THE
PLANNED
BY the late LORD ACTON LL.D.
REGIUS
PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY
EDITED
BY
A. w. WARD
G. W. PROTHERO & STANLEY LEATHES
PREFACE.
IN accordance with the original plan of the Cambridge Modern History,
this volume narrates the history of Canada, and of the colonies, French and
English, connected with it, from their discovery down to the time at which
Canada passed under the British Crown; secondly, that of the other English
colonies in North America from their origin to the Declaration of Independence;
and, finally, the history of these colonies after they had become the United
States, from 1776 down to the present day. The departure from the general plan
of this work, in thus presenting a continuous narrative of the history of a
single nation during some three hundred years, is more apparent than real. The
principle of arrangement laid down by Lord Acton was that the history of each
people should be taken up at the point at which it was drawn into the main
stream of human progress, as represented by the European nations. In the case
of the North American colonies, this change may be said to have taken place in
the latter half of the eighteenth century, especially during the Seven Years’
War and the War of Independence. Consequently the earlier history of North
America would naturally fall to be considered at the point where it is treated
in our scheme, namely about the close of the reign of Louis XV and immediately
before the French Revolution. But, although an intimate relation between
America and Europe was established during the period 1756-1783, and although
the outbreak of the French Revolution was partly due to this connexion, it was
again severed after the Peace of Versailles, to be renewed only occasionally
during many years. For upwards of a century from that date the United States
remained, in a sense, an alter orbis, standing forth indeed as a primary
example of a successful and progressive federated republic, and, as such,
exerting a constant influence on the political thought of Europe, but not
otherwise affecting the course of European affairs, and little affected
by them in return. The United States seldom came into close political
contact even with Great Britain during the greater part of the nineteenth
century, and still more rarely with other Powers. It is only during the last
generation that an extraordinary industrial and commercial development has
brought the United States into immediate contact and rivalry with European
nations ; and it is still more recently that, through the acquisition of
transmarine dependencies and the recognition of far-reaching interests abroad,
its people have practically abandoned the policy of isolation, and have
definitely, because inevitably, taken their place among the Great Powers of the
world. This, we feel justified in assuming, was the principal reason which
induced Lord Acton to decide on treating the history of the United States as a
single whole, and to bring it down continuously to the present time.
In this respect, then, the scheme drawn up by Lord Acton has been exactly
followed; but in regard to details certain divergences from it have appeared
desirable. In order to prevent misapprehensions which may exist, and to which,
indeed, publicity has recently been given, it may be well to state, with more
particularity than at first appeared necessary, what is the nature and extent
of our editorial responsibility.
The idea and general conception of this work, it is hardly necessary to
repeat, were Lord Acton’s own. He also distributed the vast subject- matter
among the twelve volumes, and subdivided these into chapters, giving to each
its appropriate title, and thus indicating in general terms its scope. For the
writing of a large number of these chapters, but by no means of all, he had,
before he resigned the editorship, enlisted the services of various authors,
and had, in correspondence with them, defined more or less clearly the method
of treatment and the limits of the matter which they were respectively to
handle. But when the present editors took over the charge, they found that,
owing to the efflux of time since these arrangements were made, to the deaths
of some of the authors engaged and the withdrawal of others, and to other
causes, a large part of the task had to be performed again. Moreover, when the
plan and arrangement of chapters came to be more closely examined, considerable
modifications appeared, in some cases, to be necessary. Connecting links had to
be supplied, and gaps to be filled up; and it seemed desirable that, in view of
the proportions of the whole, certain sections should be expanded or curtailed.
In making these alterations, the editors believe that they have done no more
and
no less than would have been approved by Lord Acton himself, had he been
able to complete his task.
In the arrangement of the first volume of this work, which was already
fairly advanced at the time of Lord Acton’s resignation, and in the
distribution of its chapters, the changes made, though by no means
inconsiderable, were comparatively few ; in the present volume they have
naturally been more numerous and larger. It is needless to enter into detail;
but it seems well to state that, of the thirteen authors contributing to it,
only five were appointed by Lord Acton; and that two or three chapters have
been added to the list as planned by him. With regard to the actual work of
editing, it should be stated that not all the chapters of the first volume were
seen by him, and of the seventh volume at most five or six; while none of the
chapters in either volume received the benefit of his revision. Of the other
volumes only a chapter or two had been prepared at the time of his death. In
the volumes which are to follow, the lamented deaths of Lord Acton himself, of
Dr Gardiner, and of other authors who had undertaken to contribute, have
necessitated a large re-allotment of the work. The chronological tables, and
the separate indexes appended to each volume, are additions not contemplated
by Lord Acton.
With regard to this volume, the editors desire gratefully to acknowledge
their obligations to the Right Hon. James Bryce, M.P.; Sir Frederick Pollock,
Bart.; President Eliot; Professor A. B. Hart; Mr J. F. Rhodes ; and especially
to Professor J. Franklin Jameson, whose advice, kindly and promptly given, has
been invaluable.
The death of Mr J. G. Nicolay prevented him from revising the chapters to
which his name is attached. The editors desire to thank Miss Nicolay and Mr H.
W. Wilson for their assistance in the revision of these chapters, and in the
compilation of the bibliographies appended to them. Professor Wendell having
been prevented by absence abroad from drawing up the bibliography bearing on
his chapter, the duty of compiling it was kindly undertaken by Mr Chester N.
Greenough, of Harvard.
A. W. W.
G. W. P.
S. L.
Cambridge, May 1903.
CHAPTER II. THE
ENGLISH COLONIES. (1700—1763.) By John A.
Doyle, M.A.
CHAPTER III. THE
FRENCH IN AMERICA. (1608—1744.) By Miss Mary
Bateson
CHAPTER IV. THE CONQUEST OF CANADA. (1744—1761.)
By A. G. Bradley
CHAPTER V. THE
QUARREL WITH GREAT BRITAIN. (1761—1776.) By John
A. Doyle
CHAPTER VI. THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. (1761—1776.) By Melville
M. Bigelow
CHAPTER VII. THE
WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. (1776—1783.) By John
A. Doyle
CHAPTER VIII.
THE CONSTITUTION. (1776—1789.) By Melville
M. Bigelow.
CHAPTER IX. THE
STRUGGLE FOR COMMERCIAL INDEPENDENCE. (1783—1812.) By J. B. McMasteh
CHAPTER X. THE
WAR OF 1812—1815. By H. W. Wilson
CHAPTER XI. THE GROWTH OF THE NATION. (1315—1828.) By J. B. McMastee.
CHAPTER XII. COMMERCE, EXPANSION AND SLAVERY. (1828—1850.) By
J. B. McMastee.
CHAPTER XIII.
STATE RIGHTS. (1850—1860.) By Woodrow
Wilson
CHAPTER XIV. THE CIVIL WAR: I. (1861.) By the late John G. Nicolay.
CHAPTER
XV.
THE CIVIL WAR: II. (1862—1863.) By the late John
G. Nicolay.
CHAPTER XVI. THE CIVIL WAR: III. (1864—1865.) By
the late John G. Nicolay.
CHAPTER XVII. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR. (1861—1865.) By H. W.
Wilson.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE NORTH DURING THE WAR. (1861—1865.) By the late John G. Nicolay.
CHAPTER XIX. THE
SOUTH DURING THE WAR. (1861—1865.) By John
Christopher Schwab
CHAPTER XX. POLITICAL
RECONSTRUCTION. (1865—1885.) By Theodore
Clarke Smith
CHAPTER XXI. THE
UNITED STATES AS A WORLD-POWER. (1885—1902.) By John
B. Moore
CHAPTER XXII. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. By HenRy
Crosby Emery
CHAPTER XXIII. THE AMERICAN INTELLECT By Baebett Wendell, Professor of English in Harvard University.
CHAPTER
I.
THE FIRST CENTURY OF ENGLISH COLONISATION.
On none of the nations of
Europe had the discovery of America an effect so great as upon England. From
the trade of the Mediterranean she was wholly excluded; for that of the Baltic
she competed at a disadvantage with the ports of the Netherlands and Germany.
In the struggle for the commerce of the New World, England for the first time
met all rivals on equal terms; and the scale was turned in her favour by
internal conditions. Spain indeed had it in her power to have built up an
empire beyond the Atlantic which might have ranked with Roman Gaul or British
India. But that which an intervening ocean made difficult, the national life of
Spain made impossible. Slave-holding became a necessity: a scanty colonial
population was swamped and barbarised in its contact with inferior races; the
thirst for gold strangled sober and patient industry. Most fatal weakness of
all, the Spaniard underwent no such training for the work of administration as
long experience of self-government had given to the Roman and the Englishman.
No tradition of public morality barred the path of the self-seeking adventurer.
In France England might have found a rival for the control of North
America. But the bigotry of Valois kings and Guise statesmen had alienated from
them the one element most fit for the task of colonisation. The wars of
religion had drained her natural resources and divided her inhabitants into two
hostile camps. There was in France no lack of the daring spirit of adventure or
of patient commercial industry; but the two qualities were not combined. In
England there was no sharp line of division between the trader and the soldier;
there was a plentiful supply of men who combined the heroism of the Spanish
discoverer with a capacity for sober industry. Happily too for English
colonisation, dreams of El Dorado and vague cravings for a colonial empire not
built up by the steady labour of centuries but won in a moment by the sword,
had died away before the epoch of colonisation proper began.
VIRGINIA.
The discoveries of John and Sebastian Cabot and the colossal projects of
Sir Humphry Gilbert form but a prelude to the real history of the American
colonies. Gilbert’s attempt was indeed an advance on anything that had gone
before. Till he came on the scene there had been nothing but voyages of
exploration and quests for gold-mines. In 1577 he obtained a patent of
colonisation, not binding him down in any way to a choice of site and giving
him full territorial rights over all land within two hundred leagues of the
spot whereon he settled. Like later proprietors, Gilbert was invested with the
power of making laws, provided they were not inconsistent with those of the
realm.
Two obstacles, closely connected, thwarted Gilbert’s efforts—the jealousy
of Spain and the lack of discipline among his own men, largely due to the
privateering spirit called into existence by Drake and Hawkins. That Spain
should view any such attempt at colonisation with suspicion was but natural,
inasmuch as what one may call the colonial literature of the time, the
pamphlets in which views such as those of Gilbert found expression, teemed with
denunciations of Spain and suggestions for her overthrow. Influenced in all
likelihood by representations from the Court of Madrid, the Privy Council
refused Gilbert permission to sail unless he bound himself over to keep the
peace. Suspicion was confirmed by an alleged attack made by some of his
followers on a Spanish vessel; and the prohibition was made absolute. It was
disregarded. But in the very act of sailing under such conditions Gilbert was
cutting away the roots of discipline. The fleet broke up (1579), and the attempt
was a total failure. Four years later Gilbert made another attempt which cost
him his life. This time he sailed with all the appliances needed both for a
trading station and for a permanent settlement. But the old evil soon broke
out; vessels straggled and turned to piracy. Nevertheless Gilbert reached
Newfoundland, took formal possession, and erected a pillar on which were
engraved the arms of England. But again discipline broke down. The settlers
straggled; finally Gilbert decided to return, and with his vessel, the Golden
Hind, was lost on the homeward voyage.
Ralegh had schemes more definite and practical than Gilbert’s; with
better fortune and perhaps more concentration of purpose he might have actually
led the way in the work of colonisation. In his mixture of generous public
spirit with aims of self-advancement, of grandiose imagination with patient
application to detail, we cannot but be reminded of that striking figure which
has recently been removed from English public life. But as a colonist Ralegh
came somewhat before his time. He had not learnt what Englishmen had to be
taught by more than a generation of sad experiences—that a successful colony
could only be built up by a large and unproductive expenditure of
capital, and must be constantly tended and reinforced by men and material. Yet
it is impossible not to see that Ralegh’s scheme marked a very real advance in
sound views of colonisation. Having obtained a patent identical with that
granted to Gilbert, Ralegh sent out two exploring vessels under Amidas and
Barlow. They landed near Roanoke in North Carolina (1584). Their relations with
the natives were friendly, and they brought back glowing accounts of the
country, on which the gallantry of the courtier or the egotism of the Queen
bestowed the name of Virginia.
Next year Ralegh sent out seven ships with a hundred
and eight settlers. They were under the command of Sir Richard Grenville. He
was to start the colony. It was then to be left under the control of his
lieutenant, Ralph Lane, a careful and courageous leader and a good soldier, as
it would seem, but with no special aptitude for the civic duties of his post.
The result showed that, before England could become an effective colonising
power, she must shake herself free from the dreams of the gold-seeker and the
methods of the privateer. Lane and Grenville quarrelled. A trumpery act of
pilfering by the natives was punished with severity. After Grenville’s
departure, Lane, instead of striving to guide his settlers into habits of
self-supporting industry, made a long and dangerous journey of exploration in
search of mines and a passage to the Pacific. Squabbles with the savages
culminated in an organised attack made by fifteen hundred warriors. This was
however baffled by Lane’s military skill and by the help of some natives who
still remained friendly. In July, 1586, Grenville returned with reinforcements
and fresh supplies; but it was too late. The settlers, wearied by their
hardships and alarmed by the hostility of the Indians, had only a week before
taken advantage of a visit from Drake’s fleet and embarked for England.
Grenville however left behind fifteen men, just enough to keep up communication
with any future settlers. •
Whatever Ralegh’s moral shortcomings may have been, it is impossible not
to admire the tenacity of purpose with which he clung to schemes, undoubtedly
of public advantage and sound in principle, though the time for their
fulfilment might not yet have come. Another party numbering a hundred and fifty
was sent out, better organised and fitter for civic life than their
predecessors, since there were among them seventeen women. Their leader,
White, was, unlike Lane, a civilian, and did not suffer himself to be drawn off
by vague schemes of exploration. White soon found that his colony could not as
yet be self-supporting, and in 1587 he returned to England to petition for
further help. His request was not neglected, and a fleet was fitted out under
the command of Grenville to assist the colony; but at the last moment the alarm
of Spanish invasion diverted the expedition. Ralegh did not however abandon his
colonists. But two expeditions sent to their relief failed
because those in command of them preferred privateering against the
Spaniards to fulfilling their appointed task. The colony perished, leaving
behind only a vague tradition of dispersion among the natives.
The dawn of the seventeenth century rose on a somewhat changed England.
Englishmen filled with the new wine of the Renaissance and united under a Queen
whose rule, despite all its craft and meanness, appealed intensely to their
imagination, had dreamt dreams and seen visions. A generation succeeded, not
less enterprising, but more patient, more self-denying, more sane. The
conception of colonies as centres from which Christianity might be spread
through savage lands did not altogether disappear, nor did English emigrants at
once give up the idea of rivalling Spain in the race, for gold. But these ideas
fell into the background. Colonisation designed to provide homes for surplus
population, to expand alike the imports and exports of England, and thereby to
develop her naval resources, now became the dominant motive.
In 1606 these ideas and schemes took definite shape. Colonies were no
longer to be dependent on the resources or the purpose of a private individual.
The trade with the Baltic and that with the East Indies were already under the
control of associated companies. That principle was now applied to
colonisation; and a company was formed with two branches. One, with its
headquarters in London, was to establish a plantation between the forty-fifth
and thirty-eighth degrees of north latitude. The other drew most of its support
from the West of England, and was therefore commonly, though not as it would
seem formally, called the Plymouth Company. This was to establish another
settlement between the forty-first and thirty-fourth degrees. For the present
we need only consider the London Company.
The constitution of the Company involved a complex system of divided and
qualified control, which had to be got rid of if the colony was to become a
thriving community with any spirit of self-government. The Company itself was
to have only a trading interest in the undertaking, to find the capital and
receive in return certain commercial advantages. The government of the colony
was to be vested in two councils, both nominated by the King. One was to be
resident in England and was to be supreme in all political and legislative
matters. The other, established in the colony, was responsible for local
administration. Thus three authorities were set up, between whom a conflict of
jurisdiction was inevitable.
In December, 1606, 143 emigrants were sent out. It is clear that the
colonists were ill-chosen. They proved idle and discontented, without the
courage necessary for explorers, or the patience and discipline to make
prosperous settlers. Nor was there among their leaders any man who combined the
natural gifts needed for the post with such a position and such antecedents as
to give him authority. By far the best was that John Smith whose adventures,
beyond doubt tinged with romance*
form so large a chapter in the early history of Virginia. He was undoubtedly
brave, resourceful, and public-spirited, and in all likelihood a man of high moral
character. But his position gave him no well- assured claim to ascendancy. The
history of the colony from 1606 to 1609 is a wretched series of squabbles,
difficulties, and failures.
The colony itself was unprosperous; those in England who were mainly responsible
took no rational or effective interest in its wellbeing. But at least it was
not suffered to slip out of public notice. In 1609, if we may judge by the
pamphlets published and the sermons preached on behalf of the colony, there was
a complete reawakening of public interest. In May of that year a new charter
was granted. Under this one of the chief evils, the dual control exercised by a
resident and a non-resident council, disappeared. The Company was incorporated.
It might levy duties and wage defensive war on behalf of its own territories.
The government was to be vested in a council originally nominated by the King
but elected, as vacancies occurred, by the Company.
The first venture of the Company in its new and extended form was
unfortunate. Nine ships were sent out with supplies and five hundred settlers.
The fleet was scattered by a storm; and Sir George Somers and Sir Thomas Gates,
the leaders of the expedition, were cast away on the Bermudas (July, 1609).
After ten months they fitted up two pinnaces with which they reached Virginia.
There they found everything in confusion. Smith had met with an accident and
returned to England, and there was no one fit to fill his place. The Indians
had become hostile. Such was the sloth and thriftlessness of the settlers that
in a land covered with timber the very houses had been broken up for firewood.
So impressed were Somers and Gates with the hopelessness of affairs that they
resolved that the colony should be abandoned and the settlers embarked for
England. Happily, at the very moment of departure, Lord Delaware, who before
the departure of the fleet from England had been appointed captain-general and
governor, arrived with three ships. There was no more talk of dissolving the
colony. The Indians were overawed, supplies of com were obtained from them, and
an expedition was sent to the Bermudas to obtain fish and pork.
A few public-spirited men such as Delaware and Somers had given their
money and their services from a disinterested wish to advance the cause of
colonisation. But we may be sure that the majority of the members of the
Company looked on their contributions as an investment, and grew disheartened
as it became more and more clear that the colony must for many years be a
source of unprofitable outlay. Delaware frankly told them that such settlers as
had been sent out, sickly, unprincipled and debauched, “ ill-provided for
before they come and worse governed when they are here,” were not the material
for a successful colony. The members of the Company seriously thought of
relinquishing the enterpi’ise as beyond their powers. Gates however returned
with
accounts of the natural resources of the colony so enthusiastic that the
energy of the shareholders was reawakened. A fresh expedition was sent out
under Sir Thomas Dale, who was appointed High Marshal of Virginia. Dale’s one
experience of public life was as a soldier in the Netherlands; and he came to
Virginia authorised to administer a military code of appalling severity. In
June, 1611, Delaware left the colony. He was replaced by Gates; and in the
interregnum Dale acted as governor, drilling the colonists into thrift and
industry with such merciless severity as to provoke an insurrection, which was
promptly and severely quelled. In August, 1611, Gates returned with a
reinforcement of three hundred emigrants. He moved the settlers from Jamestown
to a more secure and wholesome site, where a town called Henrico, with brick
houses, a church, and a hospital, was built. A fresh plantation was established
further inland and guarded with a palisade. Henceforth, to whatever hardships
and dangers the colony might be exposed, there was no thought of departure or
dispersion.
It is clear too, though no precise statistical details can be had, that
the colony was now attracting a different and a better class of emigrants,
independent landholders exporting their own servants, and freemen living by the
labour of their own hands. Thus by 1619, the governor, George Yeardley, a
liberal-minded and humane man, though, as it would seem, a little apt to err on
the side of laxity, ventured to summon a representative assembly. Each
plantation and each of the counties into which the colony was divided returned
two members. But it is not clear what constituted a plantation, nor who enjoyed
the franchise. The assembly took upon itself certain judicial business; but its
chief occupation was to pass, not a code of laws, but a system of regulations
adapted to the special wants of the colony and supplementing the common law of England
under which they lived. Meanwhile it is clear that a new spirit was at work
within the Company. The control of its affairs was passing into the hands of
men of wide social and political interest such as Shakespeare’s friend the Earl
of Southampton, John Ferrars the founder of Little Gidding, and Sir Edwin
Sandys. Under them the affairs of the colony were administered with great
energy and with a view rather to its ultimate prosperity than to immediate
profit. Silk and iron were manufactured, and an attempt was made to cultivate
vines.
In spite of the increased prosperity of the colony, it was urged against
the Company that whereas more than five thousand persons had gone to Virginia,
there were less than a thousand inhabitants, and that either there had been
heavy mortality or many settlers had returned. The Company was tom asunder by
internal dissensions; and an influential party was formed against Sandys,
Southampton and Ferrars. The King looked with suspicion and jealousy on the
power and independent attitude of the Company; and the abuse of monopolies had
made public
opinion distrustful of everything which savoured of commercial privilege.
Meanwhile the government of Spain was watching the progress of the colony with
jealous vigilance, and using whatever influence it possessed at the English
Court for the overthrow of the Company.
In 1623 the King, acting under the advice of the law-officers of the
Crown, demanded from the Company a surrender of its charter. This was refused.
Thereupon a writ of quo warranto was issued, requiring the Company to justify
its privileges as being for the public good. This, in the judgment of the Court
before which the case was tried, they failed to do; and the charter was
declared null and void. Liberal and public- spirited though the policy of the
Company was in its later days, and little justice as there was in its
overthrow, yet in all likelihood the colony was a gainer. The rule of a trading
company in England must have fettered the free growth of the colony and sacrificed
the permanent welfare of the planter to the temporary advantage of the
merchant.
Meanwhile the colony had passed through a serious danger. At the outset
the relations with the savages had been cordial. This was largely due to the
personal influence of the Indian Chief, Powhatan, who was attached to Smith and
whose daughter Pocahontas married an English husband and visited England. But
in 1618 Powhatan died. His brother and successor Opechancanough had no friendly
feeling to the whites. As so often happened, a personal quarrel between a
savage and a settler kindled the flame. Fortunately an Indian convert gave
warning; and an assault, which might have well-nigh extinguished the colony,
ended in the loss of three hundred and seventy English. Persistency in attack,
especially against anything like a fortified place supplied with fire-arms, was
not in the nature of the savage; and the outbreak soon spent its force and
subsided.
With the extinction of the Company the appointment of the governor and
council devolved unchallenged, one may almost say of necessity, on the Crown.
Thus the constitution assumed that form which henceforth became the normal type
for British colonies, of a governor and two chambers, one nominated and one
popularly elected. The economy of the colony soon put on that special form
which it permanently retained. Those varied industries which the Company had
endeavoured to foster came to nothing : tobacco became the one staple product
of the country. The rapidity with which this article superseded all others was
due to two special causes, over and above the natural aptitude of the soil.
Intersected as the colony was with broad tidal rivers and creeks, water-
carriage was brought readily to the door of every planter. He was therefore not
controlled in the matter of exports and imports by any difficulties of
carriage. Every planter had his own landing-stage, and was thus, without any
elaborate machinery of warehouses or middlemen, brought into direct contact
with the trade of the mother-country. The system of industry was already
becoming that of the slave-gang. It is
obvious that, since slave labour is unsk’Jled and unintelligent, the
employer would so far as possible confine it to one product; while the
cheapness of land absolved the farmer from the necessity of maintaining a
rotation of crops. So completely did tobacco establish itself as the staple
commodity of the colony that it soon became the recognised medium of exchange.
Between the dissolution of the Virginian Company and the outbreak of the
Civil War in England, two events, of sufficient importance to deserve mention,
broke the even course of Virginian history. In religious matters the colony, as
a whole, conformed to the opinion of its founders, who belonged to the Church
of England. But there was a sprinkling of Dissenters, and by 1642 they formed
the whole or nearly the whole of the inhabitants of three parishes. These
congregations applied to Boston, the intellectual centre of American
Puritanism, for ministers, and three were sent. The majority, alarmed at this,
passed a law requiring conformity to the Book of Common Prayer; and, as a consequence,
the Puritan congregations dispersed and disappeared.
In 1644, the year in which the above-mentioned law was passed, the colony
underwent a second attack from the Indians. The onslaught was well concerted
and secret, and three hundred settlers perished. Twenty years before such a
blow would have been regarded as well-nigh fatal. Contemporary references,
though scanty, show that the colonists, with their increased numbers and
resources, now held such an attack cheap. The war dragged on for two years, and
was brought to an end by the death of Opechancanough. Between his successor and
the English a formal treaty was drafted, fixing a boundary which no one of
either race might cross without a passport. After that the land had peace for
thirty years.
Virginia has been described as a cavalier colony, connected by origin
with the class of great landowners. As a matter of fact, it may be safely
alleged that the colonists mostly came from what may be called the upper middle
class, the smaller landed gentry, with a leaven of the well-to-do trading
classes. That being so, it was fairly certain that in the Civil War there would
be nothing like unanimity of sympathy among the settlers; and so it clearly
proved. But, though men differed, they did not hold their opinions with enough
tenacity to endanger the peace of the colony.
The action of Virginia at the outset of the war was probably determined
by the Governor, Sir William Berkeley, a frank, strenuous, blustering cavalier.
An Act was passed declaring that all commissions given by the King were valid,
and making it penal to express sympathy with the Parliament or disapproval of
the Crown. But at the first show of force by the Parliament the royalist party
collapsed. Two ships sufficed to enforce a surrender. Private rights were fully
preserved; an indemnity was granted for all past offences against the
1660-82]
9
Parliament; and those who remained loyal to the King were allowed a year
in which to arrange their affairs before leaving the colony.
As the overthrow of monarchy had been accepted in Virginia peacefully,
so was the Restoration. It was not long, however, before the colony began to
smart under the reckless prodigality of Charles II. During his exile he had
rewarded some of his followers by a huge grant of territory in Virginia,
including much that was already regularly occupied and cultivated. After the
Restoration the representatives of the colonists obtained the revocation of
that grant. But it was cancelled only to be replaced by one of wider extent and
more dangerous import. In 1672 the whole soil of the colony was granted to Lord
Arlington and Lord Culpeper with extensive proprietary rights, including powers
to exact quit-rents, nominate sheriffs and land-surveyors, and appoint clergy.
An agency was sent to England to oppose this monstrous invasion; and the
protest was received with favour. A charter was drafted which, if carried
through, would have been a document of the greatest constitutional importance,
since it contained a clause providing that the colonists could not be taxed
without the consent of their own legislature.
All this was brought to naught by an ill-timed outburst of popular fury
in the colony. Various causes were at work creating discontent. A poll-tax had
to be imposed to meet the expense of the agency. An Act was passed limiting the
right of voting to landholders and householders and thereby disfranchising
many electors. But the chief grievance of the settlers was the supineness of
Berkeley in checking and punishing outrages by the natives. At last an
enterprising young settler, Nathaniel Bacon, took up arms on his own
responsibility. For this Berkeley treated Bacon as a rebel. What followed is
somewhat obscure. For a time there seemed to be a reconciliation, and Bacon was
restored to his rank as a councillor. Then again they quarrelled. Bacon
obtained armed possession of Jamestown. Finally Berkeley prevailed. Bacon died
suddenly, with suspicions not unnatural, but probably unfounded, of poison; and
his supporters were punished with a fury and vindictiveness which excited the
displeasure of the Crown and brought about Berkeley’s dismissal.
The choice of the next two governors illustrates a danger which was
coming over colonial administration. Hitherto a colonial governorship had been
but little of a prize. The governors had all belonged to the class of wealthy
planters and had made their home in the colony. Now the official emoluments and
patronage had increased to such an extent as to offer a temptation to a needy
fortune-hunter. Lord Culpeper, who became governor in 1682, and Lord Howard of
Effingham, who followed him, were representatives of a type of whom the student
of colonial history sees a good deal too much. Culpeper was already tainted in
reputation in the eyes of the colonists as one of the recipients of that
monstrous grant which has been described above. But, fortunately for the
colony, neither he nor Howard was a man of concentrated or far-reaching
purpose. By jobbery, and by devising new imposts for the benefit of himself and
his creatures, Howard inflicted financial injury on individuals. The liberty of
the colony as a whole did not suffer at his hands. There was indeed one
exception. Howard claimed and secured for the governor and council what had
hitherto been vested in the whole Assembly, the right of appointing the
secretary to that body. This however was fully compensated by an advantage
which the popular representatives had lately secured. At first the burgesses
and the councillors sat as one chamber—an arrangement undoubtedly to the
advantage of the council, the more permanent and united body. But ibout 1680
the burgesses acquired the right of sitting as a separate chamber.
The Revolution of 1688 was received with a tranquillity which shows how
the political life of the colony had drawn apart from that of the
mother-country. Nevertheless the triumph of Whig principles made itself felt in
Virginia. The right of self-taxation was recognised in the instructions given
to the governor. He was to “recommend” certain taxes to the Assembly. The
representatives were to be “persuaded” to pass an Act giving the governor and
council certain provisional powers of raising a duty in case of emergency.
With Howard began a system vicious in theory yet not without its
practical advantages, whereby the nominal governor was an absentee, and his
duties were discharged by a lieutenant-governor. That the office of governor
should be bestowed on a wealthy and aristocratic non-resident was beyond doubt
an abuse. A tribute was exacted from the colonists for a payment which, if made
at all, ought to have been made from the English civil-list. But one must at
least admit that honest and competent men were entrusted with what was
virtually the supreme office in the colony. Such were Francis Nicholson,
lieutenant-governor (save for a short interval) from 1690 to 1704, Alexander
Spotswood (1710 to 1722), and Robert Dinwiddie (1751 to 1758). Nicholson and
Dinwiddie were both at times violent and unconciliatory, and the former was far
from decorous in his private life. None of them sympathised with the
aspirations of the settlers after political freedom, or showed much enlightenment
in their views as to the future of the colony. But they were all hard-working
and public-spirited men, and cleanhanded in money matters, according to the
standard of their time.
THE NEW
ENGLAND COLONIES.
In the meantime Englishmen were forming other communities along the
Atlantic sea-board. Of these by far the most important, both in their original
aspect and their ultimate results, were the group known as
New England. It is the fashion to speak of “cavalier” Virginia and
“republican” New England; to regard the one as representing the aristocratic,
the other the plebeian element in English life. That is but a faint
approximation to the truth. More correct would it be to say that both mainly
represented the English middle class, the class of the yeoman and the trader,
neither being exclusively drawn from one or the other; but that natural
conditions developed in Virginia a landed aristocracy, in New England a type of
community which might either be called a wide and modified oligarchy or a
restricted and severely conditioned democracy. In Virginia power insensibly
found its way into the hands of the landholders; the great bulk of the
population, the servants and bondsmen, whether white or black, stood outside
the body politic. In the various New England colonies political rights were
fenced in by religious qualifications more or less severe; but there was
nothing which could be called a class permanently excluded from power.
Citizenship was within the reach of all.
In Virginia there was no sort of corporate union below that of the State.
A New England colony was made up of a number of smaller organisms, each with an
intensely strong sense of corporate life. In both colonies a community far
removed from the nominal centre of government, conscious of needs and
aspirations which its rulers wholly ignored or misunderstood, drifted into
half-conscious republicanism. But though the political creeds of the New
Englander and the Virginian may have been in theory much the same, they were
held in very different fashions. The Virginian might be roused by an act of
tyranny into passionate self-assertion, but he was incapable of that patient
watchfulness, that continuous and systematic building-up of barriers against
any possible encroachment which formed so large a part of the political history
of New England.
In the fullest sense the New England colonies were the offspring and
embodiment of Puritanism. The desire for a certain form of worship prompted
their formation, and certain theological beliefs and moral principles were the
underlying forces which determined their growth. Moreover it was
Congregationalism, far more than any other influence, which determined the
political form that the New England colonies were to take, and the spirit which
directed and animated that form. The Swiss religious reformers regarded the
individual Church, however small and externally unimportant, as being
potentially an independent corporation. “Hongg and Kiissnacht,” said Zwingli,
“is a truer Church than all the bishops and popes together.” In the Old World
such a view could not rise beyond the expression of a pious aspiration; in
America it became in a sense a practical truth. The antecedents of the New
Englander and his conditions of life predisposed him to republicanism; and this
republicanism easily became a reality when it found an appropriate machinery
created ready to its hand.
It will be remembered that the original Virginian Company had two
branches—one the London Company whose fortunes we have traced, the other the
so-called Plymouth Company. In 1607 the latter made an attempt to form a
colony. The first expedition, commanded by George Popham and Ralegh Gilbert,
landed at the mouth of the river Kennebec, in what is now Maine, but owing to
climate and mismanagement almost immediately failed. The Company continued to
exist, but without any of that energy and activity which marked the Virginian
branch. Vessels were sent out to fish, to trade and to explore, but nothing
further was done toward the establishment of a colony. The members of the
Company seem to have regarded themselves simply as landholders with territorial
rights and no specific obligations. In 1620 the Company was reorganised with a
new patent,' and was henceforth known as the New England Company. But the change
does not appear to have brought with it wider schemes or any increase of
energy.
Colonisation on commercial principles and mainly, though not wholly, for
motives of profit had, so far, failed in one instance and had won but
incomplete success in another. Now a new force was to be brought into the
field. In 1593 a congregation of Independents in London fled to Amsterdam in
order to avoid the restrictions and penalties imposed by the English government
on their worship. The results of the Hampton Court Conference made matters look
even more gloomy for Nonconformists; and two other congregations fled to the
Low Countries, one in 1606 from Scrooby, the other somewhat earlier from
Gainsborough. It is with the former of these two that we have to deal. Their wanderings,
their arrival in America, their early hardships and their later prosperity have
been told by one of their chief members, William Bradford, with almost
unsurpassable force, dignity, and candour.
The refugees did not find the Low Countries altogether an acceptable
home, mainly owing to a coarseness and dissoluteness of life, not to be
wondered at in a country which had so long been the battle-ground of Western
Europe. After some five or six years the leaders of the party began to think of
a home beyond the Atlantic, where the members of the little flock might
preserve their nationality as Englishmen and their separate individuality as a
Church. After some deliberation as to the site for the colony it was decided to
enter into negotiations with the Virginia Company. To this end two
representatives were sent to England. In anticipation of possible opposition
from the Crown, they were armed with a document in which their attitude to the
civil power was set forth under seven heads. The document was an admission of
the supremacy of the State in religious matters. We can hardly doubt that the
concessions made in this document went beyond what a Puritan congregation would
have been prepared to make if they had intended to remain in England. At the
same time it may be taken as indicative of what we shall find abundantly
proved, namely, the conciliatory and
acquiescent character of the Puritanism of Plymouth as distinguished from
the militant and aggressive type of Puritanism which animated the later
settlement of Massachusetts. “Pilgrim Fathers” is a wholly appropriate term as
describing the Plymouth settlers: we miss a significant distinction if we apply
it to their successors.
The poverty of the refugees was a difficulty which had to be surmounted.
To this end the delegates entered into negotiations with certain London
traders, who were, in modem language, to “finance” the colony and to receive in
return all profits accruing after provision had been made for the subsistence
of the settlers. This was to last for seven years: then the partnership was to
be dissolved and the stock sold. The choice of a site for the settlement caused
no little difficulty. Some of the London partners wished to settle under the
Plymouth Company, not that of Virginia. Some of the intended colonists proposed
Guiana. Then a project was started for settling on the territory of the Dutch
West India Company. This last design was disapproved by the States General; and
the agreement with the Virginia Company was ratified. Finally, as we shall see,
the site of the colony was determined not of deliberate choice but by chance.
In August, 1620, after various mishaps and delays, the emigrants, one
hundred in number, sailed from Plymouth in that historic vessel called the
Mayflower. A stormy voyage brought them to a point far north of the Virginia
Company’s territory. The ship-master was ordered to sail south-west, but he
disobeyed orders, and, as the pilgrims thought, of deliberate treachery, landed
them in Cape Cod Harbour.
Owing to the various delays in sailing and the length of the voyage the
emigrants had to face the winter unprepared. Their sufferings were great, and
deaths were not a few. In similar circumstances Popham’s settlers had despaired
and fled; but the Plymouth pilgrims were strong in religious faith, and in the
sense of a divine mission. Happily too, whereas Popham’s colony had to face a
winter of exceptional severity, the first winter passed by the Pilgrim Fathers
was peculiarly mild. Fortunately for the colonists, their relations with the
natives were from the outset friendly. Edward Winslow, one of the leading men
in the colony, had some knowledge of medicine, and saved the neighbouring
Indian chief when his life was despaired of; and the Indians in their gratitude
befriended the settlers and instructed them in the cultivation of maize.
The alliance with the London merchants proved unsatisfactory. They looked
exclusively or mainly to their own pecuniary gain, not to the permanent welfare
of the community. Thus the colonists were glad to make an arrangement whereby,
in 1627, the interests of the London partners were transferred to six of the
chief settlers. The bargain bore hard on the settlers for the time being, but
they were more than compensated by the increase of independence.
At the outset the system of industry was purely communal. The
14
land was tilled jointly; the live-stock was the property of the whole
community; and the settlers worked under the control of the governor. This was
so far modified in 1623 that each household was allotted a patch of com-land.
But in 1627, concurrently with the dissolution of partnership, there was a
division of land and live-stock. The community thus assumed, not, we may be
sure, as the result of conscious imitation but through circumstances, the form
of an agricultural community in the Middle Ages. Each household had its own
plot of arable land; the grass land was in two portions: one was the waste
where all freeholders had equal enjoyment of the common pasturage; on the other
individuals had temporary rights of occupancy. The material prosperity of the
colony was well shown by the fact that, so early as 1625, they were able to
produce surplus corn, which they sold to the neighbouring Indians.
In a little community consisting of one town, the term “constitution”
seems almost inappropriate. Laws were passed by the whole body of freemen. They
elected a governor and a committee of seven, called assistants, who transacted
such judicial and executive business as there was. The first governor was
William Carver, chosen on landing. He died before a year was out, and was
succeeded by William Bradford, who has already been mentioned as the historian
of the colony. He held office till his death in 1657, with some few intervals of
a year each, all of his own seeking. Fortunate indeed it was for the colony to
command the services of one so fully and so deservedly trusted and beloved. The
necessity for more complete political machinery was forced upon the colony by
its expansion. By 1630 two new townships had been established. A representative
Assembly was then formed of delegates from the three towns. In theory both the
primary Assembly of the whole body of freemen and the Court consisting of the
governor and assistants still existed. In practice the functions of the
Assembly were transferred to the delegates; and thus there came into existence,
by a natural process of development, a bi-cameral legislature with a governor
at its head.
Before this time another colony had come into existence in the
neighbourhood of Plymouth, far more numerous and wealthy, and more
representative of the essential spirit of English Puritanism. Plymouth
represented Puritanism distressed and struggling; Massachusetts represented it
vigorous and aggressive. The creation of Massachusetts was, more than most
things of human contrivance, deliberate and preconceived. Yet even here several
of the steps were fortuitous, the result of failures dexterously utilised.
While Plymouth was slowly working its way to prosperity, other scattered
plantations sprang up along the shore of New England, most of them under grants
from the North Virginia Company. Some came
into conflict with Plymouth ; some disappeared or were absorbed; some, as
we shall see, became independent colonies. None had directly any lasting
influence on the Puritan colonies of New England. They were in truth rather
factories or stations for trade and fishing than regular colonies. For the
present we are only concerned with one of these.
In 1623 some Dorchester traders started a fishing venture with a
permanent station at Cape Anne in Massachusetts Bay. In 1626 they abandoned it
as a failure, but left a foreman with some cattle on the spot. One of the
company, John White, incumbent of Dorchester and a man of Puritan leanings, saw
the possibility of building on this slight foundation. He and others who
thought with him set forth their view in pamphlets. From these it is clear that
their schemes were at once more daring and more far-reaching than those of the
Plymouth settlers. The Plymouth settlers were fugitives fleeing to the
wilderness from the hardships of the Old World. White and his associates were
deliberately establishing a refuge where Puritanism, and those political views
which were so closely bound up with Puritanism, might flourish and react upon
the religious and political life of the mother-country.
In 1629 six partners, men of influence in the Puritan party, obtained
from the New England Company a grant of land. They already possessed a
fishing-station at Cape Home in Massachusetts Bay. This station, one of the
partners, Roger Endicott, was at once sent out to occupy and develop. His
encounter with a disreputable squatter named Morton, who had erected a maypole,
the overthrow of the pole and the monition administered to Morton, form a
dramatic incident, fitly regarded as symbolical of the new force brought to
bear on English colonisation.
In March, 1629, a step of the greatest importance had been taken. A royal
charter was obtained, incorporating the Governor and Company of Massachusetts
Bay. One noteworthy feature of the charter was that it did not tie down the
Company to hold its meetings in England. Thus it was easy to transfer what was
in form an English trading Company into something like a self-governing colony.
The next step was to establish a government resident in America and nominally
subordinate to the Company, consisting of a governor, deputy-govemor, and a
council of twelve.
In 1629 a fleet was sent out with 350 emigrants, three ministers of
religion, and an abundant supply of live-stock. Later in the same year an
important change was made. The whole interest of the Company was transferred to
ten persons, all concerned in the prosperity of the future colony, while at the
same time the management of affairs was transferred to America. With that the
Company, as a body distinct from the colony, disappears. The choice of a
governor fell on John Winthrop, a Suffolk squire forty-three years old, a
graduate of Cambridge with some legal training. Cast in the same mould and
trained in much the same school as Hampden, Winthrop represented all that was
noblest
and most attractive in Puritanism. His definiteness of mind and his
constructive statesmanship were invaluable to a young colony, while his moderation,
humility, and sweetness of temper enabled him to work with men of a narrower
and more austere cast and to modify what might have been evil in their
influence.
Some of Endicott’s settlers had already established themselves in a
settlement to which they gave the name which it retains, Charlestown. Winthrop
and his company joined them. But Winthrop soon moved to Boston. The colonists
were not, like those of Plymouth, kept together by dread of the natives; and
within a year eight small settlements had sprung up along Boston Bay. Such a
dispersion made some system of representation necessary, if the colony was to
preserve its unity and its liberties. In 1632 delegates from the various towns
met to settle a question of taxation. Two years later this developed into the
creation of a regular representative body, which, with the governor and
assistants, made up the legislature of the colony.
Two other measures were so far-reaching in their effect on the
development of Massachusetts that they deserve special mention. In 1631 it was
enacted that no one might be a freeman unless he belonged to a Church; that is,
unless he accepted a complex theological creed and conformed to an exacting
system of morals and devotion. In 1635 this principle was carried further by an
Act which required the same qualification before a man could vote at a
town-meeting. In the following year the rights of such meetings were determined
by an Act conferring on townships the right to divide their land, to elect
constables and surveyors, and to impose fines up to twenty shillings. This
system of exclusiveness was not to be enforced without strife; and the early
history of Massachusetts records a long series of ejections, mainly on
theological grounds, though in some cases moral considerations came in and
supplied a justification.
So early as 1629, while Endicott was provisionally in power, he had
expelled two brothers, John and Samuel Browne, prominent members of the
Council, because, being dissatisfied at the disuse of the Book of Common Prayer,
they had collected a congregation and read the Church of England service.
Morton, already mentioned, and another profligate named Gardiner, were banished
; but their moral character was such that it would be unfair to set them down
as victims of persecution, though probably the guilt of the parties was
enhanced by their non-conformity with the dominant creed. But in 1631 and 1632
we read of punishment inflicted in two cases for speaking evil of the
government, once for threatening to appeal to the Crown.
There was probably nothing in the character of any of these victims to
call for any special sympathy. The evil lay in the principle of action, not in
the application of it. But orthodoxy was soon to find more important victims.
In 1631 there came to the colony a brilliant,
energetic and attractive young Welshman, Roger Williams. Soon after his
landing he was chosen minister of Salem. It is clear that his gifts were marred
by that imperfect sense of proportion which makes a man fight with as much asperity
for trifles and formalities as for vital questions. He differed as widely from
the orthodox school of New Massachusetts as they did from the Church of
England. He held in an extreme form the doctrine, utterly repudiated by Puritan
teachers as a whole, that the secular power must not control or in any way
meddle with religion. He was not inaptly called by one of his opponents, “a
haberdasher of small questions against the power.” Beside denying the authority
of the colonial government in the sphere of religion, he seemed likely by his
ill-timed zeal to embroil the colony with the Crown. He denied the validity of
the charter, on the ground that the King of England had no right to grant away
the territory of the Indian. Moreover, at his instigation, Endicott mutilated
the royal ensign by cutting the cross out of the flag used by the local
train-band at Salem.
In October, 1635, Williams was brought before the General Court of the
colony, and, refusing to retract, was banished. He left the colony, and proceeded
with a party of some twenty disciples to form a settlement to the south in
Narragansett Bay. The Court, deeming this a dangerous proceeding, strove to
arrest him, but failed. His success as the founder of a new colony will come
before us again.
The rulers of Massachusetts had good reason for wishing to avoid being
committed to anything like an unprovoked declaration of disloyalty.
Massachusetts was endangered by the hostility of those who had suffered from
the severity of her government and of those who saw in her existence a menace
to civil and religious order. In 1633 the three chief members of the Company in
England were brought before the Privy Council and interrogated as to the
conduct of the colony. Next year emigrants to New England were required to take
the oath of allegiance and to promise conformity with the Prayer-book. In the
same year a royal commission of twelve, with Laud at its head, was appointed to
administer the affairs of the colonies. So alarmed were the settlers at these
tidings that they appointed military commissioners and made provision for
fortifying Dorchester, Charlestown, and Castle Island in Boston Bay.
