two Powers to produce any essential change in the aspect of affairs. These
errors on the part of Choiseul could not but react upon affairs both diplomatic
and military. From the diplomatic point of view, Choiseul imagined that, by
putting forward Spain in his negotiations with England, he would gain at the
same time certain important advantages. Not only, however, did Pitt, who was
better acquainted with Spanish affairs, refuse to follow this lead, but even
the two negotiators themselves, Bussy and Stanley, were of opinion that the
introduction of the Spanish grievances into the Franco-British conferences,
though perhaps not amounting to a change in the substance of Pitt’s ultimatum
of July 25, 1761, at any rate made its terms more impracticable. We know the
chief articles of this ultimatum: France was not to aid Maria Theresa except
with the 24,000 men stipulated by the First Treaty of Versailles; while England
might continue to assist the King of Prussia with all the resources at her
disposal ; the fortifications of Dunkirk were to he destroyed; and England was
to keep all the colonies in her possession
346 Last phase of the War.-Peace of Hubertusburg.
[i76i-3
at the date
of the signing of the Treaty. Choiseul replied to this ultimatum by the
“ultimatissimum” of September 3, in which he accepted the principle of the
demolition of the fortifications of Duiikirk, but demanded for France the
unchallenged possession of the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon, and claimed
satisfaction for the Spanish grievances. A deadlock had now been •eached, and
the commissioners were recalled.
In England*
the fall of Pitt was hastened as much by his own intractability, his
disagreements with his colleagues, particularly with Newcastle and Lord Bute,
and the lack of sympathy displayed towards him by the new King, as by the
rupture of the negotiations with France; but his disappearance from the Cabinet
of St James’ caused no essential modification in its policy. The cessation of
the conferences with France was followed almost immediately by the rupture of
relations with Spain, which had been growing more and more strained during
the'past months; at the end of December, 1761, the ambassadors were recalled,
and war was declared by England on January 2, 1762.
This last
phase of the War, which in the opinion of Choiseul and Charles III must decide
the question of naval and colonial supremacy between England on the one hand
and France and Spain on the other, was of short duration. The rapid opening of
hostilities against Spain, recommended by Pitt, had the result which he had
foreseen. The campaign of 1762- entailed upon France the loss of such
possessions as she still had in the West Indies, the capture of Martinique and
the islands of Grenada and St Vincent, while Spain lost Havana and the
Philippines. Meanwhile, on the Continent, the death of Elizabeth and the
accession of the Tsar Peter III to the throne of Russia marked a change of
policy on the part of that’ country in favour of Prussia; and after Peter’s
death, at the end of a few months, the new Tsarina, Catharine II, showed
herself disposed to remain neutral. The weariness and exhaustion of the1
belligerents led to a resumption of the conferences* and this time a decision
was soon reached.
In accordance
with the principle laid down by Choiseul, the negotiations were carried on by
each country separately—Prussia being represented by Hertzberg, Austria by
Frisch and Collenbach, Augustus III by Briihl—and the result was the Treaty of
Hubertusburg, signed on February 15, 1763. This Treaty confirmed the status quo
before the War, Frederick II retaining Silesia, and promising his voice in
support of the election of Joseph, the eldest son of Maria Theresa, as King of
the Romans, while the Elector of Saxony regained possession of all his
dominions. Between France and England, negotiations were resumed after the
despatch of the Due de Nivemais to London and of the Duke of Bedford to Paris.
The preliminaries were signed at Fontainebleau on November 3, 1762, and
confirmed by the Treaty of Paris on February 10, 1763. By this Treaty France
ceded to England the
whole of
Canada, and only retained, in the West Indies the island of St Lucia, in
Senegal the island of Goree, and in India the five towns of Mahe, Pondicherry,
Chandemagorfe, Karikal, and Yanaon; she further restored Minorca, and ceded
Louisiana to Spain in exchange for Florida, which the latter Power made over to
England.
This Treaty,
which secured the maritime supremacy'of England and the military prestige of
Prussia, was called in France “ the dfcgraceful peace.” It did in fact signify
for France the loss of her colonial empire, the annihilation of her navy and of
the ruin of her finances; and the discontent created among all classes by so
unparalleled a series of reverses was to prbve a source of great trouble in the1
future. Before reviewing the efforts made by Choiseul, in the second period of
his Ministry^ to repair these disasters, we may briefly recall the principal
events which' had marked the domestic history of the country1 during
the previous years.
Among the
institutions which played a prominent part in the internal history of France in
the eighteenth centilry, the Parlement holds the foremost place. At the very
beginning of the reign of Louis XV, that body, by setting aside the will of the
late King, had striven to take vengeance for the state of dependence in which
it had been kept by Louis XIV. In the absence of the States General, which had
not been convoked since 1614, the Parlement aspired to play a political part,
and to transform its right of remonstrance into a real control over the
proceedings of the royal power. The disputes constantly arising upon the
subject of the Jansenists, who had become a political coterie, had furnished
the Parlement with frequent opportunities of intervention. On several occasions
its members had refused to sit, and had been sent into exile: the banishment to
PbfttoiSe'in 1753 lasted for upwards of fifteen months. In 1755 it was engaged
in a vigorous dispute with the Archbishop of Paris on the subject Of the
Jansenists and of the administration of the’ Sacraments; In 1756, the Parlement
had to meet in the presence of the King, in order to be forced to adopt the
edicts for extraordinary taxes issued at the beginning of the War ; at the end
of the year, resort was had to the same proceeding, and on this occasion
several edicts were read, modifying the constitution of the Parlement and
reducing its powers.
During the
course of this struggle, on January 5, 1757, a fanatic, Jean-Fran^ois Damiens,
who had formerly been a domestic servant, stabbed the King with a khife as he
was entering his carriage; The wound was slight; but profound emotion was
excited at the Court. When the assassin was tried by the Parlement, a strange
light was thrown upon the sentiments produced in the lower classes of society
by their misery, and by the political and religious d icussions of the time.
Ther attempt of Damiens also had unforeseen consequences in another
sphere of public life. In the first stress of his emotion, the
King had
refused for several days to see Mme de Pompadour. From this it had been
generally inferred that the favourite had fallen into lasting disgrace; and her
return to favour resulted in the fall, at the very moment when the Seven Years’
War was about to begin, of the two Ministers who had shown themselves most
strenuously opposed to her influence, but who, on the other hand, were the most
capable of ensuring satisfactory preparations for the War—d’Argenson and
Machault.
The combined
influence of the ill-feeling of the Parlement and the Jansenists, and of the
opinions of the Philosophers, was responsible for the movement against the
Jesuits, which began in France some years later, and resulted in the
dissolution of their body. The animosity aroused by their ascendancy in the
principal Catholic Courts of Europe, and by their interference in politics,
which in Portugal brought about their expulsion, is described in another
chapter of this volume. In France, the looked-for opportunity arose with the
action brought by several merchants against Pere Lavalette. This Jesuit had
founded in Martinique a business house, which had at first prospered, but
eventually failed, in: consequence of the capture by the English of
a number of vessels laden with cargo belonging to the concern. Some merchants
of Marseilles, Lavalette’s creditors, had brought a suit against the whole
Order, as being responsible for the debts of its members. The Jesuits refused
payment, on the ground that they had excluded Pere Lavalette from their Order,
and further invoked the principles of their constitution. They lost their case
before the Consular tribunal of Marseilles, and before the Parlement of Paris;
but the latter body, when an appeal “ on the ground of abuse ” was entered by
the Attorney-General, undertook to examine the constitution of the Society. The
result was that the King’s subjects were forbidden to join it, and the Jesuits
themselves interdicted from teaching. Meanwhile, several provincial Parlements,
notably those of Rouen and Rennes, gave decisions against the Order. Under the
pressure of public opinion and of the Philosophers, and following the advice of
Choiseul, Louis XV disregarded the opposition of the Dauphin, a number of
Bishops and the divot party, and issued at last, in November, 1764, an edict
enacting that “ the Society should no longer exist in France; that its members
should only be allowed to live in private in the King’s dominions.” Nine years
later, in 1773, the abolition of the Society of Jesus was pronounced by Pope
Clement XIV.
While
Choiseul was thus satisfying the principles of the Philosophers and the ambitions
of the Parlements,. he was also engaged upon the reform of the army and of the
navy, undertaking himself, from 1761 to 1766, the entire responsibility of
those two departments, and leaving in the meantime the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to his cousin, the Due de Choiseul-Praslin. In 1766, he again resumed
the conduct of foreign affairs and entrusted his cousin with the management of
the navy; but, as a matter of fact, it was at any given moment his opinion
and his
behaviour that inspired and dominated the entire policy of the Cabinet. With
regard to the army, a preparatory military school was established at La Fleche
to supplement the military school at Paris; the guns were thenceforth
manufactured in the state factories; and, in 1765, the new system introduced by
Gribeauval established the artillery corps— thenceforth distinct from the
engineer corps—consisting of the first seven artillery regiments. As to the
navy, the three arsenals already existing were supplemented by two
more—Marseilles for galleys, and Lorient; by means of voluntary contributions,
the fleet was increased by a certain number of vessels, and important works
were set on foot at Brest. The Naval Academy was reorganised, and a new impetus
given to scientific studies. But the indefatigable activity of Choiseul displayed
itself above all in the department of politics and diplomacy, during the seven
years (1763-70) which formed the latter portion of his Ministry.
During the
last period of his career, the foreign policy of Choiseul displayed two chief
tendencies: to annul the effects of the Treaty of Paris and to intervene in the
Eastern question in favour of the old allies of France concerned in it—Sweden,
Poland, and Turkey. Never had the qualities and defects of his character been
more clearly marked than in his application of this policy. Of quick and
resourceful intelligence, far-seeing at times to the point of divination, swift
to conceive schemes which sometimes evinced a very real force, when it came to
execution he was invariably inconsequent, thoughtless, and blundering, thus in
a measure justifying the quip attributed to Louis XV; “ he thinks himself a
great Minister, and has nothing in his mind but a little phosphorus.” These
defects could not fail to have a sinister influence on his schemes. But he was
in any case, from his very position as Chief Minister of such a King as Louis
XV, foredoomed to disaster. All his efforts against England and in the East
ended in war—a result which he foresaw and, far from dreading, almost welcomed;
but Louis XV, especially in his later days, was incapable of following Choiseul
in this redoubtable enterprise, and the foreign policy of the Minister
inevitably ended in his downfall. That downfall was for him well-timed, in that
his plans scarcely had to endure the test of being put into practice: it was
ill-timed, in so far as it caused the results obtained to appear disproportionate
to his efforts. Hence the different judgments passed by recent historians upon
Choiseul—some honestly admiring his policy, and others seeing in him only a
fanatic and a blunderer.
With regard,
in the first instance, to his policy against England, he has been accused of
failing to grasp the importance of the losses entailed by the Treaty of Paris.
The assertion has been put into his mouth, that he had done the English a good
turn by obliging them to distribute their strength all over the world, and he
has been reproached for speaking i’sdainfully of the loss of Canada. His words
were doubtless nothing
350 Results of Choiseul's policy in the
Mediterranean. [1755-90
more than the
capricious utterance of a statesman trying to put a good face on a bad
business; and his failure to,appreciate,the*yalue of Canada was shared at that
time by the Englisn themselves. In any case, he had projects of reorganising
the, paval and colpnial empire of fFra,nce—projects summed up in his
dream of supremacy • in the two Mediterraneansrn-that of the old Continent, and
the American Mediterranean, (the Gulf of Mexico and tthe West;Indian
seas).
France owed
to Choiseul the acquisition ,of Cp^ica in the western Mediterranean, wjhich was
qpntrolled, by the English forts of Gibraltar find Port Mahon. In 1755, a
patriot, Paoli, raised , the whple island against its Genome masters, who, as
is related elsewhere, were in ,1756 forced ,tp appeal for help .to the French
troops occupying the principal forts on the coast. In 1768, Choisepl induced
Gfinpa to sejl, the island to France. Equilibrium was thus restored in the,
western Mediterranean, and Toulon and the coast of Provence were protected by
advanced ppsts pf first-class strength. The English Qpvemment,; preoccupied by
their disputes with the American colonists, realised too late,the impprtance of
the proceedings, when, in response .to the protests pf Jfooli, the whole of:
the patriot party indirectly came to their aid. The iPapJists defeated tbe
first troops sent by Chpiseul,, but in May, 1769, Count de Vaux, thanks to his
superior numbers, wpn the decisive victory of ,P,pntenuovo. These proceedings
bred in, the Corsicans a bitter resentment against France, while the, English
chafed,at their Ipst opportunity. Thns.it came to pass that the island once
more revolted, jinder the leadership of Paoli (1790), and the English
established)there,a naval fort threatening that of Toulon, until jn course of
time the ascendancy pf .Napoleon Bonaparte transformed the Corsicans into
French patriots.
Perhaps ar
expedition sent by Choiseul against,Tunis and Biserta— an expedition w^ichfwas,
moreover, premature and productive ,of no lasting results—need,not be regarded
as mare than an incident in the lflpgrstanding quarrel between ,the inhabitants
of Rarbary and the Europeans. Bvit, pn the other , hand, Chpiseul in 1769
encouraged the Fpepcji ,adyance into Egypt, which was a station of,first-class
importance in tbe eastern Mediterranean, in contact with the seaports of the
Levant, where the influence of France predominated, and at the same time
affprding an approach , to India. Choiseul anticipated Bonaparte by cherishing
the,thought of Egypt as a French possession.
But, in the
direction, pf the . American Mediterrarean, Choiseul ihad a yet more exalted
aim. Ever since the Bourbon dynasty had placed PhiUp,V upon the thrpne
of,Spain,.France, had dreamed of opening to French products that market,
hitherto jealously barred to European importation. This traditional policy of
France, interrupted by the, Regent’s anti-Spanish policy, and by the friendly
relations between, Spain and England signalised by the commercial treaty of
1750, reappeared when France and Spain came to an agreement, inspired by a
common dread of
1758-67] Choiseul’s commercial schemes in the New
World. 351
the
flourishing navy of England. Since 1758, Choiseul had employed on the drafting
of an economic! alliance a functionary, established in Spain by the French
since the reigniof Philip V-^the Agent-General of commerce and naval affairs,
who combined the functions of a commercial attach^ with those of a secret
diplomatic agent, and whose part it was to guide and—when necessary—to; take
the place of the ambassador, in matters of trade. In 1758, this post was
occupied by Abbe Beliardi, “the channel of communication between M. de Choiseul
and M. d’Arandi.” He set on foot a great commercial enquiry in Spain, from 1758
to .17163, oncemed principally with Cadiz, the general market in. the West i
Indian trade. The Family Compact of 1761 was, in certain of , its bearings, an
economic alliance. In 1763, after the War, Choistal developed his news as to
the method pf turning that alliance, to account. “I should like,” he wrote to
Louis XV, “ all other alliances i to be subordinated to this union.” The otyect
of France was to obtain from Charles III ..the opening of the Spanish Indies to
her industrial products, and so to .assist the economic development of Spain as
to procure for herself,a prosperous ally. From 1763 to 1766, negotiations for a
commercial,agreement were carried on; in 1765, Charles III reduped the export
duties on iSpanish products imported into America, which were principally
French goods imported under the protection of Spain: these goods*ibecoming consequently
cheaper, competed in America with the English contraband merchandise brought
from Jamaica. Finally—most important of all— Choiseul hoped to form out of all
that remained of the French empire in America—St Dominique, Martinique and
Guiana—a colonial domain in the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas. This
domain was, under the protection of ;Spanish America, to make French influence
supreme in the American Mediterranean and provide ,a means of taking a>vay
the trade of British America from the south; it was, further, to serve as a
market for French products destined for Spanish America, and wpuld even make
possible, in case of .need,, an attack upon Brazil, or the blocking of the road
by which ^English contraband goods came from British Guiana to Peru. With this
end in,view, Choiseul took in hand the colonisation of French Guiana; his
attempt, however, was a dead failure, not through his own fault, but through
that of d’Estaing, ,to whom he had entrusted the management of the scheme: and
even-..then he still had the hope, of .obtaining from Spain a station in the
Philippines, whence French commodities could be carried to the Pacific coast of
Spanish America.
Such schemes
could not fail to produce disquiet in England, on whom, however, Choiseul was
eager to inflict a more direct injury. He judged, quite correctly, that the,
loss of Canada by France would lead to a rising in British America, now that
they had no further need of the mother country as a point of resistance to the
Canadians. So early as 1767, Choiseul foresaw this insurrection of the British
settlers, and sent a secret
agent, Kalb,
to study the situation. At first Kalb did not recognise any signs of a
separatist movement, but presently he changed his opinion and urged Choiseul to
take active steps. But that Minister was no longer able to spare attention for
America, and Kalb’s reports left him unmoved. Choiseul, whose fall in 1770 was
due to a “plan of campaign against England,” showed a prophetic belief in the
inevitable rivalry to come between the revolted Americans and the English.
Though, as has been seen, at times guilty of inconsequence or of blindness, in
the question of the American Mediterranean he nevertheless displayed amazing
foresight, anticipating the ephemeral project of Napoleon I, in 1803, of
constituting a French empire in America with the help of Louisiana and St
Dominique—which project, it may be, in turn influenced Napoleon Ill’s scheme of
a French empire in Mexico.
We are now in
a position to appreciate Talleyrand’s description of Choiseul as “ one of the
most prophetically-minded men of our generation.” It will also be seen that
Pitt was right, when he said, in 1763, that England, by making peace with
France, was offering her the opportunity of reconstituting her navy and her
colonies. This reconstitution was the work of Choiseul. But, as Captain Mahan
has said, “In the naval development of a State, the regular action of a moneyed
class, preponderant in the nation and free to act, is of more importance than
the initiative of a despotic and temporary power.” Choiseul, so long as Louis
XV left the government in his hands, had a certain influence on the
reconstitution of the navy and the colonies of France: but Louis XV deprived
him of this power, and from that moment the plans of Choiseul were destined to
fall into oblivion.
The Eastern
question was another of Choiseul’s chief preoccupations. In the eighteenth
century, France had three allies in eastern Europe— Sweden, Poland, and Turkey.
These three States had been falling into decadence since the end of the
seventeenth century, while, in their place, Prussia, Austria, and Russia were
coming into prominence. Thus had sprung up the idea of a partition of each of
the three declining Powers by their three rivals; and, in the time of Choiseul,
Sweden was threatened with partition by Prussia, Russia, and Denmark, Poland by
Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and Turkey by Russia and Austria. However,
Prussia, Austria, and Russia were themselves divided by mutual jealousy and
apprehension. Frederick II of Prussia, since the Seven Years’ War, had lived in
mortal fear of the colossal and barbarous power of Russia, declaring her to be
a “deadly neighbour and a peril to the whole of Europe.” He would fain have had
the support of Austria, France, and England, in keeping in check Catharine II,
to whom he preached the duty of moderation in her appetite for conquests.
Catharine, on her side, declared to Potemkin that the Prussian alliance was
“the most ignominious and intolerable thing in the whole world,” and sought
rather to make an ally of Austria. That Power, which, now that Silesia was
finally lost to it, nursed a permanent grudge against Prussia,
had another
ground for uneasiness in what has1 been called “ the Greek project”
of Catharine II—her desire, that is, of reuniting the Orthodox party in Russia
with their kinsmen in the Balkan peninsula, and of establishing the Christian
faith in Constantinople, by introducing there the supremacy of Russia. If
Prussia, Austria, and Bussia were divided, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, which
ought to have joined forces in their common danger, were similarly separated by
a traditional hostility, and England, instead of supporting Turkey, was
disposed to sacrifice that Power to Russian ambition. But France always took up
the cause of the three Powers thus menaced. Though she had lost much of her
authority in Europe by her reverses in the Seven Years1 War,
Choiseul reckoned on the help of his ally, Austria, against Russia and Prussia—
a calculation which, in fact, lay at the root of his Eastern policy. But,
unhappily, this was, like much of the official policy of France, not in
accordance with the secret policy of the King. Louis XV distrusted Austria
equally with Prussia and Bussia, and the “King’s Secret” consequently resisted
any extension of Austrian influence in Turkey and above all in Poland. It
cannot be denied that events were to prove the farsightedness of the “King’s
Secret” with regard to Austria, and the mistake of Choiseul on the same head.
In any case, the opposition between the official diplomats and the secret
agents of France deprived her Eastern policy of all definiteness and all
efficacy.
The real
danger for Sweden, Poland, and Turkey lay not so much in the sinister designs
of their neighbours and the powerlessness of France as in the shortcomings of
their internal organisation. They were feudal States—States, that is, without
unity, without a centralised government, without any financial or military
organisation—opposed to such modern States as Prussia and Austria were, and
Russia was trying to be. At the end of the Seven Years’ War, Russia, Prussia,
and Austria, having gained no new territory in that War, fell to dreaming of
compensation. The year 3762 saw the death of the King Augustus III of Poland,
Elector of Saxony; and the election of a new King furnished an excellent
pretext for foreign intervention. Consequently, Peter III of Russia and
Frederick II of Prussia undertook, by a secret treaty, to maintain the
Constitution of Poland—in other words, to perpetuate anarchy in that country.
From 1763 onwards, in view of the defects of her Constitution, the situation of
Poland became extremely grave. As for Turkey, she was then what she is now. The
Mussulman Turk pitched his camp in the midst of infidel Slavs and Hellenes,
whom he had neither absorbed nor converted; he did not govern them, for the
Sultan despot, torpid in his seraglio, left the Pachas to act for him, and they
had no other administrative system than that of “devouring the country.” The
Sultan’s Christian subjects, too, were waking little by little to covet
independence, and were no longer indifferent to the propaganda issued by Russia
in favour of the project of rousing the Greeks to revolt.
Given the
position of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, what steps did Choiseul think fit to
take? To save Sweden, he lectured the heir presumptive to the throne, Prince
Gustavus, the son of King Adolphus Frederick, upon the dangers threatening his
country. He thought that Turkey was strong enough in military force to save
herself, and even to help in safeguarding Poland. Poland it was, above all,
that Choiseul was planning to protect, and she was in truth the most severely
menaced of the three. The first transaction demanding attention was the
election of the successor of Augustus III. The candidate put forward by Prussia
and Russia was Stanislaus Poniatowski, by birth a Polish noble, who was
supported by the powerful family of the Czartoryskis, and a favourite of
Catharine II. Choiseul and Austria had another candidate—Prince Xavier of
Saxony, brother of the Dauphiness of France; and Choiseul reckoned on obtaining
the intervention of Turkey in favour of his nominee. But Austria had no other
motive in upholding the claims of a Saxon in Poland than that of gaining the
vote of the Elector of Saxony in the election of Joseph II as King of the
Romans; and, that election once made, Austria had no further interest in the question.
Turkey declined to act, because Prussia and Russia assured her that the only
desideratum was liberty in elections to the throne of Poland, and that to
uphold Poniatowski was simply to support a true Pole. Finally, Xavier of Saxony
offended the Primate of Poland, Lubienski, whose influence was very great.
Choiseul, thus finding himself alone against Prussia and Russia, dared not
state precisely the attitude of France. Some Russian troops entered Poland, and
Stanislaus Poniatowski wab elected (September, 1764)- Choiseul’s endeavour was
now to screen Stanislaus from Russian influence, to the advantage of Austria
and France. With this end in view, Choiseul sketched a plan of marriage between
Stanislaus and an Archduchess of Austria; but the plan came to nothing, through
the machinations of the “ King’s Secret ” against Austria.
From 1766
onwards, Stanislaus and the Czartoryskis endeavoured to reform the Polish
Constitution; while an opposition faction, formed by the adherents of Xavier of
Saxony, but claiming the title of “ national party,” demanded the preservation
of the old Constitution in every point. Matters were, however, upon the point
of being arranged in the Diet by a reconciliation between the Czartoryskis and
the national party, when the Russian ambassador, Repnin, brought the Russian
soldiery to bear upon the Diet, and obliged it to repeal the laws against
Dissidents, which pressed hard on the Greek Catholics, and restored the liberum
veto in its unrestricted form (1768). By way of revenge, the nobles who were
hostile to the Dissidents and to the Czartoryskis formed the Confederation of
Bar. Choiseul espoused the cause of the Confederates; but public opinion in
France, following the Philosophers, in whose eyes Catharine II appeared as the
patroness of religious tolerance in Poland, pronounced
i768-7o] Russian fleet in Greek waters-Fall of
Choiseul. 355
against them.
The support of Choiseul was given indirectly, by sending to the Confederates
certain officers, such as Dumouriez and Choisy, whose record as adventurers
would justify him in disowning them, in case of need, and by gifts of money and
ammunition. But the Russian troops penetrated further and further into Polish
territory, and under the pretext of helping the Dissidents drove out the Confederates
of Bar. Choiseul now urged Austria to give direct support to the Confederates,
and since the Russian troops, in pursuing their prey, violated Turkish
territory, the French ambassador in Constantinople, de Vergennes, persuaded
the Sultan Mustafa to declare war against Russia (1768).
Upon this
occasion also, the “ King’s Secret ” baffled the effort made by Choiseul to
rouse Austria to arms, and the war dragged on in another quarter between Turks
and Russians, while in Poland the state of anarchy increased. Frederick II and
Maria Theresa posted troops to keep a lookout on the Polish frontier, and
these troops, in particular the Austrians, encroached little by little upon the
Polish territory. Prussia and Austria were uneasy at Catharine’s seizure of
Poland, and Frederick II wished to divert her attention to Sweden; in certain
interviews with Joseph II of Austria at Neisse and Neustadt, he sought to
devise ways of keeping Russia in check. And in the midst of all these
complications and intrigues, the idea already formulated in the seventeenth and
the first half of the eighteenth century was taking shape—the idea of a
partition of Poland which should satisfy the conflicting desires of her
neighbours.
At this
moment Catharine II, instigated by her favourite, Gregori Orloff, who was
himself inspired by the Greek Papazoglu, tried to carry out her “ Greek project
” by sending into the Archipelago, by way of the Mediterranean, a Russian fleet
to rouse the Hellenes to revolt. England favoured this scheme, in order to play
a trick upon France and her ally, Turkey; and it was an English sailor,
Elphinston, who piloted the first Russian fleet that ever sailed the waters of
the Levant. The Turkish fleet was burnt at Tchesme (in August, 1770), and the
Straits and Constantinople were only saved by the menaces of Baron de Tott, an
adventurer sent by Choiseul to the Sultan to play the same part in Turkey as
that played-by Dumouriez, Choisy, and their fellows, in Poland. It was these
advantages gained by Russia over the Turks which determined Austria and Prussia
to call upon the Tsarina to check her advance on Constantinople, and to offer
her indemnification in Poland. Before these consequences of the Russian cruise
manifested themselves, France saw the fall of Choiseul from power, in
December, 1770.
The fall of
Choiseul was brought about partly by his foreign policy • his naval and
colonial policy was driving him into a war with England, and his attitude in
the Eastern question was also involving him in a war with England and Russia.
These adventurous schemes “ disturbed the senile egoism of Louis XV.” The
Minister was, moreover, the victim of his domestic policy—in other words, of
his concessions to the Parlements,
his lack of
foresight in financial questions, and his quarrel with the devot party at
Court, together with the ill-will of the new favourite, Mme Du Barry.
The eternal
conflict between the Crown and the Parlements was renewed in 1763-4, when the
Government, in spite of the fact that peace had been concluded, sought to
continue the taxes levied on account of the Seven Years’ War. In Britanny, this
conflict resulted in a coalition between the Estates of the province and the
Parlement of Rennes, led by its Attorney-General, La Chalotais, against the Due
d’Aiguillon, the royal Governor of Britanny, whom the Parlement of Rennes,
followed by that of Paris, undertook to subject to solemn censure. Thus the
Parlements were setting on foot proceedings against a representative of the
royal authority, while resisting the financial policy of the Crown. But the
King could not allow himself to be set at defiance; and, moreover, the state
coffers were empty. Choiseul had none of the qualities of an expert financier:
he was too lofty a personage to interest himself in questions of statistics,
and the successive Controllers-general whom he had chosen, Bertin and L’Averdy,
had not succeeded in supplying the deficiencies of the Treasury. At any price,
then, in 1769-70, the opposition of the Parlements to the authority and to the
fiscal demands of the Crown must be overcome—and this had, in fact, been the
cry of Maupeou, Chancellor since 1768, and Terray-, appointed
Controller-general in 1769. But Choiseul shrank from crushing the Parlements,
because they had the support of public opinion, which it was ever his care to
please; and he forbore to give serious consideration to the attitude of Maupeou
and Terray, because he believed himself at that juncture to be all-powerful.
The death of the Dauphin had indeed freed him from his most powerful enemy, and
that of Mme de Pompadour from a compromising patronage, and he had succeeded in
marrying the new Dauphin, the heir presumptive, whose reign could not be long
delayed, to Marie-Antoinette of Austria. But Maupeou and Terray had on their
side the devot party, lately headed by the deceased Dauphin, and now under the
leadership of the Due de La Vauguyon and Nicolay, Bishop of Verdun, and they
could not forgive Choiseul for the fall of the Jesuits. This coalition was
further strengthened by Mme Du Bariy, whom Choiseul had been so ill-advised as
to hold in contempt; not that she was contemptible—Mme de Pompadour, his
protectress, had scarcely been more powerful—but because the Minister believed
Louis XV’s attachment for her to be nothing more than a fleeting caprice. The
Due d’Aiguillon and Marshal Richelieu instructed Mme Du Barry to slander
Choiseul in the King’s hearing. The quarrel with the Parlements furnished the
coalition with the opportunity of overthrowing that Minister. Between June and
December, 1770, Maupeou insisted on forcing the King’s will upon the
Parlements, until that of Paris suspended its functions. The strike was brought
to an end on December 20 by a royal injunction that the Parlement should resume
its duties; and on December 24 Choiseul was dismissed.
His fall came
none too soon for his reputation. The ingenuous confidence of his foreign
policy with regard to Austria, which he regarded in the light of an instrument
for safeguarding Poland, marked him out for speedy disaster, while at home his
compliance towards the Parlements and his laxity in financial matters could not
long be allowed to continue. His fall relieved him of responsibility for the
difficulties bequeathed by him to his successors, and he carried with him into retirement
the reputation of a great statesman. That reputation was, indeed, in some
measure exaggerated; for in spite of his magnificent designs in certain matters
of foreign policy, he had often proved himself trifling, blundering,
indiscreet; while at home, by the expulsion of the Jesuits, the upholders of
absolute royalty, by the impunity accorded to the Parlements when they attacked
that same royalty, and by his heedlessness in finance, he had contributed not a
little towards the overthrow of that system of absolute monarchy of which he
was, nevertheless, a partisan.
The new
Minister of Foreign Affairs was the Due dAiguillon, who, with Maupeou at the
head of judicial affairs and Terray in charge of finance, formed the Ministry
called by their contemporaries the Triumvirate. Public opinion was against
them from the first, because the will of an unpopular King and his infamous
favourite had put them in the place of the people’s hero; and, inheriting
difficulties which Choiseul himself would unquestionably have failed to solve,
they were to find disasters at home and abroad, which he had rendered
inevitable, laid to their account.
It was not in
the power of dAiguillon to save Poland, who lost her frontier provinces to
Prussia, Austria, and Russia, after their coalition in 1772. From 1770 to 1772,
Catharine II, under pressure from Prussia and Austria, slackened in her
hostility towards the Turks, and then granted them a truce. Prince Henry of
Prussia familiarised the mind of Frederick II with the idea of a partition of
Poland, and, in 1771, was sent by his brother to enforce this project upon
Catharine II, who would have preferred to retain the monopoly of influence in
Poland and to conquer Turkey, but dared not break with Prussia and Austria, now
once more united. Austrian and Prussian troops now followed the example set by
the Russians, and penetrated into Polish territory. Austria, however, still
hesitated: she would have preferred, instead of being allotted a fragment of
Poland, to deprive France of Alsace and Lorraine, or to recover Silesia from
Frederick II, or to receive part of Turkey. But Frederick II forced her to
adopt his views by inspiring her with a fear of Russia, exactly as he forced
Russia to adopt them by making her afraid of Austria; and, after he had signed
with Catharine II, on February 10,1772, the First Treaty for the Partition of
Poland, Austria, eight days later, signified her adherence to the treaty.
France could not possibly oppose the division, abandoned as she was by her
ally, Austria, and jealously watched by England. The “King’s Secret,”
farsighted in its
distrust of
Austria, was powerless to find any other solution, and Louis XV, a prey to
senile weakness, let his cherished policy fall to pieces. D’Aiguillon, then,
was not responsible for the ruin of Poland. Nor would the saying, attributed
without probability to Louis XV, that “ if Choiseul had been there, the
partition would never have taken place,” have been just in the mouth of a King
who had excellent opportunities for a fair assignment of the responsibilities
in question.
During the
same period, Sweden escaped the fate of Poland. The Prince Royal of Sweden,
Gustavus, summoned by Choiseul to France to receive his advice, had arrived
there at the end of 1770, after the fall of the Minister. But the Due de La
Vrilliere, who was taking the place of dAiguillon till the latter should
arrive, and the officials of the Foreign Office, did what Choiseul would have
done. Gustavus returned to Sweden in 1771, with four million francs and Vergennes
as his mentor. When on his return he took up his duties as King, he received
from d’Aiguillon and Louis XV the same support as Choiseul had given him ; and
he prepared a coup d'etat against the Diet. Though England sent to the Diet a
copy of a letter in which Gustavus disclosed his plan to Louis XV, the young
King was too quick for the Senate, and the Constitution of 1772, which
reestablished absolutism at the expense of the nobility, was followed, in 1778,
by the renewal of the alliance between Sweden and France. The partition of
Poland and the renewal of war with Turkey prevented Catharine II from putting
any obstacle in his way. In this affair d’Aiguillon had shown himself a worthy
successor of Choiseul: it is true that he was helped by Sweden herself, and by
the diversion created in her favour by Poland and Turkey. As for the Turks,
Frederick II had incited the Tsarina to renew hostilities against them; and
they were eventually forced to sign the disadvantageous Treaty of
Kutchuk-Kainardji, in July, 1774, some months after the death of Louis XV. But
d’Aiguillon was no more responsible for her misfortunes than he had been for
those of Poland.
The
Chancellor Maupeou, for his part, had assigned himself the task of
consolidating the absolute monarchy by the destruction of the Parle- ments. In
the night from January 21 to 22, 1771, the magistrates of the Parlement of
Paris were sentenced to exile and relieved of their positions. Maupeou
established a new Parlement, whose members were nominated by him and were
entirely devoid of political authority; the jurisdiction of the old Parlement
was mutilated by the institution of six other Courts of justice, called
Superior Councils. The other Parlements and all the judicial tribunals suffered
the same fate. Maupeou did away with the sale of legal offices and made justice
free to all; he wished, further, to simplify legal procedure and to codify the
laws. These reforms in the administration of justice were applauded by the
Philosophers ; but public opinion was far from following them; and, in truth,
Maupeou had nobody to put in the place of the dismissed magistrates except
persons of damaged reputation, one of whom, Goezman, was
1763-74] Discredit of Louis
XF. His death.
359
convicted by
Beaumarchais of having taken a bribe from him; while, again, the fact that
Maupeou’s Parlements were the creatures of a Minister and of a King who were
alike detested, was not calculated to inspire confidence. Maupeou’s coup
d'itat, instead of consolidating the royal authority, threatened its stability.
What he really did was to cause an extraordinary effervescence; and, though
this speedily subsided, the public did not forget the dialogue held between the
Parlements and the King at the time of the coup diktat. That dialogue bore upon
the respective rights of the Crown and the nation: the Parlement of Paris
declared, for example, in 1763, that the French were “free men and not slaves”;
in the same year, the Cour des Aides demanded that the States General should be
convened, and the magistrates on all sides invoked “ the right of resistance.”
Louis XV answered: “ We hold our Crown from God alone. The right of making laws
belongs to ourselves alone; we neither delegate it nor share it.” Such language
could not be forgotten.
Terray, for
his part, freed from fear of the Parlements, asserted that the only way of
paying the royal debts was to make a declaration of bankruptcy. This he
accordingly did, silencing protest by the words, “ The King is master.”
Bankruptcy was a usual proceeding for the State under the ancien rigime; and
even Colbert had recourse to it. But Terray at first neglected to employ the
discreet formalities of his predecessors, and it was a matter of common
knowledge that the money which he withheld from the creditors of the State went
to Mme Du Barry. Public opinion was, in consequence, less quietly resigned to
the fraudulent proceedings of the Government than t had been in the time of
Colbert; and, by invoking the authority of the King as a cloak for his actions,
Terray brought that authority into final discredit.
It will be
seen that the Triumvirate, all things considered, deserved a better reputation
than it obtained, but that it contributed equally with Choiseul to the
dislocation of the ancien rigime. The person of Louis XV served as a mark for
the anger of all parties—that of Choiseul, who occupied the leisure afforded by
his disgrace in writing memoirs, in which he spoke of the King as “
impressionable wax,” and blamed his cowardice and evil disposition; that of the
intellectual spirits of the time, who compared the enlightened despotism of
Frederick II, Catharine II, and Charles III of Spain with the paltry and
hackneyed despotism of the King of France; that of the people of Paris, who in
their turn attributed to Louis XV the “ Treaty of Famine ”—a vast wheat “ comer
” existing only in the popular imagination. It may be that, if the reign of the
Triumvirate had lasted long, it would have finally disarmed all opposition ;
for there was no hatred of Louis XV in the rural population, or in parts of the
country at a great distance from the capital, and his vices were not known
outside Paris and the great towns. But the King died in 1774.
At the end of
his reign—when Louis’ egoism and slothfulness were causing the despotic system
of government to become arbitrary, and the administration incoherent and
mechanical, and when ample room was left for unj ust practices based on the
social privileges of the nobility and clergy—the popular cry in favour of
reform was so insistent, that on every side the subordinates and subjects of
the King tried on their own initiative to find some remedy for the existing
abuses. The high officials, especially the intendants, offered every
encouragement in their power in their several departments to industry, to
commerce, to agriculture; the nobility and ecclesiastics on their lands, the
bishops in their dioceses did the same. The middle classes profited by this
state of feeling to gratify their desire for wealth; but, the richer they grew,
the more they were exasperated by the obstacles put in the path of industry and
commerce by superannuated institutions, by the privileges of the nobles and
ecclesiastics in the matter of taxation; and by “ Gothic ” laws such as the
coutumes, dating from the Middle Ages, which regulated business transactions
and were in flagrant contradiction to the commercial law which was taking shape
by degrees. The protection given in high places to agriculture did indeed
lighten the condition of the peasants, who ceased to be despised as such, now
that the citizen class had begun to take an interest in them and to bring into
fashion the love of nature and the pleasures of rustic life; the peasant
profited by this state of things to acquire land of his own, practising
desperate economies within his own miserable income. But he always had just too
little land to cultivate, and upon whatever he had there weighed always the
heavy burden of the royal taxes and the rents due to the privileged classes.
And, besides all this, the literature of the day, instinct with activity, with
the spirit of propagandism and criticism, was spreading the ideas of the
Philosophers and Economists, with the help of the learned provincial societies,
of masonic lodges, of novelists, of letter-writers, of drawing-room gatherings.
Welcomed by the nobles and ecclesiastics, these ideas robbed them of all
confidence in the legitimacy of their privileges; spreading among the well-read
and ambitious commons, they encouraged them to claim a part in political life;
they sank deeply into the minds of the populations of the great towns; and, if
they came to a standstill before the ignorance of the unlettered country-folk,
their echo awoke even in these a confused sense of the suffering and misery
which pressed them down. Hence, when the day should come for the deserters from
the ranks of the nobility, the Church, and the middle classes, to continue to
lead the revolutionary movement, they were destined to have behind them the
uncivilised mass of the people of the great towns and of the peasantry—an
untamed and redoubtable force.
Louis XV thus
died on the eve of a beau tapage. A saying has been attributed to him which
evinces cynical clearsightedness and egoism: Apres moi le deluge. In very
truth, the “deluge” was not to be long delayed.
SPAIN AND
PORTUGAL.
(1746-94.)
(1) SPAIN
UNDER FERDINAND VI AND CHARLES III.
Ferdinand VI, the sole survivor of the four
children of Philip V by his first wife, Louise of Savoy, ascended the throne of
Spain on July 9, 1746. The long exercise of supreme power by Elisabeth Famese
was now replaced by that of the new Queen, Maria Barbara of Braganza, whose
influence over her dull and indolent husband was very great. The King had many
good qualities and virtues, but he was conscious of his lack of ability and was
content to leave the administration of affairs, in the details of which he took
no interest, in the hands of others more capable than himself. His Queen, to
whom, though she was quite without personal charm, he was tenderly attached,
had the stronger character, and the King rarely took any resolution except by
her advice.
The immediate
effect of the accession of Ferdinand was the relinquishment of the ambitious
and warlike policy which had so often dragged Spain into hostilities for
objects in which the country had little or no interest. The new King, however,
treated his step-mother, who thenceforth lived in retirement at San Ildefonso,
with kindliness and magnanimity, and introduced no violent changes into the
conduct of affairs. The old Ministers of Philip V, Villarias and Ensenada, continued
to hold office. The war still went on ; but efforts were quickly made for
bringing about a peaceful settlement. The Queen was Portuguese, and
negotiations were privately set on foot through the Court at Lisbon with the
British Government. Ferdinand wished to pursue a national policy, and no longer
to allow the interests of Spain to be subordinated to dynastic and family ties.
Villarias, the President of the Council of Castile, who, as Minister of Foreign
Affairs, had shown strong French sympathies, was therefore replaced by Don Jose
de Carvajal y Lancaster, a younger son of the Duke of Linares, and a descendant
of John of Gaunt. Carvajal was'a man of the strictest integrity, somewhat stiff
and reserved in manners, experienced in affairs, and a sound and capable
diplomatist. He was proud of his descent
from the
House of Lancaster and anxious to promote good relations with England. His
colleague, Zeno Somodevilla, Marquis of Ensenada, who had in 1743 succeeded
Campillo in the Ministries of Finance, of War, of Marine, and of the Indies,
was a man of humble origin, but of the greatest industry and brilliant
abilities, whose love of luxury and ostentation formed the strongest contrast
to the almost austere simplicity of the aristocratic Carvajal. Ensenada was an
adherent of the French alliance, so that the influence of the one nearly
balanced that of the other. Side by side with the two statesmen were the two
court favourites—Father Rabago, the Jesuit confessor of the King, and Carlo
Broschi (Farinelli), the Neapolitan singer, whose lovely voice secured for him
the same highly privileged positibn in the home life of Ferdinand and Barbara
as it had in that of Philip and Elisabeth. Rabago aimed at the formation of a
party independent of Carvajal and Ensenada, and was able to exercise a secret
control over the very devout King’s mind in moments of doubt and irresolution.
Farinelli’s influence, especially with the Queen, was so great that his favour
was courted on all hands, even by Ministers of State and foreign ambassadors.
But, amidst all the temptations that surrounded him, he remained honest,
unassuming, and independent, and was content to give his services to his royal
patrons in a spirit of disinterestedness.
One of the
first steps of the new Government was the nomination of the Marquis de La Mina
to the command of the Spanish forces in Italy, and the supersession of Generals
Gages and Castelar. Mina found the Franco-Spanish army retreating from Piacenza
before the victorious Austro-Piedmontese in a state of disorganisation. After
halting at Genoa, he withdrew his forces into Provence, whither he was followed
by the French under Maillebois. Genoa was left to its fate, and surrendered on
September 15. Not content with this success, the allied armies, under the
command of Charles Emmanuel and Count Brown, crossed the .Var and invaded
Provence. Their progress was however speedily arrested by the news that the
Genoese had risen in revolt and expelled the Austrian garrison (December).
Finding their enemies discouraged and hesitating, the Spaniards under Mina and
the French, now commanded by Marshal Belleisle, assumed the offensive and
advanced (February, 1747) along the western Riviera to the relief of Genoa,
which was closely invested by the English fleet and an Austrian army. They were
at length successful, and the blockade was raised (July 6). A fortnight later,
an attempt of the French to force the pass of Assietta brought upon them a
disastrous defeat at the hands of Charles Emmanuel (July 19) at Exilles. After
this no serious operations were undertaken.
Meanwhile,
the negotiations for a peaceful settlement were making headway. The brilliant
successes of Marshal de Saxe in the Low Countries had alarmed the British
Government. France, too, was anxious to terminate hostilities which had
crippled her navy and
finances. The
pourparlers between the Courts of St James’ and of Madrid carried on through
the mediation of Portugal had led to an understanding between them. The chief
obstacle had been the question of the establishment of Don Philip in Italy; but
on this point Ferdinand stood firm. He had no desire to have his half-brother,
with his pronounced French leanings and intriguing temper, back in Spain. The
recognition of Philip as Duke not only of Parma and Piacenza, but also of
Guastalla, was ultimately conceded by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the
preliminaries of which were signed (April 30, 1748) by France and Great
Britain, and which was definitely accepted by Spain six months later (October
20). The commercial differences required separate treatment and raised
questions of some delicacy between the British and Spanish negotiators. Thanks,
however, to the skill of Sir Benjamin Keene, who was now for some years to
exercise great influence at Madrid, the Treaty of Aquisgran was signed (October
5, 1749), by which Great Britain secured the confirmation of all the commercial
immunities and rights obtained by the earlier treaties, and undertook to
renounce the remaining term of the Asiento contract, accepting ,£100,000 as compensation
to the South Sea Company for the loss of its privileges.
The years
that followed were marked by the struggle between the English and French
Governments to secure the goodwill of Spain. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was
felt to be little more than an armed truce, and both Powers were anxious for
the Spanish alliance in case of a fresh outbreak of hostilities. Ferdinand and
his Queen were alike in favour of a peaceful policy, and of maintaining
friendly relations with both the rival Powers. In this policy they had the firm
support of Carvajal. On the other hand, Ensenada, who was jealous of the
growing influence of his colleague, worked incessantly in the interests of
France, with the object of securing a renewal of the “Family Compact” between
the Bourbon Kings. Madrid became thus for a succession of years a centre of
diplomatic scheming and intrigue, of which a wonderfully clear and graphic
account is given in the despatches of Keene. Ensenada’s failure . to induce
Ferdinand to entangle himself in a French alliance was largely due to the
sleepless vigilance and statesmanlike tact and address of this eminent
ambassador, whose exertions placed the relations between England and Spain upon
a more amicable footing than that on which they had stood for more than half a
century. The decline of the influence of the Court of Versailles was
conclusively shown by the Treaty which, in spite of French opposition, was
signed at Aranjuez (June 14, 1752) for securing the neutrality of Italy. All
points of dispute with regard to territorial rights in Italy were settled to
the satisfaction of the interested parties, with the solitary exception of the
King of Naples. Charles complained that it infringed his rights to the
allodials in Tuscany, and to the disposal of the Crown of Naples on his
succession to the Spanish throne, which he regarded as assured.
364 Wall Foreign Minister.—Fall of Ensenada. [1752-4
He
even went so far as to appeal to the French and English Governments for
support against his half-brother, but without success. The defeat of the French
party at Madrid was even more marked in the failure of the effort made to
obtain the recall of the Spanish ambassador at the Court of St James’, Richard
Wall, who had done much to promote a good understanding between England and
Spain, and was accused of having lent himself to intrigues hostile to France.
Wall, an Irishman by birth, had early in life entered the Spanish service; his
abilities had secured for him the patronage of Ensenada, and it was to this
Minister that he owed his earliest diplomatic appointments. On the present
occasion Wall was able successfully to disprove the charges against him, and
was confirmed in his post at London. ,
The sudden
death of Carvajal, on April 8, 1754, was a . serious loss to Spain. It was
feared that the inclinations of Ensenada, whose influence with the Queen was
great, would ensure the triumph of the French party. Both Ferdinand and
Barbara, however, were bent on the maintenance of peace, and dreaded the
consequences of any tightening of the bonds with France. They were strengthened
in their resolve not to permit any change of policy by the advice of the Duke
of Huescar and the Count of Valparaiso, two prominent court officials and
friends of Carvajal. Neither of them would accept the vacant ministry of
Foreign Affairs; but, acting on the instigation of Keene, they suggested the
fitness of Richard Wall for the post, and their counsel was accepted. But
Ensenada, still intent upon embroiling Spain in hostilities with Great Britain,
entered into secret negotiations with the Court of Versailles for a close
alliance, and, in his capacity as Minister of the Indies, sent out orders to
Havana for an expedition to be got ready for the expulsion of the English from
their settlements on the Gulf of Mexico. He thus hoped to . force the hand of
his sovereign, relying upon the help of his friends Farinelli and Rabago. But
the British Minister, Keene, whose vigilance had discovered these intrigues,
took Wall and Huescar into his confidence, and furnished them with proofs of
Ensenada’s manoeuvres, which they in their turn laid before the King. The
Minister was suddenly arrested in the night of July 20, 1754, and, after being
deprived of his offices, was sent into retirement at Granada. An inventory of
his effects showed him to be possessed of immense wealth. He was, however,
treated leniently, no proceedings were taken against him; and, though he was
exiled, a pension was granted to him. Father Rabago was likewise exiled, on the
charge of having fomented a rebellion of the Jesuits in Paraguay.
Ensenada,
whatever his faults, deserved well of his country. Even the chief author of his
downfall, Sir Benjamin Keene, speaks with unstinted admiration of his
“perspicuous parts, extensive knowledge and activity in the transaction of
business,” and of the great services which had signalised his ministry. Among
these may be mentioned his efforts to improve agriculture, to open out
communication by means of
1753-7] Services of Ensenada.—Minorca and
Gibraltar. 365
canals and
roads, to reopen the mines by revoking the prohibition on the exportation of
precious metals subject to a small royalty, and to reform the system of
taxation, by the abolition of the system of farming the taxes in Castile and by
a scheme for replacing the hateful imposts known as millones and alcabalas by a
single tax (contribution unica) levied upon a valuation of income and property.
At the time of his fall, this reform was under consideration. His most
remarkable achievement was his reorganisation of the Spanish navy. The
fortified harbour and arsenal at Ferrol was his creation, and all the other
arsenals were enlarged and put in order. To effect this, he neglected the army;
for his paramount aim was to enable Spain to hold her own against England at
sea, and in the course of his administration he raised Spain both in number of
vessels and in efficiency to a more formidable maritime position than she had
held since the days of Philip II. He had also a large share in bringing about
the conclusion of a Concordat with Pope Benedict XIV, which was signed on
January 11, 1753. This instrument recognised unreservedly the royal right of
patronage, save in the case of a small limited number of benefices, and settled
other matters of controversy between the Papacy and the Spanish Crown.
The
redistribution of offices which ensued upon the fall of Ensenada, and the
appointment of Wall as successor to Carvajal, did not, as had been expected,
effect any real change of policy. Ferdinand had firmly convinced himself that
peace was necessary for the recuperation of Spain, and nothing could move him
from his determination to remain neutral in the war which broke out between
England and France in 1756. In this determination he could always reckon on the
support of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, though well-disposed to
England, was anxious to act disinterestedly and impartially for the best
interests of his adopted country. The capture of Minorca by the French (May,
1756) furnished both the belligerent Powers with an opportunity for making an
appeal to Spanish patriotism. The French Government proposed an offensive and
defensive alliance between the two Bourbon kingdoms, in which France should
engage to cede Minorca and to aid the Spaniards by land and by sea in the
recovery of Gibraltar. Keene was instructed by Pitt in a long confidential
despatch (August 23, 1757) to use all his well-tried diplomatic skill and
influence at the Court of Madrid to secure Spanish cooperation with Great
Britain in the War, more especially in the recapture of Minorca. In return, the
British Government actually offered to cede Gibraltar, besides giving full
satisfaction to all Spanish complaints in the matter of privateering and of
encroachments on the coast of Honduras. It was the last act of Keene, who died
on December 15, 1757. From the first, his experience told him that the British
offer was doomed to failure. Neither bribes nor entreaties, whether from London
or from Versailles, could move Ferdinand from his fixed resolve not to be
dragged into hostilities.
In the
pursuance of his pacific policy, Queen Barbara had given the King her fullest
sympathy and support. Unfortunately, her health had been of late seriously
impaired, and an attack of illness terminated fatally on August 27, 1758. The
bonds of affection, which had so long united the royal pair, had grown with the
lapse of time constantly stronger and closer, and now the loss of his wife had
the most fatal effect upon the mind of Ferdinand. His mental powers had always
been feeble, and he was Subject to fits of hypochondria. He now completely
secluded himself, refused to speak, and finally fell into a state of complete
lunacy. After lingering on in this condition for some months* he died on August
10, 1759. Thus ended the reign of this well-intentioned prince who, though
lacking all the qualities of a great ruler, was enabled nevertheless by his
personal integrity, his prudence, his kindliness of temper, and his simplicity
of life, to endear himself to his subjects and advance their welfare. lie did
much for the encouragement of learning and science. The proceedings of the
Inquisition were greatly restricted, and public autos-de^fi abolished.
Ferdinand could, moreover, boast that he had found the country’s finances
ruined and the navy in a state of decay, but that he left behind him a
formidable fleet, and a balance of three millions sterling in the national
treasury.
By the death
of Ferdinand without issue the succession to the Spanish throne passed to his
half-brother, Charles, King' of Naples. The Queen Dowager, Elisabeth Farnese,
by the will of the deceased monarch, became Regent until the arrival of Charles
III. The first care of the new King was to negotiate with' the Empress Queen
and the King of Sardinia concerning the arrangements made by the Treaty of
Aquisgran (1749), to which Charles had never acceded, by which Philip, Duke of
Parma, was to succeed to the Crown of the Two Sicilies, and his duchies of
Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla to be shared between Austria and Sardinia. A
speedy settlement was effected, for it was the interest of Austria at this
juncture to conciliate the new ruler of Spain and the Indies; and the claims of
Charles Emmanuel on Piacenza were compromised by a money payment. The eldest
son of Charles III, Philip, had been imbecile from his birth; and he was now
formally and publicly declared to be incapable of reigning. Charles,
accordingly, designated his second son, Charles, to be Prince of the Asturias
and heir to the Spanish throne, and he abdicated the Crown of Naples and the
Two Sicilies, in favour of his third son, Ferdinand, then eight years of age.
This act accomplished, Charles III, accompanied by his Queen and family and escorted
by a Spanish squadron, set sail for Barcelona from Naples* where during a reign
of twenty-five years he had won the hearts of his Italian subjects. His
reception on Spanish soil (October 17, 1759) was enthusiastic, and on December
9 he reached Madrid, where he met his mother again for the first time since his
departure from Spain in 1731. It was soon clear, however, that neither he nor
his wife,
Maria Amalia
of Saxony, though they treated Elisabeth with respect and deference, had any
intention of allowing her to exercise any influence in affairs, and she
speedily withdrew into retirement at San Ildefonso. Three months after her
state entry into the capital (July 13, 1760) Queen Amalia, who had been in bad
health ever since her arrival in Spain, died. Her htisband was deeply afflicted
at his loss, and never married again.
The habits of
King Charles were exceedingly methodical. He rose early and spent the morning
in the transaction of business, making himself minutely and conscientiously
familiar with the details of all affairs of State. He was not a man of striking
ability; but his experience was already great, and he united great honesty of
purpose and an inflexible regard for justice with a sincere desire to promote
the well-being of his subjects. He combined deep piety with a keen interest in
the advances of science and knowledge. The whole of his afternoons, whatever
the weather, he occupied in hunting and shooting, in which he sought and found
not merely amusement, but a healthful diversion from the pressure of state
cares and an antidote to the constitutional melancholy which afflicted so many
members of his family. Simple in his tastes and habits, and genial in manner,
this robust and bronzed sportsman had all the qualities for winning the hearts
of those with whom he was brought into contact. Charles governed indeed autocratically,
but Spain had never been more in need of the firm hand of a benevolent and
enlightened ruler. On his accession he made few changes in the personnel of the
Government. He retained Wall in his post, and gave no office to Ensenada,
though recalling him from exile. Farinelli was banished, and the Marquis of
Squillaci, a Sicilian, was made Minister of War and Finance.
The beginning
of the new reign was to be attended by misfortune. Charles never forgot that he
was a Bourbon and cherished strong French sympathies. Moreover, the imperious
action of the British admiral in 1742, and his threat to bombard Naples, had
rankled in the King’s memory. The Seven Years’ War was now in mid course and in
every part of the world the British arms, directed by the genius and energy of
Pitt, were victorious over the French. Choiseul, of whose policy a connected
account is given elsewhere, in the autumn of 1759 began to make overtures for
peace and offered to submit certain disputed points to the arbitration of His
Catholic Majesty. But Spain had herself grievances against England with regard
to contraband, and settlements on the coast of Honduras, the searching of
Spanish ships, and the claim of Spain to a share in the Newfoundland fisheries.
The proposed mediation of the Spanish King was accordingly rejected by the
British Government. The war went on still, disastrously for France. Meanwhile
there was a continual exchange of friendly communications between the Courts of
Versailles and Madrid, and the efforts of Choiseul were skilfully directed
368 Renewal of the Family Compact. War with
England. [1759-61
to persuading
Charles that the triumph of England would spell danger to the Spanish dominion
in South America, and that it was in the interest of Spain that the two
countries should make common cause against a common foe. The refusal of Pitt to
offer any satisfactory redress to the Spanish grievances gave added force to
the representation of the French Minister. In the spring of 1761 matters came
to a climax. The Marquis de Grimaldo, who had been ambassador at the Hague, was
sent by Charles to Paris (February 11), with secret instructions to approach
Choiseul with proposals for a renewal of the “ Family Compact,” and for the
conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between France and Spain. The
final result of their deliberations was the conclusion of two treaties, one
permanent on the lines of those previously concluded between the sovereigns of
the House of Bourbon, and known as the “Family Compact.” (It was afterwards
joined by the King of Naples and the Duke of Parma.) In the second, which was a
secret convention, it was agreed that in the conditions on which France was
willing to make peace should be included a settlement of the grievances of
Spain against Great Britain, the King of Spain undertaking to declare war,
should these overtures be rejected. Both the treaties, which have been more
fully described elsewhere, were actually signed on August 15. Pitt had,
however, already peremptorily declined to allow the disputes with Spain to be
mixed up with the French negotiations, and, had he had his own way, would at
once have summoned the King of Spain to withdraw his demands on pain of instant
war. The retirement of Pitt and the accession of Lord Bute to power gave
Charles III an opportunity of delaying, by a further exchange of notes and
explanations, the inevitable hostilities until his naval and military
preparations had been completed and the treasure ships from America had safely
come to port. When this object had been attained, the categorical demand of the
British Government as to the cause of the warlike preparations and of the
existence of a treaty with France was met by a refusal to give any explanation.
The British ambassador, Lord Bristol, left Madrid in December, 1761, and at the
same time an embargo was laid by the Spanish Government on all British ships in
Spanish ports. Ferdinand’s prudent policy of neutrality was definitely
abandoned, and Charles threw in his lot with Louis XV for a renewal of the
struggle in which France had already suffered so many defeats.
One of the
first steps taken by the allied Bourbon monarchs, in accordance with the terms
of the secret treaty, was the sending of a joint note to Lisbon, requiring the
King of Portugal to close his ports to the English and observe strict
neutrality. The reply was a firm refusal. Hereupon, an army of 40,000 crossed
the Portuguese frontier under the Marquis of Sfuria, a general old in years but
inexperienced in command, and proceeded to take possession of the country north
of the
1761-2] Portuguese campaign.-Loss of
Havana andManila. 369
Douro. There
was little serious resistance. Moncorvo, Braganza, and Miranda fell rapidly
into the hands of the invaders. Lack of provisions stopped the advance on
Oporto, and the news of the landing of 6000 English troops at Lisbon under the
command of a distinguished German officer, Count Lippe, led to a change of
plans. It was resolved to besiege Almeida, and to push on to Lisbon by the
valley of the Tagus. Before Almeida, the Spaniards, now under the command of
the Count of Aranda, were reinforced by a body of 8000 French. Nine days after
the trenches had been opened, Almeida surrendered and Aranda now advanced with
the intention of crossing the Tagus at Villavelha. He found that Lippe had
entrenched himself with a strong British and Portuguese force at Abrantes, and
had established fortified posts at Alvite and Niza, to prevent the Spanish
general from effecting the passage of the river. Aranda succeeded in forcing
the pass of Alvite and reaching Villavelha; but the strength of the position of
Abrantes, and the vigilance of Burgoyne, who commanded the detachment at Niza,
checked his further progress. The autumnal rains began to fall; and Aranda
found it impossible to remain longer in a desolate and rugged country, with
troops suffering heavily from disease and privations. He accordingly
ingloriously withdrew his discouraged and diminished army into winter quarters
at Albuquerque.
Meanwhile,
two serious disasters had befallen the Spanish arms in the West and East
Indies. Admiral Pocock appeared before Havana (June 6,1762), in command of a
British fleet of twenty-four ships of the line and ten frigates convoying a
large number of transports. Every effort had been made to put Havana in a state
of defence, and the Governor, Don Juan de Prado, was confident of his ability
to hold his own. On June 8, 8000 British troops, commanded by Lord Albemarle,
effected a landing on the coast without opposition, and then proceeded to lay
siege to the Castle of Morro, the chief defence of the harbour of Havana. The
garrison, led by a gallant naval officer, Don Luis Velasco, made a most
determined defence; but, though the British force had suffered heavy losses
through sickness, the vigour of its attack triumphed over all obstacles. The
Castle of Morro was taken by assault (July 30) after a prolonged struggle in
which Velasco himself fell. Prado, fearing the destruction of the town by
bombardment, a few days later entered into negotiations for its surrender^ and
the capitulation was signed dn August 13. This important success had cost the
British 2910 men. Twelve ships of war were captured, and immense military and
naval stores and treasure amounting to fifteen million dollars. On September 22
Admiral Cornish appeared before Manila with thirteen ships, and a force of 6000
men under General Draper effected a landing. After a fierce bombardment the
town surrendered; and of an indemnity of four million dollars demanded from it
more than half was secured, the Treasury of Madrid being left to pay the
remainder—which was never
370 Peace concluded.—Grimaldo and Sguillaci.
[1762-6
received. The
only set-off to this series of misfortunes was the conquest of the colony of
Sacramento from the Portuguese.
Finding that
Bute’s Government was pacifically disposed, the Courts of Versailles and
Madrid, as has been related in another chapter, now seriously entered upon
negotiations for peace. The Spanish ambassador at Paris, Grimaldo, was the
representative of Charles III at the 'pourparlers. All parties being desirous
for a cessation of hostilities, the terms for a peaceful settlement of the many
points in dispute were arranged without much difficulty; and the definitive
Treaty was signed on February 20, 1763. In return for the restoration of Havana
and Manila, Spain ceded Florida to Great Britain, and an important piece of
territory east and south-east of the Mississippi. The right to cut logwood in
Honduras was granted to British subjects but coupled with the stipulation that
all fortifications were to be rased. The claim of fishery rights on the banks
of Newfoundland was abandoned, Portugal was evacuated, and the colony of
Sacramento restored to the Portuguese. By a private agreement Spain received
Louisiana from France in compensation for the loss of Florida.
The
conclusion of peace was speedily followed by the retirement of Wall. He had
served his adopted country well, in spite of his dislike both of the Family
Compact and the War with England; but he was not a self-seeker or enamoured of
office, and he now begged the King to allow him to resign his post of Minister
of Foreign Affairs on the ground of failure of eyesight and other growing
infirmities. Charles assented most unwillingly and granted a substantial
pension to the retiring Minister. He was succeeded by the Marquis de Grimaldo,
a Genoese of noble extraction, who as ambassador at Versailles had been one of
the chief authors of the “Family Compact.” Disputes quickly arose with Great
Britain about the privileges accorded to the English settlers in Honduras, and
war at one time seemed imminent. As, however, it was not the wish of the King
to be dragged into hostilities, these questions were settled by concessions on
both sides. The necessity of a policy of reform at home aiming at a revival of
the country from the state of decay and lethargy into which it had for some
time been falling, had since his accession been continually present to the mind
of Charles. Squillaci was now to carry out the changes, which the King
considered necessary for the purpose; but this Minister, though experienced in
the management of affairs, and exceedingly industrious and exact, was not a man
of talent, of culture, or of tact; and he showed a conspicuous disregard of
the tenacious attachment of the Spanish people to their traditional customs.
Finding that the streets of the capital were badly lighted, extremely filthy,
and hardly safe for passers-by, Squillaci had them cleansed and lighted; and,
not content with these measures, he attempted to enforce a change in the
national dress, on the ground that the wide-brimmed hats and long cloaks
generally worn were
1766]
Rising at Madrid.
Squillad dismissed.
371
favourable to
the perpetration of crimes. An edict was therefore issued prohibiting the
wearing of the Spanish capas and sombreros, and enjoining the general use of
the French style of dress (March, 1766). The populace were already hostile to
the Minister of Finance, to whose measures they attributed a considerable rise
that had taken place in the price of provisions, and the attempt of the police
to compel the Madrilenos to abandon the national costume aroused fierce
opposition. Resistance was secretly organised, and on Palm Sunday (March 23) it
broke out in open revolt. At 4 o’clock in the afternoon of that day a body of
men, arrayed in the forbidden costume, openly challenged arrest, and attacked
the soldiers, who tried to seize them. It was the signal for a general rising.
With loud cries of “Long live the King; death to Squillaci,” the crowd made
their way to the house of the obnoxious Minister; but he had been warned in
time and fled to one of the royal palaces, his wife seeking refuge in a convent.
The house was gutted, and the furniture thrown out of the windows and burnt.
The windows of Grimaldo’s house were likewise smashed. At midnight the
insurgents dispersed, only to gather in still greater numbers on the morrow. An
encounter then took place between them and a picket of the Walloon Guards, who,
on being assailed with stones, fired and killed and wounded some of the
populace. Then the Guards were in turn attacked and dispersed; those who were
captured being murdered and their bodies horribly mutilated. All efforts to
appease the tumult proving in vain, Charles was at length compelled to appear
in person on the balcony of the palace, and to accede to the demands of the
mob. He promised to dismiss Squillaci and appoint a Spaniard in his place, to revoke
the edict about the hats and capes, to reduce the price of provisions, and to
grant a general pardon. Alarmed for his safety, the King with his family
secretly made his escape at night through the cellars of the palace, and betook
himself to Aranjuez. Irritated at this seeming act of treachery, the mob
hereupon rose again and for two or three days held Madrid in its power. Not
till the Governor had read a message from the King undertaking to carry out his
promise was tranquillity restored. Squillaci had followed Charles to Aranjuez;
but on the 27th he departed under charge of a military escort for Cartagena,
whence he sailed to Sicily. Six years later he was appointed ambassador at
Venice.
The King’s
pride was deeply hurt by these occurrences, and it was many months before he
returned to Madrid. Don Miguel Musquiz, Squillaci’s first secretary, was
appointed Minister of Finance, and the office of President of the Council of
Castile was conferred upon the Count of Aranda, with full powers for dealing
with a state of affairs that needed the firm hand of a strong and capable
administrator. He proved himself to be the right man for the task. By a rare
combination of tact and energy, order was speedily restored, the city was
divided
into
districts and thoroughly policed, vagabonds and idlers were expelled, and
finally, on the petition of the representatives of the nobles, the gremios
(trade gilds) and the Municipal Council, the concessions extorted from the King
by the insurgents were revoked. The King, however, consented not to enforce the
edict about dress except in the immediate vicinity of the Court, and at last,
in the month of December, reentered his capital amidst the plaudits of the
people. The death of the Queen Mother, Elisabeth Farnese, had taken place at
San Ildefonso on July 10. Charles, though strongly attached to her, had never
allowed her to exercise any political influence.
The year 1767
was marked by the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain. The members of this
Order had already been expelled from Portugal (1759) and from France (1764).
Charles III, though extremely devout, had throughout his reign shown that in
ecclesiastical no less than in civil affairs he was determined to be master in
his own kingdom. Jesuit intrigues both in Spain and in Paraguay had prejudiced
him against the Society, before a secret enquiry instituted by Aranda into the
origin and causes of the Madrid outbreak laid the blame upon the Jesuits.
Aranda was himself a Voltairean and an enemy of the Society, and there can be
little doubt that he used his opportunity to persuade the King that the Jesuits
were disloyal to their country and plotting against his own life. Charles was
induced to determine upon the immediate expulsion of the Order from Spain; and
the execution of the decree was entrusted to Aranda, who carried it out with
the most extraordinary secrecy and success. Orders in the King’s own hand were
despatched to the Governor of each province, to be opened on April 2, those for
the capital on March 31. The six colleges of the Jesuits in Madrid and its
neighbourhood were simultaneously surrounded at midnight, the inmates summoned
to the refectory, ordered to seat themselves in parties of ten in vehicles
prepared for the purpose, and then conducted to some place on the sea coast,
where frigates were ready to carry them to Italy. On April 2 similar orders
were executed throughout Spain. No resistance was offered. After suffering
untold hardships, the unhappy Jesuits were after three months on shipboard
allowed to land at Civitfil Vecchia, and settled in various towns in the Papal
States, a scanty pension being granted to them by the King for their
maintenance. The expulsion of the Jesuits from Spanish America and especially
from the flourishing missions of Paraguay would have been attended with great
difficulty, had the Fathers opposed the royal orders. Trained to submission,
they obeyed everywhere with the greatest fortitude and resignation. The
sufferings of the South American Jesuits in their voyage to Italy were even
more prolonged and more severe than those of their Spanish brethren.
The
suppression of disorder and the overthrow of the power of the Jesuits left the
. King, who had never summoned the Cortes since they
1762-8] O'Reilly in
Louisiana.-Falkland Islands dispute. 373
had taken the
oath of fidelity to him on his accession, supreme and absolute in the State. He
had never lost an opportunity of circumscribing the privileges of the clergy
and the abuses of papal interference in his dominions, and had made the bishops
to recognise his authority. He had not ventured to abolish the Inquisition; but
he had forced this dreaded tribunal to submit its decrees against books to the
approbation of the royal Council and to soften its penalties. Very few persons
were put to death by sentence of the Inquisition between 1759 and 1788, and
long before the latter date its power had been reduced to a mere shadow.
The cession
by France of Louisiana to the west of the Mississippi in 1762 had been
unwillingly accepted by Spain, and speedily became the cause of trouble. The
Spanish Governor, Antonio de Ulloa, stirred up general discontent among the
habitants at New Orleans by the restrictions imposed upon trade and by his
general tactlessness and severity. An insurrection broke out in 1768, and a
large force had to be despatched from Havana under General O’Reilly for its
suppression. Meanwhile, the relations between the Spanish and British
Governments continued to be strained. The extent of the contraband trade
carried on by British subjects on the Mississippi, at Campeche, and other
places on the Gulf of Mexico, and with the Spanish colonies generally, caused
much friction. A further irritant was the question of the ransom of Manila,
which Charles III obstinately refused to pay, while the British Ministers as
persistently pressed for a settlement. A dispute about the Falkland Islands
increased the soreness, and well-nigh led to an outbreak of hostilities between
the two nations. Both Spain and Great Britain claimed the possession of these bleak
and inhospitable islands (discovered by Captain Cowley in 1686), which were
useless except as a station for whale and cod fishery. In 1766 an English
settlement was made for this purpose and named Port Egmont. Four years later
(1770), the news that an expedition sent by the Spanish Governor of Buenos
Ayres had expelled the English from Port Egmont aroused general indignation in
England, and a strong protest, with a demand for reparation, was lodged at the
Court of Madrid. Aranda urged Charles not to yield; and both sides made
preparations for war. Relying on the terms of the Family Compact, Charles
caused urgent diplomatic representations to be made at Paris; but the finances
of France were not in a condition to bear the burden of another war. In 1770, as
related elsewhere, the influence of Madame Du Barry was supreme at Versailles,
and Choiseul fell from power. Spain found herself isolated, and, her fleet
being in no condition to face the sea-power of Great Britain single-handed,
Charles was compelled to give way. An apology was made to the British
Government; the Spanish forces were withdrawn from the Falklands, and the
English settlers reinstated at Port Egmont. Aranda, on whom Charles threw part
of the blame for the humiliating position in which he
found
himself, was appointed to the embassy at Paris, and was succeeded in the
presidency of the Council of Castile by Don Manuel Ventura Figueroa (August,
1773).
In 1774 the
Moors made an attack upon the Spanish fortresses of Melilla and Penon de Velez
on the African coast, but were driven off with loss. As it was known that the
Dey of Algiers had been the instigator of this breach of the peace, Charles III
determined to use his army and navy, which now had been by strenuous efforts
reorganised and made effective, to destroy the power of this potentate and make
himself master of the nest of pirates which had so long been a scourge to the
Mediterranean. He chose as commander of the expeditionaiy force Alexander
O’Reilly, who, after his success in suppressing the insurrection at New
Orleans, had been entrusted with the task of reforming the organisation of the
Spanish army on the model of that of Frederick the Great. A great effort was
made. A fleet of 46 vessels of war conveying 22,000 men appeared before Algiers
on July 1, 1775. After disembarking on the 7th, the troops, misled by a feigned
retreat of the enemy, advanced towards the town, only to find themselves
suddenly enveloped on both flanks by far superior forces. They were compelled
to retreat in disorder and suffered heavy losses before O’Reilly was, with
difficulty, able to reembark them. In this disastrous affair 27 officers and
500 soldiers were killed, 191 officers and 2088 soldiers wounded. Sixteen guns
and all the stores that had been landed were abandoned. The lack of provisions
making it impossible to remain in the bay, the whole armament returned to
Alicante, bringing back the news of their disgrace. The utter collapse of this
enterprise on which so many hopes had been placed caused deep disappointment
and general indignation in Spain. O’Reilly barely escaped with his life from
the fury of the populace, and was removed from his post at Madrid. Nor did
Grimaldo escape a full share of the odium which fell upon O’Reilly. He offered
his resignation to the King; but Charles, always staunch to those who served
him well, refused to accept it. The Minister, however, had many enemies, among
them the Prince of the Asturias; and at last the King reluctantly yielded to
his desire for retirement (November 7,1776). In February, 1777, Grimaldo left
Madrid for Rome, where he had been appointed ambassador in the place of Don
Jose Monino, Count of Florida Blanca, whom the King by Grimaldo’s own wish had
nominated to succeed him as Minister.
Florida
Blanca, who had already won distinction during his embassy at Rome, was able to
begin his administration with a successful settlement of the long pending
disputes with Portugal in South America concerning the colony of Sacramento and
the question of boundaries generally. As to this question it will be sufficient
to say here that, finding the English fully occupied by their difficulties with
their own insurgent colonies in North America, the Spanish Government had
1776-9] Florida Blanca Minister.—American revolt.
375
determined to
take advantage of the situation by despatching a strong force to the Rio Plata
to put an end to the aggression of the Portuguese in that region, and to drive
them away from their settlements on the north bank of. the river. The despatch
of an expeditionary force with 12 vessels of war conveying 9000 men was one of
the last acts of Grimaldo’s Ministry (November, 1776). After seizing the island
of St Catharine, it took possession, almost without resistance, of the colony
of Sacramento. At this very time Joseph I, King of Portugal, died (February
24, 1777). This event was the signal for the fall of Pombal, and the accession
of Maria I, whose mother, Maria Victoria, the sister of Charles III, had been
opposed for years to that Minister’s policy. Florida Blanca thus found an
opening for an accommodation, of which he skilfully availed himself. His
proposals for the drawing up of a treaty of limits were favourably received,
and the negotiations were conducted with such mutual goodwill that an agreement
was signed at San Ildefonso, October 1, 1777, by Florida Blanca and the
Portuguese plenipotentiary Francisco de Sousa Coutinho. By this so-called
Preliminary Treaty of 1777 all the disputed boundary questions were regulated,
but its importance was greatly augmented by means of a treaty of defensive
alliance and amity concluded at the Pardo on March 24,1778. This drawing
together of the two neighbouring countries, so long alienated from each other,
which was marked by a visit of a year’s duration by the Queen Dowager of
Portugal to her brother, was of especial value to Spain when on the eve of a
new war with England.
On the
outbreak of war between Great Britain and her North American colonies, France,
having after some hesitation thrown in her lot with the rebels (March, 1778),
made every possible effort to induce Charles III to seize so favourable an
opportunity for drawing the sword against the hereditaiy enemy of the House of
Bourbon. Aranda at Paris energetically supported a war policy. But Charles was
more than doubtful. The consequences of the participation of Spain in the
Seven Years’ War had been disastrous, and he listened not unsympathetically to
the plea urged by the British Government that it would be dangerous for his
monarchy to support American colonists in armed revolt against their mother
country. Florida Blanca, therefore, pursued a cautious and temporising course.
Finally, at the beginning of 1779, Charles proffered his mediation. Since
France required that the independence of the colonies should be recognised by
England as a preliminary to the discussion of such a proposal, it was
contemptuously rejected by the British Government, which declared that the
right to treat with its own colonies without foreign interference was a first
principle on which it must insist; and that any other course would be
inconsistent with the national honour. Florida Blanca’s specific plan was that
a truce should be concluded between England and France, to which the colonies
should agree; and that then the plenipotentiaries of the three parties and of
the mediating
Power should
meet at Madrid and enter into negotiations for a permanent peace. The reply of
the British Ministry was that this proposal “ seemed to proceed on every
principle which had been disclaimed, and to contain every term which had been
rejected.” Charles had hoped that he might without war have obtained the
concession of Gibraltar, as the price of his neutrality and mediation. As soon,
however, as the unbending demeanour of the British Ministry convinced him that
further diplomatic efforts were useless, he suddenly changed his attitude; and,
after despatching to Lord Weymouth, the Secretary of State, a long memorandum
recounting at length all the grievances of Spain against Great Britain, he
declared war (June, 1779).
Spain
commenced hostilities in a more favourable position than on previous occasions.
The recent alliance with Portugal meant security from attack both in Europe and
in South America, and the closing of Portuguese ports to the English squadrons.
The relations with the Moors were friendly. The Spanish people were filled with
patriotic enthusiasm at the prospect of the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca,
and eagerly made voluntary offerings for the prosecution of the war. The
combined Spanish and French navies had a great numerical superiority over the
British, and the design was formed of landing a large force upon the Isle of
Wight and striking at the very heart of the British power by the capture of the
port and arsenal of Portsmouth. Never perhaps has England been in more serious
danger of invasion than in July, 1779, when the combined Franco-Spanish fleet
under Admirals d’Orvilliers and Cordoba appeared before Plymouth, while an army
of 40,000 men lay encamped at Brest and Dunkirk, furnished with transports. The
British fleet under Admiral Hardy numbered only 38 sail. How the Bourbon
alliance failed in its ambitious enterprise has been told elsewhere. When the
fleets returned to winter in Brest and Cadiz, their crews decimated by
sickness, and without having achieved anything, except the capture of one
British ship, the Ardent which had mistaken the enemy for her own fleet, there
was grievous disappointment and heartburning.
The chief
efforts of the Spanish Government were thenceforth centred on the capture of
Gibraltar, which had already been closely invested by sea and land. So strict
was the blockade that it was believed the garrison would soon be driven by
hunger to capitulate. These hopes were frustrated by the brilliant exploit of
Admiral Rodney, who in the depth of winter, with a relieving squadron of 28
ships, ran the gauntlet of the fleets at Brest, Ferrol, and Cadiz, succeeded in
capturing a large convoy off' Cape Finisterre, and then, near Trafalgar,
destroyed a Spanish squadron under Admiral Langara (January 10, 1780), which
had been prevented by the tempestuous weather from effecting a junction with
the rest of the Spanish fleet under Cordoba. Out of nine ships of the line and
two frigates only four escaped. In the teeth of the storms,
1779-81] Secret negotiations
about Gibraltar.
3
7T
which
scattered his foes, Rodney now revictualled the fortress and then sailed to the
West Indies.
In the
following summer a gleam of success was to attend the Spanish marine. Two
weakly guarded British convoys, one destined for the West, the other for the
East Indies, were surprised at the Azores by a Spanish squadron and captured.
Sixty transports and merchantmen, 1800 troops, and stores to the value of
£2,000,000, were brought in triumph into Cadiz harbour. In America the
Spaniards also achieved brilliant successes. Don Bernardo Galvez, Governor of
Louisiana, aided by a Spanish squadron under Admiral Jose Solano, who brought
with him a large force from Havana, made himself master of the course of the Mississippi,
and then conquered Florida. Mobile was taken on March 14, 1780, and the
capital, Pensacola, on May 10, 1781. During the same period the British were
likewise expelled from their settlements on the Bay of Honduras.
The failure
of the great expedition for the invasion of England in the summer of 1779 led
to bickerings and disputes between the two allied Powers. The chief object for
which Spain had plunged into hostilities was the recovery of Gibraltar, but in
this the French showed little interest. In November Florida Blanca appears to
have received indirectly, through Feman Nunez, the Spanish envoy at Lisbon,
information that the commander of a British squadron in the Tagus, Commodore
Johnstone, had hinted that the British Government might be willing to purchase
the friendship of Spain by the cession of Gibraltar. On such slight grounds a
clandestine negotiation was set on foot. The agent was an Irish priest, Hussey
by name, formerly chaplain to the Spanish embassy in London, who put himself in
communication with Richard Cumberland, private secretary to Lord George
Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies. In his turn Cumberland conveyed
to Lord North and Lord George Germain the confidential information that the
Spanish Government in consideration of the restitution of Gibraltar would
abandon the French alliance and give ample compensation. It was a critical
moment both at home and abroad, for Rodney had not yet relieved Gibraltar, and
the Ministers, without committing themselves to any definite proposal,
determined to send Hussey back to Madrid, with a letter addressed to himself by
Germain, and permitting him in perfectly general terms, should opportunities
occur “ of conversing with persons in high trust and office,” to state “ that
any opening or overture on the part of Spain towards a pacification so
essential to the interests of both Kingdoms...will be entertained with all
possible sincerity and good faith.” Gibraltar was not even mentioned. Hussey
reached Madrid on December 29,1779, and had a series of interviews with Florida
Blanca. Finally, he returned with a letter in Florida Blanca’s own hand, which
had been approved by the King, together with confidential instructions. On
January 29, the secret agent arrived once more in London, where the
378 Mission of
Cumberland.—The Armed Neutrality. [i780
subject was
discussed at four successive cabinet councils. The question of compensation,
should Gibraltar be ceded as a condition of peace, was fully considered. In
exchange for the coveted fortress was demanded the island of Porto Rico, and
the fortress and territory of San Fernando de Omoa, an indemnity of £%,000,000
in addition to payment in full for all the stores and artillery, rupture with
France, assistance to Great Britain in the reduction of the rebels to
obedience, or at least a solemn engagement not to furnish succour to them.
These conditions are interesting as showing the high value that was attached to
the possession of Gibraltar. As a matter of fact, they were never submitted to
the Spanish Government. In an interview, indeed, which was granted to Hussey,
one of the Ministers, Lord Stormont, declared: “ if Spain would lay before him
the map of her empire, to take his choice of an equivalent, and three weeks to
fix that choice, he should not be able in the period to find in all the
dominions of Spain what in his judgment would balance the cession of
Gibraltar”; and he was further informed that Lord North and all his colleagues
disavowed having given Commodore Johnstone any authority for the statement
advanced by him. Deeply chagrined Hussey betook himself to Cumberland, who,
expressing his own willingness to go on a special mission from the Cabinet to
Madrid, persuaded Hussey to write to the Spanish First Minister (February 13,
1780) that the British Ministers, while unwilling to assent to the cession of
Gibraltar as an indispensable article of a treaty of peace, might be willing to
treat upon the basis of the Treaty of Paris under the title of Exchange of
Territory. In this letter Hussey went on to express his personal belief that,
though he had no authority written or verbal for his assertion, the British
would cede Gibraltar on terms. This letter, after being read by Lord George
Germain and Lord Hillsborough, was sent, and, vague though it was, led to a
continuance of negotiations, and finally to the sending of Cumberland on a
confidential mission to Madrid. He resided there for eight months, and had
frequent interviews with Florida Blanca. The Spanish Government, however,
insisted on the cession of Gibraltar as a previous and indispensable article of
peace; and an insuperable obstacle having thus been placed in the way of any
favourable result, Cumberland was recalled.
While,
however, these clandestine and abortive negotiations were proceeding, Florida
Blanca had also been actively engaged in promoting friendly relations with
Russia, and he lent his support to the action taken by Catharine II in forming
that league of the neutral nations, headed by Russia, known as the Armed
Neutrality, of which an account has been given elsewhere. He saw that it was a
blow aimed at the naval power of Great Britain.
One effect of
the Cumberland negotiations was, as was no doubt foreseen by Florida Blanca, to
arouse the French Government through fear of being deserted by Spain to more
vigorous cooperation in the
1781-2] Capture of
Minorca.—Siege of Gibraltar. 379
Mediterranean.
A great joint expedition was secretly prepared for the capture of Minorca. The
united fleets of 52 sail left Cadiz on July 22,
1781, and were followed by 63 transports
conveying 8000 troops under the command of the Duke of Crillon. The British
garrison, taken by surprise, withdrew into Fort St Philip, which was blockaded.
A reinforcement of 4000 French troops was despatched from Toulon on October
16. But as General Murray, the British commander, despite the shortness of
provisions, continued to hold out, Crillon determined at the beginning of the
new year to turn the blockade into a regular siege. On January 6, a tremendous
fire was opened from 150 pieces of heavy artillery, and a more formidable enemy
than the besiegers, the scurvy, reduced the defenders to a mere handful of
effectives. As no relief came, the Governor was compelled to capitulate,
February 5,
1782, receiving most honourable terms.
Encouraged by
this success,, the allies resolved to prosecute the war with all possible
vigour. A large armament was despatched across the Atlantic to complete the
conquest of the West Indies. Island after island was captured, and hopes rose
high that these successes would be crowned by wresting Jamaica from the hands
of the British. The splendid victory, however, gained on April 12, 1782, by
Rodney over the French fleet, restored British naval supremacy in western
waters, and saved Jamaica from the threatened attack. To the still more
determined attempt made to gain possession of Gibraltar, reference is made
elsewhere. There is scarcely a more glorious page in the military annals of
England than the defence of the “ Rock ” by Eliott and his unconquerable
garrison. The utter failure of the grand attack of September 13, 1782, and the
destruction of Chevalier d’Ar^on’s floating batteries, proved a crushing blow
to Charles III, who had been led to believe in the certainty of success. Even
the faint hope that lack of munitions and supplies might compel surrender was
dissipated, when in tempestuous weather (October 10) Admiral Howe succeeded, by
sheer superiority of seamanship, in eluding the far larger fleet under Admiral
Cordoba, which was drawn up at the entrance of the Straits to dispute his
passage, in bringing his transports safely into the harbour of the fortress,
and in repassing the Straits without being forced to an engagement. This
brilliant exploit rivalled that of Rodney in the first year of the siege.
Meanwhile,
negotiations both direct and indirect had been in progress since the late
spring of 1782 between Great Britain and the members of the hostile coalition.
The negotiations of which Paris was the centre, and the French Minister
Vergennes the active agent, it is unnecessary to follow here. The rapid changes
of ministry in England during this period and the obstinate insistence of
Charles III upon inadmissible conditions rendered a speedy settlement of the
differences between Great Britain and Spain impossible. Their negotiations were
carried on at
Paris by the
two ambassadors, Fitzherbert (afterwards Lord St Helens) and the Count of
Aranda, and later (September) in London also whither dc Eayneval, the
confidential secretary of Vergennes, was sent over to treat directly with Lord
Shelburne (now at the head of the Government) himself. The demands of Charles,
who was elated by the successes of the Spanish arms in Florida and Honduras,
and by the capture of Minorca, and who believed that Gibraltar was on the point
of being taken, were exorbitant. He asked for the cession of Florida, all the
British settlements on the Gulf of Mexico, the Bahamas, fishery rights on the
shore of Newfoundland and, last and most important of all, he demanded
Gibraltar. In compensation for Gibraltar and Minorca, he offered to hand over
to Great Britain, Oran and Mazarquivir on the African coast. Aranda was
instructed to say, “if England desires peace, this is the only means of
procuring it: since the King, my master, from personal as well as political
motives, is fully determined never to put a period to the present war, till he
shall have acquired Gibraltar either by arms or by negotiation.” But Shelburne,
though ready for considerable concessions, well knew the exhausted condition
of the Spanish treasury, and in the matter of Gibraltar he was immovable. His
reply to Rayneval was not less explicit than the demand of the Spanish King:
“Gibraltar being actually in the possession of George III cannot be a subject
of discussion.” Month after month, the defiant fortress continued to block the
way to an understanding. Even the destruction of d’Arson’s floating batteries
by Eliott’s red-hot shot, and the subsequent revictualling of the garrison by
Howe, failed to make King Charles withdraw his demand. Gibraltar he must have,
though it should be at the cost of restoring to England all his conquests in
America and the West Indies, with Porto Rico thrown in. But, whatever
compensation Shelburne himself might have been ready to accept in lieu of “ the
Rock,” English public opinion would not hear of its surrender. Faced by the
coalition of North and Fox against his Ministry, Shelburne in self-defence had
no choice but to stand firm. Spain ostensibly began to prepare for a renewal of
hostilities; but the hopelessness of an attempt to fight Great Britain
single-handed was no doubt apparent to Florida Blanca, and by him impressed
upon the King. On November 23, the Minister wrote in a despatch to Aranda: “the
King would like to know what considerable advantage Spain might derive from the
treaty, if, for any reason, she made the sacrifice of desisting from such a
claim,” i.e. the cession of Gibraltar. Aranda gave Vergennes the despatch to
read, and the French Minister at once informed Rayneval at London that Spain
would abandon Gibraltar if she obtained Minorca and the two Floridas. Rayneval
replied that peace could be obtained on these terms and Aranda thereupon, as
Spanish plenipotentiary, gave his adhesion. Both Florida Blanca and Charles III
declared that Aranda, in taking this decisive step, had
1781-6] Peace concluded-Mediterraneanpiracy
suppressed. 381
exceeded his
instructions; but he was the last man to have run the risk of his sovereign’s
displeasure for the sake of bringing about peace with England. The preliminary
articles were signed, January 30,1783. Possibly the Spanish Court hoped to
revive the claim to Gibraltar at a later stage of the negotiations. The fall of
the Shelburne Ministry (April, 1783), however, dissipated any such expectation,
and in September the definitive treaty was concluded. Gibraltar remained
British, and the two Floridas and Minorca passed into the hands of Charles III.
Outwardly, therefore, Spain emerged from this arduous struggle with the fruits
of victory; but it was purchased by the ruin of her fleet and the serious
crippling of her finances.
Nor was this
all. The consequences, which had been partly foreseen, of a policy which lent
armed support to the revolt of the American colonies against their mother
country, in due course followed. Insurrectionary tumults and risings took
place in various parts of Spanish America and had to be put down by force. The
rebellion in Peru under Tupac Amaru, a descendant of the Incas, assumed
dangerous proportions. In a short time he found himself at the head of some
60,000 men, but without discipline and badly armed. He was defeated (March,
1781) by a Spanish force under Don Joseph de Valle, and was himself taken
prisoner.
After the
conclusion of peace, Charles Ill’s efforts were steadily directed to an object
which had so often before occupied the serious attention of the Spanish
monarchy—the freeing of the Mediterranean from the Algerian and Tunisian
piracies. His aim was to effect by treaty a result, which arms had failed to
accomplish. An amicable understanding had already been reached with the Moors.
Negotiations had been set on foot at Constantinople, which issued in a
commercial treaty (December 24, 1782), and the way was opened for negotiations
with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. By a mixture of threats and bribery, and the
influence of the Sultan and the Moorish emperor, the piratical Governments were
at last persuaded to listen favourably to Florida Blanca’s proposals. A treaty
with Tripoli, similar to that with the Porte, was concluded (September, 1784).
Algiers and Tunis were more obdurate; but both assented to arrangements on the
same lines two years later (June, 1786). Piracy ceased, and the lands on the
Mediterranean coast of Spain, now freed from the fear of raids and
depredations, began to be cultivated and peopled. The bonds of friendship with
Portugal, which had so happily subsisted since 1778, were further cemented by a
double matrimonial alliance between the reigning Houses. In 1785 the Infant Don
Gabriel, third son of Charles III, was married to Dona Mariana Victoria,
daughter of Queen Maria, and Dona Carlota, eldest daughter of the Prince of the
Asturias, to Dom John, second son of the Portuguese sovereign. Florida Blanca
had during this period to contend against the enmity and obstructions of a
powerful
cabal,
hostile to his measures of internal reform, headed by the Count of Aranda, who
had now been recalled from the embassy at Paris. Wearied at last with long
years of continuous labour, hurt by the bitterness of the attacks of his
adversaries, and feeling himself in declining health, the Minister now (October
10,1788) drew up a lengthy memoir or apology, for submission to the King, in
which he gave a full account of the whole of his administration and concluded
by asking his Majesty’s permission on the ground of health to retire. But one
of the most marked characteristics of Charles III was the immovable firmness of
the support which throughout his life he always gave to those who had once won
his confidence. He now refused to accept his Minister’s proffered resignation,
and removed from their posts two of his chief opponents, the Marquis of Rubi,
Governor of Madrid, and General O’Reilly, the Minister of War.
This was one
of the last acts of Charles. The deaths in rapid succession, from small-pox,
of his daughter-in-law, Doha Mariana, of her infant, and then of Don Gabriel
himself (October and November, 1788) were a great shock to him. Shortly
afterwards the King fell ill of a fever, and he died on December 14, in the
seventy-third year of his age. Of Charles it may in truth be said his faults
were few, his virtues many. To assert of him that he was the most capable,
intelligent, honest, and best-intentioned of all the kings who have ruled in
Spain since the death of Philip II, would perhaps be in itself small praise.
The best tribute to his memory is a survey, however brief, of the many reforms,
administrative, material, economic and social for the public welfare, carried
out or initiated under his auspices.
The Minister
to whom the chief credit is due for the internal progress of Spain after the
conclusion of the war with England is Florida Blanca. He seized the opportunity
of the restoration of peace to push forward in every department of the national
life the system of reform, which Patino initiated and which Campillo, Ensenada,
and Aranda had each of them striven, not altogether unsuccessfully, in spite of
many prejudices and much opposition, to carry on. Florida Blanca was fortunate
in having at his side so capable an adviser as Pedro Rodriguez, Count of
Campomanes, jurist, historian, statesman, writer, and above all one of the
leading authorities of his day on economic science. Campomanes, as President of
the Council of Castile, gave his wholehearted cooperation to the First
Minister in putting into practical shape the projects of reform, which the King
had at heart. Francis, Count de Cabarrus, a Frenchman by extraction, and Joseph
de Galvez, Marquis de Sonora, the conqueror of Florida, also did excellent
service in the departments of commerce and the Indies.
It is not
possible to do more than indicate all that was accomplished for the advancement
and prosperity of Spain by the efforts of these statesmen. To relieve the
heavy burden of public indebtedness and to increase
the revenue
by a readjustment and reorganisation of the whole system of taxation was a
pressing necessity. The foundation of the National Bank of St Charles, with a
capital of 300,000,000 of reals (£3,593,750) in 1782 carried out chiefly by the
financial skill of Cabarrus, did much to give stability to the credit of the
State. In Catalonia the obnoxious duties known as the holla and plomos de
ramos, a charge of 15 per cent, on all articles manufactured and on all sales,
were abolished. The corresponding duties in Castile and other parts of
Spain—the alcabalas and millones—which were exacted not merely on manufactures
and fabrics, but upon all the necessities of life, were all greatly reduced—
those on food products from 14 per cent, to 2, 3, and 4 per cent. In place of
these oppressive charges there was at first imposed a single tax of 5 per cent,
upon incomes, which it was afterwards found expedient to graduate, a reduction
of one-half being allowed to those who resided on their own property. At the
same time, all restrictions upon the commerce of the mother country with the
colonies were gradually swept away. As a result of this policy, the export of
home produce to America was speedily quintupled, and the imports from America
were increased nine-fold. Every effort was also made to stimulate the
prosperity of home industries. In 1783 a new tariff was brought into operation
to check the import of foreign manufactures, and at the same time skilled
artificers from abroad were introduced to teach the native workmen their craft.
Thus the Government were enabled to start factories for glass-making, and porcelain,
fine cloth, velvets, leathers, and other goods, and to create profitable
occupations for large numbers of the people. Every possible encouragement was
also given to agriculture and means of communication. The Canal of Aragon,
planned in the time of the Emperor Charles V, was completed from Tadela to
Saragossa, enabling a large extent of country that had passed out of
cultivation to be irrigated. Other canals on a large scale—the Canal of Old
Castile to connect Madrid with the Tagus, the Canal of Guadarama, and others of
less importance—were begun, and likewise proved of great service for irrigation
purposes. A practical school of agriculture was founded near Aranjuez. Attempts
were made at afforesting the bare plateaux of Castile, and to establish
colonies in waste lands in the north of Andalusia. A perfect network of new
roads was constructed, and regular posting between the chief towns established.
Hospitals, colleges, schools, philanthropic institutions, arose on every side.
Mendicity was suppressed and punished, and vagabonds placed in houses of
correction where they were compelled to work, while for the infirm and aged
asylums were provided. The funds for these objects were largely derived from
the confiscated property of the Jesuits and by charges made upon the revenues
of the clergy for what was called “ the pious fund ” (Jbndo pio beneficial).
Much was done for the codification and revision of the laws and for securing
the prompt administration of justice. Many abuses were swept away; a good
police system secured
384 General progress in
Spain.—Portugal. [1748-88
order in the
large towns; and the rapacity and extortion of officials checked. All these
changes and reforms could not be effected without friction, or without
opposition from those whose privileges or whose liberties were curtailed. But,
on the whole, the result for good rivals that achieved in an equally short time
in any other country; and in the history of Spain there is certainly no period
which can compare with the reign of Charles III. Despite the wars against
England, with their disastrous drain upon the finances of the country, the
welfare and the prosperity of the kingdom continually advanced. It was an age
at once of material and intellectual advance. The Universities became centres
for the acquiring and the diffusion of knowledge, and scientific and literary
societies were to be found in all the chief cities of the land. Unfortunately,
the brighter days which seemed to be dawning for the Spanish people were not
destined to endure. In an absolute monarchy very much depends upon the
enlightenment and character of the monarch. With the accession of Charles IV
the old evils attendant upon weakness and misrule were once more to reappear,
and the destinies of the country to sink with the moral tone of its government.
(2) PORTUGAL.
(1750-93.)
John V died
in 1750 after a long reign of 44 years, marked by peace and lavish expenditure.
The incomings from the mines of Brazil had been very large; but they had been
wasted in the erection of costly edifices and in a continual stream of
donatives to Rome. As a reward for the religious zeal, which showed itself in
this practical form, Dom John received from the Pope in 1748, the title of Most
Faithful. During the last eight years of his life this King fell into a state
of imbecility, and the government was carried on by a Regency. He was succeeded
by his son Joseph I, who, though he was 36 years of age, had hitherto been
allowed to take no part in the administration. He had no love of the details of
business, and, though a man of some ability, was content to leave the practical
work of government in the hands of his Ministers. He was fortunate in finding
one capable of dealing with the difficult task of restoring prosperity and
vigour to a country that had become impoverished, stagnant, well-nigh moribund.
Sebastian Joseph de Carvalho e Mello, after filling the posts of ambassador at
London and Vienna, had been summoned by the Queen Regent in 1750 to take the
Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs. Before he arrived at Lisbon, Joseph had
ascended the throne; but he was confirmed in his office by the new King, over
whom he speedily acquired complete ascendancy.
Carvalho was
already 51 years old; but, though he had had to wait so long for an opportunity
for the exercise of his great abilities, he now began at once to display an
energy, industry, and strength of character
which
won the King’s unlimited confidence, and secured for the Minister, until
Joseph’s death in 1777, the exercise of absolute and autocratic power. There
were no Cortes to dispute his predominance; but he had to encounter the
opposition of the nobility and the Church in his efforts at reform, besides the
prejudices of the people—and these were no slight obstacles. One of his first
steps, in 1751, was to curb the power of the Inquisitor. A royal decree enacted
that henceforth no auto-de-fi was to take place, or execution be carried out,
without the approval of the Government. He set to work to put the defences of
the country into a more satisfactory state, by putting aside an annual sum for
the maintenance of the fortresses, arid at the same time did his utmost to
revive agriculture, and stimulate industries. The streets of Lisbon and other
towns, which had been the scenes of licence and outrage, were efficiently
policed, and offences were severely punished. The finances were reorganised,
and great economies in expenditure effected. The condition of the colonies next
occupied the Minister’s attention. In June, 1755, a charter was issued
incorporating a Company with special privileges for trading in Maranhao and
Grand Para; and this was followed by the establishment of the Pcmambuco and
Paraiba Companies. A decree was issued in the same month by which all the
native Indians in Maranhao and Grand Para were declared free; and Carvalho’s
brother, Francisco Xavier de Mendoza, was sent out as Governor to cany it into
effect. , : '.
An awful catastrophe
was to interrupt the course of these well meant efforts at reform. On the
morning of All Saints’ Diay (November 1, 1755), a great earthquake laid Lisbon
in ruins and causcd the death of some 30,000 of its inhabitants. A terrible
tidal wave, sweeping up the* estuary of the Tagus, completed the destruction
caused by the upheaving of the ground. The courage and energy d’splayed by
Carvalho were extraordinary. Working day and night, visiting personally the
scenes of devastation, he issued decree after decree in rapid succession, for
the restoration of order, the tending of the wounded, the burial of the dead,
the provision of necessary food. From this time forward, the trust reposed by
the King in his Minister was practically unbounded. Under his care and
supervision, the city rose from its ashes with handsome streets and squares,
cleansed, improved, and embellished. The old feelings of amity between England
and Portugal were greatly strengthened by the munificent donation of
<£100,000 made by the British Government for the relief of the sufferers in
the earthquake. In 1756, Carvalho was made First Minister, and all departments
of administration were placed under his supreme control; while, on his
nomination, he was succeeded as Secretary for Foreign Affairs by,Luis da Cunha.
The establishment of the Oporto Wine Company in September, 1756, which gave to
the company the exclusive right of buying all the wines in a given district for
a fixed price during a certain period after the vintage^
was intended
to benefit the quality of the wine and the growers. It gave, however, much
umbrag? to the English, who, through the trade privileges granted them under
the Methuen Treaty of 1702, had been the almost exclusive consumers of these
wines, and excited such discontent in Oporto that formidable riots broke out
(February, 1757). These were suppressed with great severity.
Carvalho had
two great obstacles in his path to absolute autocratic authority in the
State—the powerful Order of the Jesuits and the nobility. He now set about the
task of crushing them both. The conduct of the Jesuits in America furnished the
pretext. The Jesuit missionaries in the seventeenth century had converted the
Indians in the interior of Paraguay, and had formed a colony, consisting of 31
mission stations or ff ductiones as they were called, which carried on a
considerable trade and by its remoteness had become almost independent. In
174)8, an agree* ment had been made between Spain and Portugal, by which the
latter ceded the long-disputed territory known as Nova Colonia to Spain, in
exchange for seven of the Paraguay reduetiones adjacent to the Brazilian
frontier. The attempt to carry out this compact was resisted by the Jesuits in
1754-5 by force of arms, and the reduetiones had to be conquered by a difficult
and costly campaign. The Jesuits, who had on the Amazon many mission stations,
which were also centres of trade, likewise opposed, as much as they could, the
operations of the Maranhao and Pard Company and the decree of 1755 for the freeing
of the Indians. Hitherto, the Order Had oeen powerful in Portugal and had
exercised, through the royal confessors, jjreat influence at Court. Joseph,
however, placed himself entirely in his Minister’s hands, and Carvalho
determined to strike hard. The King’s confessor, Moreira, was dismissed, and
Jesuits were forbidden to approach the Court. Representations were made to the
Pope as to the misdemeanours of the Order in America and elsewhere. Finally, on
April 1,1758, Benedict XIV nominated Cardinal Saldanhaas Visitor and Reformer
of the Society of Jesus in the dominions of His Most Faithful Majesty. By a
decree dated May 15,1758, the Visitor ordered the Jesuits to desist thenceforth
from trading and commerce, and suspended them from preaching and confessing in
his patriarchate.
The next blow
fell on the nobility. On September 3, 1758, an attempt was made on the life of
the King. He was fired at in his carriage and wounded. In the middle of
December, some of the most influential members of the Portuguese aristocracy,
the Marquis and Marchioness of Tavora and their two sons, the Duke of Aveiro,
the Count of Atouguia, and others, were arrested as the authors of the crime.
They were strong opponents of the Carvalho autocracy. A special tribunal was
appointed to try them; they were condemned to death, and their property was
donfiscated. The sentence was carried out, on January 13,1759, with cruel
brutality. A great mystery surrounds this summary procedure. Whether the
accused were innocent or guilty is one of those questions on which no
positive
opinion can be given. Many people believed in their innocence; but Carvalho
succeeded in persuading the King that the step he had taken was just and
necessary, and as a reward for his services he was in June created Count of
Oeyras. The conviction of the Tavoras had meanwhile served as a pretext for
further attacks upon the Jesuits. On the ground of evidence found in the Tavora
papers, Gabriel Malagrida, the confessor of the Marchioness, and eight other
Jesuits were arrested. The whole Society were accused of being the instigators
of, and accomplices in, the crime. On January 19, a decree was issued for the
sequestration of all their estates; and this was followed, in September, by the
expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal and from the Portuguese possessions in
Brazil and the East Indies. Malagrida, a half-crazy enthusiast, was burnt alive
as a heretic in 1764.
The Minister,
having thus with a strong hand removed opposition from his path, was able to
carry out his policy of reform without further let or hindrance. His reign was
a reign of terror; spies filled the land; the prisons were crowded; but all
that a man could do for the welfare of his country was taken in hand by
Carvalho, and carried out with an unsparing energy and an administrative
capacity and resource that have rarely been surpassed in the annals of
statesmanship. He rebelled against the political and commercial dependence
upon England to which Portugal had been reduced by the Methuen Treaty; but,
when attacked by Spain in 1762, he was, as has been related elsewhere, ready to
avail himself of British assistance in repelling the invasion. After the
campaign he retained the services of Count William of Lippe-Biickeburg to
reorganise the Portuguese army and to train a force of 32,000 men on the
Prussian model. The fortresses were also repaired, and a respectable navy of
thirteen ships of war and six frigates was created. In 1769, an attempt
attributed to the Jesuits was made upon Carvalho’s life. It was at this time
that the King conferred upon him the title of Marquis of Pombal, by which he is
best known to history.
To recount
all the reforms of Pombal would occupy a larger space than is at our d:,posal.
A brief resume must therefore suffice. Mention has already been made of the
commercial companies established by him. He did his utmost to offer facilities
for an increase of trade between the mother country and her colonies, and by
shutting out foreign imports he endeavoured to stimulate the growth of native
manufactures and industries which he set on foot. The distinctions between “
old ” and “ new ” Christians were swept away, and all Portuguese subjects were
made eligible to serve in Church and State. The system of internal administration
was revolutionised, and a crowd of useless and costly petty officials were
abolished in 1761 by a stroke of the pen. The legal machinery was simplified
and made more effective. Education occupied a large share of the Minister’s
attention. The expulsion of the Jesuits and the sequestration of their property
necessitated the creation of fresh
educational
institutions, and also afforded the financial means for their establishment.
The former Jesuit College at Lisbon was transformed into a College of Nobles
under secular administration, and Pombal introduced into the Univiersity of
Coimbra faculties for instruction in the Natural Sciences and the latest modern
learning', while 837 elementary and secondary schools were scattered over the
land. The ideas and projects of Pombal were in these matters far in advance of
his time; unfortunately, they never had an opportunity to take root and
acclimatise themselves, and the fall from power of the great Minister was a
fatal blow to that revival of the prosperity and welfare of the Portuguese people
on which he had spent his best efforts and energies during twenty- six years.
The King died on February 24, 1777; and Pombal, who was now 77 years of age, at
once fell into disgrace.
The new
sovereign, Maria I, was married to her uncle, who now became King Consort as
Pedro III. Both Maria and Pedro were weak and amiable, and disinclined to treat
the aged Minister with harshness, but the Queen Mother, Mariana Victoria,
resented his treatment of the Jesuits, and was bitterly incensed against Pombal
because of an attempt that he had made to exclude females from the right of
succession. Through her influence he was ejected from power, and would
doubtless have incurred heavy penalties, but for his vindictive adversary’s
death (January, 1781). He was, however, banished to his estates, and died in
1782. One of Maria’s first acts had been to release many great noblemen and
others, whom Pombal had thrown into prison on various pretexts. The Court was
therefore full of his bitter enemies; nevertheless, his policy of reform was
not reversed. The Queen was well disposed, and efforts to promote agriculture
and industry, and to advance the progress of education and learning, continued.
The Royal Academy of Science was founded in 1779, and many judicial abuses were
corrected. In all matters of administration the Queen placed herself in the
hands of her confessor, Ignacio de San Caetano, the Grand Inquisitor, who,
though a religious bigot, was on the whole an enlightened adviser.
In May, 1786,
Pedro III died, and shortly afterwards his eldest son Dom Josd. The second son
of Pedro and Maria, Dom John, who was married to Carlota Joaquina,
grand-daughter of Charles III of Spain, now became heir to the throne. For some
time the Queen had been showing signs of religious mania, and the death of
Caetano, following closely upon that of Dom Jose, completely upset the balance
of her mind, so that she became more and more unfit to discharge the duties of
her office. She remained nominally sovereign until 1792, when Dom John took upon
himself the administration of affairs. He was not, however, actually named
Regent until 1799.
1548-1654]
389
(3) BRAZIL.
(Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.)
In the course
of the sixteenth century the Portuguese had established themselves along the
whole coast line of Brazil from the Rio de la Plata to the mouth of the Amazon.
The country was divided into captaincies —hereditary grants of territory,
covering about 50 leagues of the coast and extending to an indefinite distance
inland. In 1548 the first Governor-General was appointed, with the seat of
government at San Salvador (Bahia). Brazil was the first of the European
settlements in America to attempt the cultivation of the soil; and, in
particular, sugar plantations soon became a flourishing industry. In 1581,
Philip II conquered Portugal; and Brazil passed under the dominion of the
Spanish kings. The colony now suffered from the apathy and neglect of the new
rulers, and, being especially vulnerable to attack by European freebooters,
suffered much during the closing years of the sixteenth and earlier half of the
seventeenth century from attacks by the enemies of the Spanish monarchy,
English, French, and Dutch. The French established a settlement on the island
of Marajo in 1612, but were expelled in 1618. The successful ejection of the
foreign colonists (1648) led to the formation of the State of Maranhao -Par6.
The Dutch during this same period planted a number of trading stations in the
mouth of the Amazon and some way up its main stream, but were finally driven
away (1606-24).
The formation
of the Dutch West India Company, in 1621, led to serious efforts being made by
Holland for the conquest of Brazil. San Salvador (Bahia) was captured in 1624
by a large Dutch armament, but was recaptured by a great expedition sent from
Spain in the following year. In 1630, the Dutch directed their attack on the
town of Olinda in Pernambuco and its port, the Reciff, which fell into their
hands. Count Maurice of Nassau, appointed Governor-General in 1636, succeeded
in establishing a great Dutch dominion stretching along the coast from the Rio
San Francisco to Maranhao. He established friendly relations with the
Portuguese settlers, and the colony prospered under his rule. Maurice retired
in 1644; in the meantime, the disposition of the Portuguese towards their
foreign conquerors had been changed by the successful revolt of the mother
country against Spain in 1641, and the assumption of the Portuguese Crown by
John IV. The Brazilian settlers rose against the Dutch, and gradually
reconquered the territory that had been lost. Ill supported from home, the
Dutch were finally driven out in 1654, when the Reciff, their last stronghold,
was taken. From this time onwards, the Portuguese were able to set themselves
to the task of the development of the enormous territory which had now, without
further let or hindrance from foreign aggression, fallen into their hands.
The four
centres of settlement in Brazil were Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and, in
the interior, Sao Paulo on the central plateau. Of these the last, founded by
the great Jesuit missionary Nobrega, in 1553, was the most vigorous and
enterprising. The Paulistas intermarried frequently with the natives, and
their descendants were noted for their daring activity in exploring the
interior in search of gold. They penetrated as far as the Jesuit reductiones on
the Parana, 1635, and into the districts to the north afterwards known as Minas
Geraes, because of the gold that was found there. The first discovery of rich
mines was made in 1670 near the head-waters of the San Francisco river and in
1690 at SabarA. Adventurers now flocked in, both from the sea-coast and
Portugal, and considerable population grew up round the mines. At first, the
mining laws were liberal, but afterwards more and more restrictions were
imposed, export was forbidden, and one-fifth rigorously exacted as the King’s
share. A revolt of the emboabas or foreign immigrants broke out under a leader
named Nunez Vianna, and was with difficulty subdued in 1709. A little later,
there was a further rebellion in Pernambuco against the rapacity and corruption
of the Portuguese Governors and officials, which was not put down without
difficulty, many concessions having to be made to the settlers by the home
authorities. In the north, the provinces of Pard, Maranhao and CearA had in
1621 been united as the State of Maranhao and created a separate Governorship.
This enormous stretch of territory included the mouths of the Amazon and the
vast watershed of that river. For a long time the settlements were confined to
the neighbourhood of the sea-coast, the seat of Government being the town of
Par A. Only very slowly did any settlements rise on the Amazon or Rio Negro.
The Jesuits, under the leadership of the famous Padre Antonio Vieira,
established a number of mission stations in the interior, and at the end of the
third decade of the eighteenth century they had made their way far up the river
Solimoes and Negro. They gathered the Indians together into villages, aldeas,
and with their aid cultivated the soil and carried on a considerable commerce.
Meanwhile the hunting for gold had led to discoveries on the head-waters of the
Madeira and the Paraguay, and to the foundation of the two new provinces of CuyaM
and Matto Grosso. In 1729 came the further discovery of diamonds in northern
Minas. So immense was the yield that it is said that, between 1730 and 1770,
more than 5,000,000 carats were taken from the district. This output,
unequalled in the world at that time, was a source of immense profit to the
Portuguese Crown.
In the south
events had not moved so smoothly. Spain had neglected to occupy the north bank
of the Rio de la Plata, although she claimed its possession as falling to the
west of the boundary between the Portuguese and Spanish spheres as defined by
the Treaty of Tordesillas. But this district was also claimed by Portugal, in
whose early maps this portion of the South American continent had been placed
eight degrees
1680-1777] Boundary disputes in the South.
391
to the
eastward of its correct position. In 1680, the Portuguese planted a fort and
settlement, called Colonia, right opposite Buenos Ayres. It was captured by the
Spanish Governor; but it was restored by the influence of Louis XIV, and finally
ceded definitely to Portugal by the Treaty of Utrecht. The Portuguese retc ned
possession of this coveted outpost, which was valuable as a centre of
clandestine trade, with one or two short intervals until 1777. In the years
1710-11, during the War of the Spanish Succession, two daring attacks were made
on Rio de Janeiro by French expeditions. In the latter year it was captured by
Admiral Duguay-Trouin, and had to pay a heavy ransom.
The
importance of Colonia was greatly diminished by the founding, in 1726, of
Montevideo; and in 1737 a Portuguese force was sent to capture it, but failed.
It was at this time that the Portuguese, for the protection of their southern
frontier, fortified the only entrance to the series of great lagoons which
skirt this part of the coast. This fort was the beginning of the city of Rio
Grande do Sul.
An effort was
made, in 1750, to settle all disputed boundary claims between Spain and
Portugal on the principle of uti possidetis, and it was arranged that seven of
the Jesuit reductiones in the interior should be given in exchange for Colonia.
But the Indians strenuously resisted this attempt to hand them over to new
masters. Colonia was, accordingly, not surrendered, and in 1761 the outbreak of
war in Europe reopened the whole question. A strong army despatched from Buenos
Ayres took possession both of Colonia and Rio Grande (1763). By the Treaty of
Paris Colonia was given back to Portugal, but Rio Grande was retained by the
Spaniards. In this diplomatic surrender, however, the inhabitants refused to
acquiesce. They carried on fierce guerilla warfare with the intruders, gained
strength year by year, being aided by the Paulistas from the interior, and
finally, in 1775, succeeded in recapturing the town of Rio Grande, and driving the
Spaniards out of their conquests. When the news of these events reached Madrid
a great expedition was despatched to recover the lost ground. Santa Catharina
was taken, and preparations were made for an invasion of southern Brazil in
force, when the resolve of Spain to join France in supporting the revolted
American colonies against Great Britain led to a change of attitude towards
Portugal. A treaty was signed at San Ildefonso in 1777, by which all disputed
questions between the two Peninsular Powers with regard to their frontiers in
South America were amicably settled.
The interval
between these two treaties of 1750 and 1777 covered the period of the Ministry
in Portugal of the Marquis of Pombal. At the time of his accession to office
nothing could have been worse than the administrative and economic condition of
Brazil. The policy of the mother country towards its great colony was narrow
and restrictive. No trade was permitted except with Portugal, and this was
hampered by manifold restrictions. Corruption among the officials, high and
low, was
392 Pombal’s reforms.-Movement for independence.
[1753-1822
universal.
Justice was an affair of bribery, and the industrial development of the
country was at a standstill. The Brazilians were gradually learning to regard
Portugal as their enemy, and to nourish a deep feeling of resentment against
the treatment they received. For a time this inimical attitude to all things
Portuguese was changed to a more friendly one by the energetic efforts of
Pombal to reform abuses in Brazil as well as at home. He did his utmost to
encourage commerce, agriculture, and industry. Corruption was sternly dealt
with and suppressed; As has been already told, charters were granted to trading
companies. A decree was issued in 1753 forbidding the enslaving of the Indians,
and encouraging intermarriage with them. Lastly, in 1759, there came the order
for the expulsion of the Jesuits and the confiscation of their property. Under
Pombal’s wise administration the revenue from the mines was greatly increased,
and, despite the hostilities in the south, commerce and prosperity began to
make a real start in many parts of the country. With the great Minister’s fall
this promise of better things speedily vanished. The old abuses crept back and
with them the desire for freedom from political dependence on a distant and
selfish mother country began to make headway among the more ardent spirits of
the cultured class. It was fomented by the declaration of independence of the
United States, which set an example, and gave an impulse, which was to bear
fruit at a later date. How the Portuguese royal family were compelled in 1807
to take refuge at Rio, is related in another volume. It was an event which
profoundly affected the relations between the colony and the parent State, and
caused the severing of their political ties to be effected (in 1822) after a
quite different fashion in the case , of Brazil from that of the armed revolts
which led to the establishment of the. Spanish colonies as a series of independent
republics.
GREAT
BRITAIN.
(1756-93.)
(1) WILLIAM PITT THE ELDER.
The Seven Years’ War, the military events of which
have been recorded in other chapters of this work, brought about two results of
universal historical significance. England, after her victories over France
beyond the confines of Europe, now appears as unmistakably the foremost
colonial Power. For America was wrested from the French and their power in
India broken. The command of the seas lay in the hands of Great Britain, and
even a Napoleon was not able to take it from her. Next, in the old world of
Europe the little kingdom of Prussia had successfully held its own in the face
of a strong coalition. Both of the old military Powers, France and Austria, had
been its opponents in the field, and a few other States, Russia and Sweden,
were ranged by their side. English help was mainly indirect and consisted, from
the Prussian point of view, chiefly in occupying hostile activity at remote
points and in supplying subsidies. Relying almost entirely on her own
resources, Prussia carried on this struggle under her gifted King, who, with
equal courage and tenaeity, daring and prudence, overcame all dangers and
proved to the world that Prussia’s ambition to be counted among the Great Powers
could no longer be arrested.
With
England’s share in bringing about these results the name of William Pitt is
inseparably associated. In him the French recognised their most dangerous
adversary. In the archives of the Foreign Office in Paris is a report of the
year 1783 in which a government official points out the dangers that would
arise for France if she should remain without sufficient warlike preparations
on land and sea and confine herself to a passive attitude. “She will be what
Lord Chatham ■wished her to be: a Power of secondary rank limited to the
Continent of Europe.” And Frederick the Great, who found his best ally in Pitt,
calls him “a lofty spirit, a mind capable of vast designs, of steadfastness in
carrying them into execution, and of inflexible fidelity to his own
394
Pitt's
beginnings and qualities. [i735-56
opinions,
because he believed them to be for the good of his country which he loved.”
When the Wax
began, Pitt was already a man of forty-eight. His grandfather, Thomas Pitt, had
been in the service first of the old, then of the new (combined) East India
Company, though not above an occasional connexion with the “ Interlopers ”;
and, by a bold and successful commercial career, he had attained to wealth and
importance. Posterity has remembered him as “ Diamond Pitt,” because of the
celebrated transactions (which occupied, fifteen years of his life) concerned
with the disposal of a diamond of unprecedented size and beauty, which he sold
—greatly to his own advantage—to the Regent Orleans. He was one of the earliest
of those “nabobs” who invested their imported riches in English estates and
parliamentary seats.
Thomas’
grandson, William Pitt, would probably have persisted in the military career
which he had originally chosen in accordance with his own inclination and
natural gifts, had he not been, at an early date compelled by a gouty tendency
in his constitution to relinquish a soldier’s life. Prom 1735 he was a member
of the House of. Commons. He joined the party of the “Patriots” who gathered
round the heir to the throne and whose intellectual head, though he remained
excluded from Parliament, was Bolingbroke. Pitt grew up in Opposition. He
helped to overthrow Walpole; he attacked Carteret; after he had been a member
of the Pelham Ministry, though not in the Cabinet, he again went over to the
Opposition in 1755, and until the outbreak of the War remained the most
dangerous parliamentary adversary of the Government.
Pitt’s
strength was founded on his own personality, and not on powerful family
connexions. From his first appearance in Parliament onwards he was
accounted one of the best speakers. How his contemporaries were impressed by
the flash of his eye,, the music of his voice, the noble bearing of his tall
figure—doubtless the outward dignity of his personal appearance was no less
impressive, even when he rose in the House for the delivery of his great
orations leaning on crutches and wrapped in bandages. It cannot be denied that
the form of these speeches is superior jto their substance; the energy of the
delivery was more remarkable than the strength of the arguments. But, even so,
he was possessed of the power of fascinating and convincing his hearers. “ You
don’t know,” Lord Cobham once observed, “ Mr Pitt’s talent of insinuation ; in
a very short quarter of an hour he can persuade any man of anything.”
He presented
himself on every occasion as the whole-hearted champion of nothing less than
the true ideals of every Englishman: tjie interests of the nation, the
Constitution, the privileges of Parliament, the honour of England. And, most
assuredly, his whole nature was pervaded by the moral earnestness which was the
keynote of his speeches. For, beyond all doubt, Pitt was a high-minded patriot;
and, if
his ambition
was bent for power, he was also impelled by the conviction that no other could
guide the helm of the State so safely as himself. In the years of Opposition he
had struggled against the great political evils of the time, or at least
against what his contemporar'es regarded as such. No one gave stronger
expression to the indignation provoked by Walpole’s system of corruption than
Pitt. And just as, a few years after the accession of George I, the Jacobite
Shippen declared the Speech from the Throne fitter for the meridian of Germany
than for that of England, so, with not less animosity, Pitt, the Opposition
leader, a few decades later, asserted of the connexion of England with Hanover,
“that this great, this powerful, this formidable kingdom, is considered only as
a province to a despicable electorate,” and adjured the House to show “that,
however the interest of Hanover has been preferred by the Ministers, the
Parliament pays no regard but to that of Great Britain.” When George II
ascended the throne of Great Britain, Sir Robert Walpole stood at the height of
his power. At the death of that monarch the affairs of the State were
controlled by Pitt. The two men, as has been already indicated in an earlier
chapter, were wholly different in their relations both to the Crown and Parliament.
Walpole, it is aptly said, was given to the people by the King, Pitt to the
King by the people. Walpole rose to power, and was supported by the Kr lg, as
the most capable man in the Whig party, which under the two first rulers of the
Hanoverian dynasty had the monopoly of political power. When the new reign
began in 1727, it rested with the sovereign whether Walpole should go or stay.
George II decided, after a short hesitation, for his father’s Minister, and
Walpole remained. His highest aim being to maintain himself in the monarch’s
favour, he was not less ready to please the King in his foreign policy, by a
punctilious consideration for the Hanoverian electorate, as to satisfy his
personal requirements. He drew his support from above, from the Crown; but in
order to secure his own rule, he needed to retain the lasting cooperation of
Parliament. By means which would now be condemned, but which were then
acquiesced in as indispensable, he succeeded for a long while in mastering a
very troublesome Opposition, and in keeping a majority without ever sinking to
be its'tool. In fact the general sentiment declared his rule necessary for the
country. His system was the policy of peace and of the prosperity which depends
upon peace. He was not the originator of what had become the leading principle
of English politics since Utrecht—the maintenance of peace and friendship with
France—but he adopted it and carried it out. He thus became the historical
embodiment of this principle; foreign policy always being accounted by him of
secondary importance, while his primary purpose was the development of finance,
commerce, and the colonies. Thus he condemned the Treaty of Hanover of 1725,
because it might lead to a great war, and always remained disinclined to push
matters to extremities. Herein he was, as we shall
see, the
exact opposite of Pitt, the great war Minister, who was resolved to carry
through the struggle to its final conclusion, and not to desist till victory
had been won all along the line. When at last Walpole was obliged by the will
of the nation to enter on a war agairst Spain, it was precisely this War which
caused his fall. For he carried it on with an insufficient expenditure of force
and with indifferent success; Parliament had little confidence in the bellicose
achievements of his Ministry; and the actual successes won were not placed to
his credit.
Walpole has
been called the first Prime Minister in England; but his position still
retained much of the traditions of earlier times. The Minister rules for the
King and can, like him, change his political system. He leads Parliament and
seeks to assure himself of its support; but he is not yet the choice of
Parliament. William Pitt, on the contrary, is the first great representative of
the new conception of the office of Minister. He had begun by joining in the
Opposition against Walpole; but every Complaint which he brought forward, after
all, addressed itself rather to the system than to the man. In his later years
Pitt came to esteem Walpole far more highly than he had done at first, and
indeed to admire him. To understand Pitt, it will always be necessary to recall
the Administration of Walpole and the contrast between the two great Ministers,
though many years lay between their periods of office. In the course of this
interval numerous men of talent appeared on the political scene, but no great
genius dominated England. Carteret was a man of great intelligence and signally
well acquainted with the problems of European politics. But, on the other hand,
he was neither sufficiently familiar with the internal affairs of Great Britain
(he had never sat in the House of Commons), nor had he a true insight into the
rising importance of Britain beyond the seas, that is, of the colonies.
Still less
deserving of praise is the Administration of the Pelhams, which, as has been
seen, was conducted, quite in Walpole’s way, by patronage and bribery. The
younger, Henry, for some time First Lord of the Treasury, was certainly a
clever business man, with a special gift for finance. The elder, the Duke of
Newcastle, who sat in nearly every Cabinet through many decades, from the time
of Walpole until after the great Ministry of the elder Pitt, was necessary to
the Government on account of the number of votes of which he disposed, although
his personal qualities in no way recommended him for great office in the State.
But the long term of his activity in high place, his immense political
experience, his familiarity with routine—all this gave him as a rule great
weight within the Cabinet, and explains how he could be a valuable
fellow-worker even for a man of genius like Pitt. Extremely selfconfident, but
with moderate powers of judgment, he had, besides the merits already mentioned,
an immense personal capacity for work; he was certainly one of the most
industrious Ministers whom England ever had. His business papers, which are now
national property, contain,
besides
countless political despatches, often couched in a somewhat solemn long-winded
style, large collections of various materials to aid him in finding his way;
and yet historians are always dwelling, surely with some exaggeration, on his
grotesque ignorance! His diligence, his loyalty, and his blameless personal
conduct, make him by no means the most unattractive figure among the English
Ministers of the eighteenth century. He had a gift for hard work, but no
personal distinction ; he was a man who under superior gu lance was capable of
rendering excellent service, but he was himself little fitted for the position
of leader. Thus, for more than forty years, and under three English sovereigns,
Newcastle filled high political offices; until, at last, weary of his many
burdens and of his many adversaries, he retired, not without dignity, from
public life.
In the great
days of Pitt’s Ministry, when England’s position in the world had risen to so
great a height, foreign policy occupied a much larger place than home affairs.
Since the time of William III it had been assumed that England and France were
adversaries, and in the formation of alliances it was only necessary to ask who
would take the side of England and who that of France. It was also customary to
find the Imperial Court, that is, the Austrian Power, in alliance with England
or—as the traditional friendship between England and Holland had made it
possible to say from the days of William III onwards—with the Maritime Powers.
For the rivalry of the House of Habsburg with France was still older than that
of England; it dated from the days of Charles V. The electorate of Brandenburg,
too, which had now grown into the kingdom of Prussia, stood on the side of the
opponents of France ever since the Great Elector had in 1672 hastened to
succour Holland, when hard pressed by Louis XIV. Thus, the system of coalitions
pour contrebalancer la France, as it was expressed in the diplomatic language
of the time, was, in the eighteenth century, a familiar notion kept up all the
more tenaciously because of a corresponding joint policy on the part of the
kindred Bourbon Courts in France, Spain, and Italy. Temporary deviations from
this Old System, as it was called, indeed occurred. In Walpole’s time England
on the whole maintained friendly relations with France. The year 1725 had seen
the Powers of Europe grouped in unusual combinations in face of a threat of
war—the Emperor and Spain on the one side, the Western Powers on the other; but
this position appeared to politicians so unreasonable that 1725 came to be
spoken of as “the mad year.”
Thereafter,
England and France once more stood opposed to each other, especially on account
of their interests beyond sea; and in the War of the Austrian Succession the
conflicting Powers of Europe were seen again in the familiar old grouping. Only
in one case had a remarkable change been carried out. Prussia, under her young
King Frederick,
had entered
upon a wholly new course of action, and her invasion of Silesia had been
followed by a series of conflicts between herself and Austria. From the year
1740 onwards, the enmiiy of the two most powerful German States was as much
taken for granted in European politics as was the old hostility between England
and France; and whoever ignored it had to learn it to his own cost. Newcastle,
in 1748, failed completely in his attempt to recall Prussia to her traditional
place in the “ Old System.” An alliance between Prussia and Austria, said
Frederick himself, is quite as inconceivable as a combination of fire and
water.
In substance,
the policy of Frederick from the end of the Second Silesian War had been
directed to the maintenance of peace and the security of his own possessions.
The chief import to him of the negotiations of 1748 and the conclusion of the
Peace of Aix-larChapelle was that by this Treaty he obtained a European
guarantee of his recent acquisition of Silesia. Feeling assured of the hate of
Queen Maria Theresa, who had not given up the hope of reconque: <ng Silesia,
he for eight years sought to deprive her of the chance of renewing the contest
under favourable conditions. But these years of diplomatic efforts for the
maintenance of peace he afterwards himself regarded as having been wasted and
fruitless; and, declaring the futility of his policy before the Seven Years’
War to be a topic unworthy of the attention of historians, he left a lacuna in
his own historical narrative of his reign.
Hereupon, it
gradually became patent that the system1 of alliances maintained up
to 1755—England and Austria on the one side, France and Prussia on the
other—was no longer based on common interests, and that such was especially the
case with regard to' Austria and England. The English Ministers had in view the
great colonial conflict with France, in which it mus1 be decided whether
America should belong to the English or to the French. The Austrian alliance
was only important to England in a continental war in so far as it was
calculated to keep in check the French land forces and to resist any attack by
them on the Netherlands or on Hanover. But this concerned Austria far less than
the new struggle against Prns:- a. Maria Theresa longed to crush and cripple
the foe who had despoiled her of Silesia; in comparison with this the
antagonism to the House of Bourbon had ceased to be of the same account as of
old. And in a passage of arms with Frederick the English alliance could be of
no great use.
Thus both
parties began to look for more valuable allies. Already in 1749, soon after the
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the keen-witted Kaunitz had recommended his mistress
to abandon her old policy. “ Inasmuch as the loss of Silesia cannot be
forgotten and the King of Prussia is to be regarded as the greatest, most
formidable and implacable enemy of the illustrious Archducal House,” and as
little assistance against him could be hoped for from the Maritime Powers,
Kaunitz recommended an alliance with France. The suggestion clashed too much
with the
accepted view
to meet with sympathy at once. But, during the ensuing years which Kaunitz
spent as ambassador at Paris, he certainly did not relinquish it; and as
Chancellor he repeated (August 21, 1755) what he had said six years earlier as
the youngest member of the Conference of State at Vienna—“ It is' certain that
Prussia must be overthrown, if the illustrious Archducal House is to hold its
own ’’—further pointing out that with Austria’s present allies, the Maritime
Powers, this goal would never be reached. France must be won. His endeavours
were accordingly from this time onwards directed to bringing over France from
the Prussian to the Austrian alliance. For the moment, however, the idea was too
novel to the French Government; though it was quite ready to draw nearer to
Austria, even to guarantee to ;her security against external attack, while in
the case of an Anglo-French, war Austria was, like Prussia, to stand aloof. But
all this was to be included in the existing system; and the French had no
intention,of abandoning their alliance with Prussu
But, at the
same time, England and Prussia, were preparing to approach each other. George
II wished to secure Frederick the Great’s army for the protection of his
Hanoverian inheritance in the event of a French attack. Frederick, at first
mistrustful, ceased to show himself indisposed to listen to these overtures,
after he had been informed of the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian Treaty and had
seen it carried intq effect. From Russia and the Empress Elizabeth, who was
unfriendly towards him, Frederick could hope for little good. But now the King
thought that, if he were but in alliance with England, there would be nothing
more to fear from her other ally Russia. In that event, Austria too, left to
herself, would not venture upon a new conflict with Prussia.
The result of
these calculations was the Anglo-Prussian Alliance—- or, as it was called, the
Convention of Westminster (January 16, 1756) —purchased, in the opinion of
Pitt, by the sacrifice of British rights. Both the contracting sovereigns
undertook to preserve peace and friendship with each other. Each was to
prevent his allies from any hostile attempts upon the European territories of
the other. Were a foreign Power, under any pretext, to move its troops intp
Germany, the two contracting parties were to join forces to meet them and to
maintain tranquillity in Germany; for a guarantee of the neutrality of Germany
was the explicit object of this treaty. Accord’agly, on the present occasion
the term “ Germany,” which was officially quite unknown, was employed instead
of that of “the Roman Empire,” in prder not to involve Prussia in an
undertaking to defend the Austrian Netherlands.
Both Powers
were completely mistaken as to the effect of the new alliance. While they had
wished to secure peace on the Continent, they brought about war. England and
Prussia alike believed it possible tq enter into thei new alliance without
dissolving their old ties. The result frould have been a sort of general
European fraternisation. But the age
was
predisposed to war, and herein lay the mistake of the political calculation.
France, on the one hand, Austria and Russia on the other, felt themselves
injured and repulsed by the Powers which bad hitherto been their allies. They
now found themselves quickly at one. The Convention bf Westminster completed
what Kaunitz’ diplomacy could not of itself have brought about. It led to the
alliance between Maria Theresa and Louis XV.
Yet the Convention
of Westminster contained nothing by which France need have felt aggrieved. She
had herself already declared that she did not wish to attack Hanover. She could
not, therefore, regard as hostile to herself the obligation into which Prussia
had entered to defend the electorate. It was not so much the conditions of the
Treaty which caused annoyance in Paris as the Secrecy with which it was concluded.
Frederick tried conciliatory methods, and sought in sundry conversations to
convince the French ambassador, the Due de Nivemais, of the harmlessness of his
Treaty with England. He affirmed that' the new Treaty would change nothing in
his relations with France. He regretted the haste with which he had been
obliged to conclude it, insomuch that a previous communication to France would
have been dangerous, indeed impossible. He even caused Nivemais to open in his
presence the box containing the original documents of the Westminster Treaty
which had just arrived, in order that the Frenchman might convince himself that
there was nothing in them which he did not already know.
It was all to
no purpose. The unpleasant impression was not to be effaced. The French Court
could not pardon the King of Prussia for allying himself with England, the
enemy of France, without having in any way first asked her permission. A ready
hearing was now given to the Austrian overtures. The Imperial ambassador, Count
Starhem>- berg, who was earnestly supported by the Marquise de Pompadour and
by the Abbe Bernis, could, on February 27, inform Kaunitz that France had no
opposition to offer, if Austria were, in alliance with Russia, to deprive the
King of Prussia of his conquests, and that she held out hopes of subsidies for
this object. Further than this, however, the Government of France did not go;
and its consent to any notion of the dismemberment of Prussia was out of the
question.
The Treaty of
Versailles, which the two Powers signed on May 1, 1756, was, therefore, of a
purely defensive nature. Austria declared that she wished to remain neutral in
the Anglo-French wars and would renounce any deferice of Hanover. In return,
France promised her aid, in case Austria were attacked by Prussia or by the
Porte. No threat was hereby intended to the peace of the Continent. King
Frederick received the news of the Treaty of Versailles somewhat indifferently,
and gave a polite answer to the French ambassador who informed him of it. The
Cburt of St James’, however, regarded the event with more concern.
Newcastle,
never far-sighted, spoke of the unnatural alliance by which the Protestant
Courts were especially threatened. Either a powerful counter-alliance must now
be formed, or Europe would be given over to the supremacy of France. The remark
shows Newcastle’s curious undervaluation of the strength of England, whose
marvellous expansion under Pitt no one, indeed, could have foreseen.
The Peace of
Europe was in the end imperilled by the Treaty of Versailles, but only when it
became the starting-point for agreements with an ulterior scope between the
sovereigns of the Houses of Bourbon and Habsburg. Maria Theresa and Kaunitz had
had no other intention from the beginning but to move on towards a joint war
upon Prussia; and Louis XV and the woman who held sway at his side, the
Marquise de Pompadour, were quite willing to be pressed into this course. The
King’s responsible advisers, the very men who but shortly before had been the
most earnest partisans of Frederick the Great, acquiesced. In June, 1756, an
agreement as to the most important points had been reached, although the Treaty
of offensive alliance, towards which these efforts were directed, had not yet
been finally drawn up. Both Powers were already agreed that Silesia should be
restored to Austria, and Kaunitz also found the French Court well disposed
towards his intention of despoiling the Prussian monarchy of other provinces,
perhaps of dismembering it altogether. France would support the action of
Austria with military and financial assistance. She would also make no separate
peace with England. Austria was, however, to make over the Netherlands—but only
after the conquest of Silesia—i to the son-in-law of Louis XV, the Spanish
Infant, Don Philip, in exchange for his Italian possessions ; nor would she
raise any objection if certain parts of the Netherlands should become directly
incorporated with the French State.
Russia, too,
was won over to Kaunitz’ policy. The expectation that the Empress Elizabeth
would submit to the Treaty of Westminster and remain the ally of England ended
in disappointment. She cared for nothing beyond the attack on Prussia, and was
quite ready to agree to the Austrian proposal that this attack should be
supported bv Russian troops. She was even ready to exceed the stipulated number
of 60,000 or 70,000 men and to employ the whole of her forces by sea and land
in the war against Prussia.
“Are you sure
of the Russians?” the King of Prussia asked the new English ambassador, Sir
Andrew Mitchell, on May 12, 1756. “The King, my master, thinks so,” was the
answer of the diplomatist, who shared the mistake under which his Government
laboured. . But to Frederick this was the key of the political situation of
Europe. The Treaty of Versailles roused no fear in him, so long as English
influence prevailed in Russia. From the beginning of June, however, news had
reached him from different quarters which left him in no doubt that Russia
was actually
planning an attack on Prussia. Hereupon, he at once recognised the full extent
of the danger. He now knew that the military preparations of Russia, which he
was meant to believe, and had believed, were to be undertaken in the interest
of England,'were directed against himself. The situation appeared to him all
the more serious, when he simultaneously learnt of an unusual concentration of
Austrian troops in Bohemia. He resolved to be beforehand with his enemies.
Certain recent historians have refused to be satisfied with the assumption,
attested by Frederick’s own words, that he now began the War himself only on
account of the clear impossibility of preserving peace, and have adduced his
political testament of 1752, in which he speaks of the necessity of extending
his dominions, together with the timely commencement of Prussian preparations
in 1756, as evidence that he had from the first intended to attack and,
therefore, did not precipitate the War only as an act of self-defence: so that
it would be rather a case of two attacking Powers, Prussia and Austria,
clashing together. While unable to accept this hypothesis, or to enter fully
here into the arguments for or against it, we may refer to the discussions
which passed between England and Prussia during the critical weeks of the year
1756. It would be difficult to see how it could have been possible for the
English Ministry to fail to detect any false play on the part of their ally.
But, so far as we can see, they appear to have had no suspicion. On the
contrary, however strongly they desired the maintenance of peace on the
Continent, they unreservedly recognised the emergency which threatened Frederick,
l'hey candidly declared to Michell, the Prussian ambassador in London, as he
states in his despatch to his King, “that His Majesty is not in the least to
blame if he tries to forestall his enemies instead of waiting until they
carried out their hostile intentions.” And Frederick, on his side, declares to
his English friends in the most emphatic manner that he has tried every means
to maintain peace. His language rises to solemn heights when he calls on Heaven
to witness that there is no other course by which he may hope to prevent the
threatened destruction of his kingdom except that of forestalling his enemies.
“If ever I had had the intention of injuring that Court and seeking a quarrel
with them, I could have attacked them' two months ago without giving them time
to prepare for battle. God is my witness that I never thought of it.” This is
not the language of a guilty conscience, or, to be explicit, of a sovereign who
is deceitfully betraying the confidence of his ally.
The English,
at all events, believed the truth of his words. In any case, they had to accept
the facts as they were. For now the double character of the approaching
struggle was revealed. The maritime war and the struggle in distant parts of
the world, for which they were prepared, would not be all: they were now
forced into a continental war.
At the death
of Henry Pelham in 1754 his brother, Newcastle, had, as has been seen, become
First Lord of the Treasury and head of the Ministry.
1756] Loss of Minorca.—Pitt demanded by the nation.
403
But it was a
weak and incompetent Government. Corruption and patronage, the supports with
which it could not dispense, might, in times of peace, suffice for the
management of the House of Commons. But they were not enough for solving the
more difficult problems which the outbreak of war offered in both the New and
the Old World. For this purpose creative ideas were needed, and Newcastle was
not a man of creative ideas. It was soon recognised that the War had been as
ill prepared as it was ill conducted. The loss of Minorca, and Admiral Byng’s
withdrawal (May 20,1756), produced the most painful impression in England. A
British admiral, after an indecisive action with an opponent nearly equal in
strength to himself, had sailed away with his fleet and abandoned to the enemy
the island he had been sent to defend. The Government was eagerly bent on
laying the whole responsibility on Byng, who was certainly not free from blame.
Nevertheless, the incident could not but tell unfavourably on their own position.
Moreover, the sudden invasion of Saxony by the Prussian King amounted to
another rebuff for the English Cabinet, which had quite recently been extolling
the Westminster Convention as the infallible means of preserving peace on the
Continent. News from America further embarrassed Newcastle’s position. The fall
of Fort Oswego (August, 1756) made it clear that the English were driven from
the territory round the Great Lakes, and that no obstacle remained to prevent
the French from establishing a connexion between their possessions on the St
Lawrence and those on the JJpper Ohio.
All these
events rendered the position of the Cabinet untenable. Two of its most
important members, Murray, now Lord Mansfield, and Henry Fox, withdrew from the
Government. The people of England had lost confidence in this Ministry of
mediocrities, and called for a deliverer in their need. At this crisis every
eye must of necessity have turned to William Pitt, the man who for twenty years
had been one of the most interesting personalities in the House of Commons,
admired and respected by the peopler feared by the Government; the
man who was never at a loss for the severest rebukes with which to visit the
weaknesses and faults of the Ministers; but who had hitherto not been granted
an opportunity of proving his capabilities at the head of affairs. The use of
his brilliant and unimpaired energies could no longer be denied to the State in
its hour of stress.
George II
recognised that he must give way to the general pressure and admit the great
member of the Opposition into the Cabinet. The influence of Leicester House,
the Court of the heir apparent, the recommendations of the King’s most intimate
counsellor, his mistress Lady Yarmouth—all worked together to force the
reluctant sovereign to call in the dreaded Commoner. Personally, he expected
little good from him: “Pitt will not-do my business,” the King is recorded to
have said, presumably referring to the care for the interests of Hanover which
always lay so
near to his
heart. But the crisis was serious, and for the first time in English history
the sovereign found himself compelled to accept as principal Minister a
politician personally odious to him.
When it had
been decided to summon Pitt, the composition of the Cabinet still offered very
great difficulties. Pitt declined to sit in the Cabinet under or even beside
Newcastle; neither would he tolerate Henry Fox, or anyone else who might
threaten his own predominance. His first concern was to take the entire
direction of the War into his own hands. He consented to allow the office of
First Lord of the Treasury, the occupant of which had ever since the time of
Walpole been regarded as Prime Minister, to be held by the Duke of Devonshire,
the head of one of the first families in the land. Pitt became one of the two
Principal Secretaries of State. Newcastle, Hardwicke, Fox—indeed, all the
leading names of the late Government—disappeared from the Cabinet. It was an
attempt to compose an Administration of new men and with new principles, to carry
on the Government without seeking to influence the elections, without patronage
or corruption, and to apply no other standard but that of the interests of the
nation.
The attempt
failed. Pitt’s first Ministry lasted no longer than four months (December, 1756
to April, 1757). But even in this first brief period it is unmistakable that
Pitt’s action was informed by a grand and unbroken impulse. We see him
indefatigable in action, but at the same time always keeping in view the
political situation and its needs as a whole, ever calculating and planning,
reviewing the chances and dangers of impending struggles on the Continent and
on the high seas, in America and in the West and the East Indies. We see him
endeavouring, by means of more sympathetic forms of intercourse, to establish
more friendly relations with the colonial Governments than had hitherto been
customary—doubtless in the main with no other intention than that of
stimulating the colonists to increased efforts for the objects of the War. We
see him preparing and setting in motion the despatch of armies and fleets,
while at the same time taking steps for the introduction of important measures
concerned with the home affairs of the country. We see him directing la haute
politique, successful in winning the personal confidence of his ally, the King
of Prussia, and cont.. _ng to maintain peace with Bourbon Spain while maturing
plans hostile to Bourbon France. Yet, for the present, we are still in the
region of projects, attempts, designs only half begun—sufficiently significant
for us to recognise ex ungue leonem, but not important enough in their actual
effects and results to need further discussion at this point.
In spite of
what he had already achieved, Pitt’s position was not yet assured. It could not
but be threatened, so soon as the national belief in him, which alone had
raised him to power, began to waver. Such was the effect of the further
developments connected with the case of Byng. The unfortunate Admiral, who had
been responsible for the
loss of
Minorca, was condemned to death by Court-martial. .The King was ready to yield
to the demand of public opinion, merciless in a case of neglect of duty, which
the Court declared this to be. But the Court itself had recommended mercy,
inasmuch as the Admiral’s conduct was attributable, not to cowardice or
disaffection, but to an error of judgment. The King laid the sentence before
the highest judges in the kingdom for revision, and they upheld it. The
sovereign would now have been very glad if the Minister had advised the
carrying out of the capital sentence. But Pitt recommended mercy; although, in
view of the popular feeling, he did not absolutely insist upon this course. On
March 14, 1757, Byng was shot.
When the
question arose of the appointment of a Commander-in- chief for the Army of
Observation established in Germany for the protection of Hanover, the Duke of
Cumberland, the victor of Culloden, was proposed by the wish of the King of
Prussia. George II was willing; but Cumberland, anxious for the security of his
laurels, was apprehensive that the necessary military and financial support
might not be afforded him under Pitt’s Ministry. For Pitt, who was during these
months suffering from gout, which plagued him throughout his life, seemed to
the Duke to be a sick man, and moreover little interested in the conflict on
the Continent. Cumberland, therefore, made Pitt’s resignation the condition of
his own acceptance of the command in Germany. For George II, however, all other
considerations fell into the background when Hanover was in question. Marshal
d’Estrees was marching towards the Lower Rhine, and Cumberland’s departure
could not be delayed. He demanded the dismissal of Pitt, and the King granted
his wish (April 6, 1757). It is not correct to assert that Pitt was thrust from
office by the opposition of the great Whig families. Only so much is true:
that, without the support of those powerful groups, even Pitt with all his
popularity was unable to form a strong Government, that is, one which would not
fall to pieces in the face of adverse circumstances.
The
interregnum of eleven weeks which elapsed between the first and the second
Ministry of Pitt revealed to the world the fatal confusion among English
parties. In the circumstances, no other result could follow except the return
of William Pitt as the one man in whom the country could find its preserver in
the hour of need. “I know that I can save this nation and that nobody else
can,” was Pitt’s often quoted proud remark. Devonshire, still the nominal head
of the Government, Newcastle, indispensable on account of his parliamentary
following, the formidable orator Henry Fox, who was much more concerned with an
ample official income than with the exercise of power, the aged Carteret
(Granville), the famous jurist Lord Mansfield—all of them were summoned and
treated with, before the King finally reached the conviction that he could form
no Cabinet of which William Pitt was not the actual leader.
406
Pitt resumes office
with Newcastle„
[lVsV-ei
Thus was the
Newcastle-Pitt Ministry formed* a kind of alliance between the great Whig
nobility , and its henchmen, and the great orator and statesman, upheld by the
people. Newcastle, as First Lord of the Treasuiy, undertook the management of
home affairs. Pitt no longer refused to act with him, provided rhat he would
place the national resources at his colleague’s disposal for the purposes of
foreign policy and the War. For in this sphere Pitt’s rule was absolute.
Indeed, he was considered the actual head of the Government. His personal
influence in the Cabinet was greater than that due to his office. Pitt again .
became merely one of the two Secretaries of State. He took the Southern Department,
which included the Romance nations as well as the Colonies. The latter were
especially important to Pitt at the time of the conflicts beyond sea.
Holdemesse, the Secretary of State for the North, willingly carried out Pitt’s
intentions. Yet it was not Holdemesse, but Pitt, in whom Frederick the Great
recognised the mainstay of his alliance with England:
In Pitt’s
mind, too, the sense of the importance of military affairs occupied a dominant
place—possibly because of his brief period of service in the army. He intended
to be the supreme organiser of war, not only in diplomatic but also in military
matters. As to the Continental War, there was no difficulty on this head. The
Secretary for War (Lord Barrington) was controlled- by the Secretaries of
State. But as to the Admiralty open dissensions took place between Newcastle
and Pitt. Pitt seems to have waived his original demand to keep in his own
hands the correspondence with the commanders of the fleets, to the exclusion of
the Admiralty. The regular practice of his Ministry on this head conformed to
custom; for before his time the admirals were accustomed to take their
instructions direct from the Secretaries of State. No supersession of the
Admiralty was implied by this procedure, since the instructions were approved
by the Cabinet of which the First Lord of the Admiralty was a member; so that
there was nothing unconstitutional in their reaching the Commander of the
Fleet after being drafted by the Secretary of State and merely signed by three
Admirals. Pitt was in the position of being sole author of these instructions,
simply because the direction of the Cabinet lay entirely in his hands. With'
perfect justice, therefore, he could declare in 1761 that he had never issued
Orders in disregard of the chiefs of other Departments.
Owing to
Pitt’s personal Authority these other chiefs, his colleagues, wholly confined
themselves to administrative work without decisively cooperating in the
determination of policy. In this way there was still employment enough for
them. The services, for instance, of Newcastle to the English nation in these four
years 1757 to 1761 lie in the fact that as First Lord of the Treasury he
skilfully and industriously supplied Pitt with the means for his conduct of the
wars in progress in all parts of the world. And Pitt was hard enough to please,
and troubled himself little about the cost of his military expeditions. The
National Debt rose in
1757-61]
Military and naval
undertaldngs.
407
these years
from J?70,000,000 to i?l 50,000,000. That this was possible, that the credit of
the country could bear such a strain, must be also placed to Pitt’s account.
The personal confidence of the nation in his policy provided the Government
with the necessary capital. Under the Ministry of Bute confidence in the
Government was wanting, and the public was no longer so willing as before to
takie up its loans.
Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke called Pitt’s Ministry “the strongest Administration that
has been formed for many years.” A modem author describes it as “ an
organisation for war which theoretically, at least, could scarcely be nearer
perfection.” Its methods and its achievements seemed to contemporaries equally
wonderful. “ There has been as much business done in the last ten days as in as
many months before,” wrote Newcastle himself, who in these words
unintentionally pronounced the keenest criticism on the preceding Government,
of which he had himself been the head.
The scale of
the undertakings corresponded to this activity of action; the number of
expeditions, of ships, of troops, was in keeping with the grandeur of the
strategic conception, and with the consistency and the energy of its execution.
That England, for the first time, carried on alone a maritime and colonial war
with France without, the assistance of Holland, seems to call for merely
incidental mention. Everything else was subsidiary in Pitt’s mind to the main
offensive movement which was to take place in America. But to that end his
other undertakings might very usefully contribute, as, for instance,
demonstrations and attacks on the French coasts, and also the War in Germany,
of which we shall speak presently. It would be enough if the French by these
means were prevailed upon to break up their forces and induced to turn their
attention from the scene on which the main issues would have to be decided.
The
particular incidents of the struggle are narrated elsewhere. The results were
nothing less, than that England became the first sea Power in the world, with
whom contemporary France could no longer vie; that the Continent of North
America became an Anglo-Saxon not a Romance dominion ; that in the East Indies
the power of England rose superior to that of France. -The result of the War in
Germany, too, the establishment of Prussia as a Great Power, is scarcely
conceivable without the Ministry of Pitt. The present is not the place for
narrating the campaigns of the Seven Years and the events which occurred on
the widely- separated scenes of war. Our task is to indicate briefly the
principles which guided the English Government and the aims which it pursued.
England’s ally
was King Frederick of Prussia. Let us see what England was to him, and he to
her. The Treaty of Westminster brought the two Powers together. Their common
enemy was France. But, besides her ally, every English Government was obliged
also to consider Hanovei the source of the King’s ancestry, However eagerly
Pitt had
attacked the Hanoverian policy of the earlier Governments, he could not, when
himself chief Minister, decline to provide the necessary protection for
Hanover. Already in his first Ministry he had brought about the return to
Germany of the Hanoverian and Hessian troops which had been kept in England for
protection against foreign invasions. Their departure was hailed with joy, and
it was a popular step when Pitt, in the Speech from the Throne on September 2,
1756, caused the King to announce the formation of a national militia “planned
and regulated with equal regard to the just rights of my crown and people.” The
return of the German troops was mentioned with the addition, “ relying with
pleasure on the spirit and zeal of my people in defence of my person and
realm.” Part of the troops sent back were used for forming an army in western
Germany, which was described as the Army of Observation, and destined, as was
publicly stated in the royal Message of February 17, 1757, for the protection
of his Majesty’s electoral dominions, and to enable him to fulfil his
engagements with the King of Prussia.
The Army of
Observation, paid for by England, and commanded, in the first instance, by
Cumberland, and later by Ferdinand of Brunswick, was a most important military
instrument, which in the course of time was not less serviceable to the King of
Prussia than to purely Anglo- Hanoverian interests. Each of the two parties
endeavoured to induce the other to strengthen the Army of Observation, to
which, as a matter of fact, both Prussian and English troops belonged. It must
be recognised that Pitt, although the Continental War was never his prime
interest, nevertheless did his utmost on its behalf. He steadily endeavoured
to strengthen still further the resistance offered to the enemy by his Prussian
ally who had saved Hanover, as well as his own country, by his victory at
Rossbach. For this object, a special Treaty was signed on April 11,1758,
between England and Prussia, and renewed several times during the ensuing
years. The King of England pledged himself to maintain an army of 55,000 men
(in other words, the “Army of Observation ” which thus became permanent), and
Frederick was further to receive a subsidy, which in the following year was to
be reckoned at i?670,000. No negotiations or treaties with the enemy were to be
undertaken except by both sovereigns jointly.
It was in
this shape that the Anglo-Prussian alliance during the Seven Years’ War assumed
practical significance; for Pitt carried it no further. In particular, he
always deferred, and practically prevented, the fulfilment of one request which
Frederick the Great repeatedly made for assistance on the part of England. This
was the intervention of an English fleet in the Baltic. Frederick desired this
movement as a demonstration against his enemies Russia and Sweden.
Communications were being made on the subject from 1756 onwards. In 1757,
Frederick begs that England will now, according to her promise, despatch a
1757-8] iVo English fleet sent
into the Baltic.
409
squadron to
the Baltic, to keep Russia in check and prevent her “ from harassing my Baltic
Coasts with her ships and galleys.” In May, 1757, the Prussian envoy in London
is informed, in reply, that England will menace Russia with a squadron, should
the latter appear likely to harass the Prussian coast. Frederick expresses his
joy at the information, and adds his thanks to the Secretary of State, Lord
Holdemesse, in the most complimentary terms. But the Russian fleet actually
appeared in the Baltic without any English fleet being at hand. Memel was blockaded,
troops were landed, villages burned down, the country was ravaged, and every
kind of cruelty and horror perpetrated. Similarly, in the same year, the Swedes
were able without let or hindrance to send reinforcements to their army in
Pomerania, in order to advance against Prussia. Frederick had no better success
during the campaign of 1758. The English ambassador, Mitchell, told him in
February, 1758, that it would be impossible for England to provide the
necessary number of ships for a demonstration in the Baltic, because the claims
upon the naval strength of Great Britain were already so numerous in various
and remote parts of the world. Intimations of this sort led King Frederick to
reduce his demands, but without dropping them altogether. Even if not a “
formidable ” fleet, they might at least send him a “ promenade ” squadron, for
the sake of the moral effect. At last he signed the Convention of April 11,
1758, without having received the promise of the Baltic fleet.
Whatever may
have been the reason of the British Government’s refusal,1 it was
perfectly justified in laying stress on the enormous and diverse duties of its
fleet in the War with France, and on the difficulty of sparing the additional
ships, and, what was more, the complement of men required for an expedition
into the Baltic. Moreover, if the King of Prussia desired a British squadron,
in order to threaten his northern enemies, Russia and Sweden, this opened a new
question for England, who was not at war with these Powers, and was
particularly anxious not to disturb her trade with Russia. Again (although this
reason was not confided to the Prussian King) the local conditions of the
Baltic, and the inadequ icy of the Engl h navy for meeting the special
difficulties which had to be overcome in navigating these waters, had a strong,
perhaps a decisive, share in the English refusal of the Baltic fleet demanded
by Frederick. In a word, then, the King of Prussia was denied the assistance
which he so eagerly implored. Perhaps his heroism may be rated all the higher
inasmuch as, thrown back now on his own military resources, he nevertheless
parried the attacks of the enemies pressing round him. Nor is our estimate of
it much lowered if we take into account the aid which England gave him by means
of her subsidies and the maintenance of the Army of Observation.
No one
recognised more frankly than Frederick the Great that Pitt was the inspiring
force in England’s conduct of the Continental War. He
had at first
watched the Minister’s rise to power with suspicion, for Pitt had been
described to him as a brilliant orator, but also as a fault-finder who carried
no real weight. And, when the reports of his ambassador soon overflowed with
praises of the new Minister, Frederick wrote reprovingly to him that his
letters seemed written by “ one of Mr Pitt’s secretaries, rather than by an
envoy of the King of Prussia.” But before long there was no more enthusiastic
eulogist of the British statesman than Frederick himself. Arid yet, as we have
seen already, the interests of Frederick the Great, though straightforwardly
upheld by Pitt, never occupied the central place in his political' system. To
him the struggle with France, on the sea and in the colonies, was of paramount
importance. The memorable results achieved in this struggle, in America, in the
East and West Indies, are related elsewhere. We must content ourselves with
advancing certain general considerations as to the general aims and objects
pursued by Pitt with regard to, and for the sake of, the colonies, which may be
summed up as Pitt’s colonial policy. ■
We turn, in
the first instance, to the American Continent, as the theatre on which the
greatest and most striking results were won, and which most clearly exhibits
the operation of Pitt’s own ideas. Leaving aside Spanish Central America, it
was the English and French colonists, alike inspired by strong tendencies
towards expansion, who sought to bring an ever larger proportion of the
Continent within their grasp. The English occupied the greater part of the
eastern coast; the French share consisted principally of two blocks of ter
’tory: namely, Canada, the region of the St Lawrence, and, in the widest
ineaning of the name, Louisiana, the valley of the Mississippi so far as its
mouth. The natural course of development therefore was to unite the two blocks
and thus form a French coloriial iempire, which should stretch from the mouth
of the river St Lawrence across the region of the Great Lakes, down the course
of the Ohio and of the Mississippi so far as the outlet of this mighty river
into the Gulf of Mexico. But by this development the further expansion of the
English colonies would be arrested. It is only necessary to review on the map
the ring of territories by which the French strove to surround the English
colonies on the east, and to push them back from the interior, in order to
understand the threat, occasionally uttered on the French side, that the
English would be driven into the sea.
The
conditions under which the two European nations lived here in the New World
were fundamentally different. The English, 'n a much smaller area, had a
population about fifteen times as numerous as the French. But this numerical
preponderance was amply counterbalanced by other circumstances unfavourable to
the English. There was little or no cohesion among the several colonies, and it
was all but impossible to induce them to take common action. They showed attachment
and goodwill to the mother country, because it was in their interest to do
so—but only just so far as such was actually the case. The French
1702-48]
English and French
colonial rivalry.
411
possessions,
consisting, except for a few centres that were beginning to prosper* of a thin
extended chain of outposts, were well protected from a military point of view;
but, being entirely a creation of the absolute monarchy of France, they were
administered thence on a perfectly uniform system. In addition, the French were
far more skilful than their rivals in their policy towards the Indians; so that
the half-savage tribes of the Redskins usually stood in much greater numbers on
the French side than on the English.
In the
Spanish and Austrian Wars of Succession, while France and England had been at
war in Europe, Frenchmen and Englishmen had also been fighting each other in
America. By the Peace of Utrecht (1713), Nova Scotia and Newfoundland,
important countries lying in front of French Canada, were assigned to England.
But the Peace of Utrecht, as well as that of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), contained
several ambiguities, as well as omissions, in the definitions of the boundaries
and rights of the two sides on the American Continent. The Peace of Aix-
la-Chapelle, as has been seen, produced disappointment in all quarters; and in
Paris the phrase was current: bite comme la Paix. An early renewal of the War
was looked upon as probable. In such cases, indeed, the French were in the
habit of thinking in the first instance of campaigns in the Netherlands and
conflicts on the Upper or Lower Rhine. “ For with the French nation,” says
Ranke, “ a land war is always more popular than a sea war, as being associated
with a greater number of glorious memories.” But, on the present occasion,
there was no lack of warning intimations of the dangers at hand beyond the
confines of Europe. The old Due de Noailles, who had served under Louis XIV,
and who was now in the habit of submitting his garnered experiences in long
exposes to Louis XV, from 1748 onwards made the imminent renewal of war with
England almost the exclusive topic of his communications to the King. The
fleet ought to be reconstructed and at once provided with the organisation
which it had in' the days of the great Colbert. Six thousand regular troops
must be sent to the colonies; “ Your Majesty may reflect,” he adds, as a modest
admonition, “that such a force would hardly be sufficient to garrison one of
your Flemish fortresses.”
Still more
significant is a report to be found in the present French archives, drawn up so
early as the year 1747 by a Ministerial official. He, too, advocates the
encouragement and strengthening of the' colonies in view of the danger of a new
war, and refers with much point to their want of both money arid men, in order
to recommend, in the first instance, the immediate despatch of a few thousand
settlers to Louisiana. He concludes with a side glance, almost of alarm, at the
disquieting development of England’s trade and colonies, and at the dangers
which might threaten the position of France in Europe from the further1
advance of the English in America. “ They would rule the seas through'
their fleets
and the land through their wealth, and America would furnish them with the
means of dictating to Europe,” “ France alone,” he continues, “is in a position
to prevent this catastrophe, and France must do so, for her own sake and that
of all Europe.”
In Er gland,
too, similar anxieties prevailed. From 1748 onwards, a new war seemed
inevitable. It was keenly felt how much had been left insufficiently defined in
the existing territorial relations beyond seas. The frontiers between British
Nova Scotia and French Canada were still unsettled, and the imperfect
delimitation between the more southern English colonies and the territories
held by the French must inevitably give rise to fresh quarrels. In America
itself hostilities, in fact, scarcely ceased between 1748 and 1756, that is,
between the Peace of Aix-la- Chapelle and the renewal of war. During those years
the French were engaged in constructing a chain of forts along the Ohio and
Mississippi, and thus actually bringing about the long apprehended connexion
between Canada and Louisiana, which implied the strategical enclosure of the
English colonies by a long line of military stations from the mouth of the St
Lawrence to that of the Mississippi.
On both sides
of the Atlantic, during these years, it began to be clearly perceived among
Englishmen that special measures were required for checking the threatening
development of the French power. In point of fact, the issue only depended upon
making effective use of the great existing numerical preponderance of the
English colonists over the French. With this object a scheme was earnestly
mooted, in America and in England, for a closer union between the English
colonies. The Board of 'Trade in London had, on September 18,1753, instructed
the Governors of a number of the colonies to hold a joint conference with the
tribe of Iroquois Indians, in order to keep them firm to their alliance with
England. And, if possible, the colonies were to conclude an agreement among
themselves with a similar object. The policy thus suggested by the Government
in London with a view to the Indians became the origin of a much larger scheme.
In a meeting held at Albany, in 1754, the representatives of all the colonies,
convinced of the necessity of combining in self-defence, unanimously resolved
to propose a scheme for a close political federation among themselves. This was
drawn up instantly and accepted unanimously. It contemplated an executive for
the United Colonies in the person of a President-General and a legislature to
be called the Grand Council. The foremost place among the intellectual authors
as well as among the draughtsmen of this scheme was token by the distinguished
man who afterwards came forward as the spokesman of the American colonies when
united against England—Benjamin Franklin.
Before
Franklin’s scheme could be submitted to the Parliament of Great Britain, it was
shattered by the unanimous opposition of all the cnlnnia.1 Assemblies. They
were alarmed at the financial burden which
1754-6] Schemes of colonial
federation.
413
a joint
defence of the new Commonwealth would have laid upon them. But the Government
of the mother country would hardly have approved the plan; for, though ardently
desiring the awakening of a military temper in its American colonies, it had no
wish to see them politically united, inasmuch as such a federation might easily
lead to the severance of the colonies from the mother country—an event always
dreaded in London.
The Board of
Trade decided upon a colonial scheme of its own, according to which
commiss'^ners from all the Assemblies were to determine, in time of peace, the
expenditure and measures needed for military, purposes, in proportion to the
capacities of the several colonies. The Crown was to name a Commander-in-chief
for the whole of the colonial forces. And, in fact, a commissioner, Edward
Braddock, was sent over, with two British regiments. For the rest, however, the
scheme of the Board of Trade had as small a chance of realisation, in face of
the independent attitude of the colonial Assemblies, as the more far-reaching
ideas of Franklin. Not until twenty years later was the federation of the
colonies brought about, through the enthusiasm aroused by the new ideals of
freedom and independence in conflict with the mother country. Things had,
however, changed by that time in America; and the French no longer held Canada.
In the efforts to establish a federation before the Seven Years’ War, military
considerations and preparations for the conflict with France had the greatest
share. A series of schemes was projected during these years for the same
purpose, which aimed at levying an assessment, common to all, for the joint
defence of the colonies— a kind of legislative enactment which could not be
determined by the colonial Assemblies, but only by the Parliament at
Westminster. The question of the equitableness of such a measure was, however, not
yet decided, although it was already manifest that any such taxation by the
British Parliament would call forth fierce resistance from the Americans. In
other words, if already at this date, when the French were still threatening
the rear of the English colonists, it was impossible to carry out such a
taxation, though intended only for the purpose of military defence, there is no
difficulty in understanding how the attempt of the mother country to effect it,
when the danger from France had been removed, became the cause of the historic
conflict which resulted in the assertion of American Independence.
In truth, the
Government of the mother country had a difficult task before it when attempting
to preserve harmonious relations with the colonists in America. This task
became harder and harder, as during the course of the eighteenth century the
colonists themselves, with a rapidly increasing population and steady economic
advance, grew into a flourishing and powerful community. It must be remembered
that here, as elsewhere, the principles of Mercantilism governed the system of
administration,
implying much control and coercion of the colonies by the mother; country. The
Navigation Acts of the seventeenth century were still in force, by which the
foreign trade of the colonies was kept within narrow bounds; and there were
corresponding restrictions on industry. The cardinal principle was the belief
that the possession of colonies ought •to be a source of revenue. On:the other
hand, the colonies already possessed a considerable share of self-government
and legislation of their own. The Governors, as representatives of the King,
often found their seats thorny, often played a rather ignominious part in the
Assemblies, which, in the matter of military or financial contributions,,
treated their demands as importunate, and looked upon them as unwelcome police
officials charged with the obstruction of industrial activity when it clashed
with existing commercial laws. When, in the period from 1754 to 1756, the
frequent Anglo-French strife in America developed into a war between the two
nations, some of the colonies' at first showed little inclination to break off
their trade with the French in the Hinterland, and actually continued to supply
them with materials of war. Naturally, the English Government intervened with a
stringent prohibition, but whether with much effect is very doubtful. In any
case, instead of stimulating patriotic enthusiasm, it caused much discontent
among the colonists. Thus the unsatisfactory restrictions which England was
obliged to lay on her colonists for military purposes made bad blood— and this
at a time when, without hearty cooperation on the part of the colonies, there
was no hope of a successful termination of the War.
Under the
rule of Pitt, the scene entirely changes. He possessed the gift of engaging the
confidence of the British subjects in the New World in the same measure as that
of his countrymen at home in England, if indeed not in a still greater degree.
His primary purpose was to reconcile the colonies and to bring about a ready
cooperation on their part in the struggle which, after all, was carried on
essentially in their interest. The repression of illicit commerce was only
continued so far as this commerce directly interfered with military ends. Not
until later, when the whole issue of the War depended on it, and when the
French in the large West Indian islands could only hold out by means of the
supplies which came to them from English sources, were the Governors instructed
by Pitt, in a sharply worded circular (August 23, .1760), to ascertain exactly
“the state of this dangerous and ignominious trade” a,nd bring the culprits “to
the most exemplary and condign punishment.”
But Pitt’s
best way of winning the confidence of the colonies was his system of carrying
on the War. For the traditional frontier war were substituted combined attacks
on a grand scale by land and water, the successful .cooperation of British
regular troops and the American militia, of army and fleet, and the effective
isolation of the French colonial possessions as regards all assistance from
France by means of the command of the sea which England’s victories had secured
to her.
Thus a series
of decisive blows were dealt—Louisburg 1758, Quebec 1759—which brought home to
the colonists the joyful conviction that the final goal would be reached, and
that they would be completely freed from their old enemies the French. And to
this result they had themselves materially contributed. • ;
But a still
greater significance attaches to the fact that Pitt was able to induce the
colonists themselves to take part in the War, when it was no longer a question
of the French in their immediate vicinity but of those in far distant Louisiana
and in the West Indies. In the conquests, some won, some planned, by Pitt in
1761, when he overstepped the customary programme of wars with France, the
cooperation of the colonists on the American mainland played a decisive part.
So much as to
the actual facts of the period of Pitt’s great Ministry. In order to ascertain
his conception of the relations between the mother country and the colonies,
and the lines on which he might perhaps have developed them, had he remained
longer in office, we are obliged to appeal to his later utterances. In his great
speech of September 9, 1762, on the Preliminaries of the Peace of Paris, Pitt
declared himself against the restoration of the great West Indian islands to
France. Yet to retain them together with Canada would have necessitated a new
colonial policy. How far Pitt would really have been in favour of
this—practically a relinquishment of the Mercantile System—is uncertain. It
seems warranted to assume that he had thought of materially lightening the
economic burdens of the colonists, though certainly without granting to them
complete freedom of trade. He would have been as little inclined to advocate
the abolition of the Navigation Acts, or the removal of the control of economic
conditions exercised by the Parliament at Westminster for the common good, as
to champion the independence of the Americans. On the other hand, he protested
energetically against their taxation by the English Parliament, and went so far
towards conciliating them, during his short Ministerial service as Earl of
Chatham under Grafton (1766-8), that he was called the “ Father of America.”
And it is true that he had a full understanding of their complaints in the
sixties and seventies. The rights of the Americans were among the favourite
questions of which he never wearied during the course of his whole political
career. Thus, there is ground for believing that he was not averse from a
federal connexion between the mother country and the colonies. In 1766, he drew
up the draft of a Ministry in which appears the new office of “ Secretary of State
for the American Department,” and the holder of it was to be “Mr Pitt.” He had
further considered the idea of a representation of the colonies in Parliament,
and among the Chatham papers a memorandum has been found on the number and the
proportion of votes which should be assigned to the several colonies, although
it is not quite certain how far this may have been a plan of Pitt’s own. And,
lastly, when on April 7, 1778, the death-stricken Lord Chatham by a
final effort
raised his voice to protest once more against the independence of America, what
that voice expressed was not the self-will of a ruling people clinging to its
sovereign power; rather, his speech may have sounded like the cry of a father
who cannot bear that the children whom he has loved and reared to manhood
should despise the paternal protection and seek to renounce him.
England now
stood at the height of success, and William Pitt at the climax of his fame,
for, by Englishmen and foreigners alike, the conr quests won were regarded as
being in reality his. The foremost minds of the age were agreed in their
admiration of Pitt. “ England,” said Frederick the Great, “ has long been in
travail and has suffered a great deal to produce Mr Pitt, but she has certainly
brought forth a Man.” Voltaire, when about-to put forth an edition of the works
of the great Corneille, begged for the honour of being allowed to place the
name of Mr Pitt at the head of his list of subscribers. A French nobleman who
had fought against England in India and had been sent a prisoner to London
declared that, since he had left Europe five years before, he had become “
historically acquainted with but two men in this world, the King of Prussia and
Mr Pitt.” And yet the position of the great Minister was no longer the same as
in the days of the victories in Canada and Bengal. On October 25, 1760, George
II suddenly expired, at the age of nearly seventy-seven. He was succeeded by
his grandson George III, a young man of twenty-two. The change of sovereign was
in many respects of great importance. The young King was naturally born to an
easier position than that of his two predecessors. They felt more at home in
Hanover than in England, and their foreign policy too readily, and repeatedly,
assumed a Hanoverian bias. In former days, the people bad accepted the
succession of the House of Brunswick- Luneburg as a lesser evil than a Stewart
Catholic reaction; but their hearts had not gone forth to meet the son of the
Electress Sophia when he landed on English soil.
George III
had been bom and bred in England. The electoral hat of Brunswick-Luneburg had
fallen to him together with the crown of Great Britain, but his affections did
not draw him across the sea to the home of his ancestors. He never visited
Hanover. The world was to recognise that he was different from his
predecessors. Entirely on his own impulse, he had added a sentence to his first
Speech from the Throne. “ Born and educated in this countiy, I glory in the
name of Briton.” In fact, the national mistrust of the first two Georges on
account of Hanover had now, in so fan as it was attached to the person of the
monarch, definitively passed away. The Stewart Pretender had, in the meantime,
forfeited all support in England, and the name of Jacobite lost its terrors for
the Government.
And there
were other points in which the new King differed from his predecessors. The
period 1714 to 1760 had derived its characteristics
from the rule
of the Whigs. The King governed with them and through them. The sovereign
himself was no longer so prominent as had been the case in the days of William
III and Anne. More is heard of Townshend and Walpole, of Carteret and Pelham,
than of George I and II; while the personal influence of the King sank
completely into the background during the popular Ministry of Pitt, allied by
marriage with the Grenvilles, one of the greatest of the Whig families.
The young
George III was inspired by an ambition to rule in reality, and not merely bear
the name of King. His mother, the widowed Princess of Wales, had imbued him
with this conception, and her favourite, the Scotchman Lord Bute, had
instructed him in the politics of the time with the same intention. Bute
himself was a man of varied scientific acquirements and aesthetic interests,
though scantily gifted for the conduct of public affairs. After the young
King’s accession he came forward to announce the royal views, almost as a kind
of middleman between George III and his Ministers. Whether the King from the
beginning felt the power and popularity of Pitt oppressive and sought to check
it, can scarcely be ascertained. At all events, it was obvious that, so long as
the War lasted, Pitt’s genius could not be dispensed with. And, as the King at
once showed himself inclined to peace, the thought cannot have been far from
his mind that Pitt might be made no longer indispensable, and might perhaps
even be removed. In his first speech to the Privy Council, shown to none of the
Ministers beforehand, the King spoke of the “bloody and expensive War”—words
which were considered by those who heard it as an invidious expression aimed at
Pitt. The latter—though only by means of excited explanations lasting for
hours—contrived to have the expression softened in the printed speech into “ an
expensive but just and necessary War.” In the same speech the King had already
spoken of the securing of an “ honourable and lasting peace”—words which must
have seemed still more objectionable to Pitt, in view of the impression they
could not but create in Frederick the Great, since, according to the terms of
alliance, neither of the allies was to conclude a peace without the other. He
succeeded in inserting in the printed speech the words “ in concert with our
allies.” Almost too much honour is accorded to George III and Bute, when this
little incident is treated as if two radically different systems of policy had
here come into conflict. The King had no such definite programme; and his
opposition was rather that of a dilettante in politics to a great statesman.
Nothing can really be argued from the incident, except that Pitt’s position
under the young King was no longer so strong as under the old. This was made
clearer in a few months, when Bute had to be admitted into the Cabinet, as
Secretary of State, in the place of Holdemesse, who retired, possibly for this
very purpose.
Though
Pitt was resolved only to conclude a peace which should ensure the conquests of
the War to England as permanent possessions, his c. M. H. VI. CH. XIII. 27
418
Peace negotiations
broken off by Pitt.
[1761
hope of accomplishing
this at some time late in the summer of 1761 seemed' to have vanished again.
The negotiations, which have been detailed elsewhere, had temporarily assumed a
hopeful aspect. Pitt and Choiseul, the leading statesmen on the two sides of
the Channel, were ■working to bring about an accommodation ; but
naturally the difficulties ■were not slight. The consideration of the
allies on both sides was the first and permanent obstacle. So far as Prussia
was concerned, Frederick had certainly every confidence in the proved
friendship of Pitt; but now he began to be suspicious. He was willing that
England should keep all her conquests; but he did not want, as he put it, to “
pay the piper.” In other words, he was determined not to sacrifice one foot of
territory, notwithstanding the unfavourable position in which he fojind
himself.
Nevertheless,
it was not this which wrecked the negotiations, but the intervention of France
in the Anglo-Spanish conflict. While Pitt mercilessly sought; to utilise the
English victories to the full for the humiliation of France, for the
destruction of her commerce and fleet and the ruin of her colonial dominion,
Choiseul was playing the game of diplomacy merely as a blind to his adversary,
until he had secured an ally in the kindred Bourbon kingdom of Spain; then he
would lay down the pen and take up the sword again.
Pitt saw
through the scheme and recalled his agent Stanley from Paris. A new and
powerful impulse now communicated itself to his own schemes. The crucial
question is not whether he actually knew the details of the Bourbon “ Family
Compact ” signed at Paris on August 15, before he took the decisive step—a
point which is much debated—for he knew enough to convince him of the actual
fact. He knew that France had pledged herself to conclude no peace without
taking Spanish interests into consideration; he knew also that to go to war
with England at this moment, before the expected Plate fleet from America had
reached Cadiz, would be exceedingly inconvenient to Spain; he even knew that
Spanish men-of-war had been sent out to convoy the Jlota safely home. This
information convinced Pitt, not only that war with Spain was unavoidable, but
also that it must.be declared by England at once. It was on this head that the
memorable disagreement arose in the Cabinet which ended in the resignation of
Pitt.
The Minister
had little difficulty in convincing his colleagues of the necessity of breaking
off the negotiations at Paris and recalling Stanley. But now they declined to
go any further with him. The majority would not consent to an immediate
declaration of war against Spain. We are now fully informed from various
sources as to the stormy Cabinet meetings of September 17,18, and 19,1761.
Pitt laid before the Cabinet an intercepted letter from the Spanish envoy in
Paris, which revealed everything. He showed, in an impressive speech, that the
danger could onlyl grow greater if Spain were to declare war herself
in the following spring. There was at present but one House of Bourbon. The
Spanish fleet must'
176l]
Opposition to Pitt in
the Cabinet.
419
be regarded
as a French fleet. “ Spain is France, and France is Spain.” The peace party in
the Cabinet raised the objection that .action could not be taken on the ground
of an intercepted letter without a previous declaration of war, and that the
attack of the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro, in 1718, without such a
declaration, still remained a cause of bitterness. Anson, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, declared that the preparations necessary for the stroke which Pitt
demanded could not be finished in time. And the conclusion reached was that it
would be sufficient to present a protest at Madrid and demand explanations, and
perhaps to make some advances towards settling the differences which embroiled
England and Spain in Central America. Only Pitt’s brother- in-law, Lord Temple,
supported him in demanding the recall of Lord Bristol, the English ambassador
at Madrid. Pitt and Temple drew up a protest to lay before the King. It exposed
the aggressive and unexampled conduct of the Spanish Court, which aimed at
producing a crisis in a conflict with England by causing the intervention of a
Power at war with her, and this at a time when Spain was loudly proclaiming her
friendliness to Great Britain. The King was therefore begged to order Bristol
to hand in a declaration of war, and to return to England without taking a
formal leave.
The
King declined to receive the protest. He was already completely under the
influence of Pitt’s opponents in the Cabinet, who were led by his favourite,
Lord Bute. We find the little coterie assembling at Devonshire House to
concert, in secret meetings, the best tactics to be followed in their
opposition to the powerful Minister. They were still alarmed at the possibility
that Pitt might at this moment retire from the Cabinet and leave them to
conduct the War without the genius which organised the fleets and armies of
England. Nor could they altogether parry Pitt’s argument for the necessity of
an immediate war with Spain, that the Plate fleet had not yet reached Europe,
and that the wealthy Spanish colonies could be attacked with good prospects of
success, inasmuch as England was in command of the sea. But they did not flinch
from their opinion, when Pitt made his retention pf office conditional on the
acceptance of his scheme. The personal attitude of the King was, moreover, of
extreme importance. The Ministers came separately to him to give their advice.
Pitt had his audience like the rest. But George was already estranged from him,
and there is no doubt that the King’s desire to free himself from the influence
of the great Minister was an element of extreme importance in the whole
struggle. Bute, too, appears in these proceedings quite as much in the
character of the tool of an autocratic master as in that of the exponent of a
policy whose consequences he was hardly able to grasp. How thoroughly he could
rely upon the support of the sovereign if he opposed Pitt in the Cabinet is
seen by a remark of Newcastle’s on September 26: “the King seems every day more
offended with Mr Pitt, and plainly wants to get rid of him at all events.” oh. xiii. 27—2
The situation
was in no way altered by the arrival of Stanley and his verbal explanations,
although they seemed to justify Pitt’s contention completely. On October 2, the
decisive sitting of the Cabinet took place, when for the last time the two
sides had the opportunity of explaining their intentions. Pitt repeated his
earlier statements; but he added with great dignity that he could not remain in
office without possessing a real control, nor be responsible for a policy of
which he had not the direction—old Lord Granville urging against him that, when
a matter had1 once been submitted for the decision of the Cabinet,
it was to be regarded as a Cabinet measure and not as that of a single
Minister. In the entry which Burke made in his Annual Register for 1761, the
different attitudes of the Ministers with regard to the constitutional question
are indeed set in much sharper mutual contrast than is shown in the notes of
those who were present. But, however little credit be attached to Burke’s
account, it at least shows clearly enough in what' light the relations between
the young King and the great Minister were popularly regarded. Pitt is reported
to have said that he had been called to the Ministry by the voice of the
people, and was answerable to them for his conduct, and that he would not
remain in a position which laid upon him the responsibility for measures which
he could no longer direct. Granville is stated to have replied: “I find the
gentleman is determined to leave us, nor can I say I am sorry for it, since he
would otherwise have certainly compelled us to leave him. But if he be resolved
to assume the right of advising His Majesty and directing the operations of the
war, to what purpose are we called to this Council ? When he talks of being
responsible to the people, he talks the language of the House of Commons, and
forgets that at this Board he is only responsible to the King.”
On October 5,
1761, William Pitt laid down the office which he had conducted so gloriously as
to become the foremost man in England. His fall was an event of far greater
moment than ordinarily belongs to the resignation of a Minister. No other could
wield the tremendous power which he had possessed—neither Lord Egremont, his
successor in office, nor Bute, the King’s favourite, nor the King himself. For
the confidence of the nation, which had been given to Pitt, could not be
transferred with the office to another. Bute’s fears that when Pitt left the
Government he would take its popularity with him were by no means groundless.
In the constitutional history of England this important fact is to be observed,
that the first great statesman raised to power by the will of the people laid
down his office voluntarily, not only because his colleagues did not agree with
him in his policy, but also because government by the will of the people, which
had been extorted from the monarchy in the last years of George II, was no
longer possible under his successor. The rule of the Great Commoner is followed
by George Ill’s attempt at personal government, for which his Scottish
favourite endeavoured to smooth the way.
1761-2] War with Spain. -Negotiations for a
separate peace. 421
To return to
the year 1761: it was the struggle with Spain which led to the resignation of
Pitt. If, then, convinced of the impossibility of avoiding war, he wished to
forestall the attack of the enemy, wherein did his design differ from the
action of Frederick the Great at the beginning of the war in 1756 ? Frederick,
like Pitt, was decided by the strategical question—by the advantages to be
derived from an immediate and well-aimed stroke against an enemy taken
unawares. Only, the position in which these two great men, akin to each other
in genius, found themselves was not identical. Frederick could conduct his
policy as he liked in time of war and peace; he could mockingly dub Podewils,
when that Minister proffered his warnings, Monsieur de la timide politique—for
he was King. Pitt at the moment of the supreme crisis had to recognise the
limits of his power.
Pitt’s
foresight was justified. The War with Spain became a fact. It provided fresh
successes for the British fleets and armies, which are described below. England
once more clearly proved her superiority in power over Spain. At the same time,
it is as if the mighty impulse communicated to English warfare by Pitt had been
still in action. Some of the operations which were being carried out had actually
been prepared by him. The nation judged rightly in hailing him as the real
conqueror. More especially, the conquest of Martinique and the smaller French
islands in the sphere of the Antilles, even to the smallest, was to be looked
upon as the accomplishment of Pitt’s plans. The impression which all these
events made in the world was tremendous. The Pope in Rome admiringly declared
to an English Catholic that he knew no greater honour than that of being bom an
Englishman.
With these
successes in warfare the conclusion of peace is signally out of keeping. Now,
at last, the lack of the great personality no longer at the head of the State
impresses itself upon the mind beyond all possibility of mistake. Pitt would
never have submitted to either the terms or the form of the Peace. The form was
that of a separate treaty, which England without her principal ally concluded
with France and Spain. Pitt had assured Frederick the Great that England would
always adhere to her alliance with Prussia; he was in the habit of repeatedly
referring in his parliamentary speeches to the value of the Prussian alliance;
and never had he done so more effectively than when in opposing the conclusion
of peace he made use of the celebrated hyperbole: “America had been conquered
in Germany.” As to the actual terms of the Peace, victorious Great Britain
amazed all sides by giving up voluntarily more of her conquests than seemed
necessary for the sake of a permanent pacification. Pitt would have required a
far greater share for England, and, if necessary, would have sought to force
the enemy by fresh humiliations to submit to his demands. The course of the
peace negotiations, which were eagerly taken up in 1762, is
intimately
connected with the internal politics of England, and is described in this
connexion in the following section.
The good
understanding between England and Prussia was not restored. In 1762, Newcastle
and Bute had for the first time left unrenewed the Convention of April, 1758,
which had hitherto been annual. They had at first been prepared to pay the
subsidies; but it was precisely at this point that a difference of opinion
arose between the two leading Ministers. Newcastle retired, and the King’s
favourite became the head of the Administration as First Lord of the Treasury.
But it was no longer possible for Frederick to remain in alliance with the
English Government, which had nothing to offer him but good advice—to the
effect that he should make a sacrifice for the sake of peace, the very
sacrifice which a world in arms had proved unable to wring from him.
It was not to
the English alliance that Frederick was indebted for being at last able to
extricate his State from the difficulties of the Seven Years’ War without loss
of territory and with great increase of prestige. He never forgot the treatment
which he had experienced from the English Government in 1762. He declined the
suggestion of an English alliance in 1773, in remembrance of “ the indecent, I
might almost say infamous, way in which England treated me at the last peace.”
The judgment of history will hardly be so severe. The eighteenth century is too
full of treaties of peace concluded by one member of an alliance without the
other for the instance of 1762 to appear utterly unprecedented. In any case,
the English people resented the abandonment of the hero of Bossbach
bitterly—almost more bitterly than the loss of so many valuable conquests. But
how could it have been otherwise ? How could such a Government as Bute’s have
been expected to uphold England’s Prussian ally more energetically, when they
actually gave back the most valuable portion of her own magnificent conquests ?
The question, which has recently been asked, whether England would have been
able to maintain all these possessions without reorganising the relations
between the mother country and the colonies, can no more affect our judgment of
Bute’s policy than the circumstance, so favourable to the English, that the
French, after generously presenting Spain with the whole of Louisiana, had now
retired completely from the Continent of America. As things then stood, the
Peace seemed so out of proportion to the conquests won that, very soon after
the event, Bute was stated to have been bribed by France—and the statement has
been repeated up to the present day. At the time, in 1762, the indignation was
great. Such a result was not what the nation, though certainly anxious for
peace, had contemplated. Never had Pitt expressed more perfectly what was in
the nation’s heart than in the great speech which, on December 9,1762, he
delivered against the Preliminaries of the Peace. When he left the House, he
was hailed in the street by the acclamations of the people. But, in the House
itself, gross corruption had once again won the day. In the
division on
the Address, moved by Fox, which approved the signature of the Preliminaries,
an enormous majority was in favour of the Address. Only sixty-five members
voted against it. “ The Ministers have had the numbers printed,” wrote Horace
Walpole; “ if they had but put the names to them, the world would have known
the names of the sixty-five who were not bribed.” When the Princess of Wales
heard the news of the acceptance of the Preliminaries she is said to have
exclaimed, “ Now my son is really King of England.”
The
settlement of the Peace was followed by the fall of the great Whig families.
The day of the personal rule of King George III had come.
(2) THE KING’S FRIENDS.
It has been
seen how the accession of Gebrge III was accompanied by the revival of
aspirations and pretensions that had long been in abeyance. The Whigs had owed
their ascendancy not merely to their wealth, capacity, and solidarity, but
also—and in a principal degree— to the foreign character of the dynasty of
which they were the mainstay. Their wealth was still enormous and secured them
commensurate influence, but they were rent with schisms, and their disordered
ranks contained no statesman of genius save William Pitt, while with George II
the foreign character of the dynasty passed away. The new King could claim to
be an Englishman born and bred, and as such entitled to the loyal allegiance of
Whig, Tory, and Jacobite alike. It was open to him, were he so minded, to essay
the realisation of the ideal set forth by Bolingbroke of the “Patriot King”
governing through constitutional forms, but yet freely, as the head of the
State, not as the puppet of a party.
Perhaps no
King was ever inclined by nature to take a low view of his prerogative; and
certainly George Ill’s education had not been of a kind to impart any such
bias. His father’s death and his grandfather’s neglect had left him to the
guidance of a mother, Augusta, Princess of Wales, who was imbued with all the
autocratic ideas of a petty German Court. She was never tired of exhorting her
son to be a King; and her mentor and confidant, John Stewart, third Earl of
Bute, having, so to speak, prerogative in his blood, was not the man to
counteract her influence or to choose for the Prince instructors who would be
likely to do so. The Prince therefore came to the throne with a mind made up to
shake off the yoke of the Whig oligarchy, and form for himself a party which
should secure him against the danger of ever again falling beneath their yoke.
Such a party Bute, who on the accession was sworn of the Privy Council and
admitted to the Cabinet, undertook to organise and to maintain in subservience;
and the moment was peculiarly prop: tious, for the political equilibrium was
unstable in the extreme.
Government by
the collective Cabinet was still the pure theory of Whig constitutionalism, to
which whatever savoured of a Prime Minister was abhorrent. Pitt, the strong man
just now at the helm, was by consequence regarded with suspicion by such old
Whigs as Devonshire, Hardwicke, Newcastle and Bedford, who stood or fell by, the
system of “ general cabinet advice,” and could not recognise a principal
Minister as being more than their most trusted spokesman in the Closet. So soon
as Pitt claimed to exercise a paramount, or anything approaching to a
paramount, influence in the Cabinet, it was time to concert some new
arrangement, aud Newcastle and Hardwicke were excellently well qualified for
such work.
To Bedford
Pitt’s policy was no less obnoxious than Pitt himself. He adhered to the
Walpolean tradition of an entente cordiale with France, and was for making
peace at almost any price. His connexion consisted of Marlborough and Lords
Gower, Sandwich, and Weymouth, with Richard Rigby, an unscrupulous wire-puller
recently appointed Master of the Irish Rolls. Hardwicke recognised that after
the conquest of Canada England had nothing substantial to gain by a
prolongation of hostilities. George Grenville, who had a private feud with Pitt
and a small connexion of his own, which included Lords Egremont, Barrington,
and Hillsborough, was ready to approve any honourable terms of peace, and to
coalesce with whoever might be able to secure them. Newcastle and Anson took
their cue from Hardwicke; Ligonier was no politician; Henry Fox was nothing
else; and Halifax was pledged to no policy or faction. In short, except Temple,
no Minister was prepared to give hearty support to Pitt’s policy of pulverising
the House of Bourbon, which might well seem quixotic to Mansfield and
questionable even to Granville.
Outside the
Ministry, Whiggism had no more typical representative than Charles
Watson-Wentworth, second Marquis of Rockingham; while in Augustus Henry
Fitzroy, third Duke of Grafton, and Charles Lennox, third Duke of Richmond, it
was tempered by popular sympathies, and, in Grafton’s case, by admiration for
Pitt. Bute’s immediate entourage consisted of his brother James Stewart
Mackenzie, who had gained some trifling experience of affairs of State at the
Court of Turin ; Charles Jenkinson, a clerk in the Secretary of State’s office,
whom he made his private secretary; Gilbert, afterwards Sir Gilbert, Elliot,
member for Selkirkshire; and Bubb Dodington, an old habitui of Leicester House.
Jenkinson and Elliot were both men of some ability, and Dodington had a great
capacity for small intrigue; but the favourite’s most trusted adviser was the
Sardinian Minister, Count de Viry, who acted as his intermediary in all
important secret negotiations. In Lord Egmont, an Irish peer, the notorious Sir
Francis Dashwood, and the Earl of Northumberland the Court might find Ministers
faute de mieux; and in Jeremiah Dyson, Clerk of the House of Commons, it
possessed a
nei] New
policy. Measures and Men.
425
wire-puller
all the more zealous for prerogative because he was a quite recent convert from
republican principles.
The keynote
of the new policy was struck in the Speech from the • Throne which inaugurated
the first parliamentary session of the new reign. The speech itself was drafted
by Hardwicke in the tone of sobriety congenial to his temperament and training;
but Bute took care that the King should interpolate with his own hand the
flourish in which he gloried in the name of Briton. Two measures followed, the
limitation of the Civil List to £800,000, and the exemption of judicial offices
from defeasance on the demise of the Crown. These Acts were gratefully received
by the people as an earnest of the young monarch’s good intentions. The
dignity of Chancellor was at the same time conferred on Lord Keeper Henley,
soon afterwards created Earl of Northington.