So far the authorities of the colony had only been brought into conflict
with individuals. Their next strife was one of a different kind, one which
seemed to threaten civil and ecclesiastical disruption. In 1635 the colony
received a notable recruit in Henry Vane. In the following year there came to
Boston a clergyman, John Wheelwright, who had been silenced in England, and with
him his sister, Mrs Hutchinson, an acute and singularly resolute woman with a
passion for theological controversy. The brother and sister taught doctrines
whose divergence from the accepted creed can only be understood after a careful
study of Calvinistic theology; and a violent strife ensued. Vane, who had
been elected governor in 1636, took the part of the new-comers. Finally,
however, the party of Wheelwright and Mrs Hutchinson proved to be the minority
and therefore the heretics. After two years of wrangling they were silenced and
banished.
Along the coast of Massachusetts the proportion of fertile soil to
habitable area is but small, and consequently, as the community throve and
grew, the inhabitants began to consider the question of expansion. The pastures
along the rich valley of the Connecticut offered a tempting home. The
legislature of Massachusetts at first opposed the movement. Local compactness
was almost an essential condition of that intense spirit of unity and minute
State-control at which Massachusetts aimed. But material considerations
outweighed these feelings. The emigration to Connecticut was complicated by the
fact that the district in question was already claimed by one party and
partially occupied by another. In 1631 Lord Saye and Sele, Lord Brook and
others had obtained from the New England Company a grant of land along the
Connecticut. As they were of the Puritan party, this grant was not likely to
act as a practical bar to emigration from Massachusetts. But it made it almost
certain that, whatever wishes the legislature of Massachusetts might express,
or whatever conditions they might impose, the colony when formed would be a
separate body.
In 1633 a party from Plymouth had already established themselves, not
without opposition from the Dutch, in the Connecticut valley. Two years later a
party of emigrants from Dorchester entered the valley. A dispute with the
settlers from Plymouth followed; but terms were arranged, and the Dorchester
men were left in possession. Soon afterwards a small party, sent out by the
patentees, were, according to their own story, also driven out by the men of
Dorchester. It was fortunate for the peace of New England that the aims and
views of the Connecticut patentees were virtually identical with those of the
rulers of Massachusetts. The choice by the former of Winthrop’s son John as
governor of their district was a further guarantee. Massachusetts allowed the
secession to become complete ; and in 1638 three townships in the Connecticut
valley formally declared themselves a commonwealth with a constitution similar
to that of Massachusetts. In one point of great importance the constitution of
Connecticut differed from that of Massachusetts. No religious test was imposed
upon freemen. The more liberal spirit thus shown remained a characteristic of
Connecticut during the whole of the colonial period.
The settlement of Connecticut involved New England in its first Indian
war. The country near Boston Bay had been depopulated not long before the
arrival of the settlers by a pestilence, followed after 1630 by an outbreak of
small-pox. Whether attacked or attacking, blameless or culpable, some isolated
trader was almost always at the
bottom of trouble with the savages. First of all, in 1633, a Virginian
ship’s captain named Stone was killed near the mouth of the Connecticut river.
Two years later John Oldham, a trader who had previously given trouble to the
authorities at Plymouth, was murdered. Neither Stone nor Oldham was a man of
good character; and it may well be that they provoked their fate. Tha former
outrage was set down to the score of the Pequods, the latter to that of the
Narragansetts—two tribes whose mutual relations were unfriendly. The murder of
Oldham was avenged by Massachusetts in a raid which made little discrimination
between the guilty and the innocent. The punishment for this fell, not where it
was deserved, on Massachusetts, but on the weaker colony of Connecticut.
Desultory slaughter of settlers went on, and communication with the coast
became impossible. Worst of all, tidings reached the English that the Pequods
and Narragansetts were about to join hands. There was one man in New England,
the exile Roger Williams, who knew how to earn the good-will. and confidence of
the savages. Forgetting his grievances he went as an ambassador to the
Narragansetts and secured their neutrality.
Connecticut naturally turned for help to Massachusetts and Plymouth. The
rulers at Boston were too busy persecuting Mrs Hutchinson and her associates to
give heed to aught else; the men of Plymouth had been exasperated by the
grasping policy of Massachusetts in matters of trade and refused to cooperate.
Connecticut had to rely on her own courage and soldiership; and happily these
qualities did not fail her. A force of ninety men was raised; and an old
soldier trained in the Netherlands, John Mason, was placed at their head.
Mason’s original intention was to make straight inland against the Pequods.
With the intuition of real military genius, he at the last moment changed his
plan and by a forced march fell upon the flank of the Pequods and assailed
their chief fort. The defenders had a vast superiority in numbers; but bows and
arrows were profitless against firearms and corslets. It is said that six
hundred Pequods fell, and only two English, though of the latter more than
one-fourth were wounded. The slaughter was no doubt merciless; but the
conditions of savage warfare make forbearance impossible. The few scattered
bands that remained made but slight resistance ; and the Pequods ceased to
exist as an independent nation.
When Roger Williams was banished from Massachusetts he purchased from the
Indians a tract on the mainland. This in 1636 he shared with twelve other
householders, forming a settlement which he named Providence. In four years the
growing colony formed a second township; and a simple form of government was
instituted. Five “select men” were to transact all executive business, while
the whole body of freemen were to hold quarterly meetings and to settle any judicial
questions that might arise. About the same time some of those who had been
banished from Massachusetts with Mrs Hutchinson purchased the island of
Aquednok, opposite to Providence. Their constitution was even simpler
than that of Providence, since they had no “select men,” but only a judge,
William Coddington. In 1639 this settlement divided. The original settlers
moved to Newport, and the island was shared between the two townships. In 1640
they reunited, and then a regular government was introduced, with two
assistants chosen from each township.
In 1637 another colony was formed, which practically secured to the
English race the whole sea-board from the Kennebec to Long Island. The man who
had the chief hand in bringing this about was Theophilus Eaton, a leading man
in the Baltic Company. As agent for that Company he had sojourned abroad, and
had subsequently acted as English ambassador in Denmark. He was accompanied by
men of better station and larger means than the generality of emigrants to New
England. They established themselves at the mouth of the Quinipiac river, south
of the Connecticut. It is noteworthy that neither they nor the settlers at
Providence and Aquednok secured any title except by purchase from the Indians.
This illustrates the fashion in which New England was, as it were spontaneously
and half unconsciously, emancipating itself from the control of the
mother-country. Of all the Puritan settlements, this most definitely and
uncompromisingly asserted a religious basis for civil society. Not only were
the rights of a freeman limited to Church members, but, when the community met
to frame a constitution the minister, Davenport, preached a sermon in which he
formally laid down the doctrine that Scripture is a perfect and sufficient rule
for the conduct of civil affairs.
As the community consisted of a single township no system of
representation was at first necessary. The executive power was vested in an
elected governor and four assistants. The town received the name of New Haven.
Other settlements soon came into existence in the neighbourhood, at first, like
New Haven, independent townships. The advantages of union however soon became
manifest, and what a Greek would have called a process of synoiJcismos took
place. The exact steps are not recorded, but by 1643 New Haven was a colony
with five townships and a representative system. The founders of New Haven
were, in comparison with their neighbours, wealthy men; and the town at the
outset impressed visitors from Massachusetts with a sense of its dignity and
even luxury. This however was short-lived; and, before the colony had existed
ten years, there were symptoms of commercial decline.
Though Puritanism was the dominant influence in bringing about the
settlement of New England, yet we are not to suppose that it was the only one.
New Hampshire, like New Haven, was formed by a process of consolidation out of
a number of small independent settlements, some of them founded by men who
were by no means in sympathy
with the dominant Puritanism of Massachusetts. The most noteworthy of
these men were Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason. They, with certain
other associates, founded a body called the Laconia Company, which obtained a
grant of land at the mouth of the Piscataqua. There they set up trading houses
not altogether without success, and made some fruitless attempts to discover
mines. Mason seems himself to have been liberal and energetic, and to have
spent money freely in furnishing his colony with the needful equipment.
In 1635 the territory in question was divided between Gorges and Mason,
Gorges taking the northern moiety, Mason that next to Massachusetts. On this
Mason appears to have bestowed the name of New Hampshire. It will be convenient
to use this name; but it must be remembered that it had as yet only a
territorial signification, and that it was not till later that it designated a
political community. Mason died soon after 1635. His heirs made no attempt to
carry on his work, and the colonists were left to take care of their own
interests.
There were at this time two settlements in occupation of the district
over which Mason had proprietary rights. One, near the mouth of the river
Piscataqua, had been founded by David Thompson, an independent settler who had
originally established himself in Boston Bay, but had withdrawn when Winthrop
and his associates occupied that district. This had served as the nucleus of
the colony formed by the Laconia Company. The other settlement was fifteen
miles up the river at Cocheco, on land acquired by certain Bristol and
Shrewsbury merchants. In 1633 they transferred their interest to Lord Saye and
Sele and Lord Brook, with the result that an Independent congregation
established itself there. Subsequently many of those who were driven from Massachusetts
after the great religious strife found their way into New Hampshire. Some
joined the settlers at Cocheco or, as it was now called, Dover; the others
formed a settlement called Exeter further south. Shortly after this a
settlement called Hampton was formed in the same neighbourhood under the
jurisdiction of Massachusetts. The men of Exeter protested against this as an
intrusion on their territory, but the protest went unheeded.
It was soon evident that the best thing which could befall these settlements
was incorporation with Massachusetts. Separate agreements were drawn out in
each case; and the three townships of Piscataqua, Dover, and Hampton became
part of Massachusetts, retaining certain rights of local government more
extensive than those enjoyed by the other townships of that colony.
The territory assigned to Gorges went through much the same history as
that of Mason. In addition to his territorial grant from the New England
Company, Gorges obtained a charter of proprietorship from the King (1639). On
the strength of this he drafted a grotesquely elaborate constitution, with more
offices than there were citizens to fill
22
[1626-47
them. All that resulted was two small settlements, one at Agamenticus,
afterwards York, the other at Saco. At the same time other independent
settlements sprang up within the proper limits of Gorges’ patent. The New
England Company, through carelessness and imperfect surveying, made many
conflicting and overlapping grants of land. This had a very important effect on
the future history of New England, since it was by annexing these that
Massachusetts acquired its control over Maine.
The foundation of Connecticut and New Haven brought New England into
contact with the settlements of another civilised power. In 1626 the Dutch West
India Company had established a settlement, which extended up the valley of the
Hudson and on to Long Island. The settlement, as a whole, bore the name of New
Netherlands: the chief town, on Manhattan Island, was called New Amsterdam.
This colony enjoyed nothing like the highly organised civic life of New
England, nor even that of Virginia. It was at first little more than a trading
station, with a scattered community of farmers attached to it, holding under
non-resident landowners. The governor had almost despotic power: such control
as was enjoyed by the citizens was doled out grudgingly by instalments and
fenced in by checks which rendered it well-nigh valueless. The community
depended largely on the Indian fur-trade. This and its paucity of numbers made
it needful to secure the good-will of the savages, or, in default of that, to
overawe them; yet the rulers of the colony and the Dutch settlers were
conspicuously wanting in the capacity to do either. Nor was the colony happy in
its governors. Peter Stuyvesant, who succeeded to office in 1647, was by far
the best. He was brave, pious, and disinterested, but an austere martinet,
utterly without that sympathy and flexibility needed in one who has to govern a
young and expanding community. Between New Netherlands and New England there
could not but be mutual jealousy. Before Connecticut became an organised
community, there were quarrels between English and Dutch traders in the
Connecticut valley. It was the settled policy of the English to press on
southward and to occupy the land to which the Dutch made a de jure claim under
their patent from the States-General. To this local source of strife was added
another from abroad. Englishmen had been deeply impressed by the unscrupulous slaughter
of their countrymen by the Dutch at Amboyna (1626); and it was not surprising
if the next generation believed that the Dutch were capable of inciting the
Indians to attack the New England settlements. Every movement which suggested
the possibility of such an attempt was viewed with suspicion and alarm.
Thus a combination of motives, desire for religious and political unity,
dread not only of Dutch and Indian attacks but of encroachment by the British
government, and the want of machinery for deciding territorial disputes, all
seemed to force upon the settlers the need for
some union between the various colonies. Negotiations for a federal union
began in 1638, but it was not till 1643 that a confederation was actually
formed. It included the four colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Haven,
and Plymouth. The settlers at Aquednok and Rhode Island more than once applied
for admission, but were refused. This was reasonable enough, since their
political status was wholly different from that of any of the four constituent
members. The affairs of the confederacy were to be managed by eight
commissioners, two from each colony. Each colony was to make a contribution
proportionate to its population, to be levied as seemed good to itself.
There were two obviously weak points in this system. The largest colony,
Massachusetts, contributed more than the other members of the confederacy, but
it neither possessed a larger share of control nor derived more benefit from
the union than the rest. This begat a sense of injustice, which constantly
showed itself in arrogant and high-handed treatment of the other confederates.
Moreover the federal government had no means of acting directly on the
individual citizens. They remained wholly and exclusively citizens of their own
colony. The confederation was in fact no more than a permanent league. It is
significant as showing how far the colonies had already learnt to regard
themselves as independent communities, that throughout the business of
confederation there was no reference to the government at home.
The natural ascendancy of Massachusetts, an ascendancy due to her
superior numbers and resources and in no way softened by the manner in which it
was used, soon made itself felt. Two Frenchmen were engaged in dispute over the
governorship of the province of Acadia; one, Charles de la Tour, turned to
Massachusetts for help. It was given, though in a half-hearted and ineffectual
fashion, without any consultation with the other federated colonies, and in
clear violation, if not of the letter, at least of the spirit of the federal
constitution. Subsequently De la Tour applied to Plymouth, and was promised,
though it is not certain whether he received, support. The proceedings of the
two colonies were implicitly though not formally condemned by a resolution of
the federal commissioners, to the effect that no federated colony should allow
its subjects to volunteer in any cause unless with the approval of the
commissioners. A few years later, it was rumoured abroad that the Dutch were
stirring up one of the native tribes, the Nyantics, against the English. In
1653 seven of the eight commissioners actually voted for declaring war on the
Dutch and their supposed allies. One commissioner only, Bradstreet, stood fast
for peace; his colony supported him, and their influence prevailed. Again, in
the following year, although Massachusetts actually consented to make war on
the Nyantic Indians, yet the half-hearted spirit in which, under a
Massachusetts captain, the campaign was conducted, gave rise
to grave suspicion and dissatisfaction. In fact it became abundantly
evident that the ascendancy of Massachusetts was fatal to all those purposes
for which a confederation exists.
The chief events which befell New England during the time of the Commonwealth,
besides those already mentioned, were the incorporation of Rhode Island, the
annexation of Maine by Massachusetts, and the dealings of the colonists with
the Quakers.
Though the settlements on the mainland founded by Roger Williams, and
those on the Aquednok founded by Coddington, were still distinct, they were
evidently prepared for union, since in 1643 they had sent Williams to England
to act as their representative and to secure their territorial rights. This was
the more necessary, since the commissioners, in whom the Long Parliament had
vested the government of the plantations, had made a grant of territory to
Massachusetts which would have swallowed up Providence and left the island
townships isolated, Williams came back with a grant from the commissioners
incorporating Providence, Portsmouth and Newport under the title of Providence
Plantations. He also brought a letter to the government of Massachusetts
reproving them for their previous treatment of Williams and his followers, but
not abrogating the grant to Massachusetts. It was not till 1647 that the
colonies concerned combined themselves into a community. In that year they
established a General Assembly of the whole body of freemen, a governor and a
body of assistants, with a court of commissioners from the various towns for
certain limited purposes. The history of the General Assembly forms so curious
a chapter in the history of institutions that it deserves special notice. At
first it met in the various towns by rotation. Then, in 1655, a system was
introduced whereby every legislative measure was voted on in each town
separately, and lost if not carried by a majority in each. This strange and
cumbrous system held good till 1664, when the whole constitution was remodelled
and an ordinary representative assembly established. The technical name of the
colony was Providence, but it was more commonly known as Rhode Island, the name
bestowed by the English on the island of Aquednok.
We come next to Maine. The outbreak of the Civil War left Gorges little
time to attend to the affairs of his colony. He took up arms for the King,
fought and was taken prisoner at Bristol, and died soon after. In the meantime
one Edward Rigby had laid claim to the soil of Maine under an alleged grant
from the New England Company. With the consent of Gorges’ and Rigby’s agents
the dispute was referred to the government of Massachusetts, which settled the
matter, in the fashion of Solomon, by dividing the territory and allotting
three townships to each claimant. The settlers in the townships assigned to
Gorges, after two unsuccessful attempts to communicate with his heirs, took
their fate in their own hands. In 1649 the inhabitants of Maine
met and declared themselves a body politic, with an elective governor and
a council representing the different towns.
It is clear that there were in the various townships of Maine, if not a
majority, at least a substantial minority who sympathised with the religious
and political views of Massachusetts. Even those who did not must have felt
that annexation was better than the renewal of territorial disputes. The rulers
of Massachusetts were wise enough to see that, the more gradually the process
of annexation was carried out, the less chance there was of resistance or
protest. By three separate acts of surrender, made in 1651, 1653, and 1658, the
various townships of Maine, by a majority vote in each case, accepted the
authority of Massachusetts.
The treatment of Mrs Hutchinson and Roger Williams effectively disposes
of the grotesque delusion that New England was, or wished to be thought, a home
of spiritual freedom. If more complete proof were needed, it would be found in
the measure meted out to the Quakers. In 1656 two Quaker women landed at
Boston. They were at once arrested, and carefully isolated; their books were
burnt; they were themselves charged with witchcraft and in consequence brutally
handled, and after five weeks’ imprisonment were sent off to Barbados. Luckily
for them, Endicott the governor was absent, and they escaped scourging, an
omission which he regretted on his return. Scarcely were they gone when eight
more of the sect appeared and were dealt with in like fashion. The matter was
brought before the federal commissioners, who recommended that each colony
should take steps to exclude the Quakers. In this action they besought the
support of Rhode Island; but the government of that colony, with the approval
of the whole body of freemen, answered with a firm refusal, setting forth the
doctrine of freedom of conscience.
In all the New England colonies Acts were passed excluding or punishing
the Quakers; but in none except Massachusetts did they meet with greater
severity than would have been shown to clamorous heretics at that day in almost
every country of the civilised world. Even Massachusetts was not unanimous. An
Act imposing the penalty of death in cases of extreme obstinacy was only
carried after a hard struggle, by a majority, as it would seem, of two. Under
this Act three Quakers, two men and a woman, were hanged. Certain of the Boston
clergy took a leading part in demanding the stringent enforcement of severe
measures, and in defending the policy of intolerance.
The influence of the Restoration made itself felt in New England not by
specific changes in the machinery of administration, but rather by a difference
of spirit in its working. The first colony to feel this effect was New Haven.
Two of the regicides, William Goffe and Edward Whalley, had crossed to America
and landed in Boston. Thence they
fled, first to Connecticut and then to New Haven. Orders came for their
arrest. The governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut were diplomatic enough
to comply formally while they gave no real help. The governor of New Haven was
less dexterous. He succeeded in keeping the secret of the regicides’ escape,
but the nature and manner of his answer betrayed his complicity. The fugitives
themselves lived out their days in hiding, unmolested.
New Haven paid dearly for loyalty to its principles. In 1661 the younger
John Winthrop, governor of Connecticut, went to England to obtain a charter for
his colony. He had little of his father’s definiteness or force of character,
but he was genial and attractive, a man of varied interests, able to commend
himself to those who differed widely from him in religious and political views.
He succeeded in obtaining for his colony a charter of singular liberality,
which confirmed the existing system of government by governor, assistants and
deputies. But the most important point in the charter was the grant of
territory. Like the majority of such documents, the grant was confused in its
terms, but one thing was clear; it was meant to include New Haven, and the
government of Connecticut intended to enforce that view. One town, Southwold,
at once accepted the new jurisdiction: elsewhere parties were divided. The
government of New Haven protested and for a while held out; and the federal
commissioners supported them in their protest. But the determination of
Connecticut, backed by the home government, was too strong; and after three
years of bickering the union was accepted. One township alone, Brainford, stood
out; and its inhabitants emigrated in a body into the unoccupied territory near
the Delaware, bearing with them their civil and ecclesiastical records. In 1663
Rhode Island obtained from the Crown the same favour that had been granted to
Connecticut, a charter defining their boundaries and confirming their form of
government.
The Restoration gave, as might have been expected, the signal for a
series of attacks on Massachusetts on the part of those many enemies whom she
had made alike by her merits and her errors. The Quakers appeared at first to
have won a crowning triumph. A reprimand to Massachusetts for their treatment
was sent by the King and entrusted for delivery to one who had himself been
scourged and banished, with the result that all Quaker prisoners were released.
In the next year the Court of Massachusetts drew up a manifesto at once
elaborate in substance and temperate in tone, tracing the whole of their
existing political system to their original charter. This was so far successful
that the charter was confirmed, though with the restriction that the franchise
should be granted irrespective of religious opinion. The necessity of “a sharp
law” against the Quakers was admitted.
At the same time the representatives and namesakes of Gorges and Mason
were endeavouring, by petition to the Privy Council, to reassert
their territorial rights, while Ferdinando Gorges, the grandson and heir
of the founder, was taking steps to assert his authority in Maine. The Crown
did not uphold Gorges’ claim, but it suspended the question, and in 1665 set up
a provisional government in Maine of which we know but little. In 1668 the
government of Massachusetts, with the approval of the majority of the
inhabitants of Maine, reasserted its authority over that district. In 1678 it
finally extinguished Gorges’ claim by purchase; and Maine continued
incorporated with Massachusetts till after the Revolution. New Hampshire fared
differently. The law officers of the Crown decided against Mason’s territorial
claim, but at the same time ruled that the territory in question lay outside
the jurisdiction of Massachusetts. Thereupon the Crown, in 1679, created New
Hampshire a separate province with a governor, a council, and a representative
assembly. The first governor and at least one of the council were loyal
citizens of Massachusetts; and the provinces remained friendly.
The last quarter of the seventeenth century was in every way a time of
trouble for Massachusetts. Since the extinction of the Pequods there had been
only one native tribe, the Pokanchet Indians, numerous and strong enough to be
a source of danger. Their relations with the English settlers were continuously
friendly till about 1670, when they were under the leadership of an able and
warlike young chief called Metacam, better known by the English name of Philip.
For some years there were alarming rumours of Indian hostility. In 1674 an
Indian convert warned the English that there was danger. He was soon after
murdered. Suspicion fell upon Philip, who anticipated an attack by falling on
the settlements at the southern extremity of Plymouth. The settlers were
ill-prepared; and, as we have seen, the machinery for united action was
cumbrous and ineffective. Moreover the nature of an Indian invasion, as carried
on by small parties making sudden and rapid inroads, rendered combined
operations almost impossible. Every village had to become a fortified post and
fight for its own hand. In November a day of humiliation was held at Boston;
and the proceedings are instructive. The sins which had brought this calamity
on the colony were chiefly neglect of worship, extravagance in apparel, the
wearing of long hair, and lenity towards the Quakers. It is clear from the
accounts left us by one who took a conspicuous part in the war that the English
threw away no small advantage by their universal suspicion of all Indians, and
by their consequent neglect to use even those who were friendly for scouting
and irregular fighting.
When once the first rush of invasion was baffled, the superior resources
of the civilised race were certain, if numbers were anything like equal, to
secure victory. The settlers could import supplies; the savage engaged in war
must neglect his hunting and fishing, and starvation must follow. In 1676,
after nearly two years of warfare, the
Indian power was wholly broken, and Philip was hunted down and slain.
Henceforth New England never had to dread the power of the savages save as a
weapon wielded by the French rulers of Canada. The war, no doubt, brought with
it heavy loss in life and in the destruction of farm- buildings, garnered crops
and live-stock; but all these are losses which can be quickly made good in the
expansive life of a young community.
Simultaneously with this conflict an Indian war was being waged in Maine
and New Hampshire, provoked mainly by the wanton and brutal murder of an Indian
child and by the misconduct of an Englishman, who, being commissioned to arrest
some Indians charged with killing settlers, used his authority to kidnap and
sell friendly natives. This war was in every way humiliating to the English. It
was marked by at least one act of gross treachery on their part; finally they had
to buy peace by the humiliating expedient of paying a corn-tax to the savages.
New England soon found itself beset by dangers of another kind. At the
Restoration the administration of the colonies was vested in special
commissioners. In 1675 it was transferred to a committee of the Privy Council.
During those fifteen years Parliament had passed a succession of Acts making up
a definite system of restrictions on colonial trade. The chief features of the
system were that only English vessels and English subjects might trade with the
colonies; that the colonists were restricted to English ports for most of their
exports and all their imports; and that certain duties were imposed on
intercolonial trade. The duty of enforcing these regulations was vested in revenue
officers appointed in England by the Commissioners of Customs.
The newly created colonial authority at once took measures for the more
stringent enforcement of this system, and to that end sent out a special
commissioner, as he would now be called, Edward Randolph, to inquire and
report. Randolph reported specifically on the systematic violation of the
Revenue Acts by the New Englanders, and more generally on their factious and
disloyal temper. It was no doubt largely due to him that legal proceedings were
taken against the charter of Massachusetts. Agents from Massachusetts protested
and entreated in vain. In 1684 the charter was annulled by a decree of the
Court of Chancery. It seemed as if the accession of James II had brought ruin
to the constitutional rights, not only of Massachusetts, but of the whole body
of New England colonies. The King himself had experience as a colonial
proprietor, and an honest, though it might be a narrow and unintelligent
interest in colonial administration. He saw that it was of the greatest
importance to bind the colonies together for administrative and defensive
purposes, but he attempted the task in a manner which showed that he had not
the faintest sense of the difficulties with which it was beset. The whole
territory from the Delaware to the St Croix was consolidated into a single
province and placed under the governorship of Colonel Sir Edmund Andros, a man
of good private
character and
of some colonial experience, a brave soldier, and more honest than most public
men of that day, but wholly wanting in the intelligence and power of
conciliation needed for the task before him. As a staunch churchman he was
certain to be unacceptable to the people of Massachusetts.
In Rhode
Island and Plymouth, where there was no influential class tenaciously wedded to
political privilege, Andros met with little or no resistance. One township
indeed, Ipswich, refused to pay taxes levied without the consent of the
representatives. In Connecticut, when Andros presented himself and demanded the
surrender of the charter, it was refused and the document itself hidden, if
tradition be true, in an oak- tree. The struggle against Andros in
Massachusetts bore no little likeness to the proceedings of the revolutionists
eighty years later. In each case the colonists were not so much resisting
actual oppression as warring against a system under which gross oppression
would become possible. In each case popular opinion was stirred up by
exaggeration and even slander. Thus Andros, a staunch churchman and a loyal and
gallant soldier, was accused of seeking to convert the Indians to Popery and of
encouragjng them to massacre the settlers. In each case the administrators were
tactless and blundering, and by their half-hearted tyranny at once excited opposition
and failed to crush it. The parallel is incomplete in that, in the first
instance, happily for both countries, the drama was cut short by external
intervention, instead of working itself out to its natural climax; while the
encroachments planned by James and entrusted to Andros were more far-reaching
and more destructive to liberty than anything devised by George III and his
advisers.
Representation
was swept away; all administration, legislation and taxation were vested in the
governor and council. That council was, as vacancies arose, to be nominated by
the King. Moreover all sense of security in properly was overthrown by an
instruction given to Andros to require that fresh titles to land should be
taken out and paid for. There was no regular machinery left through which the
whole colony could make a formal and constitutional protest. The townsmen of
Ipswich, in their public meeting, protested against a rate levied by any
authority but an elected assembly. For this action six of the leading men were
fined and declared incapable of office; and an order was issued that no town
should hold a meeting more than once a year. Increase Mather, an Independent
minister of distinction and practical ability, was thereupon sent to England to
plead the cause of the colonists. Like Penn, he accepted as genuine that policy
of toleration whereby James was trying to win the good-will of the dissenters,
and ingratiated himself with some of the most unscrupulous of James’
supporters, though, unlike Penn, he did not pursue that policy so thoroughly
and so overtly as to forfeit the good-will of those soon to be in power.
In April,
1689, the news of William’s landing at Torbay was brought to New England by one
John Winslow, who had with him copies of the Prince’s declaration. . Andros,
instead of frankly confiding the news to the people and abiding the issue,
imprisoned Winslow for attempting to circulate seditious documents. For a
fortnight things were in suspense, the air full of vague rumours. Then the
people of Boston rose, being supported by two armed parties from the country,
one apparently at Charlestown, which was separated from Boston by a narrow
strip of water, the other at the neck which joined the town to the mainland.
Andros took refuge in the fort at the end of the town. The main part of his
troops were in the castle on an island two miles off. If Andros had been the
butcher that his enemies professed to think him he might have caused much
bloodshed. He was no coward; and the ease with which he suffered himself to be
overpowered and captured showed that he had no wish to fight the hopeless
battle of a deposed Papist. As in England, an elected convention was
established as a provisional government. In the other New England colonies
there was no need for any exercise of force. The adherents of Andros, deprived
of their head, made no attempt to carry on the work of administration; and in
each colony the pre-existing machinery of government came again, as it were
automatically, into force.
Yet the
Revolution of 1688 did not leave the constitutional life of New England
unchanged. The forfeiture of the Massachusetts charter might have been brought
about in a corrupt fashion, but it had been effected by legal process. The King
and his advisers were no doubt morally pledged to a regard for constitutional
rights and representative institutions. But it was also very certain that
William would look with more anxiety than his predecessor on the possibility of
French invasion, and would be slow to grant any privileges which would
interfere with combined resistance. Accordingly when a new charter was granted
to Massachusetts, no changes of great importance were introduced. There were to
be, as before, a governor, a council and a representative assembly. The
governor, lieutenant-governor and secretary were to be appointed by the Crown,
and all judicial and military appointments were to be vested in the governor.
The franchise was no longer limited to church-members, but granted on a
property qualification. At the same time popular rights were secured by the
provision that the council, though at the outset nominated by the Crown, was
thereafter to be chosen by the General Court, consisting of the governor,
council and house of representatives. The old religious oligarchy became a
thing of the past. Henceforth Massachusetts was an ordinary Crown colony,
enjoying constitutional rights neither greater nor less than those granted to
any such community.
Territorially
Massachusetts both gained and lost. Plymouth was incorporated with the larger
colony, apparently without any protest or
disapproval.
On the other hand one Allen, who had bought the rights of Mason’s heirs,
contrived, as it would seem through the corrupt connivance of an English
official, to get the territory of New Hampshire separated from Massachusetts.
Allen himself was appointed governor; there was to be a council nominated
partly by him, partly by the Crown, and a representative assembly elected by
the freeholders. There was no declaration to show how far this was intended to
be permanent. In the case of the other two colonies, Connecticut and Rhode
Island, the law officers of the Crown decided that the forfeiture of their
charters by James was invalid.
MARYLAND.
We must now
go back to a colony whose origin was nearly contemporary with that of
Massachusetts. In 1632 George Calvert, the first Lord Baltimore, a Roman
Catholic, received from Charles I a grant of land immediately to the north of
Virginia. He had already tried to form a settlement in Newfoundland. The severity
of the climate and the hostility of certain Presbyterians settled there led him
to give up the attempt. With his company he emigrated to Virginia. There he
fared no better. The colonial government required him to take the oaths of
supremacy and allegiance, and thereby to renounce the spiritual and
ecclesiastical authority of the Pope. Baltimore, as a peer, was exempted from
the second of these oaths; and it is doubtful whether any authority resident in
Virginia had a right to administer either. Instead of resisting, however,
Baltimore withdrew.
In the same
month in which Baltimore received the grant he died. The grant was confirmed to
his son and successor Cecilius, and was embodied in a charter giving not only
territorial but also political rights. The colony thus constituted was the
first instance in which a portion of the rights of sovereignty inherent in the
Crown was transferred to a subject. The proprietor was authorised to make laws
with the advice of the freemen or their representatives; that is to say, a
system of popular government was suggested, but so vaguely as hardly to impose
on the proprietor any definite restriction. The Crown divested itself of any
right to levy taxes within the colony. All churches and places of worship were
to be consecrated according to the ecclesiastical laws of the Church of
England. It does not appear certain what liberty of worship was left to Roman
Catholics; but we may at least say that the religion of the proprietor was
allowed only a subordinate position.
In the autumn
of 1633 Baltimore sent out three hundred emigrants under his brother Leonard,
accompanied by two priests belonging to the order of Jesus. In material matters
the colony was prosperous from the outset. It is evident that the settlers were
both well chosen and well provided. The social and industrial organisation of
the colony proceeded
on the same
lines as those of Virginia. There were small independent proprietors,, tilling
their own land, and large estate-holders working with gangs of indented servants;
and, as in Virginia, the economical advantages of the latter system virtually
crushed the former out of existence. The constitution of the colony eventually
conformed to the normal pattern with a governor and two chambers; but some
years elapsed before it definitely took that shape. As in the case of other
colonies, the primary assembly of freemen preceded a representative assembly,
and only gave way to it as the colony expanded. As elsewhere, too, the
deputies and the council sat together. The proprietor seems at first to have
claimed the right to place his own nominees on the council without any limit of
number. In 1647, however, the two chambers were separated; and the proprietor’s
right to create councillors became practically innocuous.
The relations
of the settlers with the savages were friendly; and the only hostilities in
which they were engaged were with their civilised neighbours. At the very
outset, as we have seen, there was no friendly feeling between Virginia and the
proprietor of Maryland; and events soon widened the breach. The dispute was the
first of a type which we shall meet almost continuously in colonial history, a
quarrel due to the reckless and slovenly fashion in which the English
government dealt with the soil of the New World by granting tracts with no
precise definition of boundaries, and in some cases almost openly and avowedly
making grants that overlapped. This was manifestly the case with Virginia and
Maryland. A tract of sea-coast nearly a hundred miles long was included in each
grant. The island of Kent, just off the coast, and at the northern end of the
debatable land, was a point of special importance. It was used as a trading
station by a small company of Virginian merchants, and so early as 1625
contained a hundred settlers. It was separated from the rest of Virginia by a
stretch of unoccupied territory. The utility of the island for the Indian trade
made it specially desirable to Virginia; proximity seemed to attach it
naturally to Maryland; its detached and therefore vulnerable position made it
specially important that the place should be held definitely and securely;
while the character of Claybome, the manager of the trading station,
enterprising, unscrupulous, and a strong Protestant, made it certain that the ^laima
of Virginia would be resolutely upheld. The Virginians in the first instance
appealed to the Committee of the Privy Council for the Plantations and to the
Crown, and got from both an equivocal reply. The advisers of the Crown
suggested a compromise; but it was dear that nothing was further from the
thoughts of either side. In 1635 the crews of a pinnace belonging to Claybome
and of two vessels sent out by Calvert came to blows; and lives were lost on
both sides. No decisive result was reached, and the Isle of Kent remained a
source of possible dispute till the matter became an incident in a wider
struggle.
In 1644 the
colony became entangled in the Civil War. Calvert and Ingle, an ally of
Claybome, had each received letters of marque, the former from the King, the
latter from the Parliament. Ingle and Clayboi ne then made a successful raid
into Maryland, seizing the chief settlement, St Mary’s, and putting Calvert to
flight. They failed however to hold what they had acquired. A year later
Calvert died. Baltimore showed the flexibility of his principles by appointing
as his successor one William Stone, a Protestant. He had shown the same
eclectic temper by admitting as colonists those congregations of Nonconformists
who had been banished from Virginia. The new-comers do not seem to have felt
any special gratitude to Baltimore for his tolerance, and were prepared to make
common cause against him with the inhabitants of the Isle of Kent and other
disaffected persons.
It seemed at
first as if the authority of Parliament and of the Protectorate would be
accepted in Maryland as quietly as in the other colonies. In 1652 Stone and
apparently all the settlers acknowledged the authority of the parliamentary
commissioners. The commissioners did not formally revoke Baltimore’s patent;
but they may be said to have done so implicitly by deciding that writs should
run not in his name, but in that of the authority appointed by Parliament, the
keepers of the liberties of England.
For two years
after this the commissioners remained practically the supreme authority. But in
1654 the Proprietor took advantage of the establishment of the Protectorate to
reassert his rights. His contention was that the authority of the commissioners
had lapsed, and that he, Baltimore, stood in exactly the same position towards
the Protectorate as previously towards the Crown. The commissioners at once met
this by a fresh assertion of authority. Having disfranchised all Roman
Catholics and so secured a compliant assembly, they declared that settlers
might occupy land without making any declaration of loyalty to the Proprietor.
Baltimore’s party at once resisted what would virtually involve the overthrow
of his territorial proprietorship. Stone took up arms against the
commissioners, but was defeated and taken prisoner. What Baltimore failed to do
by force he effected, however, by diplomacy. In 1656 he petitioned the
Protector for the restoration of his authority. At the same time a claim was
being made on behalf of Virginia, asserting the rights of that colony over the
territory of Maryland. The result was a compromise whereby Baltimore’s
proprietary rights were restored in full and the claims of Virginia abandoned,
while in return Baltimore granted an indemnity to those who had opposed him.
Two years
later a somewhat obscure dispute broke out. The Assembly claimed to have full
legislative rights and to be independent of all authority save that of the
Crown. They were countenanced in this, if not instigated to it, by the
governor, Josias Fendall, who in the previous disputes had acted as a partisan
of Baltimore. The time
of the
outbreak was, however, ill-chosen. Hardly had it taken place when the news of
the Restoration arrived; and the Proprietor was able to re-establish his
authority with nothing more than a show of force.
The history
of the colony under the restored Stewarts is uneventful, and it continued to
develop a social and industrial life closely resembling that of Virginia. Its
tranquillity was undisturbed save by boundary disputes, towards the end of the
period, with the newly-founded colony of Pennsylvania and with Virginia. The
Proprietor, Lord Baltimore, who had succeeded his father in 1675, also came
into collision with the home government respecting a collector of customs
appointed by the Crown, whom he first refused to assist and then illegally
imprisoned, finally conniving, at least ex post facto, in his murder. For this
action he was censured by the Privy Council.
How
completely the colony had separated itself from the creed of its founder was
shown by its action at the Revolution of 1688. In every county save one the
adherents of William and Mary asserted their authority unchallenged; and a
convention was established. There seems to have been no violence; the
Protestant majority and the adherents of the Proprietor both laid their case
before the King. William and his advisers took the reasonable view that a
settlement held by a Roman Catholic Proprietor in the very heart of the English
colonial empire must be a source of danger. The political rights of the
Proprietor were annulled, and Maryland was constituted a Crown colony, but
without any prejudice to Baltimore’s territorial position. In 1715 his son, the
fourth Lord, became a Protestant. It was therefore held that his full rights revived.
Such influence as that change had on the fortunes of the colony will come
before us at a later stage.
THE
CAROLINAS.
In
1629 Sir Robert, afterwards Chief Justice, Heath, obtained from the Crown a
grant of land to the south of Virginia, to which, out of respect to the King,
he gave the name of Carolina. Of this grant there came no practical result. In
1663 the whole land between Virginia and Florida was granted to eight
patentees, among them Lord Albemarle, Sir Anthony Ashley (afterwards Lord
Shaftesbury), and Sir William Berkeley. This grant not only gave to the
Proprietors territorial rights and political authority, but, unlike any that
had preceded it, it marlo provision, at least in an elementary form, for a
constitution, since it provided for assemblies of freeholders with legislative
powers. The settlement of Carolina was largely carried out by that indirect or,
as one may call it, secondary process of colonisation which we have already
seen at work in Connecticut. The colonists were drawn not solely, nor even
mainly, from the mother-country, but from New England, Virginia and Barbados. .
It will save
possibilities of confusion to enumerate the different settlements by which the
soil of Carolina was occupied. These were: (1) a settlement from Virginia on
Albemarle River, which became the nucleus of North Carolina; (2) a settlement
from New England near Cape Fear, which was dispersed and absorbed into (1); (3)
a settlement from Barbados, also near Cape Fear; (4) a settlement direct from
England. This last changed its habitation more than once, absorbed (3) in the
course of its wanderings, and finally grew into South Carolina. Of the settlers
from Massachusetts we know but little. At one time their condition was such
that a collection for their help had to be made in the parent colony. The
process of emigration from Virginia is equally obscure. All we know definitely
is that in September, 1663, the new Proprietors divided their province into
two, and that the northern section was already settled. The instructions given
by the Proprietors to the governor of the northern half constituted it for the
time being as something like a democracy. The elective Assembly was invested
with the appointment of officers, the establishment of law courts, and the
military defence of the colony.
In 1667 the
Proprietors of Carolina put forth a most elaborate constitution, attributed,
though on inconclusive evidence, to John Locke, who was their secretary. The
Proprietors more than once thought it worth while to modify it in form, but
they never made any serious attempt to enforce it as a working system.
Meanwhile the Assembly of the northern settlement was dealing with the needs of
the colony in a wholly practical way, by passing certain regulations which show
us what they intended the colony to be and help us to understand what it
became. For five years from its foundation no settler was to be legally liable
for any debt incurred outside the colony. No tax was to be levied on newcomers
for a year. Marriage was valid if there was a ■declaration of mutual
consent before the governor. A colony so administered might seem a paradise to
the bankrupt and the pauper. It is no exaggeration to say that the history of
North Carolina for the next fifty years is little more than a dreary and
uninstructive record of disputes and insurrections. The colony indeed seems to
have reached that chronic state of anarchy when the imprisonment and deposition
of a governor is a passing incident which hardly influences the life of the
community.
In the meantime
a province was growing up in the southern half of the territory whose life,
though it did not wholly escape the same class of disturbances as beset the
sister colony, was on the whole vigorous and prosperous. In 1670, after a
careful survey of the country, the Proprietors established a colony at
Charleston. The constitution was a liberal one, since the freemen were not only
to elect a house of xepresentatives, but also to nominate ten out of twenty
councillors.
The
instructions given by the Proprietors for the colony at Charleston
aimed at
preventing that tendency to scatter over the face of the country which marked
the growth of Virginia. Every freeholder was to have, in addition to his
country estate, a town-lot of one-twentieth the extent of his whole domain.
This foreshadowed, though it can hardly be thought to have caused, the future
development of South Carolina. Instead of a society of landholders, each living
on his own estate, it was rather a society of wealthy traders living at
Charleston and owning plantations inland. But this was due not so much to any
deliberate design on the part of the Proprietors as to natural conditions—the
existence of one first-rate harbour and the insalubrious and unattractive
character of the inland country, especially near the coast. This concentration
of the active life of the colony in Charleston had an important influence on
the political history of the colony, by checking the development of local
representation. The whole body of freemen met together at- the capital and
there elected a House of Representatives. This system was at once the result
and the reacting cause of the backwardness of the country districts. It lasted
till 1717, when the ordinary method of electing by counties was substituted.
Of the first
colonists of South Carolina only a portion came direct from England. The rest
joined at Barbados, whence also came William Sayle, the governor. This no doubt
had its effect in assimilating the life of the new colony to that of the West
Indies. In one way this had a baneful effect on the future of the colony. Under
the recognised economic conditions of that day slavery was certain to spring
up; and it was also certain that in such a climate the labouring class could
not, like that of Virginia, consist largely of white men. Only the negro or the
native could work in the climate of South Carolina. The colonists, accustomed
to impose slavery on the weak and unresisting population of the West Indies,
made a similar attempt with the Indians of the mainland, but, as might have
been foreseen, with very different results. The proximity of the Spaniard on
the southern frontier would have been in any case a source of danger. Instead
of lessening this by securing the alliance of the savages, the settlers by
repeated acts of kidnapping drove the natives into alliance with the Spaniard,
while on the other hand they incurred the great displeasure of their southern
neighbours by the encouragement which they gave to pirates. It is just to the
Proprietors- to say that they saw this danger and did their best to prevent
both these practices.
The dread of
Indian attack and Spanish invasion was probably one of the influences which
were at work to keep the settlers concentrated in Charleston. For the first
quarter of a century of its existence nothing worse befell the colony than
isolated Indian raids. But in 1701 war between Spain and England was imminent;
and the colonists heard that a Spanish captain in command of 900 Indians was on
his way to attack them. In order to anticipate the blow, James Moore, a
political
adventurer, but a man of considerable courage and capacity, was sent with 100
English and 800 Indian allies against the Spanish town of St Augustine. The
town was unfortified and fell an easy prey, and the inhabitants took refuge
with most of their property in the fort. The assailants had no siege
appliances; and, while they were sending to Jamaica for cannon, two Spanish
vessels came to the help of the besieged. Moore then withdrew with some booty.
Next year he made another raid on a somewhat larger scale and with more
success. These inroads appear to have kept the Spaniards in check for a while.
The position of Charleston, with its long tract of swamp along the southern
coast, protected it effectually against an attack by land. But in 1706 it was
assaulted by a combined French and Spanish fleet. Yellow fever broke out in the
town, and many of the inhabitants fled inland. But the governor, Sir Nathaniel
Johnstone, gallantly supported by those who remained, routed the hostile fleet
and secured 230 prisoners.
A new factor
of discord was now introduced into the life of the colony. Dissenters were a
numerous and influential part of the community ; it is even said, though this
may be doubted, that they formed a majority. In 1696 their liberty of
conscience had been secured by special enactment. Lord Granville, the Palatine,
or head of the Board of Proprietors, was one of that party of churchmen who
were trying to crush the dissenters by pressing on the Occasional Conformity
Bill. The same spirit now showed itself in the policy of the Church party among
the settlers. In 1704 they passed an Act requiring from members of the Assembly
a declaration of conformity and the reception of the sacrament. Should a
candidate refuse to qualify, a fresh writ was not issued, but the next
candidate on the list obtained the seat. The defeated party appealed to the
Crown, and the Queen vetoed the Act. The constitutional propriety of this might
be doubtful. There could be no two opinions as to its substantial equity.
It was dear
by this time that the Proprietors had given up any idea of securing organic
unity between their two provinces. Nominally indeed there was one governor for
both; but he resembled a governor of Virginia in that his connexion with the
northern province was merely titular, and the duties were discharged by a
deputy. In 1711 a dispute broke out between two claimants for this office,
Thomas Cary and Edward Hyde; and something like a little civil war followed.
Hyde prevailed and Cary fled. He appears to have made some overtures to the
Tuscarora Indians to support his cause. This may have led to what followed, an
onslaught by the Tuscaroras upon the colony. The principal destruction fell on
a settlement of refugees from the German Palatinate. South Carolina sent a
force to the assistance of her neighbours; and the Indians were, it was
supposed, brought to terms. But almost immediately after the troops had
withdrawn a fresh onslaught was made. Again
help was sent
from South Carolina. This time the work was done effectually, and the
Tuscaroras were virtually annihilated.
Scarcely was
North Carolina relieved from the dread of an Indian invasion when a similar
blow fell on the southern colony. It came from the Yamassees, an Indian tribe
in alliance with the Spaniards. In 1710 three separate bands made a concerted
onslaught on the colony, and 200 settlers fell. Happily the governor, Charles
Craven, was not only a man of vigour and courage but enjoyed to the full the
confidence and good-will of the settlers. An Indian raid might be furious, but
the temper of the savage and his lack of resources always deprived it of
endurance; and, before the year was out, the colony was again in safety. Soon
afterwards an expedition had to be undertaken against pirates. These successive
operations left the colony in no little financial embarrassment. At every turn
some cause of dispute and ill-feeling arose between the colonists and the
Proprietors. At length, in December, 1719, the Assembly formally threw off the
authority of the Proprietors and elected a governor under the Crown. The
governor, the son of Sir Nathaniel Johnstone, did his best to uphold the
authority of the Proprietors, but to no purpose. The advisers of the Crown
accepted the situation and sent out Francis Nicholson, an experienced and
fairly competent colonial official, to administer and pacify the province. In
the northern province there was no attempt on the part of the colonists to
throw off the authority of the Proprietors; but they had by this time come to
perceive clearly that it was an irksome and profitless burden, and in no way
worth retaining without the southern colony. In 1729 the Proprietors
surrendered, for an equivalent in money, the whole of their rights over the
northern province; and the two Carolinas passed into the condition of ordinary
Crown colonies.
NEW YORK AND
DELAWARE.
The Dutch
colony of the New Netherlands has been already mentioned. When in 1664 the
English government, with no adequate provocation, declared war on the United
Provinces, the one definite result was the capture of this colony. At the very
outbreak of the war Charles II granted to his brother the Duke of York the
whole territory from the Connecticut to the Delaware. Morally speaking, the
seizure was little better than a piece of buccaneering. Iu the result however
one cannot doubt the substantial advantage to all concerned. Without control
over the valley of the Hudson it would have been impossible for England to
offer solid and united resistance to France. Yet one can hardly believe that a
French colonial empire stretching from the St Lawrence to the Mississippi would
have been either possible or desirable. That unhappy state of things, daring
which America was the battlefield of European powers, would have been
prolonged; and independence, if it
had ever
come, would have come piecemeal to a string of disconnected communities
incapable of forming an organic whole. At the same time we need not suppose
that any such far-sighted views influenced Charles II and his advisers. A more
effective reason probably was that the existence of a Dutch settlement in the
midst of the English colonies made an effective administration of the
Navigation Laws and a comprehensive commercial system almost impossible. If
the subsequent advantage, we may almost say the necessity, of the conquest
might be held to justify it, so not less did the manner in which it was carried
out. Neither the States-General nor the Dutch West India Company had so dealt
with the New Netherlands as to beget any spirit of loyalty. When an English
fleet appeared before New Amsterdam, the governor, Peter Stuyvesant, found it
impossible to rouse the settlers to effective resistance; and on August 29,
1664, the English flag floated over the settlement. The conquest of the
settlements along the valley of the Hudson was as easy and as complete as that
of the capital. The name of New York was thereupon given to both the city and
the province.
One incident
connected with the conquest of Fort Orange, afterwards Albany, deserves
mention. The chief Indian power in the neighbourhood of the English settlers
was that of the Five Nations, called by the French the Iroquois, often by the
English the Mohawks, a name which really belonged only to one of the five
constituent tribes. Their policy was marked by a definiteness and continuity
rare among savages. Their hunting-grounds—for in no other sense can one speak
of Indian territory —extended from the St Lawrence to the hills west of
Carolina; and they held a number of the smaller tribes in a state of
semi-vassalage. Their friendship was of vital importance to the English. Twice
only, so far as authentic records show, had there been up to this time any
dealings between the Iroquois and the New Englanders; and on each occasion the English
befriended a small party who had wandered as far as the sea-coast. An embassy
from the Five Nations now met Cartwright the English commander, at Fort Orange,
and received from him promises of help and of the continuance of that trade
which had existed between the Indians and the Dutch. Thus was laid the
foundation of a friendship whose value to the English it is scarcely possible
to overrate.
By singular
good fortune the task of annexation fell into the hands of one of the few men
in England who could have been found thoroughly equal to it. The character of
Richard Nicolls reminds one of those men whose wisdom, firmness, and
forbearance, shown alike in military and diplomatic victories, have built up
our Indian Empire. His clemency was not that of indifference: it went hand in
hand with a thoughtful policy of construction. The antecedents of the colony
had no doubt done a good deal to lighten his task. Not only was there no
loyalty to Dutch rule and no organised political life, but one may almost say that
there was no nationality. The statement that eighteen languages were
spoken in the
streets of New Amsterdam might be an exaggeration, but there can be no doubt as
to the cosmopolitan character of the settlement. In addition to the Dutch
population there were Walloons, Swedes, Lutherans from Germany, and Waldenses
from Piedmont, while the possibilities of commercial profit had sufficed to
attract Jews and Armenians. But most important of all in the present connexion
was the number and the influential position of emigrants from New England. On
Long Island settlements had sprung up, founded by emigrants from New Haven and
Connecticut, and in every respect conforming to the life and usages of New
England. It is moreover clear that the English were treated by Stuyvesant with
an amount of favour which offended the Dutch; and at least one Englishman held
office under him. Thus, before the actual conquest took place, the colony had
been in a great measure anglicised.
Nicolls,
however, did not yield to the temptation of endeavouring to set up anything
like a system of race ascendancy. Practically, for administrative purposes, he
divided the province into an Englishspeaking and a Dutch-speaking district,
and dealt with each on separate principles. In February, 1665, a convention of
representatives from the English-speaking towns met at Heemstade on Long
Island. Acting in concert with them Nicolls drew up a code of laws and
instituted a system of local government. Each township was invested with powers
of assessment, and was to elect a court of overseers with judicial powers in
small civil cases. The ecclesiastical system was to be one of denominational
endowment. Each township was to have a church, the denomination being chosen by
the majority of the freemen. Practically their choice was limited to the
reformed Churches, as no one might be appointed a minister who had not received
Protestant ordination. The Dutch townships of New York and Albany kept each its
mayor and aldermen, with judicial powers. It is clear that no attempt was made
to interfere with the use of the Dutch language. Nor were any steps taken
towards consolidating the whole colony under one representative government.
There was one
portion of the English conquest which might be regarded as, for all practical
purposes, a separate province. In 1638 the government of Sweden had formed a
colony on the southern bank of the Delaware. Unjust though the English conquest
might be, yet the Dutch had estopped themselves from any right of complaint by
the measure which they had dealt out towards the Swedes. The claim of the Dutch
Company to the soil occupied by the Swedes was not one whit better than the
claim of England to the Hudson. Yet in 1655 Stuyvesant, acting under the
instructions of the Company, had attacked and annexed the Swedish settlement.
The Dutch West India Company, instead of retaining the territory, sold it to
the city of Amsterdam,
which
established a colony of its own there by the name of New Amstel. When Nicolls
had completed his conquest of New Amsterdam he detached Robert Carr, one of his
subordinates, to reduce the settlement on the Delaware. Carr’s severity to the
twice-conquered Swedes was the one exception to the humanity and moderation
shown by the English.
In 1673
England and Holland were again at war. Nicolls’ successor, Francis Lovelace, in
careless confidence, took no measures for securing the colony. When a Dutch
fleet of twenty-three ships with sixteen hundred men on board appeared before
New York resistance was manifestly useless. Albany and the settlements on the
right bank of the Hudson and the outlying province on the Delaware all yielded.
Only the towns of English descent on Long Island, supported by Connecticut,
held out. The Dutch reoccupation did not last out a whole year. In accordance
with the Treaty of Westminster (1674) the whole of the reconquered territory
was restored to England. Nothing could show more strongly the lack of any
vigorous sense of nationality than the passivity with which the Dutch settlers
suffered themselves to be handed backwards and forwards without protest or
expression of interest.
The Duke of
York had already shown a conspicuous lack of intelligence in his dealing with
the soil of his new province. Before the result of Nicolls’ expedition was
known, before indeed he had reached America, James granted to Sir George
Carteret and Lord Berkeley the whole territory from the Hudson to the Delaware
(1664). The effect of this was to cut the Duke’s province into two detached
portions, and to isolate New Amstel from the seat of government. Nicolls
remonstrated, but it was too late. Carteret at once proceeded to act on his
grant by sending out his kinsman Philip Carteret to act as governor of the
newly-formed province, and also by drafting a constitution vesting the
government in a governor or council and an elective chamber. New Jersey, as the
colony was called, was settled after a fashion previously unknown elsewhere.
The Proprietors did little towards supplying their settlement with inhabitants.
A scattered population of small farmers, mostly Swedes and Finns, was already
on the soil; but the Proprietors also looked to drawing inhabitants from New
England. In this fortune favoured them, since most of those inhabitants of New
Haven, whom we have already mentioned as escaping incorporation with
Connecticut by flight, took refuge on the south banks of the Hudson.
The
re-conquest of New York in 1673 annihilated the Duke’s first patent and made a
fresh grant from the Crown necessary. The Duke might have taken advantage of
this to resume his grant to Carteret and Berkeley, compensating them, as
Nicolls suggested, by a grant of land on the Delaware, which would have left
New York a compact and continuous territory occupying both banks of the Hudson
to the sea. The opportunity was, however, neglected; and Carteret was
reinstated with full proprietary rights.
As might have
been expected, the political aspirations of the inhabitants of New York were
not unaffected by-the neighbourhood of the virtually self-governing communities
of New England, with whose members many of them were connected by similar
habits of life and thought, and even, in some cases, by ties of blood. It was
only natural that they should demand similar political institutions. Such a
demand was made before the Dutch re-conquest and the governorship of Lovelace,
and it was renewed under his successor Andros. The Duke’s reply thoroughly
illustrates his whole attitude towards popular rights. Why, he said, should the
settlers want more than they had ? Such legislative powers as would be vested
in an elective assembly were already enjoyed by the Court of Assize, composed
of his nominees the magistrates. An elective assembly would probably be
composed mainly of the same men. A demand for good government was a thing which
James could understand and, according to his lights, sympatl je with: a demand
for constitutional safeguards was beyond his comprehension.
In 1683
Andros was succeeded by one of the ablest men who had yet appeared in the field
of colonial politics, Thomas Dongan. By this time successive governors of
Canada had entered on a policy of resolute and continuous aggression. Not only
were they orga lisi] ig their own Indian subjects into an instrument of attack,
but they were undermining the loyalty of the Five Nations, hitherto the trusty
allies of England. The valley of the Hudson was the key of the English
position; and on the governor of New York, more than on any other official,
fell the burden and responsibility of resistance. Dongan had personally no
friendly feeling to France. As a young man he had served in the French army and
had been, as he considered, treated with injustice. Roman Catholic though he
was, we may be satisfied that his religion did not interfere with his
inclination to thwart the designs of France, since not even among the Puritans
of New England do we find a trace of any distrust of him on that ground.
The key-note
of Dongan’s anti-French policy was a firm alliance with the Five Nations. On
three occasions he met the Iroquois chiefs in formal conclave, and he
effectively counteracted the intrigues by which successive governors of Canada
were trying to win them over. It was Dongan’s policy, too, that the alliance
should be a fact fully recognised and proclaimed in the face of France. In no
spirit of mere empty ceremonial he induced the chiefs of the Five Nations to
set up the arms of the Duke of York over their wigwams. Dongan, however, did
not limit his defensive policy to strengthening the Mohawk alliance. Albany and
Schenectady were palisaded. The home government was invited to establish a
chain of forts along the western frontier of the Fnglisli settlements and to
consolidate Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, so as to form an effective
scheme of defence. It was perhaps even more important that Dongan induced James
to send a despatch to the French
Court,
announcing that the Iroquois were British subjects and were to be treated as
such. Thus it was made clear that the policy of the Indian alliance was not the
individual creation of a single colonial governor, but represented the views
and purpose of the English nation.
Dongan’s
instructions might be said to embody a constitutional revolution, since they
authorised him to issue writs for the election of a representative assembly.
When the Assembly met it at once took steps to perpetuate, so far as a popular
vote could do so, a system of self-government. A resolution was passed
analogous to a Bill of Rights. Triennial Assemblies were to be held, elected by
the freemen and the freeholders of the towns. The right of taxation was vested
in the Assembly; freedom of conscience was secured to all; and provision was
made for trial by jury. Soon afterwards Dongan, on behalf of the Proprietors,
granted to New York and Albany charters of incorporation.
The proposals
of the Assembly seemed to be favourably received; but next year, by an almost
inexplicable change of policy, Dongan received instructions entirely reversing
the system so lately suggested by the Crown and developed by the settlers, and
vesting all rights of legislation in a council appointed by the Crown. In a New
England colony such a measure would have called into existence a torrent of
pamphlets, would have been condemned in town meetings and denounced from
pulpits. In New York it was accepted in silence, though not without an
undercurrent of resentment which made itself felt a little later. This
withdrawal of the rights granted to New York was no doubt a step in that policy
of unification which we have already seen applied to New England. Colonial
union was a good thing; but only a man utterly without perception of those
living political forces which control communities could have thought it
possible to achieve such a union by mechanically combining into a single province
communities so different in origin and in political experience, and by placing
the whole under the rule of a slow-witted, unsympathetic governor such as
Andros. This might not be felt strongly in New York. It would assuredly be felt
in New England.
The whole
history of the manner in which the tyranny of Andros, if tyranny it should be
called, was met and overthrown in New England and New York respectively is an
admirable illustration of the different conditions of the two provinces. Andros
himself was too fully occupied with refractory New Englanders and with the
defence of the western frontier to take any active steps in the administration
of New York. That was left to his deputy, Colonel Nicholson, with the
assistance of three councillors, who, it is worth noticing, were all Dutch.
This disposes of any suggestion that the revolution which followed was an
uprising of Dutch nationality against alien rule. Nicholson was, as is shown by
his despatches and the various incidents of a prolonged official career, a
clear-headed and observant man, but he was violent and
obstinate,
wholly lacking in the moral force which surmounts difficulties or in the
dexterity which evades them.
When rumours
of the Revolution in England reached New York, Nicholson, acting as his superior
Andros had acted in Massachusetts, kept the tidings secret. But soon afterwards
there came simultaneously to New York the news of three events, any one of
which would have made Nicholson’s position difficult. The Prince of Orange was
in power in England; Andros was a prisoner at Boston; France had declared war,
and the colony might at any moment be invaded. Nicholson’s first impulse was a
sound one. He called together the aldermen of New York, the members of the
Council, and the militia officers, to form a convention. Then at once was felt
the lack of all those conditions which had enabled the men of New England to
defy constituted authority and yet to avoid anarchy. The pay of the militia
was in arrears, and their disaffection threatened danger. The people demanded
that the control of the fort should be transferred from the Deputy to their
representatives. The townships bordering upon New England went further and
deposed the Proprietors’ officials. Two purely personal disputes set fire to
the train. A quarrel having broken out between Nicholson and one of his
subordinates, Cuyler, Nicholson foolishly used the words, “I would rather see
the city on fire than be commanded by you.” Immediately the story circulated
that the Deputy-Govemor had threatened to bum New York. Next day Nicholson
denied the charges and dismissed Cuyler. Thereupon the people rose and seized
the fort. Their leader was Jacob Leisler, a German brewer, who also had a
personal grievance. He had already refused to pay customs, on the plea that the
collector was a Papist and his commission therefore invalid. He now took
command of the mutineers. Nicholson fled, and Leisler might not unreasonably be
supposed to have stepped de facto and by popular approval into the vacant
governorship.
Thereupon a
convention met. More than half the community stood aloof; and of the eighteen
representatives who came together, eight took no part in the proceedings. The
remainder invested Leisler with something like dictatorial power. But it is
clear that he was no more than the leader of a faction. In New York itself
Leisler succeeded by promptness and energy in forcing his authority on an inert
majority. At Albany a far more vigorous temper prevailed. The inhabitants
refused to accept the authority of Leisler unless he could prove that it had
been granted to him by the new sovereigns: let him produce a commission from
William and Mary; then he would be obeyed.
The home
government at first made mistakes of which Leisler took advantage. A commission
was sent to Nicholson, authorising him to act as governor. If he was absent,
this duty was to be transferred to “ such as for the time being take care for
preserving the peace.” Leisler took possession of this letter and, without
giving any details, told the citizens
that he had
received a commission as lieutenant-governor. At the same time he contrived for
a while to keep the home government in the dark by representing himself as
chosen by popular election, by intercepting letters which would have undeceived
them, and by imprisoning and brutally maltreating the writers of such letters.
In the meantime some of the settlers at Schenectady, a settlement on the upper
Hudson, had been massacred in an Indian raid. This was largely due to the fact
that Leisler’s attitude towards Albany had made united action impossible. This
event contributed largely to undermine Leisler’s position.
For nearly
two years the English government with incredible apathy suffered the colonists
to be the victims of a blundering and ineffective tyrant. In spite of Leisler’s
merciless suppression of free speech, it is clear that complaints reached
England; and the King and his counsellors must at least have known that the
colony was in the hands of one with no proved fitness for the post. At length, in
1690, a governor was appointed and sent out with a small military force.
Fortune granted Leisler a respite, since the governor, Colonel Sloughter, was
delayed on the voyage. When his second in command, Richard Ingoldsby, arrived,
Leisler refused to resign his authority. Ingoldsby’s course was an obvious one.
“ Where was Leisler’s commission ? ” No commission could be produced, and
Leisler stood in the position of an avowed rebel. He held the fort and fired on
the English soldiers, killing two; but the arrival of Sloughter, though it did
not influence the attitude of Leisler himself, was the signal for the general
collapse of his party, and his supporters laid down their arms. The ringleaders
were tried for high- treason and found guilty, but the extreme penalty was put
in force only against Leisler himself and his chief supporter Jacob Millbome.
As
we have seen, the government of James II had virtually left New York without a
constitution. The defect was supplied by the instructions given to successive
governors, whereby certain methods acquired the authority of precedent and
usage. The Assembly endeavoured to define the future constitution by a
declaratory Act passed May 13,1691, shortly after the arrival of Sloughter. His
instructions had provided for a council nominated by the Crown, and an assembly
elected by the freemen. The Act just mentioned filled in this outline by
Requiring annual elections, limiting the franchise to freeholders of forty
shillings a year, and apportioning the colony into constituencies. A
declaration was permitted instead of an oath; and freedom of conscience was
secured to all Christians, Papists excepted. No tax might be imposed but by the
governor and the two Houses; and soldiers could not be billeted upon any
inhabitant without his own consent. The Bill was vetoed by the Crown, owing, it
is said, to the last clause; and the colony was left without a defined
constitution. •
NEW JERSEY.
We have
already traced the beginnings of the colony granted by the Duke of York to
Carteret, and by him called New Jersey. The process by which it came into being
was not unlike that followed in the case of New Hampshire. A number of
independent townships were consolidated into a single community.' But in New
Jersey there was an element of difficulty which did not exist in New Hampshire.
When the settlements of New Hampshire united, the Proprietor, Mason, was dead;
his heirs took no interest in the province, and suffered it to work out its
destiny in its own fashion. The settlers in New Jersey knew that the
Proprietors might at any moment interpose their authority. Nor was there
anything in the character of that authority to reconcile the settlers to its
exercise. The Proprietors were not in any sense partners with the settlers in a
costly and troublesome undertaking. They did not, in modem language, “finance”
the colony in its early days—as did Baltimore or the Proprietors of
Carolina—and thus establish a claim to some future benefit; they were simply
beneficiaries. The system of “unearned increment” was presented to the
settlers in a singularly unqualified and repellent form. Not only were the
Proprietors absentee landlords, but the settlers had actually already obtained
titles for their land by purchase from the natives.
For three
years after he landed Philip Carteret made no attempt to call an assembly of
the whole province; and the various townships remained virtually
self-governing. When an assembly was summoned, the settlers reckoned the burden
of attendance greater than the gain. The representatives of two townships
refused to attend, and were followed by the rest. As was natural, the question
of land-tenure soon gave rise to trouble. The Proprietors had liberated the
colony from quit-rents for five years; but they required all settlers to obtain
from them patents of land. One of the townships claimed the right to grant land
irrespective of the Proprietors. Thereupon the settlers at once did, for the
purpose of resistance, what they had refused to do for the purpose of
co-operation with the Proprietors. They held a joint assembly of
representatives of the towns, deposed Philip Carteret, and substituted another
member of the family. The Proprietors at once put down the rebellion, and,
acting on the assumption that the settlers had forfeited the privileges
conceded to them, drew up a constitution in which the rights originally granted
to the colony were considerably restricted.
New Jersey,
like New York, was reconquered by the Dutch in 1673, and again ceded to the
English in 1674. The history of New Jersey now becomes extremely complex, owing
to the number of distinct proprietary rights which were created, each in some
measure calling into existence an independent community. The Duke of York held
that the conquest annulled all previous titles, his own as well as those
granted by
him to
others. His own title was, as we have seen, re-established by a new grant. He
likewise re-established those of Carteret and Berkeley, but only in part. He
executed a fresh grant, transferring to Carteret alone a tract of land on the
southern bank of the Hudson, but reserving to himself the left bank of the
Delaware. In the meantime Berkeley had sold his share in the original grant to
two Quakers, John Fenwick and Edward Bylling. They now virtually claimed that
they were entitled to the residue of the original grant, after Carteret’s new
grant had been deducted. This claim the Duke disputed. Matters then, so far as
territorial title went, stood thus. Carteret had an undoubted claim to the
right bank of the Hudson. The Duke had a claim to the right bank of the
Delaware, and a disputable claim to the left bank of the Delaware. Throughout
the whole of this territory there were settlements which had come into
existence with little or no help from any of the claimants.
When, in 1675,
Fenwick acted on his grant and endeavoured to form a settlement on the right
bank of the Delaware, some of the existing settlers resented it, and appealed
to Andros, who ordered Fenwick to give up his attempt. The order, however, was
disobeyed; and a settlement came into existence called Salem. Soon afterwards
William Penn and other Quakers who had acquired Bylling’s rights began
colonising on the Delaware. In 1680 they received a fresh grant from the Duke,
including Fenwick’s settlement at Salem. There were thus two distinct settlements,
called East and West New Jersey, one on the Hudson, the other on the Delaware.
In each the government spontaneously fell into the accepted model, with a
governor, council and representative assembly. In 1680 a dispute arose between
Andros and Philip Carteret as to the right of the Duke of York to impose
commercial restrictions and levy duties on New Jersey, in which Andros
imprisoned Carteret in an arbitrary and brutal fashion. At the same time
Andros, by the issue of writs for an assembly, confirmed the system of
self-government which already existed in East Jersey.
In 1681 the
heir and namesake of Sir George Carteret received a fresh grant of his
grandfather’s territory from the Duke of York; and the authority of Philip
Carteret was re-established. It is clear, however, that the attack made on
Carteret’s authority by Andros had weakened it in the eyes of the settlers, who
now began to question the rights of the Proprietors. Sir George Carteret,
dissatisfied, as he well might be, with the turn of affairs, sold his rights in
the colony. Among the purchasers were the Quakers, William Penn and Gawen
Laurie, who were already among the Proprietors of the eastern province, certain
other members of the same sect, and several influential Scotsmen. The new
Proprietors made an attempt to saddle the province with an elaborate
constitution. But, as in Carolina, the simpler system evolved by the settlers
to meet their own wants prevailed. The chief result of the transfer was to
invigorate
the colony by bringing into it a number of Scottish refugees, who had fled from
Scotland to avoid being coerced into Episcopacy, and by so assimilating the two
provinces into which New Jersey was divided, as to prepare the way for their
future union.
In 1685 the
Proprietors of the eastern province excited the just displeasure of Dongan by
an unscrupulous attempt to annex Staten Island, to which the Duke had an
indisputable claim. It was probably owing to this event and to advice given by
Dongan, that the Duke included New Jersey in the consolidated province which
was placed under the shortlived administration of Andros. His dealings with the
refractory New Englanders left him no time for meddling in the affairs of New
Jersey; and in that colony the Revolution seems to have aroused no political
disturbance.
In 1692 an
important step was taken towards the union of the two provinces. The two
separate bodies of Proprietors appointed the same governor, Andrew Hamilton, a
man who more than almost any colonial official of the day was convinced of the
need for more complete intercolonial union. But the colony of New Jersey did
not attain unity till it had passed through several troubled years. There were
disputes as to the right of the government of New York to levy duties within
the limits of New Jersey. Repeated transfers of proprietorship had invested the
whole question of proprietary rights with elements of confusion and difficulty.
To the settlers the political rights of the Proprietors were a standing menace,
threatening interference with that system of selfgovernment which had, as it
were spontaneously, established itself. To the Proprietors these rights were
valueless, and worse than valueless. To men like Penn and some of his
associates, social philosophers and political enthusiasts, the task of creating
a new community might be attractive. But Penn had found a sphere for his
activity elsewhere. The day for attempting such work in New Jersey was past,
and the only result that the Proprietors were likely to bring about by
asserting their political rights would be the forfeiture of those territorial
claims which to most of them were of far more value. The way out of the strait
was obvious, and the Proprietors adopted it. In 1702 they surrendered their rights
of sovereignty to the Crown; and the whole territory from the Hudson to the
Delaware became a single province, though practically consisting of two
distinct sections, separated by an unreclaimed and almost unpenetrated
wilderness. As in the case of New York, the colony did not receive a charter.
The constitution rested on usage and on the instructions given to successive
governors. The existing system of government by a council and assembly remained
unaltered. The weak rule of the Proprietors had, however, left behind elements
of faction and almost of anarchy; and the choice of a governor by the Crown led
to no improvement in these conditions. The appointment, together with the
governorship of New York, was given to the Queen’s cousin, Lord Cornbury, a brainless
49
and arrogant
profligate, with a tendency to intermittent and ineffective tyranny. The
mischief he did in both provinces was happily remedied by his successor, Robert
Hunter, one of the ablest and most judicious in the list of colonial
administrators.
PENNSYLVANIA.
In New Jersey
we have seen a fresh religious force, that of Quakerism, brought into the
sphere of colonial politics. Historians have written of William Penn as though
he had been a religious enthusiast whose friendship with James II, in politics
a despot and in religion a bigoted member of an alien Church, must either be
explained away or accepted as evidence of unscrupulous opportunism. That view
involves a mistaken conception of the characters alike of Penn and of his
patron. The two men were in many respects unlike; but their views and
characters found a meeting- point in their indifference to constitutional
forms, in their inability to see that men might reasonably demand something
more than good government, and might fairly ask for those securities which,
under any change of rulers, would guarantee good government for the future. In
New Jersey Penn was no more than one in a firm of Proprietors: his position did
not give him that free hand which he required to carry out his theories as a
constructive statesman. A better chance soon offered itself. He inherited a
claim against the Crown for ^16,000. That debt might be paid in a cheap and
easy fashion. The territory conquered from the Dutch included, as we have seen,
a tract colonised by the Swedes on the south bank of the Delaware. Of that
tract the greater portion was not included in the Duke of York’s second grant.
It was included in the original patent of Maryland, but it was unoccupied and
to grant land twice over was no uncommon incident in colonial administration.
The tract in question was in 1682 transferred to Penn in settlement of his
claim.
Penn’s rights
as a Proprietor were limited by three important restrictions, in which we can
trace the effect of past colonial experience. The Crown was to have a veto on
all legislation. In all legislation and administration which concerned revenue,
the colony was to be treated as an integral part of the realm. There was to be
an agent living in England, who might be called upon to explain any alleged
infraction of the revenue laws. Penn’s colony neither was nor was designed to
be composed exclusively of Quakers. The Quaker element, however, undoubtedly
preponderated; and one at least of the Quaker tenets— their abhorrence of
war—was to prove a serious hindrance on a future occasion, when it became
needful that the colonists should be united against French and Indian enemies.
The Quaker theory of the equality of all men in the eye of God was with Penn no
vague dogma, but a practical belief which lay at the root of all his dealings
with the savages.
Among
colonial Proprietors Baltimore alone seems to have grasped the truth that the
less elaboration and complexity there is about a constitution the better,
especially in a community whose needs are unknown and whose resources are
untested. Under the constitution as first devised by Penn there were to be two
Chambers, both elective, the Upper called a Council, consisting of seventy-two
members, and the Lower of two hundred at first, with possibilities of increase
to five hundred. The Council was to initiate legislation, the Lower Chamber to
approve, the Crown to ratify it. The defects of this system are obvious. The
Lower Chamber was a cumbrous superfluity: the Upper was too large for executive
duties. This was soon perceived; and in 1683 the Council was reduced to
eighteen and the Lower House to twenty-six. No power of initiatory legislation
was assigned to the representatives; but their power of veto was increased by
requiring the consent not of a majority but of two-thirds. Three years later a
change was introduced, which, if the Proprietor had followed it up strenuously
and persistently, might have annihilated the political rights of the community.
He appointed five Commissioners of State, of whom three might be a quorum, with
a right of veto upon all legislation.
It will be
remembered that the territory conquered from the Dutch and granted to the Duke
of York included a small group of settlements on the south bank of the
Delaware. These were always administered as a dependency of New York.
Administrative difficulties might have ensued; but fortunately the friendship
existing between the Duke and Penn made a settlement easy; and in 1682 the
territory was transferred to Penn and incorporated with his other grant. This
portion of the provinces was commonly known as the Territories, and now forms
the State of Delaware. In 1688 a dispute arose. The inhabitants of the
Territories considered that they were not dealt with equally in the apportionment
of magistrates. For a while a compromise was made. The Territories were to have
a separate executive, but there was to be only one elective assembly for the
whole province.
Much of
Penn’s work has vanished, for in the political constitution of his colony
experience and the practical teaching of necessity proved too strong for
theory. But one monument of his practical judgment and foresight abides. Alone
among the leaders of English colonisation in the seventeenth century, he can
claim to be a city-founder. That dignity, the result of symmetry and
spaciousness, in which Philadelphia ranks above any city of its own age and
kind, are largely due to Penn’s wise choice of a site and to his systematic
construction.
It was
inevitable that Penn’s colonial fortunes should suffer by the downfall of his
patron James. There is no trace of any formal act of deprivation; but in 1692
Pennsylvania was included in the commission granted to Benjamin Fletcher as
governor of New York. A better and a wiser man than Fletcher might have used
the opportunity as a stepping-
stone to some
form of permanent union. A man of more purpose and concentration might have
provoked a rebellion. Fletcher was arbitrary and brutal, but there was very
little continuity or definiteness of purpose in his tyranny; and his loose
private life and gross official corruption constantly put him in the power of
those whom he wished to oppress. In one important point the liberty of
Pennsylvania gained by his appointment. Hitherto, as we have seen, the representatives
of the people had no power of initiating legislation. Now, either through
weakness or through ignorance of the preexisting constitution of the colony,
Fletcher acquiesced in their exercise of that power. In 1694 Penn was restored
to his proprietary rights. But the ground accidentally gained, as one may
fairly say, by the Assembly under Fletcher was not lost; and their right of
legislation was formally confirmed by an Act of Settlement approved by the
Proprietor.
In 1699 Penn
revisited the colony. Two years later a dispute broke out, the first of a long
series arising from the same cause. Pennsylvania was called upon to contribute
to the fortifications of New York. The Assembly might have anticipated the
attitude so often taken up by its successors, and protested against military
expenditure as inconsistent with the principles on which the colony was
founded. It might have anticipated the attitude taken up seventy years later,
and pleaded the right of self-taxation. It was content to take lower ground and
to plead poverty. In Penn a statesmanlike view of the necessity for colonial
defence was stronger than sectarian prejudice, and he remonstrated with his
settlers, but to no effect.
The dispute
between the Territories and the main body of the colony had been temporarily
patched up by a provision that the Assembly should meet alternately at
Philadelphia and Newcastle. The colony now claimed that the Assembly when
meeting at Newcastle should only legislate provisionally, such legislation to
be confirmed at Philadelphia. The inhabitants of the Territories not
unnaturally resented this demand. This and other questions were settled in
another charter superseding the previous one, and settling, so far as any such
settlement could be final, the constitution of the colony. The chief points of
difference in the new system were that provision was made for a possible
increase in the number of representatives, and that the Territories were
allowed, if they chose, to have a separate legislature. This was accepted. The
two provinces formed part of the same proprietorship and were usually under
the same governor, though with different commissions. In other respects they
were distinct. At the same time Penn granted a charter of incorporation to the
city of Philadelphia. That was his last official act. In 1701 he left the
colony, never to return. His mental powers soon afterwards failed. A few years
later we find him remonstrating with the Assembly for their attacks on the
Proprietor’s secretary and staunch supporter, James
Logan. After
this date Penn disappears from the history of the colony which he had founded.
NEWFOUNDLAND.
We have as
yet said nothing of one portion of the New World occupied by Englishmen.
Newfoundland may be looked upon as standing altogether beyond and apart from
the colonial system which we have been considering. Geographically, as is
obvious, it is connected, not with those colonies which afterwards formed the
United States, but with Canada and Nova Scotia. It differs from these, however,
in that Great Britain acquired it, not by conquest and treaty, but by right of
original and continuous occupation.
We have
already seen how Gilbert made an elaborate but unsuccessful attempt to
colonise Newfoundland, and how, two generations later, Baltimore renewed the
attempt, but without success. Another who acquired certain territorial rights
in Newfoundland was Sir David Kirke, better known in connexion with the early
history of Canada. Gradually small isolated settlements were formed by
Englishmen in Newfoundland, similar to those formed in the territory which
afterwards became Maine and New Hampshire. Perhaps the most important of these
was one formed in 1610, under a regular patent from the Crown, by John Guy, a
Bristol merchant. His attempts to enforce his rights of proprietorship brought
him into conflict with the west-country fishermen who resorted to the Island.
The first
attempt to bring Newfoundland under one definite system of administration was
made under the Long Parliament. In 1653 John Treworgie was appointed, by the
Council of State, Commissioner for Newfoundland. This practically meant little
more than superintendent of fisheries. After the Restoration there does not
seem to have been any sustained attempt to exercise authority on the island;
and the French were suffered in 1662 to establish a settlement called
Placentia. Fortunately for Great Britain, the resources of France, both in
population and capital, were already unequal to the demands of Canada. The
French could take but little advantage of the foothold thus granted them by the
indifference or treachery of Charles II and his advisers; and the English claim
to Newfoundland was formally confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht. It was not,
however, till 1720 that the Crown, tardily following up the policy of the
Protector, nominated a governor for the colony. He had authority to appoint
Justices of the Peace, and he and they were bound by the Common Law of England.
But not till the nineteenth century was well advanced had Newfoundland a
legislature of its own.
THE ENGLISH
COLONIES.
(1700—1763.)
GOVERNMENT
AND SOCIETY.
From the beginning of the eighteenth century we may
regard the American colonies, if not as a homogeneous community, yet as an
organic body bound together by certain principles of administration. There was
indeed wide diversity arising from difference of origin, of religious beliefs,
and even more of industrial conditions. Against these there were, over and
above the connexion with Great Britain, two influences making for unity. Each
colony, as we have seen, had a constitution modelled on that of the
mother-country; and thus each was of necessity familiar with the same political
methods, and imbued in some measure with the same political principles.
Moreover the flowing tide of French aggression was forcing the colonists,
albeit reluctantly, to face the problem of common action.
In one
respect the British colonial empire was paying heavily for the heedlessness of
its rulers at an earlier day. We have already seen how the carelessness with
which land had been granted and provinces laid out—a carelessness no doubt in
some measure inevitable in the case of an imperfectly known and often
impenetrable country—had led to territorial disputes between colonies. A large volume
might be compiled from the pamphlets and the correspondence in which are
embodied the disputes between Virginia and her neighbours North Carolina and
Maryland, between Maryland and Pennsylvania, between New York and Connecticut.
These disputes usually had their origin in the refusal of settlers occupying
the debatable ground to accept the jurisdiction of the colony which claimed
them. Unfortunately the dispute almost always arose in newly-settled and
isolated districts, where effective control was most needed and where dispute
meant violence.
By 1700 the
whole territory continuously occupied or at least claimed by the British
settlements reached from the St Croix to the Savannah, along a coast-line, in
places deeply indented, of about a thousand miles. In theory each colony had
the Atlantic for its eastern
boundary,
with an indefinite right of extension westward. To this however there was one
conspicuous exception. The northern boundary of New York ran not at right
angles to the Atlantic but along the left bank of the Hudson, and thus,
inclining northward, blocked the expansion of the New England colonies by
giving them a western frontier. New York and Connecticut may be regarded as an
isolated projection running westward, and far beyond the normal line, as one
may call it, of occupied territory. With that exception the colonies practically
formed a belt along the coast, of less than a hundred miles across at its
widest.
If we divide
the colonies by their constitutions they fall into three groups. Connecticut
and Bhode Island were chartered colonies with extensive rights of
self-government. The Crown exercised over them no regular and continuous
control: it could only intervene in special cases and by exceptional process.
Otherwise they were only subject to such restrictions as the Crown or
Parliament might impose on the whole body of colonies. In Maryland and
Pennsylvania administrative power was normally vested in the Proprietor,
subject, as in the chartered colonies, to special intervention by the Crown. In
the remaining eight colonies all administrative power was vested in the Crown
and exercised through its nominees. Somewhat indefinite powers of legislation
and taxation were enjoyed by all the colonies, in varying degrees, and
exercised in popular assemblies of similar though not identical nature.
The division
by constitutions is however one of no great practical importance. A division
which has far more real bearing on facts is one which has been already touched
upon, namely, that which separates the colonies into a northern and a southern
group, the former in some measure agricultural, but tending more and more to
become commercial and industrial, and depending mainly on free labour; the
latter purely agricultural and wholly dependent on some form of servile labour.
We may go further and subdivide the northern colonies. New England, homogeneous
in origin and principles, intensely definite in habits of thought and modes of
life, stands on one side; on the other side are New York and the Quaker
colonies, cosmopolitan and fluid, and lacking in that political and religious
discipline which fashioned, for good and evil, the self-conscious and
self-reliant New Englander.
That
exactness of method and organisation which marked the New England colonies
enables us to ascertain with tolerable accuracy their population at successive
stages of their growth. We shall probably be not far wrong if we set down the
English-speaking population of New England at the accession of George I at
about 90,000, of which Massachusetts contributed about half, Connecticut a
fourth, and Bhode Island and New Hampshire the remainder in about equal
proportions. Of the southern colonies we have no such statistics as warrant us
in
hazarding a
conjecture. All that we can say is that in the middle colonies the negroes were
to the whites in the proportion of about one to seven; in Maryland and Virginia
of one to three; while in South Carolina they formed a majority.
In race, as
in other respects, the New England colonies were by far the most homogeneous
portion of the colonies. French Huguenots and Irish Presbyterians occasionally
settled in Massachusetts; and among the former were the founders of more than
one prosperous house of business; but there was no appreciable influx of any
alien element. In the middle colonies, on the other hand, over and above the
original Swedish and Dutch populations, there were waves of immigration from
Germany, Switzerland, Scotland, and Wales. In Virginia and Maryland we find no
trace of any foreign element, though doubtless there were individual foreign
settlers. But the Carolinas were largely peopled by French Huguenots, by Swiss,
by refugees from the Palatinate, and during the eighteenth century by Scottish
and Irish immigrants.
In the
northern colonies slavery was a mere excrescence, exercising no perceptible
influence over industry or social life. Probably in 1700 there were not 6000
slaves in the whole territory between the Kennebec and Long Island. For the
negro slave can only fulfil one of two functions. He may be the appendage of a
luxurious establishment* or he may be the instrument of a monotonous and
unintelligent form of tillage where labour can be organised in large gangs. In
New England neither of these conditions existed. Luxury, except at Boston, was unknown.
Farms were small, and the sterility of the soil necessitated intelligent and
diversified tillage. In New York, on the other hand, the rich merchant could
find place for a retinue of domestic slaves; and the landowner growing com on a
large scale could make use of unskilled labour. Further south, in the tobacco
plantations of Virginia and Maryland, negro-slavery was no doubt, if one sets
aside moral and social considerations, the most effective and economical system
of labour; and, as the black was more efficient than the indented white servant
and less likely to organise resistance of any kind, negro-slavery rapidly
obtained the ascendancy over the earlier system. It is also noteworthy that,
whereas slaves were proportionately fewer in New York than in the southern
colonies, yet they were evidently objects of greater dread. The legislative
restraints imposed upon them were more severe. In the South we never hear of
anything like an organised servile insurrection; but in New York there were
negro insurrections in 1712 and 1741. In both cases houses were burnt, and in
both the offenders were punished with great severity, some being broken on the
wheel or burned alive.
Men have
often written and spoken as though the economical development of the colonies
had been stifled by the narrow and selfish policy of the mother-country. It is
no doubt true that English
statesmen for
the most part thought of a colony as a community which existed to supplement
the commerce and industry of the mother-country, to receive its goods and to
furnish it with desirable imports. In this respect the colonial administration
of England differed in no way from that of any other country in the Old World.
It differed, however, in this, that, though the men who administered the English
colonies might be at times corrupt or negligent, corruption and negligence
never undermined the colonial administration of England as they did that of
France. Nor is there any reason to think that under a more liberal and
enlightened system the colonies would have advanced further in manufacturing
industry than they did. In New England repeated attempts were made to encourage
the production of textile fabrics by bounties and by importing skilled workmen,
but with small success. Only the coarser forms of clothing worn by the poor
were made in the colony. Iron, too, was raised, but only of inferior quality;
and all cutlery and farm-implements of any importance came from England.
Shipbuilding flourished at Boston and in Rhode Island. The chief exports of New
England were ship-timber, salt fish, tar, and com; and the vessels that
conveyed these exports did a complex carrying trade among the southern colonies
and the British West Indies, with many sales and purchases of cargo. Thus the
New England trader acquired a versatility denied to those whose commerce moves
regularly in certain fixed and limited grooves.
The trade and
industry of the middle colonies did not differ widely from those of New
England. Com, cattle, and other articles of food were sent to the West Indies;
the command of the Hudson enabled the settlers to export furs; and already
ironworks were carried on profitably in Pennsylvania. In Maryland and Virginia
on the other hand there was one staple of industry, and one only, namely
tobacco. So completely was it the dominant product of the country that, by the
middle of the seventeenth century, it had become the recognised circulating
medium of the country and the accepted standard of value. In the early days of
the colony much of the coarse clothing worn by the slaves was home-made. As
communication with England became more frequent, even this form of manufacture
died out. The trade of South Carolina resembled that of Virginia, save that
rice took the place of tobacco. North Carolina, the poorest, most backward and
ignorant of all the colonies, was virtually a community of small proprietors
living squalidly on the products of their own farms, and occasionally exporting
their surplus products, pork, cattle, and tar.
The lines of
demarcation separating the various groups of colonies in intellectual and
spiritual matters corresponded pretty closely to the differences just sketched
in their national progress. In the New England colonies we find a
well-organised and firmly rooted ecclesiastical system. It is not enough to say
that in New England every township
had a
Congregational Church: more truly might it be said that Church and township
were the same society seen from different points of view. Against this solid
resisting body the efforts of Anglicanism profited little. In Connecticut the
Church of England fared better than in Massachusetts. There was always in
Connecticut a greater width of thought and more accessibility to new
impressions. There Episcopacy obtained as recruits from the Independent ministry
more than one man of ability, learning and high character. Episcopalians too
were granted a form of concurrent endowment, whereby, if there were a church of
their own denomination within reach, their rates for church-maintenance might
be diverted thither. Episcopacy in Connecticut also benefited by a movement
which ran through New England in the middle of the eighteenth century. The
preaching of Whitfield and the emotional religion which it awakened were
passionately accepted by one section of the Independent Churches and as
passionately repelled and denounced by another ; and many persons, alienated by
the violence of the contending parties, found a refuge in Anglicanism. In Rhode
Island the majority of the inhabitants were Baptists. Quakers were also numerous;
and the residue of the inhabitants were for the most part equally divided into
Independents and Anglicans. The system was one of pure voluntaryism; and there
was nothing in the moral and intellectual condition of the colony to furnish
arguments either to the upholders or the opponents of Church establishments.