On the eve of
the dissolution of March 20, 1761, Bute was admitted by Newcastle to a sort of
partnership in parliamentary patronage, which placed perhaps thirty or forty
votes in the House of Commons at the disposal of the Crown. About the same
time, George Grenville, of whom the Court had hopes, was accorded cabinet rank,
reto'aing, however, his office of Treasurer of the Navy (February 11). Occasion
was found in Legge’s opposition to the proposed indemnification of Landgrave
Frederick II of Hesse-Cassel for his losses in the recent campaign, to dismiss
an able financier and put in his place Lord Barrington, the very type of
respectable mediocrity (March 12). Gilbert Elliot was made a Lord of the
Treasury. Holdernesse, Pitt’s makeweight colleague in the Secretaries’ office,
was pensioned off, and the seals were transferred to Bute (March 25). Halifax
surrendered the Board of Trade to a veteran placeman, Lord Sandys, and
succeeded Bedford in the Irish viceroyalty. These changes were made with the
cognisance and consent of Newcastle, Devonshire, Hardwicke, and Bedford, whose
countenance of Bute gave great umbrage to Pitt. The elevation of Bubb Dodington
to the peerage as Lord Melcombe secured a seat in the House of Commons for
Dashwood. It was now that was formed the nucleus of the party which, as
consisting of the avowed supporters of Prerogative, soon came to be known by
the appropriate designation of “ the King’s Friends.” About the same time, the
seat vacated by Lord Fitzmaurice on his succession to the Irish earldom of
Shelburne and the English barony of Wycombe was taken by Colonel Isaac Barre, a
staunch Whig with a great command of rhetoric and a grudge against Pitt. The
return for the Ayr boroughs of a versatile Scottish lawyer, Alexander
Wedderbum, served to strengthen the Grenville group.
Bute, as has
been related above, received the seals at a critical juncture. The outlook,
dark as it was for Russia, was hardly less so for France; and in these
circumstances Choiseul proposed a general pacification (March 27) and consented
to lead the way by a separate negotiation. As was only to be expected, Pitt
dallied with Choiseul’s
CH,
XIII.
426 FallofPitt, Rupture with Spain. Conduct of
the War. [1761-2
proposals,
while the reduction of Belle Isle and Dominica was in progress; and Choiseul in
his turn fenced with Pitt until he had signed a new Family Compact (August 15).
A month later Pitt ruptured the negotiation, and shortly afterwards he
announced to the Cabinet the existence of a secret understanding between France
and Spain, which he proposed to make a casus belli. Temple alone supported him,
and after several stormy meetings he and Temple resigned (October). The seals
of the Southern Department were thereupon given to Lord Egremont, and the Privy
Seal to Bedford, who, however, had not the full confidence of the King and the
inner Cabinet, which consisted of Bute, Egremont, and George Grenville. Natural
as was Pitt’s resentment, no less natural was the divergence of opinion which
occasioned it. Choiseul’s renewal of the Family Compact was a suspicious
circumstance; but, however much Pitt may have gathered of the provisions of the
Treaty, it remained unauthenticated, and so long as that was so, its existence
could, in the cool judgment of statesmen less bellicose than Pitt, hardly
warrant an immediate declaration of war. It was fairly arguable that the
resources of diplomacy should first be exhausted.
The resources
of such diplomacy as was employed on this occasion were, however, soon at an
end. Disclosure of so much of the Family Compact as concerned British
interests was demanded rather than requested of the Court of Madrid, which took
the only course consistent with its dignity and haughtily refused the required
information. In December the British ambassador, Lord Bristol, was recalled,
and early in the following year war was declared. The Council was, however, to
the last far from unanimous ; Newcastle, Hardwicke, Bedford and Mansfield
holding that there was no casus belli.
The course of
the War proved on the whole disastrous to the House of Bourbon. The conquest of
Martinique by Rear-Admiral Rodney and Major-General Monckton (February 12,
1762) was followed by the occupation of St Lucia, St Vincent, and Grenada. On
September 18, the only recent French acquisition, St John’s, Newfoundland, was
recovered by Colonel Amherst. In Germany Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick,
brilliantly seconded by the Marquis of Granby, defeated the united forces of
Soubise and d’Estrees at Wilhelmsthal (June 24) and Luttem- berg (July 23), and
compelled the evacuation of Gottingen (August 16) and the surrender of Cassel
(November 1). Nor was Spain much more fortunate. The army, 42,000 strong, which
in May she threw across the frontier of Portugal, at first carried all before
it; but the defence of the line of the Tagus was ably organised by the eminent
artillerist Count William von der Lippe-Buckeburg, aided by Lord Loudoun, in
command of a contingent of 7000 British, while Colonel Burgoyne adroitly surprised
Valencia de Alcantara (August 27) and Villavelha (October 6). Havana, blockaded
by nineteen sail of the line under Admiral Pocock fliid besieged by twelve
thousand seasoned troops under Lord Albemarle,
surrendered
after an obstinate defence (August 12). In the East Indies the recent reduction
of Pondicherry (January, 1761) made it possible to equip an expedition at
Madras under Rear-Admiral Cornish and General Draper, which carried Manila by
assault and held the Philippines to ransom (October, 1762). Unfortunately,
however, the splendour of these feats of arms had its foil in the misguided
policy of the Government. Bute saw in the alliance with Frederick the Great
nothing but an obstacle to peace; and, being inexperienced, tactless, and none
too scrupulous, he, upon the accession of Tsar Peter III, made to the Courts of
St Petersburg and Vienna overtures of a kind to suggest a triple alliance for
imposing peace on Bourbon and Hohenzollem alike. Upon the fairest construction,
the policy was scarcely loyal, and it wore the appearance of downright treachery.
Kaunitz
suspected a snare, and the Tsar was already pledged to Prussia. Bute’s advances
therefore met with a haughty repulse at both Courts; and Frederick, discovering
what had happened, put the worst construction upon the British policy. His
irritation was increased, when he learned that the British Government had
determined to discontinue his subsidy and withdraw from the German War. Since
the subsidy was contingent upon annual conventions which alone precluded the
making a separate peace, its discontinuance was no positive breach of faith;
but, as Frederick’s position was still critical, such a volte-face at such a
juncture was, to say the least of it, discreditable. The new policy, first
mooted by Bedford, speedily gained the adhesion of George Grenville, but was
stoutly resisted by Newcastle, Hardwicke, and Devonshire. Upon its definitive
adoption by the Government, Newcastle, whom Bute had treated with studied
indignity, resigned, and Devonshire and Hardwicke withdrew from the Council
Board.
On May 26,
1762, the King gave the Treasury to Bute, who was also invested with the
Garter. He was succeeded as Secretaiy by George Grenville, the Treasurership of
the Navy being given to Barrington, and the Chancellorship of the Exchequer to
Dash wood. Frederick, Lord North, eldest son of the Earl of Guilford, remained
Junior Lord of the Treasury; and, on Anson’s death (June 6), Halifax succeeded
to the First Lordship of the Admiralty. Jeremiah Dyson became Secretaiy to the
Treasury, and Charles Jenkinson Treasurer of the Ordnance Office. Lord Melcombe
was admitted to the Cabinet; and honours were dispensed with a lavish hand to
the supporters of the Court.
Meanwhile,
the Family Compact had ceased to be regarded as an obstacle to peace. Occasion
had been found for resuming negotiations with Choiseul upon a basis which
included the Spanish claims. To ensure secrecy, the correspondence was for a
time conducted through the medium of the Sardinian Ministers at London and
Paris; but by May, 1762, the fact that the negotiation was pending had
transpired. It was then formally notified to the Empress Queen, and in the
course of the
summer the
matter was brought to a point at which it was ripe to be entrusted to
plenipotentiaries. As such, in September, the Due de Nivemais was accredited at
London and the Duke of Bedford at Paris. Bedford, however, was not allowed a
free hand, though, except the Spanish cli ms , there remained little to
discuss. When the question of the exchange for Havana came on the tapis, there
was much divergence of opinion in the Cabinet, and, though Florida was
eventually insisted upon, George Grenville, the stoutest opponent of gratuitous
concession, changed places at Bute’s instance with Halifax and gave up the lead
in the House of Commons to Henry Fox (October 14). A seat in the Cabinet was
offered to Newcastle, in the hope of securing not only his but Hardwicke’s and
Devonshire’s support for the peace, but was unceremoniously refused; and the
three malcontent peers absented themselves from file Council summoned for the
discussion of the final draft of the preliminaries, though all three had
received the customary writs. In the circumstances the King regarded their
absence as a personal affront, and took the first opportunity of denying
Devonshire an audience. The Duke, in consequence, resigned the office of Lord
Chamberlain (October 28), and the members of his family and his principal
political connexions and friends followed suit. The King thereupon erased his
name from the list of Privy Councillors, and depi red Newcastle,
Rockingham, and Ashburnham of their Lord Lieutenancies.
The
Preliminaries of the Peace were signed at Fontainebleau on November 3, 1762;
but the Treaty was not made definitive until the virtual completion of the
separate negotiation between Austria and Prussia. It was signed at Paris, with
the accession of Portugal, on February 10, 1763, five days before the Peace of
Hubertusburg. Thus, by two separate Treaties, the general pacification was at
length effected.
During the
final stage of the negotiation Bedford had been placed at a great disadvantage
by the fact that the tenor of his instructions was perfectly known to Choiseul.
Choiseul’s informant was the Chevalier d’fion, Nivemais’ secretary, who by a
discreditable artifice had got sight of the instructions and copied them.
Bedford, however, believed that he had been betrayed by Bute, and on his return
to England Inarked his resentment by resigning the Privy Seal and refusing the
Presidency of the Council, vacant by the recent death of Granville.
By the Peace
of Paris Great Britain, retaining Canada and Cape Breton, ceded to France the
islets of St Pierre and Miquelon as an unfortified station for her fishermen,
who were guaranteed their rights under the Treaty of Utrecht and accorded a
circumscribed right of fishing within the Gulf of St Lawrence: the neutral
islands were partitioned —St Vincent, Dominica, and Tobago falling to Great
Britain, St Lucia to France, to which Great Britain ceded Martinique and
Guadaloupe for Grenada and the Grenadines, in Africa the island of Goree for
the Senegal Protectorate, and in Europe Belle Isle for Minorca. With Spain
Great Britain
exchanged Havana for Florida, and agreed to dismantle her forts in the Bay of
Honduras in return for a guarantee of a limited participation in the log rood
trade, Spain totally renouncing her claim to participate in the Newfoundland
fishery. As the westward limit of British dominion France and Spain accepted
the line of the Mississippi from source to mouth, exclusive only of the New
Orleans territory, which with western Louisiana France ceded to Spain by a
separate convention. In the East Indies the status quo of 1749 was restored,
except that France engaged to keep no army in Bengal and ceded Natal and
Tapanuli in Sumatra to Great Britain. All other conquests were restored by the
signatory Powers. France engaged to reduce the fortifications of Dunkirk to
the condition stipulated by the Peace of Aix-la- Chapelle.
The
discrepancy between the concessions which Great Britain made by this Peace and
the terms which she was in a position to dictate was so glaring as to raise a
suspicion that the country had been betrayed—a suspicion which, all things
considered, cannot be characterised as entirely on reason able. It is a significant
fact that, after the battle of Wil- helmsthal, Bute wrote to Choiseul as to an
ally, urging him to do his utmost to check Prince Ferdinand’s advance. But,
though the Peace was by no means such as the country was entitled to expect, it
encountered, except on the part of Pitt, no detsrtr -'ned opposition and was
carried by majorities too large to be attributable wholly to corrupt influence.
The country was weary of the War, and sullenly acquiesced in sacrifices which
were speciously represented as essential to the durability of the Peace. The
victory was crowned by a proscription of the Opposition, which did not cease
until they had been stripped of most of the places of honour and profit which
they held under the Crown, down to subordinate posts in the customs and excise
departments.
The
unpopularity of the Government was increased by their budget, which saddled the
country with a loan of £7,000,000 and an excise duty on cider, Tev;able
on the maker. The cider duty was still (as in Walpole’s day) extremely
obnoxious to the people, and was only carried after a severe struggle which
reunited the Opposition. The odium which it brought upon the Government found
peculiarly pungent expression in che North Briton, a journal edited by John
Wilkes, member for Aylesbury. Bute felt his position to be intolerable, and
lost no time in resigning (April 8). Dashwood, who followed suit, was consoled
with the barony of Le Despencer; and about the same time Henry Fox, retaining
the Pay Office., was created Lord Holland. The lead of the King’s Friends in
the House of Commons devolved upon Jenkinson.
There is no
reason to seek for other explanation of Bute’s retirement than lassitude and a
desire to relieve the Government of the obloquy in which it was involved by his
presence at its head. He continued for a while to enjoy the royal confidence,
and selected as his successor George
430 The Grenville-Bedford Administration and
Wilkes. [1763-&
Grenville,
who united the seals of the Treasury and the Exchequer. The Admiralty was given
to Sandwich. Charles Townshend, who had just succeeded Sandys at the Board of
Trade, was displaced to make room for Shelburne (April 20). Stewart Mackenzie
received the Privy Seal of Scotland. These arrangements, except the last, were,
however, merely provisional. Bute contemplated an early reconstruction of the
Administration, with Pitt as Secretary and some other First Lord of the
Treasury than Grenville. He lost no time in sounding both Pitt and Bedford, but
was encouraged by neither. On Egremont’s sudden death (August 21) he renewed
his overtures; and the King sent for Pitt (August 27). But it was in vain that
he offered to place Temple at the Treasury; Pitt required the dismissal of all
who had had a hand in the Peace. Bedford, however, whose son-in-law,
Marlborough, was already Lord Privy Seal, at length accepted the Presidency of
the Council, though only on condition that Bute retired from Court—a condition
which Bute fulfilled in the letter by rusticating himself at Luton Hoo.
Egremont’s place was taken by Halifax, with Sandwich for his colleague, whom
Egmont succeeded at the Admiralty. Shelburne, who had now cast in his lot with
Pitt, resigned, and was succeeded by Hillsborough (September).
The
Grenville-Bedford Administration compounded with France a claim for the
maintenance of prisoners of war (April, 1765), but failed to recover the unpaid
moiety (2,000,000 pesos) of the Manila ransom. It is chiefly memorable for the
series of blunders by which it embroiled the Court and eventually the House of
Commons with the country, the country with the American colonies, and itself
with the Crown. On April 19, 1763, the session closed with a Speech from the
Throne, in which the nation was congratulated on the Peace, and the Treaty of
Hubertusburg was represented as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris. The
Speech furnished the North Briton (No. 45, April 23) with matter for much free
comment. In particular the passage concerning the Treaty of Hubertusburg was
characterised as “the most abandoned instance of ministerial effronteiy ever
attempted to be imposed on mankind”; and more followed, amounting to an
insinuation that the King had allowed himself to be made a party to a
deliberate falsehood. George III keenly resented this licence,, which, indeed,
in the opinion of the law officers, constituted a seditious libel. As, however,
evidence was wanting to convict the anonymous writer, the Secretaries of State
issued warrants for the apprehension of the persons and papers of the authors,
printers, and publishers of the libel. The warrants named two printers who had
been in Wilkes’ employ, but not Wilkes himself; and, as by common law a warrant
must name all persons to be apprehended thereunder, and the Secretaries had no
exceptional powers, neither warrant was valid against Wilkes.. Nevertheless, on
April 30, he was arrested in the vicinity of his house, which was entered,
searched, and cleared of his papers. He was taken before the Secretaries,
examined, and,
1763] Waiver of privilege and expulsion of Wilkes.
431
notwithstanding
that, on Lord Temple’s application, his writ' of habeas corpus had in the
meantime been granted, he was committed close prisoner to the Tower. General
warrants by Secretaries of State were not without precedent since the
Revolution, and, on the return of the writ of habeas corpus, Sir Charles Pratt,
Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, refrained from pronouncing those issued
in the present instance to be illegal, and discharged Wilkes on the ground of
privilege of Parliament (May 6).
To the King
it was intolerable that privilege of Parliament should stand between him and
the object of his displeasure; and, as Parliament alone could determine the
extent of its privilege, to Parliament he appealed. A message conveyed through
George Grenville on the first day of the ensuing session (November 15) readily
elicited from the House of Commons resolutions not only censuring the North
Briton, No. 45, as a seditious libel and consigning it to the common hangman to
be burned, but withdrawing the aegis of privilege from all who had been
concerned in its production. Even Pitt joined in the censure on Wilkes and
opposed the waiver of privilege on purely constitutional grounds. As, however,
treason, felony, and breach of the peace were the only offences then recognised
as ousting privilege of Parliament, its withdrawal even in the case of Wilkes
was felt to be so serious an innovation as to demand the sanction of both
Houses. A conference of Lords and Commons, managed on the. part of the latter
by Lord North, was accordingly held; and, though the Court triumphed, there was
a goodly array of dissentients. The waiver was opposed by Shelburne with
studied moderation, and with inflexible determination by Temple, who, with
Grafton, Portland, Bristol, Devonshire, Scarborough, Bessborough, and ten other
peers, entered a protest against it in the Journal of their House. Few
constitutional lawyers to-day would be found to regret the abandonment of a
privilege which was only valuable as a check upon prerogative; but the circumstances
of the hour fully justified the strong stand made by the minority.
Matter for
collateral proceedings against Wilkes was furnished by a pseudonymous
production printed at his private press. Its contents consisted of a filthy
parody of Pope’s Essay on Man, entitled An Essay on Woman, with notes
purporting to be by Bishop Warburton, and some blasphemous paraphrases of
Christian hymns. Only a dozen copies of the work were in print, and there was
no evidence that they had been circulated. One, however, had been procured from
the compositors by Sandwich, on whose motion (November 15) the House of Lords
voted the book a breach of privilege and a scandalous, obscene, and impious
libel.
Wilkes, laid
aside for a time by a wound received in a duel, coolly employed his
convalescence in reprinting the North Briton at his private press. He then
found himself menaced with two prosecutions for libel, one because of the North
Briton, the other because of the Essay on Woman, and absconded to France. He
was expelled the House of
Commons
(January 19,1764); and, having thereupon been found guilty before Lord
Mansfield on both the charges of libel (February 21), and not appes. ;ng
to receive judgment, he was outlawed (November 1). Popular feeling acclaimed Wilkes
a patriot and the dismissal of Temple from the Lord Lieutenancy of Buckingha
mshire, pf Shelburne from the post of aide-de-camp to the King, and of General
Conway and Colonel Barre, who had supported the “patriot’s” cause in the House
of Commons, from their respective commands, served to intensify the pablic
indignation. The burning of the obnoxious number of the North Briton caused a
riot, and, though Mansfield by reserving the question of law for his own
decision secured the conviction of the publisher, the pillory to which he was
consigned proved a place of honour rather than of ignominy. Wood, the
Under-Secretary who had superintended the seizure of Wilkes’ papers, was cast
in ^1000 damages in an action instituted by Lord Temple in Wilkes’ name (December
6, 1763); and cognate legal proceedings edited from Mansfield himself a final
determination of the illegality of general warrants (1765). An action against
Halifax was delayed by legal chicane until the outlawry could be pleaded in
bar, but was revived on the reversal of the outlawry, and resulted in a verdict
for Wilkes with cf?4000 damages (November 10, 1769).
The American
policy of the Government, which has been already discussed in an earlier
volume, was dictated by no set purpose of sub-' verting liberty; but its errors
were none the less fatal because they sprang from nothing worse than defective
insight and foresight. It proceeded on the principle, in itself plausible
enough, that the colonies, delivered by the mother country from imminent peril
of subjugation by the French, ought thenceforth to contribute to the cost of
their defence and administration by some method more regular and remunerative
than voluntary and occasional aids and the insignificant revenue from the Crown
quit- rents. It ignored the fact that, if the supples which in times of
emergency the colonial Assemblies were accustomed to grant, and the commercial
intercourse which the Navigation Laws regulated in the supposed interest of the
mother country, did not constitute an adequate compensation for her expenditure
upon the colonies, no revenue which she coaid exact from them could possibly
turn the scale in her favour, while the mere attempt to raise such a revenue,
however small, by Act of Parliament could not but excite the resentment of a
people singularly jealous of its liberties. The Government, however, was bent
on trying this hazardous experiment, and, as the Opposition did not as yet
concern itself seriously with America, the experiment was made without delay.
The Sugar Act of 1733 (6 Geo. II, c. 13) was revised, reenacted without' limit
of duration, and converted from a merely commercial into a fiscal measure (4
Geo. Ill, c. 15); and the powers of the Admiralty Courts and executive were
amplified, both for the enforcement of the Navigation
1764-s] Reinforcement of Navigation
Laws.—Stamp Act. 433
Laws and for
the collection of the revenue. Pursuant to this Act, a Court of Vice-Admiralty
was established for the whole of the colonies (May 18, 1764). The measure was
peculiarly obnoxious to the colonists, because the Governors were entitled to
one-third of the value of the forfeitures and had thus a substantial interest
in enforcing the law. Complaint was also made that the Courts sat at places
that caused great inconvenience to the parties. But this was not all. From the
purview of the Navigation Acts bullion was expressly excluded; nevertheless,
by some strange oversight, commodities bartered for bullion were not exempted
from seizure. The authorities had hitherto refused to take advantage of this
oversight, and had also relaxed the law with regard to Portuguese lemons and
wines. All this was now altered. The bullion trade was treated as contraband;
and the whole available naval force was commissioned for the enforcement of the
law. The revenue officers, armed with “writs of assistance” from the superior
Courts, obeyed their instructions to the letter, and, despite strenuous
resistance, with such effect that the supply of bullion fell short. The
stringency of this policy was 'ncreased by the inopportune demonetisation of
bills of credit, which had hitherto circulated as legal tender. In these
circumstances, it was scarcely to be wondered at that the colonists viewed the
establishment in their midst of a standing army of twenty regiments rather. as
a menace to their liberties than as a means to their protection, and bitterly
resented the requisitions served upon them for the provision of recruits. Their
resentment was aggravated by the application to their business transactions of
an elaborate system of stamp duties appropriated to the same account as the
tariff, and enforceable by the same machinery.
The Stamp Act
passed almost unopposed (March, 1765), and, indeed, could hardly have been
opposed on strictly constitutional grounds. The delegated powers of the
colonial Assemblies cbuld not oust the authority of Parliament. The attempt
made by Pitt at a later date to limit that authority in colonial matters fiscal
to the imposition of “external” duties merely evinced his ignorance of the true
incidence of taxation. Nor could the principle of no taxation without actual
representation be maintained with logical consistency by any statesman not
prepared for a radical reform of the British representative system. If the
unenfranchised masses of Great Britain were to be regarded as virtually
represented because they possessed the power of influencing the electorate and
Parliament by money and agitation, the same might be said, though doubtless
with a less degree of plausibility, of their kith and kin beyond the Atlantic.
Moreover, the
same logic which made actual representation a condition precedent to taxation
by Act of Parliament implied either the actual inclusion of the colonies within
the British representative system or the concession to them of virtual
independence. The former alternative was generally regarded on both sides of
the Atlantic as impracticable, and only the stem logic of fact could be
expected to reconcile the mother
country to
the latter. In truth, the issue between the colonies and the mother country was
simpler and broader than it at first sight appeared. Nothing could be urged
against the Stamp Act which was not in principle equally valid against the
vexatious restrictions of the Navigation Laws; nothing short of complete
autonomy could permanently satisfy the aspirations of the colonists; and the
injudicious action of the British Government did but precipitate a struggle
which in' any case could not have been long deferred.
The
Grenville-Bedford Administration went to pieces on a Bill for the ^constitution
of a Regency.in the event of the demise of the Crown during the minority of the
Heir Apparent. It was a Ministerial measure, introduced in the House of Lords
in response to a Royal Message in the spring of 1765. The Bill proposed to vest
the Regency in the Queen or such other member of the royal family as the King
should appoint, with such powers and advisers as were provided by the similar
Act passed on the death of the King’s father (24 Geo. II, c. 24). The ample discretion
thus reserved to the sovereign by no means commended itself to the entire
Cabinet. , Bedford and the Secretaries, of State suspected that the message
which had determined the scheme had been inspired by Bute, and, by way of
asserting their independence, attempted so to construe the term royal fan |y
as, to exclude the Princess Mother from the Regency, The Princess had not been
naturalised by Act of Parliament, and it was therefore contended that she was
still an alien. This injurious quibble was summarily disposed of by Northington
and Mansfield, who pointed out that she was naturalised by her marriage; and an
opinion to the same effect was elicited from the puisnes, who, were quite free
from the suspicion of court influence. Richmond then moved (May 3), that the
Queen, the Princess Mother, and lineal descendants of the late King resident in
England,, should be designated as eligible for the Regency. Halifax procured
the King’s sanction to an amendment which had the effect of excluding the
Princess Mother. The amendment was carried; but the triumph of the cabal was
only transient. The House of Commons inserted the Princess Mother’s name; and,
thus reamended, the Bill was returned to the House of Lords and passed into law
(May 15). Nothing had, in fact, been further from the King’s thoughts than to
countenance such a slight, to his mother, and he determined at all costs* to
deliver himself from Ministers whom he regarded as little better than traitors.
To this end he opened, through Cumberland, negotiations with Pitt and Temple,
on the one hand, and Newcastle and Rockingham, on the other. Pitt and Temple
demanded in effect carte blanche as to men and measures. Lord Lyttelton, to
whom the King then turned, would not take office without Pitt. The cabal threatened
resignation. The King temporised; but the terms—the proscription of Bute and
all his connexion and the Commandership-in-chief for Granby—on which the cabal
insisted as the price of their retention of office, were more than he
1765-6] The Rockingham Administration.-The
Stamp Act. 43$
could brook,
and, through Grafton, he renewed his overtures to, Pitt, An arrangement seemed
assured, when, suddenly, everything was upset by Temple’s unexplained refusal
of office. Probably; tie nor :nated as colleagues persons obnoxious
to Pitt, who was prepared neither to defer to Temple nor to dispense with him,
and thus lost what proved to be his last chance of forming a homogeneous
Administration. To the King no option remained but the recall of the old Whigs
to power. Rock ingham became First Lord of the Treasury with Newcastle as Privy
Seal, William Dowdeswell, a man of ability, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
aged Earl of Winchilsea as President of the Council, and -the Earl of
Dartmouth, a mere cipher, as President of the Board of Trade. At the same time
the Pittite Grafton was associated with General Conway, a Rockingham Whig, in
the Secretaries’ office. Charles Townshend retained the Pay Office, in which he
had just succeeded Lord Holland, Egmont the Admiralty, and Northington the
Great Seal. Lord Chief Justice Pratt was raised to the peerage as Baron Camden;
Charles Yorke, Lord Hardwicke’s second son and intellectual successor, was reinstated
in the office of Attorney-General which, pending the proceedings against
Wilkes, he had resigned; and Lord George Sackville, to Pitt’s intense disgust,
was restored to the Privy Council, and appointed joint vice-treasurer of
Ireland. The Privy Seal of Scotland was given to Lord Breadalbane.
In his
private secretary Edmund Burke, member for Wendover, and Attorney-General
Yorke, Rockingham had two mentors whose views on the American question had
taken definite shape. Both acknowledged the competence of Parliament to
legislate for the colonies in regard to all matters, and both regarded the
Stamp Act as impolitic, and were therefore prepared to approve its repeal,
provided this were accompmied by a measure affirming the limitless legislative
authority of Parliament. Without such a measure there was, indeed, little
chance of carrying the repeal; nor were Ministers by any means nnan 'mous on
the question. They therefore temporised, and allowed Parliament to adjourn for
the Christmas recess without affording any clear indication of their policy.
When the Houses reassembled (January 14,1766), opinion was divided between the
repeal, the modification, and the enforcement of the Stamp Act. In this
difficulty, Ministers appealed to Pitt to come in and save them.
Pitt
stipulated for the dismissal of Newcastle, the removal of Sackville from the
Council, and “a transposition of offices,” which was understood to mean the
removal of Rockingham from the Treasury. Newcastle was patriotically willing to
be sacrificed; but the King demurred, and the negotiation fell through.
Meanwhile, Pitt pressed for the total repeal of the Stamp Act, on the
fallacious ground of a natural right in the colonists to the exclusive
regulation of their internal taxation; and in the House of Lords the same
argument was used by Camden and Shelburne. Its refutation by Mansfield, who
showed ch. sin.
28—2
that no valid
distinction could be drawn between an internal and an external tax, the
incidence of both being upon the community at large, served to clear the issue.
On the one hand, the plenitude of the sovereignty of Parliament, on the other,
the futility of any mere modification of the Stamp Act, came to be generally
recognised, and thus Yorke’s policy was at length adopted. The omnipotence of
Parliament was affirmed by a Declaratory Act and exemplified in practice by a
Mutiny Act, which required the Provincial Assemblies to vote supplies for the
housing and maintenance of troops. Compensation was voted to be due by the
Provincial Assemblies to the sufferers by the recent disturbances, and the vote
was made an instruction to the Colonial Governors. The Stamp Act was repealed,
not without an indemnity to those who had incurred penalties through inability
to comply with its provisions. The American tariff was materially lightened;
the bullion trade was authorised; and Dominica and Jamaica were opened to
foreign shipping. The Government also concluded a commercial treaty with
Russia, adjusted with France the claims of holders of Canadian paper currency
issued by the French Government before the Peace, and exacted from her a
partial demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk.
Notwithstanding
strenuous opposition, the repeal of the Stamp Act was carried by a handsome
majority (275 to 161) in the House of Commons, and by a substantial majority
(34) in the House of Lords. The Administration was, however, already doomed. It
held office by sufferance of Pitt and the King; and, mortified by his failure
to obtain an allowance for his brothers and by the House of Commons’ express
condemnation of general warrants, the King determined to try once more the
effect of a new deal of the political cards. Pitt already made no secret of his
hostility to the party system as such, and was able through his friends Grafton
and Northington to make his influence felt in the Closet; but, when offered
office, he, according to his wont, demanded carte blanche, and it was not
until both Grafton and Northington had resigned that the King was brought to
accede to his terms (July 12). There was at first some talk of coalition with
the existing Administration; but, as Pitt continued to proscribe Newcastle,
this proved impossible. A coalition with the Bedford faction was equally out of
the question; and Temple, to whom Pitt offered place, declined it, on learning
that he was to have no share in the formation of the Cabinet.
Forced thus
to rely on the magic of his personality to make good the lack of common
principles, Pitt thereupon formed that ingenious and incongruous combination so
happily described by Burke as a “tessellated pavement without cement.” The
Treasury was entrusted to the pococurante capacity of Grafton, the Exchequer
to the erratic genius of Charles Townshend. The Secretaries were Conway for the
Northern, Shelburne for the Southern, Department. Pitt himself took the Privy
Seal and a seat in the House of Lords as Earl of Chatham, Northington
resigned
the Great Seal to Camden and accepted the Presidency of the Council.
Hillsborough was made President of the Board of Trade, with powers subordinate
to Shelburne’s. Granby was installed in the office, which had been long left
vacant, of Commander-in-chief. Sir Charles Saynders succeeded Egmont at the
Admiralty. Bute was propitiated by the restoration of the Privy Seal of
Scotland to his brother and the grant of a ducal coronet to his family connexion,
Northumberland. The Pay Office was divided between Lord North and George Cooke,
member for Middlesex. James Grenville replaced Lord George Sackville as joint
vice-treasurer of Ireland. Charles Yorke, whom Chatham could not forgive for
having, as he conceived, trimmed in the Wilkes case, was succeeded as
Attorney-General by William de Grey.
,
That this
congeries of indifferent or mutually repellent atoms should have proved more
than ephemeral is attributable solely to the potent influence which even in his
eclipse emanated from its author. Chatham’s peerage and insignificant office
were rightly interpreted at home and abroad as symptoms of weakness, and in
fact gout and hypochondria rendered his position in the Cabinet from first to
last little more than nominal. Grafton and Conway, the one from indolence, the
other from sheer irresolution, were unfit to act except under Chatham’s
guidance. Townshend, who owed his place to Grafton’s interest and his admission
to the Cabinet to Chatham’s indisposition, was enamoured of a plan for raising
a revenue from the colonies by external taxation. Shelburne and Camden were
opposed to the reopening of the American question in any form; but
Hillsborough, who supported Townshend, was not a subordinate whom Shelburne
could readily control; Camden’s influence was limited; and Northington was only
desirous of ending his days in peace.
The
Administration was hardly in office before it became necessary partially to
reconstruct it. The dismissal of Lord Edgcumbe from the Treasurership of the
Household to make way for one of Chatham’s friends, John Shelley, led to the
exodus of the remnant of Rockingham Whigs, with the single exception of Conway.
Saunders was succeeded at the Admiralty by Sir Edward Hawke, with Jenkinson
vice Keppel as Junior Lord.
In Europe the
new Government commanded no confidence and inspired little respect. Frederick
the Great denied to the Earl of Chatham the trust he had reposed in the Great
Commoner. Spain met the claim on account of the Manila ransom with a
counter-claim to exclusive possession of the Falkland Isles, on one of which a
small British settlement, Port Egmont, had been established in 1765. Nor could
Ministers rely on hearty support at home. Hitherto, the country gentlemen had
sulkily acquiesced in a land tax of 4s. in the pound; now, led by Dowdes- well,
they rose in revolt, and carried its reduction to 3s. (February 27,
1767).
Meanwhile, the American question had assumed a new complexion. The colonists
had ignored the Declaratory Act, while they
438 American port duties.—The Crown and India.
[1766-7
received the
repeal of the Stamp Act with professions of gratitude; but the suggestion of
compensation for the sufferers by the riots, and the demand of supplies for the
army, evoked a contrary spirit. The Assembly of Massachusetts Bay voted the
compensation, but by the same Act granted a general pardon to the rioters
(December 6, 1766). The Assembly of New York made provision for the quartering
of the troops in a manner contrary to the Mutiny Act. The Privy Council
annulled both Acts, the one as an usurpation of the royal prerogative, the
other as inconsistent with the Charter of the Province. An Act of Parliament,
as has been related elsewhere, suspended the legislative functions of the
Assembly of New York until the provisions of the Mutiny Act should be complied
with. These measures were essential to the maintenance of the authority of the
Crown; but wanton offence was given to; the colonists by the
imposition of Townshend’s port duties on glass, leads, pigments, teas, and
paper.
Amid these
manifold embarrassments, the Government essayed to grapple with the formidable
problem which the prowess of Clive had forced upon their consideration, and
which is discussed in another chapter. The immense extent and importance of the
recent territorial acquisitions of the East India Company raised the question
whether or how far such imperial dominion was consistent with the terms of the
Company’s Charter—a question upon which the Cabinet was far from unanimous.
Chatham, Grafton, Shelburne and Camden construed the Charter strictly, claiming
for the Crown the eminent domain in all the provinces in which the Company
exercised a virtual sovereignty. Townshend, on the other hand, boldly claimed
for the Company the prerogatives of an independent State, and carried Conway
with him. The extravagance of the contention was patent; and Parliament,
without expressly affirming, tacitly recognised the title of the Crown by
leasing the new territories to the Company for two years at an annual rent of
£400,000, and restricting; the Company’s dividend, in the meantime, to;
ten per cent. The measure, which was “ managed ” by Dyson and supported by the
rest of the King’s Friends, was carried, and was afterwards continued, with certain
modifications, for five years.
Grafton’s
overtures to Bockingham for a reconstruction of the Administration upon a broad
basis led to much consultation, but to no agreement either as to men or
measures. The general feeling among the Opposition was that Chatham had better
be allowed to “run himself aground.” This deplorable decision paved the way for
the ultimate triumph of the Court. On the premature death of Charles Townshend,
the seals of the Exchequer were given to Lord North (September, 1767). About
the same time, Viscount Townshend succeeded Lord Bristol , in the Irish
viceroyalty, and Jenkinson was transferred from the Admiralty to the Treasury
Board. Grafton, acting upon a hint dropped by Chatham, now completely disabled,
was at last resolved
to detach, if
possible, the Bedford group from the Opposition; and, though Bedford himself
steadfastly refused office, he released his followers from their self-denying
ordinance. The result was that Hillsborough was accorded the status of Colonial
Secretary—a guarantee for an un- conciliatory policy towards America; Conway
yielded the seals to Weymouth, retaining however cabinet rank; Gower replaced
Northington as President of the Council, and Rigby succeeded North in the Pay
Office. To everybody’s surprise, a new Solicitor-General was found in John
Dunning, a stuff gownsman who had distinguished himself as counsel for Wilkes’
printer, Dryden Leach.
Coalition
Governments are apt to be weak, and weak Governments are apt to drift into war;
but the Grafton Administration, as now patched up, was too divided even to
drift. In the east of Europe, events were marching towards the dismemberment of
Poland; in the south, the acquisition of Corsica by France was imminent. The
Polish crisis was too remote to interest British statesmen seriously, and the
Cabinet had thus no temptation to intervene otherwise than by friendly counsel;
but the Corsican question, involving as it did the aggrandisement of France at
the expense of a people which had long maintained a heroic struggle for
independence, might easily have been so handled as to lead to a renewal of
hostilities. That such was not the case was due rather to the impotence than to
the prudence of the Government. Shelburne took a high tone; Grafton was
lukewarm; the rest of the Cabinet were either indifferent or opposed to overt
intervention. Thus, while Ministers debated, and privily furnished Paoli with
arms (July,
1768),
Choiseul made good his hold on the island.
On the
American question the Government were no less divided. The Assembly of
Massachusetts Bay which had taken the lead in organising resistance to the
collection of Townshend’s taxes was dissolved by Hillsborough’s orders (July,
1768), but continued to sit under another name. The agitation grew and spread,
and the turbulence of the populace was hardly restrained by military force. It
began to be plain that the duties must either be remitted or levied at a cost
disproportionate to their value. The Bedford section of the Cabinet demanded
enforcement coute que coAte; while Grafton, Camden, Shelburne, Conway, and
Granby advised their repeal. Chatham, anticipating Shelburne’s dismissal, and
Shelburne, despairing of Chatham’s recovery, resigned without concert about the
same time (October 12, 19); and thus the cause of conciliation lost its most
earnest advocates. Shelburne’s place was taken by Weymouth, whom Rochford
succeeded in the Northern Department; Bristol receiving the Privy Seal
(October—- November). At the close of the year, a place was found for Dyson at
the Treasury Board. The struggle in the Cabinet terminated, on May 1,
1769, in a compromise—the repeal of the duties
on paper, glass and colours, the rest being retained. Futile in itself, this
act of grace was
communicated
to the colonies by Hillsborough in a manner so offensive as to convert it into
an affront. A league for the total exclusion of British goods from the colonies
was organised and assumed formidable proportions.
Circumstances
were hardly more favourable to a sound domestic policy than to a reasonable
treatment of the colonies. Nevertheless, in the course of the years 1768-9 two
important additions were made to the Statute Book. The Nullum Tempus Act
abolished the ancient rule of law by which no lapse of time was pleadable in
bar of a crown claim, and made sixty years’ possession of landed estate an
indefeasible title; and, as noted elsewhere, the Irish Octennial Act struck a
blow at the corrupt oligarchy to which the fugitive or absentee Viceroys—with
Townshend began the rule of residence—had been wont to farm out the government.
In 1769 the Court gained a signal triumph by carrying an Act for discharge of
the debts, amounting to =£*500,000, upon the Civil List without account given
of the purposes for which the expenditure had been incurred.
Meanwhile, no
small share of the attention of Parliament was absorbed by Wilkes. Early in
1768 he came back to England, and by the gupineness of the Government was
suffered to stand for Parliament at the general election. Returned for
Middlesex (March 28), he surrendered to his outlawry in the King’s Bench and
was committed to the King’s Bench prison (April 27). The vicinity of the gaol
was soon thronged with a rabble of disorderly patriots. Their demonstrations
daily increased in violence, and, on May 10, the Riot Act having been read, the
mob was dispersed by the military not without loss of life. One of the soldiers
was tried for murder, but was acquitted. Wilkes was subsequently relieved of
the outlawry on a technical flaw, but was sentenced on the prior convictions to
two consecutive terms of ten and twelve months’ imprisonment, with a fine of
£1000 and the obligation to give recognisances in £1000, with two sureties in
£500 each, for his good behaviour for seven years after his discharge (June
18). The judgment was affirmed by the House of Lords on writ of error; a
petition presented in Wilkes’ behalf to the House of Commons was dismissed; and
a stinging paragraph on the precautions taken by the Government in anticipation
of the riot, which he had caused to be inserted in the St James's Chronicle
(December 10,1768), was voted a seditious libel, for which, in addition to his
previous offences, he was again expelled the House (February 4, 1769). On his
immediate reelection, the House annulled the return, and declared him “
incapable of being elected to serve as a member in this present Parliament.”
Other returns were also annulled, and eventually the Court nominee, Colonel
Luttrell, was declared duly elected, though he had been beaten at the polls,
and the return was falsified accordingly (April 15).
The
proceedings were technically defensible, for each branch of the
1769-72] Wilkes, Junius, and the Constitutio?h 441
legislature
has exclusive cognisance of the capacity of its members. Nevertheless, they were
totally repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, and, if sanctioned by the
acquiescence of the electorate, would have established a precedent of most
dangerous consequence, capable indeed of indefinite abuse, even to the
annihilation of free speech and the transformation of the House of Commons
from a representative assembly into a close corporation perpetuating itself by
ostracism and cooptation. It was, therefore, no spirit of faction, but a sober
appreciation of the gravity of the crisis, which now prompted George Grenville
to lay aside personal considerations, and to enter the lists as the champion of
the man on whom not so many years before he had led the first attack. His cold,
grave constitutionalism fell, however, unheeded on ears deafened by passion and
subservience. Wilkes was known to be still in the last degree obnoxious to the
King, and the King’s Friends were now in the ascendant. Petitions were
multiplied in vain. Their rejection at St Stephen’s, as at St James’, was a
foregone conclusion; and, though constitutionalism gained an unexpected
champion in Wedderburn, the shortsighted and suicidal arrogance of the majority
found a specious apologist in ithe young member for Midhurst, Lord Holland’s
third son, Charles James Fox. By all this Wilkes, of course, gained vastly in
popularity. A society organised by his friend Home under the title of “
Supporters of the Bill of Bights ” canonised him as a patriot, and raised
sufficient funds to set him free from pecuniary embarrassment on his discharge
from prison.
In the
Letters of Junius (1769-72), which, whoever may have been the scribe that
turned their classic periods, represent perhaps more nearly the sympathies and
antipathies of Lord Temple than those of any other statesman of the day, the Wilkes
case naturally occupied a prominent place. One of them indeed amounted to
nothing less than a direct arraignment of the King as the prime mover in the
persecution of the “ patriot,” and as thus, in effect, the subverter of the
Constitution. This licence, unparalleled since the appearance of the North
Briton, No. 45, provoked a fresh attack upon the liberty of the Press. The
letter had appeared in the Public Advertiser of December 19,1769, and had been
at once reprinted in the London Museum and the Evening Post. Ex officio
informations were filed by Attorney-General De Grey in the Court of King’s
Bench against the printers and publishers of all three papers. In each case
Lord Mansfield, in strict conformity with precedent, reserved for the Court the
determination of the question of law; and, so instructed, the juries in one
case acquitted, in another convicted, the defendants, while in the third (that
of Woodfall, the original publisher) they returned an evasive verdict of “
guilty of printing and publishing only ” (June 13, 1770)—a form of words
without legal import, upon which it was impossible to found a judgment. This
conflict between judge and jury led to much discussion in the House of Lords;
but Mansfield’s ruling, though vigorously impugned by Camden (December 10),
commanded the general
442 Burke's
policy.—Rally of the Opposition, [mo-92
assent of the
legal profession, and continued to be followed by judges and disputed by
juries, until the controversy was closed by legislative enactment in 1792 (32
Geo. Ill, c. 60, commonly known as Fox’ Libel Act). '
The crisis
elicited from Burke a manifesto entitled Thoughts on the Cause of the Present
Discontents (1770), in which he sought to deduce all the disorders of the body
politic from one and the same source, the secret and insidious influence of the
Court—as if the Whigs had been incapable of intrigue and quite unversed in the
arts of corruption, and had not, by their jealousy of Chatham, their
determination to adhere at any cost to the obsolete system of “ general cabinet
advice,” and their own interminable dissensions, given the Court its
opportunity. In discountenancing the popular cry for Triennial Parliaments,
Burke was doubtless wise; but there was more to be said for a Place Bill than
he was prepared to acknowledge ; and, in finding his panacea in the revival of
the old Whig egime, he gave no hint of the means by which this-consummation was
to be attained. His truest admirers must recognise that in this pamphlet the
political sagacity of which his name has become a symbol is none too apparent;
but, as yet, statesmen of all schools, with the single exception of Chatham,
lacked either the insight to perceive or the courage to proclaim that the
defective, the all but illusory, representation of the people was the true
cause of the confusions, and its reform the paramount need* of the State.
In
Parliament, the campaign against the Court was opened in form by motions for
the disfranchisement of revenue officers (too often mere placemen), an account
of the debt on the Civil List (which was shrewdly suspected to have been
incurred for corrupt purposes), and a scrutiny of the Pension List. Defeat was
inevitable ; but the programme became an integral part of Whig policy and bore
fruit in due season. The Opposition was led by Chatham, now completely
recovered and at one not only with Temple and George Grenville but (by the
death of Newcastle) with Rockingham. The agitation in favour of Wilkes was
accordingly pressed with the utmost heat, even to the verge of provoking a
conflict between the two Houses, while the King was plied with Remonstrances on
the part of the City of London t The Remonstrances were treated with con-
temptj and the Government triumphed in the divisions; but the dismissal of
Camden, and the secession of Grafton, Granby, Bristol, and Dunning, left gaps
which were hardly to be filled. For Granby no competent successor could be
found, and the Commandcrship-in-chief was in consequence left in abeyance. The
Privy Seal was given to Halifax (February 26, 1770). North, retaining the
Exchequer, succeeded nominally to the Treasury, but remained in effect only
finance Minister, the real direction of affairs being assumed by the King,
whose most confidential advisers were Mansfield and Sir Gilbert Elliot, the
Treasurer of the Navy. Dyson was also high in favour, and generally supposed to
be the main channel of influence. Edward Thurlow, who might be
1770-2] Futile concession to A
merica- The Falkland Isles. 443
trusted to
serve the King’s turn so long as pay and promotion were to be had, was made
Solicitor-General. A lawyer of a similar type, Sir Fletcher Nprton, who,
however, proved a thorn in the side of the Court, was chosen Speaker of the
House of Commons. Charles Yorke, importuned by the King to accept the Great
Seal, yielded against his better judgment, and died within three days—as it was
supposed, of shame and remorse that he should have deserted his party at such a
crisis (January 20, 1770). The Seal was then put in commission; and eventually,
Henry Bathurst, the least able of the Commissioners, was elected as Chancellor,
being created, on January 24, 1771, Lord Apsley.
In regard to
America, the Government carried the remission of the port duties a step
further, retaining only that on tea as a badge of subjection. In the way of
domestic legislation, the most important result of the session of 1770 was
George Grenville’s Act, by which election petitions were referred to Select
Committees, a form of procedure only superseded by the transference of the
jurisdiction to the Courts of Law in the reign of Queen Victoria. It proved to
be its author’s last, as it was certainly his most important, achievement: he
died on November 13,
1770, and, by the consequent dissolution of his
connexion, the Court gained a recruit in Henry Howard, Earl of Suffolk.
When
Grenville passed away, Parliament was reassembling to discuss matter of more
stirring interest than economic reform or the jurisdiction on election
petitions. As has been related in an earlier chapter, a dispute with Spain
about the possession of the Falkland Isles threatened war; and when Parliament
met, the situation was so grave that nearly i?l,500,000 was added to the naval
estimates, and a fleet was collected at Spithead. The Pacte de Famille, however,
disappointed expectation; and Charles III, unprepared for a single-handed
contest with Great Britain, disclaimed responsibility for the action of the
Governor of Buenos Ayres, and consented (January 22, 1771) to restore Port
Egmont, which had been occupied by the Spaniards. The restitution was made on
September 16, 1772, but without either acknowledgment of the British right or
reparation for the insult offered to the British flag; and the withdrawal of
the British garrison followed so soon afterwards as to seem like a virtual
recognition of the Spanish title. During the crisis Weymouth resigned,
doubtless to mark his disapprobation of a [>u lllanimous polity. He was
succeeded by Rocliford, the Northern Seals being transferred to Sandwich.
By this
affair the country suffered even more in purse than in pride. Of the
extraordinary naval supply no account was ever given, and its due appropriation
to the purposes for which it was voted would, as matters then stood, have been
nothing short of a miracle. The corruption, from which no department of
government remained free, was especially marked where wise economy was most of
all necessary—in the Admiralty, and was here allowed to shelter itself under
the pretext that the fluctuating
444 Corruption in the Admiralty-Freedom of the
Press. [1771-4
exigencies of
the service precluded strict account. Hence a ruinous proportion of the sums
annually voted for the repair, construction, and equipment of ships, was
absorbed by the rapacity of subordinate officials, whom their superiors were
either unable or unwilling to expose or control. The mischief was the more
serious because, the supply of oak having fallen short, not a few ships had
been built of timber of inferior quality, and were already rotten; while
France, with the advantage of a better school of naval architecture than the
British, had made, and was still making, every exertion to place her navy upon
such a footing as might enable her once more seriously to contest the empire of
the sea. Hawke, who can hardly have been blind to the gravity of the situation,
was by this time superannuated, and resigned (January 9,1771). Sandwich was,
for purely party reasons, appointed his successor—a man entirely without
nautical experience, and far too much engrossed by his pleasures to concern
himself with the disagreeable details of administration. The Northern Seals
were given to Halifax and, on his death in the following June, to Suffolk, the
vacant Privy Seal being transferred to Grafton. About the same time Thurlow was
made Attorney-General, and Wedderbum, weary of opposition, succeeded him as
Solicitor-General.
The sanction
of Parliament to the Spanish Convention was not obtained without long and
acrimonious debates, of which, when reported, Parliament had good reason to be
ashamed. The publication of debates was still technically a breach of
privilege, and the House of Commons on this occasion saw fit to resent it as
such by citing the publishers to its bar. Default being made in appearance, one
of the culprits was taken into custody by the Serjeant-at-arms, and the other
two were arrested under a royal proclamation. All three arrests were made
within the City of London, and without the concurrence of a City magistrate. As
this involved a breach of the City Charter, Lord Mayor Brass Crosby, with the
concurrence of Aldermen Wilkes and Oliver, discharged the prisoners, and
committed the messenger by whom the Speaker’s warrant had been executed to
gaol. A citation to the bar of the House of Commons was evaded by Wilkes, on
the ground that his incapacity placed him beyond its jurisdiction. Crosby and
Oliver attended, but only to refuse submission, and be committed to the Tower
(March 25, 27). .There they were visited by Rockingham, Burke, and other
leading Whigs; and, on the prorogation, they came forth to find their popularity
enhanced and the cause for which they had contended virtually won. A'pri vilege
of a different nature was asserted in 1774. An alleged libel on the Speaker (in
the Public Advertiser of February 11), being attributed on inconclusive
evidence to John Home (afterwards Horne Tooke), the House of Commons usurped
the functions of a Court of justice, summoned and interrogated the compositors,
and was defeated by their profession of total ignorance of the authorship of
the libel.
The session
of 1772 produced the Royal Marriage Act (12 Geo. Ill,
1772-80] Royal Marriage
Act.—East India Act.
445
c. 11), by
which descendants of the late King other than the issue of princesses married,
or who should thereafter marry, into foreign families, were disabled from
marrying without the King’s consent, unless, being of the age of twenty-five
yearsj they should give twelve months’ notice to the Privy Council of their
intention so to marry, and Parliament should not in the meantime disapprove the
union. The measure was occasioned by the marriage of the King’s third brother,
Henry Frederick, Duke of Cumberland, with Anne, sister of Colonel Luttrell
(Wilkes’ supplanter in the House of Commons), and widow of Christopher Horton,
of Catton, Derbyshire. Such an alliance was extremely distasteful to both the
King and the Queen ; and the extent of the royal prerogative in regard to such
matters had not as yet been precisely determined. That it governed the
marriages of the King’s grandchildren had been decided during the long and
embittered contest between George I and the Prince of Wales (1718); but there
was no precedent in regard to collaterals, nor were the majority of the judges
prepared to make one. Thus, though in terms declaratory, the measure was in
fact an innovation, and as such was resisted stoutly by Rockingham, Shelburne
and Charles James Fox, who had made his debut as a ministerialist. Upon
Cumberland’s banishment from Court, his elder brother, William Henry, Duke of
Gloucester, magnanimously avowed his own prior secret marriage with Maria,
Countess Dowager Waldegrave, an illegitimate daughter of Sir Edward Walpole,
and was likewise banished; nor was it until 1780 that the brothers were
restored to favour.
The session
of 1773 was almost exclusively devoted to Indian affairs, of which a connected
account will be found in a subsequent chapter. By a complication of causes,
chief among them the recklessness of the Directors and the rapacity of their
servants, the East India Company had been brought to the verge of ruin.
Parliament met the Company’s more pressing needs by a loan of £1,400,000 on no
very onerous terms, while taking security for the better management of its
affairs by Lord North’s Regulating Act, which in effect remodelled its
constitution, substituting for the annual election of the entire Court of
Directors a rota so arranged that in the ordinary course there should never be
more than six places to be filled at any one election. The presidencies of
Bombay and Madras were subordinated to that of Bengal, and the administration
of the latter was vested in a Governor-General and Council of Four. The Act
constituted Warren Hastings the first Governor-General, and named his Council;
but the appointment and removal of succeeding Governors-General and their
Councils were left to the unfettered discretion of the Court of Directors.
This measure, of which more is said below, encountered strong opposition on the
part of the Whigs— two protests against it were entered in the Journal'of the
House of Lords—an opposition grounded partly on the abrogation of chartered
rights, partly on the extension of the royal prerogative which it involved.
446 Excl'usibn of East Indian.teafrom American
ports. [1774-6
The, reform
which it effected was however salutary and amply justified the means. The
Company’s Chartef had not contemplated the assumption of .imperial dominion by
A trading corporation. It would have been sheer superstition to have held it
sacrosanct in circumstances so novel. The title ,of the Crown to the
territorial acquisitions of the Company was incontestable, and might reasonably
have been held to warrant changes far more drastic than those which the Act
introduced. The degree of centralisation which it effected was indeed no more than
was essential, and subsequent events unfortunately proved that its provisions
igainst malpractices were none too stringent.
: A minor
measure of the session, consisting of a slight boon to the embarrassed Company,
the remission of the home customs duty on their consignments of tea to America,
proved productive of effects wholly unexpected and out of all proportion to its
intrinsic importance. Since the tea could thus be offered at a reduced price
and the American import duty was only 3d. per pound avoirdupois, it was feared
in the colonies that the loyalty of the people to their non-importation
restrictions would be severely strained by the new regulation. The emergency
nerved the more fiery spirits to extraordinary measures; and, as is narrated in
another volume, three of the Company’s ships were boarded in Boston harbour by
a party of armed men disguised as Mohawks, who discharged their cargoes into
the sea. At New York a single cargo was landed under the guns of a ship of war,
and was immediately secured under lock and key. From other ports the ships were
sent home with their cargoes. The rebellious temper evinced by these
proceedings evoked a correspondingly high spirit in the mother country.
Opposition was for the time extinguished, and in the course of the year 1774
Parliament passed several stringent coercive measures. The further use of
Boston Port was prohibited. The Charter of Massachusetts Bay was annulled, and
provision was made for changing the venue within the colonies or to Great
Britain, when rieedful in order to secure a fair trial of persons capitally
prosecuted for acts done in enforcing the law. At the same time the province of
Quebec was extended so as to include parts of the basins of the Ohio and Mississippi,
and converted into a crown colony, the French population being conciliated by a
guarantee of religious equality and their ancient laws and customs except in
criminal cases. These measures converted Fox from a wavering supporter into a
determined foe of the Government.
In the autumn,
Parliament was dissolved, and the Opposition returned from the polls, a
demoralised remnant of seventy-three members. Wilkes, now permitted to take his
seat, distinguished himself by his zeal in behalf of the colpnies, and by the
well-considered plan for the redistribution of seats which he laid before
Parliament on March 21,1776; He failed, however, to make a sensible impression
on the Ministerial cohorts. The need of Parliamentary Reform was as yet
unrecognised by all parties, and, as has been shown elsewhere, the Government
was intent on pacifying
the colonies
by a judicious mixture of cajolery and coercion. Thus, in
1775, Chatham’s moderate proposals, the
withdrawal of the troops from Boston, the suspension of the obnoxious Acts, the
delegation of the exclusive right of taxation to the Assemblies, and the
restriction of the powers of the Vice-Admiralty Courts to their ancient limits,
were summarily rejected; and the defeat in the House of Commons, Burke’s more
logical scheme, which would have repealed what Chatham proposed to suspend, and
secured the judges against removal except by the King in Council upon complaint
by the Assemblies, Governors, Councils, or Houses of Representatives, but was
otherwise substantially identical with that of Chatham, was a foregone
conclusion. On the other hand, North’s illusory concession of temporary
immunity; from taxation to those colonies which should place at the disposal of
Parliament such supplies as Parliament should deem adequate was carried by a
majority of the usual dimensions—to be decisively rejected by Congress. In the
same session not only the external but the intercolonial trade of Massachusetts
Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Providence Plantation, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina was placed under
severe restriction, while the military and naval forces of the Crown available
for the coercion of the colonies were augmented. By the Prohibitory Act (1776),
the entire external commerce of the colonies was laid under interdict,
removable at the discretion of the Crown. Ministers, however, remained without
a concerted plan of action, while the colonial militia surprised the principal
fortresses on the Canadian frontier, invested Boston, and at Lexington and
Bunker Hill (April 19 and June 17, 1775) came into collision with the King’s
troops.
In November,
1775, Grafton, who had hoped against hope that hostilities might be averted,
resigned, and was succeeded as Lord Privy Seal by Dartmouth, the office of
Secretary for the Colonies (which had been transferred to him from Hillsborough
in the autumn of 1772) being given to Lord George Germain, whose competence for
administration was apparently inferred from his proved incapacity for military
command. About the same time, Rochford retired on a pension, and was succeeded
as Secretary of State by Weymouth. In opposition as in office, Grafton still
clung to the hope that, even at the eleventh, hour, an irreparable rupture with
the colonies might be averted by a very simple expedient. The Government had
turned a deaf ear to the petitions of Congress, the last, presented by Richard
Penn, being contemptuously dismissed—largely, it would seem, through the
influence of Mansfield. Congress could not be expected to persevere in an evidently
futile procedure. But Congress might be invited to present a petition to the
Peace Commissioners in America appointed under the Prohibitoiy Act, and
hostilities might be suspended pending its consideration. Such a petition, if
considered by the Commissioners in a conciliatory spirit, might prove the basis
of an accommodation. Accordingly, on March 14,
1776, Grafton moved for an address to the
Throne, praying that the necessary powers might be delegated to the
Commissioners. The defeat of this motion, after a long and animated debate,
marks the turning point in the struggle. It was followed by the'Declaration of
Independence (July 4), and the confederation of the Thirteen States.
Towards the
close of the year Rockingham virtually seceded from Parliament, and carried a
great part of his followers with him. Chatham was at that time once more
disabled by ill health; nor was it until the summer of 1777 that he was
sufficiently recovered to resume the lead of the Opposition. He retained much
of his old power of declamation ; but the strange inconsequence with which,
while deprecating the continuance of hostilities, he set his face against the
recognition of the independence of the colonies—his last speech was a vehement
repudiation of that policy (April 7, 1778)—raises a doubt whether his return to
power would not have been productive of more harm than good. It was vain to
hope that after the treatment which they had received the “removal of
accumulated grievances” would have sufficed to bring the colonies back to their
allegiance. A nation had been bom, and it would never abdicate its sovereign
rights.
The effect of
the Prohibitory Act was to drive the colonial trade into foreign ports. Holland
especially profited by this clandestine traffic, of which the island of St
Eustatius became a principal emporium, and to which a quasi-legal sanction was
given by the connivance of the States General in a Treaty of Amity and
Commerce, concluded, on September 4, 1778, between the city of Amsterdam and
Congress. Nor was the reception accorded to the merchantmen denied to the
privateers of the Americans. To check the depredations of the privateers, the
British Government issued letters of marque in profusion, and deprived persons
suspected of piracy in American waters of the benefit of the Habeas Corpus Act.
The resources of the colonists on land were greatly underrated, and the
possibility of foreign intervention was ignored. The first war loan amounted to
no more than £5,500,000—with so light a heart did the Government enter on the
contest. The loan rose in 1778 to £6,480,000, and in 1779 to £7,490,000. The
additional taxation was on the whole raised judiciously, being for the most
part laid on luxuries; but it was supplemented by drafts on the Sinking Fund.
The most grievous error of the Government was their neglect of the navy, which
at the outbreak of hostilities was so weak that the Channel Fleet was only
maintained at its nominal strength by the inclusion of several unseaworthy
hulks, while the squadron commanded by Lord Howe in American waters Was not
only inadequate for the maintenance of an effective blockade over any
considerable extent of sea-board, but barely sufficed for the discharge bf the
dutifes subsidiary to the military operations which were the most important
services at first demanded of it. The colonists kept up in the vicinity of
their coasts a desultoiy warfare, which in 1777 John Paul
Jones carried
into British waters. The nearest approach to a regular fleet which they
possessed was annihilated by Sir George Collier in the Penobscot River on
August 14, 1779. Meanwhile* however, a more formidable enemy had appeared on
the scene.
By the Treaty
of Paris (February 6, 1778), France and the United States entered into a
defensive alliance, which was to become offensive in the event of war between
France and Great Britain. The Treaty escaped the vigilance of the British
ambassador, Lord Stormont, though Franklin’s presence at Paris caused him some
uneasiness, and the Government first heard of it from Grafton some days before
its official communication.
To France and
Spain the independence of the United States was a secondary, the conquest of
the British possessions in the West Indies, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
Mediterranean the primary, object. Nevertheless, Spain was only with
difficulty induced to comply with the terms of the Family Compact, and did not
join the alliance till after the rejection by the British Government of her
proffered mediation (June 16,
1779).
The rupture with France brought in its train a rupture with the Dutch. While
giving harbourage to Paul Jones, the States General refused the succours which
by the Treaty of Westminster (March 3-13, 1677-8) they were bound to furnish in
the event of a Bourbon aggression, and allowed their merchantmen to carry into
French ports cargoes of naval stores and timber suitable for the construction
of ships of war. These cargoes were treated as contraband by the British
Government, and some of the merchant ships were accordingly arrested. The
States General joined the Armed Neutrality, and Great Britain, further
exasperated by the discovery of the secret Treaty of Amity of 1778 between the
city of Amsterdam and the American Congress, declared war against the Republic
(December 20, 1780).
In
undertaking the coercion of the American colonies George III had erred mainly
through ignorance, believing that their militia could never cope with regular
troops. Grafton’s warning that the employment of German mercenaries “ would
only increase the disgrace and never effect his purpose” he received with
unfeigned amazement. To the risk of foreign intervention he was blinded by the
fixed idea that the House of Bourbon would never ally itself with insurgents.
As the prospect darkened, he became less sanguine; but he still clung
tenaciously to the hope of avoiding a formal concession of independence, and,
cajolery having been tried and found wanting, he stooped to conciliation. So in
1778 the tea duty was repealed, and a Commission appointed (April 5) with
authority to negotiate with Congress as a quasi-independent Power, and in the
meantime to suspend obnoxious laws. A more homogeneous Commission might well
have been chosen; but, even so, the time for such expedients had gone by for
ever.
To his “
friends ” the King clave more closely than they to him. Germain resigned in a
fit of the spleen (March 3), but unfortunately
repented and
resumed office. North was eager to make way for Chatham and lacked only the
resolution to resign. Both before and after Chatham’s death, overtures were
made to several members of the Opposition for a coalition; but, as no material
change of policy was purposed, the Whigs saw clearly that the real object of
the King was merely to seduce as many of them as might serve to strengthen his
tottering Administration, and with one consent held aloof. If anything had been
needed to vindicate their sagacity, it would have been the transference of the
Great Seal from Apsley, now Earl Bathurst (June 1,1778), to Thurlow, the
truculent and trumpet-tongued coryphaeus of the party of coercion, and the
substitution for Barrington as Secretary at War of Jenkinsan, the most
subservient of courtiers (December 16). North, whose better judgment
disapproved the prolongation of hostilities, was by this time so weary of
office that only the lucrative sinecures of Warden of . the Cinque Ports and
Constable of Dover Castle reconciled him to the retention of it (June .4).,
Lord Suffolk, the shameless apologist of the employment of Bedskin warriors
against the colonists, was with difficulty persuaded to remain at his post
until his death in March, 1779. To take his place, Stormont, a diplomatist of
proved incapacity, was recalled from Paris (October). On the subsequent
defection of Gower and Weymouth, Bathurst became President of the Council and
the vacant Secretary’s place was given to Hillsborough (November). These
changes, with the appointment of Carlisle, now returned from America, to the
Presidency of the Board of Trade, constituted a virtual reconstruction of the
Administration. ■
In the House
of Lords, Thurlow, who was joined in June, 1780, by Wedderburn (created Baron
Loughborough), early established an ascendancy which would have reduced the
Opposition to impotence, even had it not been paralysed by the reluctance of
Shelburne and Camden to follow the lead of Bockingham in demanding the
immediate recognition of the independence of the United States. In the House of
Commons, the cause of Parliamentary Beform made some little progress. A Place
Bill (for the disqualification of persons interested in government contracts
not made at a public bidding), which had been summarily rejected on its first
introduction by Sir Philip Jennings Clerke in 1778, was reintroduced in 1779
and defeated by a reduced majority.
The naval war
opened inauspiciously for the British. Only twenty sail of the line and three
frigates could at first be mustered for the defence of the Narrow Seas; and
with this inadequate force Admiral Keppel sailed from Portsmouth on June 13,
1778. In the Bay of Biscay he captured some French frigates, and from their
papers first learned the greatly superior strength of the fleet (thirty-two
sail of the line with ten or twelve frigates) which lay off Brest under Admiral
d’Orvilliers. This compelled him to return to Portsmouth for reinforcements,
and it was only by dint of great exertions that he was at length able to
encounter
1778-9]
Unsatisfactory state of
the navy.
451
d’Orvilliers
with a force approximately equal in regard to the mere number of ships, but
otherwise decidedly inferior in material. The fleets engaged off Ouessant on
July 27, but without decisive result; for, though at the close of the action
the advantage rested With the British, the French made good their escape. For
this failure Vice-Admiral Palliser was held responsible by public opinion, and
Admiral Keppel by ViceAdmiral Palliser. Both officers were tried by
Court-martial (1779) and acquitted, it being established that Palliser’s ships
were too damaged for pursuit; but upon Palliser rested the stigma of having
brought an unfounded accusation against his superior officer.
A
parliamentary enquiry into the administration of the navy, demanded in the
House of Lords by Bristol, in the House of Commons by Fox, was stifled ; but
the emphatic testimony not only of Keppel but of Lord Howe, who had recently
resigned his American command, to the deplorable condition of the service was
sealed by their retirement from it, and their example was followed by other
officers of distinction. Howe was not the man to be moved either by pique or by
panic, nor had he thrown up his command without grave cause. With an inadequate
force (nine sail of the line and a few frigates) he had been left to cope with
a squadron of twelve sail of the line and several frigates of superior armament
under Count d’Estaing. The French commander had sailed from Toulon on April
13,1778, and had been delayed for some weeks in the Mediterranean. The
Admiralty had had early intelligence of his movements, but had made no attempt
to intercept him until his destination was accurately known (June); and the
intercepting squadron under ViceAdmiral Byron had arrived too late and in an
unseaworthy condition by no means wholly imputable to the tempestuous weather
which it had encountered. In the meantime, Howe, apprised of d’Estaing’s
approach by one of his own frigates, had succeeded in barring the access to New
York and Rhode Island alike, until a storm of unusual violence so shattered the
French ships that they were compelled to take refuge in Boston harbour. That
Rhode Island and New York had not fallen into the hands of the French was thus
entirely due to the vigilance and resource of the British Admiral, aided by the
chapter of accidents. It was this experience which had determined Howe to
return to England, and retire from the service; nor did he change his mind
until the fall of North’s Administration,
In November
d’Estaing, evading Byron’s blockading squadron, sailed from Boston for the West
Indies, where Bouille, Governor of Martinique, had already reduced Dominica.
D’Estaing, with his twelve sail of the line and 7000 troops, arrived just .too
late to prevent the capture of St Lucia by Rear-Admiral Barrington and
Commodore Hotham, whose joint forces amounted to seven sail of the line with
5000 troops under Major-General Grant (December 14, 1778). The advent of Byron
with ten sail of the line (January, 1779) gave the British a temporary
superiority
of strength,
which was maintained until the end of June, when the arrival of reinforcements
from Brest turned the scale in favour of the French. Byron, who had the chief
command, was embarrassed by convoy duty, and failed to prevent the reduction of
St Vincent (June 18) and Grenada (July 4) by d’Estaing. Worsted in a general
action off St George, Grenada (July 6), the British commanders withdrew to St
Christopher, and soon afterwards sailed for England. D’Estaing, after refitt:'
ig at Cap Francois, mustered twenty ships of the line, with which he sailed to
Savannah; but, being repulsed with great loss in the general assault on that
place (October 9), returned to France.
On the
eastern side of the Atlantic the conduct of the war reflected no credit on the
Allies. The French' recovered Senegal (January— February, 1779) but abandoned
Goree to the British (May). They massed troops to the number of 60,000 in
Normandy and Britanny, and were beaten in two attacks on Jersey (May, 1779 and
January, 1781).
The
Franco-Spanish fleet (sixty-six ships of the line) sailed up the Channel in the
autumn of 1779 as far as Plymouth, but did not succeed in bringing on a general
engagement with the British fleet, hardly more than half as strong, under
Admiral Hardy. In the autumn of the following year it made a similar idle
parade between Ouessant and the Scilly Isles. In the North Sea, the Dutch
Bear-Admiral Zoutman tried conclusions with Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker off the
Dogger Bank on August 5, 1781. The'fleets seem to have been about on a par, for
each commander had seven ships of the line, and, if four of the British ships
were so old as hardly to be worked, it is probable that the Dutch were in no
better plight. The contest was maintained with great courage and carnage for
more than three hours, when it terminated, by reason of the shattered condition
of the ships, without decided advantage on either side.
In the
Mediterranean the British squadron at the outbreak of hostilities consisted of
only one sixty-gun ship, three frigates and a sloop; nor was it reinforced in
time to prevent the blockade of Gibraltar and Minorca. Port Mahon, gallantly
defended by General Murray, was reduced by sickness and famine to capitulate
(February 5, 1782). Gibraltar was more fortunate : to the ample relief convoyed
from home by Admiral Rodney in command of thirty-six sail, of which twenty-two
were of the line, were added five Spanish ships of the line and twelve Spanish
provision ships captured en route off Capes Finisterre and St Vincent (January
8 and 16, 1780); and the subsequent reliefs by Vice-Admiral Darby in command of
the “grand fleet” of twenty-eight sail of the line (April, 1781), and Lord Howe
with thirty-four sail of the line (October, 1782), enabled General Eliott and
his heroic garrison to defy the assaults of the enemy until the Peace.
During the
years 1780-2 the West Indian and American stations were the theatre of
operations of great interest. In March, 1780, a French
i780-i] The War in West
Indian and American waters. 453
fleet of
twenty-two sail of the line under Guichen lay in Fort Royal Bay, Martinique, on
the look-out for a Spanish fleet under Don Jose Solano ; the two commanders
were to join their forces for the conquest of Jamaica and New York. They
reckoned, however, without Admiral Rodney, who assumed the command in the
Leeward Islands station towards the end of the month and, with, roughly
speaking, a parity of force, fought three engagements with the French (April
17, May 15 and 19), by which he so crippled their fleet that, though the
junction with the Spaniards was effected, its purpose was frustrated. Guichen,
with the bulk of his fleet, sailed to Cadiz, while Solano put into Havana.
In July,
1780, the American station was guarded by only four sail of the line under
Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, and Rhode Island had been denuded of troops for the
defence of New York. Arbuthnot was by no means a brilliant commander; but in
such circumstances it was hardly in his power to prevent the occupation of the
island by Rochambeau’s six thousand veterans, convoyed by seven sail of the
line under Temay. Reinforced by Rear-Admiral Graves with five sail of the line,
he succeeded, by an action off Cape Henry (March 16, 1781) in frustrating a
descent on the Chesapeake by des Touches, Temay’s successor in command ; but a
tactical error, the reckless exposure of his van, seriously impaired the value
of the victory. He was in consequence recalled, and the command devolved upon
Graves.
In May, 1781,
Don Bernardo Galvez, Governor of Louisiana, reduced Pensacola, and thereby
recovered West Florida.
In the spring
of 1781 Rodney occupied the Dutch West India Islands, a conquest as easy as
lucrative, but which left the rest of the islands almost at the mercy of Count
de Grasse, who succeeded Guichen in command of the French fleet. After
defeating Rear-Admiral Hood, whom Rodney had detached in command of seventeen
sail of the line to intercept him in the straits between St Lucia and
Martinique (April 29), de Grasse reduced Tobago, and then, with his whole fleet
of twenty-eight sail of the line, boi« down upon the Chesapeake and occupied
the Bay (August 30), before Hood and Graves were able to join their forces. The
junction effected, the British commanders were able to oppose nineteen sail of
the line to the twenty-four with which the French Admiral guarded the mouth of
the Bay. The disparity of strength was, therefore, not so great as to preclude
all chance of victory had the British ships been properly handled. Graves,
however, for some as yet unexplained cause, failed; and an indecisive
engagement left his van so crippled that, upon the arrival of a squadron under
Barras, which raised the French strength to thirty-six sail of the line, he
lost no time in withdrawing to New York to refit; and, before he could return
to the Bay, Cornwallis had capitulated (October 19). Ill health had meanwhile
compelled Rodney’s return to England, and in his absence disaster followed
disaster in the West Indies. Bouill^ carried
St Eustatius
by a coup de main (November 26), and, while Hood manoeuvred brilliantly
against de Grasse, reduced St Christopher (February 13, 1782). Nevis and Montserrat
also fell into the hands of the French, and Antigua, Barbados, and even
Jamaica, were in imminent peril when Rodney’s advent changed the aspect of
affairs. Collecting his entire force of thirty-six sail of the line off
Martinique, he waited until de Grasse slipped out of Fort Royal Bay (April 8,
1782) with the view of joining the Spanish squadron off Hayti, and, at once
giving chase, came up with him in the offing between Dominica and Guadaloupe.
De Grasse commanded thirty-five sail of the line, and most of his ships were of
larger size and heavier armament than the British; and it would seem that he,
therefore, at first supposed that he could defeat his pursuers in detail. At
any rate, on April 9 his rear offered battle to Rodney’s van, but with no result;
and, when on the 12th de Grasse resumed the offensive, the engagement became
general, and Rodney carried the day by the then novel manoeuvre pf breaking the
enemy’s line. Shortly after sunset de Grasse struck his flag, and surrendered
to Hood. In all, eight ships of the line were taken or destroyed: the rest made
good their escape. The victory was less complete than it might have been, had
the pursuit been pressed with due vigour; nevertheless, it completely
demoralised the enemy, and practically terminated the war in the West.
In the East
the capitulation (October 17, 1778) of Pondicherry to General Munro and
Commodore Vernon was followed by the expulsion of the French from
Chandernagore, Mahe, and the rest of the settlements in India, and by the reduction
of the Dutch settlements at Negapatam (November 13,1781) and Trincomalee
(January 11,1782). The situation was, however, materially changed by the
appearance off the Coromandel coast of a French squadron of twelve sail of the
line under the able and gallant Suffren, who, after a brush with a numerically
superior force under Commodore Johnstone off Porto Praya, Cape Verde
Islands (April 16, 1781), had outsailed the British commander and frustrated
his designs on the Cape of Good Hope. In the course of 1782, Vice-Admiral
Hughes, and Suffren fought several desperate actions, off Sadras (February 17),
Providien (April 12), Cuddalore (July 6) and Trincomalee, which Suffren had
meanwhile reduced (September 3). In all these battles the advantage rested with
the French, notwithstanding that after the first there was no great disparity
of strength; nor did reinforcements, which gave Hughes eighteen ships of the
line to Suffren’s fifteen in a final engagement off Cuddalore (June 20,1783)
enable him to gain a decisive victory over his brilliant adversary.
While the air
was heavy with rumours of imminent French invasion, two liberal measures of a
quiet character were carried through Parliament. By Sir George Savile’s A°t
(18 Geo. Ill, c. 60) such Catholics as would take the oaths of , allegiance,
and supremacy in a form specially adapted to negative the supposed pretensions
of their Church in matters
temporal were
relieved from the penal statute (11 and 12 Will. Ill, c. 4) by which they were
debarred from inheriting or otherwise acquiring real estate within England and
Wales and, if officiating priests or schoolmasters, were liable to perpetual
imprisonment. By a further Act, English Protestant Dissenting Ministers were
relieved from the subscription to the declaration of faith required by the
Toleration Act (1 Will, and Mary, c. 18). Meanwhile, as is narrated in another
chapter, Ireland, suffering the more acutely by the War because of the shackles
set upon her commerce by British monopolism, now at last bestirred herself, and
organised a volunteer force of 40,000 men, while demanding through her
Parliament the abolition of the entire system of vexatious restrictions imposed
on her, and shortened supply to a six months’ Bill (November,
1779). Shelburne and Rockingham, though both but
recent converts to her cause, gave it the support at St Stephen’s which the
gravity of the crisis demanded. North, who in the previous year had made a
trifling concession, surrendered at discretion, and thus, at one stroke,
Ireland achieved her commercial emancipation.
The movement
for curtailing the corrupt influence of the Crown, on the other hand, made but
slow progress. The House of Commons, indeed, on the motion of Dunning, ably
supported by Sir Fletcher Norton, affirmed the principle of a periodical
scrutiny into the Civil List (April,
1780); ,but the Government had still strength
enough to wreck Burke’s grand scheme for the reform of the civil and certain
other establishments by the abolition of sinecures and other redundant offices,
the consolidation of such offices as overlapped one another, and the due
regulation of the system of payment (May 18). Sir Philip Jennings Clerke’s
Contractors’ Bill reached the House of Lords, but was thrown out by the
Thurlow-ridden majority, which also negatived motions by Richmond and Shelburne
for the revision of the Civil List, the extraordinary charges of the services,
and the entire system of public finance (December, 1779, and February, 1780).
Parliament,
however, was no true index of the public mind. Reform, economic and
parliamentary, was eagerly discussed at county meetings, in which Yorkshire and
Middlesex led the way. Numerous petitions for reform were presented at St
Stephen’s, and associations spread" the agitation throughout the country.
Fox and Richmond headed the movement, the latter declaring for annual
Parliaments, manhood suffrage, and electoral districts. In the midst of this
ferment, a singular outbreak of popular frenzy, originating in a tumultuous
demonstration in support of a petition presented at St Stephen’s by Lord George
Gordon for the repeal of the recent Roman Catholic Relief Act, was suffered by
the culpable supineness of the Government to spread anarchy and arson
throughout a great part of the metropolis, and was only suppressed by the
military, not without considerable loss of life (June 2-8). These outrages,
nevertheless, strengthened the hands of the Government, whose
partisans
were not slow to attribute them to the machinations of the Whigs. The Court,
after some coquetting with Rockingham, gathered courage, and, further
exhilarated by the tidings of the capture of Charleston, resolved on an appeal
to the country. Parliament was accordingly dissolved (September 1) ; and the
verdict of the polls gave the Government a fresh, albeit a very brief, lease
of life. During the first session of the new Parliament the Opposition was
powerless. The Dutch War, against which they did not fail to protest, was
popular both in Parliament and in the country; and a new war loan of £12,000,000,
though raised on terms so extravagant as seriously to damage North’s reputation,
was nevertheless sanctioned. Burke reintroduced his Establishment Bill, and
Clerke his Contractors’ Bill, but neither measure was committed, dnd a Bill for
the disfranchisement of revenue officers shared the same fate. Lord Sandwich’s
administration of the navy was attacked and defended with the usual success.
The session
closed (July 18, 1781) without more important result in the way of domestic
legislation than a measure validating marriages solemnised in good faith in
places of worship unauthorised by the Marriage Act of 1751. In Ireland, under
the genial sway of the new Viceroy, Lord Carlisle, the Separatist cause made
rapid progress. Across the Atlantic, the capitulation of Yorktown (October 19)
virtually settled the question of the independence of the United States.
When
Parliament reassembled (November 27), the fate of the Administration was
already sealed. The old high language was indeed still heard from the Throne;
but Fox’ amendment to the Address censuring Ministers collectively, and his
subsequent arraignment of Sandwich in particular as primarily responsible for
the naval reverses, were defeated by reduced majorities; and, on Conway’s
motion for an Address deprecating the continuance of offensive operations in
America, the majority fell to one (February 22, 1782). The motion was thereupon
renewed and carried without a division (February 27). The Reply which the
Address elicited from the Throne being ambiguous, a further motion denouncing
as enemies to the country all who should contribute to the prolongation of
offensive war in America was also carried without a division (March 4). All
classes were now weary of the War; and, though a new loan of £13,500,000 was
carried, a vote of censure moved by a typical Tory, Sir John Rous, was only
negatived by a majority of nine (March 15). On the 20th, North anticipated its
renewal by announcing that his Administration was no more.
(3) THE YEARS
OF PEACE, AND THE RISE OF THE YOUNGER PITT.
(1782-93.)
When the last
parliamentary struggle of Lord North was over (March 20, 1782), and the beaten
Minister drove away, in his coach, from the House of Commons, with “the
advantage of being in the secret,” Lord Rockingham entered (March 27) into a
troubled inheritance. All the omens were unfavourable. The King was
ostentatiously hostile ; “ the fatal hour has come,'” he wrote ; and he talked
of retiring to Hanover. The Whig party were not yet a compact body. The new
Minister was committed to an adventurous policy. He had always encouraged the
ambitions of the Irish Nationalists; and Ireland, still unconciliated, was on
the brink of rebellion. He had always opposed the influence of the Crown; and
the King was disposed to make a struggle for what remained of historic
prerogative. Rockingham had always advocated drastic measures of royal and
administrative economy, and he was now to undertake the ever dangerous
experiment of retrenchment. He had, throughout the rebellion in the colonies,
been constant to the American cause, and the Americans were now in a position
to dictate the dismemberment of the Empire. To carry out a consistent policy in
all these cases was a difficult task. The troubles of forming an administration
began early. A preliminary negotiation, through Lord Thurlow, begun on March
11, 1782, while North was still in office, ended unsuccessfully on March 18,
because Rockingham wished to set out to the King the conditions of his
acceptance of office, while the King wished him to take office unconditionally,
and settle the terms afterwards. Meantime an ineffectual negotiation, not known
at the time, had been tried by the King with Lords Shelburne and Gower. Both
refused the white elephant of office, and Shelburne, knowing his own weakness,
urged on the King the necessity of sending for Rockingham. The King, after
hitherto persistently refusing even to see Rockingham, whom he disliked, at
length conceded the point, and accepted the unwelcome terms proposed to him; on
March 27 the new Minister kissed hands. Lord Rockingham was First Lord of the
Treasury; Lord John Cavendish, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Camden,
President of Council; the Duke of Grafton, Lord Privy Seal; Lord Thurlow (as a
concession to the King), Lord Chancellor; Lord Shelburne and Charles Fox, Joint
Secretaries of State. Among the minor appointments was that of Edmund Burke,
who was made Paymaster of the Forces—a well paid office which did not,
however, admit him to the Cabinet. The omission was questioned by many
contemporary critics, and condemned by many subsequent commentators, perhaps
not very judiciously, as discreditable to a party which his genius did so much
to adorn.
The demands
which Rockingham had made upon the King, first through Thurlow and again
through Shelburne, were chiefly these: the acknowledgment of American
independence; the curtailment of the patronage and influence of the Crown; the
disqualification of contractors from sitting in the House of Commons; the
exclusion of the numerous revenue officers from the privilege of voting; the
abolition of sinecure offices; and the introduction of a system of rigid
economy into all the departments of the Government. The programme was
sufficiently large and radical; but it included everything for which the
opposition to North had contended. Every separate item had, however, in the
eyes of the King, an obvious relation to his known wishes and to his suspected
policy. That the King should have been reluctant to submit to the new regime
was not unnatural. Its advent inflicted on him the chagrin of a personal
defeat., Dunning, Fox, Burke, Rockingham himself, had, one and all, made
themselves conspicuous as personal opponents of the King; nor had they
refrained from insulting personal reflexions.
The affairs
of Ireland were the first to which the attention of the Ministry was
peremptorily called. Two Acts of ancient date stood in the way of Irish
legislative independence. One was the Irish Act, 10 Henry VII, cap. 4, commonly
called “ Poynings’ Law.” By this Act, no Parliament could be held in Ireland
without the consent of England having been first sought and obtained, and no
legislation passed without the substance of it being first submitted to the
King of England and his Council. This Act was obviously restrictive of
legislative freedom, but the Viceroys had never enforced it rigorously.
Moreover, if the Act limited the powers of a Parliament which never represented
the people, it had some well-understood merits in restraining the Viceroys
from acts of selfish tyranny. The other Act was 6 G-eorge I, cap. 5, a
declaratory statute affirming the right of Great Britain to legislate for
Ireland, and declaring that the Irish House of Lords had no right to judge of,
affirm, or reverse, any judgment of the Irish Courts. The repeal of these Acts
was the demand made upon the new Ministry. The Irish Parliament, which had
temporarily adjourned over the Easter recess, met on April 16, by special
summons from the Speaker, ordering every member to be in his place, “ as he
tended the rights of Ireland.” All efforts, by Portland in Dublin and by Fox
from Westminster, to effect a postponement or compromise failed. Grattan, as an
amendment to the address, moved his declaration of rights, in a speech which
has become part of the national literature. The amendment was carried without
division, though not without debate. The demands to be made upon Great Britain
were settled, and a short adjournment to May 4, and then to May 27, was
arranged, in order to await the results from Westminster. At Westminster there
was little delay. Fox, on April 8, while protesting against the abandonment of
the supremacy of England over Ireland, promised an early and coriiplete
measure. On the 9th, he presented a message from the King,
recommending
the consideration of Irish affairs; and hereupon proposed that, as it was
impossible to proceed on the little information before the House, reports
should be received from the Executive in Ireland before further steps were
taken. Shelburne, on the other hand, asserted in the Lords that there was no
need for further documents: “he was sure that every noble lord ” was fully
acquainted with the circumstances. He also asserted that the Irish leaders had
“ blended moderation with their steadiness ”—a fact which was not very
apparent. The address to the King was carried in both Houses, on May 17. The
Act of George I was repealed, the necessary communications being made to the
Lord Lieutenant in Ireland in advance of the royal signature to the repealing
Act. On the reassembling of the Irish Parliament on May 27, the concessions
made at Westminster were announced. The sum of £100,000 was voted, for the
service of the British navy ; and £50,000 was offered for the purchase of an
estate for Grattan. An address was voted to the Viceroy; Poynings’ Act was,
without special mention, repealed by the Act 21 and 22 George III, cap. 47
(Irish) “to regulate the Manner of passing Bills”; and Ireland entered on the
short period of legislative independence which was to last till the Union.
Meanwhile,
other events were occupying the attention of Ministers in England. , From the
beginning, the new Ministry was but loosely united. Fox had declared, before
the Ministry was fujly formed, that he perceived there were two parties in it,
one devoted to the King and one to the nation. Shelburne was, of course, the
King’s man, and Fox the man for the nation. The jealousy of Fox towards
Shelburne was acute, and he watched his colleague with suspicious eyes. On
April 28, he describes Shelburne as “ ridiculously jealous of my encroachment
on his department.” And, again, “ he affects the Minister more and more every
day, and is, I believe, perfectly confident that the King intends to make him
so. Provided we can stay in long enough to have given a good stout blow to the
influence of the Crown, I do not think it much signifies how soon we go out
after.” Posterity, looking back with impartial eyes on the situation, and aware
that there was Ireland to pacify, Europe and America to conciliate, and the resources
of the kingdom to safeguard, can hardly agree that to accept office under the
King, merely in order to undermine his prerogative and then leave the country
to its fate in other hands, was an ambition worthy of a statesman. Nor was
Shelburne free from blame. Having easier, access to the King than his
colleagues, he made use of it largely for the purpose of patronage. Dunning was
created a peer without Rockingham’s knowledge. Barre was rewarded with a
pension. Fox complained to Grafton that he was constantly thwarted in the
Cabinet; and he was always on the point of resigning. The measures of economy
to which Ministers were committed were with difficulty accomplished. The plan
having been submitted by a royal message, the address of thanks was made the
vehicle of reluctant but effusive
460 Financial reforms.—Peace
negotiations.
compliments
to the King; it was “ the best of messages, from the best of Kings, to the best
of people,” said Burke; but he could not refrair from pointing out that the
measure was one of his own suggestion. Shelburne, on the other hand, was very
specific in declaring that the message was the personal act of the King, and by
no means framed on the model of that which had been put forward on a previous
occasion, i.e. by Burke. The saving to be effected was only £72,368 per annum—
hardly enough to excite a tempest of popular gratitude. And, as it was, after
all, to be appi ed to the payment of interest on the arrears of the King’s
Civil List (£296,000), a confused impression was left that there had been no
saving at all, but only a little financial juggling for the benefit of the
creditors of the Crown. Several parts of the scheme had to be given up. A
number of sinecures remained untouched; one of these, the clerkship of the Pells,
being, as was alleged by Horace Walpole, retained in order that Burke might
confer it on his son. But something practical had been done. An Act was also
passed , to prevent revenue officers from voting; and another excluded
contractors from sitting in the House of Commons. The resolution which had
affirmed the disability of John Wilkes to sit in Parliament was expunged from
the Journals. Thus, somewhat disheartened by concessions to Ireland, disappointed
at the result of financial reforms, and divided by growing jealousies, the
Ministers found themselves face to face with the imperative duty of deciding
the question of peace or continued war, with France, Spain, Holland, and
America.
It can hardly
be said that they were negligent in negotiation. Fox, as Foreign Minister, had
taken the subject seriously to heart. From the first, he set himself to secure
the aid of the Empress Catharine II of Bussia in negotiating peace with
Holland, against which England had been carrying on war since 1780—when
Holland, in violation of existing treaties, had joined the “ Armed Neutrality,”
proceeding (in 1781) to recognise the independence of the American Colonies.
His correspondence with Sir James Harris at St Petersburg shows how earnestly
he sought to secure Russian cooperation: he even went the length of offering to
bribe the officers of the imperial Court—a proposal discountenanced by Harris.
The death of Rockingham and Fox’ subsequent resignation prevented the
negotiation from being carried to an issue; and, though the mediatorship of
Russia and Prussia was more or less recognised in the conclusion of the Peace
of 1783, it never was an important factor in the negotiations.
Contemporaneously with the Russian negotiations, steps had been taken to
negotiate with Franklin in Paris. From 1779, propositions had at various times
been entertained, at Philadelphia and in London, tending to a peace, but
nothing had come of them. A resolution in favour of peace had been carried in
the House of Commons in 1781, and North had taken some steps in that direction.
In 1782 an Act was passed to enable the King to conclude a peace or truce. On
April 6, Shelburne sent to Franklin
1782] Death of
Rockingham. Ministerial changes. 461
Richard
Oswald, as a man of “pacifical” disposition, “fully apprised of Lord
Shelburne’s mind.” On April 8, Franklin reported to Shelburne his interview
with Oswald and Vergennes, with the explanation that the object was for a
“general peace.” In this interview with Oswald, Franklin committed to his care
a paper in which a proposal was made for the cession of Canada. On this point
much Jiscussion—not yet fully ended—has arisen. Oswald always asserted that
Shelburne, of whose mind he was “fully apprised,” entertained the proposition.
On the other hand, it is obvious from the Diplomatic Correspondence of the
Revolution (the sole first-hand authority for the proceedings from day to day)
that Shelburne did not formally adopt the suggestion; that he replied unfavourably;
and that he did not think it worth while to place it before his colleagues for
consideration. North had initiated the proposal before his retirement by means
of a private agent, in March, 1782, as appears from a letter of Rayneval to
Franklin, dated April 13. The offer was known to Vergennes. Franklin naturally
adopted the idea at the jpemng of the new negotiations. His first plan was,
that by the sale of lands in Canada a fund could be raised to compensate the
Loyalists, to whose claim Vergennes was favourably inclined. This plan Franklin
soon abandoned; and he was afterwards hostile, throughout the negotiations, to
all the Loyalist claims. On May 9, Thomas Grenville was sent to Paris by Fox,
in whose new department of Foreign Affairs the negotiations for a general peace
naturally lay. Grenville was always overmatched in negotiation by Franklin and
Vergennes. His chief work was, in effect, to stimulate the jealousy of Fox
against Shelburne and Oswald. Up to a certain point Vergennes and Franklin
worked harmoniously. But a distrust had been growing in the mind of Adams and
of Jay towards France. The French Minister was favourable to the claims of the
Loyalists; and he was not eager to press the claims of the Americans to the
fisheries and to the hinterland of colonial territory. According to Jay, the
French Minister “ did not play fair.” Before the negotiations had proceeded to
the point of an agreement as to terms, Lord Rockingham died, on July 1, 1782,
and the whole chain of negotiation was temporarily broken.
The whole
system of government in England was, in fact, broken. The party which had made
it a principle to dictate to the Crown the choice of Ministers was now unable
to choose a Minister. “ The Crown,” said Horace WaJpole, “devolved upon the
King of England on the death of Lord Rockingham.” Fox was naturally the nominee
of his friends. The Duke of Richmond was ambitious, but was too deeply pledged
to drastic measures of Reform. Fox pressed on the King the Domination of the
Duke of Portland. The King, however, had made up his mind. There was a momentary
chance that Lord North might be recalled; but Pitt refused to serve under him.
Shelburne was sent for. Fox, who had long been restive and resentful,
passionately refused to
serve with
Shelburne. He resigned, thinking that he would be followed by the whole Rockingham
connexion. He was followed only by the Duke of Portland, Lord John Cs vendish,
Burke, and Sheridan. The Duke of Richmond remained at the Ordnance, and
Viscount Keppel continued head of the Admiralty. Shelburne proceeded to fill up
the vacant places. Lord Grantham and Thomas Townshend became Secretaries of
State; Pitt became Chancellor of the Exchequer at twenty-three; and Lord Temple
went to Ireland. Lord Camden remained President of Council, and Thurlow
continued to be Chancellor. The Cabinet now consisted of seven Chathamite
Whigs, two Rockingham- Whigs, and two members, Grantham and Thurlow, who were
not strictly of any party. The triumph of Shelburne seemed to be complete.
In the months
which elapsed between July 11,1782, when Shelburne became head of the
Government, and December 5, when Parliament met, much was done. The peace
negotiations were pushed to completion. The situation had changed somewhat in
favour of Great Britain. On April 12, Admiral Rodney, who had been commissioned
by North, had defeated the fleet of France in the West Indies. The Rockingham
Administration had sent an order for his withdrawal; but the news of his
victory reached England a day too late to stop the order. Thus, the Ministry
were compelled to glorify and reward the man they had dismissed, and to take
what credit they could for the victory they had not expected. If the state of
affairs in America had been encouraging, Rodney’s victory might .have prolonged
the contest. But all parties were weary of the war and desirous of peace.
France was dismayed at the defeat of de Grasse, and reluctant to boncede
further financial aid to the Colonists. Spain was disheartened by the failure
before Gibraltar. Holland was under pressure from Russia. The American leaders
were in despair at the discontent of the people, the mutinous spirit of the
army, and the lack of all material resources for carrying on the conflict. The
American' negotiators at Paris had come to the conclusion to make a separate
peace. Franklin held out long against this conclusion; but an intercepted
letter from Marbois, the French charge d1affaires in America
(March 13, 1782), advising Vergennes unfavourably to the American claims to the
fisheries and the territory of the valley of the Mississippi and the Ohio, which
was put before Franklin, precipitated an agreement among the negotiators. On
November 30 provisional articles of peace between the Colonies and Great
Britain were signed. On December 15 Vergennes wrote to Franklin a dignified
protest against the signing of the articles without consultation with France,
and contrary to the instructions from Congress. Franklin wrote a reply,
apologising for the “ indiscretion,” but hoping that Vergennes would not permit
the English Ministry to suppose they had divided America from France. On
February 14, 1783, a cessation of arms was proclaimed by King George, and, on
the 20th, a like proclamation was made by Congress.
On February
24, Shelburne resigned office, and the' negotiations were again suspended.
The events
which led to the resignation of Shelburne may be briefly related. Coming into
office with a following which, pitted against the party of Fox and the party of
North, left him in a minority, his continuance in office was from the first
doubtful. From July to December he had had a free hand in the negotiations.
When Parliament met on December 5, 1782, the elements of opposition* which had
used the recess for the purpose of agitation and intrigue, began to unite. The
King’s Speech contained the announcement of the provisional peace, but referred
to “so great a dismemberment of the Empire.” On this point great differences of
opinion were expressed by Ministers. Shelburne, in the Lords, declared that;
the grant of American independence was revocable, should there be no final
general peace. Pitt, in the Commons, asserted (December 11) that the
recognition could not be revoked in any case; and General Conway supported him.
But the King inters preted his speech in the sense adopted by Shelburne; and
the Opposition naturally made much of this conflict of statements. Pitt was,
indeed, obliged to confess that, he was mistaken. Ministers were, however,
sustained by an overwhelming majority. On January 27,1783, the preliminary
articles of peace with France, Spain and America were tabled. The amendments
moved by the Opposition were vehemently debated. Pitt’s speech was not very
successful, and in the course of it he made an attack on Sheridan’s theatrical
associations, which produced the famous retort about the “Angry Bqy.” The amendments
were carried by 224 to 208, Ministers being left in a minority. In the course
of the debate the coalition between Fox and North, which had been rumoured,
became apparent. On February 21, Lord John Cavendish moved resolutions of
censure on the Peace. Fox in his speech admitted the necessity of a coalition ;
but Pitt, with his vigour renewed, attacked it with immense spirit and “ in the
name of the public safety forbade the banns.” The amendments were again carried
by 224 to 208; and on the 24th Shelburne resigned. Events had dictated the
resignation, apart from the vote of the House. Keppel had resigned; Richmond
had refused to attend Council; Grafton had informed the King of his intention
to retire; Camden had advised Shelburne to give up the struggle; and Temple was
dissatisfied in Ireland. North and Fox had put aside personal ambitions,, and
agreed upon the Duke of Portland as their leader. The Duke had indeed been
negotiating beforehand and had approached Richmond and Temple; but both
refused. The King did not yield without a struggle, and importuned Shelburne,
who vainly put forward Pitt. After a day or two of hesitation, during which he
is said to have attended for a few hours at the Treasury and prepared a list of
Ministers, Pitt finally abandoned the dangerous task. An appeal was made to
North; but he was too deeply committed to Fox;
Lord Gower,
too, was tried unsuccessfully. Some differences of opinion now arose between
Fox and North as to the distribution of offices; but on April 1 the Ministry
was completed. The Government consisted of the Duke of Portland, First Lord of
the Treasury; Lord North* Home Secretary; Fox, Foreign Secretary; Lord John
Cavendish, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Viscount Keppel, Admiralty; Viscount
Townshend, Ordnance; Lord Stormont, President of Council; the Earl of Carlisle,
Privy Seal; the Chancellorship was presently put into commission, as Thurlow
was not acceptable. Burke returned to his Paymastership, somewhat dejected;
Sheridan was made Treasurer of the Navy; Lord Northington went to Ireland, with
William Wyndham as Secretary.
The business
of the session was but little interrupted. An American Intercourse Bill was
introduced, but not then pressed; but a Bill to remove restrictions on American
trade was carried. An enquiry into the sufferings of the Loyalists was ordered,
and certain Loyalist troops were placed on half-pay. The session closed on July
16, 1783. The new and memorable session opened on November 11. The King’s
Speech announced that definitive Treaties of Peace had been signed on September
2 and 3 with America and all the Allies, except Holland, with which Power
preliminaries only had been settled. There was no debate. The terms had been
discussed in detail during the various debates, from the accession of Shelburne
in July, 1782, to the close on February 24, 1783. The negotiation of treaties
of peace had not been favourable to the Ministry of 1713, or to the Ministry of
1763; and neither the Ministry of Shelburne, nor the Coalition, was to prove
more fortunate. The Treaties now accepted were much the same as those all but
concluded by Shelburne; though Fox in his speech of November 11, 1783, made the
most of such changes as he had been able to secure in the definitive treaty
with France. The main articles of the Treaties remained unaltered. France
obtained certain rights of fishing and drying fish on the uninhabited coast of
Newfoundland, and the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon were ceded to her. She
also obtained St Lucia and Tobago; but Great Britain retained Dominica,
Grenada, St Vincent, St Christopher, Nevis, and Montserrat. The French gained
Senegal and Goree in Africa; the English retained Fort James and the river
Gambia. The French regained their establishments in Orissa and Bengal,
Pondicherry and Karikal, Mahe and Surat, with some trade advantages. The
provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) were abrogated as to the demolition
of Dunkirk. Spain was forced to abandon all hope of Gibraltar, but obtained
Minorca. She also retained West, and Great Britain ceded East, Florida; while
Spain conceded the right to cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras, and gave up
Providence and the Bahamas. The terms with the United States were open to some
of the objections which they called forth. The boundaries of the country were
enlarged unduly; the fisheries concessions were too liberal; the provisions for
the collection of debts due before the Peace
were too
easily evaded; and the conditions as to the Loyalists were (so far as the
Americans were concerned) insincere and inoperative. The concessions to France
in the Newfoundland Fisheries, abrogated by the War of 1812, but renewed at
Ghent in 1814 in a curtailed form, became a source of infinite trouble and
correspondence. But, as it was impossible to foresee the future, and as peace
was necessary to all parties, special censure can hardly be passed on the
negotiations of men who were politicians and not prophets. To all the parties
to the negotiations the Treaties were welcome—to the American Colonies they
were a godsend. The latest authoritative writer on the subject, Van Tyne, sums
up the situation thus: “ Disorganisation was seen everywhere—in politics, in
finance, in the army. Peace came like a stroke of good fortune rather than a
prize that was won. Congress (January 14, 1784) could hardly assemble a quorum
to ratify the Treaty.”
Other
subjects were simultaneously coming to the front. The question of Reform was
not a new one. In 1766, 1770 and 1771 Chatham had given it his eloquent and
prophetic patronage. Alderman Sawbridge had been making annual propositions in
its favour since 1771. In 1776, Wilkes had moved for leave for a Bill proposing
extensive reforms in representation. In 1780, the Duke of Richmond had
presented a measure for annual parliaments, universal suffragie and equal
electoral districts. The Gordon riots had temporarily discredited all such
eflbrts; and, at the close of the session of 1780, the King’s Speech warned the
people against “the hazard of innovation.” On May 7, 1782, Pitt moved for a
Committee. His proposal was rejected by only 161 to 141. A year later (May 7,
1783) he brought forward a definite scheme which caused a division amoiigst
Ministers. Fox supported it; North opposed; Burke was so badly received that he
declined to proceed; Dundas, who had opposed Pitt’s first measure, supported
his second; but the proposal was rejected. Pitt’s popularity was, however,
greatly increased by his action in this matter.
Meanwhile,
under the preceding two Administrations as well as in that under the new Coalition,
the affairs of India, of which an account is given in another chapter, loomed
large through the mists of political agitation at home. Since 1773 Warren
Hastings was Governor-General, and in 1780 the East India Company’s Charter was
to expire after three years’ notice. In 1781 there were discussions between the
Directors and Lord North as to terms of renewal. In the same year, complaints
and petitions had reached London from India concerning the conduct of Hastings,
whose many enemies now began to be active. In 1781 an Act was passed (21 Geo.
Ill, cap. 65) extending the privileges of the Company till three years’ notice
after 1791, regulating the dividends, and giving the Government larger powers
over the political affairs of the Company. On April 9, 1781, North moved the
House into committee to consider the affairs of India. On April 30, a secret
Committee was named to enquire into the war in the Carnatic. Burke and Fox
wished the Committee to be public;
but secrecy
was maintained. On December 4 the Secret Committee was empowered to add the
Maratha War to the scope of their enquiry. In March, 1782, North was out of
office, and the Rockingham Administration was in. On April 15 Dundas, Chairman
of the Secret Committee, moved a series of resolutions condemning the mode in
which the two wars had been conducted. On April 24 a resolution condemning
Hastings for his relations with Chief Justice Impey was passed; -and on May 3
an address for the recall of Impey was voted. On May 30 Dundas carried a motion
for the recall of Hastings, but on July 1,1782, Rockingham died; Shelburne
succeeded ; and the Court of Proprietors, taking advantage of the change of
Ministers, assumed authority to i esc ind the order for the recall of Hastings,
which, in obedience to the House of Commons, the Directors had made.
On April
1,1783, the Coalition was in office, and the parliamentary session opened on
November 11 following. Pitt and the Opposition pressed for Reform, especially
in India. Fox’ reply was his famous India Bill, said, on incomplete and
unsatisfactory authority, to have been the composition of Burke. Its first
reading took place on November 18, when, contrary to modem custom, it was
debated. A young speaker, John Scott (who, as Lord Eldon, was afterwards to
become so familiar a figure in English public life) indicated at the outset the
point which was in the minds of all, and against which North had forewarned
Fox, viz. the too obvious exclusion of the powers of the Crown in the
appointments inder the Bill—the Commissioners being in the first instance
nominated en bloc by the House, without reference to the Crown, for a period
fixed and certain, though after that period the Crown might appoint. Fox
observed the point at once, and, while complimenting Scott, not quite fairly
accused him of stating his opinion with “ a good deal of positiveness.” Pitt
immediately enlarged the breach made by Scott, and said that “the accession of
power which it must certainly bring to the Ministers of the day was not the
least considerable ” of the objections to the Bill. On the lines thus laid down
the opposition was conducted1. Fox’ measure consisted of two Bills:
one referring to the administrative
1
The use of the terms “Crown” and “Ministers” all through the debates requires
some discrimination. It illustrates a then existing difference in political
theory. Fox’ Bill presented to the Crown a list of party nominations, made
first in the House, and not submitted in the Closet. This was a limitation of
the Crown’s prerogative, on well understood Whig lines. The appointments were
for four years Certain. This gave the appointing Ministers, through the persons
appointed by them, an enormous and increasing patronage, 6ven if they went out
of office. Many Opposition speakers referred to the increase of the power of
“the Crown” when they really meant the power of the Ministers. Pitt always
spoke against “the Ministers.” Under Pitt’s Bill the Crown had no more real
power than under Fox’, since Ministers would naturally prepare for the Crown
the lists of nominees. The difference was in great measure a matter of
procedure, qualified by the personal feeling of the Kiug, who was, no doubt,
willing to accept as constitutional advice from Pitt what he resented as Whig
dictation from Fox. ■
body in
England, the other to the administrative powers in India. Petitions against the
Bills were presented by the Company, and by the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of
London; and counsel were heard at the bar of the House, On December 1 Fox moved
the House into committee on the Bill, and Burke delivered the first of his
memorable speeches on India; it occupies seventy-four columns of the
Parliamentary History. At half-past four on the morning of December 2 the
motion to go into committee was carried by 217 to 103. The third reading was
carried by as large a vote. The names of the seven Commissioners had now been
inserted, and Fox, accompanied by a triumphant procession, carried the Bills to
the Lords. Here the Bills were debated on December 9. The Opposition was led by
Thurlow and Temple; the Bills were supported by Loughborough and Carlisle. In
the course of the debate a newspaper article was read by the Duke of Richmond
stating that Temple had had an audience of the King, who had given him to understand
that the Bills were “in the highest degree disagreeable to his Majesty.” Temple
admitted that he had tendered his advice to his Majesty, but would say no more
than that it had been unfriendly to the Bills. The fate of the measure was
sealed. Temple had in fact been authorised by the King to declare to his
friends that the measure was objectionable to him, and that he should count as
enemies those who voted for it. On December 17 the commitment of the Bill was
rejected by a majority of nineteen. The Prince of Wales, who had voted for the
measure on the first vote, was absent on the occasion of the final division.
The Ministers
did not immediately resign as was generally expected. The King had been waiting
for his opportunity to dismiss them. Writing to Fox on September 3 concerning
the signature of the definitive Treaties, he had used this curious expression:
“ In States as in men, where dislike has once arose I never expect to see
cordiality.” He was now to prove his own philosophy. Late at night on the 18th,
the King sent to Fox and North for their seals, which were handed to Temple,
who next day wrote letters of dismissal to the other Ministers. On the 19th
Pitt kissed hands, and proceeded to form an Administration. He had some initial
difficulties. Camden refused; Grafton refused; Lord Mahon refused. Gower, who
had contemplated total retirement, came to Pitt’s rescue and offered to serve.
Temple acted strangely. He had plotted the overthrow of Ministers; had advised
the King how to proceed; had carried the King’s message to the Lords; had
received the seals of the dismissed Ministers ; and had accepted the office of
Secretary of State on December 19. On the 21st he resigned. On the vexed
question as to the reason for this step, Lord Stanhope comes to the conclusion
that Temple had asked for, or had expected, a dukedom, and, being refused,
withdrew from the side of Pitt and the King. He never again filled any public
position. In the new Administration Shelburne was not invited to take any part.
He accepted a marquisate, with the promise
of a dukedom
if the King changed his policy of retaining that rank for members of the royal
family. The events of the next few years, which gradually drove Pitt into a
leadership : of Toryism, equally impelled Shelburne (Marquis of Lansdowne) into
a more intimate connexion with the Whigs and a general agreement with Pox and
the Opposition. In •spite of all the refusals, Pitt’s Ministry was rapidly
formed. He was 'himself First Lord of the Treasury and' Chancellor of the Exchequer;
Earl Gower, President' of Council; the Duke of Rutland, Privy Seal; Lord
Sydney—after Temple’s resignation—and the Marquis of Carmarthen, Secretaries
of State; Lord Thurlow, Lord Chancellor; Viscount Howe became First Lord of the
Admiralty; the Duke of Richmond, Raster-General of the Ordnance; Dundas,
Treasurer of the Navy. Of the seven Cabinet Ministers, only Pitt was in the
House of Commons, where Dundas was his chief support. Rutland subsequently went
to (reland, and was succeeded by Gower, as Lord Privy Seal. When Pitt’s writ
was moved for, the motion was received with derision. The Opposition, counting
on an easy and' early victory, proceeded to take matters into their own hands.
They voted it a high crime and misdemeanour to report the opinion, of the King
on any public measure— though North was forced to confess that he had never
felt any of the royal influence so much condemned by his present allies. They
addressed the Crown against a dissolution. They refused payment of any money
not already voted, postponed the Mutiny Bill, and carried a motion of want of
confidence.
On January
14, 1784, Pitt moved for leave to bring in his India Bill, and leave was
granted; on the 23rd, the second reading was taken. The Bill, which is more
fully described in a later chapter, differed materially from that of Fox. The
royal prerogative in the appointments to the Board of Control was maintained;
The Board was to go out of office with Ministers, not, as in Fox’ Bill, to be
continued for four years without reference to any .change of Ministers. It was
to have no patronage; and the Company was left in control of administration and
trade in India. On the second reading it was thrown out, but only by the small
majority of eight. Fox, at once, moved for leave to bring in another Bill, but
demanded to know if the discussion was to be interrupted by dissolution. Pitt
refused to reply. From this date (January 23, 1784) the contest against his
Ministry was carried on with vehemence, both in the House and in the country.
In the House, the result was remarkable. At first, the Opposition majorities
were large; but the House gradually grew weary of the contest; the echoes of
hostile public opil/ion became formidable; and the majorities diminished from
fifty-four to forty-seven, to thirty-nine, to twelve, to seven, and on March 8
to one. This was the last struggle of the Coalition in Opposition. In February
a negotiation had been set on foot for a union of the friends of Pitt and Fox
in one Cabinet.. Both the leaders professed a willingness to join on
1781-4].
New Parliament.—Indian
affairs.
469
“equal”
terms; but what was meant by “equality” was a point that could not be settled,
and the negotiation failed. On March 24 Parliament was prorogued; and on the
25th it was dissolved. The Great Seal was stolen from the Lord Chancellor’s
house by some over-zealous enthusiast; but a new one was speedily procured, for
the purpose of the dissolution. The result was now a foregone conclusion. The
King’s active aid, Pitt’s popularity, the India Bill of Pitt, the mistakes of
the Opposition, and their actual defeat in the Commons—all contributed to a
great Ministerial victory. Over a hundred and sixty members lost their seats,
the greater pairt belonging to the Opposition. The first divisions in the new
House showed majorities of from 147 to 168 for Pitt.
While
three Administrations had been discussing the affairs of India, that country
had been the scene of disquieting events. Haidar Ali had, indeed, been defeated
by Sir Eyre Coote at Porto Novo (July 1,
1781),
and was now (December, 1782) dead; but he had been succeeded by his ambitious
son, Tipu Sultan, who, supported by a French force, was pressing on the divided
forces of the English. At sea, affairs had gone badly for England, as indeed they
had from 1746. Admiral Hughes and Admiral Suffren had, during 1782, encountered
each other in force on several occasions, on February 16 and 17, on April 12,
and on July 4, with indecisive results. The fort of Trincomalee was taken by
the French on August 31. On September 3, 1782, and on June 30, 1783, naval
engagements resulted unsatisfactorily for the British side. Operations on land
were not more encouraging.- The British under General Meadows had indeed
captured Bednore with a large treasure; but the army was dispersed in
detachments. On April 9 Tipu appeared before Bednore and, after a heroic
resistance, the English army was forced to surrender. When this bad news
arrived, during the discussion of Fox’ India Bill, a mistaken expectation was
entertained that it would promote the speedy passing of the Bill. The Treaties
of Peace of 1783 brought about the retirement of the French from the service of
Tipu. Peace was finally made with him on March 11, 1784, on the basis- of a
restoration of conquests. 1
Pitt’s new
Parliament met on May 18, 1784. The Opposition protested at great length
against the dissolution which had destroyed them. The Westminster election case
was raised by Fox, who had been a successful candidate; but in whose favour the
sheriff refused to make a return, on the ground that a scrutiny had been
demanded. The case was heard at bar, and the sheriff was ordered to proceed
promptly with the scrutiny. The legislation of the session was largely fiscal.
The budget, which (Was passed, included many new taxes. The franking privilege
was amended; a Bill for the suppression of smuggling was passed; and provision
was made for the arrears of the Civil List (if?60,000). An Act was passed for
the repeal of the Act confiscating estates in Scotland. The East India Company
was granted
470 Pitt's second India
Bill carried.—Ireland, [mi-5
an Act for
its temporary relief. Hereupon, the great measure of the session, Pjtt’s India
Bill (24 Geo. Ill, cap. 25), was introduced. Following the lines laid down in
his Bill of January 14, it provided for a Board of Control, consisting of a
Secretary of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and three Privy
Councillors, all to be nominated by the Crown. The Commanderrin-chief was to be
nominated by the Crown. Commercial affairs were to be left in the hands of the
Company, which was also to nominate all the chief officials in India, under
the veto of the Crown. A special judicial tribunal was created, by ballot of
the Lords and the Commons, for the trial of offences under the Act. The process
was complicated. In each session twenty-six or more Peers, and forty or more
Commoners were chosen by ballot in each House. On a case arising for trial,
three Judges were appointed, and before these the names of the Peers and
Commoners were placed in a box and drawn out singly. When, after the power of
challenge had been liberally exercised, four Peers and six Commoners had been
allowed, then the trial was to proceed. The Bill was moved for on July 6; was
read a first time on July 9; and the House went into committee after the second
reading on July 16. It was finally carried in the Commons on July 28, and in
the Lords on August 9. Fox, throughout the session, continued to refer to the
superior merits of his own Bill; and Pitt not less constantly retorted as to
the assault made on the rights of the Crown.
One of his
earliest efforts, in accordance with his general policy of fiscal legislation,
was to bring forward a measure of commercial freedom with Ireland. His
propositions, eleven in number, adopted during the recess by a Commiss ion
appointed by him, were at first carried in Ireland. When, after a long debate
at Westminster, and the increase of the number of the resolutions to twenty in
order to satisfy English jealousies, they were again considered in Ireland,
they were carried by so small a majority that the Irish Government thought it
best to withdraw them. A great opportunity for enlarged free trade was thus
abandoned. The Westminster scrutiny occupied the House of Commons during part
of two sessions. Pitt’s persistence in continuing the scrutiny was not
sustained by the House. An Act was passed which limited polling to fifteen
days, and provision was made for an early return by the sheriffs. On the whole,
the session of 1785 was unfavourable to Ministers.
In the
conflict of European opinion during the years 1781 to 1785, which is discussed
at length elsewhere, and which Sir James Harris, who was sent to the Hague,
reported (December 6, 1784) to be “ the most critical since the outbreak of the
Thirty Years' War,” England remained neutral. It had been provoked by the
attempt of the Emperor Joseph II to abrogate the Barrier Treaty of 1715, the
conditions of which were guaranteed by Great Britain, and to obtain the free
navigation of the Scheldt. In the Treaty of November 8,1785, by which war was
averted, though the Bander Treaty was in effect broken, England took no part.
1786-95] Trial of Warren Hastings- The Prince of
Wales. 471
Parliament
met in 1786 on January 4. One important event was Pitt’s measure for the
gradual reduction of the public debt by means of a sinking fund. It was brought
forward on March 29, and was passed with little debate, though Sheridan moved
resolutions which he did not press to a vote. The scheme had an encouraging,
though fallacious, appearance. It stood the test of much financial criticism,
however, and continued in favour till 1828, when, after an elaborate report
from a Committee, it was abolished. Other measures were adopted in 1866 and
1875 which remain operative still. Article 18 of the Treaty of. 1783 with
France having provided for a Treaty of Commerce, Eden was commissioned by Pitt
to negotiate; and a Treaty was signed on September 26, 1786. It provided for a
large measure of Free Trade between France and her dependencies, and Great
Britain and her colonies. A Treaty was also arranged with Spain by which
British settlers were to abandon Spanish territory in South America, and the
liberty of cutting logwood in the Bay of Honduras was enlarged. The great event
of the session was the beginning of the series of charges against Hastings,
which ended in his impeachment. On February 7 Burke brought up the resolutions
of May 30, 1782, for the recall of Hastings, and demanded the correspondence of
the Governor-General with the Directors. The motion was carried. On the 20th,
when the Benares charge was urged, Pitt significantly declared his
impartiality; Hastings demanded a hearing at the bar, and was heard on May 1,
when he made a long and laboured defence. On June 13, this charge was
formulated, when Pitt, to the surprise of Hastings and the House, conceded that
the fine of ,s£?500,000 imposed on Chait Singh by Hastings was an extortion.
This practically settled the question of the impeachment, though it was not formally
resolved till the following session. When Parliament met in 1787, Sheridan
brought forward the charge against Hastings relating to the Princesses of Oudh,
in a speech made memorable by the praise b-jstowed on its eloquence alike by
Fox and Pitt. The charge was duly reported, and, a special committee of
managers having been appointed to conduct an impeachment before the Lords,
Hastings was taken into custody, but released on bail. And thus was begun that
trial which figures so largely in the history and literature of England. It
lasted till 1795, and ended in the acquittal of the accused on every charge,
leaving him triumphant and ruined. His fellow in the accusations, Sir Elijah
Impey, was more fortunate. In December, 1787, charges were made against him
relating to the affair of Nuncomar. He made a successful defence, and the
charge was abandoned.
In 1787,
another question which caused more than ordinary debate at the time and which
has been much discussed since, was brought before the House of Commons. The
Prince of Wales, who had become an active supporter of the Opposition and was
especially the ally of Fox’ personal party, had exceeded his liberal income and
was deeply in
debt. An
appeal to Parliament for aid was his only hope. The King refused any assistance
of his own, and Pitt was unwilling to proceed without the command of the King;
“ he had,” he said, “ no instructions upon the subject;" The Prince’s
friends were divided in opinion, and some 'retired temporarily from attendance
in Parliament. Alderman Newnham brought the subject forward on April 20,1787.
In the course of the debate a member alluded in a vague but significant way to
the current rumour of the Prince’s marriage to Mrs Fitzherbcrt. On April 30 Fox
made a specific and formal denial of the marriage, alleging the direct
authority of the Prince for this statement. In spite of-a subsequent vague
explanation by Sheridan, intended to shield the lady, the denial was accepted,
and a generous provision was made for the Prince. The bonajides of Fox’
statement has been the subject of dispute. It was based on a letter written by
the Prince to him on December 11,1785. Ten days after that date, the Prince
was, however, duly married by a Church clergyman in the presence of witnesses.
All London society was possessed of a secret which the principal parties took
little care to keep; and Fox must have been familiar with all the gossip of the
time. Yet in 1787, after the lapse of sixteen months, he used the Prince’s
letter of 1785 as his authority for a denial of the marriage. Lord Holland
contends that Fox was deceived, and his friends alleged that he did not speak
to the Prince for a year; but it is certain that he corresponded with him.
Meanwhile, the Prince had confessed to Grey that he was married; and Fox,
immediately after his denial, was informed of the marriage by Harris, who was
in the house when the event took place, though not one of the actual witnesses.
The Prince’s letter of 1785 was a transparent prevarication, and can hardly
have imposed on FOx, who for some time after his denial in 1787 absented
himself from the House.
In 1788, the
question of the Slave Trade, which had long been agitated in England, and as to
which a Committee of the Privy Council had recently collected much information,
was brought forward by William Wilberforce; but, owing to his illness, it fell
to Pitt to introduce the subject in the House of Commons. The trade in slaves
had been legalised by charters in 1631, 1633 and 1672; by Act of Parliament in
1698; by treaty in 1713, 1725 and 1748. In 1772 Lord Mansfield in a celebrated
case declared it illegal in England. A humane agitation was started by
Granville Sharp and continued by Clarkson, Zachary Macaulay and Wilberforce.
And finally Pitt, on the absence of Wilberforce, through illness, took charge
of the business in the House, though he reserved his own opinion till the next
session.
On May 9, he
moved a resolution which had the strong support of Fox. It was that the House
would take the question into consideration in the following session. Fox, on
this occasion, declared for total abolition. The resolution was agreed to, and
at a later date a
Bill was
introduced and passed. It was amended in the Lords; and the amendments not
being accepted in the Commons, a Compromise Bill (28 Geo. Ill, cap. 54),
prepared by Sir William Dolben, was passed;. This compromise bill, for the
regulation of the trade on more humane conditions, was made necessary by the
fact that the Lords’ amendments had made the original bill a Money Bill, which
could not originate in the Lords. In this year a Committee of the House was,
with Fox’ support, also appointed (June 6) to enquire into the losses of the
American Loyalists. The promises of the American negotiators in 1783 had not
been fulfilled; the Loyalists had been driven from their homes and harshly
persecuted; and Parliament was already pledged in their favour. Commissioners
had been appointed in 1783 to investigate their claims, and a series of reports
presented. Parliament now finally disposed of the business. In 1788, the
Commissioners reported that they had examined in all sixteen hundred and eighty
claims, and had allowed £1,887,548 for payment. Pitt’s proposals were made with
much care as to details. The amount allowed in liquidation of the entire class
of claims was ,£3,033,091, of which £2,096,326 had already been paid. There
remained only £936,765, which was paid. A loyal address was presented to the
King at the conclusion of the payments, signed by the representatives of the
Loyalists of all the old Colonies expressing their grateful thanks for his “
most gracious and effectual recommendations of their claims to the just and
generous consideration of Parliament.”
The most
important question that had hitherto occupied the attention of Parliament was
now suddenly sprung upon public notice. The health of the King (December, 1788)
became curiously disturbed1. On October 20, at the levee, he gave
obvious signs of derangement. Parliament having met on November 20, the Lords,
after a short adjournment, appointed a Committee to examine the King’s'
physicians, and another to search for precedents. The Commons on December 4
received the report of the physicians, which was, in substance, that his
Majesty was seriously incapacitated, but that there was great probability of
his recovery. A Committee of the Privy Council, of both parties (54 in all, of
whom 24 were of the Opposition), had examined the physicians on the day before
their report was considered in the Commons. The doctors now began to differ
politically as well as professionally, thus adding to the difficulties of the
situation. Fox, who had been abroad, now hurriedly returned. He at once put
forward the right of the Prince of Wales to assume the Regency without
restrictions. This gave the key-note to the debates which followed, and to the
agitation which arose in the country. Pitt promptly proceeded to “ unwhig the
gentleman” by challenging the constitutionality of Fox’ doctrine as to the
Prince’s right to the Regency without the consent of the two Houses. It was, he
said, a revival of the doctrine of Divine Right, which a Whig leader should be
the last to put forward. The debates in both Houses
showed
curious developments of doctrine. In the Lords, Thurlow made his celebrated
speech in which he said: “ When I forget my King, may my God forget me ”—though
it was well known that he was privately pledged to advance the Prince’s cause.
Fox went so far as to hint that the Prince had the right to enforce his claim,
and was refraining only out of respect for the two Houses; while Pitt advocated
with vigour the theory of the right of the two Houses to settle the Regency on
such terms as they were pleased to dictate. It was now a struggle for office
between the Ministers and the Opposition. The known alliance between the Prince
and the Opposition made it certain that as Regent he would call them to power.
This was so well understood that the Duke of Portland had prepared a list of
Ministers. On January 19, 1789, Pitt gave notice of resolutions involving a highly
restricted Regency. The resolutions were carried; the Lords concurred; and at a
conference an address to the Prince was agreed upon.
The Prince,
in his judicious reply, accepted the Regency “ in conformity to the
resolutions now communicated to me.” The hopes of the Opposition now ran high.
Pitt was preparing to resume his legal practice. On February 3 a new session
was opened by commission, and on the 5th the Regency Bill was passed. It
provided that the Prince should exercise the Regency during the King’s illness;
that the care of the King’s person should remain with the Queen; that no royal
property was to be alienated; that no office or pension should be granted save
during pleasure, nor any peerages created save in the royal family. On February
13, all the speculations of the politicians were confounded by the sudden
announcement of the King’s recovery.
During the
excitement in London the atmosphere of Dublin had also been disturbed. The Duke
of Rutland, the young friend of Pitt, died on October 24, 1787, and had been
succeeded by the Marquis of Buckingham. The Irish Government began to lose
strength, owing to the expected change in England. Grattan had been in London
in the company of Fox and the Prince. He hurried to Dublin before matters had
reached a crisis, and, on the very day on which Pitt introduced the Regency
Bill, moved for an address to the Prince to take on himself the unrestricted
Regency of Ireland. In vain it was pointed out that it was necessary to wait
for the action of the British Parliament, so as to avoid differences in
legislation. When Pitt’s Bill arrived, no notice was taken pf it. Grattan’s
address was carried, and presented to the Viceroy, who refused to touch or
forward it. A deputation was appointed to carry it to the Prince in person.
When the deputation arrived in London, the King had recovered. Meanwhile,
certain gentlemen and noblemen in Dublin, some of whom were in office, had
signed a round robin to oppose any Government that would disturb them for
voting for the Regency Bill. The round robin was communicated to the Viceroy,
who, in due time, exacted a separate submission from each
1788-93]
475
of the
signatories ; dissolved their compact; dismissed some, purchased others; and so
put an end to what was meant to he a formidable conspiracy. It was at this very
time, while the royal authority was upheld and respected in England and the
hands of the King’s Ministers were strengthened, that the King of France and
his Ministers were entering the rapids of revolution.
The session
of 1789 in England reopened after a short adjournment on March 10. Addresses
were passed concerning the King’s recovery, without any protest save from Fox,
who protested against an address to the Queen, and suggested rather one to the
Prince of Wales. Two Treaties of much consequence—one with Holland (April 15,
1788), and one with Prussia (August 13,1788)—rwere laid before Parliament. They
provided for a defensive alliance in each case, for the supply of troops and
for the security of each other’s possessions. The independence of the United
Provinces was specially guaranteed. Wilberforce again took up the question of
the abolition of the Slave Trade, in a series of resolutions which had the
support of Pitt and Fox. The debate was not concluded at the end of the
session. In 1790 he moved for a Committee to take evidence, by which much time
was lost. In 1791 he made another attempt, but his proposals were rejected by a
large majority, and no further effort was made during the period covered by
this chapter. In the session of 1790, which was opened by the King in person,
the affair of Nootka Sound at once attracted attention. A message from the King
conveyed the information that British ships had been seized by Spain while
peacefully engaged in the fisheries at Nootka Sound. An address was presented;
a million was voted; and the country expected war. During the recess, however,
an arrangement was effected, and, when the late session opened on November 25,
1790. the King’s Speech contained the announcement of peace. A convention had
been signed (July 24) by which Spain released the British vessels, restored the
lands and property seized, and agreed to give compensation. There was to be no
further disturbance of the fisheries on either side; no illicit trade with
Spanish settlements; and no British fishing within ten leagues of Spanish
territory on the Pacific coast.
The revival
of disturbances in India occasioned debate. In 1788 Tipu attacked the Rdja of
Travancore. British troops were sent to his aid, and Tipu was defeated. In
1791, Lord Cornwallis personally took command; but the campaign was not highly
successful In 1792 Seringapatam was attacked, and Tipu’s army defeated and
dispersed. On February 24 a treaty of peace was made, Tipu ceding half his
territories and paying an indemnity of £3,300,000. The Governor-General and
General Meadows resigned their prize-money to the army. In 1793 the outbreak of
war in Europe justified the British in assailing French possessions in India.
Pondicherry was taken, and all the French possessions passed into the hands of
the English. Lord Cornwallis hereupon
476 The Whig schism.—Imminence of war. [1771-93
returned
to England. The debates of 1790 were spirited; but the Government, pledged by
treaty to sustain the R&ja of Travancore, held its own. In 1791, a Catholic
Relief Bill (31 Geo. Ill, cap. 32) was passed in England; and like measures
were passed in Ireland and for Scotland. The agitation for the relief of Roman
Catholics had pro-' ceeded slowly. In 1771 and 1774, Irish Acts enabled
Catholics to hold certain kinds of real estate, and to testify to their loyalty
by an oath which was accepted at Rome. In 1778, an English Act relieved
Catholics from penalties imposed by 7 William III, cap. 4. The Act of 1791
relieved Catholics, wbo took the oath of allegiance, from prohibitions relating
to education, property and the practice of the law. It gave Catholic peers the
right of access to the King, and permitted attendance at religious services and
entry into religious Orders. In 1792, a similar Act was passed in the Irish
Parliament; and, in 1793, an English Act extended the relief to Scotland. •
In 1791, the
long-deferred Bill for the better government'of Quebec; described elsewhere,
was introduced and passed. It was during the discussion on this Bill that the
painful quarrel occurred between Burke and Fox, which separated their political
fortunes for ever. The alienation between the two statesmen, due to social as
well as to political causes, had been for some time in progress. The outbreak
was occasioned by a misunderstanding. Early in the debate Fox had intimated an
intention, or a wish, to leave the House till Burke should have ended the
irrelevant portion of his speech dwelling on the French Revolution. When, at a
later stage, Fox and some of his friends actually left the House—for the
purpose of refreshment only—Burke, with a sensitiveness habitual to him,
interpreted this as a deliberate attempt to discompose and insult him; his
temper flared up; and the breach was beyond repair. The’ quarrel marked. the
long impending division of the Whig party into two hostile sections, securing
the support of one of them to Pitt during the continuance of his
Administration.
Events were
now (1792) proceeding rapidly; On May 28 the King’s message relating to war
between Russia and Turkey produced acrimonious debates. His Majesty announced
the failure of himself and his allies in an attempt to put an end to the war
and recommended an increase in the naval forces, to give added weight to his
representations. Shelburne, now Marquis of Lansdowne, emerged from retirement
and took part against the Government. Grey brought forward, at the request of
the Friends of the People, a notice of motion for Reform, which Pitt resisted
on the ground that “this was not a time to make hazardous experiments;” In
January, 1792, the King had recommended the reduction of the army and navy. In
the following December, he was compelled to ask for their increase in view of
the state of affairs in France and on the Continent; and, as will be seen
immediately, on February 3, 1793, France declared war. The Duke of Portland and
1765-93] Revolutionary propaganda.-France
declares war, 477
his friends
now supported Pitt, and Fox could only muster a minority of forty. Treaties
were negotiated with Hesse-Cassel and Sardinia, in June, for the supply of
troops, and a treaty of peace and commerce was negotiated with Russia. On
August 17 Earl Gower was withdrawn from Paris, though he was instructed to use
conciliatory language to the existing Government. The. King’s Speech had
referred to the seditions which were rife in the kingdom. Disturbances,
accompanied by treasonable declarations, had occurred in various quarters; and
a profuse flow of disquieting pamphlets had proceeded from a number of
societies which had arisen in Great Britain. The Society of the Bill of Rights
(1765), the Society for Constitutional Information (1780), the Society for Commemorating
the Revolution (1788), the Constitutional Society (1788), the London
Corresponding Society. (1791), and finally the Friends of the People (1792)—all
had exercised an activity deemed to be dangerous. Representatives had been sent
to France to express fraternal sympathy with the Revolution, and it was
suspected that money and arms had been sent in return. Prosecutions were begun
under the Alien Act (33 Geo. Ill, cap. 4) and the Traitorous Correspondence Act
(33 Geo. Ill, cap. 27), which had been passed in succession to meet the case of
these offences. Some prosecutions failed, some succeeded; many agitators,
including Thomas Paine, went into exile. Against the propagandism of sedition
the friends of order had not been idle. In 1790 Burke had published his
Refactions on the French Revolution, a work which at once became popular, and
which has since exercised a dominating influence over the opinions of a large
part of civilised mankind. In reply, Mackintosh (afterwards Sir James)
published his Vindiciae Gallicae, which also had a wide success as the most
scholarly attempt to justify the Revolution. The author subsequently altered
his views and confessed to Burke that in writing it he had been “ the dupe of
his own enthusiasm.”
In France, in
the meantime, things had, as is narrated elsewhere, been going from bad to worse;
and in June, 1791, the abortive flight to Varennes deprived the royal family of
their last hope. All the attempts of the European Powers—half-hearted as they
were—to accomplish the safety of the royal House failed. The acceptance of the
Constitution by Louis XVI weakened the hands of his allies, while the emigrant
nobles formed an ineffectual army on the frontiers. He was forced to declare
war against the Emperor in April, 1792; and, on January 21, 1793, the King was
executed, and the gauntlet was thrown down to humanity.
The
declaration of war against Great Britain and Holland on February 3, 1793,
followed. Pitt entered on the war with reluctance; for he did not share the
propagandist enthusiasm of Burke. In 1792, he had recommended the reduction of
the army and navy, which had been increased in view of the Nootka Sound dispute
with Spain in 1790 and the possible rupture with Russia in 1791. He expressed a
confident hope
of fifteen
years of peace. So much was he disposed to think peace certain that, in 1792,
he allowed himself to be led into the project of a coalition with Fox, to which
Burke was opposed, but to which the Duke of Portland had given his assent. The
negotiation failed. Lord Loughborough, the leading Whig lawyer, accepted the
Great Seal from Pitt in 1793, and secured the adherence of Portland. From this
time forward a large section of the Whig party, prominent among whom were Earls
Spencer and Fitzwilliam, the Duke of Portland, Burke, and Wyndham, followed the
lead of Pitt, who now entered on that tremendous conflict which was to be made
glorious at sea at Trafalgar, and finally victorious on land at Waterloo. On
February 12, 1793, he accepted the gage of battle in these memorable words: “It
now remains to be seen whether, under Providence, the efforts of a free, brave,
loyal and happy people, aided by their allies, will not be successful in
checking the progress of a system, the principles of which, if not opposed,
threaten the most fatal consequences to the tranquillity of this country, the security
of its allies, the good order of every European Government, and the happiness
of the whole human race.”
IRELAND IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
With the eighteenth century we enter on an entirely
new period of Irish history. The process of conquest and colonisation, that had
been going on for centuries, had at last been completed, and Ireland lay helpless
in the grasp of her stronger sister, England. This is the key-note of the
situation. Of the land, more than three-fourths had passed into the hands of a
relatively small body of English owners, and of the two and a quarter millions
of inhabitants that composed its population nearly four-fifths had sunk into a
state of bondage bordering on slavery. Excluded by the operation of the penal laws
from all share in the government of the country, reduced socially to the level
of outcasts, exposed to the tyranny of the informer and the oppression of their
landlords, steeped in poverty, and debarred the means of acquiring wealth,
while their religion was proscribed, and the possibilities of education were
denied them, and deprived, as they were shortly to be, of the last vestige of
their political rights, by the restriction of the franchise to the Protestants,
the Irish Roman Catholics were subject to conditions of life as deplorable as
those of any class in Europe. Year by year, the exodus that had set in with the
surrender of Limerick and was drawing off the best blood of the nation, to
replenish the armies of France, Spain, and the Empire, went on without
intermission. None but the old and feeble remained at home to fill the offices
of hewers of wood and drawers of water for their masters. It is a sad picture,
and the Irishman may well be forgiven who prefers to see in the laurels won by
the Irish brigade on the battle-fields of Europe the real history of his
country at this time, rather than in the gloom and torpor that reigned at home.
But the picture has another and more important aspect. For it was in the gloom
and misery of the period that the Irish nation had its birth. Modem Ireland,
the Ireland with which Englishmen are most familiar, with its deep drawn lines
of social demarcation, dates only from the extinction of the clan system. The
process had been slow, and painful for England as for Ireland. But the end had
come at last, and, in the common fate that had overtaken both clansmen and
480 England's claim to
legislate for Ireland. [1698-1719
chieftains,
the old obstacles that had presented an unsurmountable barrier in the past to a
sense of nationality and to national action were removed. But the time for
national action had passed away, or had not arrived; and it was perhaps rather
a sense of a common religious belief than any conscious feeling of nationality
that was to provide a basis for unity of action in the future. For the period
covered by this chapter the history of Ireland means practically the history of
the English colony in Ireland.
The creation
of an English - Colony In Ireland was the result of deliberate policy on the
part of English statesmen. In such a result they had seen the only hope of
reducing Ireland, as the phrase went, to civility and good government, and at
the same time of securing England from a hostile neighbour. The latter object
had been the predominant one; and, now that the establishment of the colony had
been accomplished, it remained to be seen whether the object of the policy
pursued had been achieved.
In
considering this question and in tracing the causes which led to the
recognition by England of an independent Irish legislature, it must be borne
steadily in mind that, in the opinion of every Englishman, the English colony
in Ireland existed for the sake of England and not primarily for its own sake.
Without this underlying idea the colony would never have been established at
all. We have seen in an earlier chapter how, in the pursuance of this policy,
the English Parliament had thought fit at different times to interfere directly
in the internal affairs of Ireland, and in the interests of English manufacturers
to suppress the Irish woollen industry. In doing so it believed itself to be
acting entirely within its rights, and, in order to put the question, as it
thought, once for all outside the sphere of discussion, it passed an Act in
1719 (6 Geo. I), divesting the Irish House of Lords of its power of judicature
on appeals, and affirming its own power and authority to make laws binding on
the people of Ireland. The assumption that lay at the bottom of its action did
not pass unchallenged. In 1698, at the time of the woollen controversy, William
Molyneux published his Case of Ireland being bound by Acts of Parliament in
England stated, in which, with no little learning and great moderation, he
argued that the English Parliament possessed no right to the claim it alleged.
Molyneux’ book was condemned by the English House of Commons as “of dangerous
consequence to the Crown and Parliament of England,” and several attempts were
made to confute it. His argument possesses little more than an academic
interest to-day; but it contained an idea that was destined to germinate and
bear fruit in the future. “If,” said he, “it be concluded that the Parliament
of England may bind, Ireland, it must also be allowed that the people of
Ireland ought to have their representatives in the Parliament, of England. And
this, I believe, we should be willing enough to embrace; but this is an
happiness we can hardly hope for.” The idea
noi-7] Opportunity for
a legislative Union neglected. 481
of a
legislative union was not a novel one. Cromwell had given practical expression
to it, Sir William Petty had argued strongly in favour of it, and there exists
among the state documents of the Revolution period a memorial to Government, by
an anonymous writer, warmly advocating its adoption. Later, when the question
of a union between England and Scotland was broached, Irish writers came
forward to urge the adoption of a similar policy in regard to Ireland,
petitions to the same effect were presented by the House of Commons in 1703 and
1707, and no one who has studied the question can doubt that a union with
Ireland might have been carried at this time with less trouble than it was in
the case of Scotland, and would have been attended with equal benefits to both
partners. But commercial jealousy and indifference to Irish needs prevailed.
The opportunity of effecting a union on a basis of a mutual understanding was
lost; and, though the idea was more than once revived during the century, times
had changed, great parliamentary interests had been formed, and a spirit of
independence, not to say of antagonism, had been aroused, so that, when the
Union was actually effected, this was done in opposition to the wish of
Ireland, and entirely in the interests of England.
The immediate
consequence of the refusal of English statesmen to take advantage of the
situation was a visible estrangement on the part of the colonists and the
formation of a so-called Irish Interest. This Irish Interest must not be
confounded with what, for distinction’s sake, must be called a native Interest.
Its leaders were men of English descent and members of the Established Church,
between whom and the Roman Catholic majority there was not only no feeling of
sympathy, but one of intense hostility. Such an Irish Interest, as distinct from
both an English and a native Interest, had always existed in Ireland. But it
had never till the present time been a Protestant Interest also. Herein lay its
strength, so far as England was concerned. Its weakness lay in its antagonism
to the bulk of the nation. The Irish Interest had already made its influence
felt in the first Parliament of William’s reign, in the disputes as to the
right of the House of Commons to originate Money Bills. But its terror of Roman
Catholicism and its jealousy of Presbyterianism had crippled its independence
of action, and in its resistance to the restrictions placed by England on the
woollen industry it had been criminally remiss. Still, it was by no means
powerless; and in 1701 it showed its indignation at the callous subordination
of Irish to English interests by striking off i?16,000 from the already
overgrown Pension List. In Parliament its acknowledged leader was William King,
Bishop of Derry, promoted, in 1702, to the archbishopric of Dublin. King was
neither a Whig nor a Tory, but something of both. His position, to put it
briefly, was that the Revolution had been made by, and in the interests of, the
Church of England party. But he also held that in coming to Ireland the English
colonists had forfeited none of
their rights
and privileges as Englishmen. They had their own Parliament and their own
Church, and in civil and ecclesiastical matters they were independent of
England. Holding this opinion, he offered a strenuous resistance to every
attempt on the part of the English Ministry and the English Parliament to
subordinate the Irish to the English Interest in the country. His view was
dictated by his care for the Church. For he clearly recognised that the dignity
and usefulness of the Church rested ultimately on the material prosperity of
its members. Anything that went to weaken the Irish Interest weakened pari pasw
the welfare of the Irish Church. He was far from desiring to loosen the natural
bonds that held the colony to England; but he saw that, if the colonists lost
their position of independence, they would sooner or later join hands with the
natives to the detriment of the Church.
The
destruction of the woollen industry proved a deadly blow to the rising
prosperity of the English colony in Ireland. Its effects were felt in all
directions. In 1702 the poverty of the country was so great that it was feared
that the court mourning for the death of William would exhaust its resources.
The promise to encourage the linen manufacture, that had been made a pretext
for the .estrictions on the woollen trade,, was left unfulfilled, or so
fulfilled as to afford a maximum of advantage to England. To alleviate the
misery, the House of Commons, in 1703, came to the,unanimous resolution that
“it would greatly conduce to the relipf of the poor and the good of the
kingdom, if the inhabitants thereof wo,uld use none other but the manufactures
of this kingdom in their apparel and the furnishing of their houses.” Similar
’resolutions were passed in 1705 and. 1707;, but fashion and necessity rendered
them ineffective. Forced to adopt other measures, the Irish Parliament did what
it could to promote the linen industry. The services of Louis Crommelin, a
Huguenot refugee and an eminent specialist in the art of growing and weaving
flax, were secured, spinning-sc^ools were established, premiums awarded for the
best linens, bounties on exports granted, and a linen Board appointed. By its
exertions a flourishing linen trade was created in Ulster; but its progress was
at first slow, and its benefits restricted to a narrow area; and it was at best
an inadequate equivalent for the ruined woollen industry. Meanwhile, the
poverty and wretchedness of the people increased daily. Finding no employment
for their labours, thousands of artisans, chiefly Protestants, quitted the
country. But emigration was only the beginning of the mischief. As the
industrial resources of the country declined, the people were driven back more
and more on to the soil for a subsistence. But the condition of things was not‘
favourable to the development of a flourishing agricultural community. The
soil of Ireland—the spoil of war and confiscation—was in the hands of men who,
in their uncertainty whether a fresh revolution might not deprive them of their
possessions, were only anxious to turn their lands as quickly as possible to
account. The Catholic natives,
whom the
penal laws had reduced to a state of impotence, were driven off to the bogs and
mountains, to make way for sheep and oxen. Wool growing, thanks to the
contraband trade, was a profitable business, so too was cattle rearing for the
provision trade. Little capital was wanted for either and the returns were
quick. In the process, whole v'.jlages were depopulated and the country filled
with crowds of strolling beggars. With English grain flooding the markets,
there was no inducement to cultivate the soil. As the favourable leases that
had been granted after the Revolution began to fall in about 1716, rents were
raised, in some cases trebled, and clauses inserted in their renewals,
restricting the area to be put under tillage. In Ulster, where the disabilities
placed on the Presbyterians by the Sacramental Test aggravated matters, the
consequences were most serious. Hundreds of intelligent and industrious
farmers, finding it impossible to make a living and resenting the interference
with their consciences, threw up their farms and left the country. Their places
were taken by Catholic natives, who, being debarred by the penal laws from
taking profitable leases, were willing to offer higher rents, in the hope of
making a profit out of the grazing trade. As often as not the landlord was an
absentee, whose only means of turning his lands to account was to grant long
leases of between forty and sixty years to some Protestant middleman, who made
a fortune out of the transaction, partly as grazier himself, partly by
subletting the land at rack-rents to Catholic cottiers. As he in turn grew
rich, he also employed a middleman; and so the process went on till at last
there were sometimes as many as three, and even more, middlemen between the
proprietor of the soil and the cultivator. The result can be easily imagined.
Of agriculture, in the strict sense of the word, there was little to be seen.
Here and there a field of wheat or oats could be discerned, sufficient to meet
the wants of the farm. Otherwise, as far as the eye could reach, nothing but
one wide stretch of pasture land, with only the lowing of oxen and the bleating
of sheep to break the silence, and with nothing to relieve its monotony save
the tumbled-down hut of the lonely herdsman. Where the land was too poor for
profitable grazing, or where the necessities of the landlord required his
presence, there the Irish cottier raised his cabin and cultivated the plot of
potatoes, which were becoming more and more his staple food. Tied to the soil,
with little incentive to work and no opportunity to accumulate capital, with
starvation staring him daily in the face, he grew up to a wild, reckless
existence. Marrying early, he filled his cabin with half-fed, naked children.
If he could pay his landlord his rent, the parson his tithes, and the parish
priest his dues, and withal manage to scrape together a scanty livelihood for
himself, he was tolerably happy.
But for the
country the existence of such a class was fraught with terrible danger. This
was recognised by Parliament. In 1716, the House of Commons intervened with a
resolution condemning the insertion
484 Periodical
famines.—Anti-English feeling rises. [1716-40
of .clauses
in leases restricting tillage; public granaries were established and in 1727 an
Act was passed, enjoining that five out of every hundred acres should be under
the plough. Considerable efforts were made, notably by the Dublin Society,
founded in 1731, to promote a more scientific system of farming and to develop
the industrial resources of the country. But neither legislation nor
philanthropic endeavour could provide a remedy for the evils consequent on the
destruction of the woollen industry. In 1727, and again in 1740, Ireland was
visited by famine which swept away thousands; but the demand for land remained
unsatisfied, thus paving the way for Whiteboy and other agrarian disturbances,
which were to follow at no very distant date.
With the sad
evidences of the folly of the policy, that had brought Ireland to this pass,
staring them in the face, a feeling of indignation against England naturally
grew up in the breasts of men, who, though themselves of English origin, were
deeply. concerned in the welfare of the colony. Were their interests to be for
ever subordinated to those of England? The arguments of Molyneux had passed
unheeded; the authority of their own Parliament had been set at naught; their
demand for a union had been rejected; their protests had been disregarded;
and, to add insult to injury, whenever a pension had to be found, for which no
justifiable reason could be alleged to the English Parliament, it was placed on
the Irish Civil List. The feeling of indignation was all the more justifiable
as nothing had occurred to reflect on the loyalty of the nation at large. Of
Jacobitism there was not the slightest trace. In 1715, when England and
Scotland were convulsed by rebellion, Ireland was perfectly tranquil. In fact,
neither colonists nor natives desired to have anything more to do with the
Stewarts. It was a comparatively trifling affair that brought the long
smouldering discontent of the colonists to an open flame.
The monetary
system of Ireland had long been in disorder. She had no mint of her own, which
of itself was a serious disadvantage, > and commercial stagnation and the
constant drain of metal currency in the form of rents to absentee landlords had
produced a deficiency of coin. In 1724 it was calculated that the entire metal
currency amounted to no more than £400,000. To relieve the pressure, it was
resolved to increase the number of copper coins. The proposal was reasonable
enough; unfortunately, in putting it into execution two mistakes were
committed. Instead of undertaking the business itself, Government granted a
patent to coin to the Duchess of Kendal, one of the King’s mistresses. This
lady, who already enjoyed a pension of <£*3000 on the Irish list, sold her
patent to an English iron-master of the name of Wood for <£10,000. Jobs were
the order of the day, and this one might have passed, had the amount of the
proposed new copper coinage borne any reasonable proportion to the standard
currency of the country. But to flood the country with £100,800 worth of
halfpennies and farthings was a grave
1720—4J Wood’s Halfpence. Swift's Drapier’s
Letters. 485
economic
blunder. The subject was taken up by the only man capable, by his genius,
authority, and literary ability, of adequately expressing the sentiments of the
nation. Jonathan Swift had the misfortune, in his own opinion, to have been bom
in Dublin. He loathed, the land of his birth, and to his last day he reviled
the untoward fate that had banished him to Ireland as Dean of St Patrick’s.
To-day men call him an Irish patriot and link his name with those of Molyneux,
Lucas, and Grattan. But he has no real claim to the title. It was not the pure
flame of patriotism, but the scorching fire of indignation at the folly and
stupidity of mankind, that inspired him now and then to break a lance for Ireland.
He did not love the Irish; but, fortunately for Ireland, he hated the Whigs.
The disastrous effects of the woollen legislation had not escaped his notice,
and in 1720 he had come forward with a pamphlet urging the Irish to use Irish
manufactures only. The printer of the pamphlet was prosecuted; but the
indignation of the public at the partiality of the presiding judge, Chief
Justice Whitshed, was so intense, that the prosecution had to be abandoned.
When the news of Wood’s patent became known it caused no little commotion in
Dublin. Parliament addressed the Crown on the subject; petitions against it
were presented by most of the city corporations, and resolutions condemning it
were passed by the grand juries. Government consented to reduce the amount of the
new coinage to £40,000; but the concession failed to pacify public opinion. In
the midst of the excitement Swift put forth his Drapier's Letters. From the
moment he took the matter in hand the agitation assumed a new and, for
Government, a very serious character. From Wood and his patent Swift passed on
to review the whole system of the English administration in Ireland. Taking up
the same constitutional ground as Molyneux in regard to the claim to bind
Ireland by English Acts of Parliament, but in language bolder than ever
Molyneux had dared to use, he retorted that “ in reason, all government without
the consent of the governed is the very definition of slavery; but, in fact,
eleven men well armed will certainly subdue a single man in his shirt.” The argument
went home. A prosecution was commenced against the author of the Letters; the
Lord Lieutenant, the Duke of Grafton, was blamed for his remissness and
recalled; and Lord Carteret was sent over for the express purpose of forcing
the patent through. But the prosecution had to be abandoned and at Carteret’s
■ own suggestion the patent was revoked.
So far as the
cause of the agitation was concerned, the matter was at an end. But the
agitation itself had created quite a new situation in the relations between
England and Ireland. Only five years had elapsed since the English Parliament
had deliberately asserted its right to make laws binding on Ireland (6 Geo. I).
The recent agitation had shown that the English colonists were not inclined to
submit tamely to be thus deprived of their rights; and to Sir Robert Walpole it
was clear
486 Character ofAdministration-Archbishop
Boulter. [1700-24
chat, if
Ireland was not to break away from England, some system of government other
than the rather lax one that had hitherto prevailed, would have to be adopted.
Since the beginning of the century the administration of the country had rested
nominally with the Lord Lieutenant, who, with the single exception of the Duke
of Ormond, had always been an English nobleman. There had been a rapid
succession in the office; but it was practically a sinecure, and the real
business of government had been transacted by the Lords Justices, with the
assistance of the Irish Privy Council. Though differing nominally as Whig and
Tory, the Lords Justices had, with few exceptions, been Irishmen. This fact had
considerably modified their political views, so that there was not a little
truth' in the remark that a Tory in Ireland would have made a good Whig in
England. The same distinction was observable in the Irish Parliament. During
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Parliaments had been of rare
occurrence in Ireland; but after the Revolution the practice had grown up of
summoning one every second year. The reason is to be found in the insufficiency
of the hereditary revenue of the Crown for defraying the expenses of
government. Parliament meeting regularly at constant intervals, the idea had
sprung up, and was confirmed by practice, that only the death of the sovereign
could effect a dissolution. In this way a seat in the House of Commons became,
owing to the many privileges attached to it, a valuable property; while by the
operation of the English Act (3 William and Mary, c. 2) rendering it compulsory
on all members to take the Oath of Supremacy and subscribe the Declaration
against Transubstantiation, it could only be held by a Protestant. Recognising
their dependence on England, the Commons had at first shown no desire to pursue
an independent policy; but, as the effects of commercial policy became
apparent, a spirit of opposition, neither Whig nor Tory in character, but
directly anti-English, began to assert itself.
Ireland, it
had become clear to Walpole, was drifting from her moorings. To keep her in
place it was of all things most necessary to strengthen the English Interest.
It happened, fortunately for his plan, that, just at this moment (1724), the
primacy fell vacant, by the death of Archbishop Lindesay. In the ordinary
course of events, King should have succeeded; but King had identified himself
too closely with the Irish Interest to be acceptable to Walpole, and in
November Hugh Boulter, Bishop of Bristol, was created Archbishop of Armagh. As
a man, a scholar and a bishop, Boulter was admirably qualified to adorn the
station to which he was called; but it is rather as manager of Irish politics
than as head of the Irish Church that he is remembered in history. His
business, to put it briefly, was to break down the rising opposition to
England, and, in the language of the day, to secure a quiet parliamentary
session. His method of proceeding was simple enough. Whenever a vacancy
occurred on the episcopal or the judicial bench, or in the revenue, the person
recommended by him for promotion was either
1724-42] Boulter’s
policy. Government by the Undertakers. 487
an Englishman
or an Irishman of whose subserviency the Primate was fully assured. His task
was all the easier as, apart from the means employed, his policy was distinctly
calculated to benefit Ireland. Coming thither when the country was convulsed by
WoodV patent, he at once recognised the necessity of its revocation; but he was
no less convinced of the importance of reforming the currency^ His plan for
reducing the value of gold, to meet the rise in the price of silver, was economically
unsound; but the credit of having attacked the problem, and of having, after
long years of worry and trouble, succeeded, in a measure, in alleviating the
financial distress of the country, cannot be denied him. He viewed with sorrow
and regret the emigration that was draining Ireland of its industrious
population; and it was mainly in consequence of his endeavours that the measure
rendering it compulsory on landlords to set apart five out of every hundred
acres for tillage was passed, At different times, when Ireland was .ted by
famine, he exerted himself to keep down the price of grain, and did all that
lay in his power to mitigate the misery of the poor. As virtual head of the
Government he must be held responsible for putting the last touches to the
Penal Code, by an Act (1 Geo. II, c. 9), depriving the Catholics of the
franchise, and by another Act (7 Geo. II, c. 5), completely excluding them from
the legal profession. But his attitude towards the Catholics was not one of
blind hatred. He warmly supported Dr Richardson’s efforts to reach the Irish
through their native language, and, if the proselytising principle of the
Charter schools, of which he was an early and ardent promoter, strikes us
to-day as rain i Jly mistaken, the institution was at least a reasonable
attempt to substitute persuasion for persecution. But neither political
ability, nor private generosity, nor a genuine interest in the spiritual
welfare of the Irish could compensate for the fact that his aim in all things
was to subordinate Irish interests to those of England. The pride, if not the
virtue, of Irishmen was outraged by a state of affairs, in which subserviency
to Government constituted the sole claim to office. This fact introduced a
personal element into the character of parliamentary Opposition, which under
King in the House of Lords, and the Brodricks, father and son, in the House of
Commons, had worn a distinctly patriotic aspect. For, seeing themselves in
danger of being excluded from all share in the Government, the great borough
proprietors prepared to come to terms with the Primate, arid, on condition of
being allowed to monopolise all the lucrative offices of State, agreed to drop
their opposition, and to secure for Government a permanent “quiet session.” It
was a disgraceful bargain and highly detrimental to public morality; but the
Government of the “Undertakers” did not on the whole work badly. For, though it
was mainly their own interests they had in view, still, as Irishmen, they had
some care for the country, and Boulter was wise enough to hold the reins as
slackly over them as was cons:stent with the promotion of the English Interest.
Thus, except
for the chronic distress of the country, the years passed quietly away, and at
Boulter’s death in 1742, no objection was taken to his successor, Archbishop
Hoadly, whose daughter had married the son of Speaker Boyle. Even the promotion
of George Stone to the primacy on Hoadly's death in 1747 foiled at first to
disturb the general harmony. He was barely forty; but it seemed a sufficient
explanation that he was the brother of the Duke of Newcastle’s friend, the
influential Under-Secretary of State; Andrew Stone, and besides had the
reputation of being himself an able man. Of his ability there was no
question—or, as it soon became clear, of his ambition. Unlike Boulter, who had
been content to govern through the Undertakers, and Hoadly. who had allied
himself with them, Stone was determined to govern independently of them. It was
partly jealousy and ambition, partly a conviction that the government of the
Undertakers was tending indirectly to weaken the English Interest, that led him
to make the attempt. Provided he could divide them and build up a party of his
own, he might reckon upon ruling alone. With this object, he entered into an
alliance with the Ponsonby faction, in order to oust Boyle from the
Speakership. The scheme was well laid; but Boyle was alive to his danger, and
Parliament had no sooner met in 1751 than he opened a counter-attack on the
Primate by preferring a charge of malversation against the Surveyor- General,
Nevill. Stone was unable to prevent a resolution requiring Nevill to make good
his defalcations under pain of being expelled the House; but he scored a
success on a much more important point. In 1749 the revenue had shown a
considerable surplus, which the Commons had assigned to the reduction of the
National Debt. A similar surplus occurred in 1751. It was proposed to devote
part of it to the same object; and heads of a Bill to that effect were transmitted
to England. The Bill was returned thence as accepted, but with the addition of-
a preamble expressing the consent of the Crown to the course proposed. The
object of this preamble, to insist on the right of the Crown to dispose of the
surplus revenue, was observed and sharply criticised in the Irish House of
Commons; but the Bill was allowed to pass. It was thought Stone would take the
hint; but he showed no intention of coming to terms with the Opposition, and a
memorial, personally presented to the King by the Earl of Kildare, protesting
against the Money Bill as unconstitutional was treated with contempt.
Accordingly, when Parliament reassembled in 1753, the attack on Government was
renewed. This time Nevill’s expulsion was carried into effect, and a Money
Bill, with a preamble similar to that of 1751, was rejected by a majority of
five. Government retaliated by suddenly proroguing Parliament, depriving four
of the principal members of the Opposition of their offices, and seizing the
surplus revenue by an Order under the King’s sign-manual. These proceedings
raised a storm of indignation in the country. The
i753-6i] Stone and the Undertakers.-Religious
toleration. 489
Press teemed
with pamphlets lampooning Government, and particularly the Primate, in the most
outrageous fashion. The peace of the city was disturbed by tumults, not
unattended with bloodshed, that recalled the days of Wood’s Halfpence. Stone
had to barricade himself from the mob; but he begged Ministers in England to
stand firm. The Opposition, he insisted, was on its last,legs: to yield was to
sacrifice the English Interest in the country for ever.. But George II thought
otherwise, and determined to come to terms with the Speaker. The Lord
Lieutenant, the Duke of Dorset, Stone’s ally, was dismissed. A modus was easily
arranged between his successor, the Marquis of Hartington, and the Opposition.
Boyle was created Earl of Shannon with a yearly pension of £2000; Anthony
Malone was compensated with the Chancellorship of the Exchequer; and the Earl
of Bessborough was conciliated with a promise of the Speakership for his son
John Ponsonby. Everybody, except Stone—and of course the nation—was satisfied.
It was a scandalous business; but it answered its purpose of securing a quiet
parliamentary session. On returning to England at the close of it, Hartington
omitted Stone’s name from the Commission of Government. The omission greatly
mortified him; and, when, on the formation of the Pitt-Newcastle Ministry in
1757, the government of Ireland was entrusted to the Duke of Bedford, he Went,
for a time, into Opposition. But his power was no longer what it had been, and,
having promised submission, he was again included in the Commission of
Government. The attempt to break the Undertakers had failed. Things returned to
their normal condition; and, when a French expedition, commanded by Thurot,
effected a landing at Carrickfergus in ,1760, all parties, including the
Catholics, rallied to the support of Government. The danger was averted, and in
1761, when Bedford surrendered the sword of State to the Earl of Halifax, the
political horizon appeared cloudless.
The eagerness
with which the Catholics had come forward to testify to their loyalty, and the
cordial reception given to their addresses, both by Parliament and Government,
were specially hopeful signs of a better understanding between them and the
Protestants. Of religious intolerance there was really very little on either
side. The wave of free thought that was spreading over Europe and permeating
its literature had not failed to affect Ireland. The fact, even if it was
deplored by those who still clung to their old beliefs, was admitted on both
sides. An, atmosphere of scepticism was fatal to the Penal Code. What element
of religious persecution there had been in it had long ceased to be operative.
Among the Catholics themselves, the rapidly increasing number of conversions
was significant of a relaxation of religious principle, and of a growing
reluctance to sacrifice their material welfare to a mere point of theology. The
prevailing spirit of indifference to religion did not escape the notice of
John, Wesley, during his frequent visits to Ireland at this time. He
encountered very little direct
490 Agricultural distress.—Whiteboys.—Oakboys.
[i76i-3
opposition;
indeed, the Catholic, peasantry flocked to hear him; but his preaching left no
permanent mark on the religious life of the nation.
But, as
religious differences sank into the background, a new problem suddenly started
into prominence. It has been pointed out how, by the destruction of the woollen
industry, the bulk of the population had been thrown back on the soil for its
existence, and how, by the operation of the laws restricting commerce, a great
impulse had been given to the conversion of afable into pasture land. Cork, the
cfentre of the provision trade, was now in population and wealth the second
city in the kingdom.1 > The profits of the business were
enormous, andj to supply it, Munster and the adjacent parts of Connaught and
Leinster had been turned into one large pasture field. With an ever increasing
demand for meat* the greater by reason of a murrain that had recently broken
out amongst English cattle, rents rose to an average of £8 an acre, for fairly
good land. Pasture was exempt from tithe, andj to all but the large graziers,
the rents were prohibitive. To make room for more cattle, the peasantry were
evicted from their holdings, and lands which were regarded as commons taken
from them and enclosed. The distress entailed by these proceed igs was extreme,
and in their desperation the peasantry resorted to outrage and intimidation.
Towards the close of 1761: bands of men, numbering sometimes two or three
hundred, known at first as Levellers, but later as Whiteboys, from the White
shirts they Wore over their clothes, ranged the country during the long winter
nights, tearing down enclosures, hamstringing cattle, and, according to their
view, administering a sort of rude justice on their oppressors. Obnoxious
landlords were warned against exacting excessive rents; but it was the
tithe-proctor and tithe-farmer that chiefly felt the brunt of popular
vengeance. It is said that no actual murders were committed; but there was a
gooid deal of personal violence, and so widespread was the conspiracy, so
swiftly and secretly did the Whiteboys work, that the arm of the law was
paralysed over a large extent of the province. A number of individuals were,
however, arrested and a special commission presided over by Chief Justice Sir
Richard Aston, was sent down to restore order. A few persons were executed; but
justice was tempered with mercy, and the blessings of a sorely-tried but
grateful peasantry accompanied the Chief Justice on his departure. The movement
was stifled ; but nothing was done to remove the root of the disease, and, ever
and anon, the peace of the province was disturbed by agrarian outrage. The
■ fact that the Whiteboys were mostly, if not exclusively, Catholics
threatened a revival of sectarian intolerance. It was said they were only
waiting for French assistance to create another rebellion. But no evidence of
such intention was forthcoming, and the argument lost its point entirely, when
similar disturbances broke out, almost at the same time,' amongst the
Protestants in Ulster; In the case of the Oakboys'’ rising, which, starting
near Armagh in 1763, spread
1753-73] Steelboys
-Political situation at death ofGeorgell. 491
rapidly over
the adjacent counties, the grievances chiefly complained of were tithes and the
iniquitous assessment of county rates, which threw the burden of road-making
almost entirely on the tenant. The rising was disgraced by none of the fiendish
outrages that marked the White- boys’ insurrection, and was easily suppressed
without much bloodshed; while the chief cause of it was speedily removed by a
new and more equitable Hoad Act. More closely resembling the Whiteboys’
insurrection was that of the Steelboys, some years later, in counties Down and
Antrim. The rising was directly attributed to the exaction, by the Marquis of Donegal,
of a heavy fine from his tenantry, as the condition of a renewal of their
leases, at a time when a depression in the linen trade had reduced them to the
direst extremities. The fact that they were industrious Presbyterians made no
difference. Inability to meet the demand was followed by wholesale eviction
and, as a natural result, by agrarian outrages hardly less atrocious than those
of the Whiteboys. The insurrection was suppressed with difficulty; but nothing
was done to remedy the evil; and the Steelboys, with their wives and families,
left the country, to swell the ranks of England’s enemies in America. It was
calculated that in 1773 and the five preceding years Ulster was drained of
one-fourth of its trading cash and of the same proportion of its manufacturing
population.
These
disturbances were full of significance for the future. At the time, however,
the agrarian problem attracted less attention than the political. The
parliamentary storm that had raged in 1753 had passed away; but its effects
remained. Neither to the English Ministry nor to the little knot of independent
county members in the Irish House of Commons was the victory of the Undertakers
at all satisfactory. To the Ministry it had long been evident that the power pf
the Undertakers was inconsistent with the system of keeping Ireland in a
position of subordination to England. For, however venal, they were
nevertheless Irishmen, who agreed with the Patriots on many points, by raising
which they could at any time seriously embarrass Government. Their recent
victory had served to emphasise the danger and had led to a revival of the
proposal for a union. But times had changed since Molyneux had modestly urged
its adoption; and a mere rumour that Government was meditating such a step led
to a serious riot in Dublin in 1759. A union, indeed, was not contemplated; but
there was a growing feeling in England that, if the existing relations between
the two countries were to be maintained, some change in the form of government
had become inevitable. The general indignation aroused in Ireland by the
political fiasco of 1753 had resulted in a demand for the shortening of the
duration of Parliament, as a likely means of diminishing the importance of the
Undertakers, by bringing them more under the control of their constituencies.
It was warmly supported by the Patriots in the House of Commons. The general
election that followed
492 Demandfor limiting
the duration of Parliament. [i760~7
the accession
of George III had given them a leader of unquestioned ability in the person of
Henry Flood; and hardly less important than Flood’s election was that of
Charles Lucas. Without Flood’s ability and oratorical talent,, Lucas was an
earnest and honest politician. He had at an earlier period of his career come into
open conflict with the Government owing to the persistency with which he had
striven, as a Common Councillor, to reform the Dublin Corporation. To evade
punishment he had gone into voluntary exile for several years; but his memory
was cherished by the citizens of the metropolis; and, having secured a pardon,
he was rewarded by being elected one of their representatives in Parliament.
The interest excijted by the proposal to limit the duration of Parliament
completely dwarfed, for a time, the other items in the popular programme—a
diminution of the Pension List, a Habeas Corpus Act, a Place Bill, the
independence of the judicial bench, and the creation of a national militia.
Accordingly, when Parliament met on October 22, 1761, the matter was at once brought
forward by Lucas. Leave was given to bring in heads of a Bill limiting the
duration of Parliament to seven years; but further than this the House declined
to go, and a motion recommending it for transmission to England was rejected.
The measure ,was in fact as thoroughly distasteful to the Undertakers as it was
to Government. But resolutions flowed in from all sides warmly supporting it.
Government and the Undertakers were in an awkward position, the latter
particularly. For, though they clearly recognised that the measure was
calculated to diminish their influence, they were fully alive to the danger of
obstinately resisting public opinion. A way to secure its rejection, and, at
the same time, to preserve their credit with the country was discovered. Knowing
that the Bill was just as objectionable to Government they resolved to support
it, and to throw the odium of its rejection on the Irish Privy Council. These
tactics succeeded in 1763; but, supported by Flood, Lucas held his ground
tenaciously, and in the following session (1765-6) the Bill was once more
referred to the Council for transmission. To refuse a second time passed the
courage of the Council, and in the firm expectation that the Bill would be, as
it actually was, shelved in England, it was transmitted thither.
But, much as
English Ministers disliked the measure, they disliked the Undertakers even
more; and towards the close of the viceroyalty of the Earl of Northumberland,
who had succeeded Halifax in 1763, a plan was formed to break their power, by
enforcing continual residence in Ireland on the Lord Lieutenant. There was some
difficulty in finding anyone willing to accept the office on these terms.
Eventually Lord Townshend consented to make the experiment. To strengthen his
hands against the Undertakers, he was authorised to hint at a concession of
some points in the popular programme. Unfortunately, in opening Parliament in
October, 1767, he allowed himself to suggest a Bill to
1767-9] Townshend’s
viceroyalty.—Octennial Act. 493
secure the
independence of the judges as in England. This was more than his colleagues in
London intended. They returned the long desired Bill for limiting the duration
of Parliament, altering it from seven to eight years, to meet the custom
obtaining in Ireland of Parliament meeting only in alternate years, and not
from any desire, as is generally stated, to secure its rejection; but they
insisted on adding a clause to the Judges’ Bill allowing of the removal of any
judge on a joint address of both Houses of the English Parliament. It was a
wholly unnecessary stipulation; but it emphasised the intention of Ministers to
keep Ireland in a state of subjection to England; and, being so interpreted in
Ireland, it completely destroyed the popularity that had accrued to Townshend,
and enabled the Undertakers to gratify their resentment against the Octennial
Bill by throwing out a Bill for an augmentation of the army. Townshend had some
reason to complain of the way he had been treated, and the caricature drawn of
him, with his hands tied and his mouth open, was doubtless very expressive of
his feelings. But his irritation only intensified his resentment against the
Undertakers, and, Parliament being immediately dissolved, he set to work
resolutely to break their power. His policy, and the means he took to realise
it, recalled the days of Boulter and Stone; but the Octennial Act had rendered
his task of securing a majority by corruption infinitely more difficult than it
had been to them. He was still engaged in preparing his plan of campaign when
Parliament met in October, 1769. It was known that Government was anxious to
pass the Augmentation Bill, and, though the country could ill afford the
additional expense, there was a general inclination to acquiesce in the
proposal. But this benevolent attitude changed to one of opposition, when
Parliament was asked to consent to a Money Bill that had originated in the
Privy Council. Nothing irritated Irishmen more than the interpretation which
English Ministers persisted in placing on Poynings’ Law. The right to control
their purse was the last remnant of independence they possessed and they were
unanimous not to surrender it. They readily granted the taxes demanded and even
acquiesced in the measure to augment the army; but the Money Bill was rejected,
on the ground that it had not originated with the Commons. Following the
precedent established by Lord Sydney in 1692, Townshend brought the session to
a sudden close. In his speech proroguing Parliament he protested against the
construction placed by Parliament on Poynings’ Law, and insisted on his protest
being entered on the Journals of both Houses. But times had changed since the
Commons had been willing to barter their freedom for a free hand against the
Roman Catholics, and an order was passed by the House, forbidding the clerk to
obey the injunction. The quarrel attracted considerable attention in England
and an article in the Public Advertiser, calling on the English Parliament to
vindicate its authority, and, if necessary, to interfere forcibly to suppress “
the spirit of seditious obstinacy ” in Ireland, exasperated
494 A parliamentary majority purchased. [1770-5
public
opinion there. A resolution curiously recalling the treatment of Molyneux’ book
by the English Parliament was passed by the Irish House of Commons, ordering
the article to he burnt by the common hangman. It was observed that Townshend
did not imitate Sydney in dissolving Parliament; but one prorogation succeeded
another, and, in the meantime, the Lord Lieutenant steadily pursued his plan
of purchasing a parliamentary majority. The Privy Council was remodelled; the
Earl of Shannon, Speaker Ponsonby, and a crowd of minor placemen were removed
from office; peerages were distributed with a liberal hand; places were multiplied,
and, despite the promise of the Crown to the contrary, the Civil List was
encumbered with additional pensions.. The result was apparent when Parliament
reassembled in February, 1771. An address, thanking the King for continuing .
Townshend in office was voted; but Ponsonby refused to present it, and a new
Speaker was found in the person of Sexton Peiy. The business of the session was
transacted without difficulty; but outside Parliament the indignation with
which the shameful traffic was regarded rose to fever heat. The public Press
teemed with lampoons, in which neither the person, nor the character, nor the
habits, of the Lord Lieutenant were spared, His administration was ridiculed,
and he was himself held up to scorn as a second Sancho Panza, in a series of
powerful letters, afterwards collected under the title of Baratariama. From
being the most popular, Townshend had become the best hated* man in the
kingdom, and the appointment of Earl Harcourt as his successor came as a relief
both to him and the country.
But it was
soon to appear that the change of Viceroy had brought no change of system with
it. The majority which corruption had purchased corruption alone could
:maintain. To satisfy its supporters, Government strained its resources to the
utmost. New taxes were imposed and fresh loans raised; but the ever increasing
number of bankruptcies was a sure sign that the limits of taxation were being
rapidly reached. Public indignation was not so loudly expressed as it had been
in Townshend’s time. Harcourt was not personally disliked; Lucas had died in
1771; Flood, with an exaggerated notion of his ability to influence Government,
had accepted office; and Grattan, on whom his mantle had fallen, only entered
Parliament in 1775. But the inability of the country to meet the expenses of
government was unmistakable, and the fact that these expenses had been incurred
in a time of peace, for the avowed purpose of maintaining a system directly
hostile to Ireland, rendered the situation unbearable,
On opening Parliament
in 1775, Harcourt announced the intention of Government to concede certain
privileges to Irish vessels engaged in the Newfoundland fisheries, to allow
Ireland to provide clothing for her own forces when abroad, and to grant a
small bounty on flax-seed imported into the country. These concessions, he
added, would,, he hoped, “ secure riches and prosperity to the people of
Ireland.’’ The
1775-7] Harcourt's Admimstration.-Commerdal
distress. 495
unintentional
irony of his words is not less remarkable than the utter inadequacy of the
concessions to alleviate the distress of the country, which the outbreak of the
war with America, by dosing the only profitable market for Irish linens and
entailing an embargo on the export of provisions, was every day rendering more
acute. But Harcourt’s attention was wholly directed to the business of managing
Parliament. So far, he had been successful in eliciting from it a loyal:
address in response to the declaration of war, and in winning a reluctant
consent to the withdrawal, for service abroad, of 4000 of the 12,000 troops
designed for the defence of the country. But a dissolution was approaching, and
he was not so sure of the future as he could have desired to be. In fact, the
declaration of war against America had been received with very mingled feelings
in Ireland. An amendment to the address, urging the adoption of conciliatory
measures, had been rejected; but the amendment spoke the general sense of the
people, especially of the Presbyterians in Ulster. That Ireland was suffering
from much the same grievances as those which had led to the revolt of the
colonies was the subject of general comment. The similarity was pointed out by
the Americans themselves in an Address to the people of Ireland; and a voice
had been raised in the Parliament of Great Britain, warning the Irish that, if
the experiment of taxing the Americans without their consent was successful,
their turn would come next. The danger was probably exaggerated; but the writer
in the Public Advertiser did not stand alone in his opinion that England had
the right to tax Ireland; and the refusal of Lord North to yield to Harcourt’s
request to refrain from certifying a Money Bill as a reason for summoning a new
Parliament was a sufficient proof that the claim to legislate for Ireland was
to be fully maintained1. •
Harcourt
retired in November, 1776. To smooth the way for his successor, the Earl of
Buckinghamshire, he had, in one day, created eighteen peers and advanced seven
barons and five viscounts a step in the peerage. But public opinion was growing
too strong to be held in check by such a travesty of government. The distress
of the country was appalling. Trade was wholly at a standstill; rents could not
be paid; warehouses had to be closed; every day money grew scarcer and
bankruptcies more frequent. Thousands of hands were turned off, and in Dublin
the streets swarmed with halfrstarving mechanics, whose sole means of
subsistence was the half-pound of oat-meal doled out to them daily by charity.
Things, in short, had reached a pass when, as Hussey Burgh put it, England
would either have to support the country or concede her the means of supporting
herself. When Parliament met in October, 1777, a motion to retrench expenses
was brought: forward by
1
It should be remembered that cause had to be shown for the summoning an Irish
Parliament, and that, before being submitted to it, all Bills had to be “
certified ” in England.
496 Non-importation pledges—Eise ofthe
Volunteers. [1777-8
Grattan. The
motion was rejected. But the fact that Government was forced shortly afterwards
to borrow £50,000 from the Bank of England: to pay thie army left no
doubt as to the seriousness of the situation. The necessity of removing some of
the existing restrictions was admitted by the Ministry, and Bills were framed -
conceding to . Ireland the privilege of exporting all her articles of produce,
with the exception of wool and woollen goods, to the colonies in British
vessels, and of importing all goods, except tobacco, directly from them;
permitting her to export her manufactured glass to all places, except Great
Britain; and abolishing the restrictions on the importation into Great Britain
of cotton-yam and sail-cloth. The proposals drew down a storm of angry protest
from the manufacturers of Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, Stafford, and other
places. “ A foreign invasion,” it was said, “ could scarcely have excited a
greater alarm.” Government yielded' to the pressure put upon it, and, of all
the proposed benefits, only that of allowing Ireland to export her cotton-yarn
and sail-cloth was conceded. The inadequacy of the concession caused groat
dissatisfaction in Ireland; but there was no disposition to lay the blame on
Government, and the conciliatory attitude adopted by Ministers towards the
English Catholics at this time afforded the Irish Parliament an opportunity of
testifying to its own liberality, by an Act relieving their Catholic countrymen
of the chief social disabilities laid on them by the penal laws and conceding
them the right to acquire land by taking leases for 999 years. It was a large
and generous measure of relief, and, coming as a free gift from the
Protestants, did more than anything else to strengthen that feeling of national
identity, which showed itself in the subsequent struggle for free trade and
legislative independence. But the selfishness of British manufacturers in
intercepting the boon intended by Government was deeply resented, and
associations were formed pledging their members not to import or wear any article
of British manufacture. The enthusiasm with which the movement was taken up by
all ranks and classes of society, and its success, startled the nation into a
sense of its own power. Buckinghamshire regarded the situation with
apprehension. The1 people were still perfectly loyal; but they were
clearly in earnest, and, with the example of the colonies before them, there
was no saying what might happen. : Since France had taken part in the War, the
Channel swarmed with privateers. All external trade had ceased, and any day
might witness an invasion. But, with a country practically denuded of troops,
and with an empty treasury, Government could only look on in helpless
inactivity. Its inability to respond to a call from Belfast for a small
garrison to ward off an impending invasion brought matters to a crisis. Driven
to depend on their own resources, the citizens of Belfast acted as though
Government had been dissolved, and raised a volunteer corps for their own
protection. From Belfast the movement spread rapidly. Everywhere the local
gentry put themselves at its head. The danger of
1778-g] Demand for Free
Trade.—A;short Money Bill. 497
foreign
invasion, the helplessness of Government, the novelty of the thing itself, and
the appeal it made to the military instincts of the nation, conspired to render
volunteering the most popular and formidable movement the country had ever
known. Though excluded, by their inability to carry arms, from actively
participating in it, the Catholics showed their ardour in the cause by
liberally subscribing for the purchase of implements of war. Buckinghamshire,
who had hailed the appearance of the Volunteers with a sigh of relief, began to
tremble for the consequences, when he saw how formidable they were becoming.
He would gladly have suppressed them; but this was out of his power, and to the
reproaches of his colleagues in London, he could only urge the necessity of “
temporising.” Of politics there had at first been no sign; but it was not long
before the Lord Lieutenant observed a disposition, in certain quarters, to turn
the situation to political account. It could hardly be otherwise. The
Volunteers were to a man non-importers, and, next to the safety of the country,
which was now .provided for, free trade lay nearest their thoughts. As the time
when Parliament was to meet approached, members were urged by their
constituencies to limit supplies to six months, until the commercial grievances
were redressed. Buckinghamshire was alarmed at the direction things were
taking; but the Speech from the Throne showed no appreciation of the
seriousness of the situation. An equally colourless Address was proposed and
seconded. Rising to oppose it Grattan pronounced both speech and address to be
an insult to the common sense of the nation. The time for such inanities Had
passed. Ireland was in a state of dire distress and he moved that nothing could
satisfy her but “ a free export trade.” Hussey Burgh proposed “ a free export
and import,” Flood “ a free trade ” simply; and in this form the amended
Address was carried without a division. In his answer, the King announced his
intention of concurring in all measures which, on mature consideration, should
be thought conducive “ to the general welfare of all his subjects.” But the
position was too grave to permit of such ambiguous phrases. A.few days later a
riot broke out in the “Liberties” at Dublin; members of Parliament were forced
to alight from their coaches and swear to vote for Free Trade and a short {i.e.
six months’) Money Bill. The House of Commons passed a resolution resenting
this intrusion on their authority. But there was no difference of opinion
between them and the mob. It was proposed that, in view of the distress of the
country,, it would be inexpedient to grant any new taxes. The motion was
carried by 170 to 47, and was followed by another, limiting supplies to six
months. The resolution was supported by Hussey Burgh in words which electrified
the House and stirred the nation to its depths—“Talk not to me of peace,” he
said. “ It is not peace; but smothered war. England has sown her laws in
dragons’ teeth, and they have sprung up armed men.” The resolution was carried
by 138 to 100. The vote was one that Government could
498 Free Trade granted-Legislative Independence.
[1779-80
not mistake;
and on December 13, Lord North submitted three propositions to the British
Parliament, repealing the laws prohibiting the export of Irish wool and woollen
goods to any part of Europe, abolishing the restrictions placed on Irish glass,
and admitting Ireland to all the advantages of the colonial trade on terms of
an equality of taxes and customs. The non-importation agreements had
effectually1 convinced English manufacturers that Ireland was their
best market, and this time they offered no opposition. Bills based on the
proposals were drawn up, and easily passed through Parliament.
The joy with
which the concessions were received in Ireland was largely tinned with the
reflexion that she had owed them more to her own exertions and the unsheathed swords
of the Volunteers, than to the generosity of England. Would England abide by
the agreement ? The commercial concessions implied no renunciation, on her
part, of her claim to legislate for Ireland. Would she not, when the
opportunity offered, recall the boon, that had been so reluctantly granted ?
England was herself responsible for this distrust. The feeling of gratitude
gave place to one of uncertainty. Nothing could satisfy Ireland except the
recognition of her national independence. Of this feeling Grattan made himself
the mouthpiece. It was only four years since he had entered Parliament; but his
ability, patriotism, and eloquence had already won him a conspicuous position
both inside and outside the House of Commons. Early in 1780* in replying to an
address presenting him with the freedom of the Guild of Dublin Merchants, he
announced his intention of raising, in the following session, the question of
the legislative independence of the Irish Parliament. His decision alarmed
Government, and even his own friends doubted its wisdom. Considering the
excited state of the country and the determined attitude of the Volunteers, now
fully 40,000 strong, there could be no question that the step he proposed to
take would put Parliament in the dangerous position of either running counter
to the wishes of the nation, or of presenting England with an ultimatum. The
Duke of Leinster declared that he for one “ had no idea of constitutional
questions being forced by the bayonet.” Lord Hillsborough, the Secretary of State,
suggested his favourite plan of a legislative union. Buckinghamshire begged him
not to mention the subject: the mere suggestion of such a plan would set
Ireland on flame. For himself, he preferred to try to tune Parliament.
True to his
promise* Grattan on April 19 submitted a motion to the House of Commons
affirming the legislative independence of Parliament. His speech made a great
impression on the House; and Government, feeling itself unable to meet it with
a direct negative, moved the adjournment of the debate. The danger was tided
over; but Buckinghamshire admitted to Hillsborough that, though many members
were annoyed that the subject had been mooted, still the feeling was almost
unanimous in its favour. Grattan expressed himself satisfied with the result. “
No
1780-2] Perpetual
Mutiny Bill.—Volunteer Convention. 499
British
Minister will now, I should hope,” he said, “ be mad enough to attempt, nor
servant of Government desperate enough to execute, nor Irish subject mean
enough not to resist, by every means in his power, a British Act of
Parliament.” The hope was well grounded. Two cases of desertion from the army
had recently occurred; but in both cases the magistrates refused to convict on
the ground that, Ireland having no Mutiny Act of her own, the English Act could
not be regarded as binding. To meet the difficulty, a Mutiny Bill was
immediately introduced. The Bill placed Government in the awkward position of
either having to admit the inadequacy of the English Act or losing control of
the army. Buckinghamshire was urged, against his judgment, to resist it; but,
despite his efforts, it passed and was transmitted to England. It was returned
in August, with the omission of the words limiting its operation to one year.
The indignation of the country was intense; but the Bill was passed. Corruption
had accomplished what nothing else could effect. Congratulating himself on his
master-stroke, Buckinghamshire brought the session as quickly as possible to a
close, and handed over the sword to his successor, the Earl of Carlisle. The
situation, so it seemed to Carlisle, was by no means hopeless. A threat of
parliamentary reform had considerably strengthened Government, by attaching to
it all those who, for personal reasons, dreaded any such measure. A small
secret fund, Carlisle suggested, would greatly assist in keeping them steady.
He had not miscalculated the situation. When Parliament met in October, 1781, a
motion by Grattan for leave to introduce a limited Mutiny Bill was rejected by
177 to 33. He replied with a threat to appeal to the country, in a “formal
instrument.” A week or two later, he published his Observations on the Mutiny
Bill, and on February 15,1782, a Convention representing the Volunteers of
Ulster met at Dungannon. Resolutions were passed in favour of a modification of
Poynings’ Law, a limited Mutiny Bill, the independence of the judicial bench,
and a further relaxation of the laws against the Catholics. The moderation of
the resolutions was not less significant because they represented the opinion
of 80,000 men in arms. A week later, Grattan moved an address to the King,
declaratory of the independence of the Irish legislature. “Do you,” he said
addressing the House, “ hesitate to weary the ears of his Majesty with your
solicitations, or do you wait till your country speaks to you in thunder ?” But
the House was not to be moved: a motion to adjourn the debate was carried by
137 to 68. Outside Parliament, however, the agitation gained in volume daily,
and, encouraged by the addresses that flowed in from all quarters, Grattan gave
notice of his intention to renew his declaration on April 16. His intention and
the determined attitude of the country alarmed Carlisle, and on March 27 he
wrote suggesting the advisability of repealing the Act of 6 George I.
But
the credit or discredit of yielding was not to be his. Before his letter
reached its destination, the Ministry of Lord North had fallen ch. xiv. {32—2
and a new
Administration, under the Marquis of Rockingham, had been formed. On April 14
the new Lord Lieutenant, the Duke of Portland, arrived in Dublin. Ministers
were known to be favourable to Ireland: two of them, Rockingham and Fox, were
personal friends of Lord Charlemont. But neither Charlemont nor Grattan would
consent to postpone the question, and on the day appointed the latter rose to
make his promised motion. His opening words struck the key-note of the
position. “ I am now,” he said, “ to address a free people.” To the nation in
arms, to the Volunteers, they that day owed the independence of Parliament. And
now having given a Parliament to the people, he hoped and doubted not that the
Volunteers would retire and leave the people to Parliament. He moved to assure
his Majesty that the Crown of Ireland was an imperial Crown, inseparably
annexed to the Crown of Great Britain, but that the kingdom of Ireland was a
distinct kingdom, with a Parliament of her own, the sole legislature thereof.
Ministers were mortified to find that their good intentions counted for so
little. But there was nothing for it but to yield with as much grace and
promptitude as possible. In submitting the proposals of Government to the
British Parliament, Fox said it was desired to “ meet Ireland on her own terms
and give her everything she wanted in the way she seemed to wish for.” There
was no opposition. A Bill repealing the statute of 6 George I was passed, and
when the Irish Parliament reassembled, after a short adjournment, on May 27,
Portland announced that the King was prepared to give his unconditional assent
to a modification of Poynings’ Law and a limitation of the Mutiny Act to two
years. Grattan expressed his entire satisfaction. “I understand,” he said,
“that Great Britain gives up in toto every claim to authority over Ireland.” As
a token of gratitude, and to signify to the world that Ireland was prepared to
stand or fall with England, the House of Commons, at his suggestion, voted
,£100,000 and 20,000 men for the support of the British navy. A Habeas Corpus
Act had already become law; and, to crown the work of reconciliation, a measure
was passed relieving the Catholics from some of the restraints placed on their
education and the exercise of their religion. On July 27 Portland adjourned
Parliament to September 24.
Ireland had
apparently, in Fox’ words, got all she wanted. But the very completeness of the
surrender bewildered men. Ireland had too long been treated by England with
injustice to be able at once to understand that this time she was being dealt
with fairly. The concessions, it was true, were there; but they had been
extorted from England in the hour of her extremity, and there was no guarantee
that she would not, at some future time, recall them. England, it was said, was
taking advantage of the “generous credulity” of Irishmen. Simple repeal was
insufficient; England must be called upon to renounce expressly her claim to
legislate for Ireland. Grattan pooh- poohed the suggestion and asked
ironically, what guarantee an express
renunciation
could afford? But he had lost the ear of the nation. The agitation grew from
day to day; it was taken up by Flood; the Lawyers’ Volunteer Corps declared in
its favour; the culpable negligence shown in drafting two trade Bills wherein
Ireland was tacitly included, the utterances of irresponsible politicians in
England, and a decision given in the Court of King’s Bench on an appeal from
Ireland, furnished apparent proof of its necessity. In the midst of the
controversy the Marquis of Bockingham died. His death led to a reconstruction
of the Ministry under Shelburne, and in September Temple succeeded Portland as
Lord Lieutenant. Though inclined at first to resent the clamour for
Renunciation, the new Ministry acted with due regard to public faith, and at
the earliest opportunity a Bill was passed to remove all doubts which had
arisen or might arise as to the exclusive rights of the Parliament and Courts
of Ireland in matters of legislation and judicature.
Ireland had
obtained from England the acknowledgment of her legislative independence. The
importance of the victory was exaggerated in both countries. To be sure, the
English Parliament could no longer directly interfere in the affairs of
Ireland; but her counsels were still controlled by English Ministers, wholly
irresponsible to the Irish Parliament, and it was inevitable that whenever the
interests of the Irish people clashed with the views of English Ministers,
these should be tempted to have recourse to corruption, in order to tune
Parliament to their pleasure. The only guarantee for the independence of Parliament
was a reform of Parliament itself. This everybody in Ireland admitted. But how
was it to be effected ? No doubt, Ireland owed much to the Volunteers, and the
Volunteers were in favour of Reform. But the feeling of annoyance at the
political influence exercised by them was not confined to the corrupt element
in the House of Commons, whose existence Reform menaced. There were many
independent members, who agreed with Grattan that, having given a Parliament to
the people, it was the duty of the Volunteers to retire and leave the people to
Parliament. But it was Flood, the author of the Renunciation agitation, and
not Grattan, who had the ear of the nation, and with Flood went Charlemont and
that eccentric ornament of the Irish Church, Frederick Augustus Hervey, Earl of
Bristol and Bishop of Derry. During the summer of 1783 resolutions in favour of
Reform became of frequent occurrence, and at a general assembly of the Ulster
Volunteers at Dungannon in September, it was resolved to issue invitations to the
other provinces to join with them in sending delegates to a national convention
to be held at Dublin on November 10 to discuss the question. Meanwhile, the
government of Lord Shelburne had given way to the Coalition Ministry of the
Duke of Portland, with North and Fox as joint Secretaries of State, and in June
Lord Northington arrived in Dublin as Temple’s successor. Parliament was
dissolved shortly afterwards and a new one met on October 14. The general
election had caused little
alteration in
its complexion, though it was said that a third of the open constituencies had
found fresh representatives. The question of parliamentary reform had not been
mooted when the Volunteer Convention met at Dublin on November 10. It was a
thorny subject, and even in the Convention it seemed at first as if no
satisfactory solution of the question would be arrived at. Finally, however, a
plan was resolved upon, which, while preserving to Parliament its character as
a Protestant assembly, would, by raising the franchise qualification, opening
dose boroughs, incapacitating holders of pensions from sitting in Parliament,
compelling members, who accepted office, to seek reelection, and rendering
bribery at elections a disqualification, have gone far to remove the most
glaring abuses in the representation. Both Charlemont and the Bishop of Derry
thought it unadvisable to present the measure to Parliament until the
Convention dissolved and the general feeling of the country had been tested.
But Flood would admit of no delay, and on the same day (November 29) he moved
from his seat in the House of Commons for leave to bring in a Bill for the more
equal representation of the people in Parliament. The Attorney-General,
Yelverton, immediately rose to oppose the motion, on the ground that it was an
attempt on the part of the Volunteers to overawe Parliament. This was the
general line of argument; and, after a heated controversy, the motion was
rejected by an overwhelming majority. Grattan, it is true, both spoke and voted
in its favour; but his speech, as Northington rightly interpreted it, was not
intended to hurt the Government. It is easy to find excuses for him ; but his
conduct at this critical moment, though personal motives account for it, can
never be sufficiently deplored. With singular self-restraint, the Convention
manifested no resentment at the brusque rejection of its proposals, and, after
passing a loyal address to his Majesty, it quietly dissolved itself, on
December 2.
From this
moment, public interest in the subject began visibly to decline, and, though
resolutions in favour of Reform still continued to be passed at Volunteer
meetings, the consideration of questions more nearly affecting the material
welfare of the country gradually forced it into the background of politics.