The middle
colonies were the region where the labours of the Society for the Propagation
of the Gospel, founded in 1701, bore most fruit. This was partly due to the
fact that there was not, as in New England, any one rival communion in
occupation of the field. In religion, as in other matters, cosmopolitanism
prevailed. Moreover the ground had been in a measure prepared by the Swedish
Episcopalian Churches, which, remaining dependent on the mother-Church till
long after the extinction of Swedish rule, yet maintained friendly relations
with the Church of England, and were finally incorporated with it. The reports
received from these colonies by the friends of the Church at home give evidence
of a vitality, both in increased numbers and also in a growth of zeal and
liberality, unknown to the other colonies.
The legal
position of the Church of England in New York and New Jersey was somewhat
anomalous. Till 1693, whatever support had been given to the Church of England
had been given in virtue of certain specific orders from the Crown. In 1693 an
Act of extraordinary vagueness was passed, providing for the maintenance of a
Protestant minister in certain portions of the province. The Act did not provide
for the method of appointment, or impose any test on behalf of any special form
of Protestantism; but by a succession of Anglican governors it was interpreted,
not without protest and resistance, as making special provision for the Church
of England. The state of things in New
Jersey was
somewhat similar. There no legal provision was made for any form of worship.
Yet more than one governor acted on the assumption that, as the colony was
directly dependent on the Crown, and as the governor was a servant of the
Crown, the established Church of England had a certain claim to support and to
precedence.
In Maryland
and Virginia the Church of England was established by Acts of the colonial
legislation, in the Carolinas by the Proprietary Charter. In all four colonies
Dissenters existed, numerically probably weaker than the Anglicans, in
intelligence and spiritual activity fully their equals. In none of these
colonies were the learning and character of the clergy or the state of
ecclesiastical discipline such as to give the Church any advantage in its
contest with Dissent. The clergy of the southern colonies may not have fallen
and probably did not fall short of the general standard of life about them:
they certainly did not rise above it. The habits of the southern planter,
coarse, boisterous, and unspiritual, were often redeemed by his vigour, by his
clear recognition of public responsibilities, and by the extensive and exacting
demands of private administration. The clergy shared to the full in the
temptations of laymen, but not in the counterbalancing influences; and their
failure to reach a higher standard was naturally more remarked.
The weakness
of Anglicanism in the American colonies has been attributed to lack of
organisation and controlling machinery. The appointment of commissaries by the
Bishop of London, to whose diocese the colonies in theory pertained, was no
doubt an inadequate substitute for direct episcopal control. The establishment
of an American episcopate was urgently advocated by Bishop Berkeley. The
attempt nearly succeeded, and was only frustrated at the last moment by the
imperfectly concealed hostility of Walpole. Yet one may doubt whether any
machinery could have done much for a Church which was clearly felt by the
majority of the settlers, and especially by the most earnest and spiritually
minded section of them, to be exotic, which could appeal to no inspiring
associations in the past, and which had done little for the mental and
spiritual life of the colonies since they had become separate communities.
Whatever
might be the shortcomings of New England, her eyes were never shut to the truth
that man does not live by bread alone. Strenuous though her sons might be in
the pursuit of wealth, yet material aims were never suffered to stifle the spiritual
and intellectual side of life. Her care for education is among the worthiest of
her traditions. So early as 1647 the legislature of Massachusetts established
elementary schools in all townships of fifty householders, and grammar- schools
in all containing more than a hundred. A similar system was established in
Connecticut. In Plymouth little seems to have been done before incorporation
with Massachusetts. In Rhode Island the first school came into existence in
1640; but it was not till the
eighteenth
century that the colony had anything like a regular system of public education.
When we pass
into the middle colonies we at once find a change. In reading the records of
New York, of New Jersey, and of Pennsylvania, we find the neglect of education
occasionally lamented, and the obligation to supply it intermittently
recognised and imperfectly fulfilled. There was no comprehensive system
enforcing on townships the necessity for providing schools and schoolmasters.
About the middle of the eighteenth century, however, a wave of educational
progress seems to have swept over the middle colonies, since between 1741 and
1754 colleges were founded in New York, in New Jersey, and in Pennsylvania.
Among the
commonplaces of American history is the saying of Berkeley, the cavalier
governor of Virginia, who thanked God that his colony had no schools. The
indifference of the ruling classes no doubt had its share in keeping the
southern colonies without any effective system of education. But their
educational deficiencies were far more due to natural causes, mainly to the
fact that the tillers of the soil were a class permanently doomed to servile
labour, with whom any hope of improvement became more dangerous as it became
more possible. The young Virginian of the upper class either had a tutor at
home, such a one as guided the studies of George and Harry Warrington, or he
was sent to England for education. More than one of the Virginians who played a
conspicuous part in the struggle for independence, such as Dulaney and Arthur
Lee, had been trained at English public schools or universities. One vigorous
attempt was indeed made to introduce higher education into Virginia. After the
Revolution, Compton, Bishop of London, appointed as his commissary in Virginia
an able and public- spirited Scotsman, James Blair. Through his energy,
seconded by that of Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson, and by the liberality of
certain London merchants, a college called that of William and Mary was founded
in Virginia. It is clear, however, that, in spite of Blair’s energy, the
college did not become more than a boarding-school with a somewhat disorderly
set of pupils.
It was not
only in the narrower and more special sense of the term education that the New
England colonies stood out pre-eminent. They alone had something which might be
called a definite and organic school of literature. English thought in the
generation which produced Puritanism was intensely articulate. It instinctively
embodied in words its experiences and aspirations with due regard to literary
form. Of that spirit there was no lack among the founders of New England. For
the New Englander in the young days of his country two subjects overwhelmed all
others—the spiritual life of the individual, and the corporate life of the State.
Thus the literature of early New England falls into two groups—chronicles, and
theological writings. The former are always tinged with partisanship and, with
one or two exceptions, are
uncritical in
their estimate of evidence, but are redeemed by their tone of glowing and
hopeful patriotism, and by a dignity of diction belonging to those who have
assimilated the English Bible till their speech instinctively adopts its form.
To a modem reader the theology of New England, the sermons and the
controversial treatises, can, with very rare exceptions, be nothing but a
weariness. Their dogmatising is for the most part to us meaningless, buried
under the successive strata of thought which three centuries have produced:
their controversial fencing has the cumbrous elaboration and tortuousness which
were the besetting vices of Elizabethan literature. Yet they claim our respect
as written not only by men, but for men, who did not shrink from resolute study
and serious thought.
The type of
writer of whom we speak passed away as New England changed its character. The
New England of 1700, though still orderly, patient and labour-loving, was no
longer the Christian Sparta, merciless in its discipline, crushing the
individual into subjection to the State, yet strengthening him in the process,
at which the founders of Massachusetts had aimed, not without a measure of
success. As the life of Boston becomes more and more a reproduction of decorous
middle-class English life, so the literature of New England becomes more and more
a conventional copy of contemporary English models. We find colonial Steeles
and Addisons and Popes without the redeeming graces of instinctive felicity of
expression and simple elegance. One New England writer of the eighteenth
century, Jonathan Edwards, stands out, it is true, above his fellows. His work
is marked by a force and consecutiveness of thought, an exactness of
expression, and a wealth of illustrative learning which give him a place among
great thinkers. But he is isolated, and in no sense a typical representative of
a contemporary school.
In the
colonies outside New England we have nothing that can be called a school of
literature. We find men in whom colonial life had quickened the habit of
observation, and who have left us vivid descriptions of what was striking in
the physical life of the newly-discovered world. Virginia produced three
writers who at least showed that a colonist could attain a high standard of
culture and expression. Stith’s history of Virginia, published in 1747, the work
of a Virginian clergyman, is fragmentary and uncritical; but it is never tame,
and the style has a rolling dignity such as might have been begotten by a study
of Clarendon. Beverley and Byrd, both Virginian squires, wrote, the former a
history of the colony, the latter a narrative of his exploration in the
backwoods, full of freshness and easy correctness.
In journalism
Boston, as might be expected, led the way, producing in 1704 the first American
newspaper. By 1750 Rhode Tslanrl^ New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
and South Carolina all possessed newspapers of their own.
61
GEORGIA.
In 1732
another colony was added to the twelve already in existence. The foundation of
Georgia was, both in conception and in execution, the work of James Oglethorpe,
as fully as the foundation of Pennsylvania was the work of Penn. Oglethorpe was
bom in 1698. After the Revolution, members of his family adhered to the Stewart
cause; and he did not wholly escape the suspicion of Jacobitism. After a short
military career he settled down on the family property to which he had
succeeded, entered Parliament and became a well-known figure in political life
and in the fashionable and literary society of London. He was chairman of a
Parliamentary committee for inquiring into the state of prisons. What he then
saw and learnt turned his thoughts to the necessity of colonisation. He may be
said to have taken up afresh those conceptions of colonisation which had been
present to the minds of statesmen in the Elizabethan age, but had been overlaid
by other motives.
The
contemporaries of Gilbert and Ralegh thought of colonisation as a national
enterprise, having among its chief objects the relief of the country from the
burden of surplus population, and the creation of a check on Spanish
aggression. In the actual formation and development of the colonies these
considerations had passed out of sight; and the profit of individuals or the
advantage of special religious communities had become the foremost consideration.
Oglethorpe’s design was by the establishment of a colony adjoining South
Carolina to form a home where men, instead of pining in debtors’ prisons, might
live in industry and comfort, and also to establish for the whole body of
colonies a barrier against Spain. Accordingly Oglethorpe and his associates,
amongst them the well-known philanthropist Thomas Coram, obtained from the
Crown a grant of land south of the Savannah river. The grantees were formed
into a corporation entitled “Trustees for the Colonisation of Georgia,” with
full powers of administration for twenty- six years, after which the control of
the colony was to revert to the Crown. For the present the appointment of all
officials was vested in the Trustees; nor were the settlers to enjoy any rights
of self-government save such as the Trustees might grant them of favour. The
needful funds were obtained by contributions from the Trustees themselves, and
by appeals to public benevolence.
In October,
1732, Oglethorpe set sail with 114 settlers. The spot chosen for the settlement
was a high ground on the south bank of the river Savannah, about twenty miles
from its mouth. The site was well chosen, as the river was navigable by large
vessels; while the colony was guarded on the water-side by a high and
precipitous bank, and landwards by the swampy and impenetrable nature of the
country. The settlement
was called
after the name of the river. The frankness and kindliness which were leading
features in Oglethorpe’s character at once won the good-will of the natives,
and relieved the colony from all fear in that quarter. Early in 1736 a second
settlement was formed, and received the name of Frederica. It was on St Simon’s
Island at the mouth of the Alatamaha river, about seventy miles south of
Savannah. The site chosen faced the mainland, and could only be approached
through a narrow strait; and the town was fortified. The colony, though
primarily intended for the good of destitute English citizens, was not wholly
made up of such inhabitants. There were two foreign settlements, one of
Moravians, and one of Protestants from Salzburg who had fled from the severity
of a Homan Catholic archbishop. There was also a settlement of Highlanders, of
great military value to the colony, forming a township called New Inverness, a
little to the north of Frederica. Somewhat later another township was formed at
Augusta, about a hundred miles above Savannah, on the river of that name. This,
however, was rather a station for the Indian trade than a regular town.
In 1736 the
Spaniards in Florida excited Oglethorpe’s suspicion by making an armed
reconnaissance. Finding the colony, however, stronger than they expected, they
abstained from active hostility, and Oglethorpe received a friendly visit from
the Spanish governor. In 1739 war was declared between Great Britain and Spain;
and in the spring of 1740, Oglethorpe, relying on assistance promised from
South Carolina, resolved to invade Florida and to attack the fortified town of
St Augustine. His force consisted of 400 regulars whom he had brought out, two
troops of irregular horse and one of foot, and a company of Highlanders, raised
in the colony. He had also a large force of Indians, and 100 volunteers from
South Carolina, while a fleet of six vessels was to co-operate. He reached St
Augustine, but for various reasons could do nothing against it. The garrison
had been reinforced, and was stronger than Oglethorpe had anticipated; the
government of South Carolina failed to send adequate help; the Indian allies
were, as usual, useless for sustained operations; and, most serious of all,
Oglethorpe had no siege artillery. Moreover on such a coast, intersected by
creeks and often untraversable, it was scarcely possible to keep up regular communication
between the fleet and the land force. The siege had to be abandoned, and
Oglethorpe retired into his own colony; but the Spaniards were not strong
enough to retaliate or even to harass the retreating enemy.
During the
next year the colony was more than once alarmed by the appearance of Spanish
vessels, evidently with hostile purpose; but it was not till 1742 that any
attempt was made at an invasion by land. In that year a force estimated at 5000
men, supported by a fleet of 41 sail, threatened Frederica. The result fully
confirmed what the events of two years earlier had suggested, that in such a
country there were
enormous
advantages on the side of those who acted on the defensive. Over and above the
physical difficulties of the country, the Indians, who were little but an
encumbrance to an organised invading force, were invaluable in harassing an
enemy advancing through their own country. It was clear too that the previous
failure had done nothing to dishearten the settlers or to shake their
confidence in their general. The Spaniards were worsted in two engagements near
Frederica, and their attempts to attack from the sea were equally unsuccessful.
The colony
might now reckon itself safe against foreign invasion. It had not escaped other
dangers almost of necessity inherent in its origin and composition. Care was
taken so fax as possible that the colonists, albeit debtors and paupers, should
not be the refuse of society. But men who had failed in England were not likely
as a rule to make thrifty and industrious colonists, save under exceptionally
favourable conditions; and in Georgia the conditions were distinctly
unfavourable. The climate was one in which only men of unusual resolution and
physical energy, such as were the Salzburgers, could work hard. In the hope of
enforcing industry and sobriety, the Trustees forbade the importation of
negroes and of ardent spirits. An influential party sprang up among the
settlers, which insisted that both the prohibited articles were necessaries of
life. Oglethorpe’s virtues were great and many; but there was along with them a
good deal of the benevolent despot. It is clear that he did not make unpleasant
restrictions smoother by his administration. He also came into conflict with
John Wesley, who, accompanied by his brother Charles, had come out as a minister.
Two such men as Oglethorpe and Wesley, strenuous, self-willed, and sustained by
a firm conviction of the integrity of their own motives, could hardly fail to
quarrel. Wesley, after more than one act of indiscretion and display of
ill-temper, left the colony with a sense of martyrdom.
In 1743
Oglethorpe also departed, never to return. If Georgia had not become all that
its founders hoped, one may at least say that Oglethorpe had attained a far
larger measure of success than most men could have won with such material.
Broken and shiftless men could not be made at once into prosperous and
hard-working citizens. But the colony held together: it fulfilled its function
as an outpost against the Spanish invasion: it had given the settlers a life
far better than that which they left behind. Oglethorpe’s associates had
loyally and disinterestedly discharged their self-imposed duties, and had
administered the colony as a trust for public ends, uninfluenced by any
prospect of personal gain. But they might fairly think that, having launched
the colony, they were absolved from the duty of supporting and controlling it.
In 1752, just twenty years after the foundation of the colony, the Trustees
resigned their charter; and Georgia passed under the direct government of the
Crown. The restrictions on slavery and the use of
spirits had
been already evaded, and were now suffered to lapse. It is clear indeed that
the prohibition of slavery must for some time have been a dead letter, since at
the time of the surrender the population consisted of 2381 whites and 1066
negro slaves.
Before the
surrender the colony had no constitution. All power, legislative and
administrative, was vested in the Trustees; and, though in 1751 a
representative assembly was called, its functions were simply deliberative.
When the colony came under the Crown it received a constitution of the normal
colonial pattern. There was a governor and a council, who together with all the
executive officers were nominated by the Crown, and a representative assembly
elected by the freeholders.
THE COLONIES
AND THE CROWN.
As we have
already seen, the constitutional development of the colonies was by the time of
the Hanoverian accession virtually complete. The chief feature of interest in
their subsequent domestic history lies in the administrative relations between
the colonists and the home government. Unhappily those relations were largely
contentious; and the contention turned chiefly on financial questions. In
Massachusetts there was a prolonged dispute or series of disputes about the
governor’s salary, beginning immediately after the grant of the new charter
under William and Mary. The first governor appointed by the Crown was Sir
William Phipps, a vigorous and enterprising seaman. He was a native of
Massachusetts, by birth one of the people, and in the disputes preceding the
Revolution he had stood loyally by his own colony. His appointment was
distinctly a concession to the feelings and wishes of Massachusetts.
Nevertheless, in spite of his own demand for a fixed salary, the Assembly would
not do more than vote him an annual grant. Exactly the same policy was adopted
towards his successor, Lord Belle- mont. Bellemont was also governor of New
York; and troubles in that colony, arising out of piracy, left him no leisure
to resist the Assembly of Massachusetts.
Bellemont’s
successor, Joseph Dudley, was peculiarly odious to what one may call the
national party in the colony. His father had been one of the strictest and
narrowest among the Puritan founders of Massachusetts. The son had held office
under Andros, and was thus looked on as worse than an open enemy, as a deserter
and an apostate. Dudley, understanding the principles and objects of his
countrymen better than did Bellemont or the advisers of the Crown in England,
saw that the question of fixed salaries to the governor and other officials was
of vital importance. On it turned the question whether the officials were to be
independent servants of the Crown or merely its nominees, dependent after
appointment on the good-will of the Assembly.
The Board of
Trade, acting as the advisers of the Crown on colonial questions, supported
Dudley’s views in favour of fixed salaries. But the Assembly stood firm. In
1705 the two Houses presented a joint address to the governor, in which they
laid down the doctrine that it was “the native privilege and right of English
subjects to raise and dispose of money according to the present exigency of
affairs.” Dudley’s personal unpopularity beyond doubt embittered the dispute.
But the action of the Assembly fifteen years later made it clear that the
contest was one of principle. In 1720 the governorship of Massachusetts was
conferred on William Burnet, son of the Bishop of Salisbury. The father’s
Whiggery and latitudinarianism might be held in the eyes of New Englanders to
wipe out the taint of episcopacy; and the reception given to the son clearly
showed approval of the appointment. But neither Burnet nor the Hanoverian
government which appointed him had any intention of accepting the interpretation
of Whig principles for which the Assembly of Massachusetts was contending. The
Crown adopted the exceptional course of sending out by the governor a distinct
instruction to the Assembly. “ As they hope to recommend themselves to the
continuance of our royal grace and favour, they must manifest the same by
immediate compliance with what has been so often recommended to them.” The
instruction went on to say that the recommendation in question was the payment
of a fixed salary. The amount was specified as at least £1000 ; and the
Assembly was warned that non-compliance would be regarded as “a manifest mark
of un- dutiful behaviour,” and would necessitate the intervention of
Parliament. The Assembly showed that clear and lawyer-like perception of the
real issue which marked the proceedings of the colonists in the great dispute
half a century later. They voted Burnet £1700, but a fixed salary they would
not give. Burnet at length succeeded in winning over the Council, but the
representatives were inflexible; and when he died in 1729 the dispute was still
unsettled.
Burnet’s
successor, Jonathan Belcher, was a rich and influential Boston merchant. He had
been first a representative and then a councillor, and had been sent by the
Assembly to England to plead their cause in the question of salary. No
self-respecting man would have accepted a position which necessarily compelled
him to turn his back on the very principles which he had just advocated.
Belcher’s career had shown that he had an elastic political conscience; and the
advisers of the Crown might have seen that it was a fatal error to entrust
their affairs to a deserter from the popular cause, liable at every moment to
be confronted with his own declarations. Again a fixed salary was demanded and
Parliamentary intervention threatened, and again the demand was refused. This
time the victory of the Assembly was complete. Henceforth the governor was
allowed to accept a grant annually voted; only the condition was imposed and
accepted that
the grant must
be made at the beginning of the session, so that the governor might retain some
measure of independence. There were citizens of Massachusetts engaged in that
dispute who lived to fight the battle of the Stamp Act and the Tea Tax; and we
cannot doubt that the feebleness of the British government in abandoning a
claim so strongly and so persistently asserted was not forgotten by them. It
should be noticed too that the Assembly was fighting not against an immediate
practical grievance which bore hard on individual citizens, but against a
system the evils of which were dormant and potential rather than actual.
Massachusetts
was not the only colony in which the question of taxation gave rise to
conflict. In Virginia, Governor Dinwiddie claimed in 1753 the right to levy a
fee fixed by himself on all documents that required the use of the public seal.
The Assembly protested and petitioned the King. The petition was rejected; but
it appears from Dinwiddie’s letter that the attitude of the Assembly led him to
modify his demands. In Pennsylvania a financial dispute raged between the
Assembly and the Proprietors. The latter claimed that their lands, of which
large tracts were unoccupied and unremunerative, should not be rated on the
same terms as the rest of the colony. The Assembly denied the claim to such
exemption, and in retaliation refused to levy money for public purposes till
the claim was withdrawn, notwithstanding that funds were urgently needed to
protect the colony against Indian and French invaders.
It will be
noticed that all these disputes were Concerned with financial matters, and that
two of them turned on the broad general question, the right of the colonists to
tax themselves. The inevitable result was to give to the colonial conception of
liberty a certain practical definiteness and hardness, to divest it of
sentiment, and to teach men to fight for it in a technical lawyer-like temper.
When Burke said that taxation had been always the battlefield on which the
fight for English liberty was waged, he might have gone further and said that,
of all Englishmen, this was most peculiarly applicable to the American
colonists.
Other
influences had been at work to make them look with suspicion and apprehension
on the financial claims of the British government. Though the hardships of the
restraint imposed by the mother-countiy on the commerce and industry of the
colonies have often been grossly exaggerated, yet it cannot be doubted that
they were enough to create friction and to beget a sense of grievance. The
commercial legislation affecting the trade of the colonies falls under two
heads—the Acts controlling exportation and importation, and those controlling
production. Of the latter we have already spoken. It will probably be
convenient to make a clear enumeration of what the former actually were. By an
Act of 1660 certain enumerated commodities, being all the chief products of the
colonies, could be landed only in British ports. Two later Acts
extended this
restriction. Security must be given at the time of loading that the goods
should be imported either to an English or Scottish port, or to one in a
British colony; and in the last case a duty had to be paid on loading.
Moreover, under the Navigation Act of 1660, European goods might not be
imported into the colonies except in ships either of Britain or the British
colonies, sailing from British ports. This restriction however was relaxed in
the case of salt, which was necessary for the New England fish-curers; moreover
it, did not apply to trade with foreign colonies. But in 1733 an Act was passed
which, if strictly enforced, would no doubt have borne very hardly on the New
England colonies. Large quantities of molasses were habitually imported from
the French West Indian islands into the American colonies and used for making
rum. The British government, for the benefit of its own sugar plantations,
imposed a duty on all molasses imported from foreign colonies.
The view that
these restrictions exercised a crippling influence on the trade and industry of
the American colonies is often met by the answer that they were systematically
and almost universally evaded. It is true that the pamphlets and official
documents of the time are full, of complaints of smuggling; but they seldom are
specific enough to enable us to gauge the real extent of the practice. It must
be remembered too that smuggling meant not only evasion of the British
Navigation Acts, but also evasion of the import duties imposed by the various
colonial governments; and those who complained were not always careful to
discriminate between the two. Undoubtedly the two restraints which bore most
hardly on the colonies were the Molasses Acts and the prohibition to export
tobacco to the continent of Europe. It is certain that both were largely
evaded. A shipowner was bound to report all tobacco loaded on board his vessel,
and to give security for its delivery in a British port. As a matter of feet a
supplementary cargo could be carried out at night in boats and shipped. The
absence of any one chief port in Virginia, and the number of navigable rivers
and therefore of private landing-stages, made effective supervision well- nigh
impossible. The contraband import of European commodities seems to have largely
depended on the above-mentioned contraband export trade. Indeed the two almost
of necessity went together. If an American vessel landed a cargo in a foreign
port, it was clearly better to load with French silk and foreign wine and sail
straight back to an American port, than to excite suspicion by touching at a
British port.
Whatever may
have been the extent of this contraband trade, there can be little doubt that
the commercial restrictions begat a sense of oppression and a habit of evasion.
Yet, in estimating their justice, we must not forget that the mother-country
granted compensatory advantages. The tobacco trade of Virginia was rendered
possible by the prohibition against growing tobacco in Great Britain, while
bounties
were given
for ship-timber and naval stores; but this class of products supplied another
source of dispute, in the persistent and legitimate determination of British
officials to retain the woods and unoccupied land as a source of supply for
naval timber.
There was yet
another fruitful source of dispute between the home government and the colonial
assemblies. The latter were constantly seeking to meet financial difficulties
by the issue of paper-money. The causes of this desire were of two kinds,
commercial and political. All the colonies suffered from lack of specie. In
some the difficulty was partly surmounted by what one may call a system of
modified and legalised barter. In Virginia, as we have seen, tobacco was the
accepted form of currency. In New York beaver-fur held at one time the same
position. There was in New England a curious and complex system by which
certain commodities were declared to be legal tender at a fixed value. As might
have been expected, the vendor indemnified himself by having two prices, one
for specie, the other for what was called “ country pay.”
The deficiency
of specie naturally made men welcome the issue of paper; and this in turn
reacted and diminished the supply of specie. For it is an accepted economical
law that bad money drives out good; or, to put it differently, if one form of
currency will circulate more generally than another, no one will introduce that
other into an area where both forms are of equal value, or keep it there. The
demand for paper-money was further strengthened by administrative
considerations; for if payment in kind is inconvenient to the private trader,
much more is it so to the collector of public dues. Moreover there is a natural
tendency on the part of young and hopeful communities to escape from financial
difficulties by mortgaging their future.
The problem
of raising funds for public purposes was also beset by special difficulties.
For while there was plenty of wealth in the colonies, that wealth was mostly in
the hands of men actively engaged in trade, and thus took the form of floating
capital, not of those accumulations which are the easy and obvious prey of the
public financier.
It was
natural that the home government should oppose such a policy, for the real
inconveniences of a paper currency made themselves felt far more in
intercolonial than in internal trade. Thus we find the records of almost every
colony full of disputes between governors endeavouring to carry out their
instructions prohibiting the issue of paper-money, and assemblies bent on
taking a short road to financial relief and prosperity. In 1720 an order was issued
by the King in Council forbidding governors of colonies in America to sanction
the issue of bills of credit. It may be doubted how far this instruction was
held to apply to the proprietary or chartered colonies, two of
which—Pennsylvania and Rhode Island—were among the chief offenders. But this
limitation did not apply to an Act of Parliament passed in
1744
containing the same prohibition. Since the belief in the enriching power of a
paper currency is a delusion deeply rooted in the human mind, we may be sure
that the action of the Crown and of Parliament was looked upon as a real and
serious grievance.
The
ill-advised attempt of James II to consolidate the colonies north of the Hudson
into a single province bore witness to the necessity of some form of
administrative union. There is hardly a bundle of colonial papers from 1700 to
1750 which does not contain some document insisting on that necessity. The one
redeeming feature of Leisler’s career was that he convened a meeting of
deputies from the northern colonies to make arrangements for an invasion of
Canada. The convention met at New York in May, 1690. Unhappily Leisler’s
arrogant and tactless disposition prevented any practical result. In 1751 the
governor of New York invited representatives of all the thirteen colonies to
confer with the Iroquois confederacy about an alliance; but nothing was aimed
at in the nature of permanent union. In 1754 William Shirley, one of the most
vigorous of colonial governors, obtained the permission of the British government
to summon a convention of colonial representatives at Albany. A scheme for a
federal union was then laid before them, drawn up by perhaps the ablest and
most statesmanlike man who had as yet borne any part in colonial affairs,
Benjamin Franklin.
Franklin’s
scheme for colonial union was approved of by the Convention. He proposed a
council elected by the colonies, with a president appointed by the Crown. The
difficulty of proportioning representation to the population of the various
colonies and yet preventing the smaller colonies from being virtually
annihilated was surmounted, not, as in the later Federal Constitution, by
establishing two chambers, but by varying the number of representatives
assigned to the different colonies, and giving to none less than two or more
than seven. The president was to have a veto, the Crown a further veto.
Military appointments were to be made by the president and approved by the
council, civil appointments vice versa. The administrative functions of the
council were virtually limited to three subjects— defensive war, Indian trade,
and the distribution of unoccupied lands. The weak point of the system was that
it provided no machinery whereby the council could exercise any authority over
individual citizens, or could even enforce its decision on a refractory
province. The scheme was disapproved by many of the colonists as giving too
much power to the Crown. It was rejected by the home government as giving too
much independence to the colonies. In this Franklin ingeniously found a proof
that he had hit upon the happy mean.
THE FRENCH IN
AMERICA.
The French empire
in the New World has vanished, leaving behind it ineffaceable monuments of the
grand political conception of which it formed part. Wherever that empire had an
actual existence, the distinctively national French characteristics still
appear, little if at all weakened by change of sovereignty and long lapse of
time. Even if no vital forces had survived its decay, its historical literature
alone would stand as a worthy monument of the great past. The story of that
past is known in marvellous detail—in detail to which British colonial history
can scarcely offer a parallel. All that can be attempted here is to mark the
chief stages in the rise of the French power and to analyse the elements of
strength and weakness shown in the development of Canada, Acadia, Louisiana,
the French Antilles and French Guiana. The fact that the course of British
colonisation runs closely parallel serves to point the meaning of the
chronological sequence of events and to assist by contrast the analysis of the
French colonial character.
Although the
tropical and temperate colonies cannot for most purposes be treated as one, yet
the changes in the system of government of each coincide so closely that the
history of them all falls conveniently into well-defined periods. The first
period, that of inchoation, ends with the creation of the two Companies, the
Company of New France, and the Company of the Isles of America, in 1627. Their
period of rule ends in 1664, when Colbert created his Company of the West.
Colbert’s period, 1664-83, may be treated as one; for, although it divides
sharply in 1674, when the great Company of the West ceased to he, and when the
colonies passed under the control of the Crown, Colbert’s scheme possesses a
unity which absorbs the subordinate question of trade monopoly. The fourth
period, 1683-1713, covers the attempted foundation of Louisiana, shows Canada
militant and West Indian trade nascent. In conclusion, the period from the
Treaty of Utrecht to the Treaty of Paris, 1713 to 1763, covers the death-
struggle of New France and opens the golden age of the French sugar-islands.
The English
priority in successful settlement was of about twelve
months only. The
last unsuccessful attempt at a French Canadian settlement happened to coincide
with the first successful planting of a permanent English colony in Virginia.
In 1608 the first permanent French colony was planted in Canada; and the New
World rivalry began. But as in both France and England the memory of past
discovery still lived, educated opinion dated the rivalry yet further back. The
French looked back to Verrazzano as the English looked back to Cabot. The
direction of French efforts was determined for all time by the discoveries of
Cartier, 1584-41; by the raising of the royal arms in the mysterious Norumbega,
Canada, and Hochelaga; by Roberval’s attempted colony of “ New France ”; by the
fort erected at Quebec. Powerful to influence the imaginations of English and
French alike were the fate of Ribault and Laudonniere’s Huguenot colony in “
Carolina,” 1562-65, and the story of Hawkins’ visit to it, of its fate at the
hands of the Spaniards, and of the French vengeance. Nor had the fishermen of
the two countries waited for politicians to direct them in search of a harvest
in the New World.
Already a few
French traders, undirected by authority, found profit in trading with the
natives for their furs in the Tadoussac district on the northern shores of the
mouth of the St Lawrence, when in 1598 the Marquis de la Roche, like another
Gilbert, decided to renew the letters patent which he had received in 1578 and
to settle a colony there, as lieutenant-general of the King in Canada,
Hochelaga, the Newfoundlands, Labrador, the river of the Great Bay, Norumbega
and the adjacent islands. Backed by a company possessed of the monopoly of
trade in this unknown region of many names, a colony of forty men reached Sable
Island, a barren sandbank off the coast of what is now Nova Scotia. The Marquis
returned, and the colony was not revisited till 1603, when the miserable
remnant of twelve came home. But the merchants of Dieppe, Rouen, St Malo and
Rochelle, eager to seek a share in the monopoly of the nascent fur-trade, supported
the next patentee, the Huguenot de Monts, who in 1603 was styled Lieutenant of
the King in New France or La Cadie (said to be the Micmac Akade), between the
40th and 46th degrees. A settlement was made in 1605 at Port Royal, now
Annapolis in Nova Scotia, and de Poutrincourt received the first grant of land.
In 1607 the colony was abandoned, and de Monts with difficulty got his charter
renewed for one year. He then made good use of his time; Port Royal was
re-established, and the explorer Champlain, who had already visited the coasts
afterwards to be known as those of New England, extended the range of trade so
far that a habitation was built at Quebec. A first winter was successfully
passed, and there never again ceased to be French colonists on the St Lawrence.
Champlain in the first instance seems to have desired settlement mainly as a
means of supporting exploration and missionary work. For these purposes he
chose the northern shores of the St Lawrence. The small settlement at Port
Royal offered
no opening for the discovery of an inland waterway westward, none for a wide
range of dealings with the Indians; from the first, then, the Acadian and the
Canadian settlements were unfortunately separated. In its haphazard character,
the choice of Acadia for settlement seems English rather than French, and
remains a memorable exception to the French rule of attempting at least an
apparent unity. The necessity for union between Canada and Acadia was
ultimately perceived, notably by Talon; but the two colonies which formed New
France never succeeded in adding to each other’s strength.
An indication
of an early intention on the part of the Crown to treat the colonies on
imperial principles appears in the title “ Viceroy,” long before given to
Roberval and now again to Conde, as whose agent Champlain acted from 1612 with
the title “lieutenant-general.” But a company of merchants continued as before
to supply the funds.
The
missionary purpose having been constantly advanced as a main portion of the
intended colonial work, Conde in 1615 allowed the Franciscan Recollets to join
the settlement. The Jesuit Fathers were also seeking to establish missions, on
the model of those of Paraguay begun in 1609. Their opportunity came after the
assassination of Henry IV, when, in 1611, the Marquise de Guercheville won the
Queen-mother’s support and obtained leave to plant all the land from Florida to
Canada except the already granted Port Royal. The result was a third and
short-lived settlement, in which the missionary object was for the first time
the sole acknowledged aim, planted in Penobscot Bay and called St Sauveur.
In 1606 James
I had chartered two companies to plant between the 34th and 45th degrees,
granting them exclusive trade in return for homage and a fifth of treasure. The
southern colony of the London Company alone flourished, but it grew rapidly and
in 1611 numbered 700 souls. When the news of French settlements within the 45th
degree was brought to Jamestown, the order for their destruction was issued.
Port Royal and St Sauveur were wiped out in 1613, and the English thus first
forcibly entered claims to a supremacy which they were unable to maintain Some
protest was made, but the justice of the claim was not then* discussed between
the two nations; Madame de Guercheville was able to secure compensation for her
personal losses only.
Meanwhile
under Champlain’s leadership the waterways were methodically traced out from
the St Lawrence to the southern end of Lake Champlain, and on the west to the
head of Lake Ontario and along the Ottawa. It was Champlain’s energy and the
zeal of the R ^collet missionaries which kept the little settlement from actual
diminution. When in 1625 the Jesuits arrived in Canada, the population of the
fort varied from 50 to 60; and only about twenty acres were under tillage. The
trade monopolists had felt no interest in the creation of a self-supporting
colony; trading-posts sufficed for their purposes, and Champlain was not able
to promote a wider polity, until in 1627 he won the sympathy
of
Richelieu, whose desire to secure a great sea-power made him perceive the
wisdom of enlarging the limits not only of French trade but also of French
settlement. «'■**
The decay of
the Spanish empire opened to the Dutch, the French and tie English the
possibility of a colonial expansion which fitted in with, and was necessary to,
the development of the political and commercial ideas of more far-sighted
thinkers. Commercial and political principles combined to point the necessity
for a navy strong enough to protect the colonial trade, and to prevent all
other nations from sharing in its profits. Colonies produced saleable
commodities; and the carrying-trade developed a mercantile marine. A subsidiary
consideration was the desire to secure strategic coigns of vantage and
convenient stations for receiving a fleet in distress. The time had not yet
come for the development of wider views. Indeed, the possibility of
depopulating the mother-country was acknowledged to be a serious danger;
nothing had occurred to suggest hopes of great racial expansion.
The risks
involved in colonial speculation were still so considerable, and the amount of
superfluous capital was still so small, that the Dutch, French and English as
yet saw no means to develop colonial trade other than the privileged company,
forgetful of the many occasions on which the timely arrival of an unlicensed
vessel had saved a dying colony. Richelieu’s creation of the Company of New
France, consisting of one hundred and twenty Associates, in 1627, marks an
epoch in the development of French colonisation, inasmuch as now for the first
time government support was offered to supply the want of adequate voluntary
contributions. The Association was on a larger scale than the earlier
companies; its acknowledged purpose was wider; and the subscribers (one of whom
was Richelieu) were men of very different ranks. The twelve largest
shareholders were to be ennobled, and many privileges were extended to those
who took up the stock. The Company’s merchandise was exempted from customs, and
the King promised to provide two vessels of war for the Company’s service.
Entire possession of the soil was given to the Company, together with rights of
justice and lordship, from Florida to the Arctic Circle, and the monopoly of
all trade, except in the cod and whale fisheries, which were free to all French
subjects. In return, the Company rendered homage and fealty, and submitted to
certain conditions. Two or three hundred artificers were to go to Canada at
once, and in the course of fifteen years at least 4000 men and women were to be
sent, and maintained for three years. All emigrants were to be French and
Catholic, and for each habitation three ecclesiastics were to be provided by
the Company. The missionary purpose was put forward prominently. But the
capital of the Company amounted only to 800,000 livres; and here was a
principal source of weakness. The experiences of the Virginian Company, under
more favourable conditions, proved that a far larger capital was necessary.
Still more
inadequate was the capital provided for the French Company of the Isles of
America, viz. 45,000 livres, of which Richelieu subscribed 10,000. While on the
mainland France and England were entering claims extending from Florida to the
Arctic Circle, and from the 34th to the 45th degree respectively, in the West
Indian islands similarly extensive and unsubstantial claims were entered by
both parties, and again with a close coincidence in date. As the Spanish
supremacy lapsed, the smaller West Indian islands were deserted and left open
to adventurers of all nationalities. The Englishman Warner and the Frenchman
d’Esnambuc alike selected St Kitt’s, one of the Leeward Islands, deserted by
the Spaniards, as one of the most convenient whence to direct attacks on a larger
spoil. It is possible that the two rivals chose the same island in order to use
each other’s alliance in case of danger from Spain. Both foresaw great
opportunities in the future, and both came home to seek government support in
their undertakings. To the French Company were granted all the islands not
possessed by Christian princes that lay between the 11th and 18th degrees, with
a reservation of a tithe of the produce to the King for twenty years. The
English counter-step was the grant of all the Caribbean Islands between the
10th and 20th degrees to the proprietary government of the Earl of Carlisle
(1627).
Similarly, in
Guiana a company of Rouen merchants, in 1626, sought to follow up beginnings
which dated from La Ravardiere’s enterprise (1604); but here again the English
had entered claims by more than one attempted settlement. But the dangers of
the climate, the hostility of the natives and the jealousy of the Dutch and
Portuguese, long made permanent settlement impossible alike to French and English.
The long story of failure is interesting mainly as an indication of the wide
geographical range which the Anglo-French colonial conflict covered from the
earliest period.
The second
period of French colonial history, from 1627 to 1664, is a period of quiescence,
in which slowly but surely some of the main roots struck. The brilliant hopes
for Canada’s future, which the Company of New France had raised in French
bosoms, were doomed to an abrupt disappointment; for the English colonists
seized the opportunity created by an outbreak of hostilities with France, to
cut off the fleet sent to the relief of the Catholic colony. The scheme of
attack, directed by the Kirkes, the Calvinist sons of a Scotch settler in
Dieppe, was so well concerted that in 1629 Champlain and the little fort of
Quebec had no choice but to surrender, and, till the peace of St Germain 1632,
New France was an English possession.
For a time
the English claim threatened pressure at all points. The work of Guy and
Calvert promised permanent settlement in Newfoundland. The foundation of
colonies at Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay showed that the question of the
Acadian frontier must grow serious.
In 1621 James
I granted to Sir William Alexander the “isle and continent of Norumbega ”; the
continental portion to be styled New Alexandria, the peninsular Nova Scotia. In
1627 Alexander’s son made a settlement opposite Port Royal, and the son of La
Tour, the French successor to de Poutrincouft, withdrew to Cape Sable. With the
formal restoration of Canada and Acadia in 1632, a better regulated attempt at
their colonisation followed; but the proposal to make three provinces of
Canada, Port Royal and Cape Breton rendered La Tour jealous of the rival
governors, and he encouraged interference from the now flourishing New
Englanders. In 1656, with Cromwell’s co-operation, the Acadian settlement once
more passed to the English and was granted to Sir Thomas Temple, who vigorously
developed it. But in 1667 Charles IPs French sympathies compelled the restoration
of the much debated territory. No boundary-line however long remained
satisfactory to both parties, and the weakness of the French colony exposed it
to continual attacks on the part of its powerful neighbour. Eventually the
Kennebec river was to become notorious as a sort of “no-man’s land” where
encroachments might, or might not, constitute serious offences according as
the exigencies of the moment, and the readiness of the rival parties to proceed
to larger issues, should determine.
After the
restoration of Canada the zeal of the Company began to fall off; and in 1663
the population was only 2500, at a time when the town of Boston numbered 14,300
inhabitants, and Virginia over 80,000. A main cause of the backwardness of
Canada lay in the particular circumstances that the colonists were called upon
to meet. Unluckily for France, Champlain’s arrival in Canada had coincided with
the rise of the Iroquois confederacy of Five Nations and the outbreak of
hostilities between the races south of the St Lawrence and the Algonquin races,
inhabiting the Lake districts and the River valley. It was natural and
necessary that the scanty band of settlers should seek a friendly alliance with
the natives whose habitations lay nearest to them or into whose lands they
pushed their explorations; but these natives happened to belong to tribes
destined ultimately to succumb in one of the internecine wars which had
continually thinned the native population of America. The hostile confederacy
is believed to have numbered in the height of its power not more than 2200
fighting men; but the race of the Mohawks, Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, and
Oneidas, who made up the Five Nations, was superior in quality to that of the
Algonquins and Hurons, the French allies. Their power of permanent
confederation supplies evidence enough of their superiority. By lucky accident
the English settlements escaped the path of the Iroquois. The tribes that had
occupied the New England coasts had been devastated by disease shortly before
the arrival of the Puritans, and in Virginia too none of the tribes that were
dislodged belonged to the races whom a great future awaited. The path of the
Iroquois naturally stretched northward and westward to the
hunting
grounds, rather than east of the AUeghanies to the coast. Even if the future
growth of the Iroquois power could have been foreseen, a neutral position was
impossible for intruders so weakly supported as were the early French traders.
According to Champlain’s belief he and a force of 120 soldiers supported by his
two or three thousand savage allies could force English and Dutch to retire to
the coasts, and could then keep the general peace with the Iroquois.
A policy of
extermination was no part of the French scheme. It was Champlain’s hope that
the beginnings of New France might be made easy hy a warm friendship with the
Indians. If a large French population failed to emigrate, the example of the
Spanish colonies showed that the natives themselves could be used as labourers.
In order to be gallicised, the Indians must be converted, and the converts must
be protected from the raids of the heathen. But the veiy process of conversion
and protection, the insidious effects of contact with civilisation, and the
pressure of repeated Iroquois attack, involved the unintentional destruction of
the tribes whose alliance was most easily secured.
The position
of the Hurons in the neighbourhood of Lake Simcoe had made them a defence to
the tribes north of the lakes; with the fall of the Hurons the Algonquins were
the next exposed. Thus it happened that the missionary work which engaged the
best efforts of the French from 1632 to 1664 was deprived of a large part of
its usefulness; and during this period it was missionary work alone that met
with enthusiastic support at home.
The members
of the Company in whose hands the future of the colony lay, for the most part
perceived that their chances of personal profit depended on the fur-trade. A
large population of French farmers was not to their advantage; for agriculture
diminished the profits of the chase, and in a forest-countiy yielded a low
return. No chartered company had yet found profit in an agricultural colony,
and the northern shores of the St Lawrence, being the coldest portion of the
country, offered the least hope. Quebec, Three Rivers, and Montreal, each
ninety miles distant from its neighbour, were planned as trading-posts only. Of
the total population one-third was gathered at Quebec, the least sheltered and
least fertile of the three. During the long winter there was no communication
between the three posts except on snow- shoes. So slight was the Company’s
success even in the fur-trade—for systematic fraud on the part of its officials
could not be effectually checked—that the temporary cession of its privileges
was found to be advantageous. In 1645 the Canadian colonists ohtained the
fur-trade in return for an annual payment of a thousand pounds weight of
beaver-skins. The Company still allowed no stranger to go to Canada except on
its own vessels, and fixed a tariff for the purchase of furs. The Company chose
the Governor-General, and on rare occasions he was assisted by a Council
consisting of
the Superior of the Jesuits, and of three syndics representing the inhabitants
of Quebec, Montreal and Three Rivers. Appeal might be made from the judicial
decisions of this council to the parlement at Rouen. The habitants, who came
for the most part from Normandy, were free from litigious spirit, and such
disputes as arose were settled by the governor in the way of arbitration.
The emigrants
from France consisted mainly of humble artificers who bound themselves to work
for three years without payment, in return for their passage and keep. At the
end of the three years they might hope to receive a grant of land en roture
from one of the lords of lands whom the Company had enfeoffed; or, if they
preferred a life of adventure, they entered the fur-trade. The number of
enterprising heads of families seeking to raise the family fortunes by taking
up a grant of land en seigneurie was as yet very small. Beyond an increase of
dignity, such grants offered little advantage. A seigneurial grant of some ten
leagues by twelve was merely hunting-ground, unless the lord could obtain
labourers willing to take grants en censive or en roture, who paid a nominal
rent per acre, together with some agricultural service on the lord’s demesne.
The burden of defence was great when the danger of Indian raids grew serious;
and agriculture was not as a rule carried on except in close proximity to the
three forts.
The men to
whom emigration offered the greatest attraction during this period were not
those who sought to found a family or fortune, but those who sought the crown
of martyrdom, or, if life at all, a life of religions devotion and perpetual
celibacy. Monastic sentiment found in the French colonies a remarkable revival.
The Jesuit father’s reflexion, “should we at last die of misery how great our
happiness will be,” animated men to endure hideous mutilations and agonising
sufferings at the hands of the Indian enemy, and made them indifferent to
starvation, thirst, fatigue and the torments of Canadian forest travel. Women
too crowded to the new country in order to deny themselves the pleasures of the
old, to tend the Indians dying of small-pox, and to teach Indian girls to seek
with them the crown of virginity. The growth of religious institutions was for
the present out of all proportion to the development of the State, which above
all things required population. But the lines of Jesuit enterprise were fairly
varied. Unlike the Recollets, the Jesuits were under no vow of poverty and
encouraged agriculture and trade with that definiteness of purpose which they
possessed by virtue of their intellectual superiority. At home their work was
kept constantly in mind by their writings, by their appeals for help, and by
the Crown itself.
In all but
population and strength to resist the Iroquois the little colony stood well.
Men of bad character were not allowed to stay, and care for the education and
well-being of the Indians was a first thought with those who had power.
Humanitarian influences were
unusually
strong, and the evils which generally accompany the movements of alien
settlers, whose civilisation is in advance of their environ--, ment, were
conspicuously absent.
In what has
been called the second period of French colonisation, 1627-64, the close
parallel which marked the nascent stages of the French and the English
settlements in the tropical islands ceases; for the English colony in Barbados
developed with astonishing rapidity and completely eclipsed the French islands.
The isolated situation of Barbados far to the windward, the work done by the
Dutch, and the character of the English immigration, made it possible early to
exploit the fertility of this small island, which is only about the size of the
Isle of Wight; and in their turn the other islands would be exploited. Very
wild figures have been given as to the population of Barbados in 1650; they
serve mainly as an indication that immense prosperity was believed to exist
there. In 1650 half an estate of 500 acres, of which 200 were under cane, sold
for ,£7000. In 1636 there were about 6000 English in the island; in 1656,
25,000 Christians; in 1643, 6400 negroes; in 1666, 50,000. But the first
twenty-five years of rapid development were followed by a gradual decay. The
destruction of the woods deprived Barbados of rain; and the white proprietors
began to migrate. In 1676 it was however still inhabited by 21,000 whites, and
by over 32,000 negroes. In the same way Jamaica developed after the English
conquest, but not with such startling rapidity.
Neither
Martinique nor Guadaloupe witnessed anything like an equal progress in
population. At first the Company of the Isles of America, or of St Christopher
as it was also called, had been powerless to exclude foreign trade; and for
this reason the islands began to flourish, and the Company then began to crave
the returns which it believed to be dne to its expenditure. When a royal order
had been issued closing the trade to foreigners the Company was reconstituted
with larger capital and privileges (1635). It now aspired to settle all the
islands unoccupied, or where joint occupation could be effected, as at St
Kitt’s. Its sovereignty was conditional on the despatch of 4000 French
Catholics within twenty years, with due ecclesiastical provision. The
condition, which in Canada was not fulfilled, was in this case quickly
satisfied. Nevertheless, the failure of the Company became far more rapidly
obvious in the islands than in Canada; for the openings for contraband trade
were here almost unlimited, and could be checked only by a large and ubiquitous
fleet. The Company overcharged the colonists for European goods, and fixed low
prices on the tobacco and other goods which they offered for sale.
Consequently, a flourishing Dutch trade soon carried off all the shareholders’
profits, and the Company decided to make the best bargain possible by selling
the islands to would-be proprietors.
In 1661
Colbert succeeded Mazarin as Controller of Finance; and
the Ministry
of Marine came under his reforms.. He seized the opportunity opened by a
proposed Company of Equinoctial France centring in Cayenne, to form a scheme
for the consolidation of the whole of the French colonies in Canada, the West
Indies and Guiana under one great Company, to be controlled by himself. The
prices at which the islands had been sold and were now bought back give the
best view of their relative value. Martinique with the adjacent islands had
been sold for 60,000 livres and developed so well under proprietary government,
through the introduction of sugar industries by Dutch Jews, that it now cost
240,000. The claims sold to the Maltese Knights for 120,000 livres now cost
500,000; and Guadaloupe and its adjacent islands, sold for 73,000 livres, cost
125,000 to buy back.
In 1664
letters patent were issued constituting a new Company of the West, with a
monopoly of trade for forty years in Canada, Acadia, Newfoundland, the
Antilles, Cayenne and the land between the Orinoco and the Amazon, as also on
all the coast of Africa, from Cape Verde to the Cape of Good Hope, and in
particular on the coast of Guinea and Senegal, so that a supply of slaves might
be forthcoming. The number of shareholders was unlimited, and official and
social privileges of many kinds were offered by the government to large
subscribers. The government offered a bounty on every ton of merchandise
imported or exported, and freedom from duty on all goods re-exported from
France and on the export of military stores or provisions for shipping. It also
proposed to contribute a tenth of the total capital yearly for the next four
years, and afterwards to continue this endowment as a loan. The Company was to
have entire lordship over the whole of the lands named, saving only homage to
the King; also full powers to fortify, to form alliances, and to engage in war.
Subinfeudation was not made compulsory; nor were any terms imposed except that
the Company, remembering the King’s sacred purpose to convert the savage
nations, should send out clergy and build churches. All emigrants, all children
bom in the colonies, and all converted natives were to have the privileges of
naturalised Frenchmen. The nomination of governors and officials lay with the
Company; and an annual meeting of the Chamber of Direction was to be held in
Paris.
The
government offered all these privileges in order to attract the necessary
capital for colonisation on a grand scale. The close relation of the Company to
the government renders the French scheme of chartered companies unlike that of
other countries. It was in fact only a step to the ultimate buying out of the
shareholders, which, as no conditions were dictated to the Company, was
doubtless foreseen by Colbert. From the first the Company tacitly allowed the
Crown to appoint the chief officials. The lieutenant-general and the governors
of the islands, being invested with militaiy powers, corresponded with the
King and with
Colbert, not with the Company. The slight governmental functions left to its
nominees were carefully regulated, so as to allow of supervision by the Crown.
Colbert’s
intention of dealing with the transatlantic possessions of France as a whole
and of protecting them adequately, was clearly shown in 1664 by the despatch of
a squadron under the Marquis de Tracy, with powers as lieutenant-general over
all the governors, to make a general inspection of Guiana, the Antilles and
finally of Canada. In Canada the necessity of sending disciplined soldiers to
break the Iroquois power had long been pressing. A force of 1200 men was sent
out; and the result of their brief campaign was to change for a time the
relations of the Iroquois to the French Canadians. The Iroquois power was not
yet extinguished, but it was so far broken that their chief hope now lay in
taking advantage of French and English enmity and in forming alliances with the
one or the other as best suited the needs of the moment. The immediate result
of the expedition was that roads were made, and forts and missions established,
along the line of the River Richelieu and Lake Champlain.
The advance
of the French frontier along this southward waterway implied the danger of
conflict with the English on fresh ground. The Iroquois had hitherto served as
a bulwark between the Dutch in the New Netherlands and the French in Canada. In
1664, again by a few months only, the English were the first to see the
necessity of removing the feeble Dutch power which was the one obstacle to
continuous settlement along the American coast. By way of exchange for
Surinam, the New Netherlands became the English New York (1667). Talon, the
Canadian mtendant, with his usual foresight, wrote in 1666 of the necessity
that the French should find on the Hudson a second entry to Canada, one which
was not .blocked with ice half the year, which would break the English power in
its centre, and cut off the English trade with the Iroquois. Although Talon was
not allowed to carry out his scheme, the mixed character of the population of
New York, their want of sympathy with their neighbours, the ready means of
approach by the Lake route, and the exposure of the colony to Iroquois attack,
enabled the French for half a century to nurse the hope that it might one day
be theirs.
The Carignan
regiment which had been sent to quell the Iroquois was disbanded in Canada; and
every effort was made to form military cantonments of officers and men who
would settle and protect the Richelieu River. The officers were to receive
seigneuries, and the men cash and a year’s subsistence, if they would take up
the lands there. During the ten years 1664-74 the population of Canada trebled
under the careful guidance of Talon and Colbert. Emigration, settlement, early
marriage, and large families, were encouraged by every device and decree that
could suggest itself within the limits set by considerations of religion and
nationality. The neighbourhood of the heretical Dutch and
English
population was deemed to make it doubly necessary to exclude the schismatics,
lest heretics should become traitors. Free maintenance, bonuses on marriage, on
large families, fines on celibacy, the despatch of shiploads of young women,
and the forcible prevention of return home were among the means tried to
stimulate artificially the increase of population. Louis XIV watched the Canada
censuses so closely that he was continually disappointed at what seemed to him
slow progress; and, in the end, the artificial encouragements were withdrawn.
During these
ten years the form of government, the main lines of which ultimately became
fixed in Canada, was gradually shaped. From the first the governor’s power had
been checked by the Superior of the Jesuits, or by the bishop who acted in
their interests. In 1665 the King added further an intendant, as successor to
the Company’s agent-general, with full powers in justice, police and finance. A
clear differentiation of functions was purposely avoided; the governor, with
mainly military functions, was ordered to act harmoniously with the intendant;
and, if conflict arose, Colbert at home decided which official should return.
The bishop, as the one permanent member of Council, could check both, and made
his power felt through his disciplined army of seminary priests, trained to the
control of consciences, and to the use of the weapons of the confessional and
of excommunication. Nor was it the intention of Louis XIV to disturb this power
so long as it was not used in a manner derogatory to his own sovereignty. The
Council, chosen by the Company while it lasted, and on its lapse by the King or
the governor, was to be summoned by the joint action of governor and intendant.
It sat weekly as a judicial body at the intendance; and from its judgments
there was an appeal to the Cornell d'etat at Paris.
At first it
seemed likely that municipal institutions would develop. In 1663 a meeting of
the habitants of Quebec and its bamlieu was convoked to proceed by election to
the choice of a mayor and two bailiffs. The election threatened to become a
reality; whereupon the system was cancelled, and the municipal idea was rooted
out from Canada. De Tracy urged Talon to avoid any “balance of authority among
subjects,” which might lead to a dismemberment of the community. In 1672 the
Comte de Frontenac had assembled the habitants to take the oath of fealty and
had divided them into three estates, as de Tracy himself had done in the West
Indies. Thereupon Colbert wrote the celebrated letters ordering Frontenac to
follow the example of the home government, where the Kings, he says, have for
some time ceased to assemble the States-General, in order insensibly to put a
stop to that ancient form. The syndic who presents requests in the name of all
the habitants must cease to be appointed when the colony grows stronger, since
it is well that each should speak for himself and that no one should speak for
all.
The Council,
which consisted of only seven members till in 1703
the number
was raised to twelve, had no power to levy taxation; and none was levied. The
law of the land was now made uniform under the Custom of Paris, and the Custom
of the French Vexin which had been partially introduced was abolished. Thus a
form of Roman Law well adapted to a municipal community was extended to a
nascent colony that was essentially rural. The forms of law had however the
merit of uniformity, simplicity, and cheapness; and care was taken in the
organisation of a system of police for the three Canadian towns. The decrees
issued by the Council cover matters large and small, from tithe, the size of
the seigneuries, feudal dues, provision for the poor, down to rules of
precedence, nuisances and the cleaning of the streets. The ordonnances of the
intendant direct the enclosing of habitations, and make building regulations
and market-laws; while, as representative of the King in finance, he also
regulates the coinage. The tendency was for legislation to pass more and more
under his control and out of that of the governor.
The system on
which lands were laid out by the French in Canada is of peculiar interest as
throwing light on the method of procedure in earlier agricultural colonies. The
great seigneuries of ten by twelve leagues were enfeoffed to the roturiers in
strips measuring, as a rule, three arpents (each of 100 perches in width by 30
in depth), each strip running from a river frontage. The dwelling- houses were
placed at the river end of the strips; and thus a row of farmsteads was formed,
which even in the most scantily peopled regions allowed some indulgence to
French social inclinations. Each strip was cultivated by a tenant and his
family; on his death, by the Custom of Paris, equal division (subject to
certain exceptions) was the mode of succession. The strips were divided
longitudinally, with results not a little injurious to agriculture. In 1745 it
was ordered that every habitant must have 1^ arpents of frontage. A strip even
of this width was not convenient in form, since it made central supervision
impossible and access to the remote portions of the holding difficult, while
requiring a large amount of enclosure. Throughout the French occupation the
methods of agriculture were most primitive. The cleared land was tilled until
exhausted, when fresh land was cleared, the tilled land being left to lie
fallow under weeds on which the tenant’s few beasts pastured.
The method of
land-tenure was ill adapted to the circumstances of Canada, where the initial
difficulties of clearing forest land were immense. It excluded the possibility
of a metairie system, which so greatly assists the young agricultural colony
where capital is plentiful and labourers are not highly skilled; and it
excluded the freehold system which gives scope for the independent efforts of
the individual. The “franc alleu roturier,” which most nearly approached the
English « free socage,” was very sparingly admitted in Canada, more freely in
the West Indies.
A heavy tax
on the alienation of lands, in the case of the seigneur the payment of a fifth
of the value of the estate, in the case of the tenant the payment of lods et
ventes, though both were customarily lower in Canada than in France, was
injurious to the development of uncultivated lands, and, as Adam Smith pointed
out, robbed the colony of its prime source of prosperity, an abundance of cheap
land. The liability of the tenants to promiscuous forced labour in the lord’s
service (after 1711 harvest time was excepted, and after 1716 the service was
made commutable for 20 sous yearly per arpent), the inability of the cemitaire
to subinfeudate, the initial absence of obligation on the lord to infeudate, too
late corrected, the rule which allowed only two- thirds of the fee to be
infeudated, were injurious features.
But Canada
was not troubled with absentee landlords ; the relations of the seigneurs and
the roturiers were singularly close and friendly; and the passionate military,
national and religious spirit that animated all alike, dignified the bond. The
lord had, according to his grant, “ haute,” “ moyenneor “ basse ” justice over
his tenants, until in 1714 it was ordered that no such grants of jurisdiction
should be made. The large number of cases that came before the Council would
seem to indicate that the liberty to erect gallows and pillory and to enforce
jurisdiction over tenants was not generally exercised by the lords. It was to
the advantage of the tenants in the early period that it was made incumbent on
the lords to erect mills and to lay out roads, though the tenant’s com paid its
multure of one-fourteenth of the grain ground, and the tenants had to make the
roads themselves. The lord’s supposed obligation of defence fell also of course
on the tenants. Every man capable of bearing arms between the ages of 14 and 70
was bound to military service and drilled with a regularity unknown to the
English colonial militia. The Canadian tenant was constantly engaged in active
warfare, choosing the winter for his campaigns if possible, as summer warfare
meant certain famine.
The seigneury
in many cases formed a parish, and lord and priest worked as a rule
harmoniously, except, it might be, on the question of precedence, which set the
highest officials of Church and State constantly at issue. Many were the
decrees of the Council upon this subject, and also regarding the amount of
Church-tithe. Originally fixed at the ruinous proportion of one-thirteenth of
all increase, it was lowered to one twenty-sixth of thrashed grain, with an
exemption for five years on newly cleared ground. In 1667 Talon wrote that the
clerical estate consisted of a bishop, nine priests, and many clerks gathered
in the seminary at Quebec or sent out to missions in the country. There were
thirty-five Jesuit Fathers whose work, he reports, is pious if not of
commercial value: this last it might acquire in time. He foresaw the danger
that the Jesuits might seek an excessive share of temporal power, and favoured
the despatch of Sulpitian priests to counterbalance them.
The
first Canadian bishop, Laval, desired to equip a disciplined body of clergy
wholly subordinate to his authority. To maintain control he proposed that the
appointment of cures should be in his own hands, and that tithe should be paid
to and administered by him. The question of the removability of cures was
decided against him in 1679, and a fixed salary from the tithe of each district
was allotted to them. ■
But the
burning question between Church and State was that of the wisdom of allowing
the sale of spirits to Indians. The State officials, bent on commercial
success, argued in favour of free sale that the Indians’ desire for spirits
must be satisfied by the French, or they would cease to come under French
influence, and would pass under the influence of those who were less
scrupulous. The Jesuits dwelt on the hideous results of the trade in degrading
and destroying the native tribes. Bishop Laval, finding the officials against
him, decided to use his spiritual authority and made the sale of drink to
natives a religious offence to be punished by excommunication. Although in the
absence of the support of the Crown the Bishop had to change his policy, his
point was so far gained that the liquor trade with the Indians was made
illicit, but the issue of numerous licences to traders greatly reduced the
value of the prohibition.
Colbert’s
hope that a great Indian population would be converted and gradually gallicised
met with no support from the Jesuits. He had looked for much intermarriage and
believed that common schools for French and Indian children would be found
successful. The Jesuits favoured for the Indians a system of perpetual
tutelage, arguing that the Indian mind was incapable of development. They
arranged .permanent missions for “domiciled” Indians, but were powerless to
secure that total exclusion of all outside influences which characterised the
South American missions. In Colbert’s correspondence with the intendamt some watchfulness
over the Jesuit power is recommended; but “ to soften Jesuit severity the means
must be gentle, imperceptible.” His hppe was that, as the population grew, the
royal power would insensibly supersede the Jesuit.
But his
desire to draw the colony into a closely united whole, occupying the valley of
the St Lawrence, clearing grounds only in immediate proximity to the settled
parts, met with no sympathy from the Jesuit missionaries, or from the
adventurous explorers who sought to enrich the colony by discovering a
convenient way to the South Seas, or at the least, an outlet westwards to the
sea-coast. The period of most carefully encouraged settlement was also the
period of the scientific pursuit of exploration, mainly by the Jesuits. By 1669
they had pushed their mission stations westward as far as Sault St Marie, the
first station on the southern bank of the lakes or the river. This, with
Michillimackinac, and the Mission St Ignace,
commanded the
junction of the three Lakes, Superior, Michigan, and Huron. Discovery was then
pushed down the Illinois to the Mississippi; and the knowledge of a great
waterway to the Gulf of Mexico determined the lines of future Canadian policy.
To command the western trade, and the eastern head of Lake Ontario, Frontenac
built in 1673 Fort Cataraqui, afterwards Fort Frontenac (now Kingston).
From 1664 to
1683 the colony was nursed with the utmost care by Colbert. He directed the
governor and the mtendant alike to encourage the export of charcoal, tar,
potash, to sow hemp and flax, to foster a trade with the French West Indies,
and to encourage Canadian shipping, sedentary fisheries, mining, the breeding
of cattle and the clearing of forest land. His instinctive bent was industrial
rather than agricultural; but he saw that Canada needed development in every
direction. In 1679 the total number of arpents cleared was put at 21,90U, the
population at 9400. Of horses there were only 145, most of these having been
sent by Colbert himself. The homed cattle numbered 6983, sheep only 719, goats
33, asses 12. The need for live-stock was so great that Colbert forbade the
slaughtering of any domestic animals capable of breeding. The colony still
possessed but one trade, that in furs. In 1667 Talon estimated the value of the
exported furs at 550,000 livres. The colony continued in constant need of
support from the Crown, and sums varying from 20,000 to
200,000 livres were sent annually to the mtendamt,
according as the demands for European expenses were large or small.
In the West
Indies Colbert ruled the Company of the West during the ten years of its
existence with an equally firm hand, seeking from the first to secure a wide
liberty of commerce for French subjects within its dominions. It was seen that
the profits of the West Indies went for the most part to the filibusters and
buccaneers. As members of the strange commonwealth which was established by
these outlaws, the French showed themselves peculiarly skilful in the art of
self-government and in the framing of codes. The buccaneers took up
constitution- making—on a small scale, it is true, and merely in order that
each pirate-group might secure a share in the booty for which life had been
risked ; but their work was not without influence on the more peacefully minded
settlers. The cry for open trade, open to all Frenchmen, if not to all nations,
was raised with persistency by each succeeding governor; and there are many
indications that the French West Indians asked and took a freer lead in the
defence of their own interests than the Canadian farmers. It is seen in the
greater importance of the Council in Martinique, which in 1668 was made the
seat of civil and military government, Guadaloupe becoming dependent on
Martinique. The Council being framed on the pattern of the Parlement, it was
intended that it should consist of professed lawyers; but, as these were not
forthcoming,
the chief officers of the militia were chosen instead. At first much freedom
was allowed in deciding the number of councillors called in to decide
contentious matters; and not till 1674 was it reduced to ten. The separation of
St Domingo from the central scheme of government shows the respectful treatment
which it was thought advisable to adopt where the buccaneers were strong; and
the whole tone of Colbert’s letters and instructions to West Indian governors
points to his having given careful consideration to the complaints of West
Indian colonists. To satisfy them he compelled the Company to sell its
merchandise to the habitants within a month of its arrival, and ordered that
French vessels not belonging to the Company should be licensed to trade.
Besides the danger of contraband trade, the fear of sedition was ever present.
The negro slaves, the native Caribs, the Mulattos, and the tameless buccaneers
were elements of danger that required careful handling. The skill of such
governors as d’Esnambuc and d’Ogeron, the founder of the French settlement in
St Domingo, men who thoroughly understood the peculiar circumstances of the
case, appealed strongly to Colbert, who with all his love of centralisation saw
the need of independence of judgment and liberty of action for high officials
on the spot. There was to be unity of government, but not necessarily
uniformity. Thus he saw in the freebooters a source of strength for the
tropical colony, while the Canadian trapper he would fain have suppressed. The
tropical climate forbade the hope of the settlement of any very large white
population in the islands; accordingly Jews and Protestants were allowed to
enter here though they were excluded from Canada. In his correspondence with
the governors he constantly urged a mild treatment of offenders; no one must
ever be sent back to France for any crime except sedition. In the endeavour to
people the islands with men and women, to stock them with domestic animals, and
to develop a shipping interest, Colbert showed the same zeal as in Canada.
The fear lest
the governors should defraud the Company required that a host of intendants,
commissioners, receivers, etc. should be paid to watch their proceedings; and
the large staff maintained by the Company robbed it of most of its profits. By
1674 its failure became obvious, for its debts were over three and a half
million livres. Thereupon, besides paying an indemnity to the shareholders, the
Crown took over their debts, and thus bought back the possessions of the great
Company. From 1674 the colonial trade was thrown open to French subjects. In
the same year the Dutch West India Company opened its trade to Dutch subjects.
The danger of a general collapse of French colonial enterprise had been
successfully tided over by the Company, and so far it had served its purpose.
But the general opinion was that it had been ruining the islands, and great
hopes for the future were now raised. The number of inhabitants was given as
45,000; the trade occupied 100 French ships of from 50 to 300 tons. The zeal of
the
Crown in
developing the islands was not without a direct reward in the form of taxation,
parallel to the four and a half per cent, duty paid by Barbados. The French
taxation took its rise in the sum paid to the Company by French merchants who
bought the licence to trade, which amounted to six livres a ton on imports and
five per cent, on exports. In 1669 the King obtained the monopoly of these licences;
and under the name Domaine (F Occident the duty was levied, after 1671, at the
rate of three per cent. There was further a poll-tax of one cwt. of sugar on
every freeman and every slave, together with a tobacco duty of 20 sous a pound,
a small duty on cotton, and, for a time, duties on indigo and cocoa that
discouraged the planters. The regulation, decreed for the better control of the
trade, that ships must return to the port from which they started, and the
partial confinement of trade to the ports of Marseilles and Rouen, exercised a
damaging effect. The regulation of the sugar trade had certain distinctive
merits, inasmuch as the refining of sugar on the spot was early promoted,
instead of being discouraged in the interest of the refiners at home, as in all
the other colonies.
The fourth
period of French colonial history extends from 1683 to 1713—from the death of
Colbert to the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1682 La Salle had sailed down the
Mississippi. The support which he received in his attempt to found a colony at
its mouth showed that Colbert’s son, de Seignelay, was prepared to follow up
his father’s work, had not a period of reaction, which favoured continental
rather than colonial expansion, set in to divert the current of Louis XIV’s
ideas. La Salle’s scheme, as set forth by himself, was to obtain for France a
second continental establishment which should make her “ mistress of the whole
continent,” besides serving to harass Spain, and making possible an attack on
the Mexican mines. “ We should obtain there everything that has enriched New
England and Virginia, timber, salted meat, tallow, corn, sugar, tobacco, honey,
wax, resin, gums, pasturage, hemp,” and such things as yearly freight two
hundred vessels in New England. He observes that, if foreigners should
anticipate the French in settling the Mississippi valley, New France would be
completely hemmed in. He anticipates that the ease of living would here keep
the settlers together, unlike the habitants of New France, who are obliged to
seek their subsistence over a wide area. His talent for dealing with the
natives had already established friendly relations with a vast range of tribes,
and he urges that possession be taken in right of discovery and of the consent
of the greater number of inhabitants. His well-considered memoir determined the
government to give him the support he asked; and four ships were despatched
with 280 colonists, male and female, and abundant stores—the first example of a
French colony the whole expense of which was provided by the Crown. Unluckily
La Salle’s skill in the management of natives would seem to have been in part
due to the very
qualities
which made him an unsympathetic leader of French colonists, and unluckily, too,
the prospect of successful raids on the Mexican mines served to divert his
attention from the proper settlement of the colony. In 1687 La Salle was
murdered by his own people, and the well-provided little colony was wholly
lost. It served only to excite the watchfulness and cupidity of the more far-seeing
of the English colonists. The proprietor of Carolina began to press his claims
to the wider “ Carolana,” dating his claim from Charles I’s patent of 1630; and
in 1687 Dongan, the governor of New York, is found asking for a sloop to
“discover La Salle’s river,” where, he notes, French possession will be an evil
thing for both English and Spanish.
In 1698 the
Louisiana scheme was again taken up by the French government under the
influence of the Canadian brothers d’lberville and Bienville, the sons of a Norman
emigrant, who had led French arms and enterprise wherever an opening offered.
In 1700 a fort was planted fifty miles up the river, and another at Biloxi
midway between the mouth and the nearest Spanish settlement eastward,
Pensacola. The bulk of the population of some 200 settlers consisted of
Canadian coureurs; and when some Huguenots made application to join the colony,
Louis XIV’s reply was that he had not chased the heretics from his kingdom in
order to found a republic for them in America.
In 1708 the
population was still not more than 280, with some 60 Canadian coureurs; but its
immediate strategic and possible commercial value was so far realised that
Louis provided the forts with small garrisons. The climate and the unfortunate
choice of sites for the forts, which were driven to become more or less
peripatetic, were a constant source of discouragement, and agriculture was
neglected in the belief that the most probable source of wealth lay in mineral
treasures. In the meanwhile the colonists were dependent on the Indians for
food.
Four years
later Louisiana was converted into a proprietary colony, a form that had so far
been left untried by France. Perhaps the success of some of the English
proprietary colonies may have inclined the government to the experiment.
Crozat, a member of the flourishing Company of St Domingo, obtained the
exclusive commerce of the nascent colony for fifteen years, his rights
extending from the sea-coast to the river Illinois. Beaver was excluded from
his monopoly, in order that the Canadian trade might not be injured. The Custom
of Paris was introduced, and the administration put in the hands of a council
after the pattern of that in St Domingo. After nine years Crozat was to assume
all the expenses of government, including military charges, but till then the
king subscribed
50,000 livres towards the cost. Crozat agreed to
send two ships annually, and hoped to refund himself out of mines, gold, silver
and pearls, silk and indigo. The ideas which La Salle had put forward some
thirty years before had as yet struck no root, and the Governor La Mothe
Cadillac wholly despaired of the future of the colony. But the work of
1690]
89
Frontenac in
Canada had already made it clear that the maintenance of a steady hold on the
Mississippi would ultimately become part of a wide scheme of political
expansion, through the settlement of French colonists, or at all events through
French influence upon the natives.
The first
period of Frontenac’s government, 1672-82, had given him no opportunity of
showing his real strength; for the vexatious struggle carried on between him
and the intendant, whose rivalry he could not brook, had ended in the
governor’s recall. But when danger of the most serious kind threatened the
colony,Frontenac’s masterfulness and his extraordinary influence with the
Indians pointed him out as the one man capable of facing the situation. The new
danger arose once more from the power of the Iroquois. After the check
inflicted by the Marquis de Tracy, Canada had ceased for a while to fear them.
But under Frontenac’s two successors in office, who failed to appreciate the
necessity of caution, the rising began again. Fort Frontenac and Fort Niagara,
the two main bulwarks of the colony against the Iroquois, were lost, and the
total abandonment of the colony seemed imminent. But on Frontenac’s restoration
there was an immediate change. The keynote to his policy was struck when he
insisted on taking back with him all the Iroquois prisoners who, by Louis’
order, had been sent to labour on the galleys. In ten years’ time, with little
or no military help from France, he had secured not only a long peace from
Indian disturbance, but had got the best of the struggle with the English for
fisheries in Acadia and Newfoundland, and for peltries in Hudson’s Bay; had
raided, and kept in a constant state of alarm, the great colonies of New
England and New York; had met and triumphed over an English invasion. Acadia,
which had been restored to France by the Treaty of Breda (1667), was in 1682
almost devoid of organised government and passing gradually under English
control. Supported by dTberville, and by the half-Indianised Baron de St
Castein, formerly an officer in the regiment sent out against the Iroquois,
Frontenac recovered Port Royal, which had been taken by Phipps; and made it
possible for France in the discussions after the Treaty of Ryswick to claim the
Kennebec river as a frontier-line for the Acadians, who numbered less than a
thousand souls.
D’lberville’s
work in Newfoundland was yet bolder, ending in the destruction of almost all
the English settlements, and putting an end to the numerous English raids upon
the French settlement at Placentia. His expedition, which excited great alarm
in New England and even in Virginia, was however not followed up by active
settlement or by the establishment of forts. It was d’Iberville again who, by
the injuries which he inflicted on the forts of the English Company, secured
for the French a possession of Hudson’s Bay which remained almost unbroken
until by the Treaty of Utrecht the Bay was ceded to England. Still more
impressive was Frontenac’s general scheme of attack on the English colonies.
The Iroquois had been converted by him from most dangerous
enemies into
cordial allies, whose friendship opened the way across the frontiers of New
York. The English Revolution gave the opportunity for attack; and Canada with a
population of some 12,000 prepared to pit herself not only against New York,
with a mixed population of some 18,000, but also against New England with a
fairly united population seven or eight times as large as her own. That New
York would fall was thought to be sufficiently within the range of
possibilities to make it worth while to sketch a whole scheme of government for
the conquered province, in which Protestants were not to be allowed to live.
The raid was so far successful that Schenectady was destroyed (February, 1690),
a feat which served to glorify the French in the eyes of the Indians.
Although
schemes so bold as to include the thought of bombarding both Boston and New
York served, as they were intended, to divert attention from the inherent
weaknesses of the Canadian colony, the risk was very serious of exciting a
community of feeling in the English colonies. The historian Charlevoix observes
that it was not so well known in France as it was in Canada how important it
was to destroy the English power in America: perhaps the difficulty of doing so
was better understood in France than in Canada. But just as Frontenac was not
supported by the French fleet, so Phipps’ counter-attack on Quebec (October,
1690) was unsupported by England, absorbed in her own troubles. Yet
ill-organised as it was, it came far nearer to completion than Frontenac’s
attack on New York. Had the latter been renewed in the next year it might have
been wholly successful; but the Peace of Ryswick put an end for a while to the
contemplated hostilities. The death of the aged Frontenac followed in 1698; but
his successors, satisfied with their peaceful relations with the Indians,
adopted an equally bold tone in their correspondence with the home government
when the European war reopened. D’lberville alone wrote of the grave dangers
involved in an attack on Boston. In 1709 de Vaudreuil with 1500 picked men
resumed the offensive; and the total collapse of the English naval expedition
up the St Lawrence left the Canadians fairly satisfied that, small as their
population was, their position was impregnable. In 1713 they numbered some
20,000, as opposed to the 158,000 settlers in New England, and the 218,750 in
the other British colonies on the coast of America.
While the
military effectiveness of Canada was well maintained, its commercial and
agricultural development lagged far behind what might reasonably be expected of
the small population. During the military disturbances of Frontenac’s time land
had gone out of cultivation, and the heavy government taxation of 25 per cent,
on the country’s one profitable trade, the fur-trade, had by 1712 driven it
very largely into the hands of the English. In 1674, on the transfer of the
colony from the Company of the West to the Crown, the Company’s fur-trade
monopoly was
made part of the Domaine <f Occident in the form of a tax of a quarter of
the beaver-skins and a tenth of the moose. The Crown took also 10 per cent, on
wine and brandy, and five sous on the pound of tobacco entering the colony; all
else was free. The farm of the Crown’s rights was let out for a composition to
any adjudicataire who would take it. The colony ascribed its ruin to the
farmers’ system, and agreed to take over the farm for 70,000 Imres a year. In a
short time however the colony ran up a heavy debt, and the farm passed under
the control of a company (1706-17). The 25 per cent, on beaver was a mistake of
the most serious kind; for it robbed the colony of the very trade which it was
most important to foster. The English, who had shown no aptitude for the trade,
were encouraged to take it up; for the Indians, finding a better exchange there
than in Canada, carried their furs to the English colonies. Ships that came to
Canada laden with French goods sought a return cargo by going to the West
Indies, taking in perhaps some coal at Cape Breton to be used in the sugar
refineries of the islands. Nothing had been made even of the pitch and tar
industry. The colonists engaged in a few of the roughest clothing industries,
but on a scale so small as to escape the jealousy of the manufacturers of the
mother-country. The Canadian Council vainly sought to secure the clearing of
lands by ordering that those not actually occupied should be surrendered; and,
to eliminate the difficulty of providing for livestock during the long winter,
the habitants were forbidden to have more than two horses and a mare. In 1711
the breeding of cattle and sheep was still a matter of such anxiety that
live-stock was specially exempted from distraint. No fresh emigration of
consequence augmented the population ; but the natural increase was good.
A more rapid
increase in white and black population went forward during this period in the
West Indies; but the French islands still offered no promise of that startling
development of prosperity which was to distinguish the next period. The
revocation of the Edict of Nantes threatened for a time to have serious
consequences in causing a general exodus of the heretical colonists, until the
King directed that care should be taken to retain them. Signs of development
are visible in the new regulations touching the amount of the Domaine d'Occident,
which were directed to the relief of the colonists. In 1698 the French part of
St Domingo, which had always been exempt from the Domaine, and, since d’Ogeron
had elected to bring it under the control of the Crown, subject to certain
other charges, was for the first time put into the hands of a company for fifty
years. The Company of St Domingo was modelled on the old pattern, without
material reform. In return for sending 1500 white settlers and 2500 black at
once, with further yearly reinforcements of 100 whites and 200 blacks, the
Company received the monopoly of trade. All the French islands suffered
severely during the War of the Spanish Succession, but a season of peace was
all that was needed to
allow their
trade in sugar, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, and red dyes to reach great
proportions.
Within four
years of the Treaty of Utrecht, the whole of France had become convinced of the
greatness of its immediate colonial future, and looked to the financier Law to
play the part of Colbert on a still grander scale. The belief that the colonies
required only capital to secure their progress made the principle of the grand
Imperial Chartered Company appear as attractive as ever, in spite of the
lessons of the past. The moment for a change of some sort was opportune, as
Crozat’s failure in Louisiana (1717) reopened the question of the best way of
dealing with the Mississippi valley. The monopoly of the fur-trade in Canada
and Acadia was also seeking a farmer. It was proposed to hand these over to a
new Company of the West with what then seemed the vast capital of 100 million
livres. The purchase of shares by Law’s Bank caused the requisite “boom,” and
the interest of speculators was directed to the discovery of colonial wealth in
every imaginable form. All the existing companies, believing success assured if
they joined Law’s scheme, elected to cooperate; and the Company of the West,
reinforced with the privileges of the French East India Company, became the
Company of the Indies. For a time the new Company made sincere attempts at the
development of Louisiana, which, as the least known colony, offered the wildest
hopes to the fevered imagination of the speculator. Colonists, for the most
part of the worst type, were poured into it; the foundations of New Orleans
were laid; and vast grants of territory were allotted to a few individuals. But
the usual troubles arose; the Company sought to make so high a profit on the
merchandise which it imported, and fixed so low a tariff of prices for exports,
that the sufferings of the colonists became at last matter of general
knowledge, in spite of all attempts, by means of postal censorship, or by
refusing colonists leave to return home, to keep the secret of the colony’s
situation. With the collapse of Law, Louisiana fell once more into the
background; the very extravagance of the hopes that had been raised now made
the difficulties in the way of successful colonisation seem all the more
insuperable. The colony, which in 1721 numbered 5420, of whom only 600 were
negroes, abruptly lost the greater part of its white population, while the
slaves alone increased. The Natchez Indians began to show hostility so soon as
the white population thinned, and the colonists were careless in their
treatment of them; the missionaries, who had been instrumental in maintaining
native alliances in Canada, were absent; and the numerical strength of the
negro slaves offered opportunity for conspiracies between them and the natives.
In 1731 the colony obtained a hard-won triumph over the Natchez, a number of
whom were sent as slaves to St Domingo; but the victory cost the colony dear in
more ways than one. In 1732 the Company yielded its chartered rights over
Louisiana to the King for 1,450,000 livres,—more than they were
worth, in
spite of the large sums that had. been sunk in the colony. Under the Crown the
colony was freed of all export and import duties, and under these conditions it
made progress. It was characteristic of the French scheme that when Louisiana
again came under the Crown it remained theoretically part of New France, the
Council consisting of the Governor-General of New France, the Governor and
Commissary (analogous to the intendant) of Louisiana, with the Mayor of New
Orleans, the Attorney-general, and six Councillors.
The best hope
for the colony, as Charlevoix, de la Gallissoniere and de Bougainville saw, was
to develop the corn-growing lands of Detroit and Illinois, where La Mothe
Cadillac had formed a hopeful settlement in 1702. The chief interest of the
Louisiana scheme lay in the immense possibilities that opened before it if the
whole Mississippi valley could be brought into a real connection with the
Canadian Lakes. The vast and premature schemes of the Company furnished at
least this one fertile idea. Raynal describes the bounds of Louisiana as, on
the south, the sea, on the east, Florida and Carolina, on the west, New Mexico,
on the north, Canada and unknown lands. The mean breadth he put at 200 leagues,
the length he found it impossible to determine. But even in his time (1770) the
ascent of the Mississippi occupied three and a half months; and the voyageurs
were dependent on the Indian hunters for food. At the height of their
development under the French, Upper and Lower Louisiana together numbered only
7000 inhabitants, not counting troops; and this population covered a range of
5000 leagues. Raynal mentions the exports sent to the West Indian islands,
chiefly tallow, smoked meat, timber and tar, and to France, indigo, hides and
peltry, valued at about two million livres. The public expenses were always
abnormally great, the currency difficulty exceptionally oppressive; and the
greedy officials who ruled the forts, with special privileges of trade with the
Indians, enjoyed a monopoly more dangerous than that in Canada. The loss of
Canada and the abandonment to Great Britain of claims east of the Mississippi
determined the fate of Louisiana. The small value placed by the French
government on the remnant who crossed to the other bank of the river was proved
by the treaty in 1763 which ceded the western half of the colony to Spain. In
1800 the Secret Treaty of San Udefonso restored Louisiana to France, much to
the annoyance of the United States; but, in 1803, the imminence of war between
France and Great Britain induced Napoleon to sell it to the American government,
for fifteen million dollars.
In Canada the
rise and fall of Law’s Company were scarcely felt. Unfortunately no hopes for
any rapid development of that colony were raised in France, and the governors
pressed in vain for the despatch of emigrants. The statements of the amount of
Canadian trade vary greatly, but all agree that the expenses of government no
longer ate up the whole of the profits. A small balance of about 250,000 livres
found its
way to the
French treasury. In peaceful and plentiful years the colony was able to export
80,000 minots of flour and biscuit. The settlements improved as the traveller
went westward; below Quebec there was little cultivation. The steady movement
westward to a warmer climate and more fertile cornlands was not supplied by
French emigrants, as de la Gallissoniere hoped it might be, but by the
Canadians themselves. The number of hunters in the upper country, who could not
be relied upon as part of the militia, had steadily increased to some 8000, and
almost every colonist was more or less engaged in trading with the Indians.
During the years of peace that followed the Treaty of Utrecht, a road was
opened from Quebec to Montreal, and the fortifications of both towns were
increased. For this purpose the first direct tax was levied by the authority of
the Crown on the inhabitants of the two towns. Quebec numbered about 8000, and
though the shores of the river were closely settled by farmers as far as
Montreal, the town population of Quebec and Montreal tended to increase more
quickly than that of the countiy.
The
communication with France was annual only, and not half-yearly as Colbert had
hoped to make it. Every October, when the French fleet sailed for home, the
paper and card money of the colony was converted into bills of exchange payable
in France. The power of creating paper money, which was put in the hands of the
intendant, opened the way for the gravest malversations; and after Bigot’s
peculations and the stoppage of payment of Canadian bills, a loss of some four
million Imres in circulation fell on the habitants (1759). The years that
passed between the Treaty of Utrecht and the war of 1745, in spite of much
sound legislation by the Council, saw few new industries develop. At Three
Rivers some iron-working was begun by a solitary blacksmith, and the
timber-trade, the whale-fishery, the salt-meat and wool trade were greatly
neglected.
The hope of
making Canada a succursale for ship-building which Colbert had fostered, had
been kept up by a royal dockyard at Quebec, where the King kept a
constructor-in-chief. A memoir of 1758 states that the yard was then run down
and about to be stopped on the ground that vessels built there cost more than
in France, and that Canadian wood was unsuitable. There is evidence of grave
mismanagement. Even the building of boats for fishing-stations and for the
river-trade was neglected, and canoes were obtained from the English at cheaper
rates.
The colony
still maintained its preeminence as taking the lead in discovery. The journey
of Gautier de la Verendrye (1746-49), who penetrated to Winnipeg, Manitoba and
the Saskatchewan, and, it is said, though on doubtful authority, to the Rocky
Mountains, was an expedition after the old pattern in which Canadians had
always distinguished themselves. The military development of the colony also
had fallen but little behind in the long years of peace, although the
disproportion in numbers between the Canadian militia and the British colonial
militia
steadily
increased. The French had two sources of hope—the disunion of the British
colonies, and the chance of permanently limiting their power of geographical
expansion. But the steady pressure of British traders across the mountains, up
to the district south of Lake Erie, the creation of the Ohio Company by the
Virginians, and the influence which the English were learning to obtain over
the Indians, under the guidance of such men as Sir William Johnson, showed that
this last hope was of the slenderest. De la Gallissoniere’s desperate effort to
confine the English within the Alleghanies was too late and too ill-supported
to do more than betray the French designs to the English colonists.
The interest
of the Crown in the protection of Canada was seen mainly in the steps taken to
guard the mouth of the St Lawrence, after the cession of Acadia and
Newfoundland to England by the Treaty of Utrecht had endangered it. To replace
these losses, the great fort of Louisbourg was built on Cape Breton Island at a
cost of 30 million livres. As the port here was never frozen, great hopes of
its future were entertained; and it was believed that here was a centre from
which Acadia might be recovered, the French Newfoundland fisheries protected,
New England destroyed, and a great Canadian trade with the West Indies
developed. But again the old difficulty of establishing any settled population
stood in the way, and the isolated fort proved useless when the struggle came.
The British
possession of Acadia on the other hand did not open up the path into Canada in
the ready way that was anticipated. The strong national feeling of the French
settlers, and their close alliance with the Abenaki Indians, who for
generations had kept the frontiers of New England in alarm, involved the
English in grave difficulties. The events which led up to the expatriation of
the French taught the English lessons which proved of service when the
government of Canada had to be settled.
The brilliant
success of the French sugar islands in the eighteenth century forms a distinct
episode in the history of French colonisation. Here, with less deliberate
schemes, less guidance and government support, the great trade was developed
which in Canada and Louisiana was only dreamed of. The accidents of fortune
must always exert exceptional sway when the forces of nature are all-powerful.
When storm, earthquake and disease may annihilate the prosperity of an island
in a brief space, the inclination to exploit its riches with the utmost
possible speed is not to be held in check. Each of these islands in turn has
enjoyed a golden period of longer or shorter duration—a fact which makes it
difficult to determine how far prosperity has, in any given case, been due to a
good system of government. In the eighteenth century English writers praised
the French system in unmeasured terms, seeing before their eyes the prosperity
of “the pearl of the Antilles,” St Domingo,
which was
steadily eclipsing all the other islands, until in 1780 its trade amounted
almost to that of all the rest of the West Indies put together. The change in
the position of St Domingo began in 1724, when the failure of Law’s Company
drove a number of proprietors to return to the plantations which they had left
in hopes of a life of successful stock-jobbing in Paris. The Spanish alliance
now assisted, as much as Spanish hostility had hitherto hindered, the
development of trade; and a policy of reduction or abolition of commercial
restriction on the colonies began to be steadily pursued. The extraordinary
facilities which the brilliant fertility of the island offered, when unhampered
by a company claiming monopoly, exercised their effect at once; and France for
a time threatened to drive the English out of the sugar and coffee trade. The
prosperity of the island continued to grow by leaps and bounds until the great
rebellion of 1792. In 1788 it was reckoned to absorb two-thirds of the whole
foreign commerce of France. But in population the tendency was for the
proportion of whites to negroes and mulattos to grow steadily less. The wealth
of St Domingo encouraged traders to reserve the finest negroes for that market;
hence the strength of the black people when the revolution came.