Despite the commercial concessions of 1779, the trade of Ireland continued to
languish. There were several reasons for this, due partly to the incapacity of
Irish manufacturers, chiefly from lack of capital, to take full advantage of
the colonial trade opened to them, but mainly to the prohibitive duties placed
by England on all k'oods, except provisions and plain linens, imported from
Ireland. Unable to participate in the English market, Irish manufacturers
found it difficult to hold their own even in Ireland, owing to the merely
nominal duties placed on English imports. Competition, it was insisted, was
impossible unless they were provided with some sort of protection. There was a
good deal of reason in the argument; and, early in 1784, the matter was brought
before Parliament by Luke Gardiner. The distress
1784-6] Corn Laws.-Pittfs project of a Commercial
Union. 603
prevailing
among the manufacturers of the metropolis was, he said, too well known to
members to require special proof. But the distress was not confined to Dublin.
It extended to every manufacturing town and to every industry in the kingdom.
The only remedy was the imposition of a light duty on imports, just sufficient
to place Irish manufacturers on a level with their English competitors. The
House, however, was unwilling to give any cause of offence to England and
rejected the proposal. Gardiner, it was said, had mistaken the causes of the
distress which were to be found rather in an inadequate supply of bread-stuffs
than in industrial depression. To remedy this evil, the new Attorney- General,
John Foster, gave notice of his intention to introduce a Bill to regulate the
corn trade and to promote agriculture. The Bill (which provided for a system of
bounties) passed rapidly through Parliament, and received the royal assent on
May 14. It is Said that Foster’s Com Laws altered the entire face of Ireland,
and turned her from a purely grazing and corn-importing country into an
agricultural and corn-producing land. It would be more correct to say that they
enabled her to take advantage of the economic situation created by the
extraordinary development, at this time, of England as a manufacturing country,
and thus indirectly led to that result. But the effect of the Corn Laws was not
immediate. Distress continued unabated, and the indignation at the rejection of
the demand for Protection found vent in serious riots and the revival of
non-importation agreements.
The Lord
Lieutenant, the Duke of Rutland, who had succeeded Northington, when Pitt came
into office on the downfall of the Coalition Ministry in December, 1783,
proposed to adopt severe measures of repression. But Pitt, while agreeing that
disorder ought to be checked with a firm hand, was anxious to treat Ireland
with consideration. The recent constitutional changes had, in his opinion,
undoubtedly weakened the connexion between the two countries. Perhaps a union
would have been a better solution. But Ireland had preferred independence, and
the account was closed. All the same, it was clear that her new acquisitions
had not satisfied her. The demand for Protection, backed up by nonimportation
agreements, might be repressed for a time; but, sooner or later, it was bound
to make itself heard. Could not the concession of the Channel Trade be made the
basis of a commercial union? Pitt studied the problem long and seriously. On
February 7,1785, the Irish Secretary, Thomas Orde, submitted a plan calculated
to put Ireland on the same commercial footing as England, on condition that,
whenever the hereditary revenue in Ireland exceeded a sum which remained to be
fixed, the surplus should be appropriated towards the support of the naval
forces of the Empire. It was a large and statesmanlike plan, and its acceptance
would, as Pitt himself said, have made “England and Ireland one country in
effect, though for local concerns under distinct legislatures—one in the
communication of advantages, and of course in
504 Commercial proposals dropped.—Tithes. [1785-6
the
participation of burdens.” But the condition stuck in the throat of the Irish
Parliament. Experience had taught Irishmen how unwise it was to trust ministers
with the public purse. The hereditary revenue amounted to £652,000 and it was
steadily rising. It was proposed to amend the proposition by making the
contribution contingent upon the establishment of a balance between revenue and
expenditure in time of peace at £656,000. The amendment, much to Pitt’s
annoyance, when he heard of it, was accepted by Orde, and, in gratitude for the
liberal treatment of Ireland, the Commons at once created a substantial surplus
by voting new taxes to the amount of £140,000. On February 22, Pitt submitted
the proposals to the English House of Commons. The whole mercantile influence
of Lancashire and Yorkshire was thrown into the scale against them. Fox seized
on the alteration made in them by the Irish Parliament, to prove that Ireland
was being made the arbiter of English commercial interests. They were
withdrawn, revised, and again submitted to the House on May 12. From eleven
resolutions they had grown to twenty. Some of these affected patents,
copyright in books, the rights of fishing, and the like; but they were mainly
intended to meet the objection raised by Fox. To avoid the very hypothetical
danger of Ireland becoming “ the emporium of trade,” an obligation was placed
on the Irish Parliament to adopt, without delay or modification, all the
navigation laws then in force in England, or that might be afterwards made by
the British Parliament. With a tergiversation reflecting great discredit on
him, Fox denounced the clause as an insidious attack on the Irish Constitution.
He could not prevent the acceptance of the resolutions in England; but his
words awakened the' jealous fears of the Irish Parliament. A motion for leave
to bring in a Bill based on them only escaped rejection by nineteen votes, and
it was thereupon dropped. The news of its abandonment was hailed with general
satisfaction, and that night Dublin was illuminated. It would, perhaps, have
been better if the commercial treaty had never been proposed; but its rejection
in the circumstances was most deplorable. The measure was one which, as Pitt
admitted, sat very near his heart. Its withdrawal was regarded in Ireland as a
great constitutional victory. Perhaps both sides overestimated its importance.
But in linking the fortunes of Ireland to those of the Whig party in England
Grattan and his friends made a great mistake. No one of course could see that
the future was to belong to Pitt and not to Fox. At the time Fox’ factiousness
was regarded as patriotism and Pitt’s statesmanship misrepresented as
treachery. It was a misunderstanding fatal in its consequences for Ireland.
Meanwhile,
the effect of Foster’s Com Laws was beginning to be felt in the increased
prosperity of the country. There was still, however, considerable distress; and
in 1786 there was a fresh outburst of agrarian crime in Munster. The cause of
the disturbances was admitted to be the tithes. It was confessed that, so far
from being able to pay them, the
1787-9] King's illness.—Regency
question.—Conclusion. 505
peasantry
could find neither food nor clothing for themselves; but it was in vain that
Grattan pleaded for remedial measures, which should ease the peasant and at the
same time satisfy the clergy. Parliament refused to countenance what it
regarded as an attack on private property, and armed Government with
exceptional powers for the restoration of order. On the whole, however, as the
Irish Chancellor, Lord Lifford, wrote, in August, 1788, to the Marquis of
Buckingham (Earl Temple), who had been reappointed Viceroy on the death, in
October, 1787, of the Duke of Rutland, the country had, in his long experience,
never been quieter. But, even as he wrote, disquieting rumours arrived of the
terrible misfortune that had befallen the King. By the beginning of November it
was impossible to doubt the fact of his insanity. The situation created was
unprecedented; but, as everybody agreed that a Regent would have to be
appointed and that the only person who could be so appointed was the Prince of
Wales, there seemed little room for a crisis. Unfortunately, the Prince’s
appointment meant a change of Ministry; this was the one fact that possessed
any real interest; and for Ireland it was the all-important fact. If Fox
succeeded to power, the young Constitution would be secured a free development,
and the balance of power would be definitely shifted to the side of the Opposition.
This was the opinion of Grattan and those who acted with him. That their
calculations were well based, was evident from the practical unanimity with
which the proposal to address the Prince of Wales to take upon himself the
government of the kingdom during his Majesty’s incapacity, was received in both
Irish Houses. As Fitzgibbon ironically remarked, all the hangers-on of office
had gone over to pay their devotions to the rising sun. On February 19, 1789,
both Houses waited on the Lord Lieutenant to request him to transmit the
Address. He refused point-blank. Whether he acted constitutionally may be
doubted; but his refusal brought into prominence the weak point in the Irish
Constitution, viz. the inability of Parliament to control the Administration.
The difficulty was surmounted by the nomination of a Parliamentary Commission
to present the Address personally. But, by the time the Commissioners reached
London, the King had recovered his health. His recovery sealed the fate of the
Irish Parliament. Pensioners and placemen, scenting danger, drifted back to
their allegiance. To make it easier for them Government held out an amnesty to
all who repented. Those who were too proud or too independent to accept it,
were dismissed. Corruption once more became the order of the day. The end did
not come immediately. The Irish Parliament had still ten years of sickly
existence before it. But, even in 1789, the Union was a foregone conclusion.
The boasted independence of the Irish Parliament had proved a sham. Its
corruption was past dispute. It had refused to reform itself when the
opportunity offered, and it was itself mainly responsible for its own fate.
(1) THE MOGHUL EMPIRE.
The points of
connexion between the histories of Europe and Asia, and the reciprocal
influence, moral and material, exercised from time to time upon each other by
the two continents, would provide an attractive subject of enquiry, It might
begin with the Asiatic conquests pf Alexander the Great, who founded an Eastern
empire which, under his successors, spread Hellenic ideas and institutions
throughout all the regions that had been subject to the great Iranian monarchy,
from the Mediterranean beyond the Euphrates almost up to the confines of India.
The changes that followed his campaigns were wide and lasting. For, although
Alexander’s empire was reft asunder by partition among his successors, yet the
Macedonian Greeks seem to have long maintained their general ascendancy as a
ruling race, held together by the ties of common nationality, political
interest, and intellectual superiority, in the midst of a vast indigenous
population: When the Romans took over from the Asiatic Greeks the dominion over
the lands west of the Euphrates, their strong, organised administration
enforced order and restrained barbarism , for several centuries, and cleared
the ground for planting Christianity. In the seventh century ensued an event of
supreme historical importance, the rise of the Mohammadan Faith; and in the
long conflict between Islam and Christianity the Greek empire at Constantinople
wag gradually dismembered; until the final triumph of the Osmanli Sultans swept
out of western Asia both Christianity and civilisation. From the middle of the
fourteenth century may be dated the extinction of all European dominion in
Asia. During the next century the Asiatic continent was slowly recovering from
the devastations of the Mongol hprdes under Tamerlane, who had dispersed
armies, broken up kingdoms, and uprooted all political landmarks from the
Chinese Wall to the Hellespont. The records of that age contain little more
than the rise and fall of ephemeral rulerships, alternately won and lost in the
strife among fierce tribal confederacies;
East and West in the
sixteenth century. 507
but towards
the close of the fifteenth century this confusion abates; and the period which
follows, so far as it relates to India, is the subject of this section.
Erskine, in
the introductory chapter of his History of the Moghul Empire under the two
first Emperors, Bibar and Hum&yun, takes the beginning of the sixteenth
century as the era in which the kingdoms of Europe began to settle down into
their permanent form of great compact States, absorbing the minor
principalities and feudatories under their absolute sovereignty. Something of
the same kind, he observes, happened at the same period, though to a different
extent, in Asia, where the incoherent rulerships and minor States were largely
obliterated and superseded by strong centralised monarchies. In a broad and
general way the parallel drawn by Erskine is correct. Early in the sixteenth
century the Osmanli Sultans at Constantinople were uniting under their
authority Syria, Egypt, in fact all the Asiatic provinces of the Roman Empire;
and by the middle of that century their despotism was at its climax of power
and expansion. At the same epoch Persia became consolidated under the able
dynasty of the Safevi Kings; and India fell under the sway of the Moghuls. And
it is important to remark, furthermore, that this simultaneous rise of
powerful military States in both continents produced interacting effects and
consequences that may be clearly traced in the history of the period; for at no
other time, perhaps, was the political situation in Europe more directly
influenced by events in Asia. The collisions of rival monarchies, in the
process of enlarging their realms and planting their dynasties, were felt in
reverberation across the world from west to east. Throughout the long contest,
in the sixteenth century, between France and the Empire of Charles V, the
Franco-Turkish alliance weighed heavily in the scale against the House of
Habsburg; it placed the Empire between an enemy on either flank. On the other
hand the desolating invasions of Hungary by Suleiman the Great were checked by
his Persian wars, which drew off and divided the Turkish armies; and towards the
end of his reign the Sultan was so involved in hostilities against Shah Tamasp
that he was compelled to make peace with the Emperor Ferdinand I; a diversion
which probably saved eastern Europe from dire calamities, since the Imperial
forces were no match for the Turk. In one of his letters from Constantinople,
Busbecq, Ferdinand’s ambassador, compares the patience, temperance, and
fighting qualities of the Turkish soldiers with the licence and loose
discipline of the Christian troops; and he declares that the result of a
meeting between two such armies cannot be doubtful. “ The only obstacle,” he
adds, “ is Persia, whose position on his rear forces the invader to take
precautions. The fear of Persia gives us a respite, but it is only for a time.”
At the same time, moreover, the consolidation of a powerful State under the
Safevi dynasty had an important bearing upon the course of Asiatic as well as
of European affairs. For, while on the west
508
The Mohammadan
dynasties in India. [1450-1525
Persia was
strong enough to embarrass the Osmanli Sultans; on the north-east the first
Safevi King had been cooperating with B&bar, the future conqueror of India,
against their common enemy, the Usbegs, had assisted him with an army to subdue
the countries along the Oxus, and had made it possible for him to fix himself
so firmly in Afghanistan, that he could eventually descend upon India. And
indeed the first three Moghul Emperors were considerably indebted for the
security of their north-western frontier beyond Afghanistan to their friendly
relations with the Persian rulers, who were so constantly engaged in
hostilities with the Turkish Sultans on their western side that they were very
willing te avoid trouble in the regions between Persia and India.
From the
eleventh century the whole region of upper India had been conquered by
successive Mohammadan invaders, who descended through the mountain passes from
central Asia to carve out their kingdoms on the rich plains below; and
throughout the fifteenth century rival dynasties, in perpetual strife with
each other, had fixed their headquarters in different parts of the country. In
the north and west the territory had been parcelled out among the tribal chiefs
from Afghanistan owing nominal allegiance to the Emperors at Delhi; until,
about 1450, Sultan Behlol, of the Lodi clan, who had been raised to the throne
By a powerful confederacy, imposed energetically his supremacy over the lesser
Princes^ and founded his dynasty. But early in the sixteenth century this kingdom
was again threatened with disruption. The Afghan feudatories were hard to keep
in subordination; and under the weak rule of Sultan Ibrahim Lodi they were
falling into rebellion, conspiring and intriguing at home and abroad, and
throwing off their allegiance to the Delhi sovereignty. Four considerable
Mohammadan kingdoms had become independent in the west and south; while in
central India the Hindu chiefs of the Rajput clans were gathering strength from
the dissensions among the Mohammadan leaders, the enemies of their race and
religion. None of these principalities, except the Rajput chiefships, had any
root in the land or natural stability; though the Lodi Sultan still maintained
predominance by a numerous army and the possession of ample revenues. The
general condition of the country and of its government, distracted by internal
commotions and the alarms of civil war, undoubtedly pointed towards impending
changes, and offered a favourable opportunity for another foreign invasion.
Zahirruddin
Mahmud Bdbar was by descent a Khan of the Chagatdis, a clan which took its name
from the son of the famous Mongolian conqueror Chingis Khan. Although in
Bdbar’s day the word “ Moghul ” denoted a separate and hostile clan, it
nevertheless became affixed by common use to the northern tribesmen whom he led
into India, and to the dynasty that he founded there. He was bom in 1483, the
hereditary
chief of
Ferghana, a petty principality beyond the Oxus. After fighting from his
earliest youth to maintain his birthright, he was compelled to abandon it in
1504, when he turned his arms against Afghanistan; and in the course of the
next seven years he contended indefatigably against many vicissitudes of
fortune, until, by the aid of the Persian King, he established himself at
Kabul, where he became engaged in long and indecisive contests with the unruly
Afghan tribes. Between 1514 and 1523 he made four expeditions into India, upon
the pretext of his right to the throne by descent from Tamerlane; he laid hold,
more or less firmly, of the upper Punjab, and placed a garrison at Lahore. But
his fourth incursion had been disconcerted by a tribal outbreak in the
mountains behind him, which convinced him that no plans of permanently
conquering India could succeed without a solid base of operations in
Afghanistan; so for the next two years he put all his strength into the work of
reducing Kandahar and the country adjacent, and of repelling an inroad made by
the Usbegs from the north.
When the
highlands had been pacified and effectually overawed, Bibar set out in 1525
upon his fifth and decisive expedition into India. On his march he was joined
by several Afghan nobles, malcontents and refugees from the Lodi Government,
who brought over to his side their troops and local support; and with their
reinforcements he advanced against the far more numerous army of Sultan
Ibrahim, who was encamped at Pdniput. There, after a fierce encounter, he won
a complete victory. The Sultan was killed on the field; Bdbar seized Delhi and
distributed the imperial treasury as prize-money to his followers; he pushed on
to Agra; and the capture of these two great cities gave him possession of all
the broad and fertile plains lying between and along the upper streams of the
Ganges and Jumna. The provinces east of the Ganges made some resistance, which
was soon overcome; but in the west, beyond the Jumna river, a formidable
confederacy was gathering against him. The famous R&na Sanga of Oodipur had
mustered all the fighting force of the Rajput clans and was marching upon Agra
with strong contingents from some of the leading Afghan nobles, who had by this
time perceived that a Moghul Emperor, firmly seated on the Delhi throne, would
speedily make an end of their local independence. Bibar set out from Agra to
meet his antagonist near Bidna, where he threw up entrenchments. Both the Hindu
and Mohammadan commanders of the two armies were skilful and daring soldiers,
well trained by long experience of war. Bdbar’s north-countrymen had been disheartened,
like Alexander’s Macedonians, by the Indian climate; and his captains were
daunted by the multitude of the enemy; they pressed him to retreat, and it was
only by entreaty and exhortation that they were persuaded to stake their
fortunes upon another pitched battle. The Rajput strength lay almost entirely
in cavalry; they made a furious onslaught upon Bdbar’s position; but they
suffered heavily from his
510
The
Moghul empire founded. [1525-37
artillery,
and when their charges slackened he threw his horsemen upon either flank,
making a simultaneous advance against their centre, which broke1 up
the Rajput army into irreparable confusion. Although they still fought
desperately, they were thoroughly beaten. Some of the principal Rajput chiefs
were slain; Rana Sanga, who escaped in the rout, died within a year; the broken
clans fell back into their own country; and B&bar’s victory, which
extinguished all serious danger to his dominion, left him free to extend and
confirm it in two or three successful campaigns during the few remaining years
of his life. When he died, in 1530, his authority was supreme over almost the
whole of the wide Indian plains from the Indus to the confines of Bengal—the
region which has always been the seat of empire; while his son Humayun held
Afghanistan for him with the help of the Persians. Bdbar’s courage,
perseverance, and indefatigable activity of mind and body, his adventurous and
triumphant career, rank him among the foremost of those men, famous in the
history of nations at this period, who created or completed Asiatic monarchies
quite as splendid and powerful as any of the contemporary sovereignties in
Europe. No other authentic autobiography has been written by an Oriental prince
like the vivacious narrative in which Bdbar has described his own habits and
character, with the events of an adventurous life extending over not more than
forty-eight years.
But the
foundations of the new dominion were still unsettled; and the reign of Humayun,
the second Emperor, was speedily interrupted by revolts and grave misfortunes.
Just as in Europe disputed successions were constantly kindling great wars, so,
throughout the period of the Moghul empire, each Emperor, on his succession,
had to fight for his throne. Primogeniture carried an acknowledged right of
little use to those who were incapable of enforcing it; for in practice the
demise of the Crown was determined by the ordeal of battle; and one potent
cause of the strength and stability of the Moghul dynasty was that for more
than a century the imperial title passed in this manner to the ablest
representative of the family. Humdyun’s succession was at once challenged by
his brother, K&mr&n, who advanced from Kabul and occupied the Punjab;
and insurrections broke out in the eastern and southern provinces. The Emperor took
the field with promptitude and vigour; but these simultaneous outbreaks
diverted his forces and disconcerted his strategy. The heirs of the Lodi
kingdom, which Bdbar had destroyed, rallied their partisans among the Afghan
nobles, the most formidable of whom was Sher Shah, an Afghan chief of real
military genius, who had taken up arms on the south-east. Against these rebels
Humdyun marched; but while he was engaged with them the independent King of
Guzerat, Bahddur, began hostilities in the west; and, although Bahadur was
defeated by the imperial army, he renewed the war later and carried it on until
he died in 1537. Meanwhile Sher Shah, with whom the Emperor had at first
contrived to make terms, had
collected his
forces, and was now advancing from Bengal upon Agra. Hum&yun led out an
army to meet him; but on the banks of the Ganges he suffered a crushing defeat
(June, 1539), which completely ruined his cause. He fled northward into the
Punjab, making vain attempts to rally adherents; while Sher Shah, who had now proclaimed
himself Emperor, followed in pursuit, capturing both Humiyun’s capitals, Agra
and Delhi, until, finding the Punjab untenable, he took refuge in Afghanistan
with his brother Kdmr&n, who at first joined forces with him, but
subsequently deserted him. After wandering through Sinde and Beluchistan, the
Emperor ended his flight in exile at the Court of the Persian King. Shah
Tamasp, although his behaviour towards the fugitive Emperor was at first cold
and haughty, eventually agreed to assist him with troops to recover the Afghan
fortresses, on condition that Kandahar should be made over to Persia. So, in
1545, Humdyun crossed the border again into Afghanistan, where his brother
K&mr&n, who was ruling there independently, was by no means inclined to
make way for him. Many partisans joined his standard; he seized Kandahar, and
occupied Kabul; but for the next ten years he was entangled in long and hard
campaigns, thwarted by revolts, conspiracies, reverses, and all the
complications of a war in which the tribal chiefs had no scruple about changing
sides; until finally he beat down resistance of every kind, destroyed
K&mrdn’s party and drove him out of the country. Having thus reconquered
the whole of Afghanistan and Kashmir, he prepared to descend upon India, where
Sher Shah and his heirs had been reigning in his stead.
The moment
was favourable for his enterprise. Sher Shah had been killed at the siege of
Kalinjar in 1545; the rulership had fallen into feeble hands; and four rivals
were competing for it. The whole kingdom was distracted by civil war and
intestine confusion ; the frontier garrisons had been withdrawn to take part in
the contest for supremacy at the capital. Humdyun swept the upper Punjab clear
of enemies, with little resistance from the disorganised and divided forces of
the Afghan Sultans; he marched straight upon Delhi, dispersed an army that
offered battle at Sirhind, occupied the capital, and replaced himself upon the
imperial throne, after fourteen years of strenuous contention against hardship
and adversity. Some desultory fighting ensued in the lower provinces ; but
Hum&yun had securely established his authority when he died, from an
accidental fall, within six months after his triumphant restoration.
To his son,
Akbar Shah, who was thirteen years old at his father’s death, Humdyun
bequeathed an unfinished conquest, and a dominion whirh hardly extended beyond
the Punjab and the districts round Delhi and. Agra. In India, and even in
Afghanistan, the Moghul power still represented little more than another
successful invasion of Tartar hordes from beyond the Oxus; it had struck no
roots into either country:
512
Akbar’s accession and
successes.
[1555-95
it was
encompassed by rivals and insurgents. The preservation of Akbar’s throne during
his minority was due to the energy, in war and administration, of Bairam Khan,
Hum&yun’s best general, who took charge of the government at Delhi, put
down a serious rising in the Kabul highlands, and forced the adherents of the
old reigning Afghan family in India to lay down their arms. When, however,
Akbar assumed, in his eighteenth year, the supreme authority, he found means of
ridding himself with politic ingratitude of a Minister who was inconveniently
powerful and popular. The young Emperor lost no time in proving his eminent
capacity. He struck right and left at rebels and enemies; he defeated the
Afghan chiefs who had declared against him in the eastern provinces ; he
repelled an inroad led into the Punjab by his brother Mirza Hakim; and, having
rapidly suppressed all opposition to his internal authority, he proceeded to
organise his government and to push forward the boundaries of his empire;
During the next twelve years the strongholds of the Rajput clans in central
India were taken and garrisoned, and their chiefs brought under allegiance to
his sovereignty. In western India Guzerat and Sinde were annexed; and the rich
province of Bengal submitted after some tedious and troublesome campaigns. In
the far north Kashmir was regained for the empire; and in 1582, when his
brother Hakim again broke into the Punjab from Afghanistan, Akbar fell upon him
with an army, drove him back and followed him into the mountains, pursued him
to Kabul and restored the imperial jurisdiction over this most important
frontier province. It is true that the unruly Afghan tribes were never
completely pacified; but, so long as the important fortresses and the lines of
communication were held by Moghul governors, they attempted no further control;
and the recapture of Kandahar from the Persians in 1594 gave them sufficient
mastery over the whole country. The death of Shah Tamasp had been followed by
internal commotions in Persia, which removed for some time any fear of
reprisals from that quarter; and the historian Ferishta remarks that Akbar’s
military dispositions “ had raised a wall of disciplined valour ” against
enemies in the north.
It was not
until he had thoroughly pacified upper India, overpowered the Rajput chiefs,
and secured his position in Afghanistan, that Akbar, toward the close of his
reign, undertook the subjugation of the independent kingdoms in the south. In
1586 his armies had invaded, with partial success, the region commonly called
the Dekhan* which may be loosely described as extending from below the Vindhya
range of hills as far southward as the Tungabhadra river. Some of the territory
in the northern part of this region had been annexed; but the kingdom of
Ahmednagar resisted effectually. In 1595, when fierce disputes broke out among
claimants to the rulership, the imperial troops again attacked Ahmednagar, and
were repulsed by the Queen Regent, Ch&nd Bibi, a princess whose high spirit
and romantic intrepidity are
1594-1605] Akbar at the height of his power.
513
famous in
Indian tradition. But in 1599 the city was besieged by superior forces under
Prince Murdd, Akbar’s son; and the kingdom became a dependency of the empire.
The realm of
Akbar, at its full expansion, may be said to have had its north-western
frontier on the Oxus and the confines of Persia, and to have included all upper
and central India down to the Bay of Bengal on the south-east. To the south his
sovereignty had shifting and ill-defined limits, for which the Godavery river
may be taken as an approximate demarcation. Yet the tribes in Afghanistan had
never been thoroughly tamed, while in southern India the principalities outside
his jurisdiction were restless and hostile; so that at each extremity the
Moghul empire was exposed to revolt or attack. This, however, is the normal
situation of Asiatic rulerships, which have no fixed delimitation, and whose
territories are continually expanding or contracting as the balance of their
respective military power rises or falls. »
Nevertheless,
when Akbar died in 1605, after a reign that synchronises closely with the reign
of the English Queen Elizabeth, he transmitted to his successor the
best-ordered and richest empire of that time in Asia, divided and subdivided
throughout into provinces and districts, with the rent-roll of each division
carefully estimated and recorded, under minute regulations, for assessment of
the land-tax. His revenue system was based upon a detailed measurement of the
culturable area, an investigation of the average produce, and a limitation of
the proportion to be iemanded, in cash instead of in kind, by the State. The
rent calculated upon these data was fixed for ten years. It is not to be
supposed that this system was actually enforced in all the outlying tracts, or
that the measurements were actually carried out everywhere. Yet, although
Akbar’s reforms fell into neglect during the wars and disorders of the later
Emperors, his great administrative principle—that an equitable adjustment of
the land revenue is the basis of good government in India— lias been maintained
as the ground-plan of all subsequent settlements between the State and the
landowners or tenants up to the present day.
The fortunes
of every hereditary dynasty, at critical epochs, depend on the chance of its
producing a representative fitted to cope with the needs and emergencies of his
time. The Emperor Akbar happened to be endowed with a remarkable combination of
the qualities required by the situation of the Moghul empire at the moment when
he came to the throne. He united high military ability with political genius; he
could lead expeditions and suppress internal rebellion with skill and
resolution; he understood the art of ruling; and his wise government quieted
the people whom he subjected to his arms. The territories which he conquered
were never lost again by him; they fell away through the misrule of his
successors. He attached the Rajput chiefs to his family by matrimonial
alliances; he strove to win' the confidence of all classes
of his
subjects by tolerance and conciliation; he aimed at softening religious antipathies
by the humanising influence of intellectual culture. He had been a man of war
from his youth upward, overburdened with the affairs of a vast dominion ; yet
in his later years he became profoundly interested in theological'
speculation; his mind was powerfully drawn toward the abstruse philosophies of
Brahmanism. The atmosphere of India, which has a decomposing effect on all
positive creeds, fostered Akbar’s innate propensity toward sceptical ideas*
which carried him far above the easy indifference that is a marked feature in
the general character of the Moghul Emperors before Aurungzeb. None of them
were fanatics ; they were better trained in arms than in articles of faith;
they were foreigners ruling over an immense population, among whom the Hindu
unbelievers far outnumbered the Mohammadans. The Emperor Bdbar’s memoirs show
him to have been a jovial free- liver, who noted with a contrite heart his
frequent wine-parties ; and an anecdote told of his son Hum&yun proves him
to have been no austere Islamite. As this Emperor1 was riding with
his brother they saw a’dog defiling a Mohammadan tomb, whereupon the brother'
made the pious observation that the man buried there had been a notorious
heretic. “ Yes,” replied Hum&yun, “ and the beast of a dog represents
orthodoxy,” It may be remarked, generally, that the Mongolian or Turkish races
have bred mighty conquerors, and have founded dynasties that are still ruling
from Constantinople to Pekin; but that none of the great prophets or
propagators of spiritual ideas has arisen from among them. Akbar stands alone
among all their great temporal rulers as a philosophic autocrat, absorbed in
formulating the doctrines of a new eclectic religion. He instituted a kind of
metaphysical society, over which he presided in person, and in which he
delighted in pitting against each cthei Persian mystics,, Hindu pantheists,
Christian missionaries, and orthodox Mohammadans., . He even assumed by public
edict- the spiritual headship of his empire, and declared himself the first
appellate judge of ecclesiastical questions. “ Any opposition,” said the edict,
“ on the part of subjects to such orders passed by His Majesty shall involve
damnation in the world , to come, and loss of religion and property in this
life.” The liturgy of the Divine Faith, as it was named, was a sort of Iranian
sun-worship, embodying eclectic , doctrines and the principle of universal
tolerance. We may be reminded that the Roman Emperor Julian adopted, like
Akbar, the sun as the image of all-pervading divinity; and that he also
asserted supreme pontifical authority.! In each instance the new theosophy
disappeared at the death of its promulgator; for great religious revolutions
are never inaugurated by temporal authority, but invariably begin among the people.
Nothing, however, could demonstrate more clearly the strength of, Akbar’s
government than the fact that he could take upon himself, spiritual supremacy,,
and proclaim with impunity doctrines that subverted the
I605-21] Wars of Jehangir in south-western India.
515
fundamental
law and the primary teaching of Islam. In no other Mohammadan kingdom could the
sovereign have attempted such an enterprise without imminent peril to his
throne. Akbar’s political object was to provide some common ground upon which Hindus
and- Mohammadans might be brought nearer toward religious unity; though it is
hardly necessary to add that no such modus vivendi has at any time been
discovered.
The prudent
and powerful government of Akbar had left the empire, at his decease, in complete
internal tranquillity, with the exception of some temporary disturbances in
Bengal. And as Prince Selim, who took the title of Jeh&ngir on his:
accession, was the only surviving son, he had to contend against no serious
opposition; for his own son Khusru, who raised a futile rebellion in the Pui
ab, was easily defeated and cast into prison. But in south-west India, which
had never submitted patiently to the overlordship of the Moghuls, the
inevitable troubles, recurrent during the whole period of their dynasty, soon
began again. The kingdom of Ahmednagar, which Akbar had reduced to vassalship,
was now entirely in the hands of the Abyssinian, M&lik Ambar, a Minister
who had usurped all power, and whose fame as a soldier and statesman is still
remembered. He founded a new capital at Aurungabad, and so effectively repulsed
an army sent against him by the Emperor that he was left for some years
unmolested. In 1617, however, when Mdlik Ambar’s position had been weakened by
the jealousy of rival factions, Prince Kharram (the future Emperor Shah’ Jehan)
attacked him in great force, recovered some fortresses, and reduced him to
submission; yet although' M&lik Ambar was again defeated in 1621, he was
never finally overcome or dispossessed. It was in the time when these and other
complications had brought Jehangir into central India that Sir Thomas Roe, the
ambassador sent by James I to the Moghul Government, travelled up from Bombay
to join the Emperor at Ajmir. His letters give a description of the i country’s
condition, of the imperial Court and camp, and generally of the arbitrary
ill-regulated administration, that throws much light on the actual state of
India under this reign. The highways were most insecure for traffic or travel,
though robbers and rebels were speedily executed when caught; and in outlying
districts the central authority was little regarded by local chiefs or leaders
of banditti. Nevertheless it was an empire of great wealth and might,
maintaining a large army of various races from the revenues yielded by a vast
territory. Sir Thomas Roe, who had free intercourse with some of the principal
officials, writes that “in revenue the Moghul doubtless exceeds either Turk,
Persian, or any Eastern prince; the sums I dare not name.”
Thomas
Coryate, who had travelled from Constantinople to India, and was at Ajmir with
Roe, compares Jeh&ngir’s annual income with that of the Osmanli Sultan, and
says that it was far greater ; while
Captain
Richard Hawkins, who had been high in the imperial service, has given a
detailed account of the immense quantity of gold and silver coin stored up in
the treasury. The opulence and rude splendour of the Court, its superb
ceremonial, the crowd of officials, the ambassador!, from Persia, “ Tartary,”
and all the minor States, independent or tributary, of India, the profusion of
jewellery and gorgeous apparel, astonished these Englishmen; they contrast this
outward grandeur with the barbarous methods of government—“ an hundred naked
men left slain in the fields for robbery,” when the camp was shifted—they
remark the mixture of greed and capricious generosity in Jehdngir’s dealings
with the people. Sir Thomas Roe, who followed the Emperor’s march out of Ajmir
with his army and his retinue of nobles and functionaries, declares that the
camp, when it was pitched, had a circuit of little less than twenty English
miles. This included long rows of shops for the supply of the commissariat and
traffic of all kinds, with a miscellaneous horde of camp-followers and
hangers-on ; and, to Roe’s wonder, the whole city of tents had been set up, he
asserts, in four hours. In the midst of all the pride and pomp -of his court
Jehangir could be frank and convivial privately ; he enjoyed select
wine-parties with his boon companions; he admitted Europeans to his table and
to his service, and discoursed freely with them. How little religious prejudice
was allowed to interfere with his statecraft may be judged by the fact that he
commanded three of his nephews to embrace Christianity, with the object, as Captain
Hawkins intimates, of disqualifying them from raising any troublesome claims to
succeed him on the throne.
In 1611 the
Emperor had married Nur Jehdn, the daughter of a Persian who came to India in
search of employment. On his way he fell into such destitution that he
abandoned the child, just bom, by the roadside in Afghanistan. She was saved by
a merchant in some caravan, and was brought to Agra, where her beauty, as she
grew up, captivated Prince Selim, the future Emperor Jehangir. She was first given
in; marriage to a Persian, whom she accompanied to his estate in Bengal, where
the1 husband, conceiving himself to be insulted at an interview by
the provincial governor, stabbed him, and was himself instantly slain.
Jehdngir, who was now on the throne, sent for the widow and married her. She
rapidly obtained complete ascendancy over the Emperor; her father was appointed
Prime Minister; and thenceforward in all the politics of the reign she played a
leading part with admirable courage, cleverness, and high-spirited fidelity to
her1 consort in times of great danger. “Nur Jehdn,” Sir Thomas Roe
notes, “fulfils the observation that in all actions of consequence a woman is
not only' always the ingredient, but commonly a principall drug of most virtue,
not incapable of conducting business, nor herself void of wit and subtilitie.”
And he intimates that a discourse upon the arcana imperii, the inner politics
of the capital,would discover a Noble
Prince and an
excellent wife, a faithful counsellor, a craftie stepmother, an ambitious
sonne, a cunning Favorite^—all reconciled by a patient King, whose heart was
not understood by any of these.” Nur Jeh&n steadily supported her step-son,
Prince Kharram the heir-apparent, until her own daughter married JeMngir’s youngest
son, when she transferred all her influence to the promotion of his candidature
for the succession. The result was that Prince Kharram (afterwards the Emperor
Shah Jeh&n) took up arms, was defeated and pardoned, but rebelled again,
and eventually fled into exile. She then planned the ruin of Mohabat Khan,
Jeh&ngir’s best general, whose power and reputation might interfere with
her designs. Mohabat obeyed a summons to the Emperor’s camp, but instead of
submitting to arrest he captured Jehdngir in his tent by a night attack, foiled
a desperate attempt made by Nur Jeh&n to rescue him, and carried both the
Emperor and his wife, who had joined her husband in captivity, to Afghanistan.
For the eventual recovery of his liberty and authority Jehdngir was entirely
indebted to Nur Jehdn, who fomented discord and mutiny among Mohabat’s troops,
until a sudden and daring stratagem set him free. Mohabat escaped, to join
Prince Kharram in the Dekhan; but, in 1627, JeMngir’s death stopped the civil
war; and the new Emperor, Shah Jehdn, took formal possession of the throne
without opposition. Nur Jehin withdrew into seclusion, and lived on for twenty
years, treated always with liberality and singular consideration.
Jehdngir,
when he died in 1627, left his throne to be the prize, as usual, of the
strongest competitor. His two sons Kharram and Shahryar at once took the field
against each other; and Shahryar seized Lahore, but was speedily defeated
before Kharram reached his capital at Agra, where he was proclaimed Emperor with
the title of Shah Jeh&n, and his brother was before long put to death. The
disturbances which invariably beset each new ruler of this extensive empire,
with its ill- assorted provinces, and numerous recalcitrant feudatories, and
its restless tribes, soon broke out. In the north an irruption of the Usbegs,
who were besieging Kabul, had to be repelled. In the country west of the Jumna
river a chief of the Bundela Rajputs threw off his allegiance, and was not
reduced to submission without sharp fighting. Then Khan Jehdn Lodi, an Afghan
commander in the imperial service, a man of intractable temper, suspecting that
the Court was plotting his destruction, marched away from Agra with his troops
in open mutiny. They were pursued and overtaken by the imperial forces ; but
though he lost many men in an engagement, Khan Jehdn made his way through the
woods and wolds of central India into the kingdom of Ahmednagar at Bijapur.
Shah Jehdn followed in pursuit, but the approach of an imperial army threatened
the independence of both kingdoms. The Regent of Ahmednagar joined the
mutineers; and, though he lost a battle, the war spread, involving the Emperor
in long and laborious campaigns. Bijapur
was besieged
by him in person, when its ruler laid waste all the surrounding country, which
was also ravaged by the Moghuls. After much fruitless and exhausting warfare
Bijapur and Golconda; agreed to pay tribute; the kingdom of
Ahmednagar was destroyed; and Shah JeMn returned to his capital; but it may be
said that from this time forward the Dekhan was in a state of chronic
turbulence arid smouldering insurrection against the authority of the Moghul
Emperors. From the !first establishment of their dominion, these
three kingdoms had formed a barrier that checked its extension southward by
combination to resist encroachment, by harbouring dangerous rebels and
(mutinous generals, by harassing warfare in a distant and difficult country.
Their leagufe was now broken, and their strength materially diminished; but,
since the control of the imperial sovereignty could never be enforced or
maintained, the unsettlement and dilapidation of all this region increased.
FrOm this period may be dated the first appearance, on the political stage, of
the Marathas, who fostered and propagated rebellion until it became an,
epidemic plague, which proved eventually fatal to the Moghul dynasty. ■
At the
opposite extremity of the empire, in Afghanistan, Shah Jehau’s affairs had at
first been remarkably prosperous. The important frontier fortress of Kandahar
was surrendered to him in 1637 by the Persian governor, who undertook to
reconquer the Oxus provinces, Balkh and Badakshan, which had been overrun by
the Usbegs. He soon found the northern tribes too strong for him; and Shah
Jehan brought an army to Kabul for his support; but after some victories in the
field the imperial troops, wearied out by incessant incursions from beyond the
Oxus and surrounded by active indefatigable enemies, were withdrawn. The
provinces were left in charge of an Usbeg prince, who had tendered his
allegiance to the Moghul; and Aurungzeb, the Emperor’s son, who had been left
in command, lost the greater part of his army in a calamitous retreat through
the Afghan passes. Meanwhile the Persians were preparing to recover Kandahar.
In the winter of 1648 Shah Abbas invested the town with a powerful force.
Aurungzeb marched under urgent orders from: headquarters to relieve it; but the
snow blocked the road froih Kabul and India; and, in spite of great exertions,
he could not reach the place in time to prevent its surrender. When at last he
arrived, in the spring of 1649, the Persian garrison made an obstinate defence,
much assisted by a Persian army which hovered round the besiegers and cut off
supplies. Aurungzeb was compelled to retire, and in the following year he was
equally unsuccessful. Three years later, the Emperor’s eldest son, Ddra Shekoh,
reneved the siege with a fresh army. Four: months were spent in unsuccessful
assaults, ending with the repulse of a final and desperate attempt to take the
fortress by storm. Whereupon D&ra led back his troops, enfeebled by heavy
lo^es %nd thoroughly discomfited, to India; and
Kandahar, the
most important frontier fortress of the empire, passed irretrievably out of the
possession of the Moghuls.
The hardship
and disasters of Afghan warfare, and his failures before Kandahar, had probably
convinced Aurungzeb that he could neither increase his military reputation nor
advance his. fortunes by campaigns in that region. He had since been
transferred to the command of the armies on the empire’s southern frontier,
where he soon contrived to foment intrigues which produced hostilities with the
kingdoms of Golconda and Bijapur. Against these adversaries, much less
formidable than the northern tribes, his operations were successful; and
meanwhile he could organise his troops, augment his power and personal
influence, and await the turn of events at the capital. His opportunity came in
1657, when his father fell dangerously ill, and Ddra Shekoh, his eldest brother,
took charge of the government at Agra. Shah Jeh&n had four sons, all in
the. prime of life, accustomed to military command, ambitious and jealous with
good reason of each other’s ascendancy; they lost no time in marshalling their
forces and asserting their respective claims. Prince Shujah, who was Viceroy in
Bengal, advanced toward the capital with the troops in his province. Prince
Mordd, Viceroy in Guzerat, laid hands on the provincial treasures, and assumed
the royal title. Aurungzeb assembled his troops for a march northward from the
Dekhan; but his movements were marked by politic circumspection; he held back
until Dara had defeated Shujah, and he prevailed upon Morad to make common
cause with him. These two princes led their united army toward Agra; and Dara
sallied Out to encounter them at a short distance from the capital, with a much
more numerous force. On D&ra’s side the furious onset of the Rajputs at one
moment brought Aurungzeb into imminent peril; but Dara’s elephant, on which he
was conspicuously leading the frontal attack, was struck by a rocket and became
so unmanageable that Ddra was ob* ged to mount a horse; When his men lost
sight of him the rumour flew about that he was killed; and as the death of
their commander meant the extinction of the cause for which they were fighting,
the whole army dispersed in general panic, leaving Aurungzeb and Mor&d
completely victorious. Dara, escaping with some cavalry to Agra, continued his
flight to Delhi; and the two princes occupied the capital, where Aurungzeb
deprived his father of all authority by placing him in honourable confinement.
His brother Mordd, being of no further use, was thrown into prison, and
executed some years later. From Delhi, i Ddra attempted to reach Afghanistan;
but Aurungzeb’s pursuit was so hot upon his track that he turned' southward
into Sinde, and after some circuitous journeying reappeared in Rajputana,
where the powerful chief of Jodhpur, after at first supporting, was finally
persuaded by Aurungzeb to desert him. At Ajmir he was again utterly defeated by
Aurungzeb, and wandered about India, an unhappy fugitive, until he was betrayed
into the hands of CH. xv.
520
State of India under
Shah Jehan.
[1657-61
his
brother, who immediately put him to death. Shah Jehdn, after eight years’
confinement as a state prisoner, ended his life in the palace at Agra. "
It was in
Shah Jehdn’s reign that the Moghul empire reached its climax of external
magnificence. His retinue, his brilliant Court, the grand scale of his civil
and military establishments, far surpassed anything that had been seen before
or after him in India. Splendid edifices, unmatched for size and beauty in the
Mohammadan world, still remain to commemorate his passion for architecture; and
he entirely rebuilt on a new site the city of Delhi, with its palace, marble
halls, and the great mosque. His general administration has been so often
praised that it must have been much superior to that of his predecessors; and
the historians of his time give him full credit for governing firmly and
consistently, with a generous disposition toward his subjects, and praiseworthy
solicitude for their welfare. But he was a despot, ruling with no system
effectively organised for controlling the abuses, the corruption, and the
tyranny of his subordinates. The letters of Bernier, a French physician, who
arrived in India about the end of Shah Jeh&n’s reign, and was for twelve
years in the service of Aurungzeb, contrast the opulence and glory of the
imperial capil als, the prodigal luxury of the grandees, the glittering
brilliancy of the Court, with the miserable impoverishment of the peasants and
artisans, and the squalid aspect of thei outlying towns and villages. Commerce
, and 'agriculture were overburdened with capricious exactions, and depressed,
by the general insecurity of all property. The wealth of the whole country was
sucked in’ from all parts of the empire to the great cities that were the
centres of government, to provide for the maintenance of a huge army, to
defray the cost of the imperial buildings, and to supply a vast outlay on the
sumptuous establishments of the official nobility, and on the horde of
adventurers and parasites by whom the Court was infested. Upon the expenditure
which flowed out in these various channels from the public treasury the
prosperity of such cities as Delhi and Agra so largely depended, that when the
Emperor marched out with his army and all his high officers of state, he was
followed by such a crowd of merchants and shopkeepers that the camp was, as Bernier
observes, little less than a travelling capital.
After four
years of intermittent warfare against rivals and insurgents Aurungzeb had
effectually disposed of all resistance to his authority, and was undisputed
lord of upper and central India, from the Himalaya mountains to the eastern and
western sea-coasts. But further south, in the Indian peninsula, the independent
Mohammadan kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda still held out :against the
encroachments of their powerful neighbour; though within their own territory
they were now threatened by a new and dangerous uprising against their
governments. This region of India is for the niost part a country of
flat-topped hills, fertile
1648-80]
Sivaji and the Maratha
revolt.
521
vales, and
long tracts of scrubby woodlands and stony wolds, spreading, with broad
interspaces of cultivated land, from the mountains on the west coast far
inland. It was studded with forts on craggy steeps among deep ravines; and
toward the sea the inner ranges were peopled by a rough and turbulent Hindu
folk, never thoroughly tamed by the Mohammadan dynasties that had been
overlords in this part of India from the fourteenth century. This region bore
the ancient name Maharashtra; its population, which was really a medley of
different tribes and castes, was known in northern India by the indefinite
designation of Maratha. The Maratha leaders had originally made their way
forward by service under the Mohammadan Kings in their wars against the
Moghuls; they obtained grants of land and the charge of troops; and, when these
kingdoms were being gradually weakened and overpowered by the imperial armies,
the Marathas rose to the front. About the middle of the seventeenth century
their famous chief, Sivaji, had collected a force of disbanded soldiery,
outlaws and plundering brigands, with which he seized some forts and districts
belonging to Bijapur, and dispersed a large army sent against him, having
assassinated its general, Afzal Khan, by treachery. The Bijapur King was
obliged to make peace with him, and to leave him in possession of considerable
territory; whereupon Sivaji laid the whole country round under contribution and
pillage. In one of his raids he plundered Surat, to the great damage of the
English merchants at that seaport: an exploit that greatly incensed Aurungzeb,
who despatched a large army to punish him.
Nevertheless
it was Aurungzeb’s policy to conciliate such a troublesome rebel. Sivaji’s
submission was accepted; he went to Delhi, fled back to his own country, and
was soon again capturing forts and laying waste the Moghul districts in open
defiance of the Emperor’s authority. During the next few years, while Aurungzeb
was occupied by an insurrection in Afghanistan, where a calamitous reverse had
for the time upset his government, the Maratha chief increased his fighting
power and extended his possessions, harassing and despoiling Bijapur and
Golconda. He had assumed a royal title, and had made an alliance with Golconda
to resist the imperial armies sent to attack that kingdom, when he died in
1680. His son, Sambaji, continued desultory hostilities against the Moghuls,
until he was captured and put to death by Aurungzeb. The confusion and disorder
in southern India were now seriously endangering the empire’s integrity on that
side. The Marathas were capturing hill forts, gathering into freebooting
companies under daring captains, and declaring themselves the champions of the
Hindu race and religion against Mohammadan oppression. It has been alleged that
the imperial generals purposely let the war run on instead of Rajastdn
terminating it by vigorous operations, lest they should be transferred to much
harder and more hazardous commands among the Afghan mountains. The Emperor
determined to assume the personal
522
Aurungzeb’s wars in southern
India. [1683-1707
command of
his southern armies, but he had driven the leading chiefs into revolt by acts
of bigotry and perfidy; and when he invaded their country they opposed him with
a formidable combination that was not broken up until two years’ hard fighting
had devastated their country and compelled them to accept a treaty. In 1683,
however, he threw his whole military foirce against them, determined to
extinguish resistance of every kind, to extirpate the Maratha bands, and to
subjugate all this region permanently. One of his generals advanced upon
Golconda, pillaged the town and the royal treasury, and left the kingdom
crippled by intestinal disorders and general dilapidation. Bijapur surrendered,
after a siege, to Aurungzeb, who imprisoned its King, annexed his territory,
and dismantled his fortress. He then turned again on Golconda, which was
reduced and finally ruined. The capture and execution of Sambaji had at first
intimidated the Marathas; but their principal chiefs raised the standard of
revolt in different places, collected strong bands of marauders, levied
blackmail on all the landholders, proclaimed a religious war of Hindus against
Mohammadans, and spread anarchy throughout the country whith had been
disorganised by the subversion of the two Mohammadan States.. The fall of those
Governments had thrown out of employ a swarm of mercenaries, and had stirred
up and set' free the elements of turbulence and riot among the armed peasantry,
so that any freebooting adventurer could recruit his freelances to harry the
outposts' and cut off the convoys of the Moghul army, to seize a fort, overawe
a district, and sequestrate the land re’vienue for the support of his men. They
lived on the country and impoverished the imperial treasury. Meanwhile
Aurungzeb ■ and his generals were pressing the main body of the Marathas
and recapturing some important fortresses; but although they struck some heavy
blows they could never cut the sinews of their active enemy; and to disperse a
compact force was only to break it up into guerilla hands.
It is clear
that Aurungzeb’s great enterprise—the conquest of south Indian—was a political
miscalculation as well as a military failure. The expansion of his empire
proved fatal to its solidity; he had seized more than he could hold ; he was
unable to enforce an unpopular despotism over distant provinces, where the
nature of the country favoured defence, among a people whom his intolerance had
provoked to obstinate resistance. His huge, unwieldy army, burdened with all the
furniture arid followers of a camp that was also a Court, was gradually worn
down by the attacks of a diffuse and impalpable enemy. Throughout the last
twenty-four years of his long reign, from 1683 to 1707, the Emperor was
commander-in-chief of his forces in the field, contending vigorously but vainly
against the growing strength of the Maratha hordes, which swarmed round him, as
a contemporary annalist said, like ants or locusts, ravaging his. lands,
appropriating his revenues, and rackrenting the peasantry; while his finances
were ruined by the drain of
excessive
military expenditure, and his troops became disheartened and insubordinate. On
his northern frontier the Afghan tribes were in perpetual revolt; in the south
he had been caught in a quicksand of misfortunes. Yet he strove stubbornly
against manifest adversity. Encompassed and pursued by his enemies, he
retreated to Ahmednagar, where he died in his eighty-ninth year, having reigned
just half a century No two rulers could be less alike in character than
Aurungzeb and Marcug Aurelius, yet one is reminded of the Roman Emperor
expiring in his Pannor’an camp after fourteen years of incessant frontier
warfare, when the Parthians were threatening Syria; and the barbarian tribes
were tiring out his legions on the Danube*
In a letter
which Aurungzeb dictated from his death-bed to his son he confessed that his
enemies were many, but pleaded, “Whatever good or evil I have done, it was for
you.” Bernier, who knew tiim intimately, admits that Aurungzeb gained his
throne by violent and terrible deeds, alleging in pflliation of them the cruel,
necessity that compelled a royal prince at each demise of the Crown to fight
for his own hand and winj or perish. • And he concludes the history of this
reign thus, “ I am convinced that a little reflection on all that has been here
written will induce my readers to regard Aurungzeb not as a barbarian, but as a
man of great and rare genius, a statesman, and a grand monarch.”
After
Aurungzeb’s death the empire fell into rapid decline, for the growth and
multiplication. of internal troubles disabled resistance to foreign aggression.
The inevitable war of succession began at once. Of Aurungzeb’s three sons the
eldest, Bahddur Shah, was proclaimed Emperor in northern India, and seized
Delhi; another strengthened himself in the south, while the third brother
marched upon Agra. Both of them were defeated and slain by Bahddur Shah; but in
central India the Rajput chiefs rose in rebellion, and the Punjab was overrun
by the Sikhs, a fierce and fanatical sect of Hindus, whom Aurungzeb had put
down with bigoted severity, and who broke out again fiercely after his death.
Bahddur Shah stormed their stronghold and killed their leader; but he died at
Lahore in 1711, having reigned barely five years. He was the last able ruler of
his dynasty, one who might have stayed for a time the crash of a falling
empire; and the flood-tide of insurrection was too strong for his incapable
successors. Hitherto, as has been seen, each Emperor had been the able man of
his family, chosen by the ordeal of battle. The process was now reversed; and
henceforward Emperors were selected for their impotence; they were set up and
pulled down by ambitious ministers or vicious favourites, whose intrigues and
factions completed the disorganisation of the Government.
The closing
annals of the Moghul dynasty^ record brief reigns with intervals of bloody
tumult, rebellions, privy conspiracies and assassina
tions. The
local governors and military commanders began to'parcel out their provinces
into independent principalities. Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Viceroy of southern India,
defeated the imperial armies, and founded the present State of
Haidar&b&d. Oudh and Bengal were slipping out of control; a band of
Afghan adventurers settled down as chiefs of Rohilkhand; and in western India
Poona became the capital of a formidable Maratha confederacy, whose armies
overran all the midlands, and ravaged the plains around Agra and Delhi. In the
midst of all this havoc and spoliation came news from without that Nadir Kuli
Khan, who now reigned by usurpation in Persia, had taken Kabul, and was
invading India. With a great army he descended upon Peshawar, traversed the
Punjab, routed the imperial forces, gave up Delhi to pillage and massacre, and
went back after rending from the Moghul all his provinces west of the Indus.
This fatal blow at the empire’s heart ^precipitated its destruction; for the
north-west frontier of India now lay open and defenceless. Within the next
forty years the splendid dominion founded by Babar’s conquests was completely
demolished. It was reduced to a few districts near Delhi, along the Ganges and
the Jumna rivers; and the Moghtd empire became a broken wreck, with a crowd of
plunderers quarrelling over its fragments. In 1747, when Nadir Shah was
murdered in his camp, Ahmad Shah Abdali, an Afghan chief who commanded a corps
in the Persian army, rode off with his tribesmen to their own country. At
Kandahar he was proclaimed King, and he soon took advantage of the distracted
condition of Persia and India to make himself an independent ruler of
Afghanistan, to invade the Punjab, and to place his garrisons at Lahore. In a
second expedition he sacked Delhi, and scoured the country as far as Agra,
retiring to his mountains when the summer heat spread sickness among his
troops. Then the Maratha confederacy, now at the zenith of their power, sent a
great army northward* which drove out Ahmad Shah’s garrisons, and swept over
the Punjab; but in the northern plains they met an adversary who was more than
their match. For in 1759 Ahmad Shah came down again upon India with all the
fighting men of the Afghan tribes; he marched along the skirts of the Himalayas
until he crossed the Jumna and placed himself in the rear of the Marathas, intercepting
their communications; The two armies met at Paniput, near Delhi, in the spring
of 1761, when the Marathas were routed with tremendous slaughter. After this
victory nothing opposed Ahmad Shah’s conquest of all northern India;
nevertheless he returned again to his highlands, leaving the dismantled
provinces of the empire to be appropriated by the various Powers that were now
contending for ascendancy in India. His successors kept their hold upon the
frontier districts of the Punjab and upon Kashmir; until early in the
nineteenth century the Afghans were finally driven back into their mountains by
the Sikhs. Meanwhile, from
1765 to 1771, the titular Emperor Shah Alam had been
living at Allahabad
under the
protection of the English Government, which was now established in Bengal. He
then found his way back to Delhi, where he was no more than a puppet in the
hands of the Marathas. Finally, in 1803, when Lord Lake defeated the Marathas,
and drove them out of Agra and Delhi, all the territory from the Jumna river
and the Himalayas southeastward to Bengal (except Oudh) passed by cession and
conquest to the British Government; and the Moghul Emperor’s jurisdiction was
thenceforward circumscribed by the walls of his palace at Delhi. There for the
next fifty years he held his Court, a mere phantom of extinct sovereignty,
sitting crowned upon the ruins of a magnificent empire.
If, now, we
take a rapid survey of the course and constitution of the Moghul empire, we
find that it differed in no material respect from the ordinary type of Asiatic
despotisms. As it began with foreign conquest, with the subjugation of an
immense population by a band of Mohammadan invaders, the civil and military
services were kept mainly in the hands of Mohammadans—manyof them foreigners—and
were continuallyreinforced from abroad. The Court, Bernier says, was no more
than a miscellaneous crowd of aliens—Usbegs, Persians, Arabs, and Turks, who
filled almost all the high offices. The recruiting of the army was managed by
the chief commanders, who imported great numbers of men from their own country
or tribe, from Persia, Afghanistan, and various other parts of central Asia.
Under this system the military forces of the empire must have consisted very
largely of foreign mercenaries, almost entirely Mohammadan, excepting always
the contingents of the Bajput chiefs; for in India the Hindus so greatly
outnumbered the Mohammadans that the Emperors were obliged to rely principally
upon men of their own faith. The situation of a military autocrat necessitates
enlistment of the best fighting men wheresoever they can be found; and
throughout Asia the religious element is still a powerful bond of union and a
pledge of fidelity It may be observed that even in Europe the national army,
which strictly excludes aliens, and takes no account of sectarian divisions in
the ranks, is a very modem institution. But foreign mercenaries are radically
untrustworthy; they are apt to change sides on emergencies, or to desert a
falling throne; and so, when the Moghul Emperors could no longer command or
maintain discipline, their troops looked round for better leaders; the
professional soldier went where he expected to win.
It is clear
that in all governments of this type the mainspring is irresistible authority
in capable hands at the centre. So long as each successive Emperor gained his
throne, and held it against all challengers by personal superiority, the
sceptre passed to the fittest man of the family. The capacity of the four
Emperors who followed Babar is attested by the length of their respective
reigns, which covered in aggregate a hundred and forty-one years; for in Asia
a long rule is of necessity a strong rule; the Moghul empire depended entirely
upon
ch. xr.
vigorous
autocratic administration. It is a fact worth notice that the great towns of
Iiidiai seem never to have attained any municipal autonomy that might have
given them weight in politics; they played no part in the civil wars. Many of
the petty chiefs and large landholder? preserved independence with’n their own
domains and in outlying districts; but the practice of the Moghul government
was to level all obstacles to arbitrary power. The nobility created by the
Emperors was almost, entirely official; it contested mainly of high civil
officers and of military commanders, who held lands on service-tenure, and
could be dismissed at the sovereign’s pleasure. Most of these Omrah, as they
were called, were foreign adventurers, soldiers of fortune, or slaves and
parasites whom the Eiuperor promoted or degraded capriciously:, Another point
to be observed is that in India the great religious corporations never had the
influence that they have; possessed in other Mohammad an kingdoms..
In the Osmanli empire, far example, the Ulema, the expounders of the law of
Islaiii, have always kept the, Sultan in check; but in the general population
of India their authority could have little support, and could be disregarded by
the government. Throughout western Asia, up to the borders of India, the
Mohammad?ns had established complete political and religious supremacy; their
subjects were united under one religious law, which controlled and fortified
the civil power. But in India a general conversion to Islam was impossible; and
the Emperors could only rule by holding the balance between two great religious
communities, always ready to take up arms against each other. The combined
result of all these, facts and circumstances was an inordinate centralisation
of authority at the capitals, whereby the whole fabric became unstable and top-heavy;
so that when this supreme authority passed into feeble hands the empire,
loosened by internal revolt and battered by foreign enemies, toppled over into
irremediable collapse.. ,
Nevertheless
a weak and ill-governed rulership may last, long if it can resist foreign
aggression; but this was a danger to which the Moghul empire was peculiarly
exposed. We know that from the beginning of authentic history all Asiatic
invaders of India have made their entry from the west and north-west. On no
other side,.in fact, was it possible for armies to traverse the lofty mountain
ranges which separate, the northern plains of India from central Asia: they can
only reach India by a few passes through the highlands, or by a circuitous
route across barren regions on the south-west. But for the conquest of India it
was never sufficient to bring an army successfully through the passes; it was
also essential that the invader should be able to keep them open behind Viim ;
and for this purpose it was necessary to begin by securing a base in
Afghanistan to hold in strength the fortresses which cover the few practicable
roads thrpugh the mountains, and to guard the narrow defiles opening upon the
plains. Since the days of Alexander the unruly Afghan tribes have always risen on
an army’s flanks and rear, have
harried the
march, intercepted convoys, and attempted to cut off communications. The
centre of this country may be roughly described as a huge oblong quadrilateral
block of mountains. On the east its steep ranges overlook the Indian frontier.
But on the north-western side of Afghanistan, beyond the mountain ranges, and
toward the lower course of the Oxus river, the lands are comparatively level,
sparsely populated, and easily accessible from Persia and central Asia. On the western
side also, from Herat to Kandahar, the country is open, and traversable by
armies; while southward is a sandy desert stretching down to Beluchistan. To
invade Afghanistan from the north and west is much less difficult than to do so
from the east, where whoever occupies the mountain quadrilateral holds the
point of vantage, the key of the Indian gates, for attack or defence. No
invader by land has found it possible to conquer and establish himself in India
without keeping strong garrisons in Afghanistan ; and so long as he was master
of the highlands he could subdue the plains at his leisure.
But the next
difficulty is to hold the mountains from a base in the plains; for whenever a
successful conqueror has settled down in India—in a wide and wealthy region,
where great armies can be maintained on an ample revenue—some fresh invasion
from the west, or a tribal revolt, has threatened his position in Afghanistan.
All the successors of the Emperor Akbar were worried and weakened by exhausting
campaigns and frequent military reverses in the Afghan mountains, which
diverted their forces and cramped their operations against rebels and rivals
elsewhere ; while beyond those mountains the necessity of defending a distant
frontier on the Oxus or the Helmand river laid an intolerable strain on their
military resources, locking up their best troops in the far north at times when
they were entangled in the wars of southern India. The consolidation, in the
sixteenth century, of Persia under the powerful Safevi dynasty had given them
an enterprising neighbour who was constantly encroaching upon the debatable
lands between the two empires. The loss of Kandahar in 1648 made a serious
breach in their strategic frontier on this side; and during the seventeenth
century the government at Delhi was continually losing ground in Afghanistan.
In 1666 Shah Abb&s led a great Persian army by Kandahar against Kabul. He
died on the march, and his forces withdrew; but his inroad was the signal for a
general revolt of the Afghan tribes from the Moghul authority. And finally, in
the eighteenth century, when Nddir Shah expelled the Moghul governor from Kabul
and seized all their territory west of the Indus river, the barriers that
protected India from invasion were thereby completely destroyed; and the gates
of India, which had been held for two hundred years by the Moghul dynasty, were
irrecoverably lost, to the mortal injury of an enfeebled and sinking empire.
In
Afghani,tan, therefore, we have a striking example of a poor
and barbarous
country, whose situation and natural strength nevertheless gives' it great
political importance; for its strategical posi on may exercise a permanent
influence over the fortunies of a rich and powerful dominion. The case has
occurred more than once in history-—the nearest parallel is with the position
of Armenia between the Roman aiid Parthian empires during the first centuries
of the Christian: era. Of- Armenia Tacitus writes that it has been of old an
unsettled. country from the character of its people and its geographical
situation, bordering as it does Upon the Roman provinces and stretching far
into Media, lying between two great empires, constantly at strife with both of
them, hating Rome and jealous of Parthia. Mutatis mutandis, we have here a
description of Afghanistatt.
In
the aunals of Asia the Moghul empire stood foremost in wealth, population, and
power among the great States that attained their climax in that continent
during the sixteenth century, though the Osmanli sultanate is of much more historical
importance, because its capital and its richest provinces were in Europe. Yet
the events and circumstances which followed and were produced by the
dissolution of the Moghul empire are closely connected with modem history, and
exercised a marked influence on the politics of Europe. Simultaneously with the
decay and disruption of this mighty rulership a new dominion began; to grow and
spread in its place; and the rise of the British dominion in India has been the
direct consequence of its predecessor’s fall. The epoch marks a turning-point
in the fortunes of both continents, for Asiatic dominion was receding in
Europe; while European dominion was beginning its advance into Asia. From the
fifteenth to the seventeenth century the armies of the Osmanli Sultans had
been subjugating eastern Europe; but the defeat of the Turks before Vienna in,
1683 stopped and gradually reversed the tide of invasion; and from the
commencement of the eighteenth century may be dated a renewal, after many
centuries, of the ancient rule of European Powers over Asiatic lands. Russia
was taking her first steps beyond the Caspian; and, the maritime nations of
Europe had fixed their settlements on the Indian coast. ,
Nevertheless,
between the empire that fell and the empire that rose in India during the
eighteenth century there was complete dissimilarity—a clear contrast of
original character, of historical antecedents, and in respect to the ways and
means by which dominion was at first attained. There is no likeness whatever
between the gradual acquisition of territory by a pacific trading company and
the violent inroad of a Tartar horde from the mountains, or between the slow
penetration of commerce and the upsetting of thrones by the sword. So long as
the Moghul empire was vigorously governed, the Europeans at the seaports made
no progress inland; they began to gain ground when the outlying provinces fell
away from the central authority, leaving the sea-coast
Occupation by Europeans
of the sea-coast. 529
entirely
undefended, for the Moghul empire had never maintained a navy. For ages the
long sea-board of peninsular India had been safeguarded by the wide ocean; but
from the sixteenth century, when the armed fleets of Europe found their way
across it, the ocean became a high-road for invaders instead of a barrier
against them. One vital defect in the fighting strength of purely Asiatic
States on the mainland is that they have never maintained effective naval
armaments; a fact that is of fundamental importance in the modem history of Asia.
It explains why European ships of war, or even armed traders, could seize ports
and promontories, land troops, and take up stations whence they could
eventually advance to annex the maritime provinces of India, which are
singularly exposed to attack. The estuaries of the great rivers offer safe
harbourage, and waterways for penetration inland; their streams are like great
arteries branching out from the heart of India; the low-lying tracts along the
coast are flat, fertile, inhabited by an unwarlike, industrious population. In
these distant parts of the empire the control from the capitals had always been
weak ; it was entirely lost when disintegration set in at the centre; and the
Moghul dynasty never conquered the extreme south of the Indian peninsula. Early
in the eighteenth century the Marathas had seized all the territory adjacent to
Bombay; in the south-east the Viceroy of the Dekhan was master in the districts
surrounding Madras; in Bengal the local governor was shaking off the imperial
authority. But none of these upstart ruler- ships, excepting the Marathas—who
were quarrelling among themselves— had any solidity or cohesion. At such a
period of political confusion the rapid success of foreign intruders, well
furnished with disciplined troops and money, and holding undisputed command of
the sea, is no matter for surprise. The Moghul empire perished because, at a
period of great internal disorganisation, its frontiers on the sea and on the
land were equally defenceless—the European was advancing from the coast, while
the hordes of central Asia were pouring in through the mountains of
Afghanistan.
(2) THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH IN INDIA.
(1720-63.)
In a former
volume the history of Europeans in India has been brought down to the second
decade of the eighteenth century, A very brief review must suffice for the next
twenty-four years. It was for the English and French alike a period mainly of
commercial prosperity and silent growth; but it by no means merits such neglect
as it has sometimes received; and it is useful to bear in mind that by 1744,
the starting-point of so many histories of the British in India, the Company
had already existed for more than half of its allotted span of life.
The greatest
danger that menaced the Company at home was that of being involved in the
misfortunes of the South Sea Company. The frenzy of the “Bubble” caused a great
inflation of their stock in 1720, and one of the measures adopted by Sir Robert
Walpole to allay the panic was an obligation laid upon the East India Company to
take over nine millions of South Sea stock. The Directors wisely consented to
the “Ingraftment,” as it was called. It was worth some sacrifice to lay the
State under still further obligations to the Company. Prudence also urged them
to bow before the storm of public opinion which was running so strongly, not
only against the South Sea Company but all trading associations of any kind,
that a motion was made in the Commons to disqualify Directors of such bodies
from being elected to the House. The sacrifice however proved unnecessary.
Walpole carried his Bill, but it was superseded by the Act for restoring public
credit passed a few months later. The Ingraftment, though an abortive measure,
had given him a much needed breathing space. The knowledge that the East India
Company was prepared to come to the rescue helped to chepk the panic. Walpole
was not ungrateful, and proved himself the staunch friend of the Company at a
time when his patronage was of value. An Act of 1712 fixed 1733 as a date for
the possible termination of the Company’s privileges. A few years, before that
time the forces of opposition to the East India monopoly gathered once more to
a head. But the movement never appears to have had much chance of success. It
was more political than commercial in origin, the work of opponents of the
great Minister rather than the spontaneous act of the mercantile interest. In
February, 1730, a petition was presented to Parliament :,g nst the renewal of
the Charter with an alternative plan for the management of the trade with
India. It proved to be, as was said at the time, an old and thread-bare scheme.
The familiar features of a regulated as opposed to a joint-stock company
reappeared. The petitioners proposed to buy out the East India Company by.
raising the sum (,£3,200,000) lent by them to the State, and were prepared to
accept a lower interest. Duties were to be paid by the individual traders, who
were made free of the Company, for the upkeep of forts and settlements in the
East.
The East
India Company were in no danger. With customary astuteness, Sir Robert Walpole
had taken the sting out of the attack, before it was launched, by a private
understanding with the Court of Directors. The only consideration likely to
attract in Parliament the votes of those who were not already committed to the
scheme was the prospect of providing supplies for the public needs. Walpole was
able to announce that the Company were prepared to pay £200,000 to the State
for a renewal of their charter, and to accept a lower interest on their loans
to the Government for the future. The petition was rejected on the first
hearing by a majority of 85, and the privileges of the Company
were extended
to 1766. The East India Company were thus entrenched, as events were to prove,
from all assaults ih the rear during the critical period of the wars with
France.
In the East
the chief feature is the gradual growth of the Company’s settlements amid that
rapid dissolution of Moghul power which has been described in the first section
of this chapter. The heart of the empire decayed faster than the extremities.
Bahddur Shah was followed on the imperial throne by a succession of incapable
men, whose short and turbulent reigns were marked alike at their commencement
and close by dismal periods of revolution and intrigue. Meanwhile, the great
feudatories of the empire were busy founding for themselves independent
kingdoms, till the stage was reached when, as it has been graphically put, the
paramount power became a supremacy with which none of the other parties had any
other relation but that of rebellion. The effects of the process of dissolution
were not fully seen till the middle of the eighteenth century, and they
synchronised with the years in which the English and the French came to open
hostility in the East. That conflict not only determined which nation' should
oust the other, but indirectly revealed the fact that the native powers were
destined to succumb before the Western invader.
The ring of
semi-independent principalities round the decaying centre of the empire
shielded for a time the European possessions from the1 forces of
disruption and anarchy. Of the British settlements, Bombay felt the ill effects
of Moghul weakness most acutely. The shores of the Arabian sea were exposed to
the depredations of the corsair chief Angria, originally the admiral of the
Maratha fleet, who was often found acting in conjunction with a band of
European pirates having headquarters in Madagascar. Unsuccessful attacks were
made upon Gheria, Angria's stronghold, in 1717, and again in 1720, when the
Company’s fleet was assisted by a powerful naval force. Angria died about 1730;
but his sons succeeded to his lawless sovereignty, and this nest of pirates was
only destroyed in 1756 by the combined efforts of Watson and Clive. From the
land side the Presidency was constantly threatened by the advance northward of
the Maratha armies. Successively, the English allied themselves with the Siddi,
or Moghul admiral, against Angria, with one of Angria’s sons against the other,
with the Portuguese against the Peshwa, and finally in 1739 with the Peshwa
himself.
The
Presidency of Calcutta prospered on the commercial privileges granted them by
th<? Court of Delhi in 1717. In 1706 the population was not more tban ten or
twelve thousand; but in 1735 it had risen to one hundred thousand, and the
value of its annual trade was estimated at a million sterling. The Viceroys or
Subahdars of Bengal, now practically independent of the Moghul empire, though
apt to levy exafctions occasionally on the prosperous aliens within their
territory, lived on the whole at peace with them. Two strong rulers covered the
period from
1702 till
1739, and the usurper who supplanted them reigned till 1756. In 1742 the
Marathas were making their presence felt even in north-eastern India, and
Hooghly was sacked by a plundering force. In alarm for their settlement, the
English in the following year hastily constructed the famous “Ditch” in the
outskirts of Calcutta. But the rich Gangetic valley-^—the commercial and
political key of Hindustan—was never destined to pass beneath the sway of the
great Hindu confederacy. This advance wave of their onset was flung back, and
when the main flood swelled up a few years later, it dashed itself in vain
against the now greatly strengthened bulwarks of British power.
In the
latter'years of the reign of Aurungzeb southern India, or the Dekhan, passed
nominally under the sway of the Moghul empire. The country was divided into six
Subahs or provinces, and the whole was governed by a Viceroy. One, perhaps the
most important, of these Subahs was the Carnatic—the strip of land between the
mountains and the sea extending south of the Kistna to the frontiers of
Tanjore, containing within its limits both Madras and Pondicherry. Fortunately
for the European settlements, both the greater political division of the Dekhan
and the smaller subdivision of the Carnatic passed soon after the death of
Aurungzeb into the hands of men who, being in general capacity above the level
of Indian rulers, established their respective governments with elements of
permanency. After many revolutions and counterrevolutions Niz&m-ul-Mulk,
the Viceroy of southern India, founded what was practically an independent
kingdom at Haidardb&d in 1723 and reigned till 1748. In the Carnatic a
strong dynasty ruled from 1710 to 1740. Till the end of this period there was
on the whole tranquillity in the province, though from time to time rumours of
trouble from the Marathas reached the ears of the dwellers in the seaports. A
long duel for supremacy in the Dekhan was being fought out between the NizAm
and Baji Rao, one of the greatest of the Peshwas. The English in Madras watched
the issue of the conflict with an intense and strained interest. Complimentary
letters were despatched to Haidardb&d when the fortunes of the Niz&m
were in the ascendant. The internal history of the Presidency is uneventful.
The most notable Governor was James Macrae, a Scotchman, of Ayrshire, who
carried out many valuable reforms in financial administration. In 1740 Dost
Ali, the Nawib of the Carnatic, was defeated and slain by the Marathas, and the
horsemen of the victorious army rode almost up to the outskirts of Madras. It
is therefore noticeable that about the same time the Maratha confederacy was
impinging on all the British chief settlements in India.
When the
Scotchman John Law became the guiding spirit of the French finances, Colbert’s
East India Company became entangled in his all-embracing system. It was
incorporated in 1719 with the Company of the West, or Mississippi Company as it
was generally called, which was formed to exploit Louisiana. The new body,
known as the Company
of the
Indies, also absorbed the Senegal Company, the old Canada Company, the China
Company, and the Companies of St Domingo and Guinea, thus forming one mammoth
association with exclusive rights to the trade of France with the world outside
Europe. Not yet satisfied, Law proceeded to dower it with several state
functions, the profits of the coinage, the control of the public debt and the
monopoly of tobacco, and finally amalgamated it with his own creation the Royal
Bank. When this architectonic structure collapsed in ruins in 1720, the East
India Company was reconstituted as the “ Perpetual Company of the Indies ” on its
old basis and divested of all the special privileges granted by Law except the
monopoly of tobacco. True to the traditions of its foundation, the Company
tended more and more to become a mere department of State. After 1723 the
greater officials of the Company, the Directors and Inspectors, were nominated
by the Crown, and the shareholders were only permitted to elect the Syndics,
whose influence over the administration was very slight. Frequent changes were
made in the next few years; but gradually all real control passed into the
hands of the King’s Commissaries. The most famous of these was Orry de Fulvy,
brother of the Controller-General of Finance, who held office from 1733 to
1745. Under his rule the fortunes of the Company materially improved; but the
bureaucratic control of even an enlightened state official was a very different
thing from the driving force of a vigorous private enterprise. After 1723 fixed
dividends were guaranteed by the Crown, irrespective of the profit or loss on
the trade with India and derived mainly from the farm of tobacco. For twenty
years after 1725 the shareholders of the Company held no meeting, and they
gradually sank into a body of rentiers with no incentive to activity or real
interest in Eastern affairs, utterly unlike the strong and turbulent English
Court of Proprietors, who so often challenged and overruled the policy of the
Directors themselves. The evils latent in the anomalous and artificial nature
of the Company’s finance and its weak dependence on state control were not
apparent in the long period of peace that followed Cardinal Fleury’s accession
to power. In India, the French extended their influence by the acquisition of
Mahe (1725), and Karikal (1739). Dupleix, from 1730, greatly developed the
trade and importance of Chandernagore which had hitherto languished. Benoit
Dumas, Governor of Pondicherry from 1735 to 1741, increased the prestige of his
country by his statesmanlike outlook on Indian politics. When Dost Ali was
slain by the Marathas, his family and that of his son-in-law, Chanda Sahib,
took refuge in Pondicherry; and to the skill and address of Dumas was due that
close connexion between the French and the royal Houses of southern India upon
which the policy of Bussy and Dupleix was afterwards built up.
Though
nominally at peace, England and France had been facing each other on European
battle-fields since 1740, and at last in 1744 war between the two countries was
openly declared. The roar of French
guns off
Madras in 1746 announced ^Jie beginning of a new era in the East. During the
War of the Spanish Succession thirty years before, various agreements for a
local neutrality were made between many of the English, French and Dutch
settlements in India; and, apart from some uneasiness as to the fate of
incoming or outgoing ships, neither side seems to have feared aggression on the
part of the other. The French therefore were only acting in accordance with
tradition when in 1742 they made informal overtures to the English Company for
the declaration of a general neutrality in the East. These proposals came to
nothing, but the principle that peace or war between European nations
necessarily involves peace or war between their distant possessions hardly yet
received open recognition. Even during the War of the Austrian Succession a
strict neutrality was observed between the French and English in Bengal; and in
southern India after 1748 the principle, at least in so far as the maintenance
of peace was in question, received a nominal rather than, an actual observance.
, It is often
stated that in 1744 the French and English were equal in point of strength; but
this is probably a misapprehension. From the outset the advantage in material
resources was on the side of the English. They had, as shown in a former volume,
a longer, more continuous, and more prosperous, history in the East behind
them. Their trade exceeded that of the French several times in bulk, and the
importance of this must not be underrated. The sounder the financial condition
of the Company, the more easily would it support any initial losses in the war
and the greater sacrifices would it be prepared to make in the- conflict to
restore its fallen fortunes. On the mainland of India itself the English had a
greater number of settlements and they were strategically the better placed.
They possessed three Presidencies, the French properly speaking only one, for
Chandemagore was a mere dependency of Pondicherry and, even under the rule of
Dupleix, never really rivalled Calcutta. Their other base of operations was at
Mauritius, distant from one to two, months’ voyage. Climatic conditions had an
important effect on the strategy of the Coromandel coast, where the duel
between the two nations was destined to be fought out. For nearly four months
in the year beginning from the end of October, when the monsoons were blowing,
the sailing vessels of those days could not exist off that unsheltered shore,
and the English port of refuge, Bombay, was nearer than the French station in
Mauritius. Though the fall of Pondicherry would, and ultimately did, imply the
end of French dominion in India, the capture of Madras had no such significance
for Great Britain. It was a serious loss’; but Calcutta and Bombay still
remained. Bombay was the one Presidency which was never captured either by an
Indian enemy or by Europeans. Occupying an isolated position, it had been
obliged to defend itself as we have seen against relentless foes. It was the
birthplace and chief seat of that famous force, the Indian navy, and was in reality
stronger than either
Madras or
Calcutta where long dependence on native governors had created a spirit of
helplessness and inertia.
The
conception that the opportunity afforded by a European war might be utilised to
assert supremacy in India originated in the fertile brain of Mahe de
Labourdonnais, a famous sea-captain and free-lance, who had been Governor of
the Isles of France and Bourbon since 1735 and had founded the prosperity of
those colonies by his enlightened and strenuous policy. He was in France in
1740; and, foreseeing the probability of war being declared with England in
the near future, he planned a privateering expedition against British shipping
in India. To this scheme he succeeded in winning the support of Maurepas,
Minister of Marine, who obliged the East India Company rather against their
will to provide ships for the fleet. He sailed from France in 1741, proposing
to await in Mauritius the news of the outbreak of hostilities. But war was not
declared till 1744, and meanwhile, in 1742, the Company, which had never looked
with favour on the scheme, ordered him to send back the fleet to Europe.
Labourdonnais obeyed, declaring that all his projects had vanished like a
dream, and his annoyance was not lessened by the fact that, immediately after
the fleet had started, he received another despatch cancelling the order and
expressing the hope that he had ventured to disobey it. In the meantime the
English, having got wind of Labour- lonnais’ designs, had sent a royal fleet to
India under Commodore Barnet, and the command of the sea had temporarily passed
to them. Barnet threatened Pondicherry; but Dupleix, who had been appointed
Governor in 1741, appealed to the Nawdb of the Carnatic. The Nawdb warned the
English that he could not permit fighting between the European nations under
his protection. Labourdonnais had been ordered by the home Government to remain
on the defensive, but with characteristic energy he had equipped and manned a
fleet from the slender resources of the Isles of France. He next proposed to
Dupleix, that he should prey on English East Indiamen by cruising between the
Cape arid St Helena; but Dupleix, who was the master mind throughout this
period of preparation, persuaded him to attempt the capture of Madras, boldly
disregarding the neutrality of the Nawdb to which he had himself appealed
against the English. Labourdonnais’ fleet was reinforced by the arrival of a
squadron from France, and he left the Isles in March, 1746. His ships being
dispersed and scattered by a terrible storm, he was forced to refit them off
the coast of Madagascar. The British commander, Peyton, Barnet’s successor,
attempted to bar his passage to the Coromandel coast; but Labourdonnais beat
him back off Negapatam and anchored in the Roads of Pondicherry at the end of
June.
Hitherto
Labourdonnais had acted with the greatest energy and vigour; but, having come
within measurable distance of performing the task to which ail his preparations
had been directed, he showed a strange indecision. For six weeks he refused, on
various pleas, to
proceed to
the siege of Madras, unless he received from Dupleix and the Council of
Pondicherry a signed order to attack, the town with an admission on their part
that they took full responsibility whatever the issue might be. The authorities
at Pondicherry would not commit themselves further than to a formal demand that
he should either blockade Madras or pursue the British fleet. Both parties to
the dispute evaded responsibility before the siege, both claimed it after the
town had fallen. Labourdonnais’ relations with Dupleix were soon strained to
breaking point. The quarrel between the two men which was at bottom rather
petty has often been dignified into a fundamental difference in tactics. They
had been acquainted earlier in life and each seems to have contracted a certain
dislike of the other. Labourdonnais in his Memoirs refers to the political
schemes of Dupleix as brilliant chimeras, and when Dupleix heard of
Labourdonnais’ appointment to the governorship of the Isles he spoke
contemptuously of the “Jariboles de cet evaporc.'" But in planning the
attack on Madras the Governor-General seems to have put a strong curb on his
private feelings, and the responsibility for the rupture between the two men
must be laid chiefly at the door of Labourdonnais.
On September
2 he was at last induced to sail for Madras. This famous siege hardly deserved
the name. The bombardment lasted several days; but not a single man was killed
or wounded on the side of the French, and the only loss sustained by the
English was due to the accidental bursting of one of their own shells. The
Governor, Nicholas Morse, was a man of feeble character, and, though the
garrison did not amount to more than three hundred men, a far longer defence
was possible. Dupleix, after the capture, recorded the surprise of himself and
Labourdonnais at the large quantities of stores and ammunition found in the
place. The town was surrendered on September 10. Labourdonnais at once
announced his victory to Dupleix, and in his first despatch declared that he
had the English at his discretion. Two days later he alludes vaguely to a
capitulation on terms, but that nothing definite was settled seems proved by
the fact that he discusses with Dupleix, as though the question were still open,
the alternative plans of ransoming the place, converting it into a French
colony, or razing it to the ground. Finding that Dupleix claimed the right to
decide upon the fate of the captured town and that he was unalterably opposed
to the idea of a ransom, Labourdonnais hurried on negotiations and signed a
convention to restore Madras for a sum of JP420,000, claiming that he had given
his word to the English to adopt this course from the very beginning. Dupleix,
with admirable restraint, had tried reason, persuasion, and even entreaty, but
all in vain. There followed a bitter quarrel into the sordid details of which
it is unnecessary to enter. It would be hardly possible within a short space to
give an exhaustive pronouncement on the complicated technical and legal points
involved. In the natural
course of
events the final decision as to the fate of Madras rested with Dupleix as
Governor-General of the French in India, though by his apparent unwillingness
to accept full responsibility before the siege he had given Labourdonnais
something of a pretext for demurring to his authority. On the other hand
Labourdonnais had invalidated, by his previous demand for definite
instructions, the claim he now put forward to complete independence of the
Pondicherry Council. He frequently appealed to his commission of 1741, which
however applied to a different set of facts. As a recent French writer has
pointed out, Orry, in laying an injunction upon him not to retain any place
captured in the East, never for a moment foresaw his cooperation with Dupleix
in an attack on Madras. The plain duty of the two men was to work together
amicably for the good of their country; but to this sacrifice of personal
animosities to the dictates of patriotism, they, or at any rate Labourdonnais,
proved unequal. Throughout the dispute Dupleix was mainly in the right, and his
obstinate colleague in the wrong. There is strong reason for believing that
Labourdonnais had received a large sum of money as a personal present from the
English in Madras. Culpable as such an action may appear, the admittedly low
standard of the age in all such matters must be taken into account. It is not
always easy to draw the line which differentiates a complimentary gratuity or
douceur from a bribe. Most men at this time, at all events in India, deemed
that they had a right to lay the foundations of a private fortune by their
manipulation of public policy: Labourdonnais had no doubt honestly persuaded
himself that the course he preferred was the right one. The whole incident of
the quarrel with Dupleix may easily be magnified out of due proportion. To say
that it saved the English in India is utterly to exaggerate its significance.
It affected the fate of a single Presidency, and that only for a few years. The
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 settled the affairs of India over the heads of
those who had played the chief part in them. Till that date, Madras was
retained by the French^ as it would have been if Dupleix had succeeded in
bending Labourdonnais to his will. Had the two men been harmonious from the
very first, they might possibly have directed an attack upon the English in
Bengal, though Labourdonnais refused even to entertain the idea when suggested
by Dupleix, on the ground that if his neutrality were violated the Moghul would
drive the French for ever from Hindustan. Dupleix never even succeeded in
reducing Fort St David at his own doors. Peyton’s fleet still held the sea.
Fort William was hardly likely to yield as pusillanimously as Fort St George,
while, even if it fell, the English would still remain possessed of Bombay. In
1747, Boscawen was already on his way from England with a powerful fleet, and,
if the French forces had been engaged before Calcutta when it arrived,
Pondicherry itself would have been at his mercy.
While
Labourdonnais and Dupleix were' still fulminating at each
other
in protests and manifestos, the break-up of the monsoons cut the Gordian knot
of their quarrel. The terrific gales that blew off the Coromandel coast in
October, 1746, shattered Labourdonnais’ fleet and forced him to make all sail
for the Isles. Twelve hundred disciplined troops were left behind—the flower of
the army which enabled Dupleix to defend Pondicherry and carry out his daring
incursions into Dekhan politics. :
After Labourdonnais’
departure Dupleix cancelled the convention with the English on the plea that it
had been signed by an insubordinate officer who had exceeded his powers. He
laid siege to Fort St David; but the English were at last stung into offering a
resistance worthy of their national reputation, and he met here with his first
check. The arrival of Poscawen and Griffin with the most powerful fleet that
had ever appeared on the Indian Ocean, including thirteen ships of the line,
completely transformed the position of affairs. In August, 1748, Pondicherry
was subjected to a severe siege—wax in grim earnest unlike the.farcical
operations round Madras. The English lost over a thousand men; and, though
their conduct of the operations is said to have shown great incapacity, the
French defence was brilliantly directed and remains one of the most
considerable achievements of Dupleix. The siege was raised early in October,
seven days before the Peace was announced in India. By the Treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle Madras was given back to the English in exchange for Cape
Breton. Thus ended the first round of the Anglo-French contest. Nominally, the
status quo was restored; but to those who could look below the surface the
position was wholly different. The old neutrality and security were gone by for
ever. The sword once drawn, it could not again be sheathed till the issue had
been fought out to the bitter end. Though their material gains were taken from
them, the prestige of the French was greatly increased. They had captured the
enemy’s chief settlement on the Coromandel coast and repelled him from the
walls of their own. Dupleix well knew how to make the most of such a success,
and his emissaries celebrated the victory in every native Court. Contemporary
Englishmen might speak slightingly of French pride and gasconade; but, though
the element of vanity was not lacking .n the character of Dupleix, his action
masked a very subtle and formidable policy.
Both English
and French were after 1748 left with larger forces in garrison than they had
been accustomed to maintain. The recent war had given them a taste for
campaigning, and opportunities for indulging it soon presented themselves. To
the English; belongs the credit or discredit of the first step. Tempted by the
offer of Devicota, a port at the mouth of the Coleroon river, they interfered
in a disputed succession in Tanjore. Their success was so moderate that they
were under little temptation to repeat the experiment; but the principle
received a far wider application at the hands of the French, Unable to rival
the
1740-50]
Dynastic wars in
southern India.
539
English in
trade, Dupieix turned his attention to political intrigue. The residence of
native royal families in Pondicherry since 1740 had brought him into dose
relation with the ruling Houses of the Dekhan. His thoroughly orientalised
imagination luxuriated in the study of their conflicting claims, dynastic
revolutions and strange vicissitudes of fortune. The Nizam-ul-Mulk, the virtual
overlord, of southern. India, died after a long and prosperous reign in 1748,
and the succession was disputed among his sons. Dupieix, with great daring,
supported the cause both of a claimant to the throne of the Dekhan and a pretender
against Anwar-ud-din, the ruling Naw&b of the Carnatic. His candidate for
the latter post was the famous Chanda Sahib, a connexion by marriage of the
older royal House that had been supplanted by Anwar-ud-din in 1744. Chanda
Sahib was a man of considerable ability, who seems to have realised that the
future in India lay with the Europeans and employed his leisure in studying the
memoirs and campaigns of Conde and Turenne. The French had already come into
serious collision with Anwar-ud-din in 1746, by refusing to fulfil their
promise to hand over Madras to him when conquered from the English; The
striking success of the French in the fighting which ensued made Dupieix
realise with characteristic quickness and vividness that the best native troops
could set no barrier to the advance of disciplined European armies.
At the battle
of Ambur, 1749, Anwar-ud-din was defeated and slain. The Carnatic passed under
the control pf the protege of the French, and he in gratitude made large
territorial concessions to his European allies. Mozaffar Jang, the French
candidate for the throne of the Dekhan, was not so successful; he was
vanquished and taken prisoner, by Nasir Jang, the ruling Prince, mainly through
a mutiny of the French officers, who forced their general to retreat in face of
the enemy. But from what was apparently a desperate situation Dupieix
extricated himself with a coolness and serenity that were truly admirable. The
military position was restored in 1750 by the storming of Gingi, a fortress
hitherto regarded as impregnable. Nasir Jang was soon after assassinated;
Mozaffar Jang was released, and was enthroned at Pondicherry as ruler of the
Dekhan. Masulipatam and Divi were made over to the French; and a vague and
high-sounding title was conferred upon Dupieix, who was hailed as Governor of
southern India from the Kistna to Cape Comorin. It is often said that
henceforward Dupieix ruled absolutdy over thirty millions of people and a
country larger than France ; but, though the reputation of the French was now
earned very high and their indirect influence was very great, the truth fell
considerably short of this. The misunderstanding has arisen, because the
Oriental language of compliment and hyperbole has been taken too literally,
Dupieix appears to have been endowed with an office of high honour and rather
vague functions, which gave him the right to nominate some
of the petty
rulers of the Dekhan and conferred upon him the virtual control of the
Carnatic. To attempt an exact definition of the theoretical jurisdictions of
the native Powers in southern India at this time would be an unprofitable task;
but it may be noted that within the limits of the alleged grant were the
kingdoms of Tanjore, Madura, and Mysore, which never openly acknowledged the
suzerainty of the Nizdm far less that of Dupleix. Even in the Carnatic, Chanda
Sahib was nominal ruler till his death, though no doubt he occupied much the
same position in relation to the French as the puppet Nawribs of Bengal did to
the English after 1757. Dupleix claimed that Chanda Sahib was merely his
deputy, and on his death was anxious, instead of appointing a successor, openly
to assume the position himself. From this he was dissuaded at the time by the
saner judgment of Bussy who, foreseeing, as Dupleix himself curiously seems to
have failed to foresee, the relentless opposition of the English^ warned him
that he was seeking to pluck the fruit before it was ripe.
When the new
ruler of Haidardbid left Pondicherry in January, . 1751, Bussy at the head of a
few hundred French troops marched with him to begin his wonderful and romantic
career in the Dekhan. It was originally intended that he should return so soon
as the Subahdar was established on his throne; but Mozaffar Jang was killed in
a skirmish a few days after their departure, and Bussy with a rather cynical
opportunism set aside the dead man’s infant son in favour of Salabat Jang (the
brother of Nasir Jang), who was a prisoner in the camp, conducted him to
Haidar&b£d, and remained there to defend him against all rivals.
So far the
French policy had met with astonishing success. The grandiose conceptions and
striking character of Dupleix had bewitched the Oriental mind. The English,
dazed and sullen, looked on with a sort of helpless admiration and envy. But
there was one exception to the tale of victory. Mohammad Ali, a connexion of
the vanquished Anwar- ud-din, had fled for refuge into the strong fortress of
Trichinopoly. At length, when they saw Dupleix, the real ruler of the Carnatic,
and Bussy paramount at the Court of the Nizrirn, the English were forced to realise
that the struggle was one of life or death, and they nerved themselves to
assist the fugitive with money and men. Trichinopoly, with its rocky citadel
dominating the great plain of the Carnatic, became henceforward the centre and
rallying-point of all opposition to the French.
It is
unnecessary to enter into the details of the confused struggle that followed.
The position was extraordinarily complicated. Two Western nations, at peace
with each other in Europe, waged war nominally as the allies of native Powers
that were in reality their creatures and tools. At first, some attempt was made
to uphold the legal fiction by an agreement that the English and French forces
engaged on opposite sides should not discharge their muskets at one another;
but it was soon found impracticable to observe this curious rule of warfare,
and all disguise was thrown
aside. From
time to time the other Powers of the Dekhan were drawn into the mSlee, either
of necessity, to protect their territories from depredation, or voluntarily,
in their desire to fish in troubled waters. The R£jas of Tan j ore and Mysore,
the Pathan Naw&bs of Cuddapah, Savanore, and Kurnool appeared in arms now
on one side now on the other, while the Marathas were always hovering near the
field of strife, ready to take an unexpected and disconcerting hand in the
game. There ensued kaleidoscopic changes of allegiance, dynastic intrigues,
revolutions and counter-revolutions, while, ever moving to and fro in the
confused picture, may be discerned the brilliant but somewhat sinister figure
of the great Frenchman.
Dupleix
reached the zenith of his fortunes in 1751. In the spring, Trichinopoly was
desperately hard pressed; but Clive’s famous seizure and defence of Arcot in
the summer, and his victories at Ami and Co- veripak in the autumn and winter,
relieved the tension. The triumphal course of the French received a decided
check in June, 1752, when Jacques-Franc^ois Law was forced to surrender to
Lawrence and Clive before Trichinopoly, and their ally Chanda Sahib, who had
surrendered himself to the Tanjorean leader, was put to death. For the next two
years hard and persistent fighting went on in the Dekhan, always tending to
converge on the fortress that dominated the position. The French were never
able to reduce it, and their consequent failure to extend their control
completely over the Carnatic neutralised in great measure the dazzling success
of Bussy in the Dekhan. Slowly and step by step the English gained the upper
hand. Their grip upon the throat of their foe, at first spasmodic and feeble,
increased in power and intensity, till the whole gorgeous fabric of French
dominion was dragged down into the dust. France had no general in India who was
a match for Clive and Lawrence, and of the excellent school of subordinate
officers formed in the war, the Englishmen, Cope, Dalton and Kilpatrick, proved
on the whole superior to Jacques-Fran^is Law, d’Auteuil, de Kerjean, and
Mainville. It should be added that Saunders, the Governor of Madras, a man
whose fame hardly accords with his deserts, by his cool, cautious and tenacious
policy showed himself no mean antagonist to Dupleix.
In 1753 even
Bussy’s influence waned for a time, for he was forced to recruit his health by
a retirement to Masulipatam. It is true that in the autumn he recovered his
position at Court and won for France the important districts of the Northern
Circars extending north of the Carnatic to the frontiers of Orissa; but the
whole of southern India was so desolated by the war that for some time but little
revenue could be raised from them. Gradually there grew up a divergence of
policy between Bussy and Dupleix. Bussy was in favour of keeping peace with the
English and of extending French influence rather from Haidardbdd in the Dekhan
than from Pondicherry in the Carnatic. Since 1752 he
had
repeatedly urged arguments in favour of a pacification and counselled Dupleix
to withdraw, if possible, from the labyrinth in which he was plunged. . , . :
The truth was
that the policy of Dupleix, ingenious and imaginative as it was, had broken
down. His position in 1754 was wellnigh desperate. He had been beaten in the
field; his troops: were clamouring for pay; andhis treasury was empty. He had
been compelled himself to acknowledge the necessity for a respite, and a
conference was held , with the English, at Sadras in December, 1753. It, proved
abortive, mainly because Dupleix once more raised hi claim to be recognised as
ruler of the Carnatic in his own person. Meanwhile, both the Companies in
Europe were thoroughly alarmed at the warlike' propensities of their
representatives in India, and, on the initiative of the English, informal
conferences to negotiate a peace were held in London, 1753r-4, by the Duke of
Newcastle and the Earl of Holdemesse, with Duyelaer, a Director of the French
Company, ^nd the Due de Mirepoix, the French ambassador. The recall of Dupleix
however was not, as the. popular, rumour of the time supposed, the direct
outcome of a demand from the English Company accompanied by a reciprocal pledge
to recall the Governor of Madras. It was already decided upon in France before
the conference could be said to have begun. Silhouette, the King’s Commissary,
had long been opposed to the Governor-General whom he considered a turbulent
and dangerous spirit. The news of Law’s surrender at Trichinopoly caused
widespread alarm in France, and seemed to justify’ the warnings and criticisms
of Labourdonnais, whose M?moirs were just then being given to the world. To all
these circumstances, and,jn great measure to the unwisdom of his own conduct,
as will presently be seen, the supersession of Dupleix was really due. In the
summer of 1753, Godeheu, a Director of the Company, was appointed King’s
Commissioner to settle affairs 1 in India. He was to supersede, Dupleix, and
had even sealed orders to arrest him if he proved contumacious. ,
Landing in
August, 1754, Godeheu concluded in October a suspension of arms for three
months which was followed in January, 17,55, by the publication of a
provisional Treaty, to be v^lid only if, ratified by the Companies at home. As
a matter of fact, it was never formally ratified, owing , to the outbreak of
the Seven Years’ War, which occurred before the necessary steps could be taken
in Europe. In the Treaty both parties agreed to interfere no more in the
disputes of native States and to renounce all Mohammadan dignities and
governments. The right of each nation to various possessions was recognised and
defined. Dupleix sailed for France in October, 1754. .
Scorn and
contempt have been poured by English and French writers alike on Godeheu for
having surrendered the interests of his country, and on the administration of
Louis XV for not having appreciated and supported Dupleix. Dupleix himself
contended that when Godeheu
arrived the position
had already veered round in favour of the French, and that, with the
reinforcements Godeheu brought with him, he might have recovered all the ground
that had been lost. For this version of the facts, though it has been widely
accepted, there is little evidence. Though he railed against his successor,
Dupleix was forced to admit that he had no money to pay his army and that
financially his whole condition was desperate. Both sides, for obvious reasons,
exaggerated, in letters home, the strength of the enemy; but, probably, the
French troops brought by Godeheu were in no sense a match for the war-worn
veterans of the British army, and it is sometimes forgotten that, while
negotiations were going on, an English squadron superior to any French force on
the Indian seas was hovering round the coast. It was, indeed, the news of the
arrival of this fleet which obliged Godeheu to moderate the higher terms for
which he at first stood out. Contemporary English writers, many of whom were in
India at the time, without exception considered that the Treaty was unduly
favourable to the French. The Pondicherry Council, itself by no means
predisposed to favour Godeheu, recorded an opinion that the Peace was the
happiest thing that could happen to the Company, and expressed astonishment
that the English should acquiesce in it, in view of the advantageous position
they held. The Council declared that the English possessed at least 2500 men,
1150 of whom were soldiers of a royal regiment, powerful allies, and no lack of
money; they themselves on the other hand had but 1500 troops —“Dieu sgait
quelles troupes”—and were destitute alike of allies and cash.
The Peace
indeed can hardly be termed a surrender at all, when it is remembered that
Bussy was left undisturbed at Haidar&b&d with his army, and that, while
the territorial possessions guaranteed to the English were assessed at a
revenue of ,£100,000, those retained by the French were valued at eight times
that amount. There is no need to postulate particular baseness of soul, or
personal enmity, on the part of Godeheu. He was not a genius; but as a
practical man he saw that something drastic had to be done. He loyally
endeavoured to follow his instructions, brought about a settlement that at
least stemmed the tide of disaster, and earned undying infamy for not achieving
the impossible. His personal relations with the man he had been sent to
supersede, though they had been friends in earlier years, could hardly be
cordial; but that was at least as much the fault of Dupleix as his own.
Dupleix
indeed was largely responsible for his own recall. He had treated the
authorities at home in a way that no body of men could be ;.ipected to pardon.
On more than one occasion he deliberately withheld important information, and,
though he promptly informed them of his victories, he almost invariably omitted
to report his defeats; his despatches, for instance, made no mention of Clive’s
capture and defence of Arcot, The truth ultimately reached the ears of the
French Government, usually through English sources, and it is hardly
surprising that
in time a
deep distrust was engendered of his whole policy. Moreover, they had before
them no clear account of what that policy was. The view is baseless which
represents Dupleix as dreaming of empire even when at Chandemagore, and
formulating a definite plan to acquire dominion through political and dynastic
intrigue. He entered upon this path only in 1749, and it was not till 1753 that
he fully realised the possibilities of his schemes and drew up a full
statement for the information of the Company. This despatch was not received in
France till six months after Godeheu had sailed for India. When it arrived, the
Government reversed the order for the recall of Dupleix; but, before the news
could reach him, he had already embarked for home. Nor is it true to say that
Dupleix was left unsupported. In four years he received more than four thousand
men. He complained that these recruits were the scum of Paris and the sweepings
of the gaols; but most of the English troops were originally drawn from similar
sources, and it was only by constant warfare that they were welded into a
capable fighting force.
But, above
all, the Company at home had a right to be alarmed by his management of the
finances. They heard impressive accounts of territorial possessions and
revenues made over to them by native Powers; but it would be a complete mistake
to suppose that any appreciable amount of such sums filtered through to them.
While its servants were dealing with millions of rupees, the Company was
rapidly approaching bankruptcy, Dupleix deliberately formulated the doctrine
that, for the French at any rate, the trade with India was a failure, and that
it was better to enter upon a career of conquest. The question is how he raised
the funds to maintain the costly operations of the war. Recent research has disproved
the legend, which his Memoirs supported, that he had accumulated immense riches
at Chandernagore. In 1741 when he was appointed to Pondicherry, his fortune on
his own admission was not large enough for him to retire upon in comfort.
Indeed the largest private fortune would have gone but a little way to maintain
his costly system of subsidised alliances. From 1751 most of the revenues of
the Carnatic passed through his hands; but they barely sufficed to finance the
ruinous war against Mohammad Ali. He advanced large sums from the grants and
jagirs (revenues derived from land) made to him by native Princes, which he had
only a very doubtful right to hold at all, and charged the loans to the account
of the Company. Now, if his efforts had been crowned with success, it is
possible that at some future time the Company might have had large sums to
receive; but the fatal flaw in his policy was that it did not prove to be self-supporting.
He staked everything on victory and he was defeated. When Godeheu asked him for
his assets he could only talk vaguely of revenues and grants, and hand over
bonds signed by native rulers for large amounts which he had lent them. Many of
his creditors were obviously incapable of paying anything. Others, who perhaps
had it in their power, showed little inclination to do so,
and it was
not easy to see how pressure could be put upon them except at the cost of more
fighting. In many cases the revenues from ceded territory existed only on paper
and were never realised. The peasants had been ruined by the long war. The
devastation in the Carnatic was terrible, and it was some time before the
proper contributions were received even from the Northern Circars, the most
valuable of the new acquisitions. Bussy’s army was exceedingly costly; the rate
of pay was princely, and the commander himself was said to have become one of
the richest subjects in Europe.
The net
result of it all was that in 1754 the treasury was empty, while in addition
Dupleix claimed that the Company owed him more than thirty lakhs of rupees.
When Dupleix demanded assignments on future revenues to satisfy his private
claims on the Company, Godeheu, though he granted him a sufficient sum for his
immediate needs, referred the whole matter to the authorities at home. Dupleix
inveighed fiercely against him, but it is not easy to see what else he could
have done. With all his great qualities, Dupleix had many serious defects of
temperament. He was sanguine to the point of wilful blindness. Even the bold
and enterprising Bussy was staggered at the magnitude and multiplicity of his
plans. His -refusal to recognise a defeat often carried him to an unlooked-for
success, but sometimes turned a check into a disaster. He was lacking in the
quality of restraint, the clear appreciation of what was practical, the power
to withhold his hand, which was characteristic of his great rival, Lord Clive.
In all his schemes there was something of the gambler’s rashness, the gambler’s
desire to advance from success to success, staking at each throw the whole of
his past gains. He seldom stopped to concentrate his forces or conserve his
conquests. He was inclined to expect impossibilities from his military
commanders, and, his enmity once roused, was relentless and unforgetting. Yet,
with all necessary qualifications, he must still be regarded as one of the
ablest Europeans that have ruled in the East. He did anticipate in many ways
the policy and the methods that were to carry Great Britain to the overlordship
of India. His defence of Pondicherry, the ascendancy he won with the native
Powers, his faculty of impressing the Asiatic imagination, his dauntless
demeanour in the face of danger, the almost superstitious dread he inspired in
the English, all these things testify to his great capacity.
Dupleix
returned to fulminate in memoirs and protests against the Company. He wrote an
account of his life and actions from the standpoint of the past few years.
Unintentionally perhaps in part, he antedated the conception of his political
schemes. He represented the whole of his sojourn in India as a careful and
logical preparation for the acquisition of dominion. Every fact was wrested to
fit into the picture, every incident moulded to a preconceived theory. Dupleix
has won for himself the sympathies of posterity, and the protests of
Jacques-Franfois
Law and
Godeheu against his version of the facts have gone unheeded; but, the nearer we
get to his own time, the less conviction do his writings seem to have carried
even among those who were most hostile to the administration of Louis XV. Yet
the treatment meted out to him was ungenerous in the extreme. In view of their
own misfortunes, the Company could, perhaps., hardly be expected to pay in full
the large claims he put forward; but he should have been voted a generous
pension to pass his declining years in comfort. He had spent great sums without
authorisation, it is true; but he might have kept them for himself as others
did. If he erred, it was from no ignoble motive or despicable aim. The glory
and honour of France were ever before his eyes. He was treated with cold
neglect, his frantic protests went unheeded, and his lot was only preferable to
that of Labourdonnais and Lally, whose rewards were the Bastille and the block.
Bussy
maintained his position in the Dekhan till 1758, but like the English a few
years later he found that in the anarchic condition of southern India his
alliances with native Powers often placed him in embarrassing situations. In
1756, when before Savanore, he received a formal dismissal from the service of
the Niz&m, and began his retreat to Masulipatam with a predatory army of
JMarathas hanging on his rear. Turning upon his pursuers at Haidar&b&d,
he seized a strong position close to the city, and effected a junction with
Law, who had been marching to his relief. He was soon afterwards reconciled to
Salabat Jang, but never quite recovered his former influence.
In the short
interval between Godeheu’s Peace and the commencement of renewed hostilities
occurred the extraordinary series of events in Bengal which, breaking like a
thunder-clap .upon the easy-going serenity of the European settlements,
temporarily ruined Calcutta, taught the English their full strength in the
efforts they made to recover their position, put an end to the power of the
native government, and terminated the political and military existence of the
French and Dutch in north-eastern India. It will be convenient, however, to
reserve these events for the next section, and to complete here the account of
the Anglo-French struggle in the Carnatic. The declaration of the Seven Years’
War in 1756 determined the French Government to strike a decisive blow at the
British settlements. The attempt was a formidable one, and, had it been better
timed or better led, the results to England might have been extremely serious.
Count de Lally, son of an Irish refugee, who was placed in command, had
distinguished himself on many European battle-fields, and played a considerable
part in the Stewart rising of 1745. A brave soldier, a capable general,
conscientious and incorruptible, he was yet one of the worst men that could
have been selected for the post. Utterly without tact or pliability in dealing
either with men or circumstances, he proved singularly incapable of adapting
himself to the special conditions of Indian warfare. He fell
out with de
Leyrit, the Governor of Pondicherry, with d’Ache who commanded the fleet, and
with Bussy who should have been his most zealous coadjutor. He was
hot-tempered, harsh to his subordinates, and intolerant of advice. The
expedition was a long record of misfortunes and blunders, and at every point
the general’s unhappy temperament exerted a baleful influence on the trend of events.
The vanguard under de Soupire arrived in September, 1757; but the succeeding
months were frittered away in unimportant operations. Lally, with the main
body, only reached the coast of Coromandel in April, 1758, after a twelve
months’ voyage, by which time the English had already warded off the worst of
the critical situation in Bengal. Nevertheless, the French for the moment
possessed a superiority of force which, under happier circumstances, might
have been employed with great effect. The English admiral, Pocock, though he
inflicted severe loss on the main division of the French fleet in a drawn
engagement off Negapatam, was unable to bar their passage to Pondicherry. An
initial success was won by the prompt siege and capture of Fort St David, after
a bombardment of eighteen days. The defence was feebly conducted, and earned
the strong censure and bitterly expressed contempt of Clive, who was anxiously
watching the course of events from Bengal. Lally’s next objective was Madras;
but some very fatal features, unhappily characteristic of French history in
India, now made their appearance. There was a complete lack of cordial
cooperation between the land and sea forces, and the civil and military
authorities. The French admiral was cautious to excess, and to his spiritless
efforts to second Lally the latter with justice attributed much of his failure.
There was the usual want of money. The Governor of Pondicherry declared that he
was almost totally destitute of funds to maintain the war. Lally retorted that,
if this were true, it was solely due to the corruption and mismanagement of the
Administration—a reply which, though it contained a lamentable amount of truth,
did not smooth his path in the future. The only expedient for raising the
necessary supplies appeared to be to demand from the RAja of Tanjore the
payment of a bond for fifty-six lakhs of rupees that had come into the
possession of the French. Marching on Tanjore, Lally bombarded the town for
five days; but, as his ammunition failed, he was forced to retreat without the
money and with a serious loss of prestige. D’Ache, after fighting another
fierce engagement with the English off Coleroon, left the Coromandel coast for
Mauritius, in spite of the most earnest remonstrances of Lally and the whole Pondicherry
Council. The English henceforward held the command of the sea, and this fact
alone made the blockade of an open port like Madras a hopeless undertaking.
Yet in preparation for it, Lally summoned Bussy from his post at HaidardbM, an
action which proved calamitous from every point of view. The Nizdm was mortally
offended, and French influence at his Court was now at an end. Bussy proved
himself an
unwilling
colleague; and, though it was not easy to work' harmoniously with Lally, he
failed, in a task that was thoroughly uncongenial, to do justice to his great
abilities. There was indeed a fundamental difference in the policy of the two
men. Lally’s aim was a concentration of all available force for an irresistible
attack on the British possessions one by one, risking, as Clive said, the whole
for the whole. Bussy, now as ever, clung to the dream, which he had done so
much to realise, of French dominion built up on a system of native alliances
and supported by a resident at the Nizdm’s Court, commanding an army of picked
men. Conflans was left by Bussy in occupation of the Northern Circars; but he
proved utterly unable to cope with the diversion in that quarter planned by
Clive, who, in the midst of his multitudinous anxieties in Bengal, played a
preponderating part in the defeat of France in southern India. Realising the
assured superiority given to England by her supremacy upon the seas, he had
definitely made up his mind that the days of French political power in India
were numbered, though he stood alone in thinking so. While, therefore, he
steadily refused, in the face of strong pressure, to jeopardise his work in
Bengal by sending the Madras contingents back to that Presidency, he despatched
Forde, one of his best officers, in October, 1758, with a picked force from
Calcutta, to support a petty R&ja who had rebelled against French domination
in the Northern Circars. Forde defeated Conflans at Condore in December, 1758,
and carried Masulipatam by storm in April of the following year. The French
were finally driven from that part of India, and subsequently, in 1765, Clive
obtained from the Emperor an imperial grant making over the Circars to the
Company.
In the
meantime, December, 1758, Lally advanced against Madras. The issue, as Clive
confidently declared, was predestined from the outset. In the respite they had
gained by the failure of the French attack on Tanjore, the English had
provisioned and strengthened their fortress. The defence was ably conducted by
Lawrence and Pigot; and on February 16 the sails of a British fleet were
descried standing in towards the Roads. The French immediately abandoned the
siege; but, though they had parried the assault of the enemy, it was some time
before the English felt themselves strong enough to take the offensive. D’Ache
made a feeble attempt to intervene from Mauritius, but after fighting another
indecisive battle with Pocock retired finally from the scene. Lally, who was no
mean tactician, prolonged his resistance for another two years, but was
gradually isolated and beaten to his knees. The campaign at first went on
languidly; but, in October, 1759, Eyre Coote took over the command of the
English forces from the hands of the veteran Lawrence. The position of the
French was now deplorable. They were absolutely without money. The troops were
in a periodical state of open mutiny. In January, 1760, Coote decisively
defeated Lally at Waridiwash, when Bussy was taken prisoner. While the beaten
general stood on the
defensive at
Valdore, Coote, one by one, reduced the French fortresses in the Carnatic. His
operations were checked for a time by a French alliance with Haidar Ali, the
able usurper who had just established himself upon the throne of Mysore. But a
Maratha invasion obliged him speedily to return to his own country, and Lally
was at last beaten back within the walls of Pondicherry. The siege began in
September; all hope of relief vanished with the appearance in the offing of a
powerful British fleet; and in January, 1761, Lally was forced to surrender
from lack of provisions.
The fall of
Pondicherry was the end of French dominion in India. Lally was taken to England
as a prisoner of war, but was released on parole to meet the charges made
against him in France. After a trial lasting two years, though he had been guilty
of nothing more serious than errors of judgment, he was made the scapegoat of
the popular fury for the colonial losses of France in the Seven Years’ War, and
was beheaded. Ten years afterwards, this iniquitous sentence was formally
reversed by decree of the King’s Council. Pondicherry and the other French
possessions were restored by the Peace of Paris in 1763, with their
fortifications in ruins. Mohammad Ali was recognised as Nawdb of the Carnatic,
and Salabat Jang as Subahdar of the Dekhan. Largely through the instrumentality
of Clive, always the evil star of the French in India, two clauses had been
inserted in the Treaty limiting the armed force they might maintain on the
Coromandel coast and excluding them altogether from Bengal and the Northern Circars
except in the capacity of merchants. Henceforth, all French settlements in
India were the easy prey of British armies so soon as war had been declared in
Europe. Pondicherry was once more captured in 1778 and restored by the Peace of
Versailles in 1783, retaken in 1793, and, though nominally restored again at
the Peace of Amiens in 1802, not finally given back till 1816. The one
formidable attempt of France to regain her old ascendancy in 1781-3 will be
narrated in its proper place. With that exception, her influence henceforward
was only represented by diplomatic emissaries or military adventurers in the
Courts and camps of native rulers. The glamour of her great traditions, the
memory of her wonderful and short-lived span of power remained as a vague
menace to haunt the path of British statesmen and prove a will o’ the wisp to
more than one opponent of British rule.
The French
Company had its privileges suspended by a royal decree of August 13,1769. The
trade to India, subject to certain restrictions, was henceforth laid open, and
the settlements in the East passed directly under the control of the Crown.
French thought of the day was all against the maintenance of a trading body
dependent upon a state- granted monopoly. The Government had commissioned
Morellet, one of the ablest of the Physiocrats, to conduct an enquiry into
their financial condition, and his verdict was one of condemnation. He was no
doubt
employed to
make out a particular case; but in none of the contemporary replies that his
pamphlet brought forth, though one was from the able pen of Necker, is any
serious attempt found to discredit his chief facts. No sound economist can deny
his main conclusions: that a commercial enterprise which is not self-supporting
ought to be abandoned, and that there are infinitely more legitimate and more
important uses to which the public revenue can be put than in maintaining a
Company which is oankrupt if left to itself.
Assuredly not
the least of the causes of England’s success was the greater prosperity of her
East India Company. Accciding to Morellet the French Company entered upon the
war in 1744 with resources and credit already seriously impaired. From that
date the number of vessels returning from the Indies diopped to about a fourth
of their previous number, while there seems to have been a complete cessation
of capital sent from France. Though there was a slight improvement in this
respect after the Peace of 1748, the downward tendency was rapidly accelerated
after 1751. On the other hand, the commerce of the English throve during the
war. After-1744 the number of vessels returning from India and the amount of
imports actually increased. In the very year of the outbreak of the war the
Company made a new loan to the Government of £1,000,000, in return for which
their privileges were extended from
1766 to 1780.
The French
Company was so closely connected with the Government that it was not immune
from the lethargy and demoralisation which crept into all state departments
during the reign of Louis XV. While much, therefore* of the responsibility for
the loss of the Indian possessions of France must be laid on the Ministers of
the King, it is only fair to bear in mind that the French Government had never
been able to rely upon a strong and self-sustaining commercial interest. If it
was in some measure responsible for the Company’s fall, it had also been almost
wholly responsible for its creation. The English East India Company at this
time had no official connexion with the State, but many of its Directors sat in
Parliament and were able to press its interests on the attention of the
ministry. As a result, the Company was neither isolated from nor cramped by
state interference, and until the latter end of the century was lifted above
the turmoil of party politics.
To sum up,
therefore, it may be said that England’s success was due to a variety of
causes—the greater commercial prosperity of her trade with India, her
superiority in the hard hand to hand fighting in southern India, the severely
practical genius of Lord Clive, her general ascendancy on the sea which became
particularly marked during the Seven Years’ War, the wealth and resources she
was able to draw after 1757 from her occupation of Bengal, and, lastly, the
greater vigour and capacity of her national Government, which, less entangled
than that of France in European wars, had the leisure to direct its chief
energies at a most critical time to the field of maritime and colonial
expansion.
(3) CLIVE AND WARREN HASTINGS.
In the rich
alluvial plain of Bengal, with its wide waterways, fertile fields, industrious,
peaceful and pliant population, a European nation with resources drawn from a
sea-borne commerce was destined, when the first steps had once been taken, to
advance towards dominion more rapidly than elsewhere. Yet this fact was not at
first apparent. Till past the middle of the eighteenth century the European
settlements in Bengal were far more submissive than those in western and
southern India to the overlordship of native Powers. They bowed before the
majestic pretensions pf the imperial Court of Delhi, even when the suzerainty
of the Moghul had become a mere shadow. The War of the Austrian Succession ran
its course without any outbreak of hostilities between Calcutta and
Chandemagore, The, dynastic wars that ensued on the Coromandel coast were
brought to, a close before the peace was even broken in Bengal. The chief
settlements of the English, French and Dutch, all built within thirty miles of
one another, pursued their avocations in peace without a thought of violating
the traditional neutrality of the province* till the native Government itself
drew the sword by its savage attack upon one of themselves.
The last
strong Subahdar or Nawab of Bengal, Ali Verdi Khan, who possessed a very shrewd
insjght into the real meaning of the English occupation, died in April, 1756.
He was succeeded by Sirdj-ud-dauld, a youth of about twenty years of age, weak,
vicious, and a degenerate. Both the English and the French at this time,
knowing that war was imminent between the two countries, were fortifying their
respective settlements. The new Nawab sent them orders to desist. The French
succeeded in quieting his suspicions, but the English failed to make their
peace with, him. They had already incurred his displeasure by refusing to give
up a fugitive of whom he was in quest, and by expelling, through some
misunderstanding, the messenger who came to demand his surrender. Siraj
-ud-dauld promptly determined to extirpate the English, who were recognised by
his ablest advisers as the most formidable of the European nations. He seized
the factory of Kasimbazar, and news soon reached Calcutta that he was in full
march upon that settlement with an army variously estimated as consisting of
80,000 to 50,000 men. The European stations in Bengal at this time were weakly
defended. In all of them long years of peace had brought about a similar
condition of affairs. The forts had fallen into disrepair, warehouses, godowns,
and luxurious private houses had grown up round the ramparts, blocking ; the
fire of the guns and affording cover to an enemy. There had been mismanagement
of funds in the past and failure to carry out the recommendations of military
experts; but for this state of things, in Calcutta at any rate, responsibility
lay far heavier on the Presidency than on the Company at
552 The Black Hole of Calcutta.—Recapture.
[1756-7
home. In
Calcutta the regular European garrison did not amount to more than 260 men, and
even that was double the French force at Chandemagore. In spite of this, had
the spirit of Clive animated the defence, a sturdy resistance might have been
offered to the Nawab’s unwieldy army. But the siege of Calcutta proved one of
the least creditable episodes in the history of British India. Drake, the Governor,
was a weak man respected neither by his colleagues nor by the native
inhabitants. Holwell, the only man of ability on the Council, was personally
unpopular. The attack began on June 16. On the 18th the women and children were
embarked on the ships in the river, and the next day, in a moment of
unpremeditated pusillanimity, Drake, the military commander of the garrison,
and some others, followed them on board. The abandoned garrison, ha,ving
watched with mingled rage and astonishment the fleet drOp down the river below
the town, held out under Holwell for two days longer; but, as their frantic
signals to the fleet to return met with no response, they were forced to
surrender on June 20. That night, by an act of stupid brutality, one hundred
and forty-six English prisoners were thrust into the notorious Black Hole, or
military punishment cell, of the fortress. It was the hottest season of the
Indian summer, and next morning, after suffering indescribable torments, but
twenty-three miserable wretches, Holwell amongst them, crawled out alive. For
this atrocity the Naw£b was not persohally responsible; but he showed a
revolting callousness after the event, and made no attempt to punish the
perpetrators. Meanwhile, the fugitives from the siege, huddled together in
misery and privation, their plight further embittered by mutual reproaches and
recriminations, were awaiting relief at Fulta, twenty miles lower down the
river.
When the news
reached Fort St George, the authorities there after long discussion decided, in
spite of the imminence of war with France, to make the recovery of Calcutta
their first care. It was fortunate for them that the year 1756 witnessed the
temporary eclipse of Bussy’s power in the Dekhan, for he was thus prevented
from either attacking Madras when seriously depleted of troops, or marching to
support the Nawdb of Bengal. Clive, just returned from England to assume office
as Governor of Fort St David, was placed at the head of the land forces, while
Admiral Watson was in command of the fleet. The expedition, which consisted of
five men-of-war, carrying 900 European and 1500 native troops, started on
October 16. They reached the Hooghly after a difficult and tedious voyage,
sailed boldly up the river, though without pilots—a difficult and hazardous
feat of navigation—and relieved the fugitives at Fulta in December. Calcutta
was retaken on January 2, 1757, and Hooghly a week later. Sirdj-ud-dauld once
more drew towards Calcutta with a large army. After a sharp fight, in which a
dense fog neutralised the generalship of Clive, the Nawdb agreed on Februaiy 9
to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the English. The Company’s
forts
and former
privileges were restored, and permission was given them to coin money and
fortify Calcutta.
Clive at this
period had to direct his course with the greatest circumspection. The
difficulties that faced him were tremendous. News having reached India that wax
was declared between England and France, he was receiving urgent calls from the
Government of Madras to return with his army to that Presidency, and was
obliged to take upon himself the serious responsibility of refusing the
summons. His relations with Watson were far from cordial, and on one occasion,
in a dispute as to the government of Calcutta after the recapture, the Admiral
even threatened to open fire upon him. Watson was a brave, frank and able man;
but as a King’s officer he considered that his main duty was to act against the
French, and he hardly cared to conceal his contempt for the Company’s affairs.
Clive’s instinct told him that either Chandernagore must be captured or the
French bound to inaction by a very stringent agreement. This, more than
anything else, induced him to consent to a peace with Sir&j -ud-dauM which
otherwise could hardly have been considered satisfactory; it was essential
before all things to have a breathing space. After some futile negotiations for
a neutrality in which neither side was sincere, Chandernagore was attacked and
forced to surrender. On land, Clive drove in the outposts and kept the garrison
employed so as to prepare the way for the main attack by the fleet. The French
made a gallant defence, two hundred of their small force being either killed or
wounded; but they were quite unable to repel Watson’s brilliant onslaught from
the river. The English too suffered heavily, in the flagship every
commissioned officer, except Watson himself and one other, was either killed or
wounded. A considerable portion of the garrison escaped to join Jean Law, the
French commander at Kasimbazar. Pursued over the Oudh boundary, Law in an
adventurous march made his way to Lucknow and Delhi, and twice within the next
two years aided the Moghul Emperor to invade Bengal, finally surrendering to
the English with the honours of war in 1761.
Meanwhile,
English relations with the Naw&b were in a most unsatisfactory state.
Their demands upon him were constantly increasing as they gradually felt their
strength. He had only been kept quiet during the attack on Chandernagore by the
exercise of great adroitness on Clive’s part. It was known that he was giving
his protection to the French, and was eager for Bussy to bring his army from
southern India to Bengal. Despairing of any firm settlement while
Sir&j-ud-dauli remained on the throne, the English, contrary to their
original intentions, were driven to contemplate a renewal of the war. A
revolution at Court was obviously imminent, for Sir&j-ud-dauK had few
friends, and to Clive and his colleagues it seemed better that they should seek
to a-uide events than merely hope to profit by their issue. A conspiracy was
arranged to dethrone the Nawdb and set in his place Mir Jafar,
554 Conspiracy with Mir Jafar.—Battle of Plassey.
[1757
a great noble
of his Court. At a critical point in the negotiations Omichand, an influential
native employed as a go-between by the English, attempted to levy blackmail by
demanding a disproportionate amount of the plunder expected to accrue to the
conspirators, under threat of divulging the whole conspiracy. At the
instigation of Clive, who considered that “ art and policy were warrantable in
defeating the purposes of such a villain,” two drafts of the treaty with Mir
Jafar were prepared. One, written on red paper, guaranteed to Omichand the sum
he demanded, and was shown to him to quiet his suspicions. The other, which was
ultimately signed by Mir Jafar, omitted this stipulation. The fictitious
document was signed by Clive and the members of the Secret Committee; and, when
Watson, who, as has been well said, played throughout the transaction the part
of a disgusted spectator, refused to append his signature, Clive directed that
it should be forged. The agreement with Mir Jafar ceded to the British all the
privileges and rights which had been promised by Sir&j-ud-dauM. Heavy
compensation was exacted for the loss of Calcutta: one million sterling was to
be paid to the Company, and half that sum to the European inhabitants. By a
private arrangement large sums as gratuities were guaranteed to the members of
Council and the Commander-in-chief; Clive was to receive in all ,£234,000;
Watts, the resident at Murshid&bdd, £117,000; and others in proportion.
Meanwhile
Sir&j-ud-dauK, accompanied by the traitor Mir Jafar, had marched to the
famous grove of Plassey with an army estimated at 50,000 men. Clive advanced
northwards from Chandemagore. Before crossing the river which parted him from
the enemy’s position, he held a council of war to discuss the advisability of
immediate action. He himself voted in the negative, and was supported by the
majority of his officers. The minority, headed by Eyre Coote, were in favour of
the bolder course. The Council was dismissed; but, after an hour’s solitary
meditation, Clive announced that he had changed his mind and intended to fight.
He crossed the river, June 22, and reached Plassey an hour after midnight. The
next morning he drew up his small army, consisting of about 900 Europeans and
2300 other troops, behind an embankment which defended him from the enemy’s
artillery. The two armies began to cannonade each other soon after daybreak,
and continued to do so till eleven o’clock, when a torrential downpour of rain
caused the fire to slacken. At two o’clock the enemy, having been repulsed in a
charge, showed signs of wavering, and Kilpatrick, in the temporary absence of
Clive, ordered an advance. Clive, hastening up, at first reprimanded him
severely; but, seeing that the enemy were in motion to evacuate the field, he
ended by putting himself at the head of the charge. The Naw&b’s army, realising
that they were betrayed by Mir Jafar’s contingent, which had taken no part in
the action, and suspecting treachery on all sides, now streamed from their
entrenchments in hopeless rout across the plain.
Such was the
battle of Plassey, which set the seal on Clive’s military fame and brought him
his peerage, though he had fought many actions which more severely tested, and
more signally proved, his powers of leadership. The English lost nineteen men
killed in action, and the enemy not more t than five hundred. It was not a
battle but a panic, and there was hardly any fighting worth speaking of. The
real key to Clive’s strategy is to be found in the fact that he had determined
not to attack the Nawdb’s huge army with his tiny force, but to entrench himself
till the conspirators openly showed their hand. He was disconcerted for a time
by the ambiguous attitude of Mir Jafar, who seemed also to wait upon the event,
or who had perhaps been shamed into inaction by the deluded Sirdj - ud-dauM’s
last desperate and pathetic appeal to his honour. Clive’s momentary anger, when
Kilpatrick ordered the final advance, was due to his belief tliat his
preconceived plan was imperilled. The utter demoralisation of the enemy gave
him the victory sooner than he had dared to hope, and he was quick as always to
see and profit by the sudden change of circumstances.
After the
battle Mir Jafar, in spite of his equivocal attitude, was hailed by Clive as
the new Nawib of Bengal. Sirij-ud-dauK fell into the hands of Miran, Mir
Jafar’s worthless son, and was put to death. On the examination of the
Naw&b’s treasury at Murshidrib&d, it was found to contain only one and
a half million sterling, while the total amount to be paid over to the English
was £2,840,000. It was therefore arranged that the payments should be made by
instalments. The wretched Omichand was at the same time enlightened as to the
ieception that had been practised on him.
After
establishing Mir Jafar at Murshid&b&d and quelling several
insurrections against his authority, Clive returned to Calcutta to find that a
despatch had arrived from home for the appointment of a “rotation” Government.
A Council of ten was nominated, of whom the four seniors were to preside in
rotation for four months at a time. The despatch was written before the
Directors had been fully informed of Plassey and its results. The Council
accordingly decided to deviate from the instructions given, and offered the
Presidency to Clive who after some hesitation accepted it. In January, 1759, he
successfully defended Mir Jafar from a dangerous coalition between a rebellious
son of the Emperor and the Nawdb Wazir of Oudh. It was in return for this
service, on some rather indelicate prompting from Clive himself, that Mir Jafar
made over to him the famous jagir Consisting of the rents paid by the East
India Company for the districts held by them south of Calcutta and amounting to
about £30,000 a year.
The
extraordinary change in the status of the English affected their relations with
the < Dutch, who had always acquiesced willingly in the sovereignty of the
Nawrib while he was an independent Prince, but who now discerned in the shadow
of his throne the form of an old and hated
European
rival. Above all, they rebelled against the right granted to the English to search
all vessels in the Hooghly, and to monopolise the pilot service. Accordingly,
after some secret correspondence with the Naw&b, in which he played a very
equivocal part, they appeared in the Ganges with a strong armament. Clive
believed that to allow another ? European nation to establish itself
in force in Bengal was, in the unsettled state of the province, tantamount to a
surrender of the whole position so hardly won. On the other hand, to offer
armed resistance when there was peace between the two nations was no doubt an
utterly lawless proceeding. Yet he did not shrink from this extreme step,
declaring that a public , man must sometimes act with a halter round his neck.
The Dutch foolishly afforded him a plausible pretext by seizing some English merchant
vessels. He promptly assailed them with all his strength; their seven ships
were captured, and their land forces utterly defeated by Forde. The Dutch at
Chinsura were forced to surrender, and were only permitted to retain their
settlement in Bengal on terms that robbed their rivalry for the future of all
terrors for the English.
Clive left
India in February, 1760. To few subjects of the British Crown has it been given
to accomplish a more wonderful task than the one he had compressed into the
space of three years. The dynastic war in southern India had revealed in him a
born leader of men and a tactician of high order; the revolution in Bengal
justified his claim to the greater qualities of the strate0. s+
and the statesman. In 1756 the Company had been driven with contumely from
their chief settlement. Clive not only reinstated them, but utterly transformed
the whole position. From being the obsequious servants of the Nawdb the British
became his masters. Their influence for all practical purposes was now supreme
throughout Bengal, which in its wider signification included Behar and Orissa.
Clive had captured the chief settlement of the French in that province,
materially helped to ruin their power in the Dekhan, and reduced the Dutch to
submission.
But the
manner in which these brilliant results were achieved is more open to
criticism. The whole episode of the war with Sir&j-ud- daulri, falls below
the standard which a Western nation should observe in dealing with an alien
civilisation. The English made a fatal mistake when, in the words of Watts,
they determined to “ play the game in the Oriental style.” They were thus
beguiled into a course of action from which they would probably have recoiled,
had every step been clear from the beginning. The fact that Clive, whose
natural instincts were all in favour of frankness, was driven to write a “
soothing ” letter to the Naw&b, long after he had decided to ruin him, is
typical of the moral degeneration which had overtaken British policy. *1116
incident of the fictitious treaty with Omichand and the forging of Admiral
Watson’s name is but a detail in a course of action that was stained throughout
with
dissimulation. The first false step was taken (it was no doubt easy to see this
after the event) in meddling with a dynastic plot at all. It would have been
far preferable to defeat Sir&j-ud-dauld in open warfare and then set up a
successor. But Clive and his colleagues did not realise the Naw&b’s
weakness, prompt action of some kind was necessary, and the supreme difficulty
of the position extenuates their policy, even though forming no adequate
defence of it.
The private
arrangement with Mir Jafar for donations to individuals cannot be justified,
even though there be taken into account the lower standard in all questions of
public action and private profit which was then universally prevalent.
Technically speaking, there was no breach of the law, for the regulation
forbidding the receipt of presents from native Powers was not passed till 1765.
But the fact that the Council concealed the transaction from the Court of
Directors shows that their consciences were uneasy. A palliation was
subsequently found in the meagre official salaries paid to the Company’s
servants at this time. It is true that nominally they were very low; but, with
allowances and the permission to engage in private trade, the real uemuneration
was probably higher than that of the Indian civilian of to-day. The Directors,
as subsequent events were to prove, had some reason for their contention that higher
salaries would not exempt their servants from temptation. Verelst, under whose
rule corruption reached such a terrible height, received in salary and
commissions £23,000 a year, besides permission to trade on his own
account—remuneration on an infinitely more magnificent scale, considering the
territory over which he ruled, than that enjoyed by the Viceroy of all India.
Clive’s own
defence is well known. He declared that he considered presents not
dishonourable when they were received from an independent Prince as the price
of services rendered without detriment to the Company. But it can hardly be
said that any real independence was left to a man in Mir Jafar’s position, who
was supported entirely by British arms. Clive also claimed to have informed the
authorities at home that the Nawdb’s generosity had made his fortune easy; but
a vague and incidental statement of this kind could scarcely give an adequate
idea of the huge sums involved, and, when the Directors disclaimed the
intention of objecting to any gratuity made to individuals, they could have
had no inkling that these gratuities nearly equalled the whole amount awarded
to the Company itself for the loss of Calcutta.
The
additional gift of the jagir was rendered the more invidious in that it consisted
of the quit-rent which the Company was bound to pay to the Naw&b for their
territorial possessions in Bengal. Clive was man of the world enough to know
that his position as at once servant and landlord of the Company was an
impossible one. The surprising ttr'ng is, not that the Directors should
ultimately have withheld payment of
this huge
annuity, but that they should have acquiesced in it so long. There was sound
sense in their contention that it was inadvisable for them to be tributary to
their own servant. It is true that they played their part exceedingly ill; they
allowed Clive to retain the jagir.till
they had begun to quarrel with him, and then endeavoured to withdraw it on
purely technical grounds to which Clive could, and did, make a good technical
reply.
A more
serious charge against Clive is that he had, by accepting these presents,
seriously impaired the stability of his own work. It is probably true that at
the time of the arrangement with Mir Jafar the English believed his wealth to
be boundless. The most ridiculous reports were current as to the contents of
the treasury at Murshiddbdd, which were said to amount to £40,000,000. After
Plassey the sum was found to be but a million and a half, while the total
demands of the English, including both the sums that were avowed and those that
were concealed, amounted to more than two and a quarter millions. Yet on this
discovery no remission of any kind was granted. Mir Jafar was obliged to make
assignations on his revenue and pledge his credit for years to come. The whole
administration was crippled and could not be properly carried on, so that a
part at least of the responsibility for the notorious misgovemment of Bengal
during the next few years must be shifted to the shoulders of Clive and his
colleagues. Eyre Coote and several members of the Council declared at the time
of Mir Jafkr’s deposition that his want of money proceeded, not from any fault
of his own, but from the distracted condition in which the country had been
left after Clive’s departure. Clive’s famous statement before the Select
Committee of Parliament in 1773, that, when he recollected the gold, silver,
and jewels in the treasury at Murshiddb&d, he stood astonished at his own
moderation, must be set side by side with the fact that the wealth there
accumulated was found by himself at the time to be insufficient to meet even
the first drafts of the new reign. At the parliamentary enquiry Clive was asked
whether, at the time the jagir was granted, he knew that the Naw&b was surrounded
by troops clamouring for pay. He answered, yes; but he added as some sort of
explanation that it was the custom of the country to keep soldiers in arrears.
Again, he was asked if he knew that the Naw&b’s goods and furniture were
publicly sold to pay the Company the sums stipulated in the treaty, and again
he had to answer in the affirmative.
Clive’s
responsibility was, of course, much less than that of the men who, under
Vansittart, Spencer, Verelst, and Cartier, lowered the honour and prestige of
England in the East. They had not the palliations that he could put forward,
and they developed the evil tendencies that were only latent in his acts. Clive
could always discriminate between his own interest and that of the State. When
they clashed, he never for a moment hesitated which to prefer. In attacking the
Dutch at Chinsura
he risked the
loss of a large part of his private fortune, which had been entrusted to an
agent in the Netherlands.: But, as a responsible administrator, he
should have realised that lesser men would fail to tread so nicely the
difficult and dangerous path lying between the domains of public aud private
interest. To sum up—there was neither criminality nor corruption in the
acceptance of these presents* but there was inexpediency to a very high degree,
and Clive himself afterwards found his previous conduct something of a
millstone round his neck in his last and noblest work, the purification and
reform of the civil sei vice of Bengal.
After his
departure, Shah Alam, the new Moghul Emperor, invaded Bengal, but suffered
defeat at the hands of Caillaud and Knox. During the campaign Mir Jafar’s son
was struck with lightning and killed. The Bengal Council seized the occasion to
effect another revolution in the Government. They deposed Mir Jafar in favour
of his son-in-law Mir Kasim, from whom they took gratuities to the amount of
two hundred thousand pounds. A minority of the Council protested forcibly
against this revolution, which they considered unnecessary and likely to' cast
an indelible stain upon the national character. It was really planned by
Holwell, who temporarily succeeded Clive. Vansittart, the new Governor, was a
man of good instincts but weak character, whose own account of his period of
office presents, a pathetic picture of a constant struggle with a recalcitrant
and corrupt majority on the Council.
Mir Kasim was
a man of a very different stamp from Mir Jafar. He possessed great
administrative ability and honestly did his best to put the affairs of the
province on a sound footing, and to meet his engagements with the English. He
cleared off most of the encumbrances left by his predecessor, discharged his
debt to the Company, reduced the numbers, while greatly increasing the
efficiency, of his army, and so completely won the allegiance of his soldiers
that they fought for him with a bravery and fidelity rarely experienced in the
native armies of this period. His position however was untenable. In the end
the ruthless extortions of the Bengal Council drove him to desperation and
brought out all the latent savageness and cruelty of his nature. The English
policy towards him was an unfortunate mixture of weak compliance and
unrighteous severity. The only two men of real ability on the Council,
Vansittart himself and young Warren Hastings,, consistently supported and
defended him up to the eve of the appeal to force, declaring that with veiy few
exceptions they found his conduct irreproachable. Hastings announced that, but
for the Naw&b’s final acts of treachery and barbarity, which made it the
duty of every Englishman to unite in support of the common cause, he would have
resigned the Company’s service as a protest against the treatment of Mir Kasim.
The question
of the internal trade was a complicated one. By Surman’s Firman granted in
1717, the Company were allowed to
carry on
their trade to and from Bengal free of duty. But this exemption applied only to
imports and exports by sea. After 1756, the Company’s servants began illegally
to claim exemption for the private trade which they carried on for their own
profit within the province itself, though their competitors, the native
merchants, were still obliged to pay all imposts in full. Thus unfairly
favoured, the English diverted more and more of the trade into their own hands
or those of their native agents, and many of the factors made a profit by
selling the Company’s passes to native traders unconnected with the Company.
While therefore the English obliged the Nawdb to pay them heavy subsidies for
the support of their troops, they were at the same time lessening the customs
duties from which his revenues were mainly derived, and impoverishing by
unfair competition that portion of his subjects who would normally have paid
the tax. Against this state of things Mfr Kasim protested at first with dignity
and moderation, then with increasing irritation. Vansittart and his supporter
Warren Hastings, the two men who played an honourable part throughout in
opposition to the corrupt majority on the Council, met the Nawdb in conference
in 1762. They agreed that the English should pay duties at nine per cent, on
their internal trade, an arrangement which, even so, left them in a remarkably
favourable position as compared with their native rivals. It was stipulated
that no use should be made of this agreement till Vansittart had laid it before
the Council; but Mfr Kasim by a fatal error began to act upon it at once. The
Council promptly disowned the action of the Governor. They would probably have
done so in any case; but they were furious when they heard that the Naw&b
was acting as though Vansittart’s assent was all-sufficient. Hastings solemnly
warned them that they were making themselves the “lords and oppressors ” of the
country, but in vain. One of the most significant features of the business was
that the Council were prepared to embroil the province and risk the loss of
Bengal for a point in which the Company, as distinct from their servants, had
no interest at all.
Mfr Kasim now
abolished, as he had a perfect right to do, all internal dues for two years,
thus putting his own subjects on a level with the British. The Council
immediately demanded that he should reverse the order, Vansittart and Hastings
alone pointing out the extreme injustice of requiring the Naw&b to ruin his
own subjects for the purpose of upholding the British monopoly. Mfr Kasim was
gradually driven into open war. So far he had acted with forbearance and
moderation; but from this date he exhibits a rapid deterioration of character.
Frequent collisions took place between his officers and the agents of the Con
oany. In June, 1763, William Ellis, a man of quarrelsome and tactless ways, who
had long been on bad terms with the Nawdb, seeing that war was imminent,
forcibly took possession of the city of Patna, but was surrounded by the enemy
and captured. All the up-country
agencies were
seized and dismantled. In July Mir Kasim was formally deposed. Mir Jafar was
brought from his seclusion and once more placed upon the throne. He was made to
grant all the commercial privileges claimed by the English, promise a large
donation to the army, and, by a most iniquitous provision* indemnify the
Company for the acts committed by the usurper in whose favour he had been
formerly deposed. ‘ Mir Kasim was brilliantly defeated by Adams in two fiercely
fought battles in 1763 and, after ordering the massacre of Ellis and his other
prisoners at Patna, took refuge with Shuja-ud-dauld, the Nawdb Wazir of Oudh
and the Emperor Shah Alam, who were now acting in conjunction. Munro, who had
first to quell by drastic measures a dangerous sepoy mutiny, defeated their
combined forces in 1764 at the battle of Buxar, in which the English lost over
800 men killed and wounded and the enemy left 2000 dead upon the field. This
was the most important victory in India won by the English up to that time, and
it laid Oudh and a great part of northern India at their feet. Soon afterwards
the titular Emperor of Hindustan with his chief Minister, the Naw&b Wazir,
made his submission to the victors.
Early
in 1765 the Bengal Council once more effected a lucrative sale of the
succession to the Nawabship. Mir Jafar died in February, and was succeeded by
his second son. A new treaty was concluded, extending British influence in the
administration and transferring all real control to a Deputy Nawdb who was
largely dependent on the Council. In spite of the fact that all the
modifications of the former compact were against the Naw&b’s own interests,
he was compelled to make handsome presents to the Governor and Council. The whole
affair presented a stronger instance of compulsion than had yet occurred, and
the scandal was intensified by the fact that, before the documents were signed,
strict orders against receiving any gratuities from native Powers were received
from home. ,
The
transaction was hardly completed, when, in May, 1765, Clive arrived, with
special powers to take up his second governorship of Bengal. It was now five
years since he left India. In England his course had not been altogether
smooth. Though he was hailed by Pitt as a “heaven^ bom general,” the political
honour bestowed upon him was limited to an Irish peerage. Clive himself
considered it inadequate; but Ministers were probably influenced by the fact
that he had been munificently rewarded by a native Power. He entered Parliament
as member, for Shrewsbury in 1761, and by a lavish purchase of rotten boroughs
soon gathered round him a little band of supporters. He was consulted by the
Government in the framing of the Indian clauses of the Treaty of Paris in 1763,
but never seems to have won the complete confidence of either political party
in England; and his main sphere of activity lay in the domestic politics of the
East India Company. A certain opposition had grown up against him even in the
Court of Directors, partly due to a dictatorial letter he o. it. u. vi. oh. xv. 36
562 Clive's second governorship of Bengal.
[1759-65
had addressed
to them from Bengal and partly to the fact that his suggestion to Pitt, in
1759, of state control over Indian possessions had leaked out. Three years
after his return, the attempt already referred to was made to stop the payment
of his jagir. At this point news arrived of the calamitous position of affairs
in Bengal. The Court of Proprietors, who never faltered in their allegiance to
him, at once demanded that he should be sent out to set matters right. The
Directors gave way; Clive was appointed Governor and Commander-in-chief in
Bengal; an arrangement was made by which he was to receive the jagir for ten
years, or till his death if it fell within that period; and his chief partisan
was elected Chairman of the Company. If the existing Bengal Council were found
to be opposed to him on his landing, Clive was empowered to call into being a
smaller committee of four nominated by himself, and together they were to
assume all the functions of government.
Having
arrived in India, Clive found that the military position had been completely
retrieved by the victories of Adams and Munro. It remained for him to reform
the internal administration and determine the future foreign relations of
Bengal. His task in both directions was a difficult one. Demoralisation had
spread through every branch of the service. Insubordination was rife both on
the civil and the military establishment; waste, plunder, and recklessness were
everywhere prevalent. No living man but Clive, with his vast Indian experience
and his iron strength of will, could have stemmed the tide of corruption, and
of all his other achievements none is comparable to the work, incomplete as it
was in some respects, that he accomplished during his second term of office in
Bengal. Finding it necessary at once to exercise the special powers with which
he had been endowed, he nominated his Select Committee two days after his
arrival,, amid the pale faces of the original Council, sick with apprehension
of the reckoning to come. Eveiy man was made to take the covenant against the
receipt of presents, and the evil system which allowed the Company’s servants
to escape the regular internal dues on their private trade was abolished. Clive
himself was in favour of the total abolition of licensed trading and the
substitution of salaries on a liberal scale; but, as the Court of Directors
refused to adopt such a solution, he did his best to legalise and limit a
practice of which he disapproved by allocating the profit of the salt monopoly,
carefully regulated and graded, to the emolument of the Bengal staff. After two
years the system was abolished by the Directors, who granted instead of it a
commission on the gross revenues of the province. These reforms were not
carried without the fiercest opposition. Three of the original Council were
driven into resignation; one was expelled. The immense sums he had himself
received after Plassey were naturally, though unfairly, quoted against Clive.
To a certain extent his past now rose up against him, and his position would
undoubtedly
have been stronger, if he had been able to offer something better than the
technical and legal defence, sound enough in its way, that in 1757 there was no
order of the Court of Directors against the practice and that the circumstances
of a revolution and a peaceful succession were very different. To an uneasy
sense of a certain sting in the taunts of his opponents are probably to be attributed
both the strength of Clive’s language of condemnation and the continual
assertion of his own disinterestedness, which are alien to modem taste.
Clive had
next to regulate the Company’s relations with the Emperor and his hereditary
chief Minister, the Naw&b Wazir of Oudh, His settlement with the latter was
the constructive part of his work that was destined to endure the longest.
Shu]' -ud-dauM was required to pay 50 lakhs of rupees as a war indemnity, and
was restored to all his dominions except the districts of Kora and Allahd.bdd.
A defensive alliance was concluded with him, by which the Company engaged, on
his being responsible for their pay and maintenance, to provide troops whenever
he required them for the protection of his frontiers. Thus Oudh definitely
assumed that condition of a “buffer” State, which it retained down to its
annexation by Lord Dalhousie in 1856.
A more
difficult problem was presented by Shah Alam, who, with the prestige of his
high office joined to the disability of material poverty and destitution, was
drifting like a derelict vessel, powerless for good yet potent for harm, on the
stormy sea of Indian politics. Clive called upon the Emperor once more to
confirm the Naw&b of Bengal in his office, and took over On behalf of the
East India Company the ditvani of the province, which he had refused when
formerly offered in 1759. The duty of the Diwan was to collect and adriiinister
all the revenues, to defray the expenses of government, and, after setting
aside funds for the ’ support of the Nawdb, to remit the remainder to the
imperial treasury at Delhi. On this occasion certain modifications were introduced.
The Company were to pay the Naw&b of Bengal a fixed sum of 53 lakhs of
rupees (reduced to 41 lakhs in 1766, and to 32 in 1769), to give the Emperor an
annual subsidy of 26 lakhs, and make over to him the districts of Kora and
Allahabad as a means of supporting his imperial dignity.
'
Theoretically, it is perhaps not easy to justify this curious solution of the
problem, which was, indeed, described by a political opponent as a “monstrous
heap of partial, arbitrary, politictll inconsistencies.” Practically it is
difficult to suggest a more feasible course. The arrangement was attacked from
diametrically opposite standpoints, according as the critics gave their
attention to the Emperor’s high claims or his feeble resources. Clive was
accused both of driving too hard a bargain and of having been needlessly
generous. Was it really worth while, it was asked, to buoy up the sinking empire,
or, if so, would it not have been better to march to Delhi, and conquer all
Hindustan in the name
of the Moghul
P From these dazzling dreams Clive had the strength of will to turn away his
eyes. He realised, none more clearly, that the path to dominion lay open. “ It
is scarcely hyperbole to say,” he wrote, “ that to-morrow the whole Moghul
empire is in our power.” But he nevertheless confined the territorial influence
of the Company to the three provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. As events
showed, he was mistaken in the idea that British expansion could be permanently
limited; but that he was right in so limiting it at the time, is proved, so far
as such things are capable of proof, by the feet that the thirteen years of
Hastings’ rule barely preserved the frontiers as Clive had fixed them against
external enemies. Had the British grasped the glittering prize too soon, they
might with weakened and scattered forces have been unable to withstand the
Maratha onset in the next decade. Concentrated within the narrower lines, they
were able to repel it, and Clive perhaps was building better than he knew when
he deliberately stayed his hand.
The position
in Bengal after the acquisition of the Diwani was a very complicated one. The
Nawdb himself became a mere puppet and the pensioner of the Company. His
deputy, with whom Clive now associated two colleagues, remained as the visible
head of the executive, receiving from the English the expenses of
administration and liable to be called to account by them for any gross abuse
or scandal. The criminal jurisdiction was also left to him, while to the
Company’s servants belonged the control of the treasury and certain limited
judicial powers in civil suits. But, even in their own department, the Bengal
Council kept sedulously in the background, and till 1772 they transacted the
revenue business through the agency of native collectors, though, to control
these, English “supervisors” were appointed after 1769. Clive’s famous “dual
system” broke down badly in operation during the next seven years, and can only
be commended in so far as it was a logical step to the open assumption of
responsibility on the part of the Company carried out by Hastings in 1772, and
the completion of his work by Lord Cornwallis in 1788. There was inherent in it
a fatal divorce of power from responsibility which caused most of the old
scandals and abuses speedily to make their reappearance. The avowed reason why
Clive stopped short of assuming the full sovereignty was that to do so would
have offended the susceptibilities of other European Powers; and this plea was
considered adequate and valid by the highest authorities of his day. He may
also, not improbably, have been influenced by the conviction that such a burden
was too heavy to be placed upon the shoulders of the civilians of Bengal, till
a new generation had grown up under better conditions of training and
discipline.
Before he
left Bengal, Clive found himself called upon to face a crisis which threatened
to endanger all his achievements. He had been ordered to abolish the system of
extra pay and allowances known as “double batta," which, at first
exceptional, had grown to be the rule
1767—73] Mutiny in
Bengal.-Clive attacked in Parliament. 665
throughout
the Bengal army. The abolition produced a mutiny of the officers, planned with
great deliberation and a cynical indifference to the public interest or the
claims of military allegiance thoroughly characteristic of the demoralised
state of the presidency. Clive had already alienated the civil service to such
an extent that an open social boycott was organised against him. He now found
himself in danger of losing the power of the sword. In this fearful predicament
he never faltered, and his supreme mastery over men was never better exemplified.
The slightest sign of weakness would probably have brought upon him the fate
that afterwards befell Lord Pigot, of being deposed and imprisoned by a
combination of the civil and military officers. In a few days, by amazing
promptness of action and pure inflexibility of will, he had shamed the
mutineers into submission. It is in a crisis of this nature that Clive appears
almost a Titanic figure. He matched all the resources of his wonderful
personality agaiust a rebellious Council, an army in open mutiny, a foreign
position of extreme peril, and won the day.
Clive left
India in January, 1767, weary and disillusioned. When all necessary
qualifications have been made, he must be acknowledged to have accomplished a
task that made even greater demands upon his courage and intellectual powers
than the terrible crisis of 1756. He returned to find, within a few years, the
national gratitude for his latest services almost obliterated by the censure,
in some cases merited though most unhappily timed, now visited for the first
time (for the facts were only just becoming known) on his earlier and less
reputable transactions in Bengal. In view of the revelations made by the
Parliamentary Committee of 1772, this result was probably inevitable. The
attack on Clive is often attributed wholly to the baffled spite and mean
revenge of the corrupt Bengal gang who thronged back to England, bent on
exacting vengeance for their dismissal and disgrace. But, though it was
certainly a monstrous perversion of justice that a man like Johnstone, whose
criminality was tenfold greater than that of Clive, should have been allowed to
direct the attack instead of being put upon his defence, it would still be
unfair not to recognise that a section of his accusers were influenced by a
more righteous motive—the desire to set in no doubtful light England’s
relations with her Eastern dependency.
Clive’s great
speech in 1773, when he stood' at bay before a critical and unfriendly House,
is eloquent alike of his weakness and his strength. He scorned to gloss over or
extenuate a single one of his acts, but justified himself throughout. It has
been well said of hita, that he possessed a high sense of honour with little
delicacy of sentiment. He declared that he might have brought back from India
after his second period of office an immense fortune, infamously added to the
one already secured. This was true, and it was thoroughly characteristic of
Clive’s frank, honest, rather coarse-fibred, mind that he should claim a merit
for not having incurred infamy. Just as he would not go an inch
beyond what
was legally permissible, so he could not understand how it was blameworthy for
a man to take the utmost that his position allowed. His standards in matters of
personal profit and public duty were not particularly fastidious, though hardly
lower than those of his age; but, such as they were, he never failed to act
up,to them.:, The House of Commons, with his famous apostrophe ringing in their
ears; that when they came to decide upon his honour they should not f jrget
their own, took perhaps the best possible course. They accepted a resolution
declaratory of the fact that he had received) definite sums from native Powers;
but they rejected that, part of the motion which seemed to reflect on his
personal integrity, and they added in simple and eloquent words the famous
rider which so worthily set the seal upon his fame, that “ Robert, Lord Clive,
did at the same time render great and meritorious services to his country.”
In
1774 Clive, who had been: a victim to insomnia and melancholia, took his own
life. He was one of the greatest men, intellectually at any rate, that' have
represented England in the East. In the field or at the Council-table, he was
the incarnation of energy. . However complicated the problem that confronted
him, his clear and eager mind, disentangling the issues and sifting the trivial
from the essential, sprang confidently and unfalteringly to a decision. It was
conceivable that he might decide wrongly. It was almost inconceivable that he
should hesitate. In the difficult sphere of action in which his life was
passed, he towers above all his contemporaries. He is as supreme in India prior
to 1770, as is Warren Hastings from 1772 to 1785. Nothing is so , great a
tribute to his powers as the deference of his colleagues. In the earlier part
of his career they seem with few exceptions to have acquiesced gladly in his
masterful leading, and at the end, when he came as accuser and judge, to have
been blasted with the breath of his displeasure.
.
Five years
elapsed between Clive’s departure and the assumption of office by Warren
Hastings. The administration tended to fall back into the old evil grooves.
Verelst and Cartier, though the former at any rate was a man of estimable
private character, proved incapable of resisting the bad tendencies latent in
the dual system. While its servants accumulated vast fortunes, the finances of
the Company were far from prosperous, and Bengal itself, already; plundered by
corrupt native officials, was scourged by a terrible famine in, 1769-70. A
sinister commentary upon the administration of this time is afforded by the
fact that though a third of the inhabitants of Bengal are said to have
perished, the revenue collections of 1771 exceeded those of 1768, the year
preceding the famine. The blame for the unscrupulous scramble for wealth could
not now at any rate be put down to the parsimony of the Company at home. The
commission on revenues paid to Verelst in two and a half years amounted to
about <£45,000; and in addition he
had an
official salary, with allowances, amounting to £4800. The rhetoric of Pitt and
Burke hardly exaggerated the sinister effect on public life, both in India and
at home, of these great fortunes, won so easily and by such questionable means.
In southern
India there was a beginning of those complications which were destined to
embarrass the course of Warren Hastings. Three Powers were striving for
supremacy in the Dekhan—Mysore, Haidarab&d, and the Marathas. The Council
of Madras, unable or unwilling to regard the instructions from home that they
should stand aloof from all political entanglements, plunged into a path of war
and diplomacy which brought discredit upon the British name. It was only with
great difficulty and by the payment of a stipulated tribute that they could
prevail upon their ally, the Niz&m of Haidarabad, to recog .ise the
validity of the imperial grant which made over the Northern Circars to the
English. In 1766 they concluded a treaty with the Niz&m, by which they were
drawn into an alliance with him and the Marathas against Haidar Ali. The Nizdm
proved faithless and leagued himself with tha enemy; but their united forces
were severely defeated at Changrma and Trinomali (1767). In spite of the
successes they had won, the English concluded another treaty with the Nizam,
containing such ignominious terms that it received the sharpest censures from
the Court of Directors. The war with Mysore was waged without skill or
judgment, and Haidar Ali dictated peace on his own conditions in 1769, almost
under the walls of Madras. The Peace laid an obligation upon Madras to aid the
ruler of Mysore if attacked by another Power. This engagement the English were
unable to fulfil when Mysore was invaded by a Maratha army in 1771, and they
earned by their default the undying hate of a formidable and relentless foe.
In 1772
Warren Hastings became Governor of Fort William in Bengal. His Indian career
had hitherto been creditable rather than brilliant, and he had passed through
the most corrupt era of the Presidency with reputation unsullied. He held
office, first as Governor, then as Governor^ General, for thirteen years. The
period was the most critical in the Eastern hi'tory of Great Britain. Political
anarchy in India reached its acutest stage. Never were the anomalies in the
Company’s constitution more prominent, their control over their servants
weaker, or their policy more fitful and spasmodic. At home there was often
sharp divergence of opinion between the Courts of Directors and Proprietors,
and the Company, thus divided against itself, was called upon to repel popular
and Parliamentary attacks of a most formidable character. Under this
accumulation of evils, British power in the East was shaken to its foundations;
and the fame of Warren Hastings rests not upon victorious campaigns or any wide
extension of the frontier, but upon the claim, moderately and with perfect
justification put forward by himself, that he maintained the provinces of his
immediate administration in a state
568
Warren Hastings Governor
of Bengal. [1765-80
of peacd,
plenty, and security, when every other member of the British Empire was
involved in external war or civil tumult.
In internal
affairs his administration forms the connecting link between those of Clive and
Cornwallis. The period of misgovernment that succeeded 1765 condemned the “
dual system.” The Court of Directors now determined to “ stand forth as Diwan,”
or in other words to collect and administer the revenues of the Province
through the agency of their own servants, and they ordered Hastings to carry
out this great reform. The Deputy Naw&bs of Bengal and Behai’ were removed
from office and prosecuted for peculation, though in both cases they were
acquitted. The treasury was transferred from Murshid£bad to Calcutta. Hastings,
on a fresh succession, reduced the Nawab’s allowance from thirty-two to sixteen
lakhs of rupees a year; though, thanks to a more economical administration and
the abolition of sinecure offices, a larger net sum was actually received by
the Prince. In 1772 a quinquennial settlement of the land revenue was
introduced, and English officers, now first called collectors, were appointed
to control large districts. These men had certain powers of civil jurisdiction,
but the criminal Courts remained in native hands. In Calcutta two Courts of
Appeal were established, the Sadr Diwam Adalat (Supreme Civil Court), presided
over by the Governor-General and two members of Council till 1780, when the
presidency was conferred by Hastings on Impey, and the Nizamat Adalat (Supreme
Criminal Court), presided over by a native judge. The whole tendency of these
fiscal, judicial, and agrarian reforms was in the direction of the solution
afterwards effected by Cornwallis; and it is noticeable that Hastings was
personally in favour of going further than the Court of Directors, believing
that it was a mistake to maintain the jurisdiction of the Nawdb in criminal
affairs.
Hastings had
next to face the problem of preserving intact the frontiers of Bengal. Clive’s
solution had hitherto worked fairly well, but at this stage it utterly broke
down. The Marathas, having recovered from the rout of Pdniput in 1761, were
hanging like a threatening cloud over Delhi, Oudh, and Rohilkhand. The puppet
Emperor, who had been living at AllaMbdd on the revenues allotted him by the
Company, accepted, in spite of earnest remonstrances from his English allies,
the proposal of the hereditary foes of his House that they should place him
upon the imperial throne. He entered Delhi in 1771 under an escort of Maratha
horse, but found himself the mere tool and dupe of his patrons, who forced him
within a year to make over to them the districts of Kora and Allahabad, which
had been assigned to him by Clive. The English were confronted by an awkward
dilemma. The Emperor was merely a “pageant of our own creation.” To continue
paying his allowance was equivalent to subsidising their bitterest enemies ; to
allow the Marathas to occupy the ceded districts in his name was to surrender
the gate of Bengal. In such predicaments Hastings never hesitated.
He had a
hearty contempt for formulas as distinct from facts, which in moments of peril
often proved his salvation, though it occasionally led him into difficulties
and embarrassments. He chose a solution which at once replenished the Company’s
treasury, and was adapted to the traditional Bengal policy of strengthening
Oudh. He withheld the tribute to Shah Alam, which as a matter of fact had not
been paid since the famine of 1769-70, and he restored Kora and Allah&Md to
the Nawdb of Oudh for a sum of fifty lakhs of rupees in addition to the pay of
the Company’s troops employed to garrison them. The spirit, if not the letter,
of Clive’s treaty undoubtedly implied that the Emperor received these gifts as
being under British protection, and by all ordinary political rules Hastings
was perfectly justified in maintaining that he had forfeited his right to hold
them at all by transferring them to a third party.
When in
September, 1773, Hastings met the Naw&b of Oudh in conference at Benares,
he took the first step in a transaction which led him into deeper waters.
Shuja-ud-dauK proposed that, in return for a large subsidy, the English should
lend him troops to conquer Rohilkhand, the fertile tract of country lying
north-west of Oudh along the base of the Himalayas. The country was peopled by
Hindu peasants under the sway of the Rohillas, a Mohammadan clan of Afghan
pedigree, forming a loose confederacy and acknowledging as their leader an able
chief, Hafiz Rehmat Khan. Against this man the Nawdb of Oudh had a plausible
claim for a large sum of money, alleged to have been promised him in return for
assistance given to the Rohillas against the Marathas. Hastings saw at once the
strategical advantage to be gained by carrying the frontier of his ally to the
base of the Himalayas, nor was he uninfluenced by the chance of procuring a
large sum for the Company’s treasury, though he always maintained that this was
merely a secondary inducement; but he realised, at this time at any rate, that
there were other objections to the scheme, and he gave a somewhat reluctant
assent to the proposal, hoping apparently that the need for intervention would
never arise. In 1774, however, the Naw&b required that the bargain should
be fulfilled. Attended by a British brigade under Champion, to whom fell all
the hard campaigning, he invaded Rohilkhand. Hafiz Rehmat Khan was killed
fighting gallantly at the head of his troops, and about twenty thousand
Rohillas were banished from the country, which passed finally under the sway of
Shuja-ud-dauld. The episode of the Rohilla War formed one of the most serious
charges made against Hastings in Parliament, and the fiercest denunciations
were launched against his whole1 policy in regard to it. He was
accused of having violated the rights of nations, and bartered away for gold
the lives and liberties of an inoffensive people. An unhistorical and romantic
halo was cast by the gorgeous imagination of Burke round the origin of the
Rohilla race. It has since been recognised that much of this criticism was
beside the
570, The Rohilla War.—Hastings Governor-General. [1774
mark. The
Rohillas had no ancient prescriptive right to the country which they ruled.
They had only been established there for a quarter of a century, and their
title was no better, though certainly it was no worse, than that of most of the
States that had risen to power on Moghul decadence. The Nawdb of Oudh had,
according to the standard of the day, a specious pretext for going to war,
though it probably could not have borne a very close scrutiny. It is untrue
that the military operations were marked by any circumstances of peculiar
atrocity, and the complaints which Champion recorded against his allies were
obviously dke far more to jealousy of the plunder they acquired than to
disinterested compassion for the lot of the conquered. Though the government of
Oudh could hardly have been an improvement on that of Hafiz Rehmat Khan, who
was a man of ability, it is improbable that the Hindu population were greatly
affected by the change, and it is certain that Hastings did his best to prevent
any excesses on the part of the Naw&b and his army. But, when all this is
admitted, some serious objections to the policy still remain. It ran counter to
the clear instructions of the Directors against interference in Indian warfare.
Hastings was creating a dangerous precedent when he lent his ally a brigade of
British troops, to be used at discretion against a people with whom the Company
had no quarrel, and in his arguments and minutes on the subject there is
plainly apparent a rather cynical disregard of every other consideration except
political expediency.
The campaign
in Rohilkhand was the last important event of Hastings’ administration as
Governor of Bengal. In 1774 his position and powers were materially altered by
the Regulating Act of Lord North, passed the preceding year—the outcome of
Parliament’s first attempt to construct by statute a constitutional government
for India. To some such interference on the part of the State, events had long
been tending. In his famous letter to Pitt in 1759, Clive had suggested that
the Crown should claim sovereignty over all the Company’s possessions; but the
great Minister, as was his wont when he did not see his way clearly, spoke on
the matter “a little darkly,” plainly showing his reluctance to raise so
important a question. During the next twelve years men thronged back to England
loaded with the wealth, and what was strongly suspected of being the plunder,
of Bengal. The incursion of these “nabobs” with their lavish notions and
orientalised habits into the aristocratic circles of the time is one of the
most striking social phenomena of the eighteenth century. Contemporary memoirs
and letters reveal the mingled contempt, envy, and hatred with which they were
regarded. “We are Spaniards in our lust for gold,” wrote Horace Walpole, “ and
Dutch in our delicacy of obtaining it.” The East India Company, as Burke said,
was a State in the disguise of a merchant, a great public office in the
disguise of a counting-house, and political thinkers saw a dangerous anomaly in
the growth of an Eastern empire,
1766-74]
571
linked to the
main fabric of British dominion only through the agents of a private company.
From 1766 Indian affairs were constantly,before Parliament, and in 1767 a
compromise on the question of sovereignty was accepted by both parties, in the
arrangement that the Company should pay a yearly sum to, the State of £400,000
for its territorial possessions. In 1772 two Parliamentary Committees (Select
and Secret) conducted those exhaustive enquiries into East Indian affairs which
led incidentally to the attack on Lord Clive. It was shown that within the nine
years 1757-66, £2,169,665 had been distributed by the Princes and natives of
Bengal in presents to the Company’s servants, exclusive of Clive’s jagir, and
that a further sum of £3,770,833 had been paid as compensation for losses
incurred. At intervals of a few months the committees issued voluminous reports,
and the revelations there made, together with the Company’s appeal for a public
loan of a million and a half, indicating the breakdown of their finance, led
many to the conclusion,, as stated by;Burgoyne, that, if sovereignty and law
were not separated from trade, both India and Great Britain would be
overwhelmed. The divorce of trade from the other functions of the Company was
not destined to be effected for many years; but the Regulating Act of Lord
North attempted, in a rather half-hearted way some differentiation between the
executive and judicial functions in India, and an extension of state control
over the Company both at home and abroad. The Governor of Bengal was to become
Governor-General of all the settlements. He was to be advised by a Council of
four, and was allowed a casting vote in the event of there being an equal
division of opinion. A Supreme Court of Judicature was to be established at
Calcutta, consisting of a Chief Justice and three puisne judges. All
correspondence on civil government or military affairs was to be laid by the
Directors before his Majesty’s Ministers, and the constitution of the Company
was largely remodelled on a more oligarchical, basis. The Act was a compromise
throughout and intentionally vague in many of its provisions. It did not openly
assert the sovereignty of the British Crown in India, or invade the titular
authority of the Naw&b of Bengal. It appointed a Governor-General, but
shackled him with a Council that might reduce him to impotence. It established
a supreme Court of justice, but made no attempt accurately to define the field
of its jurisdiction, specify the law which it was to administer, or draw a line
of demarcation between its functions and those of the Council.
' Warren
Hastings was appointed the first Governor-General, and he was also the last to
hold office under the terms of the Act. The Councillors, Monson, Clavering,
and Francis (Barwell was already in India)* the Chief Justice Impey and his
three colleagues, arrived in 1774. The members of Council, always inspired by
Philip Francis, began by quarrelling with the Governor-General over some
absurd point of etiquette in their reception, and they followed this up by a
general revision and
572
[l774—80
condemnation
of his policy. There followed six years of an administration which is probably
unparalleled. Hastings governed in the face of a hostile majority and a
relentless opposition directed, not from Press or platform outside, but from
the other side of his own Council-table. Philip Francis, one of the ablest and
most merciless of men, directed a stream of criticism, vindictive, subtie, and
provocative, on every detail of the Govemor-General’s policy. Hastings had
control of Indian affairs at a peculiarly critical time; but the Struggle at
the Council-board alone, where Barwell was his only supporter, would have fully
taxed the powers of any other man. He could not even rely upon consistent
support from home, and in 1777, when his own precipitation in offering resignation
had given a handle to his enemies, he only retained his position by refusing to
accept the order appointing General Clavering Governor-General.1 In
view of the nerve-destroying ordeal to which he was subjected, it would be more
than surprising if his career did not reveal some faults and mistakes. When
every act was submitted to the same fierce attack, every motive called in
question, the very boundaries of right and wrong must have tended to become
blurred in the mind of the victim who, as he himself said, was enveloped in an
atmosphere of “dark allusions, mysterious insinuations, bitter invective, and
ironical reflections.” By his savage vindictiveness, Francis utterly
neutralised all that might have been salutary in his opposition. From 1774 to
1776, Hastings was almost uniformly outvoted in
the Council. By the successive deaths of Monson and Clavering in 1776 and 1777,
and the exercise of his casting vote, he regained control, and maintained it
though with difficulty till 1780, when he disabled Francis in a duel. After the
final departure of the latter in the same year, his position was somewhat
easier, for, though his Council were not fully in accord with him, they were
men of much smaller powers than their predecessors.
The Council
began with a thorough-going condemnation of the RohiUa War. They recalled
Hastings’ agent from Lucknow and Champion’s brigade from Rohilkhand. The Nawdb
Wazir of Oudh died in 1775; and, in direct opposition to the traditional policy
of strengthening British friendship with that State, they forced his successor
to enter into new treaties, imposing upon him largely increased subsidies for
the use of British troops, and supporting the claims of the late Nawdb’s widow
to a disproportionate share in his wealth and estates. The personal hostility
of the Council reached its highest point in 1775, when Nuncomar, a native of
high rank and great influence but of doubtful character, appeared at the
Council-board with a charge against Hastings of having received a bribe. The
accusation was eagerly welcomed by Francis, Monson, and Clavering, who,
without waiting for proof, placed on record a minute that “ there is no species
of peculation from which the Honourable Governor-General has thought it
reasonable to abstain.” Warren Hastings firmly refused to be arraigned at his
own
Council-table
by a man of “so notoriously infamous” a character as Nuncomar. He probably felt
that, with the untrustworthiness of native evidence and before a prejudiced
Court, it might be difficult to prove his innocence, and he had good
justification for resisting the high-handed and insulting procedure of his
enemies 011 the Council. While the matter was still pending, Nuncomar was
himself suddenly arrested on a charge of forgery unconnected with the case. He
was brought to trial in due course, condemned to death, and executed. The
charge against the Governor-General was dropped and never proceeded with.
It is
unlikely that the fascinating mystery which broods over this famous episode
will ever be entirely dispelled. The insinuation that Hastings and Impey
deliberately planned the destruction of Nuncomar is now regarded as baseless.
It is, at any rate, as Pitt declared, unsupported by a shadow of proof. The
two men were by no means always on the best of terms, and the quarrel between
the Supreme Court and the Council as to the limits of their respective
jurisdictions had already begun. The charge originated in a natural way out of
an old lawsuit that had been before the Courts for many years, and Impey
appears to have tried the case patiently and fairly according to his lights. On
the other hand the punishment of death was undoubtedly too severe. Though the
point has been disputed, the best reading of the law is that the English code
making forgery capital was not introduced into Bengal till some years after
the alleged crime had been committed. However this might be, Nuncomar’s case
was preeminently one in which the discretionary power of the judges to relax
the general severity of the law should have been exercised. There was therefore
something very like a miscarriage of justice; but for this the Supreme Court,
and not Hastings, was responsible, and the part played by the judges is quite
capable of explanation without any necessity for suggesting a corrupt motive. Impey
and his colleagues were intensely jealous of their privileges and rights. They
had hardly been long enough in the country to appreciate the difference between
English and Indian, ideas of law. Their conduct in the case was quite on a par
with their whole attitude till 1780, during which time they were constantly
engaged in a high-handed and injudicious attempt to apply the practice of the
Courts of Westminster to the native population of Bengal. Th.’y were absolutely
conscientious and utterly wrong-headed. The Chief justice seems seriously to
have considered that it was his duty to check by a severe example the
prevalence of the crime of forgery in Bengal, and that to grant any remission
of sentence to Nuncomar would, in view of his great wealth, have brought upon
the Supreme Court the charge of being open to corrupt influence. Whether or not
Hastings, finding there was a legitimate handle against his enemy, and having a
shrewd idea from his knowledge of Impey’s character of what the issue would be,
if he once set the train of events in motion, gave a hint to Nuncomar’s
accuser to
press on his case at this particular juncture, admits of no exact proof or
disproof. The coincidence in time was extraordinary, and it is likely enough
that Hastings would have regarded such a method of defending himself as
perfectly justifiable. When he was fighting with his back to the wall he was
not, any more than his adversaries, inclined to be fastidious as to the weapons
he employed. Not the least mysterious part of the episode is the fact that
Francis and his colleagues made no attempt, as they might constitutionally have
done, by petition or intercession, to obtain a reprieve. The reflexion is
inevitably suggested that, realising they had gone too far, they were actually relieved
to see their tool and coadjutor put out of the way. Francis himself at the time
stigmatised the suggestion of any complicity between the judges and the
Governor- General as “wholly unsupported and libellous,” and only adopted the
insinuation as his own a few months later. If there is anything sinister in
Nuncomar’s fate, it is not perhaps the darkest shadow that falls across the
reputation of the Governor-General.
It is a
curious point that Hastings never seems to have denied in so many woids that he
had received the sum mentioned by Nuncomar, and even his most strenuous
defenders have acknowledged that there was probably some irregularity in the
business which he was anxious to conceal. A few words may profitably here be
said on the whole' subject of his financial transactions. The charge of
rapacity was, as Hastings himself averred, that of all others the most foreign
to his nature. Yet it must be admitted that in matters where money was
concerned he was, at best, inexcusably careless and extravagant, and he
afforded Francis, who, to do him justice, was personally incorruptible, too
many opportunities for damaging criticism. Hastings’ life in retirement shows
a constitutional inability to keep clear of debt, and in India the
extraordinary difficulties of his position compelled him, or seemed to compel
him, to act in a manner which looked highly suspicious to those who did not
possess the key to his conduct. In the depressed state of the public finances^
he appears to have considered that he was justified in accepting for the
Company presents or douceurs offered to himself; and, to avoid objections from
his Council, he occasionally retained them for considerable periods in his own
possession. He dared, in fact, to risk his reputation for what he conceived to
be the interests of his employers, and was thus sometimes proved to have
seriously compromised his own future defence. Whether the equivocal course
followed by Hastings was really necessary, is open to dispute. The Directors
themselves did not think sO, and it may be said at once that no modem
administration would tolerate for a moment the extraordinary latitude in
financial matters claimed by the Governor-General. He seems to have considered
that so long as he could assure the Company that he had “the applause of his
own breast,” they had no cause to make any further demand upon him. Francis was
often needlessly provocative; but he was right in
demanding a
more stringent method of control, and the severe terms in which the famous
Eleventh Report of the Select Committee of 1783 commented on Hastings’ whole
system of account-keeping cannot be said to be unmerited. No one now believes
that Hastings was personally corrupt; but the real proof of his integrity
depends, not upon the formal defence offered at the Impeachment, whicb was
technically weak, but on the moderate fortune that he brought back from India,
and on the well- attested fact of his absolute cleanhandedness during his early
years in Bengal, at a time of life when the prospect of wealth holds out its
most dazzling attractions, and his opportunities of acquiring it were
unlimited. Moreover, Hastings cannot in fairness be judged by the standard that
would be applied to a modem representative of the Crown in India. To govern
provinces and wage wars successfully is one thing, to do either or both at a
financial profit is quite another—and yet this is what was expected of him. The
Governor of Bengal was now called upon to deal with high and intricate
political problems; but, as the representative not of the State but of a
private commercial company, he was required, not less than when his duties were
confined within the walls of a factory, to show a credit balance in the pages
of his ledger.
In the
affairs of his own province of Bengal, Hastings exercised, at least when able
to dominate his Council, a direct control. In western and southern India, since
he was usually only informed of the fait accompli, he was limited as a rule to
the rather melancholy choice of trying to wrest a partial success from the
conduct of policies he condemned, or the alternative, so distasteful to a
British administrator, of disowning bis subordinates. In 1775 the Bombay
Government engaged by the Trfeaty of Surat to support a Pretender to the
Peshwaship at Poona, on condition that Bassein and Salsette were ceded to them.
Hastings was at one with his colleagues in denouncing the war that ensued as
“impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised, and unjust”; but, as the Bombay
authorities had actually occupied Salsette and involved themselves in military
operations, in which they had won a certain amount of success at a heavy cost,
he argued that they must be allowed to continue the war to a point whence they
could extricate themselves without loss. He was opposed, however, by the majority
of the Council, and an agent was sent from Calcutta to Poona, who concluded the
Treaty Purandhar, by which the English were allowed to retain possession of
Salsette on abandoning the cause of their protege. Neither Hastings nor the
•Directors were satisfied with the treaty, and in 1778 it was proposed to make
a new alliance with the Pretender. It is questionable whether, in spite of
obvious drawbacks, it would not have been better, even in 1775, to have
reversed the Bombay policy. It is fairly certain that in agreeing to a renewal
of the war Hastings, though he had the support of the home authorities, made a
serious mistake. No man could do more justice in debate to a good cause than
Philip Francis, though he seldom
allowed
himself the luxury of supporting one. In this instance, he by his able minutes
and protests undoubtedly got the better of the Governor- General. The only
argument advanced by Hastings that could justify the long and harassing
warfare, which ended without gain to either side, was the danger of a European
and Maratha alliance, suggested by the presence at Poona since 1777 of a French
envoy. The military successes, Goddard's march across India and capture of
Ahmadab&d in 1780, and Popham’s storm of Gwalior in the same year, were
gained by Calcutta forces and what his enemies called the “frantic military
exploits” of Hastings. The Bombay expedition only met with disaster, and its
commander in 1779 was forced to sign the disgraceful Convention of Wargaon,
which surrendered all the territorial possessions gained by the English in
western India since 1765. The treaty was disowned by the civil authorities, and
the war, chequered by victories and defeats, dragged on till 1782, when peace
was made by the Treaty of Salbai, which practically restored the status quo,
though the Company were allowed to retain Salsette.
Madras was,
at the same time, passing through a disastrous and discreditable epoch.
Difficulties in relation to the hostile Powers of southern India were
aggravated by the equivocal status of the presidency itself. Mohammad Ali, like
the Subahdar of Bengal, was incapable of defending .his own territories, and
his dominion rested on the support of British arms; but, as Madras did not
possess the executive and financial control of the Carnatic, he was left with a
dangerous amount of power and responsibility. The attempt of the British Crown
to maintain in Arcot during 1770-1 plenipotentiaries accredited to his Court
proved an unhappy experiment, against which the Company vigorously protested on
the ground that it hopelessly compromised their relations with the Naw&b.
Mohammad Ali’s corrupt and collusive financial transactions with the notorious
Paul Benfield and other junior servants of the Company gave birth to the
gigantic scandals known as “the Nawab of Arcot’s debts,” which demoralised the
whole internal government of the presidency. In the short period of seven years
two Governors were expelled by the Court of Directors, and one suspended by
Hastings, while a, fourth, Lord Pigot, died in prison, where he had been
confined by his own subordinates for the rather high-handed and
unconstitutional measures he had taken against their corrupt policy. The result
of these constant changes in the executive was a chaotic and contradictory
policy, producing the most deplorable results. By 1780 the presidency had
succeeded in manoeuvring itself into a position of hostility to all the great
Powers of the Dekhan. In that year Haidar Ali made his famous raid upon the
Carnatic, which was immortalised in the oratory of Burke. An English force
under Baillie was surrounded and utterly defeated after a gallant resistance.
Munro, falsifying the reputation he had gained at Buxar, flung his heavy
artillery into a tank at Conjeveram, and retreated to the suburbs of Madras.
1778-84] War with Haidar Ali and the French.
577
Hastings now
interfered drastically in the affairs of the presidency. He suspended the
Governor and, appealing, not in vain, to the patriotism of Sir Eyre Coote,
hurried him from Bengal with all available reinforcements to the scene of his
former fame. The gallant old commander saved the English in southern India by
the severe defeat he inflicted upon Haidar Ali at Porto Novo in July, 1781. An
indecisive engagement at Pollilore was retrieved by another victory at
Sholingar in September. The internal affairs of the presidency were reformed by
Lord Macartney, who came out as Governor in June, 1781. Appointed by the
Company from the ranks of the diplomatic service, he was in many respects a
forerunner of Lord Cornwallis, and he introduced a standard of incorruptibility
in pecuniary matters to which even the best of the Company’s servants at this
time were unable to attain. In administration he showed a vigour and
independence of character which brought him into frequent collision with the
Governor-General. In 1782 Tipu annihilated a British brigade under Braithwaite;
but Coote won his last victory at Ami, and the signing of the Treaty of Salbai
in May withdrew from Mysore the cooperation of the Maratha Powers.
Meanwhile,
war had been declared against France in 1778, and Chandemagore and Pondicherry
had been captured by the English. In the eclipse of British prestige in
southern India the French saw a last chance of effective interference in the
politics of the Dekhan. In 1782 a formidable French fleet with Bussy on board
appeared off the Coromandel coast. Fortunately for the English the attempt was
made a little too late. Pondicherry was already in their hands; there was no
port of approach; and the military position on land had been retrieved.
Suflren, the French admiral, was a naval commander of great genius; but in Sir
Edward Hughes he met a worthy antagonist. The rival fleets inflicted great
damage upon each other in five fiercely contested battles; but neither could
gain complete command of the sea. When Bussy landed in 1783, he found the
opportune moment had gone by. Haidar Ali had died in December of the foregoing
year, worn out by his great activities and the ravages of a slow disease. Bussy
himself was besieged by the English in Cuddalore, till the news of the Treaty
of Versailles forced him to sever his connexion with Tipu. The son of Haidar
Ali was however quite capable of continuing the war unaided. Eyre Coote died in
April, 1783, and his successor in the command was a man without energy or
genius. In March, 1784, by the Treaty of Mangalore, Tipu granted the English a
Peace on terms of a mutual restoration of conquests. Such a conclusion of the
war was far from being a glorious one, and Hastings, severely censured Lord
Macartney’s conduct of the negotiations; but, when he looked back to the year
1780, in which he was called upon to face “ a war, either actual or impending,
in every quarter and with every Power in Hindustan,” he had good reason for satisfaction.
The
armies of
Mysore had been beaten back from the Carnatic; an understanding had been
patched up with the Nizdm ; and a further breathing space had been won before
the final and inevitable conflict with the Maratha confederacy.
During this
time Hastings’ path in Bengal had been anything but smooth. The long and costly
wars begun by Madras and Bombay were supported mainly out of the revenues of
Bengal. As a result, the Company’s finances, which the Governor-General had
placed on a sound footing at the beginning of his administration, proved even
from 1778 unable to bear the strain imposed upon them. Casting about eagerly
for relief, Hastings was led into that course of action in regard to the
R&ja of Benares and the Begams, or Princesses, of Oudh which formed two of
the most serious charges against him at his trial. The circumstances were very
briefly as follows. The sovereignty over Benares had passed by treaty in 1775
from the Nawdb Wazir of Oudh to the Company. On the outbreak of hostilities with
France in 1778, Hastings held that he was justified in demanding from the Rdja,
Chait Singh, a special war contribution, in spite of a guarantee given by the
English in the treaty that the annual revenue paid by him should not be
increased. He obtained with difficulty sums of five lakhs of rupees in 1778 and
1779; in 1780 he ordered him to supply in addition 2000 cavalry. This Chait
Singh refused to do, on the plea that it was beyond his power, and Hastings
promptly determined to inflict upon him a fine of fifty lakhs as rebellious and
contumacious. The Governor-General proceeded in person to Benares in 1781, and
there denounced as “offensive in style and unsatisfactory in substance ” a
letter addressed to him by the Rfija in mitigation of sentence, which certainly
appears on impartial study to be neither the one nor the other, but rather to
be couched in terms of almost abject submission. Though attended by only a weak
escort, Hastings next ordered the arrest of the Rdja in his own capital. Chait
Singh quietly submitted; but his troops rose suddenly, massacred the English
guard, and released him. Hastings was placed for a time in extreme peril, and
it was only his extraordinary coolness and intrepidity that saved his life. The
rising assumed alarming proportions, and serious fighting was necessary before
the insurgents could be dispersed. The domains of Chait Singh were declared
forfeited, and were transferred to his nephew in return for double the revenue
formerly paid to Calcutta.
The Nawdb
Wazir of Oudh had been for many years heavily in debt to the Company; but,
while he was comparatively poor, his mother and grandmother, the famous Begams
of Oudh, held large jagirs, or landed estates, and, on the strength of a rather
doubtful will, the rich treasure valued at £2,000,000 left by Shuja-ud-dauld,
which in the natural course of events should have been bequeathed to the ruling
Nawdb. The latter, maintaining that he was unrighteously deprived of what was
his due, suggested that he should pay his debts to the Company
with the
wealth of the Princesses, and that Hastings should help him to obtain it. Now,
in 1775, on the earnest entreaty of the British resident at Lucknow, the widow
of Shuja-ud-dauM had consented to pay a large sum to the Naw&b, on
condition that the Bengal Government gave a guarantee that no further demands
should be made upon her. Hastings at the time was strongly opposed to the
giving of such a pledge, but had been overruled by his Council. The Nawrib now
(1781) asked that the engagement with the Begam should no longer be considered
binding, and Hastings consented, giving as his reason for a decision which certainly
required justification, that the Begams had countenanced the rebellion of Chait
Singh and had therefore forfeited anything of the nature of treaty rights with
the British. Having once screwed himself to the point, Hastings urged the
Naw&b Wazir, whose character was feeble and irresolute, to resume the
jagirs and seize the treasure, though he stipulated that the Begams should receive
ample pensions in compensation. British troops were marched to Fyzabad, for the
Naw&b hung back when the crisis came, and the eunuchs who managed the
Begams' affairs were compelled by imprisonment, deprivation of food, and other
hardships, to disgorge the hoarded treasure. It has often been denied that
anything in the way of “ torture ” took place; but a letter is in evidence from
the British resident at Lucknow, stating that on several occasions the eunuchs
were led forth for corporal punishment.
These
transactions were properly condemned by the Court of Directors at the time. In
both cases Hastings was driven to go back upon the treaty engagements of the
Company. He contended, as to the business of Chait Singh, that the outbreak of
the war with France justified the levy of a special subsidy, and he charged the
Begams with complicity in the rising at Benares. But it was rightly felt that
allegations of this kind might be advanced with fatal facility in the case of
any treaties that the British found it inconvenient to keep. In his dealings
with Chait Singh, Hastings showed an impatient ruthlessness which was alien to
his kindly nature. The fine imposed by him was undoubtedly excessive. His own
conduct in the matter was rash to the point of folly, and he seems for once to
have been driven from his wonted serenity into a mood of petulance and
vindictiveness. As for the case of the Begams, the evidence against them of any
active part in the insurrection at Benares was extremely weak, and it cannot be
said that British troops were worthily employed in aiding an Eastern sovereign
to wrest money from his relatives and dependents, or in standing by while
servants were maltreated, whose only fault was a too obstinate fidelity to the
interests of their mistress. The Nawdb himself and the British resident at
Lucknow faltered in the ugly work of coercion, and the reluctance of the latter
to carry out the task imposed upon him called forth a severe reprimand from the
Governor-General, who forbade him to allow any negotiations or forbearance “
until the Begams are at the entire mercy ch.
xv. 37—2
of the
Nawab.” Hastings’ attitude throughout was that of one who willed the end, but
did not wish to be held accountable for the means, or even to know too
accurately what they were. The responsibility cannot be altogether thrust upon
subordinate agents, and no special pleading, not even that of his able counsel
at the trial, has quite availed to clear his reputation in this sinister
business. Both the episodes therefore of the Raja of Benares and the Begams of
Oudh merited an enquiry; to some extent they merited censure; but they did not
warrant the ingenious distortions, the gross exaggerations, the malignant
additions in the way of imputed motive and alleged corruption, with which they
were overlaid by the managers of the impeachment.
The quarrel
between the Council and the Supreme Court by 1779 became an open scandal, and
all but produced a deadlock in the administration. In 1780 Hastings conciliated
Impey by appointing him to the Presidency of the Sadr Diwant Adalat or Court of
Appeal for the provincial Courts of Bengal, at a salary of £6500 revocable at
the will of the Governor-General and Council. This action was loudly condemned
at home, on the ground that to appoint the Chief Justice to a second judicial
post under such terms was to run counter to the whole purpose of the Regulating
Act, which aimed at making the Supreme Court independent of the executive.
Impey seems not to have acted from corrupt motives; but he was hardly well advised
in acceding to an arrangement which laid him open to the suspicion of having
compromised his judicial independence for an increase of salary. He was
recalled two years later by the Directors at the orders of Parliament, but the
attempt to impeach him broke down. From Hastings’ point of view the transaction
had many advantages. It put an end to a wellnigh intolerable state of things,
afforded Impey the opportunity to draw up a valuable Code of procedure, and
anticipated the solution afterwards adopted of extending the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Calcutta over the provincial Courts of the
presidency.
Hastings
spent eight months of the year 1784 in an extended tour through Benares and
Oudh, where distress, partly the result of famine* partly of misgovemment, was
everywhere rife. He proved his supreme administrative talents in a
thorough-going reorganisation of the finances and internal affairs of these
allied States, and in the autumn of the year returned to Calcutta, to find the
news of Pitt’s India Act awaiting him, with an account of the Minister’s
equivocal attitude towards himself. Hastings, who had survived the fierce
hostility of his own colleagues, the censures of the Court of Directors, the
condemnatory resolutions of Parliament, and one definite order for his recall,
was destined after all to resign of his own accord the office he had held so
long. Declaring that “fifty Burkes, Foxes, and Francises” could not have
devised a worse measure, he quietly made the preparations for his departure,
and sailed for home on February 8,1785.
The
government of the East India Company at this time might perhaps be described as
an oligarchy tempered by recurrent periods of inquisitorial state inspection.
For the last seven years public attention had been fully occupied with the
rebellion of the American Colonies and the war with France; but after 1780 the
Indian question once more came prominently to the front. Though the Company’s
privileges were extended for ten years, in 1781, as in 1772, both a Select and
a Secret Committee were busy with their affairs. The former investigated the
relations between the Supreme Court and the Council in Bengal, the latter the
causes of the Maratha War. The voluminous Reports they presented were freely
used as arsenals for weapons against the Company by party orators in
Parliament. Condemnatory resolutions were passed in the Commons against the
Governors of Bombay and Madras. The relentless enmity of Francis and the nobler
anger of Burke were preparing to attack the man who had guided England’s
destinies in the East for the past nine years. In the quick changes of the
unstable Ministries at this time, the fate of Hastings often trembled in the
balance. The advent to power of Rockingham, Fox, and Burke, in 1782 brought a
vote of censure in Parliament and the consent of the Directors to his recall;
but their supersession by Shelburne’s Ministry and the staunch support of the
Court of Proprietors gave him a further respite. The Coalition of Fox and North
in 1783 was a political portent that boded ill both to the Company and their
great servant, while at the same time the Directors were obliged openly to
confess that the war had beggared them and to apply to the State for another
loan of i?l ,000,000. After a measure drafted by Dundas had been rejected, Fox
introduced his India Bill. It transferred all the political and military power
of the Company to a Board of seven Commissioners to be nominated in the first
instance by Parliament and afterwards by the Crown, and all its commercial
powers to a subordinate body of nine assistant Directors, who were ultimately
to be nominated by the holders of East India stock, though they too, in the
first instance, were to be appointed by Parliament. The feature of the Bill
upon which the Opposition seized was the surrender of the immensely valuable
patronage of India to the Ministry or the Crown, and Pitt thundered against it
as the most desperate and alarming attempt at the exercise of tyranny that ever
disgraced the annals of this or any other country. Nevertheless, the Bill,
being advocated with all the eloquence of its author and his cOadjutor Burke,
passed the Commons by large majorities, only to be strangled in the Lords, as
Fox indignantly declared, by an infamous string of bed-chamber janissaries. The
truth was that George III, realising with his usual political shrewdness, that
the Coalition, though all-powerful in Parliament, was highly unpopular in the
country, had determined both to destroy the Bill and rid himself of advisers he
intensely disliked. He took measures to make his wishes known to the Lords ;
the Bill was
thrown out;
and the Ministry resigned. Pitt came into power and in 1784 carried his famous
Act, which greatly extended the control of the State over the East India
Company. While the patronage of the Company was left untouched, all civil,
military, and revenue affairs were to be controlled by a Board consisting of
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, one of the principal Secretaries of State, and
four members of the Privy Council. A Secret Committee of three Directors was to
be the channel through which important orders of the Board were to be
transmitted to India. The Court of Proprietors lost the right to rescind,
suspend, or revoke any resolution of the Directors which was approved by the
Board. In India the chief government was placed in the hands of a
Governor-General and Council of Three, and the Presidencies of Madras and
Bombay were made subject to Bengal in all matters of diplomacy, revenue, and
war.
Warren Hastings
landed in England in June, 1785. The storm that was hanging over him did not
break at once. In 1786, Burke on several occasions moved in the Commons for
papers on various points of his administration. The attack upon Hastings in
connexion with the Maratha War and the expedition against the Rohillas failed;
but the House passed condemnatory resolutions on his transactions with Chait
Singh and the Begams of Oudh. Pitt, who had defended Hastings on the first two
of these counts, turned against him on the third. Much ingenuity has been
wasted in the attempt to discover some recondite motive for this proceeding. In
political matters the simplest motives are often those actually operative. Pitt
was honourably desirous of preserving a judicial impartiality, and there is
every reason to suppose, that when he read the evidence offered by the
prosecution on the Benares charge, he was reluctantly driven to the conclusion
that he could no longer stand in the way of a trial. On May 10, 1787, Burke
formally impeached Hastings at the bar of the Lords. The trial began in
Westminster Hall on February 13, 1788.
The articles
of impeachment finally presented at the bar of the Lords were twenty in number,
and differed in many respects from the original list of twenty-two, drawn up by
Burke in 1786 for the consideration of the Commons. The indictment was clumsily
drafted, and combined charges involving the highest criminality with others,
which, if proved up to the hilt, hardly amounted to more than venial errors of
judgment and policy. By far the greater number of the articles centred round
the dealings of the late Governor-General with the allied and protected State
of Oudh. Hastings was charged with tyranny and oppression in the case of the
Rdja of Benares, the spoliation of the Begams of Oudh, the fraudulent sale of
contracts, the grant of pensions to friends and dependents from corrupt
motives, the arbitrary settlement of the land revenues of Bengal, the removal
of the treasury from Murshiddb&d to Calcutta, the violation of treaties
made with the Naw&b Wazir of Oudh,
i788-9i] Charges against Hastings.
583
compulsion
put upon him to maintain an excessive number of troops, unnecessary
interference in the internal affairs of his kingdom, and the confiscation of
revenues and allowances due to his brothers and sisters.
Three of the
episodes, which had given rise to the fiercest attacks upon Hastings in
Parliament and in the pamphlet literature of the day, did not appear in the
impeachment. The House of Commons had definitely acquitted him on the charges
connected with the Rohilla campaign; and, in addition, neither the Maratha War,
the subject of voluminous reports by the Secret Committee of 1781, nor the
trial of Nuncomar, was included in the indictment. In his discursive conduct of
the case for the prosecution, Burke was inclined to traverse the whole of
Hastings’ career in India, but acknowledged that he was debarred from
commenting upon the Rohilla expedition, while he was censured by the House of
Commons for having stated incidentally that the Governor- General had murdered
Nuncomar by the hand of Sir Elijah Impey, on the ground that the condemnation
and execution of Nuncomar had never been imputed as a charge.
Throughout
the trial, there was an incessant wrangle on the question of the admissibility
of evidence, between the eminent barristers conducting the defence and the
managers of the impeachment, who were politicians and laymen in legal matters.
Burke declared that the Lords were exempt from ordinary rules of procedure, and
were bound only by the law and usage of Parliament. He claimed that an
impeachment was a unique judicial process, designed to afford, in exceptional
cases, exceptional facilities for investigation and enquiry. But Hastings’
counsel obtained a decision that the rules of evidence of the ordinary Courts
should be adopted, and they used to the full all the advantages which the
technical forms of the Common Law permitted, or their own expert knowledge
suggested, in order to shield their client and to hamper the conduct of the
prosecu on. Largely through disputes on this head, the trial was extended to so
inordinate a length, that, in 1791, the Commons decided to abandon the greater
part of the articles. Only the first, second, fourth, and sixth, with part of the
seventh and fourteenth were retained. The first dealt with Chait Singh, the
second with the Begams of Oudh, the fourth with contracts, and the remainder,
which for greater convenience were consolidated into one, with the taking of
bribes and presents. Upon these counts alone did the Commons offer evidence,
and ultimately appeal to the verdict of the Lords.
The course
and result of the impeachment are recorded in a later volume. The reputation of
Warren Hastings has suffered curious changes. By the highest Court of
judicature of his day he was acquitted; but on many counts the historical and
literary verdict went against him for nearly a century. Modem research seems to
have justified his acquittal on all the most serious charges; but the reaction
in his favour has sometimes been carried too far. The impeachment
684 The impeachment and the acquittal of
Hastings. [1788-95
was not:
only a piece of party tactics, nor was it due simply to the spite of Sir Philip
Francis. The malignity of no man, however eminent, could have supported so vast
a superstructure. It was upheld by nobler pillars—the high-motived though
misdirected zeal of Burke, and Fox’ devotion to the law of liberty.
There were
many things in the administration of Warren Hastings that invited criticism,
and some that deserved censure. It was well for the credit of the British name
that his action in the case of Benares and Oudh should not crystallise into a
tradition of British policy. It was well that the whole of his career should be
scrutinised, and if the scrutiny was fair, his fame was bound to emerge
justified, if not wholly triumphant, from the test. It was well that the
humanitarian feelings quickening men’s minds at the close of the eighteenth
century should find expression in the field of England’s relations with her
Eastern dependencies, even though that expression was rhetorical, turgid, and
over-elaborated. But it was not well that Hastings, who had on the whole played
a great and splendid part, should be gibbeted as the modem Verres, and made
year after year a target for Burke’s scorching invective and Sheridan’s
theatrical calumny.
The managers
of the impeachment (and this particularly applies to Burke) rained their cause
by the ferocity with which they conducted it. Had they been content with a
temperate presentation of their charges, it is probable that, as was done in
Clive’s case, a qualified censure would have been passed on some of Hastings’
acts, coupled with a generous recognition of his great services to his country.
The machinery of an impeachment was a clumsy anachronism that defeated its own
object. Many gave their votes for an acquittal, not because they believed there
was nothing to reprobate, but because they deemed the long agony of the seven
years’ trial a more than adequate penalty for any errors of judgment on the
part of the accused, who, whatever else he had done, had at least preserved
India for England through a period of extreme peril and in the face of
appalling difficulties.
No one has
ever doubted the transcendent abilities of Warren Hastings. Even Francis paid a
reluctant tribute to his high capacity. The leading traits of his character
were an amazing industry, remarkable precision and clearness both of thought
and expression, a serene equanimity, a dogged patience under misfortune that
seems almost superhuman, a high and noble courage. Conjoined with these
qualities there may be observed on occasion a certain note of unscrupulousness,
a clear-eyed and rather cynical insight into the motive springs of human conduct,
a steely relentlessness when his mind was once made up, and an Unshakable and
extremely provocative self-confidence in the rectitude of his conduct, even in
cases where it was most open to criticism. Such a character forms a complete
foil to the generous-souled and idealistic, but passionate and unbalanced
temperament, of his great accuser. In
doing justice
to Hastings, it is unnecessary to disparage the motives of Burke. In so far as
the latter was impeaching the vices inherent in the constitution of the Company,
he was often victoriously in the right. The wrongs of India, as he himself
declared, constantly preyed upon his peace, and haunted his imagination by
night and day. One of his last letters contains an impassioned prayer that all
he had ever said or written might be forgotten before his part in the
impeachment of Warren Hastings. Right in his sincere dislike of many of the
Govemor-General’s isolated acts, right in his profound distrust of some
tendencies of his policy, right above all in his constant reiteration of the
truth that the function delegated to the Company was a trust and to be rendered
accountable, he allowed the strength pf his feelings to carry him beyond the
boundaries of taste and decency, and made the cardinal mistake of visiting the
condemnation, justly incurred by the system, upon the head of the individual
who was called upon to administer it. To his vivid and heated imagination, the
Peers assembled in Westminster Hall were trying the cause of Asia in the
presence of Europe, and the prisoner at the bar stood forth as “the grand
delinquent of all India.” He thus wholly missed the key to the character of his
great antagonist, and failed to discern what to posterity is the most salient
feature of Hastings’ career, that though he committed faults and made mistakes,
he was never influenced by a lower aim than what he conceived to be his duty to
the Company, and the preservation at any cost of England’s position in the
East.
ITALY AND THE
PAPACY.
Although the papal power itself was far too
weak to affect the result of the War of the Spanish Succession, yet the
attitude of Pope Clement XI as an Italian ruler had some importance, and he
might have traded upon the ancient claim of the Papacy to feudal suzerainty
over the Sicilies in order to obtain some temporal advantage. It was by the
advice of Innocent XII that Charles II of Spain had made the Bourbon claimant
his heir, and it was in accordance with the ancient papal tradition to prefer a
French to an Imperial ruler of Naples. Besides, Louis XIV had of late years
been militantly orthodox, warring perpetually against Huguenots and Jansenists.
On the other hand, there had been little sympathy between the Papacy and the
Empire since the Peace of Westphalia; the Papacy was naturally alarmed at the
Habsburgs’ obvious intention to reassert Imperial claims in Italy by means of
the Spanish inheritance, and Austria’s chief ally was William III, who
represented the leading Protestant Powers. In 1700, the Curia had distinctly
declared in favour of a French policy by electing Cardinal Albani, who had
inspired Innocent’s advice to Charles II, to the Papacy.
But Clement
XI (as Albani now called himself), though learned, upright, intelligent, and an
able politician, had not sufficient strength of character to carry through a
bold and difficult policy. Alberoni said of him that “he changes with every
changing breeze”; the Venetian Erizzo, that “ his opinions and decisions are
frequently at variance.” He recognised Philip V as King of Spain, but, afraid
of irrevocably offending Austria, refused him the Sicilian investiture, and
declared himself neutral. As the investiture was also refused to Archduke
Charles, the Emperor was not conciliated; by refusing investiture to either
claimant, Clement practi ally renounced his suzerainty. Both parties carried on
campaigns in the Papal States without any regard for the Pope’s remonstrances.
Clement did not resist until the Emperor forced the Duke of Parma to do him
homage for his fiefs, over which the Church likewise claimed suzerainty; but in
this question France had no interest in supporting the Papacy. The Austrian
army occupied Comacchio as an ancient fief of the duchy, of Modena, and
advanced on Rome, unhindered by the
Pope’s
hastily raised levies of peasants. Clement was forced to treat, and ultimately
to recognise the Archduke as King of Spain (1709); but Comacchio was not given
back for sixteen years.
At Utrecht
the interests and rights of the Papacy were totally disregarded; its feudal
claims on Sicily and Parma were ignored. Afterwards, Clement made a desperate
effort to restore its prestige by a new Crusade against the Turks; he induced
Austria to join a new Holy League with himself and Venice, and persuaded
Austria’s enemies to promise neutrality during the war. At first there was much
enthusiasm; smaller States and even Spain promised help; Clement fancied
himself another Pius V, and dreamed of another Lepanto; But, even before the
Allies had time to quarrel, Alberoni, having secured a Cardinal’s hat by empty
promises, turned his crusading fleet against Sardinia. Austria’s attention was
immediately diverted from the East, and Clement’s dream vanished with the Peace
of Passarowitz.
Victor
Amadeus’ Tacitean verdict on Clement—“he would always have been esteemed worthy
of the Papacy if he had never obtained it ”— might have been passed on his
successors. Innocent XIII (1721), kind- hearted, but old and feeble, died, it
was rumoured, of shame for having made Dubois a Cardinal. Benedict XIII (1724) was, said the traveller de Brasses, “ bonhomme,
fart pieux, fort faible et fort sot.''' Amiably
disposed and well-intentioned, he was ruled by his scandalous favourite,
Cardinal Coscia, who trafficked in spiritual privileges; but Benedict would
hear no complaints. When the Pope’s death was announced at the opera, the
people rushed out, crying, “ Good; now we will go and bum Coscia! ” Coscia was
severely punished by Benedict’s successor, Clement XII (1730). This Pope was a
Corsini of Florence, who flooded Rome with Florentines, and, when old and
blind, was ruled by domineering nephews. “ Let them do as they like; they are
masters,” he cried. Clement’s election had been the work of the Zelanti
(zealot) party among the Cardinals, which, led by the dominating and terrible
Cardinal Albani, Clement XI’s nephew, was determined to fight against Jansenism
and Liberalism.
. The
eighteenth century sovereigns envied the Church’s wealth, and disliked her
independence and privileges. .It was hateful to them that the imperium in imperio
which an independent self-jurisdiction and the right of self-taxation had
obtained for the Church should be virtually exercised by a foreign Power, still
formidable when it interfered in domestic affairs, though contemptible in
politics. And popular movements, of which they were but partly conscious,
irresistibly drove the sovereigns forward to attack the ecclesiastical
position. These movements sprang from different sources and motives, but their
strongest factor was Jansenism—the agitation for moderate Protestant reform,
whose influence, beginning in France, extended to several other countries. In
France it was really popular, and even affected the clergy. A few more daring
and
independent minds pushed heterodoxy to atheism; these were called, rather
flatteringly, the “Philosophers,” and their influence seriously menaced
religion amongst the upper classes. Again, the lawyers, a compact and
homogeneous body, almost a caste, were prejudiced by their professional
feelings against a double jurisdiction. Different in motives and aims, these
groups united against their common enemy. The “ Philosophers ” encouraged
Jansenism as a menace to the Church; the French Parlement cherished it as a
weapon in that campaign which, having begun with a vindication of the rights of
the Gallican Church, now aimed at transferring the sovereignty over it from the
Papacy to the State. In France, where all anti-clerical parties were strong,
the first battles were fought. Clement XI, trusting to Louis XIV’s orthodoxy,
promulgated the Bull Unigenitus, which championed Jesuit theology against
Jansenism so unwisely that it offended all Augustinian divines and moderate
Catholics. Upon Louis’ death there was a violent reaction; Parlement and people
became more Jansenist, while the Court favoured the Philosophers.
Anti-clericalism had grown immensely before Louis XV was old enough to exert
his influence in favour of orthodoxy, and the Parlement, in its opposition to
the Bull Unigenitus, dared to defy the royal authority. The Government vainly
endeavoured to obtain peace by silencing the noisy controversialists.
Next to
France, it was in Naples that anti-clericalism most flourished. No Jansenism
existed there, and the movement hardly extended beyond the educated classes;
but for centuries lawyers and officials had struggled against ecclesiastical
privileges and jurisdiction. Clement’s refusal of the investiture embittered
the strife; the lawyers urged anti-papal reform upon the Government, and a
group of anti-papal writers became prominent. The clerical party pitched as
their scape-goat upon the historian, Giannone, and forced him to leave the
country. But the city authorities pensioned him, and he found a refuge at
Vienna, while his book, the Istoria Civile, though in itself neither powerful
nor original, became the standard work for all Italian anti-clericals.
Accordingly,
when the Infant Don Carlos conquered Naples (May, 1734), and Clement XII, for
fear of the Emperor, refused him the investiture, he found his more influential
and intelligent subjects eager that he should assert his independence of the
Papacy by ignoring investiture and curtailing ecclesiastical power. They
presented numerous petitions to this effect; and an eminent lawyer, Genovesi,
propounded a scheme for ecclesiastical reform which would have suited
Bonaparte. However, the Spanish Government, which had itself just completed a
Concordat with the Pope, intervened, and the Pope was persuaded to grant the
investiture (1738), and negotiations for a Neapolitan Concordat were begun.
In Sicily,
there had already been a struggle about the Monarchia, the ancient royal
tribunal which claimed supreme control over ecclesias-
1719-40] The Papacy and Sardinia.—Benedict XIV.
589
tical
affairs. The controversy was intensified when Victor Amadeus ascended the
Sicilian throne without papal investiture. Clement XI, afraid to defy a great
Power, thought that he could frighten Victor Amadeus, and declared the
Monorchia abolished. The King and Piedmontese officials resisted firmly, but
they actually had to hold in check the anti-ecclesiastical zeal of the Sicilian
Gran Carte. Native enthusiasm soon cooled, and Victor Amadeus’ loss of Sicily
was partly due to clerical agitation among the lower classes.
In Piedmont,
where the King was absolute, and the governing classes were his officials, the
struggle lay wholly between the Monarchy and the Papacy, though Victor Amadeus
was supported by the unquestioning loyalty of his subjects and by many of the
clergy themselves. The Sicilian question was followed by a quarrel about the
investiture of Sardinia, which Victor Amadeus declared unnecessary. Clement XI
was irreconcilable; but the King sent the clever diplomat Ormea to Rome, to
attempt an arrangement with the milder Benedict XIII. The Cardinals were set
against any concessions, and Benedict was terribly afraid of them; but Ormea
gained the Pope’s confidence and the support of Cosda; and, after three years
of intrigue, a favourable Concordat was made, and the Sardinian investiture
dropped (1727). The Zelamti furiously declared that, though the Pope must die,
the Sacred College was eternal, and, to prove their words true, elected Clement
XII, on purpose to repudiate the Sardinian Concordat (1731). Charles Emmanuel
III firmly continued his father’s policy, though he obliged the Pope by
treacherously arresting Giannone and imprisoning him for twelve years.
The Conclave
of 1740 was fiercely contested between the Zelanti and the more moderate party,
and the election of Benedict XIV (Lambertini) was a compromise. It was
surprising that the Zelanti should have agreed to a candidate so unlike the
typical Cardinal. Benedict was genial, friendly to everyone, and witty, a man
who would turn an awkward situation with a jest—at times of a Rabelaisian
flavour. Yet his private life was pure; he improved his States by good and
economical administration; he was learned, especially in Canon Law. His chief
interest was in literature, and he was a brilliant writer and
conversationalist. His reign recalled the Renaissance days; he patronised
literary men and societies; to encourage Roman art the Academy of St Luke was
founded* The Catalogue of the Vatican MSS was begun, churches were restored,
antiquities discovered, the Index modified, the Roman schools improved, even
scientific professorships founded. Benedict’s friends were Muratori, Noris, and
Montfaucon; Hume, Montesquieu, and Frederick the Great joined in his praises.
Voltaire dedicated Mahomet to him, and wrote him a flattering epitaph. Horace
Walpole said “he was loved by Papists, esteemed by Protestants; a priest
without insolence or interest, a Prince without favourites, a Pope without
nephews.” Conscious of his impotence to stem the tide of change and
disintegration,
he spent his energies on matters within his power, and hoped by ample
concession in temporal affairs to improve the position of the Papacy. He wrote,
“ Princes are a better support to the Papacy than Prelates. With their aid I
think myself invincible....I prefer to let the thunders of the Vatican rest; Christ
would not call down fire from Heaven....Let us take care not to mistake passion
for zeal, for this mistake has caused the greatest evils to religion.” A series
of Concordats and temporal concessions gained for Benedict himself general
respect and admiration; but their ultimate result was to convince the
anti-clericals that the Papacy was powerless and would concede any demand,
while the zealous Church party was exasperated, and prepared for a violent
reaction after Benedict’s death. It was now indeed impossible to adjust the
conflicting ideals of Church and State, of Catholic and anti-Catholic; moderate
concessions would not satisfy Jansenists who wished for reform, nor the
Parlement, which aimed at supreme control of the Church, nor the Philosophers,
who wished to crush it altogether.
At first,
however, Benedict’s policy seemed to prosper. The Sardinian Concordat of 1727
had been in part his work; he now wrote to Ormea, “I have changed my rank, but
not my heart nor my memory.” Negotiations had already begun under Clement, and
were now swiftly concluded (1742); the old Concordat was renewed, with some
concessions on each side, and Sardinia thus obtained more ecclesiastical
freedom than any Italian State excepting Venice. A Neapolitan Concordat was
also soon concluded (1741); but it by no means satisfied Genovesi and the reforming
party, though further changes were afterwards effected by the Government on its
own authority. In reality the King was not in sympathy with the extreme party,
nor was the populace, though a rumour that the Archbishop meant to introduce
the Inquisition led to a riot. The clergy were still less satisfied; they
continually evaded the Concordat, and excommunicated Magistrates for carrying
out its provisions. Controversy was incessant, and attempts for another
Concordat failed; so that, though on excellent terms with Charles, Benedict
could not procure ecclesiastical peace for Naples.
To Spain
Benedict conceded, amongst other matters, the appointment to nearly all Spanish
benefices; thus the Government obtained a control over the secular clergy which
proved very .nportant at a later date. Venice, which had more ecclesiastical
liberty than almost any State, had been for some time quiescent. In Benedict’s
reign, however, she published a decree infringing certain papal rights.
Benedict protested, but to no effect. The situation of Tuscany was the exact
opposite of that of Venice. No State had been so priest-ridden; the later
Medici and their subjects were slaves to clerical domination. The range of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction and privilege was extensive, and the clergy
interfered in every department of life. The Grand Duke Francis could dare to be
more independent, and began ecclesiastical reforms, which
led to some
friction with the Papacy, but not to a quarrel. Nor were there as yet serious
difficulties with Austria. Benedict maintained neutrality in the War of
Succession, and quietly disregarded d’Argenson’s hectoring orders to oppose
Francis’ election as Emperor.
The greatest
troubles still proceeded from France. Here society was atheistic; Madame de
Pompadour exercised her authority against the Church; the Philosophers extended
their influence by the publication of the Enci/clopedie. Jansenism was highly
popular; it was acquiring saints and miracles of its own. The Government
wavered in face of whatever influence momentarily predominated; it claimed to
subject the clergy to ordinary taxation, but withdrew before their firm
opposition. The King was personally devout, but he was swayed by Mme de
Pompadour. The storm broke, when the Parlement bullied and imprisoned priests
for withholding the Sacrament from persons who had not confessed to authorised
confessors, and who therefore might be tainted with Jansenism. The King forbade
the Parlement to interfere, and, on its proving recalcitrant, banished it, but
afterwards recalled it (1754). He ordered a cessation of controversy; but to
this the Parlement would never submit. Bishops were fined and exiled; the King
himself sent the Archbishop from Paris for obstinacy, Benedict was uncertain of
the wisdom of interference; but the General Assembly of the clergy (1755)
appealed to the Pope. After consultation with the Government, he issued a very
moderate Encyclical, which, while proclaiming the Bull UnigenUus as a rule of
faith, really waived the confession question. “Since infidelity progresses
daily,” he wrote, “we must rather ask whether men believe in God than whether
they accept the Bull.” Bemis attempted conciliation, but his Ministry ended too
soon, and Benedict’s moderation produced no ultimate good effects in France.
Towards the
end of his reign the anti-papalists opened a new campaign. For nearly two
hundred years the Jesuits had been the strongest champions of the Papacy. Their
immense influence, especially in education, their discipline, devotion,
intrepidity, above all their extraordinary cleverness, made them the most
determined supporters of the Curia. Frederick of Prussia called them “the
advanced sentinels of the Court of Rome.” But they had now grown too confident
in their own cunning, and were committing serious mistakes. Intrigue and greed
of power had made them unpopular in France, and their system of morals was open
to grave criticism on the part of the Jansenists. In Spain and Portugal the
prosperity of their American settlements and trade provoked envy. They were
identified with the uncompromising attitude of the Church, especially with the
Bull Unigenitus, and were becoming rather a cause of weakness than of strength
to the Papacy. Hence the anti-papalists now directed their attack against them
rather than against the Papacy itself.
The moment
was favourable, for several European Governments
were
controlled by anti-papalist and Jansenist Ministers. Choiseul* indifferent to
religion, was simply guided by expediency; but Roda and Aranda in Spain,
Tanucci at Naples and Pombal in Portugal, were one and all enthusiasts. Pombal
began by demanding an enquiry into the Jesuits’ American trade; and
Benedict,who disliked their worldly avocations, allowed Pombal’s friend,
Cardinal Saldanha, to hold the enquiryi Benedict could not have foreseen the
violent hostility of Saldanha’s report; but he died before it was issued, and
his successor, Clement XIII (1758), had neither skill to avoid nor ability to
master the approaching storm. Clement and his Minister Torrigiani had personal
piety, courage and patience; but both were priests rather than politicians, and
believed that the righteous must ultimately triumph, and that their trials
could be overcome by passive endurance. Clement, elected by Jesuit influence,
was convinced that their cause was that of the Church, and was prepared to
submit to any humiliation rather than sacrifice them. But he could not
effectually protect them, and thus only involved the Church in their
misfortunes. As the Jesuits were always suspected of tolerating regicide,
Pombal’s next move was to discover a supposed Jesuit plot against the King’s
life. More than two hundred Jesuits were imprisoned; the rest were forcibly
transhipped to the Papal States. When the Pope behaved meekly, Pombal picked a
quarrel with the Nuncio, and so compassed a complete breach with the Papacy.
Clement humbly craved for reconciliation, and the King and people were soon
tired of the quarrel; but Pombal persisted.
The French
Parlement was delighted to find a fresh object for attack, and tried to follow
Pombal’s lead. The French Jesuits had foolishly appealed to it against an
unfavourable sentence in the law Courts, and the Parlement seized the
opportunity to appoint a Commission to examine the Jesuits’ Statutes. The King
intervened half-heartedly, appointing a parallel Commission, which proposed,
amongst other reforms, that the Jesuits should obey a French Vicar-General
independent of Rome. The Parlement ignored its proceedings, and, wholly
disregarding the royal authority, published a sweeping decree (1762), clos'ng
the Jesuit schools, confiscating their property and dissolving their
foundations. In 1764 it banished all Jesuits except those who were willing to
renounce their Order. Choiseul was not actively hostile to them, but prepared
not to offend Mme de Pompadour on their account. Meanwhile, Clement’s diplomacy
was so formal, almost mysterious, that with him, as with Benedict XIV, friendly
negotiation was impossible. As he and the Jesuit General Ricci scouted the
proposals of the Royal Commission, the French Government made this the pretext
for abandoning the Jesuits altogether. Thus the Parlement had its own way, and
the King finally suppressed the Order in France (1764).
Charles III
of Spain, in spite of his Jansenist Ministers, at first, inclined towards the
Jesuits, encouraging them to continue their work in
Paraguay, and
sheltering some of the French exiles. But Charles, though pious, was an absolutist,
and had an uushaken faith in his own rights. He was certain not to tolerate the
Order for an instant, if convinced that its continuance in Spain was
prejudicial to his authority. His Ministers accordingly declared the Jesuits
responsible for some popular risings in 1766. Meanwhile, the Pope injured their
cause, while involving himself in their unpopularity, by issuing a Bull,
Apostolicum Pascendi (1765), which uncompromisingly proclaimed the innocence
and merits of the Order. Charles appointed a Commission of lawyers, sure to be
deeply prejudiced against the Jesuits, to report on their case; and, in 1767,
he determined to suppress the Order in his dominions. Complete secrecy was
preserved until, on an appointed day, all Jesuit establishments in Spain and
its colonies were suddenly closed, and the. Jesuits forcibly, though without
discourtesy, shipped to Italy. Thus ended that interesting and successful
experiment in the paternal government of savage races which the Order had
conducted in Paraguay, The natives were told that they had been tyrannously
ruled, but would now be free and possessors of their own land.
The
Neapolitan Jesuits soon followed the Spanish. The Minister of Justice, Tanucci,
had controlled his enmity reluctantly, until Spain unloosed his hands: when he
drove the members of the Order across the border with brutal contumely. The
sudden advent of so many exiles was very embarrassing to the papal Government.
Many had been granted small pensions; but they arrived in great destitution,
and the Roman clergy looked upon them with disfavour. Fearing lest Spain should
threaten to withdraw their promised pensions, in order to obtain concessions
from him, Clement refused admission to the Spanish Jesuits. Repelled from
Civita Vecchia, they suffered much hardship until Genoa gave them a i-efuge in
Corsica. On the cession of the island to France, they were again expelled, and
Clement had to allow them to come privately to the Papal States.
Hitherto no
Power except the Bourbons had moved against the Jesuits; a clever politician
would,have used this circumstance, and in return for certain concessions
partial toleration might have ultimately been obtained even from the Bourbons.
If the Jesuits were nominally secularised, they would be permitted to return home,
and might have gradually recovered their former position. But Ricci would
listen to no such plan; “Sint ut sunt," he said, “aut non tint” The
inevitable result was extinction.
Far from
conciliating the Bourbons, Clement entered upon a new and quite unnecessary
quarrel with them. Duke Ferdinand VI of Parma, or rather his Minister du
Tillot, demanded the same concessions as Spain had received in her Concordat,
and when Clement refused, took them without permission. The Pope might have
disregarded the impertinences of this petty State; but, forgetting the
solidarity of Bourbon interests, he issued
a severe
monitorium (1768),, asserting' his feudal claims over the duchy, and
threatening the Duke and his Ministers with excommunication. The Duke retorted
defiantly and expelled the Jesuits. All the Bourbons united to demand the
withdrawal of the monitorium,’, and, when Clement* more courageous than wise,
refused, France occupied Avignon, while Tanucci seized Benevento and
Pontecorvo, the papal possessions in Naples, and threatened' Castro, a former
fief of Parma in the Papal States. Clement appealed to Maria Theresa; but she
wished to marry her daughter to Ferdinand of Naples, and would not interfere.
The Bourbons naturally, and no doubt rightly, blamed the Jesuits, to whose
influence the Pope was entirely subject. Charles III formally demanded the
entire dissolution of the Order; the other Bourbon Governments corroborated his
demands; when Clement died (February, 1769).
To the next
Conclave it practically fell to decide the fate of the Jesuits. The Powers had
not recently taken much interest in papal elections; but on this occasion the
Cardinals kept up a close communication with the ambassadors at Rome, who
exercised direct, if not open, pressure upon the Conclave. The Cardinals dared
not defy the Bourbons, yet the ‘Zelanti struggled against electing a Pope
fledged beforehand to destroy the Jesuits. Though Austria stood aloof, Joseph
II happened to be then in Rome; the rules of the Conclave were relaxed, so that
he might visit the Cardinals, to whom he gave plenty of informal advice, remarking,
“A year would not be wasted in electing another Benedict XIV.”
The intrigues
of this Conclave are hard to unravel; the Jesuits afterwards declared that the
election of Ganganelli was simoniacal, because he pledged himself, if elected,
to abolish the Order. He was among the candidates approved by France; but no
definite pledge of the kind can be proved. Indeed, Choiseul interfered when
Spain wished to exact pledges from all candidates. Probably both parties
thought that they might control Ganganelli, because of his known moderation,
not to say pliability, of character. The new Pope, who took the name of Clement
XIV, loved peace and justice; yet he was obliged to listen continually to the
bitter complaints and malicious misrepresentations of the Jesuits and to the
importunities and threats of the Bourbons’ envoys. To gain time, and not to
allow the Powers any fair ground for discontent, he made many concessions to
their demands. The monitorium against Parma, though not formally revoked, was
ignored; privileges were granted to Sardinia and Venice; Portugal was
reconciled, to the delight of both King and people; Pombal behaved imicably,
and his brother was created a Cardinal. Charles III also made Concessions;
while France appointed Bernis as ambassador, who gained Clement’s confidence,
and in his turn received a Cardinal’s hat. Only Tanucci remained
irreconcilable. Heedless of the reproofs of Charles III and Choiseul, he
continued his violent anti-papal campaign, republishing the works of GiannOne
and Sarpi.
The contest
as to the Jesuits continued for four years. Clement knew that he could not save
them, nor had he much sympathy for them. He was a Franciscan and a Thomist, and
had to suffer from their slanders. He called them “those men abandoned by God,
who are about to undergo the consequences of their obstinacy.” But he would not
be forced to condemn them with unseemly haste, and without at least an
appearance of judicial impartiality. He refused foreign troOps to guard him
against a real danger of assassination, and would not hear of bargaining on the
basis of the restoration of Avignon. “ I do not sell my decisions,” he said.
The Powers accused him of shuffling; and even Bemis complained of his reserve
and inaccessibility. Nor was there any responsible Minister at the Vatican to
bargain with, since the Pope dared not trust any Cardinal. The Curia was full
of intrigue, even the Bourbon ambassadors mistrusting one another; Spain; suspected
France of lukewarmness, especially when Choiseul fell before Madame Du Barry,
who favoured the Jesuits. Aiguillon, however, carried on the anti-Jesuit
campaign.
But Clement’s
delay justified itself. The violence and duplicity of the Jesuits alienated
their own friends, even Cardinal Albani; they were very unpopular in Rome,
especially amongst the other clergy. By January, 1773, Clement had drafted a
Bull for their suppression; it was modified to satisfy the scruples of Maria
Theresa, and in August it was published. Early in 1774,, Avignon, Benevento and
Pontecorvo were restored to the Papacy; but many diplomatic forms had first to
be gone through to make the bargain appear as a concession.
Most of the
Powers granted pensions to ex-Jesuits, and allowed those who submitted to
return home as secular priests; but the more refractory members of the Order
refused even to acknowledge its dissolution. They heaped unmeasured obloquy
upon the Pope; but the story spread by them of his madness,is quite discredited;
for, though his health soon began to fail, he could transact business until the
end; but calumny probably shortened his life, and it is possible that he was
poisoned. Bemis had to order French soldiers to protect his catafalque from
insult.
So ended for
a time the great Order of Ignatius Loyola. As Ranke observes, it had long
survived its original function, the spread of the Counter-Reformation. It had
been diverted to other ends—the contest with royal and national
anti-ecclesiastical movements, with Jansenism and Rationalism. In spite of its
influence on education, it had proved unequal to these struggles, and its
unpopularity was injuring the papal cause. Yet the interests of the Jesuits and
those of the Curia were so nearly identical that the fall of the Order was the
heaviest blow which papal prestige had received since the Reformation.
Philosophers, Jansenists and anti-papal statesmen exulted, and there followed
within a few years tremendous ecclesiastical changes, some with the consent of
the Pope, but many in defiance of his protests. The demands of the
Powers were
not at all moderated by papal compliance on this occasion; they merely
considered one success as a step towards others, and States, hitherto less
aggressive, soon followed their example.
The
Neapolitan nobility had appreciated the independence allowed them by the
Austrian Government; but the populace remembered the strict hand kept by the
Spanish Government over the nobles. They thought that an independent king would
likewise keep the nobles in order, while giving Naples the advantages of a
local Court. So Naples welcomed the Infant Don Carlos with many fireworks, and
San Gennaro graciously signified his approval. Sicily, which had lately fought
for Spain, was equally satisfied. '
Charles III
(Don Carlos) was young, good-looking, pleasant and well-meaning; he had fair
abilities, and a careful education would have made him a good king. But
Elisabeth Famese intended to control Italy dirough Naples, and Naples by
Ministers dependent upon herself, who encouraged her son’s natural idleness and
discouraged him from participation in the Government. His attendance at
Council was almost formal; his time was spent in sport, especially hunting, at
Church, at the theatre, in planning fine new estates and in stocking them with
game. Hunting- lodges were built—it was in digging the foundations for the
lodge at Portici that Herculaneum was discovered. Magnificent and costly
palaces were begun at Capodimonte and Caserta; but both were unfinished when
Don Carlos left Naples. For the city were built the huge theatre of San Carlo,
some new streets and a mole. In 1738, morefetes celebrated the King’s marriage
with Maria Theresa’s niece, Maria Amalia of Saxony. Though only a child, she
was clever, charming, and high-spirited, and joined enthusiastically in the
King’s sports, so that he was soon devoted to her. She wished for political
power; but the Ministers, San Stefano and afterwards (1738) Montealegro di
Salas, governed under the sole direction of Elisabeth Famese. In foreign policy
Naples had to follow Spain, and in 1741 sent its army to join Monte,nar in
central Italy. Nevertheless the Neapolitan Government had declared itself
neutral, and was disagreeably surprised when (August, 1742) an English fleet
appeared off Naples, and threatened immediate bombardment if the Neapolitan
troops were not withdrawn from the wax. Di Salas, aware that Naples could not
be defended, gave way, though the King wished to resist. Henceforth, however,
more attention was paid to military preparations, and, when in 1744 Austria
threatened invasion, an efficient Neapolitan army, commanded by the King,
joined Gages’ Spanish force in the Papal States, to oppose Lobkowitz’ advance.
After much
manoeuvring on both sides about Velletri, Lobkowitz at last made a night attack
and seized the town, Don Carlos himself narrowly escaping through a window. But
while the Austrians were sacking Velletri, Gages reassembled his forces and
expelled the invaders.
Afterwards
the camps remained face to face, until in the autumn Lobko- witz slowly
retired, Don Carlos following as far as Rome. His triumphant return home made a
great impression on the fickle Neapolitans, whose loyalty would hardly have
resisted an Austrian invasion. In fact there was still a powerful and active
Austrian party amongst the nobility. They had persuaded Maria Theresa to
attempt the reconquest of Naples, and they promoted an Austrian propaganda
amongst the people which the Government- severely repressed by a series of
Commissions called Giunte cTInconfidenza, punishing many innocent as well as
guilty persons.
In spite of
his victory, Charles remained under Spanish domination until Maria Amalia,
weary of political insignificance, contrived to substitute for di Salas a less
powerful Minister, Fogliani (1746), and the death of Philip V ended the rule of
Elisabeth Famese. After this, Charles seemed to acquire an unwonted sense of
responsibility, developing a policy of his own, and exercising control over his
Ministers and even in part over his wife, who had aspired to fill the place of
his mother. But her persistent meddling led to much court intrigue, and in 1755
Fogliani fell before her machinations. Henceforward, the King ruled without a
chief Minister through the Secretaries of Departments. One of these was the
clever Parmesan lawyer, Tanucci, who, from Minister of Justice, now became
Foreign Secretary.
Charles
asserted his independence in refusing to sigh the Treaty of Aix, which implied
that, if he succeeded to Spain, the Sicilies must be ceded to his brother
Philip. He did not hope to keep both, but intended the Sicilies for his own
younger son; and, when the Seven Years’ War began, France, anxious to secure
the solidarity of the Bourbons, by the Third Treaty of Versailles guaranteed the
Sicilies to Charles’ descendants. Pitt also was bidding for his friendship, but
the King shared Tanucci’s truly Tuscan hatred for Pitt’s ally, Sardinia.
Indeed, Naples and Sardinia were on the verge of a war over Piacenza, which,
according to the Treaty of Aix, Don Philip ought to cede to Sardinia if Charles
succeeded to Spain. France, however, intervened for peace, and Sardinia finally
accepted pecuniary compensation. Further to secure his son before leaving
Naples, Charles established good relations with Austria in a treaty which
guaranteed the succession to the Sicilies, in return for the cession of the
Presidi to Tuscany.
The death of
Ferdinand VI (1759) made Charles King of Spain. As his eldest son was an idiot,
the second was heir to Spain, and the third, Ferdinand, a child, was left at
Naples with a Council of Regency, in which Tanucci was supreme. So powerful was
Tanucci’s personality that he was credited afterwards with having inspired and
directed Charles’ policy from the first. But, until he became Foreign
Secretary, his Ministerial position was subordinate, and there is no evidence
that he exercised any special influence on the policy of the Government outside
his own office.
The
Government had excellent intentions, but not sufficient strength of purpose to
effect striking improvements. The Neapolitans, it has heen said, were familiar
with revolution, but could not understand or assimilate reform. The
Government’s action was continually hindered by the privileges of the nobles
and clergy, the conservatism of the lawyers, and the prejudice, inertia and
superstition of the populace. Some good reforms were effected, but they were
few and not far-reaching. The chief were the ecclesiastical changes already
mentioned, because in these matters public opinion assisted the Government.
Ecclesiastical jurisdiction and immunities and rights of asylum were limited,
and clerical property (about one-third of the whole kingdom) was taxed, though
never beyond two per cent, of its value. Ecclesiastical censures on officials
for the discharge of their duty were declared inoperative, and a limit was
imposed to the number of Religious, which had reached one-fortieth of the
population.
Thus but
little progress could be made towards the most needful kind of reform, a change
in the social system. The ancient “Grand Barons ” had given way to a class of
nobles, generally ignorant and idle, dissipated and extravagant, and devoid of
political ability. Yet they possessed most of the land, and had feudal
jurisdiction over four-fifths of the people. As the principal Estate in
Parliament, they could withhold donativi, or voted taxes, and thus force the
Government to abandon any unpopular reform. The municipality of Naples was
mainly in their hands, and the control of the capital was of supreme importance
for the kingdom at large. The Government diminished their authority by
attracting them to the Court, where they spent more money on luxuries, and less
on, retinues of lawless feudal retainers. Austrian partisanship ruined many, and
their place was taken by new creations from the official classes. Many titles
were sold, and so too was membership of Charles’ newly established knightly
Order of San Gennaro. Thus rank decreased in social value, and “E duca, ma non
cavaliere” was a popular saying. The lawyers, many of whom were of noble birth,
held political power and filled the government offices. They formed a
homogeneous, influential, and conservative body, including nearly all the
talent of the nation. They usually opposed reform, especially in legal matters.
A commercial middle class hardly existed; but the revenue officials, mostly
Genoese, made fortunes by cheating both people and Government, and often bought
land and titles. The city populace had been indulged with festas and cheap food
by nervous Governments; it was lazy, turbu-, lent, addicted to mendicancy; “la
phis abominable canaille, la plus digodtcmte vermine,” de Brosses called it.
The city was financially: favoured at the expense of the provinces, and the
upper classes at the expense of the lower; the unfortunate peasantry bore the
weight of taxation, and were crushed between the nobles and government
officials. Many lived on coarse grains and herbs, without salt or oil, and in
the
1734-59] Reform in
Naples under Charles III.
699
remote
districts com was unknown. Misery drove many to brigandage; others joined the
crowd of beggars in the city. Genovesi, the noble Neapolitan seeker after
reform, compared the people to savages, without civilisation or Christian
morals.
The difficulties
of fiscal reform were increased by the extravagances of the Court, which spent
about five million francs annually, three times as much as that of Turin.
Building cost a nearly equal sum. But the revenue was almost doubled, though
the individual burden was actually rather diminished. This was due in part to
official economy, in part to ecclesiastical taxation, but mainly to economic
reforms which increased the national wealth. Many of the alienated customs were
redeemed, and taxation was redistributed by means of a new catasto (valuation
schedule). By the old catasto land escaped lightly, while every kind of
industry and labour was overburdened; the rich were exempted while the poor
paid heavily. Unfortunately, the new catasto perpetrated the worst faults of
the old—the poll-tax, and the additional tax on every worker, which crippled
industry and rewarded idleness. It was therefore much less beneficial than had
been hoped. In spite, however, of economic fallacies, the Government really
tried to increase the wealth of the country and its own revenue by rescuing
trade from its disastrous condition. It was plundered by brigands within, by
pirates without, and at the ports by Custom-house officials, who extorted what
duties they pleased. The coinage was corrupt; laws against usury hindered the
circulation of capital. Manufactures hardly existed, exportation of natural
products was narrowly limited; once, when a comet appeared, it was stopped
altogether. The Giunta del Commercio, acting on the advice of Vau- coulleur, a
French economist, established a supreme magistracy of commerce, which was
expected to work wonders. It made commercial treaties, started and subsidised
manufactures, reformed the coinage, and so forth. But those who had battened
upon the old abuses hated the new Magistracy, and the nobles voted a donativo
as a bribe to induce the Government to deprive it of its authority. It had
ventured to tolerate Jews; but, as the friars assured the King that it was for
this reason he had no male heirs, the toleration was withdrawn.
In spite of
the opposition of Barons and lawyers, Tanucci, as Minister of Justice,
contrived to improve the judicial system; and no doubt the magistrates
respected direct authority rather than that of a distant King, Tanucci tried to
check bribery, moderate the ferocity of criminal justice, impose limits on
feudal tyranny, hasten procedure, subject the irresponsible magistrates to
syndics, and punish the corrupt; but he had only partial success. In imitation
of Sardinia, an attempt was made to codify the law, which was in a hopeless
confusion of Roman law, custom, royal and vice-regal edicts. Unfortunately the
codification was entrusted to a single incompetent lawyer, Cirillo, who had
already made himself ridiculous by attacking Muratori. His work could never
be used; it
contained many obsolete laws, and omitted whole sections of modern law,
commercial, military, and so forth. The same fatuity appeared in every
department of government. The Famese collections, brought from Parma, were left
in dirt and confusion; the royal architects wasted vast sums of money and did
not complete their buildings. A pedant was appointed to describe the
discoveries at Herculaneum, who diligently compiled vast tomes on the labours
of Hercules, and prosecuted scholars who published actual descriptions of the
antiquities.
Yet the
Sicilies were certainly better off under Charles than they had been for many
previous centuries. The Government was well-intentioned ; its Ministers were
personally upright; its direct supervision was valuable, and some real progress
was made. Fair seasons and a long period of peace favoured prosperity, though
much distress was caused by the terrific eruptions of Vesuvius and by
earthquakes in 1738 and 1750. The King was popular, and the people fairly
contented.
Tuscany,
after two hundred years of stultifying Medicean government, needed reform as
much as any Italian State. It was enslaved by ecclesiastical tyranny, and sunk
in ignorance and superstition; for the Inquisition and the moral espionage of
the friars had crushed its ancient intellectual qualities, whose last
manifestation had been in the seventeenth century scientific school. The
commercial prosperity, the old civic spirit and autonomy of the capital were
dead; the place of the vigorous merchant nobles was taken by flaccid,
dissipated courtiers. Trade was slack; unemployment and mendicancy, encouraged
by “ pious benefactions*” prevailed. The provincial communes retained a measure
of self-government, the peasantry, naturally more energetic, never sank to the
level of the Neapolitans; but they were oppressed by tax- gatherers and feudal
lords possessing rights to a multitude of “ services,” so that they were much
in the position of medieval villeins, but without their customary rights. The
prosperity of Livorno benefited only its principally foreign inhabitants, since
it was cut off from the rest of the countiy by internal customs-barriers.
Reform had
more apparent success in Tuscany than in Naples. The Tuscans, though not quite
so lethargic and ignorant, were more pliable than the Neapolitans, and usually
acquiesced in their ruler’s dictates. The Grand Duke, Peter Leopold of Austria,
son of Maria Theresa and brother of Joseph II, was of far more decided opinions
and energetic character than Charles III, and was helped by excellent
Ministers. The work of reform was begun under Francis of Lorraine (1737-65), by
the Regency which governed for him, and especially by Richecourt, a Lorrainer,
Minister of Finance and afterwards Governor (1747-57). He was, however, so
despotic that he was at last overthrown by the able Tuscans whom he kept out
of office; but his talents and ability effected some notable improvements. He
checked certain
feudal
abuses, forbade the creation of new entails, and used the Emperor’s authority
to bring under control some almost independent Imperial feudatories. Judges
approved by the Government were now to exercise feudal jurisdiction, and appeal
was allowed from the feudal to the central Courts. Finance was burdened by the
Medici debt; the country was already over-taxed, the customs mostly farmed out;
nearly half the revenue had to be sent to the Emperor. Administrative economy,
the unification of the public debt, and some commercial reforms and trade with
Lombardy and Austria, slightly improved matters. Interned customs were lowered,
and agriculture encouraged by permission to export a portion of its produce.
But attempts to colonise the marshy and unhealthy Maremma district failed.
Conflict with
the overweening clerical power was inevitable. The censorship of the Press was
taken from the Inquisition , uid its furious protests' led to its temporary
suppression and ultimate revival on the limited Venetian model. Clerical
revenues were taxed, and a mortmain law passed which included large pecuniary
bequests. Violent Opposition followed, especially from the monks; but the
firmness of the Government and the moderation of Benedict XIV prevented a
quarrel.
In 1765
Tuscany became nominally autonomous under its youthful Grand Duke, Peter
Leopold, in Italy called Leopold only. The Tuscans were pleased to have a
sovereign of their own, and liked the pleasant, unassuming manners and the
simple style of life of Leopold and his Spanish wife. The unpopular Minister,
Botta Adorno, who had acted as Regent, was soon dismissed; but it was long
before Leopold could shake off the control of his mother and brother. In spite
of his protests, Joseph borrowed nearly all the money in the Tuscan Treasury.
Joseph meant to be very kind: he wrote letters of affectionate advice, asked
Leopold’s opinion on his own policy, sometimes visited Tuscany, and treated
Leopold’s son as his own heir; but the Grand Duke resented all intrusion into
his private affairs, and suspected evil motives in Joseph’s well-meant
interferences. The brothers were alike in their admiration of the new “
philosophy,” in their reforming notions,' ecclesiastical tastes, love of
symmetry, order, economy, efficiency, and of personally regulating minute
details. But Leopold, as Botta remarked, “was more Jansenist than philosopher,
and Joseph more philosopher than Jansenist.” Leopold leaned more upon
ministerial advice than did Joseph; he lacked Joseph’s imperious
self-confidence, but also his straightforwardness. Leopold was slow, timorous,
cautious, and allowed his natural suspiciousness to grow into a painful
obsession. He set spies upon his Ministers and Court, even upon his meanest
subjectsj and then spies upon the spies. “Let them deceive you sometimes,”
wrote Joseph, “ rather than thus. torment yourself constantly and vainly.”
Verri said of Leopold severely, but with truth, that “timid and tortuous, he
was not upright like his brother, but was almost indecently false and immoral.”
602
Reforms in Tuscany
wnder Leopold. [176&-90
In the
earlier part of his reign he had excellent Ministers, of whom the best was
Pompeo Neri, Home Secretary, and then (1770) President of the Council of State,
a prudent, logical, and far-sighted statesman, who planned Leopold’s most
successful measures. He had reformed municipal government for Lombardy, and
gave Tuscany the benefit of his experience. Tavanti and Rucellai were good
finance and ecclesiastical Ministers. After the deaiths of Neri and Rucellai
(1776 and 1778), the only able and intelligent Minister was Gianni. As Leopold
' grew more suspicious, he ceased to trust good advisers, and was deceived by
bad. His jealousy induced him to prefer less capable men, some of whom he knew
to be secretly scheming against his own policy. He ruled principally through
the Presidente del Buon Governo, an inquisitorial and arbitrary official, with
large fiscal, magisterial and disciplinary authority, who spied into the
private affairs of the people, and kept them in a state of nervous
apprehension. The police were so feared that even the soldiers mutinied against
them.
Yet the one
object of Leopold’s life and interest was reform. Like Joseph he believed that
only an autocratic government could effect this. The Government was frankly
absolute, quite ignoring the last remaining constitutional authority, the
Senate, which even the Medici had pretended to consult. Yet Leopold had
abstract notions of educating the people by pamphlets and preaching, and, when
they were sufficiently advanced, of granting a real Constitution, for which
Gianni drew up an ideal scheme. More practical was Leopold’s reconstruction of
local administration, which he intended as a first step towards the
establishment of popular institutions. The Medici had allowed a remnant of
medieval local government to survive in the provinces, and there were voluntary
leagues amongst the Communes for mutual protection against feudal tyranny. On
the basis of these existing systems, Leopold drew up an organised scheme and
set of statutes for communal self-government, which was gradually applied all
over Tuscany and proved more successful than any of his other experiments,
especially as a means for educating the people. Florence, which the Medici had
utterly deprived of its autonomy, was the last to benefit by the new scheme.
In other
directions, Leopold’s secular reforms were necessarily more remedial than
constructive. Great improvements were made in the judicial system by
simplifying procedure, abolishing unnecessary tribunals, checking corruption,
and especially by humanising the savage criminal law. Following Beccaria’s
advice, Leopold abolished torture, confiscation,' and even the death-penalty.
Leopold could
not put an end to feudalism; but he modified its worst effects by relaxing the
entail law, protecting the peasantry, and limiting feudal jurisdiction. Rural
servitude, with all its crushing burdens of wood-cutting, service, pasturage
and so on, was gradually abolished; and, together with personal emancipation,
Leopold assisted
the
emancipation of the land from its burdens of custom, entail and mortmain. The
agrarian situation was further improved by unifying the land-tax, abolishing
numerous vexatious regulations, magistracies and internal customs, which
interfered with economic freedom, and permitting under certain circumstances
the importation and exportation of com. Before Leopold’s reign famine was
endemic, and the land-owners had no capital; at its close landed proprietors
were able to invest largely in commercial undertakings, to their mutual profit.
The morasses of the Val di Chiana were successfully drained and cultivated,
though the Maremma was still a swamp. In reality the population was too scanty
to make the cultivation of any but good land profitable. Industrial prosperity
also increased with the abolition of the worst taxes and monopolies—especially
those of town against country—the encouragement of new industries, and above
all the abolition of the Arti and other ancient commercial tribunals.' now mere
forces of tyranny and reaction. But there was little foreign trade, and
Leopold, with mistaken economy, put down the fleet which had at least
partially protected it from pirates. Increased prosperity and administrative
economy recovered the finances from the desperate condition in which Leopold
found them. The alienated taxes were redeemed; and, by lowering the customs and
the price of salt, contraband trade was checked and legitimate encouraged. In
order to diminish the heavy national debt, the Monti (Government stock) were
all incorporated into one fund, and the land-tax was applied for its
redemption.
Yet Leopold
never gained the real confidence of his subjects, whose conservatism credited
him with an insensate mania for innovation. The feudal classes regretted their
loss of privilege; the people resented the inquisitorial methods of the
Government. Leopold was able to force reform upon them, but not to obtain their
cooperation in it. They obeyed, but always unwillingly. Racial incompatibility
made him seem a foreigner to them, and he was never really in sympathy with
Italian sentiment. Most unpopular of all was the ecclesiastical policy which he
regarded as the crown of his life’s work. Joseph himself was not more
enthusiastic; but while he, like a modem politician, aimed at separating the
functions of Church and State, and preventing the former from infringing the
rights and injuring the material interests of the latter, Leopold, like a
sixteenth century Protestant, desired to reform the Church itself, so that it
might advance the spiritual condition of his people. He believed himself
“established by God as guardian and tutor of religion.” His chief adviser,
Scipione Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia and Prato, was practically a Jansenist; and
so, in all but doctrinal matters, was Leopold.
In spite of
the efforts of the Regency, Leopold found Tuscany behind most European States
in the struggle for ecclesiastical freedom. He did not favour Concordats,
believing that Rome generally profited by them,
and preferred
to make all changes on his own responsibility. Many of these followed the usual
lines; a ducal eooeguatui was enforced, clerical taxation increased, the
Inquisition suppressed, pecuniary payments to Rome strictly limited.
Ecclesiastical jurisdiction was confined to purely spiritual matters, without
power to impose temporal penalties; the Nuncio’s Court was abolished, and
appeals to Rome forbidden. The Curia’s patronage to benefices with cure of
souls was transferred to the Bishops, and the religious Orders were released
from dependence upon Roman superiors, subjected to episcopal control, and no
longer allowed to compete with parochial organisation. Superfluous and
ill-conducted Houses were suppressed, and their revenues augmented the
emoluments of poor benefices. To check mendicancy and indiscriminate charity,
the number of begging friars was limited, while hospitals and other pious
foundations were placed under lay control.
In his
constructive moral and religious policy, however, Leopold- departed from the
ordinary course of the anti-ecclesiastical reformer Here Ricci was his adviser,
and in his own dioceses made experiments which the other more conservative and
orthodox Bishops could not be induced to try. The most pressing necessity was a
reform of the convents, especially those for women, which were mainly under the
control of monks and friars and were in an utterly immoral condition. Their
number was preposterous, because social conditions forced all women without
dowries to take the veil. Ricci interfered in a flagrant case of immorality at
Prato; and the Dominicans, who were really responsible, resisted furiously;
but, finally, the Pope agreed to withdraw all nuns from their control. General
improvements were effected by raising the age of profession, limiting the
endowments which novices might bring to their convents, and providing
occupation for the nuns by turning convents into schools. The parish priests,
divided by an almost impassable gulf from the higher clergy of noble birth,
were extremely poor and ignorant. Reform was initiated by placing patronage in
the hands of the Bishops and the Grand Duke, by insisting on clerical
residence, raising the emoluments of poorer benefices, and founding academies
for clerical education. Meanwhile, provision was made for secular education by
substituting lay for Jesuit schools and establishing girls’ schools in
convents; the condition of the Universities was also improved.
But what
chiefly infuriated the ecclesiastical party was Leopold’s interference in
matters connected with worship: such as the prohibition of burials inside
churches, the abolition of flageillation and of many unedifying local
festivals, and of the innumerable “Confraternities” (guilds of a combined
religious and social character) which fostered idleness, extra ragande and
political agitation. A single Confraternity was established in each parish; but
the people generally refused to join it. Ricci celebrated Mass in Italian, and
discouraged superstitious
1714—92] Leopold?#
reform schemes,—Policy of Venice. 605
devotions;
but his rumoured intention to remove the famous girdle of the Virgin from Prato
as spurious caused a riot, in which his palace was sacked. .
Leopold could
not make reform popular; his explanatory pamphlets failed to touch the
populace, into whose minds friars and ex-Jesuits instilled discontent. Hoping
to enlist the Tuscan clergy on his side, he tried to revive the synodal system
of church government. In 1786, a Diocesan Synod at Pistoia passed, under
Ricci’s influence, extraordinarily Liberal resolutions, even affirming the
principles of the French “ Four Articles of 1682 ”—including the propositions
that the temporal power is independent of the spiritual, that a General Council
is superior to a Pope, and that the Pope is not infallible, even in matters of
faith. This Synod was in itself a remarkable assertion of the democratic ideal
of church government. In 1787, Leopold called a General Assembly of the Tuscan
Bishops; but even Ricci doubted the wisdom of this step, The Grand Duke drew up
a programme for discussion, but refrained from any personal interference. The
Assembly issued a few useful, if minor, disciplinary reforms, but was far too
conservative and too much afraid of Roman censure to consider Leopold’s
sweeping proposals in any liberal spirit. He found that it was passing time in
aimless discussion, and dismissed it. Though he might have expected the
failure, it dis-? appointed him greatly. But he was contemplating fresh
efforts, when the death of his brother ended his activities in Tuscany.
His whole
reign is extraordinarily interesting as a typical experiment in reform worked
out by a personal; autocrat in minute detail upon a small and homogeneous
State. The scheme never bore fruit; it was destroyed, partly byi popular
reaction, partly by the power of the coming Revolution; we may doubt whether at
that date it could possibly have been fruitful; but, while recognising its
ultimate futility and the weaknesses of its author, we must admire his high
ideals, industry, self-denial and perseverance, his grasp of the problems of
his age, and his insight into modern methods of solving them.
„ Neither
temptations nor threats could move Venice from her attitude of formal
neutrality in Western politics; but her geographical position on the Austrian
route into Italy threatened her independence, since she was obliged to grant
passage to Austrian troops. She could not even obtain the inviolability of a
neutral; the War of the Spanish Succession was partly fought within her
territories, and in the later campaigns even her expensive army could not
protect them from damage. The Peace of Utrecht surrounded her terra jirma with
Austrian dominions; even her command of the Adriatic was threatened when
Austria held the Sicilies. The Holy League and Turkish War bound her to friendliness;
but this tie was severed when Austria abandoned her interests, and in the Peace
of Passarowitz acquiesced in her loss of the Morea. Venice therefore
refused to
renew the Holy League in 1735, and tried to hinder the efforts of Charles VI to
develop an Adriatic and Mediterranean commerce. There were various border
disputes, especially as to the patronage to the patriarchate of Aquileia, whose
diocese embraced both Austrian and Venetian territory.
Venice really
preserved her independence because the rival Great Powers would not permit each
other to violate it. She had little vital force left to sustain her after her
last gallant struggle in the Morea. To preserve the remains of her commerce,
she was obliged, against her traditions, to make treaties with barbarous
States. Once more the old spirit blazed up in her last Admiral, Angelo Emo,
who, after immense difficulties, humbled Algiers and Tunis (1769; 1787). But
her navy was really decaying together with her commercial marine. Her
protective tariffs had driven away both Levantine and Mediterranean trade to
the more open ports of Genoa, Ancona, Livorno and Trieste. New commercial
treaties were useless, and her remaining Levantine ports were more expensive
than profitable. The nobles had abandoned commerce; the people no longer loved
a sea-faring life; ship-yards and arsenal were idle. Yet in the eighteenth
century the Republic accomplished her last splendid building, the Murazzi* or
great marble walls, five thousand metres long, which strengthened the shifting
Lidi and protected the harbour. Internal industries were stagnant, and
agriculture' seriously burdened, though the Venetian provinces were the most
prosperous in Italy. Yet much private wealth remained in Venice, and no signs
of exhaustion or poverty appeared in its life of luxury and display, its feasts
and carnivals, its theatres, concerts, and balls. In Goldoni’s work, reflecting
the life of the middle and lower classes, the Venetian theatre now reached its
highest development. Still, strangers from every part flocked to share the
gaieties of Venice, its life of amenity and licence, where everyone might enjoy
himself to the utmost, sure of excellent police and sanitation, while there was
no government interference with those who did not disturb the peace or try to
meddle in politics. Yet amongst the nobles there was much discontent, which
occasionally broke out in open agitation. Many were impoverished by gambling
and debauchery, and lived miserably upon government allowances. Interbreeding,
limitation of families, strict entails, and the custom of younger sons taking
Orders, had so diminished the nobility that during this century the members of
the Grand Council decreased from fourteen to seven hundred. An attempt to
infuse new blood by ennobling good provincial families failed, since few would
pay the sum demanded for the honour.
Discontented
and dissolute nobles complained of the strict rule of the Inquisitors of State,
and thought that they would find independence and prosperity if the
Inquisitors’ authority were restored to the Grand Council which had delegated
it. Another party, imbued with new
1714-79] Venetian decadence.—Genoa.
607
Liberal
ideas, desired more liberty and disliked the secret methods of the Inquisitors;
a Moderate group wished to limit their power without crippling it. The wisest
understood that the tyranny of the Inquisitors alone protected the State and
citizens from the licence of the worst nobles and of ruffians of all classes.
In 1761 a
particularly high-handed action of the Inquisitors caused the Grand Council to
appoint a committee of Correttori to consider some modifications in their
power. The Correttori presented two reports, one far more stringent than the
other. The populace, which appreciated the Inquisitors, was delighted when the
Grand Council adopted the milder report. But the discontented faction of nobles
was unsatisfied, and became so turbulent that an order was issued for the early
closing of the cafes in which its revolutionary theories were discussed. This,
however, had soon to be rescinded. In 1779, a new committee of Correttori was
appointed; its most popular member, Giorgio Pisani, played the part of a
demagogue, and even dared to appeal to the sentiment of the populace. This was
going too far, and the Grand Council acquiesced in his arrest by the
Inquisitors and long imprisonment. The Correttori continued their work, and
carried several minor reforms, but no substantial change was made in the
Inquisitors' position.
All through
the century the physical weakness and the political and moral decadence of
Venice continued; yet the changes which accompanied her decay were so gradual
that they can only be estimated by their ultimate results. Venice really
existed on her past reputation and on the mutual jealousies which withheld her
powerful neighbours from attacking her; but the whole artificial fabric of her
structure, since it had no innate strength to support it from within, collapsed
before the first sharp blow from without.
Genoa, unlike
Venice, had no social attractions, and her. citizens lived simply and soberly.
Many were very wealthy, for her geographical position and comparatively
moderate tariff enabled Genoa to retain more of her ancient commercial
prosperity than Venice. Some were officials in Bome, with large shares in the
Monti (papal Government stock); some, as bankers, merchants and revenue
officers, controlled nearly all the finance of Naples, A narrow oligarchy still
ruled the State. Once it seemed as if the:people, still strenuous and
patriotic, would displace their feeble rulers, but after the crisis the keys of
the city were restored to the Senate, merely with a warning to take better care
of them in future. Probably the popular leaders knew that foreign Powers which
allowed the Republic to exist under an unenterprising Government would never
permit her to make an experiment in democracy.
Genoa, like
Venice, preserved her autonomy only because of the mutual jealousies of the
Great Powers on either flank ; for she was even weaker than Venice, and her
geographical position as a gate of Italy
was almost
equally valuable. She, too, preferred neutrality and obscurity, but she did not
altogether escape political trouble and danger. These were partly caused by her
ancient territorial rivalry with Savoy and her position on the Riviera, which
cut off that acquisitive Power from coastward expansion, partly by her
possession of Corsica, always rebellious, and growing important, now that
England and France were competing for the control of the western Mediterranean.
But Genoa’s
difficulties were also due to her own unwisdom in buying Finale from the
Emperor at the moment when Savoy was bidding for it (1714). Finale was not a
commodious port and its inhabitants were troublesome, but Savoy never forgave
the interference. In the Treaty of Worms, Charles Emmanuel III obtained the
cession of all Imperial rights upon Finale, which really meant that he might
either purchase or conquer it if he could. Any additional outlet to the sea was
valuable to Piedmont; but this clause in the treaty was really a serious
political mistake; It confirmed the belief of the Italian States in Sardinia’s
insatiable ambition, and it drove Genoa to side with Sardinia’s enemies. In
1745 she concluded the League of Aranjuez with France and Spain, who recklessly
promised her all that she claimed from Sardinia, whether rightfully or no.
Henceforward, the Bourbon armies were reinforced by Genoese troops, while a new
route was opened for France into Italy, and another by which Maillebois’ army could
cooper rate with the Spa: ards under Gages. Thus they were able to conquer the
south-west portion of Piedmont and besiege Alessandria, while Don Philip
successfully invaded Lombardy and established himself at Parma and Milan.
However, clever diplomacy and generalship extricated Sardinia from her critical
position, and in 1746 Genoa, abandoned by both allies, was defenceless before
Charles Emmanuel and the Austrian General, Botta Adorno, whose father, a
Genoese, had been executed by the Republic. The feeble Senate submitted to
Adorno without attempting resistance, surrendered the ciiy gates, lodged his
troops, and paid him huge sums of money. Meanwhile Charles Emmanuel occupied
many Rivieran towns, including the coveted Finale. But Adorno was more concerned
to extract money than to consolidate his military position; and in December the
Genoese populace rose, seized arms from the Arsenal, and, without any
assistance from their Government, drove the Austrians from the city. The
neighbouring peasantry joined to complete the rout, and Genoa regained her
independence.
Austria was
eager to recover its prey, and Sardinia would not easily surrender its
conquests. In 1747 they concluded a “treaty of Genoese Partition," and,
helped by an English fleet, again attacked the town; but this time Genoa
resisted bravely, and French ships contrived to bring help. A new
Franco-Spanish invasion drove Charles Emmanuel to defend his own borders, and
the siege was raised. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) ignored Charles Emmanuel’s
Rivieran ambitions,
1729-68] Corsica: King
Theodore.—General Paoli. 609
and
his subsequent efforts to obtain compensation there for Piacenza proved
unsuccessful. But Genoa had demonstrated a vitality and a power to defend
herself, hitherto unsuspected. ■
For a century
and a half, Corsica had been nominally submissive, but not really tranquil.
Genoa never learned wisdom by experience; the aim of her Government seemed to
be to extort large taxes and provide offices for needy Genoese. The Corsicans
were debarred from lucrative offices and professions; order was not enforced;
the country districts were half savage and, since licenses to carry arms were
cheap, were ravaged by interminable vendettas. In a population of two hundred
thousand, there were nearly a thousand murders annually.
Famine and
additional taxation caused a fresh revolt in 1729. The Corsicans mastered all
but a few coast towns, proclaimed their independence, and created governors
and a General Assembly. At Genoa’s request, Austria sent troops, which obtained
a temporary submission; but Genoa violated the conditions of peace, and the
revolt broke out again. Internal dissensions and the difficulty of obtaining
provisions and munitions caused the Corsicans to seek external aid; and in 1736
they elected Baron Theodore von Neuhof, a rich Westphalian adventurer, as King
under constitutional limitations. It was a rather farcical sovereignty; and
Theodore, though well intentioned, found the situation impossible. He spent his
time and energies in travelling to Holland to procure food and war material for
his straitened kingdom. He was finally frightened off by a French army which,
at Genoa’s appeal, succeeded in obtaining the partial submission of the
Corsicans (1739). France had begun to realise the importance of Corsica in the
Mediterranean, and, though not yet prepared to seize it herself, meant to
acquire sufficient influence there to smooth the way for future annexation.
During the
War of the Austrian Succession, English ships landed Rivarolo, a Corsican
refugee, on the island, and the rebellion broke out afresh. England, Sardinia
and Austria issued proclamations in favour of Corsican independence, and
numerous foreign troops appeared on the island, but were withdrawn after the
Treaty of Aix. In 1755, the Corsicans chose as their General Pasquale de’
Paoli, the son of Giacinto, a former leader who had voluntarily retired to
facilitate the settlement of 1739. A Constitution, extraordinarily modem for
the eighteenth century, was drawn up; it established a really popular
Government, and was loyally carried out by Paoli, who was President with large,
but constitutional, powers. Order and justice were restored, assassinations
became rare, taxation was low, material prosperity increased, the people were educated
and c iv ,’ised. Paoli corresponded with England, where his constitutional
government was admired; but France was now determined to obtain Corsica in
order to counterbalance the Mediterranean possessions of England. First, she
obtained Genoa’s permission for a military occupation, and then (1768) she
bought the island outright. England was
610
Paoli's departure and
return. > [i769-iao7
occupied with
the American War; Sardinia dared not defy France; and Corsica only received
irregular help in her last gallant struggle for liberty. The Corsicans fought
furiously; Paoli showed brilliant generalship, and the French were defeated
frequently; but ultimately their military superiority overwhelmed the scanty
resources of the islanders. Assisted by some treacherous Corsicans, they at
last utterly defeated Paoli at Pontenuovo (May, 1769). Rather than involve the
people in useless sufferings, he and other leaders quitted the island, and the
French were soon in complete possession. After a period of severity, they instituted
a moderate government, which made the Corsicans fairly contented and
prosperous. Paoli settled in England with a government pension; he became an
honoured member of Samuel Johnson’s circle, and lived peacefully, except when
the French Revolution unfortunately tempted him back to Corsica (1790). He was
received with enthusiasm and made President of the Department, but soon learned
that the principles of Liberty were not to be extended to the subject province.
Before long the Republic proclaimed him a traitor; and in 1794 he ceded the
island to England, which held it for two years. Paoli died in England in 1807.
One of the few heroic and romantic figures of the eighteenth century, he might,
under more favourable circumstances, have been the Washington of Corsica. His
period of rule, with its loyal effort after constitutional government and
devoted patriotism, provokes more sympathy than any other episode in
contemporary Italian history.
SWITZERLAND
FROM THE TREATY OF AARAU TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.
For two centuries Switzerland had ceased to play any
part as a Great Power—since 1515, when in the battle of Marignano the Swiss had
after their famous Italian campaigns been defeated by France with the help of
Venice and forced to withdraw from Lombardy. Peace was made with France in
1516; and in 1521 an alliance followed which for Switzerland was to be the
beginning of centuries of subjection, and which once more hired out the prowess
and fame of her soldiers for the pay of foreign Powers. It was this French
alliance and the foreign service of her sons which chiefly occupied Switzerland
in her external relations during the eighteenth century, together with the
maintenance of her neutrality and independence throughout the numerous great wars
of that period. On the time of her greatest military glory there followed
immediately the beginning of the Reformation, which occasioned two centuries of
religious strife in Switzerland. But the wars of religion, as is shown below,
came to a termination with the Treaty of Aarau (1712). The cleavage between
Catholics and Protestants, indeed, continued for some decades, until the new
compact with France in 1777; but it had changed in character and become purely
a question of the balance of political power between the two sides. With the
opening of the eighteenth century the period of religious wars had ended in
Switzerland as in the rest of the Christian world. In their place class wars
became more and more prominent until the outbreak of the great Revolution,
which had been advancing on parallel lines with the general intellectual
awakening (.Aufklarung). Such are the characteristic notes of Swiss history n
the eighteenth century: during which the French alliance, foreign military
service, neutrality, the class wars, and the intellectual awakening, alike
leave their impress upon the national life.
The
alliance with France was for Switzerland the most important affair of the
century before the great Revolution, and occupied those ch. xvii. 39—2
concerned
during the greater part of the period in question. The preceding treaties with
Prance, by which Switzerland entered into relations as an independent Power
with a foreign State not included in the German Empire, were the result of the
military prowess exhibited by the Swiss on an occasion of very ancient date in
their history—the battle of St Jacob on the Birs in 1444. At the commencement
of the connexion, however, in the course of the fifteenth century, the Swiss
did not serve the purposes of France exclusively, but still pursued ends of
their own. When, after Marignano, the Swiss again made peace with France, the
French alliance of 'May 5, 1501, marks a complete change in Swiss policy.
Switzerland had ceased to occupy a place among the Great Powers, find had fallen
to the position of a recruiting-ground for French mercenaries. This state of
things had been brought about by the propensity of the Swiss for foreign
service, and by a greed of yearly subsidies to which their soldiers and
statesmen alike had been accustomed by France. Under this curse they remained
until the absolute upheaval' of all ways of thought and political action in the
great Bevolution. After taking part in the numerous wars of France with Charles
V (1521-44), the Swiss, themselves divided into two camps by the Reformation,
were fighting against each other in the French religious wars (1562-90) both
for the League and the Huguenots. But Henry IV, after putting an end to the
French religious struggle, in 1602 further succeeded in once more uniting the
Swiss of both confessions in a common alliance with France. This union,
concluded for the lifetime of the King and of his son Louis XIII and for eight
years after, endured until 1651. In 1663 was effected another alliance, the
last before the period covered by the present volume; and it is with the
renewal of this that we are now particularly concerned.
The reasons
which once more brought about a general alliance with Switzerland differed to
some extent from those of 1521. France had for some time past provoked bitter
complaints from Switzerland, partly by employing, in violation of the agreement
between them, Swiss troops for attacks on foreign countries, and partly by
delaying payment of the yearly subsidy to the Governments and even the
soldiers’ pay. Moreover, the Treaty of Westphalia had by its recognition of
Switzerland as a sovereign Power awakened a feeling of independence in the
Swiss Governments which asserted itself as against France. It was,
therefore,unanimously resolved by the Diet, in 1651 and 1652, that there should
be no renewal of the alliance till these grievances had been redressed. In 1653
Solo- thum was, nevertheless, persuaded to promise a renewal of the alliance
with France; in 1654 Luzern followed suit, and in 1655 the remaining Catholic
cantons. The Catholic districts, lacking both money and ways of earning it,
were moved by the old passion for foreign service and its gains. Hereupon the
Protestant cantons also turned back to France, but on political grounds—to
avert the dangers of a one-sided combination
between the
Catholic cantons and France—the more readily as in the Third Religious War
(1656), sometimes called the War of Rapperswyl or the First Vilmergen War, they
had been overcome by the Catholic cantons unaided, and had no other ally of
equal standing in view. Thus a new general alliance with France was concluded
on September 24,1663.
This
alliance, like that of 1602, was concluded not only for the life of the
reigning monarch (Louis XIV) but also for that of his son and for eight years
after. But, before the King felt his end near, no member of his family remained
to succeed him but his infant great-grandson, afterwards Louis XV. In order,
therefore, that affairs might be left on a satisfactory footing for the King’s
successor, negotiations were opened in 1713 for a renewal of the alliance with
the Swiss. In the meantime, however, the situation had changed in such a way
that the Catholic cantons were quite ready for a renewal of the league, but not
so the Protestant, notably Zurich and Bern. In the previous year, 1712, the
Fourth and last Religious War in Switzerland had been waged, terminating in the
Treaty of Aarau (August 11,1712) between Zurich and Bern and the five Catholic
cantons of Luzern, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, and Zug. In this War, the Second
Vilmergen War (which, like its predecessor in 1656, arose out of the dispute as
to the relations of the county and abbacy of Toggenburg to the Empire), the
wheel of fortune spun round: the Five Cantons were defeated by Zurich and Bern
and were routed a second time by Bern alone ; and the supremacy of the
victorious cantons was established in the Treaty of Aarau. Apart from other
arrangements, the “free bailiwicks” (Jreie Aemter) of Aargau were ceded to Bern
and Zurich, in order to secure the connexion between their territories, while
the Catholic cantons were, with the exception of a small remainder, excluded
from the resettlement. Bern was further admitted to a share in the control of
the common prefectures (Vogteien) of Aargau and Thurgau, in order to establish
the preponderance of the Protestants as governing cantons. Such treatment was
unbearable to the Catholics, not so much on religious grounds as in view of the
political disadvantage involved and, last but not least, because the lucrative
sway over the “ free bailiwicks ” thus slipped from their hold. They therefore
set to work again on their little separate leagues, but all to little avail.
Then came the offer from France for the renewal of her alliance, very opportunely
for the Catholic cantons if it could be renewed with them alone, so that they
could obtain the powerful aid of France against their Protestant rivals. The
French Court would really have preferred a general alliance which should also
include the Protestants; but the Protestants did not desire it, and the French
ambassador in Switzerland, Du Luc, who regarded Zurich and Bern with
detestation because of their obstinacy and arrogance, pushed the interests of
the Catholic cantons, giving his Court to understand that the Protestants would
soon join. But their hatred of France had increased since 1663, and now
they had in
view a substitute for the French alliance. To the list of hardships inflicted
by France were now added the curtailment of the privileges granted to the Swiss
in France by earlier treaties, and the check imposed upon commerce; and, above
all, the Protestants of Switzerland, as of every other country, were
exasperated by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). On the other hand,
Bern bad concluded a treaty of alliance with the States General in 1712; the
Grisons had done the same in 1713; with England, too, the Protestant cantons
were on a friendly footing; and there was even some talk of the Maritime Powers
taking up again Cromwell’s idea of uniting in one great, Protestant league all
the Protestant countries and communities of Europe. This made it all the easier
for the Swiss Protestant cantons to give play to their natural dislike of
France and refuse to league themselves with her. Thus the alliance which she
desired was concluded with the Catholic cantons only, precisely as they had
intended, but not without their having to submit to her supremacy. The fifth
clause of the treaty concluded on May 5, 1715, contains a stipulation that in
the event of disputes arising among the Catholics or between them and the
Protestants, the King of France shall mediate, and eventually have the right of
enforcing bis will—much as in the later days of the Act of Mediation. There
was, besides, a secret article or bond, the Trucklibund—a name given to it
because it was enclosed in a tin capsule—and in course of time applied to the
whole treaty. In this bond the King promised the restoration of Catholicism,
that is to say, the restoration to the Catholic cantons of their recently
forfeited prerogatives—the control of the free bailiwicks and their ascendancy
over the Protestant cantons—in a word, the much-vext “ Restitution ”; the
admission of Zurich and Bern to the alliance being made conditional on their
consent to it. The whole ignominious treaty was kept secret, not only from the
Protestants but even from the popular assemblies (Landsgemeinden) of the
Catholic cantons. The supplementary agreement was concluded by the French
ambassador absolutely without the King’s knowledge, because in default of it no
alliance at all might have been brought about with the Catholics.
Up to the
time of the alliance between the Catholic cantons and France there had still
been no settlement effected between the victorious Protestant cantons and the
Abbot of St Gallen as to the Toggenburg, which was situate in his dominions.
This was due to the fact that the Emperor took the part of the Abbot and the
Catholics. The dangers generally besetting the Protestants had been greatly
augmented by the Treaties of Rastatt and Baden (in Aargau) in 1714 between the
Catholicising Louis XIV and the Catholic Emperor. In the case of this
particular dispute of the Protestants with the Abbot, the Imperial Diet wished
to intervene in favour of the Abbot as a Prince of the Empire— a proceeding
contrary to Article VI of the Treaty of Westphalia. When the Catholics formed
the alliance with France, however, the Emperor
lost patience
and ordered the Abbot to come to terms with Zurich and Bern; and after the
death of that headstrong personage, a peace was finally concluded on the
Toggenburg question (June 15, 1718).
On September
1 of the year 1715, in which he had concluded the alliance with the Catholic
cantons, Louis XIV died. Two months previously Du Luc had been sent as
ambassador to Vienna. But the policy of France was still to win over the
Protestant cantons to the alliance. It was of great importance that a general
alliance with the Swiss should be effected, not only in order to make the
fullest use possible of them in the interests of France, but also to draw them
away from the side of her opponents, the Emperor and the Maritime Powers. This
was the great end pursued by all the succeeding French ambassadors to
Switzerland; and, numerous as they were and various as were the principles
advanced by them, not one of them attained this object until the occurrence of
an event of European importance, the First Partition of Poland. This so
terrified the Swiss that they yielded and sought protection from a like fate in
a general alliance with France. Before this, on the occasion of the expiration,
in 1723, of the Treaty of alliance of 1663, Basel opened negotiations on her
own account, in order to propitiate France and the Catholic cantons, whom she
had alike offended by favouring the enterprise of General Mercy in 1709.
Further attempts were made in 1738, and in 1756, when Kaunitz, at that time
ambassador in Paris, had effected an alliance between Austria and France
against Frederick the Great, which increased the dangers threatening the Protestant
cantons, while it furnished the five Catholic cantons with fresh hopes of
restitution and led to a renewal of the “ Borromean ” League of the year 1586.
Chavigny seized this moment to treat with the Zurich Burgomaster Heidegger; but
the negotiations again fell through. In 1759 Zurich rejected an offer on the
subject made by Roll, the Schultheiss of Solothurn. The last fruitless effort
was made in 1762, after which there was for ten years no thought of renewing
the French alliance. As one attempt succeeded another, the most various
political principles were followed. The experience of 1663 seemed to teach that
the Catholics could be won over by pecuniary considerations, and that the
Protestants would follow of themselves for fear of being left to stand alone.
So Du Luc (who was ambassador from 1708 to 1715) concluded; but his
expectations were in part defeated because the Protestants had meanwhile gained
the support of the Maritime Powers. Bonnac (ambassador from 1727 to 1737) had
to try another expedient, namely that of winning over the smaller strongholds
of the Reformed faith and abandoning Zurich and Bern; but this measure was
prevented by the strong influence wielded by the two leading cantons over the
rest. Bonnac expressed the opinion, in a memorandum to his Court in 1733, that
the general alliance, useful as it would be, was not essential; a perpetual
peace might be made to serve instead, as it had ten years before. But, for the
next few years, during
which France
was involved in continual wars with Austria and Prussia— the Polish and
Austrian Wars of Succession and the. Silesian Wars—she required not only peace
with Switzerland but direct assistance from her, which nothing short of an
alliance could ensure, so that Bonnac’s counsels of renunciation seemed merely
a case of sour grapes. Mariane, charge d’affaires, took a quite different line;
he concentrated his efforts upon the two chief cantons, whose lead the lesser
Protestant cantons always followed. But no plan was of any avail; each attempt
broke down over the question of the Restitution, upon which France invariably
insisted, and which Zurich and Bern would not accept at any price. Bonnac had,
it is true, cancelled one part of the stipulation: Bremgarten and Mellingen were
to be exempt from the Restitution so as to secure the territorial connexion
between Zurich and Bern; but Heidegger would not even accede to -this proposal.
There was, however, nothing to prevent the Protestant districts from concluding
with France an agreement as to the engagement of soldiers
(MiUtdrlc'apitulation), which they did on May 8,1764.
With the year
1772 came the First Partition of Poland between Austria, Prussia, and Russia,
which terrified the Swiss all the more, because at the time the conduct of the
Emperor Joseph JI had roused their mistrust, while it made the Protestants
doubtful of Prussia also, whose King had hitherto been a good friend to them.
LeopoM I (1705) had revived the old Austrian designs on Switzerland; Joseph II
followed in his steps and proved a dangerous neighbour to the Swiss; and there
was a rumour that Austria and France had already planned a partition of
Switzerland like that of Poland, The whole affair of the alliance of the two
Powers, secured by Kaunitz’ treaty and cemented by the marriage of
Marie-Antoinette with the future King Louis XVI (1770), looked suspicious; and
the Chancellor’s journey through Switzerland in
1777, shortly before the conclusion of the
French alliance with the Swiss, gave fresh cause for anxiety. The feeling
aroused in Switzerland by the Partition of Poland was immediately turned to
account by France; and in that very year she made fresh attempts to obtain a
renewal of the alliance. Not till after the death of Louis XV, on May 10,1774,
and the accession of Louis XVI, who as a man of upright character dealt
honestly with the Protestants, would they consent to come to terms. In 1776,
for the first time for 113 years, a conference of all the cantons was held to
consider an alliance with France, which led to the “Treaty of alliance between
the Crown of France and the States of all Switzerland,” concluded on May
28,1777. The Protestants secured, first and foremost^ that there should be no
question of restitution, and, secondly, though the TriicTclibund was not
formally annulled, a clear statement in the preamble that by the Treaty all the
States of the Confederation were united in one and the same alliance with
France. The part of mediator, so humiliating to the Swiss, which had been
assigned to France in the TriicMiburid, she now abandoned; in return, it was
agreed that the
privileges of
the Swiss in France, which were very unpopular there, should be considered in
detail with a view to their revision or removal. For the rest, a perpetual
peace was stipulated for, as in the alliance of 1663, and laid down as a treaty
obligation. France had the right, in case of need, of raising any number of
recruits not exceeding 6000 in Switzerland, beyond the number of Swiss soldiers
agreed upon by capitulation. Neither country was to allow enemies of the other
to pass through or to remain in her territory. Swiss neutrality must at all
costs be maintained, as towards every Power. Geneva and Neuchatel, despite the
wishes of Switzerland, were not admitted as parties to this treaty—the former
on account of the revolutionary tendency of Geneva politics even before the
French Revolution, the latter as being a dependency of the King of Prussia.
Instead of
France acting as mediator in the interest of the internal security of Switzerland,
this was to be ensured by an agreement between the cantons themselves with
regard to matters coming under the cognisance of the Federal law, the
procedure in the event of disputes between Estates or relating to jurisdictions
held in common, the preservation of security at home, and the administration of
the Federal law. For this purpose, at the general meeting of the Diet in 1776 a
so-called “ Plan of Protection ” (Tuitionsplan) for the French alliance was
drafted, but in the end abandoned. Neither was anything gained by subsequent
negotiations with France in regard to the question of privileges; so that
Switzerland left off treating with her on the subject.
The alliance
of 1777 was concluded for fifty years; in 1798, after the great Revolution, when
the Helvetic Republic was set up and Switzerland came under the yoke of France,
its place was taken, in widely different circumstances, by a fresh compact,
likewise termed a treaty of alliance.
Foreign
military service on the part of the Swiss dates from the beginning of the
fourteenth century, that is to say, from the early days of the Swiss
Confederation. Soldiers who travelled about from one foreign war to another
were called Reisldufer (travellers). So early as 1319, soon after the battle of
Morgarten, which laid the foundation of Swiss military glory, warlike men
marched from the three original cantons of Switzerland to join in the battles
of the valiant House of Visconti, which had risen to the mastery of Milan. In
1373 no less than 3000 Swiss entered the service of another Visconti of Milan.
The military renown of the Swiss grew and increased, notably through the
battles of Sempach and Nafels, the last great fights for liberty, in which they
broke away from Austria and raised themselves to the rank of an independent
Power on a footing of equality with Austria and other States. So much the more
the soldiers of Switzerland were sought after by foreign rulers and took
service Under them. This increase of mercenary service gave rise to two cyils
which in time became disastrous—the fact that the Swiss
occasionally
found themselves fighting on opposite sides; and the system of yearly subsidies
(Permonenwesen, as it was later termed). The former result became increasingly
difficult to avoid, as the military service of the Swiss grew and spread on all
sides and their soldiers were in constant demand; so that influential
intermediaries were continually being called in, to obtain satisfactory
conditions or to outbid rival claimants. Still, it was a long time before the
Swiss cantons took upon themselves this office of go-between. When Louis XI
first drew them away from Germany to France and involved them in wider
political issues, he turned their steps in this direction, in order that he
might gain military rights over Switzerland. This came about by the Treaty of
1474, which affords the first example of a military capitulation; it was called
an alliance, though, so far as the obligations on the Swiss were concerned, it
was nothing more than a military capitulation binding them to furnish 6000
men—just as subsequent military capitulations were called alliances or unions
down to that between Switzerland and France in 1764, which, for the first time
so far as we are aware, is called a military capitulation. The Treaty of 1474
was followed by military capitulations of the cantons with various other
Powers, often hostile to each other. Besides this foreign service regulated by
treaty; there continued in practice that of the private mercenary, who fought
for countries with which there was as yet no capitulation, so long as he could
get his pay or more especially get higher pay than those in treaty service. ,
The numbers of Swiss on foreign service accordingly became excessive; with
their numbers the evils increased which , are inseparable from any such
relation, especially when complicated by the coexistence of different and
mutually contrasting kinds of service. Besides the treaty troops there came to
be irregular companies recruited without authorisation, not to mention the many
who enlisted independently and were simply enrolled among the national troops
of the foreign State. Among these last there were even vagabonds who had
provided themselves with a uniform and a Swiss name. Thus, by the side of
treaty service, Reislaufen developed into individual enlistment; and the entire
practice, under the name of foreign service, contributed to drain Switzerland
for wars in which the country had no concern. In the French wars against the
Empire the Swiss were “Frenchmen” or “Imperialists”; in the French Religious
Wars they were “ Leaguers ” or “ Huguenots,” and so forth; and thus it came to
their having to fight against each other and to shed each other’s blood. On the
other hand, in addition to the yearly subventions payable by virtue of the
capitulations to the canton, its Government, or the people, there was a
continuous and increasing stream of payments and gratuities 01 every
description on account of free companies and other levies. As the military
capitulations succeeded one another, it was easy to include in their terms such
unlawful payments, according as this or that party became predominant in the
canton; while other receipts might in their
1460-1503]
619
turn be
declared illicit, supposing it were desired to retain them in practice while
abandoning them as obligatory by treaty.
But, the more
general the prevalence of foreign military service, the more patent were its
disadvantages : the country was sapped of its economic strength, especially of
the labour required for agriculture; its youth were running wild; while
avarice, idleness, luxury and selfindulgence grew, until finally the whole
nation was possessed by an unhealthy spirit of discontent and demoralisation.
The Diet had opposed foreign service so soon as it began to assume serious
dimensions —even as early as 1460, when it was exclusively the affair of
private individuals, and when capitulations were as yet unheard of; and
measures were set on foot against general enlisting abroad. Subsequent decrees
of the Diet on the subject, after military capitulations had become customary,
were directed against “wild,” i.e. promiscuous, foreign service, and “wild”
pensions not authorised by capitulations. This form of foreign service and
pensions had to be withstood, not only because it seemed unlawful, but because
it was altogether without limit or restriction, and therefore all the more
dangerous. The capitulations had at least introduced some law and order into
foreign service; troops so engaged were put under special officers and special
jurisdiction; they might not be broken up and sent on any service whatever,
neither could they be sent oversea, nor employed for attack on other countries
; and the agreements contained definite provisions as to the rates and
recipients of the subsidies, which could be controlled accordingly. The Free
Companies, on the contrary, were mustered and employed as the supreme authority
thought fit; they must be ready to serve anywhere, for that was the purpose
indicated by their name; it was naturally still easier to dispose as might seem
best of the individual recruits. The “ wild ” pensions were infecting the whole
country like a slow poison, perceptible only in its effects and perhaps not
even then, since intrigues and opposition arose which proved unexpectedly
traceable to the same hidden agency. The excrescences of foreign service at
least were attacked in later decrees of the Diet, and when these had been
removed there was less of foreign service and its evils. Such was notably the
subject and spirit of the decrees of the Diet enacted after the Burgundian Wars
and during the Italian campaigns, of which those of July 18, 1495, and July 23,
1503, are typical and on that account famous. This tendency can be traced
further in the action of Zwingli, whose reforms bore not only upon religion,
but first and foremost upon the question of foreign service; not till he had
reformed this did he set about a reformation of the faith. His attack was,
however, directed not only against promiscuous foreign service, but against the
whole system of mercenary service and of subventions, even as settled by
treaty; and, following his lead, those cantons which had adopted the Reformed
faith abstained from such agreements, notably Zurich, also Bern, etc.; but the
rest soon fell back
CH. XVII.
into their
old ways. Nothing, not even the decrees of the Diet, was of permanent avail in
the face of the universal, deep-seated system of self-subjection to the
foreigner which had taken root in Switzerland and thriven on the glory of the
Burgundian victories and the still greater renown of the Milanese campaigns.
Reislavfen and illicit subsidies could not be abandoned for any length of time,
because they were part and parcel of the whole system of foreign service and
pensions, legalised or otherwise. If the one were permitted, how could the
other be criminal ? So these abuses sprang up again and flourished, until by
the eighteenth century almost all foreign service was undertaken by
capitulation. All interest, too, in foreign service culminated in the question
of money. Originally, even the Reislaijfen of individuals had been prompted by
other interests, by skill and delight in warfare, although from the first money
played an important part, as it was the poorer and remoter and the highland
cantons which had mostly furnished the mercenaries. The wealthy Protestant
towns might well preach against foreign service; but even they could never
quite put a stop to it. The capitulations too were for some time largely directed
by political interests, according to the existing bias in favour of one or the
other of the belligerent foreign Powers: the Swiss came to terms with France
and not with Burgundy against whom they wished to make war, although Burgundy
was wealthier and able to pay a higher price. The cantons allied themselves
with France or with the Empire according to their sympathies; and, in the
French Religious Wars, with the Guises or the Huguenots according to the form
of their faith., Thus, until the eighteenth century it was a question more or
less of political considerations; but thenceforth militaiy treaties were simply
business transactions settled according to the price offered. So soon as the
money interest was predominant and came to turn the scale in the conclusion of
capitulations, fraud and corruption were the order of the day in carrying them
out; promotion was for sale, the strength of the companies was overstated in
order to pocket more pay, and so on. Before the eighteenth century foreign
service had undergone another change in common with the general militaiy
system. After the Treaty of Westphalia absolutism developed, and with it came
the' establishment of standing armies. Hitherto, regiments had been drawn up
and disbanded according to the contingencies of foreign war or of a period of
war: those were the days of hired foot-soldiers (Landsknpchte\ Absolutism on
the other hand required, to maintain its internal integrity and external
independence, perpetually mobilised troops, like those of a standing army. Thus
foreign service became constant. So early, as 1497 the first standing Swiss
guard of 100 meu was formed; but this was simply a body-guard for the King,
such as had been customary from ancient times: the other Swiss regiments were
disbanded as occasion demanded. From the reign of Louis XIV onwards, however,
these regiments, too, were permanent, although particular corps were
occasionally discharged; and finally, the
Swiss Guard
was merely the elite of the standing Swiss regiments. It ended gloriously
(August 10, 1792) as a last witness to ancient Swiss loyalty and valour. The
Swiss regiments of other monarchs thus also became standing armies.
Such is the
note of Swiss foreign service in the eighteenth century: its conditions
entirely regulated by capitulation, a business transaction pure and simple
between rulers and ruled, and essentially a standing service. Still, it was
France which, after having first introduced the Swiss to official foreign
service, was chiefly instrumental in keeping them to it. The system had thus
reached its zenith, and the returns for foreign regiments and annual subsidies
their highest point: in 1748, 60,000 Swiss are stated to have been in the
service of foreign Powers, and for 1761 and 1762 the expenditure of the French Government
on subventions and bribes is given at 1,400,000 livres(= <£’55,416. 13s.
4<d.). According to Waser, between 1474 and 1715 the Swiss sacrificed
700,000 men to France, receiving in return 1146 million gulden (=
=f?95,500,000) in pay and pensions.
From a
political point of view there can be but one verdict as to the system of which
Swiss history offers so conspicuous an example—wholehearted condemnation. Even
private military service cannot be approved; for all military service is the
service of the State, and as such properly given only by the subjects of the
country to which it is rendered. But in regard to capitulations the case is
self-evident: they degrade an entire State to the position of a hireling
soldier of another, and, simply show that it has no work worth doing to offer
its citizens and is incapable of making them fight its own battles. As Rudolf
Reding, Landammcmn of Schwyz, said in the Diet of 1492, “ a Swiss ought to have
a hole ” (i.e. way out); but it was for Switzerland herself to lead forth her
sons in her own interests. Neither is the argument admissible that foreign
service contributed to the safety of Switzerland; she would have been safe, and
more than safe, had she known how to keep her sons together and turn their
energies to her own account.
There was no
reason why neutrality, after it had once been adopted by Switzerland, should
not have been combined with foreign service—as the term neutrality was
understood in those days. Swiss neutrality dates from the abandonment of independent
warfare after the battle of Marignano, the effects of which were enhanced by
the further defeats at Bicocca and Pavia, sustained shortly afterwards in ,the
service of France. This occasion determined the character of the neutrality
observed from that time : it simply involved abstention on the part of
Switzerland from wars in her own right; but the Swiss forces were not required
to desist from fighting in foreign services. There was consequently a
continuance of capitulations and of Reislaivfen according to a man’s own
choice; which latter was indeed forbidden, though not out of consideration for
other States but as prejudicial to the nation itself. The capitulations,
express agree*
merits for
assistance in foreign wars, increased to the exclusion of all other forms of
foreign service. Switzerland held aloof from wars in her own right, although
she defended herself from harm by means of foreign armies. Such was the
character of Swiss neutrality from its origin throughout the early history of
Switzerland. No other form of neutrality was required from her by the other
Powers, all of which had their part in the Swiss capitulations and were only
concerned to see that no exceptions were made in favour of their opponents.
Although Switzerland took no part by means of armies of her own in the Thirty
Years’ War, this was not because such an abstention was required by the terms
of her neutrality, but for reasons of policy, (suggested by France, that is to
say, Richelieu), inasmuch as her own neutrality and territorial immunity would
otherwise have been risked, and there would have been danger of her own soil
becoming the seat of war. Until the Treaty of Westphalia, moreover; it was even
held to be compatible with the neutrality of Switzerland that she should allow
friendly Powers to march through her territory for purposes of war, as was
chiefly done in the case of French troops. Subsequently, however, after
Gustavus Adolphus had nearly made war upon the Catholic cantons because they
had granted a passage to Spanish troops, the interpretation of the term
neutrality was altered, and Switzerland closed her territory to the passage of
foreign armies. Foreign service, on the other hand, was still looked upon as
permissible until last century, when it was in its turn forbidden as a breach
of neutrality* which term now excludes all support, direct or indirect, of the
military operations of a belligerent.
In its
numerous wars of the eighteenth century in particular, an important part is
played by the foreign service and neutrality of Switzerland ; and on both
heads important negotiations and transactions result from abuses and breaches,
claims and questions. There were the three Wars of Succession—the Spanish, the
Polish and the Austrian War (ending with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle), and,
following close on the last two, came the three Silesian Wars, including as the
Third the Seven Years’ War; so that throughout the whole century one war
followed as it were on the heels of another, until the great Revolution broke out
and along with it a general war of the nations. In the Wars of Succession it
was chiefly France and Austria which were opposed to each other, with their
respective allies, Spain, Sardinia, and the States General; in the Seven Years’
War it was Austria, France, and the rest, against Prussia. Switzerland was
constantly taking part on both sides by virtue of her foreign service—the
Catholic cantons for the French, and the Protestant, notably Zurich and Bern,
for the Emperor and the States General; Austria demanded, not only that the
French regiments of Swiss should confine themselves to the defence of France,
but that Switzerland should, in conformity with the standing agreement of 1511,
herself undertake the defence of the Austrian territory indicated in its provisions;
1690-1777] Complaints of infringements of
neutrality. 623
but France
merely conceded that her Swiss regiments should not be used against such
territory, while constantly employing them to attack her enemies, and even
sending regiments from the Protestant cantons as the case might be against the
Emperor or Prussia. Questions incessantly arose in regard to the neutrality of
Switzerland, to the protection of that country from molestation by the
belligerents, whether in the north, on the Rhine, or in the War of the Spanish
Succession in the south also, as against Sardinia; and Switzerland claimed
neutrality not only for her own territory but also for the Austrian Forest
Cantons and more remote territories and districts in the north and for Savoy in
the south, inasmuch as the “security” of these neighbouring regions contributed
to assure her own safety. The question of declaring Savoy neutral dates
therefore from this time (actually from 1690). The cession of the Austrian
Forest Cantons to Switzerland came frequently under discussion; Bern on one
occasion (1734) treated with Austria on the subject; but no settlement was
reached in either direction. Such were the main points on which the
negotiations and transactions during these wars depended. In particular, the
following instances may be cited. In the War of the Spanish Succession the
neutrality of Switzerland was twice infringed: once, in 1702, by the French,
when, in order to secure a passage over the Rhine, they occupied the
Schusterinsel, including the part of it belonging to Basel; and, again, in
1709, by the Austrian General Mercy, who descended upon Alsace by way of Basel
territory. In the latter case France and the Catholic cantons, already
specially attached to her, were stirred against Basel for permitting the
passage, and Basel thereupon strove to recover the goodwill of both by her
intervention in favour of the French alliance. In the subsequent wars there
were complaints in particular of abuses in the employment of Swiss regiments
in the French service—by their being employed for purposes of attack, in the
Wars of the Polish and Austrian Successions against Austria, and in the Seven
Years’ War against Prussia. In the latter instance, complaints were made not
only by the enemy but by the Swiss themselves, i.e. by the Protestant cantons,
which, in spite of having hitherto refused the alliance with France,
nevertheless had soldiery, in her service; but then Frederick II was regarded
by them as the hero of the century and the inventor of a new art of
war—especially by the Bernese, who had been among his godfathers. In 1774,
another abuse was committed on the part of France—by her sending Swiss
regiments oversea to Corsica to put down the struggle of the islanders for
liberty; and this eventually led to the conclusion of the general alliance with
France in 1777.
With the
eighteenth century begins in Switzerland, as elsewhere, that long succession of
conflicts between class and class which continued throughout the century until
their culmination in the French Revolution, that historic class struggle. The
way for this was prepared by a general
intellectual
movement, the Avfkl'drung as it was termed, which made its appearance in
Switzerland also in the second half of the century. The class conflicts were
the result of the development of oligarchies, a reaction against the
suppression of the privileges acquired by particular classes and families. This
growth of oligarchies began with the Reformation, inasmuch as, in the first
instance, public authority was concentrated in the hands of the State at the
expense of the Church, which was set .aside, and, again, as the tendency of the
times was in the direction of absolutism which the Reformat; or had thus far
helped to foster. Switzerland was specially exposed to this tendency, as being
closely connected with other countries by means of her foreign service,
especially with France, whose King Louis XIV had brought absolutism to its
highest pitch. It was through foreign service that the Swiss of higher rank, the
sons of the ruling families, came into touch with the life of foreign Courts,
where they learnt court ways, and that money and affluence came into the
influential circles in the various districts, bringing with them an arrogant
and exclusive tone. In this sense foreign service also had a bearing upon the
class conflicts. The development of oligarchical rule, which grew .and throve
in a soil thus prepared for it, was carried out in concentric circles. First
came the suppression of the rights of dependencies—of the subject territories
and common prefectures (Vogteieri)—and the concentration of all rights and
powers in the hands of the towns or governing cantons; next, within that town
or canton, followed the ruling out from among the burghers of outsiders (Hintersassen)
or resident aliens (Beisassen); and their exclusion from any share in the
government. Finally, individual families from among the burghers set
themselves over the rest; and thus begins the supremacy of. certain families
'or the patriciate.. In Bern the patriciate had been handed down from early
times in the shape of government by the nobility; but in the other towns and
cantons it only grew up in the last period of old Switzerland; in any case, it
had reached its full development at the beginning of the eighteenth century, so
that this century stands out above its predecessor as the period of the
all-prevalent patriciate. In Freiburg only a legalised patriciate existed,
inasmuch as the group of families in power was defined by a formal ordinance,
whereas in other places it had arisen simply by usurpation on the one side and
voluntary submission on the other. The entire development of oligarchical rule,
from the suppression of the rights of dependencies down to the establishment of
the patriciate, was effected, where the requisite preliminary conditions were
in existence, in three concentric circles, although these circles partly
intersect in this way: that a further concentration of authority begins before
the last has been quite completed. Thus, and to this extent, the dependencies,
the outsiders or resident aliens in the towns, and the citizens themselves,
were in succession suppressed, and it was the revolt of one or other of these
bodies or groups which constituted the class wars. There was an
1653-1798] Class
revolts and conflicts.—The Aufklarung. 625
impressive
prelude to these struggles in the Swiss Peasants’War of 1653, when the
districts round the towns of Luzern, Basel, Solothum, and Bern rose in concert;
but the defeat of the peasants was so complete that no further attempt was made
until in the next century movements took place, independent but universal, now
here and now there, incessant and constantly renewed. First of all in 1713, a
year after the Second Vilmergen War and caused by it, came the rising of the
burghers of the town of Zurich against the patriciate; then, from 1717 to 1729,
the revolt at Wilchingen in the canton of Sclfaffhausen; 1719-32, the rising in
Werdenberg, a dependency of Glarus; 1723, the attempt on the part of Davel to
snatch Vaud from Bern; 1728-35, the struggle between the families of Schumacher
and Zurlauben in Zug; 1732-5, that between the Wetters and Zellwegers in
Ausserrhoden; 1749, Henzi’s plot in Bern; 1755, the Val Leventina rising
against Uri; 1757-70, the affair of the Schumachers and Meiers in Luzern ;
1762-75, the Suter affair at Innerrhoden; 1764-8, that of the Pfeils against
the Redings in Schwyz; 1766, that of Einsiedeln against Schwyz; 1781, that of
Greyerz against Freiburg, and many others. Sometimes ‘these were struggles of
depiendencies or subject territories against the town or ruling canton,
sometimes of the burghers against the patriciate, or'of one family against
another for supremacy-1-** cock-fights ” as these last were
called—struggles of the Montagues 'and Capulets, the most selfish and therefore
the most reprehensible of all social struggles. In Geneva, these party
conflicts lasted for almost the whole of the eighteenth century. As these class
wars in Switzerland were in general the precursors Of the world-famed class war
in France, so it was Geneva in •particular1 from which the French,
before they had yet emerged out of the sphere of theories, derived their
examples of popular risings, of deliberative assemblies and imperious action
on the part of private societies, and finally even a supply of agents versed in
the art of insurrection.
Meanwhile the
intellectual movement called the Aufklarung had communicated itself to
Switzerland also—with the aid of literary and scientific men such as Bodmer and
Breitinger, Gesner, Lavater, Johannes von Muller, Haller, and of societies like
the Helvetic Society, founded in 1760, which entered upon a fresh lease of life
and activity in the so-called “Regeneration,” when the reaction of the
Restoration had followed on the Revolution.
After the
outbreak of the French Revolution, the class struggle began afresh in
Switzerland, now stimulated by the example of France, in the agitation,
rigorously repressed, at Stafa, 1794—5; the object, however, was ho longer to
regain ancient popular rights, but to introduce the new “equality” and
“fraternity” of the French. The struggle was again put dovvn, until the great
Revolution spread into Switzerland and brought about, in 1798, the complete
overthrow of the Swiss Constitution by the establishment of the Helvetic
Republic.
JOSEPH II.
i Joseph II, the eldest son of Maria
Theresa, since the death of Francis I in 1765 Emperor and co-regent with his
mother in the Habs- burg dominions, took up the reins of government, in a
spirit wholly deserving of praise. He was endowed by nature with an unrivalled
zeal for hard work, and with great openness of mind: he claimed in addition to
belong wholly to his own age, and held an exalted view of the responsibilities
of his office. He had learnt history and the law of nations from Bartenstein,
natural law and the economic sciences from Martini, tactics and strategy from
Daun, Laudon, and Lacy.:
Desirous of
possessing a thorough knowledge of his dominions and of the principal countries
of Europe, ,he, undertook many journeys, primarily in quest of information. No
pride of State attended him ; he would put up at inns, and rarely showed
himself at entertainments or spectacles, devoting the whole of his time to
matters of real importance. In every town through which he passed, it was his
care to enquire minutely into all that concerned the army, trade, industry, and
charity, and in his thirst for comprehensive knowledge he plied with eager
questipns anyone who could furnish him with useful information. Thus he visited
Hungary twice, in 1764 and 1768; the Banat of Temesv&r in 1766; Rome and
Italy twice, in 1769 and 1783; Bohemia and Moravia in 1772; Galicia in 1773;
France twice, in 1777 and 1781; the Austrian Netherlands and the Republic of
the United Provinces in 1781.
The dominions
which were to be the scene of the young Emperor’s activity were of the most
heterogeneous character, endlessly subdivided and occupied by peoples separated
from each other by every law of their being—by birth, language, tradition, and
interests. These 250,000 square miles of land were in fact composed of
territories rather contiguous than united, whose inhabitants displayed an
infinitive diversity, and belonged to races not only different, but in many instances
hostile: there were Germans, Magyars, Italians, Roumanians, Slavs, vying with
each other in their subdivisions; and it might have been said with truth that,
save for the Catholic religion professed by all but a small
minority
among them, they had nothing in common except the person of the Emperor and the
service due to him. The task to which Joseph II was to devote all his energies
would clearly be hard, and full of difficulties. It was inevitable that
struggles should ensue, when the administration was shared by an eager and
ambitious Prince, athirst for progress, and an autocratic Empress, who was
jealous of her own power, no less ambitious but infinitely more prudent than
her son, essentially conservative and distrustful of innovation. The temperaments
of the two rulers were, in a word, mutually antipathetic, and with regard to
certain definite aims they disagreed from the first.
Scarcely was
Joseph installed when he declared war upon all expenses which were useless, or
judged by him to be such, and sought to compass the conversion of the national
debt. Besides this, he undertook a minute inspection of his frontiers and his
troops, returning with the conviction that the military equipment of the Empire
was inadequate and demanded considerable reinforcement, though this would
entail great pecuniary sacrifices. The Chancellor, Kaunitz, who sided with the
Empress, resisted the projected reforms, submitting that every increase in the
public burdens would make itself felt by a perceptible decline in general
prosperity. Moreover, unless the state coffers were to be completely
exhausted, it would be impossible to keep continually under arms a body of
troops sufficient to guarantee the safety of all the frontiers at once. They
must content themselves with possessing a good standing army, and such
facilities for recruiting as would ensure the speedy enlistment of the
necessary additions. Any other course of action would involve the risk of
paralysing industry and trade; moreover, such a widespread distribution of
military forces would rouse uneasiness in the foreign Powers, and would be
likely to result in diplomatic complications.
Nor were
these the only points at issue between the co-regents. Joseph II, whose heart
was in the system of centralisation, pronounced the State Conference to be
ill-organised and the surveillance exercised by the superior authority a mere
pretence; and he criticised in no measured terms the working of the office of
Chancellor, the joint creation of the Empress and Kaunitz. Although in the end
he was to succeed in bringing about certain reforms in these directions, he had
first to encounter a stubborn and fierce resistance.
When the
young Emperor visited Hungary and Bohemia, he was profoundly impressed by the
wretched plight of the peasantry. He rightly attributed their deplorable
condition to the unfair pressure of the seigniorial charges and to the
ignorance of the people, and he wished to mitigate their serfdom, to lighten
the feudal burdens imposed upon them, and to build schopls. Maria Theresa
eventually yielded to his representations, and issued, in 1773, a decree
regarding feudal servitudes.
But
the result of this proceeding was unfortunate: the peasants, imagining that
their rulers wished to free them from all dues, and that the nohles were
opposed to this measure and had gained to- their side the ministers of State,
rose in revolt. Bands of insurgents spread terror in the rural districts; the
insurrection Spread to Moravia, to Austrian Silesia, Styria, and Hungary, and
was only quelled at last by a summary application of martial law. Kaunitz
advocated the withdrawal of all concessions hitherto made, and the refusal of
all favours to rebels; but the influence of Joseph carried the day, and the
more crying abuses were suppressed. . .
The Emperor,
again, was in favour of a cpmplete remodelling of public education in a more
secular spirit. “ The State is no cloister,” he said, “ and we have, in good
truth, no monks for our neighbours.” It is not difficult to imagine how his
mother’s strict piety felt itself outraged by such sentiments. Later, the
breach between the two was widened still further upon the question of religion,
when, after the .persecutions carried on against dissenters in Moravia, Joseph
wrote to his mother, during, the month of June, 1777: “I am more and more
convinced of the soundness of my principles by these open avowals of
.irreligion in Moravia: once grant freedom of belief, and there will be but ,
one religion—that of directing all the citizens equally towards the good of the
State. On any other plan it will be impossible to save mgn?s souls,
and many bodies will be sacrificed which we need and might have used. Shall the
power of man aspire to pass judgment on the mercy of God, to save men in their
own despite, to make a law to rule over conscience? You who are temporal lords,
if only the State be duly served, if the laws of nature and society meet with
reverence and the Supreme Being fail not of honour—why should you seek a wider
sphere of influence ? Hearts may not be enlightened, save by the Holy Spirit,
whose workings your laws can only disannul. Such, as your Majesty is well
aware, is my creed: and the strength of my convictions will hold me to it as
long as I live.” Maria Theresa replied: “ Without a supreme religion, tolerance
and indifference are the very means whereby comes ruin and total overthrow. We
ourselves should fare the worst.” The contest grew so hitter that Joseph
proposed to his mother that he should abdicate, and peace was only restored
with the utmost difficulty.
In the sphere
of external politics, too,, harmony was far to seek. Poland had, for a, long
time past, maintained its position, not by its own strength, but simply through
the feuds and jealousies of the neighbouring States. After the death of
Augustus III, the kingdom passed , (September 7, 1764) to Stanislaus
Poniatowski, under the guardianship of the Russian ambassador Bepnih. The
policy of Russia was to resist all reforms which might tend to strengthen
Poland, and to maintain the liberum veto, together with all the drawbacks of
the ancient Constitution.
1768-71] Russian aggressions against
Turkey.—Kaunitz. 629
Again, Russia
interfered on behalf of the non-Catholics, and, notwithstanding the fierce
opposition of the nobles and clergy, she forced upon the country liberty of
worship, and the admission of dissenters to all the public offices and the
electoral assemblies. This conduct provoked a revolt, which was cruelly
suppressed by the Russians. In 1768 their troops pursued some Polish insurgents
into Turkish territory, and the Porte, in consequence, declared war on the
Tsarina: and from this time onward the fortunes of Poland became intimately
connected with the Turco-Russian question.
At this
juncture, Kaunitz devised a plan which he thought very ingenious. Austria was
to take the initiative in a coalition with Prussia and Turkey: this triple
alliance would quickly get the better of Russia, and check the threatening
growth of that Power. At the same time, Silesia would be won back, Frederick
being allowed to take Courland and the grand duchy of Posen. Joseph II had
little difficulty in exposing the chimerical nature of this arrangement. It
savoured of childish folly to imagine that Frederick would give up Silesia in
exchange for territories which were certainly larger, but at the same time far
less necessary for the consolidation of his dominions: nor was it more likely
that he would abandon at such a price the chief supporter of his policy.
Baffled, but not disheartened, Kaunitz, who had already drawn the attention of
Frederick to the dangers threatening the equilibrium of eastern Europe from the
pretensions of Russia, tried to convince his sovereigns that war was to be
preferred to the complete success of the Tsarina’s troops in Turkey. If they
could come to an agreement with Prussia, the entry of an Austro-Prussian army
into Poland would force Catharine to make peace, without striking a blow. But
Maria Theresa was afraid of war, and her son doubted the readiness of the
Austrian army to take the field. His reply to his Chancellor accordingly ran: “
Leave Russia and Turkey to come to blows; but let us reinforce our military
strength, tnd, when the two rivals have Weakened one another, the Porte will
pay us highly for our help. Then, we will hold the Russians in check, if they
encroach towards the Danube, and we will leave Frederick a free hand in
Poland.” After prolonged hesitation, Maria Theresa acquiesced in this opinion,
and the negotiations resulted in the Convention of July, 1771, described below.
Frederick,
for his part, could not acquiesce in the outrageous stipulations to which
Russia demanded that the Turks should accede. The downfall of Turkey could
involve no possible advantage to Prussia, and might even draw her, in the end,
into war against Austria on behalf of Russia. Thus it was that he conceived the
idea of partitioning Poland, by way of a solution of all these difficulties;
for by this means the rapaciousness of all the claimants would be satisfied,
with the additional advantage that the balance of power would be restored.
Joseph II had already anticipated this step during the year 1768, when he had
caused
his troops to
occupy the Polish district of Zips, taking his stand upon the doubtful mortgage
of it to the Polish Crown in 1412. Maria Theresa disapproved of this course of
action, and held very different views. Austria, in her opinion, should offer
her mediation to win more favourable terms for Turkey; and the Empress fondly
hoped to win Little Wallachia in return for these good offices. In this way the
projected partition of Poland was resisted, and a blow was dealt at the
influence! of Prussia in ( jnstantinople. But the Emperor and his Chancellor
were opposed to such a plan, and the Tsarina, on her part, refusing to give it
countenance, sighed with Frederick II the secret Treaty of St Petersburg
(February 17,1772). It was thenceforth impossible to prevent either Russia from
establishing her supremacy on the Black Sea, or the two allied Powers from
seizing whatever part of Poland they coveted; and Austria had no choice but to
share in the dismemberment proposed by Prussia. Maria Theresa expostulated with
sighs—“She is always in tears,” said Frederick; “ yet she is always ready to
take her share.” She sent Kaunitz a note breathing trepidation and anguish: “
When all my dominions were threatened and I knew not where I might bring forth
my son in safety, I trusted in my right and in the help of God. But iii this
matter, where among other voices the voice of manifest right cries out against
us to Heaven, I must acknowledge that never in my life have I suffered pangs
like these, that I feel shame to show my face. Let the Prince bethink him what
example we set to the world, when we prostitute our honour and our good name
for a wretched fragment of Poland or Moldavia or Wallachia. I know well that I
am weak and friendless, and for this reason 1 suffer events to take their
course; but my spirit is bitterly vexed.”
The Treaty of
August 5, 1772, gave to Prussia the whole basin of the lower Vistula with the
exception of Danzig, about 20,000 square miles with 600,000 inhabitants, thus
establishing continuity between the eastern provinces and the centre of the
monarchy. Russia received White Russia with 1,600,000 inhabitants; Austria had
for her share the Comitat of Zips, an important part of Red Russia, certain
portions of Podolia and Volhynia, the southern part of Little Poland, more than
two millions of subjects, and the northern slope of the Carpathians.
From the
point of view of general politics, the partition of Poland linked the three
Courts of the north in a complicity which for a long time involved a joint
responsibility; for the rest, it substituted for the ancient right of nations
the proclamation of brute force as supreme, of might as right.
Austria had
for many a year cast longing glances in the direction of Bavaria. The marriage
of Archduke Joseph with Princess Maria Josepha, sister of the childless Elector
Maximilian Joseph, had been concluded nainly in order that the inheritance of
the Elector might pass to the
House of
Habsburg; but the Empress died, without issue, in 1767, and the cherished dream
came to nothing. But hope was not yet abandoned. The inheritance of the Elector
Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria had on his death (December 30, 1777) lapsed to the
Elector Palatine (Charles Theodore of Sulzbach). Skilful negotiations, carried
on under the seal of absolute secrecy, resulted, on January 15, 1778, in an
agreement whereby the Elector, in exchange for advantageous settlements secured
by Austria to his natural children, recognised the Austrian claim to Bavaria,
thus sacrificing the interest of his heir presumptive, Duke Charles II of
Zweibrucken-Birkenfeld, who was descended in collateral line from the Rudolfine
branch of the House of Wittelsbach. The House of Austria thus acquired, without
striking a blow, a German land, part of which carried the Habsburg monarchy
into the heart of the Empire and brought its dominions in Germany near to its
Italian possessions.
The agreement
once signed, Kaunitz believed that the game was won. On the one hand, he
reckoned on the French alliance; bn the other, the attention of Russia was
absorbed by the events in the Crimea, as was that of England by the
insurrection of her colonies, and the King of Prussia, now grown old, could
have no other preoccupation beyond keeping intact the conquests of his youth.
The Chancellor was soon to see how grievously he had deceived himself. Vainly
did Joseph II try to secure the support of Louis XVI by offering him a share of
the Austrian Netherlands: seductive as the offer was, it could not outweigh
thfe disadvantages which, from the point of view of France, must inevitably
attend the extension of the Austrian power into the heart of Germany, and its
acquisition of absolute control over the Empire and the highway into Italy.
Frederick had
foreseen this attitude on the part of France; at the same time, he had
persuaded the Tsarina that the least change in the Germanic Constitution would
be prejudicial to the interests of Russia. Having no fears in this quarter, he
occupied himself in' winning over to his views the Duke of
Zweibrucken-Birkenfeld. Austria had brought about the relinquishment pf all
claims on the part of the Elector Palatine; but the agreement of January 15,
1778, was not completely valid without the assent of the heir presumptive
aforesaid. But, far frpm identifying himself with the intrigues of Austria, the
young Prince, obeying the instigation of Frederick, disputed at the Diet the
validity of the transfer. The King of Prussia was not slow to intervene. His
attitude at first was that of peacemaker, and he had much to say in favour of a
new arrangement: the Palatine House should give up to Austria two districts of
Bavaria, on the Danube and on the Inn; Austria for her part should cede to the
Elector the duchy of Limburg, with the small portion of Gelders which she then
held, comprising the town of Ruremonde and certain villages. The Elector of
Saxony should
have Mindelheim and Wiesensteig. Maria Theresa was to renounce the suzerain
rights of Bohemia over the fiefs of the Upper Palatinate, Saxony, and the
margravates of Franconia. These offers not being accepted, the negotiations
were broken off,' and war became a certain prospect.
The Cabinet
of. Vienna instantly put in a claim at Versailles for the military assistance
stipulated in the Treaty of 1756. But the French Ministry refused the demand,
on the ground that the possessions guaranteed to Maria Theresa by the Treaty
cited were not now the ground of dispute. The present difference related to
territories which had not been in question at the time when the alliance was
concluded:; the matter now at issue was thus no longer the protection of the
Austrian dominions, but their extension, and /the casus foederis could not
therefore be said to arise. Besides these reasons, borrowed from the Treaty,
France had others as to which she kept silence: was it not to be feared that
the enlargement of Austria towards the upper Danube might tempt hep to extend
her sway towards the Rhine? Moreover, was it wise for France to involve herself
in the difficulties of a continental war, when a maritime war was imminent and
would tax her resources to the utmost?. Would, there not be a risk of reviving
the Anglo-Prussian alliance ? France accordingly remained neutral.
In July,
.1778, Frederick II at the head of more than 100,000 men, entered Bohemia by
the county of Glatz, occupied Nachod and advanced as far as the Elbe. Joseph II
was awaiting him in a formidable position on the opposite bank, and for several
months the two armies kept a watchful eye on one another, but made no
important movement. It seemed as if the old King shrank from tempting Fortune
again, while the young Emperor was afraid to expose to the hazard of a battle the
soldierly reputation which was his cherished ambition. Whatever the explanation
may be, he was content to show himself as a very calm and vigilant commander.
This extraordinary campaign, in which some of the foremost generals of the
age—Frederick II and Prince* Henry, Lacy and Laudon—were brought together, came
to an end in October, 1778, without a siege or engagement of any moment.
The war had
filled the Empress with intense fear. Without her son’s knowledge, she entered
upon negotiations with Frederick II, and, when these proved fruitless, sought
the mediation of France and Russia. France, absorbed in restoring the
efficiency of her navy, and involved in a costly war with England, was iall for
peace; Russia, still preserving an unpleasant remembrance of the behaviour of
Austria towards her during her disputes with the Porte, atid recalling with
gratitude, on the other hand, the intervention of Prussia in the same matter,
was prepared to listen to the demands of Maria Theresa, but with the
reservation that Frederick’s interests must be consulted.
In a congress
hereupon opened at TeSchen, there were vehement
discussions
and much heated advocacy of the opposing claims, and more than once it seemed
that the negotiations were in jeopardy. The news of the decisive peace
concluded at Constantinople between the Sultan and the Tsarina gave a timely
support to the efforts of diplomacy Fearing that Russia, relieved from anxiety
with regard to Turkey, might give military aid to the Prussians, Austria
adopted a more conciliatory attitude, and the Conference came to an end on May
13, 1779.
• The Treaty of Teschen bestowed upon
Austria that part of the territory of Berghausen which lies between the
Danube, the Inn, and the Salza—an acquisition Offering the advantage of
establishing direct communication between the archduchy of Austria and Tyrol.
In exchange for this extension of their dominions, the Emperor and his mother
gave up their claim to the inheritance of Bavarif, which remained in the hands
of the Elector Palatine, with a reversion in favour of the Duke of
Zweibriicken. They also bound themselves to further the eventual reunion of the
margravates of Baireuth and Ansbach'with the Prussian Crown. The consequences
of this Treaty were of no small importance^ The readjustment of the plan of
alliance, the work on which Kaunitz prided himself so highly, did not, as a
matter of fact, produce any of the important results for which its author had
fondly hoped; the alliance with France brought no appreciable advantage to Austria.
On the other hand, the Peace of Teschen revealed the growing influence of
Russia. Joseph II was profoundly impressed; he noted the additional strength
given to Prussia by the Russian support, and (finding himself, once again, at
variance with his mother) he was disposed to shift the basis of the Austrian
policy, moving it eastwards towards Russia rather than in the direction of
France; and to renounce the traditional hostility between Vienna and St
Petersburg. In fine, Russia had now for the first time made her voice heard in
German affairs; Prussia had increased in strength; and Austria was doomed to
fall into the second rank.
If
the pretensions of Russia in the direction of the Vistula were aiarming to
Austria, that Power viewed with still more suspicion the steps taken by the
Tsarina towards the provinces of the Danube, the natural outlet of the Austrian
dominions into the Black Sea. In order to strengthen himself beforehand against
the Muscovite encroachments, Joseph II negotiated a reconciliation with
Prussia, in his celebrated’ interview with Frederick II at Neisse, in August,
1769. TO this date we may trace back the first symptom of coolness in the
Franco Austrian alliance, and the first steps taken by Prussia to free herself
from Russian influence. The two sovereigns met again at Neustadt, in September
1770,
when Turkey,
disheartened by the calamity of Tchesmc*, implored’ their, joint mediation. It
has already been indicated how clOsely this question was entangled with that of
Poland; and these transactions which are treated in another volume, need not be
discussed here. ’
Kaunitz now
negotiated an alliance with the Porte, with intent to protect the interests of
the monarchy in the east. By the Convention of July 7, 1771, Austria bound
herself to make common cause with Turkey, “to deliver her out of the hands of
Russia by the means either of negotiations or of arms, and to cause to be
restored all the fortresses, provinces and territories, which, bfiing in the
possession of the Sublime Porte, have been unlawfully seized bj Russia;” As the
price of this . Jliance Turkey promised to pay a subsidy of 11,250,000 florins,
to grant to Austrian subjects the most-favoured-nation terms as to trade and to
give up the part of Wallachia between Transylvania, the Banat of Temesvar, the
Danube, and the Aluta. But when (as has been seen) Austria came to terms with
Russia about the partition of Poland, it became dear that the cause of Turkey
could no longer be uphdd otherwise than by diplomacy, the alternative of war
being naturally excluded, ThUgut showed his skill in bringing the Porte to
acknowledge this; and he further offered to cancd the Treaty in question. The
Sultan showed a conciliatory temper, and offered to abide by the concessions he
had granted, if Austria succeeded in obtaining by her mediation a peace which
would secure to him the Danubian Provinces and Crimean Tartary,
In the
conferences held at Focktchany in' April, 1772, the questions of secondary
importance were settled with no great difficulty ; but, since no agreement
could be reached on the subject of the independence of the Tartars, the
negotiations were broken off; and the efforts made to come to terms at
Bucharest, in the following year, proved fruitless. The point at issue on this
occasion was the ■ right of navigation in the Black Sea, demanded by
Russia, together with the cession of Kerch and pf Yenikale. There was
accordingly a fresh outbreak of war: the Russian army, defeated successively in
the neighbourhood of Silistria and of! Varna, had the greatest difficulty in
recroswng the Danube. But in 1774 Rumyantseff succeeded in routing the Turkish
army at Shuinla, and the Porte, in face of this pressing danger, concluded, on
July 21,
1774, the Treaty pf Kutchuk-Kainardji. This was
the first great treaty concluded between Rus« :a and the Porte, “
the foundation-stone of the lengthy I transaction, varied by intervals of
bloodshed, which was destined, after a century of endeavour, to bring the
soldiers of the Tsar to the gates of Constantinople." It made Russia the,
protectress of the Mussulmans of the Crimea in the matter of political
independence,; and of the Christians of the Ottoman empire in that of religious
liberty. Joseph II claimed, in return for his good offices, that the Bukowina
should be given up to him : it was relinquished by the Turks on May 7,
1775. Austria thus acquired a strategic
position of the first order, enabling her, at her choice, to support the
Russians in a joint campaign, or to intimidate them, if the two Powers should happen
to disagree.
By the death
pf Maria Theresa, on November 29, 1780, Joseph II
1780—l] Joseph as sole
ruler. His “enlightened despotism.” 635
became sole
monarch of the Habsburg dominions. He now hoped to be able to carry out
sweeping reforms in every direction. He was not, however, the originator of
these reforms; their spirit was that of the eighteenth century, and similar
endeavours are observable in almost every part of Europe. Reason must rule the
world, the omnipotence of the State must he servant to reason. The State,
acting in its own interest, must be the agent of reform. The programme of this
“enlightened despotism” included the general distribution and equitable
apportionment of taxation, uniformity of legislation, subordination of the
Church to the State, abolition of annates and tithes, establishment of
intellectual liberty, of tolerance in religion, of impartial justice for every
man. All these boons must be the gift of a sovereign whose authority was beyond
question, and who devoted himself wholly to his people’s welfare. It was to the
sovereigns only that the reformers looked for the realisation of their schemes.
All
the statesmen of Austria were more or less imbued with these ideas, and not
even Maria Theresa herself had entirely escaped their influence. Jealous as she
was of her authority, and deeply devoted to the happiness of her subjects, she
had been inspired by Kaunitz, van Swieten, Martini, Sonnenfels, and others, to
encourage intellectual culture, to amend the penal laws, and to restrict the
application of torture. At the same time she did not cease to regard the
nobility and clergy as the mainstay of her power, while her son was not likely
to be hampered by these conservative predilections. In his turn, he was led
astray by a tendency to excessive theorising, and a failure to take sufficient
account of tradition, time, and surroundings; and he was apt to fall into yet
another mistake—that of believing the men whom he entrusted with the execution
of his orders possessed of his own virtues, his own zeal and devotion to the
public welfare. Thus he was destined to a cruel disillusionment, which
embittered the last years of his life. .
Joseph H
always protested that he was not the enemy of the Church, and that it was his
wish to remain a believing Christian. But he, would not suffer the papal
authority to intervene in his dominions; in his eyes; the nuncio was only the
ambassador of a temporal sovereign. Without decisively advocating a
transformation of the hierarchy, he wished to see the episcopal power more
independent of Rome; his views on this question being closely allied to those
of the Archbishops of Cologne, Trier, Mainz and Salzburg. He was presently to
adopt more radical opinions; and he may even have thought of creating a national
Church—of proceeding, that is, so far as schism.
Judging it
inadmissible that citizens should be branded with inferiority by reason of
their religious principles, the Emperor issued, in 1781, the Patent of
Tolerance. In this, while proclaiming his firm resolve to protect and uphold
with unvarying consistency the religion of the Catholic Church, he declared
himself at the same time on the side of
636 Patent of
Tolerance.—The Religious Orders. [i78i-90
that civil
tolerance* which, without enquiring into a man’s belief, in each case considers
only his worth as a citizen. In consequence,. while the Catholic religion alone
was to continue to enjoy the prerogative of public worship, in all the
districts containing a fixed number of persons sufficient to defray the
expenses of the Protestant or Greek form of worship, these sects were to be
free to use their own service. Dissenters might build places of worship, on
condition that these edifices should bear no outward resemblance to churches,
and should have neither bells nor steeples; they should be capable of becoming
citizens, and be admissible to trades and corporations, and to academic
degrees; and the Emperor reserved to himself the right of admitting them, by
special dispensation, to public offices. The freedom thus granted was, it is
true, by no means untrammelled; and the condition of the Jews, in particular,
was in no respect bettered. Nevertheless, this decree bore the stamp of a
generous and lofty spirit; heresy was no longer an infringement of the law; honourable
careers were opened to dissenters; and, if it be borne in mind that the Patent
was the work of a Prince whose life had been spent in the austerely orthodox
atmosphere of the Court of Austria, it must be pronounced a document of a
singularly broad-minded type. Pope Pius VI was moved by this Patent to take a
step unprecedented in the history of Christianity. In 1782 he repaired to
Vienna, where he stayed for a considerable time. Received with all due honour,
he frequently conversed with the Emperor on ecclesiastical questions, but
without Succeeding ih his wishes; and the Patent remained in full force.
Disliking the
cosmopolitan character of the religious Orders, Joseph II prescribed that they
should no longer be subordinate to foreign Generals, and that they should be
for the future entirely dependent on the Ordinary; Shortly afterwards, he
declared his intention of completing the work of reform undertaken and left
unfinished by the Council of Trent; and he suppressed all the contemplative
Ordiers, which he condemned as useless, allowing only the Congregations
occupied with the care of the sick and with teaching to remain. At the end of
his reign, 700 out of 2000 convents had disappeared, and the number of monks
had been diminished by 30,000. In the substitution Of the episcopal authority
just mentioned it is possible to trace the influence of Febronius. In spite of
the refutations directed against them, the doctrines defended in the works of
“Febronius” (Hontheim)—of which an account is given in a later volume—had long
exercised a powerful influence in the ecclesiastical world of Germany, and many
Austrian statesmen were deeply imbued with their teaching.
In opposition
to this tradition it has recently been urged that the son of Maria Theresa
cannot be regarded as a disciple of the theologian of Trier. The Emperor,
according to this view, wished to subordinate the Church to the State, while
Febronius urged the national Churches to emancipate themselves, not only from
the Pope, but also from the
temporal
power. The truth is that Hontheim made his appeal to all Princes, to help him
in protecting the episcopate against the encroachments of the Roman See. It
seems certain that Joseph II did wish to see the Church subordinated to the
State; but there are none the less unmistakable indications of the influence of
Febronius in certain of the imperial reforms. We can still find its mark in the
decrees bearing on dispensations in questions of marriage, and in the rule that
the pontifical Bulls must be submitted to the placet, as well as in the
prohibition of written sermons, and of exegetical discussion in the seminaries
of the two Bulls In Coena Domini and Unigenitus,’ which define the prerogatives
-of the sovereign pontiff. .
The Emperor’s
wish to restore the primitive simplicity of' worship and to restrain the
prevailing extravagance of display led him to interfere in the inner details
of parochial life and church service, thus encroaching upon a domain not his
own. He took no less interest in the education of the secular clergy. The work
of instruction being much neglected in the diocesan seminaries, the Emperor
desired.that the secular branches of knowledge should be added to the courses
of theological and canonical learning: and, judging that these studies would
bear more fruit in centralised institutions than in independent schools, he
issued a decree suppressing all the. diocesan seminaries. These, he replaced by
five general seminaries, at Vienna, Pest, Freiburg, Louvain, and Pavia,
together with several affiliated seminaries, playing -the part of subsidiary
institutions, at Gratz, Olmiitz, Innsbruck, Prague, and Luxemburg. , His
ostensible aim was to provide the young priests with a solid, comprehensive,
and liberal education, in conformity with all the latest results of science,
and in touch with all the learning of the age. Care was taken to admit as
masters in these establishments! none but the “ enlightened ”; but, in choosing
this staff, the Government was not invariably fortunate from the point of view
of orthodoxy. The general seminaries were in fact placed under the authority of
the State, and the education of the young clergy, was entirely removed from the
hands of the episcopate. Serious (difficulties were thus to be expected.
The judicial
system was certain to engage the Emperor’s passion for reform. Already in 1753,
Maria Theresa had established ,a committee called the Compilations Commission,
whose work it, was to draw up a new and very definite code, perfectly uniform
in character. The young Emperor wished to complete his mother’s work by
sipaplifying the organisation of tribunals, establishing a uniform procedure,
and equipping the Courts of justice with a body of men worthy of their task. In
his view, judicial and political power ought to be kept entirely separate; he
suppressed the greater number of the subordinate jurisdictions, as impotent and
withal costly, and created a complete hierarchy of linked tribunals, descending
from the High Court of Vienna to the judges in the rural districts, with a
first instance, an appeal and a final revision,
as in our own
day. At the same time, the heavy fees payable by newly appointed magistrates
and for written judgments were abolished, and the cost of obtaining justice was
considerably lessened. To this substantial improvement of the judicial
organisation Joseph II added an admirable reform of the penal laws. The
principle of terror and vengeance, which lay at the foundation of the old
legislation, was abandoned, and the idea of a social safeguard adopted in its
stead, nquisitional procedure and torture, already partially abolished by Maria
■Theresa, now disappeared entirely; the infliction of the death-penalty,
hitherto indiscriminate, was restrained within reasonable limits, and all
penalties were considerably lightened. The list of crimes no longer included
magic, apostasy, and intermarriage between Christians and infidels. The Emperor
had also ordered a revision of the civil laws, but he had not time to complete
his work; he could only publish certain preparatory edicts, whereby marriage
became a civil contract and the law of inheritance underwent'some equitable
modifications.
The condition
of the peasants left much to be desired in more than one province, more
especially the case in Moravia and Bohemia. In a report on the latter a
Idressed to the Council of State in 1769, we read: “One cannot remark without
amazement, without real terror and profound emotion, the state of utter misery
in which the peasants languish under the crushing burdens imposed on them by
their feudal lords.” Joseph II visited the country, as we have seen, and
returned in dismay. The peasants were almost entiicly dependent upon the lord
of the manor; they were not owners of the land, but simply held it in usufruct;
they could not leave their lord’s estate without his permission, or marry, or
give to their children any profession but that of labourers; they were bound by
a thousand forms of servitude, called robot. Maria Theresa had already
commanded certain reforms; she had, in particular, defined the limits of
statute labour and undertaken to transform feudal rights into dues payable in
money. Joseph II carried on this work, abolishing serfdom in the Slav
provinces, and securing to the peasants the right of owning land, of marrying according
to their choice, and of changing their domicile at their own pleasure. He also
increased considerably the pbwers of the offices of the “circles” (Kreisamter),
so as almost to paralyse those of the feudal proprietors.
The young
Emperor had been especially struck by the want of regularity and uniformity in
the laws which governed his dominions, and it was his wish to divide the Empire
into districts identical in administration. There were thirteen governments,
divided into “circles,” which in their turn were subdivided into urban and
rUtal communities. The true basis of the organisation was the “circle,” which
was the unit in all that concerned the array, education, and finance. At the
same time, the provincial Estates underwent a diminution of their power. They
had already, under Maria Theresa, ceased to meet oftener than
once in ten
years; henceforth, they would not be assembled at all, unless by express
summons of the Prince; their permanent representatives were in future to be
assembled only for the voting of necessary subsidies; nor were they permitted
even then to give any opinion as to the object of the requisition, but might
only discuss ways and means. A similar system was to be adopted with regard to,
the towns, whose privileges were to be withdrawn or evaded, one by one; and
steps were to be taken to substitute for the local governing bodies delegacies
from the State.
; During the
earlier half of the eighteenth century, the Austrian Government was constantly
involved in financial difficulties.. The reason of this was not, however, as in
France, the extravagance of the Court, the erection of ostentatious monuments,
the lavish expenditure of the sovereigns on their favourites—the all but
hopeless: embarrassment of the administrators of the exchequer was due to the
demands made upon them by the army. To . defend so vast a territory- and keep
the peace among so many different peoples was a task necessitating an army of
considerable strength, involving a proportionate cost to the country. This
state of affairs had already caused grave anxiety to Maria Theresa, jyho, at
the instigation of her husband, had caused the most rigorous economy to be
observed in the management of the Court; then, with the aid of Chotek, a fi.ech
nobleman who, in 1761, succeeded Haugwitz as Chancellor of Bohemia and Austria,
she had introduced the principle of the twofold tax, on land and personalty,
which affected all classes of the population. At the same time, she caused the
harbour of Trieste to be reconstructed^ and the roads and canals improved;
scrupulous- payment , of the state interest raised the credit of the country,
and the financial situation became more favourable. Joseph, who shared the
views of the “ physiocrats/ and dreamed of bringing the organisation of taxation
intp conformity with, them, yet shrank from a radical reform, and established a
provisional tax on land, calculated from the average revenue of ten years. At
the same time, he set on foot the colossal enterprise of revising the register
of landed property throughout the monarchy, and thus brought about a
rearrangement of the scale of taxes, whereby, if an estate yielded an income of
a hundred florins, seventy of these remained in the possession of the tenant,
seventeen at most belonged to the feudal lord, and the remainder went into the
state coffers. In addition to all this, the Emperor, as a true disciple of
Colbert, imposed upon foreign products taxes so heavy that they were in some
cases prohibitive. In matters of this kind his convictions differed from those
of his Chancellor, Kaunitz, who, though in agreement with his master upon the
principle of equality for purposes of taxation and upon the expediency of
adopting the least expensive method of collecting the taxes, held that taxation
should not be expected to meet more than the indispensable necessities of the
State; while any alleviation of the public burdens must, in his view,
presuppose an increase in the general prosperity
640 Austria cmd the
“Barrier" fortresses. [1715-48
and
therefore in the wealth of the country. But Joseph, to whom the strengthening
of; the army was a matter of the most immediate concern, refused to sacrifice
any possible source of income. 1
:
We pass once more to external events. The Treaty concluded on November 16,
1715, with a view to the establishment of a “Barrier” against the ambition of
France, granted to the United Provinces the right, of garrisoning seven
fortified places in southern Belgium. The contingent of troOps occupying these
fortresses was to number, in time of peace, 35,000 men, of whom three-fifths
were to be furnished by Austria and two-fifths by the Dutch Republic. All the
expense—it might be 1,250,000 florins—was to be defrayed by Belgium. This
Treaty had caused much dissatisfaction among the various populations, and the
States of Flanders and Brabant had stubbornly objected; but during twenty- five
years Charles VI had submitted to this condition, which impaired his
sovereignty over the Netherlands. The War of the Austrian Succession had
interrupted the observance of the Treaty; and in 1748, at the Conference' of
Aix-la-Chapelle, Kaunitz attempted to obtain its withdrawal, supporting himself
by the plea that the greater number of the “Barrier” fortresses had been
gradually dismantled after the French victories; and that their possession had
therefore: ceased to be a matter of any importance ; moreover, they had yielded
so easily to the attack of Maurice de Saxe,: that: all could see how
idle were the precautions taken by the'Dutch in their defence. ■ Besides
this very admissible reason, there was another, which the Austrian
plenipotentiary did not mention: the fact, namely, that the circumstances had
greatly changed. When the “ Barrier ” was established in 1715, Austria,
England, and the United Provinces were just emerging from a long struggle with
Louis XIV, their common enemy; their interests were identical,, and they had
all agreed without demur upon the means to be adopted in order to restrain the
ambition of the conqueron But since that time thirty years had passed away; in
1748, Holland had been the accomplice of England when the latter country
betrayed the confidence of Austria, and Maria Theresa was pondering the
advisability of disengaging herself from the Maritime Powers, in order to shift
the basis of her policy in the direction of the French alliance. Under such
conditions, for Austria to receive Dutch troops into the country could only be,
to say the least, to expose herself to a highly inconvenient surveillance. ' > ": ■ ’ ‘
But the
United Provinces, vaguely conscious of these new tendencies on the part of the
Empress, insisted with considerable asperity on the observance of their right,
and the only success achieved by Kaunitz was the suppression, in the new
diplomatic contract, of the annual subsidy. This henceforth remained unpaid;
there was no further attempt to save the fortresses from falling into decay,
and the Republic, no longer setting any store by their preservation, left in
the unprotected towns of Belgium
1664-1782] Belgium,
abandoned by the Dutch garrisons. 641
the mere
semblance of a garrison, exactly large enough to affirm a right which it did
not please her to abandon openly. During the whole period: of the occupation,
difficulties were continually springing up in the towns of the Barrier between
the national authorities and the Dutch commanders, Independently of the
religious complications resulting from the presence of Protestant garrisons,
incessant disputes arose between the Belgian magistrates and the Dutch
officers—rdisputes that were often very serious in character, respecting the
police, the chase, fishing, economic matters, and so forth, often involving the
two Governments in grave anxiety. Joseph seized the opportunity of his journey
to the Netherlands to examine the question for himself at close quarters. He
was of opinion that the general condition of the Austrian monarchy did not
warrant him in despatching to the Netherlands a body of troops boasting
sufficient strength to resist a possible attack. Moreover, scarcely one of the
fortresses was now in a condition to endure a siege, and there was reason to
fear that an enemy would have no difficulty in establishing a position in one
or more of them, and might, if it so chanced, thus find a substantial base from
which to prolong the horrors of war. The restoration of the fortresses to
efficiency would have demanded sacrifices, which the state of the Treasury did
not warrant; thus the wiser plan would be to keep in perfect condition only
Antwerp and Luxemburg, as strategic positions of the first importance—and to
dismantle the rest. Besides the considerable economic advantages which this
proceeding afforded to the towns concerned, it also furnished a method of
getting rid of the Dutch in the natural order of events. The Republic
submitted; the Belgian forts were evacuated under the pretext of a change of
garrison, and no fresh troops were sent to fill them, so that on April 18,
1782, there was not a single Dutch soldier left
in Belgium. But a short time sufficed to allay the agitation caused in the
United Provinces by the unexpected. demands of the Emperor. The Minister of
France accredited at the Hague wrote to his Government that the mass of the
people were but little affected; but the statesmen could not accept the
transaction with such philosophic resignation—on the contrary, there were many
who nursed resentment on that score against the Court of Vienna, and held the
suppression of the Barrier to be a cruel stab at the dignity of the nation.
When Spain,
after a war of eighty years’ duration, had been com-' pelled to recognise the
independence of the United Provinces and to give up to them certain prosperous
colonies, the Treaty of Munster, sanctioning a state of things which had long
been in existence, had closed the Scheldt to Belgian vessels and reserved the
freedom of the rivet to the Dutch navy and mercantile marine. On a later
occasion, the Convention of September 20, 1664, which went even further than
this stipulation, so disastrous to the trade of Belgium, had ceded to the
States General the fort of Liefkenshoeck, in Belgian territory. In this way,
the fronting
guns of Lillo
arid of Lief kenshoeck gave Holland the control over the two banks of the
Scheldt all the way to the sea. The Government of the Hague, by way of
asserting its poWer, stationed off Lillo a nippel to levy import and export
duty on cargoes from Antwerp going to Saftingen or Doel, which were Belgian
possessions, and found many ways of annoying the inhabitants along the banks.
The Treaty of 1715 left this state of things unaltered, and at the Cdnfetehce
held at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, the Ministers of Maria Theresa, preoccupied
with the question of the Barrier, seem not to have discussed the opening of the
Scheldt.
In 1780,
Antwerp could number no more than from 35,000 to 45,000 inhabitants, 12,000 of
whom were beholden to the public charity. Such was the condition of affairs
when, on December 20, 1780, England, annoyed at the refusal of the Republic to
make common cause with her against the disaffection in America, declared war
upon her former ally. To outwit her enemies, and to open new markets for
British trade, the English Cabinet did not scruple to hint to the Viennese
Government that they might take advantage of the occasion to restore the
prosperity of Antwerp, by reopening the Scheldt. It was inevitable that these
advances should be favourably regarded by the Emperor, who, in his eager
ambition to raise his dominions to the rank of a maritime Power, could ill
brook the htimiliating; dependence forced upon him so long as the
chief river, of the Netherlands was closed to vessels under his flag. He wrote
to Kaunitz to point out to him the happy opportunity now at' hand; but the
Chancellor’s reply was far from encouraging. He directed his master’s attention
to the inevitable risk of letting loose a general war, merely for the slender
advantage “ of enriching certain individuals of Antwerp.” The proceedings of
England, he wrote, were inspired by a momentary .irritation against the States
General, and to lend countenance to her interested projects would involve the
risk of upsetting the existing system of alliances, which enabled Austria to
defend herself at need against either Prussia or the Porte, without fear of
being worsted. Clearly, Kaunitz could not admit that the particular advantage
of the Netherlands balanced the general interests of the monarchy. During his
journey in 1781, Joseph II received numerous petitions demanding the opening of
the Scheldt. He revealed his intentions to no one; his, language was always the
same, and he said to the Minister of,France what he said to the Burgomaster of
Antwerp: that, so long as the Treaty of Munster remained in force, there could
be no thought of restoring the freedom of the river. The truth is that the
question was never out of his thoughts; but he was apparently scheming to
obtain the support of France in carrying out his design, and therefore
postponed to a more propitious moment the opening , of negotiations or of a
campaign with a view to the liberation of the Scheldt, The demands of Antwerp
were premature; the occasion was not yet ripe; the best policy was to wait, and
to discourage impatience by citing
1783-4]]
Austro-Dutch quarrel as to the Scheldt. 643
some treaty
as a pretext for inaction. Two years later, circumstances seeming more
favourable, the Emperor openly advanced his claims.
In
1783, an incident, in itself devoid of importance, marked the beginning of an affair
which almost involved the European Powers in war, and which was not to be ended
before two troubled years had passed. On' October 17 the Dutch commander of the
fort of Liefkens- hoeck permitted the burial of one of his soldiers in the
Belgian cemetery of the disputed village of Doel. Some days afterwards, the
bailiff, acting on the orders of the Government, caused the body to be exhumed
and thrown into the moat of Liefkenshoeck. Almost at the same time, Joseph II
delivered to the States General a veritable catalogue of territorial grievances
laid at the door of the Republic, styled a “ Summary of the Emperor’s Claims.”
This document practically set forth that, if the United Provinces consented to
open the Scheldt and allowed the Emperor to trade with India, he would abandon
the question of the indivisible sovereignty of Maastricht. He added that he
considered the Scheldt to be entirely open to the two riverain Powers, and that
“ if on the side of the Republic the least insult were offered to the Imperial
rtag> his Majesty would look upon it as a declaration of war and a formal
act of hostility.” The States General returned a stubborn refusal, and Joseph
lost no time in carrying out his threat. Two ships of the Austrian navy were
ordered to navigate the Scheldt, one in either direction. Their instructions
were, not to allow themselves to be stopped, but to avoid violent measures. The
brigantine Louis was stopped by gun-fire near Saftingen, the boundary of the
territory of the Austrian Netherlands; the other could not get beyond Flushing
(October, 1784). The Emperor instantly broke off all diplomatic relations. This
naval demonstration on the part of Austria aroused an extraordinary agitation
throughout the Netherlands, both north and south. In the United Provinces,
opinion was unanimous in favour of urging the Government to defend, to the last
gasp, the nation’s rights and her honour. Nor was. the struggle confined to a
question of disputed frontiers, but it was raised immediately to higher ground:
the point at issue was the freedom of seas and rivers, the opening
of the Scheldt, claimed by the one State in the name of natural right, while
the other opposed the claim with an appeal to treaties safeguarding its
independence. Joseph II’s violation of the Treaty of Munster, the work of the
Great Powers, had the consequence of making the question of the Scheldt an
international affair of the utmost gravity. It attracted the attention of the
world at large and of legal specialists, as well as of politicians in every
part of Europe, and innumerable dissertations for or against the Emperor’s
claims appeared in every language. Already before the naval incident, the
Cabinet of Versailles had recommended moderation to the rival Powers: Even
while they mobilised their troops and declared their resolution to resist to
the death, the States General were well aware that they could ch. xvm. 41—2
644 Meaning
ofJosephII's ultimatum. French mediation, [i784
not sustain
without assistance the attack of the Imperial forces, and solicited the
intervention of Prance. The Emperor on his side, while asserting that he was
about to send out 80,000 men against the Republic, counted on the connivance of
Louis XVI, his ally by blood as well as by policy, to defeat the Dutch without
drawing a sword.
He was not
slow to remind'the Ministers of his brother-in-law of the services rendered to
French trade by the port of Ostend during the American War, and he threw out a
hint that Antwerp might prove equally useful. But France had many reasons, both
political and commercial, for caution in her conduct towards the Republic; if
Marie- Antoinette, at the instigation of Mercy, championed her brother’s'cause,
she had Vergennes against her, supported by the whole Cabinet and by the King
himself. French opinion was dear that Joseph II wished to annihilate the United
Provinces, or at all events to make himself master of a great part of their
dominions. We know the truth now, through the Emperor’s correspondence: his
real thought was that war was to be a last resort, to which he would not betake
himself until all the resources of diplomacy had been exhausted. His ultimatum
was merely a device to intimidate the enemy. France (of this he had proof)
dreaded war, which would mean ruin for her already embarrassed finances; and,
he argued, she would ensure peace by supporting his plans with regal’d to the
Scheldt, Should his wishes on this point be met, he would make all the
concessions compatible with his dignity in order to bring about a friendly
understanding, and thus wal’d off the possibility of a campaign, so greatly
dreaded by France. But he knew very Well how to compensate himself for this
conciliatory attitude. Louis XVI, delighted to have been able to escape the
giving of armed assistance, would lend powerful help to his brother-in-law’s
project of exchanging the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria—a scheme to which
we shall return. Joseph II was soon to learn that he had deceived himself
egregiously. It was true that France was anxious to avoid war at any price ;
but, contrary to the hopes of the Emperor, she succeeded in avoiding it without
turning her back on the United Provinces and without facilitating the desired
exchange.
Louis XVI had
offered to mediate, and the offer was accepted. Joseph II lost no time in
making an important concession: while his ultimatum demanded the opening of the
Scheldt, under the penalty of an instant declaration of wax, he had now an
alternative to propose. The Dutch should either grant the freedom of the river
or give up Maastricht and the contested districts in Flanders. But the French
Ministry feared that the quarrel, if prolonged, would only incline the
politicians of Holland towards an alliance with England—a result which would be
greatly to the detriment of France in the event, always a possibility, of war
with England. Further, the language employed by Vergennes lacked candour, and
in action he lost his presence Of mind.
1784-5] The Scheldt and the
Bavaro-Belgian Exchange. 645
The
declaration of the mediating Power explicitly recognised the right of the
Republic over the disputed river. The King proposed the resumption of
negotiations, dealing with no questions other than those enumerated in the
Emperor’s “Summary”; any other course of action entailed the risk of disturbing
the Powers. At the same time, two detachments of French troops took up their
position, the one on the
• Rhine, the other on the frontier of
Flanders. This was a severe blow to the Emperor. He felt that he could no
longer persist in his claims to the Scheldt without exposing himself to a war
which he would have to encounter without an ally. He put a good face, however,
on a bad business; and, feeling that the slightest manifestation of vexation
might jeopardise his yet unrevealed plan of the exchange of the Netherlands, he
concealed his annoyance. “ So long as we have still need of the Court of
France,” he wrote to Leopold, “we must swallow her humour and keep her in
ignorance of our real opinions.” He then suddenly showed himself much less
exacting in. his demands, furthering the cause of peace in accordance with the
unconcealed sentiments of the Cabinet of Versailles, and calculating that the
latter would evince its gratitude by helping him in the matter of Bavaria.
He did not,
however, wish to expose his schemes in full daylight. His plan was rather to
keep alive a wholesome fear by refusing to check the march of his troops
towards the Netherlands; for such an attitude must, according to his reckoning,
predispose France to facilitate the exchange, and thus remove the fear of war
by destroying its very motive. In the light of this secret design of the
Emperor, it becomes easy to understand the contradictions apparent in his
policy—his persistent preparations for wax going hand in hand with
declarations of a singularly conciliatory nature. The first and principal
concession had reference to the Scheldt: in the protocols of the Conference so
complete a silence was maintained regarding this river, that Austria seemed to
have abandoned the idea of making any further claim upon the right of
navigating it, and to have resolved to restrict herself henceforth to
territorial demands. On the other hand, Louis XVI took up a firm attitude
towards the Republic, threatening to abandon her unless all her unreasonable
pretensions were given up. Thus, at last, the disputants came to terms. The
Scheldt remained closed; but the possession of the portion of the river between
Saftingen and Antwerp was guaranteed to the Austrian Netherlands; and the
States General were in consequence debarred from levying any toll there for the
future, or in any way impeding trade; they were obliged to pull down certain
forts and to give up others. The Emperor received ten million florins in
exchange for the sovereignty of Maestricht, and the frontiers of Brabant and
Limburg were readjusted, somewhat to his advantage. Such were the main
stipulations of the Treaty concluded at Fontainebleau on November 8, 1785. From
the point of view of modern ideas, the cause upheld by
OH. XVIII,
Joseph II was
that of liberty and justice. But, if the question be regarded strictly from its
practical side, and all the circumstances taken into account, the Emperor must
be held to have been wrong in wishing to decide, summarily and upon his own
responsibility, a question of the most delicate nature, by refusing to
recognise the existence of a particular clause in a solemn Treaty, to which all
the Powers of Europe had pledged themselves and which Charles VI had in 1715
accepted without demur. Whether or not the son of Maria Theresa would have
attained his end if he had betaken himself to negotiations with the various
States which had given their signature to the act of 1648, it is impossible to
say positively; but it is certain that the course which he actually pursued
brought him into collision with the desperate energy of the Dutch, showed him
his ally France ready to turn her weapons against him, and struck an
humiliating blow at his self-respect. In the words of a recent writer, this
Prince, who with all his faults can still stir sympathy because he was sincere,
was inspired for the most part by excellent intentions and lawful motives; but
the means adopted by him in order to realise his projects were generally
maladroit and extravagant. If, however, the Treaty of Fontainebleau did not
procure for the Belgians all the advantages they could have wished, and, if
they saw themselves baulked of the hope which had for an instant been theirs,
that the fetters which held and bound the port of Antwerp might be broken in
pieces before their eyes, yet it is well at least to acknowledge that this was
one of the most , glorious treaties concluded for many years past by the
sovereigns of the Netherlands with their neighbours. Flanders restored to the
boundaries of 1664 and assured of the freedom of her rivers, the frontiers of
Brabant, which included Antwerp, advanced towards the north; liberty gained to
make regulations about the customs and trade according as the interest of the
country should dictate, in opposition to the stipulations made at Munster; the
humiliating treaties of 1715 and 1718 annulled and territory of considerable
extent acquired beyond the Meuse—these were results of sufficient importance to
fill the Belgians with gratitude towards the Imperial Government.
While negotiations
were pending as to the freedom of the Scheldt, Joseph II had reverted to his
schemes about Bavaria, though not without modifying them to a certain extent.
His design now was to secure this country, which was marked off by well-defined
boundaries and could easily be amalgamated with his own territory, thus
rounding off the Austrian dominions and increasing his power of withstanding
Frederick II, by ceding in exchange for it the Austrian Netherlands, which by
reason of their remoteness were difficult to defend in the case of a possihle
attack, and which, in their extravagant particularism, were strenuously opposed
to his views as a reformer. In this project the Emperor had
1785-6] The
Austrian design and the Fttrstenbund. 647
Catharine
II for an ally, having induced her to believe that Austria could only cooperate
seriously with the designs of Russia in the east* if she were secured, by the
projected acquisition, against possible attack on the part- of Prussia. The.
diplcmacy af Russia played a very active part in the design; nor had
Rumyantseff much difficulty in winning the ear of Charles Theodore. The Elector
was old, cared but little for his new domains, and was not embarrassed by
patriotic scruples. The territory of the Austrian Netherlands being the larger,
the inequality was to be made good by the addition of Salzburg. The Elector was
to receive the Netherlands under the designation of the kingdom of Burgundy,
but curtailed by the transfer of the provinces of Limburg, Namur, and Luxemburg
to the Archbishop of Salzburg in the way of compensation; the attempt was also
to be made to secure to that prelate the prince-bishopric of Liege. Such was
the gist of the secret treaty signed at Munich on January 15, 1785. But the
acquiescence of the Duke of Zweibriicken, heir presumptive of Charles Theodore,
had still to be obtained—and he was under Prussian influence. But Joseph II
•eckoned on the support of Russia and France. France, however, played him
false; and the Tsarina, fearing that she would be drawn into a war against both
France and Prussia, finally made her concurrence dependent on the consent of
the Duke of Zweibriicken. The refusal of the Duke was emphatic; and the
Emperor, perceiving that he had been utterly deceived and that success was out
of the question, abandoned his project. Frederick II had in secret carried on
an ardent campaign against him at the Courts of the Princes of the Empire, and
had, as is related elsewhere, succeeded in gaining, on July 23, 1785, the
signatures of fifteen German Governments to the Fiirstenbund, an alliance of
the Princes directed to the maintenance of the constitutional rights of the
Empire; nor was any attempt made to conceal the intention of this league, which
was opposition—if necessary armed opposition—to the projected exchange of
Bavaria. .
When
Frederick II died on August 17,1786, Joseph II mediated a reconciliation with
Prussia, hoping to obliterate the traces of the bitter rivalry which had tom
Germany asunder. He wrote to Kaunitz that the establishment of goodwill was not
impossible, and might eventually secure to the two monarchies the lead in
European politicsbeyond a doubt, he added, an understanding of the kind could
never have come to pass between Maria Theresa and Frederick, for the hostility:
which prevailed ; between them arose from causes too deeply rooted;, but
circumstances had now altered, many prejudices had disappeared, and this
alliance between two peoples of the same race and of the same language was
greatly to be desired. But the Chancellor, in his devotion to the system of
which he had been the architect, maintained that there could be no sincere
alliance between two Powers whose interests must always be mutually opposed,
until one of them had been reduced to
subordinate
rank, Austria would not have a free hand in the east until Prussia had been
incapacitated from doing her any injury. While the Emperor was occupied in this
discussion with his Minister, the favourable opportunity was allowed to escape,
and the futility of any1 attempt" to bring about an alliance
between the two Powers soon became apparent, when Frederick William II'retained
in office Hertzberg, the determined foe of Austrian influence.
It will be
remembered that early in 1783 Austria and Russia had concluded an arrangement
whereby die Tsarina was authorised to annex the Crimea and Kuban, and the
Danube was opened to Russian ships. Catharine’s dream was now to annihilate the
domination of Turkey, and to establish in its stead a Christian empire at
Constantinople; and it ■>eemed to her that, if this project were to be
carried out, the Austrian alliance was indispensable.'' There is strong
evidence that she tried to purchase it, hinting at a readjustment of the
frontiers towards Galicia and the Bukowina, together ivith the cession of part
of Wallachia, and of Venetian Istria and Dalmatia. Thanks to the assistance of
Austria, Russia extended her borders considerably towards the Black Sea, making
formidable arsenals of Kherson and Sevastopol, and Austrian mediation aided her
in becoming mistress of Georgia (1783-5). During the month of April, 1787,
Joseph II met Catharine at Kherson, in an interview which was shortened by the
news of the revolt of the Austrian Netherlands. A few weeks later, the Russian
ambassador laid before the Divan the new demands of his sovereign. He was
answered by a counter-proposal involving the restoration by Russia of the
Crimea. When the diplomatist refused his signature on the plea that he was not
empowered to give it, the Turkish Government threw him into prison. Such a
violation of the law of nations could not fail to provoke war, and, as is
related elsewhere, a close alliance was concluded between St Petersburg and
Vienna. Russia was but ill: prepared, and the Turks displayed an
unforeseen strength; and, though the Austrian army suffered no defeat, the
results of the campaign of 1788, which is narrated elsewhere, were poor enough,
if compared with the hopes which ushered it in. Joseph II was not discouraged,
however, and the Austro-Russian Treaty was renewed in 1789. The second campaign
was more successful, and on September 29 Belgrade was taken by Laudon, who
pursued his advantage as far as Bosnia.
The revolt of
the Austrian Netherlands bore no resemblance to the contemporary insurrections
in America and France, or to the Revolution in England a century before. It was
of an exceptional—possibly 6. unique—character, for in this case the sovereign
was ahxiotis for reform in the spirit of modern ideas, while the revolutionary
party was conservative to the last degree. The Belgian Provinces had been
ruled from time immemorial by institutions, incongruous enough, retaining for
the most part the methods of the Middle Ages. Each Province
formed a
miniature State, with its own Constitution, its own representation, its own
magistrates. To Joseph, who could not but be painfully impressed by the inner
inconsistency of the Belgian institutions and laws, this time-honoured state of
things seemed to demand radical alteration. To the mind of the young Emperor,
no freedom was possible for a nation unless all the citizens enjoyed the same
kind and the same amount of liberty; everything that he called “an abuse,” or
“antediluvian rubbish,” he condemned, failing to understand the Belgian
character, which Charles of Lorraine had appreciated so exactly. After the
death of that Prince, Maria Theresa had entrusted the general government of the
Netherlands to her daughter, Maria Christina, conjointly with her husband, Duke
Albert of Saxe-Teschen, and Joseph II had confirmed the nomination.
From the
beginr >ng of his reign, edicts followed one another in rapid succession.
First came, on November 12,1781, the Patent of Tolerance, which aroused the
most fiery opposition on the part of all the civil, judicial, and religious
authorities; this appears, indeed, entirely natural, if the exclusive character
of Catholicism, and the preponderating influence it had hitherto wielded, are
borne in mind. Then followed, in rapid sequence, the Edict of November 28,
1781, rendering the monastic Orders entirely independent of all extraneous
authority; that of December 5, 1781, forbidding any appeal to the Court of Rome
for dispensations in questions of marriage; that of March 17,1783, declaring
the Emperor’s intention of suppressing certain monasteries and devoting their
revenues to a more useful purpose; and, finally, the Edict of November 24,1783,
forbidding assent to papal Bulls conferring benefices.
On February
11, 1786, Joseph II issued an order that the Kermesse, a local festival, should
be celebrated on the same day in every commune. He was accused of wishing to
disturb the ordinary customs and pleasures of the people^—and this for no
really advantageous purpose, but simply in order to gratify his passion for
uniformity; the truth, however, is, that these festivals, when celebrated on
different dates, used to attract huge crowds from the neighbouring districts,
and meant for the working classes much expenditure on amusements, food and
drink, even apart from the fact that thiey commonly ended i unseemly
drunkenness and in vehement, even murderous^ brawls. The dissatisfaction of the
clergy reached its height upon the appearance of the Edict of October 16, 1786,
establishing at Louvain one general seminary for the whole of the Netherlands.
The Emperor, wishing the young candidates for the priesthood to be equipped
with a thorough education and flawless morals, gave out that no man could be
ordained a priest without having studied theology at Louvain for five years. It
followed that the Belgian clergy, whose morality was for the most part
unimpeachable, even if their learning left something to be desired, felt
themselves greatly aggrieved by the unjust suspicion to which the Edict gave
voice. They submitted, however, after lodging futile protests with the
Government; only one
650 Religious and
judicial reforms in Belgium. [i786-7
prelate, the
Bishop of Namur, refused to send his seminarists to Louvain. The professors fqr
the new college were ill-chosen ;> some were accused of professing
doctrines, of doubtful orthodoxy, and others were the reverse of exemplary in
conduct. : Disturbances arose and became serious, so that the military had to
be, called in to restore order. The majority of the seminarists took refuge in
flight, arid but few remained at Louvain.
, The reforms
which have been described met with but a sorry reception; but the opposition
only , became really dangerous when Joseph II, after having dealt his blow at
the religious institutions, threatened* by two patents issued on January, 1,
1787, to;disturb likewise the civil order. The first of these iritroduced
radical changes'into the administrative system: it substituted a single
Council for the three collateral Councils and divided the Provinces into nine
Circles, administered by as many mtendants, who were invested with wide powers
in matters of policy and finance. The States saw almost the whole management of
affairs snatched from their grasp, leaving therii practically nothing but the
power of voting subsidies. Had this measure strengthened the action of .the
central, power, it might have been advantageous to the public interest; but a
grave mistake was made in granting undue authority to officials who were to all
intents and purposes irresponsible. However that may be, it is never safe to
introduce even the most admirable of innovations without employing the utmost
discretion and tact, and neither of .these qualities distinguished the Austrian
rulers.
. In his
other declaration the Emperor suppressed all the civil tribunals, and
established in their stead sixty-four triburials of the first instance, two
Councils of Appeal and a Supreme Council of Revision. Judged on its own
merits,, the new organisation was well conceived, and it introduced into the
administration of justice an order and unity hitherto conspicuous by their
absence. In fact, the: system at present in force in Belgium is nothing but an
imitation, of the Josephine; but the reform was one which contradicted the
spirit of the Constitution, since the judicial administration, like the
Constitution itself, could not be remodelled, save by common consent of the
Estates and the Crown. And, when it is added that the displaoed magistrates
were left without the indemnity to which they were lawfully entitled, it will
be readily understood: that the storm was not long in breaking. On April 29,
1787, the Estates , of Brabant refused further payment, of the ordinary
subsidy—a resolution involving the suspension of taxes, until the -edicts hostile
to the Constitution should be revoked. In the other Provinces the Estates
adopted a less radical attitude, contenting themselves with addressing vehement
remonstrances to the; Emperor. It is :worthy of remark that these protests
scarcely touched upon the religious reforms (which were apparently regarded,
from that time forward, as an accomplished fact), but concerned themselves
exclusively with the political aspect of the question.
1787-8] Opposition to
the reforms. Their partial withdrawal. 651
The Govemors-General,
intimidated by the bold proceed:~g of the Estates of Brabant, and by
the decision of the Judicial Council of that Province, declaring the
institution of the tribunals of first instance to be illegal* and alarmed by
the universal outburst of dissatisfaction, were in no haste to put the
Emperor’s wishes into execution. At the same time, Belgiojoso, the unpopular
Minister, left the country. Meanwhile, the Emperor was travelling with the
Tsarina in the Crimea, and during his absence Kaunitz replied to the report of
the Governors, persuading them to wait quietly for the decision which the
sovereign would make when he returned. But fears were entertained in Belgium of
resentment on the part of Joseph II, and preparations for armed defence were
set on foot. Henri van der Noot, an advocate practising before the Council of
Brabant, an ambitious upstart not devoid of cleverness, published a violent
pamphlet on the rights of the people of Brabant and the recent interference
with their ancient Constitution, the Joyeuse Entree; he enrolled volunteers
under the banner of the Serments, a kind of citizen guard, whose function was
to defend the town in case of need. This example was followed in the other
Provinces, and there was no attempt to conceal the scheme of raising in this
manner a national army to protect the threatened privileges. At the same time,
the Estates of Brabant took secret measures to obtain the intervention of
France. The Emperor, in his reply to his sister Christina, made no attempt to
conceal his dissatisfaction, but consented to the temporary suspension of the
edicts until he should have had the opportunity of consulting at Vienna with
the deputies of all the Provinces. The result of these deliberations was that
the patents of January 1, 1787, were definitely withdrawn; but the edicts
bearing upon religious questions were left in force nevertheless.
A few months
earlier, such a concession would have saved the whole situation; but the party
of resistance had learnt its own strength, and would unqaestionably lose no
time in making demands of a more and more exacting nature. The clergy, now
assured of the concurrence of the Estates, refused to accept the conciliatory
measures adopted by the Government in the matter of the general seminary, and the
Bishops utterly refused to cooperate in the administration of the odious innovations.
The new Minister Plenipotentiary, Trautmannsdorff, who upheld a pacific policy,
found his suggestions but coldly received at Vienna, and Joseph II associated
him with the Govemors-General in a charge of incompetence. The Emperor, indeed,
entrusted the command of the troops to General d’Alton, and made him
independent of the Minister— a serious mistake which could not but entail grave
difficulties. The inopportune deployment of some troops caused an affray at
Brussels in which some citizens were killed or wounded (January 22, 1788). A
few days later, Antwerp was the scene of further deadly struggles, when d’Alton
tried to close by force the episcopal seminaries of Malines and Antwerp. These
disturbances were followed by illegal measures against
the
newspapers and by arbitrary arrests of members of the Opposition in the
Estates, and all public meetings were forbidden. The hopes df a reconciliation
flow became more and more doubtful; and, in November, 1789, the Estates of
Brabant and Hainault refused to vote the subsidies* Joseph II answered this
manifestation of hostility by abolishing the </o2, tuse Entree-,, at the
same time he suppressed the “Permanent Deputation” of the Estates, dismissed
the members of the Council jf Justice, and placed Brabant under the
jurisdiction of the Grand Council of Malines. Almost at the same moment, the
Archbishop of Malines condemned as heretical the teaching of the General
Seminary* and. wild riots simultaneously broke out in many parts of the
country. , Van der Noot. For his part, convinced that it was impossible to
succeed without foreign help, was carrying on an intrigue with the Hague and
Berlin. This short-sighted politician imagined that the United Provinces and
Prussia, being hostile to Austria, would provide the malcontents with
sufficient troops, and ask in return merely a pecuniary indemnityi He traded on
the uneasiness inspired in Berlin by the close alliance between the Courts of St
Petersburg and Vienna; and, on the other hand, he hinted to the leading
statesmen of the United Provinces that Austria would not be slow to undertake
the conquest of their territory. The violation of the Barrier Treaty and the
attempt to obtain the liberation of the Scheldt had been (so he said) the first
indications of a project to which the Emperor would take the earliest possible
opportunity of returning. He counted on the fears , thus aroused, to bring the
two Governments into active and effectual corroboration. There, had arisen in
the Austrian Netherlands, besides the ultra-conservative party headed by van
der Noot, which included the mass of the people, an important body drawn from
the most cultured classes of the nation, directed by the lawyer Vonck, and
drawing its inspiration from French Liberal ideas. It would not have been
difficult for the Austrian Government to win to their side these reforming
spirits; but the blundering methods of their agents drove the adherents of
Vonck towards an alliance with the partisans of van der Noot. A regiment of
patriots was organised in the Dutch territory; but d1 Alton, failing
to realise that this was a struggle in good earnest* and thinking to inspire
the Provinces with greater respect, took the false step of dispersing his
troops ; and the patriots, under Colonel van der Meerset, defeated the Austrian
corps of Schroeder at Turnhout, and seized Ghent. D’Alton, with incredible
weakness and lack of decision * retreated instantly to Luxemburg. His disgrace
followed forthwith; Joseph II entrusted his command to General Ferraris, and,
since the complications in the east prevented the despatch to Belgium of an
army strong enough to quell the revolt, he sent the Imperial ViceChancellor,
Philip von Cobenzl, to Brussels, with full powers to negotiate an arrangement,
having for its main clauses the reestablishment of the Joy erne Emtree, the
suppression of the General Seminary, and an
1784-g] Belgian Republic proclaimed.—Hungary. 653
unconditional
amnesty. But the time had gone by ; Cobenzl’s mission failed of its desired
effect,'and in December, 1789, the States General proclaimed the deposition of
Joseph II and the foundation of the Republic of the United States of Belgium.
Only a short time was, however, to elapse before they split asunder into two
irreconcilable parties—the Statists of van der Noot, on the one hand, and the
Democrats of Vonck on the other. This schism was destined to bring about the
downfall of the new Government.'
Serious
troubles had arisen In Hungary almost at the same moment as in Belgium. In
Hungary, too, an unfavourable reception had been given to a series of religious
reforms similar to those promulgated in the Netherlands—such as the diminution
of the episcopal revenues, the prohibition of pluralism, the reorganisation of
parochial administration, the establishment of new seminaries; certain
innovations in the administrative system had also excited complaint; but; as
they did not affect the Constitution, they had met with no violent opposition. The
net result was, however, a widespread sense of uneasiness and apprehension,
heightened by the fact that the Emperor was delaying his coronation; he was
accordingly suspected of intentions inimical to the liberties of the people.
The truth is that the Hungarian Constitution, based as it was entirely on
privilege, was opposed to all the instincts of Joseph II. By the terms of this
Constitution, all the rights belonged to the Magyars, the descendants of the
ancient conquerors; the descendants of the conquered peoples, on the contrary,
were literally kept in a state of slavery.
The Hungarian
nobility, jealously attached to their privileges, which they regarded as
reciprocally binding on the sovereign, thought to treat with him as one power
with another, affecting to know him not as Emperor, but simply as King of
Hungary. They could not feel more than a qualified sympathy with a prince whose
levelling principles were well known to the whole world, and whose innovations
were, one arid all, regarded with suspicion. When in 1784 he prescribed the
employment of German instead of Latin as the official language the
was accused of wishing to Germanise the country; and this measure has been
represented as the first step towards the introduction of German Officials into
the Hungarian administration of Hungary'—a suspicion wholly, unfounded, for
throughout the reign of Joseph II all official posts were reserved for natives
of the country. The real truth is that he aimed at centralising every
institution; thus he introduced into Hungary the division into Circles, each
with a Crown official at its head. There were other measures, too, which
ruffled the nobles: the organisation of the Courts of justice in three grades,
the abolition of serfdom, the revision of the register of property, the
suppression of fiscal immunities. Yet the reforms did not prove so beneficial
as their author had hoped, for the historic law that alterations for the
better, if too abrupt, are perilous,
654 Hungarian
disturbances.—Death of Joseph II. [1784-90
was
once more fulfilled. Violent disputes having arisen between feudal landowners'
and tenants, the latter sent to the Emperor delegates, who subsequently drew up
a formal list of their claims. Joseph II, to whom insubordination was quite as
hateful as servility, dismissed them harshly. The peasants rose in fury; a
regular Jacquerie was organised, hundreds of castles fell a prey to the flames,
and the landowners took up arms in brutal retaliation. :
, , p ;
The Emperor
restored, order by,putting forth an imposing array of military forces, but
showed himself full of clemency towards the bewildered peasants, refusing to
lend an ear to the grievances of the nobles. But the crisis was only deferred.
When the imminence of war with TUrkey forced the Government to aemand subsidies
and soldiers from Hungary, the request was met by the stipulation, as a
preliminary condition, that the Diet should be convoked. And, when the Emperor
was so ill-advised as to object that the circumstances were unfavourable, the
fetment in men's minds reached such a pitch that Kaunitz exclaimed, “ Here we
have the story of Belgium over again.” Beyond a doubt, the majority of the
Hungarians were in favour of remaining, united with Austria, while retaining
their privileges; but one section of the nobility went further, and demanded
the support of the King of Prussia. A revolution seemed inevitable; and,
meanwhile, the condition of affairs outside the country was far from
reassuring. Turkey and Prussia had just concluded an offensive and defensive
alliance. From France^ herself in revolution, nothing was to be hoped, while
Russia was paralysed by Sweden.. On February 4,1790, Joseph II decreed that
everything should be Restored to the condition in which it had stood at the
time of the death of Maria Theresa; the single reform of his to which he
adhered was the abolition of serfdom. The fair dreams of his youth had
vanished, and his days were numberedhe prepared himself bravely for death, and
expired on February 10, 1790, charging the Belgians, with his last bi'eath,
with having failed to understand him.
The most
convicting judgments have been passed upon the character and actions of Joseph
II. Historians have dealt with him as their political prejudices inclined,
them—while some exalt him to the skies, seeing in him the martyr of public
ignorance and ingratitude, others pronounce him an unscrupulous seeker after
fame, a savage despot, trampling under his feet all the'feelings of his
subjects. The truth may probably be found midway between these extreme
opinions. The son of Maria Theresa cannot be pronounced impeccable—he was
human: we have had occasion to observe that his reforms, if for the most part
fundamentally just, were not introduced with the fitting discretion; but it is
impossible to mistake either the purity of his intentions or that deep love for
his fellow-men which was his inspiring motive. It must be remembered that the
violent animosity aroused by him was due, above all, to the fact that his
projects injuriously affected all privileged
persons, 6f
whatever class—and privileged persons are always hostile to any man who dares
lay hands upon even the most questionable of their prerogatives.' Most of his
reforms have been put into practice since his day, under circumstances more
favourable to their realisation, and there is scarcely one which has not
triumphantly endured the test of time arid experience. '
A study of
the foreign policy of Joseph II reveals the fact that he was ambitious; but his
ambition might almost be called defensive in its nature. He judged, and
rightly, that the configuration of his dominions exposed him to serious
dangers; he aimed, in consequence; at consolidating his scattered domains, and
at! making them one compact whole, capable of sturdy resistance
against possible attacks on the part of Prussia and Turkey; and the project of
exchanging the Netherlands, which lay at a great distance from the centre of
his monarchy, and uncomfortably near the enemies of Austria, had no other end
in view. He has been accused of attempting to aggrandise himself at the expense
of Prussia. His letters establish, on the contrary, that he lived ini perpetual
fear of the hostility of Frederick II; and that, but for the stubborn
resistance of Kaunitz, he would have sought an opportunity of establishing
friendly relations with his mother’s ancient enemy; but, thwarted in this
design, he was faiti to turn to Russia, the Only Power which he held capable Of
withstanding Prussia’s growing strength.
Leopold II,
successor to his brother Joseph, was imbued with the same ideas, but equipped
with more discretion and tact. He had had no difficulty in carrying out, in his
dominions of Tuscany, many of the reforms which in Austria caused so niuch
trouble. He found a tottering throne, Belgium' set free from allegiance,
excitement still intense’ in Hungary, the capital of the Eiripirei a prey to
distraction,'the conferences with 'Turkey broken off, war with Prussia on the
point of being declared. He had need of all the skill and all the genius for conciliation
which he displayed during his unfortunately brief reign, to extricate himself
with honour from a situation so fraught with peril. Turning his attention first
to Belgium, he repeated the propositions of Cobenzl, with the addition that the
Estates should henceforth have the right to meet when they judged it desirable,
and that the Emperor should not have the power to make new laws without their
adhesion. The Congress of Brussel i made no reply, but the offers made by the
sovereign lent new bitterness to the party quarrels of the Belgians, arid a
struggle between the political factions became inevitable. The Emperor returned
to the charge, promising that the whole constitutional system should remain as
it had been under Maria Theresa, and that he would both grant a general amnesty
and introduce into the organisation of the Estates, with their consent, such
modifications as the public advantage should demand. This time he was not left
without a reply. On November £1, 1790,
656 Conciliatory policy of Leopold II.—His death.
[1790-2
the
Belgian Estates elected Archduke Charles, the third son of Leopold, Hereditary
Grand Duke, on condition that this dignity should never. be merged in a
sovereignty compelling the Grand Duke to reside elsewhere than in Belgium; for
the nation attributed their calamities to the distance separating them ,from
their Princes, < 1
In the
meantime, the Austrian army had invaded the Netherlands, and the forces of the
States' retired without. an engagement. Their commander, the Prussian General
Schonfeld, who on this occasion played a very equivocal part, had, on November
25,'1790, abandoned the important strategic position of Namur, and fled to
France,. On Decem-. ber 3 the Austrians entered Brussels. Van der Noot and the
more compromised of the statesmen hastened to seek shelter abroad, Nego- .
tiations were opened at the Hague, and resulted on December 11 in a treaty
which breathed the spirit of the proposals made by the Emperor at the time of
his accession. The Government exacted no other revenge than that'of forcing the
Archbishop of Malines to sing a Te Deurn at, the Church of St Gudule at
Brussels, and of compelling him to make a recantation which must have been a
severe blow to his self-respect.
Leopold II
turned next to Prussia. He knew, without sharing, the prejudices of Kaunitz
against that Power, and, leaving the Chancellor outside the negotiations, he
treated directly with Frederick William IL A conference was soon opened at
Reichenbach,.to determine the basis of a treaty of reconciliation ; and shortly
afterwards the Treaty of Sistova (August 4.1791) put an end to hostilities
between Au?tria and Turkey. The political horizon was thus unexpectedly swept
clear of clouds, but the condition of France was causing anxiety to the whole
pf Europe. Leopold’s caution in dealing with the Emigrants and their designs,
and his general wish to defer any definite action against the existing regime
in France, are described elsewhere. He consented, however, at last, to see
Count d’Artois at Mantua on May 20,1791, when, without consenting to make any
definite promise, he spoke of a projected understanding with the other Powers;
and, after the flight of Varennes, he had an interview with the King of Prussia
at Pillnitz in Saxony, which resulted in the joint Declaration of August 27,
1791. They wished to enable the King of France to secure the foundations of a
monarchical government, and had therefore “resolved to take prompt measures,
with one consent, to attain the end desired by both.” War was now inevitable,
but Leopold died at the moment when the storm was about to break, on March
1,1792.
CHAPTER XIX CATHARINE II.
“
Happy the writer who a century hence shall tell the history of Catharine
II!”—so Voltaire exclaimed ;in a letter to that monarch. No historian, however,
has yet been found to give a really conclusive portrayal of her character in
its whole bearing on the history of Russia; BilbassofTs great work only reaches
the year 1764. The task remains unfulfilled to which Voltaire refers—with flattering
intent it is true—but at all events the Tsarina’s memory has been cleared of a
considerable amount of detail traceable to unauthentic anecdotes with which an
interest not untinged by gossip and malice had surrounded it. Neither the cheap
designation, “the Northern Semiramis,” nor any comparison with Louis XIV,
really goes to the root of this remarkable and complex character, which we are
now able to survey as it passed through the history of the nation and the age
to which it belonged.
Sophia
Augusta Frederica, Princess of Anhalt-Zerhst, was bom at Stettin on May 2, 17291.
Her father, Prince Christian August, Was a Prussian officer, a somewhat
commonplace man of the old-fashioned rigid Lutheran creed. The mother was
Johanna Elizabeth, a princess of Holstein-Gottorp, a superficial, lively woman,
fond of intrigue, and her husband’s junior by many years; she was a sister of
Prince Carl August, who died in St Petersburg as the betrothed of Elizabeth,
afterwards Tsarina. The girl grew up amid the environment provided by a large
commercial centre and an officer’s household conducted on a far from briiliant
scale. She was brought up strictly, but not very carefully, in the habits and
traditions of the petty princesses then so numerous in Germany, only perhaps in
circumstances modest below the average. Her journeys afforded her the best
teaching she received; but at an early date she displayed a taste for reading.
In no respect did she stand forth among her fellows, except that, even in her
youth, she was supposed to have shown signs of a “serious, cold, calculating
mind”;
1
All the dates in this chapter are N. S.
exhibiting
little or nothing of that liveliness, mental activity, and passionate nature so
strikingly evident in her as Tsarina.
The
turning-point in her life was the invitation to St Petersburg from the Empress
Elizabeth of Russia which reached her and her mother at Zerbst on January
1,1744, followed by a letter from Frederick the Great clearly stating the
object of the summons, namely, the proposed marriage of Princess Sophia to the
Russian heir apparent, Peter Carl Ulrich of Holstein-Gottorp, the son of Anna
Petrovna, Elizabeth’s elder sister.
The
circumstances which had led the Tsarina to take this step have been described
in an earlier chapter. Mardefeld, Frederick I]?s ambassador at St Petersburg,
had opposed the plan of marrying the destined successor to the throne to a
Saxon princess; it was probably Podewils, the Prussian Minister, who first drew
attention to the young Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst. Frederick strongly
recommended her to Elizabeth, since as the daughter of one of his generals she
was in his interest, while at the same time in her he had not to “sacrifice” a
Prussian princess; but, in thus deciding the marriage question, the Empress in
the main acted on her own judgment. It was in Sophia’s favour that she was
descended from a small princely house, an alliance with which could involve no
difficulties for Russia; and that she was cousin to the Tsarevich through her
mother.
Mother and
daughter set out on January 10, 1744; the father giving them a great deal of
advice which at a later date must have struck his daughter as singularly
homely, precise and narrow. This, girl of fifteen was entering upon an utterly
unknown future and an absolutely strange world. She cannot have really
experienced the feelings which in her Memoirs she describes as having animated
her at that time; as a matter of fact, this record was not taken in hand till
after 1780. It may be added that, though the Memoirs excited much and just
surprise when published in London by Alexander Herzen in 1859, there can be no
doubt as to their authenticity. Unfortunately, the extremely interesting
evidence as to Catharine’s character furnished in this work, one of the chief
authorities for her biography, comes to an end with the close of 1759, and thus
does not cover what is really its most interesting period. The Memoirs cannot
of course be regarded as an unadulterated historical source; in spite of the
almost unfeminine coldness of their tone, they are even more strongly biassed
than is ordinarily the case with this class of writings. Facts and events are
generally correctly narrated, but the opinions expressed are for the most part
coloured by partisan feeling. Perhaps Catharine was calculating the effect on
her son Paul and his wife; but, be that as it may, her tendency is to represent
her marriage with Peter and her whole position as a martyrdom which at last
became unbearable^ and so to render the coup d’Stat intrinsically intelligible
and justifiable.
No unreserved
use can therefore be made of this source in any
1744-59] Married life of Peter and Catharine. 659
attempt to
draw the cliaracter of the Prince to whom in 1744 the Princess of Anhalt was
wedded. Peter was by no means half-witted, but had been very badly brought up,
miseducated, and even physically neglected. In St Petersburg, too, all efforts
to develop his powers were in vain; in the words of Solowjeff, “he displayed
every symptom of mental backwardness; and resembled a grdwn-up child.” He indulged
without restraint in childish pastimes, yielded to common and low propensities,
and was both mentally and morally of an inferior type. Moreover, he neither
could nor would adapt himself to Russian ways and to the special circumstances
of his position as Tsarevich. He remained a Lutheran at heart, and ridiculed
the Orthodox faith and its usages. Even as a future Tsar he retained his pride
in his rank as a German Prince and a lasting passionate and personal devotion
to Frederick the Great, whose interests he served against those of his adopted
country. In every respect he did precise!; what he ought not to have done in
his position, especially when the throne was so insecure.
. After, at
the end of August, 1745, he had married the Princess Sophia, the contrast
between husband and wife was from the very outset made evident by the rapidity
with which the Princess accommodated herself to her difficult position, though
she was certainly, not assisted in the matter by her tactless, intriguing
mother. With an insight and -judgment remarkable in one so young, she
immediately, perceived the course she must pursue to win her way in Russia:,
she must learn the language and adopt the Orthodox faith. Princess Sophia
became the Grand Duchess Katharina Alexeievna. She had no longer, any home in
Germany nor any connexion with it, after her mother had been obliged to leave
Russia and her father had died (March, 1747).
There was no
question of an intimate relation with her husband, though she would have been
prepared for it. He neglected her, absorbed in amusing himself with his
soldiers, in carousals find amours, and making it clearer every day how
ill-fitted he was to become the ruler of the Russian empire. Catharine’s early
years as Tsarevna were a lonely time for her, and she was jealously watched and
guarded. Nevertheless, she lost neither her force and elasticity of mind nor
her cheerfulness of disposition.- Like Peter I, she was her own teacher; but he
learnt practically, whereas she had to educate herself theoretically. She read
a great deal, passing from novels to Voltaire, Bayle, Montesquieu, and then to
the Annals of Tacitus and the early volumes of the EncyclopMie. Her reading
developed that political sense which was so characteristic of her; she became
imbued with ideas of enlightened absolutism, and her intellectual labours may
be to some extent compared with those by which Frederick the Great as Crown
Prince trained himself for the duties of King. During the years thus spent in
serious work, as she recognised what manner of ruler her husband would make,
she became at heart a Pretender by his side. In the outside world she
deliberately sought
popularity;
she had to act a part and acted it consciously, calculating the while, mistress
of herself.
But in the
heavy atmosphere of the Russian Court there awoke in her at the same time a
craving for the joys of life, hitherto latent within her passionate soul and
vigorous nature. She had no family life with her husband; and her first child,
Paul, had been taken from her by Elizabeth, delighted by the advent of an heir
to the throne. After brief love passages with others, in 1759 the first
favourite proper, Gregori Orloff, came on the scene. Husband and wife drifted
further apart, and the “ young Court ” presented a sorry picture of discord.
But,
politically also, Peter and Catharine belonget to opposite sides. The ambition
which animated Catharine taught her that for her own sake she must be a Russian
or at any rate appear such outwardly. Peter, on the other hand, seems to havei
set his Holstein interests before those of the Russian imperial Crown, not
realising that it was precisely in the identification of himself with national
aims that lay his one and only chance of the succession—and even so it was a
very uncertain chance. Thus he was constantly outraging public feeling, and
entered into the maze of politics without either thought or capacity, while
Catharine assumed her part sagaciously and as one acting with mature and
conscious judgment. It was soon evident that their ways could not lie together.
Both were kept under close and constant supervision; Elizabeth’s relations
with Catharine were singularly lacking in confidence and kindness. The
attention of high officers of State and foreign diplomats was claimed
increasingly by the Grand Duchess as the Empress grew older, and as Peter’s
conduct strengthened the conviction that he would not reign for long. For ten
years Catharine had stood alone at Court; now the several parties were drawing
round her. Bestuzheff, hitherto her enemy, provided her ambition with a
definite political aim, namely, the exclusion of Peter from the throne and her
own regency during the minority of her son Paul. Catharine availed iierself,
too, of her credit with the English ambassador. There were two parties at Court
whose object was to set aside Peter, and she had entered into secret relations
with both, when she was brought into serious da'iger by the fall of Bestuzheff
in February, 1758, already described elsewhere. But Bestuzheff had burnt all
compromising correspondence, and Catharine escaped a great peril; in a dramatic
scene she quieted the suspicions of the Empress, whose confidence was, however,
forfeited by Bestuzheff.
Though
Elizabeth was obliged to acknowledge openly that her nephew would not be
competent to reign for any length of time, she did not alter the succession.
For Catharine, too, the situation was becoming more critical, as it was
anticipated that, on his accession, Peter would divorce her, pronounce Paul a bastard,
and marry his mistress, Elizabeth Vorontsoff. Moreover, another claimant to the
throne was still living in the person of Ivan Antonovich, imprisoned at
Schlusselburg. Thus it
was
altogether uncertain who would succeed, should Elizabeth die suddenly. Shortly
before that event Princess Catharine Dashkoff, a sister of Elizabeth
Vorontsoff, implored the Grand Duchess, of whom she was an enthusiastic
partisan, to end the suspense by taking an extreme step—the purport of which
was obvious. But Catharine refused, being apparently persuaded that there was
no help for it if Peter meant to get rid of her. Hence, when Elizabeth died on
January 5, 1762, his accession followed without any hindrance.