The phrase, “ nos seigneurs de St Domingue, nos messieurs de Martinique,
nos bourgeois de Guadaloupeexpressed the relative prosperity of the islands. Martinique
continued to be the centre of government for the Windward Isles, but after St
Domingo had secured a distinct government on the same pattern, the governor was
no longer governor of the French American Islands, but of the Windward Isles
only. The power which Martinique obtained, as the mart for all the French
islands except St Domingo, raised its position above Guadaloupe for a time; but
the loss of trade during the Seven Years’ War, Jesuit speculations, and the
development of Guadaloupe while in British hands (1759-63), ruined this
supremacy. The rise of Guadaloupe under English care brought the question
seriously to the front, whether it would not be more profitable to England to
retain it in 1763 rather than Canada. For once, considerations touching
security of dominion prevailed over the more immediate considerations of trade.
At that time indeed the magnitude of the French West Indian trade was
sufficiently alarming. Raynal and Justamond in 1776 put the total of French
West Indian trade at about 100 million livres, as against a British total of
only 66, the Dutch following next with 24, the Spanish with 10. But in a later
edition (1783) Raynal and Justamond fix the trade of the French West Indies and
Cayenne at 126 millions, as against a total of 93 minions from the British West
Indies.
Although in
wealth St Domingo surpassed other islands, its rapid commercial development had
left it no time for growth in civilisation. Martinique and Guadaloupe both possessed
a more firmly rooted society, addicted to amusements though possessed of some
cultivation; but
the picture
of society in English and French islands alike is dismal enough. “ Every man
hurries to grow rich in order to escape for ever from a place where men live
without distinction, without honour, and without any form of excitement other
than that of commercial interest.” The numerous religious Orders introduced
into the French islands an element that was lacking in the English. Although
they engaged as actively in commercial pursuits as the most worldly
adventurers, they did so with larger views. The work of a du Tertre or a Labat
found no parallel in the British islands. But it was West Indian commerce that
led the Jesuits to their fall, involving with it the bankruptcy of Martinique
for 2,400,000 livres. The failure of Choiseul’s great scheme in Guiana, which
was to have cancelled the loss of Canada—a fiasco by which 12,000 people
perished and nearly thirty million livres were wasted (1763)—showed that it was
still possible to make immense mistakes. But the able administration of Malouet
(about 1767-79) came opportunely to wipe out the new disgrace.
It has been
necessary to devote space to some brief review of the historical epochs into
which the western colonisation of France divides itself, in order to show that
considerations of time and place must not be neglected, when generalisations on
the character of French colonisation as a whole come under discussion. What is
true of Canada may not be true of St Domingo; what is true of the missionary
epoch may not be true of the mercantile. Yet certain broad features distinguish
French colonisation, which are notably absent from the schemes of the English
on the one hand and of the Spanish on the other. In nothing is this more
apparent than in the relations of the French to the native tribes occupying the
North American continent. It is generally agreed that in relation to the
natives the French showed themselves at their best. The Baconian view, that there
is a supreme and indissoluble consanguinity and society between men, was to the
French American a natural law, so far as it described his feeling towards the
Red Indians with whom he was constantly associated. It does not seem too much
to say that where the average British colonist felt an instinctive abhorrence,
the average French colonist felt an instinctive sympathy. The suggestion was
made by the Swiss Bouquet and accepted by Sir Jeffery Amherst, that the Indians
should be inoculated with smallpox by means of the blankets which they bought
from the English, to hasten the extermination of that detestable race. We may
well believe that such a suggestion would have shocked Frenchmen then as much
as it shocks Englishmen now. The idea of anglicising the Indians was not
entertained by the English; the French inclination was either to gallicise
their neighbours, or be themselves indianised. Of no British governor could the
story have been told that was related of Frontenac, how he went to meet the
Indians, painted and attired as an Indian. The English
half-breeds
appear to have been few as compared with the French, and those few were chiefly
confined to the frontiers where children were kidnapped and indianised in their
early years. Whereas the French priests encouraged intermarriage, the British
colonists discouraged it. At an early date the coureurs, among whom most of the
Indian alliances took place, found no parallel in the British settlements; and
though subsequently the “frontiersmen” approached their type, they never
rivalled the coureurs in numbers or importance. In records of French travel it
is common to find mention of the unexpected discovery of Frenchmen, living
among the Indians, having abandoned civilisation and become wholly Indian.
Again, in readiness to cope with the difficulties of native dialects, the
French, trained in the linguistic system of the Jesuits, far surpassed the
English; and in appreciation for the Indian forms of self-expression, which
required imagination and love of hyperbole, they showed a readiness which the
English learned only by slow degrees. The instinctive courtesy of the French
was deeply appreciated by the Indians, who dearly liked to have full respect
paid to their dignity; and it is noticeable that the scientific interest in
native history and civilisation, attested by the number of books written by
Frenchmen, Jesuits and others, was late to enter the British mind.
The very
smallness of the French population, and the value placed upon the fur trade
rather than on agriculture, helped to give the French an additional advantage.
The English exterminated the Indians by sheer force of settlement, and by
clearing their hunting-grounds deprived them of their livelihood. In 1754 the
truth of the argument which Duquesne urged upon the Iroquois—“the French make
forts and let you hunt under the walls, but the English drive all game away,
for the forest falls as they advance”—was fully appreciated by the Indians. The
French divided the country into “ hunts ” after the Indian pattern, and found
it to their interest to pay some heed to the Indian hunting-rules which forbade
the extermination of game at breeding-seasons. The English occupied and made
ownership a reality. The Indians told Sir William Johnson that “ they soon
could not hunt a bear into the bole of a tree, but some Englishman would claim
a right to it as being his tree.” The French forts on the other hand, planted
in the thick of the forest, depended for their very subsistence on the Indian
friendship. Many of the garrisons, unrelieved for six years, found their
isolation alleviated only by friendly relations with the natives. While the
French secured a real ascendency in the Indian councils, by sharing their life
and understanding their habits, the English hastened to assert an outward
supremacy hateful to the independent ideas of native chiefs. Pownall comments
on the skilful way in which the French chose out Indian sachems and gave them
medals and emblems of authority which secured their support and the support of
their subordinates. The unity of the French scheme gave France a special
strength
in dealing
-with the natives; no two British colonies could agree upon the same course,
and in the eighteenth century, the necessity of a single council capable of
undertaking all Indian negotiations was seen to be pressing. On the other hand
the French failed to make the Indian and French military forces one. La Mothe
Cadillac schemed to enlist the Indians in regiments and to give them posts as
officers equal with the French; but it was argued against him that it was
dangerous to introduce discipline, when the want of it was the chief source of
Indian weakness. La Mothe Cadillac’s own sincerity seems to have been doubted;
if his plan had been developed by a great military organiser, French colonial
history might have pursued a very different course.
On the other
hand, the difference between the circumstances of the French and those of the
Spaniards in the New World led to a marked diversity in their relations with
the Indians. The northern Indians were not conquered until they were almost
exterminated; and neither France nor Great Britain ever had under their rule a
vast subject Indian population, yielding tribute and forced labour. The
relations of the Spaniards with the Indians were just as intimate as those of
the French, but, being based on governmental supremacy, were of a very
different character. The Spanish government, after the barbarities of the first
colonists had shown the necessity for interference, stepped in to protect the
Indians by a whole code of regulations, the main object of which was to prevent
the exploiting and extermination of the population on which the prosperity of
Spain in the New World was seen to depend. These regulations, which exhibit the
Spanish system in its best aspect, have no parallel in the early colonial
schemes of any other nation. The scheme of protection, humane and tender as in
many points it was, involved, on the other hand, perpetual tutelage for the
protected, and was in no way educative. The small and widely scattered
population of French settlers was not in a position to attempt a protective
system. They were compelled by the circumstances of the case to treat the
Indians as equals, and this was plainly shown in the abortive attempt of the
Jesuits to protect the Indians from the dangers of the liquor trade.
The English
attitude towards the Indians varied with time and place. From the time of
Ralegh and Halduyt the practical wisdom of humane and sympathetic treatment had
been inculcated by the enlightened; but the colonists, whose interests came
much into conflict with those of the natives, early displayed a different
inclination. The Virginian resolution never to end the wars with the Indians,
and the open rejoicing at the outbreak of hostilities, “ because the way of
conquering them is much more easy than the way of civilising them by fair
means, besides that a conquest may be of many and at once, whereas civility is
particular and slow,” expressed the feelings of the less sheltered colonists.
Another school found a way to reconcile the expulsion of the natives with the
principles
of justice by
obtaining Indian signatures to English charters, which ceded Indian territory
with all the English conveyancing formulae, and gave the Englishman a record
which, meaningless as it was to the Indian, adequately protected the new
possessor against rival British claims. The conciliating work of the Quakers
had at last considerable influence on English feeling, and in the eighteenth
century it was less rare to find the French view prevailing among Englishmen,
although up to the last it would appear that the French were more skilful than
the English in obtaining Indian alliances. Both parties, it would appear, were
equally unscrupulous in allowing the barbarities of Indian warfare to have free
play. Neither French nor British governors scrupled to put a price on the
scalps of the enemy. On the whole however the Indian warfare of the eighteenth
century was less barbarous than that of the seventeenth, and Parkman ascribes
the change in the main to French influence on the Indians.
The
missionary work of the French is equally dissimilar from that of the English.
The English have no such records as the Jesuit Relations, for they undertook
their work in a wholly different fashion. The strength of the French missions
lay in the enormous range that they covered, the strength of the English in the
more careful working of the ground that was broken. The French missionaries
were geographical explorers, the English were teachers. The English translated
the Bible into a single Indian dialect, a work which could appeal only to the
Indians who knew that dialect and had been taught to read English print, but
the French collected the grammars and vocabularies of a number of tribes; they
preached to the natives in their own tongue, whereas the English employed
interpreters, and insisted that the teaching of English must precede the
teaching of Christianity. The Spaniards on the other hand, by their
governmental supremacy, succeeded in displacing the dialects, and made one
native language understood in South America. While many of the Jesuits lived
wholly with the Indians, and slept and fed in their tents, even such a man as
Eliot could not bring himself to accept their habits; and when he went to
preach, his wife sent his food with him. The Jesuits were satisfied with what
the English deemed slight tokens of success, for they counted baptism as
tantamount to conversion; the English, and particularly the Puritan preachers,
confounded the minds of their converts with an excess of doctrine, seeking
vainly for Indian words to represent the ideas embodied in the words adoption,
election, and justification. Both French and English followed the Spanish
example in domiciling the converted families in mission villages. The Recollet
Le Clercq writing in 1691 complains that, though the Indians attend the
services regularly, they are without the spirit of religion. We can only, he
says, withdraw a few picked families from the woods and group them in villages,
and even after years of such domicile they will run back to the forest. Such
mission-stations
had to be continually repeopled with fresh converts as the confined life
steadily enfeebled the race. The English constantly dwelt on the necessity that
the Indians must be civilised “ as well as, if not in order to, their being
christianised ”; and the rules for civility among the English domiciled Indians
were absurd enough. Women wearing their hair loose or cut like a man’s were to
be fined 5,?., for exposing their breasts 5s., men with long locks 5s.; and
howling and greasing the body were prohibited. At first, both English and
French were hopeful of educating the natives. The Jesuits brought Huron boys
and girls to Quebec, and the English founded Colleges for their instruction. In
New England Indians were admitted to the ministry, and in 1675 one took his
B.A. degree. There is evidence that the French missionaries showed marked
intellectual superiority over the English missionaries of a later period; but
both English and French wearied at last of their efforts—the English the more
rapidly, as they were dependent on voluntary subscription. In Canada the
missions were supported in part by the Crown; but here too the work slackened
in the eighteenth century. The uniformity of religious doctrine and the wealth
of ceremonial naturally had a greater effect on the Indian mind than the
teaching of the many jarring sects of the English colonies. The religious
fervour of the French colonists, and the good parochial organisation in the
thinly peopled districts were marked by the Indians, who constantly charged the
English colonists with irreligion. In 1701 the reply of the Abenakis to the
English order to dismiss the Jesuit missionaries was, “You are too late in
undertaking to instruct us in prayer after all the many years we have been
known to you. The Frenchman was wiser than you; as soon as we knew him he
taught us how to pray to God properly, and now we pray better than you.”
The same
distinctions make themselves felt in the treatment of the negroes of the French
and British sugar-islands, though in slighter measure, inasmuch as similar
commercial considerations affected both nations. It is admitted on all hands
that the Code Noir, a “monument of inhumanity” as it must now appear, was
humane compared with the laws of most of the British colonies, which however
varied greatly from place to place and from time to time. The Catholic holidays
allowed the slaves of the Catholic States a greater measure of repose than was
allowed in any Protestant colony. It was a primary article in the Code Noir
that all slaves should be baptised; the English, it was often said, feared lest
baptism should be deemed tantamount to manumission. The Code required further
that instruction in the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion should be given;
and the religious Orders for the most part attempted to supply it. The Code
inflicted heavy penalties on masters who used their slaves as concubines;
marriage between free women and slave men was not forbidden, and the offspring
inherited freedom. The law stipulated that proper food and clothing should be
provided, with nursing in time of sickness. Torture and mutilation were
prohibited,
and flogging
with rods and cords was to be the severest form of chastisement. In 1686 the
testimony of the slave was made good in cases where white witnesses were
wanting, but not against the master. In the English Barbados there was in 1688
no fine for punishing the slave in life or limb, and only a penalty of £15 for
wanton, cruel killing; the absence of provision for taking slave evidence in
many British colonies made the protective clauses of the law nugatory. In the
French colonies the ecclesiastical power was often exercised in the defence of
slaves, and such writers as Labat, who had practical experience and literary
power, made known in France how cruelly the slaves were treated. Their wretched
life, he says, gives a bad opinion of our religion; all agree that there is
nothing in the world more fearful than the existence they lead. He describes
the French Catholics as no whit better than the English and Dutch heretics, and
instances the insatiable avarice and horrible harshness of some habitants. The
opinion prevails that the Spaniards made on the whole the best masters of
slaves, as being less commercially minded, more inclined to sympathize with
indolence, more lenient on the colour question, and more successful in making
permanent homes in tropical countries where the English and French lived but temporarily.
The Mulatto population in the French colonies generally bore a larger
proportion to the white than in the British. In the French Antilles the
presence of a large number of priests, of various and rival orders, insured the
permanent existence of an element of civilisation. In the British islands the
dearth of priests and churches, and the incompleteness of the whole parochial
organisation was matter of common remark.
Although in
the West Indies the French provided better for education than the English, in
Canada the complaints of inadequate provision were very general. The Jesuits
were there singularly unsuccessful in establishing the schools with large
classes characteristic of their method, and the attempts to provide for higher
education were more active in the early than in the later years of the colony.
The chief source of failure was the absence of students, for the scanty
population was wholly absorbed in the struggle for existence. The literary and
scientific workers were for the most part not Canadians, but Frenchmen who came
to the country for a time, and returned home to write of what they had seen. It
was early noticed that the women were better educated than the men, and
possessed in consequence great social influence.
The fact that
not a single newspaper or book was printed in the French colonies before the
middle of the eighteenth century is perhaps the most startling and impressive
in the whole history of French colonisation. From early times the Spanish
colonies, under the licence of the Council of the Indies, had presses, which
issued large and important works of travel and history. Kalm, writing of Canada
in 1748-49, says that the one press which had existed had closed. “All the
orders made
m the country
are written, which extends even to the paper currency.” It is said that
printing was not introduced lest it should be the means of propagating libels
against the government and religion; but the true reason, in Kalm’s opinion,
was the poverty of the country. No printer could sell enough books to live. He
suggests also the further reason that the French at home desired to have the
profits of the export of books. In St Domingo a royal printing-house was
established in 1750; and the rapid increase of population in the other islands
soon led to the creation of presses elsewhere.
The absence
of the printing-press would seem to be the one feature which points to marked
backwardness in the social state of the French colonies. Nearly all the
contemporary descriptions of Canadian society dwell on the favourable aspects.
Charlevoix’s penetrating analysis and comparison of the condition of the
British and French colonies brings out many points of interest. The British
colonists, he says, are opulent, with the appearance of not profiting by their
wealth, while the Canadians conceal their poverty under an air of comfort. The
Canadian enjoys all he has and often makes a show of having more than he has.
The British colonist strives for his heir. The Canadian is content if he leaves
his sons no worse off than he was at the beginning of life. The British
Americans will not have war, for they have too much to lose; the French
Canadian detests peace. There is evidence that the humbler Canadians, suffering
no burden of taille, having cheap bread, meat, and fish, were fairly well off
for necessaries; and it is repeatedly noticed that the humblest class of
habitant would resent being classed with the French peasantry. Intendant
Hocquart writes, in 1737, that they have not the coarse and rustic appearance
of French peasants; the industrial arts not being restricted by trade
organisations, and mechanics being scarce, each man is his own manufacturer and
mechanic, and thus the idle hours of the long winter are employed. The gentry
suffered more than the poor from the high price of the luxuries to which they
were accustomed; and, as there was, according to Charlevoix, a larger noblesse
in Canada than in all the other colonies put together, the colony lost
reputation accordingly. Charlevoix ascribes the distressed state of the gentry
to their folly in considering agriculture a degrading employment.
Although
class distinctions, questions of precedence and of etiquette enjoyed fully as
much prominence in the colonial Canadian as in the French mind, on all hands
the creole’s love of liberty and independence of spirit were noticed and
ascribed to the comparative equality of fortunes. But the government failed to
appreciate the meaning of these things, or to see why “emigrants should ever
expect an enlargement of their native rights in a wilderness country.” A report
to the French government contrasts the colonies as follows. “The policy of the
people of New England being to labour at the thorough cultivation of their
farms and
to push on
their settlements little by little, when it comes to a question of removing to
a distance they will not do so, because the expense will fall upon
themselves....The settlers of New France are of a different mind. They always
want to push on without troubling themselves about the settlement of the
interior, because they earn more and are more independent when they are
further away.” In the main portion of the colony, the social tyranny, to escape
from which is often the emigrant’s first desire, was fully as oppressive as in
the mother country. Indeed, the Church in Canada ruled society with a severity
only paralleled by that of the New England Puritans; it sought to restrict
men’s pleasures and enforced, at least in La Hontan’s prejudiced view, “a
perpetual Lent.”
Energy and
enterprise rather than patience were characteristic of the early French
colonist in Canada, if the opinion of Le Clercq, writing in 1691, may be
trusted; they want to reap, he says, as soon as they have sown. Had agriculture
been made a definite and primary object, Upper Canada, Detroit, Illinois and
the Ohio valley must have been opened with successful results; failing that
impulse, the drift westward towards a more favourable soil and climate was
necessarily very slow. It is curious to observe too how markedly the French failed
as breeders of stock, a business in which the Spaniards succeeded when
necessity drove them to take it up. Having at first deliberately set aside the
agricultural intention as unworthy and unnecessary when other forms of profit
were accessible, the Spaniards ultimately made excellent use of the fertile
hattes and savannahs, and developed a business which they were well suited by
disposition to undertake. But the French lacked zeal in an employment the
results of which are slower even than those of tillage. Thus for example in St
Domingo, while the French colony imported large supplies of meat and was
sometimes in danger of famine, the Spanish in the laager half of the island
engaged in a salt-meat trade. The French backwardness would seem to have been partly
due to certain unfortunate restrictions, for instance on slaughter-houses.
The
commercial regulations of the British and French colonies, though directed by
like principles, worked out very differently in practice. The populous
condition of New England and its confined geographical position quickly
brought the question of the mother-country’s control of manufactures to the
front. With the single exception of clayed sugars the French colonial produce
never competed with home manufactures in a manner sufficiently threatening to
raise professional alarm. The fact that the colonial sugar-refiners were for
the most part liberally treated may however serve as an indication that, had a
conflict of home and colonial interests arisen, the French government was more
willing than the British to allow indulgence to the colonies. England, guided
by the exigencies of the moment, swayed by each manifestation of mercantile
hostility and without continuous colonial policy, was guilty
of what Burke
calls “a chain of petty, interested mismanagement,” to which France felt no
temptation.
The French
colonies were apt on the other hand to be treated too much as hothouse plants,
when a hardier culture might have suited them better. The British colonies,
like thistles planted by the hand of nature, seemed to grow apace out of sheer
wilfulness. England took interest in the sugar colonies only, because they were
not competitors with her in the field of manufactures; but here her success was
by no means continuous, and the example from which she expected to learn most
was the example of France. To many minds the only conclusive argument in favour
of colonial expansion was that the French King believed in colonies, and
undoubtedly knew his own interest better than England knew hers.
The French
colonies, however, would seem to have received less support from the individual
capitalist than those of England, and less support from the French at home than
from the colonials themselves. The one large and regular French shareholder was
the government. The British government was as a rule chary of risking anything
till the eighteenth century, when Georgia and Acadia were made notable exceptions
to the rule. The French colonies, of which very few were proprietary, show no
such great sacrifices on the part of individuals as were made by the English
proprietors.
The colonial
currency question was one which troubled both peoples alike and was dealt with
in an equally unsatisfactory way by both. The French King tried to meet the
difficulty by sending small quantities of bullion, but the supplies were wholly
inadequate. The early Spanish colonies were free at least from the dislocation
of trade caused by the want of coin, to which both French and English were
continually subject.
The contrast
between the comparative absence of commercial restraint in the French colonies
and the subjection to it of the English is balanced by that other contrast
between the governmental institutions of the two countries which, obvious as it
is, yet always needs accentuation as the most fundamental cause directing the
issue of events. Representative institutions were banished from the colonial
empire of the Old Regime, and with them every governmental idea which the
English cherished in their colonies, tropical and temperate. No attempt
whatever was made to resist the action of the monarch in this respect. The
French colonists believed that their welfare was dependent on the sovereign’s
will, for they saw that if with one hand he took from them certain profitable
issues, he returned fully as much with the other. The sense of commercial
oppression from which the colonists of New England suffered was not paralleled,
apparently, by any sense of governmental oppression on the part of the
Canadians. They suffered no disabilities which were not suffered by their
countrymen at home. The colonists took pride in the
sense of
central unity which their form of government brought home to them, and
perceived in it a source of strength, against the disunited British colonies,
some of which were ktiown to be also disaffected. The French colonies were
constituent parts of the empire, and no single colony was permitted to detach
itself from its neighbour. Louisiana and Acadia were parts of New France, and
the islands were attached to Martinique as a centre.
The French
had a further advantage in the union of the Marine and Colonial Offices at
home, which forced into recognition the dependence of the colonies upon the
protection of the navy, contrasting in this respect favourably with the British
Board of Trade and Plantations. A Conseil de Commerce was added to the Conseil
de Marine, at the beginning of Louis XV’s reign, consisting of deputies from
some of the chief French towns—an administrative department much admired by
Burke. But it does not appear that its influence was by any means so great as
he had been led to suppose.
The
bureaucratic system enforced by the Minister of Marine required the colonial
officials to keep constantly in correspondence with him, and it is from their
memoirs, censuses, and reports, that the history of the colonies may be built
up in extraordinary detail. But there are indications of weakness in the spirit
of subserviency which marks the colonial reports; and it is clear that the
colonial leaders suggested urgent reforms only in a timid, hesitating manner. A
further indication of weakness is to be found in the government’s persistent
repetition of courses of action that had already failed. That at times
indecision and ignorance prevailed in high quarters is clear from several cases
in which an official was recalled, only to return again soon afterwards as
obviously the right man for the post.
That the
system of dual authority—that of a military governor and an intendant of
police, justice and finance, with functions not clearly delimited—should have
worked well with few exceptions, can only be ascribed to the strong spirit of
loyalty and sincere co-operation which was zealously inculcated. The cases of
friction, though salient enough, are comparatively few in number. This dual
system may fairly be described as a French constitutional invention; it is the
only constitutional experiment of any sort tried by the French in their
colonies, whereas the experiments tried by the English were most diverse. The
very small salaries of the highest officials contrast unfavourably with those
of the English; the poverty of the French governors exposed them to great
temptations; and, although the government repeatedly forbade them to engage in
trade lest this should influence their judgments, they were driven to more or
less clandestine methods of raising an income. Fortunately their tenure of
office was not ultimately fixed at the short term of three years, which was
tried at first, after the example of the Spanish colonies. Materials for the
history of the French
colonies
exist in such profusion and, as regards Canada at least, have been studied in
such full detail, that the character and actions of the French officials may be
fully known; yet matter for a scandalous history is for the most part absent.
The number of great and world-remembered names that stand out in the list of
French colonial governors is strikingly large. Whereas the British colonies
repeatedly failed signally in their military undertakings for want of
leadership, the Canadian governors were not only generals by profession but
leaders of men in a more than military sense. Unhappily France could not spare
a de la Gallissoniere to the New World for more than a brief space; but the
fact that he should have been even for a time a Governor of Canada shows that
France was willing to give of her best.
In no respect
was there greater divergence in the governmental systems of the British and
French colonies than in the matter of taxation. While the British colonists as
a rule taxed themselves heavily, both directly by poll-taxes, and indirectly by
customs, and in nearly all cases bore the whole expense of government, the
French were not suffered to tax themselves. The King kept taxation as the most
carefully guarded sovereign right; the Crown bore the expense of government
and paid all salaries; the colonies contributed direct to the Crown through the
Domaine d’Occident. The rate levied by the Crown on Quebec and Montreal for
their fortifications is a solitary example of a direct tax levied in Canada to
defray local expenses. In the sugar islands, in this respect as in others,
there was a somewhat stronger tendency to self-government. In 1713, when it was
found that the indigo duty did not cover the expense of governing St Domingo,
the Minister of Marine wrote to the Governor and Commissary of St Domingo
ordering that a meeting of habitants should be summoned to negotiate the
provision of an octroi that would cover governmental expenses. Again in 1714 a
general assembly of habitants and merchants was held in Martinique, convoked by
parishes, in which the habitants offered to bear the whole expense of the
colony’s maintenance if the King would release the island from the rights of
the farmers-general. But these instances are isolated, and serve only to
indicate that a change in the system of government could not be very much
longer delayed.
No nation
perceived so early and so fully as the French the importance of geographical
position in political and military strategy. The magnitude of French designs is
best witnessed by the names “La Nouvelle France,” “ La France Septentrionale ”
(the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence), “La France Meridionale” (Louisiana), “La
France Equinoxiale” (Guiana and the Antilles), not to speak of “La France Or
lent ale.” During the rise of the French colonial empire the French were
preeminent in geographical discovery and cartography. The nature of the
fur-trade, and the character of the missionaries early dispersed the French
wanderers into the heart of the continent. Once
the
wilderness had been penetrated, it became obvious immediately that the
possession of the waterways gave mastery in a land then deemed incapable of
land-carriage. To Burke the French colonies were “the most powerful, their
nature considered, of any in America ”; for in the great Lakes lay the throne,
the centre of vast dominion, by their alliance with the waters of the St
Lawrence and the waters of the Mississippi. If, says Governor Pownall, we give
attention to the nature of this country and the one united command and dominion
which the waters hold throughout it, we shall not be surprised to find the
French (though so few in number) in possession of a power which commands this
country. The French work proceeded far more rapidly on the Mississippi than on
the St Lawrence, for climate and soil offered no hindrance, and the unbounded
range of Indian trade allowed scope for those qualities in which the French
colonist proved himself strongest. But to establish dominion something more is
needed than a full recognition of the possibilities of the future. No steady
stream of trade poured down from Canada to Louisiana or vice versa. The entire
neglect of the portage between Lake Erie and the Ohio, in favour of the distant
communication by Green Bay and Wisconsin, proves that there was no trade
seeking a route. That the appreciation of the importance of the Ohio came late,
serves to show the unreality of the whole scheme of dominion. Similarly, in
Guiana the French found themselves shut out from the waterways of the Amazon
and Orinoco through delay in planting a populous and enduring colony. Whereas
to Burke it appeared sheer madness on the part of the English to have allowed
the French to shut them in from behind the Alleghanies, to Oldmixon it was
possible to speak lightly of French “dreams of colonies and commerce in the
moon.” Whereas alarmists saw the French work already accomplished, others
foresaw that it would take a hundred years to make the French scheme a reality.
With Canada, Louisiana and half St Domingo under one power, and Spain in
alliance, it was thought that Jamaica and Cuba would next be absorbed, and that
the English would be driven from the New World. The very dispersal of the
scanty French population seemed to magnify their strength, for, like the
Iroquois, they could give trouble out of all proportion to their numbers.
There appears
to be no reason to doubt that the French and British peoples proved equally
prolific on the American continent. With both it was natural increase, and not
a continuous stream of emigrants, that mainly raised the population. But in the
race for numerical increase the handicapped competitor is sure to fall further
and further behind; and from the outset France was handicapped. With no
Huguenot exodus to parallel the twenty years’ Puritan exodus, the French
colonies depended for their origin on a mere handful of men and women,
despatched many of them against their wi1! and kept in the colonies
by compulsion. All the French colonies were dependent on the engages; not all
the
-1763]
Colonies as strategic
posts.
109
British were
dependent 011 the influx of “indented servants.” There was “ seducing ” and “
spiriting away,” kidnapping and crimping for the colonies in England, but on no
such scale as the legalised despatch of three engages for every 60 tons of
shipping, six for 100, and so on in proportion.
The absolute
government of France does not show itself in all respects at its worst in the
colonies. Absolute power lodged in the wise hands of a Colbert, even of a
Seignelay or a Pontchartrain, gave scope for ideas undreamed of in England. In
Burke’s opinion “obedience to a wise government serves the French colonists for
personal wisdom”; and the dangers involved in such exchange were not at first
obvious. Absolute power had faith in the future, passed over questions of
profit and loss, silenced or ignored the old grumble that the colonies did not
enrich France. Policy, not commerce, dictated the retention of the St Lawrence,
the Lakes and the Mississippi; they were strategic posts in the defence of a
military empire. While Spain cared for her colonies as an all- important source
of wealth, and her colonies depended upon her as their protection; while
England hindered hers where she feared commercial rivalry, and at the same time
secured an oceanic power surpassing that of France and Spain combined; France
grasped the idea that colonies are an expansion of the empire, at least in its
military sense. The seventeenth century hope of a possible colonial neutrality
was very soon finally laid aside. French colonial history is so coloured by the
artistic and dramatic sense of its creators that the facts seem to lose their
true relative importance. In the minds of the French, distance, severance such
as we now can hardly realise, poverty, the scantiness of the population, the
internal dissensions, all counted for nothing. There were elements of disunion
in the jealousies of Montreal and Quebec, of Church and State, of the small and
the large planters, of the dependent islands and Martinique, of French
officials and the Creole population, of French and colonial soldiers, of the
trappers and the settled colonists; but these prosy realities seemed trifles
that would fade away and be forgotten in the beautiful vision of a world-wide
and united empire.
New France,
while it gave promise of gigantic empire, was to the government a part of
France, and could therefore risk its fate in the international contest,
regardless of the fear of pressing the divided British colonies into union,
regardless of European diversions, of the want of oceanic defence. But that
this sense of unity was rather sentimental than substantial, became manifest
when the moment of loss arrived. The loss of Acadia, Canada, Louisiana, was no
dismemberment of the French empire; such losses merely marked certain stages in
a wider contest. Yet it is the clear, if premature, perception of one aspect of
the modem colonial idea that serves to glorify for all time the story of the
French in America.
ACADIA, CAPE BRETON,
AND THE ILE DE SAINT JEAN.
The French
settlement on the Bay of Fundy has been briefly referred to, in so far as it
displays certain main characters in French colonial policy; but for many
reasons the story of Acadia and the two adjacent islands calls for separate
treatment. French maritime colonies in the neighbourhood of New England were
called upon to play a part politically that was even more disproportionate to
their material development than the part played by French Canada. The hapless
Acadia was the shuttlecock to French and English battledores. Thrice in the
wars of the seventeenth century it fell to England; thrice it was restored by
treaty to France. It stands apart from the other French colonies, inasmuch as
it was scarcely touched, for good or ill, by the commercial companies. Unlike
the French Canadians, the Acadian colonists laid no disproportionate stress on
military organisation, but, on the contrary, repeatedly allowed themselves to
fall a prey to English raids for want of sufficient armament. But though time
after time the little posts were ruined, the fields laid waste, the cattle
destroyed, there seemed to be an indestructible vitality in this, the least
carefully fostered of all the French colonies. As compared with Canada, Acadia
received little or no help from the home government. Its officials, too often
men who had failed in Canada, produced the censuses and “ memoirs ” that were
required of them; and the colony flourished rather in spite than because of
their efforts, which were mainly directed to their own enrichment. The widely
scattered population, settled in hamlets of some twenty persons each, found a
congenial climate and soil, and, in their dependence on their own initiative,
resembled rather an English colony in its early stages than a colony of New
France. With few exceptions the 2500 Acadians of 1714 were the descendants of
forty families sent out between 1633 and 1638, and of some sixty colonists sent
in 1671. The 2500 French of 1714 increased nearly six-fold in the next forty
years of English government.
The first era
of attempted French settlement (1605-32) bequeathed to its successor (1632-70)
nothing but an inheritance of disputed claims, which the fertility of the La
Tour family, representing the first grantee, passed on from generation to
generation. Argali’s raid (1613), and Sir William Alexander’s ill-supported
attempt (1621) to found a “Nova Scotia” that should be to Scotland as New
France and New England to their parent stems, did not make things easier for Razilly,
sent as governor to make a fresh start when Acadia had been restored to France
by the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye (1632). The story of the relations of
the governor, and his deputy d’Aulnay, with Nicholas Denys, one of the grantees
and the historian of the colony in this
period, and
with the La Tours, father and son, whose interests Alexander had divided,
dramatic as it is in all the details that Denys has left us, cannot be told
here; it need be noticed only because it was the disputes of these rival
gentlemen-adventurers that gave the colony a bad beginning, and led to that
want of concentration which was throughout a main source of its weakness.
Now, as in
the next period, the governors could not decide whether to fix their centre at
the sheltered Port Royal, or on one of the rivers which might be made a means
of communication with Quebec, or on the Atlantic shore of the peninsula, which
offered most advantage for the fishery. The Rochellais, whom Razilly and
d’Aulnay brought with them, found at Port Royal conditions of which they had
had experience at home; and by dyking the marsh-lands a promising agricultural
settlement was made. But Port Royal was no centre. From Pentagouet on the
Penobscot, by river and portages, it seemed possible to establish a connexion
with Quebec; and accordingly Pentagouet looked the more promising to those who
had ambitious schemes. The drawback was that it was nearer to New England, and
certain to be an object of attack. La Heve, which offered advantages rather like
those of the present capital of Nova Scotia, could be made a convenient port
for sea-commu- nication with Quebec, whilst the river was free of ice. All
these were tried in turn, now and later.
Had any one
of these ports been strongly defended, the colony would not have fallen again
to the English in 1654, when Sidgwick took Port Royal for the Protector.
Between 1654 and 1667, the story of the period 1613-32 was repeated, Sir Thomas
Temple playing the part of Sir William Alexander, and the Treaty of Breda (1667)
that of the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye. France having recovered Acadia,
there seemed hope that Colbert might promote settlement here as he had in
Canada. But a renewed effort on the Penobscot was checked by the Dutch; and the
creation of a way to Quebec, by what was known as the chemin de Kennebec, could
not proceed. So far as this western district came under French influence at
all, it was left to the indianised Baron St Castein, who had married the
daughter of an Abenaki chief in 1680. Through him, and later through his son,
the French in Acadia were assured of Indian friendship. In 1685 the intendant
of Canada was sent to study the needs of the colony. At that time the
population numbered only 885, of whom 600 were at or near Port Royal. The mtendant
advised more military protection; and the ease with which Port Royal was
destroyed in every filibustering raid, and its speedy fall before Phipps in
1690, proved the wisdom of his view.
At the third
restoration of Acadia to France, by the Peace of Ryswick (1697), the choice of
a capital again lay open. The new governor, Villebon, a capable military
commander, decided on a site on the most eastward of the great rivers that
might form a frontier, the
112
Cape Breton and lie de Saint
Jean. [1629-1713
St John,
furthest from New England, and, facing Port Royal, the most suitable for the
defence of the Bay of Fundy. Unfortunately a special commissioner, sent from
France, decreed its abandonment. In 1704 Port Royal, once more a fairly
prosperous colony, was again cruelly wasted by the English. Again it was built
up, and in 1710, with about eight hundred inhabitants, could make a brave
defence against Nicholson, and only surrendered with the honours of war, on a
promise that the inhabitants should be transported to France.
In 1707 the
census gave to the whole of Acadia a population of 1838, with some 7500 head of
live-stock. By the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, all “Nova Scotia, formerly called
Acadia, with its ancient boundaries, together with the city of Port Royal,” was
ceded to England. What the ancient boundaries were nobody knew; but of course
the French now wished Acadia to mean a small tract, not a large, while the
English had equal reason to make a volte-face in the opposite direction. The
English commissioners of 1755 assumed that the right bank of the St Lawrence
was their northern boundary— certainly an extravagant claim; and the French,
with as little show of reason, said that the treaty ceded only a part of the
peninsula now called Nova Scotia and none of the mainland. But as La
Gallissoniere had succeeded in planting French forts on the neck of the
peninsula, it seemed possible that they might by force make their claim good,
for the Acadian population was purely French till 1749; and the strong French colonies
in Cape Breton and the lie de Saint Jean offered plenty of support.
The two large
islands off the coasts of Acadia, originally called Cape Breton and lie de
Saint Jean (now Prince Edward Island), naturally formed part of the Acadian
dominion. Cape Breton is severed from the mainland only by a narrow gut, and
the lie de Saint Jean lies along the shores of the neck of land which attaches
Nova Scotia to New Brunswick. Both were important centres for the fishery, but
neither had offered much attraction to colonists so long as there was space in
lands of milder climate and happier conditions.
At the
outset^ here as elsewhere, it was the old story of rival pretensions based on
flimsy pretexts, and of the ultimate success of the most patient competitor. At
the time of Sir William Alexander’s grant, which included Cape Breton, it had
seemed possible that the Scotch might make a lasting settlement, for in 1629
Lord Ochiltree built a fort on the island. But a Frenchman destroyed it and
built another, to be deserted in its turn. When in 1632 the way lay open for
France, Nicholas Denys, into whose hands this part of the Acadian dominion
fell, did no more than establish trading-posts and quarrel with rival
adventurers. No permanent settlement was made until by the Treaty of Utrecht
this island, with its neighbour Saint Jean, acquired a wholly new importance,
as the only sea-board from Florida to Hudson’s
Bay that was
definitely acknowledged to belong to Prance. At once the whole energy of the
French government was concentrated on the development of these islands. Cape
Breton was rechristened lie Royale, by way of marking its new destiny; and all
the French settlers from Newfoundland were transferred to its shores, and put
under their old Newfoundland governor. In the two islands homes were offered to
any Acadians who chose to come; but the English were loth to lose the French
colonists and their property, and, in the early years after the Treaty of
Utrecht, placed difficulties in the way of such emigration, a fact that made
the deportation of 1755 the less justifiable. The fortification of Louisbourg
began in 17S0, after Vauban’s plan. The population in the neighbourhood of the
fort was over 2000, the garrison itself 1000; but the population of the rest of
the island amounted to little more than another thousand. The constitution was
of the Canadian pattern, with the same elements of strength and weakness. The
export of fish, oil, and coal was good; and the colony could boast a fine
military road, a hospital, and a nuns’ school for girls. But the concentration
of the inhabitants round Louisbourg, where the soil was poor, hindered tillage,
so that the island depended on its neighbour Saint Jean for food.
As the
government of Cape Breton was subordinate to Canada, so Saint Jean was
subordinate to Cape Breton. In Saint Jean there had been fishing-ports in the
seventeenth century, but no agriculture till 1713. In 1735 the population was
only 542; but in the next twenty years the numbers increased rapidly, and at
the time of the expulsion of the Acadians there was another great rise. When
Saint Jean passed with Cape Breton to England by the Treaty of Paris (1763),
both lost their population, which had been kept up by artificial causes; and
its place was but slowly filled up with Scotch settlers.
The late
development of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, and Prince Edward
Island in English hands, under perfectly peaceful conditions, is the best
testimony to the merit of the French efforts made at a remoter time under conditions
of chronic warfare. The vitality of Port Royal, rising ever,- phoenix-like,
from its ashes; the solidarity of the little Acadian people, who after forty
years of English rule had to be deported, only to make their way back to their
old homes again; the creative power repeatedly shown in making something out of
the least promising material—these things set Acadia apart as deserving a.
special place in the history of French colonisation. But here, as elsewhere,
the main source of strength was the successful manipulation of the Indians. By
their skill in this particular the French multiplied their forces many times
over. It was this that made the impenetrable backwoods which cut off Acadia
from Canada, and to a less degree from New England, seem to be really French,
and which gave an apparent justification to the claims of the French
commissioners of 1755.
THE CONQUEST
OF CANADA.
The four years’ war between England and France, which
closed in 1748 with the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, was waged by both nations
with little reference to their possessions in North America. The small French
settlement of Louisiana, founded at the close of the seventeenth century for
the better control of the Mississippi, was not yet in touch with the English
colonists of Georgia and the Carolinas, and there had been no possibility of
friction. Great as was its significance in view of those vast ambitions of
France that were the immediate cause of the events With which this chapter
deals, its occupants were too few and too remotely situated to take any part in
the struggle. Planted at the mouth of the Mississippi, they were little more
than a futile reminder of the splendid opportunities which the moment held for
France— opportunities practically stultified by the policy which revoked the
Edict of Nantes. French Huguenots had been already pouring by thousands into
the Carolinas. Their overtures for land and liberty of worship under French
rule had been spumed by the officials of the weak and somewhat stagnant colony
at the mouth of the great river. The King, they were curtly told, had not
turned them out of France in order to build up French Protestant republics in
America. So the French Huguenots mingled their blood and energy with the
successful foes of France, and ultimately became a source of strength to an
Englishspeaking republic. The contesting forces which at this epoch were to
settle the destinies of North America were numerically insignificant; and it is
possible that ten thousand sturdy Huguenot settlers sent up the Mississippi at
this moment might have changed the history of the world.
But along the
ill-defined and sparsely settled borders of Canada, where they fronted New
York, the New England colonies, and the Crown province of Nova Scotia or
Acadia, there was continual friction and bloodshed, which formal declarations
of war did little more than aggravate. Neither inj;he days prior to the
European war of 1744-48 nor during it was there any operation worthy of notice
in this district except the siege and capture of Louisbourg. For the rest it is
sufficiently
described by
the French term la petite guerre, a restricted method of warfare which the
French Canadians when left to themselves rarely exceeded. This mainly consisted
of raids across the frontier, not only for purposes of plunder, but quite as
much for intimidating the too venturesome and intrusive English settler; and no
lasting results accrued from it other than the loss and suffering of
individuals.
Another
factor too, which, till the nations seriously engaged each other during the
Seven Years’ War, kept hostilities within limits, was that great Indian tribal
league known as the Five Nations, who occupied the region on the south of the
Canadian border and at the back of the English colonies. They were by far the
most powerful Indian combination, and may be fairly said to have held the
balance of power between the European rivals. They favoured the English with
tolerable consistency, but their friendship was of a cautious and passive kind
and would have stood no great strain. It was moreover being continually tested
by the overtures of the French.
In la petite
guerre the French Canadians had a distinct advantage. From their own more
thickly settled frontiers they could descend in sufficient force on the isolated
settlements of New England or New York to achieve their object, whereas the
banks of the St Lawrence could hardly be attacked except by a large and
organised force. Half a century earlier, it is true, in Frontenac’s time,
Quebec had been seriously though unsuccessfully attacked by a large New England
force. But military organisation was difficult at all times for the British
colonists, while mere punitive and doubtful raids on Canada would not have
seemed worth the special effort needed. In Acadia there was no British
population whatever before the founding of Halifax in 1749. The officials,
supported by a slender garrison, had not only to control the French
inhabitants, but to watch vigilantly and, when necessary, to resist the jealous
enterprise of the French soldiers on the borders of the province that they had
lost and hoped to win back.
The capture
of Louisbourg in 1745, early in the first war, relieved Nova Scotia from very
real and pressing danger, and, as we have said, was the only enterprise during
this first and shorter period of strife between the two nations that calls for
notice here or that had any effect on the fortunes of America.
This was
indeed the most brilliant military exploit ever performed by a British colony
prior to the Revolutionary war, and was the work of New England alone, and
mainly of the single colony of Massachusetts. The plan was conceived by
Shirley, the governor of the colony, and readily adopted by its legislature.
The preparations were carried forward with despatch and all possible secrecy.
The British Government was solicited to order Admiral Warren with four warships
from the West Indian station to the support of the expedition, and readily
complied. On March 24,1745, a fleet of New England ships carrying four thousand
men, more
than three-fourths of whom were furnished by Massachusetts alone, sailed out of
Boston. They were well supplied with artillery and stores, and the force was
commanded by a colonial soldier, William Pepperell. Arriving at Canso in Nova
Scotia they awaited Admiral Warren, who shortly joined them with his squadron
and proceeded to cruise off the coast and keep it clear of enemies.
On April 80th
the New England fleet was in front of Louisbourg, a town strong in its natural
situation, and fortified with the care and skill that its high importance
required. Some twenty-five hundred militia and regulars, together with the
able-bodied men of a population of about similar strength, manned its walls and
outlying batteries. The besiegers encountered a most difficult task in landing
upon the surf-beaten, rocky coast. Everything had to be carried ashore on the
men’s backs, and it was a full fortnight before the New Englanders were ready
to open their siege operations. Even then unsuspected difficulties were encountered,
the chief of these being the marshy nature of the ground, which made the moving
and mounting of guns, under the fire of the town, a most arduous proceeding.
The energy and spirit however of the besiegers triumphed over all obstacles,
including their own lack of discipline, which was not unnaturally conspicuous.
Outlying batteries were silenced or carried one by one, sallies were repelled,
and the town was reduced by degrees to a heap of ruins. The powder ran short on
both sides, but, when that of the New Englanders had been replenished, the town
at length surrendered after a five weeks’ siege, and both garrison and
inhabitants, to the number of over four thousand souls, were deported to
France. The bugbear of all the sea-going and coast-dwelling folk of the
northern and middle colonies was thus removed and the still graver danger to
Nova Scotia averted, while the military prestige of New England received an
impetus, the effects of which were considerable and enduring.
The news of
the fall of Louisbourg reached England when good news was sorely needed—for the
battle of Fontenoy had recently been lost, and Charles Edward had just landed
in Scotland. It was greeted in London with loud acclamations, cannon-firing,
bell-ringing and bonfires. The achievement stands by itself as the only
considerable warlike enterprise undertaken and carried through by the American
colonists without the instigation, help or leadership of the mother-country,
other than such assistance as Warren’s ships rendered in keeping the coast
clear. Shirley, the organiser of the expedition, and Pepperell, its commander,
were rewarded with baronetcies; and the cost was ultimately repaid by England.
The value set upon Louisbourg by the French was sufficiently shown at the peace
three years later, by the concessions they made in other continents for the
sake of retaining it, while the chagrin felt at its restoration by the
Americans and those concerned with America was. not less marked.
So far the
struggle between England and France had not been seriously felt in America; but
the ink was scarcely dry upon the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, when the French
rulers of Canada commenced a policy, which forbade all hope of a lasting peace.
The French representative at this juncture was de la Gallissoniere, who was
afterwards conspicuous as the opponent at Minorca of the ill-fated Byng. To him
belongs the credit of those aggressions in the American hinterland which
ultimately stirred England and her colonists to military endeavours on a scale
hitherto undreamt of, and resulted in the eventual loss to France of her
transatlantic empire. That the issue of so momentous a struggle, strange though
it now seems, was for some time in doubt, should also be remembered to the
further credit of the able Frenchman who conceived, his contemporaries who
supported, his successors who continued, so daring a policy. At first sight,
from our modern point of view, such a contest would seem a hopelessly unequal
one. A few words to correct so natural an impression are indeed almost
necessary, before proceeding to the struggle itself. When it is noted that the
French in North America then numbered less than 80,000, while the British
colonies contained a million white inhabitants, exclusively of negro slaves,
this might seem to confirm rather than modify the impression in question. But
here for military purposes the superiority of the English ended. All other
advantages were with the French, and some of these were very great. Though
Canada was numerically so feeble, consisting almost wholly of the settlements
on the St Lawrence between and near Quebec and Montreal, its government was an
absolute one. The King exercised an unquestioned rule in lay matters, and the
Church in clerical. Canada’s vast fur-trade was the main object of its
existence in the eyes of its owners, and the agricultural settlers were chiefly
valued as growing food for those engaged in it or as furnishing soldiers for
the protection of its interests. The mission of the English colonist was to
make a home for himself where he and perchance his children after him might
live and die. Upon these sound lines the Anglo-American social and legal fabric
rested. The statesmen who governed Canada from their high-perched palace on the
rock of Quebec, had far wider, if less stable, aims than the practically
self-governing English farmer or planter. The habitants, who under feudal
tenure gathered in their limited harvests by the St Lawrence, were not
undervalued; indeed their comparative paucity was a matter for constant regret,
but they were regarded as mere useful adjuncts to the fur-trade, that great
source of profit to the King and still more to his agents. In this not the King
only and his immediate servants were interested, but every man of position and
education in the colony. The territorial appetite and ambition of the
fur-traders were insatiable; and their aims were the more formidable to
civilised rivals, since, unlike the more limited aggressions of the
slow-moving
farmer, they did not directly menace the native with extermination. For the
extension and support of such a system the Canadian peasantry, ignorant,
superstitious, hardy, well treated, after the fashion of children, were
admirable instruments. Every man was by law a soldier of the backwoods type,
and, moreover, was prepared to rally to the national cause with unquestioning
obedience and without expectation of pay, and to march with equal readiness
against either Indian or English heretic.
How utterly
opposite in these respects were the English colonies scarcely needs
demonstration. It is, however, hardly possible to insist too strongly on the
absence of homogeneity that distinguished them. Their subsequent union has in a
great measure caused us to forget how sharp were the lines which divided one
from the other, before the policy of France drove them into those crude
attempts at combination which the folly of an English government afterwards
perfected.
The New
England provinces formed somewhat of an exception to this state of things.
Similar in origin and in type and habits of thought, they fraternised more
readily than the rest, and for defensive purposes had often been forced into a
military co-operation. In them alone at this time was to be found military
capacity or anything approaching to a warlike spirit. The rest of the colonies,
succeeding one another on the Atlantic coast as it trended southwards to the
newest settlement of Georgia, were but so many detached units with little
mutual intercourse. Distances were great, population thin, means of transit primitive.
They had all grown up on separate stocks, worked out their own individual
destinies on vaiying lines, and, as a matter of fact, regarded each other with
no little jealousy, while such outside intercourse as opportunity or
inclination provided was mainly in the direction of the mother-country. This is
not the place to take note of their contrasts, social and political. It will be
sufficient to say that, unlike the men whom France sent to govern Canada, the
Colonial officials, in accordance with the existing English system of
patronage, were, as a rule, persons of inferior capacity, and, though small
blame attaches to them on this account, lived in perennial disagreement with
the provincial legislatures.
Speaking
broadly, the Anglo-Saxon race in America at this time was confined between the
Alleghanies and the sea. This was ample space for all present needs. To the
average colonist it seemed no doubt, not unnaturally, ample for all time.
Happily there were minds of a more prescient turn among them, while the fact
that there were French statesmen who clearly foresaw the pressure of
Anglo-Saxon civilisation upon the West has been sufficiently demonstrated.
Behind the Alleghanies lay that vast and fertile region which drained into the
Ohio and thence into the Mississippi. It was a better country, as a whole, than
that already occupied by the British colonists. This, however, was then a
matter of no significance. It was as yet a far-away
Indian-haunted
wilderness, known only to a few hundred traders, hunters and voyageurs of both
British and French nationality.
The British
provinces vaguely claimed everything that lay to the westward within their
respective parallels. The French, on the strength of La Salle’s early
discoveries, claimed with equal vagueness the entire basin of the Mississippi,
whose head-waters extended to Lake Erie. In other words, the English denied the
right of the French to cross the Canadian lakes, while the French, on their
part, desired to confine the English to the strip of country which they then
occupied between the Alleghanies and the sea. But the French were preparing to
put their theories into practice, and to secure the whole fur-trade of Western
America. De la Gallissoniere hoped to plant French settlements in the Ohio
Valley as they had been planted in Canada. He intended theft forts should be
built and garrisoned, and that a firm alliance should be made with the Indian
tribes on the strength of their instinctive dread of the English cultivator.
Thus Canada and Louisiana would be linked together by a chain of forts and a
combination of military force that would certainly intimidate any land hunters
or traders from the Atlantic colonies, at any rate till emigration from France
should give substance to the settlements and add strength to the barrier which
was designed to shut out the Anglo-Saxon from the West. Nor was it territorial
greed only that prompted this ambitious scheme. It was felt that if the growing
power of England in America remained unchecked it would so stimulate her
prosperity as to make her a menace to France in every part of the world.
In 1749 de la
Gallissoniere made the first move in the game by sending his notable expedition
of two hundred persons under de Celeron into the heart of the Ohio wilderness.
Here at certain spots they buried leaden plates on which the French monarch’s
claim to the country was inscribed. At others they nailed shields bearing the
arms of France upon the trees. Much rhetoric was expended on Indian audiences
with the object of convincing them that Louis XV, not George II, was their
father. British traders found in the Indian settlements were summarily expelled
and letters written to the British authorities professing surprise that British
subjects should be found poaching on French territory. The French were beyond a
doubt less distasteful to the Indians than their rivals. They had more natural
genius for winning the affection of the natives, and had no desire to settle
their lands to the detriment of the game. On the other hand the French traders
could not compete with the English in the matter of good wares and low prices—a
very serious consideration and another urgent reason for checking if possible
the British advance. De la Jonquiere and Duquesne, who succeeded de la
Gallissoniere in the government of Canada, continued his policy. The larassed
English traders went eastward with their grievances, while the communication of
the formal and reiterated claims of the Canadian
governors to
those of Pennsylvania and Virginia showed that the backwoodsmen were no
self-interested alarmists.
The temper of
the colonies chiefly concerned remained however wholly apathetic to a danger
they scarcely realised. The question was beyond the limited vision of the
average colonist, the scene of these forward movements too remote, the
movements themselves were too insignificant. Having regard to the
self-absorbed isolation that distinguished the nature of his life for the most
part, one can hardly be surprised at his apathy. He could not easily divine
what by the light of history seems to us now so clear, that the momentous
question whether France or England was to dominate North America was on the eve
of settlement. Happily there were some far-sighted men upon the spot who rose
superior to colonial indifference, and thus while divining the future supported
their views with energetic action. Conspicuous among these was Din- widdie,
Deputy Governor of Virginia. In 1753 he despatched George Washington, then a
capable, promising youth of twenty-two, to warn off the French in their turn as
interlopers. With the co-operation of some of his fellow-govemors he followed
up this futile formality by a strong appeal to the English ministry to have
regard to the gravity of the situation. The answer was a permission to repel force
by force, but it was accompanied by no promise of assistance. A small sum
however was wrung from the reluctant and half-sceptical legislators of
Virginia, and a handful of provincial troops was sent to construct a fort at
the forks of the Ohio river—a spot soon to become one of famous and ensanguined
memory and now buried among the roaring furnaces of Pittsburg. This was but a
challenge. The ■ French, pouring southward in small bodies through the
shaggy forests that clothed this whole country, soon succeeded in driving these
rustic sappers back. In the following summer the English retaliated with a
provincial force of some four hundred men led by Washington. A brisk skirmish
of vanguards, in which the French were captured and their leader killed, made a
stir throughout North America and caused much talk in Europe. Soon afterwards
Washington and his rough levies, after fighting behind entrenchments for the
whole of a rainy July day against overwhelming numbers, surrendered on
favourable terms at the Great Meadows and were permitted to return to Virginia.
This was in
1754. The two nations were nominally still at peace and were to maintain for
some time the curious fiction. The voice of Din- widdie however and the
rifle-practice of the French at the Great Meadows had not fallen on deaf ears
in England, and preparations were made for more serious movements. Meanwhile it
will be well to say a few words abOut an American province of England that lay,
physically and politically, outside the old colonial group, but which was to
play no insignificant part in the coming war. Nova Scotia, then more often
called Acadia, thrusting its rugged coast line far out into the Atlantic
between Canada and the New England colonies, was of vastly more importance than
its
territorial
value and its thin population would suggest. Upon that northern fragment of the
province known as Cape Breton Island, the embattled town and great fortress of
Louisbourg, restored to France in 1748, frowned over the misty seas. In the
ample harbour, beneath its formidable batteries of big cannon, navies could
ride securely at anchor, and from such a base could effectually dominate these
northern waters.
For forty
years the Acadians, made famous by Longfellow’s pathetic but sadly misleading
hexameters, had been British subjects. They had been governed with a leniency
so remarkable as to be the despair of the Canadian authorities, lay and
clerical, whose interest it was for many urgent reasons to spread discontent
among them. The oath of allegiance, indispensable to the good government of
alien subjects, had been most tenderly administered. Their religion and their
priesthood received full recognition, their lands remained untaxed. The
habitants themselves, simple, ignorant and superstitious, were incapable of
sacrificing their lands and possessions for any abstract ideas of loyalty to a
distant and shadowy monarch. All they asked was to be left unmolested in their
village life and peaceful agriculture. But this placid acquiescence did not
suit their old masters the French, who hoped some day to recover the province
by their assistance, and in the meantime to make its possession as troublesome
and as little valuable as possible to the English. To this end the Acadian
priesthood, who were under the control of the Bishop of Quebec, were utilised
as agents. Their mission was to preach discontent with English rule and
denounce acquiescence in it as a sin against Heaven. Thirty years however of
practical experience of King George’s rule had been almost too much for the
ceaseless thunders of the Church, when the short war of 1744 broke out which
witnessed the capture of Louisbourg by Pepperell and Warren.
This event
rekindled some faint sparks of the old feeling and redoubled the incendiary
efforts of the Canadian government. These were intensified when the French,
having received Louisbourg back in 1748, commenced to make it more formidable
than ever, and thus compelled Great Britain to reply by founding to the south
of it the town and naval station of Halifax. For now not merely was British
officialism, represented by two or three isolated forts, planted in Acadia,
but the British axe was sounding in the forests of the eastern sea-board, and
the advance of British civilisation threatened the supremacy of the French
Acadian. The origin of Halifax differed from that of all other British American
settlements. It was purely the work of the government, who landed there in one
year nearly 3000 immigrants, of whom the men were mostly soldiers thrown out of
occupation by the peace. Cornwallis, uncle of the ill-fated general of Yorktown
memory, was governor, an admittedly just and kindly man. He had a difficult
task before him. The energies of the Canadian government, the French officials
at Louisbourg and their willing tools the priests, now exerted themselves to
the utmost to make
rebels and
malcontents of the simple Acadian peasantry. The most merciless exponent of
this heartless policy was a certain Abbe La Loutre, of whose performances even
Frenchmen of his day wrote with horror and his employers with apologies that
they themselves needed. The only weapons at their disposal were fear and
superstition. A fresh oath of allegiance was for good reasons now required by
Cornwallis ; and few Acadian settlers, of their own accord, could have
hesitated for a moment to repeat a form which had brought them such tangible
material blessings. But they were given no choice: acquiescence in heretic rule
was represented as a deadly sin against God. Those for whom this argument was
not strong enough were threatened with a more visible terror, for the forests
were full of Indians, many of them so-called Christians, and all under the
influence of the French. To a peasantry so primitive in their faith and so
superstitious, the threat of eternal damnation was generally convincing. To the
more sceptical the immediate loss of their scalp was a worse alternative than
the threat of expatriation so often uttered by the long-suffering British
governors.
Crushed
between these upper and nether millstones, great numbers of Acadians had fled
in despair to the woods and had adopted a life of outlawry. Many left the
country and their possessions, beginning life again in French territory. These
courses were equally convenient to the French authorities, who showed no spark
of feeling for their miserable compatriots. British settlers round Halifax were
killed and scalped. The lives of the soldiers of the outlying garrisons were
unsafe a mile from their forts. The history of Acadia from 1749 to 1755 is a
woeful story. The cruel and masterful tactics of La Loutre and his abettors
were contemptuously undisguised. The British officials spared no efforts to
recall the harassed and panic-stricken Acadian peasantry to their former happy
condition, but their attempts were vain. A great struggle was at hand, and a
population of professed malcontents, whatever the true reason of their
attitude, was more than the ethics of the eighteenth century could be expected
to tolerate. An ultimatum was accordingly issued; Its date was more than once
deferred in the hopes of reason mastering terror; but finally it seemed to both
colonial and British officials, men notable for their qualities of head and
heart, that there was no alternative but deportation. Everybody knows the
sentimental side of the story of Evangeline, few the causes that compelled it.
Some 8000 Acadians of all ages and both sexes were forcibly embarked and distributed,
with all the regard for family ties possible in the circumstances, among the
Atlantic colonies. It was a lamentable eviction, and the ultimate lot of its
victims was anything but happy. It is a poor consolation to know that those who
found their way to Quebec met with less consideration and kindness than those
who were cast upon the charity of the Puritans of New England and the Anglicans
0f the South. This memorable incident, which resulted in Nova Scotia
1755]
General Braddock's
expedition.
123
becoming
mainly British in blood as well as in allegiance, occurred in September 1755.
A few weeks
earlier an event of much greater significance had taken place to the southward.
The urgent warnings of certain colonial governors to the English ministry in
the previous year, coupled with the noise of these backwood skirmishes, had not
fallen on deaf ears. Parliament voted money for the defence of the colonies;
and in the spring of 1755 the 44th and 48th regiments sailed from Cork for
Virginia. They were each 500 strong, to be increased to 700 by enlistment in
America. They went into camp at Alexandria, a place upon the Potomac river
immediately opposite to the present city of Washington. The object of their
attack was a stronghold named Fort Duquesne, constructed by the French on the
Ohio on the site of one taken from the British, as noted above. The leader of the
British force was General Braddock. He was a middle-aged man and an approved
soldier of the type of the Duke of Cumberland his master. His faults were those
of his period and have been emphasised and exaggerated by writers of both
history and fiction, while his courage and honesty, though undisputed, have
received less notice. He is said to have been given to violent language, to
have been lacking in consideration for colonial susceptibilities, to have underrated
both provincial troops and Indians, and to have been over-confident in a style
of war with which he was unfamiliar. Of many of these charges and others
unworthy of mention Braddock may be in whole or part acquitted. He had been led
to expect active assistance from the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania,
whose interests were chiefly threatened by the French agencies; but, with the
exception of 500 irregular troops to be paid by the Crown, he received none.
Means of transport for his army through nearly 200 miles of forest wilderness
and over rugged mountains were utterly lacking till Benjamin Franklin, of his
own initiative, by threats and entreaties obtained the requisite number of
waggons from the Pennsylvanian farmers. Much enthusiasm was exhibited at the
presence of the redoubtable British infantry in America, but little practical
help was given by the legislatures, and Braddock was sorely tried. Washington,
however, who had formerly commanded the Virginian levies and was now the
General’s aide-de-camp, was of great service.
The
expedition started early in June from Fort Cumberland on the Potomac, some
seventy miles above Alexandria, whence it was 122 miles to Fort Duquesne. The
difficulties of this march through the primeval forests and over the high
ridges and rugged defiles of the Alleghanies must be left to the imagination,
since there is no space here for detail. The force consisted of about 1400
regulars and 600 provincials. Of the promised Indians, through no fault of the
General, there were practically none. The French garrison at Fort Duquesne was
believed to be strong, while the roods swarmed with Indians in the French
interest. When about half the march had been accomplished with the utmost
difficulty, Braddock
124
decided to
push on with 1400 of the best troops. The catastrophe which overwhelmed this
advancing force within nine miles of the French fort is one of the most
dramatic tragedies in our military annals. 600 Indians and 200 French and
Canadians awaited the British at a spot well adapted to forest warfare, and
virtually destroyed an army nearly twice their strength, of better discipline
and equal courage. The story has been often told. The enemy, lurking behind
trees and bushy ridges, themselves invisible, poured in a fire so rapid and so
deadly that the redcoats, massed together, fell in heaps. For a time discipline
to some extent prevailed, and crashing volleys were fired in futile fashion
into the woods whence came the pitiless leaden hail. But when the slaughter
increased and no enemy could be seen, confusion seized upon the troops, who,
huddled together in small knots, fired wildly in all directions, killing more
of their comrades than of their enemy.
Officers
showed the noblest devotion, vainly endeavouring to lead parties of their men
against the hidden foe but invariably falling in the very act, picked off by
the marksman’s bullet. Braddock performed prodigies of valour and had five
horses killed under him. Washington in like fashion was twice unhorsed and his
coat riddled with balls. After two hours of slaughter and confusion, a general
panic set in, and the survivors fled back along the road they had so
laboriously made and traversed, not halting till they reached Dunbar’s camp
sixty miles away. Braddock was shot in the lungs, and being borne along with
the fugitives was buried four days later under forest leaves. Out of 1460 of
all ranks who went into action 863 were killed or wounded. Out of 87 officers
only 26 came off unscathed. Yet there was no serious attempt at pursuit. This
catastrophe caused a painful shock in England and spread consternation in the
colonies. Its immediate effect was enormously to increase, among the Indians,
the prestige that the French by their activity had already been acquiring, and
to hurl on the defenceless frontiers of the middle and southern colonies a
horde of savages, thirsting for scalps and eager for blood.
Two
expeditions of less import were undertaken this year in the North. War had not
yet been formally declared between France and England; but, when Braddock’s
corps was despatched from Cork, France answered the challenge by sending 3000
soldiers to Canada. Now Shirley, the governor of Massachusetts, was a man of
energy and ability, and profoundly convinced of the urgency of the French
question. He had brought 6000 provincials, mostly New Englanders, into the
field. They were commanded by Johnson, an Irish gentleman of large possessions
on the Indian frontier and of great influence with the friendly Indians of the
Five Nations. The object was to operate from Albany and oppose the French
forces which were massing on Lake Champlain, and which threatened to seize and
hold the water-connexion flanking the New England colonies and leading direct
from Canada to New York. The
1755-6]
Failures on the
Canadian frontier.
125
Marquis de
Vaudreuil was now governor of Canada. He had 5000 regular troops at his
command, besides the large and invaluable Canadian militia and countless
Indians. Baron Dieskau, an able soldier, was in command of the troops on Lake
Champlain. Those who sweepingly attribute Braddock’s defeat to his professional
spirit and European troops will find food for reflexion in the fact that a
large force of provincials was ambushed by Dieskau’s Canadians and Indians on
Lake George this same summer, with precisely the same results. The provincials
however, being undisciplined, ran away quicker and were moreover only three
miles from their entrenchments, so that the slaughter was infinitely less.
Dieskau, following up his success, was repulsed by Johnson and his troops in an
attack on their encampment with considerable loss, and was himself badly
wounded and taken prisoner. After a summer yielding no tangible results, the
French and English forces faced each other through the winter of 1755-56 from
the opposite ends of Lake George, the former at Ticonderoga, the latter at
Forts Edward and William Henry.
Shirley, like
some other capable administrators, had an ambition to shine as a soldier; so he
personally took command of the third expedition which Braddock, Dinwiddie,
himself, and others of less eminence had projected for the year 1756. Its
object was the capture of Niagara, where a strong fort protected the western
fur-trade of Canada. Shirley’s base of operations was Oswego, the only British
outpost on the northern lakes and a thorn in the side of Canada. But his
intentions were discovered from letters captured in Braddock’s baggage; and
when he reached this solitary British station on the southern shores of Lake
Ontario, he found Fort Frontenac (the present Kingston) on the Canadian side
reinforced in such strength that he dared not leave Oswego exposed to its
attack. So, leaving 700 men, raw levies for the most part, to strengthen the
defences, he retired to his administrative duties, which were of more importance
to America than his military adventures. Washington in the meantime had been
placed in command of 1500 provincials and ordered to protect the frontier.
The
boundary-line was now pushed back along its whole length, and the labours of a
generation were destroyed with all the horrible accompaniments of savage
warfare. Hundreds of persons, including women and children, were butchered. The
French not only incited the Indians, but often led them. Panic seized even the
oldest settlements and the eastern cities. The Quaker legislature of
Pennsylvania earned the reproaches of posterity and the execrations of its
contemporaries by refusing to vote a dollar or a man for the public defence.
Washington, with his small force on a frontier 400 miles long, was almost
powerless, and wrote that he would sooner die a hundred deaths than witness the
heart-rending scenes which his hard lot compelled him to see. The triumph of
Canada on the other hand was somewhat damped by the
126
[1756
scarcity of
food that prevailed there through the winter of 1755-56. But in May, 1756, war
was formally declared; and the Marquis de Montcalm sailed in the same month
with supplies of all kinds and 1200 fresh troops to take command of the
Canadian forces. He was a man of high character and ability, then in his
forty-fourth year, and had served with distinction in Europe. His immediate
subordinates were de Levis, Bourlamaque, and de Bougainville, all three of them
efficient soldiers.
England sent
out Lord Loudon as commander-in-chief, the 35th regiment, 900 strong, sailing
just before him, with Abercrombie and Webb. Loudon was a respectable soldier,
but wholly lacked vigour and initiative. He was quite unequal to a situation so
strange and trying, and no match whatever for his able adversary with an army
and a colony at his entire disposal. Montcalm indeed lost little time. In
August he headed in person an expedition against Oswego and forced the
garrison, some thousand strong, who should have been reinforced, to capitulate
at discretion. Forts, houses, stores and shipping were demolished. The place
was temporarily erased from the map, and Ontario once more became a French
lake. The blow was a severe one, and the English this summer had no successes
of any kind to counterbalance it. It had been intended to send another
expedition against Fort Duquesne along Braddock’s road, but Pennsylvania and .
Virginia refused all assistance, and the project had to be abandoned.
The chief
operations of the summer had their centre at Albany, which may be roughly
described as in the angle of the only two routes to Canada—the one leading
north through Lakes George and Champlain to Montreal, the other westward up the
Mohawk valley to Oswego on Lake Ontario. The country they penetrated was a rugged
and romantic wilderness, the historic battle-ground of eighteenth century
America, much of it occupied by the Indians of the Five Nations, whom a traditional
policy and Johnson’s skilful diplomacy kept neutral or friendly in spite of
French prestige. The efforts of the British were mainly directed towards the
northern route and, as in the preceding year, to the expulsion of the French
from the lodgements they had gained within such easy striking distance both of
New York and the New England colonies.
There were as
yet few British regulars in America. The newly arrived 35th and Braddock’s
survivors were almost all that Loudon had at his disposal. But an army of
several thousand provincials, mostly New Englanders, had taken the field, and
were gathered under his orders. Except that they could handle a gun and
possessed as much courage as could be expected without discipline, never was a
people more calculated to be the despair of a commander than the Americans of
that day. Every colony jealously controlled its own levies and its own military
expenditure, and set limits, not only to the term of the men’s services, but
sometimes even to the districts in which those services were to be given. The
New England militia regiments chose their own officers, usually their own
social
equals and
neighbours, an arrangement in itself fatal to discipline. Sanitary knowledge,
even such as then possessed by regular armies, was entirely absent; and, in
localities where men to-day seek camp life as a means of health, the colonial
troops sickened by hundreds, and died by scores. Jealousies between the
colonial leaders, and again between the colonial officers and those of the
British regiments, increased the confusion. When to this are added the
difficulties of campaigning in regions outside the food-producing area, wrapped
in the gloom of unbroken forests and swarming with Indians, one ceases to
wonder that North America proved the grave of such moderate reputations as
George II’s generals brought out with them before the days of Pitt’s supremacy.
Loudon was of
a desponding nature, and acquired a reputation for dilatoriness and other
failings that was perhaps not fully deserved. The summer was consumed in
strengthening Forts Edward and William Henry and in building the vast fleet of
boats necessary for advancing down Lake George against the French, whose great
fortress of Carillon or Ticonderoga, at the narrow entrance to Lake Champlain,
bade defiance to the British and filled the surrounding forests with fierce
bands of marauding scalp-hunting warriors, both red and white. Similar troops
were also to be found on the British side, and that in increasing numbers as
time went on—bands of hardy dare-devil rangers, drawn from the ranks of
frontiermen and hunters and grouped under popular leaders like Stark and
Rogers. The adventures of these men formed one long romance, while their
services were invaluable. Their deeds of daring and heroism, their amazing
fortitude, their hair-breadth escapes and their too often sanguinary deaths, add
to the picturesqueness which so eminently distinguishes the story of these
half-forgotten campaigns when read in detail. It is only possible here to
remind the student that the intervals between those combined movements which
general history can alone take note of were filled with performances whose
simple narration makes fiction seem in comparison tame and poor; and it is far
from wonderful that many British officers, fascinated by the dash and danger of
these forest raids, sought service in them and, being for once the amateurs,
while the colonials were the experts, not seldom paid the penalty of their
inexperience with their lives.
The winter of
1756-57 dragged through with little change in the respective positions of the
two rival nations. Campaigning in a serious sense was out of the question at
that season of the year. The requirement of winter-quarters for the regular
troops raised considerable friction. The inhabitants of the chief cities showed
a reluctance to provide food and shelter for the men who had come to fight
their battles that seems almost inexplicable. The health of the soldiers, the
temper of the officers, and the good understanding, so vital at this crisis,
suffered in consequence. Large numbers deserted their colours. The colonial militiaman
left his colours from the natural yearning of a raw recruit
128 Loudon's failure against Louisbourg. [1756-7
for his home,
and not seldom in despair of his long-deferred pay. The regular was tempted to
desertion by a country which afforded good hope of escaping recapture and
offered at the same time encouraging prospects.
Loudon had
urged upon the government the doubtful policy of making the capture of
Louisbourg their main object for the summer campaign of 1757. They had followed
his suggestion, and he was now ordered to New York with as many troops as the
exigencies of colonial defence were supposed to admit of. This accomplished, he
awaited the favourable moment to embark his force for Halifax, there to be
joined by reinforcements from England, and a strong fleet under Admiral
Holbome. Sir Charles Hardy, with a small squadron, was to be his convoy to Nova
Scotia; but in the meantime news of a large French fleet off Louisbourg
arrived, and Loudon dared not move. He waited in vain for tidings of Holbome,
till at length, urged by the necessity for action, he and Hardy decided to take
the risks. Discovery by the French fleet would have meant certain ruin; but
they took every precaution possible, and fortune favoured them. The transports
arrived at Halifax upon the last of June, and Holbome, with fifteen
battle-ships and over five thousand troops, joined them ten days later. The
Royals, 17th, 27th, 28th, 43rd, 46th and 55th regiments of the line, each of
them seven hundred strong, constituted the bulk of the reinforcements. The
regiments previously with Loudon or in the Nova Scotia garrisons were three
battalions of the Royal Americans, the 22nd, 42nd, 44th and 48th, besides
American rangers. In all there were some eleven thousand troops, mainly
regulars, collected at Halifax, the most formidable army that had yet trodden
American soil. But, like everything else connected with British strategy at
that unhappy period, they were too late. A month was occupied in drilling and
organising the troops and in vain endeavours to ascertain the military and
naval strength at Louisbourg. The first report of this was so far encouraging
that the army was actually embarked. Before setting sail, however, a second and
more trustworthy account was received to the effect that 7000 troops, besides
Indians and irregulars, were within the walls of the strongest fortress in
America, and that 22 battle-ships, besides frigates, carrying 1300 guns, were
riding in the harbour. A council of war pronounced this to be a hopeless
outlook; and Loudon, leaving four regiments for the protection of Nova Scotia,
sailed back with the remainder to New York. Admiral Holbome, being subsequently
reinforced, endeavoured to tempt the French fleet out of Louisbourg. But La
Motte, their commander, had no object in risking an engagement; and Holbome,
while cruising off the coast, was caught in a hurricane, his fleet scattered,
and some ships wrecked. A melancholy close was thus put to an ill-advised and
badly executed campaign. Loudon has been made the scapegoat: his dilatoriness
is the burden of most writers. He is even
1757]
129
ridiculed for
occupying the troops at Halifax in planting vegetables for the use of the sick
and wounded in the looked-for siege of Louisbourg, and in practising
siege-operations—a better and healthier alternative surely than the other one
of drinking and idleness! The dilatoriness lay with the English government in
despatching an expedition to an open harbour on the 5th of May that should have
sailed rather on the 5th of March. Loudon has perhaps a greater blunder to
answer for, namely, that of entering on a campaign which, at a critical moment,
removed him with the cream of his troops from operations of more vital import.
He had not reached New York before the error was brought home to him by a
despatch-boat laden with the disastrous news that Fort William Henry had fallen
in lamentable fashion and that the waterway from the Hudson to Montreal was in
the hands of the French.
While Loudon,
as the lampooners said, was “ planting cabbages ” in Nova Scotia, Montcalm had
vigorously thrown himself on the weakened frontier of New York. Dazzled by his
brilliant achievement at Oswego, hundreds of western savages had flocked to his
standard at Montreal, while the so-called Christian Indians of Canada needed no
such incentive to take up the hatchet. Ticonderoga or Carillon, at the head of
Lake Champlain, was to be the rallying-place; Fort William Henry, thirty miles
off at the head of Lake George, the point of attack. The French commander, on
his side, was not free from personal annoyances. Vaudreuil, the governor, as a
native-born Canadian, was jealous both of him and of his friends. The French
troops on their part had no love for their Canadian brothers-in-arms. The civil
administration from top to bottom battened on corruption. The Church claimed
immense privileges, and was sometimes troublesome. But in the matter of making
war these were trifles compared with the cumbrous and complex machinery that
existed across the English frontier. There were no fanatical, jealous,
parsimonious or ignorant legislators to be consulted, no supplies to be voted.
The King found the money; the colonists were at any rate anxious to fight,
however they might differ on other matters; and when the commander-in-chief
gave the signal, every Canadian, without hope of pay, was ready to march with
the French regiments, only anxious to prove his perennial though vain boast,
that he was a better soldier than the regulars and equal to three Englishmen.
8000 men, including six royal regiments and a large body of the marine or
colonial regulars, were at Ticonderoga in July. Montcalm was there himself,
with the able de Levis as second in command. At the far end of the long,
narrow, mountain-bordered lake in Fort William Henry, lay Colonel Munro with
some 2000 men, nearly half of them raw militia recruits. Fourteen miles behind
£im, on the Hudson at Fort Edward, General Webb, commanding in Loudon’s
absence, had a still smaller number of still worse troops. In his rear lay
Albany
130
Capture of Fort
William Henry. [1757
and the
English settlements, quaking with a fully justified trepidation and sorely
weakened in their former faith in the invincibility of the mother-country.
The story of
the capture of Fort William Henry and its ghastly sequel is one of the dramatic
episodes with which this period of American history abounds, though it can only
be treated in brief outline here. Montcalm, with the help of boats and bateaux,
experienced little difficulty and no opposition in bringing his motley but
effective host and formidable artillery to the raw clearing of the forest^ not
a stone’s throw from the lake shore, where the doomed fortress awaited its
fate. His summons to surrender, coupled with a significant hint that the 1800
Indians with him, if exasperated by resistance, might prove uncontrollable, was
curtly rejected by Munro, who did not wholly despair of help from Webb. The
garrison, which contained Otway’s regiment (the 35th), was outnumbered by
nearly four to one, and in average quality was at an even greater disadvantage.
The British artillery was miserably inferior to that of the enemy, and the
garrison was encumbered with women and children and a long sick list. Webb, who
was responsible for the posts which kept the road to Albany open, had sent from
Fort Edward all the men he could spare to Munro. To have faced the French in
the open with less than 2000 raw militia, and at the same time left Fort Edward
at the enemy’s mercy, would have been most hazardous. Yet Webb has been widely
blamed for his inaction, probably on the principle followed by Loudon’s critics
of “ once wrong always wrong,” for he had made mistakes before. Through a week
the roar of artillery, the rattle of musketry, and the wild war-whoops of the
Indians woke fierce echoes in the mountain gorges round Lake George. The
defenders’ ammunition was nearly exhausted, their wretched cannon had burst or
were dismounted. Sickness was raging, and the French trenches, armed with heavy
artillery, had been pushed close to the ramparts. Entirely surrounded, cut off
from supplies, Loudon being on the Atlantic and Webb hemmed in, Munro agreed
to the inevitable capitulation. Canada could scarcely feed her own people and
troops; accordingly the garrison, under the promise of not serving for eighteen
months, were to be safely escorted with their moveables to Fort Edward. But all
French subjects taken since the war began were to be restored; each prisoner so
delivered was to release from his parole a member of the garrison. The fort was
then abandoned for a large entrenchment near by which had been included in the
defence.
It was at the
evacuation of this temporary refuge that the bloody scene was enacted which has
stained Montcalm’s memory. The Indians, though they had joined in the
agreement, could not tolerate the sight of vanquished enemies marching off, not
merely with their lives and scalps, but witH their clothes, arms and small
possessions. The outrage began with a scuffle; the war-whoop was raised; and a
hundred
tomahawks
flashed in the air. A scene of wild confusion followed; the captive garrison
had little means of resistance but unloaded muskets. The sick with the women
and children were among them, and numbers of these fell instant victims to the
fury of the savages. The escort was culpably insufficient, and proved
heartlessly indifferent. Montcalm was thoroughly acquainted with the Indian
nature, and detested its brutality while he recognised the value of his
indispensable allies. When the catastrophe due to his carelessness occurred, he
and his officers threw themselves into the tumult and exerted all their powers
of persuasion and intimidation to stop the plunder and slaughter. The troops on
guard, chiefly Canadians, callous to Indian excesses, would risk nothing. The
French, more especially their officers, though late on the scene, behaved like
men. Nearly a hundred of the weaker persons, however, had been butchered; 600
were made prisoners by the savages, and had to be redeemed at various later periods
by French money; while numbers, stripped of their clothes, fled to the woods
and found their way eventually to Fort Edward. Montcalm’s mistake cost the
French, as well as its more immediate victims, dear; for the English, with just
reason, repudiated their part of an agreement which had been broken in such
ruthless fashion. The guns and contents of Fort William Henry were carried to
Canada; the fort itself was destroyed; and French craft plied on Lake George
with as much impunity as on Lake Ontario.
This winter
of 1757-58 was a gloomy one for the English in America, whether colonists or
soldiers. The French, firmly seated on the Ohio, were still hurling the Indians
on the reeking frontiers of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, whose older
settlements showed a remarkable lack of spirit. In the North the horrors of a
greater war were detailed in hundreds of rural homesteads by disbanded soldiers
who were without laurels to glorify their tales. The faith of the colonies had
been greatly shaken, though unjustly, in British troops, and much more
reasonably in British generals. The latter, on their part, had cause to
complain of many things and were not backward in their complaints. But they
were shortly to be relieved; for Pitt was now in power. Few indeed at that
dismal season could have dreamed that within three years the French power in
America would have virtually ceased to exist. France indeed was now at the
zenith of her success. Her failure as a true colonising power, however, is
significantly illustrated by the fact that the Canadians, satiated as they were
with glory, were almost starving, in a fertile country occupied for a century
and a half. Yet, still land-hungry, France was grasping at a continent.
Pitt had
risen to supreme power in the preceding June. The train of the late disasters
had then already been laid, and he had to take the consequences and profit by
them. By the new year the magic of his inspiration had begun to work; and the
agents of his vigorous policy, both at home and abroad, were feeling the
influence of his lofty
132
[1757-8
enthusiasm.
Prance was not merely to be checked in America; she was to be crushed and
evicted. It was there he clearly saw, and not in the vast and endless turmoil
of European strife, that the quarrel between France and England was to be
decided. It was unfortunate for France that, almost at the moment when a great
man possessed of these convictions stepped to the helm in England, French
colonial interests should have changed hands with a precisely opposite result,
and that ministers who had backed up the able conductors of the Canadian
forward policy, with both sympathy and supplies, should have given place to
others who shut their eyes to the future and failed to see the “handwriting on
the wall.” Two French fleets, however, were already fitting out in Toulon and
Rochefort respectively, for the carriage of troops and supplies to Canada. Pitt
sent squadrons to check them, with the result that the one at Toulon could not
get out, while the other was driven on the rocks.
Pitt’s
American programme for the year 1758 differed from that of the preceding one in
nothing but the men and methods by which it was to be carried out. Louisbourg
was to be attacked by one force, Ticonderoga by another, Duquesne by a third ;
in short, the three chief pivots of French influence were to be destroyed. In
the selection of his officers Pitt threw precedent to the winds, ignored
seniority, rank and influence, and had regard to merit alone. To Forbes, a
brave and capable soldier, was given the task of avenging Braddock; Loudon was
abruptly recalled; and (Pitt’s only mistake) Abercrombie, his second in
command, was left in his place. For the conquest of Louisbourg, the most
important task of all, he recalled Amherst, then a colonel, from Germany. His
brigadiers were also men of comparatively humble rank, Lawrence and Whitmore of
proved efficiency and American experience, and lastly James Wolfe, the eventual
hero of the war. Wolfe was of Anglo-Irish stock, though bom at Westerham, the
son of a general who had served under Marlborough, and was now thirty years of
age. Ever since Dettingen, where at sixteen he served as adjutant to his
regiment, he had seen much service on the Continent and in Scotland. Without
fortune or interest of the kind then useful he had forced his way to the
command of a regiment at two-and-twenty. The heart of a lion beat in his sickly
and lanky frame. Underneath his red hair and pale homely face was the cool
quick brain of a military leader, matured by studious application rare enough
in the soldier of any period, while a quenchless spirit, fired with a high
ambition for the glory of his country, shone through lustrous blue eyes that
went far to redeem the shortcomings of face and figure. In the hapless
expedition against Rochefort, in the preceding years, Wolfe had reaped what
scanty credit was to be gained. For years he had been chafing at the inactivity
of peace, and had been forced to content himself with making his regiment the
best disciplined in the British service. Now his chance had come.
1758]
133
Eleven
thousand men and an ample train of artillery set out in February, convoyed by
Admiral Boscawen and a strong fleet. So terrible was the weather that it was
the 10th of May before they reached Halifax, where a few regulars and militia
joined them. For nearly a week in early June fleet and army lay tossing off the
surf- lashed coast, where Louisbourg, “ the Dunkirk of America,” the pride of
France, armed to the teeth, lay frowning between a shaggy desert and a tumbling
foggy sea. The embattled town was flanked by an almost land-locked harbour
where a French fleet lay in doubtful security, though it added 3000 sailors to
a somewhat larger number of regulars, who, with the armed members of a hardy
civic population of 4000, formed the garrison. A million sterling had been
recently spent on strengthening the fortifications, now a mile and a half in
circumference. 250 cannon and mortars gaped defiance from the walls, while the landing
places on the adjacent coast had been fortified for immediate occupation. After
much difficulty and at considerable risk, a landing was effected on July the
9th, in the face of a raging surf and a storm of grape and round shot. Wolfe,
lately an invalid at Bath, and since tortured by weeks of sea-sickness, led in
the foremost boat. Leaping into the surf, cane in hand, he headed the leading
files against the opposing battery and carried it at the bayonet’s point. The
whole force was then landed, the French outer defences driven in, the heavy
artillery and stores brought on shore, and the siege formally commenced.
There was no
lack of energy now. Admiral and general for once worked in full accord. The
trenches were pushed rapidly forward and the terrific fire of British artillery
“served,” in the words of a French officer, “ with an activity not often seen,”
played havoc with the masonry, while a constant stream of bombs left the
defenders, in a short time, not a spot in which they could with safety lay their
heads. A sally in force was defeated and driven back. Wolfe was conspicuously
active, now heading a charge, now erecting fresh batteries on the harbour side
and working big guns with joyous energy. It was a gallant defence too. Drucour,
the governor, behaved with infinite spirit; and his wife is said to have
mounted the ramparts and personally animated the men who manned them. But by
July 24th only four guns were feebly answering the roar of Amherst’s artillery,
and the place was a heap of ruins. The ships in the harbour were burned or
taken, and there was no option but unconditional surrender, though even now the
French officers were anxious to fight to the last. But the populace dreaded
retaliation for the barbarities of the French Indians and insisted on
capitulation. 5637 French soldiers and sailors were delivered up and sent
prisoners to England. The greater part of the population was shipped to France,
and 240 guns with a large supply of arms and stores passed to the victors. The
news was received in England with transports of joy. Bells pealed and bonfires
flared, while
134
[1758
the captured
standards were carried in solemn procession to St Paul’s, for it was the first
great success in America. Louisbourg was soon afterwards levelled to the ground
at enormous labour and cost. Its pride and power became but a memory, now this
long time a faint one. The lines of its streets may even yet be traced upon the
turf of the lonely promontory; and fragments of massive masonry may be still
seen half buried beneath the verdure of more than a century’s growth.
There were
now some thoughts of moving on Quebec, but the season seemed too short for so
formidable a venture, and in the meantime came news of a great disaster on Lake
George which hurried Amherst to New York with all his available forces.
Even the
colonial legislatures this year had caught some sparks of Pitt’s enthusiasm. He
had called on them to furnish, clothe and pay 20,000 men, a force almost as
large as the whole British army of a few years back. They had nobly responded,
Massachusetts, seconded by Connecticut, bearing more than half the burden. With
some 10,000 provincials and 6000 regulars, Abercrombie, after a month in camp,
moved on to what was regarded as the certain destruction of Ticonderoga. Never
had an American summer sun shone on a more brilliant and martial spectacle than
the vast flotilla which drifted up the shining surface of the most beautiful of
American lakes to disaster undreamed of. Borne in more than a thousand boats
and propelled by ten thousand glinting oar blades, went redcoats, plaided
highlanders, and blue-coated provincials, with arms shining and banners
flaunting in all the pride and panoply of war, while the still morning air was
filled with the sound of martial music and the stirring calls of trumpet and
bugle made wild echoes in the mountain glens. Many of those who saw it have
left us their impressions of that memorable scene: seldom perhaps has such a
picture been set in such a frame.
Abercrombie
was past fifty. If his lack of ability was suspected, it was in part
counteracted by the presence of his brigadier, Lord Howe. The latter was now
thirty-four. He was a promising officer, and beloved by the Americans. “The
noblest Englishman that has appeared in my time and the best soldier in the
British Army,” wrote Wolfe, who knew him well. Montcalm, with somewhat over
3000 men, all good regular troops, but with no chance of timely succour, waited
at Ticonderoga, halting, as well he may have done, between many plans. The one
adopted was a bold one and a sudden thought. The fort, for various reasons, did
not commend itself as a point of resistance. Half a mile distant, some rising
ground seemed much more suitable. This elevation his whole army toiled day and
night to intrench. The trees, for a musket-shot round, were felled and left
lying with their branches pointing outwards. A barricade of logs, eight feet
high, was erected in a rude circle, while outside the barricade an almost
impenetrable frieze of branches placed in layers with their points sharpened
made access, even without opposition,
135
no easy
matter. Montcalm, who had de Levis and Bourlamaque with him, knew well that
against artillery he was powerless, and that a mere blockade without even
firing a shot would soon reduce him. His only hope lay in some blundering on
the part of the English commander; and a Frenchman of that day had fair cause
to regard it as no forlorn one. Montcalm’s risk was justified by the sequel.