Peter III was
now in a position to give practical expression to his veneration for Frederick
the Great, and took immediate advantage of it by making peace with him, giving
back all conquered territories, and freeing Prussia from the almost
overwhelming pressure brought to bear on her by the coalition between Russia, Austria,
and France. This was not in itself contrary to the interests of Russia. But the
sudden change of front was regarded as an ignoble surrender of what had been
won and a capitulation to the “mortal enemy”; and this charge was (according
to one version at any rate) subsequently brought against Peter in the manifesto
of July 9, 1762. Most other measures taken by him were of a similar nature and
contributed to his ruin. His efforts at reform, for the most part well-meant,
included the abolition of torture and capital punishment (the latter at all
events for the nobility)—while the exemption of that Order from the obligation
of service to the State was not justifiable and incited the peasants to
revolt—and the secularisation of ecclesiastical property. But Peter’s wild
zeal for reform set everyone against him, as too many interests were threatened
at once. Again, his endeavour to reduce the Guards to discipline by means of
Prussian drill was well-intentioned. But, mainly because of the petty way in
which it was introduced, this innovation roused against him the Guards and
their officers, who were precisely the one element able to carry out a
revolution effectively. Things grew still more serious as the Emperor became
more and more possessed by the idea of engaging in war with Denmark for the
sake of Schleswig—a war which must naturally find very little favour with the
Guards and among the populace. He continued to wound Russian susceptibilities
on all sides just as he had done when Tsarevich; and the increasing
dissoluteness of his life rendered him more and more unfitted to rule, while he
treated his wife with more brutality and ignominy than ever. Catharine bore
every insult with perfect self-control, her immediate object being that the
Russians should come to see in her the means of delivering them from the
present tyranny and maladministration. The more imminent the dangeir became
that Peter would drive, her from the throne into a convent or Schlusselburg, so
as to be enabled to marry his mistress, the more assiduously Catharine added
mesh to mesh in the net of conspiracy which finally brought about his
downfall. All who desired a change thronged to her side; but she was astute
enough to keep the
several
contributory currents distinct from each other, and to retain in her own hands
the management of the whole. The several factions which were helping her—the
Orloffs, Princess Dashkoff, Panin—at various times ascribed to themselves the
leading part in the entire affair. As a matter of fact, Catharine alone directed
its course, and her strongest allies were the brothers Orloff. Gregori Orloff,
her passionately devoted lover, won over his brothers, first and foremost the
sharp-witted Alexei; they in turn won over to the cause other officers and
soldiers of the Guards, among whom there was enough hatred of the Tsar.
Princess Dashkoff, in her Memoirs, attributes to herself a larger part in the
revolution than she actually played; but she enlisted supporters among the
aristocracy, in particular Nikita Panin, Paul’s tutor.
From afar,
Frederick the Great perceived that his satellite, the Tsar, would not long hold
his own, and Peter was not left without admonitions from that quarter. Lulled,
however, by a false sense of security he failed to notice how isolated his
position was becoming, and how the tide had turned in the Tsarina’s favour. The
sword of divorce still hung over her; and, at the beginning of July, 1762, the
catastrophe seemed on the point of overtaking her. Thus it came to pass that,
on her side, the conspiracy broke out by which she,saved herself and Russia;
and, though the moment for action came sooner than had been expected, the
several agencies ended by cooperating most successfully, little as they knew of
each other’s movements. Peter fell, and he alone ; and an otherwise bloodless
revolution, accomplished with the utmost ease, reached its terrible climax in
the murder of the Tsar.
By a mere
chance one of the accessories to the plot was arrested. The conspirators at
once took decisive action, although nothing was prepared. In hot haste, Alexei
Orloff fetched the Tsarina from Peterhof into the city of St Petersburg, on the
night of July 8—9. Early in the morning of the 9th, she drove to the bairacks
of the Guards; who immediately swore allegiance to her. Then, in the Kasan
cathedral, whither Panin had meanwhile taken the Tsarevich Paul, Catharine was
proclaimed Autocrat. From the Winter Palace she issued a manifesto informing
the people of the step. Peter had been dethroned, practically without
opposition.
On the
evening of the same day, the Guards marched from St Petersburg to Peterhof,
where Peter had remained ; what had been begun must be carried through.
Catharine headed the march in person, wearing the uniform of the Guards and
accompanied by a splendid suite. The- brilliant personal qualities of this
amazing woman Were most strikingly evinced on this occasion and held everyone
as it were spell-bound; political action was undistinguishable' from romantic
masquerade. Peter was perfectly helpless, arid surrendered unconditionally; he
agreed to the declaration of abdication sent him and was takei/ as a prisoner
to the country seat of Ropscha. The military revolt against the reigning
Tsar had
triumphed speedily and without bloodshed; as in 1741, it had been effected by
the Guards, who had no intention of going to war on behalf of a foreign
princess, and she succeeded in giving a national Russian significance to the
enterprise. Disorderly and undisciplined behaviour on the part of the soldiery,
which made the danger attaching to these revolts abundantly evident, was
quickly put down by the firmness of Catharine and those around her. But a dark
shadow was cast on the whole transaction, which had been so easy of
accomplishment, by the murder of Peter at Ropscha on July 17. Catharine did not
give the order for this deed; but the guilt of it nevertheless lies at her
door. Alexei Orloff and several others were the actual perpetrators of the
murder; but he would not have ventured so far unless he had been certain that Catharine
would breathe more freely if this still dangerous rival were disposed of, and
that they were carrying out Catharine’s own secret wish. And OrlofFs deed went
unpunished.
Catharine had
taken the lead in the revolution, and was now Autocrat of the Russias. For
there was no question of her merely holding the regency during the minority of
her son, as Panin had desired. She seized the reins in her own hands and held
them till her death. Her innate fitness for personal rule was at once made
manifest; with impressive calmness and self-control she at once commanded the
situation; the kindly, grateful side of her character was seen in the nature of
the rewards bestowed by her; and, from the very outset, she revealed that
mental superiority, energy, and, above all, that mastery of the art of
government, which make her reign appear truly great.
In the early
years, Catharine’s advisers as to foreign affairs were Panin and, to a less
extent, Bestuzheff, who had been recalled. She did not, as was naturally expected,
reverse Peter’s sudden change of polity in regard to Prussia; she did not
return unconditionally to Austria; for she was of opinion that Russia required
peace, followed by a foreign policy independent of any foreign Power and
calculated to serve no interests but her own. From 1725 to 1762, the influence
of other Powers upon Russia had been continually on the increase; after 1762,
Russia once more became an independent State. During the eighteen years of her
life as Grand Duchess, Catharine had herself awakened and cultivated the
natural gifts which she possessed; and now, as Tsarina, she boldly proceeded to
deal with a problem which Peter I had left behind him and which had since been
neglected, and worked out a solution of it in which the other Powers were
obliged to concur. This problem was the Polish question.
After the
revolution of 1762 the first problem which Catharine had to face was the
attitude to be adopted towards Prussia. The Treaty of Hubertusburg, which
terminated the Seven Years’ War, was concluded without the participation of
Russia, whose proffered mediation
Frederick had
firmly refused. But only a year afterwards this neutral attitude towards
Prussia had developed into an alliance which lasted till 1780. Catharine and
Frederick recognised each other’s intellectual calibre; in the pleasing
personal correspondence carried on between: them one can detect beneath all the
courtly verbiage the conversation of two great personalities mutually
congenial—that is to say, in their political capacity. It is a purely political
correspondence, carried on for definite political ends by two writers gifted
with esprit. Each delighted, and vied with the other in manipulating with the
utmost possible virtuosity the ingeniously graceful forms of the eighteenth
century. What brought Frederick and Catharine together, and kept them together,
in the first instance, for a decade and a half, consisted of very real
political interests—in fact, of the community of interests between them in the
matter of the kingdom of Poland.
Poland was
drifting towards a doom, which had, even in this very, form, been long since
predicted. For the idea of a partition of Poland between the adjacent Powers
did not originate with Catharine, Frederick, or Joseph II. It had been in the
air earlier than that; Charles X Gustavus of Sweden had spoken of it to the
Great Elector of Brandenburg; and, so early as 1662, John Casimir of Poland had
actually foretold the details of the,process: the Lithuanians were mostly in
favour of the Muscovite; and after his death it could hardly be but that the
latter would keep Lithuania, while the Emperor would get possession of , Poland
(i.e. Little Poland), in which case the Elector of Brandenburg might get a
slice of Great Poland. The partition of Poland thus predicted, of which
Catharine II must be considered the real author, must be differently judged
from different points of view. The Poles anathematise it because it deprived
them of their independent existence as a nation. The Cabinets of the Powers concerned
have endeavoured to exonerate themselves from the blame of, at any rate, the
initial step. Contemporaries, however, regarded Poland as a centre of religious
intolerance and aristocratic tyranny, and they welcomed Catharine’s action;
Voltaire wrote in commendation of it, when she sent troops into Poland. But the
root of the matter was that, since Brandenburg and Moscow had come to the fore,
only a strong State could hold its ground between these two Powers. Poland was
not a strong State, if State she could be called at all—and so she was
overwhelmed. Out of this policy of the Eastern Powers, initiated by Catharine,
arose the Polish question, which became an important political problem of the
nineteenth century. The action of the Powers might obliterate the Polish
kingdom, but it could not wipe out the Polish nation.
For various
reasons, external and internal, which cannot be discussed here, Poland, though
a powerful political community at the beginning of her history, had never
become an actual State. The difficulty of
building up a
State was in this case enhanced by the fact that to the east and west Poland
was practically without natural frontiers, while to the north and south such
could not be acquired by the natural expansion of the nation, but must be won
by conquest and subjugation of foreign races. The kingdom, of Poland thus
expended a great deal of strength on the struggle against the Turks in the
south and south-east, thereby serving its own special purposes and a common
European interest at the same time. But at home, instead of going through those
stages in the development of political life which we denote by the terms
mercantilism and absolutism, Poland came to a standstill at a lower stage, and
her institutions were developed on that level and in a direction detrimental to
the monarchy. King and Constitution succumbed to the idea of a Confederation,
which Moltke aptly defined as the “ legal organisation of revolution.” By means
of the Confederation, by the pacta conventa imposed by the nobility on the
elective monarchy, and by their position in the central Diet {Sejm) and in the
provincial Diets (SejmiM), the nobles managed to prevent the several provinces
from becoming welded together into a corporate whole and to identify the State
with their own Order. Their interests alone were considered; no strong middle
class arose ; and the pressure on the peasants left them no longer capable of
revolt, and at the same time devoid of all patriotic feeling. While the
economic and political interests of the nobility were thus paramount, the
security and independence of the nation had not been duly vindicated as towards
other Powers., When the Powers concerned in the affairs of eastern Europe
interfered more and more freely in Polish politics, there was no possibility
either of resistance or of independence. By means of political and military
pressure and of bribery, to which all classes of the nobility were susceptible,
these Powers managed to influence the election of the King, so that after 1572
very few candidates who were not foreigners ascended the throne. The foreign
Powers in question were: Austria, France, the Papacy, Sweden; subsequently,
Brandenburg, Saxony; and, finally, Russia. The weakest of these, Saxony, had
come into possession of the Polish throne, which from 1697 till 1763 had been
held by Augustus the Strong and Augustus III. The rule of the latter had,
however, been no rule at all. Belligerents had infringed on Polish territory
with impunity. In the duchy of Courland, a fief 6f the Polish Crown, Russian
influence established itself when, in 1737, Biren, the favourite of the Tsarina
Anne, became Duke after the death of the last Duke of the House of Kettler.
Poland herself had taken no part in the Seven Years’ War; but she had had to
submit to being utilised by Russia as a military base, while Frederick levied
contributions and recruited soldiers on Polish soil. Poland was at Catharine’s
mercy when she ascended the throne and aggressively resumed the policy of
expansion westwards, which Peter had actually begun, but of which the origin is
really to be sought in the course which Muscovite history had for
centuries
followed. The turn of Courland came first; in 1763 Biren was restored, and the
son of Augustus III of Poland was ousted from the dukedom which he had obtained
in 1758. The fate of Courland was thus sealed, and the consummation made
possible which in 1795 converted this Polish dependency into a Russian
province. Henceforth, Russian influence was firmly established in Courland, a
country of vital importance for the position of Russia on the Baltic coast, and
containing the river Duna and the ports of Libau and Windau. Poland legally
retained the overlordship; but as a matter of fact it had passed to Catharine,
whose foreign policy thus achieved its first great success.
But the real
Polish question, as Catharine and Frederick fully recognised, would be set in
motion on the death of Augustus III. This event took place in October, 1763.
Neither of the two sovereigns wished an Austrian Prince to succeed Augustus;
Frederifck was, on the whole, in favour of a Piast, i.e. a native Polish King;
but Catharine was determined to utilise the election of the King for her own
purpose in regard to Poland; the time had not yet come for the incorporation of
Poland or part of it, but, at least, the influence of Russia should predominate
in Warsaw. Her candidate for the throne was to serve this interest, and she had
one ready to hand in Stanislaus Poniatowski. He had had a passing personal
intimacy with Catharine, but was now to be ruthlessly employed as an instrument
of her purposes. To ensure his election, she took advantage of the differences
among the Polish nobility. For the nobles no longer formed a homogeneous body,
even though the democratic equality supposed to exist within their circle was
still marked with a ludicrous emphasis. The nobility was divided into the
Szlachta, or lesser nobility, and a group of about one hundred families of
grandees, among which sixteen or seventeen held a leading position. This small
circle represented a brilliant aristocracy, possessed of the culture and
manners of western Europe-—that is to say, France. Around them were grouped in
solid factions the dependent families of the Szlachta, which was again divided
into a middle and an inferior stratum, the latter often of the poorest sort.
The public life of Poland still consisted solely in the rivalry of these
factions, following the selfish lead of the most influential families of
grandees. Some patriotic ideas were still to be found, but they were always
rendered ineffective by the prevailing selfishness, absence of all discipline,
and habit of looking to foreign countries for assistance, financial and other.
The most important family, called “ the family ” par excellence, were, as has
been seen, the Czartoryskis, whose aim was actually to win the throne for their
House. They formed the nucleus of the Russian party and favoured the election
of Stanislaus Poniatowski, himself a member of their family.
Frederick and
Catharine had a common interest, in the first instance, in the continuance of
the present anarchy in Poland,, since a strong well- regulated Polish State was
contrary to the tendencies at work in their
own
monarchies. They accordingly insisted that “free” election, the liberum, veto,
and all the pomp of the Diet, should be kept up. Furthermore, however, a
pretext was afforded them in the question of the “Dissidents,” or “Dysunits,”
as the Polish Dissenters (Protestants and Greek Orthodox Catholics) were
termed. Their position afforded Catharine a welcome opportunity of coming
forward as the protectress of religious toleration for the Orthodox in Poland*
while at the same time it increased her influence and facilitated an
interference on her part, analogous to that which she had asserted on behalf of
the Christians of the Balkans under Turkish rule. She proceeded resolutely,
setting her diplomats, Kayserling and Repnin, to work in Warsaw, distributing
money, and sending troops into Poland; she also concluded the alliance of 1764
with Frederick the Great, engaging him to move troops to the Polish frontier.
She thus secured her end; and, on September 7, 1764, Stanislaus Poniatowski was
elected King—as Catharine herself afterwards very truly remarked, “the
candidate who had least right of all and must therefore feel more indebted to
Russia than anyone else.” This first election of a Polish King “ made ” by
Russia was the second success of her foreign policy, the elections having been
hitherto determined by Austria, France, and Brandenburg; and it might logically
be expected that fortune would favour Russia still further.
Once safely
on the throne, Stanislaus attempted to initiate reforms. He submitted a
proposal to the Diet abolishing the liberum veto, at any rate in matters of
finance; while the Czartoryskis had already brought forward schemes of reform
at the “ Diet of Convocation.” But Russian and Prussian interests clashed with
any honest effort to consolidate the State by means of reforms: and Stanislaus
had to recognise in despair that it was now too late for any reform in Poland
which should tend to strengthen the power of the Crown. Repnin, Catharine’s
ambassador at Warsaw, was instructed to prevent any alteration in the existing
form of government. The fundamental evil lay in the liberum veto, which
required unanimity in all resolutions; but the policy of Russia and Prussia
required that this should be preserved as precluding the Diet from passing any
constructive measures. Anarchy was still further increased under the pretext of
protecting the Dissidents, for whom Russia claimed equal political rights with
the Roman Catholics. When the King, backed by the Czartoryskis, refused to
grant this demand, Repnin, availing himself of the feeling in the Szlachta
against the supposed absolutist tendencies of the King, contrived the Confederation
of Radom, in support of which Russian troops came on the scene. From 1767 to
1768 the Diet sat at Warsaw surrounded by Russian soldiers, and under this
pressure consented to the removal of the regulations against members of other
creeds, and to a compact by which Russia guaranteed the integrity of Poland and
the maintenance of her Constitution. Catharine seemed already to be mistress
of Poland; but she
6.68 Intermixture of
the Polish and Turkish questions. [1767-70
had bent the
bow too far. Two days after the Diet had risen, was formed the Confederation of
Bar (in Podolia) “pro religione et libertate” i.e. against all concessions to
the Dissidents, absolutist reforms in the State, and any guarantee by Russia of
the Polish Constitution. A terrible local war began between Russians and
Confederates. The Confederation obtained; the support of France, which sent
money and officers, and of Austria. For some time, as has been seen, these two
Powers had been agitating against Russia and Prussia in Constantinople; and now
""Turkey intervened on behalf of Poland and declared war against
Russia (September, 1767). The Polish and Eastern questions, were thus combined.
It was a fatal step for Poland to have asked and received help | from Turkey,
thus abandoning her old historic hostility against the I Porte, and committing
an act of virtual self-surrender. For the amalga- j mation of the Polish and
Eastern questions gave rise to an international tension which nothing short of
the first partition of Poland could bring vfo a close, unless it were to find
vent in a great European war.
In her
ensuing war with Turkey, Catharine was successful, as will be related below.
The conflicts of the Confederation, on the other hand, in which everyone
operated on his own account, ended disastrously. Austria watched with growing
resentment the triumphs of Russian arms, which threatened to annex the Danubian
Principalities; and if, as seemed likely, a war broke out between Austria and
Russia, Prussia, which was the ally of Russia and was already subsidising her,
would be drawn into hostilities, which Frederick desired to avoid. Accordingly,
as has been narrated elsewhere, he met Austria’s advances by the interviews
with Joseph II at Neisse and Neustadt, and sought to induce Catharine to
relinquish her designs on the Crimea and the Danubian Principalities. With war
on her hands against Turkey and against the Confederation of Bar, while Austria
was assuming a threatening attitude, Catharine had to try at all costs to
retain Prussia on her side. In order to impart a more personal note to her
relations with Prussia, she therefore, so early as July 30,1770, invited Prince
Henry, Frederick’s brother, who was then staying at' Stockholm with his sister
the Queen of Sweden, to pay a visit to St Petersburg. Unexpected as was the
invitation, Prince Henry accepted it, and spent several months in the Russian
capital. It was at one of the Tsarina’s soir&es that the question of the
partition of Poland was first broached to the Prussian Prince on the part of
Russia.
At the
Russian Court there had hitherto been two conflicting opinions in regard to the
fate of Poland, and as to how it could best be made to serve the interests of
Russia. One view, advocated by Count Nikita Panin, the Foreign Minister, was in
favour of Poland being brought into increasing dependence on Russia by
continuous interference in her internal affairs, without any curtailment of her
territory. The other view, advocated in particular by' the War Minister, Count
Zachary Chernuisheff, favoured the annexation of Poland. Now, in the summer
. i of 1770,
Austria had furnished a precedent for this course by the occupation of the
Zips, to which she alleged herself to possess ancient rights. On the evening of
January 8,1771, Count'Chemuisheff observed to Prince Henry on this subject:
“Then, why not seize the bishopric of Ermeland? for, after all, everyone ought
to have something”; and Catharine asked the Prince “And why should not everybody
help himself likewise1?” The first hint as to the partition of
Poland was conveyed in this conversation, which, quite in Catharine’s way,
touched
seriously,
though in a seemingly light and even jesting tone, on an_____
important
topic. The strongest argument in favour of-such a line of j action on the part
of Russia was that, if she relinquished her schemes of j extension along the
lower Danube, which might compromise her with Austria and cost her the Prussian
alliance, she ough; to seek a com- ■ pensation in Poland. Panin put this
quite plainly to the Prussian— ambassador, and King Frederick concurred. But
Austria hereupon, ih her turn, insisted on remaining in possession of those
parts of Poland which she had appropriated; and PrussVs actual political position
enabled her to demand something beyond Ermeland, viz., the German districts of
Poland separating it from East Prussia. At the close of
1771, Catharine made a binding declaration to
Frederick that she would give up the Danubian Principalities; and hereupon they
struck a bargain about Poland. On February 17, 1772, the Russo-Prussian Treaty
of Partition was signed at St Petersburg, and on August 5 Austria joined in
this compact. Maria Theresa naturally had much more difficulty in taking part
in this transition, which was not, essential to Austria from a
politico-geographical point of view. Her son Joseph* in his eagerness for
annexations^ of cOurse-f»Hed--to see how the occupation of the Zips sufficed to
involve Austria in all the consequences of this Polish policy, and how her
share of Poland would only encumber her with territory which it was not to her
interest to possess, and which did away with the former security of her
north-eastern frontier.
The First
Partition of Poland (August 5,1772) deprived that country of about one-third of
its territory and almost a third of its population. Prussia acquired Ermeland
and what was called Royal Prussia (the West Prussia of the present day) with
the exception of Danzig and Thom. Austria obtained part of Little Poland
(excepting Cracow) and the greater part of East Galicia, then called Red
Russia. To Russia fell the strip of Livonia which had remained a Polish
possession, with White Russia along the Duna and the Dnieper (the districts of
Polozk, Vitebsk, Minsk, and Mstislavl). Whereas there was no historical
justification for the extension of Austria, Prussia and Russia by the First
Partition of Poland only took territories to which they could assert
well-founded claims. For Polish Prussia had formerly- been under German
rule,
1 “ Mats pourquoi pas s'emparer de I'ewche de Warmie?
Oaril faut, apres tout, que, chacun ait quelque chose." “Mais pourquoi pas
tout le monde se prendrait-il aussi ? ”
670 Responsibility for
the First Partition.—Its results, [m2
and
the districts taken by Russia were inhabited by Russian-speaking Greek
Catholics. Catharine always maintained that she had taken no genuine Polish
country; and there was some foundation for this statement, even when she
repeate,d it after the Third Partition. The acquisition of White Russia, with,
its rigidly Russian and Orthodox population, even wore the appearance of a
national act of liberation, though in point of fact it was nothing of the kind. ,
Catharine did
not bring about the situation leading to thje Partition of Poland which was
really the beginning of its end; but she availed herself of that situation with
so much skill and energy, that her action was designated as a masterpiece of
political finesse, by so experienced a statesman as Kaunitz. But the fact that
the situation was not of her making had the further consequence that the whole
of Poland did not fall into her hands, which was the final goal towards which
the expansion of Russia might be and actually was directed. The Tsarina was on
the horns of a dilemma: the maintenance of Polish integrity might in the end
bring Poland under Russian influence, but Austria had already violated it.
Unless Prussia stood firmly by her alliance with Russia, Austria would probably
take up arms in favour of Turkey, while on the other hand any acquisition of
Polish territory by Prussia would arouse the jealousy of Austria against that
Power. Frederick the Great in his Memoirs correctly judged that the violation
of the integrity of Poland was suddenly made to serve as an expedient for
avoiding a great European war. Under the: influence of his brother Henry, he
thereupon adopted the suggestion emanating from St Petersburg, adroitly
availing himself of it to effect a much-needed enlargement of his borders. By
the occupation of the Zips Austria had made the first move, and it was
therefore she who, as Frederick says, “did most to pave the way” for the
Partition Treaty. But it was the fault of Poland herself that, her own state
organisation had been too weak to offer any resistance to the long-cherished
aspirations of her two neighbours when these crystallised into action; and it
was her fault, again, that her own ruling class, the nobility, itself helped to
assure the success of this foreign encroachment.
Poland was
not annihilated by the First Partition. Of course it was the death-blow to the
conception of a Greater Poland “from sea to sea,” i.e. from the Baltic to the
Black Sea; this, however, was no true national ideal, but a mere scheme of
aggression against peoples of different race. Nor can Poland, after 1772, be
said to have been anything more than a Russian tributary State under the rule
of the Russian ambassador at Warsaw, and in the hold of the Russian garrisons
distributed throughout the country. But, even so, the nucleus of the State
remained; and Poland might still have a future before her if she resolved on a
reform of her home affairs. And such a reform was actually attempted with some
show of zeal, while the part of the country which had fallen to Russia was energetically
and judiciously brought into line with the Russian
civil and
ecclesiastical system by its Governor-General, Count Zachary Chernuisheff, in
most of whose ideas and plans Catharine concurred.
The Partition
by the , three Powers was ratified by what was called the “ Delegation Diet,”
which lasted from 1773 to 1775. Thus Poland was brought by persuasion,
compulsion, and bribery to consent to the loss of one-third of her territory
without striking a blow—a national surrender scarcely paralleled in history.
The same Diet, however, at once adopted measures of reform and “cardinal
rights,” as they were termed, which, however, left untouched the weakest points
in the Constitution, such as the election of the King and the liberum, veto.
The most important reforms were, first, the establishment of a “ perpetual
Council of State ” (Rada nieustajqca), under the presidency of the King, in
which the executive power was vested when the Diet was not sitting, and,
secondly, the appointment of an Education Commission endowed with the wealth of
the expelled Order of Jesuits, which was to reform public instruction. These
two bodies were the first central authorities exercising jurisdiction over
Lithuania as well as Poland—for, by the Union of Lublin (1569), Lithuania had retained
its separate administration, finances, and army. Though the Education
Commission in particular did zealous and effective work for public instruction,
no really far- reaching reforms were achieved till 1788, owing to the
continuance of the intrigues and personal antagonisms and ambitions of the
several factions. And the reforms planned by the King and his adherents were
likewise crippled by the fact that the “cardinal rights” were under the
guarantee of the partitioning Powers, which had no interest in any real reform
and internal consolidation of Poland. It should be noted how the ideas of the
Auflclarung gradually penetrated into the Polish world, in particular through
the writings of Staszic and Kotig,taj, and prepared the way for still more widespread
reforms— for example,, the emancipation of the peasants. Altogether, these last
years of the kingdom of Poland were a period of intellectual activity.
Stanislaus loved and promoted art and literature; and many poets and writers,
such as Krasicki, Naruszewicz, Niemcewicz and the two mentioned above, shed a
glory as of sunset on the last years of the doomed country. Politically, Poland
stood alone throughout the years which included the dissolution of the
Russo-Prussian, and the formation of the Russo-Austrian, alliance. In 1787,
Russia, conjointly with Austria, began her second Turkish War, and the question
arose: which side would Poland take ? Stanislaus inclined towards that of
Russia, though there was little hope that she would concede anything in the
matter of reforms, and much less that she would consent to the strengthening of
the Polish army. Although desirous of getting possession of Danzig and Thorn,
Prussia, being now hostile to Russia, had no objection to reforms in Poland,
and she therefore proposed to Poland an alliance on these lines, which was
negotiated by the Diet opened on October 6, 1788. This
famous “Four
Years’ Diet” began the last period of Polish independence, and accomplished
reforms culminating in the Constitution of May 3, 1791. But no time was left
for Poland to show whether she was capable of carrying through an organic
change in the conditions of her public and social life. It is told elsewhere,
how, in 1793 and 1795, Catharine completed what she had begun in 1772, and
Poland fell out of the ranks of independent States. The Tsarina had taken
skilful and Unscrupulous advantage of the impotence and internal decay of
Poland, and, though obliged to share the spoils with Prussia and Austria,
contrived that the historic struggle carried on for centuries with Poland
should end triumphantly for Russia. The Russian frontier was thus pushed
forward into central Europe, while the position of the empire op the Baltic was
at the same time brought into connexion with that which it held in regard to
the Eastern question.
The
antagonism between Russia and Turkey1 was, and remains to this day,
partially due to: the fact that the Turks are the successors of the
Tartars. This antagonism is deep-rooted and quite exceptionally widespread
among the Russians, and explains the sympathy inspired in them by an enduring
sense of community of race and faith for the Christian subjects of Turkey.
Furthermore, the actual situation of Turkey had prevented Russia from obtaining
a natural frontier and sea-board in the south, and her European expansion in
the south-west. Throughout the course of centuries this antagonism continued
closely interwoven with that between Moscow and Poland. Peter I sought to
dispose of this menace to Russian development by endeavouring, first of all, to
turn the national and religious sympathies of the Balkan peninsula to Russia’s
account as against Turkey. This plan, as we know, friled absolutely. The
Tsarina Anne then continued his projects in alliance with Austria. Their direct
political objects are stated in an instruction of 1737: namely, incorporation
of the region of the south Russian steppe, the conquest of the Crimea, the'
left bank of the Danube as Russia’s southern frontier, the liberation of the
two Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), in which of course
Russian influence was henceforth to predominate. This programme once realised,
Turkey would cease to be a dangerous enemy to Russia, which could then aim at
putting an end' to the very existence of a Turkey in Europe, and substituting
for it any other sort of States—provided always that they were dependent on
Russia, or, better still, under her direct rule. Catharine had in the main
carried out the earlier programme; this later scheme she was unable to
accomplish, but left as an inheritance to her successors. Antagonism to Turkey
in Asia was not overlooked by her, but kept more in the background. Though in
this quarter also she achieved successes towards the end of her life—such as,
for instance, the establishment of a protectorate over Georgia (1783) and the
war with Persia—their significance was merely incidental to her
Eastern
policy: for the European side of the question was paramount. In this respect
her reign brought about the important and lasting result that no solution of
the question was conceivable either without Russia, or through Russia alone.
It has
already been stated how Russia’s first Turkish War (1768-74) was consequent
upon the struggle against the Confederation of Bar. Catharine entered upon the
War with confidence and courage, although the odds were heavy against her. Her
throne was still far from secure; there were still internal crises to be
overcome, and she had France and Austria aguirst her in the conflict with
Poland and Turkey. All this enhanced the importance of Prussian support. The
Russian equipment left much to be desired; in particular, the war department
and commissariat failed, as always in Russian wars. However, the Porte was
still worse prepared, so that Frederick the Great ridiculed the War as a fight
between the blind and the one-eyed. It proved a protracted affair; especially
as Catharine had no competent generals except Peter Panin; and in him she
placed no implicit trust.
The invasion
of New Servia by the Tartars at the beginning of 1769 pointed to the necessity
of settling accounts with them once for all. But this could only be
accomplished if Russian territory were extended to the shores of the Black Sea.
Catharine’s hopes, however, soared beyond this —to naval operations on the waters
of the Black Sea; to securing a free navigation of its waters; to the
acquisition of the Caucasus; and, finally, to rousing the Greeks to a revolt
against the Turks. Thus the daring expedition to the Black Sea which started
from Kronstadt in 1770 was pursuing the ultimate and most ambitious aims of
this Eastern policy. And, though no general rising of the Greeks took place,
yet the expedition, which was commanded by Alexei Orloff, achieved the
greatest naval victory at any time won by Russia. On July 5 and 7, 1770, the
Turkish fleet was defeated off Scio and absolutely annihilated off Tchesme— a
victory comparable with Lepanto and Navarino. The Russians owed it rather to
the admirals of English extraction (Greig and Elphinston) who were commanding under
Orloff, than to that officer himself, who was comparatively ignorant of naval
tactics. He reaped the greatest honours, however, as Catharine wisely always
saw fit to confer higher rewards and more brilliant promotion on native
Russians than on foreigners, though the latter were for the most part more
capable, and were certainly indispensable when it came to gaining victories.
The land
forces* too, were successful: in 1770, Bender, Ismail, Kilia, Akerman, Brailoff
fell in succession, and, in the next year, Kerch, Eupatoria, Perekop, with the
whole Crimean peninsula, were occupied. The other European Powers looked on
with mingled feelings at these successes of the Russian arms. England was
little affected by them, but was unwilling that Russia should secure the
passage of the Bosphorus as a result of this War. France was more strongly
opposed to the advance of
Russia; and
Prussia, which was paying subsidies to Russia, was by no means pleased with the
War in itself, and still less by Catharine’s victories, which threatened to
drag Prussia into a conflict with Austria. In the Peace of Belgrade in 1739,
the Austrians had made away with the fair prospects of their own Eastern
policy, while at the same time destroying the great and legitimate expectations
of Russia; and now it was they on whom the Russian successes against the Porte
pressed most heavily, and whose Balkan schemes were threatened. The state of
tension between the Powers was fraught with possibilities of a European war;
but a solution of the difficulty was found, as described above, by the First
Partition of Poland among the Eastern Powers.
Meanwhile,
the Russo-Turkish War was progressing. The first peace negotiations were
abortive, and fresh Russian victories followed, the Turk proving as usual a far
more obdurate foe than had been anticipated. Then, when Pugachoff’s rising
broke out at home in Russia, Catharine concluded a peace, which, although it
did not fulfil all her high hopes, was nevertheless one of the most
advantageous treaties ever made by a Russian sovereign. By this Treaty of
Kutchuk-Kainardji of July 21, 1774, Russia obtained Azoff, Kerch, and Yenikale,
which meant the control of the straits between the Sea of Azoff and the Black
Sea, also Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper, and the steppe beyond it lying
between the Bug and the Dnieper. The Treaty declared the independence of the
Crimean Tartars—the first step towards their subjection to Russia. The Black
Sea from which other nations were still excluded was thrown open to Russia, and
her merchantmen were allowed to pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.
Further, Great and Little Kabardia, parts, that is to say, of the Kuban and
Terek district, became Russian; whereby a footing on the eastern shore of the
Black Sea and in the Caucasus was secured, involving of course conflict with
the Circassians. Articles 7 and 14, again, afforded Russia a pretext—not
justified by the wording—for claiming protective rights over adherents of the
Greek Church living in Turkey and so interfering in the internal affairs of
that country. Henceforth, the Eastern policy of Russia could be based on the
popular conception of her as the natural protectress of the Greek Christians.
Thus, the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji abundantly rewarded the immense sacrifices
made by Russia for the war. But even so it was no final settlement of the vexed
question. In the first place, Catharine did not relinquish those more ambitious
schemes which, particularly after Potemkin’s rise to favour, became almost reckless
in their scope. She dreamed of breaking up Turkey in order to form a new Greek
empire, which was destined for her second grandson, significantly named
Constantine, while Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia were to constitute a
kingdom of Dacia, to be ruled by an Orthodox Prince—Potemkin to wit. These
fantastic and prodigious plans could only be realised by a yet greater war, in
which Austria must side
1783-7] Annexation of
the Crimea.—Catharine's tour. 675
with Russia,
for without the help of that Power, much less in opposition to it, Catharine’s
projects were futile. Now, the longer Catharine pursued this path, the further
she drew away from Prussia and the nearer to Austria, for Joseph IPs way of
thinking met such notions half-way, even if they savoured of extravagance. He
was prepared to fall in with Catharine’s plans against Turkey, claiming for
Austria by way of return Servia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia, while Venice
was to receive the Morea, Candia, and Cyprus. So the eggs were carefully
counted before they were hatched. Meanwhile, Frederick II felt certain that, so
soon as there was any real question of a partition of Turkey, the interests of
Austria and Russia would clash, in particular as to the lower Danube.
There was no
mention of the Crimea in Catharine’s scheme, for it was already regarded as the
property of Russia, which it actually became in
1783, without any objection on the part of
Joseph II. For this achievement Potemkin was decorated with the agnomen of “
the Taurian,” and raised to the rank of a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. He
had, however, performed no specially glorious feat. The internal discord always
seething among the Tartars had been turned to account, and the subsequent
annexation of their country had been accompanied by scenes of terror and
butchery, which must not of course be laid at Catharine’s door. She was pleased
and elated by the conquest, declaring that she had come to Russia empty-handed
but had won Tauria and Poland as her doWry. Now, at length, Russia had won a
firm and sure southern frontier and respite from the races which had formerly
borne her down by their numbers and had since constantly harassed her; these
had now been brought beneath her sway or had migrated. The union of the Crimea
with Russia at last put an end to the trade carried on thence for centuries in
Russian slaves.
In France and
Turkey, however, the annexation of the Crimea aroused considerable misgivings,
and war once more seemed imminent. In face of this, Catharine contrived a
singular demonstration, namely, the famous Tauric journey begun in January,
1787. She was accompanied by the Emperor Joseph II, and by a brilliant suite
which included the Austrian, English, and French ambassadors. The expedition
was largely a pleasure party, producing by its magnificent and often theatrical
setting a perfectly incredible impression; but it was also a political move,
intended to show off the wealth of Russia, the newly acquired steppe, the
southern beauty of the Crimea, the rapid development of the recently founded
towns, fortresses, and harbours. There was certainly a good deal of staging
about all this; for Potemkin was, all of a sudden, to appear in the light of a
splendid organiser and administrator, and there is justification for the
proverbial use of the expression “ Potemkin’s villages ” to signify sham
splendour. The spectators, however, realised the significance of a naval port
having arisen at Sevastopol from which Constantinople could be reached in two
676 Austro-Russianwarwith Turkey-Treaty of Jassy.
[1783-94
days; and it
was felt far and near how vast a change the present Tsarina had wrought in the
position of Russia in the Eastern question.
For this very
reason Catharine’s journey only increased the existing tension; and in August,
1787, war with Turkey broke out afresh. The immediate cause alleged by the
Porte was the annexation of the Crimea; hut it was further apprehended that the
dependence of Georgia (since, in 1783, its sovereign, Irakli, had put himself
under Russian protection) would ultimately involve the’'subjection of the
whole Caucasus. Joseph recognised a casus foederis for Austria as the ally of
Russia; and in February, 1788, he likewise declared war against Turkey, by
which means the two Powers thought to accomplish its projected partition.
Accordingly, a few years afterwards (1790), Prussia entered into an alliance
with the Porte, and then with Poland, so that Prussia was henceforth opposed to
Russia all along the line.
The year 1788
ended with a decisive victory for Russia in the capture of Ochakoff. Once
again, there was some idea of a naval expedition to the Mediterranean to rouse
the Greeks to insurrection. This renewed advance of the Russians was already
causing great excitement in Europe, more especially in England. However, the fleet
was not despatched, as it was needed elsewhere, Gustavus III of Sweden having
declared war. Thus, despite her successes against Turkey, Catharine found
herself in a precarious position, which was further aggravated by the death of
Joseph and a change in the attitude of Austria. Thanks to her own skill and
energy, she was able to extricate herself by means of the Treaty of Varala with
Sweden (1790) and that of Jassy with Turkey (January 9,1792), thus avoiding the
intervention of one of the European Powers. The Treaty of Jassy confirmed that
of Kutchuk-Kainardji; the partition of Turkey had certainly not been effected,
neither had the Greek empire and the kingdom of Dacia come into being. But the
Dniester had become the boundary river of Russia, and the northern shore of the
Black Sea to the confines of the Caucasus was now Bussian. It remained for
Catharine’s successors to improve upon the position of Russia in Asia and to
pursue her plan of utilising against Turkey the foothold afforded by the
protectorship over the Greek Christians of that country. Sevastopol and Odessa
(founded in 1794) remained the outward and visible signs of what Catharine had
achieved in the East; henceforth Turkey had no longer any terrors for Russia.
The nature
and results of Catharine’s foreign policy will now have become sufficiently
intelligible. Its gist was the consistent assertion of the strength of Russia
in the interests of Russia; nor was it devoid of a Machiavellian note.
Catharine never allowed her country to be taken in tow by another Power. To
her, alliances and understandings were, simply and solely, means for increasing
the strength of Russia with a view to securing for it the status of a really
European Power.
1762-96]
Catharine'spolicy towards Germany and the West. 677
And herein
she was so successful, that, apart from the acquisition of territory, which in
itself furthered her aims, she almost attained to the position of arbitress in
the affairs of central Europe. She was able to avail herself of the strong
antagonism between Prussia and Austria, siding now with one and now with the
other, and thus dependent on neither. In the crisis created by the Bavarian War
of Succession in 1778, both Powers sought her help at the same time; so that
she could announce her intention to stand surety for the Constitution of
Germany, thus assuming a rdle hitherto played by France. After the conclusion
of the Treaty of Teschen, on which Russia had brought a decisive influence to
bear, Frederick and Maria Theresa expressed their gratitude for her
mediation—an indication of the ohange in the European status of Russia, even as
compared with that reached under Peter. It was at Teschen that Catharine laid
the foundation of the political influence exercised by Russia in Germany, and
more especially in Prussia, which lasted far into the nineteenth century.
With England
there were not as yet so many points of contact, since that Power had offered
no special opposition to the Russian forward movement in the East. The change
in the Russian relations with Prussia was, however, accompanied by a similar
alienation of England, and, in the last years of Catharine’s reign Pitt was
definitely opposed to her in Eastern affairs. It was against England that the
system of “ Armed Neutrality ” (1780) was directed, by means of which Catharine
sought to secure the neutral flag in face of the English practices against
neutral shipping in the war with the North American Colonies. The declaration
marked an important advance in the theoretical development of maritime law,
but could be of no practical avail against the naval strength of England.
With all her
liking for French society and literature, Catharine’s relations to France had
always been rather cool; and, as to the Eastern question, France had sided
against her, without, however, taking any leading part. But, despite her
attitude towards the AufTelarung, she was adverse on principle to the French
Revolution, just as she had been indignant at the American. For the same
reason, she became, towards the close of her reign, more reactionary in her
home policy. But, though she might express her views on the Revolution in
France, she took care not to be drawn into the war for its suppression. On the
contrary, she openly confessed that the War of the First Coalition appeared to
her an excellent way of occupying the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, so as to
leave her a free hand for her undertakings. In fact, however, she served the f'
Revolution, inasmuch as her Polish and Eastern policy compelled the j coalition directed against the
West to turn its attention to the East, and / thus hampered and crippled its
action.
The results
of Catharine’s foreign policy were, as regards diplomacy, almost exclusively
the work of the sovereign herself. Her ministers and
678 Catharine's foreign
policy her own.—Potemkin. [1762-96
ambassadors
were her assistants; of counsellors she had no need. Neither Nikita Panin nor
Alexander Besborodko, her Foreign Ministers, held a position with her
resembling that of Bestuzheff with the Tsarina Elizabeth or that of Kaunitz
with Maria Theresa. Catharine, exactly like Frederick the Great, managed her
foreign affairs herself, notably by dint of vigorous private correspondence
with other crowned heads* Frederick II, Joseph II, Gustavus III of Sweden (her correspondence
with Prince Henry of Prussia may likewise be included). Her literary
correspondence with Grimm, Voltaire, and Diderot was of some political
significance: she meant these literati to influence the public opinion of
Europe by blowing the Russian trumpet; and, herein too, she was highly
successful. It is true that these letters betray an undercurrent of personal
vanity on her part; but she exhibits at the same time a marvellous versatility
of mind and skill in dealing with political matters. Her letters prove her a
woman of great political talent, by whom the privileges of her sex and
position alike were utilised to the full for public ends, both in her
correspondence and more especially in her conversation. She often tried to
transact affairs of State under cover of social pleasures, delightful as these
were to her in themselves. Nor must the influence of Potemkin on this
essentially independent woman be overestimated, though he was a favourite of
hers and seemed preeminently trusted by her to play a leading part in public
matters. It is certainly an exagger t:on to divide her reign simply
into the period before Potemkin (to c. 1774) and the time of his ascendancy. He
may have imparted a rather more adventurous and fantastic tone to her Eastern schemes
than would otherwise have belonged to them; but they formed an organic part of
Russia’s historic development, and the political action of the Tsarina did not
run out of all bounds in obedience to the wishes of this strange favourite. He
did not dominate her; anyone who seriously considers the two personalities must
be convinced that such a supposition is psychologically inconceivable. When he
took command of the troops in the second Turkish War, it was she who led and
advised, and allowed herself to be disconcerted by no emergency, while his
passive nature broke down utterly. It was her individual will which prompted
and determined her foreign policy; though it must of course be borne in mind
that, while her statesmanship justly commands admiration by reason of its
firmness, breadth and uniformity, the main lines of her foreign policy were
defined for her with comparative clearness and simplicity, so soon as she had
made up her mind to consult none but Russian interests. But, if the masterly
conduct of foreign affairs in which lay the chief glory of this reign is
entirely attributable to Catharine, at her door must also be laid the immense
sacrifice of life and property imposed upon the Russian nation by that policy,
to whose demands all home affairs, the material prosperity of her people, and
their advance in civilisation, had always to remain subordinate and
subservient.
1762-96] Court
factions.—Appeal to national feeling. 679
From the
first Catharine threw herself with great zeal into the tasks appertaining to
absolute rule. She endeavoured to inform herself on every subject, read and
wrote a vast amount with this end in view, and strove to be absolute monarch in
home affairs as well as foreign. Her first task, indeed, was that of securing
her own position. She had usurped the throne; and, although the coup d'etat had
easily raised her to it, a turn of the tide might just as easily bring her
down. For the Guards had been demoralised by the coup d'etat, and aspirants to
Catharine’s position were not far to seek. She confessed to having felt
insecure on the throne till the middle of the seventies. At Court, the various
factions were scheming against each other for the upper hand, as, for example,
Princess Dashkoff against the Orloffs. Catharine owed the Crown mainly to the
energetic support of the Orloffs, who consequently rose to the top, although
Gregori, her actual favourite, was incapable of exerting any real influence on
state affairs. For a time it seemed as if the Tsarina meant to legitimatise her
relations with him by marriage; and this step. was advised by Bestuzheff,
though strongly opposed by Panin. But she can hardly have seriously
contemplated it, as such a marriage could be of no service to her and must have
involved her immediately in the petty rivalries of the various court cliques.
For her, a stranger to Russia, it was even more important than it had been to
the English Queen Elizabeth to be “ wedded to her people.” That Russians proper
felt no very great enthusiasm for the German usurper became evident at the
coronation, when the Moscow populace cheered her son Paul far more than they
did the Tsarina herself, She had all the more need of emphasising her
determination to be a Russian; and herein she was aided by the fact that no
foreigner ever more thoroughly understood the character, often wholly
mysterious, and the psychology of the Russian people. For instance, no German
was ever one of her numerous favourites, or placed at the head of Cabinet or
army, although in administrative and military affairs she could but ill
dispense with the German element in her State. In this way she flattered the
patriotic feeling which was intensified by the splendid successes of her
foreign policy; and, in the end, she was accounted a genuine Russian, though
she never was or could become such at heart.
At the outset
of her reign she had to struggle against the opposition of the Orthodox clergy,
which might have become exceedingly dangerous to her. As regards religion, she,
was heart and soul a child of the AufMarung\ but such convictions did not
prevent her from clearly recognising the importance of the Greek Church, in
which Old Russian opinion might find a support against her. She therefore
pursued vigorously and successfully the ecclesiastical policy of Peter III,
namely the secularisation of church lands. Archbishop Arseni Mazeievich of
Rostoff became the representative of the opposition against her and her policy,
which ended by openly questioning her right to the throne (1763
and 1767).
Catharine had to face a dangerous crisis, and came through it successfully. The
common people associated various legends with the person of the prelate who
vanished into the dungeons of Reval; evidently, he had elicited something of an
echo among the masses, and their attitude towards the new regime was by no
means enthusiastic. This disaffection and unrest might easily have found a
tangible and thus exceedingly dangerous centre. Ivan Antonovich was still
living'in Schlusselburg, though almost reduced to idiocy by his long imprisonment,
and any fresh revolutionary movement might well make use of him as a rival for
the throne. It was, therefore, fortunate for Catharine that he met his end in a
wild attempt made for his liberation (1764). In this case also Catharine has
been accused of the trick of having participated in the plan for her rival’s
release in order to effect his removal. She was, however, assuredly innocent of
Ivan’s murder; but the rumour proves how insecure her position was thought.
The last
genuine claimant was thus disposed of. But all through the reign there was a
succession of false claimants. Russia has always been the classical land for
the type; so that each instance of it must be regarded as part of a problem in
social pathology. So far as Catharine’s reign is concerned, the murder of Peter
III, Ivan’s long imprisonment, and the criminal proceedings against supposed
revolutionary designs, were shrouded in so much mystery as to excite the
imagination of the people, who were quite prepared to believe that it was not
the real Peter, Ivan, and so forth, that had been done away with. Pseudopretenders,
often mere adventurers or robber-chiefs, were readily followed by the Russian
populace, who thus testified to a complicated series of experiences that had
impressed themselves upon it—bad government and a barbarously arbitrary
administration of justice; the miserable social condition of the peasantry,
oppressed by the conscription and by a load of taxation imposed by authorities
ruthlessly set upon finding men and money; together with the instinctive
hostility of the people to non-Russian domination; the hatred nursed by the
sectaries against the persecution of their creed by the state Church; the
remembrance of their lost freedom cherished by the Cossacks; the hostility of
the “foreign” elements towards Russian nationalism; the repugnance to a settled
condition of things natural to a people which, after all, had not as yet fully
emerged from the nomadic state and still clung largely to vagrant habits. Amid
these constant convulsions of the politic body the pretender became in the end
a mere accessory; the movements in question were in fact social upheavals, with
a national woof in the texture. The most formidable rising was Pugachoff’s, of
which Bibikoff, who had been sent to quell it, wrote appositely: “Pugachoff
matters little, but the universal discontent much.”
This rising
of Pugachoff (1773-5), coinciding as it did with the Turkish War, was the most
serious internal crisis which Catharine had
1722-97] Pugachoff’s rising.—The Succession
question. 681
to face
during her reign. Jemelian Pugachoff, a Don Cossack, who could neither read nor
write, came forward as Pretender, professing to be Peter III, who was not
really dead at all. The wave of insurrection stirred up by him in the
south-east rolled onwards amid terrible atrocities, and was swelled by all the
currents of feeling noted above. It was at one and the same time a peasant
revolt and a rising of Cossacks, Tartars, Chuvas, Bashkirs, and others, against
the Russians. It lasted for a long time, until the insurgents, who were already
threatening Moscow, were overthrown and Pugachoff was put to death. But the
Pretender had almost been lost sight of in the horrors of the struggle and in
the universal excitement. The rising was no longer a movement to dethrone the
Tsarina, but a revolution—not a political revolution with definite political
aims, but a social upheaval, a sort of Jacquerie. It became glaringly evident
how unprepared and how unsound at heart was the State which at that very time
succeeded in concluding the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji. An appalling contrast
was thus revealed hetween the outward splendour and the wild ferment of the
interior, between the European form of the State and the Asiatic barbarity of
the people.
After 1775
the Tsarina felt secure, even though the intrigues at Court had not ceased, nor
the discontent among the people, especially in Moscow. To this was added her
suspicion of her own son Paul. The relations between mother and son were not of
the best; he reminded her of his father, like whom she considered him unfit to
rule the empire. She intended accordingly to exclude him from the succession to
the throne. From a legal point of view, the execution of this intention would
not have amounted to an act of violence; for it had been provided by Peter I
that every Tsar should appoint his successor. Catharine had her grandson
Alexander in view as her successor and made a point of alienating him from his
father; while Paul was kept away from the Court and from affairs of State, she
won over Alexander and Constantine to herself. Thus, the same condition of
things repeated itself which she had experienced as Tsarevna under Elizabeth;
and the throne which Catharine had herself with difficulty secured was once
more exposed to the risk of violent agitations. But her death intervened before
the matter had been entirely settled according to her wishes; and Paul was able
to ascend the throne without difficulty or opposition. In 1797, he reintroduced
the law of succession by primogeniture, which continues in force in Russia at
the present day.
Catharine,
being a usurper, had to depend very specially on the support of the new
bureaucracy created by Peter I in the order of precedence issued on February
4,1722. Russia was henceforth in civil and military affairs under the sway of
the agreement between the Tsar and this bureaucracy (the Chim), who were alike
separated from the people by a broad line of cleavage. These allied authorities
held the reins of
government,
each being deeply interested in the existence of the other; the vast subject
mass of the people stood by, uncomprehending and apathetic like a sacrificial
lamb, while its rulers brought about the new development of Russia as part of
the European world. Far from reforming, Catharine rather intensified this
relation, which possesses so enormous an importance for the history of Russia.
The instruments of her policy were the officers, who commanded the soldiers
drawn from the peasantry, and the bureaucracy, whose formal composition and
organisation she altered to some extent, but without being able to change its
character materially. It was the task of this bureaucracy to hold the resources
of the country in readiness, so as to place them at the immediate disposal of
the sole and absolute sovereign. Thus the whole administration absolutely and
entirely centred in St Petersburg and the Tsarina.
In the first
instance, she was environed by a number of Ministries, or Colleges, as Peter I
had termed these central authorities founded by him. Of these only the
Department for Foreign Affairs, the War Department, and the Admiralty,
remained intact and of importance. The title of Chancellor, which was attached
to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, lapsed under Catharine: the Foreign
Ministers (Panin and Besborodko), however, discharged the office of Chancellor,
with the assistance of a ViceChancellor (Prince Alexander Galitsin, and
afterwards Count Osterman). The other departments lost their raison d'etre
under Catharine and were abolished, their functions being transferred by her to
the Boards constituted in the provinces. On the other hand an attempt was made
by her to establish a central administration of revenue; but this was not
systematically carried out. The head of this central financial administration
was the Procurator-General, whose post, created by Peter in order to facilitate
the relations between Tsar and Senate, became an exceedingly important one
under Catharine: this official (since 1764* Prince Viasemski), as the head of
the whole internal administration, took the lead in home affairs. No real
importance was attained by the departmental organisations, which the central
offices were to weld into a systematic whole, nor by the Senate, which had originated
in Peter I’s reign, nor yet by the Imperial Council, which Catharine had added
in
1768, to meet the needs of the militaiy
administration in the Turkish War. For Catharine had herself so strong an
interest in legislative and administrative matters, that she preferred to
manage the various branches directly through the agency of persons on whom she
could rely. In the main she was her own Minister, Chancellor, and Imperial
Council.
The
fundamental principle of administration in Russia was centralisation in the
hands of the. sovereign. Catharine was, however, shrewd enough to see that in
her enormous empire such a centralisation was, as a matter of fact,
impracticable, unless methodically supplemented by allowing the highest
possible measure of independence to the administration of the provinces. In
place, therefore, of the more or less chaotic
conditions of
local administration, she established (1775) a system of governorships on which
the provincial administration of Russia at the present day is largely based.
This reform, if tending overmuch towards regular uniformity, was at the same
time of great importance. Its chief features were as follows: the unwieldy
governmental districts then ^.listing were to be split up into smaller
districts of 300,000 to 400,000 inhabitants, which were further subdivided into
circles of 20,000 to
80,000, but grouped together in large provinces
under Govemors-General. There was to be decentralisation, distribution of
functions, and establishment of judicial and administrative Boards; while the
population was to cooperate, organised in Estates, for purposes of local
administration. The model for the main part of these changes was supplied by
the German (Baltic) provinces, and during the two decades required for carrying
them into effect the Tsarina was materially assisted by Count Johann Jakob
Sievers, a Baltic nobleman, one of her leading officials. The idea was to have
a local administration which would best serve the interests of people and
State, whereas direction and control should rest with the central body. The
framework was to consist of two governmental Boards (administrative and
financial) under the Governor and Vice-Governor, with the Governor’s Civil and
Criminal Court. In addition, a number of authorities superintended justice,
police, poor- relief, etc., which were to be elected by the people partially in
the case of the provinces and entirely in that of the circles. By means of this
comprehensive reform, Catharine wished to give self-government to the people
as. organised in Estates. But what was established was, of course, not
“self-government” properly so called; for it is contradictory to the spirit of
even the most enlightened despotism to permit any really independent
participation of the people in government by means of elective bodies.
Catharine looked upon the share taken by the Estates as a function of the
State, and upon the officials elected by them as state officials; she allowed
them a wide scope for activity, but not the conditions of any real autonomy,
and much less the right of levying taxes. For these organs of the Estates were
intended to carry out the will, not of the people, but of the sovereign, and to
perform the tasks prescribed by her; since, according to the conception of
enlightened despotism, the will of the sovereign must of necessity be the most
rational. Yet even this concession in the direction of self-government was
excessive in the eyes of the official classes. With the aid of the autocracy,
conceived of as indicated, these new bodies were utilised by them in such a way
as entirely to forfeit their character of organs of self-government. Such a
course was rendered possible by the compact between Tsardom and Chin on the one
hand, and by tbe immaturity of the population on the other. As a matter of
fact, self-government did not ensue from the law of 1775, as might have been
anticipated from its wording. The centre of gravity of the local administration
lay in the
Governor or
Governor-General as the case might be, who was virtually nothing more than the
local representative of the central Government. Thus, this reform associated
with Catharine’s name failed to bring about so great an advance in the art of
administration as ought to have ensued. A better distribution of functions
between central and provincial authorities was achieved, and a general
organisation of local government was effected which was a considerable
improvement on the former state of affairs, although, it must be confessed,
somewhat inelastic, and not altogether calculated to work smoothly. The law of
1775, however, failed to result in real self-government, and to shake the power
of the bureaucracy; it did not give rise to that restraining force which alone
could improve the character of the tiivil service. Catharine endeavoured to
master every difficulty and to reform in every direction; she was the first
sovereign since Peter the Great to travel about Russia, in order to form an
idea of things for herself; but, owing to the enormous size of the country, the
lack of means of communication, and the passive obstruction of the official
classes, she was unable, in spite of all her great natural gifts and force of
character, to accomplish a wholesale reform. She could not, single-handed,
alter the character of the officials, who remained on the whole arbitrary,
negligent, corrupt, and mercenary; and often she was herself only too prone to
judge by appearances. Catharine’s administrative reform manifests her eminence
in a sphere of action usually closed to women; but at the same time it reveals
the limitations imposed on an enlightened despotism even when represented by a
sovereign of such brilliant gifts and so powerful a will.
If the nation
was to be led up after this fashion to self-government, it needed to be already
organised, or to become organised in one way or another, and in its several
Estates, since it was in strict accordance with the system of Estates that this
particular form of self-government was devised. The peasantry had from of old
been organised in their traditional communities. Catharine’s legislation tried
to bring these into line for self-government. In the newly constituted bodies,
few in number, which were to embrace all ranks of society, the peasantry were
to be represented, and, where a special agency had been provided for each
Estate, the peasants also were to have one of their own. But this only held
good in respect of peasants belonging to the Crown; the vast majority were
manorial peasants, who, being debarred from all rights conferred by this
administrative reform, remained under the exclusive control of the landowners.
But even this limited measure of self-government was shorn of all significance
for the crown peasants, too, in consequence of the construction put upon it by
the bureaucracy and of the low state of civilisation of the peasant population.
On the other
hand, it was of some importance for the towns on which the municipal system
promulgated in 1785 conferred a form of selfgovernment based on a
classification of their inhabitants (in guilds,
1775-96]
Municipal government.—1'he nobility.
685
companies,
etc.). But, here again, self-government did not imply very much—for the simple
reason that in Russia there existed as yet no middle class as such with its
distinctive social aspirations. Thus, at bottom, in the towns also everything
remained virtually dependent on the organs of the Government.
What amount
of self-government the administrative reform of 1775 did bring about was, as a
matter of fact, solely to the advantage of the nobility; this reform, coupled
with the “Letter of Grace to the Nobility,” of 1785, completed the process by
which they became the privileged class. Not only did they enjoy unconditional,
direct, and unrestrained power over their own peasantry, but the State was
virtually, if indirectly, controlled by them as a bureaucracy, and through the
medium of this so-called selfgovernment. By the “Letter of Grace” the nobles
were corporately organised as belonging to the several circles and provinces
(with an assembly and a marshal of the order); this organisation, which
continues in the main to the present day, was modelled on that of the Baltic
provinces. The elections of the official functionaries of the Estates,
instituted in 1775, took place according to the circles and provinces. The
exemption of the nobility from state service, granted by Peter III, was
continued by Catharine. The nobles enjoyed immunity from taxation, might not be
subjected to corporal punishment, and so forth. They now possessed absolute
power over their peasantry, but were responsible to the Government for the due
performance of state obligations by their peasants, in the way of military
service and payment of poll tax. Thus, the reform of 1775 had conceded no real
self-government of a kind to educate the nation politically. The State was
ruled by an absolute Tsar and a bureaucracy in the hands of the Chin, whose
hierarchy remained. As a highly privileged class of landed proprietors and as a
social order, the nobles had a great measure of power; it was from their ranks
that the officials were mainly drawn, and they thus controlled administration
and justice—but political importance they had none, more especially as the rank
of a noble was easily attained, being conferred as a matter of course on anyone
who reached a certain position in the table of precedence. The Chin and the
landed proprietors were actual powers in the land; but the nobles constituted
no country gentry, as such, in the Russia of the Tsars, corresponding to that
which existed in western Europe. This development, the result of which was of
vital importance for Russia, was definitively marked out by Catharine’s
legislation. Speaking generally, the whole reform aimed at an organically
subdivided national life on a local basis; but it failed to achieve a result
which presupposed a freedom incompatible with the absolutism of the Tsars and
consequently not permitted by them.
This contrast
between theory and practice is still more clearly apparent in Catharine’s
treatment of the peasant question and in her famous “Legislative Commission.”
This Commission, which sat from
1767 to 1768,
seemed to be a move in the direction of legislation by the people
themselves—the beginning, in other words, of a parliamentary system in Russia.
It will therefore be easily understood that this step caused the greatest
possible sensation in Europe and, since it was inconceivable that Russia could
be transformed from an absolute monarchy into a State which had limited its own
powers, was regarded, and ridiculed, as sheer comedy. As a matter of fact, the
Commission was intended to be neither a parliament, nor even the germ of one.
Catharine had
eagerly assumed the duties of a ruler, having prepared herself for them by her
study of writings in French political philosophy. As an enthusiastic student of
the new French school, she felt that an opportunity was now afforded her of
introducing into Russia its liberal and humane doctrines, so fraught with
blessings for the people. She was imbued with the conviction that a clear legal
code and good laws were of paramount, indeed of all-important, value. Such laws
as there were in Russia consisted of a confused mass of the most heterogeneous
provisions; it had been recognised before Catharine’s time that they required
systematic codification, though this had not been accomplished. Catharine, a
true child of the eighteenth century, was of opinion that it was necessary, in
the first place, to establish fresh legal principles adapted to the age, with
which the detailed regulations must be made to accord; this method of procedure
would best remedy the deficiencies in the existing laws and render them what
they had not been in the past —a really just expression of existing conditions.
She undertook herself the task of establishing the general principles on which
the legal code was to be drawn up; she even represented it to Voltaire as a
simple matter to determine the general principles. The problem of working out
the details according to these principles was confided to representatives of
the people, so that the nation should have an opportunity of making known its
wishes and needs in regard to the legislative settlement.
Catharine
next proceeded, quite in private, to elaborate these general principles; and
they were published in 1767 in the shape of her famous “Instruction (Nakas) to
the commission appointed to prepare a draft for a new code.” This remarkable
document did not, however, appear in the form which she had originally given
it, but previously underwent extensive modification at the hands of persons
consulted by her. Catharine had herself felt, and her advisers had made it
still clearer, that the general ideals of the Avfklarung in State and society,
not practicable even in western Europe, were little adapted to Russian circumstances
; “ these are axioms fit to bring down stone walls,” Count Nikita Panin had
said of the Liberal views of the Nak&s in its first form. With Catharine’s
authorisation it had been transformed and had received a thoroughly
conservative tone; in particular its views on the condition and future of the
peasantry were revised—it need hardly be said in what sense. Thus, here
already, is observable the contradiction between theory and practice which
permeates the whole work.
1767-85] Representative
Legislative Commission. 687
Even in this
form, however, the Nakas is a book of great note and interest. It affords some
insight into Catharine’s social and political views in general. These are by no
means original, since the work as a whole reveals but little independent
thought. She herself confesses to wearing a great many borrowed plumes. Her
sources were in the first place Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois, and, next,
Beccaria’s. recent work Dei delitti e delle pene (Crime and Punishment),
published in 1764. The several paragraphs offer general remarks on State and
society rather than an enunciation of set legal principles; in fact, the book
is a sort of legislative catechism. It is permeated by an optimism that
delights in human progress, and is derived from ethics based on the law of
nature; and it is instinct with the sense of responsibility proper to
enlightened despotism, though these latter ideas are unable to blend quite
harmoniously with the rest. “The people do not exist for the ruler, but the
ruler for the people,” and “ the ruler is the source of all civil and political
power ’V-here we have natural right and Tsarism in juxtaposition. The
impression created by the book in Europe was deservedly great; but it was of
course practically useless as a guide to the codification of Russian law.
If
in this general design Catharine had not been able to mould all the principles
and demands contained in it as she had desired, far more serious difficulties
were encountered in the process of elaborating her suggestions into particular
laws and adapting to them the existing legal material. Though the Commission
appointed for this purpose was not intended to be a parliament, it was in point
of fact the first representation of the whole nation since the Semskw Sobary of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and was thus virtually a
parliament—consisting of no less than 564 member? elected by the people and
embracing all ranks of society except the clergy, who were not represented as a
class. The manorial peasants were of course only represented by their masters,
whereas the crown peasants sent deputies. The total was made up of 161 representatives
of the nobility, 208 of the towns, 79 from the peasantry, 54 from the Cossacks,
34 from “foreign” peoples as they were called—this representation of Samoyedes
and Bashkirs was ridiculed abroad—and in addition 28 representatives of the
Government. These class divisions exhibit the same feature in the system of
representation as that which recurs in 1775 and again in 1785, and which is
fundamentally opposed to the ideas of the Aufklarung and of the Nakas itself. ,
The elections
went off smoothly, and on August 10, 1767, the Commission was opened in the
audience-chamber at the Kremlin in Moscow. Out of three candidates nominated by
Catharine, Bibikoff was chosen President, and he with the Procurator-General of
Finance (Viasemski) conducted the proceedings, which passed off in a dignified
and orderly lashion. The deputies displayed the natural eloquence and parliamentary
ability innate in the Russian people., After the Tsarina’s
mandate had
been read aloud, there followed the mandates of each electoral district to its
deputy. These, nearly 1500 in number, together present an almost complete
picture of the condition of the most widely divergent sections of the Russian
people, and for this reason an exceptional historical interest attaches to
them like that belonging to the cahiers of the French Revolution. With the
Tsarina’s Nakas for their guidance, and with the aid of these, of course
entirely unsystematic, lists of popular requests, the Commission now had to
compile a modern code out of the confused and incongruous mass of materials
confronting them in the existing laws, over 10,000 in number. It is obvious
that the task was an impossible one for this body of men. Catharine had sought
to win the fame of a Justinian, underrating in happy ignorance the enormous
difficulty of such a work. There was, as a matter of course, considerable
difficulty about producing a systematic codification within a reasonable time
through an assembly of such diverse social aims; and it was rendered
insurmountable by the utter absence of all preparatory work, the unpractical
and ill-defined distribution of the labours of the Commission and the
incapacity of those responsible for its management. Not a single section of the
future code was produced, nor, in the course of 200 sittings, were all the
mandates of the deputies read out. At the end of 1767, the Commission was
transferred to St Petersburg, and the sittings became less frequent. Then, on
the outbreak of the Turkish War in 1768, many of the members were called away
to serve in the army, and the Commission was adjourned, never to meet again.
The sub-committees went on working for a time, till they too came to a quiet
end. Catharine seems to have entirely forgotten the Commission after 1775. She
must have realised that nothing was to be accomplished in this way, and so have
determined to confine herself to legislation. But this interesting experiment
was not in vain; although begun without any serious appreciation of its
importance, it diffused, in Catharine’s own words, “light and knowledge over
the whole empire with which we have to deal and for which we have to provide.”
No Tsar had hitherto adopted this attitude towards the condition, wishes, and
needs of the various strata of his people; the mandates of the deputies, the
privileges of the nobility and of the merchants, the peasant question, and so
forth, had been very amply discussed. Abundant proofs had been given of the
class selfishness of the nobles, more especially of those of Moscow, who had a
leader of weight in Prince Scherbatoff, yet had been the chief opponents of the
demands advanced by him. The representatives of Little Russians and Cossacks,
and those of the Baltic provinces, who, though in part not even able to speak
Russian, had formed the most important element in the Commission, had brought
to light their various special needs. The administration of justice,
decentralisation, and self-government had been discussed. In a word, there was
now in hand a mass of valuable information as to the
temper and
condition of the people. But the lofty designs formed by Catharine, when
undertaking the reform of legislation, had produced no results but the
administrative regulations of 1775 and the Letters of Grace of 1785; and even
these documents had only in part the significance which at first sight they
seem to possess.
The important
point was, however, that the peasant question, in which Catharine had been
interested even as Tsarevna, had thus before her death met with a treatment
diametrically opposed to the fact that, in accordance with the ideas of the
century, she was, as her own statements testify* in favour of the liberation
of the serfs. Among her papers there are projects for the gradual abolition of
serfdom by the emancipation of the peasants in cases of land changing hands. In
the first edition of the NaJcas a great deal was said about the necessity for
ameliorating the condition of the peasantry and doing away with serfdom. When
the St Petersburg Free Economic Society had announced as the subject of a prize
essay the emancipation of the peasantry, the Tsarina promoted a widespread
competition both in Russia and abroad; and the prize was awarded to an
inhabitant of Aix-la-Chapelle, who advocated the emancipation of the peasants.
She also allowed the “Legislative Commission ” to discuss the question at
considerable length and was ill- pleased when the majority supported the
existing law. It appeared consistent and logical that the abolition of serfdom
should go hand in hand with the exemption of the nobility from state service
definitively established by the Letter of Grace of 1785. It seemed scandalous
that advertisements should appear in the papers for the sale of peasants
unattached to any land; this was slavery pure and simple—a term otherwise
inapplicable to the relations between landowners and peasants, though sometimes
used for purposes of agitation.
In spite of
all this, however, serfdom continued to be censured in theory, whereas in
practice the existing state of things was aggravated in the interests of the
landowners. In the final printed version of the Nakas numerous Liberal
expressions on the subject of the peasantry were suppressed under the influence
of the current which had set in against reform. It was not, as the Slavophils
maintained, the fault of the Tsarina or even of the Germans that nothing came
of the emancipation of the peasants in Catharine’s reign; the result must be
laid at the door of the landed nobility, who in this matter proved too strong
for the sovereign. She was on the horns of a dilemma: if she abandoned her
compact with the dominant section of society and effected the emancipation of
the serfs in spite of its opposition, could she in her still precarious
position rely upon the wild and largely fluctuating masses let loose by her act
of emancipation ? Their constant convulsions and risings proved how insecure
was her footing; for Pugachoff’s revolt, the greatest and most dangerous, was
by no means an isolated occurrence. The Tsarina must have seen she would have
run too great a risk in
carrying such
a measure in opposition to the nobility; and thus she did not throw the whole
force of her will into her theoretical scheme of emancipation. Hence her
agrarian policy likewise bore a twofold character. She placed peasants in the
towns which she founded and of which she made them free citizens. She changed
the whole mass of peasantry formerly owned by the clergy from manorial into
crown peasants—certainly a considerable advance for them. On the German peasant
colonists who came into her dominions and were settled on the lower Volga, she
bestowed an admirable legal and administrative system, which, in conjunction
with the influence of schools and religious ministry, produced great prosperity
in these settlements. On the other hand, by her enormous gifts of land and
peasants to her favourites she vastly increased the number of peasants attached
to private estates. Altogether, her administrative reform did not in the
slightest degree affect the manorial serfs, as they were not represented on the
“ Legislative Commission.” Despite all her vaunted enthusiasm for liberty, the
rights of the landowners were increased under her rSgime, and villanage continued
in the same form as before. Thus landowners, in addition to the right of
sending their peasants to Siberia—which was already allowed— gained that of
imposing on them forced labour for “ insolence ” towards their masters. A
landed proprietor might send a peasant to serve in the army, whenever he
pleased, without waiting for the regular recruiting time; and a peasant was
actually forbidden to bring an action against his master. In short, the peasant
seemed to be a mere chattel, a personal possession, a slave, and not a subject
of the State. The sale of peasants unattached to the land was indeed forbidden,
but it did not cease, any more than illicit traffic in peasants at recruiting
time. In Little Russia serfdom was first introduced in this reign. Thus the
economic interests of the nobility as a class outweighed the theoretical
opinions and wishes of the Tsarina; and the patriarchal relation between the
peasant and his master survived. It was not as a matter of course oppressive
for the peasant, but it kept him entirely at the mercy of his master, whose
one-sided interest in the services of his peasants, coupled with his own
responsibility for the burdens imposed by the State, effectively checked all
progress of civilisation among the peasants, who in so purely agricultural a
country formed the enormous majority of its population. In fact, the condition
of the peasantry under Catharine was deplorably wretched. This became
alarmingly evident from the description of their condition in RadishchefTs
Journey from St Petersburg to Moscow (1790), a simple, somewhat sentimental
narrative in the style of Sterne. But the views of Catharine, upon whom the
French Revolution in particular had exercised its effect, were no longer those
of the authoress of the Nakas, with which the Journey was in perfect accord.
The unfortunate writer was banished to Siberia as a revolutionary agitator.
At the same
time, the burdens and sacrifices imposed by the Government weighed heavily
upon these very peasants, who were treated as slaves, but who had to be
regarded as subjects of the State and as citizens, at all events from the point
of view of duties. In order to win her great successes abroad, Catharine
strained the resources of the nation to the utmost, more than it could bear without
detriment to its advance in ci ’'ilisation. Her home policy was entirely
subservient to her foreign policy, and no thorough-going reforms could be
achieved because the claims of foreign affairs constantly intervened. This
pressure, unavoidable in itself, but fatal to the internal progress of the
nation, was due to Russia’s recent political advance, and was a legacy from
Peter the Great to Catharine, who in turn bequeathed it to her successors. The
primary duty of the Government at home was the supply of men and money. The
wars cost many lives, and the losses were even greater than in the case of
other European States, by reason of the bad military administration, and the
natural difficulties presented by the theatres of these wars. The annual expenditure
during Catharine’s reign rose from 17 to 70 or 80 million roubles (£2,408,000
to £9,917,000), almost exclusively for purposes of foreign policy—and this in a
country whose population was far too low in proportion to its vast area, and
where no surplus wealth was produced. Catharine succeeded in raising the
importance of Russia abroad, but only by drawing upon the capital which the
country possessed in the powers and resources of its people. She was unable to
repress the unscrupulousness of the officials and the abuses connected with
conscription, which rendered the popular burdens still harder to bear. Neither
was it beneficial to the public health, that under her rule the proceeds of the
state monopoly of spirits formed one-eighth of the whole revenue.
In her
economic views and in the tendencies of her economic and commercial policy
Catharine appears to have been a moderate Liberal, with physiocratic
principles. In this respect she differed from Peter the Great who was a strong
mercantilist; and, here again, she was a direct adherent of contemporary
theories. She was therefore in favour of freedom of trade and manufacture and,
instead of continuing to impose all sorts of regulations, removed many
oppressive restrictions. Export duties were abolished, and the prohibition of
the export of wheat was cancelled; all monopolies were abolished, and for a
time the Empress actually allowed the unrestricted import and export of gold,
which was contrary to all mercantilist theories. Industries were to be earned on
freely; private works and factories might be founded without special permission
from the authorities and were to be treated as private property; the benefit of
free competition at home being thus recognised. In Catharine’s commercial
policy she consequently likewise adhered to moderate Liberal lines ; in 1782, a
Liberal tariff was put in force instead of that of 1767, which had still been
mercantilist in character. In 1763,
she appointed
a “Trade Commission” to deal with all matters connected with trade; it was a
sort of Ministry for Commerce of. an advisory nature, which continued in force
till 1796. The moderate Liberal views of the Empress prevailed in this body,
which was under her sole superintendence ; hence* when the Tsarina veered
round to protectionism in 1793, the Commission followed suit; for towards the
end of her reign she relinquished her Liberal. propensities on this head also.
The unsatisfactory financial condition into which the empire was sinking ieeper
and deeper furnished the immediate pretext for a revision of the customs policy
of which the new tariff of 1796 was the outcome; this did not, however, come
into force, as the death of the Tsarina ensued and her successor rescinded the
tariff.
But in
general, too, Catharine’s Liberalism in commercial and industrial matters was
mainly a paper policy. In practice, political and fiscal interests were
paramount all through, and her economic Liberalism only came into play where it
directly contributed to these ends, or at all events did not run counter to
them. If the natural law of the freedom of the individual is an essential
element in the Physio- cratic conception, Russia could not have been further
from following it. Despite free trade and the abolition of monopoly no part of
Russia was ripe for a really free economic system, and the economic Liberalism
of this enlightened Empress accordingly had little real meaning. Catharine’s
whole policy in regard to the internal welfare of Russia is fragmentary and
spasmodic; it was not free from dilettantism and paid no due attention to
detail; it suffered from the lack of an efficient executive and from the
restrictions placed upon it by the Tsarina’s foreign policy. Her memory is best
perpetuated by her efforts for the improvement of the water-ways of the empire,
in which Count Sievers vigorously supported her, and by the foundation of new
towns, often rashly undertaken, and genuin ely successful only in the case of
Odessa.
What has been
said of Catharine’s economic policy is equally true of her course of action in
regard to the education and the general advancement of her people, much as she
prided herself on her entire legislative activity and liked to look at
everything in the most favourable light. “ It is clear,” she says, “ that
education is at the root of all good and evil; a new race or new fathers and
mothers must therefore, so to speak, be produced, by means of education in the
first instance.” She accordingly provided cadet corps for boys,
boarding-schools for girls—the school for noblemen’s daughters at Smolna was
founded by her. There were to be national schools in the capital of each
province and circle; and she intended to found new universities. But though her
energy and that of her adviser Betzki call for commendation, no thorough-going
reforms could be effected because of the want of resources and other drawbacks
to which reference has been made. Nothing, therefore, came of the interest in
learning which animated the Tsarina and of which she gave so many
proofs.
Recognition is also due to her efforts on behalf of the public health, in the
engagement of medical men, the provision of hospitals, etc. She instituted an
Imperial Medical Commission, and created a great sensation by being inoculated
for the small-pox and thus helping to overcome the prejudices on that head.
Thus her fields of activity were many and various; sometimes she moved
prematurely, but always with a sense of her responsibility, and her methods
were invariably shrewd and vigorous. But she met with insurmountable barriers
in the vastness of her dominions, the low grade of culture of the population,
and the incapacity and indolence of the administration; while the overwhelming
demands of her foreign policy left to the merits and successes of her domestic
rule a value nominal rather than substantial.
In religion
Catharine was a child of the Aufklarung. She was, accordingly, tolerant towards
sectaries and divergent forms of faith. In her ecclesiastical policy she was
entirely guided by reasons of State; while admitting the importance of
maintaining the Orthodox Church, she made it absolutely a state institution. In
carrying out the secularisation of ecclesiastical property up to 1768, she
deprived the clergy of all independent political significance, since in future
they were the paid servants of the State. In this, she was following in the
steps of Peter the Great; the very measures which he had adopted in regard to
the old Boyars she was applying to the clergy—a move of singular importance
for the Tsardom. She had to come to an understanding with the Roman Catholic
Church, since large numbers professing that faith had become her subjects by
the Partitions of Poland. She treated this difficult problem with her customary
good sense and vigour; extending toleration to the Church of Rome, and
establishing satisfactory relations with the Papacy, but at the same time
rigidly maintaining however the supremacy of the State. She never dreamt of a
concordat; and, when the Pope dissolved the Order of Jesus, she thanked the
Fathers for the services which they had rendered to her ecclesiastical policy,
giving them permission to found a noviciate so that the Order could continue in
her country in spite of the Bull of dissolution. It was particularly in ecclesiastical
matters that Catharine revealed her statesmanship and resolutely practical
policy; and, in so far as matters of this kind could be decided by these
qualities, she thoroughly mastered the situation—which can be said of but few
monarchs. In ecclesiastical questions, however, statesmanship does not count
for everything; it could wipe out neither the mistrust felt by the White
Russian clergy towards the Jesuits, nor the loyal attachment to Rome; neither
could it solve off-hand the problems suggested by these currents of feeling.
Was it, we
may now proceed to ask, Catharine’s aim to Russify her non-Russian subjects? On
this point she expressed herself in no uncertain manner in the instructions
which she drew up with her own hand for Prince Viasemski as Procurator-General
of Finance: “Little
Russia,
Livonia and Finland are administered according to the privileges confirmed to
them. To break through these and annul them all at once would be extremely
ill-advised. But to call them alien peoples and treat them on this basis would
be worse than a mistake—it would be a serious blunder. These provinces,
together with Smolensk, must be induced by the gentlest methods to consent to
being Russified.” These remarks, of course, do not apply to Poland; the Tsarina
was not as yet confronted with the whole difficult problem of the treatment of
Poland and of the position to be assigned to it within the Russian empire. But
her Polish policy proved that she knew how to treat the Polish nobles and to
attach them to herself. Her own words show her to have consciously favoured the
creation of a centralised Great Russia—an ideal to which she was attracted,
generally, by the levelling tendency inherent in absolutism, and, in
particular, by her own position as Tsarina. But this ideal was to be realised
without any forcible repression of foreign nationalities, whom she rather
sought to weld into the Great Russian State by means of good government such as
would arouse a sense of gratitude in them. Her willingness, in some cases, to
allow the continuance of separate conditions of existence in particular
provinces was simply and solely a matter of tactics. In her dealings with
respect to the frontier lands she knew exactly how far she could go, how far
from the point of view of the interests of Russia as a Great Power she must go,
and where she was at liberty to stop. She was not inclined to grant to the
Baltic Provinces a measure of political autonomy such as would be inimical to
the position won by Russia on the Baltic, and she was ill-pleased at the manner
in which the Baltic members of the Legislative Commission pleaded for the
maintenance of separate conditions for their provinces. She intervened by
introducing, in 1783, the establishment of Governors and the imposition of a
poll tax on the peasants in the Baltic Provinces also; they were not to be
allowed to develop in such a way as to be estranged from Russia. But she
respected the privileges recognised by Peter the Great, and allowed the body of
Knights (Ritterschqft) to retain their self-government, being much too wise and
liberal not to see that the independent German culture of the Baltic Provinces
was far ahead of that of the rest of Russia and, instead of becoming a danger,
might serve as a model. By this policy she brought her non-Russian dominions
into the right and necessary relation with the empire, while arousing in them
an enthusiastic loyalty, which she turned to good account, towards herself and
the dynasty. The Baltic countries indeed furnished her with a whole series of
statesmen and officers; of eight men who held the important post of ambassador
at Warsaw in her reign, four (or five) were Baltic nobles.
Her action in
regard to the particular frontier land to which she attached primary importance
in her dealings with Viasemski,, if somewhat painful for those concerned, was
equally right from the point of
view of the
power of Russia as a whole. Catharine brought it to pass that Little Russia
ceased to be a frontier country. The Little Russians regarded the Great
Russians with aversion and detestation, the two being distinct races and
speaking different languages. They were united with Moscow only by tbe common
sovereignty established by the Treaty of Pereyaslavl (1654) and they retained
at their head a Hetman of their own as an indication of their independence. Of
primary importance to Moscow were the Saporog Cossacks, who had settled on the
far side of the rapids of the Dnieper (hence the name) and whose free and
warlike community of Sich had constituted an outpost against the Tartars.
Without a close connexion with these, which had been endangered by Charles XII
in the days of Mazepa, the Russian route to the Black Sea was insecure. But
Catharine, who looked askance on the separate rights and organisation of the
Ukraine, and on the innate hostility of the Little Russians towards the claims
of Great Russia, desired, to begin with, the abolition of the office of Hetman,
which, without being dangerous in itself, served to emphasise the independent
position of Little Russia. It was done away with in 1764 and a Little Russian
Board under a Governor- General was established in its place, which meant the
substitution of a real for a personal union. In 1775 followed the suppression
of the Saporog Cossack Constitution of Sich; the entire civil administration
passed into the hands of the imperial authorities, and the Cossacks thenceforth
ceased to exist as a distinct nationality. They survived, however, as a
distinct class, whose part it now became to serve Russia by securing the
annexation of the Crimea and the newly acquired position on the Black Sea. In
order to reconcile the landowners of Little Russia to her policy, Catharine
carried into effect a measure abrogating freedom of settlement for Little
Russian peasants; in 1783, she introduced serfdom into Little Russia, where it
did not as yet exist, although the local conditions were of course ripe for its
introduction. Naturally, Catharine’s measures could not bridge over the gulf
fixed between Great Russians and Little Russians; they rather tended to widen
it. They were designed to guarantee the predominance of the Russian Tsardom in
the south, and, so far as possible, to weld north and south together, and
thereby to assure its full value to the acquisition of the northern shore of
the Black Sea. This was of course no final solution of the Ukrainian problem,
which Catharine left it to her successors to achieve* She also bequeathed to
them the Polish question, which indeed she had created for Russia by means of
the Partitions; whereas the problem of the Ukraine she had inherited from the
past.
The Court of
St Petersburg under Catharine owed its special significance to the fact that
it was the seat of enlightened despotism, incarnate in a woman of genius. She,
and she alone, was the centre of it all; for she had not been happy in her
marriage and domestic life; indeed, her relations to her son and his family
were a repetition of what had been
696 Grand Duke
Paul,—The Tsarina's favourites. [i762-96
her own lot
as Grand Duchess. A growing mistrust and estrangement prevailed between
Catharine and her son Paul, and the bearing of the Tsarina was at times the
reverse of dignified towards the “young Court” at Gatschina, although, since
her position had become strengthened, Paul was no longer to be regarded as a
rival. A deep shadow was thus cast on the years of Paul’s manhood, during which
he was deprived of any sort of power and obliged to keep entirely aloof from
public affairs. Paul had married, as his second wife, Maria Feodorovna (Sophia
of Wurtemberg), who proved a most devoted consort. (This marriage had been
adroitly promoted by Prince Henry of Prussia, behind whom of course stood
Frederick the Great.) Their life was further embittered by Catharine lavishing
her whole affection upon her grandsons Alexander and Constantine, whom she
sought to alienate from their parents, though without success, notwithstanding
that she brought the whole weight of her general interest in educational
matters to bear upon the training of these princes. Nor, as has been seen, did
she achieve her purpose of making Alexander her successor to the throne in
place of his father.
The cleavage
within the family was maintained and aggravated by the uninterrupted succession
of favourites who shared the Tsarina’s political labours and obtruded
themselves between her and the members of her family. Her son and grandson
always remained aloof from this innermost circle of her life. Little need here
be said about her systematic favouritism, which, of course, provided ample
field for all manner of scandal and has often been exclusively emphasised to
the exclusion of all else in delineations of her character. For, though the
political influence of Potemkin, and subsequently of Plato Suboff, was
undoubtedly great, not one of all her many favourites can be said to have ever
dominated the Tsarina. Intellectually, she was the superior of every one of
them, and she never allowed her heart to influence her against her better
judgment. The material prosperity of Russia was, no doubt, seriously affected
by the gross selfishness of these men, on whom their mistress heaped gifts and
whom she enabled to enrich themselves at the public expense. None of them,
however, exercised any political influence in the wider sense; whatever be the
estimate formed of Catharine’s rule and its results, to her alone belongs the
praise or blame. Favouritism brought up both good and evil sides of her nature;
in it she found vent both for that feminine capacity for self-devotion pent up
within her and frustrated by her wretched marriage, and for unrestrained and
unmitigated sensuality. She really loved Gregori Orloff, to whose devotion she
owed her Crown, and Potemkin, who was indolent and utterly selfish in spite of
all his great gifts, but whose strange individuality may have exercised upon
this rationalist Princess the peculiar charm of the “ Russian soul.” These
blemishes are inseparable from any portrait of Catharine; but they should not
be allowed to overshadow all else.
1762-96] Princess
Dashkojf.-Eminent servants of the Crown. 697
The feminine
element of\ Catharine’s Court was very much in the background as compared with
her male favourites, the single prominent exception being Princess Dashkoff,
whose interesting Memoirs exhibit the impression produced by Catharine’s
personality upon those who were capable of understanding it. She was congenial
to the Tsarina on account of her great intellectual interests and her virile
qualities of energy and force of will. She played a unique part among the
Russian ladies of that day; she was President of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, and it was in no small degree due to her that its Dictionary was
compiled. The Princess had stood beside Catharine in her hour of good fortune,
when the coup d’etat had been successful; but she was unable, chiefly through her
own fault, to maintain herself in the position to which she aspired, and she
certainly exerted no strong political influence upon her mistress.
The same
remark applies more or less to the whole bevy of government officers,
diplomats and generals gathered about the Tsarina— statesmen such as Nikita
Panin and Besborodko, public officials such as Viasemski, Chemuisheff, Sievers,
diplomats like Repnin, Vorontsoff, Dmitri Galitsin, generals like Alexander
Galitsin, Peter Panin, Rumyantseff, Suvoroff. They were one and all, in varying
degrees, the intelligent and energetic instruments of her will, but nothing
further. She was extraordinarily skilful in training her officers and her army,
and, above all, in drawing out diplomatic talent; and, if she was unable to
secure like efficiency in her civil service, the fault was not entirely hers.
But what is characteristic of her reign is that the circle of her Court
supplied the entire body of persons with whom and through whom she carried on
the task of government. The work of these generals and statesmen was in the
main court service, and the whole national and political life of the country
centred in the Court. And an amazingly brilliant centre it was. The excessive
luxury which reigned eveiywhere at Court was the more obtrusive in character
because unrestrained by any refinement of taste; indeed, there was often a
frankly barbarous and oriental flavour about it. Far and wide in Europe
admiration was aroused by the exotic splendour of the lavish entertainments of
Catharine and her favourites. The extravagance which prevailed was boundless;
but outside Russia hardly anyone noticed or knew how heavy a burden was thus
laid upon the nation.
The general
aspect and tone of the Court was thoroughly French; it was evident that the
presiding genius was a lady of French culture, and no longer Peter the Great
with his guard-room manners. A leading part was played in this brilliant
society by foreigners, such, for example, as the French ambassador, Count
Segur, and that typical rococo courtier, Prince de Ligne, who lacked the
capacity for becoming a commander or a statesman, but who was an elegant and an
accomplished causeur such as Catharine loved to fence with in conversation, and
with whom she long
kept up a
correspondence. For Russia it was of moment that the Court of St Petersburg
thus imparted a French character to the members of the Russian nobility so far
as they came into contact with it; and these were the men at the head of army
and administration. Thus, a Russian Empress of German blood and French culture
accomplished organically what Peter had begun externally, namely, the
separation of the governing classes from the governed. The Russian nation
consisted from the reign of Catharine of an upper stratum with foreign culture
and manners and a bed-rock composed of those who adhered to the old mode of
living. This upper stratum of society was heterogeneous in character, being a
combination of the corrupt culture of the ancien regime with Russian barbarism;
it was at the same time utterly degenerate in tendency. The immense danger to
the whole nation involved in this line of development was lost to view in the
dazzling splendour of the Court, which was at the same time a centre of
intellectual life. Catharine introduced the salon into Russia, and allowed
liberty of criticism there. Derschavin composed his odes in her honour. She
encouraged Wisin, the “Russian Moliere,” to satirise society in his comedies.
With her reign is associated the first bloom, as it were, of intellectual life;
and in these endeavours the Tsarina bore an active part herself, besides
promoting and encouraging them.
Catharine was
a prolific writer, and delighted in her work. Reference has already been made
to her political and literary correspondence (with Grimm, Voltaire, Diderot,
d’Alembert). She displayed great talent in her letters, which were written not
only with the direct intention of influencing public opinion in Europe, but
from a real interest in the intellectual movement of her day, of which she was
an enthusiastic disciple. The richness and versatility of her mind, the
diversity of her interests, and her charming talent for causerie and witty
banter, find full and delightful expression in her letters. She was keenly
interested in literature, science, and art, and endeavoured often with
considerable tact to play the role of a Maecenas. On the other hand, she probed
for herself subtle questions of history, philology and political economy, wrote
on these subjects, and stimulated research in them. She produced the Nakds and
composed her Memoirs, besides contributing to a periodical edited by Princess
Dashkoff, in which the Tsarina gave free play to her satirical gifts and
caprices in a column reserved for her. More than this, she was a dramatic poet
in her own right, whose works, in the last edition of them, fill four large
volumes. Her plays were actually put on the stage, their authorship being
concealed to a certain extent from the Russian public, but not from her foreign
correspondents. Her writings (comedies, stories, librettos, proverbs) are no
literary masterpieces—the comedies alone possessing interest; in these she
satirises the freemasons, the Cagliostro craze, etc. Catharine herself regarded
her literary efforts solely as a hobby; “ I look upon my writings as play,” she
wrote to
Grimm. They
certainly bear the stamp of dilettantism, and cannot, as to seriousness and
depth, bear comparison with the literary productions of Frederick the Great.
But they exhibit her mental freshness, wealth, and versatility, after a fashion
assuredly unique among female sovereigns of modem times.
The older
Catharine grew, the more reactionary she became on this head also. The surface
splendour of her reign could not conceal its deep defects; criticism was
excited; and she became more and more suspicious and severe, whenever she
scented in Russian authors tendencies towards political and social reforms. Her
reign furnishes a startling contrast between the patronage of literature and
science at Court, on the one hand, and, on the other, the cruel treatment of
Radishcheff and the persecution inflicted on Novikoff' at Moscow. Catharine was
in theory a disciple of the Aufkldrung, and in practice an absolute monarch.
It would be
difficult, indeed impossible, to characterise in a word so rich and varied a
nature as Catharine’s; but she might perhaps be described as a “ political
woman.” For a woman, she had a singularly strong political sense and notable
theoretical insight into the conditions of existence for a State and the duties
of a monarch. Her policy was, therefore, a thoroughly practical policy in the
selfish interests of Russia, devoid of all moral scruples or sentiment. There
was no mystical side to her nature; she was entirely dominated by a clear,
rationalist intelligence. In political matters, she was not affected in the
slightest degree by her own feelings, nor did she allow herself to be confused
by the flattery lavished upon her or diverted for a single moment from the
pursuit of her political aims. At the same time, she never lost her grasp of
the situation or her courage, so that this aspect of her character is
absolutely masculine; Prince de Ligne was not without justification in saluting
her as “ Catherine le grand.'"
But this
Princess, whose virile personality becomes especially manifest if she is
compared with Maria Theresa, was, nevertheless, a thorough woman—not the virago
of the Renaissance to which she has been likened, nor yet, despite her sins and
shortcomings, an ordinary example of female frailty. There are many testimonies
from which to choose; perhaps the best is the Diary of Chrapovitzki, her
private secretary, which gives a true picture of Catharine as she really was
and as she appeared in everyday life. It shows a woman full of merits and failings
; bright and active, with sanguine temperament and very variable moods,
sometimes arbitrary and often supremely vain, and with a strong propensity for
praising and for being praised. Touches are not wanting of real womanly kindness
and motherliness in her care of her grandsons or in her letters to a young lady
at the Frauleinstift (school for young ladies of the nobility). At close
quarters, there is nothing majestic to be found in her. She had a feminine
charm and lovableness of her own, the attraction of which was felt by all
diplomatists who conversed with her, and of which she
700 The significance of
Catharine's personality and rule. [1762-96
made good use
for obtaining her own way. And this same imperial lady was so little able to
curb her warm-blooded passions that her love affairs, especially as she grew
older, became public scandals.
In dealing
historically with an absolute ruler who regards the State and the personality
of the sovereign as identical, it is not easy to differentiate precisely between
what appertains to the one and to the other. No certain estimate can
accordingly be formed as to the objective significance of Catharine’s reign,
and the problem remains unsolved by accepting as an adequate definition of her
character and reign such a formula as “ the search for glory, supplemented by
self-indulgence.” Catharine recognised the objective ends laid down by Peter
the Great, and felt herself to be continuing the rule of that monarch, whom her
heart revered as a hero and whom her reason bade her follow for practical
purposes, foreign usurper though she was. She achieved so large a part of his
design that there could be no ultimate turning back for the Russian nation, and
that the policy of Russia was indissolubly bound up with European interests and
questions. Under her, St Petersburg became the real capital of the empire. She
brought about the union of the Baltic Provinces and Poland with Russia, thus
securing a position for her country as a European Power. She changed the face
of the Oriental question in the same way and definitely fixed the southern
frontier of the empire. Thus, she acquired (according to Storch’s estimate)
over 500,000 square versts (= 219,704 square miles) of territory for her empire
and an addition of nearly seven million subjects. Her policy was prompted not
only bv personal ambition, but by a sense of responsibility for her country and
people. Under her, Russia fully developed into a European Power, whose prestige
and sphere of influence abroad she increased enormously, while at home
systematic centralisation had firmly established its authority. The direct
gains and the general results of her reign were, therefore, enormous, and found
unmistakable expression in the enhanced national confidence of Russia.
The Tsarina was
hailed as standard-bearer of the Aufklarung and of liberty in Russia by
contemporary writers generally, more especially those of France. Peter bad not
more than a simple instinctive sense of being a European, and had accordingly
wished to make Europeans of his people, who had not yet passed beyond the
Asiatic stage of civilisation; Catharine, on the other hand, was a European by
birth and education and stood in close relation with the great intellectual
movement of her time. But, amid the chorus of praise bestowed upon her, Europe
easily overlooked the fact that this brilliant reign had achieved virtually
nothing towards the advance of European civilisation among the mass of the
Russian people; Her thirty-four years’ reign is ostensibly the second and decisive
stage in the historic process of “Europeanising” Russia begun by Peter I. As a
matter of fact, she left it to her successors to solve the second part of the
great problem
with which
Peter had begun to grapple, and to accomplish the internal metamorphosis of
Russia into a European State. For it is a mistake to maintain that ideas of
humanity and the rights of man came to Russia with Catharine; these
conceptions, for which she professed such enthusiasm, had very little to do
with the actual course of affairs in Russia. Moreover, this German Princess,
with her cosmopolitan and rationalist views, was utterly alien to the nation,
and in herself promoted the Germanisation of the Romanoffs and with it their
estrangement from the Russian people. So much she achieved: that at the time of
her death the upper class had the outward semblance of Europeans in the
externals of life, in dress and speech, and, finally, in their ideals of
culture. But the common people acclaimed Paul; they rebelled against this regime
in PugachofTs insurrection and in many other risings; they lived on in their
old stolid barbarism, separated by a broad gulf from their sovereign and the
upper strata. For them, the only result of this reign was that the institution
of serfdom was developed to the full, and that the process of depriving the
vast majority of Russians of all rights was thereby completed. Thus, the
cleavage already existing between the ruling class and the people was further
widened under Catharine, while the first beginnings of internal reform and of
the reconciliation of conflicting elements attempted by her remained wholly
barren. There are many points of resemblance between Catharine and Elizabeth
Tudor, although the Tsarina was assuredly the more gifted of the pair. The likeness
does not however hold good in this respect: it could not be said of the
Tsarina, as it could of the English Queen, that the pulses of sovereign and
people beat in unison. A great historical idea was the basis of Elizabeth’s
rule, whereas the necessary historical tasks which Catharine’s policy had to
perform implied only the announcement of an idea, but not the expression of it.
Nevertheless, her reign with all its defects was one of the greatest in the
annals of Russia, and she herself among the most notable monarchs of history—a
Princess whose virtues far outweighed her shortcomings. She was, every inch, a
“political being” unmatched by anyone of her sex in modern histoiy, and yet at
the same time a thorough woman and a great lady. She died on November 17, 1796.
FREDERICK THE
GREAT AND HIS SUCCESSOR.
(1, HOME AND
FOREIGN POLICY.
(1763-97.)
After the Treaty of Hubertusburg, the King of Prussia
found himself, diplomatically, in an exceedingly difficult position. There was
no thought of dissolving the Austro-French alliance, for Vienna and Paris were
united in the conviction that Frederick was only watching his opportunity to
overthrow completely the Constitution of the Empire. Between the Courts of
Versailles and Potsdam personal animosity ran so high that for years no renewal
of diplomatic relations between France and Prussia could be brought about.
Frederick hardly stood on a better footing with George III of England and
Hanover than with Louis XV. In his capacity of Elector of Hanover more
especially, George entertained the most violent feelings of antipathy against
the King of Prussia, as the adversary of the existing distribution of power in
Germany. •
The bitter
antagonism between Prussia and Austria, the cause of their seven years’ conflict
in arms, continued with but little abatement, despite the restoration of
diplomatic relations between the two Courts. Prince Kaunitz speciously
suggested to the Prussian charge d’affaires in Vienna the possibility of
agreeing upon a disarmament—say, on the lines that each Power should discharge
seventy-five per cent, of the soldiers who had been in her service at the time
of the Peace of Hubertusburg. Commissioners might be appointed to see that such
an agreement was conscientiously carried out. Frederick, however, would have
nothing to do with Kaunitz’ plan of disarmament, observing that it savoured
somewhat of the ideas of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. In April, he entered into a
defensive alliance with Russia. While Catharine II was openly undermining the
Polish Republic, she was attacked by the Turks, who rightly surmised that it
would be their turn next to be swallowed up by Russia. Throughout the
Russo-Turkish War, which lasted six years, Frederick II had, according to the
terms of his compact with the Tsarina, to pay her an annual subsidy of 400,000
roubles
(£72,000),
which he could ill spare in drawing up his budget. On the other hand, the
complication in south-eastern Europe was in so far to his advantage, that it
led the Court of Vienna to incline more towards Prussia. At the end of August,
1769, the Emperor Joseph visited the King of Prussia^ at Neisse in Silesia; and
Frederick returned the visit in September,1770,spending a few days with Joseph
at Neustadt in Moravia.
Meanwhile, at
St Petersburg, King Frederick had proposed the partition of Poland, allotting
to Austria eastern Galicia only (not western, which borders on Silesia). In
order to forestall Prussia’s prospective claims to this district, the Austrians
in 1769 and 1770 occupied, as Frederick expressed it, “ a region twenty miles
long, from the county of Saros to the Silesian frontier.” Their troops, instead
of halting here, were spreading themselves slowly but surely over the whole of
the southwest of Poland; and this fact induced the Tsarina at length to adopt
Frederick’s plan for the partition of Poland, which appeared to her a very
critical step, and which she had opposed for some time. Frederick acquired West
Prussia—the territorial link between East Prussia and the main body of the monarchy;
and the increase in his revenues permitted of his raising the numbers of his
standing army from 160,000 to 186,000 men. At the same time, he
unintermittently continued his efforts for the acquisition of Saxony. In this
he was now, as before, opposed by all the Powers, even by his ally Russia, who,
in order to disturb his designs, made a new move by proposing that the
Russo-Prussian alliance should be expanded into a great coalition of the north.
In the first place, the Tsarina and he were to join with England and Hanover;
and then, “as more passive members,” Holland, the Scandinavian States, and
“some German States like Saxony,” were to be admitted to the coalition. But
this insidious scheme was promptly rejected by Frederick.
At the close
of 1777, a good opportunity appeared to offer itself to him for gaining
possession of at least some parts of Saxony. The Elector Frederick Augustus III
of Saxony, son of the sister of the late Elector Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria,
laid claim to the freehold property left by his uncle, estates valued by him at
several millions. The new Elector of Bavaria, Charles Theodore, who like his
predecessor had no legitimate issue, but wished to provide for his bastards,
was keenly interested in this property—much more so than in the electorate. In
order to secure the protection of the head of the Empire against Saxony,
Charles Theodore resigned part of Bavaria to the Emperor Joseph (January,
1778); but a protest against this dismemberment of the Bavarian electorate was
raised by Duke Charles of Zweibriicken, who stood first in the succession to
it. His cause and that of Frederick Augustus III were espoused by King
Frederick; and, though formerly sworn enemies to each other, Prussia and Saxony
formed an alliance against Austria. Sixty thousand Prussians under Prince Henry
marched into Saxony, where they Were joined by 21,000 Saxon troops;
while the
Prussian main army of 80,000 men, commanded by the King in person, concentrated
in Silesia.
The
Austrians, under the command of the Emperor Joseph and Laudon, mustered in
Bohemia. They were greatly inferior in numbers to the Prussians; and,
consequently, no strong hopes of victory were entertained- on the Austrian
side. The King of Prussia, however, had no desire to fight for the integrity of
Bavaria, of which, indeed, he proved to be quite willing to allow Austria to
annex a province. . But, as the price of his consent, he demanded some
compensation; and negotiations to that end were carried on under arms.
At this time,
it seemed as if the line of Margraves of Ansbach- Baireuth would become extinct
at no remote date—an event which actually happened in a few decades. This
dynasty was a branch of the House of Brandenburg, which possessed an
incontestable reversionary right to the south German principalities in
question. The King of Prussia, accordingly, planned that homage should be done
in Ansbach and Baireuth to the Elector Frederick Augustus III, whose right of
succession there would thus be recognised. On the other hand, Lusatia, a considerable
section of the Saxon dominions, was to swear allegiance to the King of Prussia,
together with Wittenberg, the cradle of the Protestant faith, and other
possession of the House of Wettin on the right bank of the Elbe.
The Dresden
Court did not reject these proposals, but demanded that, besides Ansbach and
Baireuth, Prussia should secure to Saxony part of the Bavarian Upper
Palatinate, or the bishopric of Bamberg, or Erfurt, which belonged to the
Archbishop of Mainz. Once more, the Saxon statesmen sought protection against
their new and highly dangerous ally at St Petersburg; Baron von Sacken, the
Saxon ambassador to Catharine II, affirming that Bussia might now play the “
great and flattering part ” which Louis XIV and his successors had in their time
played in Germany. On the other hand, Saxony could in no wise depend upon
Austria, the former champion of Saxon integrity against Frederick, but now
prepared to let Prussia indemnify herself out of the possessions of the House
of Wettin, provided that the Austrian dominions could be rounded off at the
expeuse of the Wittels- bachs. By means of a compromise of this sort, it was
confidently anticipated on the Austrian side that war with Prussia would be
avoided. “The King’s inclination to wage war is very slight,” Joseph wrote from
his headquarters to Vienna; “but his desire for Lusatia is all the stronger.”
The two German Great Powers could, however, arrive at no final settlement in
the details of their plans of annexation. No adequate explanation has yet been
offered of Frederick’s special reasons for ultimately breaking off the
negotiations carried on for months between himself and the Austrians, and
declaring war. In any case, the political and military situation was very
favourable to Prussia. Louis XVI declared himself
neutral,
because it was Austria who had virtually assumed the offensive; Russia was the
ally of Prussia, who was actively supported by Saxony and morally by almost all
the Princes of the Empire, apprehensive as they were, for the moment, of
Joseph’s territorial greed rather than of Frederick’s. Altogether, therefore,
the chances of the latter were far more promising in 1778 than they had been in
1756.
At the
beginning of Jtily, the main body of the Prussian army crossed the mountain
range between Silesia and Bohemia at Nachod. But the invasion came to an
immediate standstill. The main body of the Emperor’s army stood on the Upper
Elbe. It was commanded nominally by Joseph, but in reality by Lacy, who in the
Seven Years’ War had been quartermaster-general to Daun (now dead). The centre
of the Austrian formation was Jaromircz, where a triple line of redoubts,
extending the whole length of the river as far as Koniggratz, had been
constructed and ah immense amount of heavy artillery stationed. Austrian
tactics had obviously profited by the experiences of the Seven Years’ War,
which had proved that defensive operations promised the Austrian army the best
chances of success.
Once
before—in 1758—Austrians and Prussians had been drawn up in the neighbourhood
of Koniggratz, and had stood there face to face for weeks, without Frederick II
venturing to attack his foes in their trenches. On the present occasion, he
remained inactive for fully three months, from the middle of July to the middle
of October, on the borderland between Bohemia and Silesia south of the'Giant
Mountains, never once attempting a serious engagement with the enemy. The
statement that he did not really mean to make war, and merely wished to cany on
“ armed negotiations,” is quite erroneous: on the contrary, he was, with a view
to facilitating the negotiations, awaiting the opportunity for a “good battle.”
While the
main body of the Austrians lay facing towards Silesia, a smaller Imperial army,
with Laudon at its head, was watching the passes leading from Saxony and
Lusatia into Bohemia. Along this extensive frontier there were far too many
passes for Laudon to be able to prevent the entry of Prussians and Saxons into
Bohemia. His chance of covering the whole frontier line was rendered still more
remote by the exceptional mobility and endurance of the Prussian troopsand
Prince Henry, who was one of the most distinguished strategists of the age,
succeeded in marching into Bohemia a few weeks after his royal brother.
Descending by the right bank of the Elbe, he touched Bohemian soil at
Hainspach, where the difficulties of crossing the mountains were enormous.
However, the defiles once safely left behind, Prince Henry’s chances were very
promising, the Austrians being numerically far weaker. Laudon had to retreat
beyond the Iser; but even in this position he could not hope to hold out long.
By this time the whole fighting force of the Austrians had come between two
fires; Prince Henry was advancing on
their left
wing and placing it in imminent danger of being outflanked, while their right
was threatened by the Prussian main army.
On August 10
Prince . Henry wrote to the King of Prussia that his operations would be in
time if completed by the 20th or 22nd; after that, lack of forage would make it
necessary for Prince Henry’s force to retreat upon Lusatia. Frederick would not
have been a great general if he had not determined to cooperate most vigorously
with Henry during those precious ten or twelve days. He meant to attempt to
cross the Elbe at Amau and thus reach the Emperor Joseph’s rear. The depression
felt in the Austrian headquarters was profound. The King estimated the strength
of his adversaries at Arnau and Hohenelbe at
30,000 men. “If fortune still favours the aged,”
he wrote to his brother, “ I hope soon to defeat this corps.” At Tumau he then
expected to effect a junction with Prince Henry’s army.
Frederick’s
preparations for action lasted till August 25, that is to say, beyond, the term
up to which Prince Henry had thought that he could procure fodder for his
horses in the region of Niemes. However, this delay was of no consequence, for
the Prince, a master of manoeuvring operations, managed to hold out
considerably longer in front of the Iser. But, on August 25, Frederick finally
gave up his designs of attacking, recognising that the enemy’s position at
Hohenelbe was far too strong to be forced. After this, he made up his mind that
the campaign was lost. For the rest, he had already a week earlier told his
Foreign Minister, Count Finkenstein, that he felt no particular confidence in
the success of the advance on Amau, and that, should it fail, Russia alone
could help him by creating a diversion which would set his army free.
The
inevitable consequence of this ill success was that the Emperor Joseph, who had
twice already sent reinforcements to Laudon during the seven weeks of
Frederick’s manoeuvring in Bohemia, now despatched a third detachment to the
Iser. Any action on the part of Prince Henry was thus out of the question; and
both the Prussian armies thenceforth confined themselves to the “potato
war”—that is, they consumed the resources of the enemy’s country, till the cold
weather set in and forced them to terminate their inglorious campaign by
evacuating Bohemia. It was Moravia, not Bohemia which Frederick had originally
intended to invade, If the main army of the Prussians had, nevertheless,
entered Bohemia, this had been in consequence of Prince Henry’s advice, whose
plan of campaign, as the King extravagantly expressed it, seemed to him
inspired by some dii inity. But, though devised and prepared by two strategists
of such eminence, the Bohemian invasion of 1778 had collapsed—just as that of
1757 had failed after brilliant initial successes. It is quite uncertain
whether Frederick would have achieved any better result by an attack on
Moravia. This, too, he had once before attempted under very favourable
conditions (the Austrians having been almost annihilated at Leuthen in the
preceding year); yet he had been obliged to abandon the
siege of
Olmiitz without attaining his object, The strategy of Frederick’s age was much
stronger in the defensive than in the offensive. He had wrested Silesia from
Austria at a time when Maria Theresa’s reforms had not yet developed the
Austrian military system, while a formidable coalition was threatening her
monarchy. His subsequent campaigns, carried on for the purpose of occupying
Austrian territory, whether directed against Bohemia or Moravia, ended without
exception in failure.
Despite his
sixty-six years, Frederick was still physically well fitted for war; in the
recent campaign he had been in the saddle for many hours daily. But he felt
little inclination for a renewal of military operations, after it had become
evident that his Russian allies would not comply with his summons to attack
Galicia. Prussia had declared war, not Austria; and, therefore, Catharine
argued that her defensive alliance with Frederick did not bind her to give him
military assistance. What weighed more with the Tsarina than this formal
question was that she saw no reason for handing over Lusatia to the foremost
military Power of eastern Europe and thus materially increasing its strength.
Without an ally, however, an attack on the monarchy of the Habsburgs was
hopeless, as the experience of the campaign of 1778 had proved. Frederick,
therefore, consented to relinquish once more the attempt to acquire Saxon
territory. In the Peace concluded at Teschen in May, 1779, through the
mediation of France and Russia, Frederick Augustus III received 4,000,000
thalers (<£600,000) from Charles Theodore in satisfaction of the Saxon
claims to the freehold property of the late Elector Maximilian Joseph. There
was no question at Teschen of any exchange of Saxon territory for the
Ansbach-Baireuth lands of the House of Brandenburg; so that the Saxons had
successfully disengaged themselves from the friendly demonstrations of their
Prussian ally without being stifled in his embrace. The Elector of Saxony might
regard it as a guarantee for the future that by the Treaty of Teschen Russia
had secured protective rights over the Germanic Imperial Constitution, just as
a similar authority had already been conceded to her in Poland and Sweden with
regard to the Constitutions of those countries; and it had become more
difficult than before for the King of Prussia to round off his monarchy at the
expense of any Prince of the Empire.
The Austrians
were justly dismayed, in 1778, by Frederick’s unexpected declaration of war,
and now fully realised that they were not strong enough to effect conquests
against the King of Prussia’s will. On the representations of France and Russia
they, therefore, agreed to evacuate the regions of Bavaria which they had
occupied, with the single exception of the Innviertel. This was a district of
inconsiderable size; but the Prussian Foreign Minister, Ewald Friedrich von
Hertzberg, implored his sovereign not to allow the principle of the integrity
of Bavaria to be violated in even the smallest degree. To this Frederick
replied that Hertzberg’s ideas were excellent, but that political business
could not be
managed by ideas alone; the question was whether they could be carried out.
About this
time, Frederick’s alliance with the Tsarina began to givie way. One of the
first symptoms of a change in the policy of Russia, at once noticed by the
King, was that the Tsarina did not reply personally to an autograph letter from
him, but answered it through her private secretary. The Poles, whom Catharine
treated as her proteges, complained incessantly at St Petersburg of the
ruinous way in which Prussia had set herself to worry their only seaport,
Danzig. Diplomatic explanations thus began between Potsdam and St Petersburg,
which led to nothing. At Vienna, Kaunitz had been for some time under the correct
impression that Frederick was aiming at the possession of Great Poland —that is
to say, Danzig, Thom, and the districts which now form the Prussian province of
Poseh. In Russia, Potemkin endeavoured to get at the bottom of King Frederick’s
plans by hinting to the Prussian ambassador at St Petersburg that Russia might
find it expedient to join with Prussia in putting an end to the Polish State.
Frederick replied by proposals at the Russian Court for admitting to the
Russo-Prussian alliance the Ottoman empire, for which the Tsarina wished to
substitute a Greek empire under her grandson Constantine. Catharine intervened
all the more strongly on behalf of the ill-used Danzigers, while Frederick
would not yield an inch.
The aged King
found himself once more diplomatically isolated, when, in 1780, Catharine
definitively deserted him, and concluded her alliance with Joseph against
Turkey. But such was the admirably consolidated strength of his monarchy that
he might at any time expect to secure new allies. When the Emperor Joseph, not
content with the vista of Eastern conquests, resumed his policy of expansion
within the Empire, the German States, whose independent sovereignty and very
existence were threatened, rallied round the King of Prussia. Thus, in July,
1785, shortly before Frederick’s death, was brought about the Fiirstenbund
(Confederation of Princes); the Archbishop of Mainz, the Elector of Saxony,
George III as Elector of Hanover, with many other German Princes, both
Protestant and Catholic, ranging themselves under the leadership of Prussia.
Frederick the Great had often expressed his just contempt for the Constitution
of the Teutonic Empire; but now, as against the actual designs of annexation
cherished at Vienna, he, at the head of the Fiirstenbund, poweifully
represented the Protestant interest, and was hailed as the champion of
universal freedom by German public opinion, which was mainly determined by the
Protestants as the intellectually more alert moiety of the nation.
At the same
time, Prussia’s relations with France and England improved. Frederick now
considered his position so favourable for new conquests in Poland that, of the
European Governments, his alone was working against the preservation of the
general peace. Among the
1786-90] Intervention in Holland and alliance
with England. 709
representatives
of the European Powers at the Golden Horn, the Prussian envoy alone tried to
provoke the Turks to an armed resistance against the definitive establishment
of Russian domination in the Crimea. Frederick was extremely dissatisfied when
the Porte, instead, concluded the Treaty of Ainali Kavak, by which the Kuban
and the Crimea were ceded to Russia.
In the midst
of the planning about Poland, Frederick the Great died, on August 17,1786. He
was succeeded by his nephew, Frederick William II, who was then approaching his
forty-third year.
At midsummer,
1787, there ensued the declaration of war by the Porte against Russia, which
the deceased King had so eagerly desired, Austria joining in the war in support
of her ally, Russia. Ip his foreign policy Frederick William II was advised by
Hertzberg, who, (with Finkenstein) had directed the same department under
Frederick II. In accordance with the late King’s ideas, Hertzberg hoped to
utilise the complication in the East to obtain possession of Danzig, Thorn, and
Poland between the lower Vistula and the town of Posen. Now, to carry out a
policy of this sort, some alliance was needful to Prussia, at that time
isolated except for the Furstenbund. The choice fell on England, whose King as
Elector of Hanover belonged tp that league. In order to gain over the Cabinet
of St James’ to his Polish policy, Frederick William, in the autumn of 1787,
sent an army into Holland, where the party of the patriots, who were friendly
to France, was oppressing the supporters of the Stadholder, William V of
Orange, who were adherents of England. The intervention of Prussia in the
Netherlands had a romantic as well as a political origin. The Princess of
Orange (Wilhelmina), a sister of the King of Prussia, had been treated so
disrespectfully by her political opponents that her royal brother felt himself
bound to insist upon signal reparation. But the chief object of the Prussian
Government remained the establishment of a close relation between Prussia and
England; and this was actually attained by the despatch of 24,000 Prussian
troops whose campaign, though almost bloodless, was thoroughly successful. At
midsummer, 1788, the defensive Alliance of Berlin was concluded, by the secret articles
of which Prussia and Great Britain undertook to act in concert with regard to
the Eastern troubles, while, in the event of a war with the Tsarina, Frederick
William might claim the assistance of the English fleet.
Frederick the
Great had expressed to Finkenstein his intention, when Russia should have been
exhausted by a few campaigns agrlnst the Turks, to begin preparations for war,
and by threats of hostilities tp bring about the Tsarina’s acquiescence in his
Polish policy. Seven years later, Frederick William II actually carried out
this plan, except that the Prussian preparations were directed in the first
instance against Austria*—not against Russia, whose turn was to come
afterwards. In May, 1790, a large Prussian army mustered in Silesia. In consequence
of the
reforms of Joseph II, the Austrian Netherlands had revolted against the
Austrian Government, while the Hungarians refused to supply trOops or render
other services to the Emperor, and threatened rebellion. In face of these
difficulties, Leopold II, who had ascended the Austrian throne on the death of
his brother Joseph, had to agree, in June, 1790, to the Convention of
Reichenbach with Prussia. The Austrians renounced the acquisition of Turkish
territory, thus forfeiting the results of two exhausting campaigns on the
Danube. Prussia had no objection to a slight readjustment of frontier at
Turkey’s expense; but the Convention of Reichenbach provided that the Cabinet
of Berlin should in that case be likewise entitled to demand some compensation—which,
of course, must be in Poland. It has been shown elsewhere how the Reichenbach
Convention led to Prussia’s participation in the Revolutionary Wars, and to
the Second, as well as the Third, Partition of Poland.
The
territorial acquisitions of Prussia between the close of the Seven Years’ War
and the death of Frederick William II increased her population from four and a
half to nearly seven and a half millions, and the growth of the State in area
was relatively even greater. The Prussian Government owed this remarkable
expansion to negotiation rather than to force of arms, and the diplomatic
prestige of Prussia was very largely due to the results of Frederick the
Great’s home policy. He laboured Without intermission at the replenishment of
his Treasury. This source had in time of war to supply him with the means for
military operations which the Governments of western Europe raised by means of
war loans; and to it the Prussians looked to save them from the necessity of
carrying on war by the aid of foreign subsidies, like Austria, Russia, and the
smaller States of Europe. After the Treaty of Hubertusburg, the Royal Exchequer
still contained nominally 14J million tfAafers (£2,175,000); but this sum of
money consisted largely of coin enormously depreciated in value, which
Frederick had put in circulation during the war. Thirteen years later, all the
bad money was withdrawn from the Treasury, and a reserve put by of 23^ millions
(£3,525,000) in coinage of full weight. At the death of Frederick the Great,
the Exchequer contained 51 million thalers (£7,650,000), as against an annual
revenue of barely 22 millions (£3,3^)0,000). An English Government of the
present day which should propose to lay by two and a third times the yearly
revenue of the State would have to deposit £336,000,000. Frederick the Great
had to pursue an unflinching, not to say oppressive, fiscal policy in order to
save up out of the surplus of the yearly budget so huge a reserve, unparalleled
in the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As to the fiscal
burdens of the country, the second half of his reign (1763 to 1786) compares
very unfavourably in this respect with the first (1740 to 1763).
The
reorganisation of the coinage system furnished the King with an
early opportunity
of applying inexorably the strictest principles of a one-sided fiscalism. After
1764 better money was again minted; but the debased coinage issued during the
war was henceforth taken by the royal banks only at its actual (that is, at
little more than twenty-five per cent, of its nominal) value. This sweeping
measure was the culmination of pernicious manipulations which may be compared
to the national bankruptcies of Louis XIV and Louis XV. During the war, fines
and imprisonment, or corporal chastisement, had been unhesitatingly inflicted
on persons refusing to accept money utterly debased; tradesmen had even been
punished because they had in despair given up their business and closed their
shops and stalls. The statement, that in 1764 Prussia returned to a standard of
full weight in her coinage, can only be accepted with considerable
qualification. For the reorgai i iation of the coinage in that year inundated
the country with small coins, the standard of which was so greatly lowered by
amalgamation with base metals, that a nominal three thalers' worth of this
minor currency contained no greater proportion of silver than that required by
law in two thalers. In the absence of a sufficient supply of larger coins,
small change often had to be used even for the payment of large amounts. This
unsound practice did much harm already in Frederick’s time and still more under
his successors, to whom he bequeathed, in the guise of a dead weight of base
coin, the obligation of discharging a heavy debt, on which, to be sure, he had
not been obliged to pay any interest.
The mints of
the Prussian State were empowered to demand from the Jews, who bought up the
old silver in the country, that they should supply every year a certain
quantity of silver at considerably below the market price; it being left to
them to shift the burden, if they could, on those who had to part with their
family plate. This impost had been introduced by Frederick once btefore, aAd
abandoned. On this occasion, when it was considerably increased and levied
afresh from the1 Jews, it yielded no more than 23,000 thalers
(£3450) per annum; but at this period of his reign the King found no duty too
petty or too invidious. The revenue from stamp duties was more than quadrupled.
Even street bands were obliged henceforth to take out stamped licenses. About
the same time, the receipts from the salt monopoly1 were doubled by
the introduction of the “salt conscription,” as it was termed. In Europe the
King of Prussia was called le roi des lisieres (king of frontiers), on account
of the scattered configuration of his kingdom. There was, consequently, an
immense amount of smuggling; A great deal of smuggled salt, too, was consumed
in Prussia. This was now effectively excluded by the minute regulations of the
salt conscription, which obliged every household to purchase yearly a certain
amount of fiscal salt for the consumption of human beings and cattle.
Frederick II
gradually became more and more convinced that the best means of putting down
smuggling and generally increasing his
revenues was
to appoint French revenue officers. The French official jlass, the pattern of
all modem bureaucracies, was still superior to the Prussian in ability. In
1766, therefore, the King of Prussia appointed de Launay Gentralregisseur (chief
superintendent), at the head of his customs and excise, administration,; and,
out of the 2000 posts in these branches of the; public service, from 175 to 200
were filled by Frenchmen. The Postmaster-General (Generalintendant der Post)
was likewise a Frenchman. An Italian trained in, French financial
administration organised a lottery, De Launay abolished the tax on rye-flour,
and the duty on pork was at any rate not raised. Rye-bread and pork were the
chief articles of food of the poor and of the soldiers, who had to live on
their very scanty pay and the little they could earn when on leave.
Frederick II
gave in his adhesion to no religious: creed; yet, like his father,
he possessed conscience, sense qf duty and, feeling for the masses. The
soldiers idolised him, although flogging in the army was, if possible, even
more common and more arbitrary under him than under his father. But, on the
oth,er hand, he cared fpr the material welfare of the private spldier, shielded
him from many an injustice, and, altogether, used no empty phrase when he
called himself the roi des gueux. In this spirit, he wished to distribute the
burden of taxation more fairly than had hitherto been the case among the
several classes; but his need of money was so pressing that the promptings of
humanity were in the main abandoned. As not unfrequently happens, de Launay’s
financial reforms, amounted in the end. to little more than an increase of
taxation. For, with the exception of pork, all kinds of meat, as well as beer,
spirits and coffee, were subjected to heavy additional taxation. A monopoly was
laid on tobacco. The prosperity of the people increased but slowly under
Frederick II, as it had under his father; so that it was a yeiy long time
before his subjects were accustomed to the enhanced price, of salt, tobacco,
coffee, meat, beer, and wine, not to mention the inprease in various other
duties. Even six years after the imposition of the additional duties on meat
and alcoholic liquprs, we find a high official—>no doubt reluctantly—urging
their withdrawal upon the irascible King, who rarely brooked contradiction.
In 1779,
Frederick II reckoned that the sources of revenue opened since 1763, apart from
money drawn from West Prussia, were yielding nearly 3 million thalers
(=£450,000). The total public revenue at this time reached 21 millions a year
(£3,150,000). The check on smuggling contributed tp this thprpughly
satisfactpry result. The Regie (excise) introduced on the French model
certificates of origin, cockets (plombes), etc., organised brigades of excise
officers (douaniers), and set up offices for them on the frontiers. The whole
system was new in Prussia; hitherto the whole of the customs had been levied at
the gates of the towns. The native official class had been incapable of adapting
to the primitive conditions obtaining in Prussia institutions which in western
Europe
were the
outcome of a very highly developed political and economic situation.
Consequently,, Frederick retained de Launay.for twenty years as
Generalregisseur, and preserved the French element generally in his
administration during the rest of his reign.
His departure
from de Launay’s advice in one matter of some fiscal importance is not likely
to be forgotten. A coffee monopoly had been introduced, of which the King
wished to take advantage (in order to protect beer-soup) so as to restrict
greatly the consumption of coffee in his dominions. This (though he gave way to
some extent) was the origin of the famous caricature ridiculing him as grinding
coffee and trying to save the beans as they fell—which, when he noticed it on a
street wall at Berlin as,he rode past, he ordered to be “hung lower so that the
people need not crane their necks to see it.” Much in the same way, he had said
on his accession, when he stopped the interference of the censorship with the
non-political portion of the public journals: “ Newspapers must not be worried
if they are to be interesting.” Such declarations, proceeding from such a
source, acted as a ferment in the mental and political development of the
contemporary world, England not excepted. Nevertheless, Frederick’s stirring
liberal utterances sprang from the liberalism of a despot—however
“enlightened.” “Pray do not tell me,” said Lessing, “about your Berlin liberty
of thought and writing: it merely consists in the liberty of circulating as
many witticisms as you like against religion.” The governing classes of the
Prussian nation perceived no trace pf, practical Liberalism in the King. His
conduct towards officers and civil servants was only too often cruel and
capricious. After the Treaty, of Hubertusburg, he required heavy pecuniary
sacrifices even from the officers of the army, who in other respects
constituted so highly privileged a body, and the necessity for filling his
Treasury obliged him to lower the pay of the regimental commanders and
captains. The income of the officers, most of whom were the sons of very poor
noble families, ran short in the case of lieutenants, and was not sufficient
for their needs till they obtained a company. Now, the lieutenants had lost
this chance, while the captains in command of companies found their reduced pay
inadequate.
The author of
Letters of am old Prussian Officer, Kaltenborn, who entered the Prussian army
in the course of the Seven Years’ War, although he preserved no kindly
remembrance of Frederick the Great, cannot but acknowledge a marked advance in
refinement under his rule in the manners and tone of Prussian officers. The
same judgment no doubt applies to their conceptions of the point d'honneur. The
moral trustworthiness of military and civil officials, which is taken for
granted in the best administered States of modern Europe, was in the eighteenth
century only an idea in process of gradual evolution; and this moral
purification was considerably impeded by Frederick’s deference to fiscal
considerations. It was one of the most painful consequences of
the excessive
and long-continued financial strain, that the corruptness of the officers,
which had so greatly added to the burden of the “ cantonment ” system under
Frederick William I, could not be extirpated under Frederick II. The officers
of the army were, in the words of an ordinance of Frederick’s, “the foremost
class in the State.” The middle and lower classes had practically no legal
redress even against the worst excesses committed by officers. On the other
hand, Frederick, in agreement with the extreme views of his father, held the
civil servants as a class in far lower esteem than was their due. “ Out of a
hundred Kriegsrathe,” he wrote, “ one can always with a good conscience send
ninety-nine to be hanged, since the chance is small of there being one honest
man in the lot.”
The hope of
the Prussian bureaucracy proved vain, that the King would in time renounce his
predilection for the countrymen of de Launay, and abandon the Regie,
exasperated as he was by the corruptibility of a large number of its members.
The moral defects of the foreign excise officials were regarded by Frederick
with comparative leniency, because the Frenchmen brought him in money. As his
father’s son, he knew how to quell the latent opposition of the native Prussian
officials to the French, more especially as very few of the Presidents,
Directors and Councillors in the various War and Domains Offices throughout his
dominions were men of property, or so much as had sources of income even in
part independent of the Government.
The judges
met with a treatment at the hands of the King no less harsh than that of the
administrative officers. Arnold, a water- miller in the neighbourhood of
Ziillichau in the Neumark, did not pay his rent and was on two occasions
condemned to eviction. He petitioned the King, maintaining that he could not
pay, because a carp-pond made above his mill carried away the water needed for
his business. The King took an interest in the maintenance of the country
middle class which they gratefully appreciated. On this occasion, therefore,
he, in Russian style, sent a colonel to report on the provincial judges. The
colonel decided in favour of the miller. Hereupon, the King entertained no
further doubt but that there existed a conspiracy of aristocrats between
Arnold’s landlord and the owner of the carp-pond, on the one side, and the
Neumark judges, on the other, and twice ordered the case to be tried over
again, the second time before the Supreme Court at Berlin. Both times Arnold
was sentenced afresh to eviction—and rightly so, for a saw-mill situated
between his property and the carp-pond was working excellently and not
suffering from any shortage of water.
However
Frederick II might warp or force justice, he required it to be strictly
maintained by his magistrates. It seemed to him to be in this case outrageously
disregarded. He determined to expose as secret enemies of public justice those
persons who seemed to be thwarting his efforts for the preservation of the
existing distribution of rural property. Orders were accordingly issued by the
King’s sovereign authority declaring that Arnold’s sentence of eviction was
revised, and
that the
carp-pond should be filled up. Two members of the Supreme Court were dismissed
and thrown into prison. The High Chancellor of Justice, von Fiirst, at an
audience on the subject, ventured to express an independent opinion on some
secondary point; but he was imperiously set aside: “ Leave the room; your
successor has been appointed.”
It is evident
that Frederick the Great closely resembled his father in temperament and
character. In the military and administrative institutions of Frederick
William I, he made no material change. Consequently, it was quite impossible
for the middle classes to cherish any enthusiastic patriotism towards the
State as built up on Frederick’s lines. However conscientiously and judiciously
he might govern, the system of the officers’ State remained all too illiberal.
The nobility, in their turn, were far from content, but the principle of
chivalrous fidelity bound them to the throne. The personal relation between
noblemen and king was one of the strongest of the invisible buttresses supporting
the social edifice of Prussia, which rested on no common national basis. In recognition
of his moral dependence on the nobility, Frederick favoured them in many ways.
He did not scruple to assert that noblemen had more sense of honour than the
bourgeoisie. Commissions in the army were reserved by him for the nobility, and
commoners were only tolerated as officers in the artillery and in the garrison
regiments. The purchase of manorial estates (Ritterguter) by commoners was
forbidden.
The King
entertained the opinion that each historic class had its definite calling, and
that disorder arose when one invaded the sphere of another. He, therefore,
opposed the attempts of the nobles to absorb peasant properties. After the
Treaty of Hubertusburg, those peasants who had been ruined by the hostile
invasions received from the King com for consumption and for sowing, flour,
bread, oxen, horses, sheep, pigs, cows. In the Neumark alone, where a large
part of the population of the plains lived by wool-spinning and cloth-weaving,
68,866 sheep were distributed. For the rebuilding of farms and houses destroyed
by fire the distressed peasants and burghers received timber free of charge
from the royal forests, besides some ready money. Ten-thousand houses, bams and
sheds were thus rebuilt with the aid of public funds. It is not known how much
this r&tablissement cost the King; in any case, immediately on the
conclusion of peace millions of thalers were distributed among citizens,
peasants, and noblemen also. These last had been plunged deep into debt by the
war. A two years’ respite (moratorium) was accorded to the landowners by the
Courts; but the only result was, as the King expressed it in his History, to
destroy completely the credit of the “ first and most brilliant class of
society.” In order to assist the landed aristocracy, the King, from 1767
onwards, increased his extraordinary expenditure by nearly three million
thalers (d£?450,000), which he allotted, partly as gifts and partly as a two
per cent, loan, in Pomerania, Silesia and the Neumark.
716 Agricultural credit
societies.—Colonisation. [1763-86
With this
assistance, highly effectual in itself, a new departure in organisation was
closely connected. In Silesia—for it was here that the organisation of
agricultural credit began—the great landowners as a company issued shares
paying interest. For money so invested the company was liable to the holders to
the extent of the total property of its members. It then lent out to them the
funds entrusted to it; they had, however, to mortgage their property to the
Landschaft, that is, to the company of great landowners, mortgages being only
accepted up to half the assessed value of each estate. The Silesian large
landholders thus secured easy credit. To defray the initial cost of the
arrangement, the, King made over 200,000 thalers (=£30,000) to the province at
two per cent. When, six years afterwards, in 1776, representatives of the
Estates of the Kurmark waited upon the King at Potsdam, he referred to the
agricultural credit,system of Silesia, and added: “You must imitate that; it
answers capitally,'” The deputies objected that there might be another Thirty
Years’ War; when every single great landowner would be ruined by this general
liability. The King replied: “You need not trouble about that; if the skies
fall all the birds will be caught, and if the end of the world comes we shall
all be bankrupt. And, even if a province were ruined, the King would have to
come to the rescue, for he and his Estates are one.” This encouraging speech of
the sovereign had for its result the formation of the Creditsodetat (credit
company) of the Kurmark and the Neumark, on a similar basis to that adopted in
Silesia. To this undertaking also the King lent 200,000 thalers (<£30,000)
at a low rate of interest. In the same way, he assisted the Pomeranian nobles,
who of their own accord asked him for an institution of agricultural credit. “I
will gladly help you,” he said, “ for I love the Pomeranians like brothers; and
they could not be loved better than I love them, for they are brave people who
have at all times helped me in the defence of our country with their purses and
their persons both in the field and at home.” Frederick solved an important
problem of true conservative policy by saving his nobles from usury even at the
sacrifice of public money. Moreover, the mortgage banks instituted by him for
the landed nobility spread all over Germany, and still flourish; whereas the
differentiation of political rights according to birth, which he rigidly maintained,
has in the main passed away.
In the matter
of colonisation, again, Frederick followed in his father’s footsteps; except
that his chief exertions on this head concerned the Mark Brandenburg and
Silesia instead of East Prussia. Colonisation was, nevertheless, likewise
carried out very extensively in East and West Prussia, in Pomerania and in the
duchy of Magdeburg. It is estimated that, during the course of his reign, the
King settled 300,000 foreigners on specially privileged conditions. Even if that
figure is an exaggeration, it is at all events certain that Frederick’s
colonisation policy very considerably increased moderate-sized and small rural
(holdings. Under
Frederick II,
as under Frederick William I, large numbers of immigrants were settled on
comparatively unproductive soil; the fertile portion of the royal domains was
reserved for the farmers-general (Generalpdchter), whose rents were, after
1763, raised more relentlessly than ever.
In
almost all his provinces Frederick drained marshes, cut canals, cleared away
virgin forests, cultivated estates running to waste; in these respects too he
was following the example of his predecessors, but on a very much larger scale.
If it was at all possible, foreign immigrants were settled on such reclaimed
land. After the draining of the bog on the Warthe in the Neumark, the colonists
settled there had to see for themselves to the clearirg of their new homesteads
and to bringing them under cultivation. There was certainly little of the free
and independent life of the squatter in the conditions of existence of these
people. As the townsfolk were under the Steuerrath (surveyor of taxes), so the
rural colonists were under the Amtmamn (crown bailiff)—the designation of the
farmer-general as a vicarious representative of magisterial authority. The
colonist, having almost invariably accepted benefits from the Government, was
not at liberty to leave his holding again at pleasure, or had at all events to
find a proper substitute. Colonists were also liable to forced labour. The King
held liberal opinions on this point, and, instead of feudal services, imposed
dues in money on the peasants newly settled on the crown lands. But, with
regard again to the imposition of forced labour on those settled there from of
old, the march of progress had to give way before considerations of finance. In
1748 Frederick had laid down the principle that peasants on crown lands should
not render more than a four days a week statute service, personal and with
their teams. After the Seven Years’ War this concession was dropped, as it
would have prevented the War and Domains Offices from demanding higher rents
from the crown tenants. ,
The peasants
in the service of the nobility—two-thirds of the total rural population—lived
under still more unfavourable conditions than the crown lands peasantiy. Their
statute labour was for the most part unlimited. The King was not blind to the
fact that the extreme poverty of the rustic population could only be remedied
by the abolition of feudal services; but such fundamental reforms were hardly
compatible with his conservative method of government. The Prussian peasant was
induced by his forced labour to put no heart into his work. The French peasant,
who, long before the Revolution, had ceased to be harassed to any considerable
extent by the feudal system, was indefatigably industrious, and was constantly
purchasing more land; whereas King Frederick could only with difficulty prevent
the large estates from swallowing up the peasant properties. The Prussian
landlords and bailiffs, on whom the patrimonial jurisdiction depended,
practically possessed the right of inflicting corporal punishment on the
peasants. A peasant had to get their consent to his marriage, and to give up
his children to them as
718 Corn pripes
regulated.—Government monopolies. [1763-86
servants for
a number of years. Such things; if occurring at all in the France of 1786, were
sporadic phenomena. But* even if Prussia could not bear comparison with the
sphere of civilisation of western Europe, the conditions prevailing in
Frederick’s monarchy had a strong attraction for the subjects of many German
Princes. It. is true that in the years of famine, from 1770 to 1774, when there
were many deaths from privation in other parts of Germany, Prussia too
suffered from exorbitant corn prices; but the Government was able here to
prevent the distress from reaching the highest pitch. In innumerable
instances,. Frederick fed communities or individuals at the cheapest possible
rate, and seed com was often distributed by him gratuitously, Forty thousand
Bohemians and Saxons are said to have been driven by famine across the border,
where they found a new home under the wings of the Black Eagle. In no country
of Europe was the public corn supply at that time regulated according to the
principle of laisser Jhire, laisser aller; not even in England. By means of
prohibitions of exportation and importation, and by the establishment of depots
which bought at cheap and sold at dear times, Frederick succeeded in keeping
the price of corn at a moderate level, except in quite abnormal years. In his
testament of 1768 he says: “With regard to the price of corn, it is incumbent
on the ruler to draw a hard and fast line, striking the mean between the
interests of the nobleman, the farmer of crown lands, and the peasant, on the
one. side, and those of the soldier and the working man, on the other.” This
policy was unquestionably right. Thoroughly adapted to the age in its whole
conception, it acted all the more advantageously, in that the Prussian dipots
could command for their purchases not only the home market, but also the
neighbouring market of Poland, where com was absurdly cheap. It must not be
forgotten that, here again, Frederick was merely carrying on the work of his father.
He added thirteen fresh dipots to the seventeen left by Frederick William I.
Frederick II
was more powerful at home than Louis XIV, and his dominions were easier to
supervise; consequently, economic conditions in Prussia could be more
effectually regulated from above than in France, the model country of
mercantilism. The Crown had a monopoly of salt, coffee, and tobacco. The state
institution of the Seehandlung (Board of Maritime Trade) possessed a monopoly
of sea-salt, and partially of wax. The King was the chief corn-merchant in his
realm; he owned a third of the arable land. He was building great merchantmen
at Stettin for sale abroad. A government concern, endowed with monopoly rights,
purveyed firewood to Berlin and Potsdam; another was granted the sole right of
exporting timber from the state forests of the Kurmark and the duchy of
Magdeburg, together with a right of preemption as to all timber from private
forests destined for export. As regards mining, in Upper Silesia lead-mines and
blast-furnaces were worked in the fiscal interest, and there was in Berlin a
government iron dipot tor
the sale of
Silesian iron. In the Westphalian county of Mark the iron industry, which was
already highly prosperous, was at least restricted to ground forming part of
the crown domains, and paid tithe. In this and in every other trade, no less
minute and careful regulations were made under Frederick II than under
Frederick William I. In order to supply efficient labour for the Silesian
woollen trade, spinning-schools were established, and the agricultural
labourers were not allowed by the authorities to many, until they had given
proof of their qualification as wool spinners. The tutelage exercised by the
State over the domestic affairs of the citizens was extended to the most
trivial matters. Thus, on the occasion of the proposed erection of a
paper-mill, the King issued the following order: “In our land the bad habit is
prevalent among maid-servants both in town and country of burning up rags for
tinder to light the fires; an effort must be made to break them of this. The
ragmen must therefore be provided with touch-wood to give to the maids in
exchange for rags. They can light their fires just as well with that as with
rags for tinder.”
But Frederick
II further resembled his predecessor in not merely extending a sort of police
protection to those engaged in industries or trades, but also, in patriarchal
fashion, assisted them with money and money’s worth, He declared that of the
3,000,000 thalers (£450,000) yielded annually by the increased duties nothing
should be expended for political purposes, but that the whole sum should be
devoted to promoting the welfare of the country. And he fully redeemed his
word. Between 1763 and 1786 he spent nearly 60,000,000 thalers (£9,000,000) in
raising the economic condition of his people. He built factories in Berlin at a
cost of 9,000,000 thalers (£1,350,000), and made them over to the
manufacturers. This absorbed thrice the sum given or lent by the King to the
nobles who had suffered damage through the Seven Years’ War. One special
feature of Frederick’s mercantilism was the development of the silk and velvet
industry from quite insignificant beginnings. Throughout the civilised world of
that day, efforts were being made to set this industry on foot; but no
Government strove with so much tenacity, intelligence and liberality as the
Prussian to reach the unattainable height of the example given by Lyons. During
his reign Frederick expended 2,000,000 thalers (£300,000) on the advancement
of this trade. Of course, but a very small proportion of the raw material was
obtained at home, and a government dipot for raw silk ensured a regular supply
for the mills at steady prices. Except for a few temporary crises, the
manufacture of velvet and silk grew steadily in Prussia.
The King
called the Silesian linen industry his “Peru.” He said that in the
linen-manufacturing districts he would permit no mining, not even for gold,
lest the supply of wood should be diverted from the bleacheries. Recruits for
filling up the gaps made by the Seven Years’ War in the ranks of the weavers
were sought abroad not less energetically
than they
were for the army. Every immigrant weaver received a loom as a free gift. Of
course, he was not allowed to leave Prussia at his option, after he had once
settled there and accepted benefits from the Government. The position of the
linen weavers was most unfavourable in Prussia—as indeed all over Germany. The
King was ignorant of those social ills which the eighteenth century ih general
was little capable of understanding. In his eyes, the salient point was that
Silesian linen should reach the Spanish market at a low enough price to be able
to undersell that manufactured across the frontier in Prance close by.
As in the
case of the velvet and silk manufacturers and the weavers, Frederick assisted
employers and employed alike in every trade with free gifts, pecuniary
advances, indemnifications, premiums. “Let it be known,” the King said to one
of his Ministers, “ that, if an economic enterprise is beyond the power of my
subjects, it is my affair to defray the costs, and they have nothing further to
do than to gather in the profits.” Keen advocates of mercantilism affirmed that
the flourishing condition of Prussian industry was due to the great circulation
of money, as debased coins could not pass out of the country. This strange
notion certainly failed to hit the mark; but, in point of fact, the means
employed for securing the productiveness of Prussian industiy, though efficacious,
were two-edged. “I make use of prohibition as much as I can,” the King said to
de Laiinay. Prohibitions of importation, exportation, and transit followed one
another in rapid succession after 1763. Soon after the Treaty of Hubertusburg
the importation of pig-iron and raw steel from Austria was forbidden. At the
same time, the export of Silesian wool to the Habsburg monarchy was stopped, as
also the transit thither of Polish wool. The exportation of that commodity from
the other provinces had been already prohibited by Frederick William I. The
political economists of Vienna replied with the strongest countervailing
measures. Austria forbade the importation of Prussian silk, goods, woollen
cloths and shawls, hats and stockings. After Prussia had also stopped the
supply of wool from Silesia and Poland to the factories of the Saxon
electorate, a still fiercer tariff war began on that frontier. A Dresden edict
of 1765 prohibited outright all Prussian manufactures; and Prussia retaliated
by an edict forbidding the importation from Electoral Saxony of all silk,
cotton, woollen and linen goods, gold and silver plate of every sort, and
china.
In 1768, rich
strata of iron ore were discovered in Upper Silesia, a district hitherto of
little account. Hereupon, the importation of iron from Sweden was forbidden.
The iron-workers thought it impossible to do without Swedish iron, and, in
order to teach them better, artillery experiments were made upon Swedish and
Silesian iron. It was alleged that the native metal stood the test better than
the foreign; but the Prussian Ordnance Office, which could of course procure
import licenses, continued to use principally Swedish iron, and,
for several
years afterwards, the wrought-iron trade considered itself very heavily damaged
by the prohibition.
The necessity
of securing some return from the concerns carried on or subsidised by the State
caused the system of prohibitions to be extended further and further; and this
of course reacted very unfavourably on the development of trade. How much this
branch of economic policy left to be desired, is clearly seen in the history of
the origin of the Prussian Bank, the forerunner of the modern German
Reichsbank. This institution was founded by Frederick the Great at Berlin in
1765; and a branch was started at Breslau, where it was lodged in the refectory
of the Jesuits. This was done despite the protests of the reverend Fathers,
whom Frederick took under his protection against the Pope, because they
conducted the higher education of the Silesian Catholics free of charge—not
that he otherwise entertained any special regard for the rights and property of
the Order. Privy Councillor Wurmb, who took in hand the establishment of the
Breslau branch of the Prussian Bank, soon recognised that the merchants of the
Silesian capital were full of mistrust, and told the chief men among them that
it would be folly for everyone to be afraid of bank-notes, and to try to get
rid of them immediately on receiving them. This dread of paper money was in fact
the crux of the matter. The commercial world had not forgotten the catastrophe
produced by the fall in the standard value of money during the Seven Years’
War. The Prussian Bank was started with 450,000 thalers (£67,500) cash in
public money and the right to issue bank-notes up to 1,300,000 thalers
(£195,000). The King further held out the prospect of making over to the Bank
8,000,000 thalers (£1,200,000) in cash out of the War Exchequer. The leading
merchants of Breslau begged that a part of this sum might be put in circulation
at once, but that the issue of paper money might be stopped; otherwise they
would enter into no business transactions with the Bank. But their hand was
forced, as that of the Jesuits had been ; and twenty-one of the chief merchants
of Breslau were obliged to open accounts with the Bank.
The centre of
the linen industry of Silesia was Hirschberg. In their distrust of paper money,
the merchants there gave up sending their bills to the capital of the province
for discounting, and sent instead to Leipzig or Prague. The notes on the
Prussian Bank continued to fall in value; and the Breslau merchants after all
had their way in the main. Of the 1,300,000 thalers which the Bank, according
to its patent of 1765, might issue in notes, only 580,000 had been set in
circulation by 1806. In business and general dealings, Prussian paper money
counted for so little as to warrant Mirabeau’s gibe that no scoundrel had ever
yet counterfeited a Berlin bank-note. King Frederick put a quite different interpretation
from that anticipated by the Breslau merchants on his edict proposing to endow
the Bank with 8,000,000 thalers. He caused, in the first instance, 900,000
thalers and then another
7,900,000, to be transferred from the Treasury to
the Bank. But these
8,800,000 thalers were not invested, but merely
deposited. The royal deposit was called Fouragegelder (forage moneys), in order
to indicate that it still belonged to the War Exchequer.
The “forage
moneys” constituted an apparent security for the voluntary and compulsory
deposits of the general public flowing into the Bank. The compulsory deposits
were due to a second edict, issued by Frederick in 1768, directing the
authorities to invest in the Bank, at an interest of 3 per cent., all
unemployed capital deposited with them belonging to widows, orphans, minors,
institutions, hospitals, or charitable and educational foundations, unless
such money could be placed in mortgages. Chit, was a serious enactment from the
moral point of view; and its economic expediency is also open to grave
question. The trade of Prussia, hampered as it was by the system of monopolies
and privileges and by tariff wars, could not profitably employ the capital
which was to reach it through the medium of the Bank. The directors of the Bank
looked round them in vain for an opportunity to make suitable investments. So
they did the best they could, putting the money into tobacco shares, ships, and
commodities. Under the two Kings who followed on Frederick II, the directors of
the Bank found themselves driven further and further along this precipitous
path. There was all the less chance of safeguarding tht deposit-holders, when
the1 avalanche of the Napoleonic invasion descended upon the kingdom
of Prussia. At that time, all the possessions of widows and orphans, and the
like, which through the Bank had been brought into an unnaturally close
connexion with the State, were involved in its catastrophe. But, during
Frederick’s lifetime, all seemed safe; and the net profit from the Bank was continually
increasing ; in the year of the King’s death the 450,000 thalers of initial
capital paid over 50 per cent. This money had been earned by the many millions
of voluntary and compulsory deposits. In spite of this, Frederick claimed the
total profit of the Bank for the Exchequer. No reserve fund was started The
security of the creditors now as ever rested solely on the “forage moneys,” for
which the Bank had to pay the King 3 per cent, interest. On the other hand, the
rate of interest to other depositors was soon lowered to 2 or S2| per cent. The
institution of this Bank was manifestly premature from an economic standpoint.
All manner of coercive measures on the part of the'Government, indeed,
gradually accustomed the business world to having its transactions managed to a
certain extent by the Bank; but this probably had no effect on trade, one way
or the other. Thus, there was no palpable result from the foundation of the
Prussian Bank beyond the creation of a new surplus in favour of the royal finances.
There was
economic progress in Prussia under Frederick II, just as there had been under
Frederick William I, though the figures of contemporary statistics, which
should indicate a marked rise, are
absolutely
untrustworthy. It was no case of a rapid advance in material welfare either
under Frederick the Great or under his father; but from certain facts it may be
inferred that a certain improvement in the welfare of the people actually took
place. Frederick the Great once complained to de Launay that luxury was so much
on the increase that every servant-girl must now have a thread of silk in what
she wore. The purchasing public can only have gratified fresh wants of this
sort by means of additions which must have been made to the national wealth.
What applies to silk must be also said of coffee, the consumption of which from
1750 onwards became a more and more general custom. As stated above, however,
it must not be supposed that there was any very considerable increase in public
prosperity between 1763 and 1786. The revenue from excise and customs yielded,
between 1766 and 1786, a net increase in returns of 23,500,000 thalers
(£3,525,000); The revenues from the province of West Prussia, not acquired till
1772, are not included in this sum. Thus the French revenue officials managed
to raise on the average, another million thalers per annum. This represents
both the proceeds from increased taxes and the additional receipts due to
increased purchasing power, which latter must therefore not be reckoned at too high
a rate. For the Prussian body pol^ic rested, after all, on a substructure of
unfree peasantry, who, whenever the landlords and farmers-general required, had
to furnish statute labour four days and more in the week; whose way of work was
slack; and who, if they earned 55 thalers cash in the year, were only allowed
20 thalers and less for their own domestic purposes.
Shortly after
Frederick’s death Mirabeau’s book De la monarchie prus- sienne sous Frederic le
Grand appeared in London. The author passes a crushing judgment on Frederick’s
economic policy, by applyingthe standard of those theories of political economy
which had recently come to the fore in western Europe and eclipsed
mercantilism. But, for the present, the English and French in practical politics
applied the hew doctrines only very cautiously and not even consistently, while
in Prussia not only Frederick II but almost the whole body of his civil
officers steadily adhered to mercantilist principles. The Prussian nation,
which was far behind the nations of western Europe in almost every respect,
seemed for a long time yet to require direction from above in economic matters.
“ Mankind,”
Frederick complains in his testament of 1768, “ move if you urge them on, and
stop so soon as you leave off driving them. Nobody approves of habits and
customs but those of his fathers. Men read little, and have no desire to learn
how anything can be managed differently; and, as for me, who never did them
anything but good, they think that I want to put a knife to their throats, so
soon as there is any question of introducing a useful improvement, or indeed
any change at all. In such cases I have relied on my honest purposes and my
good conscience, and also on the information in my possession, and have
calmly pursued
my way.” It has been shown that only too many changes ordered by the King put
the fiscal knife to his subjects’ throats; and it was no wonder that they cried
out, forgetting in that perilous moment the economic blessings which beyond all
doubt they likewise owed to him.
•It was not
merely by victorious battles and diplomatic skill, but also by his home policy,
that Frederick the Great raised Prussia to the third place among the Powers of
the world. As the champion of enlightenment he appears in a specially glorious
light. In the Belgian possessions of Maria Theresa, from whose intolerant rule
Frederick had freed the Protestants of Silesia, a Bockreiter (“ gentleman of
the road ”) was burnt alive, about 1780, because, when committing his highway
robberies, he was said to have performed blasphemous ceremonies after the
manner of the customs formerly imputed to the Templars. If, at the dose of the
eighteenth century, inhumanity, superstition, intolerance, and pseudoscience
had to give way all over Europe, incalculable services for the victory of
rationalism were rendered by the royal philosopher, who took the lead on the
Continent in the abolition of . torture. Where Voltaire is praised, Frederick
must not be left unhonoured.^,
Frederick
William II, the successor of Frederick the Great, was a gentle, kind-hearted
man, who tried to do away with the innumerable hard and ugly comers in the
State built up by his grandfather and his uncle; He raised the pay of captains
and commanders of regiments, and also the salaries of civil officials. He
abandoned the plan of constantly raising the rent paid by the farmers-general,
abolished the monopolies on coffee and tobacco, and put an end to the Regie,
sending all the French revenue officers back to their homes. The new ruler
earned great popularity by this measure; for, just as the people of Prussia had
before laid the chief blame for the debasement of the coinage on Frederick II’s
Jewish financiers, so ‘the odium subsequently aroused by oppressive taxation
attached mairily to the French.
The eleven
years’ reign of Frederick William II was economically a happy period. Customs
and excise, the proceeds from which had grown so slowly under Frederick II,
yielded a constantly ample and steadily increasing revenue, despite the fact
that the vexatious methods of the French excisemen were a thing of the past.
The causes of this material advance are to be sought in the fact, that, though
Frederick William II carried on numerous campaigns in Holland, in Champagne, on
the Rhine and in Poland, all these wars were fought outside Prussia, and
consequently had no deleterious effects upon the economic conditions of the
country. On the contrary, they stimulated trade, in accordance with Cobden’s
maxim that war is the greatest of all consumers. The expenditure on these wars
was not defrayed by increased taxation, any more than Frederick the Great had
augmented the taxes in the Seven Years’ War. Such a step would have been quite
irrational; for the non-noble
1786-97] Reaction
agcdmt the Axd^i\&x\xng. TheRosicrucians. 725
classes in
Prussia had so great a burden of taxation to bear, even in time of peace, that
progress was but slow and difficult. Heavy war taxes would have crushed them.
Thus, nothing remained then for Frederick William II but to pour out the 51
million thalers (£7,650,000) left by Frederick the Great, in order to meet the
expenditure on military operations and armaments which preceded the Convention
of Reichenbach. The whole of this sum was not expended at home, but a large
part of it was; and the contraction of a public debt to the amount of 9|
million thalers (£1,425,000) which was, though with a good deal of trouble,
floated abroad, brought foreign money into the country, and was thus more or
less to the advantage of Prussian trade and industry. The “forage moneys” in
the bank, were, in strict accordance with their designation, used up for
military purposes together with the entire reserve in the Treasury, so that the
private deposits were, together with the widows’ and orphans’ funds, the
hospitals and charitable and educational endowments, left absolutely unsecured.
But a more serious result of the political decadence of Prussia was the fact
that, bj the exhaustion of her Exchequer, she was degraded financially to the
level of her rivals, Austria and Russia, who were not in a position to sustain
great European wars without the aid of subsidies from England or France.
When
Frederick made peace at Hubertusburg, there were still, after seven campaigns,
over 14 million thalers (£2,100,000) in his Treasury. If he could have made
territorial acquisitions, as his nephew did, without a great war, but at the
cost of his whole treasure, he would probably have preferred to risk a war on a
large scale, which would then have been self-supporting—just as the Seven
Years’ War was fought on the Prussian side by means of the resources of
conquered Saxony, and, subsequently, the cost of Napoleon’s war with England
was squeezed out of subjugated Prussia.
Frederick’s
title to be called “ the Great ” is more than half due to his having made room
in the world for the Auf Jclarung. But the “spirit of the world ” did not cease
to work; religious feeling and the historic sense began to stir in their turn,
and to react against rationalism. At the head of this mighty host of opinion
marched a troop of strange and repulsive figures. The Rosicrucian Order, which
was widespread in the aristocratic circles of Germany, sought for the
philosopher’s stone, busied itself with alchemy and spiritualism, laboured at
the preparation of a balm to make old people young and bring the dead to life
again. The surgeon-general of the Prussian army, Theden, endeavoured to catch
falling stars in order to distil the balm from this elemental matter. With
alchemy, spiritualism, and the search for panaceas, bigotry was associated, and
thus some very queer saints came to the front. Towards the end of his time as
heir presumptive, Frederick William was persuaded that he had been cured of a
large abscess in the thigh by the secret panacea and devoted care of the
Rosicrucians. The heir to the crown
hereupon
entered the Order and received the name of Ormesus Magnus. When he came to the
throne, Frederick William II directed his foreign policy chiefly according to
the advice of a brother of the Order, Farferus, whose name in ordinary life was
von BischofFswerder, and who was adjutant-general to the King.
In his home
policy, Frederick William relied to a large extent on another Rosicrucian,
Minister von Wollner. He was the son of a poor country clergyman, and, as
private tutor in a wealthy noble family, had by his intelligence and eloquence
secured the goodwill of the mother and the hand of the daughter. Frederick the
Great, who desired that a caste-like distinction between classes should remain the
basis of the Prussian State, was wroth at Wollner’s successful coup, and
pronounced him “ an intriguing and tricky parson.” In any case, “ Heliconus ”
was without reproach in his private life—something of a merit in the Berlin of
that day. In other ways, the “ Minister for the Lutheran Department” was not
without his merits; but as to this we cannot here enter into further
particulars. Wollner owes his place in history solely to the Religionsedict, as
it was called, which he drew up for the King, and which was promulgated by
Frederick William II in the summer of 1788.
The censures
of the Religionsedict on the teaching and conduct of the rationalistic clergy,
university professors and schoolmasters cannot be termed altogether
unwarranted, in view of the shallowness and indiscretion of many aufgeklarte
preachers and teachers. On the other hand, Frederick William and his advisers
exhibited a startling lack of appreciation of the intellectual achievements of
the past century; for the edict threatened all who were not orthodox with
removal from their pulpits and chairs. The Government also abrogated that
freedom of speech and writing in regard to religious matters by which Prussia
had under the late King set so glorious an example to the world. In this
Frederick William II appealed to the example of his sober-minded grandfather,
Frederick ■ William I, in accordance with whose views he wished to
restore the Christian religion in its original purity and authenticity, in
order to check so far as he was able the immorality arising from infidelity and
the perversion of the fundamental truths of religion.
The
Rosicrucian Order imposed on its members among other obligations that of
chastity, after the example of the Templars. Frederick William II attacked
immorality in his Religionsedict, and, as a matter of fact, rationalism had
tended to upset the moral views of many men and women. But the morality of the
pious King himself was anything but strict. He carried on innumerable
love-intrigues; his favourite mistress, Wilhelmine Enke, the sister of a
ballet-dancer, was married to a groom of the chamber named Rietz, and enjoyed
the favour of the King until his death. Frederick William’s second consort,
Princess Louisa of Hesse- Darmstadt, bore him four sons; but, in her lifetime,
he contracted a morganatic marriage with one of her maids of honour, who was
succeeded
1788-97]
The resistance to the Religionsedict. 727
on her death
by another of the Queen’s ladies. Both these bigamous alliances were solemnised
according to the rites of the Church by Zollner, the rationalistic court
chaplain.
The
Rosicrucians, a medley of religious enthusiasts, hypocrites, and deceived
deceivers, were hardly more virtuous in their everyday life than the
rationalists. Their self-knowledge did not prevent them from taking their stand
on the Edict and adopting violent measures in the name of true Christianity
against the clergy, the teaching profession, the universities, and literature,
“ lest the mass of poor folk be handed over to the delusions of the teachers of
the day, and millions of our good subjects by thus forfeiting the peace of
their lives and the consolation of their deathbeds, be made utterly
miserable.” Wollner issued a rescript against Kant, in which the philosopher
was charged with the perversion and degradation of many of the cardinal
doctrines of Christianity and of Holy Scripture, and with thus violating his
duty as a teacher of youth at the university. If such conduct should be
repeated by him, he would most certainly have to take the consequences. “
Heliconus ” enjoyed a triumph; for Kant, old and desirous of quiet, almost
entirely suspended his academic activity. But in other quarters the execution
of the Hehgiomedict encountered the most tenacious opposition. In Prussia there
existed at that time only the small beginnings of a cultured middle class in
independent circumstances. Culture belonged almost exclusively to the official
class. Trained as this body of men had been by Frederick the Great, it was,
clergy and all, thoroughly permeated with rationalist views. This official
class accordingly summoned up courage to defy the obscurantist Government. The
judicial and administrative authorities took under their protection the
persecuted literary adherents of the Ayfklarung, as well as the rationalist
clergy, professors and teachers. Moreover, the persecutors themselves proved to
be not untouched by the humanitarian spirit of the age; and, when the rare
event occurred of a clergyman losing his benefice, Frederick William ordered
that he should be provided with some well-paid secular post. The Rosicrucians1
attack on the AufJclarung dwindled away and, at the most, served to confirm
Prussian society in its hostile attitude towards orthodoxy. The nucleus of that
society, the official class, not merely earned the negative credit of having
averted an unhealthy mysticism, but won a high positive title to fame in the
sphere of legislation. The Prussian official class had been trained by two
great Kings in the way, not always of justice, but of practical intelligence,
insight and indefatigable zeal, and now bade fair to surpass its French
prototype, and to become the most efficient bureaucratic body in j>j||ie
world.
This phase of
the internal history of the country found expression in the codification of the
common law of Prussia (Allgemeines Preussisches Landrecht). A different system
of law prevailed in every province of the Prussian State, as it did in every
German territory; and the
general
development of the law in Germany at large had been for centuries at a
standstill. Frederick the Great had, therefore, commissioned von Carmer, the
successor of von Fiirst, who had been so brusquely dismissed from the High
Chancellorship, to prepare a general code for the whole Prussian kingdom.
Carmer surrounded himself with a staff of lawyers, of whom Privy Councillor
Suarez was by far the most important. This Herculean task, which occupied ten
years and was not interrupted by the change of sovereign, reached its
conclusion in 1791. The code bore the stamp of the absolutist polity of
officers, with its spirit of caste; but on the other hand it was full of the
tendencies of the Ayfklarung. It may be noted, in this connexion, that
Frederick the Great had removed from the Prussian code the application of torture,
but not the infliction of cruel and barbarous additions to the punishment of
death. Frederick William II laid it down that, though the death penalty could
not be abolished, there must under no circumstances be any deliberate increase
of the physical pain necessary in its application. But the King’s gentleness of
disposition was such that he was very imperfectly obeyed; and almost half a
century passed before Prussian justice absolutely ceased, in certain cases, to
direct that the bones of criminals should be broken on the wheel. Carmer and
Suarez even took over some of the French ideas of political liberty; but the
King, under the influence of the mystics, struck out most of these. Some
remnants, however, survived; and these, together with the whole spirit of the
code, supplied the Prussian officials as a class with the force which enabled
them to accomplish their development into an independent factor in the history
of their country, instead of being as heretofore, merely an instrument in the
hands of its Government. The Allgemeine Landrecht was a masterpiece as to both
form and contents, and morally advanced the cause of rationalism throughout the
whole of Germany. The first great codification of law since the time of
Justinian was supplemented by the philosophy of Kant. Thus it was not only the
body of military officers who in this State had laurels to show. When, in 1806,
it was annihilated, the enlightened men among both its military and its civil
servants joined hands, and, by means of the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg,
succeeded in founding a new Prussia.
Although he
permitted the Rosicrucians to exert a baneful influence over him, it cannot be
said of Frederick William II that he was merely a tool in the hands of that
sect. On the contrary, he often made important decisions repugnant to the
mystics. To the women about him the King allowed no political influence at all.
Despite his love of pleasure, he did not squander public money. He was not
deterred by financial diffictflties from considerably strengthening the army,
herein acting like a true King of Prussia. Frederick William II died, in his
fifty-third year, on November 16, 1797, just about the time when Napoleon
Bonaparte was coming to the front in France.
(2) POLAND
AND PRUSSIA.
(1763-91.)
The
acquisition of Polish Prussia (the present province of West Prussia) had been
described as a political necessity by Frederick the Great when still Crown
Prince, and a glance at the map fully bears out this view. In the political
testament of November 7, 1768, he pictures the time when this connecting link
shall have been gained for his monarchy, and when, certain points along the
Vistula having been fortified, it will at last have become possible to defend
East Prussia effectively against any Russian aspirations. But, he adds, it is
from Russia that the strongest opposition will come to the endeavours to annex
Polish Prussia. His successors must, therefore, try to get possession of the
country piecemeal, by means of negotiation based on Russia’s urgent need, at
any time, of Prussian support. It was a conjuncture of this kind which led to
the First Partition of Poland. Russia was, then, at this time of vital
importance to Prussia in respect both to her Eastern and to her general policy;
because both of the tension between Prussia and the Western Powers, and of the
enduring historic antagonism between Prussia and Austria. Though, after the
murder of Peter III and the Treaty of Hubertusburg, the attitude of Russia
towards Prussia had seemed, at the best, one of neutrality, the common interest
of the two Powers in Polish affairs brought about relations between Frederick
and Catharine which she wished to limit to an understanding as to Poland, but
which he desired to expand into a general cooperation between them against
Austria. The difficulty of bringing the Polish interregnum to a close in such a
way as to suit Russian interests at length compelled Catharine to commit
herself to an alliance which was more in those of Prussia than in her own. The
compact was concluded on April 11,1764, the two Powers undertaking to effect
the election of Stanislaus Poniatowski. Should either of the signatories be
attacked within his or her own frontiers by a hostile Power, the other was
bound to furnish military assistance; if “ subjects of the Polish nation should
disturb the peace of the Republic and form a confederation against the lawful
sovereign, the Tsarina and the King would advance their troops into Poland.” In
this treaty of alliance Russia guaranteed the possession of Silesia to
Frederick; on the other hand, he was now bound to Russia, whatever consequences
might arise from her own policy in regard to Poland; for both Powers further
pledged themselves to maintain the Constitution and freedom of election in
Poland and proposed a line of action in common in regard to the “Dissidents”
(dissenters). It was to the advantage of Prussia that anarchy was kept up in
Poland, and the pressure long exercised by that Power along the Prussian
frontiers proportionately weakened. On the other hand, Prussia had nothing to
gain
730 Confederation of
Bar.—“ Lynar’s project.” [i764-9
from the
Russian ascendancy in a kingdom so impotent as Poland, which implied the
advance of the Russian empire to the Prussian frontier. There was thus an inherent
inconsistency in the Prusso-Russian alliance, of which Frederick was fully
aware; the position in which he had to carry on his Polish policy was one of
constraint, but he made admirable use of it when the crisis of the Partition of
Poland was reached.
With the
election of Stanislaus Poniatowski Catharine had attained her object, and till
1768 she seemed to have become absolutely mistress of Poland. Her policy,
however, led to the Confederation of Bar, and to the war which broke out in
consequence between Turkey and Russia. A dangerous international tension arose,
France and Austria in particular, as has been previously related, in their
turn assuming a threatening attitude towards Catharine. Should a European war
ensue, Frederick would be involved in it as a matter of course, and must stand
or fall with Russia. In this event, he was resolved to fulfil his obligations
towards Russia; but he told himself that he would then be fighting for ends
which either had no bearing on Prussian interests or were directly opposed to
them, and that it would therefore be better from his point of view if there
were no war. He was also determined, if war there must be, to put in a claim
for territorial compensation from Russia: here was the occasion indicated in
the political testament which at this very time he was revising.
Frederick
recog.iis id the casus foederis and paid the stipulated subsidies to Russia for
her Turkish War. At the same time, he endeavoured to effect a renewal of the
alliance with Russia; but the modest condition which he laid down for such a
renewal proves how slight was his expectation of acquiring West Prussia; for he
merely asked that Russia should agree to a not very serious guarantee of a
Prussian claim to the reversion of a certain territory within the Empire.
Prince Henry, however, was already of opinion that this crisis would force
Russia and Austria to consent to an acquisition of territory by Prussia at the
expense of Poland. Now, so early as the beginning of
1769, Frederick had suggested to Panin a scheme
of partition which was ostensibly put forward by the Saxon minister Count zu
Lynar, but of which the real originator was the King himself. According to this
plan, Russia, in return for the assistance rendered her against the Turks, was
to offer to Austria the town of Lemberg with its surroundings and the Zips; to
hand over to Prussia Polish Prussia, with Ermeland and protective rights over
Danzig; and, by way of indemnity for the expenses of the war, take for herself
whatever part of Poland would suit her. The significance of this suggestion
should not, however, be overestimated. Frederick simply intended “Lynar’s
project” as a feeler; and it absolutely fell through when Panin replied with a
quite different scheme, drily observing that, so far as Russia was concerned,
she already possessed larger dominions than she could govern.
The
negotiations for the renewal of the Prusso-Russian alliance dragged on so long
that before their termination the meeting between Frederick and Joseph had
taken place at Neisse (August 25-7, 1769). [nasmuch as this meeting indicated a
rapprochement between the two Powers from whose inveterate antagonism Russia
had much to gain, she was obliged once more to come to terms with Prussia. The
alliance was extended till the end of March, 1780; but, of course, no mention
was made in the treaty of a partition of Poland.
In the middle
of the following year, 1770, the Porte called in the intervention of Prussia
and Austria in her struggle with Russia. Frederick and Joseph met again, this
time at Neustadt in Moravia; and, immediately afterwards, Frederick formally
enquired of Catharine whether the mediation of Prussia and Austria in the war
with Turkey would be agreeable to her, adding that Austria wished the Danubian
Principalities to remain under Turkish domination. This turn of affairs placed
Catharine in a difficult position: and it has been already related how, in
July, 1770, she quite unexpectedly invited Prince Henry of Prussia to visit St
Petersburg, in order that a personal note might be struck in the progress of
her relations with Prussia. Henry arrived in St Petersburg on October 12 and
remained there till the following February; and the intimacy then formed
between him and the Tsarina was kept up by a correspondence of ten years’
duration. But Henry was not, as has been surmised, the bearer of secret
instructions for a treaty of partition of Poland. The correspondence between
the two brothers shows that Frederick did not at that time wish “to interfere
either in the peace (with Turkey) or in the affairs of Poland, but simply to
watch the course of events ”; and Henry’s sole business was to induce
moderation and compliance in the Court of St Petersburg. However, Catharine
would not hear of any mediation by other Powers, and the terms of peace which
she offered to the Porte seemed tantamount to a declaration of war against
Austria. At the critical moment, a way of escape was provided by the occupation
of a part of Poland by Austria. The famous brief conversation on the subject
which took place between Catharine, Chemuisheff, and Henry at St Petersburg on
January 8,
1771, set the ball rolling towards the
partition of Poland as a solution of the problem. A tract of Polish territoiy
was offered to Prussia on that occasion, Russia thus abandoning her principle
of maintaining the integrity of Poland. But Frederick disapproved, because his
acceptance at the moment seemed necessarily conditional upon his implication in
war—and war there would apparently be, since Chernuisheff clearly meant the
Danubian Principalities to fall to Russia’s lot—a result which Austria would
never tolerate. Frederick felt, too, that for so great a risk Ermeland was too
small a gain. “ My share is so slight,” he writes to his brother on January 81,
1771, “that it would not make up for the tumult which it would arouse; but
Polish Prussia would be worth the
trouble,
even if Danzig were not included, for we should then have the Vistula and free
communication with the kingdom (i.e. East Prussia)—, an important matter.” Even
in that event, Frederick wished to adhere to his plan of neutrality and, if
need were, pay a sum of money for his strip of Poland. But Prince Henry, on his
return, correctly summed up the situation: “You hold the balance between
Austria and Russia; in the end Russia will have to give in and to grant you
some advantage in return for those you secure her; when the Austrians see this,
they will in their turn desire some advantage; so that each of the Powers, in
seeking an advantage for itself, will agree to an arrangement beneficial, to
all three.” Accordingly, lest by persisting in neutrality he should fall to the
ground between two stools, Frederick made up his mind to enter into the
suggestion made from St Petersburg. This suggestion itself was, therefore, by
no means the result of an offensive policy against Poland on the part of Prus*
a, whose line of action was rather forced upon her by stress of circumstances.
It is to Frederick’s credit that he was able to turn this pressure to good
account in the interests of his monarchy. Further developments were determined
by Russia’s standpoint, which Panin expressed quite frankly and which
Frederick shared: if Russia had to forgo what she had gained by the war with
Turkey, she must seek compensation elsewhere, namely, in Poland. Negotiations
were carried on between Panin and Count Solms at St Petersburg. On the other
hand, the opposition of Austria seemed to quell all hope that war between
Russia and Austria could be averted by means of the plan for the partition of
Poland, the origin and extension of which have just been described. It was only
when Catharine, at the close of 1771, formally declared to Prussia that she
would renounce all claim to the Danubian Principalities, and when both Powers
thus came to terms about Poland, that Austria determined to participate in this
solution of the question, distasteful as it was to Maria Theresa. On August 5,
1772, Austria entered into the Prusso-Russian Treaty of Partition of the
previous February 17; and, as has been related above, the First Partition of
Poland was concluded. ,
While the
policy of Austria in the Polish question was artificial and showed no steady
purpose, that of Frederick was clear, definite and tactically correct. He had,
no doubt, now accepted a solution the effects of which were contrary to the
traditional interests of Prussia; but his hand was forced in the matter and, in
any event, the independence of Poland was doomed. He must not, therefore, be
regarded as the author of the Partition of Poland, for which Catharine is
responsible both in its general bearing and as a move in political tactics. The
opposition in which he stood to Austria forced him to follow the Russian lead
in this question. On the other hand, as Ranke shows, it was certainly due to
his action that the scope of the Partition scheme was so enlarged as to bring
about a readjustment of the balance of power in both north
and east.
Frederick’s Polish policy was fraught with still more important results;
inasmuch as it may be said to have largely contributed to the prevention of a
violent crisis in the Eastern question and to the stoppage of Russia’s advance
on the Danube. Furthermore, it rendered impossible the sole domination of
Russia in Poland. Russia’s claim to the dominium maris Baltici was henceforth
contested by a strong Power, Prussia, instead of by a weak one, Poland, and the
lower Vistula became once more a German river. Finally, through Frederick’s
Polish policy the foundations were laid for an understanding between the two
German Great Powers. These far-reaching results were, it is true, secured at
the cost of Polish independence. But Germany, and more especially Prussia, had
an inherent historical title to the parts of Poland allotted to her in
1772. They consisted in fact of ancient German
territory which had never become thoroughly incorporated into the Polish
community; so that “ regno redintegrate ” was an appropriate inscription for
the medal struck to celebrate the allegiance of the newly acquired territory.
Nowhere was there any opposition to the occupation, the Protestants in
particular eagerly welcoming the new rule. The lands annexed by Prussia were,
indeed, in a miserably neglected condition; but this did not lead Frederick to
mistake the importance of what he had gained: “ It is a very good bargain,” he
wrote to Prince Henry on June 12,1772, “ and very advan* ageous both
financially and as regards the political position of the State”; and, on June
18,1772: Prussia, he added, now controlled all the products and all the imports
of Poland—an important point; but the chief gain was that the inhabitants of
Prussia could never again be exposed to famine, since they had the corn supply
in their own hands. Notwithstanding all the efforts made, however, her new
commercial position could not attain to its full importance, so long as Danzig,
the emporium of the Baltic corn trade, remained outside her frontier.
Frederick
next set to work with great energy to raise this new part of his kingdom to the
economic level of the rest of his dominions. In this task he found valuable and
far-seeing assistants in Johann Friedrich von Domhardt, president of the Board
of Domains, and Franz Balthasar Schonberg von Brenkenhof, the first
administrator of the Netze district. But, as a matter of fact, Frederick was
himself the real administrative head of this province of West Prussia, as the
newly acquired territory was named. His policy was practical and most carefully
thought out, and he pursued it steadily and with due moderation. The liberation
of the peasants was at once proclaimed; the land was taken out of the hands of
the Polish nobility, and German peasants and burghers were settled on it; a
systematic administration of justice was introduced, and national schools were
established—measures which brought the countiy into line with the order of
things existing in the Prussian State.
The further
development of the Prussian policy in regard to Poland was a matter of course,
so long as the alliance with Russia held good;
734 Prussia’s Polish policy changed. Its
incompleteness. [1777-91
in this
Prince Henry remained the intermediary, who corresponded with Catharine and
paid a second visit to Russia. Notwithstanding the prolongation, in 1777, of
the agreement between the two Powers to March 81, 1788, Russia?s
Eastern schemes led to her abandonment of the Prussian side for that of
Austria, which momentous decision ranged Prussia in a triple alliance with the
Maritime Powers against. Austria and Russia. How entirely anti-Russian the
polidy of Prussia had now become was shown by the agreement with Turkey, concluded
on January 30, 1790, and by that with Poland, which followed on March 29 of the
same year. Prussia now took the side of reform in Poland, and in the end
recognised the Constitution, of May 3, 1791. Thus Frederick William II wholly
reversed his predecessor’s policy, and placed Prussia in a false position. Such
an alliance was in itself unnatural: the most important provision of the
Constitution of May 3, namely, the establishment of a hereditary succession to
the Crown, ran counter to Prussian interests; and they must likewise suffer if
the new Constitution restored the union with the Saxon electorate, of which the
cooperation of Frederick and Catharine had relieved Prussia. This preposterous
agreement with Poland precluded the extension and adjustment of the Prussian
frontier—at all events by the acquisition of Danzig and Thorn, on which
Hertzberg had concentrated his diplomacy, even in the lifetime of Frederick the
Great. Yet this end had to be reached, if the work of the Hohenzollerns was to
reach its organic consummation.
DENMARK UNDER
THE BERNSTORFFS AND STRUENSEE.
Between 1730, when Frederiok IV died, and 1784, when his
great- grandson, afterwards Frederick VI, successfully claimed the regency, the
part played by Denmark in the politics of Europe was but small. It is true
that, in an age of great wars, she increased her commerce, her possessions
overseas, and even her dominions in Europe, gaining prizes such as tempted other
nations to fight. But it was by quiet astuteness and good fortune that these
advantages were secured. The Oldenburg Kings, it seemed, had at last learned
the limits of their power. The partial detachment of Denmark from the main
current of European affairs, however, by no means robs her history of interest.
In an age of absolute monarchies, she presents the spectacle of one entirely
wielded by feeble Kings. Power soon fell to a series of remarkable Ministers,
and Moltke, Bernstorff, Struensee, Guldberg, and the younger Bernstorff,
furnish a demonstration, unique in its amplitude, of the range and
possibilities of benevolent despotism.
Frederick IV,
a monarch whose industry equalled his ambition, and who won a place beside
Christian IV and Frederick III in the reverence of his people, perfected the
machinery of despotism and simplified the foreign policy of Denmark. After the
downfall of Charles XII, Sweden no longer dwarfed and menaced her neighbours.
And, while traces of the past were evident both in the determination of
Frederick and his successors to uphold the aristocracy which kept Sweden weak,
and in their hope that fortune might once more place the three Crowns of
Scandinavia on the head of an Oldenburg, the reconquest of Scania had ceased to
be an aim of the Danish State. The rulers at Copenhagen now pursued clear
dynastic ends on their own side of the Sound. They cherished, indeed, hopes of
attaining to a vote standing earlier on the list than the thirty-fifth in the
Imperial College of Princes, as well as of filling their coffers with French or
English subsidies and with the profits of world-wide trade. But these
aspirations were feeble and fitful in comparison with those which concerned the
Duchies. To retain the
lands in
Schleswig which had been estreated from the House of Gottorp during the
Northern War, and to acquire the Gottorp heritage in Holstein, were throughout
these years the first aims of all who worked for the security of Denmark and
the glory of her Kings.
Home affairs,
on the other hand, confronted the monarchy with problems of greater diversity.
During the two generations which had passed since the coup d'etat of 1660,
autocracy had fortified itself unchallenged. The old Danish nobles, though not
numerous and apparently loyal, saw above them a Privy Council and an array of
governmental Colleges or Boards, chiefly officered by foreigners imported and
ennobled by the King. Besides the members of the central Government, the
Services, and the Bench, the principal officers of local government were agents
of the Crown. The citizens and the peasants were still as of old the faithful
upholders of absolutism. The Church supplied a docile royal servant in every
parish. The higher clergy, however deeply wounded by royal decrees, submitted
to a Divine purpose which had made Saul and Jeroboam kings. The unquestioning
loyalty of the free Norwegian peasants was paid, not to the Danes, but to the
King of Denmark and Norway, and it was to him that the Duchies likewise owed
allegiance. In an age in which loyalty was almost a religion, the King of
Denmark was the cynosure of all his subjects. He alone could sway and reform
the State.
In 1730 the
area and political influence of Denmark were far greater than at the present
day. The1 dominions of her King then included Norway, Schleswig,
Oldenburg, Delmenhorst, and the royal portion of Holstein. This considerable
area, it is true, nourished a somewhat scanty population. In 1769, when the
first census was taken, the kingdom of Denmark numbered only some 825,000 souls,
while the Norwegians numbered some 727,600, and the whole State little more
than two millions. When compared with the resources of some other European
nations, however, this number appeared respectable. Commanded by an autocrat,
and endowed by nature with the elements of power at sea, it might easily become
formidable.
After seventy
years of absolutism, however, the social and economic structure of Denmark
still showed grave defects. Although, in 1702, Frederick had abolished the
worst form of serfdom (Vornedskap), so that the peasants of Zealand and Fiinen
were no longer the property of their lords, and although Norway was in great
part peopled by small proprietors, agriculture, the staple industry of the
State, remained primitive and unprogressive. The peasants were ignorant and
poor. Great masses of them held their lands on condition of paying to their
lord taxes which were commonly beyond their strength, and of performing labour
services whose incidence was determined by him. The lord, who in many cases
appointed the local judges, could with a fair prospect of impunity resort to
brutal violence against his tenants. Apart from these evils, moreover,
agriculture
could hardly flourish, so long as the system of cultivation remained medieval
in type. The peasants still yoked four or six horses to cumbrous wheeled
ploughs, and feebly scratched the soil with wooden harrows. The villages still
cultivated all their lands in common, each owner possessing strips of land
scattered over the surface of vast open fields. The three-field system of
tillage, with its wasteful monotony of com-crops and fallow, had not yet given
place to a wiser rotation. In Jutland great tracts of territory still lay
waste, while throughout Denmark the nobles often found it no easy task to
secure tenants for their vacant farms. Industry, confined to the towns and
crippled by the gild system, was even more feeble than agriculture. An
unprosperous nation, where the rural populace fed and clothed itself, offered
no place for thriving towns. Copenhagen, which, with some 70,000 inhabitants,
was more than five times as populous as any other Danish borough, could not
rebuild itself after the great fire of 1728, until the King withdrew his ban
against houses framed with timber. Some seaports, notably Bergen, Aalborg,
Aarhuus, and Altona, showed signs of energy and progress; but even within their
confines vigorous municipal life had not yet sprung up. The market towns,
though numerous, were insignificant and poor.
Of the
national temper it is hard to speak with confidence. The sacrifices exacted by
the long Northern War had been bravely made. Ignorance, sluggishness, and
good-humour seem to have characterised the common people. Foreign travellers,
whose impressions were naturally formed chiefly in the capital, found the upper
classes cold and dull. Critics, both native and foreign, derided their
excessive greed for titles. “The world here,” wrote Colonel Robert Keith in
1771, “is parcelled out into no less than nine classes, six of whom I must never
encounter without horror. Yet my opera-glass tells me that numbers eight and
nine beat us all hollow as to flesh and blood.” The first three classes, which
formed the Court, included no one of lower degree than an acting councillor of
State, a colonel, or a commander. The King, as supreme disposer of the whole
hierarchy, gave or sold rank as he pleased, thus by yet another method
enhancing his own autocracy.
Of this
heterogeneous and somewhat unprogressive State the Oldenburg dynasty was the
conscience and the soul. Nothing was too distant or too trivial for the eye and
ear of the King. It was he who appointed the organists in provincial churches,
who gave or withheld permission to follow callings outside the gilds, and who
licensed the unfortunate to beg. To him and to the Council, whose powers and
functions he determined, men and women from the furthest confines of Norway
presented their petitions for favours and for redress. His paternal activity
embraced the affairs both of this world and of the next. By the “Sabbath
Ordinance” of 1730 Frederick IV, a bigamist, doomed his subjects to observe
Sundays and holy days with Judaic rigour. On
these
festivals work and amusements were alike forbidden, the town gates locked until
four o’clock in the afternoon, and the people directed on pain of the pillory
to attend church. This edict, and the absence of protest against it, illustrate
the character of the autocracy which in the same year devolved upon Christian,
Frederick’s son.
Christian VI,
a man of little ability, mean presence, and somewhat petty disposition, was to
prove a humane, industrious, and thoroughly well-meaning King. He came to the
throne permeated with the belief that by the exercise of his power he could
make his people happy and good. Surrounding himself with Ministers of his own
choosing, of whom the genial soldier Poul Vendelbo Lowenorn remained longest in
power, he promptly swept away the most vexatious ordinances of his father. The
taxes were reduced, the compulsory militia was abolished, the grant of trading
monopoly to Copenhagen revoked, and the Sabbath Ordinance annulled. Unhappily
for Denmark, however, Christian was tenacious only of dignity, industry, and
good intentions. Lacking genius, to divine the national needs, he did not
supply its place by personal contact with the people or by choice of Danish
counsellors. Himself German in speech, he had married, for her godliness,
Sophia Magdalena of Baireuth. The Queen despised the Danes, but spent the
revenue profusely; She demanded a new diadem, and thought it unqueenly to don a
garment more than once. To this German lady and her mother the King gave a
ready ear, while the court preacher and almost all his Ministers were German.
With so
little security that Danish policy should be national, it is not surprising
that, both in home and in foreign affairs, Christian failed to hold a steady
course. Early in 1733, the peasants were once more subjected to military
service which bound them to the soil. The new militia was only one-half as
numerous as the old; but the provisions for maintaining it fixed by law made it
far more onerous. Before the close of the reign peasants from nine to forty
years of age were forbidden to qi"t their holdings without the permission
of their lord, while it rested with him to determine which of them should
compose the contingent due from his estate.
Attempts on
the part of the Crown to regulate trade were numerous and violent. In 1732, the
King founded an Asiatic Company. In the following year, the West India and
Guinea Company was permitted to buy from France the island of St Croix. In
1735, a new department of State for Economy and Commerce was created, and in
1736 the Bank of Copenhagen was established. Foreign spinners and weavers were
brought in and paid to manufacture a number of products for which purchasers
could not be found. In order to nurture home industries, the ports of Denmark
and southern Norway were closed against ships with certain freights, of which
the chief was corn. In 1737, paternal interference reached its climax with the
establishment of a royal store in
the capital..
Government secured funds for purchasing goods from the manufacturers, by
forcing its pensioners to accept deferred orders for goods on the store in
place of the payments due on account of their pensions.
The King’s
interference in the sphere of religion likewise savoured of the limitless
autocracy which he claimed. He and his Queen were swayed by the pietism which
at this time powerfully appealed to the deep feeling and traditional independent
manhood of the Norths The Copenhageners, thousands of whom had seen their homes
destroyed by fire in 1728, listened willingly to the call to repentance. To
Christian, however, the revival of religious life seemed attainable by a social
reformation dictated by himself and by the increased activity of a state Church
controlled by him. He closed theatres and dancing-halls, forbade masquerades,
and banished actors. In 1735 he reenacted the Sabbath Ordinance, with reduced
penalties and permission to do necessary harvest work on Sundays. In the next
year he signalised the second centenary of the Danish Reformation by
introducing the rite of Confirmation, and thus made further religious
instruction compulsory for all his subjects. In 1737, to supplement his own
unceasing supervision over all departments of religious life and thought, a
General Board of Ecclesiastical Inspection was set up. Later in the reign the
King, by means of edicts, vaged war upon conventicles and sectaries. Unorthodox
propagandists were banished from all Denmark with the exception of four towns.
The Puritan
King who frowned upon amusements eagerly furthered every branch of education.
Holberg ceased to be a playwright, iand became a historian. In 1732 the
University of Copenhagen was refounded, and the overwhelming preponderance of
its theological faculty reduced, by means of favours shown to that of
jurisprudence. Seven years later, the few secondary schools which Denmark
possessed underwent drastic reform. Something was done to continue the work of
Frederick IV ir> founding elementary schools. Towards the close of the
reign, two societies for the promotion of Danish national learning and culture
were founded with: the countenance of the King. . i
To
Christian VI succeeded in 1746 his son Frederick V, a Prince of glittering
qualities, who took all hearts by storm, and in his reign of twenty years
gained for Denmark the reputation of a fortunate and happy State. He proved
himself at first too wise, and afterwards, perhaps, too indolent, to attempt by
sweeping changes to gain his aim of pleasing all. Suavely disappointing the
young courtiers who thought to rule in his name, and dismissing Count Frederick
Danneskjold-Samsoe, the able but difficult Minister of Marine, he retained in
the main the councillors and the policy of his father. Even the Sabbath
Ordinance remained unrevoked. The accent of royalty was, however, changed.
Social life, taking its tone from the King and his popular Queen Louise, became
unaffected, genial and gay. Absolutism was put into commission. ch. xxi. 47—2
i
The King’s
friend and Chief Marshal, Count Adam Gottlob Moltke, German by origin, but in
patriotism a thorough Dane, took unofficially a very large share in the
business of the State. Working with Johann Sigismund Schulin and his successor
in foreign affairs, and in home affairs with ‘ the Council or the several high
officials, Moltke gave his master leisure for the dissipation to which he
gradually became a slave.
Even,
however, after his degeneration had begun, Frederick V remained a force to be
reckoned with. His German lieutenants served him with enthusiasm while he
lived, and never ceased to extol him to each other after his death. Within the
kingdom, the Council, a benevolent oligarchy, trod with measured pace in the
paths Of policy which were already familiar. To promote manufactures, shipping,
and agriculture, and to remedy, when occasion offered, the defects in
education, in the status of the peasants and in the Organisation of the army,
were plain duties. In foreign affairs, on the other hand, Denmark, after a
quarter of a century of successful opportunism, had to face crises which
imperilled her existence as a nation. In 1750 she lost Schulin, killed, as was
believed, by the blunders of his physician. To find a competent successor,
whether native or alien, was no easy task. Next year, however, the death of
Frederick, Prince of Wales, removed a prior claim upon the future career of his
friend, the Hanoverian Baron Johann Hartwig Ernst von Bemstorff, who, as chief secretary
of the so-called German Chancery, was to guide Danish diplomacy and influence
Danish life for nearly twenty years.
Bemstorff had
already won renown by his skilful and zealous services to Denmark, notably at
the Imperial Diet. During a six years’ embassy at the Court of Louis XV he
gained a European reputation and procured for Denmark the profitable Treaty of
Alliance of Vpril, 1746. From 1751 onwards, he was for twenty years settled at
Copenhagen, and gained such eminence as to make credible the reputed epigram of
Frederick the Great: “ Denmark has her fleet and her Bemstorff'.” In some
respects,, however, he was to prove an indifferent consultant to the State.
Prone to magnificence, and believing that, inasmuch as he abstained from
gambling, he could not be extravagant, he influenced the King and Court in the
direction of their natural inclinations. Luxury reigned and debt increased in
time of peace. Bernstorff countenanced the costly efforts to create trade by
laws and subsidies. Loving the French and loved by them, he clung to the common
belief that France was still as preeminent in Europe as she had been in the
days of Louis XIV. A North German Protestant, he was blind to the fact that
leagues of small States based on religion were out of date. A disciple of
Schulin, he did not perceive that the rise of Russia ought to change the policy
of upholding oligarchic “ freedom ” at Stockholm in order to keep Sweden weak.
He exposed his adopted country, moreover, to the undying hatred which Frederick
of Prussia cherished against him and his House.
But, although
posterity finds some qualification necessary to the national and international
laudation of the “ oracle of Denmark,” the advent of Bernstorff must be
pronounced to have been highly fortunate for the State. Not only did he diffuse
through the administration an atmosphere of hbnesty, industry, and goodwill,
but it was also through him that the ideas of France, England, and Germany were
brought into the small and backward country which he served. Society and the
arts also owed much to him. In Moltke and Bernstorff, it was said, Denmark
possessed two Colberts. A strict Protectionist, Bernstorff was all for free
trade in men of talent. Besides officials, he imported from France and Germany
professors, divines, poets, sculptors, physicians, and men of science.
Klopstock, Johann Andreas Cramer, “the German Bossuet,” and his own nephew and
successor Andreas Peter Bernstorff are but the chief in a crowd of these
profitable allies. In his own deipartment, Bernstorff made good use of the
slender means at his disposal. Denmark possessed a fleet which was far from
contemptible, but her war-chest stood empty, and her army, although more than
50,000 strong, consisted of unruly German mercenaries, supported by an ill-trained
militia. Yet in 1758 Bernstorff was able to develop the French alliance into an
arrangement by which France subsidised a Danish army and pledged herself with
Austria to further that magestefte, or exchange of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst
for the dominions of the House of Gottorp in Schleswig- Holstein, which was
long the lodestar of Danish policy. In 1756 Sweden became for a short time the
ally of Denmark in armed neutrality; and ten years later the Swedish Crown
Prince Gustavus was allowed to marry Sophia Magdalena, the daughter of
Frederick V. Denmark, guided by Bernstorff, was almost the only State of
northern Europe which held aloof from the Seven Years’ War, while she succeeded
in avoiding collision with England, the terror of maritime neutrals. Most
delicate and dangerous of all were the relations with Russia.
The
difficulties of Denmark with Russia had their root in the Holstein-Gottorp
question. It was an axiom with the Gottorp Dukes that the confiscation of their
possessions in Schleswig had been a direct breach of law. That view found
support outside, notably from the Emperor. Frederick IV, on the other hand,
offered nothing by way of compensation, and declared that he would defend his
acquisition to the last drop of his blood. But the House of Holstein-Gottorp,
powerless by itself, became formidable through marriages with the sister of
Charles XII and the daughter of Peter the Great. Frederick IV and Christian VI
therefore sedulously courted France and England, and strove to secure Schleswig
by means of far-teaching alliances. For many year’s this policy proved
successful. In 1742, however, Charles Peter Ulrich, the son of the dispossessed
Charles Frederick, was declared heir to the throne of the Tsarina; and in the
following year his cousin Adolphus Frederick was unanimously elected by the
Swedish Diet to be
the future
successor of King Frederick I. The choice of Adolphus Frederick marked the
triumph of the Tsarina’s diplomacy over that of Christian VI, who all but
declared war against Sweden in support of the candidature of Frederick his son.
In the course
of the next few years, however, Denmark secured a better understanding with
both Russia and Sweden. In 1750 Schulin procured a treaty by which Adolphus
Frederick undertook that, if the inheritance of Holsteih-Gottorp should ever
fall to him, he would ■ esign it to the King of Denmark in return for
Oldenburg, Delmenhorst, and 200,000 dollars. Charles Peter Ulrich, now the
husband of the future Catharine the Great, proved less amenable. For nearly
twenty years he steadfastly refused to sell his birthright; and it seemed only
too probable that, on the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth, he would employ the
might of Russia to avenge the wrongs of his House. To avert this peril,
BernstorfF tried every resource of diplomacy in vain. Through six campaigns of
the Seven Years’ War he had preserved the neutrality of Denmark. But in
January, 1762, the Tsar, Peter III, became her foe. Denmark soon found herself,
without a single ally, confronting the veteran hordes of Muscovy supported by
Frederick the Great.
Peter III,
however, changed the issue of the European struggle without harming his enemy.
Neither her strong naval squadron nor the army of thirty thousand which her
French Eield-Marshal* Count Louis St Germain, led into Mecklenburg, was called
upon to strike a blow for Denmark. The deposition of Peter III in July
dissolved her peril. Less than three years later, in March, 1765, Catharine
became the ally of Frederick V, and undertook, while the Duke of Schleswig-
Holstein, her son Paul, was still a minor, to make such arrangements as would
put an end to the Gottorp disputes.
When, in
January, 1766, Frederick paid the penalty of his excesses by a premature death,
his servants contemplated with pride the fruit of their labours at home and
abroad. The realm had unquestionably advanced in agriculture, industry,
commerce, and general organisation, and it was at peace with all the world. But
two decades of power had produced in the Council a certain self-sufficiency.
While reform was needed on all sides, and the public debt amounted to twenty
million dollars, BernstorfF and his friends showed no desire to quicken their
pace or to welcome the cooperation of other forces. It was not unnatural that
others thought that the great King who ruled Prussia from his Cabinet should
form a model for the future conduct of the Danish autocratic State.
The sceptre
now fell into the unwilling hands of Frederick’s son Christian VII, a youth not
quite seventeen years of age. Under the stem and perhaps brutal governance of
Privy Councillor Ditlev Revent- low, he had grown up in complete ignorance of
the management of public or even of private affairs. He had never been free to
spend a
ducat or to
open a letter by himself, and the companions provided for him had achieved his
moral ruin. He possessed considerable ability and great, though fitful,
ambition. During boyhood his memory and facility of speech had often roused
admiration, and in early manhood his talents commanded unfeigned respect. His
form was agile and graceful, and he retained for many years great insensibility
to fatigue and no inconsiderable power of charming those who met him for the
first time. But grave defects in his character soon made Danish patriots
tremble. He lacked industry and tenacity, delighted in the misfortunes of
others, proved himself a traitor to his friends and servants, and devoted his
wild imagination to the invention of new forms of debauch. It is now
confidently asserted that he was already in the grip of an inexorable mental
disease (dementia praecox) which, advancing fitfully after the dawn of manhood,
could not fail to reduce him to imbecility in the course of a few years. In
that age, however, insanity was so little understood that the court physician
could in 1786 attribute the King’s malady to his premature assumption of the
duties and freedom of a sovereign. From his accession to the year 1772, acts
which betoken disease were attributed to youthful folly or to evil counsels,
and the meek obedience of Denmark was often rendered to the scribbled mandates
of a madman.
During the
first four years of the reign, two of Christian’s delusions formed the most
potent influences in the history of the State. He believed that his own power
and genius were incomparable, but that to attain perfection he must harden
himself by physical excess. He delighted to show his power by cashiering
officials who had been denounced either as serving him ill or as appropriating
to themselves his proper glory. St Germain, the able organiser of the army, was
removed from the Board of War. Moltke, long so omnipotent as to be nicknamed
“King,” was dismissed without a pension. Prince Charles of Hesse-Cassel
received in 1766 the hand of Christian’s sister and unbounded favour, only to
be driven into retirement in the following year. Even Bemstorff lived in
constant insecurity. At the same time Christian’s resolute profligacy was
endangering the repute of the monarchy and the life of the King. His ministers
had therefore other inducements than their desire for the friendship of
England, when they prevailed on him to make an early marriage. In November,
1766, he consented to espouse the sister of George III, Caroline Matilda, then
fifteen years of age. The gay young Queen brighteried the social life of the
capital. In January, 1768, she gave the Crown an heir, the future Frederick VI.
Bemstorff
remained in power, and his policy gained a notable triumph when, in April,
1767, the “ Provisional Treaty of Exchange ” was signed in Copenhagen.
Renouncing for herself the Gottorp claims in Schleswig, Catharine undertook to
use her good offices with her son Paul, when he should come of age, to follow
the same course and also
promote the
exchange of Ducal Holstein for Oldenburg and Delmen- horst. The negotiations
for this Treaty had thrown a striking light upon the political situation.
Patriots may justly lament that the policy of Denmark was decided by a
diplomatic struggle at Copenhagen between one Prussian and two Russian
diplomatists and two soldiers from France and Germany. Bernstorff, whose German
origin was now almost forgotten, had carried his point only by inciting
Catharine and her representatives to secure the dismissal of the King of
Prussia’s agents. Thanks to the same powerful support, he was now created
Count. But Russian assistance was not rendered without payment. Under the
influence of the fear that Sweden, the common foe, would gain strength by
reform, the entente between Russia and Denmark soon developed into a relation
too closely resembling that of a patron and a client State.
Meanwhile,
Christian VII was falling under the influence of the companions of his orgies,
particularly Count Conrad Hoick and the so-called Slovlet Katrine (Catharine of
the Gaiters), who seemed on the eve of becoming his official mistress. Hoick
gained for a time an ascendancy so complete that Bernstorff pledged himself to
support the favourite on condition that he did not intrude into politics. It
was he who in November, 1767, banished the disinterested Swiss philosopher
Elias Solomon Francis Reverdil, formerly the King’s. tutor and now his Cabinet
Secretary. Court intrigues, lunatic outrages, and the overthrow of notables
offensive to Russia, filled the history of Denmark, until in 1768 the King
announced his invincible determination to visit foreign lands. Escorted by a
train of more than fifty persons, among whom Bernstorff seemed to English eyes
the only man of sense and virtue, he journeyed by way of Holstein and the
Netherlands to England and France. Here he went through a summer and autumn of
festivities with a show of enjoyment and with a regal bearing which in public
never gave way, while his disease was fast reducing him to senility. The design
of including Italy and St Petersburg in the tour was abandoned. After his
return in January, 1769, when his delighted subjects discovered that the royal
orgies had come to an end, Christian was at heart indifferent to everything
save what caused discomfort to himself.
Thus
afflicted, the King came under the influence of a young German doctor, John
Frederick Struensee, who had accompanied him on his journey in 1768. Struensee
owed his post as royal physician, like his previous success among the nobles of
Holstein, to his own talent and to his friendship with Count Schack Charles
Rantzau-Ascheberg, a brilliant adventurer, in whose revolt against the accepted
rules of religion and morality he shared. By treating the King with
intelligence and tact, Struensee gradually became indispensable to him. In what
degree Christian’s astonishingly good behaviour while abroad was due to
Struensee’s advice, it is impossible to determine. On his return to Copenhagen
with the King, his modesty, handsome person, and talent for
i77o-i] Struensee and
the Queen.—Clique and Council. 74$
pleasing,
partially overcame the contempt which the arrogance of the Court deemed fitting
towards a “ pill-maker ” and a pastor’s son. The Queen’s prejudice against him
melted away when he first restored her to health, and then achieved the miracle
of bringing to her feet a husband who during eight months’ absence had wellnigh
ignored her existence. As Christian sank deeper into apathy, the Queen’s
influence over him and over the Court of Denmark grew, while Struensee became
the confidant and director of the royal couple. Often tormented by delusions
and always regarding contempt for marriage as a mark of superiority, the King
looked on with indifference while, during the year 1770, his wife became the
paramour of his friend. It was his complete and enduring conquest of the Queen
that rendered possible the extraordinary empire over Denmark to which Struensee
attained during 1770 and 1771, and the cascade of reforming edicts associated
with his name.
From the
nature of the case, the record of these years can hardly be free from
uncertainty. The King, whose brief decrees overthrew Ministers and created
institutions, was at times unquestionably sane. Amid all his wayward fancies,
he had long before aspired to become the benefactor of the people and to emancipate
himself from the oligarchy of high officials. That these results were now
zealously sought after, that in this Struensee played a great part, and that he
eventually used the lunatic King as a machine for registering his own
decrees—are facts established beyond dispute. His share in the government
during 1770 and the first months of 1771, on the other hand, like the springs
of his action and the sources of his information, may well provoke debate.
It was not
until near the close of 1770 that Struensee began to be regarded as a person of
importance. He was notoriously the favourite of the Queen; but the Queen
shunned politics and devoted herself to her lover and to her son. To the world
the King’s reader and ex-physician seemed a humble member of a royalist
clique, whose notables were Rantzau-Ascheberg, St Germain, and General Peter
Elias Gahler. These men, apart from their personal grievances and aspirations,
united in regarding the power of the Council as a usurpation. They would have
Denmark ruled like Prussia, by edicts framed in the Cabinet of the King.
Struensee they may well have regarded as one who might commend their designs to
Christian and Matilda, acting thus as their useful and harmless ally.
The struggle
between the old Government, of which Bernstorff was the centre, and its
opponents was decided during the summer of 1770. The long seclusion of the King
and Court on a visit to the Duchies, and the humiliation of the Danish arms in
an attempt, to coerce the Dey of Algiers, facilitated the triumph of Struensee
and the Opposition. Enevold Brandt, a young votary of pleasure, once the
comrade of Rantzau and Struensee in Altona, received a summons to the Court,
from which he
had been banished for attacking Hoick. Despite the earnest and outspoken remonstrances
of Bernstorff, who regarded the Treaty of Exchange as lost if a man proscribed
by Catharine were favoured by Christian, the recall of Rantzau followed.
Meanwhile Reventlow received a severe rebuff, and Hoick, after witnessing the
dismissal of his associates, found himself cashiered. These events foreshadowed
the fall of Bernstorff, which took place in September. The veteran statesman
received the blow with dignity, and from his retreat in northern Germany
continued to serve Denmark to the utmost of his power. His successor as
Minister for Foreign Affairs was Count Adolphus Sigfried Osten, an able
diplomat whose appointment might, it was hoped, be not wholly unacceptable to
Catharine without implicitly pledging Christian to remain her slave. Soon,
however, the changes went far beyond the dismissal of high officials in favour
of new men, and the rearrangement of offices so as to leave the oligarchy out
in the cold. In December, 1770, the Council was abolished; and the secret
Cabinet, in which the royal decrees were drafted, thus became the unrivalled
centre of influence in the Government. At the same time Struensee succeeded an
insignificant person in the Mastership of Requests—a confidential secretariate
of little dignity but of enormous potential importance. Early in 1771, the
King’s disease made a notable advance, and it became more than ever necessary
to screen him from his subjects. Brandt, the master of the revels in which the
Court continued to indulge, became almost formally the King’s keeper, and, in
June, Reverdil received an unexpected invitation to return to Copenhagen. On
his arrival, in September, he found the King in a pitiable condition, but still
able to conceal his infirmity from some who saw him, and at times to act and
speak with intelligence.
Meanwhile,
Struensee had made more definite advances towards official power. During the
first half of the year he had become master of the privy purses of the King and
Queen, from which he and Brandt had each received a sum of 60,000 dollars. In
July, he was declared Minister of the Cabinet, with power to write down the
verbal orders of the King, to seal them with his cabinet seal, and to
promulgate them as law. After July 15, 1771, cabinet orders were issued with
the signature “ By command of the King—Struensee.” A week later, Christian and
his stepmother Juliana Maria attended the christening of a little daughter whom
the Queen had borne to Struensee, and both Struensee and Brandt were made
Counts.
During the
eleven months which had passed since the ideas of Struensee became dominant in
the State, the nation had lived in a whirlwind of reform. Every Danish
institution had been subjected to an examination in which popularity counted
for little and antiquity for nothing. It was significant that Struensee knew
little of history and never learned Danish. Often indeed the advice ol a
specialist, a board,
or a
commission, was sought; but there was no security that the cabinet order which
swiftly followed 011 the first enquiry would do more than solve the questions
at issue by the forcible application of what the Minister held to be
enlightened principles.
The key-note
of the new regime had been struck early in September, 1770, when cabinet
orders, composed in German, struck at the abuse of rank and titles and
abolished the censorship of the Press. Before the close of the year, while
government by Cabinet was being organised, an elaborate scheme for the
reception and education of some 2500 waifs received the force of law. These
measures were but the pioneers of a host which followed in 1771. To give
Denmark a benevolent despotism secure against bureaucratic restraint, to strike
down privilege in every sphere of life, to abolish practices which outraged
contemporary sentiment, and tO maintain for every citizen the widest possible
freedom to live the life which seemed good to him—such were the main motives of
Struensee’s profuse and hasty legislation. It is impossible to mention here
more than a small number of the edicts which he poured forth from the royal
Cabinet, or to indicate how far some of the more important can be shown to have
had their origin outside his era or his brain. Although he had never been
distinguished by industry and did not now withdraw from the gaieties of court
life,- he appears to have devised and constructed the great majority of the
edicts by himself, with only such aid as a few private secretaries could
afford. Working single-handed and with no predetermined plan, he saw tasks on
every side and shrank from none of them. Reverdil, who is manifestly a witness
of truth, learned from a friend that Struensee had declared to him that he
would so reform the State as to leave no stone of it undisturbed.
The
emancipation of the King, which for the moment implied the omnipotence of
Reform, had been in great measure attained by the abolition of the Council. It
was still further advanced by changes in the administrative system. In
imitation of Prussian absolutism, the several Boards Were taught complete
subservience. Their staffs were ruthlessly reorganised, and their mutual
relations rearranged; while they were compelled to rely upon written reports in
place of personal access to the King. Their presidencies and other great posts
held by nobles who might impair the royal autocracy were abolished. A great
advance was made towards purifying the Civil Service from aristocratic jobbery
and corruption. The Treasury, which received a great augmentation of
importance, was filled with men of letters, including Professor Oeder, the
advocate of peasant emancipation, and Charles Augustus, the elder brother of
Struensee, a professor of mathematics from Liegnitz. It could not be expected
that among the slow-moving Danes such changes, dictated by men unfamiliar with
the existing machinery of government, would create in a moment a smooth and
efficient administration. The old officials, however, yielded without a
struggle, and their places were
filled by
zealous dependents of the Crown. Some parts at least of public .business were
performed with unwonted and welcome despatch.
Benevolent
despotism, however, could not attain perfection while the Crown was hampered by
debt. Struensee, therefore, submitted a policy of harsh retrenchment for the
gracious improvidence of the former Council. Although the amusements of the
Court continued to be costly, its daily life departed far from the model of
Versailles. Pensions were reduced or refused without mercy. The costly policy
of buttressing the fabric of industry by subsidies was abandoned. The erection
of superfluous churches was stopped. A reform of the University was planned by
which the State would be spared large payments to the professors. The Guards
were broken up. The higher posts in the Civil Service were abolished. As a new
source of revenue, a public lottery was established, while the revenues of
pious foundations were appropriated without scruple to public ends.
Struensee’s
war with privilege went far beyond the bounds of revenge upon the nobles, who
had been wont to scorn the bourgeois and to secure for their own lackeys places
under the Crown. In trade, in industry, in municipal government, and even in
religion, vested interests were menaced or swept away. The free port of
Copenhagen, the gild system of industry, and the governmental devices for
securing well-filled churches, were equally objectionable to the new
“enlightened” views, and severally suffered attack. The freedom of all Danish
subjects and their equal treatment by the law seemed to be within measurable
distance of attainment.
Power so
unfettered made short work of abuses which survived from ages long gone by.
Copenhagen was transformed into a well-ordered city. Throughout Denmark the
scale of punishments became lighter. Torture for judicial purposes was
abolished. So far as lay in the power of the law, the stigma of illegitimacy
was removed. Parents might no longer consign their refractory children to gaol,
or great nobles prevent the imprisonment of debtors.
Struensee’s
zeal for liberty embraced every section of the State. The cause of the serf was
taken up in earnest. The number of holidays imposed by the Church upon the
people was cut down, and the degrees enlarged within which marriages were
lawful. The vindication of personal freedom was carried so far that the police
were prohibited from entering any house in order to put down vice. Danish
subjects were no longer forbidden to leave or enter towns by night, or, in many
cases, to apply themselves, within or without the walls, to the calling of
their choice.
Salutary and
even admirable as were many of these reforms, they lost much of their value by
the manner of their promulgation. It became more and more clear to the people
that these changes expressed the will, not of an anointed King, but of an
upstart and ungracious Minister. Struensee seldom appeared in public save with
the King and Queen, and
he was
reputed to be the harsh gaoler of the one and the paramour of the other. “There
was no Dane,” declared Reverdil, “who did not regard it as a personal insult to
be subjected to a power whose sole foundation was the scandal in the royal
family.” This power, moreover, was habitually exercised with studied
indifference to the feelings of those whom it affected. To Christian Frederick
Moltke, a son of the friend of Christian’s father, the royal will was communicated
in a missive of a type to which Danish officials had now to accustom
themselves. “You are no longer my Grand Marshal. My circumstances do not permit
me to keep one; I dismiss you without a pension.” The government of Copenhagen
was transformed and her cherished civic rights annihilated by careless edicts
composed in German. In comparison with an “ enlightened ” principle, common
convenience or opinion ranked as nothing. The poor of the capital found
themselves prohibited from burying their dead by daylight, while the mass of
the people regarded the . extension of religious freedom as a conspiracy
against religion.
As the summer
waned, Struensee might well show signs of prostration brought on by many months
of assiduous court life combined with unprecedented labours of State. Never
widely beloved, he no longer possessed a single friend save the Queen. Even the
good-humoured Brandt desired his overthrow. Many hated him for what he had
already done, and more for what they believed that he might do in the future.
In the meantime, the failure of two successive harvests had spread misery
through the country; and, under Struensee’s regime, no one could feel secure
for a single day that a cabinet order would not threaten his means of living.
The capital was in a ferment. Throughout the nation, in Norway and the Duchies
no less than in the kingdom proper, all men of standing expected and longed for
the deliverance of the King from the bondage in which he was supposed to live.
The Press nourished sedition. Both within and without the confines of Denmark,
the most fantastic crimes and designs were attributed to the Minister and the
Queen. Struensee, who could not be wholly unconscious of the public hatred,
wavered in his course, feigned a serenity which he did not feel, and suffered
petty but notorious mutinies in the fleet and army to go unpunished. Thus
encouraged and egged on by another adventurer, Colonel Magnus Beringskjold,
Bantzau resolved to become the prime agent in bringing about a catastrophe
which, since the summer of 1771, shrewd observers had deemed inevitable.
Bemstorfl and Moltke scouted any enterprise in which Bantzau was engaged. Among
the officers, Danish and German, however, he found willing instruments. It was
of still greater importance that the fear of popular revolt and the display of
a forged proof of Struensee’s intention to usurp the protectorship induced the
Queen Dowager, Juliana Maria, her son, the Hereditary Prince Frederick, and his
tutor, Ove Hoegh Guldberg, to join in plotting a palace revolution.
In the early
hours of January 17, 1772, Guldberg and a party of the conspirators woke the
King from sleep. The terror inspired by their appearance, and the figment of a
plot against his life, made Christian ready to sign whatever they put before
him. At his stepmother’s dictation, he wrote with his owh hand the order for
the imprisonment of his Queen. Meanwhile Struensee and Brandt were seized, in
the royal palace, and several of their adherents at home. Rantzau carried out
with cynical brutality the deportation of' the1 Queen to
Kronborg, Hamlet’s castle at the northern entrance to the Sound. The King’s
signature was, as usual, accepted as hallowing the most violent deeds. “
Glorious, eventful night,” wrote the historian Suhm, in an open letter to the
King; “future Homers and Virgils shall sing thy praise. As long as Danish and
Norwegian bravery shall live, so long shall the fame of Juliana and Frederick
endure—but not increase, for . that is impossible.” Next day the King, cowering
in fear, was driven in a gilded coach through his capital; while Rantzau and
his accomplices, as it was believed, contrived that the rejoicings of the
people at his liberation should end in a riot. Thus was the seal set upon the
triumph of the revolution.
It remained
for the King’s deliverers, who promptly seized the reins of power, to make
their work secure. To this end Struensee and Brandt were kept in irons while
their papers were ransacked in search of proofs that they had aspired to
dethrone the King. Nothing of the. kind existed, and their accusers were
therefore compelled to rely upon more general charges. Brandt had, under great
provocation, actually bitten the King in the finger and beaten him with his
fists, while Struensee could be charged with having broken the Kongelov, or
fundamental law, by undermining the authority of the King and by issuing
official papers which had not received the royal signature. Yet, as being here
expressly authorised by a monarch whose omnipotence and whose sanity no one
disputed, his proceedings could with difficulty be construed as high treason.
But all hope for his escape vanished when, broken by five weeks’ misery in a
dungeon, he confessed to a criminal intimacy with the Queen. Jealously guarded
by the victorious party, the King was hardly capable of interference, and the
intercession of Catharine was soon to be proved unavailing. On April 6 an
extraordinary tribunal decreed the royal divorce, and on the 25th Struensee and
Brandt were sentenced to death. Three days later, in the presence of an
enormous multitude, they were hewn to pieces on the scaffold. Their remains
were for years exposed on wheels in the neighbourhood of Copenhagen.
Queen Matilda
found a protector in the English Minister, Colonel Robert Murray Keith, who
denounced war against Denmark, if she were in any way molested. His firmness
(which George III instantly rewarded with the red riband of the Bath) saved her
from a lifelong imprisonment in Aalborg Castle. At the end of May, having
embraced
her infant
daughter for the last time, she passed into retirement at Celle. The
vindictiveness of the King’s half-brother Frederick, called the “ Hereditary
Prince,” and his associates had cooled the ardent royalism of Copenhagen; and
it completely alienated the unforgiving King of England.
If anything
could have made the Danes regret Struensee, it might well have been the rule of
his destroyers. The clique which had emancipated Christian VII possessed no
common aim, save the overthrow of Struensee and the Queen. Devoid of policy,
they made the King and the nation subservient to a cabal. They created, it is
true, a Privy Council, and they were always careful to extort the King’s
signature before issuing their decrees. The deformed and contemptible
Hereditary Prince strove to play the part of regent, and his mother to exercise
the influence of a regnant queen. They made free use of the national resources
to reward their fellow-conspirators. On Beringskjold and Rantzau, men of bad
character, were showered offices, donations, and pensions. Colonel Koller was
ennobled and eventually also received office and a pension. General Hans Henrik
Eickstedt, a rough soldier, became a member of the Ministry and Governor of the
Crown Prince. In talent and experience of affairs they were too deficient to
dispense with men of merit. Osten remained in charge of foreign affairs, the
incorruptible Joachim Otto Schack Rathlou was summoned to the Council, and
Baron Henrik Karl Schimmelmann placed his great authority in commerce,
taxation and finance at the service of the Crown. Bernstorff, however, was
suffered to remain in exile. It became more and more apparent that the seat of
power was to be found not in the Council but in the Court, and that the man who
inspired the Court and carried out its wishes was Guldberg. For twelve years
(1772-84) Denmark obeyed court decrees, signed by Christian VII, but drafted by
the mentor of the Hereditary Prince.
The rise of
Guldberg to high office had a far slower' process than that of Struensee.
Preferring the reality to the appearance of power, he was not created a. noble
until 1777 or a Privy Councillor until 1780. But, by becoming ruler of Denmark
through his influence over the royal family, he formed the true counterpart to
the confidant of Christian and Caroline Matilda. In talent, character, and
ideas, indeed,, no two men could offer a sharper contrast. Guldberg was an
incorruptible patriot. Hating foreigners and foreign ideas, he personified the
reaction against the cosmopolitan humanitarianism of Struensee. Save in the
Duchies, Danish became the language of government. It displaced German in the
army. Instruction in German was denied to the Crown Prince. An Ordinance of
May, 1775, enforced the study of the Danish language and literature in schools.
In January, 1776, without the privity of the Council, an unalterable law was
issued which provided that none but Danish nationals might in future hold
offices of State. These measures
sprang from
the whole-hearted belief in the perfection of the old Danish system so far as
social organisation and religion were concerned—a belief which inspired
Guldberg’s attempts to make Denmark retrace every step taken by her under
Struensee’s guidance.
To have
created afresh the chaos of which his Court and City Tribunal and his Poor Law
had made an end, would, however, have taxed fanaticism too heavily, and these
institutions were suffered to remain. Queen Juliana Maria and her son, the
“Hereditary Prince” Frederick, who stood above the nobles, and Guldberg, whose
birth was humble, combined to enforce the eligibility of commoners to serve the
State, and to develop the results of the principle once established. The
lottery, which brought pecuniary profit, was undertaken by the State. The most
flagrant perquisites and the worst scandals of patronage, by which offices fell
to the mere lackeys of the great, were not revived. The Press continued to
enjoy a freedom qualified by peremptory orders not to meddle with politics and
by the personality of Guldberg, the vigilant defender of the faith. The spirit
of his paternal government breathes in the notorious sentence passed in 1783
upon a flippant author. Not only was the edition of his book confiscated and a
fine imposed, but the editor was sentenced “to be better instructed and
convinced of his sin.” To this end the Bishop was to have him catechised by a
few priests and eventually instructed by a schoolmaster, unless one of the
priests would undertake the task. Accused persons might once more be examined
under torture. The University and the schools were, as of old, to devote
themselves principally to the teaching of religion. Apart from some vexatious
but trifling burdens, labour services again became due from the peasants to
their lords. In September, 1774, a new army law carried ascription to the soil
to its furthest limit. An augmented proportion of natives to mercenaries in
both infantry and cavalry made the number of conscripts greater by almost
one-half than under the law of 1764. They were now to serve for twelve years,
and then to accept the holdings proffered by their lords or be liable to serve
for six years more. While the clergy and the landed proprietors were thus
propitiated, the manufacturers and merchants were not forgotten. The ports of
southern Norway were again closed to foreign corn. Once more, millions were
squandered on attempts to make Denmark an industrial country. By a natural
sequence, the Government was led on to state factories, a state store,
state-provided technical education, state-built trading ships, a state bank,
and a heavy over-issue of inconvertible state paper. Thanks chiefly to the War
of American Independence, Danish commerce flourished; but, when peace returned
in 1783, the national debt stood higher than at the beginning of the reign.
In the domain
of foreign affairs Guldberg enjoyed great and continuous good fortune. The
exiled Queen lived only long enough to
i772-8o] TAe youngerBernstorff.-Russian Exchange
Treaty. 763
strengthen
the foundations of his power by the fear of her vengeance. She died at Celle in
1775, before the projects of her partisans had come to a head or her son, the
Crown Prince Frederick, had ceased to be a child. In March, 1773, Andreas Peter
Bernstorff, whose uncle had died two years before, consented to place his rare
industry and unblemished character at the service of the State*. He had been,
in the words used by the elder Bernstorff in the constant correspondence
carried on between them, the “ dear and intimate friend ” of his uncle; and,
within a few months of his accession to office, he had gathered the coveted
harvest which that statesman had sown and tended. Russia and Denmark, menaced
alike by the monarchical power which Gustavus III seized in 1772, secretly
allied themselves against Sweden, and on May 21, 1773 (N.S.), at Tsarskoye
Selo, the Grand Duke Paul signed the Treaty of Exchange without any
reservations. Henceforward, at the cost of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, the King
of Denmark might feel secure in his possession of the Duchies.
The
Schleswig-Holstein question was, however, far from being solved by this
transfer. The relation of the Duchies to Denmark proper had yet to be
determined by time. It was significant that Caspar von Saldern, the domineering
Holsteiner who represented Russia in the negotiations, had stipulated in 1767
that in future the officials employed in Schleswig- Holstein should have
studied for two years in the University, of Kiel. He was now able to insist
that the “German Chancery,” which, administered the affairs of the Duchies,
should receive a Director of its own, and that a Holstein noble should fill
this post.' Bernstorff, being duly qualified, received the first appointment to
a post which the traditional hatred of the Gottorp Holsteiners against Denmark
made one of no small difficulty.
In the first
instance, however, the transfer of Denmark from the French to the Russian “
system ” brought many advantages. It could not fail to be a valuable safeguard
against the conquest of Norway by Gustavus III, the fear of which had caused a
hasty defensive armament in 1772. BemstorfTs efforts to check the political
revival of Sweden profited little; but the course of events ran so strongly in
favour of Denmark that in 1780 the two Scandinavian States found themselves
leagued together in the First Armed Neutrality of the North. Of that important,
though abortive, political transaction an account will be found in another
volume of this History. It may be added.here that the idea of a league between
Russia and Denmark for the protection of the claims of neutrals had been
suggested by Bernstorff to the Russian Government so early as 1778, in lieu of
a Russian proposal for a joint convoy to guard navigation in the Arctic Seas.
Catharine II, after rejecting the Danish counter-proposal, adopted it two years
later, when,, under the influence of Panin, she abandoned the project of a
British alliance which Potemkin had been bribed to urge, extending the
conception,
754 Foreign Affairs.—Dismissal of Bernstorff.
[1772-80
however, from
that of a Russo-Danish into that of a general league. Bernstorff, who at once
fell in with the Tsarina’s enlarged scheme, signing the treaty with Russia on
July 9, 1780, anticipated the execution of it by declaring the' Baltic closed
to ships of war belonging to belligerents, i He proved a staunch adherent, so
long as it lasted, of the scheme of Armed Neutrality of which he is thus to be
credited with the actual authorship.
So soOn,
however, as November, 1780, Bernstorff was suddenly dismissed from office. The
reasons for this step can only be conjectured. It is said that Guldberg was
incensed by a convention concluded by Bernstorff with the British Government
just before Denmark joined the Armed Neutrality, which by limiting the
definition of contraband weakened the force of the agreement with Russia; and
it may be that Guldberg really feared lest • his colleague’s personal sympathy
with England might jeopardise the Russian alliance. The two Ministers were
equally antagonistic to each other on questions of domestic policy. BernstorfTs
consistent endeavours to promote the emancipation of the peasantry were
offensive to his chief, who looked upon such an issue as involving the ruin of
the monarchy. Again, Guldberg was far from sharing BernstorfTs avowed anxiety
for the maintenance of distinct administrative systems as lawfully established
in each division of the tripartite monarchy, and in the Duchies in particular,
with which ties of race and of intellectual culture closely connected him. As
the elder Bernstorff was the friend of KlopstOck, so the younger was the
brother- in-law of the Stolbergs, the comrades of Goethe in the eager
aspirations of his youth.
Under Andreas
Peter BernstorfTs successor as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian
Baron Marcus Gerhard Rosenkrone, a pupil pi Guldberg, fortune continued to
favour Denmark; The action or inaction of the Dutch saved her from war with
England in 1780, and three years later the easy triumph of Russia in the Crimea
frustrated the design formed by Gustavus III of conquering Norway by a sudden descent
on Copenhagen. The attempt of the Queen Dowager to yoke the Crown Prince to
Prussia by marriage was foiled by his resistance.
Seldom,
indeed, has a foolish and feeble Government, in a land which had been regarded
as conquerable by an army of not more than fifteen thousand men, passed
unscathed and even triumphant through a period so vexed. By its very feebleness
and stupidity, the rule of Guldberg and the cabal procured indirect advantages
for Denmark. During eight years it taught Bernstorff what to avoid, and then
furnished him with the opportunity of studying from afar for more than three
years the needs of his adopted country. The Crown Prince Frederick, moreover,
grew towards manhood with a well-founded conviction, which every worthy Danish
statesman shared, of his own mission to rescue and rule the State. For three
years the plan of yet another seizure by force
1784-97] Fall of Guldberg.—Bernstorff recalled.
755
of the
regency of the kingdom was debated and matured within and without its limits. An
earlier attempt at carrying out the design was prevented, chiefly by the
counsels of Bernstorff and other men of weight, Frederick of Prussia sent
warning to the Court of Copenhagen. Yet, to the last moment, Guldberg and his
patrons believed themselves indispensable and secure. At last, in April, 1784,
when the long-deferred Confirmation of the Crown Prince Frederick had been
held, and he was admitted for the first time to the Privy Council, he declared
to his astonished relatives and their supporters that Bernstorff with three
others ought to join the Council, and that government by the Cabinet should
cease. An order to this effect immediately received the signature of the King,
who then fled from the Council-chamber, pursued by his indignant brother, the
Hereditary Prince. Meanwhile the young Crown Prince informed Guldberg and his
associates that the King had no further need of their services. Having thus
brought the meeting of the Council to an end, he succeeded in recapturing his
father, who signed a rescript which made him practically Regent. The day closed
with a ball in which both factions of the royal family took part. The victors,
secure of the moral support of society and of the nation, treated the cabal
with generosity, and the way was thus prepared for the beneficent sway of the
younger Bernstorff.
Andreas Peter
Bernstorff held office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and as President of the
German Chancery from May, 1784, to his death in June, 1797—so that the greater
part of this last and most important period of his activity as a statesman lies
beyond the scope of the present volume. But it seems desirable to note, in a
few concluding words, some of the chief features of a period of government to
which Denmark long looked back with grateful recognition, while justly
connecting its achievements with those of the even longer series of years
(1751-70) during which the elder Bernstorff had controlled the affairs of the
monarchy. The period from 1784 to 1797 was, first and foremost, a period of
peace—with the exception of the brief conflict with Sweden, in which Denmark
was reluctantly obliged to engage by her treaties of defensive alliance with
Russia. In 1788, Gustavus III of Sweden having taken the opportunity of the
recent outbreak of war between Turkey and Russia to declare war against the
latter Power, a Danish army, under the command of Prince Charles of
Hesse-Cassel (brother-in-law to King Christian VII) invaded Sweden from Norway,
and seriously endangered Goteborg (October). , But the Maritime Powers and
Prussia assumed so menacing an attitude of “ mediation” that Bernstorff
hastened to conclude a truce with Sweden, and succeeded, by the exertion of
much diplomatic skill, in inducing the Tsarina to consent that Denmark should
remain neutral during the remainder of the War.
In the
general European War which began in 1792 against Revolutionary France the same
prudent statesmanship, as has been relate*^
elsewhere,
preserved the neutrality of Denmark; nor did her great peace Minister live to
see the final frustration of the efforts, which, both before and after the
conclusion of the alliance between Denmark and Sweden for the protection of
northern trade, on the lines of the Armed Neutrality, he had made to avoid any
collision with the two chief mari time belligerents. Of these France was even
more overbearing than Great Britain; but Bemstorff had been unable to make up
his mind to side with the latter against the former.
The
neutrality of Denmark—which was fated to come to so disastrous an end—had beyond
doubt brought to the country an unprecedented prosperity, which was enhanced
by the far-sighted intelligence displayed by several branches of the
Administration of which Bemstorff was at once the head and the soul. In the
earlier years of the Revolutionary War the mercantile dealings of Denmark with
both the East and the West Indies, and in Mediterranean waters—where, in the
year of BemstorfFs death, the honour of the Danish flag was vigorously asserted
against the fleet of the Dey of Tripoli—were developed with extraordinary
success; so that Denmark has been, without much exaggeration, described as
having at this time shared with Great Britain and Ishe United States the
commerce of the world. That, however, in this as in other spheres of effort
Bemstorff and those who were associated with him were animated by something
more than the desire to advance the material interests of their country, is
shown by the abolition—in 1792— of the African slave-trade within the Danish
dominions—an example set, to her lasting glory, by Denmark to the other States
of Europe.
At home,
BernstorfFs Administration gave signal proofs of the same enlightened spirit.
Like Struensee before him, he dispensed with the censorship of the Press;
though (as has been noted elsewhere) he used the power of the Crown in order to
punish attacks upon existing institutions by dismissal or banishment. But his
chief and most beneficent reform—and that which was most directly instrumental
in confining to certain literary and academical circles the sympathy shown
towards the French Revolution within the limits of the Danish monarchy —was one
of which the conception had constantly occupied the elder Bemstorff, and which
he had carried out with remarkable success on the Zealand estate presented to him
by the King. To split up the open fields, to create free hereditary holdings,
and to determine exactly the villein services due, had long been the cherished
aims of enlightened political thinkers. In spite of the attempts of the elder
Bemstorff and of Struensee, the general condition of the Danish peasantry had
sunk again ; nor was it till the downfall of Guldberg that a sustained effort
was made for its fundamental amelioration. In 1786, the Crown Prince on the
advice of Bemstorff appointed for the purpose a Commission, of which the
leading members were the Prime Minister’s friends, Count Christian Ditlev
Frederick Reventlow and Christian Colbjornsen, who
afterwards,
as Procurator-General, won renown as the reformer of the administration of
justice. The first results of the Commission were two royal ordinances, which,
in 1787, regulated the relations between the landlords and their peasant
tenantry, greatly restricting the penal powers of the former. In 1788, despite
the opposition of men who predicted ruin for the army and navy and for
agriculture, a third ordinance released the peasants from ascription to the
soil, declaring the emancipation of those between fourteen and thirty-six years
of age as from January 1,1800,'or from their discharge from the army, and that
of the rest immediately. Further ordinances removed the prohibition of the
importation of foreign corn into Denmark and southern Norway, and made a great
advance towards complete freedom of trade in cattle. A long series of
enactments followed, whose design was to secure the legal rights of the
peasants, to improve their education, to relieve them of a portion of the
burdens, such as tithe, which still lay upon them, and to facilitate the
acquisition by them of land. Thus was gradually called into life that
flourishing peasantry which became a main element in the national strength of
Denmark. In the Duchies, where the powerful landed nobility obstinately
resisted analogous reforms, they in consequence progressed more slowly; but
BernstorfF was fortunately here possessed of special opportunities for
asserting the influence of his personality. A Commission of nobles
(Ritterschaft) was appointed in 1796; and in the following year it reported
that the landed proprietors of the Duchies, with but a single exception, were
in favour of the emancipation of the peasants. Here, too, the triumph of
BemstorfFs ideas was accordingly assured before his death in 1797, though the
emancipation was not actually promulgated till some years later. Thus the
nephew had accomplished a work dear to the heart of his uncle and predecessor
as well as to his own, and one which, more than any other of their services to
the Danish monarchy, has enshrined their name in the hearts of its peoples.
THE HATS AND
CAPS AND GUSTAVUS IH. (1721-92.)
It was not
the least of Sweden’s misfortunes after the humiliating Peace of Nystad (August
30, 1721), that the Constitution which was to be the compensation for all her
past sacrifices should contain within it the elements of most of her future
calamities. Violently anti-monarchical, this Constitution was still anything
but democratic. Theoretically, all power was vested in the people as
represented by the Riksdag, or Diet, consisting of four distinct Orders or
Estates—Nobles, Priests, Burgesses, land Peasants, deliberating apart. The
conflicting interests and mutual jealousies of these four independent Orders
made the work of legislation exceptionally difficult. No measure could, indeed,
become law till it had obtained the assent of three at least of the four
Estates; but this provision, which seems to have been designed to protect the
lower Orders against the nobility, produced far greater ills than those which
it professed to cure. Thus, measures might be passed by a bare majority in
three Estates when a real and substantial majority of all four Estates might be
actually against it. Or, again, a dominant faction in any three of the Estates
might enact laws highly detrimental to the interests of the remaining Estate; a
danger the more to be apprehended as class distinctions in Sweden were very
sharply defined. The nobility possessed the usual privileges of the Order. The
head of each noble family had the right to sit in the Riddarhus; but most of
these hereditary legislators derived a considerable income from the sale of
their fullmahts, or proxies, to the highest bidder. The invidious and
untranslatable epithet ojralse1 sharply distinguished the
three lower Estates from the dominant and privileged class. Of the three, the
clergy stood first in rank and reputation, being by far the best educated and
the least servile body in the kingdom. Yet the hard-worked Swedish ministry was
so poorly paid that the poorest gentleman rarely thought of the Church as a profession.
The Bishops, again, were not lords spiritual, as in England, but simply the
first among equals in their own Order. The burgesses, again,
* Ofralte is
the negative offraise, which means privileged, exempted.
were such in
the most literal acceptation of the term, merchants and traders with the
exclusive right of representing in the Riksdag the boroughs where they traded.
The peasantry also could only be represented in the Riksdag by peasants. The
peasant deputies were, however, generally excluded from the special committees
in which the most intricate and important business of the session was done.
Each Estate was ruled by its Taiwan, or Speaker, who was elected at the beg
ming of each Diet. The Speaker of the House of Nobles, called Landsma/r- skalk,
or Marshal of the Diet, was always chairman when the four Orders met in
congress. He also presided, by virtue of his office, in the Hemliga Utskottet,
or “Secret Committee,” consisting of 50 nobles, 25 priests^ and 25 burgesses,
which during the session of the Riksdag exercised not only the supreme
executive, but also the supreme judicial and legislative, functions. It
prepared all bills for the Riksdag, created and deposed the Ministers,
controlled the foreign policy of the nation, and claimed and often exercised
the right of superseding the ordinary Courts of justice. During the
parliamentary recess, however, the executive remained in the hands of the
R&d or Senate, now limited to 24 members. The King was obliged to select
one of three candidates submitted to him by a committee of the three higher
Orders, to fill up any vacancy in the R&d.
It
is obvious that there was little room in this republican Constitution for a
constitutional monarch in the ordinary sense of the word. The crowned puppet
who possessed a casting-vote in the Senate, over which he presided, and who was
allowed to create nobles at his coronation only, was rather an ornamental than
an essential part of the machinery of government.
■" 1 ':
At first,
this complicated system worked tolerably well beneath the firm but cautious
control of Count Arvid Bernhard Horn, the Swedish Chancellor. In his anxiety to
avoid embroiling his country abroad; Horn reversed the traditional foreign
policy of Sweden by keeping France at a distance and drawing near to England.
Thusj a twenty years’ war was succeeded by a twenty years’ peace, during which
the nation recovered so rapidly from its wounds that ■ it began to forget
them. A new race of politicians was now springing up, whose ambition and
martial ardour led them to undervalue1 the blessings of peace. Since
1719, when the influence of the few great territorial families had been all but
extinguished in a Riddarhus of needy geritlemen who claimed to be their equals,
the first Estate became the nursery, and afterwards the stronghold, of an
Opposition which found its natural leaders in Count Carl Gyllenborg, Barori
Daniel Niklas von Hopken, and Count Carl Gustav Tessin. Tessin, the son of
Charles XI’s great architect, Nicodemus Tessin, was the Admirable Crichton of
the Opposition; and by far their ablest leader. These men and their followers
were tiever w'eary of ridiculing the timid caution of the aged Count Horn, who
sacrificed everything to perpetuate “an inglorious peace.” They nicknamed his
adherents “
Night-caps ” (a term subsequently softened into Caps), themselves adopting ;he
sobriquet Hats. These epithets instantly caught the public fancy. The nickname
“ Night-cap ” seemed exactly to suit the drowsy policy of old Horn, while the
three-cornered hat, worn by officers and gentlemen, no less happily hit off the
manly self-assertion of the Opposition. From 1738 onwards these party badges
were in general use. The Riksdag, of that year marked a turning-point in
Swedish history. The Hats carried everything before them; Tessin won the baton
of Marshal of the Diet by an enormous majority; the Caps were almost totally
excluded from the Secret Committee; and Count Horn was compelled to retire from
a scene where, for three-and-thirty years, he had been absolutely dominant.
The foreign
policy of the Hats was a return to the old historical alliance between France
and Sweden. This alliance had, on the whole, been mutually advantageous to both
States, so long as Sweden had remained a great and active military monarchy.
When, however, she descended to her. natural position as a second-rate Power,
the French alliance became a luxury too costly for her straitened means. Horn
had clearly perceived this, and his cautious neutrality was therefore the
wisest statesmanship. But to the politicians who ousted Horn prosperity without
glory was a worthless possession. They aimed at nothing less than restoring
Sweden to her former proud position as a Great Power. France naturally hailed
with satisfaction the rise of a faction which was content to be her armour-bearer
in the north, and the rich golden streams which flowed continuously from
Versailles to Stockholm during the next two generations were the political
life-blood of the Hats. Yet no alliance was ever so mischievous or illusory.
The hopeless blundering of the Hats upset all the calculations of their ally,
and the millions lavished upon them were so many millions thrown away.
The first
great blunder of this party was the hasty and ill-advised war with Russia. The
European complications consequent upon the all but simultaneous deaths of the
Emperor Charles VI and the Russian Empress Anne seemed to favour their
adventurous schemes. Despite the frantic protests of the Caps, a project for
the conquest of the Baltic provinces was rushed through the extraordinary Rilcsdag
of 1740, and on July 80, 1741j war was formally declared against: Russia. A
month later the Riksdag was dissolved and the Hat Landsmarskalk, Carl Emil
Lewenhaupt, set off for Finland to take command of the army. The humiliation of
Russia, whose domestic embarrassments were notorious, was taken for granted,
and it was confidently declared at Stockholm that, within six months’ time,
peace would be dictated at the gates of St Petersburg. But even the first blow
was not struck till six months after the declaration of war, and, then, by the
enemy who routed General Wrangel at Vilmanstrand and captured and destroyed
that frontier fortress. Nothing was done on either side for six months more;
, O
and then
Lewenhaupt made “ a tacit truce ” with the Russians through the mediation of La
Chetardie, the French Minister at St Petersburg. By the time this tacit truce
had come to an end, the Swedish forces were so demoralised that the mere rumour
of a hostile attack made them ibandon everything and retire hastily to
Helsingfors. Before the end of the year all Finland was in the hands of the
Russians. The fleet, disabled from the first by a terrible epidemic, had become
a huge floating hospital, and did nothing at all.
To face
another Riksdag, with such a war as this upon their consciences, was an ordeal
from which the Hats naturally shrank; but they had to meet it, and, to do them
justice, they showed themselves better parliamentary than military strategists.
A motion for an enquiry into the conduct of the War was skilfully evaded by
obtaining precedence for the Succession question. (The Queen Consort, Ulrica
Leonora, had died childless on November 24,1741, and King Frederick who had
succeeded her as sovereign on her abdication (February 29, 1720), was now an
old man.) The Hats immediately opened negotiations with the new Russian Empress
Elizabeth, who consented to restitute all Finland except the small portion of
it eastwards of the river Kymmene, the original boundary between the two
States, on condition that her cousin, Adolphus Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp,
was elected successor to the Swedish throne. The Hats eagerly caught at the
opportunity of recovering the grand duchy, and their own prestige along with
it; and the Peace of Abo, a singularly favourable compact in the circumstances
(August 7,1743), put an end to their first unlucky political speculation.
The new Crown
Prince, Adolphus Frederick, was remotely connected with the ancient dynasty,
his grandfather’s grandmother having been the sister of the great Gustavus.
Personally he was altogether insignificant, being chiefly remarkable as the
father of Sweden’s last great monarch and as the willing slave of a beautiful
and talented, but haughty and imperious, consort. That consort was Louisa Ulrica,
Frederick the Great’s sister, whom Tessin, now Chancellor of Sweden, conducted
with great pomp from Berlin to Stockholm, where (August 27, 1744) she was
married to Adolphus Frederick and speedily gathered around her a brilliant
circle. Her support became the prize for which both the factions contended; but
all the French tastes and sympathies of the Voltairean Princess drew her
towards the Hats, and from 1744 to 1750 the brilliant Tessin became the friend
and confidant of the Crown Princess. The birth of her first-born son Gustavus
(January 24,1746), of whom Tessin was forthwith appointed Governor, seemed to
be an additional bond of union between them. Louisa Ulrica now began to build
the most extravagant hopes on the amity of a statesman who was at once the
first Minister of the Crown and the leader of the dominant Hat party.
Unfortunately, she ignored the fact that, for all his courtliness and
complacency, a more determined foe of autocracy than Tessin
never
existed. Brought up in the belief that monarchy had been the bane of Sweden, he
was firmly convinced that the Constitution of 1720 was the most perfect form of
government devisable. The only authority he recognised was the Riksdag, from
which he derived his power, and to which he was alone responsible. A collision,
therefore, between a would-be autocrat like Louisa Ulrica and a virtual
republican like Tessin was inevitable. It came in the course of 1750, when
Tessin, justly alarmed at the rapprochement between Russia and Denmark,
skilfully interposed with the scheme of a family alliance between the Swedish
and Danish Courts, which Frederick V of Denmark eagerly welcomed. Tessin,
thereupon, arranged a betrothal between his little pupil and the Danish
Princess Royal, without even consulting the parents of the infant bridegroom.
Now, the Danish Court had ever been the most bitter foe of the House of
Holstein-Gottorp; the Danish King had even refused to recognise the right of
Adolphus Frederick to the Crown of Sweden. To both the Crown Prince and his
consort, therefore, the Danish matdi was monstrous. Both parents appealed to
the Senate against the unnatural betrothal, but in vain. Adolphus Frederick was
compelled to sign the detested contract, and to write the usual letters of
congratulation.
For this
Louisa Ulrica never forgave Tessin; and, when in March, 1751, the old King
Frederick died, and Adolphus Frederick succeeded him, the situation became
acute. The troubles of the new King began early. The Estates seemed bent upon
going out of their way to mortify him. They forced upon him a new Chancellor,
Comit Anders Johan von Hopken, renowned as the most pregnant and incisive
orator of the day; they disputed the King’s right to appoint his own household
or create peers; they declared that all state appointments were to go by
seniority; they threatened to use a royal “ name-stamp,” if his Majesty refused
to append his sign-manual to official documents. In 1756, an attempted
revolution, planned by the Queen and a few devoted young noblemen, was easily
and remorselessly crushed. The ringleaders, after being tortured, were
beheaded, and, though the unhappy King did not, as he anticipated, “ share the
fete of Charles Stewart ”, he was humiliated as never monarch was humiliated
before. The Estates stung him to the' quick by means of an absolutely unique
document which, ostensibly “ an instruction ” to the young Crown Prince’s new
Governor, was, in reality, a violent tirade against his royal father. Royalty
had sunk low when “ most humble and most dutiful subjects ” could venture to
remind their “ most mighty and gracious King ” that Kings in general are “the
natural enemies of their subjects”; that “in free States” they merely “exist on
sufferance”; that, because they are occasionally invested with pomp and dignity
“ more for the honour of the realm than for the sake of the person who may
happen to occupy the chief place in the pageant,” they must not therefore
imagine that “ they are more than men while other
men are less
than worms'”; that, “as the glare and glitter of a Court” may tend to puff them
up with the idea that they are made of finer stuff than their fellow-creatures,
they would do well, occasionally, to visit the lowly hut of the peasant and
there learn that it is because of the wasteful extravagance of a Court that the
peasant’s loaf is so light and his burdens are so heavy—and so on through a
score of long-winded paragraphs. This “ instruction ” was solemnly presented
to his Majesty by the Marshal of the Diet and the Talmen of the three lower
Estates, and he was requested to give it with his own hand to the Prince’s new
Governor, Count Carl Fredrik Scheffer.
From 1756 to
1771 the most conspicuous figures in the political history of Sweden are Count
Axel Fredrik af Fersen and Baron Carl Fredrik Pechlin. Fersen, the descendant
of a branch of the Macpherson family which had been settled in Sweden for
generations, was the worthiest Swedish nobleman of his day. He enjoys the
honourable distinction of having been the purest of politicians at a time when
the whole course of Swedish politics was tainted at its source. His abilities
were considerable. As an orator in an age of orators he had few equals. He was
also an admirable parliamentary tactician. The fatal defects of his character
were a want of initiative, which made him useless in a crisis, and a dread of
responsibility which caused him to decline, persistently, high offices to which
he seemed to be born. Pechlin, a Holsteiner by descent, was the Henry Fox of
Sweden. His whole career was an unbroken series of treacheries and treasons,
and the easy effrontery with which this political chameleon changed his colours
has rarely been surpassed. That Pechlin should have wielded such enormous
influence as to receive the nickname of “ General of the Riksdagis significant of
the foulness of the political atmosphere in which he flourished; but it is also
a proof of the personal talents of the arch-renegade. Neither love of power nor
love of money, but an ingrained passion for intrigue for its own sake, seems to
have been the leading motive of his otherwise inexplicable conduct.
Fersen was a
Hat by conviction, and his generous purse was always at the disposal of his
party. Pechlin professed to be a Cap, and just then, after an eclipse of
twenty-five years, the star of the Caps was once more in the ascendant. The
game of their adversaries was, indeed, by this time nearly played out. Their
last adventure (a heedless plunging into the Seven Years’ War at the
instigation of France) had utterly wrecked their resources. The French subsidies,
which might have sufficed for a six weeks’ demonstration (it was too generally
assumed that the King of Prussia would give little trouble to a European
coalition), proved quite inadequate, and, after five unsuccessful campaigns,
the Hats were glad to make peace on a status quo ante bettum basis after
throwing away £5,000,000 and 40,000 men. When the Riksdag met in 1760, the
indignation against the Hat Cabinet was so violent that an impeachment
of them
seemed inevitable; but Pechlin, suddenly changing sides at the veiy moment of
the Cap triumph, contrived to pull the Hats out of the mire by a combination of
the most intricate and amazing intrigues; at the same time, however, involving
everything in such inextricable. Confusion that the session was brought to a
close by the mutual consent of both the exhausted factions. It had lasted
twenty months, and its sole result was to bolster up the Hat Government for
another four years.
But the day
of reckoning could not be postponed for ever, and, when the Estates met again
in 1765, the Caps came into power at last. Their leader Thure Rudbeck was
elected Marshal of the Diet over Fersen by a large majority, and, out of the
100 seats in the Secret Committee, the Hats only succeeded in securing 10. The
Caps at once struck at the weak point of their opponents by ordering a Budget
report to be made; and it was speedily found that the whole financial system of
the Hats had been based upon reckless improvidence and wilful
misrepresentation, and that the only fruits of their long rule was a doubling
of the National Debt, with such a depreciation of the note circulation that
i?15 in paper was worth only £5 in specie. This startling revelation led to a
general retrenchment, carried into effect with a drastic thoroughness which has
earned for this Parliament the name of the “ Reduction Riksdag.” By this means
the Caps succeeded in transferring i?500,000 from the pockets of the merchants
and landowners of the Hat party to the empty Treasury, considerably reducing
the National Debt, and reestablishing some sort of equilibrium between revenue
and expenditure.
The
“Reduction Riksdag” rose in October, 1766, and with it the short-lived
popularity of the Caps passed away. Their sweeping system of retrenchment had
irritated everyone who had anything to lose, while the severity with which it
had been applied had caused universal suffering. Nevertheless, their domestic
policy was, in the main, a commendable attempt to grapple with abuses of long
standing against which they had always protested. Their worst condemnation,
from a statesman’s point of view, was their short-sighted, suicidal, foreign
policy.
Sweden at
this time had stillvoice ih European affairs. Although no longer a first-class
Power she was still the foremost among the second- class Powers, and the
Swedish alliance, depreciated as it might be, was at any rate a marketable
article. Her Pomeranian possessions afforded her an easy ingress into the very
heart of the Empire, arid her Finnish frontier was not many leagues from the
Russian capital; A watchful neutrality which did not venture much beyond
defensive alliances was therefore Sweden’s safest policy, and this the older
Caps had always recognised. But, when the Hats became the henchmen of France in
the north, their opponents needed a protector strong enough to countervail the
French influence; and so it came about that the younger Caps flung thempelves
into the arms of Russia, overlooking the fact that even a pacific union with
Russia was far more to be feared than a martial alliance
with France.
For France was too distant to be really dangerous. She sought an ally in
Sweden, and it was her endeavour to make that ally as strong as possible. An
alliance with Russia, on the other hand, meant absolute subservience, for
Russia was deliberately aiming at the hegemony of the north. These were the
days of the famous “ Northern Accord,” the invention of Count Nikita Panin,
Catharine II’s political mentor from 1763 to 1781, which, although never fully
carried out, profoundly affected the politics of northern and central Europe,
and which was to attract Poland and Sweden within the orbit of Russia under
much the same conditions. Both Powers were to be kept strong enough to be
serviceable, but not strong enough to be dangerous, to Russian interests. In
each case the maintenance of a vicious Constitution under the express guarantee
of Russia was to be the curb upon too ambitious a progress. This double
arrangement first appears in the secret clauses of the Treaty of 1763, between
Russia and Prussia, on the eve of the election of Stanislaus Poniatowski to the
throne of Poland. In 1766, the Caps were induced, by a secret understanding, to
accept the Russian guarantee for the Swedish Constitution also.
Fortunately
for Sweden, the Cap Government was of too brief duration to do much mischief.
An Order in Council issued by the Senate, declaring that all complaints against
the measures of the last Riksdag should be punished with fine and imprisonment,
brought matters to a head. The King, secretly instigated by the Crown Prince
Gustavus and the Hats, presented (February 9,1768) a message to the Senate
urging it to convoke the Riksdag instantly, as the only available means of
finding relief for the great and growing distress of the nation under the new
economical system. The Senate, after a week’s reflexion, informed his Majesty
that it saw no reason for departing from the precept of the last Riksdag, which
had fixed October, 1770, for the convocation of its successor. On December 14,
further encouraged by the arrival of the new French ambassador, de Modene, with
a well-filled purse, the King, accompanied by the Crown Prince, once more urged
the Senate to convoke an extraordinary Riksdag. Upon their still refusing to
comply with his request, he formally abdicated, at the same time forbidding the
Senate to make use of his name in any of its resolutions. From December 15 to
21 Sweden was without a legal government. The capital was much disturbed.
Crowds of people surrounded the Palace, where the Senate passed the time in
anxious deliberation, issuing orders which were no longer obeyed, the various
Departments of State and the magistrates of Stockholm resolutely refusing to
accept a name- stamp as a substitute for the royal sign-manual. Still the
Senate held out. But, when the Treasury refused to part with a single dollar
more, when Count Fersen, as Colonel of the Guards, appeared in the
Council-chamber and declared he could no longer answer for the troops, the
stubborn resistance of the Caps was, at last, broken. On December 19
they resolved
to convoke the Estates for April 19, 1769. On the 21st, Adolphus Frederick
reappeared in the Council-chamber and resumed the Crown.
Both parties
now prepared for the elections, which were to decide whether the nation preferred
to be governed by a King or a name- stamp. On the eve of the contest there was
a general assembly of the Hats at the French Embassy where de Modene provided
them with 6,000,000 livres, but not till they had signed in his presence an
undertaking to reform the Constitution in a monarchical sense. Still more
energetic was Russia, on the other side. The Russian ambassador, Count Andrei
Ivanovich Osterman, scattered his roubles with a lavish hand; and so lost to
all sense of patriotism were the Caps that they threatened all who dared to
vote against them with the vengeance of the Russian Empress, and fixed
Norrkoping, instead of Stockholm, as the place of meeting for the Riksdag,
because it was more accessible to the Russian fleet. But it soon became evident
that the Caps were playing a losing game; and, when the Riksdag met at
Norrkoping, they found themselves in a minority in all four Estates. In the
contest for the Marshalship of the Diet, the verdict of the last Riksdag was
exactly reversed, Fersen, the Hat candidate, defeating the Cap leader Rudbeck
by 234 votes, though Russia spent £11,500 to secure his election.
The first act
of the Riksdag was to move a humble address of thanks to the King “ because he
had not shut his ears to the bitter cry of the nation.” The Caps got short
shrift; and the note which the Russian, Prussian and Danish ministers presented
to the Estates, protesting, in menacing terms, against any reprisals on the
part of the triumphant faction, only hastened the fall of the Government. The
Cap Senate resigned en masse, to escape impeachment; and the Riksdag appointed
an exclusively Hat administration. On June 1, the Reaction Riksdag, as it is
generally callcd, removed to the capital; and the French ambassador and the
Crown Prince hereupon called on the new Senators to redeem their promise as to
a reform of the Constitution. But, when the Hats, towards the end of the
session, reluctantly and half-heartedly, brought the matter forward, the
Riksdag suddenly seemed to be stricken with paralysis. Impediments, not
unwelcome to the party chiefs, multiplied at every step; and on January 30,
1770, the Reaction Riksdag, after a barren ten mouths’ session, dissolved
itself amidst the most chaotic confusion.
A little more
than twelve months later (February 12, 1771), Adolphus Frederick expired. The
suddenness of the catastrophe gave rise, at first, to sinister rumours; but the
highly-spiced condiments with which the deceased monarch had overloaded a weak
stomach constituted the only poison which killed him. The elections on the
demise of the Crown resulted in a partial victory for the Caps, especially
among the
lower three Orders; but in the Estate of peasants their majority was very
small, while the mass of the nobility was still dead against them. Nothing
could be done, however, till the new King had returned from France, where (from
February 4 to March 25) he had shone in the brilliant firmament of Parisian
society as a star of the first magnitude. The charming young Prince had
captivated hearts and minds alike by his grace, wit, and savoirfaire. Even
Madame du Deffand was satisfied with him. In Sweden also his abilities were
already generally recognised and inspired equal hope and fear. Everyone felt
that with Gustavus a new and incalculable factor had entered into Swedish
politics. '
Gustavus III
was born on January 24, 1746. All his Governors and tutors—and among them we
find the most eminent statesmen and the most learned scholars of their day—were
struck by the lad’s extraordinary precocity, vivid imagination, and retentive
memory. But an abhorrence of everything requiring sustained mental exertion,
the disturbing interference of the factions, who repeatedly changed his tutors
to suit the ever varying political atmosphere of the moment, and his own
natural indolence, prevented him from making a proper use of the talents of his
preceptors, as he himself in his memoirs frankly acknowledges. Another most
curious feature in the child’s character was his passion for the theatre. “ No
sooner has he seen a play,” writes his second Governor, Count Scheffer, “than
his memory absorbs the whole of it, often retaining long portions of the
dialogue....Often, while he is being dressed and undressed, you may hear him
solemnly declaim the monologues of queens and princesses.” A love of dramatic
display was, indeed, to characterise him throughout life. Somewhat later, we
remark in him a careful cultivation of that natural charm of manner which was
to make him so irresistibly fascinating. French he learnt from his very cradle,
and with the literature of France he was intimately acquainted at a very early
age. There was scarcely a French book of any note that he had not read before
he was five-and-twenty. On the other hand, the Prince had next to no political
education. The little he knew of state-craft he had picked up as best he could.
The leading politicians of both parties looked askance at the keen-witted
aspiring youth, and threw every possible obstacle in his way. The Estates even
refused him permission to study the science of war in the army of his uncle,
Frederick the Great, lest he should learn to undervalue the blessings of a free
Constitution in that school of enlightened despotism. Thus, full of ambitious
energy, yet constrained to stand in the background, Gustavus learnt betimes to
weigh his words, disguise his thoughts, and keep a constant watch upon himself
and others. He followed with the keenest interest the ever shifting course of
events; carefully studied the characters of the politicians by whom those
events were controlled, and resolved to seize the first opportunity for
rescuing
the
monarchy from the constitutional bondage under which it languished. He took the
first step in this direction, before he quitted France, by inducing Louis XV to
pay, unconditionally, the outstanding Swedish subsidies, at the rate of 1J
million livres annually, commencing from January, 1772, and to send as
ambassador to Stockholm Count de Vergennes, one of the great names of French
diplomacy, to support him in the coming struggle with Russia and her partisans,
which he already foresaw. ■
On June
6,1771, Gustavus III entered his capital. A fortnight later, in full regalia,,
and with the silver sceptre of Gustavus Adolphus in his hand, he formally
opened his first Parliament in a speech which awakened strange and deep
emotions in all who heard it.’ It was the first time for more than a century
that a Swedish King had addressed a Swedish Riksdag from the throne in its
native language. After a touching allusion to his father’s death the orator
thus proceeded: “ Born and bred among you, I have learned, from my tenderest
youth, to love my country, and hold it the highest privilege to be born a
Swede, the greatest honour to be the first citizen of a free people....I have
seen many lands. I have studied the...institutions...of many peoples. I have
found that neither the pomp and magnificence of monarchy, nor the most frugal
economy, nor the most overflowing exchequer, can ensure content or prosperity
where patriotism, where unity, is wanting. It rests with you to become the
happiest nation in the world. Let this Riksdag be for ever memorable in our
annals for the sacrifice of all party animosities, of all interested motives,
to the common weal. So far as in me lies, I will contribute to reunite your
diverging opinions, to reconcile your estranged affections, so that the nation
may ever look back with gratitude on a Parliament on whose deliberations I now
invoke the blessings of the Most High.”
The
determination of the royal peace-maker to reconcile the jarring factions was
perfectly sincere. He began by inducing them to appoint a “ Composition
Committee” with a view to the formation of a coalition Ministry, which was to
divide all offices of public emolument equally between the Hats and Caps. The
scheme was frustrated by the preposterous demands of the Caps. Pechlin, who had
now gone over to that party, seemed bent upon breaking up the Composition
project altogether, and the King had to interfere to prevent a violent
collision between him and Fersen. Still more dictatorial became the tone of the
Caps when its nominees, after a severe struggle, were elected speakers of the
three lower Estates. Crowds of deserters at once passed over into the ranks of
the Caps, who forthwith endeavoured, under every imaginable pretext, to
invalidate the elections of their opponents. In this way, they at last obtained
a decisive majority in the lower three Orders.
It was now
absolutely necessary to snatch the Riddarhus from the
grasp of the
triumphant Caps. If the first Estate were lost, all was lost. Yet lost it must
be without money, and no money was forthcoming, the new French ambassador, much
to the consternation of the royalists, having arrived (June 8) almost
empty-handed. Gustavus saved the situation by borrowing ,£200,000 from the
Dutch banking-house of Hameca on the sole security of the first instalment of
the French subsidy, which was not due till January 1, 1772. With the aid of
this bribing fund, he managed to secure the election of the royal nominee as
Marshal of the Diet by 524 votes to 450. This, the first victory of the Court
party, was more than neutralised, however, by the result of the elections to
the Secret Committee, where the Caps triumphed in the lower Orders and obtained
a majority in the Committee (54 to 46) sufficient to outvote their colleagues.
This success cost Catharine II £40,000, and she considered it cheap at the
price.
Gustavus now
desired to terminate, as soon as possible, a Riksdag from which he had
evidently little to hope and everything to fear. The Estates had been summoned
ostensibly to bury his father and crown himself. One half of their work had,
therefore, already been done. It only remained for them to prepare “the Royal
Assurance,” or Coronation Oath. They were shrewd enough to recognise that this
was their trump card, and they determined to make the most of it. As finally
presented to the King, it contained three new clauses which can only be
described as subversive. The first of these clauses bound the King to reign in
future “ uninterruptedly,” so as to make a future abdication impossible. The
second bound him to abide by the decision* not “of the Estates of the Realm
altogether” as heretofore, but simply “of the Estates of the Realm,” i.e. a
majority of the Estates. This clause was to enable the lower three Estates to
rule without, and even in spite of, the first Estate. The third clause required
his Majesty, in all cases of preferment, to be guided “solely” by merit. In all
former coronation oaths the word “principally” had been used. This new clause
aimed at the very root of oligarchical privilege, by placing “ noble ” and “
non-noble ” on precisely the same footing. Two things were evident from these
radical propositions : the strife of Hats and Caps had lapsed into a still
more ominous strife of classes, and the lower Orders were resolved to fight a
outrance for their own hands.
All through
the summer and autumn of 1771 the Estates were engaged in wrangling over the
coronation oath. A well-meant attempt of the King, at the end of the year, to
mediate between the Orders, as he had already mediated between the factions,
only resulted in an unseemly collision between him and the Talman of the Estate
of burgesses, Carl Fredrik Sebald. After the brief Christmas recess, the
interminable discussion was renewed. Finally, on February 24, 1772, the first
Estate, from sheer weariness, conceded, virtually, everything that the lower
Estates demanded, though only by a majority of 32 in a House of 686
members. So
late as February 11th Gustavus had resolved rather to resign his crown than
sign the new coronation oath; on March 3 he signed it with cheerful alacrity,
without even taking the trouble to read it. As a matter of fact, he was
hesitating on the brink of a revolution. The jolt which finally impelled him to
that desperate plunge was the violent dismissal of the Hat Senate, the last
asylum of the monarchy and the gentry, on April 25, 1772.
The situation
of the young King was now truly pitiable. He was little better than a hostage,
for the maintenance of the existing anarchy, in the hands of Ministers who were
the humble servants of the Russian Empress. He was completely isolated in the
midst of three States— Russia, Prussia, and Denmark—which had bound themselves
jointly by treaty to uphold the existing Swedish Constitution and treat any
attempt to modify it, either from within or from without, as a casus belli. The
time had arrived for Gustavus to translate his idea of a revolution into
action.
Two men of
determined character and infinite resource, Baron Jakob Magnus Sprengtporten,
Colonel of the Nyland Dragoons in Finland, and ex-ranger Johan Kristoffer Toll,
both of them having old scores to settle with the dominant Caps, were the
prompters and original contrivers of the picturesque coup d'etat which was to
make Gustavus III a European celebrity. The scheme, matured shortly after the
coronation (May 29, 1772), was two-fold. Sprengtporten undertook to cross over
to Finland and seize Sveaborg, as a base for further operations, while Toll was
to secure the Seaman fortress of Christianstadt as a rendezvous for the
conspirators in Sweden. This done, Sprengtporten and Toll were to advance
simultaneously against Stockholm from the east and south, overthrow the
Government and establish a limited monarchy in its stead. So uncertain were the
arch-conspirators of the fitness of Gustavus for so perilous an enterprise that
they resolved to leave-as little as possible to chance, by keeping him in the
background till the last moment when, as Sprengtporten expressed it, “we must
thrust a weapon into his hand and trust to him to use it.” Nevertheless^ fate
decreed that Gustavus, after all, should play the leading part in the whole
affair.
Sprengtporten
and Toll, by sheer bluff, achieved all they set out to do. Then, contrary winds
detained Sprengtporten in Finland, and, before Toll could assemble an army
round Christianstadt, the Cap Senate at Stockholm was warned by the English
minister, Sir John Goodrich, that a mysterious plot was afoot to overthrow the
Government. The contingency so much dreaded by Sprengtporten had actually
arrived: the King found himself isolated in the midst of his enemies. On the
evening of August 18, Gustavus was secretly warned that the Government intended
to arrest him within twelve hours. His resolution was at once taken. He would
strike the decisive blow himself, without waiting for his confederates. All the
officers in the capital whom he
could trust
were commanded to meet him, at 10 o’clock on the following morning, in the
great square facing the Arsenal. Some two-hundred of them obeyed the summons;
and forthwith he led them to the guardroom of the barracks where, in twenty
minutes, he won over the Guards by a splendid speech, depicting in vivid
colours the unhappy situation of Sweden. “If,” cried he, in conclusion, “you
will follow me as your forefathers followed Gustavus Vasa and Gustavus
Adolphus, I will venture my life-blood for the safety and honour of my
country.” There was a brief pause ; and then, with a single exception, they
declared their willingness to follow him. Thereupon, after detaching a picket
to arrest the Senate (it was holding a council at the Palace, and quietly
submitted to be locked in), he dictated a new oath of allegiance in the
guard-room, absolving the officers from their allegiance to the Estates, and
binding them to obey solely their lawful King Gustavus III and defend him and
the new Constitution which he promised to give them. The soldiers on the
parade-ground followed the example of their officers, and received a ducat
apiece, with six rounds of ammunition.
From the
guard-room Gustavus, after occupying the Arsenal on his way, proceeded to the
Artillery-yaid, which he bad fixed upon as his headquarters. Here he tied a
wbite handkerchief round his left arm as a mark of recognition, and bade all
his friends do the same. In less than an hour tbe whole city had donned the
white handkerchief. All the gates of Stockholm were then closed; the fleet,
anchored off the Skepperholm, was secured; and, after making a complete tour of
the capital, the King returned to the Palace absolute master of the situation.
On the evening of the 20th, heralds perambulated the city proclaiming that the
Estates were to meet in the Rilcssaal at four o’clock on the following day.
Extraordinary and elaborate precautions were taken on this occasion. The
principal thoroughfares were lined by battalions of the guard. The Rikssaal
itself was surrounded by a park of artillery. One-hundred grenadiers stood
behind the guns with lighted matches. On the 21st the terrified Riksdagsmen
crept, by twos and threes, into their places, between rows of glittering
bayonets. A few minutes after the Estates had assembled, the King, in full
regalia, appeared, took his seat on the throne, and delivered that famous
philippic which is one of the masterpieces of Swedish oratory. Not since
Gustavus Vasa had trounced the Estates at the Riksdag of Vaster&s in 1527
had a Swedish parliament received such a reprimand from the Throne. There was a
reproach in every eloquent sentence, a sting in every stately period. His
audience were made to feel that the King regarded them as either dupes or
traitors.
When Gustavus
had finished speaking, he ordered that the new Constitution, his own handiwork,
should be read to the Estates, and, without allowing them a moment for
deliberation, demanded whether they would now solemnly engage to keep it
inviolably. The Estates
responded by
a loud and unanimous “Yes!” thrice repeated. It was then signed and sealed by
the four Talmen; and the King, reverently removing his crown, beckoned to
.Archdeacon Lutkeman to intone a Te Deum.
Briefly, the.
new Constitution restored to the Crown most of its ancient rights, and
converted a weak and despotic republic into a strong and limited monarchy, in
which the balance of power inclined, on the whole, to the side of the monarch.
The King again became the source of promotion, the commander-in-chief of the
forces, the sole medium of communication with foreign Powers. The appointment
and dismissal of Ministers, including the Senators and the four Talmen, was
transferred from the Estates to the Crown. The summoning and the dismissal of
the Riksdag once more became royal prerogatives. The deliberations of the
Estates were to be confined exclusively to the propositions which the King
might think fit to lay before them. But these large powers were subject to many
important checks. No new law could be imposed, no old law repealed, no
offensive war undertaken, no extraordinary war subsidy levied,;without the
previous consent of the Estates. The Estates alone could tax themselves; they
had the absolute charge of the Bank of Sweden, and the inalienable right of
controlling the national expenditure. Moreover, the King pledged himself never
to alter his own Constitution without the consent of the Riksdag, and never to
quit the realm without the consent of the Senate. But, inasmuch as the Senators
were henceforth to be appointed by the King and be responsible to him alone, a
Senate in opposition to the Crown was barely conceivable. It is no reproach to
Gustavus that eleven of the new Senators had been Hats and only five Caps, for
both Hats and Caps had now ceased to exist. A proclamation forbade,
peremptorily, the use of “those odious and abominable names11 which
had “ smitten the land with the most hideous abuses ever known in a Christian
community.” Finally, the new Constitution introduced many, salutary reforms.
The Judges were made immovable. All extraordii.try tribunals were declared to
be unlawful. A Habeas Corpus Act was introduced. No special privileges were
henceforth to be conferred on any one of the four Estates without the consent
of the other three. The weak points of the Constitution were the vagueness of
some of its paragraphs, which did not sufficiently define the limits between
the prerogative and parliamentary privilege, and the hampering restraint upon
the royal power as regards offensive warfare, which was to have serious
consequences in the future. Diplomatically regarded, the Swedish Revolution
was the first political triumph of France since 1740. It was, at the same time,
a distinct rebuff to Russia. Panin always insisted that the coup d’etat of 1772
was the one really serious contretemps of the reign of Catharine II, inasmuch
as it destroyed the Russian influence in the extreme north. The Empress
herself, when she first heard of it, regarded an immediate war
with Sweden
as inevitable, and actually detached nine infantry regiments from Rumyantseff’s
army on the Danube, and sent them to Pskoff in view of an expected Swedish
invasion. But Gustavus was not prepared at present to imperil his newly won
position by any fresh adventures, while Turkish and Polish complications were
to tie the hands of Catharine for many years to come.
Secure, at last,
from foreign interference, the young monarch was now free to. throw himself,
heart and soul, into that ambitious plan of reform which was the necessary
consequence of the Revolution and its triumphant vindication. A fairer and
wider field of operation for an ardent and capable reformer than that presented
by Sweden in 1772 is scarcely imaginable. Half a century of misrule had
dislocated the whole machinery of government, given the licence of prescription
to the worst abuses, and brought the State to the very verge of financial and
political bankruptcy. The first two measures of the new Government, the abolition
of judicial torture and the establishment of the freedom of the Press, showed
that, at least, it had a liberal and progressive programme. The regulation of
the currency was the King’s next care. He began by appointing a Commission of
six experts to report on the subject. After three months of incessant labour,
the Commission was ready with its report, which deprecated as mischievous any
attempt to redeem the notes of the Bank of Sweden for many years to come.
Gustavus, ill pleased with this report, asked the chairman whether it
represented the unanimous opinion of the Commission. He replied that the jur’or
commissioner, Johan Liljencrantz, had alone refused to sign it. The King
immediately asked Liljencrantz why he had withheld his signature. He replied
that he had done so, because he was persuaded that the redemption of the
enormous note currency, although a difficult, was by no means an impossible,
operation. The upshot of it was that the King resolved to give'Liljencrantz’
project a fair chance, and, when the Senate twice refused to consent to it,
Gustavus boldly took the matter into his own hands, created a new Department of
Finahce, of which he made Liljencrantz the first President, and ordered him to
carry his scheme into execution. The result more than justified the King’s
venture. Favoured by a succession of good harvests, and assisted by three loans
from Holland, on uiiprecedently advantageous terms, Liljencrantz, despite the
constant resistance1 of the Senate and the reiterated protests and
Warnings of the Bank Directors, persisted in his endeavours and, after six
years of incessant labour, was able to lay before the Riksdag of 1778 a national
balance-sheet which has been well described as “ an artistic masterpiece in the
highest finance.” Briefly, it was found that the whole of the State’s debt to
the Bank, contracted during the last fifty years, had been discharged, and
there was a substantial surplus in hand. When the Landsmarslcallc, in the name
of the Finance Committee of the Riksdags proceeded to thank the King for
having restored
the national
credit and reestablished the equilibrium of the finances, Gustavus beckoned to
Liljencrantz to come forward and stand on his left, in order that “ he who had
done the work might also receive the praise,”
Next to , the
finances, it was the judicature which most needed reformation, and here the
King again took the initiative,; though his labours were considerably lightened
by the zeal and intelligence of Joachim Vilhelm Liliestr&le, whom he
discovered and employed as his first Vicar-General in civil and ecclesiastical
matters. Liliestr&le was instructed to make a thorough inquisition into the
condition of the magistracy and the general administration of justice. He
discovered, inter alia, that a very large percentage of the Lamdshqfdingar, or
Lord Lieutenants of the counties, and their deputies were, practically,
absentees; that charitable funds had been appropriated wholesale by their
administrators ; that many districts had been untaxed while other districts
had been taxed ten times over during the same period; that scores of parsonages
were in ruins; that in one diocese there had been no episcopal visitation for
twelve years; that the rich see. of Linkoping had derived not the slightest
spiritual benefit from its revenues for nearly a century. The maladministration
of justice was found to be universal. The complaints brought against one of the
two Supreme Courts, the Gota Hofratt, were, in particular, so scandalous that
the King felt bound to impeach the whole tribunal before the full Senate, under
his personal presidency. The trial, which began on November 2, 1774, with open
doors, lasted six weeks, and resulted in the disbenching of five of the eight
judges, while the remaining three were heavily fined.
No less
sweeping and drastic than his civil reforms ivere the military reforms of
Gustavus III. And, certainly, the state of the national defences had never been
so deplorable as when Gustavus ascended the throne. The militaiy spirit: which
had predominated in Sweden under Charles XII had been succeeded by a mania for
economy. , Every penny spent on armaments was grudged and, carped at. The
standard of military education was lower than it had ever been. The officers
spent three- quarters of their time on furlough; the men were very often not
manoeuvred from one year’s end to another. The superior officers had no hold
upon subalterns who were their accusers and judges in the Riksdag. Seniority
was the sole title to promotion, and the various attempts to mitigate its
mischievous consequences had only produced the monstrous “accord” arrangement,
almost identical with the extinct British Purchase system. Officers .wishing to
retire: were permitted to receive from their successors a certain bounty, or
accord. The whole arrangement was transparently unmilitary, as an instance, of
a kind by no means uncommon, will show. An officer who has, perhaps, vegetated through
half a century of inglorious peace retires at last upon the accord paid to him
by his successor. That successor is killed shortly afterwards on active
service. Had he survived, he, too, in course of time, would have
comfortably
retired in turn on his accord; but death, by cutting him off on the
battle-field, deprives him of his perquisite. Thus the officer dying in defence
of his country fared worse than the officer who avoided the foe. The “accord”
system was abolished by the Royal Decree of March 21, 1774; and, in the same
year, a Commission of National Defence, ultimately presided over by Toll, from
which all the new measures of army reform were to originate, was appointed by
the King.
Even more
indispensable to the security of Sweden than a strong army was a strong fleet.
France expressly stipulated that three-quarters of her annual subsidies to
Gustavus should be spent upon the Swedish navy. Something had already been done
in this direction by the great naval engineer, August Ehrensvard, who, recognising
that Finland was Sweden’s weak point, made the fortifying of the grand duchy
against a Russian attack his main object. It was he who first hit upon the idea
of building a Skarg&rdsjlotta, or galley flotilla, to ply among the shallow
rock-studded waters of the Gulf of Finland, and, in case of a war with Russia,
to cooperate with an invading army; while the Orlogsflotta, or man-of-war
fleet, dealt with the enemy in the open sea. He was also the constructor of the
gigantic fortress of Sveaborg, whose impregnable harbour was to serve as a
refuge, in case of defeat, for the galley flotilla. Gustavus followed
energetically in the footsteps of Ehrensvard, by reforming the whole naval
administration. The Admiralty was transferred from Karlskrona to Stockholm for
better supervision. The building of new ships of war under the direction of
Frederick Henry Chapman, the son of an English naval officer settled in Sweden,
proceeded with extraordinary rapidity; and the superb docks at Karlskrona were
completed by the architect Thunberg, who was ennobled for a piece of work
comparable even to the works of Ehrensvard. Nor was the galley flotilla
overlooked. A plan for placing the whole of the Skarg&rdsflotta on a war
footing was elaborated by Admiral Henrik af Trolle, and carried out with
masterly thoroughness.
Gustavus
could now meet his people with perfect confidence. On October 19,1778, the
session of the first Parliament on the new model was opened. Gustavus laid
before the Estates a clear and succinct account of the numerous reforms which
had been carried out since the last Riksdag. If it had been impossible to find
a remedy for every evil within so short a time, they were to recollect “ that
Kings are but men, and that time alone can heal the wounds which time has inflicted.”
The peroration exhorted to mutual confidence and concord. The session lasted
till January 17, 1779, when the King dismissed the Riksdagsmen to their homes
with every expression of goodwill.
Never had a
Parliament been more obsequious, or a King more gracious. There was no room for
a single “ No ” during the whole session. For the first time for fifty years,
the course of Swedish politics had run smoothly and equably in its natural
channel. Everyone,
apparently,
had come to the Riksdag of 1778 only to approve and applaud. There was scarcely
a glimpse of a legitimate Parliamentary Opposition. One single party chief, the
venerable Axel Fredrik af Fersen, had, indeed, warily raised his head, but
only, as warily, to withdraw it. “I have reached the happiest stage of my
career,” wrote Gustavus to a friend. “ My people are convinced that I desire
nothing but to promote their welfare and establish their freedom on a firm
basis.” Nevertheless, this harmonious Riksdag had roughly shaken the popularity
of Gustavus III. Short as the session had been, it was quite long enough to
opeil the eyes of the deputies to the fact' that their political supremacy had
departed. They had changed places with the Kitig. He was now indeed their
sovereign lord, and the jealousy with which he guarded, the vigour with which
he enforced, his prerogatives, plainly showed that he meant to remain such.
Even the minority, who were prudent and patriotic enough to acquiesce in the
change, by no means relished it. The inevitable explosion came eight years
later, when Gustavus, Very reluctantly and against his better judgment, but
yielding to the urgent representations of Liljencrantz, who required the
assistance of the Estates to balance the finances, and of Toll, whose scheme of
military organisation was at a standstill for want of funds, summoned “that
mutinous and ungrateful Riksdag” from which he subsequently dated all his
misfortunes.
On May 6,
1786, the second Gustavan Riksdag, on the new model, was “blown in1.”
On the following day, Gustavus’ new Vicar-General, Elis Schroderheim, read to
the Houses a skilfully worded retrospect of all that had been done during the
last eight years. The retrospect, after enumerating a whole series of
successful economic and social reforms, dwelt with especial pride and
satisfaction on the improved condition of the national defences. Since 1778, no
fewer than 11 liners, 10 frigates, 7 sloops and a multitude of
transport-vessels had been fully equipped, while 3 more liners and 3 frigates
would be ready by the end Of the current year. The new docks at Karlskrona,
then the largest in the world, had also been completed; Finland had been
provided with a more efficient galley flotilla; the principal fortresses had
been put upon a war footing; the artillery had been reorganised; three large
camps had been formed to promote military manoeuvres on a large scale. To
enable him to continue as he had begun, the King requested the assent of the
Estates to a number of propositions, or Bills, of which three only need be specified
here. The first aimed at increasing the mobility of the army by commuting the
transport obligations of the small landowners into small cash payments; the
second desired the Estates to grant the usual subsidies until the next Riksdag,
instead of for a fixed period; the
1
To “blow in" and “blow out” (i.e. with trunipets) were the technical
expressions for opening and closing the Riksdag. ' >
1772-86] Gradual passage to semi-absolute
government. 777
third offered
to surrender the government monopoly in the distillation of spirits (the single
economic blunder, though a serious one, of Gustavus’ reign) in return for an
annual grant to the Crown of c£?140,000. All these propositions were either
rejected outright or so attenuated as to be of little value. It at once became
evident to Gustavus that nothing was to be done with a Riksdag which, already
troublesome, might, at any moment, become dangerous. On July 5 he dissolved it,
after an abortive session of two months.
If Gustavus
III, at this point of his career, could have seen his way to retreat within the
bounds of a strictly limited constitutional monarchy with honour and safety, he
would doubtless have done so. But, in truth, such a retreat was scarcely
possible. In 1772, the King had deliberately placed himself at the mercy of the
Estates by not only relinquishing to them the power of the purse, but also by
solemnly engaging not to engage in an offensive war without their consent. It
has been well observed that to Russia her knowledge that her north-western
frontier could not be attacked without the permission of the Swedish Riksdag
was worth as much as an army corps. Even before 1786, Gustavus had begun to
realise that circumstances might perhaps compel him to ride rough-shod over his
own Constitution. As the lesser of two evils he finally resolved to curtail the
liberty in order to secure the independence of the nation. But the passage from
semi-constitutionalism to semiabsolutism was so cautious and gradual, legal
forms were so carefully retained long after they had lost all their force, that
very few people were really aware of the great change that was silently
proceeding. The King’s first care was to remove, dexterously, from the
Administration all the friends of the old system, and surround his throne with
men of his own way of thinking. Thus Liljencrantz, who was growing restive at
the increasing extravagance of the Court, was superseded by the more pliant
Eric Ruuth ; and the office of Chancellor, after the death (1784) of its last
holder, Count Philip Creutz, was left vacant, Gustavus considering that the
dignity it conferred was too great for a subject. Toll was now the man on whom
the King principally relied. That great administrator was the soul of the
secret council of four, which practically ruled Sweden during the King’s long
continental tour (September, 1783, to July, 1784), and at the end of 1785 he
was made War Minister. But, although the chief, Toll was by no means the only
royal counsellor, It is about this time that we find very near to the King two
clergymen whose rare political genius Gustavus himself had been the first to
discover, and on whom he was to lean more and more as his former friends fell
away from him; namely, Olaf Wallqvist, whom he created Bishop of Wexio, and
Carl Gustaf Nordin, who preferred, for the present, to remain a simple
prebendary. With a nice discrimination of their respective characters, Gustavus
employed the masterful and eloquent prelate to defend the royal measures in
public, while the quiet self-effacirig
prebendary,
whom Wallqvist feared and hated as a rival, was the King’s secret,
indispensable adviser whose opinion was always taken beforehand. Another
invaluable coadjutor, by reason of his fine courage and absolute devotion, was
the dashing royal favourite Gustaf Maurice Armfelt, whom Gustavus attached to
his Court in 1782.
So
early as 1784, Gustavus had made up his mind that a rupture with Russia was
inevitable. On his return to Sweden, in 1785, he began to prepare for war,
pushing on his preparations with the speed and secrecy of a conspiracy. Toll
alone was privy to his master’s designs, though both Wallqvist aud Nordiu
suspected them. Secret negotiations were entered into with all the anti-Russian
Courts simultaneously, and the results of these negotiations were communicated
to Toll and Ruuth at a series of Cabinet Councils held during 1788, at which
they were the only Ministers present. The apparently inextricable difficulties
of Catharine II during her Second War with Turkey gave him his opportunity.
After addressing an ultimatum to the Empress, in which he demanded the cession
of Carelia and Livonia to Sweden, the restoration of the Crimea to Turkey (a
Suedo-Turkish alliance had already been brought about by Great Britain and
Prussia, and the first subsidy of piastres had reached Stockholm via Amsterdam
and Hamburg), and the instant disbandment of the Russian forces on the Swedish
frontier, he embarked for Finland on Midsummer day, arriving at Helsingfors on
July 2,1788. '
Success
seemed certain. The Empress was completely taken by surprise. Gustavus, at the
head of a fine army of 40,000 men, was only thirty-six hours’ sail from the
inadequately garrisoned Russian capital. Fortunately for St Petersburg, the
Russian fleet proved to be as strong as the Swedish, which it repulsed, after a
fierce engagement, off the isle of Hogland (July 17), while a fortnight later
the operations on land were paralysed by a sudden outbreak of mutiny in the
Swedish camp at Hussula, in which Catharine saw the hand of Providence. The
officers bluntly declared that they were weary of a war which was illegal,
because it had never received the sanction of the Estates; and the King was
compelled by them to recross the boundary river Kymmene and transfer his camp
to Anjala, within Swedish territory. On August 11 the rebels sent an emissary
to St Petersburg from Anjala, placing themselves formally beneath the
protection of the Empress, on condition that Russian and Swedish Finland were
erected into an autonomous State. The conspirators then proceeded to draw up a
formal Act of Confederation, on the Polish model, which was subscribed, within
a week, by no fewer than 113 officers. Gustavus, in the midst of wavering
friends and open foes, had been powerless to check the progress of the mutiny.
Yet honour forbade his flying from Finland; and to open negotiations with the
Empress would, in the circumstances, have been tantamount to an act of
political suicide. His one remaining hope was that the Danes
1788]
Gustavus appeals to the
Dalesmen.
might
declare war against him. A Danish invasion would imperatively require his
presence in Sweden and therefore justify his departure from Finland, and he was
dear-sighted enough to perceive that such a con-; tingency “would open the eyes
of the Swedes to the reality of their danger and rally the people round the
throne.” When, therefore, the tidings reached him that the Danes, in pursuance
of their treaty obligations with Russia, had actually declared war against
Sweden, he exclaimed: “We are saved!” and set out at once for Stockholm,
leaving his brother Charles, Duke of Sudermania, commander-in-chief in his
stead.
:
Rarely has a
King been in such evil case as Gustavus III when, at the end of August, 1788,
he reappeared at Stockholm. The army was in open mutiny. The fleet was
blockaded at Sveaborg. A Russian squadron held the Gulf of Bothnia, A combined
Russo-Danish squadron swept the Cattegat. A Danish army, under the Prince of
Hesse, had actually crossed the frontier and was advancing against Goteborg, in
rank the second, in wealth the first, city in the kingdom. Confusion reigned in
the capital, panic in the provinces. A perplexed Senate, a hostile nobility, a
stupefied population were anxiously watching every movement of a defenceless
King. His friends united in imploring him to summon a Riksdag instantly, as the
one remaining means of salvation. But Gustavus saw much further than his
counsellors. A Riksdag at that moment would have been uncontrollable, and he
had been quick to recognise that the tide of public opinion had turned again,
and was beginning to run very strongly in his favour. If only he could take
this tide at its flood, it must inevitably carry him on to victory. His proper
course was to appeal from a cowardly, treacherous, and disloyal army to the
martial and patriotic instincts of the lower classes, and let the robust
common-sense of the nation at large decide between him and deserters who
negotiated with the enemy instead of fighting him. He would turn, first and
foremost, as he himself finely expressed it, to “ that portion of the people
which has the right, by long prescription, to be the bulwark of the realm
against the Danes”—to the peasantry of the Dales, as the rugged mining
districts of Sweden were called. Theirs was the glory of having saved Sweden
250 years before at the call of Gustavus Vasa; they should now have the
opportunity of saving her a second time under another Gustavus.
4*
The
King’s friends contemplated with dismay the step he proposed to take. Even the
sagacious Nordin considered the letting loose of a wild peasantry a most
hazardous experiment. But Gustavus fearlessly took all the risks, and was
rewarded with complete success. Into the romantic and dramatic details of this
hardy adventure it is impossible to enter. Suffice it to say that Gustavus, at
the head of his peasant levies, snatched Goteborg from the hands of the Danes
at the last moment, and then* with the diplomatic support of Great Britain and
Prussia (which,
themselves on
the point of a rupture with Russia, were deeply interested in the prolongation
of the Russo-Swedish War), rid Sweden of the Danes altogether. Hugh Elliot, the
British Minister at Copenhagen, took the initiative and conducted the
negotiations with overwhelming energy. On November 6,1788, the final convention
for the evacuation of Sweden was drawn up at Uddevalla, the headquarters of the
Prince of Hesse. A fortnight later, not a single Danish soldier remained on
Swedish soil. And now, sure of his people, Gustavus no longer hesitated to convoke
the Estates. On December 8 a royal proclamation, issued from Gote- borg,
summoned an extraordinary Riksdag to meet at Stockholm on January 26,1789.
From the
first the temper of the four Orders was unmistakable. Of the 950 gentlemen who
sat in the Riddarhus during this Riksdag, more than 700 were soi-disant
“patriots,” i.e. defenders of the Anjala treason, whereas the lower three
Orders were all for the King. Even of the clergy, among whom the Court was
weakest, the Opposition could only count upon sixteen deputies out of
fifty-two, while among the 112 burgesses and the 178 peasants there were not
half-a-dozen anti-royalists. So sure, indeed, was the King of the burgesses and
the peasants that he left them pretty much to themselves; but for the guidance
of the Estate of Clergy, which Nordin had compared to ice which might be walked
upon but must not be driven over, he reserved his most audacious coadjutor—
Wallqvist.
Only the
barest outlines of the dramatic history of this momentous Riksdag can here be
adumbrated. On February 2 the session was opened by an eirenicon from the
Throne. “My only enemies,” concluded the orator, “ are the enemies of my
country.” On the following day, the King proposed that a Committee of ways and
means, for which he demanded urgency, should be appointed to provide the
subsidies necessary “for the maintenance of the honour, safety and
independence of the realm ”—in other words, the continuation of the War. The
lower three Estates proceeded at once to elect their committee-men; but the
first Estate exhausted every means of obstruction to produce delay, and, when
'their Marshal refused to tolerate such tactics any longer, they insulted him
so grossly that he appealed to the King for satisfaction. Meanwhile, as the
whole machinery of legislation had come to a standstill, Gustavus resolved to
expedite matters by a coup de main. On February 17 he summoned the four Estates
in congress, and, after bitterly reproaching the nobility for their neglect of
public business and their indecent treatment of their Marshal, he dismissed
them from his presence till they had apologised to that dignitary. The nobility
having withdrawn, cowed by his fulminating eloquence but sullenly mutinous,
Gustaivus invited the lower three Orders to appoint delegates to confer with
him as to those privileges “ which it was only just and right that all citizens
should enjoy equally.” In other words, he boldly
bid for the
support of the non-noble Estates by abolishing the peculiar privileges of the
nobility.
The royal propositions
were embodied in the famous “ Act of Union and Security,” the object of which
was to substitute for the existing Constitution a more monarchical form of
government. In brief, it invested the King with the supreme executive and
legislative functions. The Riksdag was only to meet when he chose to summon it
and was only to consider such propositions as he chose to lay before it. On the
other hand, paragraphs 2 to 4s broke down the invidious distinction between
noble and non-noble which had. so long been the standing grievance of the
Ofralse Estates. Henceforth, commoners were to be eligible to all, or nearly
all, the offices and dignities of the State; some of the vexatious exemptions
of the nobility from public burdens were, at the same time, abolished. This
revolutionary Act was accepted by the lower three Estates in another congress
(February 20); but the first Estate, though depressed by the arrest and
imprisonment of twenty-one of its leaders, including Fersen and Pechlin
(February 21), rejected it (March 16) as unconstitutional. Nevertheless, on
April 3, the Act of Union and Security, with some slight modifications,
received the royal sanction.
The worst of
the difficulties of Gustavus were now over. The lower three Estates after much
debate (the peasants were particularly obstinate) consented to grant the King
the necessary subsidies “ till the following Riksdag" in other words
indefinitely; but the utmost the first Estate would do was to grant them for
two years. The opposition of the nobility had to be overcome somehow, as the
consent of all four Estates was essential to the validity of a subsidy Bill.
Gustavus got his way by a ruse as impudent as it was audacious. On April 27 he
suddenly appeared in the Riddarhus, unattended, and seating himself in the
presidential chair, “as the first nobleman in the land,” solemnly declared
that, if the first Estate persisted in refusing to grant him the new war-tax
till the next Riksdag, he would not be responsible for the consequences. To
the objection that those who had the right to grant subsidies had also the
right to fix their amount and terminus, he replied that he was not there to
dispute the rights of the nobility, but simply to desire them to acquiesce, on
this unique occasion, in the decision of the three lower Estates for the
welfare of their common country. He then formally put the question to the
House, and, ignoring the greatly preponderating “ Noes ” with imperturbable
composure pronounced that the “Ayes” had it, at the same time cordially thanking
the Riddarhus for a consent which they had never given, but refusing to put the
question to the vote. On the following day this stormy Riksdag was “ blown
out,” to the intense relief of the King’s friends, who expected every moment to
hear of his assassination at the hands of some infuriated adherent of the
oligarchical system.
The
Revolution of 1789 converted Sweden from a limited into a semi-despotic
Government. Yet, in the circumstances, the change was necessary, if only for a
time. But for this fiercely debated act of authority, Sweden indisputably ran
the risk of becoming a mere dependency of Russia. The. Confederation of Anjala
was as criminal and might easily have proved as fatal as the similar
Confederation of Targowicz was to prove to Poland three years later. The King
had, once for all, put a stop to the possible recurrence of any such treason in
the future, and Catharine was obliged to leave the Finnish rebels to their fate
and to fall back on the defensive. Two fresh campaigns in Finland, into the
details of which we are here precluded from entering, finally convinced the
Russian Empress that it would be safer henceforth to treat Gustavus as an ally
rather than as a foe. Little more than a month after the King’s crowning
victory in the second battle of Svensksund (July 9-11, 1790), where the
Russians lost 53 ships of war and 9500 men, peace was concluded at the little
Finnish village of Varala (August 14, 1790). Only eight months earlier,
Catharine had haughtily declared that “ the odious and revolting aggressiveness
” of the King of Sweden would be forgiven “ only if he testified his
repentance” by agreeing to a peace confirming the Treaties of Abo and Nystad,
granting a general and unlimited amnesty to all rebels, and consenting to a
guarantee by the Riksdag (“ as it would be imprudent to confide in his good
faith alone ”) for the observance of peace in future. The Peace of Varala saved
Sweden from any such humiliating concessions. The increasing difficulties of
Catharine, and the shuffling conduct of Gustavus’ allies, Great Britain and
Prussia, had convinced both sovereigns of the necessity of adjusting their
differences without any foreign intervention. On October 19,1791, Gustavus went
still further, and took the bold, but by no means imprudent, Step of concluding
an eight years’ defensive alliance with the Empress, who thereupon bound
herself to pay her new Ally annual subsidies amounting to 300,000 roubles.
Mutual
respect and, still more, a common antagonism to revolutionary France, united these
two great rulers in their declining years. Gustavus now aimed at forming a
league of Princes against the Jacobins: and every other consideration was
subordinated to this end. His profound knowledge of popular assemblies enabled
him, alone among contemporary sovereigns, accurately to gauge from the first
the scope and bearing of the French Revolution. “The King of France has lost
his throne, perhaps his life! ” he exclaimed when the news reached him that
Louis XVI had convoked the States General. The much belauded Necker he
regarded, from the first, as a vainglorious charlatan. When the emigration
began, Gustavus offered an asylum in his camp to the French Princes, and took
up an unmistakably hostile attitude towards the hew French Government. In the
summer of 1789, he declared officially that he would never recognise any envoy
accredited by the National Assembly, and on the
substitution' in October, 1790, of the tricolour for the
historical white flag he forbade the display in his harbours of “ the symbol of
rampant demagogism in its most outrageous form.” It was Gustavus who planned
the flight of the royal family from France, the execution of which project he
entrusted to his confidential agent Count Hans Axel af Fersen. At the last
moment he himself came to Aix-la-Chapelle, so as to be close to the scene of
action. Far from being daunted by the Yarennes fiasco, he was more than ever
resolved to restore the French monarchy. His first plan was for Monsieur to
take the title of Regent, form a Ministry of his most uncompromising
supporters, and invite all the European Powers to assist him in an armed
intervention. But the imprisoned royal family—especially the Queen—were averse
both from the proposed regency and from a foreign invasion. The more prudent of
his own friends also warned Gustavus not to build too much on the representations
of the J&migres, and questioned the sincerity of the Emperor and the
ability of the French Princes.
Gustavus-’
chief hope was now in his new ally, the Russian Empress. But Catharine,
although she hated the French Revolution and all its works as energetically as
Gustavus, agreed, nevertheless, with her shrewdest counsellor, Alexander
Besborodko, that absolute neutrality, as regards France, was Russia’s best
policy.. She had no objection, however, to give her dangerously restless “
brother- and cousin ” something to do in the West, so that she herself might
have “ free elbow-room ” in the Near East, and accordingly pretended to listen
favourably to his new project of a coalition of Princes against Revolutionary
France. She even contributed.half a million roubles towards the expense of it.
Gustavus proposed that France should be invaded simultaneously, at different
points, by the Austrians, the Sardinians, the Spaniards, and the Princes of the
Empire.
But the
Emperor Leopold’s strong dislike of the first coalition project of Gustavus
proved its death-blow. Catharine also declined to move a step in the matter
till the sentiments of all the other Powers had been ascertained. She insisted,
too, on the neutrality of Great Britain and the cooperation of the Emperor as
indispensable preliminaries. With equal coldness she regarded a subsequent
proposal of an invasion of Normandy by 30,000 Swedish troops, while a
Russo-Swedish fleet blockaded the mouth of the Seine and cut Paris off from all
communication with the sea. Besborodko considered any such isolated attack as
altogether impracticable, as no doubt it was.
The
acknowledgment of the new Constitutional French Government by the Court of
Vienna (Kaunitz’ memorandum of November 12, 1791) put an end, for a time, to
all “declarations,” or “concerts,” let alone warlike demonstrations. Gustavus
alone remained immovably firm in his reactionary policy; but his projects
became, in the circumstances, wilder and wilder. At the end of 1791 he proposed
a convention between
Russia,
Spain, and Sweden. The allies were to guarantee jointly the French King his
full prerogatives, using force to that end if necessary; they were to recall
their Ministers from Paris; refuse to receive the so-called national flag into
their harbours; and recognise Monsieur as Regent till the King had been set
free. When Spain, which was to find the money for this adventure, refused to
entertain it, Gustavus submitted to the Emperor a more modest programme,
originally suggested by Marie-Antoinette, An armed Congress, under the
protection of an army consisting of Austrian, Prussian, Russian and Swedish
troops, was to be summoned to protect the territories of the minor German Princes
bordering upon France and reestablish the balance of power in Europe. The
Congress was to be held at a place sufficiently close to the French frontier to
intimidate the Jacobins, and was to take action against them if necessary. But
Leopold at once rejected the idea of an armed Congress, and neither Prussia nor
Spain would move a step without him. Thus all the anti-revolutionary schemes of
Gustavus (to which reference is made elsewhere) foundered against the obstinate
indifference of the Great Powers.
But Gustavus’
own course was now nearly run. After showing once more his unrivalled mastery
over masses of men during the brief Gefle Riksdag (January 22—February
24,1792), he fell a victim to a widespread aristocratic conspiracy. Shot in
the back by Anckarstrom, at a midnight masquerade at the Stockholm Opera House
on March 16,1792, he expired on the 29th. Although he may fairly be charged
with many foibles and extravagances, Gustavus III was, indisputably, one of the
greatest sovereigns of the eighteenth century. Unfortunately, his genius never
had full scope, and his opportunity came too late.
ENGLISH
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES.
In the troublous years 1640-60, the air was thick
with political manifestos and schemes, each of which fell dismally to earth by
some inherent defect. None went to the root of the matter as Hobbes did. Men
took refuge in one despotic form after another; a single person, a Parliament,
a single House; even the Independents who did see that one despotism was only
replaced by another, had in their own despite to force men to be free. They had
to enforce their liberty of the subject and liberty of tender consciences by
parliamentary purgings and by the Major-Generals’ swords. Through this welter
of fogs and darkness the trenchant theory of the Leviathan cuts its ruthless
way like a blast of the north wind. It is clear-sighted where others were
blind; consistent where they were confused; single in aim where they were
entangled in contradictions. The mid-seventeenth century was a great creative
time, but creation had hardly got beyond the stage of chaos. Hobbes saw better
than anyone from what quarters of the sky light was to come. Thus nothing is
more characteristic of the Civil War than that, while it began in
constitutional questions, it soon revealed itself as a great religious
struggle. He sees that the deepest question for the State is its relation to
religion. Again, the war began with an attempt to restore the pre-Tudor
conception of sovereignty as a partnership between Crown and Parliament, and
went on to a transfer of sovereignty from Crown to Parliament. He saw that the
first step in political science was to define sovereignty. Again, the various
proposals and schemes of accommodation from the Grand Remonstrance to the
Humble Petition and Advice, were so many predestined failures because they
tried to break up sovereign power into parcels, administrative, judicial,
financial, military. He saw that it was * /{separable and indivisible.. The
logic of events in seven short years bad produced the army’s manifesto of
January 15, 1649, and so made visible the logical goal, the sovereignty of the
people. In Hobbes the sovereign, is not merely acting for the people; he and he
alone is the people.
t86
Hobbes' theory of
sovereignty.
Taking all
these documents as a whole, their moral is that constitutional forms are
neither here nor there in comparison with a proper relation between government
and the governed. This is what Hobbes would emphasise when he says that the
power of sovereignty is the same whatever be the form of commonwealth, and
prosperity comes not from the form of government but from the obedience and
concord of the subjects.
Even' if
Hobbes were judged on his doctrine of sovereignty alone our debt to him would
be immense. If he took it from Bodin, he took it by the right of better power
to use it; never was this fundamental part of political theory expressed so
trenchantly and proved to such demonstration. The very term Sovereignty is the
catchword of all the controversies of the seventeenth century. Was prerogative
“intrinsical to sovereignty and entrusted to the king by God ” ? Or was it part
of the law and within legal boundaries ? In this discussion on the Petition of
Right Wentworth had said: “ Let us make what law we may, there must, nay there
will, he a trust left in the Crown. ■ Saltis populi suprema lex."
But the lawyers would not see this. They had lately developed the idea of
limits on sovereignty. Thus the word absolute in 1586 had meant an autonomous
ruler; but in 1607 Cowell argues that the King must be above Parliament or he
is not absolute. For the idea of limitations came into collision with another
idea becoming more and more clear-cut; if sovereignty is by Divine right, how
can it be limited ? And each holder of sovereign power was forced in practice
to transcend limits; not merely Stewart Kings but Long Parliaments and
Protectors. Men had recourse to the theory of limitations only when the
sovereign was not an expression of their own will.
There was
evident need of some clear thinking, and the time was ripe for the true theory
of sovereignty and the true grounds on which it is hot amenable to legal
limitations; namely, that it is not so much a personal ruler as a general will
of the community. Hobbes has a real grasp of this true theory despite the form
of “he,” “him,” “his” in which he speaks of the sovereign. The face is the face
of a Stewart King but the voice is the voice of a Commonwealth. Non est
potestas super terram quae compa/retur ei. It is no man but “Leviathan our
mortal God.” And if he follows his age in this matter of personifying sovereignty,
he avoids the worse error of basing sovereignty on insecure foundations. Where
others trusted to Divine right alone, by which they meant a supposed deduction
from Noah and Melchizedek, Hobbes drew his sovereignty first and independently
from the principles of reason, and “ from the principles of Nature only ”; and
left the proof “ from Supernatural revelations of the will of God, the
prophetical ground” to Part m of his great work, with the dry prefatory remark
that of four hundred prophets only Micaiah was a true one. Where others
reserved a coordinate or even superior share of Divine right to
another body,
the Church, Hobbes will have no such dualism; no man can serve two masters, the
civil sovereign is also the supreme pastor. God’s law has two parts : the first
is obedience, the second is obedience. The inviolable obligation of obedience;
that is the note on which he closes.
The essential
points of this theory are beyond question. That there must be in every State a
sovereign power, illimitable, indivisible, unalienable; that the attempt to
separate it, to set it up against itself, to create a “balance of powers” or a
“mixed government,” is chimerical; that denial of these essential points leads
to a contradiction in terms. Thus if the objection be made that such sovereign
power is a menace, e.g. to constitutional liberty or to religious independence,
the objection falls pointless to the ground before these inherent attributes of
sovereignty: they are inherent, not dependent on contract, but deducible from
the thing in itself; not what suits our special party or sect, but what needs
must be, is what Hobbes offers us, and his doctrine of sovereignty is wholly
unaffected by the historicalness or unhistoricalness of his hypothesis of a
social contract. Nor is his conception of sovereign power fairly open to the
criticism that it is wholly taken up with sovereign rights and hardly alive to
sovereign duties. In fact his “duties of the sovereign” (Lev. c. 30)
constitutes a fair sketch of what we call the functions and sphere of the
State. If he thought that it was rather the duties of the citizen which
required emphasising at the time, would not this still be true in our day ?
Not that his
picture of sovereign power is wholly free from defects. He regards sovereign
power only as mature and adult, and allows it no infancy or adolescence.
Doubtless some form of judiciary existed long before legislation as such, and
the earliest and longest period was the reign of custom. He does too often
speak of a transfer of “ the natural rights of all to everything ”; and of the
rights of the sovereign as derived from this transfer; it would he truer to say
rights come from the community and grow with its growth. He is too ready also
to throw sovereign and subject into antagonism; not the crushing of the
individual, but his full evolution and realisation, is the aim of a true State,
and it is to the development of individual judgment that we must look for a
healthy national conscience. To this false antagonism Hobbes was led by his too
ready identification of sovereignty with government; the State is viewed too
much on its coercive side; and we feel that, when individuals’ freedom to
choose their own clothes and diet is represented as only precarious and
dependent on the sovereign’s silence, this does incomplete justice to one side
of human life and undervalues individual freedom. We feel that the subjects
would strike, and Hobbes has forgotten this practical limitation on
sovereignty.
But however
Hobbes may have over-emphasised a true theory, it was a very different matter
when Locke’s influence set a false theory in its place. Very convenient it was,
certainly, Sovereignty limited, to
square with
the Bill of Bights; revocable, that the nation might hold over William and the
Georges, the threat of a notice to quit; partible, the very thing to suit the
great Whig houses. But like some other convenient fallacies, it led to more
than inconvenience in the end, and had to be corrected by more and more stress
on “ the omnipotence of Parliament.” The modern Parliament is not far from
Hobbes’ sovereign : according to the saying, it can do anything but make a
woman into a man; indeed it can do this also, as for franchise purposes and for
property law. The recent tendency to displace Parliament itself by the Cabinet,
carries the likeness still further; for the Cabinet is almost a person, in
Hobbes’ sense.
Hobbes meant
his theory of sovereignty to correct a current tyranno- phobia. Our
constitutional history had seemed to make the whole object of politics to
consist in putting the brake on the state machine, arid keeping the
safety-valve open, not in providing for a good head of steam. But we are coming
to see that what we want is not less but more central power, now that it is in
the hands of the community. Trusts, interests, tariffs, may be relied on to
supply all and more than all the desired friction and resistance. The more
united and more developed a people, the more active is its sovereign power; and
the modem sovereign power comes more and more to add the work of legislation to
its older executive and judicial work. The political development of a people
may be measured by the energy of its legislative function. Modem civilisation
depends on a true conception of sovereignty. TheSe various aphorisms from
publicists are enough to suggest the importance of Hobbes’ doctrine of
sovereignty.
“Temporal and
spiritual are two words brought into the world to make men see double, and
mistake their lawful sovereign....A man cannot obey two 'masters, and a house
divided against itself cannot stand....Seeing there are no men on earth whose
bodies are spiritual, there can be no spiritual commonwealth among men that are
yet in the flesh....My kingdom is not of this world....Men’s actions proceed
from their opinions...if the sovereign give away the government of doctrines,
men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spirits.”
These
sentences contain in essence the whole theory of Hobbes on that eternal
problem, the relation between Church and State, and they are enough of
themselves to show his originality and audacity, and to explain the alarm
inspired by “ the atheist of Malmesbury.”
“A church is
a company of Christian men assembled at the command of a sovereign.” But what
if the sovereign forbid us to believe in Christ? Well, profession with the
tongue is no more than a gesture, and a Christian has the liberty allowed to
Naaman to bow in the house of Rimmon.
Does Hobbes
then foresee the modern severance of the State from
Its anti-sacerdotal
character.
789
any one
religions form, and general toleration of all forms ? No: Hobbes would have
said that he had made ample provision for conscience, when he rejected any
inquisition into opinions, and only claimed to control their external
expression; had he not said, “ Faith is a gift of God which man can neither
take nor give away ”; and, “ There ought to be no power over the consciences of
men save the Word itself”? It is possible that he was the more willing to make
these concessions from a conviction that they would not prove very expensive in
the end; for he has all the Elizabethan sense of externalities in religion.
Like the Tudor sovereign his aim is peace, and not persecution for a dogma. As
things were then, Hobbes would have made everyone attend an episcopal state
Church with a very Erastia,n service. But as things are now in a modem
community, Hobbes would admit the public rites of all sects except such as
preached some illegal doctrines, like Mormons; with the general and absolute
provision that no dogma whatever was to be appealed to against a law of the
State.
Here we have
the very antipodes to all sacerdotalism, whether of Rome or Geneva. The very
texts on which the champions of spiritual power relied are wrested out of their
hands and turned against them. Was he making a reductio ad absurdum of the
scriptural argument, to force men back on the argument from reason which he
claimed to be irrefutably on his side? Or was it a politic condescension to the
universal treatment of such topics at that time ? , Never was the argument
from authority handled with such subtlety, such consummate special pleading,
and such contemptuous confidence. Was he simply retaliating in kind upon his
predecessors ? or was he quite candid in his two surprising statements, that he
has only taken each text in its plainest sense, and that he is only offering
provisional interpretations until the sword shall have settled what is to be
the authority on doctrines ? At any rate he could have said to each antagonist
in turn, “Hast thou appealed unto Scripture? To Scripture shalt thou go/’ And
when they did go thither, they would find considerable surprises awaiting them
under his exegesis.
There has
always been in English history an undercurrent of the theory which the Civil
War thus forced to the surface: rex est vicarius Dei. But even Henry VIII is a
pale shadow beside the spiritual supremacy in which the Leviathan is enthroned.
There are only two positions in history which rise to this height; the position
of a Caliph, the vicegerent of Allah, with the book on his knees that contains
all law as well as all religion and all morals; and the position of the Greek
7ro\t? where heresy was treason where the State gods and no other were the
citizens’ gods, and the citizen must accept the State’s standard of virtue.
In his recoil
from spiritual tyranny and sacerdotal arrogance, Hobbes has overshot the mark.
From stewards of the Divine mysteries, the
clergy are
reduced in his State to so many gramophones stocked with homilies on the rights
of sovereignty. They are paid by results; for “the common people’s minds are
like clean paper lit to receive any imprint from public authority.” Before such
ultra-Erastianism the vicar of Bray himself would have revolted. The Leviathan
would have had to face a general “strike” of the clergy, despite the drastic
measures taken to tune “those operatories of enchantment, the Universities.”
Even for this the sovereign is prepared, for has he not proved his own right to
preach, baptise, administer sacraments of himself? But of what sort would be
the men who would take Orders undier such a dispensation, and what would be
the level of spirituality in a community whose pastors were reduced to such
machines?
Nor would the
atmosphere of the house of Rimmon be less stifling to the individual layman.
Both politics and morals require a purer atmosphere above them from which to
draw, and religion that gets reduced to law would end by being unable to secure
even a legal obedience.
It would be
difficult nowadays to accept Hobbes’ summary treatment of cases of conscience.
The modern State is too firmly based to seem to need such uncompromising
procedure. It is a sound social instinct which treats the conscientious
objector with respect, instead of summoning him in the name of the law to
swallow his principles. Hobbes’ policy is too much like sitting on the
safety-valve. The fact is that he takes too external and materialist a view of
men's actions. He looks too much to the community, and too much at one aspect
of that, the coercive and governmental aspect. He bears no rival near the
throne, and would crush the individual so as to make more of the community. But
assuredly the conception which needs strengthening in modern England is the
conception of social duty, that conception to which Hobbes gave so powerful if
a somewhat one-sided expression.
When men were
receiving orders from their consciences to refuse taxes, to resist military
service, or even to keep their hats on in law courts, when they were receiving
direct “revelations” how to vote or against whom to march, it was high time for
some clear thinking and some trenchant speaking on these topics. Hobbes’
immediate effect on the religious thought of his time was mainly in the
direction of reaction. Instinctively all of whatever creed felt that here was
the enemy. Hobbes’ doctrines were denounced as pernicious to all nations,
destructive of royal titles, an encouragement to usurpers, unhistorical,
unscriptural, immoral; he arrogated to himself the position of a prophet or
apostle, and made the Koran a Gospel, he was the boar that would root up the
Lord’s vineyard, an Epicurean, a Cromwellian, the foe of property, justice and
order, conscience and religion; a fellow to Machiavelli, an atheist, a garbler
of texts, an enemy to chartered companies, corporations, and trade, a
slanderer of lawyers; he cannot believe his own books, he is bound by his own
principles to recant all he has said; he denies
the social
nature of man and would dissolve all human relationships, conjugal, parental,
political; he has cheated people into a vast opinion of himself as the prodigy
of the age ; he has said nothing new but only devises new words ; he is the
champion of evil living and has made Hell the bigness of a quartan ague ; he
has even quarrelled with the elements of Euclid. These prelates and chancellors
were plainly very angry; Hobbes might well say, Leviathan clerum totum mihi
fecerat hostem. It is noticeable that the chorus swells in the twenty years
following the Restoration. “Hobbists” were not made up only, as one reverend
critic declares, of “ debauchees, fine gentlemen, and Don-friends who say Mr H.
alone hath got to fundamentals,” but included a great number of learned men
from abroad, besides the poet Cowley, Richard Bathurst, President of Trinity
College, Oxford, and Robert Blackbume, who in 1681 wrote the Auctarivm, a life
of Hobbes with some valuable additions. Foreign writers were more-ready to
acknowledge the merits of originality, acuteness, learning; the only merit the
native critics would allow was a mastery of English.
He dealt a
mortal blow at a method of reasoning which ever since St Augustine’s day had
cramped the advance of political science, the method of reasoning from texts.
When a text can be found for everything, and every text can be stretched to
cover any view, and when no one for all this hail of missiles is a penny the
worse, the game ceases to be worth the candle. Sidney still relies partly on
texts, but Locke drops the method as antiquated and inconclusive. Politics has
at last shaken itself free from the medieval tradition, and every student of
politics heaves a sigh of relief at parting with Noah and Nimrod, Melchizedek
and Meroz.
Hobbes
himself had laid down that the only ground besides Scripture was reason. Hobbes
is therefore placed next to Lord Herbert of Cher- bury as one of the founders
of the School of English Deists.
A still more
important influence of Hobbes was in the direction of Erastianism. He had made
short work of the “power ecclesiastical,” he had identified bishops with
elders, and reduced their office to teaching, referred their appointment to the
civil sovereign, and left their sustenance to voluntary contributions. All
dogmas, except that of the Divinity of our Lord, he had declared unessential;
the idea of life in another world than this earth, and the idea of a kingdom of
God in opposition to earthly kingdoms, he had rejected. His analysis of good
and evil into appetite and aversion, seemed to sap the foundations of morality.
Above all, his caustic humour, his malicious insinuations, were still harder to
bear. His whole tone and manner provoked more resentment than even his matter.
Charles II
had applied to Hobbes the description of Ishmael, his hand against every man
and every man’s hand against him.
'■
No man ever had greater self-confidence than he, who was wont to say that, if
he had read as much as other men, he should have known no more; whose first
literary work was a translation of Thucydides to convict the ancient world out
of its own imouth, by showing that its liberty was anarchy and demagogisn.; who
set out at the age of 70 to demonstrate the squaring of the circle against all
the great mathematicians—either all they or he himself must be mad, he said;
and at the age of 76 began a treatise to confute Coke ; who meets the criticism
that the whole world is against him by the retort, “ Though the whole world
build their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred that so it
ought to be.”
It had been
Papist influence which had got him as “the grand ■atheist” dismissed from
the exiled Court in 1652. But his views were quite as distasteful to the
Anglicans, and Clarendon had already told him that his book would be punished
in every country in Europe. Most ‘scathing of all were his sayings on conscience,
saintship and inspiration, the shibboleths of Puritanism. He makes, it is true,
a rather suspicious concession to Independency. But Presbytery, Prelacy, Papacy
are joined in condemnation as the three successive “knots on Christian liberty."
Politicians too would find him as elusive as the theologians did. Royalists
hated his absolutism and his rejection of Divine Right, and his justification
of de facto governments. Parliamentarians had “caressed” him on his return in
1652, but found that he made a disconcerting distinction between innocent
subjects and guilty leaders.
“Civil
philosophy is no older (I say it provoked and that my enemies may know how
little they have wrought upon me) than my own book De Cive (1642).” No one as
yet, Hobbes continues, had applied to civil philosophy the clear method of
natural philosophy, the gate of which was first opened by Galileo, following
Copernicus and Harvey. The universal law is motion. The new method will apply
this law to the body politic. It will be dieductive from a few axioms; demonstrative,
like Euclid; rigorously abstract. Fortunately this “synthetic” method, deducing
all politics and morals from geometrical first principles, is not long pursued.
Men, he saw, would never let politics be reduced to mere mathematics. So after
the geometry trumpet has been blown in a few flourishes, it is laid aside for
the sake of “ them that have not learned the first part of philosophy, namely
geometry and physics,” and they are allowed to “ attain the principles of civil
philosophy by the analytical method.” This turns out to be a very old friend.
It is the method we use in everyday life, to reduce a problem to its elements,
and then see what these amount to when recompounded. All we have to do is to
analyse terms into their ultimate constituents. Thus an unjust act is seen to
mean an act against law; and law is resolved into the command of one that hath
power; and power is derived from the wills of
those that
set it up, their object being peace; and that this is so, every man may know by
simply looking into his own mind. We have thus got back to our first principle
in politics, self-preservation, and then from this everything follows
deductively by irresistible short steps as in a proposition of Euclid. This air
of irresistible deduction is immensely assisted by Hobbes’ inimitable style,
its lucidity, its logical fearlessness, its terse felicity of phrase. No one
ever realised so well what Machia- velli meant when he said, “ Penetrate the
actual verity of the thing itself, and be content with no mere imagination
thereof.” He sees everything in sharp outline. There is no haze, nor any
perspective. The science of state ceases to be a mystery; it has to drop what
he calls its jargon. Politics become a matter in which any plain man can get to
the bottom of it, if he will only think clearly and use his terms consistently.
No new terminology is required. There is no need to call in the expert, whether
lawyer or divine. We have politics set free from theology and from jurisprudence
as from metaphysics. This was a great achievement. After a course of the
treatises of that time, it is like emerging out of stale incense into the fresh
air. It was the beginning of that literary tradition which has made political
discussion a native atmosphere to Englishmen, and to which therefore indirectly
we owe the successful working of our constitutional governments, our local
institutions, the aptitude of our race for colonisation, and even the solid,
almost too solid, qualities of our newspaper Press.
Such a mode
of treatment was well suited for the pioneer stage of a new subject. The
simplification which later enquirers find to be too simplified, is a necessary
stage, the laying bare of the anatomy of the subject. The paradoxes which
dazzle the eyes that would fain take a complete survey, had their value by
startling the contemporaries out of their dogmatic slumbers. Even manifest
one-sidedness effected a hearing for an unpopular side, and forced the orthodox
champions to come out into the open.
The method of
course has its defects. Civil philosophy cannot be modelled on natural
philosophy, then in its infancy; it can only be so, if ever, by wide and
patient induction. But Hobbes had little patience, and no belief at all in this
use of induction. In fact, here lies the first gap which a modern eye would
note in him. There is no historical method about his line of reasoning, he is
almost devoid of a historical sense. And yet here too he started a line of
thought that he could not have foreseen. By his insistence on taking men as
they are, studying their ordinary actions and motives, analysing the terms and
thoughts of common life, he was already giving the lines for the historical
method of the next century, as he had himself borrowed it from the century
preceding. Are not the “ false doctrines ” which hamper sovereignty a
reminiscence of Bacon’s idols which hamper knowledge ? and does not the
non-moral Prince of Machiavelli reappear in the Leviathan, none of whose
icts can be
called unjust ? We may say that Hobbes founded a social science, but not the
civil philosophy he conceived, and inaugurated a new method, but not the
geometrical method he promised. Further, that abstract man which he set up, the
political man, served also as model for another abstraction, destined to be of
vast importance, the economic man. The state of nature, translated into
economic terms, became a natural order of cut-throat competition. This “
economic ” man is less of a lay figure. Real men do sometimes act from economic
motives alone; whereas social life can never be all deduced from the one motive
of self-preservation. Economic motives again are measurable (“how much dost
thee sympathise with the widow ? ”); whereas politics has no such instrument of
science in its hands.
To us a
written constitution, popular consent, and popular consultation, are familiar
ideas. But their appearance as working realities was only made possible by the
constructive energy evolved by the Civil War; they were products of the sword
as much as of the pen. They came also from the convergence of various
influences. Greek philosophy, Roman law, Teutonic custom, medieval readings of
Scripture and history, combined to make the idea of contract irresistibly
attractive. Feudalism was in essence and origin, contractual. By its code
rebellion was often a duty. The very relation of God to man was fitted into
this frame of contract or covenant. Jehovah had vouchsafed to make covenant
with Noah and Abraham; the chosen people joined themselves in a covenant with
Jehovah. This covenant had passed on to the new dispensation. Christians were
under obligation to render dues to God as well as to Caesar. But, again, King
David had made a covenant with the elders of Israel in Hebron before the Lord,
and they anointed David King over Israel; it was easy to deduce that a King is
unaccountable for his acts as King. When Kings were becoming each the head of
his own Church, this accountability under a covenant was developed alongside,
especially in Scotland, where the soil was so favourable to “ un-ldnging.” The
“ band ” was not less a band for being called a covenant. Scots history is a
series of biographs illustrating the contractual groups, the revocable compact,
the universal “ diffidence ” which is the seed-plot of society, the actual war
or continual inclination thereto, even the “dissolute condition of masterless
man.” As Puritanism was the Reformation raised to the nth, the idea of
obligations resting on a covenant with God developed into the doctrine of “
tender consciences,” and with the “ Saints,” into anarchy tempered only by
revelations.
Of the
various forms of Covenant, that of Covenant with God was too much identified
with Scots who said “Gude Lard” and lived at free quarters; so that the
Covenant of a King with his people came to have the greatest popular effect;
this was the formula by which the mass of the nation salved their deposition of
James II. Unfortunately, in this
form the
ruler’s own consient seemed to be required to justify a breaking of the compact
with him ; and this consent could only be deduced from his surrender or his
flight; hence the stress laid on Charles’ surrender to the Scots, and the
clumsy Action that James II had abdicated.
But at the
same time the idea of a covenant between all individuals gained ground with the
thinkers; beginning with Hooker, it comes into more prominence with Milton and
the Independents; or shedding its theological wrappings, emerges as a purely
philosophic theory of society in Hobbes and in Locke.
When we come
to the great name of Milton, we have to ask why his political writings count
for so little. The answer lies partly in a certain hard aloofness there was
about him, partly in his impracticability, as when he qualifies his
Republicanism by confining representation to the pars melior et sanior populi,
or when he sounds his clarion when his own side are already flying from the
field. His origin of civil society is that which Hobbes had already given in
the De Cive, but with the fall of man as a prior cause. He argues that tyrants
are lawfully put to death, and rulers are trustees; the people may choose Kings
or not, as they please.
His highest
note is liberty; he would have no over-legislation, no muzzling of the Press,
no state-fed Church, no bondage to ceremonies; the two enemies of religion are
force and hire...Christ’s kingdom is not of this world...force only produces
hypocrites...religion means our faith and practice depending on God alone...was
not a voice heard from Heaven on Constantine’s donation saying, Hodie venenum
infunditur in ecclesiam ?
In the
critical months, when Lambert and then Monck held the balance, Milton tried to
make a coalition between the Army and the Council with Republicanism and
liberty of conscience as fundamentals, and a remarkable system of decentralised
local government; he would concede to the Harringtonians a rotation in the
governing body, but would sift the elections to leave only the worthiest; “ for
by the trial of just battle long ago the people lost their right, and it is just
that a less number compel a greater to retain their liberty rather than all be
slaves.” In trying to combine as he said, democracy with a true aristocracy,
he, like Cromwell and like Rousseau, would force the people to be free. But he
admits the case is hopeless, and that his pleadings for “the good old cause are
the last words of expiring liberty”; that the nation is in a torrent sweeping
over a precipice, and that like the prophet crying, O Earth, Earth, Earth, he
is speaking only to trees and stones. The lingering hope, “ Perhaps God may
raise up of these stones some to be children of reviving liberty and lead them
back from Egypt,” was to be fulfilled, but not till a generation later.
An opponent
who admires Milton’s style, learning and wit, and
refers to the
applause given to his works, yet dismisses their practical proposals as
“fanatic state-whimsies of a windmill brain.” No doubt like other fanaticisms
and “whimsies” they were swept into oblivion down the torrent; they cannot be
shown to have germinated in a later age. He was like Cassandra; his oracles
came too late; his Tenure of Kings, after Charles’ execution; his Defensio
Secunda, when Oliver was pledged to set up a state Church; his letter to Monck,
in the weeks when that great man was getting “ as drunk as a beast ” at City
companies’ dinners; his second edition of the Ready and Easy Way was issued
when Monck had already got Charles’ letters in his pocket.
Violent,
unpractical as Milton’s tracts often are, they are never without a depth of thought
and a magnificence of diction that make them not unworthy of him, and they have
passages which are truly Miltonic. His mind has such an intensity and such a
reach of vision, that he rises high out of the mere circumstances to the
loftiest principles. He is a democrat who demands of the people to submit to
the wisest and best men, to raise government beyond popular mutation, and to
elevate civic duty into religion; and of religion he demands that it shall
purge itself of all contact with material interest and all temptation to
support itself by force. His tracts remain in some respects the most
interesting, the most heroic of the countless productions of this prolific and
heroic age. He is the best example of the stirring of men’s souls to their very
depths by the great issues of the time; the pitch of selfsacrifice to which
they rose in devotion to their ideals, the foundations of the democratic
movement in new religious conceptions.
Harrington
had an influence somewhat beyond his real weight both in his own day and a
century later. Not that Englishmen are apt to fall in love at first sight with
Utopias. But the characteristic of Harrington’s ideal kingdom is its almost,
prosaic practicability. His object is to drive home certain laws of politics.
The first is the law of rotation, typified by the orange tree which bears
leaves, blossom, and fruit, all at once. In the Senate and Representatives, in
the great Councils of State, War, Trade, Religion, in all lesser offices,
one-third retire yearly. It is the circulation of the blood in the body politic
and is secured by the ballot “ to which Venice owes her 1300 years’ life.”
The second
law is that which prescribes a Commonwealth of God’s making, not the- mere work
of man. In fact, England is a Commonwealth already. Popular election, even
extending to jurors and militia officers, is to be the great remedy against “
interests ” such as that of the clergy, “ those declared and inveterate enemies
of popular power,” or the lawyers, “ armed with a private interest point-blank
against the public.”
The third law
is the “ Agrarian.” This is founded on another great discovery. Power follows
the balance of property, especially of landed property. Harrington’s Agrarian
means a Republic based on land,
landed estate
being the qualification for all offices, but that land divided equally among
the sons and no estate allowed above £2000 a year. A territorial army, the
officers of which are elected from the gentry of each county, will be a
safeguard not a menace to liberty.
But there was
to be a form of public national worship, such that all Christians could take
part in it. Here was an attempt to reconcile the old conception of a State
acknowledging a uniformity in worship, with the irresistible pressure from the
growth of sects and from the force of events making for liberty of conscience.
An impracticable attempt, all religious partisans will unite in calling it; but
a bold attempt and a generous one.
It is a
peculiar point in Oceana that the Senate alone can initiate, and the
representatives alone legislate. For this, and for the further attempt to make
an absolute incommunicable division between the functions of government,
legislative, executive, judicial, we may blame that kaleidoscopic time and the
longing to get peace between Army, Protector and Parliament by a mechanical
device.
After much
commendation of Harrington and some criticism, his acutest reviewer, Wren, with
remarkable clearheadedness observes that the contention between Leviathan and
Oceana, whether it is power or property that is the basis of society, is
immaterial, as the one comes to the other; that though Harrington professes
enmity to Hobbes, he has really “ swallowed many of his notions,” that it would
be impossible to fix an agrarian limit; that the Rota is a false principle of
keeping political wisdom in a perpetual nonage; that an absolute libration or
balance of social forces is as chimerical as perpetual motion. To a modern mind
the most fatal blots in Harrington’s scheme are his excessive belief in
political machinery; his weakening of the executive, and his hopeless
dissociation of the different functions of government. His influence however
from 1656 to 1660 can hardly be over-estimated. To men storm-tossed in the
sweltering turmoil of that time, he seemed to offer close under their lee a
vision of a blessed country, a land of ancient peace and religious tranquility.
During the last three months (July 6 to October 13) of the restored Bump,
Harrington’s followers petitioned Parliament to start on his scheme at once;
while nightly meetings of the Rota Club were held with very full meetings
(September, 1659, to February, 1660), which found it “very taking doctrine,’’
as Anthony Wood reports. “ The greatest of the Parliament men,” he goes on, “
hated this rotation and balloting as being against their power”; nor could the
Rota men carry it with the new Committee of Safety, when this took up again the
old task of framing a constitution. With the advent of Monck the Oceana model
fell to earth.
The permanent
contributions it left to English political theory were in the direction oi
religious toleration, and the separation of functions of government. But
Harrington’s ideas had a remarkable renascence in
the
constitution of the United States of America, which adopted his principles of
rotation in office, and residential qualification, his severance of the
executive from the legislative body, his belief in machinery, his use of
indirect and secondary electoral bodies, his spirit of extravagant optimism as
to the working of popular government; “the people’s interest being to choose
good governors, they may be trusted to do so.”
Yet there had
been withal a strong aristocratic element in Harrington’s republicanism;
everything depended, he thought, on the natural aristocracy within a democracy
being allowed to rule, and it was to secure this that he had insisted so much
on a universal national education, and on complete liberty of individual
religious opinions.
The
Restoration period is superficially a reaction towards authority,
conventionality, materialism; but this is rather the superficial than the real
character of the period. On a deeper view it is a long pause, to allow of
settlement and digestion, to allow a general infiltration of the great
movements. Thus it was that the literary activity under the last, two Stewarts
was not one-fourth of that amazing output of the twenty years, 1640 to 1660.
The great literary names are those of men who. had grown up in the intenser
atmosphere of the earlier time. The energy evoked by the great events of that
earlier time, and by the searching controversies which laid bare the very
foundations of politics and religion, now passed off into scientific enquiry,
into industrial, commercial, and agricultural enterprise, into economic and
financial speculation. Political writing represents only the eddies and coming
to rest of the old currents of thought. The heart is gone out of journalism,
and the new censorship and Press Acts were like calling in the military, when
the crowd had dispersed. Even the bitter anti-Puritanism of the first years of
the reign dies out into mere cynicism and disgust as it realises that worse
even than a rule of saints can be a “ fatal brand and signature of nothing else
but the impure ” (Butler).
The first
notes of a call to arms against militant Puritanism had been sounded even
before by the foreign writers, Saumaise and More. Hudson, in 1647, had depicted
kingship as accountable only to God, who has made a covenant with the people
that they are to obey His representative. Sancroft, in 1652, had traced the
troubles to “modern policies taken from Machiavel, Borgia, and other choice
authors ”; Heylin, to Calvin, when he laid down that magistrates of popular
election can interpose to check a King’s arbitrariness; which “ all our later
scribblers have turned into a maxim that we must procure the peace of Sion by
the fall of Babylon.” Wright, in 1656, had made a violent attack upon
Presbyterian and Independent preachers; “these God Almighties of the pulpit ” who
called impudence “ inspirations,” and ignorance “ the Holy Spirit ”; preaching
was a mere knack which any barber, shoemaker and tailor can pick up. The
Chancellor in September, 1660, had said that
799
religion was
nowadays made the ground of all animosity, hatred, malice, and revenge, and
godliness measured by morosity in manners and affectation in gesture; and a
certain doctor of divinity dubbed “ the Godly party” as a congregation of
Satan. Others fell foul of the Barebones Parliament, “ that sorry rebaptising
conventicle of mechanical unqualified persons ”; or the cry of “ tender
consciences ” (“ We were not allowed to have consciences at all, but only
stomachs to swallow covenants and subscriptions'”). Others ridiculed the hypocrites
who make long prayers a preface to the devouring of widows’ houses ; or asked,
Where are now your “ Providences ” ? Heylin sketched the History of Puritanism,
1536 to 1647, especially the greed, opinionatedness, and rebellious humour of
the Scots, with a bitterness that almost amounts to literary gift. The author
of the Rebels’ Plea, a criticism on Baxter, put the same views more ably and
fairly; Who ever saw a copy of the social contract ? Do not the writs show
Parliament is called only to give advice ? How can sovereignty be divided? The
Old English Puritan as no enemy to kingly poioer is interesting as a temperate
tract on the other side. As to unjust laws, he would submit passively, saying,
“ Vincit qui patitur.'" “ I appeal to all who witnessed their way of
life.”
Another
moderate view is put in The League illegal, or the Covenant examined, which
admits that if one side appealed to loyalty and conscience, the other could at
least appeal to liberty and estate.
But the
rising tide soon drowned such voices of sense and justice. Puritanism was not
argued down but simply lived down. “ It seemed as if virtue were forbid by
law.” “ The streets are become like Sodom.” “ Drunkenness, swearing, and
whoredom are now modish.” , JThese descriptions come from the scholar Evelyn,
the Quaker Fox, and a royalist preacher respectively. Those “ resolved
villains,” Harrison and Okey, had in their dying speeches prophesied a
resurrection of “the good old cause,” but they foresaw there was to be an
inundation of Antichrist meantime.
The revival
of the alliance between hierarchy and monarchy is celebrated by a rush of
pamphlets in 1660. The dignity of kingship asserted by G. S. still has
hesitations, and is anxious to prove that kingship will not necessarily bring
episcopacy with it. But already in 1658 Heylin had gone further; the
legislative power lies with the King alone, no part of sovereignty is invested
in Parliament. And this rapidly became the dominant tone. The sovereign
authority of the people, and ihe natural liberty of free-born fellow-creatures
was “ cant, the cant of our time ” (Ford). One sermon boldly said, Disobedience
is a sin, whether active or passive. Others were content to say, We can only
refuse if the act is expressly forbidden by God’s law; leaving in pleasing
uncertainty who is to be judge whether such a case has arisen. The old tracts
were reprinted exalting the kingly power all but to a level
with the
Deity, “Were not the King a God to man, one man would be a wolf to another.”
The royal
supremacy in ecclesiastical causes has to be asserted against the
Presbyterians, says a preacher, as much as the existence of monarchy against
the Independents, or the existence of laws against the Anabaptists, or the
existence of religion itself against Atheists. The King is the Atlas of the
moral world, says another; he beareth not the sword in vain, and this text
becomes a pulpit commonplace against “Fifth Monarchists, Levellers, English
Mammalukes, and Scottish enthusiasts.” “ The magistrate’s halter scares more than
the minister’s hell.”
In
Mackenzie’s Jus Regium (1684) a lawyer came to aid in beating the drum
ecclesiastic, and proved the absolute power of monarchy from the law of God,
the law of Nature, the law of Nations.
By 1684
Non-Resistance holds the field and thrusts contemptuously aside “ those who
argue that absolute obedience was only a duty in the earliest days of the
Church, and who cover all up with Glory of God, Purity of Religion, Liberty of
Conscience, Property of the Subject and so forth.” It was certainly high time
for the clergy to have a rude awakening; and a better man for the purpose could
not have been imagined than James II.
“ 1680,
origin of the Whig party” seems almost as fixed a point as “ 1066, Norman
Conquest.” But the Whigs were simply the country party formed that day in
February, 1673, when Parliament by passing the Test Act and forcing the King to
recall his Declaration of Indulgence, made the approximation to the Dissenters
which ultimately brought about the Revolution. Whiggism has been not unjustly
described as “ Puritanism. and water”; and its origin therefore goes far back.
Thus the issue whether monarchy is of Divine Right or is from the people and
conditioned by a pact, is clearly put between two disputants writing in 1643.
In Selden’s broad and reconciling mind, both aspects are found together;
kingship is divine, and based on patriarchy; yet a King is a thing men make for
their own sakes, granting him privileges on condition that he guards their
liberties; the moment he neglects this, the privileges, are forfeit, and he
comes within the power of the law. A Parliamentarian but no Republican, a
constitutionalist but not a pedant, a latitudinarian without being a Hobbist,
monarchical without allowing irresponsibility, he combines already the features
that make up the Wb:b of 1688. The same balance appears
in an obscurer author (Ware); while Prerogative is a “ tuber,” privilege of
Parliament may also mean corruption ; the foundation of all government being
the people, these may choose, change, or regulate their government and hold
their ruler to an account. Or again, in a pamphlet of 1648, we seem already to
be listening to the cool reasonableness of Locke; “ nothing man more abhorreth
than government without consent..,,Rulers are by God’s will but are
accountable
to man, God
creating the office, man setting its limits...good or ill government depends on
administration far more than on outward form....The worst of government is far
better than none at all....That the origin of government is the people, does
not make democracy more ‘natural1 than any other form....We must
remember all checks are only preventive of bad, not creative of good,
government. For that we must look to a moral change, till then it will be all
overtumings, over- tumings, overtumings, till the millennium.” Another writer
of 1658 remarks that tracing to the people the origin of political power, which
had now become the chief maxim in politics, was as old as Hooker; and he
harmonises the text “ The powers that be are ordained of God,” with the view
that consent is both the constitutive and the conservative cause of government,
by the argument that God’s ordination is conveyed to the particular magistrate
through the consent of the community. Baxter’s reconciliation of liberty with
obedience, in his Holy Commonwealth, is difficult to follow, because he tries
to sit on two stools at once; the magistrate cannot compel men to believe and
yet he has to restrain wicked beliefs, such as Popery, and such liberty as is
the way to damnation. He holds the Whig doctrines of a mixed sovereignty
between King, Lords, and Commons, a popular right to select the form of government,
a social contract, in which the people reserved to themselves fundamental
rights of which the legislators are the trustees, a nation’s duty to preserve
itself, the limits to Non-resistance.
But he has
also the Whig scorn for “the ignorant and ungodly rabble, the Damn-me’s,” and
for “men fetched from the dung-cart to make our laws, and from the alehouses
and maypole to dispose of our religion, lives, and estates ”; democracy, far
from being God’s will, is the worst of all government, for twenty elaborate
reasons. He even goes further when he condemns juries (“ it would often do as
well to throw dice ”), and Parliaments (“ as such they are neither divine nor
religious, Protestant nor just”), and a liberty which “would let in all the
sensual gang.” His system in fact is a “ parity of civil magistrates and godly
ministers, and sets up a hopeless delusion; if the magistrate orders what is
evil, We are not to obey ”; as Hobbes said, “ who is to judge what is. ‘evil’!”
One way and
another it was hardly too much to claim that by 1660 “ all good people agree
that the people are under God the original of all just authority”; and the work
of the last two Stewarts was to convert Cavaliers into such “ good people ”;
for Harrington had shrewdly prophesied, “ let the King return, and call a
Parliament of the greatest Cavaliers, so they be men of estate, in seven years
they will all turn Commonwealth men.” By this he meant Republicans, and he was
not far wrong, only that the Whigs found a way, as a preacher said in 1662, to
balance prerogative of Kings, privilege of Parliament, and liberty of subject.
The one new
idea that was contributed was the distinction between the King as sole
executive and the King as partner in the legislation, as is expressed in
Burnet’s Reflections, 1687, “all men are born free, but they compact to form a
government....The presumption is always for liberty....All Christians are bound
to the constitution as fixed by the
laws,
and our laws secure property But our laws
also forbid resistance
on any
pretence; and it is a heavy imputation on our Church that we held these
opinions as long as the Court and Crown have favoured us, yet as soon as the
Court turns against us we change our principles...but Non-resistance is
qualified by the need of liberty ; that is, we must not resist the King for any
ill administration but only if he tries to subvert the laws.”
Expressed in
another form, this was the justification of resistance as a last resort if the
King was manifestly usurping sole legislative power, and this is how the whole
Revolution came to turn on the Declaration of Indulgence. By this, as Burnet
puts it a year later, and by his encroachment on corporations, the King is
usurping the legislative, and this makes that extreme case when the ordinary
submission enjoined by Scripture gives way to the duty of defence of religion
and property. As in 1640, the constitutional theory had to stretch itself when
the matter came to be the defence of religion; religious feeling is a torrent
which creates its own new channels.
Cambridge
University in 1686 set forth these propositions:
(1) Kings are from God, their power is not from
the people;
(2) they are accountable to God alone;
(3) theirs is a fundamental hereditary right.
These may be
completed by two propositions from Filmer, another Royalist:
(4) “ Kings are as absolute as Adam over the
creatures ";
(5) subjects' are bound to absolute obedience,
either active or passive, with patient suffering if we are well assured it is a
case of obeying God rather than man, and do not pretend conscience for a cloak
of stubbornness. Hobbes adds, “ To obey the King who is God’s lieutenant, is
the same as to obey God.. .we shall have no peace till we have absolute
obedience ”; quoted by Hobbes from the Whole Duty of Man, as the best statement
of the Royalist position.
Locke sums up
the whole of “ this short system of politics ” thus: “princes have their power
absolute and by Divine Right ever since Adam.”
We cannot,
with Macaulay, dismiss as a monstrous absurdity a theory which covered all
Europe for two centuries, and was held as a passionate conviction by the
majority of able and conscientious men. The theory was due to many converging
influences. First: at the Reformation, the civil power became rival claimant
with the Pope to represent God upon
earth ; and
it had to counter the papal axioms of sovereignty of the people, right of
resistance, accountability of Kings, by propositions the direct contrary.
Secondly: in England, Wars of the Roses, risings of the Commons, French and
Spanish threats, papal interferences, had led to a Tudor monarchy which Bodin
could quote as a type of absolutism. Now James I put the finishing touch with
his hereditary title ostentatiously, not based on election, and flouting two
Acts of Parliament. Thirdly: England also borrowed from France, where monarchy
was asserting itself against the Huguenot coalition of feudal, municipal,
aristocratic privilege, and against Papist use of theories of social contract
and limited monarchy. Fourthly: the theory which James had already expressed in
his True Law of Free Monarchy throve fast in English air. Churchmen repaid
James’ “ no bishop no King” with their Appetto Caesarem, and Convocation in
1640 endorsed Sibthorpe’s and Maynwaring’s preaching, that to resist was to
receive damnation. Publicists defined “ absolute ” as “ above Parliament.”
English law, already “ as favourable to Kings as any in the world,” seemed to
range itself on this side in cases such as Calvin’s and Bate’s, Darnel’s or
Hampden’s. Chancery was a Court of absolute power, Bacon told James. The
history of the word “ Prerogative,” from 1399 to 1689, covers a great growth in
ideas.
The writer
identified with Divine Right is Filmer. He had before 1653 written with
acuteness and breadth on usury and witchcraft, on parliamentary claims, on the
value of Aristotle’s politics, on Hobbes and Milton, and on the patriarchal or
patrimonial origin of kingship. He is very modem in his use of the Bible, not
as an armoury but as a sociological document; in his application of a
historical method in politics; in his emphasis on the naturalness of human
society. What is at fault is not his claim of absolutism for the State, but the
attempt to make monarchy the exclusive form of State; not his derivation of
political power from a Patria Potestas, but his exclusion of other lines of
argument, such as that from Utility; not his parallel of the State to a family,
but his slurring over the difference between a State and a family. Moreover to
argue that if government was natural it was therefore divine, was really to
push the theological basis into the background; and opened a gap at which it
was easy for his assailants to make entry. Thus Sidney and Locke are able first
to make a very different picture of Adam and the patriarchs; and then
triumphantly to ask, What has Adam to do with present day government ? and
finally to claim Divine sanction for any de facto government that answers the
test of expediency and Utility. So in a sensible answer to Filmer by Tyrell,
Patriarcha non Monarcha, it is evident how Filmer’s book was at least the
occasion of a new method of handling such topics. Tyrell sketches the practical
evils that would result from a modem interpretation of absolutism in the hands
of an English King; he then remarks that the same powers could have belonged to
Oliver, once he had taken the Crown; and asks, How can that be
specially
Divine which is not for the people’s happiness or good ? Of history he justly
says, History has at least as much to tell of bad rulers as of bad democracies;
of scriptural analogies, we must not press too far the letter of such texts as
“ Resist not evil,” “ Swear not at all ”; and of the whole patriarchal
argument, that children’s rights rest on an even weightier sanction than
parents’ rights over children.
The
Patriarcha appeared at a crisis, early in 1610. Its pithy phrases seemed
marvellously apt; such as, “ Parliament at first contained no Commons, their
privilege must therefore have come by growth, that is by royal
grace:...Ecclesiastics, determined to put Kings below the Pope, made secure by
putting the people above Kings.” His trumpet gave no uncertain sound: “ to deem
the King bound by laws or by his own oath, is absurd, inconsistent with
sovereignty, contrary both to law and to reason.” No wonder “the pulpits owned
him at once,”as Locke puts it; for he popularised the abstractions of sovereignty
by making them concrete and personal, and hitching them on to English
constitutional history. Divine Right was one way of expressing obedience,
orderliness, continuity; it made 1660 and 1689 bloodless revolutions, and saved
the throne from a bastard in 1679. Much that it asserted remains true; that the
State is divine and above legal limitations; that non-resistance is a duty;
that the established succession is a fundamental law; finally, that a true
concept of sovereignty is the most essential need in politics.
At the
Revolution it was said of Algernon Sidney that “he being dead yet speaketh.”
But Sidney’s Discourses concerning Government follow seriatim the arguments of
Filmer’s Patriarcha, who is declared not to have used one argument that was not
false, nor cited one author whom he did not pervert; whose conclusions are
wicked infamous brutal absurdities, and so on. This plan leads to repetitions.
Ahab and Nero, Canute and Clovis, Mazarin and the Emperor Leopold, recur over
and over again; and even the chronicle of monarchical scandals from the story
of Uriah to the services rendered to the State by their Graces of Cl-v-l-d and
P-ts-m-th, comes to pall at last.
But we have
here a remarkable contribution to political literature. His range of learning
and observation is extraordinarily wide. He throws aside masses of speculative
lumber of his own day. His style has great vigour and great variety; he is
especially a master of irony; “ Filmer might plead his malice is against
England and he hurts other countries only by accident: so Brinvilliers meant
only to poison her own relations but had to put in the rest of the diners.” “
Protestantism and liberty will both flourish under a Popish prince taught that
his will is law; look at the fatherly care of the Valois Kings to Huguenots,
Philip’s mercy to Indians and Netherlander, the moderation of the dukes of
Saxony, the gentleness of the two Maries, etc., etc.’’
805
Above all,
his views are put trenchantly ; a King who breaks the law ceases to be King;
Parliament is as old as the nation itself; Parliaments are bound to be held
annually, if not, a free people may assemble when they please; the people can
judge, change, depose Kings. Such propositions hardly needed a Jeffreys to
read constructive treason into them. But what cost Sidney his life were his
scathing words on the “ vermin of a Court ” and the way titles were earned
nowadays. He had been too stiff a Republican to bow to Cromwell, and his dying
speech attested his fidelity to the “ old Cause.”
Much for
which Locke got the sole credit had already been better expressed by Sidney.
The state of nature, the surrender of rights, the inference that we can frame
society as we will; that changes in the superstructure of government leave the
foundations of society intact, and that a revolt of a whole people is not
rebellion; many such and many other sentences show how much of the Lockian
system Sidney already had struck out for himself. The continuity of thought
between the two writers comes out even in small points, as the use of
Bellarmin’s argument, the citation from the Aragonese constitution, the
handling of the text Redde Caesari, etc. Sometimes the argument is almost
repeated verbatim ; e.g. allegiance is such obedience as the law requires
(Sidney); jUegisnoe is nothing but an obedience according to law (Locke). We
find more developed in Locke the theoretic basis of social contract (on which
there is a gap in Sidney’s manuscript), the division of functions of
government, the relation of religion to politics, and the practical rules for
future regulation of the constitution. Locke also is certainly more balanced,
more reasonable, more respectable, than Sidney; he does not show, and he had no
reason to show, the other’s bitterness of tone. In Locke Independency is
softened into general toleration; and Republicanism is watered down into
constitutional monarchy.
English
opinion has never been persuaded to declare war on monarchy, to give Parliament
irremovability, to accentuate the collision between laws of God and laws of
man, or to set up an aristocratic republic. The balance should be put into the
hands of those who by birth and estates having the greatest interest, are
superior to bribes from a Court, “ so that the nobles should not be forced to
unite with the Commons to make head against the Crown.” This opens an abyss of
bottomless Whiggery, and shows us that Sidney, like another and greater exile,
would have had to be a party by himself.
The political
literature of the last two decades of the seventeenth century all centres about
the term Passive Obedience.
The
Declaration of Indulgence in 1687 had in its Scottish form boldly claimed “that
absolute power which all subjects are to obey without reserve,” and Oxford in
1685 had professed obedience without limitations or restrictions. How to pass
gracefully in three years from
this theory
to a practical duty of armed resistance, how to effect a right- about-face so
startling, was an interesting question. Any doctrine that could bridge this impasse
ought to be regarded with gratitude. We should not therefore too ruthlessly
expose all that is glaring or even ridiculous about the dogma of Passive
Obedience, as it rang from thousands of pulpits and was hammered out in
hundreds of pamphlets in these ten years.
Passive
Obedience was a sort of political postscript or proviso to the creed of
Non-resistance.
It might seem
that the Restoration victory had given Non-resistance a fresh sanction. So
late as 1684 Bishop Parker was able to say, “ Anyone who at any time on any
pretence should offer any resistance to the Sovereign,, must renounce Christ,
the four Evangelists, the twelve Apostles, to join with Mahomet, Hildebrand,
and the Kirk.” This seems raving, but even so it was a natural revulsion from
the still- remembered ravings of Fifth Monarchists. After all, it was only a
too robust way of expressing the discovery of a new sanction for Nonresistance,
the sanction of experience. This was even more convincing than the theoretic
expediency and logical necessity on which Hobbes had relied for its sanction,
or that on which Berkeley relied, namely deduction from those laws of nature
which admit no exception, or the common lawyers’ sanction, that taking arms
against the King’s person is a “ traitorous position.” All these sanctions
blended in the theory of Non-resistance; and it was the clergy who clothed it
in the garb of a divinely-ordered duty, and who in so doing did a good service.
Non-resistance
even gained strength after the Restoration, by its being as useful a weapon
against Dissenters as against Papists; the rabble defending the faith, like
another Henry VIII, would have drawn both sets of rebels to execution upon one
and the same hurdle. “ The Jesuits are Rome’s Fifth Monarchy men.” “Presbytery
jostles with Papacy for universal supremacy.” “ They believe in that monarchy
for Rome and expect it soon.” For what roused the seventeenth century fury of
anti-Popery was not papal dogmas such as Transubstantiation, nor papal abuses
such as indulgences, nor even Jesuit morality, but the papal claim of the
deposing power and the Jesuit principle of Resistance. Non-resistance is not an
absurdity, the “fiction of a time-serving hierarchy intent on Court favours.”
That its chief exponents were the clergy was natural, seeing that the roots of
the theory go down to the deepest strata of religion; and besides being
natural, the fact was of incalculable importance, seeing that, as a modem
writer has observed, the obligation to obedience as a religious duty could most
effectively be preached by a body of religious teachers. The question when,
how, and how far men must obey, is of all others the question for their
spiritual guides to face first. That they made it a rule absolute and without
exception was also natural; had they done otherwise they would have
been, as the
author (A. Seller) of the History of Passive Obedience shows, false to their
canons and homilies, their great divines, the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity,
their ordination vows, and their own interpretation of Scripture, That they
bound up the indefeasible claim of government to our obedience with a supposed
indefeasible right of a particular form of government, or even a particular
dynasty, was unfortunate, but inevitable, till the events of 1689 had made a
severance practicable, and the arguments of Locke had made that severance
logical.
When the hope
of civilisation lies in rehabilitating and reasserting the State, an undue
emphasis on Resistance seems to throw over the State a shade of illegitimacy, even
irreligiousness; and if pushed a little further, would lead us not only to the
eighteenth century view of the State as a necessary evil, but right back to the
medieval view of the State as a sort of kingdom of darkness, an anti-Church. “
The private conscience is bound to submit to the public conscience, that is
law.” In the last resort the choice is between government and anarchy; “
without a last resort, there can he no government ” (Leslie). It was good that
this should be put clearly by the clergy, and not left to Hobbes to preach;
that the obligation should be accepted not merely ob iram but still more ob
conscientiam. Nothing can do more to elevate the body of citizens than the
feeling that they are, as Aristotle puts it, obeying the reason that is in the
law and not merely the force that is behind the law.
The meaning
of Passive Obedience and its connexion with Nonresistance is commonly
misunderstood. The older writers had demanded Active Obedience; “ nothing can
excuse us from this, except the law of God or an utter impossibility,”
Sibthorpe had preached in his famous sermon. But Sanderson wrote after the
Restoration that even in doubtful cases Active Obedience was our duty ; and
where another duty imperatively ordered non-action, this was still a sin. For
it was easily seen how a merely Passive Obedience might slide into Active
Resistance. But at any rate, if Active Obedience could not be guaranteed in
every conceivable case, the balance was to be made up by the absolute
inexorable undeviating obligation to an obedience that should at least be
passive. This was held up as “ the doctrine of the Cross ”; the indispensable
postulate of government; Parliament affirmed it as a principle of the
constitution in 1661, and nearly passed a law in 1665 to impose it by oath.
If some
ridiculed it as “a doctrine of the bowstring” and ridiculed as “old
Lachxymists” those who would use no weapons against their sovereign but prayers
and tears, there were many more who claimed it for the glory of the English
Church. Oxford in 1683 publicly committed to the flames the works of Milton,
Baxter, Goodwin, Owen, Johnson and others who put forth any of the following
doctrines:—That authority is
808 The practical
importance of Passive Obedience.
derived from
the people; that there is a compact between a prince and his subjects; that the
rights of tyrants are forfeited; that self-preservation is a fundamental law;
that the New Testament allows resistance in defence of religion; that Passive
Obedience is not obligatory if the prince’s command is against the law.
Passive
Obedience was a very happy discovery whereby “ God’s law,” Non-resistance,
might be brought into a practicable relation to actual life. In fact, Passive
Obedience is the safety-valve which alone prevented an explosion. That theory
had been “ screwed up to the highest peg ”; the pressure per square inch was
dangerous. Passive Obedience not only allowed for “ conscience,” but for
individual conscience. Resistance had only been allowed to corporate bodies
both in Papist and in Huguenot theory. Each was an extravagant way of providing
for cases of conscience; using a steam-hammer to crack a nut. Passive
Obedience therefore provides an outlet for individual conscience that is
capable of much more exact adjustment to the individual as well as infinitely
less menacing to the State. The Church in some form was thus the protector and
guardian of the individual’s rights of private conscience.
The pamphlet
literature, then, from the Exclusion Bill to the Bill of Rights may well turn
on Passive Obedience. It was this doctrine which kept the gentry and middle
class from following the ignis fatuus of Shaftesbury, and made possible the
remarkable rally of the Crown in the last years of Charles II. It was this
doctrine that left to the clergy a back-way out from that absolute
Non-resistance to which James fondly imagined them pledged; and so imagining he
plunged obstinately along his fatuous way. It was this doctrine which enabled
the clergy to refuse to publish the Declaration of Indulgence; a doctrine “
providing for revolt ” as their detractors sneered, but only for revolt in the
very last resort, when they saw that principle of submission to the State,
which had been forged as a weapon against Rome, now perverted into a tool of Rome.
Finally this doctrine made them hold out till a concurrence of conditions had
appeared which never before or since had been combined in a revolution; till
they could plead the will of God manifested first in practical unanimity of the
whole nation; second in William’s right of conquest, the more indisputable
because bloodless; and third, above all, in James’ “abdication” by his flight.
Hence the importance attached to what seems to us this somewhat clumsy fiction
of an abdication, and the dismay when the well-meaning fishermen of Sheerness,
all unversed in metaphysics, dragged James back again for a while.
Even so,
there was a high-minded group who could not stretch Passive Obedience to cover
a transfer of allegiance. Had the Non-jurors not acted with scrupulous
restraint, had the mass of the nation been more logical, the schism might have
overthrown the new Constitution, and the Jacobite cause might have had a very
different history.
The weak
point in Passive Obedience is that it runs into Active Resistance; and modern
malcontents have ingenuously illustrated this by calling themselves Passive
Resisters.
As Hobbes
said, they plead “ Obey God rather than man; that is, obey their interpretation
of Scripture rather than the law’s interpretation of it.” “ He that means his
suffering to be taken for obedience, must not only not resist but also not fly
nor hide. Law is a command: how do we obey it if we do not what it enjoins ?
How can a thief hanged for breaking laws be said to be obeying them ? The only
suffering that can be called obedience is voluntary suffering, that which we do
not try to avoid.”
“ All the
compact that is or needs be between the individuals that enter into or make up
a Commonwealth is, barely agreeing to unite into one political society.” In
these words Locke has got almost completely the Contract idea in its true and
profounder form; a contract of all individuals or rather of each with all,
which imposes an obligation on each as one of a community, which tells each
that he is part of a whole and cannot divest himself of his social relations,
any more than of his other human qualities. The narrower conception of Contract
as a pact between government on one side and individual citizens on the other,
was a hereditary defect due to its descent from Roman arid feudal lawyers. It
was a very imperfect way of expressing the relation of a people to its rulers,
and led to much of that confused thinking which makes seventeenth century
political literature so indigestible, and which is reflected in the many
confused attempts to represent the Crown as one of the three Estates, not to
mention the consequent trouble required to get Stewart monarchical theory out
of the way along with Stewart monarchs. The brains were out; but the man would
not die so long as he could plead either indefeasible Divine right or
indefeasible original contract. But Locke put government in its proper position
as a trustee for the ends for which society exists; now a trustee has great
discretionary powers and great freedom from interference, but is also held
strictly accountable, and under a properly drawn deed nothing is simpler than
the appointment of new trustees. For after all, the ultimate trust remains in
the people, in Locke’s words; and this is the sovereign people, the irrevocable
depositary of all powers.
While
therefore what was valuable in the doctrine of sovereignty of the people was
retained, that on the other side which was narrow and dangerous about the
Contract theory could be got rid of; and England, refusing Divine right to any
one form of government, set out on the path of vigorous and healthy criticism
of its rulers. When the people place government in a new form and in new hands,
this is not a reversion to an anarchical state of nature, but the wholesome exercise
of an inalienable right and duty,
Government is
a trustee for the people. The practical working of this maxim in English
politics has been manifold and far-reaching.
First: the
inalienable rights with which mankind have been endowed by their Creator (Declaration
of Independence, July 4, 1776); the bald citation of this declaration is
suggestive enough of Locke’s contribution to American Independence.
Second: when
“estates, liberties, lives are in danger, and perhaps religion too,” the limit
is overpast, law ends, tyranny has begun, arid resistance becomes a right, nay
a duty. No doubt when Walpole found that a rational system of revenue
collection was met by cries of “No slavery, no wooden shoes,” or when the
presence of Presbyterians in Parliament was met by the cry of “ The Church in
danger,” the obstructive capacity of this doctrine was unduly prominent. But
all the same it was a balance to the counter-theory of the omnipotence of
Parliament, wh h h was being
developed by the coincidence of legal theory and historical facts, and that at
a time when Parliament was pretty far from possessing those other attributes of
wisdom and goodness which ought to be found along with omnipotence. A
Parliament which was to a farcical degree nonrepresentative, and of which it
was only a slight exaggeration to say that every man had his price; and which
was being told by lawyers that it could do everything but make a woman into a
man, certainly had to be reminded of other writings which held that it could
not tax without consent, nor punish but by legal process, nor elect its own
members. It was impossible ever again to have the monarch standing over against
the Commonwealth as an equal contracting party. “Absolute monarchy is
inconsistent with civil society and is no form of government at all ”; “
Prerogative can be nothing but the people’s permitting their rulers to do
things where the law was silent.” These are very different from the definitions
current half a century earlier.
Third:
Locke’s people is not evoked just to give the initial push to the governmental
machine and then retire to limbo. It is a people which actively chooses the
form of government which it thinks fit, and every member of which is free at
years of discretion to give his consent or withhold it; which perpetually
retains a right of resistance, which is not to be called rebellion. The next
hundred years seem to be giving a demonstration of these principles; they
provide for an instalment of revolution every seven years. ,
Fourth: no
one could be subjected to authority without his own consent; and as this
consent is next to impossible ever to be had, this is “ a doctrine which makes
the mighty Leviathan not outlast the day it is bom,” unless some other doctrine
comes to the rescue. Hence a rule that the majority must include the rest, is
the only remedy against instantaneous dissolution; and therefore that the act
of the majority is the act of the whole is a law both of Nature and of Reason.
Fifth: the
trustee character of all governments entails important
consequences
as to the division of the functions of government into legislative, judicial,
executive. To combine these functions in the same hands is a temptation too
great for human frailty. This separation of the functions of government
constitutes one of Locke’s most permanent contributions to politics. It became
an axiom with English politicians. Montesquieu canonised it: Blackstone made it
part of the education of a gentleman. Even Hamilton dared not boldly throw it
aside. In our English world it has tended to set up friction as to the
political ideal, and suspicion as the proper attitude towards an executive. It
has obscured the common ground that conjoins the different spheres of
governmental action, and substituted an illusory theory of water-tight
compartments. It has resisted the acknowledgment of a true doctrine of
sovereignty as one and indivisible, and so delayed the advent of centralisation
and efficiency. It has diverted attention from the real centres of gravity in
our politics, the Cabinet and the questions asked in the House of Commons.
Under the hallucination of this theory, the eighteenth century was haunted by
three great bogies: the growth of a Cabinet system, the growth of a National
Debt, the retention of a standing army; just the three things which guaranteed
that government should not override the national will.
It is a
suggestive fact that Locke’s two treatises on Government were produced in 1689.
For Locke was to serve as the Bible of the Revolution. It would have been
infinitely worse for the nation had the choice seemed to be between reason,
conscience, honour on one side, and mere material interests on the other; it
would have made the era of the Georges a veritable “ pudding-time ” indeed.
To compare
Locke with Hobbes in the matter of style would be cruel. Locke may have written
“ a treatise to which no other ancient or modem is comparable in influence ”
(Blakey); Hobbes may be “ the author of a political and moral system which
sears the heart ” (Hallam); but he is the author of a style never equalled in
English for combination of lucidity, terseness, pungency. Not that Locke always
fails to reach the high standard of the seventeenth century in force of
expression. His definitions are often pointed, suggestive, excellent; “ Passive
obedience was what Ulysses no doubt preached in Polyphemus’ cave ”; “ Learning
and religion shall be found out to justify all a monarch shall do to his
subjects”; “Truth is the seed-plot of all the virtues”; “The people are more
disposed to suffer than to right themselves by resistance”; “In most things
99-hundredths of the expense is the labour.” This common sense raised to a
point at which it becomes luminous is the light which he turns on to dispel
many of the old difficulties that had haunted men; Divine Right, prerogative,
paternal power, the natural equality of men, the coexistence of individual
property and common, the coexistence of a stable society and free political
criticism. It may
even be said
without paradox that Locke saved much of Hobbes by removing the exaggerations
which by this time had put his writings out of circulation; for:men
were bound to recoil from such a chain of reasoning, however flawless the
links, when they saw arbitrary imprisonment and cessation of Parliaments were
pooh-poohed as mere “ inconveniences,” ship-money levied by precedents of
JEthelred’s reign was justified under threat of anarchy, the clergy were
reduced to gramophones, and conscience diagnosed as a sort of indigestion.
But in this
comparative estimate there is another side to the shield. Hobbes was far
sounder in regard to a historical basis of the social contract. He dismisses
the question rather cavalierly, “Whether there ever was a time when these
things were generally so ?” But at any rate his whole system stands independent
of historical basis. Locke cannot help hankering after such a basis. What he
contemptuously calls “the mighty objection,” where are or ever were any men in
such a state of Nature, he thus answers: first, that rulers of independent governments
are in such a state: second, that all men remain in that state till they form a
politic society. So, to the demand for instances of a social contract in
history, he refers to the beginnings of Rome and Venice as evident matter of
fact, not to mention “those who went away from Sparta with Palantus ”; he
refers also to men who still live “in troops with no government at all in
Florida, Brazil, and many parts of America ”; and sums up that all history
gives either plain instances of foundation in contract or manifest traces of
it; that in fact, all lawful governments began in this way; the only other
origin being force. He is even bold enough to be confident that governments had
at first a “ golden age ” of innocence and sincerity, when rulers were nursing
fathers and subjects less vicious, and therefore there were no contests between
rulers and people.
In many
respects Locke gathered up and handed on to the next century those parts of the
intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century which were destined to be
most permanent. Thus he even exaggerates the claim of the individual, that
“freedom” which had become almost a cant term; each of his works is a defence
of the individual’s liberty—religious liberty in the Letters on Toleration,
political liberty in the Treatises cm Government, and intellectual liberty in
the Essay.
He,
therefore, fully shares the seventeenth century impatience of all medieval and
even of more recent authority: “ we cannot see by another man’s eyes,” and
“masters take men off"the use of their own judgment.” If Hobbes said that,
had he read as many books as other men, he would have been as ignorant as they,
Locke went further and said he had not read Hobbes. But this was to foster an
English contempt for the “learning” belonging to a subject, an English
confidence in “the plain man” and the light of Nature. This was so far a
wholesome
reaction from
the wearisome parade of authorities legal and historical, the deadly monotony
of Solon and Numa, Cicero and Ulpian, which reaches a climax in Prynne, who
pours out whole dust-bins of such learning into his margins.
But to lay
down that in our enquiry after knowledge it concerns us not what other men have
thought, was a flagrant contempt of the historical method and a presumption
that there is no such thing as evolution in politics, the practice or the
theory. The fundamental axiom of modem political science tells us that the
present is rooted in the past; and Burke’s contention that there are no new
principles to be found in ethics or politics, is hardly further from the truth
on one side than is Locke’s contention on the other.
Locke also
represents a reaction from the extravagant use of the Bible in argumentation.
Puritan Scripturalism had clothed everything in Bible language and referred
every controversy to biblical decision, till even contemporaries had grown
weary, after some fifty years of Jephthah and Meroz, Israel and Amalek.
The great
tenet of religious toleration was put by Locke on many grounds and expressed in
many ways. Religion is a man’s private concern, his belief is part of himself,
and he is the sole judge of the means to his own salvation. Persecution only
creates hypocrites, while free opinion is the best guarantee of truth. Most
ceremonies are indifferent : Christianity is simple; it is only theologians
who have encrusted it with dogma. Sacerdotalism, ritual, orthodoxy, do not
constitute Christianity if they are divorced from charity. Our attempts to
express the truth of religion must always be imperfect and relative, and cannot
amount to certainty. Each of these propositions may be found in writers
anterior to Locke or in his contemporaries; but it was Locke who first combined
them all and drove them home to his own generation; aud thus it was through
Locke that the eighteenth century gradually became possessed of Cromwell’s
sense that things spiritual can only be brought home by light and reason,
Milton’s confidence that truth will emerge victorious, Harrington’s idea of a
national worship supplemented by free private rites. In fact it was Locke who
did most to make toleration the practice and comprehension the ideal of the
most thoughtful men. Puritan opinion, whether Presbyterian or Independent,
sharply divided religious from civil society without very clearly defining
which was to ride in front, as Hobbes puts it; and to this division Locke had
inclined in some of his earlier writings. But in his more settled view, this
division was replaced by alliance and harmony; Church and State can be united
if the Church he made broad enough and simple enough, and the State accepts the
Christian hasis. Thus religion and morality might be reunited, sectarianism
would disappear with sacerdotalism; the Church would become the nation
organised for goodness. A noble vision, but, “ Who is to ride in front ? ”
Here however
lies in outline the eighteenth century tendency to reduce religion to “ cold
morality,” to emphasise the “ reasonableness of Christianity,” to make faith a
balance of probabilities, and creeds a matter of individual choice.
Finally,
Locke is the precursor of Bentham. To say so much is to indicate a great
movement which, counting to the date when John Stuart Mill adopted Elijah’s
mantle, was dominant in English thought for 150 years. In Locke’s ethics, rules
of conduct are merely means to the happiness of the individual; in his
politics, forms of government were merely means to the happiness of the
governed; and in each case, the test is experience, how much happiness does
each secure ? This test even claims a Divine sanction; “ at the right hand of
God are pleasures for evermore; and that which we are condemned for is, not for
seeking pleasure, but for preferring the momentary pleasures of this life to
those joys which shall have no end.” “ God has by an inseparable connexion
joined virtue and public happiness together; that which is for the public
welfare is God’s will.” It is hardly possible to exaggerate the influence of
this conception of utility; as Maine says, it made the good of the community
take precedence of every other object, and there is no single law reform
effected since 1817 which cannot be traced to it. It did more than suggest and
stimulate reforms, for it supplied a ready test of all legislation; does this
law demonstrably do good ? Hitherto, the only question asked was, does it
correspond with the law of God, the law of nature, the fundamental laws of the
kingdom, or some such ol prion standard ? But now, does it do good ? Can we
prove this ? Here we have in germ the whole modem science and art of legislation,
the apparatus of commissions, blue books, statistics. The energy of
legislation means the community vigorously adapting its environment; it is the
measure of its civilisation.
In more than
one respect Locke’s Utilitarianism marks the transition from a heroic age to
one more sober but more prosaic. But there is one respect that is very
significant. Locke might be called the prophet of Property. Man has a property
in his own person, and therefore in the work of his hands. It is his because he
“ hath mixed his labour with it, and thus removed it out of the common state.”
To preserve his property is man’s right and privilege by the law of nature ; to
ensure the better preservation of it is the motive and origin of civil society.
Properly includes lives, liberties, estates. The supreme power of a
Commonwealth cannot take a penny from a man without his consent. Violation of
this right of property is a breach of trust, and justifies the institution of a
new government. This is a profound truth; property is a necessary part of
personality. Hobbes had denied any right of property as against the sovereign.
Locke’s view expresses another and equally necessary side of the truth.
Thus the
head-lines of Locke’s bequest to the eighteenth century
are indicated
by the words Individualism, Reason, Utility, Toleration, Property; all of which
words might be summed up in the first of them. No wonder that the century
witnesses in England the rise of a gospel of self-interest which made the
wealth of a nation consist in setting the individual free; and in France that
Titanic evolution of the pent-up force of the individual which made the French
Revolution so epoch-making.
A long pause
for digestion and assimilation—such is the main character of the reigns of
William III and Anne. The assimilation was not a peaceful process; what the
Revolution really did was to lay down the lines of settlement for the next
generation to work out, not without dust and heat. The lines of force, then,
along which the political writing and action of the period arranges itself, are
the following. The first need to be satisfied is political stability. “ We are
all in the ship and must sink or swim together; that I don’t like the crew, is
no reason
to
sink the ship I go along with every
Ministry so long as they
do not break
in our laws and liberties.” This sounds such common sense that we hardly
realise how it had cost twenty-one years of bitter experience of strife since
1689 to bring it home even to so clear a mind as Defoe’s. The next need was to
accommodate new ideas to the old forms. Somehow, monarchical executive, a royal
prerogative, an established Church, must learn to make room within themselves
for theories of a sovereign people, a trusteeship of government, religious
toleration. Such a task is always difficult; but to avoid a rupture with the
past has always been the good fortune of English political progress; it has
made change slow—perhaps too slow—but it has made it part of an ordered growth
and saved us from the recourse to cataclysms. The next task which this period
had to accomplish was to set party spirit in its proper place. Parties were
violent because they were young ; and they had to buy their own experience, to
work out their own way to clearness and to a modus vivendi. It needed all the
party agitations of the next twenty-five years to hammer home the philosophy
which underlay the Revolution, to translate into practical terms the ideals put
forth by Sidney and Locke. We must look indulgently even on Seymour and
Sacheverell as the alarums which kept our unphilosophic race from turning aside
too soon from those abstractions and those theorisings on sovereignty,
obedience, government, toleration, to which they had had to give ear when
seeking escape from Popery and James II.
Further, we
ought to realise that only slowly in this period was the party system allowed
its proper corrective—responsibility. None of the writers, none of the
statesmen, saw the absurdity of having one party supreme in the legislature
while the other retained its predominance in the administration. Tory
majorities raved in the Commons, because they could not get at a Whig Ministry
outside. This absurdity was due to the age being so possessed with the
conviction that the three
great
functions of government were to be kept as separate and independent as
possible. Such an elevation of the administration above the party system
certainly gave more opportunities to the Crown, which could also make use of
the balance and alternation between the two parties; and so far it was a good
thing, for the Revolution had threatened to bring too great and too sudden a
diminution of the central executive power. But the separation of functions also
laid open this central power to all party rancour and violence. Therefore, one
of the most important developments in practical politics during this period was
the evolution of that constitutional creation, a parliamentary Ministry. All
this provision of due scope for the party system had been ignored in Locke’s
scheme, and its full importance was not realised till Burke. Yet Locke’s theory
of the trustee character of government and his declaration in favour of
representative reform required to be adjusted to the new facts involved in the
formation of two great permanent parties. Instead of a water-tight separation
between legislature and executive, what was wanted was a closer connexion
between them, so that a great change in popular feeling should be reflected in
both simultaneously. This is now done by the Cabinet at once being the executive
organ and having a party majority in Parliament. The party warfare from the
Revolution to the death of Anne was, therefore, not the mere venom and futility
that it seems, but a necessary stage towards a great result.
Of Whig
principles the most thorough-going exponent is Defoe. “Parliament has often
harmed the country, but vox populi saved it”; and against a tyrannous
legislature, traitorous factions, persecuting high- churchmen, he appealed to
the Crown as the representative of the people. Unite these two elements as he
wished them united, and you have the Patriot Sing—a conception very, much in
the air at the time, as may be seen from Burnet’s epilogue to his History.
To political
theory his chief contribution is his tract of 1701, The Original Power of the
Collective Body of the People of England, which Chalmers pronounced to be equal
to Locke in reasoning and superior in style. Defoe himself makes no secret of
his debt to Locke, from whom he takes almost verbatim his four maxims: All
government is to secure the property of the people; a government which acts ill
ceases to be a government; no representatives can claim to be infallible; the
legislature’s enactments must be tested by reason. There always remains a
supreme power; the division of functions into three streams implies a prior
fountain; the fountain does not give up all its waters at once. He often quotes
his own line, “ then power retreats to its original.”
The
anti-Lockians are important rather as politicians and as pamphleteers than as
affecting political theory save in the way of friction. The ablest of these
literary Non-jurors, as Dr Johnson says, was Leslie. When Leslie attempts
serious criticism, he hits, but not very hard, some obvious weak places; much
of his writing, however, only amounts to lively
and rather
cheap banter: “ if silence gives consent, none are so free as the Grand
Signior’s mutes”; “the Scripture is full of that Divine Right which they laugh
at ”; “ they make God ordain government, but in no particular form at all.” He
feels, however, that the tide has turned against his party; “the Whigs’
pamphlets are tenfold what ours are in number and tenfold in virulence.” There
is something hopeless, too, about his theory of Church and State, if indeed it
amounts to a coherent theory at all. There are, he argues, two separate powers
distinct per se, not merely by the subjects or cases over which the power is
exerted, for there are none which do not come both under the heavenly and under
the earthly power. Yet he also says: to call the one spiritual, the other
temporal, and then to set Church and State fighting, and to ask who shall be
the judge between them, is either malice or ignorance. Church and State are not
incorporated but are, it appears, to be regarded as a federal union; there can
be no collision so long as each keeps its own sphere. The fact is, the
Non-jurors’ cause was ruined logically by their practical English sense and
compromise.
We must not
make too much of Sacheverell and the High Church movement. “ The high-bred high-fed
high-fliers ” rattled the drum ecclesiastic, but it was to cover a retreat or
to disguise a losing cause. They contribute nothing to political theory beyond
what they had already contributed in the preceding generation. The time was
nearly ripe for Burke. All that was needed was someone to awaken the complacent
and bard-shelled individualism of the day from its dogmatic slumbers. This
awakener was Hume. But, short of originality in theory, Defoe contributed to
political progress in almost every other direction. Much cant he laughed out of
court; many prejudices he shamed into silence; on fallacies and
misrepresentations his common sense came down like a sledge-hammer. The work he
did in his numberless writings— some of them, such as the True-born Englishman,
and the Shortest Way with the Dissenters, permanent in their historical
importance—the work of writing single-handed the whole of the Review, even to
the fictitious correspondence, was work of the first value; it was educating a
nation into political sense and morality. It was Defoe who applied and popularised
Locke, and drove home the philosopher’s principles.
In the
half-century between the Revolution and the fall of Walpole political life and
the conflict of parties had become, as Bolingbroke says, a matter of men rather
than measures. And this process went on under the first two Georges, as the
Tories shed their October Club elements, as the Pretender came to be “renounced
with one voice even by the common people,” and as Walpole’s jealousy threw all
able men into the ranks of the opposition to himself.
Whatever
Bolingbroke’s faults, it is impossible to doubt the sincerity of his protests
against political corruption. It runs through his whole
life, his
whole works, bis private letters, and his private conduct. It raises his
rhetoric to the genuine ring of eloquence. It gives him true insight and lifts
him almost to a prophetic strain. He foresees a day when the offer of a bribe
will be as great an affront as the offer of a blow. Sometimes, he is in despair
in face of an evil which penetrates the whole frame of society. “ Do you think
you can banish corruption and reform the world ? You might as well try to
batter down the Minister’s Norfolk palace with your head.” But he goes on all
the same, with indomitable energy and an amazing variety of attack, “ to trace
corruption through all its dark lurking holes.”
Bolingbroke
has been charged with having no remedy to propose beyond the downfall of his
hated enemy. The charge is not quite fair; for he was vehement in urging
penalties on electoral corruption, disfranchisement of rotten boroughs,
exclusion of placemen from Parliament, full liberty of the Press; besides a
total reversal of foreign policy and a more generous colonial policy. It is
true, however, that constructiveness was not his strong point. Nor among all
that brilliant literary group on the Craftsman's staff, was there anyone to be
named in the same day with Walpole as a master of detail, a judge of measures,
an authority in finance. Bolingbroke did, however, contribute to the Craftsman
a certain unmistakable sincerity, even a touch of idealism. His aim was to
supersede existing parties by the creation of a national party. Existing
parties had become utterly unreal, more “ factious ” with avowed private
interests. What was needed was a new conception of patriotism, the union of all
in the service of the country.
It is quite
true that the Patriots, once in office, were not very different from the
jobbers they displaced. But for all that, a new idea, or an old idea with
renewed vitality, had been definitely introduced into the arena. Of course, if
what he meant was altogether to eliminate party and the party system from the
world, no project could be more chimerical, and Macaulay would have had a perfect
right to call it a childish scheme of using prerogative to break up parties and
defy Parliament. But we may safely say that to call in prerogative to break up
parties and defy Parliament was not his scheme.
In the first
place, his definition of prerogative is precisely that which Locke and Sidney
had substituted for the older royalist definition of an absolute prerogative
overriding both law and popular will. The King was to be the most popular man
in the nation, to represent the true voice of the people against a debased
Parliament, if necessary. The absolute power (he says) that must be somewhere
in every government, need not, and with us cannot, be lodged with the monarch
alone. It is no weak* ness for Kings to be subject to limitations; omnipotence
itself submits to such. “I neither dress up Kings as burlesque Jupiters nor
strip them to a few tattered rags.” A true King, a patriot King, in Britain may
govern with power as extended as the most absolute monarch, but he must be a
patriot, looking on his rights as a trust, and the people’s rights
as their
property. Against the spirit and strength of the nation he must never attempt
to govern so as to refuse to change his Ministers and his measures. As he will
espouse no party, much less will he proscribe any. He will enlist no party,
much less enlist himself in any. In other Constitutions a Prince may have
influence independently of the people’s: in ours he must acquire it by their
affection. Those after me (he says) may live to see a patriot King at the head
of a united people. This may be Utopian, and certainly is somewhat intangible.
But at any rate it cannot be identified with George Ill’s government by King’s
friends, and his rejection of the people’s Minister in favour of one of “the
vain carved things about a Court”; any more than George III himself can be
identified with the ideal Prince educating his people out of their prejudices.
In the second
place, Bolingbroke’s scheme was not to break down party government, but to
break down the abuse of party government when parties had sunk into “factions,”
that is, as he defines faction, a group pursuing private interests. He appeals
to a national party, to be created; and the conception of such a national party
has been a powerful idea at crises in a nation’s life. He complains that the
Hanoverian dynasty was from its first accession dipped in the party quarrels of
the time; “ the King is ours ” was the victorious party’s ciy. What he wanted
to form was a coalition of the best elements of either party. He grasped the
central fact that there was then no real division of principle between the two
parties, and that there was a wide ground which they had in common.
Bolingbroke’s
aim, the union of all in the service of the State, could not be achieved by his
means, the elimination of party spirit and party rivalry, but by its elevation
to a higher plane, by the discovery of real and worthy principles of party
division, and by the elevation of certain fundamentals outside and above party
strife. Foreign policy, naval predominance, have been practically elevated to
this position in English politics. Similarly, the maintenance of the federation
of the Empire is passing into the same agreed and unassailable position. It
seems that, civilised communities will tend to increase the number of these,
axiomatic and sacred subjects.
With Hume’s
Essays on Political Questions, we leave behind the stilted artificialities of
Bolingbroke. At one stride we have reached a modem world. We move among ideas
that are familiar to us, in a region of expediency and common sense, set forth
in a style that the best standards of the nineteenth centmy cannot surpass for
limpidity and ease. The worship of the Glorious Revolution has decidedly
cooled, even when we make a liberal discount for Hume’s own level-headed
personality, the Scottish atmosphere in which he wrote, and his steady pruning
of any “ Whiggish shoots ” in successive editions of his writings. Let
obedience be the rule, he says, and resistance the exception; it is
820
Hume's scepticism and
insight.
absurd to
provide for and to propagate maxims of non-obedience. A real Revolution must be
a terrible thing; we must not be misled by ours, for 1689 was not the “
dissolution of society,” but a mere change in the succession, and only in the
regal part of that; besides, it was not the work of the ten millions but of the
seven hundred who concluded for them. This coolness of judgment in Hume tends
to take the form of a general scepticism, as when he questions current
assumptions as to national character and the effects of climate and food, or
ridicules the fashionable argument that all human actions are reducible to
self-love. In the same spirit, he has a keen eye for the absurdities which
passed for Roman history, and for the weak points in both the theories of
Original Contract and of Divine Right; “a philosophic patriot under William or
Anne would have found it hard to decide between the Stewarts and the
Hanoverians.” To his mind the balance hangs pretty even between the evils of
monarchy and the evils of popular government. The one thing he holds in horror
is religious enthusiasm, which he defines as a compound of hope, pride,
presumption and a warm imagination, together with ignorance. He points out
great advances made by modem politics, such as the balance of power, the
government by laws, not men, the order, peace, and industry of societies. But,
he notes, we have no standard book yet in political science. There will arise
such a science, he thinks; but as yet “the world is too young to fix many
general truths in politics”; “Machiavel was a great genius; but there is hardly
any maxim in his Prince which subsequent experience has not entirely refuted.”
He offers in a scattered form some fundamental maxims, such as that all
government rests ultimately on opinion, for mere force must be on the side of
the governed; men obey a ruler because they believe it to be their interest and
his right, and also from the secondary motives of fear and affection; to make
property the foundation of government, as Harrington does, is therefore a veiy
incomplete account; to say that forms of government are immaterial and that
administration makes all in all, is against both reasoning and experience. The
great aim of all government may be summed up as the support of the twelve
judges, or in other words, the distribution of justice; “ even the clergy so
far as this world is concerned have no other use or object of their
institution.” In this last maxim we see that we have indeed passed away from
medieval views of the paternal and religious duties of the State, and are ready
for the laissez-faire view and the reduction of the State to a policeman. In
this and in other ways Hume shows an insight that amounts to prophecy. He
foresees the predominance of the House of Commons, the transformation of
Britain into a virtual republic by the development of the delegate theory of
membership of Parliament, the disappearance of the factitious distinction
between wealth in land and wealth from trade, the rehabilitation of kingship as
a constitutional monarchy, the increase of friction in our
Summary:
from Hobbes to Burke. 821
political
machinery, the increase of taxation, the disappearance of slavery in the
colonies as economically unprofitable. He predicts that France will become a great
republic. Even his judgment, in 1742, that Jacobitism.was dead, is not refuted
but confirmed on any but the most superficial reading of the ’45. The many
changes made in the successive editions of his essays measure no doubt the
author’s own advance in monarchical sentiment; but also may be taken as
pointing to a general movement of public opinion away from Whig principles;
while the author himself justly claims to trace a general decay of authority,
especially that of the clergy, and a general perception that popular government
is in danger of turning out to be mob-rule. It is not well to make too much of
errors in prevision, but it is certainly instructive to see that even a Hume
may be a false prophet; our Constitution has not degenerated into an absolute
monarchy, the standing army has not proved “ a mortal distemper,” nor has the
National Debt destroyed the nation. Again, we should demur to the fixing of a
near period for the dissolution of a body politic on the analogy of a natural
'body, and not regard the balance of power as so infallible a rule for
international relations; we should hesitate to say that priests always have
been and always will be foes to liberty; nor does a union between democracy and
religious fanaticism seem likely to wreck society in our time. Hume himself is
not exempt from the last infirmity of the theorists; he constructs an ideal
commonwealth of his own ; it is kindest to say nothing about it.
From the
vantage-ground of Hume’s final work we look back on 150 years of political
theory. A very notable progress has been made in the rise of a historical
sense. The great subject of the origin of government is handled on much sounder
lines; it is seen to be a thing of slow growth; if consent is still justly
taken as its basis, yet room is made for other secondary formations, such as
habit; it is seen that most actual States have originated in conquest and have
never been built on any formal or conscious consent; it is admitted that we owe
allegiance by the mere fact of birth in this or that community, and that we are
under an obligation to the constitution under which we are bom ; we are not to
“ propagate maxims of resistance,” but to make obedience our rule and not hunt
out exceptions and excuses from this primary duty. The relation of history to
politics is estimated much more fairly; Rome and Sparta, France and Spain, are
relegated to their proper place as illustrations. A true historical method is
beginning to emerge. All this is a preparation for Burke. So too is the deep sense
of the sacredness of established order. We have now for seventy years, he says,
enjoyed settlement, with harmony between Prince and Parliament, with peace and
order almost unbroken, trade, manufactures, agriculture, arts, and sciences all
flourishing; there has been no such period in the history of mankind. Such a
paean shows us Hume as the precursor of Burke, as on other sides he is the
precursor of Bentham, of Herbert Spencer, and of Maine.
THE ROMANTIC
MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN LITERATURE.
During the latter half of the eighteenth century a fresh
current swept through the literature of Europe. The spurious classicism of the
Augustan age was everywhere shaken. Everywhere the stream set violently against
the ideals of the last generation; it set, in the main, towards what we may
loosely call Romance. New ideas thronged in ' from every side; new imaginative
ideals began to shape themselves. This, if we consider the obstacles which
stood in the way, is hardly less true of France than it is of England and of
Germany; it is as true of Italy, of the Norse countries, of the Slavonic races,
as it is of France. The term Romance, however, in this connexion must be
interpreted with extreme laxity. And it will be well to indicate at the outset
the various tendencies which it will here be taken to imply.
Thus,
starting from the bare reaction against the purely intellectual outlook of the
Augustan age, we are met, sooner or later, by tendencies so distinct, in some
cases so conflicting, yet in the last resort so closely connected, as the
following: the cry of long-stifled emotion and of “return to nature,” in the
most general sense which that phrase will bear; the utterance of individual
personality; the renewed love of external nature, and the sense of a living
bond between it and man; the reawakening of religion; the revival of humour;
the return towards the medieval past; the craving for the remote and the
supernatural; the reversion to the ideals of Greek poetry and the simplicity of
Greek imagination. One tendency, the cult of realism, must be held entirely
apart. For, though in some cases it worked hand in hand with the romantic
impulse, it is manifestly of a different origin and sooner or later it was
certain to assert itself in hostility more or less pronounced.
The germ of
the whole movement, so far as it is to be brought into connexion with Romance,
is to be found in the revolt of the emotions against the tyranny of intellect.
“ Reason ” was the guiding star of the Augustan poets, of Pope hardly less than
Boileau ; and reason, on their lips, was apt to mean no more than common sense,
the faculty which may be supposed to guide us in the affairs of daily life. Can
we wonder
that, after
two generations, the world should have begun to question so distorted a view of
poetry that a strong reaction should have set in, and that, for a time,
something more than its rights should have been given to the element of emotion
? It was in Britain that the reaction first declared itself—timidly in the
poetry of Thomson ( Winter, 1726); boldly in the novels of Richardson (1740-53)
and in the resounding echo which they awakened through a large section of
English society, particularly, as is well known, among cultivated women. It
would be a shallow criticism which should find in Pamela and Clarissa nothing
more than the strain of emotion, and ignore the deep knowledge of human
character and motive, or the dramatic genius which gives to Richardson’s
fictions the force and vividness of reality. But the appeal to emotion was the first
thing to strike his contemporaries; and in a sketch of the thought and temper
of Europe it is the first thing to be recorded.
The influence
of Richardson soon made itself felt upon the Continent; and nowhere more
clearly, or more fruitfully, than in France. There, strongly as the classical
tradition was entrenched, the new leaven was at once welcomed and appropriated
by the two most original writers of the time. Diderot in the drama, Rousseau in
the novel, gave it applications of which Richardson had never thought, a
significance which lay entirely beyond his horizon. No one can read the two
dramas of Diderot, or the discourses Sur la Poesie dramatique (1757-8) with
which they are buttressed up, without feeling that a wholly new spirit is
making its way into French literature; that, to an extent even greater than was
realised by the dramatist, this spirit was fundamentally hostile to the
classical tradition; and that its origin is to be traced to the literature of
England and, above all, to the influence of Richardson, at that time its most
celebrated representative. The same influence may be traced a few years earlier
on the drama of Germany (Lessing’s Miss Sara Sampson, 1755) and, a little
later, on that of Spain (El Delinquente honrado by Jovellanos, 1774). In the
latter case the emotional strain, which is here raised to the top note of
intensity, may be drawn from the French rather than from the English. In the
other cases the influence of Richardson, Lillo (the author of The London
Merchant), and other British writers is direct, and it is openly proclaimed.
Among the French, in particular, it gave rise to an entirely new type of play,
something between comedy and tragedy, which came to be known as le drame. From
Diderot onwards to the Revolution, the stream of comedies larmoyantes flowed
almost unbroken. Sedaine in Le Philosophe sans le savoir (1765), Beaumarchais
in Les deux Amis (1770), La Harpe in Melanie (1770), Marie-Joseph Chenier in
Fenelon (1793) carried on the tradition which had been founded by the zealous
admirer of Richardson. The last two writers, indeed, definitely crossed the
border line, in no case very clearly drawn, between comedie la/rmoyante and
tragedie bourgeoise.
Far more
fruitful was the influence of Rousseau; upon the novel in
the first
instance, then upon literature at large. Neither in form nor in substance could
La nouvelle Heloise (1761) have been written as it was but for the influence of
Richardson, or again for that of Prevost (1788-40), whose later years were
devoted to the translation of Richardson. But an entirely new strain comes into
the novel with the appearance of Rousseau; the lyric note, and that sense of
harmony between man and outward nature which led him to seek an appropriate
setting for the passions that he paints, to interweave the woes of his heroine
with a scene which seemed to reecho them from every rock and copse and
impressed them indelibly upon the imagination of his readers. Werther (1774) in
the literature of Germany, Foscolo’s Jacopo Ortis (1800-2) in that of Italy,
take up the double strain; and it is heard again and again throughout the
literature of the following century. Few men have done more than Rousseau to
widen the scope of the novel, or deepen its imaginative appeal.
The lyric
note, which breaks through the prose of Rousseau, had heen as much lacking to
the poetry as to the prose of the Augustans; and its absence had inevitably
been yet more disastrous. After a silence of two generations it is heard once
more in the odes and dirges of Collins (1746); with far fuller and richer power
in the early songs of Goethe (1770-86); and, yet later, in the magic of Blake
(1783-94) and the ringing melodies of Bums (1786-96). There is no need, in this
connexion, to point to the specifically Romantic elements in each of these
poets. The mere fact that each was essentially a singer is sufficient for our
purpose. For it is the revolt of the emotions against the dominance of
intellect with which at the moment we are concerned; and the supreme expression
of the emotions is to be found in song, in that field of poetry which, however
hard it may he to define, the world instinctively recognises as lyric. The
absence of such poetry is the worst blot upon the Augustan age; its presence,
the first and chief glory of the age that followed.
From the
lyric note it is a short step to the expression of individual personality. And,
once more, the step was taken by Rousseau. The Confessions, the Dialogues, the
Reveries, all written between 1765 and 1778, are even now the supreme examples
of the type. And no writings could more defiantly challenge the classical
canons. Henceforth it could no longer be assumed that le moi est haissable to
all whose opinion is worth counting. And, within the next generation, the
example of Rousseau was followed, with more or less of completeness, by men of
tempers so different as Richter, Wordsworth, Alfieri, and even Goethe.
We pass to
other, and yet more characteristic, aspects of the movement which changed the
whole spirit of European literature and thought; to the impulse which drew men
to seek return, at least in imagination, to simpler and more primitive
conditions of life; to the renewed love of external nature and the sense of a
living bond between it and man. And, here again, we are met by Rousseau. The
former of these, the
craving
for a “return to nature,” had already made itself felt in the earlier poetry of
Gray, above all in the Elegy; under another form, it ■was soon to appear
in The deserted Village and The Vicar of Wakefield. But it is in Rousseau that
it takes the purest and most universal shape; and it is from him that it
radiated through the whole literature of Europe. The writings which give the
most complete expression to this craving are the two Discourses (1750, 1755)
and j£mile (1762). They sent an electric shock through Europe. And the
eagerness with which they were welcomed showed that Rousseau had spoken the
word in season—the word which all men had unconsciously been waiting to hear,
but which none had had the insight to conceive or the courage to utter. The
message of Rousseau has its negative and its positive side. In the first
instance, it was a cry of indignant protest against the artificialities of an
outworn civilisation; in this aspect it led to that revolt against convention
which inspired so much of the best literature of the next three generations.
The Sturm imd Drang of Germany, much of what is most characteristic in the work
of Wordsworth, Byron and Shelley, much of what is best in the romantic movement
of France—all trace their origin to this source. And, though he would have
indignantly denied it, there is a curious echo of it in the ideas which
inspired the poetry of Blake. The political results of these memorable writings
were still more startling; but, for the moment, they fall beyond our scope.
•
The positive
side of Rousseau’s influence is, however, yet more important. From the first
Discours onwards it was manifest that he appealed from the intellect to the
emotions; that he thrust aside the rationalist ideals of Voltaire and the
Encyclopedists, as one-sided and barren; that, in his view, reason was
constituted not merely by the Logical faculties acting upon the material
offered through the senses, but also and no less by the intuitive power in
virtue of which man interprets the blinder and more mysterious promptings of
his nature. This was to attack at its very foundation the philosophy of the
eighteenth century— the philosophy which, from Locke onwards to Condillac, had
been slowly shaping itself more and more precisely. It was also to apply a
standard of human worth the very negation of that which, at the time when
Rousseau wrote, was currently accepted. The whole body of opinion which had
grown up under the artificial conditions of modem society— indeed, of society
in all possible forms—was to be swept away. Man was to be talien “ as he came
from the hands of the Creator.” This was nothing short of a revolution; and its
significance was at once perceived both hy friend and foe. D’Alembert was at
first content to remonstrate with Rousseau as an erring, but well-meaning,
brother (1751). But remonstrance was soon exchanged for anathema. Kant, on the
other hand, dated the great change in the earlier history of his mind from the
moment when he learned the lesson of the second Discours; and he compared the
moral revolution wrought by Rousseau in his “ discovery
of the
deep-hidden nature of man” to the intellectual revolution inaugurated by the
discoveries of Newton (ijber das Gefiihl des Schbnen und Erhabenen, 1765). With
Kant we stand at the fountain-head of modem philosophy. And nothing could
illustrate more clearly the significance of the ideas first proclaimed by
Rousseau than the supreme value attached to them by a thinker so cautious and
so profound.
The reawakening
of the religious temper, so characteristic of this period and its literature,
is closely connected with the point we have just treated and may conveniently
be considered next. The religious revival, as was to be expected, had shown
itself in the general life of Europe— nowhere more markedly than in
England—before it found its way into literature. And it is probable that
Pietism in Germany and the Evangelical movement in England did much to prepare
the ground for the reception—perhaps even for the creation—of the new spirit
which was just coming into poetry. In any case, it is impossible to overlook
the contrast between the hard, the increasingly rationalist, strain of the
earlier half of the century and the deep, at times impassioned, religion of its
close. The first writer to show the change in a very marked degree is perhaps
Rousseau; and, in this as in other respects, he stands in the sharpest possible
opposition to Voltaire and the Encyclopedists. Le Vicaire Savoyard, which is
the lasting monument of this side of his, genius, was published, as part of
itmile, in 1762; and throughout the remainder of the century the chillier vein,
represented by Pope at the one end, by Diderot, Helvetius, and Holbach at the
other, tends to sink more and more beneath the surface, the religious temper to
assert itself more and more unmistakably. The latter appears in two widely
different shapes. Under a vague form, merging into pantheism, it is found, to
take only a few instances, in Rousseau, Goethe, and Wordsworth; under a
distinctly Christian form, again to limit our examples, in Cowper and
Chateaubriand. A more complete reversal of the current it is impossible to
conceive. During the second third of the century an observer might well have
been forgiven for thinking that the end of Christianity—nay, of religion itself
in any form that was not either a popular superstition or a purely intellectual
formula—was in sight. With the appearance of Rousseau the whole face of things
was changed. The religious spirit had once more found voice; it once more spoke
with conviction and therefore with authority; and a whole world of thought and
imagination was unsealed. No mistake could be greater than to confine the
results of this to the direct and avowed expression of the religious impulse.
The indirect results, the results both upon speculative and imaginative
thought, were yet more important. The whole bearing of man towards the world,
and its appeal to his heart and reason, was altered. A new breath of spring had
passed into his being; his sense of mystery was quickened; he read more deeply
into his own inner life and
that of
nature; he saw the colour and the movement which form the outward reflexion of
that life more vividly and therefore more truly. The whole force of the
romantic awakening, as well as of the philosophical revolution, from Kant to
Hegel, which went hand in hand with it, is closely connected with this change.
In their more
specific application, in that craving for a “return to nature ” with which, in
part at least, they were bound up, these ideas may fairly be said to have
inspired that which is of permanent value in the work of Herder; that which,
Faust excepted (if indeed it be an exception), is most fruitful and
characteristic in the earlier Vork of Goethe; the early dramas and lyrics of
Schiller; the writings of Bemardin de Saint-Pierre and, to some extent, of
Chateaubriand; above all, that part of Wordsworth’s poetry which is concerned
with human life—“ the haunt and the main region of his song."
In close
connexion with the “return to nature” in the region of human life and of human
relations must be taken the renewed love of outward nature which so strongly
marks the poetry of this period and distinguishes it so clearly from all that
had gone before. The contrast here is not only with the poetry of the Augustan
age; that is obvious enough. In a less, but still a very marked, degree it is
with the poetry of all previous ages. And that in more ways than one. Not only
do natural objects fill a much larger space in the poetry of this age than they
had ever done before; but they are brought into a much closer and more living
relation with the life of man; the inner harmony between man and nature is more
keenly felt, and more truthfully suggested; the varying moods of nature are
more lovingly studied; the subtle play of light and shade, of rest and
changefulness, without is followed with all the more eagerness under the
instinctive faith that these things are in part the reflexion, in part the
moving cause, of joy or sorrow, of gloom or confidence, within. And we may
trace an ever deepening sense of this bond between man and nature, as the
period wears on.
In Thomson,
with whom the movement may be said to take its rise, nature is, on the whole, a
world apart from man, though rich in interest for him. And Thomson was followed
almost immediately by Haller in Switzerland (1729); after an interval, by Bemis
(1763) and other descriptive poets, from Saint-Lambert (1768) to Delille
(1769-1806), in France. From Switzerland, with contributory aid from England,
the new mood of description soon spread into Germany (Kleist’s Friihling,
1749). It was in Germany, however, that the fashion received its first decisive
check; from the hand of Lessing (1766). In England it held its ground much
longer.. From The Traveller (1764) to The Task (1785), from The Task to
Wordsworth’s Descriptive Sketches (1793), the succession is almost unbroken;
though each one of these poems is both more subtle in description, and more
abundant in elements which are not “pure description,” than those of Thomson.
Thus, while
Thomson is
commonly content to take nature in her more general aspects, in the broad and
obvious changes wrought by the seasons, Goldsmith essays the harder task of
seizing that which is distinctive of each different country; and, at least in
the case of France and Holland, his cunning has assuredly not failed him. A
like attempt, but with a less broad and more elusive landscape, is made by
Cowper; and the subtlety with which he renders the rich pastures and winding
caches of the Ouse is a new thing in the poetry of Europe; though an
anticipation of it may be found in the prose of Goethe, still more perhaps in
that' of Rousseau. And the tradition, with a yet deeper faculty of minute and
distinctive observation, is carried yet farther in the Evening Walk, if not in
the Descriptive Sketches, of Wordsworth. Something of the same advance may be
traced in the treatment of atmosphere, and of the magical effects of light and
shade, of distinctness and haziness, which depend upon its changes. Here,
however, the great step forward was taken much earlier; and, in this point, the
Ode to Evening (1746) by Collins has probably never been surpassed; or, if
surpassed at all, not until the advent of Shelley (Euganean Hills, 1818) and, a
little later, of Hugo (Les Orientales, 1828); though it is only just to mention
certain passages of Wordsworth (e.g. A Night Piece and the Moon above the mists
of Snowdon in the Prelude) which, if less delicate in touch, are profoundly
memorable as imaginative renderings of atmospheric effect.
More
widespread, though not in itself more important, was the growing tendency to “
moralise ” nature, to weave a bond between her changing moods and those of man,
to make her the mirror of his joys and sorrows, of his dejection and his
gladness. Under a crude form, this tendency had from the first been latent in
the descriptive poets of the period. In Thomson, still more in his French
disciples, didactic and moralising passages are inserted at stated intervals
among the landscapes and field sports which supply the chief source of
inspiration. In Blair and Young, almost to the exclusion of natural
description, they form the staple of the whole; and the influence of the
latter, great in France, in Germany was immeasurable. It was Collins and Gray
who took the first step in advance, who first sought in nature an appropriate
background, or a mirror, for the moods and emotions of man. And the Elegy,
which awoke several echoes both in France and Germany, is the most familiar
record of this phase of imaginative feeling. To Gray, however, nature is merely
a background for certain human figures and emotions; and the mood which she
throws into relief is almost invariably that of melancholy—the mood which, traceable
in the last resort to II Penseroso, gave to the whole poetry of that day, above
all in England, its prevailing character and discriminating effect. In Collins
we find a yet more intense expression of the same mood. But he has more of
variety and modulation, he moralises less, he holds the scales much more evenly
between man and nature. Something of the same
The return towards the
medieval spirit.
829
note, but
with yet more of modulation, more power to give voice to varying passions, to
make nature the echo of the most diverse moods of man, of his joy no less than
of his sorrow, was soon to be struck by Rousseau, and after him by Goethe; at a
yet later time by Bums, Wordsworth, and Coleridge. And, with each of these
writers in succession, the moralising strain tends more and more to disappear,
its place to be more and more taken by spontaneous feeling or passion, and
nature to be accepted more and more for her own sake, for the readiness with
which she takes up the life of man, with all its fleeting moods, into herself,
or breathes her own spirit, with all its healing influences, into his. The
former is the view presented in Coleridge’s Dejection; the latter, it need
hardly be said, is the prevailing note of Wordsworth. In Wordsworth, moreover,
we catch a strain which had already made itself heard dimly in Rousseau, and
again, more clearly, in Goethe; the conviction that, behind the “outward
shows” of nature, man is able to penetrate to her spirit and, in doing so, to
rise to a purer atmosphere, to win for himself “ a foretaste, a dim earnest of
the calm That nature breathes among the hills and groves.” This is the
religious strain, the pantheism, to which reference has been made above; the
strain which reaches its highest intensity in Goethe and Wordsworth and, a few
years later, in Shelley.
So far we
have been concerned with the vaguer and less specific springs of the romantic
current. We pass now to those which are more intimate and distinctive. And
first, the return towards the past and, in particular, the medieval past. Among
the least pleasant characteristics of the Augustan age was the contempt for all
that was “barbarous” and “ Gothic,” which was then commonly professed and
almost universally felt. In part, no doubt, this feeling rested on pure ignorance.
But it is easy to see that, given the “ legislation of Parnassus,” the
antipathy was inevitable; and that knowledge, had it under such circumstances
been possible, would, in all probability, have served only to deepen it. It was
equally natural that, when the tide began to turn against classicism, men
should look to the ideas, the life, the poetry of the middle, and even the
dark, ages for inspiration. Adventure, romance, strong and simple passion, the
remote, the unfamiliar, the supernatural —all the elements that, on the whole,
were conspicuously lacking to the Latin literature which supplied the core of
the Augustan ideal, were here found, and found in a form which could hardly
fail to captivate men just escaped from the tyranny of Boileau. The first step
in this direction, intelligibly enough, was a revival of that interest in
Spenser which indeed had never entirely died out. The Faerie Queene was full of
the ideas and the matter of chivalry; but it was cast in a form moulded by the
richest culture of the Renaissance and by a loving study of the great poets of
antiquity. Romantic matter, clad in a form the beauty of which
830 Gray.—Ossian.—Percy's Reliques.
even the most
hardened Augustan was scarcely able to deny, and which unquestionably bore marks
of the study of Homer and Virgil, of Ariosto and Tasso—here was treasure-trove
for those who were moving, not without many misgivings, from the false
classicism to the true, from both together in the direction of Romance. The
cult of Spenser, doubtless under a hybrid form, may be traced back as far as
Prior (1706); but the first worthy memorial of it is The Schoolmistress of
Shenstone (1741). This was closely followed by Thomson’s Castle of Indolence in
which the vein of mock-heroic, hitherto so often associated with the Spenserian
revival, was markedly reduced; and with the appearance of this poem, which has
caught the melody, if not the manner, of the original more fully than any
subsequent production, the influence of Spenser may be said to have been fairly
launched upon its way. It was the lifelong task of Thomas Warton to further it.
It appears in the latest poem of Collins, perhaps even in his earlier work; and
through Bums, possibly through Beattie also, it was handed down, now raised to
a higher power, to the generation of Wordsworth and Byron, of Shelley and
Keats.
Admiration
for Spenser, however, was but the first step towards the medieval past. And,
had the movement stopped there, it would have counted for little in England,
for nothing at all upon the Continent. It was once more Gray who made the
crucial advance; who opened the promised land, first of national tradition,
then of primitive mythology, to the poetry of his generation. The Bard, which
revealed the treasures of Celtic legend, was published in 1757; The Descent of
Odin, which did the same service by Norse mythology, followed ten years later.
Between these dates had appeared two works which were destined to have a far
deeper and wider influence than that of Gray upon the imaginative life of
Europe; Macpherson’s Ossian (1760-3) and Percy’s Reliques (1765). Round these
two collections all in the Romantic movement that belongs to medievalism and
much, perhaps most, of that which springs from the love of adventure or of
tragic passion, much even of that which embodies the sense of mystery and of
the supernatural, may be said to gather. But the fortunes of the two books were
curiously different. “ Ossian,” discredited on antiquarian grounds in the
country of his birth, had an unrivalled influence on the whole of Europe.
Goethe, Herder, and Schiller in Germany, Napoleon and Chateaubriand in France,
Cesarotti, Monti and Foscolo in Italy, Ozeroff in Russia, all drew largely from
his inspiration. He was translated, either wholly or in part, by Goethe,
Herder, and Cesarotti; by Turgot, Letourneur and Baour-Lormian; while in
England, apart from second-rate writers, we have to wait till Byron before his
influence showed itself—and, even then, only to a very limited extent. With the
Reliques it was very different. On the Continent, except in Germany, their hour
was long ddayed; and, when it did come, came rather through the medium of such
collections as Herder’s Stimmen der Volker in Liedern (1778-9), or such ballads
as those of Burger,
Schiller, and
Goethe, than by their own force or because they were widely known and loved.
Even in their own country their effect was for a long time much smaller than
might have been expected. They did, indeed, call out an immediate response from
Chatterton (1768). But, with that exception, their influence seems to have
slept for a generation. The Ancient Mariner is the first marked and certain
sign of its revival; and they hardly came to their own until they fired and
moulded the genius of Scott.
If we ask
what it was precisely that these two collections contributed to the Romantic
movement, the answer is not far to seek. Ossian appealed to the feeling for the
wilder aspects of nature, to the craving for the mysterious and supernatural,
to the sense of “ old, unhappy, far- off things,” of the tragedy which lies in
the last struggles of a doomed race; to emotions, that is, which were already
in the air, but which were immeasurably strengthened when they found themselves
repeated in echoes that came, or seemed to come, from the remote past. The very
defects of Macpherson’sfantasia, its vague imagery and anglicised rhetoric,
were rather in its favour than against it. A literal transcript of Gaelic
originals would probably have fallen on deaf ears. What he actually gave was sufficiently
unlike the poetry of the time to provoke interest and curiosity, yet
sufficiently like it not to bar out sympathy and admiration. And it is perhaps
significant that the influence of Ossian was greatest in translations of the
translation, and, possibly, in those Latin countries, France and Italy, where
the Augustan tradition was most firmly rooted. The appeal of the Reliques was
simpler and more straightforward. The love of action and adventure, the joy of
battle and of freedom unchecked by law, the instincts of courage and loyalty—
most of all, perhaps, the craving for strong and simple passion, for the tragic
note which had hardly been heard since the deaths of Milton and Racine—all
these things found expression in the Reliques; and, despite Percy’s alterations
and adornments, they did so in a style which was strikingly simple, rapid, and
direct. Can we wonder that, to ears jaded by a century of Augustan reason and
convention, these two collections, alike in form and matter, should have come
as an inspiration ?
Three fields
in particular were opened out, directly or indirectly, by the Reliques and
Ossian the past, the distant and the supernatural. And in each case the
attraction was essentially romantic in quality. Of the return to the
past—which, just because the Romantic impulse prevailed over all others, for
our purposes means the Middle Ages, the ages above all others of Romance—it
only remains to say that, immediately and in the first instance, it was carried
out nowhere but in Germany. In France, if we except such forgotten writers as
de Belloy and Lemierre, it plays no considerable part until Chateaubriand, and
no decisive one till Hugo. In Italy, it enters only with Manzoni; in the Norse
countries, with Oehlenschlager; in Russia, but under a strangely conventional
832 The
Supernatural.—Revival of humour.
form, with
Ozeroff; while in England, if such subordinate writers as Horace Walpole and
Mrs Radcliffe be excepted, there is little or no trace of it between Chatterton
and Coleridge; nor does it reach its full importance until Scott. Much the
same is true of the search for distant scenes, which may be regarded as a
natural offshoot of the return towards the past. Here again, Germany led the
way; Lessing’s Nathan, a somewhat doubtful instance, and the later work of
Herder (1798-1802) being perhaps the earliest examples. In English literature,
apart from such experiments as Vathek (1782-6), there is nothing in this kind
until The Ancient Mariner and Kubla Khan (1797-8); and, in spite of Southey’s
efforts, the exotic hardly became naturalised till the advent of Byron. In
France, once more, the great innovator was Chateaubriand. And with the
publication of A tala and Rene (1801-2) the quest of local colouring and
unfamiliar scenery may be reckoned to have become as much part and parcel of
the Romantic temper, as the worship of the past had been from the beginning.
The cult of the Supernatural, lastly, was for a long time virtually confined to
Germany. Burger led the way (1774); and, with infinitely more of subtlety, he
was followed by Goethe; not only in Faust, the beginnings of which must be put
back at least so far as 1774, but also in ballads which rather render the
workings of supernatural terror on the soul of man than the world of spirits in
and for itself. And the same way, at a later time, was trodden by Coleridge. In
British literature, Coleridge may almost be called the pioneer, as well as
supreme master, of the Supernatural. The theme had been handled timidly by
Collins, before the appearance of Ossian and the Reliques; it was treated
vividly* yet with more than a touch of irony, by Burns. The full value was
first given to it by The Ancient Mariner, which divides the interest almost
equally between the terror of the Supernatural for its own sake and the
dramatic appeal of “such emotions as would naturally accompany supernatural
situations, supposing them to be real.” After this poem and Christabel
(1798-1800), the reign of the Supernatural was fairly established in England.
And few were the poets of the next generation who did not, in some form or
other, avail themselves of its magic; none, however, with the same confidence
and exulting strength which had been shown by Coleridge. In France it can
hardly be said to have ever taken root; and when it did appear, as in the
earlier poetry of Lamartine, Hugo, and Vigny, did so rather under the symbolism
of the Old Testament than under the forms which passed current in Germany and
England. Nor was there any other country where it found a soil so congenial as
in these.
Among the
diverse characteristics of the literature of this period— and it is one which,
except in the vaguest sense, has little or no relation to the Romantic
spirit—is the reawakening of humour. The later Augustan age had been plentifully
endowed with wit; the very name of
833
Voltaire is
sufficient proof of that. But, except in England, it hardly gave birth to a
single work of humour. Lesage and Marivaux, in very different ways, present the
nearest approach to it elsewhere; and it will be felt at once that the latter
at any rate is hardly, in our sense of the term, to be called a humourist at
all. With Fielding the old tradition, the tradition which linked humour
indissolubly with sympathy, is once more restored; and he passed on the torch
to a long line of successors, including Burns in the field of poetry and
ending, so far as our period is concerned, with Miss Austen and Scott in that
of the novel. In Germany we may trace something of the same revival; who can deny
the humour of Lessing, or the strangely different humour of Richter ? Of other
countries, if we except Diderot’s Le Neveu de Rameau—and naturalism rather than
humour for its own sake is the inspiration of that amazing portrait—the same
thing can hardly be said. So that, once more, we are fain to recognise in
Germany, and still more in England, the peculiar home of this form of creative
energy during the period with which we are concerned.
From humour
we not unnaturally pass to the strain of realism which marks this period and
reappears, under a far more uncompromising shape, in the century that followed.
The part it plays in shaping the thought and method of Diderot has already been
noticed; and in him, there is little need to say, it is intimately connected
with naturalism, as a philosophical creed. In the field of imaginative work,
Diderot found a successor in Restif de la Bretonne (1776-93); and Restif, in
his turn, points the way to certain sides—they are not the only, nor perhaps
the most significant sides—of the genius of Balzac. The only other literature
in which realism makes itself felt during our period is that of England. And
here it is curiously different both in origin and character. It has nothing to
do with theories of philosophy; and, at least in one instance, it is clearly
bent to the purposes of the moralist. The two- chief authors, Wordsworth
excepted, in whom it is to be reckoned with are Miss Austen and Crabbe. In the
former it hardly amounts to more than a resolute determination to paint only
those sides of life which observation at first hand had made familiar, and it
is guided by an instinct for unsparing selection which goes far to destroy its
initial character. In the latter it approaches more nearly to realism, as commonly
understood. It is a method of viewing both human life and outward nature; and,
as in so many other cases, it goes hand in hand with a mood of remorseless
pessimism. Yet, even here, a difference asserts itself. Crabbe, like Defoe, is
essentially a moralist. His first object was to protest against the Arcadian
pastoralism of Goldsmith and others, to shame rich and poor alike by stripping
the tinsel off their vices and weaknesses. In the earlier poems of Wordsworth a
tinge of realism is not to be denied; and, as with Crabbe, it is directed by a
moral purpose. But behind the misery, which to Crabbe had seemed the
inexpiable
curse of poverty, Wordsworth hears “the still, sad music of humanity”; and in
that music all “harsher” sounds were “chastened and subdued.” And his realism
is so closely pressed into the service of what has fitly been called the
Renascence of Wonder that it has something of the effect of romance. After the
Lyrical Ballads of 1798 it virtually fades out of his poetry altogether.
Perhaps the
most curious of all the currents which go to swell the poetic achievement of
this period, and certainly the most difficult to analyse, is the reversion to
classicism which has left so deep a mark on the three great literatures of the
time. Goethe and Schiller in Germany, Andre Chenier in France, Collins at
certain angles of his poetry and, at a later time, Keats, Shelley, and Landor
in England—all these present different phases of the tendency in question. That
in all it was a reversion not to the Latin Classicism of the Augustans, but to
Hellenism, is sufficiently obvious. And, so far, it was not only compatible
with all that we understand by romance—that would naturally follow from the
unquestionable fact that many of these writers were essentially romantic in
temper—but actually went to swell its force. The plainest proof of this is
probably to be found in the work of Andre Chenier, the least Romantic of the
group. For, whatever may be the true truth about that great but extremely
enigmatic figure, it cannot be denied that he was hailed as precursor by the
Romantics of 1830, or that his influence upon the early, and some even of the
later, work of Hugo—an influence which is by no means confined to matters of
metrical form—was very great. In a negative sense, then, we are entitled to say
that, in all these writers, the Hellenic strain represents a reaction, or a
continued protest, against the Latin Classicism of the preceding period. How
far that reaction had anything positively in common with the Romantic movement,
it is more difficult to determine. It is probable that each case requires a
separate answer. Thus, with Goethe and Schiller, there can be no doubt that
Hellenism meant a conscious and deliberate protest against the excesses of
Romanticism, as represented by the whole literature of Sturm und Drang and,
consequently, by their own earlier productions. At the same time, it must be
admitted that in the most characteristic of their Hellenic creations, in
Iphigenie and Die Braut van Messina, the Romantic spirit in its nobler forms,
in its inwardness or in its ardent passion, is not only present but does much
to inspire the whole. The impulse of Chenier is more purely Greek. Of all modem
poets he is perhaps the one who has come nearest to the unrefracted,
impersonal, reflexion of the object before him, which we commonly recognise as
the mark of Greek poetry and of Greek art in general. This at once puts a
barrier between him and the Romantic writers who from Rousseau downwards, and
in many cases of set purpose, fuse their material through and through with
personal emotion. Yet, here again, it is probable that the poet, so far as
outward conditions influenced him
Hellenism and
Romance.—Speculation and politics. 835
at all, was
prompted by rebellion not so much against Romanticism as against the moralising
and often conventional descriptions of the Augnstans. And there are other sides
of his genius, his craving for richness of colour and his subtle sense of life
in the hidden processes of nature, which clearly stand in close relation to the
inner spirit of Romance. With the English poets of the period no doubt of the
same kind presents itself. In none of them does there seem to be any opposition
between Hellenism and Romance. The former either enters as a controlling force,
arranging material which is manifestly supplied by the latter, or it is itself
subordinated to the latter, and does little more than yield subjects which the
Romantic impulse moulds imperiously to its own purpose. The first statement
would be true of Collins; the second, of Shelley and Keats. There is but one of
Collins’ poems in which the Hellenic, as distinct from the Pindaric, strain
makes itself felt: the Ode to Simplicity. And, however Greek its inspiration,
the whole poem is so interwoven with the promptings and memories of romance,
that it should rather perhaps be taken as an instance of the readiness with
which Hellenism lends itself to romantic purposes than of any inherent conflict
between the one spirit and the other. The flowers, we may say, adapting a
crucial verse of the Ode, are to be “culled” by Romance, though the hand, which
“ranges their ordered hues,” is that of Hellenism. With Shelley and Keats the
case is clearer still. Both are apt to select subjects from the mythology or
the legendary lore of Greece. But neither handles such subjects in the manner
or spirit of the Greek poets. As both poets, however, fall beyond our period,
we must content ourselves with one instance: the Ode on a Grecian Urn, where
the antique figures, Greek as they are in form and posture, speak, it must be
admitted, with a voice which comes from the inmost soul of romance.
This sketch
began with the return to nature in the field of imaginative thought. It may
fitly close with the return to nature in the field of speculation and politics.
The fountain-head of the stream which sweeps in this direction, it need hardly
be said, is to be found in Rousseau; not indeed in Le Contrat Social (1762),
which is, in the main, the embodiment of a very different creed; but in itmile
and, still more, in the second Discours (1755), which took the imagination of
men captive and effectually shut their ears to the qualifications—we may almost
sav, the antagonistic doctrine—subsequently put forward by the writer. No
writing of this, and few of any other, period can claim to have wielded a
stronger or deeper influence than these. Witness the earlier phases of the
French Revolution, on the one hand; the early work of Goethe and the whole
literature of Sturm und Drang, upon the other. These, however, for different
reasons fall beyond our limits. Nor is it possible to dwell upon the Jacobin
dramas of Giovanni Pindemonte in Italy (1797-1800). It must suffice to pause
for a moment on the corresponding movement —a movement too often neglected—in England.
This reached its
height in the
very years of the revolutionary ferment across the water. It is to these years
(1790-6) that belong the early, the distinctively Jacobin, writings of
Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey; the glorification of “ nature ” as against
“ art ” to be found in the novels of Godwin, Bage and Mrs Inchbald ; and, above
all, the Political Justice of Godwin (1793). If any one book can be said to
embody the revolutionary spirit of these wild years, the years of the Jacobin
crusade and the anti-Jacobin reaction, it is this strange medley of political,
social, and philosophical nihilism which casts a spell over minds so different
as those of Wordsworth and Shelley; while even a writer so little given to
dreams as Madame de Stael was accused, absurdly enough, of using it as an
arsenal of free- thinking ideas. Godwin’s argument is full of confusions, and
he was the last man in the world to carry uncompromising principles into
action. But, as a symptom of the extent to which the revolutionary ferment had
spread to other countries, and as the first of a long line of writings which
have urged a reconstruction of the social fabric from top to bottom, his book
is intensely significant. And the protest raised by Political Justice has never
fallen entirely silent. Much of it is echoed, and echoed with a far purer note,
in the earlier poetry first of Wordsworth, then of Shelley. And, from
Saint-Simon onwards, it has become almost a commonplace of European literature
and thought. The only other writer of these troubled years whom there is need
to mention is Paine; the author of The Rights of Man (1791-2), a fiery and, in
some points, a not altogether unmerited assault on Burke.
Burke, it
need hardly be said, was the deadly enemy of the creed, so dear to the earlier
romanticists, which exalted nature above society and found in a return to
nature the only remedy for the ills of mankind. Yet, behind these differences,
there was common ground on which he might have joined hands with his opponents;
ground far deeper than that on which he met and fought them. In his conception
of reason, in his belief that the purely logical and conscious elements of
man’s mind do not make the whole of it, that the instinctive, unconscious
imaginative elements must be admitted as factors—nay, that they are, and ought
to be, the determining factors of the whole—in all this he was at one with the
ideas which lay at the very root of the Romantic movement, and which declared
themselves more and more plainly as that movement gathered strength. It was
this that secured the triumph of the imagination over the intellectual
elements in the poetry of this and the succeeding age. It was this that cleared
the way for the philosophical revolution which reached its height in the
theories of Hegel. And of all this Burke, in his later and more significant
writings (1790-7), is the precursor. This is true not only of his thought, but
of the style in which it found appropriate expression. In passion, in richness
of colouring, in his power of touching the deepest springs of thought and
feeling, of passing without an effort from the homeliest effects to the highest
and
most
imaginative, he reaches back to the great writers of the seventeenth century,
and marks nothing short of a revolution in the history of English prose style.
And the effects of that revolution are not yet exhausted. On the writers of his
own day it might be difficult to show that Burke exercised any considerable
influence. Yet echoes of his thought, and in a less degree of his style, make
themselves dimly heard in the prose of Coleridge and Wordsworth ; more clearly,
unless appearances are altogether deceptive, in that of Joseph de Maistre
(1796-1819). And, if the question of direct influence be waived, it is certain
that the author of Le Pape moves on the same plane as the author of the
Reflections, and has a certain kinship with him in respect of style.
Of the other
literary developments of the time—of the renewal of History by Gibbon, of the
great work done by Lessing, Diderot, and others in criticism, of the new birth
of philosophy associated with Kant and his successors—there is no room to
speak. In so great a wealth of material, it has been necessary to keep within
the limits of literature, in the narrower sense.
(1) THE HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION.
[See also
Bibliographies of Chapters II and IV in the present volume; also the
Bibliographies of Chapter XIV, Section (2) and of Chapters XV and XXI in Vol.
F.]
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Loewe, V. Bibliographie der Hannoverschen und Braunschweigischen
Geschichte. Posen.
1908.
[This
exhaustive bibliography of the history of the House of Brunswick and its
dominions supersedes the necessity of any others; references to earlier bibliographies
will be found in it, as well as to the catalogues of important libraries, such
as that of the late King George V of Hanover, and that of the Historische
Verein fur Niedersachsen at Hanover.]
See also Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der Deutschen Geschichte, 7th edn.,
edited by E. Brandenburg, Leipzig, 1906.
In Loewe’s
Bibliography are also enumerated the various historical periodicals of this
part of Germany, notably the
Zeitschrift
des Historischen Vereins fur Niedersachsen, Hanover, 1850, etc.; from 1892 with
the supplementary title: Zugleich Organ d. Vereins fur Gesch. d. Herzogthumer
Bremen und Verden, und des Landes Hadeln (In progress), and the Archives,
Repertories and subsidiary publications of this and other Societies.
II. MANUSCRIPTS.
It is
unlikely that any extant documentary evidence concerning the transactions
connected with the Hanoverian Succession, or illustrating its antecedents and
the personages who had part in bringing it about or obstructing it, remains
unutilised, though not all of it may have been reproduced at length in print.
The most important among the repositories of this ms. evidence are, of course, our own Record Office and the
British Museum. In the former, Foreign Entry Books, 49, 217, and Germany
(States), 164, may be specially noted; in the latter, eleven folio vols. of
Hanover Correspondence, together with transcripts of the same, and a collection
of documents made by Thomas Astle, intended as an appendix to the Hanover
Papers, are preserved among the Stowe mss.,
the contents of which are fully described in the Catalogue of Stowe mss., London, 1895, Vol. i, pp. 287-321.
For valuable guidance as to diplomatic personages see:
Chance, J. F.
List of Diplomatic Representatives and Agents, England and North Germany,
1689-1727. Contributed to Notes on Diplomatic Relations between England and
Germany. Ed. C. H. Firth. Oxford. 1907.
Next come the
treasures, which for a long time seemed inexhaustible, of the Royal Archives at
Hanover; as to which see
Bar, M. Ubersicht tiber die Bestande des K. Staatsarchivs zu Hannover.
(Mit- theilungen der K. Preuss. Archiv-verwaltung, 3.) Leipzig. 1900.
Cf. Bar, M. Geschichte des K. Staatsarchivs zu Hannover. (Mittheil.
2.) Leipzig. 1900.
Of the
Electress Sophia’s vast correspondence preserved in the Hanover Archives a large
proportion has heen printed. (See the publications enumerated below.) The copy
of the Act of Settlement brought to Hanover in 1701 is preserved there. The
original patent of the same date conferring the Garter on the Elector
(afterwards King George 1) is preserved in the Royal Public Library at Hanover,
where the mss. connected with the transactions and prominent personages of the
Succession period are relatively few in number. See
Bodemann, E. Die Handschriften der K. offentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover. Hanover.
1867.
For the
history of the Hanoverian Succession the ms. material in the diplomatic
correspondences at Vienna (more especially Hoffmann’s reports), the Hague (the
correspondence of Heinsius) and Paris (where Torcy’s correspondence is of
course chiefly concerned with the other side) has been assiduously examined.
Among English sources of importance for the history of the Succession the
following have been calendered for the Historical mss. Commission:
Harley
Letters and Papers, Vols. n and in, forming Vols. iv and v of the mss. of the Duke of Portland. 1897-9.
Shrewsbury
Papers, mss. of the Duke of Buccleuch. Vol. n. Part i. 1903. Stuart Papers,
belonging to the King. Vol. i. 1902.
III. CONTEMPORARY LETTERS AND MEMOIRS.
Burnet,
Gilbert, Bp. of Salisbury. History of my own times. Vols. v and vi. Oxford.
1823.
A
Memorial offered to the Princess Sophia, containing a Delineation of the
Policy of
England. (From the Hanover Archives.) London. 1815.
Ernest
Augustus (the younger), Duke. Briefe an Johann
Franz Diedrich von Wendt aus den Jahren 1703-26. Ed. by Count
E. Kielmannsegg. Leipzig. 1902. Kemble, J. M. State Papers and Correspondence,
1686-1707. London. 1867. [Contains letters of Leibniz.]
Zur Geschichte der Succession des Hauses
Hannover in England. (Contains
contemporary
letters.) In Zeitschr. d. hist. Ver. fur
Niedersachsen. Hanover. 1852.
Leibniz, G. Werke. Ed. O. Klopp. Series l. Hanover. 1864, etc.
Vol. v. Briefe und Berichte an den Herzog Ernst August.—Die Feststellung
der Primogenitur im Welfenhause.—Briefe und Berichte iiberd. Reise von 1678-9
bis zum Ende d. Aufenthalts in Wien.—Erster Aufenthalt in Wien. Vol. vi. Die
neunte Kurwiirde.—Personalien des Kurfursten Ernst August von
Braunschweig-Liineburg.
Vols. vn-ix. Correspondenz mit der Prinzessin Sophie, spater Kiirfurstin
von Braunschweig-Liineburg. 1680-1714.
Vol. x. Correspondenz mit Sophie Charlotte, Konigin von Preussen.
Vol. xi. Correspondenz mit Caroline geb. Prinzessin von Anspach.
Geschichtliche Aufsatze und Gedichte. Ed. G.
H. Pertz. Hanover.
1847.
Marchmont
Papers.—A selection from the papers of the Earls of Marchmont, in the
possession of Sir G. H. Rose, illustrative of events, 1685-1750. Vol. hi.
London. 1831.
Original
Papers containing' the Secret History of Great Britain from the Restoration to
the Accession of the House of Hanover, arranged and published by James
Macpherson. Section: Hanover Papers. Vol. 11. London. 1775.
As to these
Papers, which are copies of translations, extracts, or abstracts from a portion
of the papers left by John de Robethon concerned with English domestic
politics, see J. F. Chance, Corrections to James Macpherson’s Original Papers
in English Historical Review, vol. xhi, July, 1898.
Pauli, R. Aktenstiicke zur Thronbesteigung des Welfenhauses in England. In
Zeitschr. des hist. Vereins fiir Niedersachsen. Hanover. 1883.
Sophia, Electress.—Memoiren der Herzogin Sophie, nachmals Kurfiirstin von
Hannover. Hrsgbn. von A. Kocher. (Publicationen a. d. K. Preuss. Staats-
archiven. iv.) Leipzig. 1879.
— The Electress Sophia. Quarterly Review. July, 1885.
Aus den Briefwechsel Konig Friedrichs I von
Preussen u. der Kurfiirstin
Sophie von Hannover. (Aus den Briefwechsel Konig F. I und seiner Familie.)
Ed.by E. Berner. (Quellenund Unters.z. G. d. H. Hohenzollem.) Berlin. 1901.
Aus den Briefen der Herzogin Elisabeth
Charlotte von Orleans an die Kur-
furstin Sophie von Hannover. Ed. E. Bodemann. 2 vols. Hanover. 1891.
Briefe an die Raugrafinnen nnd Raugrafen zu
Pfalz. Ed. E. Bodemann.
Publicationen a. d. K. Preuss. Staatsarchiven. xxxvu. Leipzig. 1888.
Briefe der Konigin Sophie Charlotte von
Preussen und der Kurfiirstin Sophie
von Hannover an hannoversche Diplomaten. Ed. R. Doebner. (Publicationen a.
d. K. Preuss. Staatsarchiven. lxxix.) Leipzig.
1905.
Briefe des Konigs Friedrich 1 von Preussen und
seines Sohnes des Kronprinzen
Friedrich Wilhelm I an die Kurfiirstin Sophie von Hanover. Ed. E. Bodemann.
In Zeitschr. des hist. Vereins fur Niedersachsen, 1899.
Hanover.
Memoirs of Mary, Queen of England (1689-93),
together with her letters
and those of
Kings James II and William III to the Electress Sophia of Hanover. Edited by R.
Doebner. Leipzig. 1886. .
Toland, John.
Account of the Courts of Prussia and Hanover. London. 1705.
German
transl. Frankfort. 1706.
Wentworth
Papers, the. Selected from the Correspondence of the Earl of Strafford. Edited
by J. J. Cartwright. London. 1883.
IV. LATER WORKS.
A. Works referring to the Hanoverian
Succession.
Bodemann, E. Herzogin Sophie von Hannover. In Hist.
Taschenbuch. Leipzig. 1887.
Chance, J. F.
John de Robethon and the Robethon Papers. In English Historical Review. Vol.
xm, January. 1898. London.
Droysen, J. G. Geschichte der preussischen Politik. Part iv. Sections
1 and 2 (Frederick I and Frederick William I). Leipzig. 1867-9.
Erdmannsdorffer, B. Deutsche Geschichte vom westfalischen Frieden bis zum
Regierungsantritt Friedrichs des Grossen. Vol. n.
Berlin. 1893.
Favre, C. B. La diplomatic de Leibniz. Negotiations et memoires pour la
succession d’Angleterre. In Revue d’histoire
diplomatique, 1905, 1906, 1907. Paris.
' Fester, R. Kurfiirstin Sophie von Hannover. Hamburg. 1893.
Fischer, Kuno. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. (Chapters vm and ix.)
4th edn. Heidelberg. 1902.
Foxcroft, H.
C. A Life of Bishop Burnet, ii.
England. 1674-1715. With an Introduction by C. H. Firth. Cambridge. 1907.
Guhrauer,
Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leihnitz. 2 vols. Breslau. 1846. Hallam, H. The
Constitutional History of England. Vol. m. 7th edn. London. 1854. Halliday, A.
A General History of the House of Guelph. With an appendix of authentic and original documents. London. 1821.
Havemann, W. Geschichte der Lande Braunschweig und Liinehurg. 3 vols.
Gottingen. 1853-7.
Heinemann, O. von. Geschichte von Braunschweig und Hannover. Vol. m. Gotha.
1892.
Klopp, O. Der Fall des Hauses Stuart und die Succession d. Hauses Hannover
in Grossbritannien und Irland. 14 vols. Vienna. 1875-88.
Meinardus, O. Die Succession d. Hauses Hannover in England und Leibniz. Ein
Beitrag zur Kritik des Dr Onno Klopp. Oldenburg. 1878.
Kocher, A. Andreas Gottlieb Graf von Bernstorff (1649-1726). In Allgemeine
Deutsche Biog. Vol. xlvi. Leipzig.
1902.
Sophie Kurfiirstin von Hannover (1630-1714).
In Allgemeine Deutsche Biog.
Vol. xxxiv. Leipzig. 1892.
Michael, W. Englische Geschichte im 18. Jahrhundert. Vol. i, pp. 281-400,
40359. Hamburg and Leipzig. 1896.
Pauli, R. Die Aussichten des Hauses Hannover auf den englischen Thron im
Jahre 1711. In Pauli’s Aufsatze zur englischen Geschichte. (New series.)
Leipzig. 1883.
Confessionelle Bedenken bei der
Thronbesteigung des Hauses Hannover in
England. In Pauli’s Aufsatze zur englischen Geschichte. (New series.)
Leipzig. 1883.
Ranke, L. von. Englische Geschichte vomehmlich im xvn. Jahrhundert. 2nd
edn. Vol. vn: Grundlegung und Bedingungen der hanoverschen Succession.
Sammtliche Werke. Leipzig. 1871, etc. Vol. xxi. English translation: Oxford.
1875, etc. Vol.
vi.
Roscoe, E. S.
Robert Hardy, Earl of Oxford. A Study of Politics and Letters in the Age of
Anne. London. 1902.
Salomon, F. Geschichte des letzten Ministeriums Konigin Annas von England,
1710-4, und der englischen Thronfolgefrage. Gotha. 1894.
Schaumann, A. Georg I, Kurfiirst von Hannover (1600-1727). In Allgemeine
Deutsche Biog. Vol. vm. Leipzig. 1878.
Geschichte der Erwebung der Krone
Grossbritanniens von Seiten des Hauses
Hannover. Hanover. 1878,
Johann Caspar von Bothmer (1656-1732). In
Allgemeine Deutsche Biog.
Vol. hi. Leipzig. 1876.
Zwei Aufsatze zur Geschichte des Welfischen
Hauses. In Zeitschr. des hist.
Vereins fur Niedersachsen, 1874r-5. Hanover.
Schmidt, H. Die Kurfiirstin Sophie von Hannover. With Appendix by A. Haupt:
Die bildende Kunst in Hannover zur Zeit der Kurfiirstin Sophie. No. v of
Veroffentlichungen zur Niedetsachsischen Geschichte. Hanover. 1899, etc. Sichel,
W. Bolingbroke and his Times. Vol. i. London. 1901.
Stanhope,
Earl (Lord Mahon). History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of
Versailles, 1713-83. 3rd edn. Vol. i. London. 1853. Thornton, P. M. The
Brunswick Accession. London. 1887.
Vehse, F. Geschichte der Hofe des Hauses Braunschweig in Deutschland und
England. Vol. i. (Gesch. d. deutschen Hofe seit d. Reformation. Vol. xvm.) Hamburg.
1853.
Ward, A. W.
The Electress Sophia and the Hanoverian succession. Paris and London. 1903. 2nd
edn. (revised). London. 1909.
The Electress Sophia and the Hanoverian
succession. English Historical
Review. Vol.
i. London. 1886.
Ward, A. W.
Great Britain and Hanover. Some aspects of the personal union.
Oxford. 1899.
German translation, by K. Woltereck. Hanover.
1906. Weber, O. Der Friede von Utreoht. Verhandlungen zwischen England, Frank-
reich, dem Kaiser u. der Generalstaaten, 1710-3. Gotha. 1891.
Wright, Th.
Caricature history of the Georges, or Annals of the House of Hanover. London.
1898.
Wyon, F. W. The
History of Great Britain during the reign of Queen Anne. Vol. ii. London. 1876.
Bottger, H. Stammtafel der regierenden Fiirsten des Welfenhauses und ihrer
Vor- fahren. Hanover. 1858.
Bottger, H. Die allmahliche Entstehung der jetzigen welfischen Lande.
Zur Erlauterung der Stammtafel. 2nd edn. Hanover.
1859. .
Guelph,
Pedigree of the House of. Founded principally on L’Art de Verifier les Dates.
By W. A. Lindsay. Compiled for the Guelph Exhibition, 1891.
Stewart,
Pedigree of the House of. Founded on the accounts printed in Wood’s edition of
Douglas’ Peerage. By W. A. Lindsay. Compiled for the Stewart Exhibition, 18S0.
B. Miscellaneous.
Beaucaire, H. de. Une mesalliance dans la maison de Brunswick
(1665-1725). fileonore Desmier d’Olbreuze, duchesse de Zell. Paris. 1884.
Bodemann, E. Neue Beitrage zur Geschichte der cellischen Herzogin Eleonore
geb. d’Olbreuse. Zeitschr. des hist. Vereins fur Niedersachsen, 1887. Hanover.
J. H. von Ilten. Nebst Anlagen: Briefe an
Ilten. Zeitschr. des historischen
Vereins fur Niedersachsen, 1879. Hanover.
Chance, J. F.
A Jacobite at the Court of Hanover. [On Lady Bellamont.] English Historical
Review. July, 1896. London.
Deecken, Count von der. Beitrage zur hannoverschen Geschichte unter Georg
Wilhelm, 1649-65. Vaterland. Archiv d. histor. Vereins fur Niedersachsen.
Liineburg and Hanover. 1839.
Greenwood, A.
D. Queens of the House of Hanover. Vol. i. (Sophia Dorothea.) London. 1909.
Heimbiirger, H. T. Georg Wilhelm Herzog von Braunschweig und Liineburg
Celle. 1852.
Kocher, A. Die letzte Herzogin von Celle. Preussische Jahrb. lxiv. Berlin. 1899.
Gesch. von Hannover und Braunschweig,
1648-1714. Vols. i and n, 164868, have appeared so far. Leipzig. 1884, etc.
Sophie Dorothea, Prinzessin von Ahlden
(1666-1726). Allgemeine Deutsche
Biog. Vol. xxxiv. Leipzig. 1892.
Malortie, C. E. von. Beitrage zur Gesch. des braunschweig-luneburgischen
Hauses und Hofes. 7 parts. Hanover. 1860-84.
Beitrage zur braunschweig-liineburg. Gesch.
New Series. Vol. i. Hanover.
1879.
Der hanoversche Hof unter dem Kurfiirsten
Ernst August und der Kurfurstin
Sophie. Hanover. 1847.
Meier, E. von. Hanoversche Verfessungs- und
Verwaltungsgeschichte. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1898-9. .
Rocholl, H. Die Braunschweig-Liineburger im Feldzug d. Grossen Kurfiirsten
gegen Frankreich. Zeitschr. d. histor. Vereins fur Niedersachsen, 1895.
Hanover.
Spittler, C. T. Geschichte dps Fiirstenthums Hanover seit den Zeiten der
Reformation bis zu Ende des 17. Jahrh. 2nd edn. 2 vols. Hanover.
1798.
Tytler,
Sarah. Six Royal Ladies of the House of Hanover. London. 1898. Wilkins, W. H.
The love of an uncrowned Queen. Correspondence
of Sophie Dorothea with Count Konigsmarck. London. 1900.
Geerdsj R. Die Briefe der Herzogin von Ahlden, etc. Beilage zur Allgemeinen
Zeitung, No. 77. Munich. 1902.
Sophia
Dorothea. Edinburgh Review. January, 1901.
See also
Appendix B to second edition of A. W. Ward, The Electress Sophia (ante, A).
(2) THE
FOREIGN POLICY OF GEORGE I.
1714-21.
[See
also Bibliographies to Section (1) of the present Chapter, to Chapters II, VII,
VIII,
1, and X of the present volume, and to Chapters I and II of Vol. F.]
I.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
(This list is
confined to bibliographies specially concerning affairs treated in this
Section and
not given elsewhere.)
Allen, C. F.
Scandinavian bibliographies prefixed to Haandbog i Foedrelandets Historie.
Seventh edn. Copenhagen. 1870. And to the French translation by E. Beauvois.
Copenhagen. 1878.
Baden, G. L.
Dansk-Norsk historisk Bibliothek. Odense. 1815.
Brunn, C.
Bibliotheca Danica. Systematisk Fortegnelse over den Danske Literator fra 1482
til 1830. Vol. in. Copenhagen. 1896.
Hidalgo, D. Diccionario General de Bibliografia Espanola. 7 vols.
Madrid. 1862-81.
Minzloff, R. Pierre le Grand dans la literature etrangere. [Publie a
l’occasion de l’anniversaire deux fois seculaire de lanaissance de Pierre le
Grand,] d’apresles notes du Comte de Korff, etc. St Petersburg. 1872.
Pirenne, H. Bibliographie de l’histoire de la Belgique. Ghent.
1893. Second edn., Ghent. 1902.
Setterwall,
K. Svensk historisk Bibliografi, 1876-1900. Stockholm. 1907.
II.
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.
British Museum.
Alberoni,
Cardinal. Unione de Scritture attenenti all’ Emmo Giulio Alberoni,
fatto Cardinale li 12 Luglio, 1717, etc. 2 vols. Add.
16481-2. Sucessos de Alveroni, y diligencias de la Corte de Espafia, en carta
del duque de Parma de 21 de Marzo 1721. Egerton, 361, f. 231. Manifiesto de el
Cardenal Jullio Alveroni. Carta escripta al Exmo Senor Cardenal
Paoluzzi secretario de Estado de N. Senor. (March 1,
1721.) Egerton, 361, f. 247. (French translation from an Italian version, “
Nouvelle Lettre,” etc. Amsterdam. 1721.)
Carteret
Papers. Official copies of Lord Carteret’s despatches, etc., from Sweden,
1719-20, and as Secretary of State, 1721-4. Add. 22511-9 and 22523-4.
Dayrolle Papers.
Official diplomatic correspondence of James Dayrolle, British Resident at
Geneva, 1715-7, and at The Hague, 1717-38. Vols. i-iv (170638). Add. 15866-9.
Letterbooks, Vols. ii-iv (1715-38). Add. 15876-8.
Gualterio
Papers. Correspondence, chiefly of Cardinal F. A. Gualterio, Protector of the
English Catholics at Rome* with all the principal Courts of Europe, Add.
20241-20583 B; of which; 20241, correspondence with Clement XI, 1716-9; 20242,
registers of drafts of secret letters, chiefly 1701-6 and 1716-7 ; 20243,
copies of Papal briefs, etc. ; 20292-20310, Jacobite correspondence ; 20311-13,
miscellaneous papers relating to England, 1701-28. Further Jacobite correspondence,
Add. 31254-67.
Gyllenborg,
Count. Deciphers of his intercepted (or seized) correspondence, 1716-7, Add.
32285, and of other like correspondence, French and Italian, 32307-8. Histoire Politique du Siecle depuis 1648, jusqu’en 1748. Par l’editeur
du Testament Pol. du Cardinal Alberoni. The
dedication is signed M. B. R., Lausanne, October 10, 1763. Add. 4207, No. 5.
Melcombe
Papers. Original correspondence and papers of George Bubb, Envoy Extraordinary
to Spain, 1714-8. 6 vols. Egerton 2170-5.
Monumenta Britannica ex autographis Romanorum Pontificum deprompta. Vol.
xi,vni. Add.
15398. (Includes important letters of Clement XI and other Popes, with other
papers, relating to the Pretender. Transcripts.) Newcastle Papers. Vol. i
(1697-1723). Add. 32686.
Noailles,
Card. de. Correspondence with the Pretender, 1714-22: Egerton 1677. Norris,
Admiral Sir John. Journals, letter-books, etc.,' 1715-21. Add. 28128-9, 28135,
28143-7, 28154-6.
Northern
Pacification, The, 1719-20. Copies and drafts of papers concerning this and
other subjects. Add. 4193.
Ormonde,
James Butler, Duke of. Letter-book, concerning the projected Spanish invasion
of 1719. Add. 33950. (Dickson, W. K. See under IVB below.) Relazioni e
scritture della Successione del Duca d’ Angio di Francia, etc. Vol. xviii includes a letter of the Marchese
Grimaldi to Cardinal Acquaviva, August 9,
1717, on the invasion of Sardinia, with answers
thereto. Add. 16468.
Robethon
Papers. Miscellaneous correspondence anti papers of Jean de Robethon,
confidential
secretary to George I. Vols. vi-xi, 1714-9.
Stowe 227-32.
Rome,
Newsletters from, 1719-24. Add. 8381.
Schaub
Papers. Correspondence and papers of Sir Luke Schaub, 1714-23, mostly copies.
Add. 4204.
Diplomatic correspondence, 1717-25. Add.
35837, iii.
Spanish
correspondence, deciphers (6), 1719-20. Add. 32298.
Spanish War.
(1) An Extract of the Masters Journalls of the Barfleur in relation to the
Engagement with the Spanish Fleet by Sir George Byng, 1718. (2) An Account of
Capt. Cavendish’s Engagement with three Spanish Ships of Warr Anno 1719.
Extracted from the Masters Journalls of the Ships concerned in that Expedition.
Add. 5439, 3. 84, 90.
Losses sustained by Spanish Depredations at
Sea and in Port in the years
1718, 1719, and 1720, etc. Add. 34335, f. 146.
Stanhope,
General James. Letter-book (Hanover, etc.), July-Sept. 1716. Add. 22510.
Colonel W. Original despatches from Madrid,
1721. Add. 22520.
Sutton, Sir
R., and others. Original despatches, etc., from Paris, 1721-2. Add. 22521-2.
Warrants
(copies) for the payment of £130,000 to the Emperor, Jan. 2, 1718, and of
£63,000 for the Queen of Sweden, Nov. 19, 1719. Addi, 22616, S. 178, 180.
Worsley, Henry. Original letters and despatches to him, when Ambassador to
Portugal, 1714-21, with various papers, including a narrative of the battle of
Cape Passaro. Add. 15936.
III. PRINTED ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.
A. Treaties and State Papers.
Most of the
Treaties, without, of course, the secret articles, were published in
various
languages immediately upon their conclusion. The originals of the British
Treaties, and
papers concerning them and others, maybe consulted at the Public.
Record Office
(State Papers Foreign, Treaties and Treaty Papers).
See
specially:
Cantillo, A.
del. Tratados, convenios y declaraciones de paz y de
comercio que han hecho con las potencias estranjeras los monarcos espanoles de
la casa de Borbon. Desde el ano de 1700 hasta el dia. Madrid. 1843.
Collection of
Treaties, Alliances and Conventions, a, relating to the Security, Commerce, and
Navigation of the British Dominions, made since His Majesty’s Accession to the
Crown. London (S. Buckley). 1717-8. (Latin, French, Spanish and English texts.)
Faber, A.
(pseud.). Europaischer Staats-Cantzley, etc. (the title varies for each
volume). Vols. xxii sqq. Frankfort and Leipzig. 1714 foil.
Falck, N. N. Sammlung der wichtigsten Urkunden welche auf das Staatsrecht
der Herzogthiimer Schleswig und Holstein Bezug haben. Kiel. 1847.
Garden, Comte de. Histoire gendrale des Traites de Paix et autres
transactions principales entre toutes les puissances de l’Europe depuis la paix
de Westphalie. Ouvrage comprenant les travaux de Koch, Schoell, etc.,
entierement refondus et continues jusqu’a ce jour. Vols. i, iv,
v. Paris. [1847.]
General
Collection of Treatys of Peace and Commerce, Manifestos, Declarations of War,
and other Publick Papers, a, from the end of the Reign of Queen Anne to the
year 1731. Vol. rv (the titles of the other volumes differ). London. 1732.
Ghillany, F. W. Diplomatisches Handbuch. . Sammlung der
wichtigsten Euro- paeischen Friedenschluesse, Congressacten, und sonstigen
Staatsurkunden vom Westphalischen Frieden bis auf die neueste Zeit. Parts
i, n. Nordlingen, 1855. Bill. .
[Harris, W.,
D.D.] A Complete Collection of all the Marine Treaties subsisting between Great
Britain and France, Spain, etc. (1546-1763). London. 1779.
Hertslet, Sir
E., C.B. Treaties and Tariffs regulating the trade between Great Britain and
foreign nations, etc. Part v, Spain. London. 1878.
Hochst-gemiissigter Historischer-Acten-massiger Bericht, von dem was vom
Anfang der, im Monath Augusto 1713 angetretenen Regierung Carl Leopold,
Hertzogen zu Mecklenburg, bis
zu der, im Monath Martio und April 1719
ergangenen Kayserlichen Execution, von dem Fiirstl.
Mecklenburgischen Ministerio, vorgenommen
worden, etc. 1719. (886 docs.)
Martens, F. de. Recueil des Traites et Conventions conclns par la Russie
avec les Puissances Etrangeres. Vol. v, Germany (1656-1762). St
Petersburg. 1880. Vol. ix (x), England (1710-1801), ibid. 1892. Vol. xni, France (1717-1807), ibid. 1902.
Martens, G. F. de. Supplement au Recueil des principaux Traites precede de
Traites du xvmme siecle anterieurs a cet epoque et qui se ne
trouvent pas dans le Corps Universel Diplomatique de M" Dumont et Rousset
et autres recueils gfodraux de trails. Vol. i. Gottingen. 1802.
Mod£e, G. R. Utdrag af de emellan Hans Konglige Majestat och Kronan
Swerige & ena, och Utrikes Magter & andra sidan, sedan 1718 slutna
Alliance-Traktater och Afhandlingar. Stockholm. 1761.
Noradounghian, G. Recueil d’Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman.
Vol. i (1300-1789). Paris, Leipzig, Neuchatel.
1897.
Sammlung verschiedener Berichte, auch Staatschriften, den Tod Karls des
XII, die in Schweden hierauf erfolgten Veranderungen, und die Erhebung der
Konigin Ulricae Eleonorae auf den Schwedischen Thron, betrefiFend. Second
edn. Freistadt (Jena). 1719.
Schleswig-Holstein.
Texts of the French and English guarantees, June and July 1720. Archives diplomatiques (ed. Amyot). Annee iv. Vol. i. Paris. 1860.
Testa, Baron I. de. Recueil des Traites de la Porte Ottomane avec les
Puissances Etrangeres, etc. Vol. ix. (Autriche, Vol. i.) Paris. 1898.
B. Letters, Despatches, eto.
Bosscba, P. De Geschiedenis van Oostelijk en Noordelijk Europa gedurende
bet merkwaardig tijdvark van 1687-1716. (Correspondence
of Dutch Ministers, chiefly on Turkish affairs.) Zalt-Bommel. 1860.
Brefvexling mellan Konung Carl XII och RAdet (1714-5). Historiska
handlingar, Kongligt Samfundet. Vols. xiv,
xv. Stockholm. 1892-5.
Brunet, G. Correspondance complete de Madame Duchesse d’Orleans, nee
Princesse Palatine, Mere du Regent. Traduction entierement nouvelle. 2 vols.
Paris. 1857. Later editions, Paris, 1869 [1904].
Carlson, E. Kapten Jefferyes bref til Engelska regeringen ftAn Bender
och Adrianopel, 1711-4, frira Stralsund 1714-5 (in English). Historiska handlingar. Vol. xvi, No. ii. Stockholm. 1897.
Konung Karl Xll’s egenhandiga Bref. Stockholm.
1893. German transl.
by E. Mewius.
Berlin. 1894.
Droysen, J. G. Eine Denkschrift Ilgen’s [1716 ?]. Zur Politik von 1715
(correspondence). Das Journal des Feldzugs von 1715. Ein Bericht
von Bonnet. (London, August 7/18, 1719). Lord Cadogan’s Memorial uud Graf
Bothmer’s Project von 1721 (as to a coalition against Peter the Great). Geschichte der preussischen Politik. Vol. iv. Part iv.
Leipzig. 1870.
Elagin, S. Materialui dlya istorii russkago flota. Baltysky
flota, 1702-25. 4 vols. St Petersburg. 1865-7.
[Gaspari, A. C.] Briefe Friedrichs IV, Konigs in Danemark. Urkunden und
Materialien z. n. K. Gesch. und Staatsverwaltung Nordischer Reiche. Vol.
i. [Hamburg ?] 1786. [See especially letter of August 12,1718, to Count
Holsten- Holstenborg, with the answer, and drafts for treaties with Great
Britain and Hanover.]
Gordon,
Admiral Sir Thomas (of the Russian navy). Correspondence and papers of.
1716-40. Historical Manuscripts Commission. Report x. Part i, pp. 15799.
London. 1885.
Handlingar
rorande Skandinaviens historia. Kongligt Samfundet, Vols. vi, viii, x, xii,
xvm, xxi (Correspondence). Stockholm. 1816 sqq.
Hardwicke
Miscellaneous State Papers. Vol. n. No. ix. Lord Stair’s
Embassy in France, 1714, etc. (Stair’s jonmal and correspondence, 1714-9.)
1778.
Lamberty, G. de. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire du xvm® siecle. Vols.
vm to xi, 1714-8; Vol. x including Treaties of 1718 to 1751. Amsterdam. 1734-6.
(First edn., 1723.)
Critique by
J. G. Droysen. Gesch. d. preuss. Politik. Vol.
rv, Pt iv.
Leipzig.
1870.
Letters which
passed between Count Gyllenborg, the Barons Gortz, Sparre, and others, relating
to the Design of raising a Rebellion in His Majesty’s Dominions, to be
supported by a Force from Sweden. Published by Authority. London. 1717. (French
and English.) Also printed in Tindal’s History, and Cobbett’s
Parliamentary
History. Translations in various languages. The originals'at the Public Record
Office, chiefly in State Papers, Foreign; Confidential iA, iB.
Deciphers, British Museum. Add. mss. 32285, 32307-8.
Moe, B. Actstykker til den norske Krigshistorie under Kong Frederik den
Fjerde (17'16-8). Reprinted from the Milit. Tidsskrift, vols.
xv-xvn. 3 parts. Christiania. 1838-40.
Privateers,
The Ordinance of, 8-19 February 1715. The Swedish text in G. Floder’s
Handlingar horande til Konnng Carl Xll’s historia, Part iv. Stockholm. 1826.
French translation, and pamphlets concerning it, Lamberty, vol. ix. Abstract,
English Historical Review, vol. xvn, p. 70.
Russia.—Diplomatic
correspondence, chiefly of French ministers in Russia, 1711-33. (French.)
Sbornik, etc. Vols. xxiv, xl, xux, lii, lviii, lxiv, lxxv, lxxxi. Diplomatic
correspondence of James Jefferyes and other English Ministers in Russia, 1711-40:
Ib. Vols. lxi, lxvi, lxxvi, lxxx, lxx:-v.
Other Correspondence; etc. Ib. Vols. m, v, xi, xv, xxv, xxxiv (2). St
Petersburg. -1893.
Theiner, A. Monuments historiques relatifs aux regnes d’Alexis
Michaelowiteh, Feodor III et Pierre le Grand, Czars de Russie, extraits des
Archives du Vatican et de Naples. (Includes important despatches
of the Papal Nuncio,
1715-25,
about Russian doings in Courland, Poland, etc.) Rome. 1859. Townshend, Charles,
Viscount. Extracts from his correspondence. Historical
Manuscripts Commission. Report xi, Part iv. London. 1887.
V’:1.lebois, Sieur de. Memoires secrets pour servir a
l’histoire de la Cour de Russie, sous les regnes de Pierre-le-Grand et de
Catherine I6”. Rediges et publies par le Comte Theophile Hallez.
Paris. 1858.
Wijnne, J. A. Stukken rakende de Quadrupel Alliantie van 1718,
(Despatches of Dutch envoys, etc., Jan.-July 1720.) Kroniek of
Utrecht Historical Society, 27 Jaargang, 1871, 6th Ser., Pt n. Utrecht. 1872.
C. Periodicals
other than Newspapers.
(The
principal British newspaper of the time was the London Gazette, thrice weekly.)
The Annals of
King George. Year the first, to sixth, containing not only the affairs of Great
Britain, but the general History of Europe during that time; with an
introduction in defence of His Majesty’s title, etc. 6 vols. London. 1716-21.
La Clef du Cabinet des Princes de l’Europe, ou Recueil Historique et
Politique sur les matieres du tems. (Monthly ;
half-yearly volumes.)
Die Europaische Fama, welche den gegenwartigen Zustand der vornehmsten Hofe
entdeckt. Parts
i-cccut. 30 vols. [Leipzig.] 1702-35.
The
Historical Register, containing an Impartial Relation of all Transactions
Foreign and Domestick. Vols. i. foil, (from 1716). London. 1717 foil.
Supplementary: Transactions...that happen’d during the first Seventeen Months
of the Reign of King George. 2 vols. London. 1724.
Lettres Historiques ; contenant ce qui se passe de plus important en
Europe ; et les reflexions ne'cessaires sur ce sujet. Monthly ;
half-yearly volumes. Vols. xlv sqq. 1714, etc. The Hague; from Vol. xlviii,
Amsterdam. 1692-1736.
IV. SECONDARY WORKS, CONTEMPORARY OR NEARLY
CONTEMPORARY.
A. Memoirs and Journals.
[See
also Bibliography to Section (1) above and Chapter II.]
Bonnac, Marquis de. Meraoire historique sur l’Ambassade de France a Constantinople,
par le Marquis de Bonnac. Publ. par C. Schefer. (Socie'te
d’histoire diplomatique.) Paris. 1894. (Docs.)
Bruce, P. H.
Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce. Translated by himself (1753), from bis original
German, and published after his death. London. 1782.
Franclieu, Marquis de. Memoires du Marquis de Franclieu (1680-1745). Ed.
L. de Germon. (Societe historique de Gascogne: Archives historiques de la
Gascogne, Ser. ii, fosc. i.) Paris and Aucb. 1896. [Valuable for
the Duke of Ormond’s expedition of 1719.J
Galitzin (Golitsuin), Prince A., ed. La Russia au xviii8 siecle. Memoires
in£dits sur les regnes de Pierre le Grand, Catherine IJr* et Pierre
II. Paris.
1863.
Ker, John.
The Memoirs of John Ker, of Kersland in North Britain. With an Account of the
Rise and Progress of the Ostend Company in the Austrian Netherlands. Published by himself. 3 vols. London. 1726.
Le Dran. Memoires sur les negociations entre la France et le Czar de la
Grande Russie Pierre 1 (1719-24). Sbornik imp. russk. istor. obschtschestra,
Vols. xl, xux, lit. St Petersburg.
1884-6. Prefaced in Vol. xxxiv (Appendix) by Traites d’entre la France et la
Moscovie, 1613-1717; an essay chiefly consisting of Negociations entre la
France et le Czar Pierre I. 1715-7. St Petersburg. 1881.
Peter the
Great’s Journal from 1698 to the conclusion of the Peace of Nystad. Ed. Prince
M. Shcherbatov. 2 vols. St Petersburg. 1770-2. Complete translation, by H. L.
C. Bacmeister and C. G. Arndt. 3 vols. Riga. 1774-6-84.
Pollnitz, Baron de. Nouveaux Memoires du Baron de Pollnitz, contenant
l’Histoire de sa vie, et la Relation de ses premiers voyages. 2
vols. Amsterdam. 1737.
B. Histories and Pamphlets.
[See
also Bibliographies to Chapters II (1), III, IV and, P.]
Account, an,
of the rise of the War with Spain in 1718. London. 1740.
Alberoni,
Cardinal. The Conduct of Card. Alberoni, with an Account of some Secret
Transactions at the Spanish Court. London. 1720.
The History of Card. Alberoni, from his Birth
to the year 1719. To which are
added,
Considerations upon the Present State of the Spanish Monarchy. Translated from
the originals. London. 1719. [Perhaps a translation of the work attributed to
J. Rousset de Missy, below.]
Bolingbroke,
Viscount. Works. 8 vols. 1809. (Vols. i-in.)
Bothmer,
Count. Memoiren d. Engl. Ministers Grafen
Bothmer iiber die Quadru- pelallianz von 1718. Ed. R. Doebner. Forsch. z.
deutsch. Gesch. Vol. xxvi. Gottingen. 1886.
Colliber, S.
Columna Rostrata, or, a Critical History of the English Sea-Affairs. London.
1727 and 1742.
[Corbett, T.]
An Account (or, a True Account) of the Expedition of the British Fleet to
Sicily in the years 1718, 1719 and 1720, under the command of Sir George Byng,
Bart., etc. London. 1739. French translation: Relation de
l’expedition de la Flotte Angloise, 1718-20. The Hague. 1741.
De la Gardiska Archivet, ed. P. Wieselgren. Vol. xvi. (1) Fredrik, Prins
af Hessen. (2) Fredspunkter emellan Carl XII och Czar Petter I fundne i
Gortzens papper. (3) Ytterligare om K. Carl XII’s dod. (4) Drottning Ulrika Eleanora d. y. (5) Riksdagen 1719. (6) Riksdagen 1720.
(7) K. Fredrik I. Lund. 1842.
[Defoe, D.]
The History of the Wars of his late Majesty Charles XII, King of Sweden, from
his First Landing in Denmark to his Return from Turkey to Pomerania. The Second
Edition. With a Continuation to the Time of his Death. By a Scots Gentleman in
the Swedish service. London. 1720.
[Defoe, D. ?]
The case of the War in Italy stated: being a Serious Enquiry how far
Great-Britain is Engaged to Concern it Self in the Quarrel between the Emperor
and the King of Spain. London. 1718.
Die abgezogene Masque des Alandischen Friedens-Congresses...Eine Schrifft,
in welcher die Intriguen des Weltbekannten Barons von Gortz, und bisherigen
Absichten des Russischen Hofes wahrhafftig und deutlich entdecket werden. A. d. Frantzos. und Holland, ins Teutsche iibersetzet. Hamburg. 1720.
Discussion universelle de tous les articles du Traite de la Barriere des
Pais-Bas entre sa Majeste Imgeriale et Catholique, Sa M. le Roy de la Grande
Bretagne, & Les Seigneurs Etats Generaux des Provinces Unies. Par le Sr.
S***. Cologne. [1716 ?]
Disquisitio Juris Naturalis et Gentium de justo Gyllenborgii et
Goertzii, Sueciae legatorum in Britannia et Confoederato Belgio, arresto. With
German translation. Frankfort and Leipzig. 1717.
[Gyllenborg,
Count C.] The Northern Crisis: or, Impartial reflections on the policies of the
Czar. Occasioned by van Stocken’s Reasons for delaying the descent upon Schonen
(prefixed in transl.). 1716. French translation : LaCrise du Nord, etc. London.
1717.
[ ] An English Merchant’s Remarks upon a
scandalous Jacobite paper published
in the Post
Boy under the name of A Memorial presented to the Chancery of Sweden by the
Resident of Great Britain. London. 1716. French translation in Lamberty. ix.
667.
Interest,
the, of Great Britain with Relation to the Differences among the Northern
Potentates, consider’d.... (The dedication to Stanhope signed A. Boyer.)
London. 1716. [Defence of the policy of George I.]
Istoria del
Cardinale Alberoni dal giorno della sua nascita fino alia meta dell' anno 1720.
Seconda edizione. Amsterdam. 1720.
Kliiver, H.
H. Hans Heinrich Kliiver’s Beschreibung des Herzogthums Mecklenburg u. dazu
geh. Lander. Parts iv, v (1713-29). Hamburg. 1739-40.
(Does.)
La Conduite des Cours de la Grande Bretagne et Espagne, ou Relation de
ce qui s’est pass£ entre ces deux Cours par rapport a la situation presente des
affaires. Amsterdam.
1719. Engl. tr. 1720.
Letter, a, to
a Friend at the Hague, concerning the Danger of Europe, and particularly of
Great Britain, in case the Quadruple Alliance should not succeed. (London, June 23, 1718.) London. 1718.
“ Nestesuranoi, Ivan ” (J. Rousset de Missy). Me'moires
du Regne de Pierre le Grand. Vols. m, iv. The Hague and Amsterdam.
1726. Later editions, Amsterdam (4 vols.), 1728-30, and (6 vols.), 1740.
Critique by
J. G. Droysen. Geschichte der preussischen Politik. Vol. iv, Pt. iv.
Leipzig. 1870.
Pffeffinger, Joh. Friderich (Konigl. Gross-Britannischen Rath). Historic
des
Braunschveig-Luneburgischen Hauses, bis auf das Jahr 1733, etc. Part
in. Hamburg. 1734.
Reasons for a
War with France. The Second Edition. London. 1715. (Dunkirk and Mardyk, with
Prior’s memorial and the answer, and a general discussion.) An Argument against
a War with France, wherein a late Pamphlet entitled “Reasons for a War,”
is...refuted, etc. 1715.
Reasons for
the present Conduct of Sweden, in relation to the Trade in the Baltick, etc.
London. 1715.
Reflections
upon the Present State of affairs in France____ In
a Letter to the Right
Honourable
the E. of S . London. 1715.
Relation de lo sucedido en el regno de Sicilia por las armas de su
Magestad. Barcelona. [1719.]
Relacion veridica del combate que el 11 Agosto 1718, huvo entre la
Armada de Espana y la de Inglaterra en las Costas Orientales de Sicilia, y en
la Canal de Malta. Madrid.
Rousset de Missy, J. Histoire du Cardinal Alberoni, trad, de l’Espagnol
[which is untrue]. The Hague. 1719.
Critique hy J. G. Droysen, as ahove.
San Phelipe, Marques de. Comentarios de la Guerra de Espana, e historia
de su Rey Phelipe V el Animoso, desde el principio de su Reynado, hasta la Paz
General del ano 1725. Genoa [1790 ?]. French translation by
L. L. Flderbe, Comte de Maudave. 4 vols. Amsterdam. 1756. Mutilated. German
translation from this (not from the Spanish, as stated). Mittau, etc. 1772-7.
(The principal source for the history of Philip V.)
Schmauss, J. J. Johann Jacoh Schmaussens Einleitung zu der Staats-Wisscn-
schaft, und Erleuterung des von ihm herausgegebenen Corporis Juris Gentium
Academici und aller andem seit mehr als zweyen Seculis her geschossenen
Bundnisse, Friedens- und Commercien-Tractaten. i, Sec. hi (1700-40). Die Historie der Balance von Europa, der
Barrifcre der Niederlande, der Oester- reichischen Sanctionis pragmaticae, etc.
Leipzig, 1741. n, Sec. ii (1700-43). Die Historie aller zwischen den Nordischen
Potentzen, Danemarck, Schweden, Russland, Poland und Preussen geschlossenen
Tractaten in sich haltend. Leipzig. 1747.
Secret
Memoirs of the New Treaty of Alliance with France; with some Characters of
Persons. London. 1716.
Some
Considerations upon his Majesty’s Message; and the Dutchies of Bremen and
Verden.
In a Letter to the Worshipful Mr--------------- ,
Mayor of S . To which
is prefix’d,
A Map of those Dutchies; and of the Rivers Elbe and Weser. (8 April, 1717.)
London. 1717.
Stanhope,
Earl. Memoirs of the Life and Actions of the Right Honourable James Earl
Stanhope. With his Character, and a Poem occasion’d by his Death. London. 1721.
Struve, B. G. Memoires pour servir a 1’Histoire du Congres de Cambrai,
avec un Traite' historique sur les Investitures de quelques Etats d’ltalie. 1723.
Discurs vom Uhrsprung, Unterscheid und
Gerechtsamen der Lande-Stande
in Teutschland, insonderheit im Hertzogthum Mecklenburg; wobey die im Jahre
1715 zwischen dem reg. Hertzog Carl Leopold von Mecklenhurg- Schwerin und der
Mecklenhurg. Ritter- und Landschafft enstandene Dispute erortert werden.
.Hrsgbn. von C. G. J. [C. G. Jargow]. Hamburg. 1741.
Theatrum Europaeum. Theatri Europaei Zwantzigster Theil. 2 parts (1713-5). Frankfort.
1734. Jubilaeum Theatri Europaei. 2 parts (1716-8). Frankfort. 1738.
Townshend,
Viscount. An Impartial Enquiry into the Conduct of the Right Honourable Charles
Lord Viscount T . London. 1717.
V. LATER WORKS.
A. Great
Britain.
[See also
Bibliographies of Section 1 above and Chapters II and III.]
Acton, Lord.
The Hanoverian Settlement. Lectures on Modem History, xvi. 1906. Ballantyne, A.
Lord Carteret, a political biography, 1690-1763. London. 1887. Bussemaker, Th. De Triple-Alliantie van 1717. Bijdragen voor
vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde. Series lv.
Part n. The Hague. 1901. Chance, J. F. George I and the Northern War. London.
1909.
Clowes, Sir
W. L., and others. The Royal Navy. Vol. hi (1714-92). London. 1898. Colomb,
Rear-Admiral Sir P. H. Naval warfare, its ruling principles and practice
historically treated. 1891, etc.
Dickson, W.
K. The Jacobite Attempt of 1719. (Publications of the Scottish History Society.
Vol. xix.) Edinburgh. 1895.
Leadam, I. S.
The Political History of England, Vol. ix: from the Accession of Anne to the
death of George II (1702-60). London. 1909.
Mahan, Capt.
A. T. The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1660-1783.
Boston
(Mass.). 1890, etc.
Mahon, Lord
(Earl Stanhope). History of England from the peace of Utrecht to the peace of
Versailles. (Vols. i and n.) London. 1853 and 1858.
Michael, W. Englische Geschichte im 18 Jahrh. Vol. i. Hamburg and Leipzig.
1896.
Weber, O. Die Quadrupel-Allianz vom Jahre 1718. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte
der Diplomatic im achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Vienna, etc.
1887.
Whitworth,
Sir C. State of the Trade of Great Britain in its imports and exports,
progressively from the year 1697. London. 1776.
B. The
Netherlands.
[See also
Bibliography of Chapters XIV 2 of Vol. 7.]
bussclie, E. van den. Le Traits de la Barriere. Pourquoi l'art. 1 de la
convention de 1718, sur les limites entre la Flandre et le territoire soumis
aux Ktats- Gdneraux ne fut point execute. “La Flandre, annee 1880.” Bruges.
1880. Dollot, R. Les origines de la neutrality de la Belgique et le systeme de
la Barriere, 1609-1830. Paris. 1902. (Bibl. and Docs.)
C. France, Spain and Italy.
[See
also Bibliographies of Chapters IV and F.]
Armstrong, E.
Alberoni and the Quadruple Alliance. The Scottish Review.
Vol. xxix. London. 1897.
Elizabeth Farnese. London. 1892.
Baraudon, A. Le Roi de Sicile Victor AmadfSe II et la Triple Alliance
(1715-20). Annales de l’Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, Vols. vi, vn.
Paris. 1891-2.
La Maison de Savoie et la Triple Alliance
(1713-22). Paris. 1896.
Bliard, P. Dubois, Cardinal et Premier Ministre. 2 vols. Paris. [1901.]
Dubois et 1’Alliance de 1717. Revue des
questions historiques. Vol. lxviii.
Paris. July. 1900.
Bossaud, A. Le Port de Dunkerque apres le traite d’Utrecht. Ibid.
Vol. xxx. Dunkirk. Paris. 1898.
Caruttij D.
Storia del Reguo di Vittorio Amadeo II (1675-1730). Turin. 1856. 2nd edn.
Florence. 1863.
Criticism on
Carutti’s works by S. Berea, .i, Storia del Cardinale Giulio Alberoni. Appendix. Piacenza. 1661.
Fantin, A. E. N. des Odoards. Histoire de France, depuis la mort de
Louis XIV jusqu’a la paix de Versailles de 1783. Vols. i, ii (1715-36). Paris. 1789.
Fernandez Duro, C. Armada Espanola desde la Union de los Reinos de
Castilla y de Aragon. Vol. vi. Madrid. 1900.
Filon, C. A. D. L’Alliance Anglaise au dix-huitieme siecle. Depuis la
paix d’Utrecht jusqu’a la guerre de la succession d’Autricbe. (Memoire lu a
l’Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques.) Paris. 1860.
Flassan, G. de Raxis de. Histoire generate et raisonnee de la Diplomatic
Fran^aise. 2nd edn. Vols iv, v (1679-1784). Paris and Strassburg. 1811.
Gaillardj G. H. Histoire de la rivalite de la France et de l’Espagne.
Vol. vm. Paris. 1801.
La Rocca, L. La cessione del Regno di Sardegna alia Casa Sabauda.
(Miscellanea di Storia Patria. R. Deputazione sovra gli studi di Storia Patria,
etc. 3rd Series, Vol. x.) Turin. 1906. (Bibl. and Docs.)
Lavisse, E. Histoire de France. Vol. vm, Part
2. (To appear.)
Legrelle, A. La Diplomatic frani^aise et la Succession d’Espagne. Vol.
vi. La Paix. (1710-25.) Second edn. Braine-le-Comte. 1899.
Martin, B. L. H. Histoire de France depuis les temps les plus recules
jusqu’en 1789. Fourth edn. Vol. xv. Paris. 1878.
H. de l’fipinois. Critiques et refutations. M. Henri Martin et son
Histoire de France. Paris. 1872.
Ranke, L. von. Franzosische Geschichte, vomehmlich im sechszehnten und
sieb- zehnten Jahrhundert. Vol. iv. Book xvii. Die Regentschaft und Cardinal
Fleury. Stuttgart and Tubingen. 1856. (Werke, Vol. xi. Leipzig. 1869.)
Schmidt, E. A. Geschichte von Frankreich. (Gesch. der europaischen
Staaten.) Vol. xv. Hamburg. 1848.
Wiesener, L. Le Regent, l’Abbe Dubois et les Anglais, d’apres des
sources Britanniques. 3 vols. Paris. 1891-3-9. (Docs.)
D. The Empire and the German States.
[See also
Bibliography of Chapter VIII1.]
Beer, A. Zur Geschichte der Politik Karls VI. Historische Zeitschrift, Vol.
lv.
Munich and Leipzig. 1866.
Droysen, J. G. Die Wiener Allianz vom 5 Januar 1719. Abhandlungen zur
neneren Geschichte. No. vix. Leipzig. 1876. Also in his Geschichte der
preussischen Politik. Vol. xv. Part iv. (Text of the treaty with
notes by Ilgen and Frederick William I.) Leipzig.
1870.
Critique by W. Michael. Ein schwieriger diplomatischer Fall ails dem Jahre
1719. Historische
Zeitschrift, lxxxviii. Part i. Munich. 1901.
Geschichte der preussischen Politik. V6l. iv. Parts
n and iv. Leipzig.
1869-70.
Second edn. 1872. Index to Vols. x to iv, by C. Gerstenberg. Leipzig. 1876. ' Erdmannsdorffer, B. Deutsche Geschichte
vom Westphalischen Frieden bis zum 3eg;ierungsantritt Friedrichs des Grossen.
1648-1740. Vol. n. Berlin. 1893.
Franck, D. Alt- und Neues Mecklenburg. Vol. vi, Book xvii : Von
Mecklenburgs Zerriittung in alien St&nden, etc. (1713-27). Giistrow and
Leipzig. 1757.
Gottorp.—Gesch. d. Herzoglich Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorfischen Hofes und
dessen vornehmsten Staats-Bedienten unter der Regierung Herzog Friedrichs IV
und dessen Sohnes Herzog Carl Friedrichs. (1700-34.) Frankfort and Leipzig.
1774. Graff, W. P. Die zweite Ehe des Herzogs Karl Leopold. Ein Kulturbild aus
Mecklenburg im ersten Viertel des 18 Jahrhunderts. Jahrbiicher des Vereins fur
Mecklenburgische Geschichte uud Altei'thumskunde, Jahrgang lx. Schwerin. 1895.
(Bibl.)
Havemann, W. Geschichte der Lande Braunschweig und Liineburg. Vol.
h.
Liineburg.
1838. New edn. Vol. in. Gottingen. 1857.
Mailath, Count J. Geschichte des ostreichischen Kaiserstaates. (Gesch. der
europaischen Staaten.) Vol. iv. Hamburg. 1848.
Matthias, C. Die Mecklenburger Frage in der ersten Halfte des achtzehnten
Jahrhunderts, und das Decret des Kaisers Karls VI vom 11 Mai 1728. Hallische
Abhandl ungen, 1885.
Menzelj K. A. Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen von der Reformation bis zur
Bundesacte. Vol. x. Die Zeit Karls VI und die Aniange Friedrichs II. Breslau.
1843 and 1854-5.
M oiler j C. Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins. Von der altesten Zeit bis auf
die Gegenwart. Vol. n. Hanover. 1865.
Pratje, J. H. Die Herzogthiimer Bremen und Verden, ein Eigenthum des konig-
lichen Grossbritannischen und Churfiirstlichen Braunschweig-Liineburg’schen
Hauses. (Vermischte historische Sammlungen. Herausgegeben unter Leitung des
vaterlandischen Vereins zu Stade. Vol. i. No. xi.) Stade. 1842. (Treaties and
docs.)
Prutz, H. Preussische Geschichte. Vol. ii.
Stuttgart. 1900.
Ranke, L. von. Neun Bucher Preussischer Geschichte. Vol. i (Book i).
Berlin.
1847. Zwolf
Bucher Preussischer Geschichte. Vol. hi
(Werke, Vol. xxvn). Leipzig. 1874. English tr. by Sir A. and Lady
Duff Gordon. Vol. i. 1849.
Schleswig-Holstein.—Beseler, G. Die englisch-franzdsische Garantie vom
Jahre
1720. Berlin.
1864. Does. Cf. Archives Diplomatiques (ed. Amyot), Annee IV. Vol. i. Paris.
1864.
Thomsen, G. Om de Fransk-Engelske Garantie for
Slesvig af 1720.
(A. F. Krieger’s Antislesvigholstenske Fragmenter, No. in.) Copenhagen.
1848. (Correspondence and does.) German and
French translations. Copenhagen. 1848.
E.
Scandinavia. .
[See also
Bibliographies of Chap. XIX qf Vol. V and Chap. XXII of present Fo/.]
Allen, C. F. Haandbog i Foedrelandets Historie. 7th edn.,
revised and improved, Copenhagen. 1870. (Bibl.) French translation by E.
Beauvois. Copenhagen. 1878. (Bibl.)
Backstrom, P.
O. Svenska flottans historia. Stockholm. 1884.
Baden, G. L. Danmarks Riges Historie. Vol. v.
Copenhagen. 1832.
Bain, R. N.
Scandinavia, a political history of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, from 1513 to
1900. (Cambridge Historical Series.) Cambridge. 1905.
Beskow, B. von. Friherre Georg Henrik von Gortz, statsman och statsoffer.
Svenska Akad. Handlingar ifr&n &r 1796, Vol. xliii. Stockholm.
1868. Carlson, F, F. Om fredsunderhandlingarne iren 1709-18. Ett bidrag till
Carl XII’s historia. Stockholm. 1857.
Cedercreutz, Baron H. Sverige under Ulrica Eleonora och Fredric I, eller
ifrin 1718 till 1751. Efter den, af framledne Hans Excellens Riks-R&det,
Herr Friherre Cedercreutz, forfattade haudskrift. Ett inledande
bihang till Skriften Tessin och Tessiniana. Stockholm. 1821.
Larsson, H.
Grefve Karl Gyllenborg i London firen 1715-7. Ett bidrag till Sveriges yttre
Politik under Karl XII’s sista regerinps4r. Gothenburg. 1891. [Moser, F. C., Baron von.] Rettung der Ehre und Unschuld
des Freyherrn von Schiitz, genannt von Goerz, etc. Mit xxx Beylagen. 1776. 2d
enlarged edn. Hamburg. 1791. Docs.
Scherer, H. Der Sundzoll, seine Geschichte, sein jetziger Bestand, und
seiue staatsrechtlich-politische Losung. Berlin. 1846.
Stavenow, L.
Frihetstiden, 1713-72. Part m of Sveriges historia intill tjugonde seklet. Ed. E. Hildebrand. Stockholm. 1903. German translation:
Geschichte Schwedens, 1718-72, by C. Koch. (Geschichte Schwedens, Vol. vn.
Gesch. d. europ. Staaten.) Gotha. 1908.
Syveton, G. L’erreur de Goertz. Revue
d’histoire diplomatique. Vol. ix, No. hi.
Vol. x, Nos. i, ii, hi, iv. Paris. 1896-6.
Woltmann, K. L. Freiherr von Gorz, Frennd Karls des Zwolften. Woltmann’s
Geschichte und Politik, Vols. i, n. Berlin. 1800.
F. Russia, Turkey, etc.
See
also Bibliographies of Chaps. XVII and XIX of Vol. V and of Chap. XIX c
of present Vol.]
Abeken, H. Der Eintritt der Tiirkei in die Europaische Politik des achtzehnten
Jahrhunderts. Berlin. 1856.
Hartmann, K. J. Tsar Peter’s Underhandlingar 1716 om LandgAng i Sk&ne.
Helsingfors.
1887. (Critical bibl. and docs.)
Herrmann, E. Geschichte des russischen Staates. (Geschichte der
europaischen Staaten.) Vol. iv. Hamburg. 1849.
Popov, N. A. Materialui dlya istory morskago dyela pri Petrye Velikom’, v’
171720 godakh’. (Materials for the history of naval affairs in
the time of Peter the Great, in the years 1717-20.) Moscow. 1859.
Solov’ev, S.
M. Istoria Rossy s’ drevnyeishikh’ vremen'. (History of Russia from the
earliest times.) Vols. xvn, xvm. Moscow. 1867-8. “Second” edn. Vol. iv. St
Petersburg. [1896.] Docs.
Stoerk, F. Das Greifswalder Bundniss zwischen Peter d. Gr. und Georg I vom
28/17 Oktober 1715. (Separatabdruck aus Pommersche Jahrbiicher. Vol. n.)
Greifswald. 1901.
Uhlenbeck, C. C. Verslag aangaande een onderzoek in de archieven van
Rusland ten bate der Nederlandsche Geschiedenis. Part in. Het tijdperk van
Koera- kieus verblijfhier te land (1711-24). The Hague.
1891. (Bibl. by T. Cordt. Docs.)
Ustryalov,
N. G. Russkaya Istoria. Vol. hi
(1689-1762). St Petersburg. 1838. 5th edn. Vol. ii. St Petersburg. 1865.
[Introduction and critical bibliography in Vol. i.] .
Veselago, T.
T. Ocherk' russkoi morskoi istorii. (Outline of Russian naval history, to
1725.) St Petersburg. 1876.
THE AGE OF WALPOLE AND THE PELHAMS.
(1) GENERAL
I.
BlIlLIOGBAPHIES.
Fortescue, 6.
K. Subject Index of the Modern Works added to the Library of the British
Museum, 1881-1900. London. 1902 ; 1901-5 ; 1906.
For
diplomatic matters, so far as they relate to France:
Monod, 6. Bibliographic de l’histoire de France a 1789. Paris.
1888.
For English
political history:
Leadam, I. S.
Political History of England, 1702-62, pp. 503 sqq., supplies a good critical
bibliography.
For all
American and Colonial affairs:
The
Literature of American History, by various writers. Ed. J. N. Lamed, and
supplements in subsequent years. London. 1902. A most valuahle critical
bibliography.
II. Manuscript Sources.
A. Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs.
References to
the unpublished material in Hanover, Berlin, Vienna, the Hague, Madrid, Paris,
and Edinburgh are given in the Bibliographies to Chapters i, m, iv and v.
Unpuhlished documents dealiug with Jacobite affairs are fully descrihed in the
Bibliography to Chapter m. So far as the English Records are concerned, the
following is the unpublished material on which the present Chapter is based.
For the
diplomatic history of the period :
British
Museum. Stowe mss. 246-7. Craggs Papers, being principally letters to James
Craggs the younger, Secretary at War and Secretary of State, from Earl of Stair
etc. (1711-20.)
Stowe mss.
261, Townshend, Viscount. Transcripts of correspondence when at Hanover in
1723. [Mostly in Coxe’s Memoirs of Sir R. Walpole. Vol. h. Appendix. London. 1798.]
Add. mss.
32743-4. Correspondence of Newcastle, W. Stanhope, Horatio (Lord) Walpole,
Viscount Townshend, etc. 1724-6. [Partly used by Coxe.]
Add. mss.
32780-2. Correspondence of Newcastle and Waldegrave.
Add. mss.
37444. Correspondence of Newcastle, Horatio (Lord) Walpole, Viscount Townshend
etc. Important for the year 1726.
For the
Spanish War and its causes, 1738-9:
Add. mss. 23802; f. 86, 23803, f. 121; Add. mss. 32091-2; Add. mss. 35406-7 passim; Hardwicke
Correspondence; Add. mss. 32800;
Add. mss. 33028; for a general
detail of the South Sea Company’s affairs v. Add. mss. 33032, copy, if. 218-28, ff. 277-82; the documents as
to British Rights on the Mosquito Shore from 1672 onwards are transcribed in
Stowe mss. 256, ff. 305-17, and
Add. mss. 33117, ff. 25-37.
The papers at
the Public Record Office, some of which are duplicated at the British Museum,
exhibit a far fuller detail of the causes of the War; see especially the
following:
Public Record
Office, State Papers Foreign, Spain, 109, 113, 118, 130, 131-4, the
correspondence between Keene and Newcastle passim,; see also P.R.O., S.P.F.,
Spain, 224, for the reports of Consuls at Cadiz, Barcelona, etc.; the proofs of
Newcastle’s duplicity as to the Counter Orders—described in the text—will be
found in P.R.O., Admiralty Outletters. Vol. lv,
pp. 194-8, 208, 230-5, 242-5, 270, 296, 304, 370, 389, 445 sqq.
British
Museum. Stowe mss. 256 ff.,
282-304, shows the respective attitudes of Pitt and Keene towards Spain in 1757
and is interesting by way of comparison with 1739. This correspondence has been
printed (apparently from copies) in Hist. mss.
Comm. Rep. x. App. 1, pp. 212-21.
At the
British Museum other parts of the Newcastle and Hardwicke Correspondence than
those mentioned supply materials of great value for the period, but the
arrangement of both series, especially of the Hardwicke Papers, is too heterogeneous
in character to permit of further specific reference. The Coxe Papers, Add. mss. 9128-97, afford a vast mine of
information, which has already been much used.
Besides these
sources the Whitworth Papers, British Museum Add. mss. 37361-97 [Charles Lord Whitworth was envoy at various
Courts and Plenipotentiary at Cambray, 1722-5], will probably be found to
contain materials of the most value. For English policy generally see B.
Williams (below IV 2), who gives many mss.
references for the period 1721-31. For Spain see Baudrillart (below III
A).
B. Home Affairs.
The Newcastle
and Hardwicke Papers are again our chief source of information— but suffer even
more from the defects above alluded to—viz. the miscellaneous and
unchronological character of their arrangement. For this period as a whole the
following volumes, which have been used in the preparation of this chapter, may
be found useful. They contain many details on the party disputes and
Ministerial intrigues of the period.
British
Museum. Add. mss. 32947 ;
32994r-99; 35335 ; 35408; 35416 ; 35423-4 ; 35870.
The working
of the Cabinet-system during the eighteenth century—a subject full of
difficulty—is probably most fully illustrated by the following volumes at the
Public Record Office:
Home Office
Conncil Office. Vols. x, xvi, xix, xi.
Home Office
Secretaries Letter Books. Vol. xxvi.
III. Printed
Original Documents and Contemporary Publications.
A. Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs.
Baudrillart, A. (see above). (1) Rapport sur une Mission en Espagne aux
Archives d’Alcala de Henares et de Simancas. (2) Ditto, aux Archives de
Simancas (Part iii). Correspondances
diplomatiques apres 1715. Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Litte'raires.
3rd ser. Vol. xv. Paris. 1889. Further correspondence after 1724 in Nouvelles
Archives des M. S. et L. Vol. vi. Paris. 1895.
Berwick, Due de. Memoires. Coll. Petitot. Vols. lxv-vi. Paris. 1828.
Recueil des instructions donnees aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de la
France, 1648-1789. Vol. xrij bis (Pt. 2). (1722-93.) Espagne. By A.
Morel-Fatio and
H. Leonardon. Paris. 1899.
Historical
Manuscripts Commission Reports:
Townshend,
Charles, Viscount. Extract from Correspondence. Rep. xi, Pt. 4.
London. 1887.
Spanish
Affairs, 1738-9, etc.
Trevor,
Robert. Correspondence of, with Horatio, Lord Walpole. Earl of
Buckinghamshire’s Papers. Rep. xiv, Pt. 9, pp. 1-56. London. 1895. Hare mss., pp. 239-55. Rep. xiv, Pt. 9.
London. 1895. Stirling-Home-Drummond-Moray, C. H. S. Papers, pp. 170-99. Rep.
x, App. 1. London. 1895.
Weston-Underwood.
Papers of Edward Weston, pp. 199-314, 427-44, 452, 518. Rep. x, App. 1. London.
1885.
Pamphlets
chiefly concerned with the Spanish War of 1739 :
For the
Convention—Gordon’s Appeal to the Unprejudiced concerning the Present
Discontents; Popular Prejudices against the Convention with Spain ; the Grand
Question War or no War with Spain. London. 1739. Those against are innumerable
and nearly all of the same abusive and uncritical character. Review of all that
passed between 1731-9 [by W. Pulteney], London, 1739, is typical. See as to
further pamphlets and information Boyer’s Pol. State of Great Britain, Vol. lvii, London, 1739, and Hertz, British
Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century. London. 1908.
B. Home Affairs.
(1) Periodicals.
London
Gazette (thrice weekly). Boyer, A. Political State of Great Britain. Vol. viii sqq. London. 1714 sqq. The
Historical Register. 2 vols. London. 1724. The Craftsman. London. 1726-7 sqq.
Gentleman’s Magazine, 1738 sqq. London. The Old Whig or the consistent
Protestant. 2 vols. London. 1739. For Newspapers :
Fox Bourne,
H. R. English Newspapers. 2 vols. London. 1887.
(2) Memoirs, Correspondence, and Papers; chiefly
unofficial.
[For
Jacobite Papers, etc. see Bibliography to Chap. 77/.]
Ailesbury,
Marquis of. Westmoreland mss. Hist.
mss. Comm. Rep. x, App.
Pt. 4, pp.
29-35. London. 1885.
Bath, Marquis
of. Longleat mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv. Vol. l, pp. 244-323.
Vols. ii and ni. London. 1904-8.
Bedford, John
Russell, fourth Duke of. Correspondence of. Ed. Lord J. Russell.
4 vols. London. 1842.
Bolingbroke,
Viscount. Works. 8 vols. London. 1809.
Buccleuch and
Queensberry, first Duke of. mss. Hist.
mss. Comm. Rep. xv, App.
Pt. 8. Vol.
i, pp. 361-417. London. 1897.
Carlisle,
Earl of. mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv, App. Pt. 6, pp.
1-211. London.
1897.
Charlemart,
Earl of. mss. Vol. i. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xn, App. Pt 10 London.
1891. .
Chatham
Correspondence. 4 vols. Edd. W. S. Taylor and J. H. Pringle. London. 1838-40.
Chesterfield,
Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl. Miscellaneous Works. [Pamphlets etc.] Ed. M.
Matz. London. 1777.
Letters to his Son. Ed. C. Strachey. 2 vols.
London. 1901.
Letters to his godson and successor. Ed. Earl
of Carnarvon. Oxford. 1890.
Cohhett’s
Parliamentary History. Vols. vii-xiv. London.
1811-2.
Cowper, Earl.
Coke Papers. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep.
xn, App. Pt. 3, pp. 116-31. London. 1889.
Lord Chancellor. Private Diary. (Roxhurghe
Cluh.) London. 1833.
Mary, Countess of. Diary. Ed. S. Cowper.
London. 1865.
Dodington,
George Buhh, first Lord Melcombe. Diary (1749-61). Ed. H. P.
Wyndham. 4th
edn. London. 1823.
Du Cane,
Lady. mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv [Chiefly naval].
London. 1905. Fortescue mss. Dropmore
Papers. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. im,
pp. 1-142, App.
Pt. 3. Vol.
i. London. 1892.
Frankland-Russell-Astley,
Mrs. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv, pp.
206 sqq. London. 1900.
(Glover,
Richard.) Memoirs by a celebrated literary and political character (1742-57).
New edn. London. 1815.
Grenville
Papers. Ed. W. J. Smith. 4 vols. London. 1852-3.
Hardwicke,
Philip, first Earl of. Miscellaneous State Papers. Vol. n. London. 1778.
Hervey, John,
Lord. Memoirs of the Reign of George II to the death of Queen Caroline. Ed. J.
W. Croker. 2 vols. London. 1848.
Kenyon, Lord.
mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xiv, App. Pt. 4, pp. 455-94. London.
1894.
Ketton, R. W.
mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xii, App.
Pt. 9, pp. 196-209. London. 1891.
Leyborne Popham
mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv, pp. 253 sqq. London. 1899. Lonsdale,
Earl. mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xm, App. Pt. 7, pp.
121-32. London. 1893.
Lothian,
Marquess of. mss. Drury Papers.
Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xvi, pp.
148-65. London. 1905.
Lyttelton,
George, first Lord. Works. 3rd edn. London. 1776.
Mar and
Kellie, Earl of. mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xvi. London. 1904.
Marchmont, ninth Earl of. Papers. 3 vols. London. 1831.
Marlborough mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. vm, App. 1. London. 1881.
Montagu, Lady
Mary Wortley. Letters of (1714r-27). 2 vols. London. 1861. Onslow, Earl of. mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xiv, App. Pt. 9, pp. 450-524. London.
1895.
Pelham,
Henry. Memoirs of Life of. By Arch. W. Coxe. 2 vols. London. 1829. Pope,
Alexander. Poetical Works. Ed. A. W. Ward. London. 1869.
Letters of, to Atterbury when in the Tower.
Ed. J. G. Nichols. Camden
Misc. Vol.
rv. London. 1859.
Letters of. Ed. M. Elwin. Vols. i-v. London.
1871.
Portland,
Duke of. mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xm, App. Pt. 2. Vol. ii, pp. 255-314, 1893; Rep. xv, App.
vol. v, pp. 506-669, 1899; vols. vi and vii (chiefly correspondence of
Atterbury and Harley). 1901.
Pulteney, W.
(Earl of Bath). Letters of. Mar and Kellie mss.
Hist. mss. Comm.
Rep. xvi, pp.
529 sqq. London. 1904.
English Hist. Rev. xiv, pp. 318 sqq.
Rogers, J. E.
Thorold. Protests of the House of Lords. 2 vols. Oxford. 1875. Somers Tracts,
the. Vol. xm. London. 1815.
Somerset,
Frances, Duchess of. Correspondence of, with Henrietta Louisa Countess of
Pomfret (1738-41). 3 vols. London. 1805.
Suffolk,
Henrietta Howard, Countess of. Letters to and from her second husband.
George
Berkeley. Ed. J. W. Croker. 2 vols. London. 1824.
Sundon,
Charlotte Clayton, Lady. Letters. Ed. Mrs Thompson. 2 vols. 1847. Swift,
Jonathan, Dean of St Patrick’s. Prose Works of. Ed. Temple Scott.
12 vols.
London. 1908.
Townshend,
Charles, Visct. mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xi, Pt. 4. London. 1887.
Waldegrave, James, Earl. Memoirs. 1754-8. London. 1821.
Walpole,
Horace, fourth Earl of Orford. Letters, complete, with Bibliography. Mrs Paget
Toynbee. 16 vols. Oxford. 1903-5.
Memoirs of the Reign of King George II. Ed.
Lord Holland. 3 vols.
London. 1846.
Aedes Walpolianae. London. 1752. [Description
of pictures at Houghton
House.]
Walpole,
Horatio, Lord. The Convention vindicated. London. 1739.
Interest of Great Britain steadily pursued.
3rd edn. London. 1743.
Answer to the later part of Bolingbroke’s
letters on History. London. 1763.
Memoirs of. By Archdeacon W. Coxe. 2nd edn.
enlarged. London. 1808.
Walpole, Sir
Robert, first Earl of Orford. A short History of the Parliament of 1713.
London. 1713. [Pamphlet.]
Report from the Committee of Secrecy. London.
1716.
Observations on the Treaty, November 9, 1729.
London. 1729.
General considerations concerning alteration
and improvement of Publick
Revenues;
Letter on Duties on Wine and Tobacco. London. 1733.
Some considerations concerning the Public
Funds, the Public Revenues and
the Annual
Supplies. London. 1735.
Memoirs of the Life and Administration of. By
Archdeacon W. Coxe.
3 vols. London. 1798.
Wentworth
Papers. [Correspondence, etc., of Lord Strafford, 1705-39.] Ed.
J. J.
Cartwright. London. 1883.
Whitefoord,
Col. C. Caleb. Papers of, 1739-1810. Ed. W. A. S. Hewins. Oxford. 1898.
Williams,
Sir C. Hanbury. Works. 3 vols. London. 1822. [Satires, etc., 1739-57.] •
IV. Secondary Works.
(1) General History of the Period.
Brosch, M.
Geschichte von England. Vol. in. (Gesch.
d. europ. Staaten.)
Gotha. 1893.
Cheyney, E.
P. European background of American History. New York. 1904. Heeren, A. H. L. Versuch einer historischen Entwickelung
der Entstehung und des Wachsthums des Britischen Continental-Interesse. Hist.
Werke. Vol. i. Gottingen. 1821. English translation. Oxford. 1836.
Knight,
Charles. Pictorial History of England. Vol. iv. London. 1841. Leadam, I. S.
Political History of England (1702-60). Vol. ix. London. 1909. Lecky, W. E. H.
History of England in Eighteenth Century. Vols. i-m. London.
1897-9. Vol. vu, chap. xxi. London. 1899.
Michael, W. Englische Geschichte im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Vol. i.
Hamburg and Leipzig. 1896.
Ranke, L. von. Englische Geschichte vomehmlich in sechzehnten und
siebzehnten Jahrhundert. Sammtl. Werke, Vol. vu. Leipzig. 1868. Eng. trans.
Vol. v. Oxford. 1875.
Rapin,
Thoyras de. History of England. The Continuation by N. Tindal to 1728. 2 vols.
London. 1752.
Schlosser, F.
C. History of the Eighteenth Century. English translation by D. Davison. Vols.
i-n. London. 1843.
Smollett, T.
History of England, 1688-1760. Vols. i-n. London. 1790. [Continuation of
Hume.]
Stanhope,
Philip H., fifth Earl. History of England, 1713-83. 7 vols. London. 1868. (2)
Diplomacy (chiefly as to Relations of Spain and England).
[See
also Bibliographies of Chaps. Ill and 7F.]
Armstrong, E.
Elizabeth Farnese. London. 1892.
Baudrillart, A. Philippe V et la cour de France. Vols. m-iv. Paris.
1893. Capefigue, J. B. H. R. Diplomatic de la France et de 1’Espagne. Paris.
1846. Clarke, E. Letters concerning the Spanish nation during 1760-1. London. 1763. Coquelle, P. Les Projets de Descente en Angleterre. Paris. 1902.
[Docs.] Coxe,
Archdeacon W. History of the Bourbon Kings of Spain (1700-88). 3 vols. London. 1813-5.
Filon, C. A. D. L’Alliance Anglaise aux dix-huitieme siecle 1713-40. Academic
des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Paris. 1860.
Hertz, G. B.
British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century. London. 1908. Laughton, Sir J.
K. Jenkins’ Ear. English Hist. Review. Vol. iv, pp. 741-9. London.
1889.
Legrelle, A. La Diplomatic Francaise et la Succession d’Espagne. Vol.
vi.
(1710-26.)
Second edn. Brainc-le-Comte. 1899.
Seeley, Sir
J. The House of Bourhon. English Hist Review. Vol. i, pp. 86 sqq. London. 1886.
Temperley, H.
W. V. The causes of the War of Jenkins’ Ear. Trans. Royal Hist. Society.
London. 1909.
Williams, B.
The Foreign Policy of England under Walpole. English Historical Review, xv,
251, 479, 665; xvi, 67, 308, 439. [Deals only with the period 1721-31.]
(3) Biographical and Miscellaneous.
[See
also III B 2 ante.]
Atterbury,
Francis, Bishop of Rochester. Life. By Canon H. C. Beeching.
London. 1909.
[Docs.]
Besant, Sir
Walter. London in the Eighteenth Century. London. 1902. Bolingbroke, Henry St
John, Viscount. Life. By T. Macknight. London. 1863.
Life and Times. By W. Sichel. London. 1902.
[Docs.]
Carteret,
John, Lord Granville. Life. By A. Ballantyne. London. 1887. Chatham, William
Pitt, Earl. Leben. By A. Ruville. 3 vols. Stuttgart and Berlin. 1905. English
translation. 3 vols. London. 1907.
Life. By F. Thackeray. 2 vols. London. 1828.
[Docs.]
Chesterfield,
Philip D. Stanhope, fourth Earl. Life. W. Ernst. London. 1893. [Docs.]
Hardwicke, Philip, Lord. Life. By G. Hams. 3 vols. London. 1847. [Docs,]
Harley, Robert, Earl of Oxford. Life. By E. S. Roscoe. London. 1902.
Lloyd, E. M.
The raising of the Highland Regiments in 1767. English Historical Review, xvii, pp. 462 sqq.
Lyttelton,
George, 1st Lord. Life. By Sir R. J. Phillimore. London. 1845. [Docs.] Nugent,
Robert, Earl. Memoirs of (1741-60). By C. Nugent. London. 1898. Shelburne,
Marquis of Lansdowne. Life. By Lord E. Fitzmaurice. Vol. i. London.
1875. [Docs.]
Swift,
Jonathan, Dean of St Patrick’s. By Sir H. Craik. 2 vols. London. 1894. Walpole,
Sir Robert, first Earl of Orford. By A. C. Ewald. London. 1878.
By J. Morley. (Twelve English Statesmen.)
London. 1889.
Ward, A. W.
Great Britain and Hanover. Oxford. 1899.
(4) Works illustrative of the History of Party
Government and Constitutional Theory.
Blackstone,
Sir Wm. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book I. Vol. i.
9th edn. Ed.
R. Burn. London. 1783.
Blauvelt,
Mary T. Development of Cabinet Government. New York. 1902. Brosch, M. Bolingbroke und die Whigs und Tories seiner
Zeit. Frankfort.
1883. Burnet, Gilbert (Bishop of Salisbury). Memorial to Princess Sophia. A
delineation of the constitution and policy of England. London. 1816.
Cowper, Earl,
Lord Chancellor. An Impartial History of Parties. Memoir delivered to George I
on his accession. In Campbell’s Lives of the Chancellors, pp. 921-9. London.
1846.
Kent, C. B.
Roylance. Early History of the Tories to 1702. London. 1909.
[Gives origin
of Tory ideas.]
Montesquieu, Baron. L’Esprit des Lois. Book xi.
Engl. tr. Vol. i. London. 1878. Pike, L. O, Constitutional History of the House
of Lords. London. 1894. Political Disquisitions. 2 vols. London. 1774.
Porritt, E.
and A. G. The Unreformed House of Commons. 2 vols.
London. 1903. Rapin, Thoyras de. Dissertation sur les Whigs et les Torys. The
Hague. 1717. ■ Redlich, J. Procedure of the House of Commons. Translated
from the German.
Ed. by Sir
Courtenay Ilbert. 3 vols. London. 1908.
Todd,
Alpheus. Parliamentary Government. Ed. Sir S. Walpole. 2 vols. London.
1892.
Torrens, W.
M. History of Cabinets. 2 vols. London. 1894.
Wilkins, W.
W. Political Ballads of Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. 2 vols. London.
1860.
Williams, B.
Newcastle and the election of 1734. English Hist. Rev. Vol. xn, pp. 448 sqq.
Winstanley,
D. A. George III and his first Cabinet. English Historical Review. Vol. xvii,
pp. 678 sqq.
(6)
Financial, Economic and Colonial.
[See
also Bibliography of Chap. FT.]
American
Manuscripts in Royal Inst, of Great Britain. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv.
Vol. i.
London. 1904.
Ashley, W. J.
Surveys Historic and Economic. Pp. 268-308. New York. 1900. Beer, G. L.
Commercial Policy of England towards the American Colonies. New York. 1893.
British Colonial Policy, 1764-65. New York.
1907.
Bourne, E. G.
Spain in America. New York. 1904.
Brisco, N. A.
Economic Policy of Robert Walpole. Columbia University Press. New York. 1907.
Brougham, H.,
Lord. Colonial Policy of the European Powers. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1803.
Chalmers, G.
Estimate of the comparative strength of Great Britain and losses of her trade.
London. 1782.
Channing, E.
History of the United States, 1660-1760. Vol. n. New York. 1908. Defoe, Daniel.
The Complete English Tradesman. London. 1732.
An humble Proposal to the People of England
for the encrease of their Trade.
London. 1729.
Plan of the English Commerce. London. 1737.
Extracts in J. R. McCulloch’s
Select Tracts
on Commerce. London. 1869.
Davis. The
Currency and Provincial Politics. Publications of Colonial Soc. of
Massachusetts. Vol. vi. Boston. 1900.
Dowell, S.
History of Taxation. 4 vols. London. 1884.
Edwards,
Bryan. History Civil and Commercial of British Colonies in West Indies.
5 vols. London. 1849.
Franklin,
Benjamin. The interest of Great Britain considered with regard to her Colonies.
London. 1761.
Gee, Joshua.
The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered [published 1729]. New edn.
London. 1767.
Hertz, G. B.
The old Colonial System. Manchester. 1905.
Hill, W.
Colonial Tariffs. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vu, 78 sq.
Molasses Act
of 1733. Parliamentary History, vm, 918, 992-1002, 1195-1200, 1261-66. London.
1811.
Moses, B.
South America on the Eve of Emancipation. New York. 1908. Pamphlets on British
and West Indian aspects of the question.
A—r—Z—h.
Considerations on the Dispute now before the Commons. London. 1731.
Comparison
between British Sugar Colonies and New England as they relate to the interest
of Great Britain. London. 1732.
(Ashley,
John.) Sugar Trade with incumbrances thereon laid open. London. 1734. Letter to
the West India Merchants by a Fisherman. London. 1751. [On the New England
side.]
Pitt,
William, Earl of Chatham. Correspondence with Colonial Governors. Ed. Miss
Kemball. London. 1907.
and the representation of the Colonies in the
Imperial Parliament. By
B. Williams.
Eng. Hist. Rev. Vol. xxh, pp. 756-8.
London. 1907. Schmoller, G. The Mercantile System. Translated. New York. 1902.
Sinclair, Sir
John. History of the Public Revenue. 3 vols. London. 1803. Smith, Adam. Wealth
of Nations. Vol. ii. Bk. rv, chap.
vu. Ed. E. Cannan.
London. 1904.
Somers Tracts.
13 vols. London. 1809-15.
Townshend mss. [full on American affairs]. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xi, Pt. 4. London. 1887.
Tucker,
Josiah. Four Tracts on Political and Commercial Subjects. Gloucester. 1774. Williams, W. M. J. The King’s Revenue. London. 1908.
Zimmermann, A. Die Europaischen Kolonien. Berlin. 1896-1901.
(2) RELIGIOUS HISTORY.
I. Bibliographies.
Bibliography
of the Works of John and Charles Wesley, arranged in chronological order, with
notes. By R. Green. London. 1896. New edn. 1906.
A record of
Methodist Literature, in two parts. By G. Osborn. London. 1869. Anti-Methodist
Publications during the Eighteenth Century, with notes. Being a list of all
known books and pamphlets written in opposition to the Methodist Revival during
the life of Wesley. By R. Green. London. 1902.
Useful short
Bibliographical notes will be found in Overton and Relton’s History of the
English Church, 1714-1800. London. 1906. For fuller lists see Sir Leslie
Stephen’s Life and Thought in Eighteenth Century. Vol. i. London. 1902.
II. Manuscripts.
There are «
number of manuscripts at the British Museum dealing with John Wesley, most of
which have been published. Further material is also to be found in the City
Road Chapel Museum and much information may be expected from the still
unpublished parts of Wesley’s journal and the various other ms. sources still in private hauds or in
the possession of societies. Much valuable material has, of late, been
published by the Wesley Historical Society.
L. Tyerman’s
laborious volumes deal with the whole life of Wesley and of his family and
friends, often from unpublished materials. Unfortunately his critical ability
was by no means equal to his erudition. Thus, the history of John Wesley’s
marriage with Mrs Vazeille and of their subsequent relations is not treated by
him with the requisite impartiality. Dr A. W. Stocks, himself a descendant of
the Vazeille family, has inherited relics and traditions from them which show
Mrs Vazeille’s side of tie question. He also possesses and has published in the
Critic, N.S., Vol. iv, No. 85, of August 15,1885, New York, U.S.A., an
importaut letter from Mr Antony Vazeille (Mrs Vazeille’s first husband) to his
wife, which shows their harmonious relations. From another point of view, a
valuable corrective of Tyerman is to be found in Hetty Wesley, by A. T.
Quiller-Couch, London, 1908, a living if not always a too favourable
presentment of the Wesley Family.
The notes and
materials for a biography of William Law, privately printed— each copy with ms. notes by the author Christopher
Walton—still await publication.
Materials for
a biography of Archbishop Wake exist at Christ Church, Oxford. In general,
nothing but the publication of diocesan records alone will throw light on the
much debated question of parochial and clerical activity in this age. A good
deal can be inferred from the charges of Bishops like Wake, Butler, and Gibson,
delivered to the clergy of their dioceses; but the history of the Establishment
during this period, and of Nonconformist bodies other than Wesleyan, can hardly
be accurately written without a much more extensive research into unpublished
materials than has yet been attempted. The first two numbers of the
Transactions of the Baptist Historical Society—just published—reveal valuable
sources of new materials.
III. The
Established Church.
(A) Papers and Works illustrative of General
Conditions.
Butler,
Joseph, Bishop of Durham. Stanhope Memorials of. Ed. W. M. Egglestone. London.
1878.
Charge to Clergy of Diocese of Durham. London.
1751.
Gibson,
Edmund, Bishop of London. Charges to Clergy of Lincoln. London. 1717.
Charges to the Clergy of London (1730).
London. 1731; to the same
(1741-2).
London. 1742.
Some account of. By R. Smalbroke. London.
1749.
Hearne,
Thomas. Works. Ed. P. Bliss. 3 vols. London. 1837.
Hurd,
Richard, Bishop of Worcester. Correspondence with Bishop Warburton. London.
1809.
Memoirs of Life and Writings. By F. Kilvert.
London. 1742.
Complete Works. London. 1811.
Lowth,
Robert, Bishop of London. Letter to Warburton. 4th edn. London. 1766..
Memoirs of Life and Writings. By R. Laden.
London. 1787.
Potter, John,
Archhishop of Canterbury. Works. London. 1753.
Pyle, Dr E.
Memoirs of a royal Chaplain, 1729-63. By A. Hartshorne. London. 1905.
Romaine, W.
Life. By W. B. Cadogan. London. 1796.
Seeker,
Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury. Works. (With Life.) 6 vols. London. 1825.
Review of life and character. By Bishop
Porteus. London. 1797.
Sherlock,
Thomas, Bishop of London. Works, with some account of his Life.
By T. S. Hughes.
5 vols. London. 1830.
Somers
Tracts. Vol. xm. London. 1812.
Wake,
William, Archbishop of Canterbury. State of English Church in Councils, Synods,
Convocations, etc. London. 1703.
charge to the Clergy of Lincoln (1709).
London. 1710.
Walker, S.
Life of. By E. Sidney. London. 1835.
Wilson,
Thomas, Bishop of Sodor and Man. Life and Works. By C. Cruttwell. London. 1781.
Life. By H. Stowell. London. 1879. [First
published 1788.]
-j Life and Works. ByJ. Keble. 7 vols.
(Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology.)
London. 1863.
Woodward; J.
Rise and Progress of the Religious Societies. 2nd edn. London. 1698.
(B) Works by Churchmen dealing with religious
controversy and thoughts.
Berkeley,
George, Bishop of Cloyne. Works and Life. Ed. A. C. Fraser. 4 vols. Oxford.
1901.
Butler,
Joseph, Bishop of Durham. Works. Ed. J. H. Bernard. 2 vols. London.
1900.
Remains hitherto unpublished. London. 1883.
Hervey, J.
Meditations and Contemplations. Liverpool. 1814. With Memoir by D. M'Nicoll.
London. 1855.
Original Letters. Scarborough. 1829.
Herveiana: sketches of life and writings of J.
H. By J. Cole. 2 pts.
Scarborough.
1822-3.
Hoadly,
Benjamin, Bishop of Winchester. Works. 3 vols. London. 1773.
Answer to Convocation. London. 1718.
Warburton,
William, Bishop of Gloucester. Works. London. 1811.
Byrom, John.
Poems. Ed. A. W. Ward. 2 vols. Chetham Soc. Manchester. 1895. Law, William.
Works. 9 vols. London. 1753-76.
Ed. G. B. M[organ]. 9 vols. Privately printed.
Canterbury. 1892-3.
Swift,
Jonathan, Dean of St Patrick’s. Prose Works. Ed. Temple Scott. London. 1908.
Whiston,
William. Essays. London. 1713.
(C) Constructive Deism.
Addison, J.
Evidences of the Christian Religion. London. 1721.
Berkeley,
George, Bishop of Cloyne. Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher.
London. 1732.
Leland, John.
Answer to Morgan. London. 1737.
Answer to Tindal. London. 1740.
Locke, John.
Works. 12th edn. London. 1824.
Morgan,
Thomas. The Moral Philosopher. Pts. i-ni. London. 1737-40. Tindal, M.
Christianity as old as the Creation. London. 1730. i
Reply to. By W. Law, Works. London. 1762.
, Toland, J.
J. Christianity not mysterious. London. 1696.
Vindicius Libcvius. London. 1700.
Letters to Serena. London. 1704.
Adeisidaemon. London. 1709.
Nazarenus. London. 1718.
Tetradymus; Pantheisticon. London. 1720.
(D) Critical
Deism.
Blount,
Charles. Anima Mundi. London. 1678-9.
Apollonius Tyanaeus. London. 1680.
Oracles of Reason. London. 1693.
Bolingbroke,
Henry St John, Viscount. Works. 8 vols. London. 1809.
Collins,
Anthony. Essay on Reason. London. 1707.
Priestcraft in Perfection. London. 1709.
Discourse on Freethinking. London. 1713; Reply
to above Remarks on
Phileleutherus
Lipsiensis. [Richard Bentley.] London. 1713. Part in. 1743.
Grounds and reasons of Christian Religion.
London. 1724.
Scheme of Literal Prophecy. London. 1727.
Hume, David.
Philosophical Works. Edd. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Oxford. 1874r-5.
Middleton,
Conyers. Miscellaneous Works. London. 1755.
Shaftesbury,
A. A. Cooper, third Earl of. Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical
Regimen of. Ed. B. Rand. London. 1900.
IV. Secondary
Works.
(A) General
Histories of the Established Church and Dissenting Bodies.
Abbey, C. J.
and Overton, J. H. The English Church and its Bishops, 1700-1800.
2 vols.
London. 1887.
Bogue, D. and
J. Bennett. History of Dissenters, 1688-1808. 2 vols. London. 1833. Dale, R. W.
History of Congregationalism in England. London. 1908. Lathbury, T. History of
the Convocation of the Church of England. London. 1842. Molesworth, Canon W. N.
History of the Church of England from 1660. London. 1882. '
New History
of Methodism. Edd. W. J. Townsend, H. B. Workman, G. Fayre.
2
vols. London. 1909. .
Overton,
Canon J. H. The English Church in the Eighteenth Century; 2 vols. London. 1878.
Abridged edn. London. 1887.
and F. Relton. The English Church (1714-1800).
London. 1906.
Simon, J. S.
Revival of Religion in England in the Eighteenth Century. London.
1907.
Skeats, H. S.
History of the Free Churches. Ed. S. Miall. London. 1894. Stevens, A. History of
Methodism. 2 vols. London. 1873-4.
Stoughton, J.
Religion in England, 1702-1800. London. 1878.
(B) Works dealing with the History of Thought and
Controversy.
Atterbury,
Francis, Bishop of Rochester. Life. By F. Williams. [Docs.] 2 vols. London.
1869.
Berkeley,
George, Bishop of Cloyne. Life. By A. C. Fraser. London. 1901. Butler, Joseph,
Bishop of Durham, Studies subsidiary to. By W. E.
Gladstone. Oxford. 1896.
T. Lorenz. Beitrag zur Lebensgeschichte von J.
B. Berlin. 1900.
Weitere Beitrage zur Lebensgeschichte in den
Jahren 1731-3. Berlin. 1901.
Farrar, H. S.
Critical History of Free Thought. London. 1862.
Hunt, J.
History of Religious Thought in England. 3 vols. London. 1870. Hutton, W. H.
Some Unpublished Letters of Nonjurors. Athenaeum, May 8,1909. Lathbury, T.
History of the Non-Jurors. London. 1845.
Law, William.
Life and Opinions of. Canon Overton. London. 1881.
Memorials of Birthplace and Residence. By “G. Moreton.” London. 1895.
Lechler, G. V. Geschichte des Englischen Deism us. 2 Bde. Stuttgart
and Tubingen. 1841.
Mandeville,
B. Works. London. 1772.
B. de M.’s Bienenfabel. By P. Goldbach. Halle.
1889. [Includes a Bibliography.]-
Overton,
Canon J. H. The Non-Jurors. London. 1902.
Pattison,
Mark. Essays. Ed. H. Nettleship. 2 vols. Oxford. 1889.* Robertson, J. M.
Pioneer Humanists. London. 1907.
Stephen, Sir
Leslie. History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century.
2 vols.
London. 1902.
Wake,
Archbishop. By J. H. Overton. Lincoln Diocesan Magazine. Lincoln. 1891.
and the Project of Union with the Gallican
Church. By J. H. Luptou. London.
1896.
(C) Works exhibiting social conditions.
Ashton, J.
The Fleet—its River, Prison, and Marriages. London. 1888.
History of English Lotteries. London. 1893.
Brown, J.
Estimate of the manners and principles of the times. 2 vols. London.
Thoughts on Civil Liberty, licentiousness and
faction. Newcastle. 1765.
Buckle, H. T.
Introduction to History of Civilisation in England. Ed. J. M.
Robertson.
London. 1904.
Conway, B. K.
History of English Philanthropy. London. 1906.
Defoe, D.
Tour through the whole island of Great Britain. 4 vols. London. 1778. [1st edn.
1724.]
Kalm, Pehr.
Visit to England. Translated by Joseoh Lucas. London. 1892. Roberts, G. Social
History of the people of the Southern Counties in England in past Centuries.
London. 1856.
Rogers,
Thorold. Six Centuries of Work and Wages. London. 1889.
Saussure, C. de. Letters of. A Foreign View of England
under George I and II.
English
Translation: London. 1902.
Sydney, W. C.
England and the English in the Eighteenth Century. 2 vols. London. 1892.
Voltaire, F.
M. A. de. Letters concerning England. English Translation: London.
1733.
Visit to England, 1726-9. By A. Ballantyne.
London. 1893.
Montesquieu and Rousseau in England. By J.
Churton Collins. London.
1908.
Watson,
Bishop, Anecdotes of Life of. By his son. 2 vols. London. 1818. Webb, S. and B.
English Local Government (1688-1834). The Parish and the County. 3 vols. London. 1906-8.
Wendeborn, G. F. A. Reise durch einige westlichen nnd siidlichen Provinzen
Englands. 2
vols. Hamburg. 1793.
Wright, T.
Caricature History of the Georges. London. 1877.
(D) Works dealing with missionary effort etc.
Anderson, J.
S. M. History of Church of England in Colonies and Foreign Dependencies of the
British Empire. 3 vols. London. 1856.
Canton, W.
History of British and Foreign Bible Society. 2 vols. London. 1904. Cross, A.
L. The Anglican Episcopate and the American Colonies. Harvard Hist.
Studies. Vol.
ix. London. 1896.
Society for
Propagation of Gospel. Digest of Records, 1701-1892. London. 1892. Warneck, G.
History of the Protestant Missions. Trans, by G. Robson. Edinburgh and London.
1906.
Whites, W.
Memoirs of Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States. Ed.
B. F. de Costa. London. 1880.
(E) The Wesleyan and Welsh Revivals.
(a)
General.
Benson,
J. Defence of the Methodists. London. 1793. .
Apology for the Methodists. London. 1801.
Crowther, J.
A Portraiture of Methodism. London. 1815.
Cudworth, W.
Whitebrook, J. C. London. 1906. [A biography and vindication with reference to
strictures of John Wesley.]
Dartmouth mss. Hist, mss. Comm. Rep. xv. App. Pt. 1. Vol. m. [Contains
correspondence of John Newton.] London. 1896.
FitzGerald,
W. B. The Roots of Methodism. (Handbook for the Wesley Guild.) London. 1903.
Fletcher, J.
W., of Madeley. Works. 8 vols. London. 1836.
Wesley’s Designated Successor. Life. By L.
Tyerman. 1882. [Docs.]
Hall, Joseph.
Memorials of Wesleyan Methodist Ministers and yearly death-roll, 1777-1840.
London. 1876.
Harris,
Howell. Memoirs of, with account of Calvinistic Methodists in Wales. By J.
Bulmer. Haverfordwest. 1824.
Hervey,
James. Theron and Aspasio. Wesley’s Remarks on, with Hervey’s Reply.
London. 1755.
Life. By Ii. J. Hughes. London. 1892.
Huntingdon,
Selina, Counte9S of. Two letters, pp. 209-11. In mss. Mrs Frankland- Russell-Astley. Hist. MS9. Comm. Rep.
xv. London. 1900.
Life and Times of. By a member of the Houses
of Shirley and Hastings.
2 vols.
London. 1844. lackson, T. Early Methodist Preachers. 6 vols. London. 1865 ;
abridged edition of this, with notes, entitled Wesley’s Veterans. By J.
Telford. London. [Autobiographies of Wesley’s principal helpers.] In the press.
Myles, W.
Chronological History of the People called Methodists. London. 1813.
Nightingale, A. A Portraiture of Methodism. London. 1807.
Nightingale v. Stockdale. Report of Trial for
Libel in connection with
above. By
Bartrum. London. 1809.
Stevens, A.
B. History of Methodism. 3 vols. London. 1899.
Telford, J.
Popular History of Methodism. London. 1899.
Warren and
Stephens. Chronicles of Methodism. London. 1827.
Wesley, the
Family of. Byrom and the Wesleys. By E. Hoole. London. 1864.
Hetty Wesley. By A. T. Quiller-Couch. London.
1908.
Memoirs of. By Adam Clarke. London. 1823.
Memorials of the Wesley Family. By G. J.
Stevenson. London. 1876.
Og-lethorpe and the Wesleys in America. By E.
Hoole. London. 1863.
The Wesleys in Lincolnshire. By G. Lester.
Londou. 1890.
Wesley,
Charles. Early Journal. Ed. by J. Telford. (To be published shortly.)
Journal and Poetry of. By T. Jackson. London.
1862.
Life. By T. Jackson. 2 vols. London. 1841 ;
abridged edn. 2 vols.
London. 1848.
[Docs.]
Life. By J. Telford. London. 1900.
and John. Poetical Worlt9. Ed. G. Osborn.
London. 1868.
Wesley, John.
Conference Minutes: Wesleyan. Vol. i. (1744-98.) London. 1862.
Correspondence of, with S. Walker. Saturday
Review, March 28. London.
1891.
Historical Society Publications. London. 1896
sqq.
Hymns, translation of German. By J. W. Ed. J.
T. Hatfield. London. 1896.
Wesley, John.
Works, etc.; City Road Chapel and its Associations. By G. J. Stevenson. London.
1873.
Journal, October 14, 1736-7. Ed. Bishop
E. R. Hendrix. New Orleans.
1901.
Journal. 4 vols. London. 1907. Standard
edition. 6 vols. (In process
of
publication.)
Original letters of J. W. and his friends. Ed.
J. Priestley. Birmingham.
1791.
Works. 32 vols. Bristol. 1771-4; 15 vols.
London. 1866.
(&)
Centenary studies and publications.
Homes, Haunts
and friends of J. W. Centenary number of the Methodist Recorder. London. 1891.
Wesley
Centenary Handbook, hymns, service, etc. London. 1891.
Wesley, the
Living. By J. H. Rigg. Centenary edn. London. 1891. New edn. London. 1905.
The Man, his Teaching, and his Work.
[Addresses and Sermons delivered in
commemoration
of the Centenary.] London. 1891.
Wesleyan
studies by various writers from unpublished sources. London. 1903. Wesley,
John, and his successors. Centenary memorial.
London. 1891.
(y) Biographies etc.
Wesley, John, Essai dogmatique sur. By M.
Haemmerlin. Colmar. 1857.
J. W., and George Whitefield in Scotland. By
D. Butler. Edinburgh. 1898.
J. W. and the Evangelical Reaction of the
Eighteenth Century. By Julia
Wedgewood.
London. 1870.
J. W.’s place in Church History. By D. O.
Urlin. Edinhurgh. 1870.
Life. By John Hampson. 3 vols. London. 1791.
Life. By Canon J. H. Overton. London. 1891.
Life. By F. J. Snell. Edinburgh. 1900.
: Life. By J. Telford. New edn. London.
1906.
Life. By J. Whitehead. 2 vols. London. 1793-6.
Life and Times. By L. Tyerman. 3 vols. London.
1870. [Docs.]
Life and Works, By Matthieu Lelievre. English
Translation. Loudon. 1900.
Life of, and use and progress of Methodism. By
R. Southey. 3rd edn.
A. Knox.
Notes by S. T. Coleridge. Ed. C. C. Southey. 2 vols. London. 1846. Observations
on Southey’s Life of J. W. By R Watson. London. 1820.
The Oxford Methodists. By L. Tyerman. London.
1873. [Docs.]
Wesley et ses rapports avec les Fran^ais. By
E. Gounelle. Paris. 1898.
Wesley,
Samuel the elder, Life and Times of. By L. Tyerman. London. 1866.
Susanna. Life. By J. Kirk. London. 1864.
Life. By Eliza Clarke. London.
1886.
Whitefield,
George. Account of. Gentleman’s Magazine, pp. 150 sqq. London.
1734.
Eighteen Sermons. Ed A. Gifford. London. 1871.
Farewell Sermon at Moorfield, August 30,1769.
London. 1769.
Journals, with appreciations. Ed. W. Wale.
London. 1905.
Life. By L. Tyerman. 2 vols. London.
1876. [Docs.]
■ Memoirs of the Life of. By J. Gillies.
London. 1773. [Includes letters
from John
Wesley.]
Williams, H.
W. Constitution and Polity of the Wesleyan Methodist Church. New edn. By D. J.
Waller. London. 1898.
A Bibliography
of Jacobite history is appended to C. Sanford Terry’s The Rising of 1745 (new
edn. 1903).
I. MANUSCRIPTS.
In the P.R.O.
are forty-six volumes of miscellaneous State Papers (Scotland), November,
1688—December 15,1760; three volumes of “ Church Books (Scotland),” May,
1724—May, 1760; eleven volumes of “Letter Book (Scotland),” September 8,
1713—May 7,1725; twenty-eight volumes of “Warrant Book (Scotland),” August 15,
1670—September 14, .1714, and seven volumes of “ Scottish Warrants,” 1711-65.
. Besides the
S.P., France, Spain, Sicily and Naples, Rome, Newsletters, and Foreign Entry
Books, there are among the S.P., Tuscany, nine volumes of John Walton’s
despatches, 1730-57, and thirty-three volumes of Sir Horace Mann’s despatches,
1737-79.
In the
General Register House, Edinburgh, are several volumes of manuscripts relating
to forfeited Jacobite estates, military orders and letters relating to the'
risings of 1715 and 1745 (State Papers, 338-65).
The British
Museum contains a large and miscellaneous collection of Jacobite materials,
chiefly among the Addit., Egerton,' Gualterio, Hardwicke, Newcastle, and Stowe mss. See a brief catalogue of them in C.
Sanford Terry’s Rising of 1745 (new edn. 1903, p. 306).
The Royal
Library at Windsor Castle contains the large collection of Stuart Papers. They
have been calendared to February, 1717, by F. H. Blackburne Daniell, for the
Historical Manuscripts Commission (3 vols. London. 1902, 1904, 1907). The
following volumes published by the Commission locate or print family archives
of the post-Union and Jacobite period : Report x (1870); Rept. n (1871); Rept.
ni (1872); Rept. iv (1874) ; Rept. v (1876); Rept. vi (1877); Rept. vn (1879);
Rept. vm (1881); Rept. ix (1884); Rept. x, Pt. i (1885), Pt. iv (1885), Pt. vi
(1887) ; Rept. xi, Pt. iv (1887), Pt. vii (1888); Rept. xn, Pt. viii (1891);
Rept. xm, Pt. vi (1893), Pt. vii (1893); Rept. xiv, Pt. iii (1894), Pt. iv
(1894), Pt. ix (1895); Rept. xv, Pt. ii (1897), Pt. iv (1897), Pt. vi (1897);
Portland mss. vol. v (1899);
Various Collections, vols. i, n (1901-3); Wedderburn mss. (1902) ; Mar and Kellie mss.
(1904); Lady Du Cane’s mss. (1905).
Sir William Fraser’s reports upon the archives of Scottish families must also
be noted.
In the French
Archives des Affaires IDtrangeres there is much material bearing upon Jacobite
project? and enterprises, 1707-60: in particular in Memoires et Documents,
Angleterre, tom. 24, 25, 52-4, 75-91, 93; ditto, Espagne, 238, 344;
Correspondence Politique, Angleterre, 211-38, 241-3, 248-50, 252, 258, 260-4,
270-4, 279, 280, 283-5, 290, 294, 328, 332, 334, 338, 339, 344, 346, 349-51,
353, 354, 360, 364, 375-7, 380, 382-91, 417, 418, 420-2, 425, 441, 442; ditto
(Supple'- ment), Angleterre, 3-5, 7, 10.
The Spanish
Archivo General de Simancas contains the correspondence of the Marques de
Villamayor with Cardinal Alberoni, 1717-9, of Cardinal Alberoni with the
Marques de San Felipe, 1717-9, of the Marques Berrety Landy with Cardinal
Alberoni, 1716-7, and of the Marques de Monteleon with Cardinal Alberoni, 1717-9.
The relations
of Charles XII of Sweden with the Jacobites are illuminated by the documents
preserved in the Swedish Riksarkiv at Stockholm. The correspondence of Count
Karl Gyllenborg, Swedish Minister at London, with Baron von Miillem, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, February 26, 1715—September 5, 1717, and the letters of
Baron Erik Sparre, Swedish Minister at Paris, to Gyllenborg, July 1, 1715—March
30,1716, are among the Diplomatica Anglica. Sparre’s correspondence with
Charles XII and von Miillern, July 11, 1715—November 8, 1717, is among the
Diplomatica Gallica. The Diplomatica Hollandica contain letters and documents
relating to the arrest of Gyllenborg and Gortz, and the latter’s letters
written from prison at Arnhem in 1717 (published by T. Westrin in Historisk
Tidsskrift, vol. xvm, pp. 135-74. Stockholm. 1898). Gortz’s letters to Charles
XII, November 4, 1716—November 15, 1717, are in a separate volume.
II. CONTEMPORARY MATERIALS. .
Historical
Papers relating to the Jacobite Period, 1699-1750. Ed. J. Allardyce.
2 vols. (New
Spalding Club.) Aberdeen. 1895-6.
Journal and
Memoirs of the Marquis d’Argenson, 1694-1757. Ed. K. Wormeley. London. 1902.
Jacobite
Correspondence of the Atholl Family during the Rebellion, 1745-6.
(Abbotsford
Club.) Edinburgh. 1840.
Chronicles of
the Families of Atholl and Tullibardine. Collected and arranged by John seventh
Duke of Atholl, K.T 4 vols. Edinburgh. 1896.
Berwick, James Duke of. Memoires ecrits par lui-meme, avec une suite
abregee depuis 1716 jusqu’a sa mort en 1734. 2 vols.
Paris. 1778.
Boston,
Thomas. A general Account of my Life. London. 1908.
Broglie, J. V. A., Due de. Le Secret du Roi: Correspondance secrete de
Louis XV avec ses Agents diplomatiques, 1752-74. 2 vols. 4th
edn. Paris. 1888. Burt, Edward. Letters from a Gentleman in the North of
Scotland. Fifth edn.
2 vols.
London. 1818.
Cameron,
Alan. Narrative: the End of the ’15. Ed. C. Sanford Terry. Scott.
Hist. Review.
Vol. v. Glasgow. 1908.
State Papers
and Letters addressed to William Carstares. Ed. Joseph McCormick.
Edinburgh. 1774.
Les derniers Stuarts a Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Documents inedits et
authentiques puises aux Archives publiques et privees. Ed. Marquise
Campana de Cavelli. 2 vols. Paris. 1871.
Jacobite
Memoirs of the Rebellion of 1745. Ed. Robert Chambers. Edinburgh. 1834.
A full
Collection of all the Proclamations and Orders published by the Authority of
Charles Prince of Wales since his arrival in Edinburgh the 17th day of
September till the 15th of October 1745. 2 pts. Glasgow. 1745-6. Memoirs of the
Life of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik. Ed. John M. Gray. (Scottish History
Society.) Edinburgh. 1892.
The Cochrane
Correspondence regarding the Affairs of Glasgow, 1745-6. Ed.
James Dennistonn. (Maitland Club.) Glasgow. 1836.
Colin, J. Louis XV et les Jacobites: Le Projet de Debarquement en
Angleterre de 1743-4. Paris. 1901.
The Report of
the Proceedings and Opinion of the Board of General Officers on their
Examination into the Conduct of Sir John Cope. London.
1749. Cottin, P. Un Protege de Bachaumont: Correspondance inedite du Marquis
d’Eguilles, 1745-8. Paris. 1887.
Culloden
Papers: comprising an extensive and interesting Correspondence from the year
1625 to 1748. London. 1815.
The Loch
Lomond Expedition, 1715. Ed. James Dennistoun. Glasgow. 1834. The Jacobite
Attempt of 1719. Ed. William K. Dickson. (Scottish History Society.) Edinburgh.
1895.
Drummond,
John. Memoirs of Sir Ewen Cameron of Locheill. (Abbotsford Club.) Edinburgh.
1842.
Elcho, David
Lord. A short Account of the Affairs of Scotland in the Years 1744,
1745, 1746. Ed. the Hon. Evan Charteris.
Edinburgh. 1907.
Forbes,
Bishop Robert. The Lyon in Mourning. Ed. Henry Paton. 3 vols.
(Scottish
History Society.) Edinburgh. 1895-6.
The
Gentleman’s Magazine. Vols. xv, xvi. London. 1745-6.
The Stuart
Papers. Ed. J. H. Glover. London. 1847.
Letters which
passed between Count Gyllenborg, the Barons Gortz, Sparre, and Others.
Edinburgh. 1717.
Home, John.
The History of the Rebellion in the Year 1745. London. 1802. Secret History of
Colonel Hoocke’s Negociations in Scotland in 1707. Edinburgh. 1760.
Correspondence
of Colonel Nathaniel Hooke, 1703-7. Ed. William D. Macray.
(Roxburghe
Club.) 2 vols. London. 1870-1.
Johnstone,
James, Chevalier de. Memoirs of the Rebellion in 1745 and 1746. Loudon. 1820.
Handlingar
rorande Skandinaviens Historia. Stockholm. 1822.
The Highlands
of Scotland in 1750. Ed. Andrew Lang. Edinburgh. 1898. Historisk Tidsskrift
(pp. 135-74, 276-86). Stockholm. 1898. 1901. 1903. Lockhart, George. Lockhart
Papers. 2 vols. London. 1817.
The Decline
of the last Stuarts. Ed. Lord Mahon. (Roxburghe Club.) London. 1843. Analecta
Scotica: Collections illustrative of the History of Scotland. Ed. James
Maidment. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1834-7.
The Argyle
Papers. Ed. James Maidment. Edinburgh. 1834.
A Selection
from the Papers of tbe Earls of Marchmont illustrative of Events from 1685 to
1750. 3 vols. London. 1831.
Maxwell of
Kirkconnell, James. Narrative of Charles Prince of Wales’ Expedition to
Scotland in the Year 1745. (Maitland Club.) Edinburgh. 1841.
Scottish
Forfeited Estates Papers, 1715-45. Ed. A. H. Millar. (Scottish History
Society.) Edinburgh. 1908.
Memorials of
John Murray of Broughton. Ed. Robert F. Bell. (Scottish History Society.)
Edinburgh. 1898.
Papers about
the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745. Ed. Henry Paton. (Miscellany of the Scottish
History Society.) Edinburgh. 1893.
Patten,
Robert. The History of the late Rebellion : with original Papers and Characters
of the principal Noblemen and Gentlemen concern’d in it. London. 1717.
A true Account
of the Proceedings at Perth; the Debates in the Secret Council there ; with the
Reasons and Causes of the suddain Breaking up of the Rebellion. Written by a
Rebel. London. 1716.
Rae, Peter.
The History of the late Rebellion (1715) rais’d against King George by the
Friends of the Popish Pretender. Second edition. London. 1746. Ramsay, John,
Scotland and Scotsmen in the 18th Century. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1888.
A Collection
of original Letters and authentick Papers relating to the Rebellion of 1715.
Edinburgh. 1730.
A Compleat
History of the late Rebellion. London. 1716.
A List of
Persons concerned in the Rebellion. Ed. the Earl of Roseberry and Walter
Macleod. (Scottish History Society.) Edinburgh. 1890.
A Faithful
Register of the late Rebellion. London. 1718.
Saint-Simon, Due de. Memoires complets et authentiques sur le Siecle de
Louis XIV et la Regence. Ed. le Marquis de Saint-Simon. 21 vols. Paris.
1829-30. Saxe, Marechal de. Lettres et Memoires relatifs aux livenements qui se
sont passes depuis 1733 jusqu’en 1750. 5 vols.
Paris. 1794.
The Scots
Magazine. Vols. vn and vm. Edinburgh. 1745-6.
A Collection
of original Papers about the Scots Plot (1703). London. 1704. Sinclair, John,
Master of. Memoirs of the Insurrection in Scotland in 1715.
(Abbotsford
Club.) Edinburgh. 1858,
A complete
Collection of State Trials. Vols. xv-xix. London. 1812-3.
Statutes at
Large. Vols. iv-vii. London.
1763-4.
The Albemarle
Papers: being the Correspondence of William Anne second Earl of Albemarle,
Commander-in-Chief in Scotland 1746-7, with an Appendix of Letters from Andrew
Fletcher, Lord Justice-Clerk 1746-8. Ed. C. Sanford Terry. 2 vols. (New
Spalding Club.) Aberdeen. 1902.
The Chevalier
de St George and the Jacobite Movements in his Favour 1701-20.
Ed. C.
Sanford Terry. London. 1901.
The Rising of
1745: with a Bibliography of Jacobite History 1689-1788. Ed.
C. Sanford Terry. New edn.
London. 1903.
Thurot, Franijois. Journal historique de la Campagne sur les Cotes
d’Ecosse et d’lrlande en 1757 et 1758. Dunkirk.
1760.
Wodrow, Robert.
Analecta. (Maitland Club.) 4 vols. Edinburgh. 1842-3.
Correspondence. (Wodrow Society.) 3 vols.
Edinburgh. 1842-3.
The
Woodhouselee ms. Ed. A. F.
Steuart. Edinburgh. 1907.
III. MODERN GENERAL WORKS.
Brown, P.
Hume. History of Scotland. Vol. in. Cambridge. 1908.
Browne, J. A
History of the Highlands and of the Highland Clans. 4 vols. Glasgow. 1838.
Burton, J.
Hill. The History of Scotland to the Extinction of the last Jacobite
Insurrection. Vol. vra. Edinburgh. 1876.
Chambers, R.
Domestic Annals of Scotland from the Revolution to the Rebellion of 1745.
London. 1861.
Craik, Sir H.
A Century of Scottish History. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 190]. Cunningham, J. The
Church History of Scotland. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1859. Graham, H. G. Social Life
of Scotland in the 18th Century. 2 vols. London. 1899.
Grub, G. An
Ecclesiastical History of Scotland. 4 vols. Edinburgh. 1861. Lang, A. History
of Scotland. Vol. iv. Edinburgh. 1907.
Mackerrow, J.
History of the Secession Church. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1839. Mathieson, W. L. Scotland
and the Union, 1695-1747- Glasgow. 1905.
Morren, N.
Annals of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 1739-52.
2 vols.
Edinburgh. 1838-40.
Skinner, J.
An Ecclesiastical History of Scotland. 2 vols. London. 1788. Stephen, W.
History of the Scottish Church. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1894-6. Stewart, D. Sketches
of the Character, Manners, and present State of the Highlanders of Scotland. 2
vols. Edinburgh. 1822.
Struthers, J.
The History of Scotlaud from the Union to 1748. 2 vols. Glasgow.
1827-8.
IV. MONOGRAPHS ON SPECIAL SUBJECTS.
Blaikie, W.
B. Itinerary of Prince Charles Edward Stuart. (Scottish History Society.)
Edinburgh. 1897.
Cadell, Sir
R. Sir John Cope and the Rebellion of 1746. Edinburgh. 1898. Chambers, R.
History of the Rebellions in Scotland under the Viscount of Dundee and the Earl
of Mar. Edinburgh. 1829.
History of the Rebellion in Scotland in
1746,1746. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1828.
Dixon, W. The
Jacobite Episode in Scottish History. Edinburgh. 1874.
Doran, J.
Mann and Manners at the Court of Florence 1740-86. London. 1876. Ferguson, R.
S. The Retreat of the Highlanders through Westmorland in 1745. Kendal. 1889.
Head, F. W.
The fallen Stuarts. Cambridge Historical Essays. No. xn. Cambridge. 1901.
Kirsch,
Peter Anton. Treibende Faktoren bei dem Schottischen Aufstande 1745-6
und Nachspiel desselben. In Historisches Jahrbuch, Vol. xxvii. Munich. 1906. Lang, A. Pickle the
Spy: or, The Incognito of Prince Charles. London. 1897.
The Companions of Pickle. London. 1898.
Lefevre-Pontalis, G. Le Mission de Marquis d’Eguilles en Ecosse aupres
de Charles Edouard. In Annales de l’Ecole des Sciences Politiques.
Paris. 1887. Macdonald, A. History of the Clan Donald. 3 vols. Inverness.
1896-1907. Macgregor, A. G. M. History of the Clan Gregor. 2 vols. Edinburgh.
1898-1901. A royalist Family, Irish and French (1689-1789), and Prince Charles
Edward. Translated from the French by A. G. M. Macgregor. Edinburgh. 1904.
Mounsey, G. C. Carlisle in 1745. London. 1846.
Perthshire, a
Military History of, 1660-1902. Ed. the Marchioness of Tullibar- dine. 2 vols. Perth. 1908.
Salomon, F. Geschichte des letzten Ministeriums Konigin Annas von England,
1710-4. Gotha.
1894.
Thornton, P.
M. The Stuart Dynasty : Short Studies of its Rise, Course, and early Exile.
London. 1890.
V. BIOGRAPHIES AND MEMOIRS.
Biscoe, A. C.
The Earls of Middleton. London. 1876.
Bissett, A.
Memoirs and Papers of Sir Andrew Mitchell. 2 vols. London. 1850. Burton, J.
Hill. Lives of Simon Lord Lovat and Duncan Forbes of Culloden. London. 1847.
Campbell, R.
The Life of John Duke of Argyle and Greenwich. London. 1746. Carlyle, A.
Autobiography. Edinburgh. 1860.
Dennistoun,
J. Memoirs of Sir Robert Strange, Knt., and of Andrew Lumisden.
2 vols.
London. 1855.
Dictionary of
National Biography. 66 vols. London. 1885-1901.
Ewald, A. C.
Life and Times of Prince Charles Stuart. New edn. London. 1904. Forbin, Claude,
Comte de. Memoires. Amsterdam. 1730.
Graham, J. M.
Annals and Correspondence of the Viscount and the first and second Earls of
Stair. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1875. daile, M. Queen Mary of Modena. London. 1905.
James Francis Edward : the Old Chevalier.
London. 1907.
Jesse, J. H.
Memoirs of the Pretenders and their Adherents. London. 1846.
Keith,
Fieldmarshal James. Fragment of a Memoir, 1714-34. (Spalding Club.) Edinburgh.
1843.
Kelly, B. W.
Life of Henry Benedict Stuart, Cardinal Duke of York. London. 1899.
The Conqueror of Culloden : being the Life and
Times of William Augustus
Duke of
Cumberland, 1721-66. London. 1903.
Lang, A.
Prince Charles Edward Stuart, the Young Chevalier. New edn. London. 1903.
and' Shield, A. The King over the Water.
[James III and VIII.] London.
1907.
Maclachlan,
A. N. C. W illiam Augustus Duke of Cumberland: being a Sketch of his Military
Life and Character. London. 1876.
Norie, W.
Drummond. Life and Adventures of Prince Charles Edward Stuart.
4 vols. London. 1903-4.
Oliphant, T.
L. K. The Jacobite Lairds of Gask. London. 1870.
Omond, G. W.
T. The Lord Advocates of Scotland. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1883.
The Amiston Memoirs. Edinburgh. 1887.
Rankin, R.
The Marquis d’Argenson. London. 1901.
Roome, H. D.
James Edward, the Old Pretender. Oxford. 1904.
Scott, Mrs
Maxwell. The Youth of James III, 1688-1712. In Nineteenth Century.
Vol. iiV.
London. 1904.
Shield,
Alice. Henry Stuart, Cardinal of York, and his Times. London. 1908. Story, R.
H. William Carstares: a Character and Career of the revolutionary Epoch
(1689-1715). London. 1874.
Terry, C.
Sanford. The Young Pretender. London. 1903.
Fhoirson, K.
Memoirs of the Jacobites of 1715 and 1745. 3 vols. London. 1845-6.
Vaughan, H.
M. The last of the Royal Stuarts: Henry Stuart, Cardinal Duke of York. London.
1906.
Wolff, H. W.
The Pretender at Bar-le-Duc. In Blackwood’s
Magazine. Vol. clvi. Edinburgh. 1894.
Zevort, E. Le Marquis d’Argenson et le Ministere des Affaires
Etrangeres. Paris.
1880.
VI. MAPS AND PLANS.
A section
entitled “Maps and Plans illustrating the Jacobite Risings” will be found at
pp. 317-9 of C. Sanford Terry’s The Rising of 1745 (edn. 1903). To those there
mentioned should be added, a plan of Glenshiel in the Scottish Historical
Review, vol. n, p. 416 ; of Prestonpans, Falkirk, and Culloden in Elcho’s Short
Account; of Culloden in Lang’s History, vol. iv, p. 510. See also A. Smail’s
SideLights on the Forty-Five. (Edinburgh. 1903.)
CHAPTERS IY and V.
THE
BOURBON GOVERNMENTS IN FRANCE AND SPAIN. (1715-46.)
I. MANUSCRIPTS.
The principal
sources for the diplomatic history of this period are to be found in the Public
Record Office, the Archives du ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, the
Archivo historico naciocal de Madrid, to which the documents previously stored
at Alcala de Henares have lately been removed. Much important correspondence is
at Siinancas. The Carte Farnesiane in the Archivio di Stato at Naples are
valuable; and these are supplemented by correspondence and documents relating
to Alberoni at the Collegio S. Lazaro, near Piacenza. The Venetian Relazioni,
unfortunately not printed for the eighteenth century, are of much interest as
taking an external point of view, and as throwing vivid light on the
personalities at the Courts to which the ambassadors were accredited.
See Flammermont, J. Rapport...sur les correspondances des Agents Diplo-
matiques Strangers en France avant la Revolution conservees dans les Archives de
Berlin, Dresde, Geneve, Turin, Genes, Florence, Naples, Siinancas, Lisbonne,
Londres, La Haye et Vienne. Nouvelles Archives des Missions Scientifiques et
Litteraires. Vol. vm. Paris. 1896.
Legg, L. G.
Wickham. List of Diplomatic Representatives and Agents, England and France,
1689-1733. (Notes on the Diplomatic Relations of England and France, ed. C. H.
Firth.) Oxford and London. 1009.
II. CONTEMPORARY OR NEARLY CONTEMPORARY
AUTHORITIES
(IN PRINT).
A. Memoirs, CoRRESPONnENCE etc.
Alberoni,
Card.—The Conduct of Cardinal Alberoni, with an Account of some Secret
Transactions at the Spanish Court. London. 1720. [Untrustworthy.]
Armstrong, E. Letters of Alberoni to the
Prince of Parma (from December,
1714).
English Historical Review. Vol. v. London. 1890.
Antin, Due de. Memoires. Melanges des Biblioph. Franc. Vol. ii. Paris. 1822. Argenson, Rene Louis de
Voyer, Marquis de. Journal et Memoires. Ed. E. J. B.
Rathery. 9 vols. Paris. 1859-67.
Bacallar y Sana, Marques de San Felipe. Comentarios de la guerra de Espana
hasta la paz general del ano 1725. 4 vols. Genoa and Madrid. 1790-3.
Barhier, E. J. F. Chronique de la Re'gence et du Regne de Louis XV,
1718-63.
8 vols. Paris. 1857.
Belando, N. de. Historia Civil de Espafia 1700-33. 3 vols. Madrid. 1744.
Bernis, Cardinal F. L. de Pierre de. Memoires et Lettres, 1715-58. Ed. F.
Masson. 2 vols. Paris. 1878.
Berwick, J. Fitzjames Due de. Memoires e'crits par lui-meme; avec une
suite abregee depuis 1716j jusqu’a sa mort en 1734. l’ubl. par le Due de
Fitzjames. 2 vols. Paris. 1778-80. Engl. Transl. [hy L. J. Hooke]. London.
1779. Bois-Jourdain, M. de. Melanges. 3 vols. Paris. 1807.
Bourgeois, E. Lettres intimes de L. M. Alberoni adressees au Comte I.
Rocca. Paris. 1892.
Brancas, Duehesse de. Memoires^ suivies de la Correspondance de Mmo
de Chateauroux. Ed. E. Asse'. Paris. 1890.
Brossesj C. de. L’ltalie il y a cent ans, ou lettres ecrites en 1739 et
1740. 2 vols. Paris. 183C.
Buvatj J. Journal de la Re'gence (1715-23). Ed. E. Campardon. 2 vols.
Paris 1865.
Campo Raso, I. del. Memorias politicas y militares para servir de
continuacion a los comentarios del Marques de San Felipe. 2
vols. Madrid. 1792.
Caruttij D.
Relazione del Abbate Maro. Acad. R. di Torino. Series
II, xix. Turin. 1861.
Uangeau, Marquis de. Journal. Vols. xvi-xvm (to 1720). Edd. E. Soulie and L. Dussieux. Paris.
1858-9.
[Defoe,
Daniel.] The Case of the War in Italy stated. London.
1718.
Digueres, V. des. Lettres inedites de la reine Maria Leczinslca et de la
duehesse de Luynes au president Henault. Paris. 1886.
Dorsanne, A. Journal contenant tout ce qui s’est passe a Rome et en
France dans l’affaire de la Constitution Unigenitus. 2 vols. Rome. 1753.
Duclos, C. P. Memoires secretes sur le regne de Louis XIV, la Regence et
le regne de Louis XV. Ed. J. F. Barriere. Paris. 1881.
Duport de Cheverny, Comte. Memoires, 1731-87. Intr. et notes par R. de
Creve- coeur. Paris. 1909.
Faur, M. Vie privee du Marechal de Richelieu. 3 vols. Paris. 1803.
Feydeau de Marville, C. H. (Comte de Gien). Lettres du Ministre Maurepas
a M. de Marville, lieutenant-general de police. Lettres de M. de Marville au
Ministre Maurepas. (Soc. hist, de France.) Paris. 1896.
Foscarini, M.
Storia Arcana. Arch. Stor. ltal. Vol. v. Florence. 1843. Galluzzi, R. Istoria del Granducato di Toscana. 9 vols. Florence.
1781. Henault, le President. Memoires. Ed. Baron de Vigan. Paris. 1855.
L. M. D. M. [La Mothe, dit La Hode.] Vie de Philippe d’Orleans, Regent
du Royaume. 2 vols. London. 1737.
Liria, Duke de. Diario del Viaje a Moscovia (1727-30). (Coleccion de Documentos
ineditos para la historia de Espana. Vol. xcm.) Madrid. 1889.
A review of
this work. Quarterly Review. January 1892.
Louis XV. Vie
privee. [By Moufle d’Angerville.] 4 vols.
London. 1791. Louville, C. A. d’Allonville, Marquis de. Memoires. 2 vols. Pans.
1818. Luynes, Due de. Memoires sur la Cour de Louis XV, 1735-58. Edd. L.
Dussieux and E. Soulie. 17 vols. Paris. 1860-5.
Manifeste sur les sujets de rupture entre la France et l’Espagne. Paris.
1719. Marais, M. Journal et Memoires sur la Regence et le regne de Louis XV,
1715-37.
Ed. M. de Lescure. 4 vols. Paris. 1863.
Marmontel, J. F. Regence du Due d’Orleans. CEuvres posthumes. 2 vols.
Paris. 1805.
Massillon, J. B. Memoires de la Minorite de Louis XV. Paris. 1792.
Maurepas, J. F. Phelypeaux de. Memoires. 3rd edn. 4 vols. Paris. 1792.
■ ■ Recueil dit de
Maurepas. 6 vols. Leyden. 1865.
Montesquieu, C. de S., Baron de. Voyages. Ed. Baron A. de Montesquieu.
2 vols. Paris. 1896.
Montgon, C. A. de. Me'moires. 8 vols. Lausanne. 1753.
Morozzo della Bocca, E. Lettere di Vittorio Amadeo II di Savoia, Re di
Sicilia, a G. M. Conte di Morozzo, Marchese della Bocca, suo Ambasciatore a
Madrid (1713-17). (Miscellanea di Storia Patria. Vol. xxvi.) Turin. 1887.
Narbonne, P. (Premier Commissaire de police de la ville de Versailles). Journal
des regnes de Louis XIV et Louis XV, 1701-74. Ed. J. A. Le Roi. Paris and
Versailles. 1866.
Noailles, Marechal Due de.—Millot, C. F. X. Memoires polit. et milit.
pour servir a l’hist. de Louis XIV et Louis XV, composes sur les pieces recueill.
par A.-M.,
D. de N. Ed. G. T. Villenave. Vol.
hi. Coll. Petitot. n, 72. Paris.
1829. Orleans, Elisabeth Charlotte, Duchess of. See
Bibliography to Vol. V, Chap. I. Piossens, Chevalier de. Memoires de la
Re'gence du Due d’Orleans durant la minorite de Louis XV. 3 vols. “The
Hague” [Rouen], 1729 and 1730. New enlarged edn, by N. Lenglet de Fresnoy. 5 vols. Amsterdam. 1749. Poggiali, C. Memorie storiche della citta di
Piacenza. Vol. xu. Piacenza. 1766. Poidebard, W. Correspondance litteraire et
anecdotique entre M. de Saint-Fonds et le President Dugas. Lyons. 1900.
Recueil des Instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs et ministres de
France. Naples et Parme. Intr. et Notes de J. Reinach. Paris. 1893.
Espagne. Intr. et Notes de A. Morel-Fatio et H. Leonardon. Vols. n, m.
Paris. 1899.
Savoie, Sardaigne et Mantoue. Intr. et Notes du Comte Horric de
Beaucaire. Paris. 1899.
Relazioni diplomatiche della Corte di Savoia. Francia. Periodo in. Vols.
i-m (Biblioteca Storica Italiana.) 1886-8.
Richelieu, Due de. Me'moires historiques et anecdotiques. 6 vols. Paris.
1829. Ripperda, Duke de. Memoirs of the Duke de Ripperda,
containing a succinct account of...events...between 1715 and 1736. London. 1740. [Untrustworthy.] Rousset, C. Correspondance de Louis XV et
du Marechal de Noailles. 2 vols. Paris. 1865.
Rousset de Missy, J. Histoire du Cardinal Alberoni. [Pretended
translation from the Spanish.] The Hague, 1719. Second edn, and Italian
translation, 1720-1. Saint-Simon, Due de. Memoires. Edd. A. Che'ruel and A.
Regnier. 21 vols. Paris. 1873-86. [From Vol. xi.]
Papiers inedits. Lettres et depeches sur l’ambassade d’Espagne. Ed. E.
Dumont. Paris. 1889.
Picot, G. Les papiers du Due de Saint-Simon aux Archives des Affaires
Etrangeres. (Compte Rendu de l’Acad. des Sc. Mor. et Pol. New Series. Vol. xiv. Paris. 1880.)
Ranke, L. von. Uber die Memoiren des Due von Saint-Simon. Franzos.
Gesch. Vol. v. Sammtl. Werke. Vol. xu.
Leipzig. 1870.
Cheruel, A. Saint-Simon et l’Abbe Dubois, leurs relations de 1718 a
1722. Revue Historique. Vol. i. Paris. 1876.
Sevelinges, C. L. de. Memoires et correspondance du Cardinal Dubois.
Paris. 1815. Tesse, Marechal de. Memoires et Lettres. 2 vols. Paris. 1806.
Madame de. Souvenirs de Frouillay de Tesse,
Marquise de Crequy, 1710
1802. 7 vols. Paris. 1836.
(Toussaint, F. V.?) Anecdotes curieuses de la Cour de France sous le
regne de Louis XV. Ed. P. Fould. 3rd edn. Paris. 1908.
Ulloa, B. de. Restablecimiento de las fabricas y comercio Espanol. 2
parts. Madrid. 1749.
Ustariz, G. de. Teorica y Practica de Comercio y de Marina. Madrid.
Editions of 1724, 1742 and 1757.
Van Hoey, A. Lettres et negociations de M. Van Hoey pour servir a
l’histoire de la vie du Cardinal de Fleury. London. 1743. Engl. Trausl. London.
J743.
Villa, A. R. La Embajada del Baron de Ripperda en Viena. Boletin de la,
R. Ac. de la Historia. Vol. xxx. Madrid. 1897.
Informacion del Marques Beretti-Landy sobre
antecedentes del Bardn de
Ripperda. Ibid. Vol. xxxi. 1897.
Villars, Marechal L. H. Due de. Memoires. Ed. Marquis de Vogud. Soc.
Hist. France. 6 vols. Paris. 1884-94.
Vogue, Marquis C. J. de. Villars d’api-es sa correspondance et des
documents inedits. 2 vols. Paris. 1888.
Voltaire, F. Arouet de. Precis du siecle de Louis XV. Vol. xxii of
(Euvres completes. Kehl. 1784-9.
Correspondance. Vols. lii and liii of
the same.
B. Treaties.
The
Collections of Dumont and Rousset, supplemented by G. F. de Martens, and
especially by A. del Cantillo, Tratados, Convenios y declaraciones de paz y de
comercio, 1700-1842. Madrid. 1843; G. de Lamberty, Memoires pour servir a
l’histoire du xvmmB siecle. Vol. x.
Amsterdam. 1736 (containing treaties from 1718-31); and L. Bittner,
Chronologisches Verzeichniss der Oester- reichischeu Staatsvertrage. Vol.
i (to 1763). Vienna. 1903.
C. Periodicals.
Annual Register.
Gentleman’s Magazine. Gazette de France. Mercure Historique et Politique
contenant l’etat pre'sent de l’Europe. (Engl. Translation: The Present State of
Europe, to 1733.) Recueil des Nouvelles ordinaires et extra- ordinaires (from
1714). Gazette d’Hollande. Gaceta de Madrid.
III. SUBSIDIARY AUTHORITIES.
Altamira y
Crevea, R. Historia de Espana. Vol. iv. Barcelona. 1909. Armstrong, E.
Elisabeth Farnese. London. 1892.
Alberoni and the Quadruple Alliance, Scottish
Review. Paisley. January,
1897.
Ameth, A. Ritter von. Prinz Eugen von Savoyen. 3 vols. Vienna. 1869. Aubertin, C. L’esprit publique au dix-huitieme
siecle. Paris. 1889, etc. Baraudon, A. La Maison de Savoie et la Triple
Alliance, 1713-22. Paris. 1896. Barthelemy, E. M. Comte de. Les lilies du
Regent. 2 vols. Paris. 1874.
Mesdames de France, filles de Louis XV. Paris.
1879.
Les Correspondants de la Marquise de Balleroy.
2 vols. Paris. 1883*
Baudrillart, A. Philippe V et La Cour de France. 5
vols. Paris. [The fullest and most important work on Franco-Spanish Histoiy in
this period.]
■ Rapport sur une
Mission en Espagne aux Archives d’Alcala de Henares et de
Simancas. Archives des Missions seientifiques et litteraires. Ser. hi. Vol. xv. Paris. 1889.
Rapport sur une Mission en Espagne aux
Archives de Simancas et d’Alcala
de Henares en 1893. Nouvelles Archives des Missions sc. et litt. Vol.
vi. Paris. 1893.
Beauriez, L. de. Une fille de France. Paris. 1887.
Bersani,
Abbe. Storia del Cardinale Giulio Alberoni. Piacenza.
1861.
Bianchi, G Giulio Alberoni e il suo secolo. Piacenza. 1901.
Bliard, P. Dubois, Cardinal et premier ministre. Paris. 1901.
Bourgeois, E. Alberoni, Madame des Ursins et la reine Elisabeth Farnese.
Paris.
1891.
■ Le Secret du Regent et
la politique de l’Abbe Dubois. 1716-8. Paris. 1908.
[Triple and Quadruple Alliances.]
Boutry, M. Vicomte de. Une creature du Cardinal Dubois. Intrigues et
missions diplomatiques du Cardinal de Tencin. Paris. 1902.
Boye, P. Stanislas Leszcynski et le troisieme traite de Vienne. Nancy.
1898. Capefigue, J. B. H. R. Philippe d’Orle'ans, Regent de France. Paris.
1845.
Louis XV et la societe du xviume
siecle. 4 vols. Paris. 1842.
Mesdemoiselles de Nesle et la jeunesse de
Louis XV. Paris. 1864.
Diplomatic de la France et de l’Espagne depuis
l’avenement de la Maison de
Bourbon, 1698-1846. Paris. 1846.
Carre, H. La France sous Louis XV. Paris. 1891.
Carutti, D. Storia della Diplomazia nella Corte di Savoia. Vol.
iv. Turin. 1880.
Storia del Regno di Vittorio Amedeo II.
Florence. 1863.
Storia del Regno di Carlo Emanuele III. 2
vols. Turin. 1859.
Chevalier, E. Histoire de la Marine Franipaise jusqu’au traite de paix
de 1762. Paris. 1902.
Courcy, M. A. Marquis de. L’Espagne aprfes la paix d’Utrecht. Paris.
1891. Coxe, W. Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon. 3 vols.
London. 1813-5.
Dalborno, C.
Elisabetta Famese. Atti della R. Acad, di Arcqueologia e Belle Arti.
Vol. xiv.
1889-90.
Danvila y Burguero, A. Estudios espanoles del siglo xvra.
(1) Luisa Isabel de Orleans y
Luis I. Madrid. 1902.
(2) Fernando VI y Dona Barbara
de Braganza. Madrid. 1905.
Danvila y Collado, M. Reinado de Carlos III. Vol. i. Madrid. 1892.
Desdevises du Dezert, G. L’Espagne de l’ancien regime. Paris. 1898.
Driault, E. Chauvelin. Rev. d’histoire diplomatique. No. I. 1893.
Duro, C. F. Armada espanola. 9 vols. Madrid. 1895-1903.
Duron, H. Philippe d’Orleans, Regent. Sa jeunesse. Memoires de l’Acad.
de Stanislas. Series v. Vol. xn. 1895.
Filon, C. A. O. L’AUiance Anglaise au xvmme siecle, depuis la
paix d’Utrecht jusqu’a la Guerre de la Succ. d’Autriche. Memoire lu a l’Acad.
des Sc. Mor. et Pol. Paris. 1860.
Funck-Brentano, F. La Regence, 1715-23. Paris. 1909.
Gachard, M. Lcs Archives Farnesiennes a Naples. Bulletin de la
Commission royale d’histoire. Vol. xi. Brussels. 1869.
Gauthier-Villars, H. Le mariage de Louis XV d’apres des documents
nouveaux. Paris. 1900.
Gay, C. Negotiations relatives a l’etablissement de la Maison de Bourbon
sur le trone des Deux-Siciles (1701-36). Paris. 1853.
Haggard,
Lieut.-Col. A. C. P. The Regent of the Roues. London. 1905.
The real Louis XV. 2 vols. London. 1906.
Haussonville, J. O. B. de Cleron, Comte de. Histoire de la reunion de la
Lorraine a la France. 4 vols. Paris. 1880.
Hume, M. A.
S. Spain; its greatness and decay. (Camb. Hist.
Ser.) Cambridge. 1898. Jobez, A. La France sous Louis XV. 6 vols. Paris.
1864-73.
Laborderie, A. de. Revue de Bretagne et de Vendee. 1857-8-9, 1868.
Lafuente, M. Historia general de Espafia. Vol. xix. Madrid. 1857-
Lavisse, E. Histoire de France. Vol. vm. Pt. n. Paris. 1909.
Lea, H. C.
History of the Inquisition in Spain. 4 vols. New
York. 1907.
Le Begue de Serminy, Comte M. Les Brigandages Maritimes de l’Angleterre
sous le regne de Louis XV. Revue des Questions Historiques. Paris. 1908. (i,
n.) Legrelle, A. La Diplomatic Franipaise et la Succession d’Espagne. Vol. ii. La Paix (1710-25). 2nd edn.
Braine-le-Comte. 1899.
L&nontey, P. E. Histoire de la R^geuce et de la Minorite de Louis
XV, jusqu’au ministere du Card. Fleury. 2 vols. Paris. 1832.
Lescure, M. de. Les maitresses du Regent. Paris. 1861.
Macanaz, M. Maldonado. Don Rafael Melchor Macanaz considerato como
politico y como regalista. Madrid. 1886.
Articles on Alberoni. Revista de Espana. Madrid.
1884.
Marmontel, J. F. Regence du Due d’Orleans. 2 vols. Paris. 1805.
Marquisetj A. La Duchesse de Fallary, 1697-1782. Paris. 1907.
Martin, H. Histoire de France. Vol. xv. Paris. 1864.
Michelet, J. Histoire de France. Vol. xvii. Paris. 1879.
Moore, G.
Lives of Cardinal Alberoni, the Duke of Ripperda, and the Marquis of Pombal. 2 vols. London. 1806-19. [Untrustworthy.]
Noorden, C. von. Victor Amadeus II von Savoyen. In Historische Vortrage,
hrsgbn. von W. Maurenbrecher. Leipzig. 1884.
Pajolj C. P. V. Comte de. Les guerres sous Louis XV. 7 vols. and Atlas.
Paris. 1881-91.
Papa, V. L’ Alberoni e la sua dipartita dalla Spagna. Turin. 1876.
Perez, L. Le President Henault et Mme du Deffand. 3rd
edn. Paris. 1893. Perkins, J. B. France under the Regency. London. 1892.
Professione, A. 11 Ministero in Spagna e il Processo del Cardinale Giulio
Alberoni. Turin. 1898.
Ranke, L. von. Franzosische Geschichte, vomehml. im xvi und xvii Jahrh.
Vol. iv. Bk. xvii : Die Regentschaft und Card. Fleury. Sammtl. Werke. Vol. xi. Leipzig. 1869.
Raynal, P. de. Le mariage d'un roi. Paris. 1887.
Reaulx, Marquise des. Le roi Stanislas et Maria Leczinska. Paris. 1895.
Riviere, H. La Marine fran^aise sous le regne de Louis XV. Paris. 1859.
Rulhiere, C. C. de. Anecdotes sur le Marechal de Richelieu. Paris. 1890.
Scelle, G. La Traite Negriere aux Indes de Castille. Vols. i, n.
Contrats et traites d'Assiente. Paris. 1906. [Vol. in, not yet
published, will treat of the period from 1715-50.]
Schipa, M. II regno di Napoli al tempo di Carlo di Borbone. Naples.
1904. Seilhac, Comte V. de. L’Abbe Dubois, premier Ministre de Louis XV. 2
vols. Paris. 1882.
Sempere, J. Historia del lujo y de las leyes suntuarias de Espana.
Madrid. 1788. Syveton, G. Une Cour et un Aventurier au xvm6 siecle:
le baron de Ripperda. Paris. 1896.
Thirion, H. La vie privee des financiers au dix-huitieme siecle. Paris.
1895.
Madame de Prie, 1698-1727. Paris. 1905.
Vanda], A. Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie. Paris. 1882.
Une ambassade franijaise en Orient sous Louis
XV. La Mission du Marquis
de Villeneuve. 2nd edn. Paris.
Vernon, K. D.
Italy, 1492-1792. (Cambridge Historical Series.) Cambridge.
1908. Villa, A. R. Don Cenon de Somodevilla, Marque's de la Ensenada. Madrid.
1878.
Patino y Campillo. Madrid. 1882.
Viollet, A. Histoire des Bourbons d'Espagne. Paris. 1843.
Weber, O. Die Quadrupel-Allianz vom Jahre 1718. Vienna. 1887.
Wiesener, L. Le re'gent, l’abbe Dubois et les Anglais d'apres les
sources britan- niques. 3 vols. Paris. 1891-9.
Wilson,
Lt.-Col. C. T. The Duke of Berwick, Marshal of France, 1702-34 London. 1883.
Wirminghaus, A. Zwei Spanische Mercantilisten: Geronimo de Ustariz und
Bernardo de Ulloa. Halle. 1886.
Zevort, E. Le Marquis d’Argenson et le ministere des affaires etrangeres
du
18 nov. 1744 au 10 jan. 1747.
Paris. 1880.
Zobi, A. Storia civile della Toscana, 1737-1848. Vol.
I. Florence. 1850.
[See
also the Bibliographies to Chapters 11 (1); III; and Vol. V, Chapters I and
II.]
FINANCIAL
EXPERIMENTS AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT.
[As
to the general English and French history of the period see Bibliographies to
Chapters 1, 2; II; and IV. So far as concerns the colonies this Bibliography is
confined to the British West Indies, West Africa, the Cape of Good Pope and
the Slave Trade. For works relating to other parts of the colonial world
reference should be made to the Bibliographies of Vol. VII, Chapters I and II,
and Chapter III; Vol. IX, Chapter XXIII; Vol. X, Chapters VIII, X, and XXI.]
I.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Cunningham,
W. Growth of English Industry and Commerce. Modern Times.
Part II: Laissez Faire. Bibliographical Index. Cambridge.
1907.
Fairbridge,
C. A. and Noble, J. Catalogue of Books relating to South Africa. Capetown.
1886.
Levasseur, E.
Systeme de Law. Preface, with a description of the principal original
documents. Paris. 1854.
Stevens, H.
Catalogue of the American Books in the British Museum. London. 1866. Theal, G.
McC. History of South Africa under the Dutch East India Company.
Vol. ii. Appendix: Notes on Books. 2nd edn.
London. 1897.
Winsor, J.
Narrative and critical history of America. Vol. v. Editorial Notes,
I, Law and the Mississippi Bubble. Vol. vm.
Bibliographical notes on the West Indies. London. 1889.
II. JOHN LAW AND THE MISSISSIPPI SCHEME.
A. Contemporary
Authorities.
Barbier, E. J. F. Chronique de la Regence. 4 vols. Paris. 1857.
Buvat, J. Journal de la Regence. 1716-23. 2
vols. Paris. 1865.
Case of Mr
Law truly stated, the. London. 1721.
Company of
Mississippi, a full and impartial account of the...in French and English.
London. 1720.
Defoe, D. The
Chimera or the French way of paying National Debts laid open. London. 1720.
Duhautchamps, B. M. Histoire du Systeme des Finances pendant les ann£es
1719 et 1720. 6
vols. The Hague. 1739. [Vols. v and vi contain a collection of Arrets and Edicts
relating to the System.]
Histoire du Visa. 4 vols. The Hague. 1743.
Dutot, C. de F. Reflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce. 2
vols. The Hague. 1738. Reprinted in E. Daire’s ^conomistes-Financiers. Paris.
1843.
Graham, J. M.
Annals and Correspondence of the Viscount and the first and second Earls of
Stair. 2 vols. Edinburgh and London. 1876.
Hardwicke,
Philip Yorke, second Earl of. Miscellaneous State Papers. 1501-1726.
Vol. n.
London. 1778.
Kurtze Remarques iiher den...Mississipischen’Actien-Handel in Paris, und
andere groEse Untemehmungen des Heern Laws. Leipzig.
1720.
Law, John.
CEuvres de Jean Law. Paris. 1790.
iSconomistes-Financiers du xvme siecle. Law. E. Daire. Paris.
1843.
[These two collections of Law”s works contain: Lettres sur le nouveau
systeme des finances, published in the Mercure de France, Feb., Mar., Apr.,
May, 1720; Lettres sur les banques, 1715?; Memoire sur l’usage des monnaies;
Memoires justificatifs, 1724; Memoires sur les banques, 1715? and a French
translation of the Money and Trade.]
Letter, a, to
Mr Law upon his arrival in Great Britain. London. 1721. Letter to Mr Law, a
Second. London. 1721.
Leven en
caracter, het, van den Heer Jan Law. Amsterdam. 1722. Memoirs, life and
character of the Great Mr Law, The. London. 1721. Money and Trade. Edinburgh.
1705. London. 1720.
Observations
on the New System of the Finances of France in two Letters by Mr Law. Trans, from the Frenchi London. 1720.
Secret, le, du Systeme de M. Law devoile en deux lettres ecrites par un
Due et Pair de France et un Mylord Anglois. The Hague. 1721.
Melon, S. F. Essai politique sur le commerce. 1st edn.
1734. Reprinted in Daire’s Economistes-Financiers.
Memoire pour servir a justifier La Compagnie des Indes. 1720.
Montagu, Lady
Mary Wortley. Letters of. Edited by Lord Wharncliffe. 2 vols. London. 1893.
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de. Lettres Persanes. See
CEuvres of Montesquieu. 7 vols. Paris. 1769.
Paris-Duverney. Examen de Dutot’s Reflexions politiques. 2 vols. The
Hague. 1740. Present State, the, of the French Revenues and Trade and of the
Controversy betwixt the Parliament of Paris and Mr Law. London. 1720.
Saint-Simon, Memoires du Due de. Par M. Cheruel. Paris. 1856-8. Par A.
de Boislisle. Paris.
. 1879- . (In course of publication.)
Tafereel, het
groote, der Dwaasheid. Amsterdam (?). 1720.
Veron de Forbonnais, F. Recherches et considerations sur les finances de
France.
1595-1721. 2 vols. Basle. 1758.
Villars, Memoires du Marechal de. 6 vols. Paris.
1884-1904.
B. Later
Works.
Alexi, S.
John Law und sein System. Berlin. 1885.
D’Avenel, Vicomte G. Histoire economique de la propriete, des salaires,
et de tous les prix, 1200-1800. 4 vols. Paris. 1894.
Bailly, A. Histoire Financiere de la France. Vol. ii. Paris. 1830.
Blanc, L. Histoire de la Revolution Fran^aise. Vol. i. Paris. 1847.
Capefigue, J. B. H. R. Histoire des grandes operations financieres. Vol.
i. Les Fermiers Ge'ne'raux depuis le xvma siecle. Paris. 1855.
Cochut, P. A. Law, son systeme et son e'poque. Paris. 1853. In English.
London. 1856.
Courtois, A. Histoire de la Banque de France. Paris. 1875.
Daire, E. Economistes-Financiers du xviii0 siecle. Notice
Historique sur Jean Law. Paris. 1843.
Davis, A.
McFarland. Historical Study of Law’s System. Boston. 1887. Reprinted from the
American Quarterly Journal of Economics. Boston.
April, 1887.
Heymann, J. Law und sein System. Munich. 1853.
Kurtzel, A. Geschichte der Law’schen Firianzoperation. Leipzig. 1846. Lacretelle, J. C. D. de. Histoire de France pendant le
dix-huitieme siecle.
4th edn. Vol. i. Paris. 1819.
Lemontey, P. E. Histoire de la Regence et de la Minorite de Louis XV. 2
vols. Paris. 1832.
assfaur, E. Recherches historiques sur le Systeme de Law. Paris.
1854. Mackay, C. Memoirs of extraordinary .popular delusions. 2nd edn. 2 vols.
London. 1852.
Martin, H. Histoire de France. Vol. xvii.
Paris. 1851.
Michelet, J. Histoire de France. Vol. xv.
Paris. 1863.
Nicholson, J.
S. Money and Monetary Problems. Essay on Law. 3rd edn. London. 1895.
Pereire,
E. and I. Du Systeme de Law. (Essay, dated Nov. 1834, appended to Enquete sur
la Banque de France. Depositions of MM. E. and I. Pereire.) Paris. 1866. ‘
Russell, Lord
John. History of the Principal States of Europe from the Peace of Utrecht. Vol.
n. London. 1826.
Steuart, Sir
J. An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy. London. 1767. Thiers, A. Notice sur Law et son Systeme in the
Dictionnaire de la Conversation.
Vol. xxxv. London. 1837.
Vallee, Oscar de. Le Due d’Orleans et le Chancelier Daguesseau. Paris.
1860. Wood, J. P. A Sketch of the Life of John Law of Lauriston. Edinburgh and
London. 1791.
—'— Life of
John Law of Lauriston. Edinburgh. 1824.
III. THE SOUTH SEA SCHEME.
A. Contemporary
Authorities.
Account, an,
of the Loans of the South Sea. 1722.
Account, an,
of the Subscriptions of the South Sea Company. 1722.
Ad
vantages... to the Public and to the South Sea Company by the execution of the
South Sea Scheme. London. 1728.
Aislabie’s
second speech on his defence in the House of Lords, Mr. London. 1721. American
trade before and since the establishment of the South Sea Company.
London. 1739.
Answer to a
Calumny (Asiento Trade). London. 1728.
Argument, an,
to show the disadvantage...from obliging the South Sea Company to fix what
capital stock they will give for the annuities. London. 1720.
Barbier, S.
An expedient to pay the public debts. London. 1719.
Battle of the
Bubbles. By a Stander-by. London. 1720.
Bubblers
Mirrour or England’s Folly, the. 1720.
Case, the, of
Contracts for the Third and Fourth Subscriptions. London. 1720. Case, the, of
the Annuitants stated. London. 1720.
Case, the, of
the Bank Contract. London. 1735.
Case, the, of
the Borrowers on the South Sea Loans stated. London. 1721.
Case, the, of
the Right Hon. John Aislabie, Esq. London. 1721.
Case, the, of
Sir Robert Chaplin, Bart., one of the late Directors of the South Sea Company.
London. 1721.
Collection,
a, of the Several Petitions of the Counties, Boroughs, etc., presented to the
House of Commons complaining of the Great Miseries...occasioned by the...South
Sea Company. London. 1721.
Comparison,
a, between the Proposals of the Bank and the South Sea Company. London. 1720.
Considerations
on the present state of the nation as to public credit. London. 1720.
Considerations recommending to the proprietors of South Sea Stock the proposals
for engrafting part of that Company’s funds into the stock of the Bank and East
India Companies. London. 1722.
Critical
History of the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole. London. 1743. Davenant, C.
Dissertation on the Plantation Trade. Political and Commercial Works, ed. Sir
C. Whitworth. Vol. n. London. 1771. Also in Select Dissertations on Colonies
and Plantations. London. 1775- Defence of the observations on the Assiento
Trade. London. 1728.
Defoe, D. The
Anatomy of Exchange-AUey. London. 1719.
Detection, a,
of the whole management of the South Sea Company. London. 1721. Dialogue, a,
concerning Sir Humphry Mackworth’s proposal...for relief of the South Sea
Company. London. 1720.
Elking, H. A
view of the Greenland trade and whale fishery. London. 1722. Essay, an, for
discharging the debts of the nation...and the South Sea Scheme considered.
London. 1720.
Essay, an,
for establishing a new Parliament money. London. 1720.
Examination,
an, and explanation of the South Sea Company’s Scheme. London. 1720.
Hutcheson, A.
An abstract of all the Public Debts remaining due Michaelmas 1722. London.
1723.
A
Collection of Treatises relating to the National Debts and Funds. London.
1720.
A
True State of the South Sea Scheme as it was first formed. London. 1722 ?
Index Rerum
et Vocabulorum (Lists of subscribers). London. 1722.
Journals of
the House of Commons. Vol. xix.
Letter, a, to
a conscientious man...demonstrating the fallaciousness of the South Sea Scheme.
London. 1720.
Letter, a, to
a member of Parliament concerning the South Sea Company. London. 1720.
Mackworth,
Sir H. An answer to several queries relating to the proposals. London. 1720.
A
proposal for payment of the Public Debts, for relief of the South Sea
Company.
London. 1720.
Midriff, Sir
J. Observations on the Spleen and Vapours. London. 1721.
Milner, J.
Three letters relating to the South Sea Company and the Bank.
London. 1720.
New Year’s
gift for the Directors, a. London. 1721.
Observations
on the Assiento Trade. London. 1728.
Pangs of
Credit, the. By an orphan annuitant. London. 1722.
Parliamentary
History. Vol. vii. London. 1811.
Philips, E.
An Appeal to Common Sense. London. 1720. Partn. London. 1721. Proceedings of
the House of Lords in relation to the late Directors of the South Sea Company.
London.. 1722.
Proposals for
restoring credit. London. 1721.
Rise, the, of
the Stocks the Ruin of the People. London. 1721.
Several
Reports, the, of the Committee of Secrecy. 2 vols. London. 1721.
Shaw, W. A.
Select Tracts and Documents illustrative of English Monetary History,
1626-1730. London. 1896.
South Sea
Schcme, the, examined. London. 1720.
South Sea
Scheme, the, detected. London. 1720.
Speech, the,
of the Right Hon. John Aislabie, Esq., upon his defence. London. 1721. State of
the nation. Appendix. The Assiento. London. 1725.
Steele, Sir
R. The Crisis of Property. London. 1720.
Steele, Sir
R. A nation a family. London. 1720.
Stevens,
Captain J. The Rule established in Spain for the Trade in the West Indies.
Translated
from the Spanish. London. 1712?
Stiptick, a,
for a bleeding nation. London. 1721.
Templeman, D.
The Secret History of the late Directors of the South Sea Company containing a
particular Account of their conduct with regard to the Assiento Commerce.
London. 1735.
Time Bargains
tried by the Rules of Equity. London. 1720.
True state,
a, of public credit. London. 1721.
True state,
a, of the contracts relating to the Third Money Subscription. London.
1721.
View, a, of
the Coasts, Countries and Islands within the limits of the South Sea Company
(with map). London. 1711.
B. Later Works.
Andreades, A. Essai sur la fondation et l’histoire de la Banque
d’Angleterre, 1694
1844. Paris. 1901.
Bastable, C. F. Public Finance. 3rd edn.
London. 1903.
Brisco, N. A.
The Economic Policy of Robert Walpole. Columbia Univ. Studies.
Vol. xxvn.
No. 1. New York. 1907.
Burton, J. H.
History of the Reign of Queen Anne. 3 vols. Edinburgh and London. 1880.
Coxe, W.
Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole. 3 vols. London. 1798.
Doubleday, T.
A Financial, Monetary and Statistical History of England, 16881847. London.
1847.
Francis, J.
Chronicles and Characters of the Stock Exchange. London. 1855.
History of the Bank of England. Vol. i.
London. 1847.
Gibbon, E.
Memoirs of Life and Writings. Vol. i. London. 1796.
Hamilton, R.
An Inquiry concerning the National Debt of Great Britain. 3rd edn. Edinburgh.
1818.
Lecky, W. E.
H. History of England in the Eighteenth Century. 8 vols. London. 1883-90.
Mahon, Lord.
History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of Aix- la-Chapelle.
3 vols. London. 1837.
McCarthy, J.
History of the Four Georges. 4 vols. London.
1884.
Michael, W. Der Siidseeschwindel vom Jahre 1720. Stuttgart. 1908. Rapin-Thoyras, Paul de. Histoire
d’Angleterre. Vol. xm. The Hague. 1736. Rogers, J. E. T. Industrial and
Commercial History of England. 2 vols. London.
1902.
Sinclair, Sir
J. History of the Public Revenue of the British Empire. 3rd edn.
3 vols. London. 1803-4.
Willson, B.
The Great Company. 2 vols. London. 1900.
Wright, T.
Caricature History of the Georges. London. 18G8.
IV. THE COLONIES.
A. Contemporary
Authorities.
Abridgement
of minutes of evidence taken before Committee of the whole House (Slave Trade).
1789.
Abstract of
the evidence before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1790 and 1791
on the part of the petitioners for the abolition of the Slave Trade. London.
1791.
Account of
the European Settlement in America. Revised by Edmund Burke. 2 vols. London.
1757.
African
Trade, the great pillar and support of the British Plantation Trade in America,
The. London. 1745.
Appeal, an,
to the Candour and Justice of the people of England on behalf of the West India
merchants and planters. London. 1792.
Barrow, Sir
J. An account of travels into the interior of Southern Africa, in the years
1797 and 1798. 2 vols. London. 1801-4.
Benezet, A. A
description of Guinea...with an enquiry into the rise and progress of the Slave
Trade. London. 1788.
Calendar of
Home Office Papers, 1760-75. 4 vols. London. 1878-99.
Calendar of
Treasury Books and Papers, 1728-45. 6 vols. London. 1897-1903.
Calendar of
Treasury Papers, 1714^28. 2 vols. London. 1883,1889.
Case of the
Sugar Colonies, the. London. 1792.
Clarkson, T.
Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species. London.
1786.
History of the Abolition of the African Slave
Trade. London. 1839.
Comparative
importance of our acquisitions from France in America. London. 1762.
Considerations
on the present peace as far as it is relative to the Colonies and the African
Trade. London. 1763.
Considerations
relating to an additional duty on sugar. London. 1747.
Cook, Captain
J. A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean. Vol. i. London. 1784.
Country, a,
Gentleman’s reasons for voting against Mr Wilberforce’s motion. London. 1792.
Danvers, F.
C. Report on the Records of the India Office. Vol. i. Part i. London. 1887.
Foot, J. A
defence of the Planters in the West Indies. London. 1792.
Gisborne, T.
Remarks on the late decision of the House of Commons respecting the abolition
of the Slave Trade. London. 1792.
Hippisley, J.
Essays, relating to the African Trade. London. 1764.
Houston, J.
Account of the Coast of Guinea. London. 1725.
Hughes, G.
Natural History of Barbados. London. 1750.
Importance of
effectually supporting the Royal African Company. 2nd edn. (with useful map).
London. 1745.
Importance of
the Sugar Colonies to Great Britain. London. 1731.
Janisch, H.
R. Extracts from the St Helena Records, 1673-1835. St Helena. 1885.
Johnson,
Captain C. A General History of the Pirates. London.
1724.
Koch, C. G. de, and Schoell, M. S. F. Histoire Abre'gee des Traites de
Paix.
15 vols. Paris. 1817-8.
Kolbe, P. Description du Cap de Bonne-Esperance...tiree des Memoires de
Mr Pierre Kolbe. 3 vols. Amsterdam. 1743.
Labat, J. B. Nouveau Voyage aux isles d’Amerique. 6
vols. Paris. 1722.
Leguat, F.
Voyage of. Hakluyt Society Publications. 2 vols. London. 1891.
Leibbrandt,
H. C. V. Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope. 18 vols. published.
Capetown. 1896- .
Meredith, H.
An Account of the Gold Coast of Africa, with a brief history of the African
Company. London. 1812.
Miscellaneous,
a, essay, concerning the course pursued by Great Britain in the affairs of her
colonies. London. 1755.
Moodie, D.
The Record or A Sevies of Official Papers relative to the condition and
treatment of the Native Tribes of South Africa. Capetown. 1838.
Mun, T.
England’s Treasure by Foreign Trade. London. 1713.
Papers
relative to Codrington College, Barbados, 1709-1826. London. 1828.
Postlethwayt,
M. The Importance of the African Expedition. London. 1758.
Pownall, T.
The Administration of the Colonies. 3rd edn. London. 1766. Present state of the
British and French trade to Africa and America compared. London. 1745.
Ramsay, J.
Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of the African Slaves in the British
Sugar Colonies. London. 1784.
Objections to the abolition of the Slave Trade
with answers. London. 1788.
Raynal, G. T.
F. Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of
Europeans in the East and West Indies. Trans, from the French by J. Justamond.
4 vols. London. 1776.
Remarks upon
a book entitled the Present State of the Sugar Colonies. London. 1731. Report
of the Privy Council on Trade to Africa, with appendices. 1789. Representation
of the Board of Trade relating to...His Majesty’s Plantations in America.
London. 1733-4.
Sharp, G. A
representation of the injustice and dangerous tendency of tolerating slavery in
England. London. 1769.
Sparmann, A.
A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, 1772-6. Translated from the Swedish. 2 vols.
Perth. 1789.
State of the
Island of Jamaica. London. 1726.
Stavorinus,
J. S. Voyages to the East Indies. Translated from the Dutch. 3 vols. London.
1798.
Substance of
Report of the Directors of the Sierra Leone Company. London. 1792. Thunberg, C. P. Voyages au Japon par le Cap de
Bonne-Esperance. Translated into French. 4 vols. Paris. 1796.
Wadstrom, C.
B. Observations on the Slave Trade and a description of some parts of the coast
of Guinea. London. 1789.
An essay on Colonisation particularly applied
to the Western Coast of Africa.
2 parts.
London. 1794.
Wesley, J.
Thoughts upon slavery. London. 1774.
Wilberforce,
W. The Abolition of the Slave Trade. London. 1807.
Letter to the Prince of Talleyrand Perigord on
the Slave Trade 1814.
Printed in
the Pamphleteer. Vol. v. London. 1815.
B. Later
Works.
(1) The West Indies.
Atwood, T.
History of Dominica. London. 1791.
Beckford, W.
A descriptive account of Jamaica. 2 vols. London. 1790.
Situation of negroes in Jamaica. London. 1788.
Borde, P. G. L. Histoire de 1’ile de la Trinidad. 1498-1797.
Paris. 1876. Breen, H. H. St Lucia. London. 1844.
Bridges, G.
W. Annals of Jamaica. 2 vols. London. 1828.
Dallas, R. C.
History of the Maroons. 2 vols. London. 1803.
Edwards,
Bryan. History of the British Colonies in the West Indies. 6 vols. London.
1819.
Historical Survey of St Domingo. London. 1801.
Gardner, W.
J. History of Jamaica. London. 1873.
Godet, T. L.
Bermuda. Loudon. 1860.
Joseph, E. L.
History of Trinidad. 1498-1837. Trinidad. 1838.
Long, E.
History of Jamaica. 3 vols. London. 1774.
Lucas, C. P.
Historical Geography of the British Colonies. West Indies. Vol. n.
2nd edn. Oxford.
1905.
Ogilvy, J. An
account of Bermuda, past and present. Hamilton, Bermuda. 1883. Oliver, V. L.
History of Antigua. 3 vols. London. 1894-9.
Pezuela, J. de la. Ensayo historico de la Isla de Cuba. New
York. 1842.
Schomburgk,
Sir R. H. History of Barbados. London. 1848.
Southey,Captain
T. Chronological History of the West Indies. 3 vols. London. 1827. Stephen, Sir
G. Anti-Slavery Recollections. London. 1854.
Williams, W.
F. Historical and statistical account of the Bermudas. London. 1848. Woodcock,
H. I. History of Tobago. Ayr. 1867.
(2) Africa.
Bandinel, J.
Some account of the Trade in Slaves from Africa as connected with Europe and
America. London. 1842.
Brooke, T. H.
History of St Helena. 2nd edn. London. 1824.
Carey, H. C.
Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign. London. 1853.
Cochin, A. L’Abolition de l’Esclavage. Paris. 1861.
Johnston, Sir
H. H. Colonization of Africa. Cambridge. 1905.
Lucas, C. P.
Historical Geography of the British Colonies. Vol. m. West Africa.
2nd edn.
Oxford. 1900. Vol. iv. South and East Africa. 2 parts. Oxford. 1898. Melliss,
J. C. St Helena. London. 1875.
Moodie, J. W.
D. Ten Years in South Africa. London. 1835.
Owen, R. D.
The Wrong of Slavery, The Right of Emancipation. Philadelphia. 1864. Percival,
Captain R. An Account of the Cape of Good Hope. London. 1804. Theal, G. McC.
Chronicles of Cape Commanders 1652-91. Contains also four papers relating to a
later period and notes on English, Dutch and French books published before 1796
which refer to S. Africa. Capetown. 1882.
History of South Africa, 1652-1795. 2 vols.
London. 1897.
Thomson, J.
Mungo Park and the Niger. London. 1890.
Trotter, A.
F. Old Cape Colony from 1652 to 1806. Westminster. 1903.
(3) General Works on Commerce and Colonisation.
Anderson, A.
History of Commerce. 4 vols. London. 1787-9.
Beer, G. L.
Commercial Policy of England towards tho An erican Colonies. New York. 1893.
British Colonial Policy, 1754-65. New York.
1907.
Bonnassieux,
P. Les Grandes Compagnie3 de Commerce. Paris. 1892. Brougham, H., Lord.
Colonial Policy of the European Powers. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1803.
Cawston, G.,
and Keane, A. H. Early Chartered Companies. London. 1906. Cunningham, W. Growth
of English Industry and Commerce. Modem Times.
Cambridge.
1907.
Egerton, H.
E. History of Colonial Policy. London. 1898.
Heeren, A. H.
L. History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies.
London. 1864.
Howison, J.
European Colonies. 2 vols. London. 1834.
Leroy Beaulieu, P. De la Colonisation chez les peuples modernes. 5th
edn.
2 vols.
Paris. 1902.
Levi, L.
History of British Commerce, 1763-1870. London. 1872.
Macpherson,
D. Annals of Commerce. 4 vols. London. 1805.
McCulloch, J.
R. Dictionary of Commerce. London. 1880.
Martin, R. M.
British Colonies. 6 vols. London and New York. 1851-7: Merivale, H. Lecture on
Colonies and Colonization. 2nd edn. London. 1861. Payne, E. J. European
Colonies. London. 1890.
Playfair, W.
Commercial and Political Atlas. London. 1786.
Postlethwayt,
M. Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce. 2 vols. London. 1774.
Smith, A.
Wealth of Nations. Ed. J. E. T. Rogers. 2 vols. London. 1869.
[Works
in the Polish language are marked (P.); works in the Russian (R.).]
I. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Finkel, L.
Bibliography of Polish History. Lemberg.
1891-1906. (P.)
II. ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.
Catharine II.
Works. Edited by A. N. Pypin. Vols. i-xii. St Petersburg. 1901 sqq. (R. and
French.)
E. N. Documents relating to the Moscovite rule
in Poland from 1734. Cracow.
1904. (P.)
Journal
(Sbornik) of the Imperial Russian Historical Society. St Petersburg.
1867 sqq.
(R., French and German.)
Korwin, S.
Materials for the history of the last century of the Polish Republic.
Cracow. 1890.
(P.)
Kurakin, J.
A. The eighteenth century. Moscow. 1904 sqq. (R. and French.)
[A collection
of historical documents.]
Moszczynski,
A. Memoirs relating to the history of Poland in the last years of the reign of
Augustus III. Cracow. 1888. (P.)
Peter the
Great. Papers and correspondence. St Petersburg. 1887 sqq. (R.) Raczynski, E.
Picture of the Polaks and of Poland in the eighteenth centuiy.
19 vols. Posen. 1840-4. (P.)
Radziwill,
Prince C. S. Correspondence, 1744-90. Cracow. 1898. (P.)
Letters, 1751-90. Warsaw. 1906. (P.)
Sapieha,
family of. Archivum Domus Sapiehanae. Lemberg. 1892 sqq. (Latin and P.)
Solov’eff, S.
M. History of Russia. Vols. xvm-xx. St Petersburg. 1895 sqq. (R.) Stanislaus II Poniatowski. M^moires secrets et inedits. Leipzig.
1862.
HI.
CONTEMPORARY OR NEARLY CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS.
A.
Augustus
II. ,
Augustus II. Beschreibung was zu Krakau vor und nach der Kronung Frederici
Augusti vorgezogen. [Dresden ? 1697.] Italian version. Rome. 1698.
Manifest zur Unterstiitzung der freyen Wahl
eines Koniges in Pohlen,
1697. [1697.]
Relation aus dem Konigmch Polen...anno 1697. [Dresden?]
1697.
B. Augustus
III.
Augustus III.
Das mit Cron und Scepter beschafftigte Pohlen, oder
eigentliche Naehricht wie es bey die Wahl eines neuen Konigs in Pohlen pfleget
geschehen zu werden. Dresden. 1733.
De prospera electione Regis Poloniae...1733
peracta. [1733.]
Drey Schreiben die jetzige Confoederaten in
Pohlen betreffende. Warsaw.
1741.
Griindlichste Naehricht von der rechtmassigen
Wahl Augusts des III zum
Konige von Pohlen. Dresden. 1734.
Historische und politische Betrachtungen iiber
die gegenwartigen pohlnisehen
Begebenheiten. Leipzig. 1733-4.
Pacta conventa Augusti III commentario perpetuo
illustrata a G. Lengvich.
Leipzig. 1763.
Justin, J. H. La vie et le caractere de M. le Comte de Briihl. [Frankfort?] 1760.
C. Stanislaus Les2czynbki.
Manstein, C. H. von. Memoires sur la Russie, 1727 jusqu’a 1740. Amsterdam.
1771. New edn. Paris. 1860. English versions: London. 1770 and 1773.
Potocki, T.
Lettera a sua Santita Papa Clemente XII [on the election of Stanislaus
Leszczynski as King of Poland]. 1733.
Manifests [10 October, 1733, vindicating the
election of Stanislaus I]. [Rome ?]
1833. (Fr.
and Ital.)
Schreiben an den Konig Stanislaum [on the affairs of
Poland]. Konigsberg.
1735.
Stanislaus I Leszczynski. CEuvres. Paris. 1763.
Commerce de lettres au sujet de la Diete
d’election et des proclamations de
Stanislas Leszczynski et de l’Electeur de Saxe. 1734.
Declaratio ullitatis electionis Stanislai
facta...14 Sept. 1733. [1733.]
Histoire de Stanislas I. [BydeC***.]
Frankfort. 1740. English edition:
London. 1741.
Lettre du Roi de Pologne ou il raconte la
manifere dont il est sorti de Dantsic,
etc. The
Hague. [1734.] English version : London, same date.
Relation exacte de ce qui s’est passe au sujet de l’election du Comte
Stanislas
Leszczynski.
[Warsaw. 1733.]
The free opinion of King Stanislaus. [A
political pamphlet published from
the original
text by A. Rembourki.] Warsaw. 1903. (P.)
The true and cogent reasons which induced the
Confederated Poles to disapprove the pretended election of Stanislaus
Leszczynski. London. 1734.
Universaux public's au nom du Roy de Pologne.
[Rome? 1733?] (French
and Italian.)
Tarlo, A..
Excerptum literarum ad P. Clementem XII [asking for his support of the election
of Stanislaus Leszczynski], [Rome ?] 1734. (Latin and Italian.)
Tarlo, J.
Epistola in risposta al Conte Poniatowski che lo consigliava a sotto- mettersi
all’Elettore de Sassonia. [Rome? 1734?]
IV. LATER WORKS.
A. General.
Gawronsky, F.
History of the Polish and Cossack Guerrilla bands in the eighteenth century. Lemberg. 1899. (P.)
Heyking, C. H. Aus Polens und Kurlands letzten Tagen. Berlin. 1897.
Roepell, R. Polen um die Mitte des iviii
Jahrhunderts. Gotha. 1874. Sokolowski, A.
Illustrated History of Poland. Vol. in. Vienna.
1896-1900. (P.) Szymanowski, O. K. Beitrage zur Geschichte des Adels in Polen. Zurich.
1884. Titoff, T. J. The Russian Orthodox Church in Poland in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Kieff. 1905. (R.)
B. Augustus
II.
Augustas II.
History of the reign of Augustus II from the death of John III to the invasion
of Charles XII. Posen. 1856. (P.)
Bastard, L. de. Negotiations de l’Abbe Polignac en Pologne concernant
1’election du Prince de Conti comme Roi de Pologne. Auxerre.
1864.
Chomentowski,
W. The family of the Hetman Jablonowski. Warsaw. 1880. (P.) Conradi, M. Lebens- und Regierungs-Geschichte Augusti II.
Leipzig. 1797. Haake, P. Konig August der Starke. Munich. 1902.
Die Wahl Augusts des Starken. Historische
Vierteljahrsheft. Jahrg. xvn.
Freiburg i. B. 1906. .
Hallendorff, C. Konung Augusts politik &ren 1700-1. Upsala.
1898. Jarochowski, K. History of the reign of Augustus II from the intervention
of Charles XII to the election of Stanislaus Leszczynski. Posen. 1874. (P.)
History of the reign of Augustus II from the
election of Stanislaus Leszczynski
to the battle
of Pultawa. Posen. 1890. (P.)
Otwinowski,
E. History of Poland under Augustus II from 1697 to 1728. Cracow. 1849. (P.)
Theiner, A. Geschichte der Ruckkehr der regierenden Hauser Braunschweig u.
Sachsen in den Schooss d. Kathol. Kirche im 18. Jahrh. Einsicdeln. 1843. [With
documents.]
Wagner, G. Die Beziehungen Augusts des Starken zu seinen Standee. 1694-1700.
Leipzig. 1903.
Waliszewski,
K. Marysienka. Paris. 1898. English edition. London, same year.
C. War of
the Polish Succession', 1733-4.
Bain, R. N.
The Pupils of Peter the Great. Chap. vi. London. 1897. Bantuish-Kamensky.
Biographies of the Russian Generalissimos. St
Petersburg. 1840. {B.)
Des Reaux, Marchioness. Le Roi Stanislas et Marie Leszczynski. Paris. 1895. Halem, G. A. von. Lebensbeschreibung des
Feldmarschalls B. C. Grafen von Miinnich. Oldenburg. 1803. French version:
Paris. 1807.
Mono
Rajavamsa Siddhi, Prince of Siam. The War of the Polish Succession. Oxford.
1901.
D. Augustus
III and the Czartorysot.
Adelung, J.
C. Leben und Character des Grafens von Briihl. Gottingen. 1760-4.
English
version. London. [1765 ?]
Dembicky, L.
Pulawy. Vol. I. Lemberg. 1887.
Kitowecz, J.
The history of manners and customs in the reign of Augustus III.
Lemberg.
1883. (P.)
Kollontaj, H.
The state of enlightenment during the last years of the reign of Augustus III,
1750-60. Posen. 1840. (P.)
Krawshar, A.
The feud of Konopki with the city of Thorn, 1742-56. Cracow. 1895. (P.)
[/See also
Bibliographies to Chaps. V and VIII.]
THE
WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.
(1) THE PRAGMATIC SANCTION.
I. Contemporary
Authorities and Documents.
Chronologisches Verzeichniss der osterreich. Staatsvertrage. i. Die ost.
Staatsv.
von 1526-1723. Von L. Bittner. Vienna. 1903.
Hoefier, L. Der Congress von Soissons nacb den Instructionen des
Kaiserlichen Cabinets. Vienna. 1876.
Instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs de France. Autriche. Edited by A.
Sorel. Paris. 1890.
Oesterreichische Staatsvertrage mit England. Bearb. von A. F. Pribram. Vol.
i.
1526-1748. Innsbruck. 1907.
Preussische Staatschriften a. d. Regierungszeit Friedrichs II. Vol. i.
1740-5. Vol.
n. 1746-56. Bearb. von R. Koser. Publ. by the Berlin Academy. Berlin. 1877-85.
Rousset, C. Recueil Historique d’actes, negotiations etc. depuis la paix
d’Utrecht jusqu’en 1748. The Hague. 1762.
II. Later Works.
Aragon, M. La Compagnie d’Ostende et le Grand Commerce en Belgique au
debut du xvmme siecle. Annales des Sciences Politiques. Paris.
March, 1901. Arneth, A. Ritter von. Eugen von
Savoyen. Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie. Vol. vi. Leipzig. 1877.
Karl VI, romisch-deutscher Kaiser. Ailgemeine
Deutsche Biographie. Vol.
xv. Leipzig. 1882.
Prinz Eugen. Vol. hi. Vienna. 1864.
Bachmann, A. Die Pragmatische Sanction und die Erbfolgeordnung Leopold l’s.
Vienna. 1894.
Beer, A. Zur Geschichte der Politik Karl’s VI. Historische Zeitschrift. 1886. Broglie, Due de. Le cardinal de Fleury et la Pragmatique
imperiale. Revue Historique. Paris. 1882.
Dullinger, J, Die Handels-Kompagnieen Oesterreichs nach dem Oriente u.
liach Ostindien in der ersten Halfte der 18. Jahrh. Part n. Zeitschr. fur Sozial-
u. Wirthschaftsgesch. Vol. vii. Part
i. Weimar. 1899.
Elvert, C. de. Zur Oesterreichischen V'erwaltuugsgeschichte. Brunn. 1886.
Erdmannsdorffer, B- Deutsche Geschichte 1648-1740. (Allg. Gesch. in
Einzeldarst.)
Vol. li. Berlin. 1881.
Flassan, G. de R. de. Histoire de la diplomatic Fran^aise. Vol. v. Paris. 1811.
Forster, F. Die Hofe und Cabinette Europes im 18. Jahrh. Vols.
i and u (with documents). Potsdam. 1835. [Charles
VI and his government.] Haussonville, Comte de. La Reunion de la Lorraine a la France.
Vol.
iv. Paris. 1860.
Hertz, G. B.
England and the Ostend Company. English Historical Review.
Vol. xxn. April, 1907.
Huisman, M. La Belgique Commerciale sous l’Empereur Charles VI. La Com-
pagnie d’Ostende. Brussels and Paris. 1902.
Philipp, A. August der Starke und die pragmatische Sanktion. (Leipziger
histor.
Abh. n.) Leipzig. 1908.
Stefanovi6-Vilovsky, T. Ritter von. Belgrad unter der Regierung Kaiser
Karls VI, 1717-39. Vienna. 1908.
(2) PRUSSIA UNDER FREDERICK WILLIAM L
I. Sources.
Acta Borussica.
Denkmaler der Preussischen Staatsverwaltung im 18.
Jahrhundert. Hrsgbn. von der Koniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin.
Vols. i-xvi. Berlin. 1892, etc.
II. General.
Koser, R. Konig Friedrich der Grosse. Vol. i. 3rd edn. Stuttgart and
Berlin.
1904.
Ranke, L. von. Zwolf Bucher Preussischer Geschichte. Books
v and vi. Sammtl. Werke. Vols. xxvn, xxvm.
Leipzig. 1874.
III. Biographical.
Koser, R. Friedrich der Grosse als Kronprinz. Stuttgart. 1886.
Lavisse, E. La jeunesse du grand Frederic. Paris. 1891.
Linnebach, R. Konig Friedrich Wilhelm I und Fiirst Leopold I zu
Anhalt-Dessau. Berlin. 1907.
IV. Public Economy, Administration etc.
Beheim-Schwarzbach, M. Hohenzollernsche Colonisationen. Leipzig. 1874.
Riedel, A. F. Der brandenburgisch-preussische Staatshaushalt in den beiden
letzten Jahrhunderten. Berlin. 1866.
Schmoller, G. Umrisse und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und
Wirthschaftsgeschichte besonders des Preussischen Staates im 17. und 18.
Jahrhundert. Leipzig. 1898.
V. Army.
Lehmann, M. Werbung, Wehrpflicht und Beurlaubung im Heere Friedrich
Wilhelms I. Historische Zeitschrift. Vol. lxvii.
Schultz, W. von. Die preussischen Werbungen unter Friedrich Wilhelm I und
Friedrich dem Grossen bis zum Beginn des Siebenjahrigen Krieges, mit beson-
derer Beriicksichtigung Mecklenburg-Schwerins. Dargestellt nach den Acten des
Grossherzoglichen Geh. und Hauptarchivs zu Schwerin. Schwerin. 1887.
VI. Ecolesiastical Affairs.
Pariset, G. L’&at et les eglises en Prusse sous Frederic Guillaume
I. Paris. 1897.
(3) THE WAR IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS.
I. Documents and
Contemporary Authorities.
[Unpublished documents arc marked *.]
Argenson, Marquis de. Memoires. Published hy the Societe de l’Histoire
de France. Paris. 1859-67.
Beer, A. Holland und der Oesterreichische Erbfolgekrieg. Archiv fur Oester-
reichische Geschichte. Vol. xi,vi. Vienna.
Die Friede von Aachen. Archiv fiir
(Esterreichische Geschichte. Vol. xlvii.
Vienna.
*Belleisle, Due de. Memoires. 5 vols. In Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris.
Charles VII.—Correspondenz Karls VII mit Graf von Seinsheim. Edited
by K. T. von Heigel. Munich. 1878.
Tagebuch Kaisers Karl VII. Edited by K. T. von
Heigel. Munich. 1883.
Chevrier, F. A. Vie politique et militaire du Marechal due de Belleisle.
The Hague. 1752.
Croy-Sobre, Prince de. Memoires. Nouvelle Revue retrospective. Paris.
1894. Espagnac, Baron de. Journal Historiquede la campagneen 1746. The Hague.
1747.
Campagne de l’armee du roi en 1747. The Hague.
1747.
Journal des campagnes du roi, 1744-7. Liege.
1748.
Histoire de Maurice, Comte de Saxe. Paris.
1775.
Frederick II. HistQire de mon temps. (2nd edn.) Berlin. 1775.
Politische Correspondenz. Berlin. 1879 etc.
Gentleman’s Magazine. 1743-8. [Especially 1743 for Dettingen.J Grimoard,
Comte de. Lettres et Memoires du Marechal de Saxe. Paris. 1794.
Historical Manuscripts Commission. Chequers Court mss. xvith Report. 1900.
Montagu House mss.
xvith Report. 1899.
Trevor mss. xivth Report. 1896.
Stopford Sackville mss. Vol. i. xvith Report. 1904.
Weston
Underwood mss. xth Report. 1896.
Instructions aux Amb&ssadeurs de la France. Autriche.
Edited hy A. Sorel. Paris. 1890.
Baviere, etc. Edited by A. Lebon. Paris. 1899.
Lowendahl, Marshal de.—Leben und Thaten des Grafen von Lowendahl. Leipzig. 1749.
Louis XV. Correspondance avec le Marechal da Noailles. Edited by C.
Rousset.
Paris. 1865. '
Mamillon. Histoire de la derniere guerre de Boheme. Amsterdam.
1750. ♦Military Auxiliary Expeditions. Public Record Office. London. [Despatches of Cumberland, Ligonier, etc.]
Moser, J. J. Staathistorie Deutschlands unter Kaiser Karl VII. Jena. 1748. Noailles, Due de. Memoires. Edited by
Abbe' Millot. Collection Michaud et Poujoulat. 3rd series. Vol. x. Coll. Petitot. Vols. lxxi-lxxiv. Paris.
1828-9.
Podewils, Count von. Berichte iiber den Wiener Hof 1747-8. Vienna. 1850.
Ranft. Leben und Thaten des heriihmten Grafen, Moritz von Sachsen. Leipzig.
1746.
Remarks on
the Military Operations of the English and French Armies in 1747. London. 1760.
Rolt, R.
Historical Memoirs of the Duke of Cumberland. London.
1767.
Spon, Baron de. Me'moires pour servir a l’histoire de l’Europe de 1740 a
1748. Amsterdam. 1749.
Valori, Louis, Marquis de. Memoires. Paris. 1820.
Van Hoey, A. Lettres et negotiations 1743-4. London. 1743.
Vitzthum, Count. Maurice comte de Saxe et Marie-Josephe de Saxe dauphine
de France. Lettres et documents inedits des archives de Dresde. Leipzig. 1867.
Walpole, Horace (Earl of Ori'ord). Letters. Vols. i and u.
Oxford. 1903.
II. Later
Works.
Arneth, A.
Ritter von. Maria Theresa. Vols. i-iii.
Vienna. 1868-79.
Arvers, A. Guerre de la succession d’Autriche. Paris. 1893.
Ballantyne, A. Lord Carteret. A political biography. London.
1887. Brackenbury, Colonel C. B. Frederick II. (Military Biographies.) London.
1884. Bright, J. F. Maria Theresa. (Foreign Statesmen Series.) London. 1897.
Broglie, Due de. Frederic II et Marie Therese. Paris. 1884
Frederic II et Louis XV. Paris. 1887.
Marie Therese Imperatrice. Paris. 1890.
Maurice de Saxe et le Marquis d’Argenson.
Paris. 1893.
La Paix d’Aix la Chapelle. Paris.
1895.
Campbell-Maclachlan,
A. N; William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland. London.
1876.
Coxe, W.
House of Austria. 2 vols. London. 1810.
Life of Sir R. Walpole. 3 vols. London. 1798.
Memoirs of the Administration of Henry Pelham.
2 vols. London. 1829.
Droysen, J. G. Geschichte der Preussischen Politik. Vols.
xi and xii. Berlin. 1855. Faesch, G. R. Geschichte der Oesterreichischen
Erbfolgekrieges von 1740-8. Dresden. 1787.
Fortescue, j. W. History of the British Army. Vol. ii. London. 1897. Griinhagen, C. Geschichte des ersten
Schlesischen Krieges. Berlin. 1881. Harris, C. Life of Lord
Hardwicke. London. 1847-
Heigel, C. T.
von. Karl VII, romisch-deutscher Kaiser. Allgemeine Deutsche
Biographie. Vol. xv. Leipzig. 1882.
Der CEsterreichische Erbfolgestreit und die
Kaiserwahl Karl’s VII. Nord-
lingen. 1877.
Jobez, A. La France sous Louis XV. Paris. 1864-73.
Lacretelle, J. C. D. de. Histoire de France pendant le xvm° siecle. Paris.
1830. Lecky, W. E. H. History of England in the xvmth century. Vol. ii. London.
1878.
Mahon, Lord
(Earl Stanhope). History of England, 1713-83. 5th edition.
Vol. hi. London. 1858.
Martin, H. Histoire de France. Vol. xv. (4th edition.) Paris.
1855-60. O’Gallaghan, J. C. The Irish Brigades in the Service of France. Glasgow. 1870. Ogle, A. The Marquis d’Argenson. London.
1893.
Oncken, W. Das Zeitalter Friedrich’s der Grossen. 2 vols. (Allg. Gesch. in
Einzeldarst.) Berlin. 1880-2.
Pajol, Comte de. Les Guerres sous Louis XV. Vol. ii (Germany). Vol. iii (Flanders and Italy). Paris. 1881-7.
Ranke, L. von. Friedrich II. Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie. Vol. vn.
Leipzig. 1878.
Zwolf Bucher Preussischer Geschichte. Sammtl.
Werke. Vols. xxv-xxix.
Leipzig. 1874.
Raumer, F. von. Konig Friedrich II und seine Zeit. (1740-69.) Leipzig. 1836. Saint-Rene Taillandier. Maurice de Saxe.
Paris. 1865.
Sindty, Marquis de. Vie du Marechal de Lowendahl. Paris. 1867.
Skrine, F. H.
Fontenoy. London. 1906.
Townshend,
Colonel C. V. F. Life of Marquess Townshend. London. 1901. Tuttle, H. History
of Prussia, 1740-56. London. 1888.
Ward, A. W. England and Hanover. Oxford. 1899.
Weber, O. von. Moritz, Graf von Sachsen. 1853.
Wolf, A. Oesterreich unter Maria Theresa. Berlin.
1884.
Zevort, E. Le Marquis d’Argenson et le ministere des affaires
etrangeres, 1744-7. Paris. 1880.
(4) ITALY.
I. Contemporary
Authorities, Documents etc.
Costa de Beauregard, Marquis C. A. de. Memoires historiques sur la
maison royale de Savoie jusqu’a 1796. 3 vols. Turin. 1816.
Grosley, P. J. Memoires sur les campagnes d’ltalie en 1745 et 1746.
Amsterdam. 1777.
Instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs de France. Naples et Parme. Edited
by J. Reinach. Paris. 1893. ■
Savoie. Edited by Count Horrich de Beaucaire. Paris. 1899.
Mailly, Chevalier de. Histoire de la republique de Genes jusqu’a
present. Paris.
1742.
Mecatti, G. M. Diario della guerra d’ Italia. Naples. 1748.
Guerra di Genova. Naples. 1749.
Muratori, L. A. Annali d’ Italia. Vol. xii.
Monaco. 1764.
Pezay, Marquis de. Histoire des campagnes du Mare'chal de Maillebois en
Italie pendant les annees 1745-6. Paris. 1775.
Recueil des traites et conventions diplomatiques concernant l’Autriche
et l’ltalie (1703-1859). Paris. 1859.
Traites publics de la maison de Savoie avec les puissances etrangeres
depuis la paix de Cateau-Cambresis. Turin. 1854.
II. Later
Works.
Armstrong, E.
Elizabeth Farnese. London. 1892.
Ayala, D. de.
Memorie Storico-militari dal 1734 al 1815. Naples. 1835.
Carutti, D.
Storia del regno di Carlo Emmanuele III. Turin. 1859.
Dumas, A.
Borboni di Napoli. Naples. 1864-7.
Morris, H. Operations militaires dans les Alpes pendant la guerre de
succession d’Autriche. Paris. 1886.
Perrero, D. La casa di Savoia negli Studi diplomatici del duca di
Broglie. 1888.
Pinelli, F. A. Storia militare del Piemonte. Turin. 1868.
Saluces, Comte A. de. Histoire militaire du Piemont. Turin. 1818.
(5) THE NAVAL WAR.
I. Documents
and Contemporary Works.
[ Unpublished
documents are marked *.]
* Admiralty
Papers. Secretary’s Letters at Public Record Office, London.
Ships’ Logs at Public Record Office, London.
Ducane mss. Historical mss. Commission, xvith Report. 1905.
Gentleman’s
Magazine, 1744-8. [Esp. for the Matthews-Lestock controversy.] (Lestock,
Vice-Admiral.) Defence to Court Martial. 1746.
Matthews,
Admiral. Authentic Letters from...relating to the expedition to the
Mediterranean. 1745.
Original Letters and Papers between Admiral
Matthews and Vice-Admiral
Lestock.
1744.
II. Later Works.
Beatson, R.
Naval and Military Memoirs. Vol. 1. 2nd edn. London. 1804. Burrows, Montagu,
Captain. Life of Lord Hawke. 2nd edn. London. 1896. Chevalier, E., Captain. Histoire de la Marine Fran^aise jusqu’au traite de paix de 1763. Paris.
1902.
Colomb, P.
H., Admiral. Naval Warfare. 2nd edn. London. 1895.
Guerin, L. Histoire Maritime de la France. Paris. 1849.
Lacour-Gruyet, G. La Marine Franchise sous le regne de Louis XV. Paris.
1902, Laird Clowes, Sir W. History of the Royal Navy. Vol. 111. London. 1898.
Mahan, A. T., Captain, U.S.N. Influence of Sea Power upon History. London. 1889
(and later editions).
Types of Naval Officers. London. 1902.
Troude, O.
Batailles Navales de la France. Paris. 1867.
[See
also Bibliographies to Chapters II, V, XI} XII.']
I. ORIGINAL AUTHORITIES.
Frederick II.
Politische Corresponded Friedrichs des Grossen. Vols.
in and following. Berlin. 1884, etc.
Histoire de la Guerre de Sept Ans. (Euvres de
Frederic le Grand.
Vols. iv and
v. Berlin. 1847.
Preussische Staatschriften a. d. Regierungszeit Friedrichs II. Vol. iii : Der Beginn des Siebenjahr.
Krieges. Bearb. von O. Krauske. Publ. by the Berlin Academy. Berlin. 1892.
Preussische n. osterreichische Acten zur Vorgeschichte d. Siebenj. Krieges.
Bearb. von G. B. Volz u. G. Kiintzel. Public, a. d. k. preuss. Staatsarchiven.
Vol. lxxiv. Leipzig. 1899.
An original
Journal of the Seven Years’ War by Count St Paul, with plans of battles, of
which the portion to be published covers the first two years of the war, will
shortly appear.
II. GENERAL.
Arneth, Ritter A. von. Maria Theresia und der Siebenjahrige Krieg. 2 vols.
Vienna. 1875.
Daniels, E. Ferdinand von Braunschweig. Preussische Jahrbiicher. Vols. lxxvji-
LXXXII.
Delbriick, H. Uber die Verschiedenheit der Strategie Friedrichs und
Napoleons. In Historische und politische Aufcatze. 2nd edn. Berlin. 1907.
Lloyd, General. History of the late War in Germany. 2 vols.
London. 176690. Tr. Continued by G. F. von Tempelhoff under the title of
Geschichte des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. 6 vols. Berlin. 1783-1801.
Masslowski.
The Seven Years’ War from the Russian point of view. 3 vols. (In Russian.)
German Translation, by A. von Drygalski. Berlin. 1889-93. Prussian General Staff.—Preussisches Generalstabswerk uber den
Siebenjahrigen Krieg. 6 vols. Berlin. 1901.
Schafer, A. Geschichte des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. 2 vols. in 3 parts. Berlin.
1867-74.
Waddington, R. La Guerre de Sept Ans. Histoire diplomatique et
militaire. Vols.
i-iv. Paris. 1899-1907.
III. THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.
Daniels, E. Friedrich der Grosse und Maria Theresia am Vorabend des Sieben-
jahrigen Krieges. Preussische Jahrbiicher. Vol. c.
Delbriick, H. Der Ursprung des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. In Erinnerungen,
Aufsatze und Reden. Berlin. 1905.
Koser, H. Zum Ursprung des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. Hist. Zeitschr. lxxiv-vii. Lehmann, M. Friedrich der
Grosse und der Ursprung des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. Leipzig. 1894.
Mitchell, Sir Andrew. Ueber den Ausbruch des Siebenjahr. Krieges. Aus M.’s
ungedruckten Memoiren mitgeth. von L. von Ranke. Sammtl. Werke. Vols. U, lii. Leipzig. 1888.
Naude, A. Beitrage zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Siebenjahr. Krieges. Repr.
from Forschungen zur Brandenb. u. Preuss. Gesch. vm, 2;
ix, 1. Leipzig. 1895-6. [Contains a bibliography of the publications referring
to the controversy up to date.]
(Vitzthum von Eckstadt, Count C. F.) Die Geheimnisse des Sachsischen
Cabinets. 2 vols. Stuttgart. 1866.
IV. PARTICULAR
MILITARY OPERATIONS.
(In chronological order.)
Grawe, C. Die Entwickelung des preussischen Feldzugsplans im FrQhjahr 1767.
Berlin. 1903.
Gerber, P. Die Schlacht bei Leuthen am 5 Dezember 1767. Berlin. 1901.
Immich, M. Die Schlacht bei Zorndorf am 25 August 1758. Berlin. 1893. Mollvo,
L. Die Capitulation von Maxen am 21 Nov. 1759. (Diss.) Marburg. 1893. Daniels,
E. Zur Schlacht von Torgau am 3 November 1760. Berlin. 1880.
[See
also Bibliographies to Chapters X, XI, XIII (II), XIX.]
RUSSIA
UNDER ANNE AND ELIZABETH.
[Works
in the Russian language are marked (E.), works in Polish (P.).]
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
The following
systematic descriptions of, or guides or indexes to, Russian historical
periodical publications may be consulted (all of them are B.): Ruskaya Starina
(Russian Historical Review), St Petersburg, 1885-9; Istorichesky Vyestnik (Historical
Messenger), St Petersburg, 1891; Russky Arkhiv (Russian Archives), Moscow,1892;
Shornik and Cbteniia Imp. Russk. Istoritsch. Obschtschestra (Magazine or
Journal, and Readings, of the Imperial Russian Historical Society), Moscow,
1883 and 1889.
See also:
Ikonnikoff,
V. Essay towards a Russian Historiography. Moscow. 1889. (JR.) Mezhoff, V.
Russian historical bibliography. St
Petersburg. 1881. (E.) Biblio- graphie des livres russes d’histoire. St Petersburg.
1892-3.
II. COLLECTIONS OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.
Bestuzheff,
Count Alexis. Letters of Count A. Bestuzheff to Count M. Vorontsoff, 1744-60.
Vorontsoff Archives, Vols. i, h. Moscow. 1870 sqq. (li.)
Botta,
Marquis de. Letters relating to the conspiracy of the Marquis de Botta.
Vorontsoff
Arch. Vol. ii. Moscow. 1870 sqq. (E. and French.)
Catharine II.
Early correspondence, 1744-58. Shornik. Vol. vn. St Petersburg. 1881 sqq.
(French.)
Dickens, Guy.
Despatches from St Petersburg. Record Office, For. State Pap. Russia.
Elizabeth,
Empress of Russia. From the papers of the Elizabethan Ministerial Conference.
Vorontsoff Archives. Vol. in. Moscow. 1870 sqq.
Elizabeth,
Princess of Zerbst. Relation [of her residence in Russia, 1744-5].
Sbornik. Vol.
vn. St Petersburg. 1881 sqq.
Filippoff, A.
N. Papers of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Empress Anne. St Petersburg. 1898.
(E.)
Finch,
Edward. Despatches from Russia, 1740-2. Sbornik. Vols. lxxxv and xci.
St
Petersburg. 1881 sqq.
Frederick II
of Prussia. Politische Correspondenz, 1740-62. Vols. i-xx. Berlin.
1879-1900.
Geffroy, M. A. Recueil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs de
France depuis les traites de Westphalie. Paris. 1884.
Hanbury
Williams, Sir. Despatches from Russia, 1755-8. Record Office, Foreign State
Papers, Russia.
Herrmann, B.
Diplomatic documents relating to the history of Russia from 1721 to 1744 from
the Saxon archives. Sbornik. Vols. in, v and vi. St Petersburg.
1868-71.
(R. and German.)
Diplomatic documents relating to the history
of Russia from 1721 to 1744
from the
Berlin archives. Sbornik. Vol. xv. St Petersburg. 1875. Hyndford, John, Earl
of. Despatches from the Russian Court, 1746-8. Record Office, Foreign State
Papers, Russia. Also in Sbornik. Vol. cm. St Petersburg. 1881 sqq.
Kurakin, J.
A., Prince. The Eighteenth Century. Moscow. 1904 sqq. [A collection of
diplomatic documents in R. and French.]
La Chetardie,
J. J. Trotti, Marquis de. Despatches, 1740-2. Vols. lxxxvi, xcii, xcvi, and c. St Petersburg. 1893-7. {French.)
The affair of the Marquis de la Chetardie.
Vorontsoff Archives. Vol. i.
Moscow. 1870,
etc. (R. and French.)
Mardefeld,
Baron G. von. Relationen [of affairs in Russia, 1721-38]. Sbornik. Vol. xv. St
Petersburg. 1875. {German.)
Despatches from Russia, 1739-48. Record Office,
Foreign State Papers,
Russia.
{German.)
Miinnich, B.
C. von, Count. Reports issued from 1736 to 1739. Issued by Russian General
Staff. Vol. x. St Petersburg. 1892 sqq. {R. and German.)
The Stavukhani Campaign. General orders, etc.
Issued by Russian General
Staff. Vol. ii. St Petersburg. 1892 sqq. {R. and German.)
Tagebuch, 1735-9. Leipzig. 1843.
Nepluyeff, J.
J. Despatches from Constantinople, 1725-40. St Petersburg.
1893. {R.)
Rondeau,
Claudius. Despatches from Russia, 1728-39. Collections of Russ. Hist.
Soc. Vols. lxvi, lxxvi, and lxxx. St Petersburg. 1889-92.
Russian
Government in Poland, from 1734, Documents relating to the doings of the.
Cracow. 1904.
(P.)
Shuvaloff, J.
J. From the papers of A. A. Shuvaloff, 1756-61. Sbornik. Vol. ix.
St Petersburg.
1881, etc. {R.)
Tyrawley,
Viscount. Despatches from Russia. Record Office, Foreign State Papers, Russia.
Wych, Sir
Cyril. Despatches from Russia. Record Office, Foreign State Papers, Russia.
III. CONTEMPORARY OR NEARLY CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS.
Bolotoff, A.
Memoires, 1738-90. St Petersburg. 1871. (R.)
Copia Schreibens von Sr Russisch Kays. Maj. an S' Konigliche
Majestat in Preussen wegen die Schlesischen Sachen [dated 16 Dec., 1740]. 1741.
Manstein, Baron C. H. von. Memoires historiques sur la Russie, 1727-44.
Amsterdam.
1771. English editions. London. 1770 and 1856.
Rondeau, Mrs.
Letters from a lady who resided some years [1728-40] in Russia. London. 1777.
Thoughts,
deliberate, on the system of our late treaties with Hesse-Cassel and Russia in
regard to Hanover. London. 1756.
Ursachen, die, des ungliicklichen Gefolges des gegenwartigen Krieges mit
Frankreich auf Seiten Englands und die nachtheiligen Folgen der Allianzen des
letztern mit Rassland, etc. Gotha. 1757.
View,
an impartial, of the conduct of the M............... ry
in regard to the engagements
entered into
with Russia, etc. London. 1756.
Vorontsoff, Prince A. R. Notes sur ma vie. Vorontsoif
Archives. Vol. v.
Moscow. 1870, etc.
Zustand, der gegenwartige, des russischen Monarchic, etc. Erfurt.
1749.
IV. MONOGRAPHS AND LATER WORKS.
Bain, R. N.
The Daughter of Peter the Great. London. 1899.
Peter III. London. 1902.
The Pupils of Peter the Great. London. 1897.
Bantuish-Kamensky,
D. N. Biographies of the Russian Generalissimos. St Petersburg. 1840. (R.)
Danielson, J. R. Die nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746-51. Helsingfors.
1888. Dolgoruki, Prince K. Count A. J. Osterman. St Petersburg. 1841. (R.)
(ienishta, V. J. and Borisevich, A. T. History of the 30th Ingrion dragoon
regiment from 1704. St Petersburg. 1904 sqq.
Halem, G. A. von. Lebensbeschreibung des Feldmarschalls B. C. Grafen von
Miinnich. Oldenburg. 1803. French edition: Paris. 1807.
Herrmann, E. Geschichte des russischen Staates. Vols. iv and v. (Gesch. d.
europ.
Staaten.) Hamburg. 1849-53.
'Carge, P. Die russisch-dsterreichische Allianz von 1746. Gottingen.
1887. Kochulinsky, A. A. Count Osterman and the proposed partition of Turkey,
1735-9.
Odessa. 1899. (R.)
Kostomaroff, N. J. Russische Geschichte in Biographien. (German
Translation.) Leipzig. 1889, etc.
Masslowski, Colonel.
DerSiebenjahrigeKriegnachrussischerDarstellung. Berlin. 1888-92. ‘
Zur Geschichte der russisch-osterreichische
Kooperation im Feldziige von
1759. Hannover.
1888.
Panchulidzeff,
S. History of the Russian Horse Guards from 1724, etc. St Petersburg. 1899-1901. (R.)
Rambaud, A. N. Histoire de la Russie. Paris. 1878.
E. Tr. by L. B. Lang.
2 vols. London. 1879.
Shchepkin, E.
Lectures on Russian history in the eighteenth century. St Petersburg. 1905.
(R.)
Solovieff, S.
M. History of Russia. Vols. ivin-xxii. St Petersburg. 1895, etc. (R.)
Titlinoff, B.
V. The Government of the Empress Anne and its relations with the Orthodox
Church. Wilna. 1905. (R.)
Vandal, A. Une ambassade fran^aise en Orient sous Louis XV. La mission
du Marquis de Villeneuve, 1728-41. Paris. 1887.
Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie. Paris. 1892.
VasilchikofE, A. A., Prince. The Family of the
Razumovskies. Moscow. 1868. (R.)
Waliszewski, K. La Derniere des RomanofFs. Paris. 1902.
L’Heritage de Pierre le Grand. Paris.
1900.
THE
REVERSAL OF ALLIANCES AND THE FAMILY COMPACT.
The chief manuscript collections to be consulted for this chapter are:
In Paris: Archives du Ministere des Affaires fitrangeres; 1° Correspondance
politique (Angle- terre, Allemagne, Autriche-Hongriej Espagne, Prusse, Russie,
Saxe, Suede, etc....); 2° Memoires et documents.—Archives nationales:
Correspondance secrete de Louis XV avec de Broglie, Tercier, etc.—Bibliotheque
nationale, departement des manuscrits: Correspondance officielle et privee de
Choiseul et de Bernis.—Ibid. Papiers de
Beliardi.—In London: British Museum: Addit. mss.
Newcastle Papers. —In Berlin: Konigliches geheimes Staatsarchiv.—In
Vienna: Kaiserliches und Konigliches Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv.—In Spain: Archivo
historico nacional and Archivo general de Simancas.
II. PRINTED DOCUMENTS.
Aranda, Count. Correspondencia diplomatica del Conde de Aranda embajador
cerca del rey de Polonia 1760-2. (Coleccion de documentos ineditos para la
historia de Espana, vol. cvm, cix.) 2 vols! Madrid. 1893-4.
Broglie, A., Due de. Le Secret du Roi. Correspondance secrete de Louis
XV avec ses agents diplomatiques 1762-74. Paris. 1878.
Briihl, Count. Des Grafen Briihl Korrespondenz mit dem Freiherm von
Riedesel. Beitrag zur Geschichte des Siebenjahrigen Krieges 1760-2. Edited by
M. von Eelking. Leipzig. 1854.
Frederick II. Politische Korrespondenz Friedrichs des Grossen. 32 vols.
Berlin.
1879. (In progress.)
Hertzberg, Count E. F. von. Recueil des deductions, manifestes,
declarations, traites et autres actes et ecrits publics qui ont ^te rediges et
publies pour la Cour de Prusse, depuis l’anne'e 1756 jusqu’a l’annee 1790. 3
vols. Berlin. 1790-5. Kaunitz, Prince. Correspondance secrete entre le comte W.
A. Kaunitz-Rietberg, ambassadeur imperial a Paris, et le baron Ignaz de Koch,
secretaire de l’im- peratrice Marie-Therese, 1750-2. Paris. 1899.
Louis XV.—Boutaric, E. Correspondance inedite de Louis XV. Paris. 1886.
Correspondanc6 de Louis XV et du marechal de
Noailles. 2
vols. Paris.
1865.
Political and confidential Correspondence oi'
Louis XV. 3 vols. New York.
1803.
Recueil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France
depuis les traites de Westphalie jusqu’a la Revolution fran<j:aise. Paris.
(In progress.) Autriche, par A. Sorel; Baviere, Palatinat et Deux-Ponts, par A.
Lehon; Suede et Danemark, par A. Geffroy; Naples et Parme, par J. Reinach;
Russie, par A. Ram baud ; Pologne, par L. Farges; Espagne, par Morel-Fatio et
Leonardon ; Prusse, par A. Waddington.
(Vitzthum von Eckstadt, Count.) Die Geheimnisse des Sachsischen Cabinets. 2 vols. Stuttgart. 1866.
III. CONTEMPORARY LETTERS AND
MEMOIRS.
A. Franoe.
Aguesseau, Chancelier de. Lettres. 2 vols. Paris. 1823.
Argenson, Marquis de. Journal et memoires, publie's par Rathery. 9 vols.
Paris.
1869-67.
Barbier (Avocat). Journal historique et anecdotique du regne de Louis
XV. 8 vols. Paris. 1867.
Bemis, Cardinal de. Memoires et lettres. 2 vols. Paris. 1878.
Correspondance avec Paris-Duverney (1762-69).
2 vols. Paris and London.
1790.
Broglie, V. F., Due de. Correspondance inedite, pour servir a l’histoire
de la Guerre de Sept Ans, 1769 a 1761. 4 vols. Paris. 1903-6.
Chansonnier historique du xvme Siecle. Recueil de chansons,
vaudevilles, sonnets, epigrammes...Publie par Emile Raunie. 10 vols. Paris.
1879-84.
Choiseul, Due de. Memoires ecrits par lui-meme et imprimes sous ses yeux
en 1778 (par Soulavie). 2 vols. Paris. 1790.
Choiseul a Rome (1764-7). Lettres et me'moires
inedits, publies par le
Vicomte Maurice Boutry. Paris. 1895.
Memoires (1719-85). Paris. 1904.
Colie, C. Journal et Memoires (1748-72). 3 vols. Paris. 1868.
Correspondance inedite. Paris. 1864.
Correspondance de plusieurs personnages illustres de la Cour de Louis XV
depuis les annees 1746 jusques et y compris 1774. 2 vols. Paris. 1808.
Croy, Due de. Memoires inedits sur les Cours de Louis XV et de Louis
XVI, publies par le Vicomte de Grouchy et P. Cottin. 4 vols. Paris. 1906-7.
Des Cars, Due. Memoires. Paris. 1890.
Duclos, C. P. Memoires Secrets. 2 vols. Paris. 1791. .
Du Deffand, Mme. Correspondance complete avec ses amis,
Henault, Montesquieu, Voltaire. Publie'e par M. de Lescure. 2 vols. Paris.
1885.
Correspondance complete avec la Duchesse de
Choiseul, l’abbe Barthelemy et
M. Craufurt, publiee par M. le Marquis de Saint-Aulaire. 3 vols. Paris.
1867. Dufort, Comte de Cheverny. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1886.
Du Hausset, Mme. Me'moires. Brussels. 1825.
Esterhazy, Count V. L. Memoires (1757-97), avec une introduction par E.
Daudet. Paris. 1905.
Grimm, Raynal and Meister. Correspondance litte'raire, philosophique, et
critique.
16 vols. Paris. 1877-87.
Henault, President. Me'moires. Paris. 1854.
Lauzun, Due de. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1822.
Lemoine, J. Sous Louis le Bien-Aime. Correspondance amoureuse et
militaire d’un officier pendant la Guerre de Sept Ans. Paris. 1905.
Levy, President. Journal historique ou fastes du regne de Louis XV,
surnomme le Bieu-Aime. 2 vols. Paris. 1766.
Luynes, Due de. Memoires. 17 vols. Paris. 1860-6.
Maria Theresia. Briefwcchsel zwischen Kaiserin Maria Theresia u.
Kurfiirstin Maria Antonin von Sachsen. Ed. W. Lippert. Leipzig. 1909.
Marie Leczynska. Lettres inedites au President Henault. Paris. 1886.
Marmontel, J.-F. Memoires. 6 vols. Paris. 1804-5.
Martange, N. B. de. Correspondance inedite, 1756-82. Paris. 1898.
Maurepas, Comte de. Memoires, par Soulavie. 4 vols. Paris. 1792.
Memoires secrets pour servir a l’histoire de la Repuhlique des lettres
depuis 1762 jusqu’a nos jours. ■ 36 vols. London. 1777-89.
Mirabeau, Comte de. Memoires du Ministere du due d’Aiguillon et de son
com- mandement en Bretagne. Paris. 1792.
Montalembert, Marquis de. Correspondance de M. le Marquis de
Montalembert, employe par le roi de France a l’armee Suedoise (1757-61).
London. 1777.
Montbarrey, Prince de. Memoires (1732-96). 3 vols. Paris. 1826-7.
Morellet, Abbe. Memoires sur le xvm° siecle et sur la Re'volution. 2
vols. Paris. 1821-3.
Narbonne, P. Journal des regnes de Louis XIV et de Louis XV (1701-74).
Paris.
1866.
Niveruais, Due de. (Euvres posthumes. 2 vols. Paris. 1807.
Pompadour, Mme de. Correspondance. Paris. 1878.
Richelieu, Due de. Correspondance particuliere historique du Marechal
due de Richelieu en 1756, 1757 et 1758 avec M. Paris-Duverney. 2 vols. London
and Paris. 1789.
Soulavie, J.-L. G. Memoires historiques et anecdotiques sur la Cour de
France pendant la faveur de la Marquise de Pompadour. Paris. 1802.
Memoires du Marechal de Richelieu. 9 vols.
Paris. 1790-3. [Dubious.]
Terrai, Abbe. Memoires rediges par Coquereau. London. 1776.
Thevenot, A. Correspondance inedite du prince Fran9ois-Xavier de Saxe.
Paris. 1875.
Tilly, Comte A. de. Memoires. Paris. 1858.
Toussaint, F. V. Anecdotes de la Cour de France sous le regne de Louis
XV, texte original puhlie par P. Fould. 2 vols. Paris. 1905.
Valori, Marquis de. Memoires des negotiations du Marquis de Valori,
ambassadeur de France a la Cour de Berlin, accompagnes d’un recueil de lettres
de Frederic le Grand. 2 vols. Paris. 1820.
Vitzthum von Eckstadt, Count. Maurice comte de Saxe et Marie-Josephe de
Saxe, dauphine de France. Lettres et documents inedits. Leipzig. 1867.
Voltaire. GEuvres, edit. Beuchot. 72 vols. Paris. 1834.
B. Great
Britain.
Buckinghamshire,
Earl of. The Despatches and Correspondence of John, second Earl of
Buckinghamshire, ambassador to the Court of Catherine II of Russia, 1762-5.
London. 1900.
Chatham,
William Pitt, Earl of. Correspondence. 2 vols. London. 1838.
Lord, W. F.
The Counts of St Paul: Correspondence of H. Saint Paul, British minister at
Versailles, 1772-6. Kingston. 1904.
Mitchell, Sir
A. Memoirs and papers. 2 vols. London. 1850.
C. Prussia.
Frederick II. Briefe zwischen Friedrich II und Katharina von Russland. St
Petersburg. 1877.
— Briefwechsel
Friedrichs des Grossen mit Grumbkow und Maupertuis 1731-59. Leipzig. 1898.
CEuvres de Frede'ric le Grand. 30 vols.
Berlin. 1846-56.
Frederick II. Originalbriefe K. Friedrichs II im Kriegsarchiv zu Wien
1759-60. Vienna. 1882,
Henckel v. Donnersmarck, Count L. A. Briefe der Bruder Friedrichs des
Grossen. Berlin. 1877.
Krauel, R. Briefwecbsel zwischen Heinrich Prinz von Preussen und Katharina
II von Russland. Berlin. 1903.
Preussische Staatsschriften aus der Regierungszeit Konigs Friedrichs II,
herausge- geben v. J. G. Droysen, M. Duncker und H. v. Sybel. 3 vols. Berlin.
1877-92.
IV. SECONDARY
WORKS.
A. General.
Bourgeois, E. Manuel de politique dtrangere. 2 vols. Paris. 1901.
Brunner, S. Der Humor in der Diplomatic und Regierungskunde des 18. Jahr-
hunderts. 2 vols. Vienna. 1872.
Duncker, M. Die Bildung der Koalition des Jahres 1756. Preussische Jahr-
biicher. Vol. xlix.
Fain, Baron. Politique de tous les cabinets de l’Europe pendant les
guerres de Louis XV et de Louis XVI. 3 vols. Paris. 1801.
Masslowski. Der Siebenjahrige Krieg. 3 vols. Berlin. 1888-93.
Memoire historique sur la negotiation de la France et de l’Angleterre
depuis le
26 mars 1761 jusqu’au 20
septembre de la meme annee. Paris. 1761.
Naude, A. Beitrage zur Entstehungs-Geschichte des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. 2
vols. Leipzig. 1895-6.
Raumer, F. V. Europa vom Ende des Siebenjahrigen bis zum Ende des Amerikan-
Krieges (1763-83). 5 vols. Berlin. 1839.
Schaefer, A. Geschichte des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. 2 vols. Berlin. 1867-74.
Segur, L. P. Politique de tous les cabinets de l’Europe pendant les
regnes de Louis XV et de Louis XVI. 3 vols. Paris. 1801.
Sorel, A. La Question d’Orient au xvm' siecle. Paris. 1889.
Stuhr, P. F. Forschungen und Erlauterungen uber Hauptpunckte der Geschichte
des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. 2 vols. Hamburg. 1842.
Waddington, R. Louis XV et le Renversement des Alliances. Preliminaires
de la Guerre de Sept Ans (1754-6). Paris. 1896.
La Guerre de Sept Ans. Histoire diplomatique
et militaire. Vol. i: Les
Debuts. Vol. ii : Crefeld et Zorndorf. Vol. m: Minden, Kunersdorf. Vol. iv: Torgau, Pacte de famille. 4 vols. Paris. 1899-1908. (In course
of publication.)
B. France.
Aubertin, Charles. L’Esprit public au xvm' siecle. Paris. 1873.
Babeau, Albert. Le village sous l’ancien regime. Paris. 1882.
—— La ville sous l’ancien regime. Paris. 1884.
La vie rurale dans l’ancienne France. Paris.
1885.
Barthelemy,
E. M., Count de. Histoire des relations de la France et du Danemark,
1751-70. Copenhagen. 1887.
Bastard d’Estang, Vicomte de. Les Parlements de France. 2 vols. Paris.
1857.
Bersot, P. E. Etudes sur le xvm* siecle. Paris. 1855.
Bonhomme, Honore. Louis XV et sa famille. Paris. 1873.
Bourguet. Le Due de Choiseul et l’alliance espagnole. Paris. 1906.
Broc, Vicomte de. La France sous l’ancien regime. 2 vols. Paris. 1887-9.
Broglie, A., Due de. Frederic II et Louis XV. Paris. 188S.
L’Alliance autrichienne, 1756. Paris. 1897.
La paix d’Aix la Chapelle, 1748. Paris. 1895.
Voltaire avant et pendant la Guerre de Sept
Ans. Paris. 1898.
Calmettes, Pierre. Choiseul et Voltaire. Paris. 1902.
Campardon, E. Madame de Pompadour a la Cour de Louis XV. Paris. 1867.
Carne, Count de. La monarchie fra^aise au xvm“ siecle. Paris. 1859.
Carre, H. La France sous Louis XV, Paris, (s. d.)
La Chalotais et le due d’Aiguillon.
Correspondance du chevalier de Fontette.
Paris. 1893.
Cre'tineau-Joly, J. A. M. Histoire religieuse, politique et litteraire
de la compagnie de Jesus. 6 vols. Paris. 1845-6.
Daubigny, E. T. Choiseul et la France d’outre-mer apres le traite de
Paris.
Etude sur la politique coloniale au xvm* siecle. Paris. 1892.
Des Reaux, Marquise. Le Roi Stanislas et Marie Leczynska. Paris.
1895. Douglas, R. B. Life and times of Madame du Barry. London. 1896.
Faguet, E. La politique comparee de Montesquieu, Rousseau et Voltaire.
Paris.
1902.
Flammermont, J. Le chancelier Maupeou et les parlements. Paris. 1884.
Rapport sur les correspondances des agents
diplomatiques Strangers en
France avant la Revolution. Paris. 1896.
Fleury, M. Louis XV et les petites maitresses. Paris. 1899.
Ford, J. L.
The Story of du Barry. New York. 1902.
Goncourt, E.
and J. de. Madame de Pompadour. Paris, 1888.
Hamont, T. La Fin d’un empire fran^ais aux Indes sous Louis XV. Lally-
Tollendal. Paris. 1887.
Jobez, A. La France sous Louis XV. 6 vols. Paris. 1864-73.
Koser, K., and Kuntzel, G. Aus der Korrespondenz der franzosischen Gesandt-
schaft zu Berlin 1752-66. Forschungen zur Brand, und Preuss. Geschichte. Vols.
vi and xii.
La Tremoille, C. L., Due de. Mon grand-pere, P. F. Walsh, k la Cour de
Louis XV et a la Cour de Louis XVI (1767-89). Paris. 1904.
Lion, H. Le President Henault (1685-1770). Paris. 1903.
Lufay, Count de. Les Secretaires d’Etat depuis leur institution jusqu’a
la mort de Louis XV. Paris. 1881.
Marion, Marcel. La Bretagne et le due d’Aiguillon. Paris. 1898.
Maugras, G. La fin d’une societe. Le due de Lauzun et la Cour intime de
Louis XV (1747-74). Paris. 1893. i Le due et la duchesse de Choiseul, leur vie
intime et leur temps, 1755-70. Paris. 1902.
La disgrace du due et de la duchesse de
Choiseul. Paris. 1905.
Mention, L. Le comte de Saint Germain et ses reformes. Paris. 1884.
Moufle d’Angerville. Vie privee de Louis XV. 4 vols. London. 1788.
Nolhac, P. de. Etudes sur la Cour de France. Louis XV et Madame de
Pompadour. Paris. 1904.
Louis XV et Marie Leczinska. Paris. 1902.
Perey, L. Le Due de Nivernais. Paris. 1891.
Le President Henault et Mmo du
Deffand. Paris. 1893.
Pocquet, B. Le Pouvoir absolu et 1’Esprit provincial. Le due d’Aiguillon
et La Chalotais. 2 vols. Paris. 1900.
Raukin, L. The Marquis d’Argenson. London. 1901.
Remontrances du Parlement de Paris au xvm0 siecle, publiees
par J. Flammermont. Paris. 1888.
Rocquain, F. L’esprit revolutionnaire avant la Revolution, 1715-89.
Paris. 1878.
Sage, H. Dorn Philippe de Bourbon, infant des Espagnes, due de Parme, et
Louise- Elisabeth, fille ainee de Louis XV. Paris. 1904.
Schaefer, A. Das Ende der Preuss.-Franzds. Alliance im Jahre 1756. Historische Zeitschrift. Vol. xiv.
Senac de Meilhan. Le gouvernement, les mceurs et les conditions en
France avant la Revolution, avec introduction et notes uar H. de Lescure.
Paris. 1862. Soulange-Bodin, Andre. La diplomatic de Louis XV et le pacte de
famille. Paris.
1894.
Stryienski, C. La Mere des trois derniers Bourbons, Marie Josephe de
Saxe, et la Cour de Louis XV. Paris. 1902.
Le Gendre de Louis XV, Don Philippe, infant
d’Espagne et due de Parme.
Paris. 1904.
Vandal, A. Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie. Paris. 1882.
Vatel, C. Histoire de Madame du Barry. 3 vols. Paris. 1882-3.
Villiers de Terrage, M. Les dernieres annees de la Louisiane franyaise.
Paris. 1903.
Williams, H. N. Madame de Pompadour. London. 1902.
Madame du Barry. London. 1904.
Zorn de Bulach, A. J., Baron. L’ambassade du Prince Louis de Rohan a la
Cour de Vienne, 1771-4. Strassburg. 1901.
C. Great Britain.
Chatham,
William'Pitt, Earl of. Anecdotes...of the principal events of his time, with
his speeches.... 3 vols. London. 1810.
Corbett, J.
England in the Seven Years’ War. 2 vols. London. 1908.
Green, W. D.
William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. London. 1902.
Innes, A. D.
Britain and her Rivals in the Eighteenth Century, 1712-89. London.
1895.
Kelley, B. W.
The Conqueror of Culloden, life and times of William Augustus, Duke of
Cumberland. London. 1903.
Lecky, W. E.
H. History of England in the Eighteenth Century. 7 vols. London.
1892.
McCarthy, J.
History of the Four Georges and of William IV. 2 vols. London.
1905.
'
Ruville, A. von. W. Pitt, Graf von Chatham. 3 vols. Stuttgart. 1905.
W. Pitt und Graf Bute. Berlin. 1895.
Die Auflosung des Preussischen-Englischen
Biindnisses im Jahre 1762. Berlin.
1892.
Skohorne, B.
C. Our Hanoverian Kings. London. 1884.
Thackeray, F.
History of the Earl of Chatham. 2 vols. London. 1827. Walpole, H. Memoirs of
the Reign of George the Third. 4 vols. London.
1894.
D. Prussia and
Germany.
Bitterauf, T. Die Kurbayrische Politik im Siebenjahrigen Kriege. Munich.
1901. Bourdeau. Le Grand Frederic. 2 vols. Paris. 1900-2.
Heussel, A. ’ Friedrichs des Gi-ossen Annaherung an England 1755 und die
Sendung des Herzogs von Nivernais nach Berlin. Giessen. 1897.
Hoffmann, W. Die Politik des Fiirstbischofs von Wurzburg und Bamberg, A. F.
Grafen von Seinsheim, 1756-63. Munich. 1903.
Klopp, O. Der Konig Friedrich und seine Politik. Schaffhausen. 1867.
Koser, R. Konig Friedrich der Grosse. 2 vols. Stuttgart. 1893-1903.
Lehmann, M. Friedrich der Grosse und der Ursprnng des Siehenjahrigen
Krieges. Leipzig.
1894.
Longman, F.
W. Frederick the Great and the Seven Years’ War. London. 1881. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, K. Friedrich der Grosse und Polen.
Ausziige aus der Korrespondenz mit den Gesandten in Warschau und Petersburg
1762-6. Forschungen zur Dentsch. Geschichte. Vol. ix.
Naude, A. Friedrichs des Grossen Angriffsplane gegen Oesterreich im
Siehenjahrigen Kriege. Marburg. 1893.
Oncken, W. Das Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen. 2 vols. Allg. Gesch. in Einzeld. Berlin. 1880-2.
Paul-Dubois, L. Frederic le Grand, d’apres sa correspondance politique. Paris.
1903. '
Ranke, L. von. Zur Geschichte von Oesterreich und Preussen zwischen den
Friedensschliissen von Aachen und Hubertsburg. Sammtliche Werke, Vol. xxx,
Leipzig. 1875.
Raumer, F. V. Konig Friedrich II und seine Zeit (1760-9). Leipzig.
1836. Reddaway, W. F. Frederick the Great and the rise of Prussia. London. 1904. Schdning, K. W. von. Der Siebenjahrige
Krieg...nach der Originalkorrespondenz Friedrichs des Grossen mit dem Prinzen
Heinrich und seine Generalen. Potsdam. 3 vols. 1851-2.
Volz, G. B. Kriegfiihrung und Politik Konigs Friedrichs des Grossen in den
ersten Jahren des Siehenjahrigen Krieges. Berlin. 1896.
Wagner, F. Friedrichs des Grossen Beziebungen zu Frankreich und der Beginn
des Siehenjahrigen Krieges. Hamburg. 1896.
E. Austria-Hungary.
Arneth, A. von. Geschichte Maria Theresia’s. 10 vols. Vienna. 1863-79.
Biographie des Fiirsten Kaunitz. Vienna.
1899.
Bermanii, M.
Maria Theresia und Kaiser Josef II. Vienna. 1881.
Broglie, A., Due de. Marie-Therese imperatrice. 2 vols. Paris. 1888.
Henneqjiin de Villermont, A. C. Marie-Therese, 1717-80. 2 vols. Paris. 1895.
Perey, Lucien. Charles de Lorraine et la Cour de Bruxelles sous le regne de
Marie- Thercse. Paris. 1903.
Wolf,
A. Oesterreich unter Maria Theresia, Josef II und Leopold II, 1740-92. Vienna;.
1883.
<
F.
Miscellaneous.
Danvila y Collado, M. Reiuado de Carlos III. 6 vols. Madrid. 1907.
Elias, K. Die Prenssisch-russischen Beziehungen von der
Thronbesteigung Peters III bis zum Abschluss des Preussisch-russischen
Bundnisses vom : 11. April, 1764. ■ Gottingen. 1900.
,
Masslowski. Zur Geschichte der Russisch-osterreichischen Kooperation, 1759.
Hanover. 1888.
Rambaud, A. Russes et Prussiens. Guerre de Sept Ans. Paris. 1895.
Rousseau, F. Regne de Charles III, roi d’Espagne (17S9-88). 2 vols. Paris. 1907. Volz, G. B., and Kiintzel, G.
Preussische und osterreichische Aktea zur Vor- geschichte des Siehenjahrigen
Krieges. Leipzig. 1899.
Waliszewski, K. Le Roman d’une imperatrice. Paris. 1897.
(1) SPAIN UNDER FERDINAND VI AND CHARLES III.
A. Contemporary
Authorities.
Angelis,
Pedro de. Relation historica de los sucesos de la rebelion de
Jose Gabriel Tupae Amaru en las provincias del Peru el afio de
l780....Coleccion de obras y documentos relativos a la historia...de las
Provincias del Rio de la Plata. Vol. v. Buenos Ayres. 1831.
Aribau, B. C. Obras originales del Conde de Florida Blanca y escritos
referentes a su persona. Bibl. de autores Espafioles. Vol. lix. Madrid. 1899.
Becatini, Francisco. Storia del regno di Carlo III. Venice. 1790.
Bourgoing, J. F. de. Tableau de l’Espagne moderne. 2 vols. Paris. 1797.
Campomanes, Pedro Rodriguez, Count of. Cartas politico-economicas escritas...al
Conde de Lerena, precedidas de una introduccion y de la biografia del autor. Madrid.
1878,
Clarke, E. D.
(Chaplain to the Ambassador, Lord Bristol). Letters concerning the Spanish
nation. London. 1763.
Crillon, Louis de Berton, Due de. Memoires militaires. Paris. 1791.
Dalrymple,
William (Lieut.-Colonel). Travels through Spain and Portugal in 1774, with
account of the Spanish expedition against Algiers, 1775. London.
1777.
Drinkwater,
John. A history of the late siege of Gibraltar. London.
1785. Fernan-Nunez, C. J. Gutierrez de los Rios, Count of (Ambassador at
Lisbon, Paris, etc.). Vida de Carlos III con la biografia del autor, notas y
appendices por A. Morel-Fatio y A. Paz y Melia. 2 vols. Madrid. 1896.
Fernando, Manuel. Diario de lo ocurrido en el sitio de Gibraltar. Madrid.
1787.
Florida-Blanca,
Joseph Monino, Count of. Gobierao del Senor Rey Carlos III ...dada a luz por A.
Muriel. Madrid. 1839.
Jovellanos, G. de. Obras publicados por D. Candido Nocedal. 3 vols.
Madrid.
1903.
Lopez de Ayala, Ignacio. Historia de Gibraltar. Madrid. 1782.
Malmesbury,
first Earl of. Diaries and correspondence of. London. 1844. Spain, a new
account of the inhabitants, trade and government of. London. 1762.
Swinburne,
Henry. Travels through Spain in 1775 and 1776. London. 1787.
B. Later Works.
Colmeiro, Manuel. Historia de la Economia Politica en Espana. Madrid.
1866. Costa, Joaquin. Collectivismo agrario en Espana. Madrid. 1898.
Coterelo y Mori. Iriarte y su epoca. Madrid. 1897.
Don Ramon de la Cruz y sus obras. Madrid.
1899.
Coxe,
William, Archdeacon of Wilts. Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of
Bourbon (1700-88). 5 vols. London. 1815. [Most valuable because of the copious
extracts from diplomatic correspondence and other contemporary documents.]
Danvila y Collado, Manuel. Reinado de Carlos III. 6 vols. Madrid.
1892, etc. [These volumes, which form part of the Hist. Gen. de Espana, by
members of the Real Acad, de Hist, under the direction of A. Canovas del
Castillo, are thorough and detailed in their treatment. The elaborate and
signally complete series of references in foot-notes to the original sources in
the various Archives of the Kingdom forms a special feature.]
Ferrer del Rio, Antonio. Historia del Reinado de Carlos III. 4 vols.
Madrid. 1856.
Colecyion de los articnlos en la “Esperanza”
sobre la historia del Reinado
de Carlos III, escrito por. Madrid. 1859.
Haebler, C. Maria Josefa Amalia, Konigin von Spanien. Dresden. 1893.
Lafuente, M. Historia General de Espana. Vols. xix to xxi. Madrid. 1850-62.
[Contains many original documents.]
Lavalle, J. A. de. Don Pablo de Olavide. Lima. 1885.
Leguina, H. de. El P. Ravago, confesor de Fernando VI. Estudio
biografico. Madrid. 1876.
Macanaz, M. R. de. Espana y Francia en el siglo xvm. Madrid. 1876.
Rodriguez Villa, A. El marques de la Ensenada. Madrid. 1876.
Patino y Campillo. Madrid. 1882.
Rosseeuw Saint-Hilaire, E. F. A. Histoire d'Espagne. Vols.
xii and xin. Madrid. 1893-5.
Rousseau, Francis. Regne de Charles III d’Espagne (1759-88). 2 vols.
Paris.
1907. [For Franco-Spanish relations in particular.]
Stryienski, C. Le Gendre de Louis XV, Don Philippe, Infant d’Espagne et
due de Parme. Paris.
1904.
(2) EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS FROM PORTUGAL AND
SPAIN.
Azevedo, J.
L. de. Os Jesuitas no Grao-Pard. Lisbon. 1902.
Brabo, J. Coleccion de documentos relativos a la expulsion de los
Jesuitas de la Republica Argentina y del Paraguay, en el reinado de Carlos III.
Madrid. 1872.
Carayon, P. Charles III et les Jesuites de ses Etats d’Europe et
d’Amerique en 1767. Paris. 1868.
Causa Jesuitica de Portugal, o documentos autenticos, bulas, leyes
reales, despachos de la Secretaria de estado y otras piezas originates. (Tr.
from Portuguese.) Madrid. 1768.
Cretineau-Joly, J. A. M. Clement XIV et les Jesuites. Paris. 1847.
Garay, Bias. El Comunismo de las misiones de la Compania de Jesus en el
Paraguay. Madrid. 1797.
Menezes, C. J. de. Os Jesuitas e o Marques de Pombal. Oporto. 1893.
Murr, Gottlieb von. Geschichte der Jesuiten in Portugal unter der
Staatsver- waltung der Marquis von Pombal. 2 vols. Nuremberg. 1788.
Opperman, H. A. Pombal und die Jesuiten. Hanover. 1845.
Pombal, Choiseul et d’Aranda...un precis historique de ce qui s’est
passe en Portugal, en France et en Espagne a l’occasion des Jesuites. Documents
historiques.
3 vols. Paris. 1827.
Recueil de pieces qui n’avoient pas encore paru en France concernant le
proces des Jesuites et de leurs complices en Portugal. Paris. 1761.
S. J. C. M. (Pombal). Rela^ao abreviada da republica que os religiosos
Jeauitas das Provincias de Portugal e Hespanha estabelecerao nos dominios
ultramarinos das duas monai'chias..., Paris. 1758.
(3) PORTUGAL.
A. Contemporary Authorities.
Administration du Marquis de Pombal. 4 vols. Amsterdam. 1787.
Anecdotes du ministere de Pombal. Warsaw. 1781.
Cartas e outras obras selectas do Marques de Pombal. 3
vols. Lisbon. 1820-4. Memoirs of the Court of Portugal and of the
administration of the Count d’Oeyras (from a series of original letters written
in French). London. 1765.
Vita de Seb. G. de Carvalho (Marchese de Pombal). 4
vols. Siena. 17&2.
B. Later Writers.
Billot, A. Pombal et les Tavora. Revue Bleue. September, 1889.
Coelho, J. M. Latino. Historia de Portugal desde os fins do xvii seculo
at£ 1814. Lisbon. 1874.
Duhr, B. (S. J.). Pombal, sein
Charakter u. seine Politik. Freiburg i. B.
1891.
Gomez, F. L. Le Marquis de Pombal. Paris. 1869.
Luz Soriano, J. P. da. Historia do
reino de Dom Jozd I. Lisbon. 1866.
Olfers, J. F. M. von. Uber den Mordversuch gegen den Konig Joseph von
Portugal an 3 September, 1758. Berlin. 1839.
Oliveira Martins, J. P. Historia de Portugal. 2 vols. Lisbon. 1901.
Processos celebres do Marquez de Pombal. Factos curiosos e escandalosos
de sua epoca. Lisbon. 1882.
Schafer, H. Geschichte von Portugal. 5 vols. (Gesch. d. europ. Staaten.)
Hamburg u. Gotha. 1874.
Silva, L. A. Rebello da. Historia de Portugal nos
seculos xvu e xvui. 5 vols. Lisbon. 1860-71.
Smith, John,
Count of Carnota. Memoirs of the Marquess of Pombal with extracts from his
writings and despatches. 2 vols. London. 1843. [The author was private
secretary to Marshal the Duke of Saldanha.]
Stephens, H.
Morse. Portugal. (Story of Nations Series.) London. 1891.
[As
to the expulsion of the Jesuits, cf. Bibliography to Chapter XVI, ii d.J
(4) BRAZIL.
Galanti, P.
R. M. Compendio da historia do Brazil. 4 vols. Sao Paulo. 1905. Mello Moraes,
A. J. Brazil historico. 4 vols. Rio de Janeiro. 1839.
Oliveira Martins, J. P. O Brazil e as Colonias Portuguezas. Lisbon.
1888. Southey, R. History of Brazil. 3 vols. London. 1810.
Varnhagen, F.
A. Historia General de Brazil. 3 vols. Madrid. 1854-7.
GREAT
BRITAIN.
A good
critical bibliography of the years 1760-1801 will he found in W. Hunt’s
Political History of England, vol. x (see helow). For the history of Ireland in
this period see Bihliography to Chapter xiv. For the history of the American
Colonies and the United States in this period see Bibliographies to Vol. vn,
General, and Chapters u, m, rv, v, vi, and vii. For the history of India see
Bibliography to Chapter xv. Forthe history of the Seven Years’ War in Germany
and the diplomatic history of the period, see Bibliographies to Chapters ix and
xi.
I. GENERAL HISTORIES.
(Covering
more than one section of this Chapter1.)
Adolphus, J.
The History of England, from the Accession to the decease of King George III. 7
vols. London. 1840-6.
Almon, J.
Anecdotes of Eminent Persons of the Present Age. 3 vols. London. 1797.
Annual
Register, the. (Commencing in 1768.) London. 1758 sqq. [The earliest volumes
are edited hy Edmund Burke.]
Bancroft, G.
History of the United States of America. 6 vols. London. 1876. Bisset, R. History
of the reign of George III to the termination of the late War.
6 vols. London.
1803.
Brosch, M. Geschichte von England. Vols. vm, ix. (Gesch. d. europ. Staaten.)
Gotha. 1893-5.
Channing, E.
History of the United States. Vol. n. New York. 1908.
Clowes, Sir
W. L. The Royal Navy. 7 vols. London. 1897-1903.
Cust, Sir E.
Annals of the Wars. 5 vols. London. 1858-60.
Fortescue, J.
W. History of the British Army. Part I. 2 vols. London. 1899. Hunt, W. History
of England from the Accession of George III to the close of Pitt’s first
Administration. Political History of England. Vol. x. London.
1905.
Hunter, Sir
W. W. The Indian Empire. New edn. London. 1893.
Laughton, Sir
J. K. Studies in Navy History. London. 1887.
Leadam, I. S.
History of England, 1702-60. (Political History of England, Vol. ix.) London.
1909.
Lecky, W. E.
H. History of England in the Eighteenth Century. New edn.
7 vols. London. 1892.
1 Works bearing more especially upon one of
the three sections of this chapter are entered under the Bibliography of that
section only.
Macpherson,
D. Annals of Commerce. 4 vols. Londou. 1805.
Mahan, A. T.
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. London. 1889 (and later
editions).
Mahon, Lord
(Earl Stanhope). History of England, from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of
Versailles, 1713-83. New edn. 7 vols. London. 1836-54. Marks, M. A. M. England
and America, 1763-83. 2 vols. London. 1907. Massey, W. A History of England
during the Reign of George III. 4 vols. London. 1855-63.
May, Sir T.
E. (Lord Famborough). The Constitutional History of England since the accession
of George III. 3rd edn. 3 vols. London. 1871.
Mill, James.
History of British India. 9 vols. London. 1840-8.
Parliamentary
History, the. Vols. xiv-xxx. London. 1813-17.
Plowden, F.
Historical Review of the State of Ireland from the invasion of Henry II to the
Union. 2 vols. London. 1803.
Seeley, Sir
J. R. The Expansion of England. London. 1900.
Torrens, W.
M. History of Cabinets. From the Union with Scotland to the Acquisition of
Canada and Bengal. 2 vols. London. 1894.
See also,
passim, The Dictionary of National Biography, edited by Sir Leslie Stephen and
Sidney Lee. London. 1885-1900; and especially the articles on William Pitt the
elder and the younger.
II. WILLIAM PITT THE ELDER.
A. Sources.
1. Manuscript.
Among the ms.
sources for the history of this period the documents of the Record Office as a
matter of course stand first, furnishing the chief material for the history of
the foreign and the colonial policy of Great Britain as well as for the
internal history of the country, during Pitt’s great Administration. Of special
importance are the diplomatic correspondences in State Papers, Foreign, and the
State Papers, Colonial; also the Admiralty Records. The Home Office Records are
calendared from 1760 to 1775. Lastly, the practice which prevailed in the
eighteenth century in England as elsewhere, of opening the correspondences of
the ambassadors of foreign States in the Post and having them transcribed so
far as possible, led to the accumulation of a large number of “ Intercepted
Despatches,” which are preserved in the section State Papers, Foreign,
Confidential. They fill
27 vols. for the years 1756-63 only.
An important
supplement to all these documents is to be found in the Chatham or Pringle
Manuscripts, which were bequeathed to the Record Office by the late Admiral
Pringle, and contain the correspondence of both the elder and the younger
William Pitt. To judge from the use to which they have been already put by
several enquirers (H. Hall, A. von Ruville, J. S. Corbett), they possess the
very highest importance not only for the family history of the elder Pitt, but
also for the home and foreign policy of his Administration. A selection of the
most interesting pieces was printed in the Chatham Correspondence, edited by W.
S. Taylor and J. H. Pringle. 4 vols. London. 1838-40.
In the
British Museum the great collection of the Newcastle Papers is of exceptional
value for this period as well as for the preceding decades. Of other manuscript
collections it must suffice to mention here the Hardwicke Papers and the
Mitchell Papers. From- the latter A. Bisset’s work, mentioned below, contains
valuable extracts. The papers of Lord Egremont, which are valuable for the
peace negotiations of 1761-3, are in the possession of the Marquis of Lansdowne
and have been used by J. S. Corbett (see II, below).
Among the
great Continental Archives the Berlin Secret Archives of State may probably be
regarded as of the greatest importance, inasmuch as Prussia was the ally of
Great Britain in the Seven Years’ War. A. Schaefer in his History of the Seven
Years’ War was the first to use the material of these Archives in comprehensive
fashion; the most interesting portions of it, more especially the Political
Correspondence of Frederick the Great, have since appeared in print. Other
historians, such as R. Koser and A. von Ruville, have also in the meantime
utilised the documents of these Archives for their works on this period. The
Archives of Paris1 and Vienna, though containing much of value, in
accordance with the nature of the relations between the Austrian and French
Governments, on the one hand, and the British, on the other, during the Seven
Years’ War possess only a secondary significance. A. von Arneth’s narrative is
based mainly on the material at Vienna, and the works of R. Waddington on that
furnished by the Archives fitrangeres at Paris.
2. Printed Memoirs and Correspondence;
Contemporary Speeches and Pamphlets. Acten.
Preussische und Oesterreichische Acten zur Vorgeschichte des Sieben- jahrigen
Krieges. Edd.
G. B. Volz and G. Kiintzel. (Publ. a. d. preuss. Staatsarch. 74.) Leipzig.
1899.
Almon, J.
Anecdotes of the Life of the Earl of Chatham. London. 1793.
Annual
Register, the. 1758 sqq. [The earliest volumes edited by Edmund Burke.] Barham,
Charles Lord.. Letters and Papers of, 1758-1813. Ed. Sir J. K. Laughton.
i* Navy
Records Society. London. 1907.
Bedford,
fourth Duke of. Correspondence. With an introduction by Lord John Russell.
London. 1842-6.
Bisset, A.
Memoirs and Papers of Sir Andrew Mitchell. 2 vols. London. 1850. Byng, Admiral
John, Trial of. Dublin. 1757.
A
Candid Examination of the Court-Martial of Admiral Byng in a letter to
the gentlemen
of the Navy. By an old sea officer.
------------------------------- An exact copy of a letter from Admiral Byng to
the Right Hon. W------------------------------------
P , Esq.
Calendars of
Home Office Papers of the Reign of George HI. Ed. T. Redington.
Vol. i
(1760-5). 1878.
Chatham, Earl
of.—Authentic Memoirs of the Right Hon. the late Earl of Chatham.
1778.
The Speeches of the Right Hon. the Earl of
Chatham with a biographical
Memoir. 1848.
Pitt, W. Correspondence of. Edd. W. S. Taylor
and J. H. Pringle. 4 vols.
London.
1838-40.
Correspondence of, when Secretary of
State with Colonial Governors
and Military
and Naval Commissioners in America. Ed., for the Club of The Colonial Dames of
America, by Gertrude Selwyn Kimball. 1906.
Choiseul, Due de. Memoires de. [See Bibl. to Chapter xi, III A.]
Clarke, E:
Letters concerning the Spanish Nation during 1760-1. London. 1763. Fighting Instructions,
1530-1816. Ed. J. S. Corbett. Navy Records Society.
' ‘ ‘ London,
1906.
Frederick the
Great.—Histoire de la Guerre de Sept Ans. (CEuvres iv, v.) Berlin, 1847.
Politische Correspondenz. Vols. xi-xxi. Berlin. 1883-94.
Gra' on, A.
H., third Duke of. Autobiography and political Correspondence. Ed.
Sir W. R.
Anson. London. 1898.
Grenville
Papers, the, being the Correspondence of Rich. Grenville, Earl Temple, and
George Grenville, their Friends and Contemporaries. Ed. W. T. Smith;
4 vols. 1852.
Louis XV, Correspondance de, et du Marechal de Noailles. 2
vols. Paris. 1865. Parliamentary History of England. Vols. xiv-xvi. 1813.
Recueil des Instructions donnees aux Amhassadeurs et Ministres de France
depuis les traites de Westphalie jusqu’a la Revolution fran^aise. xvi: Prusse,
avec une introd. et notes par A. Waddington. Paris. 1901. xubis: Espagne. Vol.
in. (1722-93.) Par A. Morel-Fatio et H. Leonardon. Paris. 1899.
Rockingham,
Marquis of. Memoirs of, and his Contemporaries. By G. Thomas, Earl of Albemarle.
2 vols. London. 1852.
Round mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xiv. App. Pt. ix, pp. 291 sqq. London.
1896.
Stopford-Sackville
mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv. London. 1904.
Townshend,
Marquis, mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xi, Pt. 4, pp. 294-328.
London. 1887.
Walpole,
Horace. Letters. Ed. Mrs Paget Toynbee, with Bibliography. 16 vols. Oxford.
1903-5.
Memoirs of the last ten years of the Reign of
George II. 2 vols. London.
1822.
Memoirs of the Reign of George III. Ed. Sir
Denis Le Marchant. 4 vols.
London. 1845.
Westou-Underwood
mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. x. App. Pt. 1. London. 1885.
II. Secondary
Works.
Barth£lemy,
Comte E. de. Le traite de Paris. Revue des questions historiques.
Vol. xliii. Paris. 1888.
Beer, A. Zur Geschichte des Jahres 1756. Mitteilungen des Instituts fur
Oester. Gesch.
xvii.
Beer, G. L.
British Colonial Policy, 1754-65. New York. 1907.
Commercial Policy of England towards the
Colonies. New York. 1893.
Bourguet, A. Etudes sur la Politique etrangere du Due de Choiseul. Paris.
1907. Bourinot, J. G. Canada under British Rule. Cambridge. 1900.
Bourne, E. G.
Spain in America. New York. 1904.
Bradley, A.
G. The Fight with France for North America. Westminster. 1902. Carlyle, T.
History of Friedrich II of Prussia called Frederick the Great. 6 vols. London. 1858-65.
Coquelle, P. Les Projets de Descente en Angleterre. Paris.
1902. [Docs.] Co.rbett, J. S. England in the Seven Years’ War. A study in
combined strategy.
2 vols. London. 1907.
Ooxe, W.
Memoirs of the Pelham Administration. 2 vols.
London. 1829. Droysen, T. G. Geschichte. der preussischen Politik. Vol. v, Pt.
4. Leipzig. 1886. Duncker, M. Die Bildung der Koalition des Jahres 1766.
(Sitzungsberichte der Akad.) Berlin. 1882.
Preussen und England im Siebenjahrigen Kriege.
(Abhandlungen z. neueren
Gesch.) Leipzig. 1887.
Fitzmaurice,
Lord. Life of William, Earl of Shelburne. 3 vols. London. 1875. Fortescue, J.
W. A History of the British Army. Vol. ii.
London. 1899. Germiny, Comte M. de. Les hrigandages
maritimes de 1’Angleterre sous le regne de Louis XV. Revue des
questions historiques. 1908.
Godwin, W.
History of the Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. 1783.
Grant, W. L. La Mission de M. de Bussy a Londres en 1761. Revue d’Hist.
Diplom. xx. Paris. 1906. ,
,
Pitt’s Theory of Empire. Queen’s Review.
Kingston (Canada). July—
Sept.
1908. ;
Hall,
H. Chatham’s colonial policy. American Historical Review, July, 1900. Pitt and the Family Compact. Quarterly Review,
October, 1899.
— Was Pitt a Prophet ? Contemporary Review.
October, 1896.
See also
papers on Pitt by the same writer in Athenaeum, May 12, 1900, April 19 and July
12, 1902.
Harris, G.
Life of the Earl of Hardwicke. 3 vols. London. 1847.
Harrison, F.
Chatham. (Twelve English Statesmen.) London. 1906.
Chatham. Address. Hist. Soc. Transactions.
1909.
Hertz, G. B.
The Old Colonial System. Manchester.
1905.
EJeussel, A. Friedrichs des Grossen Annaherung an England 1755 und die
Sendung des Herzogs v. Nivemais nach Berlin. (Giessener
Studien.) Giessen. 1896. Hotblack, Kate. The Peace of Paris 1763. Transactions
Royal Hist. Soc. 3rd ser. Vol. ii.
London. 1908.
Hunt, W.
Pitt’s retirement from office, 5 Oct. 1761. English Historical Review,
1906, pp. 119 sqq.
Immich, M. Geschichte des Europaischen Staatensystems von 1660 his 1789.
Munich and
Berlin. 1905.
Jesse, J. H.
Memoirs of the Life and Reign of King George III. London. 1867. Koser, R. Konig Friedrich der Grosse. 2
vols. Stuttgart. 1893-1903.
Lloyd, E. M.
The Raising of the Highland Regiments in 1757. Engl. Hist. Rev.
1902, pp. 466 sqq.
Lucas, Sir C.
P. History of Canada to 1812. London. 1909.
Luckwaldt, P. Die Westminsterkonvention. Preussische Jahrbiicher. Vol. lxxx. Macaulay, Lord. Essays.
William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. The Earl of Chatham.
Frederic the
Great. 3 vols. London. 1843.
Mace, W. H. Des alteren Pitt Beziehungen zur amerikanischen Revolution. Jena.
1897.
Masson, F. Le Cardinal de Bernis depuis son ministere. Paris. 1884.
Michael, W. Die englischen Koalitionsentwurfe des Jahres 1748. Forschungen
zur Brand, u. Preuss. Gesch. j. 1888.
Moses, B.
South America on the eve of Emancipation. New York and London. 1908. Oncken, W. Das Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen.
2 vols. Berlin. 1880-2. Preuss, T. D. E. Friedrich der Grosse. Eine
Lehensgeschichte. 4 vols., with Urkundenbuch. Berlin. 1832-4.
Ranke, L. von. Franzosische Geschichte, vomehmlich im 16. u. 17.
Jahrhundert. Sammtliche Werke. Vols. viii-xm. Leipzig. 1868-70.
Englische Geschichte, vomehmlich im 17.
Jahrhundert. Sammtliche Werke.
Vols. xiv-xxii. Leipzig. 1870.
English transl. 6 vols. Oxford. 1875.
Friedrich II, Konig von Preussen. Sammtliche
Werke. Vols. u, lii.
Leipzig, 1888.
Der Ursprung des Siehenjahrigen Krieges.
Sammtliche Werke. Vol. xxx.
Leipzig. 3875.
Raumer, F. von. Konig Friedrich II u. seine Zeit (1740-69). Nach den
gesandt- schaftlichen Berichten im Brit. Mus. u. Reicharchive. (Beitrage z.
neuer. Gesch. n.) Leipzig. 1836.
Ruville, A. von. William Pitt, Graf von Chatham. 3 vols.
Stuttgart and Berlin.
1905. Engl, transl., with preface by H. E.
Egerton. London. 1907.
— William Pitt (Chatham) und Graf Bute. Berlin. 1895.
Die Auflosung des preussisch-englischen
Bundnisses im Jahre 1762. Berlin.
1892.
Michael, W. Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 1894. No. 4.
Ruville, A. von. Friedrich der Grosse und Bute. Eine Erwiderung. Deutsche
Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswiss. 1894. xn.
Salomon, F. William Pitt. Vol. I. Leipzig. 1901.
Strieder, J. Kritische Forschungen zur Oesterreichischen Politik (1748-56).
(Leip-
ziger Histor. Ahh. 2.) Leipzig. 1906.
Temperley, H.
W. V. Pitt’s retirement from office, 5 Oct. 1761. English Historical Review,
1906, pp. 327 sqq.
Thackeray, F.
A History of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. 2 vols.
London. 1827. Waddington, R. Louis XV et le renversement des alliances. Paris.
1896.
La guerre de sept ans. Vols. i-iv. Paris. 1899-1907.
Ward, A. W.
Great Britain and Hanover. (Ford Lectures.) Oxford. 1899. Williams, B. William
Pitt and the representation of the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament. Eng.
Hist. Rev. Vol. xxii, pp. 756 sqq.
London. 1907. Winstanley, D. A. George III and his first Cabinet. Engl. Hist. Review.
Vol. xvii, pp. 678 S. London.
1902.
Winter, G. Friedrich der Grosse. (Geisteshelden.) 3 vols.
Berlin. 1906.
III. THE KING’S FRIENDS.
A. Sources.
1. Manuscript.
British
Museum. Conway Papers, Addit. mss. 17497-8.
George III, Letters of, Egerton ms. 982.
Gunning Papers, Egerton mss. 2696-2706.
Hardwicke Papers, Addit. mss. 35352-915.
Mitchell Papers, Addit. mss. 6819-36.
Newcastle Papers, Addit. mss. 32901-33002
and 33023-5. Wilkes Papers, Addit. mss. 22131-2
and 30883-5.
Record
Office. See Section II, 1 above.
Lansdowne
House. Viry Papers, seen hy kind permission of the Marquis of Lansdowne.
2. Printed
Documents; Contemporary Letters, Memoirs, etc.
Almon, J.
History of the late Minority, 1762-5. London. 1766.
Political Register. 11 vols. London. 1767-72.
Review of Lord Bute’s Administration. London.
1763.
Annual
Register. Vols. m-xxvn. London. 1761-83.
Bath mss. Longleat Papers. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv. London. 1904.
Bedford,
fourth Duke of. Correspondence. Ed. Lord John Russell. 3 vols. 1842-6.
Cavendish,
Sir H. Debates of the House of Commons during the Thirteenth Parliament of
Great Britain, 1768-71. With Memoir by W. Dowdeswell, and Journal of the fourth
Duke of Bedford, 1766-70. 2 vols. London. 1841. Changes in the Ministry,
1765-7. Edited from Newcastle ms. 33003
by Miss Bateson for Royal Historic^ Society. (Camden Ser.) London. 1898.
Cumberland,
Richard. Memoirs. 2 vols. London. 1807.
Dartmouth mss. Vols. ii and hi. Hist.
mss. Comm. Rep. xiv. App. Pt. 10.
London. 1895.
Dodington,
George Bubb (Baron Melcombe). Diary, 1748-61. London. 1785. 4th edn. 1809.
Du Cane,
Lady, mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv. London. 1905.
Elizabeth,
Princess, daughter of George III and Landgravine of Hesse-Homburg.
Ed. P. C.
Yorke. London. 1898.
Eon de Beaumont, Chevalier de. Lettres, Memoires, etc. The Hague. 1764.
Frederick the Great. Politische Corresponded. Vols. xix-xxn. Berlin. 1892-5.
Garden, Comte de. Histoire Generale des Traites de Paix. Vols. iv, v.
Paris, n. d. George III. Correspondence with Lord North.
1768-83. Ed. W. B. Donne. 2 vols. London. 1867.
Gibbon;
Edward. Autobiographies. Intr. by John, Earl of Sheffield. Ed. J. Murray.
London. 1896.
Glover,
Richard. Memoirs, 1742-57. London. 1814.
Grenville
Papers. Ed. W. J. Smith. 4 vols. London. 1852-3.
Historical mss. Commission, Reports of. Vols. ih-xv. Appendices, and Reports on mss. of Mrs Stopford Sackville, American
mss. in Royal Institution, and mss. of the Marquess of Lothian. London.
1872-1905.
Junius. Letters
of. Ed. J. M. Good. London. 1814.
Leeds,
Francis, fifth Duke of. Political Memoranda. Ed. O. Browning. (Camden Soc.)
London. 1884.
Lennox, Lady
Sarah. Life and Letters, 1745-1826. Ed. Countess of Ilchester and Lord
Stavordale. 2 vols. 1904.
Macfarlan, R.
History of the first ten years of the reign of George III. 2nd edn.- London.
1783.
M°Culloch, H.
Miscellaneous Representations to the Earl of Bute relative to our concerns in
America (1761). Ed. W. A. Shaw. London. 1906. [The original project for taxing the
Colonies.]
Montagu, Lady
Mary Wortley. Letters and Works. Ed. Lord Whamcliffe.
3rd edn by W.
M. Thomas. 3 vols. London. .1861.
Mure, W.
Selections from the Family Papers preserved at Caldwell. (Maitland Club.) 3
vols. Glasgow. 1853-4.
Phillimore,
Sir R. J. Memoirs and Correspondence of George Lord Lyttelton.
2 vols.
London. 1845.
Rose, G.
Diaries and Correspondence. Ed. L. V. Harcourt. 2 vols. London. 1860. Selwyn,
George. Letters and Life. Ed. E. S. Roscoe and H. Clergue. London. 1899.
Letters passim. Savile Foljambe Papers. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. xv, Pt. 5.
London. 1897.
Title and Letters, 1745-1826. 2 vols. 1904.
Waldegrave,
James, second Earl. Memoir from 1754 to 1758. London. 1821. Walpole, Horace
(Earl of Orford). Memoirs of the reign of King George IH. Ed. Sir Denis Le
Marchant; rev. G. F. Russell Barker. 4 vols. London. 1894.
Letters. Ed. Mrs Paget Toynbee. 16 vols.
Oxford. 1903-5. [Bibliography.]
Journal of the reign of George III, 1771-83.
Ed. J. Doran. 2 vols. London.
1859.
Weston Underwood
mss. Hist. mss. Comm. Rep. x. App. Pt. i, pp. 321-427. London. 1885.
Wraxall, Sir
N. W. Historical and Posthumous Memoirs, 1772-84. Ed. H. B. Wheatley. 5 vols.
London. 1884.
B. Later
Works.
Albemarle,
Earl of. Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham and his contemporaries.
2 vols. London. 1852.
Almon, John.
Anecdotes of the Life of Chatham. London. 1796, 1810. Barrington, Shute.
Political Life of Viscount Barrington. London. 1814. Buckingham and Chandos,
second Duke of. Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III. 4 vols.
London. 1853-5.
Buckinghamshire,
John, second Earl of. 'Papers, 1762-5. Ed. A. D’Arcy Collier for the Royal
Historical Society. 1900.
Papers, etc. in Lothian mss. Hist. mss. Comm. London. 1905.
Campbell,
Lord. Lives of the Chancellors. 8 vols. London.
1845-69. Choiseul-Stainville, Due de. Memoire Historique sur la negotiation de
la France et de l’Angleterre depuis le 26 mars. 1761 jusqu’au 20 septeinbre de
la meme an nee. Leipzig. 1761.
Elliot, G. F. Stewart. The Border Elliots and the Family of
Minto. Edinburgh.
Elliot, Sir
Gilbert [Earl of Minto], Memoir by the Countess of Minto. 3 vols.
Edinburgh.
1874. [Docs.]
Family
Compact, the. Quarterly Review. Vol. oxc, No. 380, Art. in. London. 1899.
Gaillardet,
F. Memoires du Chevalier d’Eon. 3 vols. Brussels. 1837.
Harris, G.
Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. 3 vols. London. 1847. [Docs.] Hertz, G. B.
Diplomacy as to Falkland Isles, 1770. In British Imperialism, pp. 110-49.
London. 1908.
Hotblack,
Kate. The Peace of Paris, 1763. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.
3rd ser. Vol. ii. London. 1908.
‘ Jesse, J.
H. George Selwyn and his contemporaries. 4 vols. London. 1843-4, 1882.
Memoirs of the Life and Reign of George III. 3
vols. London. 1867.
Nicholls, J.
Recollections and Deflections as connected with public affaire during the reign
of George III. 2 vols. London. 1820-2.
Ruville, A. von. William Pitt (Chatham) und Graf Bute. Ein Beitrag zur
inneren Geschichte Englands unter Georg III. Berlin. 1895.
William Pitt, Graf von Chatham. 3 vols.
Stuttgart and Berlin. 1905.
Sheffield,
John, Lord. Observations on the Commerce of the American States. London. 1784.
Stanhope,
Earl. Life of William Pitt. 4 vols. London. 1861-2. [Docs.] Townshend, Charles.
Life. By Percy Fitzgerald. London. 1866.
Tucker,
Josiah. Four Tracts on Political and Commercial Subjects. Gloucester. 1774.
Series of Answers to certain Popular
Objections against separating from the
Rebellious Colonies. Gloucester. 1776.
Traite, le, de Paris entre la France et Angleterre (1763). Revue des
Questions Historiques. Vol. xliii. Paris.
1888.
Trevelyan,
Sir G. O., Bart. Early History of C. J. Fox. London. 1881, 1908. Wiffen, J. H.
Historical Memoirs of the House of Russell. 2 vols. London. 1833.
C. The
Wilkes Affair.
Complete Collection
of the Genuine Papers, Letters, etc., in the case of John Wilkes. Paris. 1767.
Howell,
T. B. State Trials. Vol. xix, 982-1175, 1382-1418. '
Kidgell, J.
Genuine and Succinct Narrative of a Libel entitled An Essay on Woman. London.
1763.
Lloyd, C. Defence
of the Majority in the Question relating to General Warrants. London. 1764.
Rae, W.
Fraser. Wilkes, Sheridan, Fox: the Opposition under George III. London. 1874.
Stephens, A.
Memoirs of J. Horne Tooke. 2 vols. London. 1813.
Townshend, C.
Defence of the Minority on the Question relating to General Warrants. London.
1764.
Warburton,
William, Bishop of Gloucester. Works. Supplement by F. Kjlvert, pp. 223-32.
London. 1841. ,
Wilkes, J.
Correspondence and Memoirs. Ed. J. Almon, 5 vols. London. 1805. Wright, T.
Caricature History of the Georges. London, 1869.
See also the
following newspapers for the years during which the controversy raged: Monitor,
Auditor, Briton, North Briton, Public Advertiser, St James’ Chronicle. See also
Section A above; and article on Wilkes in Dictionary of National Biography.
D. Naval
and Military Affairs.
Barrow, Sir
J. Life of Richard, Earl Howe. London. 1838.
Beatson, R.
Naval and Military Memoirs. 6 vols. London. 1804.
Chevalier, E. Histoire de la Marine Fran^aise pendant la, guerre de
l’lndependance Americaine. Paris. 1877.
Edwards,
Bryan. History of the British Colonies in the West Indies. 3 vols. London.
1807.
Keppel, T.
Life of Augustus, Viscount Keppel. 2 vols. London. 1842. Laughton, Sir J. K.
Articles on naval commanders and John Montagu, fourth Earl of Sandwich, in
Dictionary of National Biography.
Leboucher, O. G. Histoire de la derniere Guerre entre la Grande-Bretagne
et les Etats-Unis, la France, l’Espagne et la Hollande. Paris.
1787.
Maimers, W.
E. Life of John Manners, Marquis of Granby. London. 1899.
[Docs.] Montero y Vidal. Historia de Filipinas. Madrid. 1887.
Mundy, G. B.
Life and Correspondence of Admiral Lord Rodney. 2
vols. London. 1830.
Valdes, A. J. Historia de la Isla de Cuba y en especial de la Habana.
Havannah.
1780. Reprinted in Los tres
primeros Historiadores de la Isla de Cuba, etc.
3 vols. Havannah. 1876-7.
IV. ROCKINGHAM, SHELBURNE AND THE YOUNGER WILLIAM
PITT.
A. Sources.
1. Manuscript.
The following
Historical mss. Commission Reports
indicate manuscript sources of special value for this period :
10th Report,
Appendix, Pt. vi. Abergavenny mss. Lord
Braye’s mss. London. 1887. 12th
Report, Appendix, Pt. ix. Kettoii mss. ;
Donoughmore mss. London. 1891.
12th Report, Appendix, Pt. x, 1745-83. Charlemont Papers. London. 1891. 13th
Report, Appendix, Pt. m, 1782-90. Fortescue Papers. Vol. i. London. 1892. 14th
Report, Appendix, Pt. i. Rutland Papers. Vol. in. London. 1894. 14th Report,
Appendix, Pt. iv. Kenyon mss. London.
1894. 14th Report, Appendix, Pt. v. Fortescue Papers. Vol. n. 1791 to 1793.
London. 1896. 15th Report, Appendix, Pt. v, 1781-9. Foljambe Papers. London.
1897. 16th Report, Appendix, Pt. vi, 1782-93. Carlisle Papers. London. 1897.
16th Report, Appendix, Pt. vii. Ailesbury
mss, pp. 237-306. London. 1898.
Stopford-Sackville mss. London.
1904. Lothian Papers, Earl of Buckinghamshire’s Papers (1905). American mss., Royal Institution Papers (1906).
Vol. n.
2. Printed Memoirs, Correspondence, etc.
Auckland,
Lord. Journal and Correspondence. Ed. Bishop of Bath and Wells.
4 vols. London. 1861-2.
Buckingham
and Chandos, Duke of. Memoirs of Courts and Cabinets of George IH.
2 vols.
London. 1853.
Burges, J.
Bland, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Letters, Correspondence and Life.
Ed. J. Hutton. London. 1885. [Docs.]
Burke,
Edmund. Works. New edn. 6 vols. London. 1826.
Memoir of Life and Character. By J. Prior. 3rd
edn. London. 1839.
Memoir. By T. Macknight. 3 vols. London.
1868-60.
Correspondence. Edd. Earl Fitzwilliam and
General Sir R. Bourke. 4 vols.
1844.
Burke,
Edmund. Correspondence of Burke with Dr F. Lawrence. London.
1827.
Cornwallis,
Marquis. Correspondence. Ed. C. Ross. 3 vols. London. 1859. Eldon, Earl of.
Public and Private Life of. By Horace Twiss. 3 vols. London. 1844.
Fox, Charles
James. Memorials and Correspondence. Ed. Lord John Russell.
4 vols. London. 1853.
Life. By Lord John Russell. 3 vols. London.
1859-67.
Speeches. 6 vols. London. 1815.
George HI.
Memoirs of the Life and Reign of. By J. Heneage Jesse. 3 vols. London. 1867.
Correspondence with Lord North, 1768 to 1783.
Ed. W Bodham Donne.
2 vols. London. 1867 Gibbon, Edward. Memoirs
of my Life and Writings. Ed. G. Birkbeck Hill. London. 1900.
Private Letters of, 1753-94. Ed. R. E.
Prothero. 2 vols. London. 1896.
Grafton, A.
H., third Duke of. Autobiography and Political Correspondence.
Ed. Sir W.
Anson. London. 1898.
Keith, Sir R.
M. Memoirs. Ed. Mrs Smyth. 2 vols. London. 1849. [Docs.] Leeds, Francis, fifth
Duke of. Political Memoranda. Ed. O. Browning. London. 1884.
Lennox, Lady
Sarah. Life and Letters, 1745-1826. Ed. Countess of Ilchester and Lord
Stavordale. 2 vols. London. 1904.
Mackintosh,
Sir James. Memoirs. By his son R. J. Mackintosh. 2 vols. London. 1835.
Malmesbury,
Earl of. Diaries and Correspondence. Ed. the third Earl of Malmesbury. 4 vols.
London. 1844.
Pitt, William
(the younger). Life. By John Gifford. 6 vols. London. 1809.
Life. By Bishop William Tomline. 3 vols. 1821.
Life of. By Earl Stanhope. 4 vols. London.
1861-2.
Correspondence with Charles, Duke of Rutland,
1781-7. Ed. John, Duke
of Rutland.
Edinburgh. 1890.
Correspondence with the Rev. C. Wyvill.
Newcastle. 1796.
Speeches. 4 vols. London. 1806.
Some Chapters of his Life and Times. By Lord
Ashbourne. 2nd edn.
London.
1898. -
Rockingham, Marquis
of. Memoirs of. Ed. the Earl of Albemarle. 2 vols. London. 1852.
Rose, George.
Diaries and Correspondence. Ed. L. V. Harcourt. 2 vols. London.
1860.
Sheridan, R.
B. Speeches. London. 1853.
Wilberforce,
William. Life. By Robert Wilberforce and Samuel Wilberforce.
5 vols. London. 1839.
Private Papers of. Ed. A. M. Wilberforce.
London. 1897.
Windham,
William. Diary, 1784-1810. Ed. Mrs H. Baring. London. 1866.
Speeches. Ed. T. Amyot. 3 vols. London. 1812.
Wraxall, Sir
N. W. Historical Memoirs of his own time. 4 vols. London. 1836.
For
American affairs the Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United
States should be consulted. The whole course of the Peace negotiations, 1781-3,
is to be traced from day to day in this valuable publication, edited under the
direction of Congress, by Francis Wharton. New edition, 6 vols., by J. B.
Moore, Washington, 1889. See also The Literature of American History by various
writers. Ed. J. N. James, London, 1902; a valuable bibliography.
■
See also:
Correspondence
and Public Papers of John Jay. Edited by Henry P. Johnston.
4 vols. New York. 1890-3. [Especially Vol.
n.]
Documents
relating to the Constitutional History of Canada. Canadian Archives, 1759-91.
Edd. A. Short and G. Doughty. Ottawa. 1907.
B. Secondary Works.
Browning, O.
The Flight to Varennes, and other historical essays. London. 1892. Burke,
Edmund. Works. New edition. 16 vols. London. 1826.
Butenval,
Comte C. A. Precis du Traite de Commerce, 1786. Paris. 1869. Clarkson, S.
History of the Kise, Progress and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the
African Slave Trade. 2nd edn. London. 1839.
Coquelle, P. L’Alliance Franco-Hollandaise. 1735-88. 2 vols. Paris. 1902.
[Docs.]
Fitzmaurice,
Lord., Life of the Earl of Shelburne. 3 vols. London. 1875. Hammond, J. L. Le
B. Charles James Fox, a Political Study. London. 1903. Harris, W. History of
the Radical Party in Parliament. London. 1885.
Howard, John.
The State and the Prisons. London. 1792.
Kent, C. B.
R. The English Radicals, a historical sketch. London. 1899.
Lewis, Sir
George Cornewall. Esssys on the administrations of Great Britain from 1783 to
1830. Ed. Sir Edmund Head, Bart. London. 1864.
Macaulay,
Lord. Life of Pitt. Miscellaneous Works. Vol. ii.
London. 1860. Minto, Countess of. Hugh Elliot. A Memoir. Edinburgh. 1868.
Morley, John
(Viscount Morley of Blackburn). Burke, a Study. London. 1893. Political
Disquisitions. London. 1774.
Porritt, E.
and A. G. The Unreformed House of Commons. 2 vols. Cambridge.
1903.
Rae, W.
Fraser. Life of Richard Brinsley Sheridan. 2 vols. London. 1896. Rose, Dr J. H.
Great Britain and the Dutch Question, 1787-8. American Historical Review. Vol.
xiv. No. 2. New York. Jan. 1909.
The Mission of William Grenville to the Hague
and Versailles, 1787.
English
Historical Review. Vol. xxiv. London. April, 1909.
Rosebery,
Lord. Life of Pitt. London. 1891.
Ryerson, A.
E. Loyalists in America and their times. 2 vols. Toronto. 1880. Salisbury,
Marquis of. Stanhope’s Life of Pitt. Essays from the Quarterly Review. London.
1905.
Seeley, Sir J.
R. The Expansion of England. Two courses of Lectures at Cambridge. London.
1900.
Smith,
Edward. The Story of the English Jacobins. London. 1881.
Stirling, A.
M. W. Coke of Norfolk [Coke, T. W., Earl of Leicester] and his Friends. 2 vols.
London. 1908.
Van Tyne, C.
H. The Loyalists in the American Revolution. New York. 1902. Wilkins, W. H.
George IV and Mrs Fitzherbert. 2 vols. London. 1905.
I. ORIGINAL SOURCES.
In addition
to the State Papers, Ireland, preserved in the Record Office, Fetter Lane,
comprising Vols. 363-465, and covering the period 1702 to 1779, after which
date the permission of the Home Secretary is required for their inspection, the
chief sources of information are as follows:
1. The Correspondence of Archbishop King
(1696-1727) in 14 vols. preserved in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin (N.
i. 7-9, and N. in. 1-11), of which
considerable use was made by Bishop Mant in his History of the Church of
Ireland. Vol. ii. London. 1840.
2. The Correspondence of Edward Southwell
(Secretary of State for Ireland, 1702-30) with Dr Marmaduke Coghill, preserved
in the British Museum, Additional mss. 21,122-3.
Other Southwell mss. were acquired
by the Public Record Office, Dublin, in 1898. (Cf. Thirtieth Report of the
Deputy Keeper of Public Records in Ireland. App. i. pp. 44-58.)
3. The Newcastle Correspondence in the British
Museum, Additional mss. 32,687—32,738
(“Home Correspondence”), constitutes a perfect mine of infonnation for the
affairs of Ireland from 1724-67. Some of Archbishop Stone’s letters in this
collection have been printed by C. Litton Falkiner in the English Historical
Review, Vol. xx.
4. The Pelham Correspondence, likewise in the
British Museum, including the correspondence of Thomas Pelham (Secretary to the
Lord Lieutenant 1783-4 and 1795-8). Additional mss.
33,100—33,105.
5. The Documents preserved in the Public
Record Office, Dublin, falling into four main groups, viz.:
(а) British Departmental Correspondence
(1683-1758), being the communicar tions and letters from the Official
Departments in England to the Irish Government. There is a ms. Calendar of this series.
(б) Irish Departmental Correspondence
(1685-1797), being the communications from the Irish Government to the
Official Departments in England.
(c) Irish Civil Correspondence, called “Country
Letters,” in 97 vols. (16851827); chiefly interesting for the period 1700-60,
as containing information on the state of the country, details respecting the
Whiteboys, Wildgeese, Rapparees, murders, abductions, etc. It was from these
Letters that Froude wrote the most romantic chapters in his History of the
English in Ireland.
(d) A Collection of State Papers (1786-1808), in
51 cartons; forming a connecting link between the Departmental Correspondence
and the series of modern State Papers, beginning in 1821.
6. Other sources of information are noticed
below under Reports of the Historical mss.
Commission; but attention may be directed to the following minor items:
(a) Additional ms.
6117, ff. 1-186, containing Bishop Synge’s letters to Archbishop Wake
(1703-26).
(b) Egerton ms. 77: list of Converts and Protestant Settlers,
1660-1772.
(c) Egerton us. 201: some original private correspondence.
(d) Egerton us. 917, with some letters from King
to Southwell (from the Southwell Collection).
(e) Lansdowne ms. 242, containing some miscellaneous papers
relating to Ireland during the period.
(/) A
Collection of Law Report* (1697-1793), and the Converts’ Roll, preserved in
the Public Record Office, Dublin.
The
magnificent series of contemporary pamphlets, unfortunately still uncatalogued,
is contained in the Haliday Collection, in the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin. A
catalogue of the Bradshaw Collection of Irish books and pamphlets in the Cambridge
University Library, many of which belong to the eighteenth century, is being
prepared for publication.
II. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING
PAMPHLETS.
Abernethy, J.
Scarce and valuable Tracts. London. 1751.
Abstract, an,
of the...Protestant and Popish families in...Ireland, etc. Dublin. 1736.
Account, an,
of the Charity Schools in Ireland. Dublin. 1730.
Account, an,
of the Progress of Charles Coote, Esq. [against the Oakboys]. Dublin. 1763.
Account, the
Settled: or, a Balance struck between the Irish Propositions...and the English
Resolutions. Dublin. 1785.
Address, an,
from a noble Lord to the People of Ireland. [Dublin ?] 1770.
Address, an,
to the Independent Members of the House of Commons...on... establishing a
Regency. Dublin. 1789.
Alarm, an, to
the unprejudiced and well-minded Protestants...upon...the White Boys. Cork.
1762.
Albemarle,
Earl of. Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham. London. 1852,
Answer, an,
to...A Vindication of Marriage, etc. Dublin. 1704.
Answer, an,
to a late proposal for uniting the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland.
Dublin. 1751.
Answer, an,
to...A free and candid Inquiry, etc. Dublin. 1753.
Answer, an,
to...the Proceedings of the House of Commons in rejecting the altered ' :
Money Bill...vindicated. Dublin. 1774.
Answer, an,
to the Observations on the Mutiny Bill. Dublin. 1781.
Answer, an,
to the Reply to the supposed Treasury Pamphlet, “The Proposed System of
Trade...explained.” London. 1785.
Apology, ah,
of the French Refugees...in Ireland. Dublin. 1712.
Argument, an,
upon the Woollen Manufacture...demonstrating that Ireland must be...employed
therein. London. 1737.
Arrangement,
the, with Ireland considered. London. 1785.
Astraea, or a
letter on the abuses in the administration of justice in Ireland. Dublin. 1788.
Attempt, an,
to prove that a free and open trade...would he...advantageous to both '
Kingdoms. Exeter. 1753.
Auckland,
Lord (W. Eden). Considerations submitted to the People of Ireland on
"their
present condition, etc. Dublin. 1781.
Authenticus
(pseud.). A defence of the Protestant Clergy in the South of Ireland in answer
to Mr Grattan. Dublin. 1788.
Baratariana.
Fugitive Political Pieces published during the Administration of Lord
Townshend. Dublin. 1777.
Barrow, Sir
J. Life and Writings of Lord Macartney. London. 1807.
Bedford,
Correspondence of John, Duke of. (1742-70.) 3 vols. London. 1842. Beresford,
Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. J. 2 vols. London. 1854.
Berkeley, G.
(Bishop of Cloyne). Works. Ed. G. N. Wright. 2 vols. London;
1843. Ed. A.
C. Fraser. 4 vols. Oxford. 1871.
Both sides of
the Gutter: or, the Humours of the Regency. London. 1789. Boulter, H.
(Archbishop of Dublin). Letters to several Ministers of State. 2 vols. Dublin.
1770.
Brief Review,
a, of the Incorporated Society for promoting English Protestant Schools.
Dublin. 1748.
Brooke, H.
The Tryal of the Cause of the Roman Catholics, etc. Dublin. 1761. [Browne, Sir
J.] An Essay on Trade in general and on that of Ireland in particular. Dublin.
1728.
[ ] A scheme of the money matters of
Ireland, etc. Dublin. 1729.
Buckingham,
Duke of. Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of George III. 4 vols.
London. 1853.
Burdy, S.
Life of the Rev. P. Skelton. London. 1792.
Burke, E.
Works and Correspondence. 8 vols. London. 1852. (Bohn’s Lib.)
6 vols. London. 1886.
Letters, Speeches and Tracts on Irish Affairs.
Ed. M. Arnold. London. 1881.
[Burke, E.?]
A reply to the Treasury pamphlet...“The proposed system of trade with Ireland
explained.” London. 1785.
Bush, J.
Hibernia Curiosa. London. 1769.
Caldwell, Sir
J. Examination whether it is expedient to enable Papists to take Real
Securities. Dublin. 1764.
Debates on the affairs of Ireland in 1763 and
1764. 2 vols. London. 1766.
Proposal for employing children, etc. Dublin.
1771.
Inquiry into the Restrictions on the Trade of
Ireland. Dublin. 1779.
[Campbell,
T.] A Philosophical Survey of the South of Ireland. London. 1777. Dublin. 1778.
Candid
Inquiry, a, into the late Riots in Munster. Dublin. 1767.
Candid Review,
a, of Mr Pitt’s Twenty Resolutions. London. 1785.
Case, the,
fairly stated relative to an Act lately passed against the exportation of corn.
(6 Geo. Ill, c. 18.) Dublin. 1766.
Case, the, of
the Roman Catholics of Ireland. 1755.
Cavendish,
Sir H. A Statement of the Public Accounts of Ireland. London. 1791. Cavendish,
W. (Duke of Devonshire). Letters which passed in Great Britain relative to the
Absentee Tax. Dublin. 1773.
Chatham,
William Pitt, Earl of, Correspondence of. 4 vols. London. 1838. Chesterfield,
Earl of. Letters. 5 vols. London. 1779.
Miscellaneous Works. 2 vols. London. 1777.
Clarendon, R.
V. A Sketch of the Revenue and Finances of Ireland. London.
1791.
Collection,
a, of tracts concerning the present state of Ireland. London. 1729. Commercial
Resolutions, the,...vindicated. London. 1785.
Comparative
View, a, of the Public Burdens of Great Britain and Ireland. London. Dublin.
1779.
Complete
Investigation, a, of Mr Eden’s Treaty. Dublin. 1787.
Conduct, the,
of the Dissenters of Ireland, etc. Dublin. 1712.
Conduct, the,
of the Purse of Ireland. London. 1714.
Considerations...in
answer to...Observations on the Mutiny Bill. Dublin. 1781. Considerations on
agriculture, etc. Dublin. 1730.
Considerations
on the late Bill for payment of the remainder of the National Debt. Dublin.
1754.
Considerations
on the present calamities of this Kingdom, etc. Dublin. 1760.
Considerations
on the expediency...of frequent new Parliaments in Ireland. Dublin. 1766.
Considerations
on the independency of Ireland, etc. London. 1779. Considerations on the
revenues of Ireland, etc. London. 1757.
Considerations
on...“Seasonable Remarks/’ etc. and “An Essay on Trade in general;” etc.
London. 1728.
Considerations
on the Political and Commercial Circumstances of Great Britain and Ireland.
London. 1787.
Constitution,
the, of Ireland, and Poynings’ Laws explained. Dublin. 1770. Counter-Appeal, a,
to the people of Ireland. Dublin. 1749.
C[ourtie]rs,
the, Apology...for their conduct this S-s-n of P-r-l-nt. Dublin. 1754. Cox, Sir
R. The present State of his Majesty’s Revenue, etc. Dublin. 1762. [Cox, Sir
R.?] Previous promises inconsistent with a free Parliament, etc. Dublin.
1760.
Cox, W.
(Archdeacon). Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir R. Walpole.
3 vols. London. 1798.
Memoirs of the Pelham Administration. London.
1829.
Crawford, W.
History of Ireland. 2 vols. Strabane. 1783.
Crommelin, L.
Essay towards improving the Hempen and Flaxen Manufacture of Ireland. Dublin.
1734.
Crumpe, S.
Essay on the best means of providing employment for the People. London. 1793.
Curry, J. An
Inquiry into the Causes of the late Riots in Munster. Dublin. 1766.
Historical and Critical Review of the Civil
Wars in Ireland. Dublin. 1786.
Defence, a,
of the Opposition with respect to their conduct on Irish Affairs, etc. Dublin.
1785.
Defence, a,
of the...People of Ireland in their...refusal of Mr Wood’s copper money.
Dublin. 1724.
Delany, P.
Account of the Laws in force for encouraging the residence of the parochial
clergy. Dublin. 1723.
Delany, Mrs,
Autobiography and Correspondence of. Ed. Lady Llanover. London.
1861.
Derrick, S.
Letters written from Leverpoole...Dublin, etc. Dublin. 1767.
“
Dionysius.” A Letter from Dionysius to the renowned Triumvirate, etc. Dublin.
1754.
,
Dissertation,
a, on the enlargement of Tillage and erecting of Public Granaries. Dublin.
1741.
Dissertation,
a, on the present Bounty Laws for the encouragement of agriculture in Ireland.
Dublin. 1780.
“Drapier, M.
B.” A Letter...occasioned by...Thoughts on the Affairs of Ireland. Dublin.
1754.
Dobbs, A. An
Essay on the Trade...of Ireland. Dublin. 1729.
Dobbs, F.
History of Irish Affairs from Oct. 12, 1779 to Sept. 15, 1782. Dublin. 1782.
Concise View of History and Prophecy. Dublin.
1800.
Dublin Spy,
the. Dublin. 1753-4.
Dublin
University Magazine (The). 1836. Dublin. 1833, etc.
Dunton, J.
Some account of my Conversation in Ireland. London. 1699.
Eden, W. See
Auckland, Lord.
Enquiry, an,
how far it might be expedient...to permit the importation of Irish Cattle.
London. 1743.
Enquiry, an,
into the policy of the Penal Laws, etc. London and Dublin. 1775. Enquiry, an,
into the...Progress of the linen manufacture in Ireland. Dublin. 1757. Enquiry,
an, into the causes of Popular Discontents in Ireland. London. 1804.
Essay, an, concerning
the establishment of a National Bank in Ireland. London. 1774.
Essay, an, on
the Trade of Ireland, by the author of Seasonable Remarks. Dublin.
1729. '
Essay, an, on
the ancient and modern state of Ireland, etc. Dublin. 1759.
Essay, an, on
the Character and Conduct of...Lord Viscount Townshend. London. 1771.
Few Thoughts,
a, on the present posture of affairs in Ireland. Dublin. 1765.
Few Words, a,
of advice to the Friends of Ireland, etc. Dublin. 1755.
Finishing
Stroke, the. Dublin. 1764.
First Lines,
the, of Ireland’s Interest in the year 1780. Dublin. 1779.
Flood, H. A
Letter...on the expediency...of the present Association...in favour of our own
manufactures. Dublin. 1779- Flood, H. W. Memoirs of the Life of Henry Flood.
Dublin. 1838.
Forman, C. A
Defence of the Courage of the Irish Nation. Dublin. 1735.
Four Letters,
originally written in French, relating to...Ireland. Dublin. 1739. Fox, C. G.
Memorials and Correspondence. Ed. Lord John Russell. 3 vols. London. 1853.
Free and
candid Inquiry, a,...addressed to...a Person of Distinction in the North from a
Gentleman in Town. Dublin. 1753.
[French, R.]
The Constitution of Ireland and Poynings’ Laws explained. Dublin.
1770. '
Full Account,
a, of the present dispute...between the Prerogatives of the Crown and the
Rights of the People. London and Dublin. 1754.
Gilbert, Sir
J. T. Calendar of Ancient Records of Dublin. 11 vols. Dublin. 1889-1904.
Grattan, H.
Speeches. 4 vols. London. 1822.
Miscellaneous Works. London. 1822.
Observations on the Mutiny Bill*. Dublin.
1781.
junr. Memoire of the Life and Times of Henry
Grattan. 5 vols. London.
1839-46.
[Gray, J.] A
plan for finally settling the Government of Ireland upon Constitutional
principles. London and Dublin. 1785.
Grazier’s
Advocate, the, or Free Thoughts of Wool. Dublin. 1742.
Grenville
Papers, the. Ed. W. J. Smith. 4 vols. London. 1852.
Groans, the,
of Ireland, etc. Dublin. 1741.
Guatimozin’s
[i.e. F. Jebb] Letters on the Present State of Ireland. London. 1779. Harcourt
Papers, the. Ed. E. W. Harcourt. 14 vols. London. 1880-1905. Hardy, F. Memoirs
of the Earl of Charlemont. 2 vols. London. 1810. Hibemiae Notitia: or a List of
the present officers in Church and State, etc. London. 1723.
Hibernia
pacata [relating to the events of 1753]. Dublin. 1754.
Historical
Essay, an, upon the loyalty of Presbyterians...in answer...to...The Conduct of
the Dissenters. Dublin. 1713.
Historical mss. Commission:
Report ii,
pp. 65-8. Puleston mss. ; with
letters from Lord Barrymore, 173246. See also Rep. xv, App. 7, pp. 307-43.
Report n, p.
99. Torrens mss., pointing at
certain Parliamentary Reports (1776-89), in 37 vols., now in the Library of
Congress, Washington. Cf. Eng. Hist. Review, xxiv, pp. 104-6.
Report ii, p. 103. WiUes mss. (Baron Willes’ Letters, 1757-68).
Report m, pp.
432-4. Howard’s Parliamentary History of Ireland.
Report vi, p.
236. Lansdowne mss. (Correspondence
of Earl Shelburne relating to Ireland).
Report vnij
p. 73 sqq. Portsmouth mss. (Sir
Isaac Newton’s letters on Wood’s Coinage, etc.).
Report vin,
pp. 174-208. Emly mss. (Correspondence
of E. S. Pery, Speaker of the House of Commons), cont. in Rep. xiv, App. 9, pp.
155-99.
Report
viii, pp. 441-92. O’Conor
(Charles) of Balanagare mss. (Roman Catholic agitation). .
Report ix (Pt. m), pp. 34^67. Stopford Sackville mss. (Irish Affairs, 1731-83).
Report xii, App. 10; xm, App.
8. Charlemont
mss. 2 vols.
Report xii, App. 9. Donoughmore mss. (Letters of J. Hely Hutchinson).
Report xii, App. 9. Smith (P. V.) mss. (Letters on the Commercial Treaty).
' Report xm, App. 3. Fortescue mss. Vol.
i (Correspondence of Lord Temple, afterwards Marquis of Buckingham).
Report xiv,
App. 1. Rutland mss. Vol. hi
(Correspondence of the Duke of Rutland during his viceroyalty).
Report xv,
App. 6. Carlisle mss.
History, the,
of the Proceedings and Debates of the Volunteer Delegates...on the subject of
Parliamentary Reform. Dublin. 1784.
History of
the Ministerial Conduct of the Chief Governors of Ireland...from...1688
to...1753. London. 1754.
Hitchcock, R.
An historical view of the Irish Stage. 2 vols. Dublin. 1788-94. Howard, G. E. A
treatise of the Exchequer and revenue of Ireland. 2 vols. Dublin. 1776.
A
Letter to the Publick on the present posture of Affairs. Dublin. 1754.
A
short Account of his Majesty’s hereditary Revenue. 2nd edn. with additions.
Dublin. 1754.
Some questions upon the Legislative
Constitution o£ Ireland. Dublin. 1770.
Humble
Address, an, to the nobility, etc. [against a Union]. Dublin. 1751. Humble
Proposal, an, for...promoting Christian Knowledge among the poor natives
of...Ireland. Dublin. 1730.
Hunt, W. The
Irish Parliament, 1775. London. 1907.
Hutchinson,
J. H. Commercial Restraints of Ireland. Dublin. 1779. Ed.
W. G.
Carroll. Dublin. 1882.
Impartial
Thoughts on a Free Trade to Ireland. London. 1779.
Insula Sacra et Libera. A list of members...who voted for and
against the altered Money Bill. London. 1753.
Intelligencer,
the. [Swift and Sheridan.] Dublin. 1729. 2nd edn. London. 1730. Irish Monitor,
the. (April.) 2 vols. Dublin. 1879.
Journals of the
House of Commons, Ireland.
Judgements,
the, of God upon Ireland. Dublin. 1741.
Junius. Grand
Council upon the Affairs of Ireland.
Knox, A.
Essays on the Political Circumstances of Ireland. London. 1799. [Knox, W.]
Considerations on the State of Ireland. Dublin. 1778.
Laffan, J.
Political Arithmetic of the Population...of Ireland. Dublin. 1785. [Langrishe,
Sir H.] Considerations on the Dependencies of Great Britain. Dublin.
1789.
Laseelles, R.
Liber Munerum Publicorum Hiberniae. 2 vols. London. 1824-30. Legal
Considerations on the Regency as...it regards Ireland. London. 1789. [Leland,
J.] The case fairly stated: or an inquiry how far the clause...for discharging
the...National Debt...would have affected the liberties of the People. Dublin.
1754.
Letter from a
Prime Serjeant to a High Priest. Dublin. 1754.
Letter, a,
from a Member of the House of Commons of Ireland to a gentleman of the Long
Robe in England, etc. London and Dublin. 1720.
Letter,
a,...containing some remarks on...“A free and candid Inquiry,” etc. Dublin.
1756.
Letter, a,
from a Munster Layman...on the disturbances in the South. Dublin.
1787.
Letter, a, of
advice to the I—sh Members. Dublin. 1763.
Letter, a, to
Henry Flood on the State of the Representation in Ireland. Belfast.
1783.
Letter, a, to
the Protestant Dissenters of Ireland. Dublin. 1745.
Letter, a, to
the People of Ireland...on the effects of a Union. London. 1780. Letter, a, to
the People of Ireland on the...Fisheries. Dublin. 1776.
Letter, a
[second and third],..on the subject of Tythes. Dublin. 1778.
Letter,
a,...relative to our present feuds and jealousies. Dublin. 1775.
Letter, a,
upon...taxing the estates of Absentees. Dublin. 1773.
Letters from
a country gentleman...to his Grace the Lord Primate. Dublin. 1741. Letters of a
Dungannon and Munster Delegate [on] Parliamentary Reform,. Dublin.
1784.
Life,
character and parliamentary conduct of...H. Boyle [Earl of Shannon], Dublin.
1754.
List, a, of
the Members...who voted on the question previous to the expulsion of A. J.
Nevill, Esq. London. 1753.
[Lodge, J.]
The usage of holding Parliaments and passing Bills of Supply. Dublin and
London. 1770.
Long History,
a, of a certain Session of a certain Parliament in a certain Kingdom, in 1713.
Dublin. 1714.
Lucas, C.
Works. 2 vols. London. 1751.
Luckombe, P.
A Tour through Ireland. London. 1780.
[Macartney,
Lord.] An Account of Ireland in 1733. London. 1733.
[MacBride,
J.] A Vindication of marriage as solemnized by Presbyterians; etc. Dublin.
1702.
MacGeoghegan,
Abbe. Histoire d’Irlande. 3 vols. Amsterdam. 1758-63. [Macnally, L.] The Claims
of Ireland...vindicated. London. 1782.
Madden, S.
Proposal for the general encoui-agement of learning in Dublin College. Dublin.
1732.
Reflections and resolutions proper for the
Gentlemen of Ireland, etc. Dublin.
1738.
Reprinted. Dublin. 1816.
Management,
the, of the Revenue, etc. Dublin. 1768. ;
Maxims
relative to the present state of Ireland, 1757. Dublin. 1767. ,
[Maxwell, H.]
An Essay upon an Union of Ireland with England. Dublin. , 1704. McAulay, A.
Enquiry into the legality of Pensions on the Irish Establishment. London. 1763.
Method, a, to
prevent...the running of wool from Ireland to France. London. 1745.
M[olesworth],
R. L. V., Lord. Some considerations for promoting Agriculture, etc. Dublin. 1723.
"
Molineux.” Some Thoughts on the Bill for the relief of tenants holding leases
for lives. Dublin. 1780.
Moran, P. F.
(Cardinal). Spicilegium Ossoriense. 3 vols. London. 1874i-8.
Vol.
hi. .
Mountmorres,
Lord. Impartial Reflections upon...the Trade between Great Britain and Ireland.
London. 1785.
Mullala, J.
View of Irish Affairs since the Revolution. Dublin. 1795. ,
[Nevill,
A. J.] Some Hints on Trade, Money and Credit. Dublin. 1762. Newenham, T.
Statistical and Historical Inquiry into the Progress...of Population in
Ireland. London. 1805. ,
Newenham, T.
View of the Natural, Political and Commercial Circumstances of Ireland. London.
1809.
Nicholson, E.
A Method of Charity Schools in Ireland. Dublin. 1712.
O’Brien, Sir
L. The Resolutions of England and Ireland relative to Commercial Intercourse.
Dublin. 1785.
A
gleam of Comfort to this distracted Empire. London. 1786.
Observations
on raising the value of money, etc. Dublin. 1718.
Observations
on, and a short history of, Irish Banks and Bankers, by a Gentleman in Trade.
Dublin. 1760.
Observations
made by the Commissioners...of the Barracks throughout Ireland.
Dublin. 1760.
Observations
on the Popery Laws. Dublin. 1771.
Observations
on the Finances and Trade of Ireland. Dublin. 1775.
O’Conor, M.
The dangers of Popery to the present Government examined. Dublin.
1761.
Office, the,
and power of a judge in Ireland...explained. Dublin. 1756.
O’Leary, A.
Six Tracts on Historical and Religious Questions. Dublin. 1781. Parliamentary
Register, the. [Irish Parliamentary Debates.] 15 vols. Dublin. 1784-95.
Patriot
Miscellany: or a Collection of Essays relative to the political contests in
Ireland during the administration of the Duke of Dorset. 2 vols. Dublin. 1756.
Patriot
Queries, occasioned by a late libel...“Querie to the People of Ireland."
Dublin. 1754.
Pedlar’s
Letter, the, to the Bishops and Clergy of Ireland. Dublin. 1760.
[Pery, E. S.]
Letters from an Armenian in Ireland (1756). London. 1757. Pococke, R. (Bishop
of Meath). Tour in Ireland in 1752. Ed. G. T. Stokes. Dublin. 1891.
Prescription
Sacred: or reasons for opposing...tythes of agistment. Dublin. 1736. Present
Politics, the, of Ireland. London. 1786.
Present
State, the, of Ireland considered. Dublin. 1780.
Present
State, the, of Religion in Ireland. London. 1712 ?
Prior, T. A
List of the Absentees of Ireland, etc. Dublin. 1729.
Observations on Coin in general, etc. Dublin.
1729.
An Essay to encourage...the Linen
Manufacture...by Premiums. Dublin.
1749.
Proceeding,
the, of the House of Commons...in rejecting the altered Money Bill...
vindicated.
Duhlin. 1754.
Proceedings
relative to the Ulster Assembly of Volunteers. Belfast. 1783. Property
inviolable: or some remarks upon...“Prescription Sacred.” Dublin. 1736.
Proposal, a, for lessening the excessive price of Bread Com. Dublin. 1741.
Proposal, a, for uniting the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland. London.
1751. Proposals humbly offered to Parliament for the restoration of cash and
public credit to Ireland. Dublin. 1760.
Proposed
System, the, of Trade with Ireland explained. Dublin. 1785.
Protestant
Interest, the, considered, etc. Dublin. 1757.
Queries
relating to the new Half-Pence. Dublin. 1737.
Queries
relative to...some of the present laws of Ireland. 2nd edn. Dublin. 1761.
Question, a, to be considered previous to the rejection of the Bill for paying
off the National Debt, etc. Dublin. 1754.
R., T.
Original Letters:...to the Rt. Hon. H. Flood. [London.] 1820.
Rad'cliffe,
S, A serious Inquiry whether a toleration of Popery should be enacted. Dublin.
1727-
Reasons...against...reducing
the Interest of Money. Dublin. 1765.
Reasons why
we should not lower the coins now current in this Kingdom, etc. Dublin. 1729.
Reflections
on the National Debt, with reasons for reducing the legal Interest, etc.
Dublin. 1731.
Remarks
on.Considerations on the late Bill for payment,” etc. Dublin. 1754.
Representation, a, of the present state of Religion...agreed to by both Houses
of Convocation. Dublin. 1712.
Resolutions,
the, of the House of Commons...relating to the Lord Chancellor Phipps,
examined, etc. London. 1714.
Richardson,
J. Seanmora ar na priom phoncibh na chreideamh. London.
1711.
A
Proposal for the Conversion of the Popish natives of Ireland. Dublin.
1712. ‘
The Polly of Pilgrimages in Ireland. Dublin.
1727.
Short History of the attempts to convert the
Popish natives of Ireland.
London. 1712.
2nd edn. 1713.
[Robinson,
C.] Considerations on the late Bill for payment of the...National Debt, etc.
Dublin. 1754.
[Rose, G.]
The proposed system of trade with Ireland explained. [“Treasury pamphlet.”]
London. 1785.
R-y-1
Mistake, the: or, a Catechism for the I—sh Parliament. London. 1753. Rutty, J.
History of the Quakers in Ireland. Dublin. 1751. 2nd edn. 1800. Rutland, Duke
of. Correspondence between W. Pitt and Charles, Duke of Rutland (1781-7).
London. 1890.
S., T.
Impartial Thoughts on a Free Trade to...Ireland. London. 1789. Seasonable
Advice to the Friends of Ireland on the present Crisis. Dublin. 1755.
Seasonable Advice to the People of Ireland during the recent recess. Dublin.
1780.
Second
Letter, a, to a gentleman of the long robe in Great Britain. Dublin. 1720.
Secret History, the, of the two last memorable S-ss-ons of Parliament. Dublin.
1754.
Secret
History, the, and Memoirs of the Barracks of Ireland. London. 1747. Seward, W.
W. Rights of the People asserted. Dublin. 1783.
Collectanea Politica. 3 vols. Dublin. 1801-4.
Sheffield,
Lord. Observations on the Trade of Ireland. London. 1785.
Short
Account, a, of the reasons of the intended alteration of the value of the coins
current in this Kingdom. Dublin. 1729.
Short, a, and
easy method of preventing the clandestine exportation of wool, etc. London.
1745.
Short
History, a, of the Opposition to the present time, etc. Dublin. 1796.
Short Revue,
a, of the several pamphlets...on the subject of Coin, etc. Dublin.
1730.
Short Tour,
a: or, an impartial and accurate Description of the county Clare. 1779. Short
View, a, of the Proposals...for a final adjustment of the Commercial System,
etc. London. 1785.
Simon, J.
Historical Account of Irish Coins. Dublin. 1749.
Skelton, P.
Complete Works (with Burdy’s Life). 6 vols. London. 1824. Sketch, a, of the
history of two Acts...2nd and 8th of Queen Anne, to prevent the further growth
of Popery. London. 1778.
Smith, J.
Memoirs of Wool. London. 1747.
Some
Arguments for limiting the duration of Parliaments. Dublin. 1764.
Some
Considerations on the Laws which incapacitate Papists from purchasing lands.
Dublin.
1739. '
Some
Facts...relative to the fate of the late Linen Bill. Dublin. 1753.
Some farther
account of the...Disputes in Ireland about Farthings, etc. London. 1724.
Some hints
for the better promoting of the laws in this Kingdom, etc. Dublin. 1766.
Some
important frauds...in trade...laid open. London. 1746.
Some
observations on the circumstances of Ireland. [? Dublin. 1769.]
Some
observations relative to the late Bill for paying off...the National Debt of
Ireland. 2nd edn. Dublin. 1754.
Some
proposals humbly offered...for the advancement of Learning. Dublin. 1707. Some
thoughts...towards an Union, etc. London. 1708.
Some thoughts
on the general improvement of Ireland, etc. Dublin. 1768.
Some thoughts
on the...Linen manufacture, etc. Dublin. 1739.
Some thoughts
on the tillage of Ireland, etc. London. 1737.
State of the
different Interests in the House of Commons, etc.
State, a, of
the Public Revenues and Expence, 1761-69. Dublin. 1769.
State, the,
of Ireland laid open, etc. London. 1746.
Statutes at
Large. (Ireland.) 8 vols. Dublin. 1765. 20 vols. Dublin. 1786-1801. Stephenson,
R. An inquiry into the state and progress of the Linen Manufacture of Ireland.
Dublin. 1767.
Stevens, R.
Inquiry into the abuses of the Chartered Schools in Ireland. 1817. Strictures
on “ Considerations submitted to the People of Ireland,” etc. Dublin.
1781.
Swift (Dean).
Works. Ed. Sir W. Scott. 19 vols. London. 1824.
Prose Works. Ed. Temple. (Bohn’s Lib.) 8 vols.
London. 1897.
[Swift,
Dean?] Schemes from Ireland, for the benefit of the body natural, ecclesiastical
and politick. London. 1732.
Synge, E. (Archbishop
of Tuam). A Defence of the Established Church...in answer to...“A Vindication
of Marriage,” etc. Dublin. 1706.
An account of the Charity Schools in Ireland.
Dublin. 1719. Another
edition under
the title: Methods of erecting...Charity Schools. Dublin. 1721. Taaffe,
Viscount. Observations on Affairs of Ireland. Dublin. 1766.
Temple, Sir
W. Works. (Essay on the Advancement of Trade.) Vol. m. London. 1764.
Thoughts,
English and Irish, on the Pension List of Ireland. London. 1770. Thoughts on
the Affairs of Ireland, etc. London. 1764.
Thoughts
on...the establishment of a National Bank in Ireland. London. 1780. Thoughts on
the establishment of new manufactures in Ireland. Dublin. 1783.
To all the
good people of Ireland, friendly and seasonable Advice. Dublin. 1766. Tour, a,
through Ireland by two English Gentlemen. London. 1748.
Townshend,
Marquis. Meditations upon a late Excursion in Ireland. 1767.
Trant, D.
Observations on the late Proceedings in the Parliament of Ireland on the
question of a Regency. Dublin. 1789.
Tribune, the.
Ed. P. Delany. Dublin. 1729.
Tucker, J.
Reflections on the Present Matters in Dispute between Great Britain and
Ireland. London. 1786.
Twiss, R. A
Tour in Ireland in 1776. Dublin. 1776.
Ulster
Journal of Archaeology, the. 9 vols. Belfast. 1863-61. Vol. I: The French
Settlers in Ireland. Vol. hi: Contributions towards a History of Irish
Commerce.
Universal
Advertiser, the. Dublin. 1763, etc.
Usurpations,
the, of England the chief sources of the Miseries of Ireland. London. 1780.
Utility, the,
of an Union between Great Britain and Ireland. London. 1787.
View, a, of
the present State of Ireland, etc. London. 1780.
Wallace, T.
An Essay on the Manufactures of Ireland. Dublin. 1798.
Walpole, H.
Memoirs of the reign of George II. London. 1846.
Memoirs of George III. Ed. Barker. London.
Journals of the reign of George III. Ed.
Doran. London. 1859.
Letters. Ed. P. Cunningham. London. 1857-9.
Webber, S.
Short Account of...our Woollen Manufactories, etc. London. 1739. Wesley, J.
Journals. 4 vols. London. 1827.
Woodfallj W.
Debate in the Irish House of Commons (Aug. 12, 1785): Dublin. 1785.
Woodward, R.
(Bishop of Cloyne). A Scheme for establishing Poor-Houses in... Ireland.
Dublin. 1768.
Present State of the Church of Ireland, etc.
Dublin. 1787.
Wraxall, Sir
N. W. Historical and Posthumous Memoirs. 5 vols. London. 1884. Young, A. A Tour
in Ireland (1776-9)- London. 1780. Ed. A. W. Hutton. (Bohn’s Lib.) 2 vols.
London. 1892.
III. LATER
AUTHORITIES.
Agnew, D. C.
A. Protestant Exiles from France. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1871. Ashbourne, Lord.
Pitt: Some Chapters of his Life and Times. London. 1898. Ball, J. T. Historical
Review of the Legislative Systems...in Ireland. Dublin. 1882. Barrington, Sir
J. Rise and Fall of the Irish Nation. Dublin.
1843.
Bellesheim, A. Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Irland. 3 vols. Mainz.
1891.
Benn, G.
History of the town of Belfast. 2 vols. London.
1877-80.
3onn, M. J. Die englische Kolonisation in Irland. 2 vols.
Berlin. 1906. Brenan, M. J. Ecclesiastical History of Ireland. 2 vols. Dublin.
1840. Buckley, M. B. Life and Writings of A. O’Leary. Dublin. 1868.
Cairnes, J.
E. Political Essays. London. 1873.
Collins, C.
Jonathan Swift, a Biographical and Critical Study. London. 1893. Craik, Sir H.
Life of Swift. London. 1885.
Croker, C.
Researches in the South of Ireland. London. 1824.
Cumberland,
R. Memoirs by himself. London. 1806.
D’Alton, E.
A. History of Ireland. London. 1906.
Dunlop, R.
Life of H. Grattan. London. 1889.
England, T.
R. Life of A. O’Leary. London. 1822.
Falkiner, C.
Litton. Studies in Irish History and Biography. London. 1902. Fitzmaurice,
Lord. Life of the Earl of Shelburne. London. 1875.
Fraser, A. C.
Life of Bishop Berkeley. Edinburgh. 1881.
Froude, J. A.
The English in Ireland. 3 vols. London.
1895.
[lassencpmp, R. Geschichte Irlands. Leipzig. 1886.
Hickson, M.
Old Kerry Records. London. 1872.
Ingram, T. D.
Critical Examination of Irish History. 2 vols. London. 1900. Killen, W. D.
Ecclesiastical History of Ireland. London. 1875.
Lecky, W. E.
H. Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland. New edn. 2 vols. London. 1903.
History of England in the Eighteenth Century.
8 vols. London. 1877-90.
The Irish
portion published separately under the title of: History of Ireland in the
Eighteenth Century. 5 vols. London. 1892.
Lewis, Sir G.
C. Essay on Local Disturbances in Ireland. London. 1836. Lindsay, J. The
Coinage of Ireland, etc. London. 1839.
Madden, R. R.
History of the Penal Laws. London. 1847.
History of Irish Periodical Literature. 2
vols. London. 1867.
Mant, R.
(Bishop of Down). History of the Church of Ireland. 2 vols. London. 1840.
McNeven, T.
History of the Volunteers of 17.82. Dublin. 1845.
Macpherson,
D. Annals of Commerce. London. 1805.
Monck-Mason,
W. History of St Patrick’s Cathedral. Dublin. 1820.
Morley, J.
life of Burke. (E. M. L.) London. 1879.
Murray, A. E.
History of the Commercial and Financial Relations hetween England and Ireland.
London. 1903.
Nicholls, Sir
G. History of the Irish Poor Law. London. 1856.
O’Callaghan,
J. C. History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France. Dublin. 1854.
O’Conor, M.
Military History of the Irish Nation. Dublin. 1845.
O’Flanagan,
J. R. Lives of the Lord Chancellors of Ireland. London. 1870. Parnell, Sir H.
History of the Penal Laws. London. 1822.
Plowden, F.
Historical Review of the State of Ireland. 3 vols. London. 1803.
History of Ireland to the Union. 2 vols.
London. 1812.
Porter, G. R.
Progress of the Nation. 3 vols. London. 1836-43.
Prior, Sir J.
Memoir of the Life of E. Burke. London. 1824.
Reid, J. S.
History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. 3 vols. Belfast. 1867.
Ruding, R.
Annals of the Coinage. 3 vols. London. 1840.
Smiles, S.
The Huguenots in England and Ireland. London. 1867.
Smyth, C. J.
Law Officers of Ireland. London. 1839.
Smyth, G. L.
Ireland, Historical and Statistical. 3 vols. London. 1844. Stanhope, Earl. Life
of William Pitt. 4 vols. London. 1862.
Stephen, Sir
L. Life of Swift. (English Men of Letters.) London. 1882. Studies in Irish
History (1649-1775). Ed. B. O’Brien. Dublin. 1903.
Two Centuries
of Irish History, 1691-1870. London. 1888. 2nd edn. enlarged. London. 1907.
Wakefield, E.
Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political. 2 vols. London. 1812. Wiffen, J.
H. Memoirs of the House of Russell. 2 vols. London. 1833.
Wyse, T.
History of the Catholic Association. 2 vols. London. 1829.
A. CONTEMPORARY MEMOIRS AND HISTORIES OF
PRIMARY
IMPORTANCE.
Abdulkurreem,
Khojeh. The Memoirs of, who accompanied Nadir Shah, on his return from Hindostan
to Persia. Translated from the original Persian, by
F. Gladwin. Calcutta. 1788.
Abul Fazl.
Ain-i-Akbari. Translated from the original Persian: Vol. i by
H. Blochmann, Vols. n and hi by H. S. Jarrett.
3 vols. Calcutta. 1873,
1891, 1894.
Baber.
Memoirs of Zehir-ed-Din Muhammed Baber, Emperor of Hindustan. Translated by J.
Leyden and W. Erskine. London. 1826.
Memoires de. Translated by A. P. de
Courteille. 2 vols. Paris. 1871.
Elliot, Sir
H. M. The History of India as told by its own Historians. Edited and continued
by J. Dowson. 8 vols. London. 1867-77- Ferishta. History of the Dekkan from the
first Mahummedan Conquests. Translated by J. Scott. 2 vols. Shrewsbury. 1794.
Hosain Khan.
Letters of Aurangzeb. Bombay. 1889.
/ahangueir.
Memoirs of the Emperor. Written by Himself. Translated by Major D. Price.
London. 1829. Reprint. Calcutta. 1904.
Jouher. The
Tezkereh al Vakiat, or Private Memoirs of the Emperor Humayun.
Translated by
Major Charles Stewart. London. 1832. Reprint. Calcutta. 1904. Manucci, N. Storia
do Mogor. 1653-1708. Ed. and translated by W. Irvine.
Indian Texts
Series. 3 vols. Calcutta. 1907.
Mirza
Muhammad Haidar. Tarikh-i-Rashidi. Translated and edited by E. Denison Ross and
N. Elias. London. 1895.
B. EARLY EUROPEAN TRAVELS,
VOYAGES AND NARRATIVES.
Bernier, F. Histoire de la demiere Revolution des Etats du Grand
Mogol... Paris.
1670. .
Travels in the Mogul Empire, a.d. 1656-68. Ed.
by A. Constable. London.
1891.
Careri, Gemelli de. Voyage du Tour du Monde. Traduit de l’ltalien. Par
M. L. N. Vol. hi. 6 vols. Paris.
1727- Fryer, John. A New Account of East India and Persia in eight
letters, being nine years Travels, begun 1672 and finished 1681... London.
1698.
Hawkins, Sir
R. The observations of, in his voyage into the South Sea in 1593... The Hawkins
Voyages... Ed. by C. R. Markham. Hakluyt Society (Series i, vol. lvii). London.
1878.
Mandelslo, J.
A. de. The Voyages and Travels of, into the East Indies. Begun in...1638 and
finish’d in 1640. Rendered into English by John Davies. London. 1662.
Ovington, F.
A. A voyage to Suratt in the year 1689. London. 1696.
Roe, Sir
Thomas. Journal of his Embassy to the Great Mogul, 1615-9. Ed. from the
contemporary records, by W. Foster. 2 vols. Hakluyt Society (Series n, vols. i
and ii). London. 1899.
Tavernier, J. B. Les Six Voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier... 2
vols. Paris. 1676.
Terry,
Edward. A Voyage to East India. London. 1655.
Valle, Pietro della. Viaggi di. 2 vols. Rome. 1662-3.
C. EARLY WORKS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE.
Catrou, Franfois. Histoire Generate de l’Empire du Mogol... Paris.
1715.
Dow,
Alexander. The History of Hindostan. Translated from the Persian. 3 vols.
London. 1770.
Francklin, W.
A History of the reign of Shah-Aulum. London. 1798.
Fraser, J.
The History of Nadir Shah. London. 1770.
Gholam-Hossein-Khan.
Seir Mutaqharin. Translated from the Persian. 3 vols. Calcutta. 1789.
Gladwin, F.
The History of Hindostan during the reigns of Jehangir, Shahjehan, and
Aurungzeb. Calcutta. 1788.
Jones, Sir
William. The history of the life of Nader Shah, King of Persia. London. 1773.
La Croix, P. de. Histoire de Timur-Bec. 4 vols. Delft. 1723.
Orme, Robert.
Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire... 2 vols. London. 1782.
D. LATER WORKS.
Caldecott, R.
M. The Life of Baber. London. 1844.
Duff, James
Grant. A History of the Mahrattas. 3 vols. London. 1826. Elphinstone,
Mountstuart. The History of India, The Hindu and Mahometan Periods. With notes
and additions by E. B. Cowell. London. 1905. Erskine, W. A History of India
under the reigns of the first two sovereigns of the House of Taimur, Baber and
Humayun. 2 vols. London. 1854.
Holden, E. S.
The Mogul Emperors of Hindustan. New York. 1895.
Irvine, W.
The Army of the Indian Moghuls. London. 1903.
Keene, H. G.
A Sketch of the History of Hindustan... London. 1885.
— The Moghul Empire. London. 1866.
The Fall of the Moghul Empire. London. 1876.
MacGregor, W.
L. The History of the Sikhs. 2 vols. London. 1846.
Malcolm, Sir
J. A Sketch of the Sikhs. London. 1812.
Noer, F. A.,
Count of. The Emperor Akbar. Translated by A. S. Beveridge.
2 vols.
Calcutta. 1890.
Owen, S. J.
India on the eve of the British Conquest. London. 1872.
Poole, S. L.
History of the Moghul Emperors of Hindustan, illustrated by their coins.
Westminster. 1892.
Poole, S. L.
Babar. Rulers of India Series. Oxford. 1899.
Aurangzib. Rulers of India Series. Oxford.
1896.
Stewart,
Charles. The History of Bengal. London. 1813.
Thomas, E.
The chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi. London. 1871.
The Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire.
..1593-1707. London. 1871.
Tod, James.
Annals and Antiquities of Rajast’han or the Central and Southern Rajpoot States
of India. 2 vols. London. 1829-32.
Wilks, Mark.
Historical Sketches of the South of India in an attempt to trace the History of
Mysoor. 3 vols. London. 1810-7.
A. THE ENGLISH IN INDIA.
(1) Unpublished
Material.
The India
Office contains a great volume of ms. Records
consisting of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, copies of Despatches
to the Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, Letters received from the
various settlements in India, and the Consultations, Ledgers, and Proceedings
of the Presidential Councils. There may be also mentioned the Orme Papers,
Collections of Charters, Treaties, and Parchment records, Dutch records,
including transcripts from the Hague, the series known as Home Miscellaneous,
and records collected under the heading of The French in India, especially the
Collections numbered 2, 3, and 4.
The Record
Offices of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras also contain an immense amount of
material, much of which is being gradually calendared and printed by the
Government of India.
The Public
Record Office contains collections of Miscellaneous Correspondence under the
title Colonial Office Records, East Indies, and there are some further papers
among the Treasury Records.
Among the
many mss. in the British Museum
may be mentioned Clive’s corre-' spondence with the Duke of Newcastle, the
official and private correspondence and papers of Warren Hastings, papers relating
to his Impeachment and Trial, and various letters of Mrs Hastings.
The Clive
papers are in the possession of the Earl of Powis.
The Letters
and Diaries of Warren Hastings are in the Victoria Hall, Calcutta.
(2) Recobd
Publications.
Forrest, G.
W. Selections from the Letters, Despatches, and other State Papers preserved in
the Bombay Secretariat. Home Series. Bombay. 1887.
Maratha Series. Bombay. 1885.
Selections from the Letters, Despatches, and
other State Papers preserved in
the Foreign
Department of the Government of India. 1772-85. 3 vols. Calcutta. 1890.
Hill, S. C.
Bengal in 1756-7. Indian Records Series. 3 vols. London. 1905. Long, J.
Selections from Unpublished Records of Government for the years 1748-67.
Calcutta. 1869.
Wheeler, J.
T. Madras in the Olden Time. 3 vols. Madras. 1861.
Wilson, C. R.
The early annals of the English in Bengal. 2 vols. Calcutta.
1895-1900.
Old Fort William in Bengal. Indian Records
Series. 2 vols. London. 1906.
(3) Treaties,
Parliamentary Reports’, Debates, Speeches etc.
A Collection
of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds relating to India and neighbouring
countries. Ed. by Sir C. Aitchison. 9 vols. and Index volume.. Calcutta. 1892.
Bond, E. A.
Speeches of the Managers and Counsel in the Trial of Warren Hastings. 4 vols.
London. 1859-61.
Hansard’s
Parliamentary History. Vols. vm sqq. London. 1812, etc.
History of
the Trial of Warren Hastings, containing the whole of the proceedings and
debates in both Houses of Parliament... 1796.
Journals of
the House of Commons.
Journals of
the House of Lords.
Minutes of
the Evidence taken at the Trial of Warren Hastings. London. 1788-94. Reports
(i-v) of the Select Committee of the House of Commons. May 26, 1772- June 18,
1773.
Reports
(i-ix) of the Committee of Secrecy appointed by the House of Commons.
Dec. 7,
1772-June 30, 1773.
Reports
(i-vi) of the Committee of Secrecy on the causes of the war in the Carnatic.
1781-2.
Reports
(i-xi) of the Select Committee on the administration of Justice in Bengal,
Behar, and Orissa. 1782-3.
(4) Contemporary
Works and Pamphlets.
Advantages of
Peace and Commerce with some remarks on the East India Trade.
London.
1729. .
Authentic and
faithful history of that arch-pyrate, Angria. London. 1756.
Bolts, W.
Considerations on India Affairs. 3 vols. London. 1772-5.
Broome,
Ralph. A comparative review of the administration of Mr Hastings and Mr Dundas.
London. 1791.
Cambridge, R.
O. An account of the war in India between the English and French on the coast
of Coromandel. London. 1761.
Caraccioli,
C. The life of Robert, Lord Clive. 4 vols. London. 1775. Comparative view, a,
of the Dutch, French, and English East India Companies. 1770.
Complete
History of the War in India, a. London. 1761.
Debates in
the Asiatic Assembly. London. 1767.
Downing,
Clement. A compendious history of the Indian wars with an account of the rise,
progress, and forces of Angria the pyrate... London. 1737.
Essay, an, on
the East India trade and its importance to the kingdom. London. 1770.
Five letters
from a free merchant in Bengal to Warren Hastings. London. 1783. Fullarton, W.
A view of the English interests in India and an account of the military
operations in the southern parts of the peninsula. London. 1788. Hamilton, C.
An historical relation of the origin, progress, and final dissolution of the
government of the Rohilla Afghans. London. 1787.
Hastings,
Warren, A narrative of the Insurrection which happened in the Zemeendary of
Benares. Calcutta. 1782.
Memoirs relative to the state of India.
London. 1786.
Letters of, to his wife. Ed. by S. C. Grier.
London. 1905.
Holwell, J.
Z. Narrative of the deplorable deaths of the English gentlemen and others who
were suffocated in the Black Hole... London. 1758.
Hoi well, J.
Z. Interesting historical events... London. 1765.
Ives, Edward.
A voyage from England to India. London. 1773.
Johnstone, J.
A letter to the Proprietors of East India stock. London. 1766.
■
Thoughts on our acquisitions in the East Indies particularly respecting Bengal.
1771.
Letter, a, to
a Proprietor of the East India Company. London. 1750.
Letters of
Albanicus to the people of England on the partiality and injustice of the
charges brought against Warren Hastings. London. 1786.
Letters from
Simpkin the Second...containing an humble description of the trial of Warren
Hastings. London. 1792.
Macpherson,
J. The history and management of the East India Company. London. 1779. '
Moodie, J.
Remarks on the most important military operations...on the western side of
Hindoostan in 1783-4. 1788.
Munro, Innes.
A narrative of the military operations on the Coromandel Coast. London. 1789.
Narrative, a,
of the transactions of the British squadrons in the East Indies...
comprehending a particular account of the loss of Madras... By an officer who
serv’d in those squadrons. London. 1751.
Oakes, H. An
authentic narrative of the treatment of the English by Tippoo Saib.
1785.
Observations
on the present state of the East India Company and on the measures to be
pursued for ensuring its permanency and augmenting its commerce. London. 1771.
Origin, the,
and authentic narrative of the present Maratha war and also the late Rohilla
war in 1773 and 1774. London. 1781.
Original
papers relative to the disturbances in Bengal. 2 vols. London. 1765. Orme,
Robert. A history of the military transactions of the British nation in
Indostan. 2 vols. London. 1778.
Pigot, Lord,
a defence of. London. 1776.
Proposals for
relieving the sufferers of the South Sea Company, for the benefit of that of
East India. 1721.
Robson, F.
The life of Hyder Ali. London. 1786.
Rous, G. The
restoration of the King of Tanjore considered. 3 vols. 1777. Scheme, a, for
raising £3,200,000 for the service of the Government by redeeming the fund and
trade now enjoyed by the East India Company... 1730.
Scrafton,
Luke. Reflections on the Government of Indostan. London. 1763. Some
considerations on the nature and importance of the East India trade. London.
1728.
Some thoughts
on the present state of our trade to India. By a merchant of London. 1754.
Stanhope, P.
D. Genuine memoirs of Asiaticus. London. 1785.
Sulivan, R.
J. An analysis of the political history of India. London. 1779. Thompson, H. F.
The intrigues of a Nabob. 1780.
Tierney, G.
The real situation of the East India Company. London. 1787. Vansittart, H. A
narrative of the transactions in Bengal. 3 vols. London. 1766.
Verelst, H. A
view of the rise, progress and present state of the English government in
Bengal... London. 1772.
’
Vindication, a, of Mr Holwell’s character. London. 1764.
Other
contemporary pamphlets, too numerous to detail, may be found in the many bound
volumes of “ India Office Tracts," in the Library of the India Office,
Whitehall.
(5) General
Works.
Auber, Peter.
Rise and Progress of the British Power in India. 2 vols. London. 1837.
Elphinstone,
M. Rise of the British Power in the East. Ed. by Sir Edward Colebrooke. London.
1887.
Lecky, W, E. H.
History of England in the Eighteenth Century. 7 voleu London. 1892.
Lyall, Sir A.
C. The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India. London. 1906.
Macpherson,
D. Annals of Commerce. 4 vols. London. 1805.
European Commerce with India. London. 1812.
Mahan, A. T.
The influence of Sea-Power upon History, 1660-1783. London. 1889.
Mahon, Lord
(Earl of Stanhope)^ The Rise of our Indian Empire. London. 1858. Maries, J. L. de. Histoire Generate de l’lnde, ancienne et
moderne. 6 vols. Paris.
1828.
Marshman, J. C. The History of India. 3 vols. London. 1867.
Martineau, Harriet. The History of British Rule in India.
London. 1857.
Mill, James.
The History of British India. Ed. with notes and continuations by
Grant, R. A
Sketch of the history of the East India Company from the first formation to the
passing of the Regulating Act of 1773. London. 1813. Macaulay, Lord. Critical
and Historical Essays. The Essay on Clive. London. 1869.
Malcolm, Sir
John. The life of Robert, Lord Clive. 3 vols. London. 1836. Stewart, Charles.
The History of Bengal. London. 1813.
Wilson, Sir
Charles. Clive. London. 1890.
. E. Echoes from, Old Calcutta. London. 1908.
Gleig, G. R.
Memoirs of the life of...Warren Hastings. 3 vols. London. 1841. Impey, E. B.
Memoirs of Sir Elijah Impey. London. 1846.
Kirkpatrick,
W. Select letters of Tippoo Sultan. London. 1811.
Malleson, G.
B. Life of Warren Hastings. London. 1894.
Stephen, Sir
J. F. The story of Nuncomar and the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey. 2 vols.
1885.
Trotter, L.
J. Warren Hastings. Oxford. 1894.
Harris, J. A
history of the French East India Company. Navigantium
atque Itinerantium bibliotheca. Vol. i. 1744.
Hill, S. C.
Three Frenchmen in Bengal, or the commercial ruin of the French Settlements in
1757, London. 1903.
Ugolini, F.
Review of Theiner’s History of Clement XIV. Archivio Storico Italiano. Series
n, Vol. iv.
Dubois,
l’Abbe J. A. Letters on the State of Christianity in India (for the Jesuit
Missions). London. 1823.
X.... Review
of the histories of Venice by Mutinelli and Dandolo. Archivio Storico Italiano.
Series n, Vol. in.
Gregorovius,
F. Wanderings in Corsica, its History and its Heroes. Translated by A. Muir.
Edinburgh. 1855.
Marczali, H.
Hungary in the time of Joseph II. 3 vols. Budapest. 1885-8. English Transl. by
A. B. Yolland. (Preparing for publication.)
Tooke, W.
History of Russia in the reign of Catharine II. 4th edn. 3 vols. London. 1800.
II. PERIOD TO 1762.
Bain, R. N.
Peter III, Emperor of Russia. London. 1902.
Karejeff, N.
The Fall of Poland in historical literature. St Petersburg. 1888. (R.)
Polish Reforms in the 18th century. Wjestnik
Jewropy V. 1889. (R.)
Korzon, T.
Dzieje wewn^trzne Polski za Stanislawa Augusta. 2nd edn. 6 vols.
Dubrowin, N.
The Union of the Crimea with Russia. Rescripts, letters, relations and reports.
4 vols. St Petersburg. 1885-9. (R.)
Petroff. The War of Russia against Turkey and the Polish Confederates,
1769-74.
vols. St Petersburg. 1866-74. (R.)
The Second Turkish War, 1787-91. 2 vols. St Petersburg. 1880. (R.)
Tschetschulin.
The foreign policy of Russia at the beginning of the reign of Catharine II. St Petersburg. 1896. (R.)
Complete
Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire, since the year 1649. Vols.
xvi-xxm. St Petersburg. 1830, etc. (R.)
Danewski.
History of the Origin and Growth of the Imperial Council. St Petersburg. I860, (R.)
Gradowski,.
A. D. The higher Administration of Russia in the 18th century and the
Governors-General. St Petersburg. 1866. (R.)
Hruschewskij,
M. Outlines of the History of the People of the Ukraine. 2nd edn.
Pachman, S.
W. History of the Codification of the Civil Law, St Petersburg. 1876. (R.)
Storch, H. Historisch-statistisches Gemalde des Russischen Reiches am Ende
des 18. Jahrh. und unter der Regierung Katharina II. Vol. vi. Riga. 1797,
Tugan-Baranowski,
M. Russian manufactories in the past and the present. 2nd edn. St Petersburg. 1900. (R.)
Wittscheffsky, V. Russlands Handels-, Zoll- und Industriepolitik von Peter
dem Grossen bis auf die Gegenwart. Berlin. 1905.
Grot, J. K.
Catharine II in her correspondence with Grimm. 2 vols. St Petersburg. 1879, 1884. (R.)
Brown, J. The
Northern Courts, containing original memoirs of the sovereigns of Sweden and
Denmark since 1766. 2 vols. London. 1818.
Wilkins, W.
H. A Queen of Tears, Caroline Matilda, Queen of Denmark and Norway. 2 vols.
London. 1904. [With extracts from English State Papers.]
Hedwig,
Elizabeth Charlotte, Consort of Charles XIII, King of Sweden. Dagbok.
Stockholm. 1902.
Grot, Y. K.
Catherine II and Gustavus III. St Petersburg. 1884. (In Russian.) Kynynmond, E.
E. E. E. M., Countess of Minto. Memoirs of the Right Hon. Hugh Bain R. N.
Assassination of Gustavus III of Sweden. Eng. Hist. Review, ii, 543.
Dunning, W.
A. A history of political theories (Columbia series). New York. 1905. Eachard,
J. Mr Hobbes’ State of Nature considered. Two dialogues. 1672-4. England’s
monarchy, etc. 1660. [Eulogy of British constitution.]
Figgis, J. N.
The divine right of Kings. Cambridge. 1896.
Gee, F. The right
and original of the civil magistrate. 1658. [Able and thoughtful.]
Gooch, G. P.
English democratic ideas in the seventeenth century. Cambridge. 1898. Graham,
W. English Political Philosophy. 1899.
Green, T. H.
Principles of Political Obligation. 1885.
Hall, J.
Treatise against Monarchy. 1651. [Able and interesting: the author died at 29.]
Hallam, H.
Constitutional History of England. 8th edn. 3 vols. 1855. Harrington, J. The
art of lawgiving. 1659. [A popular abstract of the Oceana.]
Long, T. The
impiety of an absolute toleration. 1662.
Old English
Puritan, the. 1660. [A good defence.]
Parker, S.
Ecclesiastical Polity. 1670.
Perry, G.
Student’s Church History. 1884 Pollock, Sir F. History of the Science of
Politics. 1890.
Prynne, W.
The sword of Christian magistracy. 1647.
Rebel’s plea,
the, or Mr Baxter’s judgment. 1660. [A vigorous attack.] Regicides, the dying
speeches of the. [1660?]
Ritchie, D.
G. Natural Rights. 1895.
Rively, B. A
sermon against Fifth Monarchists, English Mamelukes, Scotch Enthusiasts. 1679.
Sadler, J.
Olbia the new island. 1660.
Sancroft,
Abp. W. Modern policies taken from Machiavel, etc. 1652.
Seller, A. A
history of passive obedience. 1689.
Sichel, W.
Bolingbroke and his times, and The sequel. 1901.
Sidgwick, H.
Elements of Politics. 1891.
English Thought in the eighteenth century. 2
vols. 1876.
Stubbe, H. An
essay in defence of the Good Old Cause. 1659. [A witty defence of democracy
against Baxter.]
Taylor,
Jeremy. A liberty of prophecying. 1657.
Temple, Sir
W. Essay on Government. 1672.
Tomkins, A.
The rebels’ plea. 1660. [An attack on Baxter, and anticipation of Locke.]
Tucker, J. A
treatise on Locke, etc. 1781.
Ware, J. The
priviledges of the people. 1648.
Whewell, W.
History of moral philosophy. Cambridge. 1862.
Williams,
Roger. The bloody tenent of persecution. 1644.
Periods of
European Literature. Ed. G. Saintsbury. Vol. ix. The Mid-eighteenth century. By
J. H. Miller. Vol. x. The Romantic Revolt. By C. E. Vaughan, Edinburgh. 1902-7.
Courthope, W.
J. History of English Poetry. Vol. v. London. 1903.
English Literature and Society in the
Eighteenth Century. London. 1904.
Blake, W.
Works Poetic, Symbolic, and Critical. Edd. E. J. Ellis and W. B. Yeats.
Burns, R. The
poetry of. Edd. W. E. Henley and T. F. Henderson. 4 vols.
Lillo, G. The
London Merchant and Fatal Curiosity. With introd. by A. W. Ward.
Scott, Sir W.
Miscellaneous Prose Works. 28 vols. Edinburgh. 1837-40.
Scott, Sir W.
Poetical Works. Ed. J. G. Lockhart. 12 vols. Edinburgh. 1833-4.
Robertson, J. M. History of German literature. London. 1892.
Lewes, G. H. Life of Goethe. 3rd edn. London. 1882.
Ticknor, G. History of Spanish literature. 6th edn. 3 vols. London. 1882.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF LEADING EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.
1525 Babar
founds Moghul Empire in India.
1651 Hobbes’
Leviathan published.
1654 Final
acquisition of Brazil by Portugal.
1656
Harrington’s Oceana published.
1657-1707
Reign of Aurungzeb in India.
1663 Renewal
of Franco-Swiss alliance of 1602.
1668 Triple
Alliance.
1680 Filmer’a
Patriarcha published.
1683 Siege of
Vienna.
1689 Bill of
Rights. Locke’s On Toleration published.
1696
Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, elected King Augustus II of Poland.
1701 June. Act of Settlement.
August. Grand
Alliance completed.
September.
Death of James II. Louis XIV recognises “James III.”
1702 March. Death of William III. Accession of Anne.
1703 Methuen Treaty between England and Portugal.
1704 Act of Security (Scotland) receives Royal
Assent.
1707 May. Act
of Union of England and Scotland comes into force.
1710 South
Sea Company established.
1712 Toleration Act (Scotland). Patronage restored
in Scotland.
Second
Vilmergen War in Switzerland.
1713 February. Accession of Frederick William I of
Prussia.
Peace of
Utrecht.
1714 June. Death of Electress Sophia.
August. Death
of Anne. Accession of George L Marriage of Philip V with Elisabeth Farnese.
1715 April. Third Dutch Barrier Treaty signed.
September.
Death of Louis XIV. Accession of Louis XV. Regency of Orleans. Jacobite rising
in Scotland.
December.
Commercial Treaty between Spain and Great Britain.
Bremen and
Verden ceded to Hanover by Denmark.
1716 February. Commercial Treaty between Great
Britain and the Dutch.
May. Law
founds his Bank in France.
June. Treaty
of Westminster.
Septennial
Act. Turkish conquest of Morea.
1717 January. Triple Alliance. Breach between Great
Britain and Sweden. August. Louisiana Company founded by Law.
Alberoni
conquers Sardinia.
Victory of
Prince Eugene over the Turks at Belgrade.
Congress of
Passarowitz meets.
1718 Quadruple Alliance.
1718 July. Peace of Passarowitz.
August.
Spanish fleet destroyed off Cape Passaro by Byng.
,,
Cellamare’s plot discovered. Franco-British invasion of Spain. November. Death
of Charles XII.
December.
Great Britain declares war on Spain.
1719 January. France declares war on Spain. First
Treaty of Vienna. November. Treaty of Stockholm.
December.
Fall of Alberoni.
Act
empowering English Parliament to legislate for Ireland.
1720 Spain, Denmark, and Poland accede to Quadruple
Alliance.
Collapse of
Law’s System. Plague at Marseilles.
August.
Height of South Sea mania.
Pragmatic
Sanction recognised by Austrian Estates.
1721 March. Treaty of Madrid. Acceded to by Great
Britain (June).
August. Peace
of Nystad.
1722 Walpole First Lord of Treasury. “ Atterbury’s”
plot.
1723 December. Death of Duke of Orleans.
1724 January. Abdication of Philip V.
„ Congress of
Cambray meets.
April. First
JDrapier’s Letter.
August. Death
of Don Luis. Philip V reascends Spanish throne.
1725 April. Treaty of Vienna.
September.
Treaty of Herrenhausen.
„ Marriage of
Louis XV with Maria Leszczynska.
November.
Secret Austro-Spanish marriage treaty negotiated by Ripperda.
1726 Denmark and
Sweden join Herrenhausen Alliance.
September.
Hozier blockades Portobello.
October.
Treaty of Wusterhausen.
Fleury
First Minister of France. Foundation
of Monte Video.
1727 February. Spain declares war against England.
May. Peace
preliminaries signed at Paris.
First
Indemnity Act for Nonconformists.
1728 March. Convention of the Pardo. Congress of
Soissons meets (June).
1729 Methodist movement begins at Oxford.
September. Birth
of the Dauphin.
November.
Treaty of Seville. End of Ostend Company.
1730 May. Accession of Tsarina Anne.
Death of
Frederick IV of Denmark. Accession of Christian VI.
1731 January. Spain denounces Treaty of Seville.
„ England and
Holland guarantee Pragmatic Sanction.
„ Death of
Antonio Farnese, Duke of Parma.
March. Treaty
of Vienna. Acceded to by Spain (July).
1732 Don Carlos Duke of Parma.
1733 Second election of Stanislaus Leszczynski.
Polish Succession War begins. May. Spain attacks Austrian Italy. Battle of
Bitonto.
September.
Treaty of Turin.
November.
Treaty of the Escurial (First Pacte de Famille).
Walpole’s
Excise Act withdrawn. Molasses Act.
1735 January.
S. Leszczynski abdicates. Augustus III recognised King of Poland. Preliminaries
of Vienna signed.
Don Carlos
crowned King of the Two Sicilies.
Russo-Turkish
War begins. Porteous riots in
Edinburgh.
1737 Fall of Chauvelin.
1738-72
Strife of the Caps and Hats in Sweden.
1738 January, Convention of the Pardo.
1738 Third Treaty of Vienna.
1739 Vienna Treaty acceded to by Sardinia
(February), Spain and Naples (June). September. Peace of Belgrade. Peace of
Constantinople.
October. War
between Spain and Great Britain declared.
December.
Vernon takes Portobello.
1740 May. Death of Frederick William I of Prussia.
Accession of Frederick II. October. Death of Tsarina Anne. Accession of Ivan
VI.
„
Death of Charles VI. Austrian Succession War begins. December. Frederick II
invades Silesia.
1741 April. Battle of Mollwitz. June. Treaty of Breslau.
July. Sweden
declares war on Russia. Battle of Vilmanstrand.
October.
Convention of Klein-Schnellendorf.
December.
Frederick II invades Moravia. Accession of Tsarina Elizabeth. Siege of
Cartagena de las Indias.
1742 Fall of Walpole.
May. Battle
of Chotusitz.
Austro-Spanish
hostilities begin in Italy.
1743 January. Death of Fleury.
February.
Battle of Campo Santo.
June.
Preliminaries of Breslau. Battle of Dettingen.
July. Peace
of Berlin.
August. Peace
of Abo.
October.
Treaty of Fontainebleau (Second Facte de Famille).
December.
Belleisle’s retreat from Prague.
1744 May. Union of Frankfort. Frederick 11 invades
Bohemia War between Great Britain and France declared.
1745 January. Death of Charles Albert of Bavaria.
March. Treaty
of Fiissen.
May. Battle
of Fontenoy.
June. Austro-Russian
Alliance.
July.
Jacobite rising.
December.
Charles Edward retreats from Derby.
„
Battle of Kesselsdorf. Saxony accedes to Convention of Hanover. Treaty of
Dresden between Austria and Prussia.
1746 Jauuary-March. Sardinian alliance with France.
February.
Marshal Saxe takes Brussels.
„
Death of Christian VI of Denmark. Accession of Frederick V. April. Alliance of
Denmark and France. Battle of Culloden.
June. Cape
Breton taken by the British.
July. Death
of Philip V of Spain. Accession of Ferdinand VI.
August.
Battle of Roucoux.
September.
Madras taken by the French.
1747 May. William IV proclaimed Stadholder.
July. Battle
of Lauffeldt. Battle of Exilles.
1748 Bergen-op-Zoom taken by the French.
Treaties of
Aix-la-Chapelle signed by France and Great Britain (April) and by Spain
(October).
1749 October. Treaty of Aquisgran.
„
Treaty of Madrid.
Dupleix
secures French control of the Carnatic.
Bolingbroke’s
Idea of a Patriot King published.
1750 Colonial Manufactures Prohibition Bill.
Rousseau’s first Ditcourt.
1751 Sieges of Trichinopoly and Arcot.
1752 June. Treaty of Aranjuez.
1754
Representatives of the English North American colonies meet at Albany*
July.
Braddock’s disaster before Fort Duquesne.
September.
Anglo-Russian Convention of St Petersburg (ratified Feb. 1756). November.
Earthquake of Lisbon. Newcastle-Fox
Ministry.
January.
Convention of Westminster.
May. Treaty
of Versailles. Minorca taken by French.
„ War
declared by England against France.
June.
Calcutta seized by Siraj-ud-daula.
August.
Frederick II invades Saxony. Battle of Lobositz.
December.
Russia accedes to Treaty of Versailles.
Acadia
cleared of French settlers. French take Oswego.
Newcastle-Pitt
Ministry.
Jan.-Feb.
Clive takes Calcutta, Hooghly and Chandernagore.
February.
Austro-Russian Convention.
May. Second
Treaty of Versailles.
June. Battle
of Plassey.
Battles of
Prague (May), Kolin (June), Hastenbeck (July), Gross-Jagerndorf (August);
Convention of Klosterzeyen (September); battles of Rossbach and Breslau
(November), Leuthen (December).
April. First
annual convention between Great Britain and Prussia.
June.
Louisburg taken by British. Clive Governor of Bengal.
Battles of
Zorndorf (August), Hochkirch (October).
November.
Choiseul Foreign Minister of France.
March-May.
Third Treaty of Paris completed.
Battles of
Kay, Minden and Quebec (July), Kunersdorf (August).
August. Death
of Ferdinand VI of Spain. Accession of Charles III. Jesuits expelled from Portugal
and Brazil.
Battle of
Landshut (June). Fall of Glatz. Battle of Liegnitz (July). October. Russian
occupation of Berlin.
,, Death of
George II. Accession of George III.
November.
Battle of Torgau.
Spanish
invasion of Portugal.
August.
Treaty of San Ildefonso (Third Pacte de Famille).
October. Fall
of Pitt.
January. War
declared against Spain by Great Britain.
,, Death of
Tsarina Elizabeth. Accession of Peter III.
May. Prussia
makes peace with Russia and Sweden.
„ Spanish
invasion of Portugal.
June. Russo-Prussian
Alliance. Accession of Catharine II.
British
capture of Martinique (February), Havana (June), Manila (October). Battles of
Wilhelmsthal (June), Freiberg (October).
November.
Preliminaries of Fontainebleau signed.
Rousseau’s
Emils published.
February.
Peace of Hubertusburg. Peace of Paris.
April.
Resignation of Bute. Proceedings against Wilkes begin.
First
Whiteboy outbreaks in Ireland.
-September.
Stanislaus Poniatowski elected King of Poland.
Jesuits
expelled from France. Battle of Buxar.
Clive’s
second governorship of Bengal begins.
March. Stamp
Act.
August. Death
of Emperor Francis I. Accession of Joseph II.
Stamp Act
repealed. Chatham-Grafton Ministry formed.
Lorraine
annexed to France.
Jesuits
expelled from Spain.
Provisional
Treaty of Exchange of Copenhagen,
Purchase of
Corsica from Genoa by France.
1768 Confederation of Bar. Rnssian invasion of
Poland.
Turkey
declares war on Russia.
Nullum
Tempus Act.
1769 January. Letters of Junius begin.
February.
Wilkes expelled from House of Commons.
August.
Interview of Joseph II with Frederick II at Neisse.
1770 January. North’s Ministry begins. Burke’s
Thoughts on the Present Discontents.
„
Spanish attack on English settlement in the Falkland Isles. May. Marriage of
the Dauphin Louis with Marie-Antoinette.
August.
Destruction of Turkish fleet by Russians at Tchesme.
December.
Fall of Choiseul.
1771 January. Exile of the Parlement of Paris.
Death of
Adolphus Frederick of Sweden. Accession of Gustavus III. First Roman Catholic
Relief Act (Ireland).
Russian
occupation of the Crimea.
1772 February. Secret Treaty of St Petersburg.
August. First
Partition of Poland.
Royal
Marriage Act.
Coup
d’etat of Gustavus III in Sweden. Catastrophe of Struensee in Denmark. Ministry
of Guldberg begins.
1773 Alliance of France and Sweden.
August.
Suppression of the Jesuit Order.
North’s
Regulating Act for India. Warren Hastings Governor-General. Insurrection of
Pugachoff in Russia.
1774 Boston Riot. Boston Port Act.
May. Louis XV
succeeded by Louis XVI. Turgot Finance Minister (Aug.). July. Battle of Shumla.
Peace of Kutchuk-Kainardji.
1775 Skirmishes at Lexington (April), and Bunker
Hill (June).
July. Spanish
attack on Algiers.
1776 Spanish attack on Sacramento.
Prohibitory
Act against American commerce.
American
Declaration of Independence.
1777 February. Joseph I of Portugal succeeded by
Maria I. Fall of Pombal. June. Necker Director-General of French Finances.
December.
Death of Elector Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria.
1778-84 War
with Haidar Ali in India.
1778 February. Treaty of Paris between France and
America.
March. Treaty
of the Pardo between Spain and Portugal.
July.
Bavarian Succession War begins.
September.
Dutch-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce.
Savile’s
Roman Catholic Relief Act.
1779 May. Peace of Teschen.
June. Spain
declares war on England. Siege of Gibraltar begins. December. English
restrictions on Irish trade abolished.
1780 January. Rodney relieves Gibraltar.
February.
First Armed Neutrality mooted.
November.
Death of Maria Theresa. Joseph II sole Emperor. December. Great Britain
declares war on the Dutch.
Austro-Russian
Alliance against Turkey.
1781 Rodney takes Dutch West Indian Islands.
De Grasse
takes Tobago and blockades Chesapeake Bay.
June. Joseph
II issues Patent of Tolerance.
July. Battle
of Porto Novo (July); battle of Dogger Bank (August). October. Capitulation of
Y orktown.
November.
Joseph II abolishes serfdom.
1782 February. Minorca and West Indian Islands taken
by French.
March. Pius
VI visits Vienna. Peruvian rebellion against Spain suppressed. April.
Evacuation of the Barrier fortresses.
„ Rodney
defeats de Grasse in the West Indies.
„ Grattan’s
Declaration of Rights. Irish legislative independence. August-September. French
victorious in the East Indies.
October. Howe
relieves Gibraltar.
November.
Preliminaries of Peace accepted by Great Britain and America.
1783 September. Peace of Versailles.
December.
Fox’ India Bill rejected by House of Lords. Fall of North. 1781-97 Ministry of
Andreas Bernstorff in Denmark.
1784 January. Peace between Great Britain and the
United States ratified. Pitt’s India Act.
1785 February. Return of Warren Hastings.
July.
Formation of Furstenbund.
Sweden
declares war on Russia. Naval battle off Hogland (July). Denmark attacks
Sweden.
November.
Barrier Treaty of 1715 abrogated by Treaty of Fontainebleau.
1786 August. Frederick II of Prussia succeeded by
Frederick William II. September. Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and
France.
1787 Trial of Warren Hastings begins (ends 1795).
Disturbances
in Austrian Netherlands.
Prussian
troops invade Holland. Austria and Russia declare war on Turkey.
1788 April. Anglo-Dutch defensive alliance.
July.
Suedo-Russian War.
August.
Anglo-Prussian defensive alliance of Berlin.
October. Last
Polish (Four Years’) Diet meets.
November.
Convention of Uddevalla.
December.
Death of Charles III of Spain. Accession of Charles IV.
,, Ochakoff
taken by Russians.
1789 January. Regency debates.
December.
Republic declared in Belgium.
Insurrection
threatened in Hungary.
Swedish Act
of Union and Security.
1790 February. Emperor Joseph II succeeded by
Leopold II.
June.
Convention of Reichenbach.
July. Nootka
Sound dispute between Great Britain and Spain settled. August. Peace of Varala
between Russia and Sweden.
Burke’s
Reflection# on the French Revolution.
1791-2
Paine’s Rights of Man published.
1791 Act to relieve Roman Catholics in England.
(Ireland, 1792, Scotland, 1793.) Quebec Government Act.
Formation of
the London Corresponding Society.
May. Polish
Constitution announced.
1792 January. Treaty of Jassy.
February.
Tipu Sultan defeated at Seringapatam.
March. Death
of Emperor Leopold II. Accession of Francis II.
„
Assassination of Gustavus III of Sweden.
April.
France declares war on the Emperor.
Fox’
Libel Act.
1793 January. Execution of Louis XVI.
February.
France declares war against Great Britain and Holland. British conquests from
French in India.
1796 Death of Tsarina Catharine II. Accession of
Paul.
1797 Frederick William II of Prussia succeeded by
Frederick William III.
1798 Proclamation of Helvetic Republic.