Abercrombie came on without artillery or a competent engineer, and Lord Howe
was killed in a skirmish that took place as the troops were advancing through
the woods from the landing-place. The French entrenchment, defended by 3500
good troops, was impervious to musketry or the bayonet. Abercrombie believed
the defenders to be in greater force even than this, but nevertheless proceeded
at once to launch the flower of his army upon the hopeless task. A lamentable
scene ensued. The abatis of branches lining the ramparts was immovable and
almost impenetrable. Behind it was a log wall, eight feet high, from which
poured a continuous stream of lead. For four hours the troops came on, regiment
after regiment struggling wildly and vainly, amid the labyrinth of branches, to
reach the defences behind. Rarely have British soldiers exhibited more
dauntless though futile heroism. Abercrombie blundered again in failing to see
that he was sacrificing the lives of brave men in vain. Human endurance at
length gave out: nearly 2000 men, of whom 1600 were regulars, had fallen in
this short quarter of a summer day. The 42nd Highlanders in round numbers had
lost 500 out of 1000 men. The mortality speaks for the valour of the troops,
for there was no pursuit or outside fighting. Every man was shot, deliberately
rushing on that hopeless wall of flame. The victorious French, whose losses
were small, as they had fought under cover, were, as was natural enough, elated
to ecstacy, but, dreading a second attack of Abercrombie’s still formidable
army, conducted probably with judgment and artillery, they made every effort to
reinforce Ticonderoga. In no long time, instead of 3000, 12,000 men were there;
and for that season the path to Canada was unconquerable. Abercrombie, in the
meantime, had conveyed his dispirited army back to its old camp, where Amherst
joined him with the Louisbourg troops in October.
One
enterprise saved Abercrombie’s immediate command from the blame of unrelieved
failure. This was the work of an able provincial officer, Bradstreet, who, with
3000 provincial troops, made a bold dash through the northern wilderness to
Lake Ontario, and destroyed Frontenac, one of the great fortified trading-posts
of the French. He captured its small garrison, together with a large quantity
of stores and gnns, burnt their fleet on Lake Ontario, and destroyed, as it
turned out for ever, this ancient base of French attack.
A few words
too must be said of the third great expedition which signalised this busy year,
namely that of Forbes against Fort Duquesne, the key of the Ohio. Forbes was
over sixty, an able and devoted
136 Capture of Frontenac and Fort Duquesne.
[1758-9
officer. He
had with him some 4000 provincials from the middle and southern colonies and
1600 regulars, chiefly Highlanders. Before setting out, his powers of
organisation and diplomacy were heavily taxed, as in order to get his men and
supplies he had to wrestle long and painfully with the perverse legislatures of
Pennsylvania and her neighbours, who were very far indeed from emulating the
zeal of New England. He finally started, not upon Braddock’s tracks, but, in
the teeth of Virginian opinion, upon a new route to be laboriously opened step
by step through the west of Pennsylvania. An able Swiss officer, Bouquet, was
his second in command, while Washington, though opposed to the route, lent
active assistance. Forbes’ health was utterly broken, but, borne on a hurdle
between two horses, he stuck to his post with admirable courage. The strength
of Fort Duquesne was quite unknown, so Grant, a Highland officer, with 500 of
his own men and some rangers, went forward to investigate it. His zeal
outrunning his discretion, he found himself, greatly outnumbered, in front of
the enemy, and suffered a repetition of Braddock’s catastrophe on a less
serious scale, not far from the spot where the bones of the victims of 1755,
picked clean by wolves, were still whitening by the Monongahela. But British
confidence could no longer be so readily shaken. Forbes pressed cautiously but
steadily on through scalping Indians and French guerillas, securing the posts
behind him as his axemen hewed their laborious way across the Alleghanies. The
leaves were falling from the forest trees under the chill breath of November,
and the task was not yet done. His officers urged sound and logical reasons for
deferring the attack till spring. Forbes, however, swinging in his rude litter
and in mortal pain, but, with prescience perhaps in his dying eyes, refused to
listen, and with Bouquet, Washington and 2500 picked men pushed on to this
hornets’ nest of French and Indian devilry. Their nerves strung up in expectation
of a fierce and critical encounter, Forbes and his men were amazed to find the
place dismantled and forsaken, and stacks of fire-scorched chimneys rising out
of a heap of charred ruins with the unburied bodies of Grant’s Highlanders
lying round. The capture of Louisbourg and above all the destruction of
Frontenac, a source of supply to the Ohio posts, had helped, in the face of
Forbes’ advance, to render Duquesne untenable. The French had vanished for ever
from the Ohio. Their dream of western empire was at an end, and they had now to
fight for their very existence in America. Forbes in the meantime went slowly
back through the cold and sleet to die in Philadelphia, where some unrecorded
grave holds the bones of a hero, whose momentous services received scant notice
from his countrymen and whose very name has no longer any place in their
memory.
The year 1759
was to be an even busier, and for the English a more triumphant one, than its
predecessor. And it was to be made ever memorable by the capture of Quebec in
the face of natural difficulties
and physical
odds that seemed insuperable. Amherst was to resume the uncompleted task of
driving the French from Ticonderoga and Lake Champlain and if possible of
fighting his way to Montreal, forming with the attack on Quebec by a fleet and
army a combined movement, which if successful would place Canada at his feet. A
third army under Prideaux, advancing up the Mohawk route, was to clear Lake
Ontario and seize Niagara, where a large French post barred the way to Lake
Erie and the western trade.
Wolfe had
gone home after Louisbourg, full of honours; not however to display them but to
try to patch up his wretched constitution at Bath, against such demands as
Pitt, in the coming season, might make on his services. Here, not without
murmurs from the jobbers and overlooked incapables, he received his
appointment to the command against Quebec. Louisbourg was the rendezvous for
the army placed under his orders, which consisted of something under 9000 men.
He was still to remain only a colonel with temporary rank of major-general, and
was just thirty-two. His brigadiers were Monkton, Murray and Townshend, all
well-tried officers, though the appointment of the last-named was to some
extent a concession to rank and interest. The troops were composed of the
15th, 43rd, 58th, 28th, 47th, 35th, 48th regiments, and the 78th (Highlanders)
with two battalions of the 60th or Royal Americans, a corps of light infantry,
three companies of picked Grenadiers and six companies of Colonials.
The French
had always regarded the uppe^ St Lawrence as unnavig- able for large war-ships.
Bougainville had declared that 4000 men could hold Quebec against all comers,
and that the English would be mad to attempt it. He had this winter been sent
to France to beg for reinforcements, and had returned just in time to warn
Montcalm that an English fleet and army were actually on the sea destined for
Quebec. Such was that fine soldier’s energy that, when Wolfe and his men,
partly by the assistance of compulsory pilotage and partly by daring and
skilful English seamanship, found themselves floating in the vast basin of
Quebec, they beheld not four thousand but four times four thousand foes as
strongly entrenched as nature and skill could make them.
Montcalm,
despairing of help from France, had collected every man that could be spared
from the prospective defence of Montreal against Amherst, and from the western
posts, to hold the city of Quebec, which clings to the slopes and crown of a
lofty promontory between the main river and its confluent the St Charles. The
St Lawrence here suddenly narrows to less than a mile in width, and
theoretically hostile ships could not pass its batteries. Above the city for
several miles almost precipitous cliffs drop into the water from the north
shore, practically securing it from all attack upon that side. Below the city,
and beyond the confluence of the St Charles, a high ridge follows the shore
line for some six miles to where the Montmorency plunging down it in broad
cataracts
forms a natural barrier of defence. With a sufficient garrison of sailors and
militia in the town, Montcalm had strongly entrenched this six miles of ridge,
having his headquarters at Beauport in its centre, and behind it lay 14,000
men, their right upon the St Charles, their left upon the chasms of the
Montmorency. Even Wolfe’s gallant heart may well have sunk when he stood upon
the point of the island of Orleans, and took in the situation with his glass.
It was the end of June. He had less than four months in which either to capture
the city, or return bag and baggage before the ice-bound northern winter—to his
proud nature an intolerable alternative. Yet, to his eager and anxious gaze,
the city seemed invulnerable. He could pound it with artillery and reduce the
country outside the walls and the Beauport lines. For the rest he must trust to
fortune and inspiration. He planted, though not immediately, a camp and
batteries, where the Montmorency meets the St Lawrence, facing across the
former stream the left wing of Montcalm’s entrenched lines. On the point of the
island of Orleans, looking over to the city four miles distant, he had another
camp, while the heights of Point Levis, confronting Quebec at a distance of
less than a mile across the narrowed channel, were the obvious spot for his
main batteries. Montcalm had keenly felt this danger. But Vaudreuil had
overruled him, maintaining that cannon planted there could not command the
upper town.
Wolfe was
soon to prove Montcalm’s judgment the better one. He lost no time in driving
off the feeble opposition on Point Levis and erecting formidable batteries upon
the heights, which on July 12th began to play upon the town with terrible
effect. But this brought Wolfe no nearer to its capture. In the meantime two
attempts had been made with fire- ships to bum Saunders’ fleet, which lay in
the basin, but both had been defeated by the courage of the sailors. Innumerable
incidents filled the precious days passing all too swiftly. A night attack on
the Point Levis batteries was easily repulsed. The surrounding villages that
showed signs of being troublesome were intimidated. Attempts were made to find
a ford up the rough defiles of the Montmorency whence Montcalm on the Beauport
lines might be perhaps attacked in the rear, but to no purpose. Ships ran the
gauntlet of the Quebec batteries and destroyed French shipping above the town.
Reconnaissance parties went up the river and accomplished such small successes
as were in their power, drawing off by that means a few hundred men from
Montcalm’s army to watch them. But the main object was no nearer achievement.
Montcalm showed no disposition to move, and Wolfe in despair, though with much
careful preparation, attempted a dash at the Beauport lines on July 31st. Wolfe
himself led the boats under a heavy fire, which bespattered him with splinters
and knocked his cane out of his hand. Any faint chance of success, however, was
ruined by an unaccountable madness which seized the Louisbourg Grenadiers and
Royal Americans (60th), a thousand of whom were the first to land upon the flat
narrow strip below the
1759]
139
entrenched
hills. Filled with an overweening confidence in their powers, without waiting
for the regiments behind, or the orders of their own officers, who had nothing
for it but to go with them, they threw themselves upon the steep slopes from
whose embattled crests a storm of grape and musketry could sweep them at will.
They never reached the summit, but through the gloom of a sudden and drenching
thunderstorm fell back to the boats with the loss of 44S men, including 36
officers. It was a sad fiasco, and added to the depression that was fast settling
on Wolfe’s sensitive mind. But his soldiers never for a moment lost faith in
him ; and, as he lay for some days in a critical condition, wracked with the
pain of his recurrent maladies, and by mental torture at the thoughts of
failure, one note of sympathy permeated the whole army and one chorus of joy
greeted his recovery. August passed away, and, save for the fact that the
churches, convents and houses of Quebec had been battered into ruins by
Monkton’s guns on Point Levis, things were no further advanced; and news had
come that Amherst could not reach Montreal.
Wolfe had
already been up the river and looked at the cliffs which for six miles defended
the plateau on whose eastern point Quebec was perched. When he rose from his
sick bed on August 31 he had made, after consultation with his brigadiers, that
famous resolution which cost him his life and gained him immortal fame. For its
execution he could only employ some 4200 men, out of an army reduced by death
and sickness to 7000. Abandoning the Montmorency camp on September 3rd, and
leaving the remainder of his army at the Isle of Orleans and Point Levis, he
marched up the south shore to where Admiral Holmes with some ships of the fleet
well supplied with boats was awaiting him. Montcalm was puzzled: Bougainville,
who lay entrenched at Cap Rouge near to Wolfe’s new quarters, with 1500 men,
was equally perplexed. Few besides the British general himself knew that he had
selected for his desperate venture a spot where, at the Anse du Foulon, a mile
above Quebec, a rude path zigzagged up the cliff. After a few days of seemingly
purposeless manoeuvring up the river the critical moment arrived. While below
Quebec, on the day and night of the 12th the guns of the fleet and batteries,
in accordance with secret instructions, were by their unusual activity exciting
suspicions of some fresh endeavour under cover of their fire, Wolfe with 3600
picked men in boats was waiting for midnight to drop down to the Anse du
Foulon. Not without some good luck, they passed the unsuspecting sentries in
the small hours of the morning and, before dawn broke, were clambering up the
two hundred feet of bushy precipice that led to the plains of Abraham which
fronted the city. Six hundred more men under Burton, who had waited for them
across the river, crossed in the same boats and followed rapidly on their
tracks. A weak outpost at the top was instantly overpowered. The alarm was
given, but there were no facilities within reach for serious resistance. At
daylight Wolfe was marshalling on the plateau in front of the city
140
[1759
and at his
leisure the best body of troops perhaps that had fought for England since the
days of Marlborough. Montcalm, away beyond the city at Beauport, was awaked at
six, from a few hours of well-earned sleep, with what seemed incredible
reports. Leaping on his horse, he galloped along the Beauport lines towards
Quebec till he reached a point whence he could see through the grey of the
morning the red lines of the British infantry in very truth, stretched across
the plains of Abraham. He had thought himself quite safe for the season; but,
able soldier though he was, he had been clearly out-manoeuvred. Montcalm was no
boastful Canadian ranger but an experienced general, and had few delusions as
to the issue of a fight with Wolfe’s troops in the open. He remarked curtly to
his aide-de-camp that the situation was serious, and then set himself to his
difficult task amid the excitement with which the French lines from the city to
the Montmorency were already throbbing.
It was past
nine o’clock when a French force numerically about equal to Wolfe’s stood
between him and the city. Montcalm was anxious to strike at once, since
Bougainville with his 1500 men should by ordinary calculation be now in Wolfe’s
rear, while the possession of the Anse du Foulon gave the latter the power of
bringing up fresh troops and even artillery. But Bougainville had not arrived,
while the pick of Montcalm’s army, a mixture of regulars and militia, had now
collected for a struggle in which the British leader regarded victory as
already secured. Both sides were eager for the fray, when the French advanced
to the attack. The British, who had been greatly annoyed by sharpshooters from
the bordering thickets, had nevertheless kept their ranks with admirable
steadiness, and now, under strict orders to reserve their fire, awaited the
French who delivered theirs in desultory fashion as they advanced. It was not
till the enemy were within forty yards that the entire British line poured in
their first volley with a uniform precision that enthusiasts declared had never
been known off a parade-ground and with a result more crushing than had ever
been witnessed from a single discharge upon a battle-field. Amid the confusion into
which this withering fire threw the advancing French, Wolfe’s soldiers reloaded
and pouring in one more volley rushed forward upon the shaken foe with bayonet
and broadsword; Wolfe, already wounded in the wrist, led the Louisbourg
grenadiers upon the right in person. The mass of the French, already beaten,
were flying towards the city. Groups of white- coated regulars, proud in their
regimental traditions of European wars and their own victories in American
woods, offered a brave but futile resistance, while riflemen and Indians hidden
in woods and cornfields poured in a sharp fire upon the victorious enemy. At
this moment, with the shouts of his victorious troops in his ears and the
fruits of his daring already in his grasp, Wolfe received a ball in the groin,
and almost immediately afterwards another passed through his lungs. He still
struggled to
keep his feet and, as he staggered into the arms of a lieutenant of grenadiers,
gasped out his concern lest his soldiers should see him fall. He was borne to the
rear and lived just long enough to give one last order and to yield up his
noble spirit with the shouts of victory ringing in his ears. Monkton at almost
the same moment was dangerously wounded. Upon this Townshend took command.
Bougainville, like Montcalm, had been out-generalled. He arrived with his 1500
men just too late to make any attempt on his part justifiable.' Montcalm had
received a mortal wound and was dying in Quebec. A panic had seized the whole
French force; and, while Townshend was entrenching himself before the weak
western ramparts of the city, the French army passing round his left were
pursuing their way towards Montreal. The English in fact had got between them
and their sole source of supplies, while their ships held their river. The lines
of Beauport, on this account alone, were no longer tenable. The city was left
with a mere handful of men in garrison; and the governor, de Ramezay,
surrendered it in four days. The French loss upon the plains of Abraham was
about 1200, besides a considerable number of prisoners. The British had 58
killed and over 500 wounded. The precise number of French in the action is not
clear. Probably 3600 is a sufficiently accurate estimate, exclusive of several
hundred Indians. Wolfe had about the same number with him, for a battalion 500
strong had been left to guard the Anse du Foulon. Brigadier Murray was now
placed in command of the captured city.
The fall of
Quebec was greeted in England with transports of joy. Wolfe’s recent despatches
had prepared people for the worst, and the public faith in the young general,
as was only natural, had begun to waver. Now, as if in rebound from its brief
despondency, the whole nation went wild in an ecstasy of triumph, which even
the victor’s death, seeing how infinitely glorious it was, could not diminish.
Amherst, in
the meantime, though he had forced the French from Ticonderoga, found the road
to Montreal a much more difficult one than had been anticipated. He was
deplorably short of money, and had moreover to construct a lake fleet from the
output of a single backwoods sawmill. The summer was filled with stirring
incidents of partisan warfare. All hope however of supporting Wolfe was early
given up; Amherst, if sure in his movements, was undoubtedly slow. It would
have required a great leader to reach Quebec that season; and to expect a
second Wolfe in the same army is unreasonable. Prideaux on the other hand had
been successful, after an ably conducted campaign, in seizing Niagara; but,
like Wolfe, he had (by the bursting of one of his own guns) lost his life in
the moment of victory.
Montreal and
the smaller posts on the banks of the St Lawrence were now almost all that was
left to the French. De Levis was in command, and that able soldier, at the head
of his brave regiments of regulars, now recovered from their passing panic, and
a still considerable number of
142
French attempts to
recover Quebec.
[1759-
faithful
militia and Indians, made the tenure of Quebec by Murray and his 6000 men no
easy matter. The glory of Wolfe’s exploit has somewhat obscured the trials and
merits of his immediate successors. Amherst and his army wintered in New York,
Albany and other posts, looking forward with entire confidence, justified by
the past summer work, to reaching Montreal in the coming season. Murray,
however, isolated at Quebec amid the frozen waters and snowbound forests of the
North, was in anything but a comfortable position. Barrington, the Secretaiy
for War, had been lamentably neglectful. The troops had no winter clothes, and
their pay was greatly in arrear: Quebec was almost in ruins and afforded
miserable shelter. There was neither fresh meat nor vegetables; the harassed
fire-scourged neighbourhood was itself half starving, and wood-chopping parties
were continually attacked by disbanded militiamen and hostile Indians. The
city too was most vulnerable from the Heights of Abraham, to which the French
from the direction of Montreal had ready access. A winter attack by de Levis,
who had still a large force at his command, burning for revenge though cramped
by lack of provisions, was expected. Lastly sickness, due to scant clothing and
bad food, was so rife among the garrison, that by the end of winter it had
dwindled to 3000 effective men.
Early in
April, 1760, de Levis with a force of twice that number moved up to the attack.
Montcalm, surrounded by a friendly country, had failed to hold Quebec against
numbers far inferior. Murray, in the midst of an unfriendly one, had now to
hold it against a force more than twice the strength of his own. The British
general however went out to meet de Levis, and on April 28 fought the battle of
St Foy, just beyond the plains of Abraham, in which the loss of life was
greater than in the more famous fight of the preceding September. De Levis had
some 10,000 men with him, besides Indians, and after a fierce engagement drove
Murray back into Quebec with the loss of a thousand men, though the French loss
in killed and wounded was more than double that number. The British general has
been blamed for going out to battle at such a disadvantage, and is frequently
accused of having been dazzled by Wolfe’s fame and desirous of emulating his
achievement. It must be said on Murray’s behalf that the ground was still
frozen and impervious to entrenching tools, while the town itself, on that
side, was barely defensible. The French now prepared for a formal siege. But
the river was nearly free from ice. Either a French or a British fleet might
appear at any moment, and it was well understood that upon the nationality of
the first comer the fate of the city hung. On May 9th the British frigate
Lowestoft, the precursor of others, sailed into the basin. De Levis’ scanty
food supplies from the west would now be totally cut off; and he at once fell
back on Montreal, Murray following him with 2200 men. Amherst too, with the new
season, was gathering his forces at the old base upon the upper Hudson, to join
in the final blow. The
-1763]
143
Champlain
route, now easy to force, he left to Colonel Haviland, while with 10,000 men he
ascended the Mohawk to Oswego on Lake Ontario, thence to descend the St
Lawrence upon Montreal. Thus three powerful corps were converging upon this
last stronghold of the Canadas; and the French forces, terribly diminished by
death, sickness and the desertion of the militia, could only hope to harass
the British advance, make a last stand at Montreal, and obtain the best terms
they could.
Amherst, as
we have seen, was not a dashing leader, but he was an admirable organiser. His
difficulties in descending the rapids of the St Lawrence were very great, 90
men being drowned in the descent; but he reached Montreal actually upon the
same day as Haviland, Murray arriving some twenty-four hours later. Vaudreuil
the governor and the famous imtendcmt Bigot were at Montreal. There too were de
Levis, Bourlamaque and Bougainville with 2400 men, the remnant of that gallant
force, which unsupported by the mother country had struggled with such devotion
against adverse circumstances and sometimes against great odds. The militia had
all returned home. The Indians, quick to desert a falling cause, had vanished
into the woods. It was now but a matter of arranging terms of capitulation,
though the soldiers themselves showed much genuine eagerness for further
resistance. But the counsels of Vaudreuil and the civil powers prevailed
against such useless expenditure of human life; and on September 8th, exactly a
year after the death of Wolfe, the capitulation was signed. Under it the whole
of Canada passed to the British Crown; and the Treaty of Paris (1763) left this
arrangement undisturbed. The fact that the Catholic religion remained
unmolested and that the language and, for all practical purposes, the laws of
the inhabitants were in no way interfered with, is creditable to the
combination of policy and humanity which dictated these concessions. All that
was now left to the French in North America was the small colony of Louisiana
on the Gulf of Mexico, which eventually became by purchase the property of the
United States.
THE QUARREL
WITH GREAT BRITAIN.
We have seen in an earlier chapter how much there
was to keep alive a vague spirit of discontent in the colonies towards the
mother- country. The war in Canada had done nothing to allay that feeling. The
military co-operation between Great Britain and the colonies had been
incomplete and unsatisfactory. Each had seen the worst side of the other. The
colonists had seen the dulness and rigidity of British soldiership, the
arrogant contempt of British officers for mere provincials. Moreover English
politicians had debated whether to retain Canada or to abandon it and accept
Guadaloupe. This was held by the colonists, not altogether unfairly, to show
indifference to their safety and wellbeing. On the other hand British
officials had been justly exasperated by the sordid illiberality and lack of
public spirit shown by too many of the colonial assemblies.
There were
other causes tending to accentuate ill-feeling. The Episcopalians of New England
and their friends in the mother-country had never made any secret of their wish
to place the Anglican Churches of the colonies under a bishop. In 1763 John
Miller, a leading Episcopalian clergyman in Massachusetts, who represented the
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, died. In a
newspaper article published upon his death, he and his work were disparaged.
Thereupon a bitter controversy arose; the protagonist on the Independent side
was Dr Mayhew, a Boston minister of robust mind and controversial temper, well
endowed with powers of rhetoric and sarcasm. He contended that the Society had
gone beyond its legitimate sphere, when, instead of confining itself to
missionary work among the Indians, it sought to promote Episcopalianism among
the settlers. All experience shows how hard it is to refute such charges, and
how difficult it is for an earnest clergy to escape the reproach of
proselytising. The question, with which side the victory logically rested, is
of minor importance. The main point was that the colonists were taught to
belieye that those in power sought to establish not only Episcopacy but those
incidents of civil government and that spirit of administration which were
specially identified with Episcopacy.
1755-69]
145
The same
temper had been aroused in Virginia. There the dues of the clergy, like all
other contracts, were calculated and paid in tobacco. The clergyman received a
fixed quantity, and thus the amount of his stipend fell or rose as tobacco was
cheap or dear. But in 1755 the Assembly passed an Act, under which, when the
crop was scanty and tobacco therefore dear, the payment might be made in money.
In other words, the clergy were to lose by a plentiful crop, but not to gain by
a short one. Patriotic writers have frankly admitted the injustice of this Act,
which was vetoed by the King, acting fully within his constituted rights. The
tithe-payers however disregarded the veto and proceeded as if the Act were in
force. The clergy thereupon took legal proceedings. The counsel for the
tithe-payers was Patrick Henry, a young lawyer of great readiness and courage,
a master of invective and sarcasm, and destined to play a leading part in the
coming struggle. He hardly attempted to argue the case on legal grounds. He
confined himself to denouncing the moral validity of the royal veto and
exciting odium against the clergy. The jury found for the tithe-payers; and the
incident left behind it a vague sense of resentment against the rule of the
mother-country, none the less bitter because many of those who felt it most
were in their hearts conscious of having acted unjustly.
A third
incident, one in which the colonists were on surer ground, and one even more
distinctly premonitory of the coming struggle, namely, the opposition in
Massachusetts to Writs of Assistance, will be fully discussed below.
In North
Carolina also a spirit of resistance to authority was awakened. There had been,
it is alleged, much official corruption ; and the secretary of the colony,
Fanning, had exacted illegal fees. In 1769 things came to a head, and a mob of
nearly five thousand men, designating themselves “ regulators,” assembled near
Raleigh. No disturbance immediately followed. Certain individuals however
refused to pay the dues claimed by Fanning. Thereupon the sheriff distrained. A
mob then assembled, beat the sheriff’s officers, and destroyed Fanning’s house.
The legislature thereupon passed a stringent Act against armed assemblies. The
Governor, Try on, raised a force and attacked the rioters. Between twenty and
thirty were killed, and some two hundred taken prisoners. A severe blow was
inflicted on the prosperity of the colony, as many settlers departed; and the
whole affair left behind it a sense of disaffection.
The question
has often been discussed how far there was from the outset anything like a
fixed and definite purpose of separation. On the one hand there were those, not
only in America and in England, but also in France, who foretold that, when the
colonists were no longer kept in check by the French in Canada, they would
become independent of the mother-country. On the other hand Franklin, when in
1766 he
was examined
before the House of Commons, declared emphatically that he knew the whole of
the colonies, and that no one “ drunk or sober ” had ever talked of or
contemplated independence. That there were as yet few, and those few not
necessarily the wisest, who considered the question of separation, is probably
true. On the other hand it was soon to be made clear that there was no desire
for continued union strong enough to resist the pressure of a resolute minority
favoured by irritating conditions. There was undoubtedly in Boston a small
party who, if they had not even in their own minds formulated any scheme for
independence, were fully determined to pare down British control to a nullity,
and to utilise every administrative error or difficulty to that end, and for
whom the prospect of independence as a possible result of their strategy had no
terrors. At their head was Samuel Adams, a man of humble social position, but
of good education and great ability, personally disinterested, but combining
public spirit with unscrupulousness in his choice of methods in a fashion which
recalls an Italian politician of the age of Machiavelli. Among his supporters
was his namesake and distant kinsman, John Adams, a young lawyer gifted with
great powers of thought and expression, egotistical yet capable of subordinating
his egotism to the public good. There were also less worthy and less valuable
members of the party such as James Warren, irresponsible young men with a
passion for rhetoric and for abstract theories, and incapable of approaching
political disputes with any approach to a judicial attitude. Finally there were
men, such as Washington, who did not trouble themselves about political
theories till such theories were forced upon them by some practical emergency,
self-respecting Englishmen whose passion for liberty was largely based on a
sense of personal dignity, and capable enough to be readily irritated by
official blundering or corruption —men, in short, not unlike those country
gentlemen who cast in their lot with Pym and Hampden in the struggle against
Charles I, not lightly carried away by gusts of partisanship, but unflinchingly
staunch to a cause once embraced.
Political
parties in England were in a condition which made them singularly ill-fitted to
cope with any disputes arising out of administrative difficulties. Party
divisions no longer corresponded to real distinctions of faith and principle.
Whatever we may think of Walpole’s personal character or of the goud effect of
his commercial and administrative policy, we cannot doubt that his ascendancy,
and the conduct of other party-leaders, except Pitt, in the following
generation, coincided with, if it did not cause, a decay in the public life of
England, a falling-away alike in principle and practical capacity. There were
to be found, sometimes coexisting in the same man, on the one hand a vague
attachment to abstract views, on the other a cynical indifference to principle
and a belief in what one may call hand-to-mouth methods in politics. Instances
of the latter meet us at every turn in the administrative history
of the time;
while men of principle frequently allowed their judgment to be vitiated by
unfounded theory. When we find a trained lawyer like Lord Camden, in the debate
on the Stamp Act, laying down the doctrine that the union of taxation and
representation is “a law of nature,” we are filled with wonder and despair.
Pitt indeed, alone among British statesmen of that day, had that mixture of
imaginative insight with practical grasp of detail which might have enabled him
to solve the problem of colonial administration. To reconcile the claims of the
British government with the aspirations of the colonists was indeed scarcely
possible. Yet he might so have appealed to the sentiments of the colonists as
to lead them to forgo, for a while, those aspirations, and to overlook what was
implied in the claim of authority. But no such capacity could be found
elsewhere among English statesmen. George Grenville was virtually the leader of
what in the dislocated and confused state of affairs must be called the Tory
party. In all questions of administration and finance, his industry, method,
and clear mastery of details gave him paramount influence over his followers.
He approached colonial questions in the technical unbending spirit of a lawyer
wholly insensible to the importance of understanding, still more of
conciliating, colonial sentiment. The Whig followers of Rockingham, inspired by
Burke, rose to a far higher level. Yet one cannot but see that Burke, in his
estimate of colonial views and feelings, too often lost himself in
abstractions, and theorised without any real knowledge of all those
cross-currents of opinion which were at work in America.
Vagueness and
ignorance of details were not the only hindrances to effective administration.
During the whole dispute with the colonies one is reminded at every turn how
ill fitted a system of party government is for a task which is practically one
of diplomacy, where success can only be obtained by patient co-operation and
unanimity in direction. We feel that even a high-minded and patriotic statesman
like Burke could not, in approaching colonial questions, wholly forget the
possibilities of gain or loss in the game of party politics. Vital questions
are not often greatly influenced by the existence or absence of political
machinery. Yet one cannot but feel that a strong permanent department,
representing experience in colonial administration and independent of parties,
might have done much by keeping parliamentary and public opinion well-informed
and in touch with the colonies.
Projects for
taxation of the colonies had more than once come under the notice of British
administrators. An elaborate scheme of colonial taxation submitted by some
individual to Lord Townshend, Walpole’s brother-in-law and colleague, is extant
in the Record Office; and there is a tradition that Walpole refused to listen
to such a scheme, pleading that the Old World was against him already and that
he would not make an enemy of the New. It therefore hardly showed any
surprising lack of statesmanship or indifference to the interests of the colonies
when, in
1764!, George Grenville, acting as Chancellor of the Exchequer, put sucih a
project into definite form. He gave notice of a bill to be introduced in the
following year, requiring that a stamp, for which duty must be paid in England,
should be imposed on all written agreements which were to have legal validity.
As a concession to the colonies he promised that, if they would suggest some
alternative scheme of taxation equally effective, the measure should be
abandoned.
Unfortunately
at the very same time Grenville was exasperating the colonists by a sudden
increase of severity in administering the revenue laws, and by an instruction
that officers in the royal navy should give assistance to the collectors of
customs. Moreover the Molasses Act, tlready referred to, which had been only
passed as a provisional measure, was about to expire; and the probability of
its renewal was agitating the minds of the colonists.
The
disapproval of Grenville’s scheme in the colonies was general. None of them
showed the least inclination to comply with his offer and bring in an
alternative scheme. At the same time the form in which their disapproval was
expressed revealed differences of opinion. Some regarded self-taxation as a
natural and inalienable right attaching to the colonies; others ignored the
question of abstract right and were content to treat the Act as unwise and
inexpedient. This was the view taken in a formal remonstrance sent to
Parliament by the Assembly of Massachusetts. It is noteworthy that Hutchinson,
the Lieutenant- Governor, afterwards fiercely assailed as a traitor to his
country, was actually the man who drafted this address; and he never at any
later time withdrew or deviated from the position then taken up. Another view,
held, as we are told, by many in America, but not formally expressed in any
resolution or protest, was that the colonists might acquiesce in the right of
Parliament to tax them if only they were granted some share of Parliamentary
representation. Most persons will consider that without facilities for
communication better than those which then existed such a scheme was
impracticable.
No heed was
paid to the remonstrances of the colonists; and in March, 1765, the Stamp Act
was introduced and passed. Since it was carried by a majority of nearly two
hundred and fifty and only opposed by one or two irresponsible and
irreconcilable opponents of the government, Parliament as a whole must share
whatever blame attaches to the Ministry. Apart from the expediency of its
introduction at such a time, the Stamp Act has been defended on the ground that
it was easy of collection and uniform in its operation. The soundness of this
contention may, however, be doubted. The schedule of purposes, for each of
which a different form of stamp was required, contained no less than
forty-three heads; and the prices of the stamped sheets varied from two pence
to ten pounds.
The Stamp
Act, which came into force on November 1, 1765, was
received in
America with an outburst of indignation, for which the government was wholly
unprepared. Resistance was immediate and general. The official
stamp-distributors were in some cases burnt in effigy, in others forced to
resign. At Boston the mob, regardless of the long public services of Hutchinson
and of his opposition to the Stamp Act, and only remembering that he was now
endeavouring to check their violence, sacked and destroyed his house and with
it an invaluable collection of historical books and papers. This outrage was
perpetrated under the eyes of a number of magistrates. Similar outbreaks took
place elsewhere. In Rhode Island three chief supporters of government had their
houses sacked, and the revenue officers went in danger of their lives.
Disturbances also took place in New York, in Connecticut, and in Philadelphia.
The general line, however, taken by responsible men in the colonies was that
the measure, though unwise and injurious, was not unconstitutional. Such was
the view expressed by Otis, who was regarded as the leader of the popular party
in Massachusetts. Franklin consented to assist the British government in its
choice of a stamp-collector for Pennsylvania.
The first
sign of constitutional opposition came from Virginia. In the Assembly of that
colony, Patrick Henry, already noted for his attack on the clergy, brought
forward and carried a series of resolutions hostile to the Act. The vital
resolution, in which the whole force of his position lay, was the last, which
affirmed “that the General Assembly of this colony have the only sole and
exclusive right and power to lay taxes and impositions upon the inhabitants of
this colony.” But the most important feature of the whole struggle was the fact
that it threw the colonies into an attitude of united opposition. In all
previous disputes each colony had fought its own battle. Now delegates from
nine out of the thirteen colonies met in congress at New York to protest
against the Stamp Act (October 7, 1765). Only New Hampshire, Virginia, North
Carolina, and Georgia were unrepresented. A declaration of grievances was
drafted, and memorials were sent to the King and to the two Houses of
Parliament, claiming the right of self-taxation.
Next session
the Ministry to which Grenville belonged were forced to leave office, not in
any way on account of their colonial policy but because their attitude on the
question of a possible regency was distasteful to the King. The incoming Prime
Minister was Lord Rockingham. There can be no doubt that neither the Ministry
which introduced the Stamp Act nor the Parliament which passed it, and still
less the country at large, had in the least foreseen the storm of indignation
with which that measure was received in America. To undo the mischief was the
task which the new Ministry set themselves. Rockingham himself was a man of no
originality or eloquence, but he was sensible, disinterested and courageous.
His policy and that of his party was largely inspired by his private secretaiy,
Edmund Burke. The
interest
which Burke took in the colonies he had already shown by publishing the best
comprehensive account of them then extant; and he approached the whole question
of colonial administration with a sympathetic interest and a detailed knowledge
hardly to be found in any other public man in England. His party, too, were on
friendly terms with that small section of independent members who had opposed
the Stamp Act. Pitt, who had been incapacitated by illness when the Stamp Act
passed, reappeared. At the opening of the session the Ministry laid before
Parliament all the papers touching the disturbances which had taken place in
America. Pitt at once advocated the immediate and total repeal of the Stamp
Act; but his support of the government was given with such reservations that it
did little to strengthen the general position of the Ministry. Confidence, he
said, was a plant of slow growth in an aged bosom; and he could still detect
traces of an over-ruling influence, that no doubt of Bute or the King himself.
The reference to age in a man under sixty had that histrionic touch which so often
marred the greatness of Pitt; and it showed a strange lack of practical
discernment not to see that he needed allies, and that to discredit the
Rockingham Whigs was to forfeit his one possible alliance.
Half-hearted
though his aid was, it sufficed to enable the Ministry to carry the repeal of
the Stamp Act (February 22). Far, however, from abandoning the general
principle of a right to tax the colonies, they passed a Declaratory Act
affirming that right. The wisdom of this step has been a matter of no little
discussion. On the one hand it was said that by this measure the boon of repeal
was stripped of half its value. On the other hand it might be urged that the
action of the colonies had made it impossible to ignore the question, and that
to refrain from making any such declaration was virtually to abandon wholly the
right at any time to tax the colonies. Future events showed that such an
abandonment would have been the wiser policy. But if the Ministry are to be
blamed for want of foresight, the blame must be shared by almost every
responsible politician of that day.
One
noteworthy feature of the debate was that Franklin was called to the bar of the
House of Commons and examined as an expert on colonial politics. That showed a
desire to understand and propitiate American opinion which was an entirely new
feature in colonial administration. Franklin averred that the recognised
doctrine among the colonists was that the mother-country had a right to control
trade and to impose such duties as might be necessary for that purpose. What
they denied, according to him, was the right to levy internal taxation. He did
not however contend, as did some advocates of the colonial cause, that this was
a necessary distinction, based on some immutable law of natural rights.
Questions
were addressed to Franklin with the object of obtaining
an admission
that the tax was only designed to lay on the colonies a fair share of the
charges of the late war. These he answered by declaring that the war was fought
to secure the Indian trade, which was a British rather than a colonial
interest; and that “the people of America made no scruple of contributing their
utmost towards carrying it on.” No one knew better than Franklin that it had
proved impossible to induce the provincial assemblies, notably that of his own
State, Pennsylvania, to bear anything like a due share in the cost of the war;
while the frequency of border raids and the imminent danger of an invasion by
French and Indians combined was a sufficient answer to the contention that the
colonists themselves were not directly interested in the issue of the conflict.
But through his whole public career it was characteristic of Franklin to be at
once temperate in the tone and unscrupulous in the substance of his arguments.
One may doubt
too whether he was thoroughly convinced of what he asserted with full
confidence, namely the capacity of the colonists to manufacture for themselves
and so to become independent of British imports. That might,be possible as a
temporary measure of retaliation: it was almost certain that, if it were
attempted for any length of time, the force of natural conditions would
reassert itself. One significant statement was made by Franklin. He was asked
whether the repeal of the Stamp Act would induce the colonists to acknowledge
the right of Parliament to tax them and to erase their resolutions of protest.
His answer was that nothing could change their opinions, and that only force
could induce them to rescind their resolutions.
That answer
really expressed the truth that the repeal of the Act, though in itself a wise
measure, could not put things back where they were before the Act passed. The
colonists had been led to formulate definitely views which hitherto they had
held but vaguely; and behind the resistance to taxation, which was gradually
taking shape, if. there was not as yet a conscious desire for independence,
there were the elements out of which such a desire would quickly and easily
spring. Young men like James Warren of Boston were coming under the dominion of
those abstract theories of human rights which were soon to convulse and
transform Europe. And this sentiment was neither allowed to evaporate in mere
rhetoric or in childish mock-treason, nor left to smoulder beneath the surface,
inactive and unemployed. In such men as Patrick Henry and John Adams we find
that abstract theories, lending themselves to rhetorical treatment, were
combined with a clear grasp of facts and a sound practical judgment as to the
details of policy.
It is hardly
an exaggeration to say that the whole history of the relations between the
mother-country and the colonies, from the repeal of the Stamp Act to the
Declaration of Independence, was one series of disputes, often insignificant in
themselves, but rendered dangerous by
152
ignorance and
hesitation in the rulers, by permit '.ent and dexterous agitation on the part
of the subjects. In most of these disputes Massachusetts was the battle-field.
But, in 1767, the legislature of New York incurred the displeasure of the
Ministry by refusing to comply with the Mutiny Act by providing the King’s
troops with quarters and certain necessaries. This act of disobedience was
punished by the suspension of the legislature, a procedure of which the policy
and the constitutional propriety might alike be doubted. New York however
showed no tenacious adhesion to constitutional rights like that which
distinguished Massachusetts; and the Assembly, thus pressed, gave way.
In July,
1766, the Rockingham Ministry had fallen, a result largely due to the covert
opposition of the King. Then followed a most unhappy state of affairs, when
Chatham was nominally Prime Minister, but was so incapacitated by suppressed
gout that he could take no part in public business, still less exercise any
control over his ill- irranged and discordant Cabinet. If Chatham’s acting
lieutenant, Grafton, had but possessed sufficient force of will and fixity of
purpose to control his colleagues, all might have gone well. Grafton was imbued
with a genuine respect for old Whig principles and with a generous loyalty
towards his absent chief; but his influence was fatally undermined by the
looseness of his private life and by his incapacity for continuous application.
The result was that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Townshend, had
virtually a free hand in the questions of colonial taxation. He had been a
member of the Cabinet with Grenville, and had supported his colonial policy.
That alone would have made him an object of suspicion to the Americans and
their- friends. Not only were his views out of harmony with those of Chatham,
but he made no secret of his contempt for Chatham’s authority. In 1767 he
introduced and carried through Parliament a bill imposing duties on tea and
other commodities when imported into the colonies. In thus taxing colonial
trade the Ministry were not introducing any new principle. But the proceeds
were to be employed in making an American civil list; and, as we have seen,
Massachusetts had continuously and successfully resisted every attempt to make
colonial officials directly dependent on the home government. Moreover a
measure which at another time might have gone almost unnoticed was sure to be
resented when colonial feeling was still sore from the effect of the Stamp Act and
the Declaratory Act.
Massachusetts
at once met this new attack on colonial liberty, as it had met the Stamp Act,
by an appeal to the whole body of colonies. A circular letter was drawn up by
the Assembly of Massachusetts and sent to each colony. Thereupon Lord
Hillsborough, the Secretary of State, sent instructions to Bernard, the
Governor of Massachusetts, to dissolve the Assembly unless it would withdraw
the circular letters. This they refused to do, and Bernard thereupon dissolved
them. They
continued
however to sit as a convention, having indeed no legal status but being equally
effective, possibly for that very reason more effective, as a means of
expressing and guiding popular feeling.
At the same
time other events took place at Boston, not important in themselves, but acting
as irritants in an already morbid condition of affairs. A sloop named the
lAberty, belonging to John Hancock, a leading merchant in Boston, who
afterwards played a somewhat conspicuous part in the Revolution, was seized by
the Custom House officers, on the ground that her master had landed a cargo of
Madeira wine, declaring and paying duty only on a portion of it. To prevent a
rescue, the sloop was anchored close to a King’s ship, the Romney, which was in
the harbour. A riot followed in which the Custom House officers were
maltreated. The select-men of the town then summoned a meeting. The meeting,
with a dexterity which marked these proceedings throughout, avoided expressing
direct approval of the rioters, but passed resolutions declaring that taxes had
been imposed unconstitutionally and payment enforced by armed violence, and
they petitioned for the removal of the man-of-war. There could hardly have been
a better instance of the act of fostering a spirit of lawlessness while avoiding
responsibility for any breach of law. Nor did the governor feel himself strong
enough to make any attempt at bringing the rioters to justice.
This was not
the only open and successful defiance of authority. In July, 1768, Lord
Hillsborough, alarmed by the reports which Governor Bernard sent home, ordered
two regiments to be sent from Halifax to Boston. Bernard claimed the right to
quarter the troops in the town. The Council, of which a majority was now
hostile to the governor, declared that quartering troops on private citizens
was only allowed when there was no barrack accommodation. The difficulty was
got over, not by forcing the troops on the inhabitants, but by hiring quarters.
The arrangement was no doubt in the interests of peace ; but there remained the
fact that the authority of government had been successfully defied.
As we have
seen, the Assembly, though deprived of legal power, continued to sit as a
convention. On the transparently false plea of a possible French invasion, the
town-meeting passed a resolution requesting all inhabitants to furnish
themselves with fire-arms. It is even said that Otis and others went so far as
to collect a supply of arms ready for distribution. It is hardly too much to
say that the town of Boston, without formally throwing off the authority of the
Crown, was building up a de facto government which, for all practical purposes,
superseded that which existed de jure.
On the 3rd of
March, 1770, took place that incident called, with somewhat grotesque
magniloquence, the Boston Massacre. Various displays of ill-feeling between the
townsmen and the soldiers culminated
154
The
“Boston Massacre.” [1767-70
in an affray
in which the. soldiers fired on the mob and killed three of them. Preston, the
officer in command, and the soldiers were tried for murder. Preston was
acquitted, as there was no proof that he had given the order to fire. Two of
the soldiers were found guilty of manslaughter. It is neither possible nor
practically important to apportion the blame of this occurrence. Where there
has been for months a persistent exchange of expressions of ill-feeling, a
trivial incident for which neither party is to blame may lead to an outburst of
violence. Far more important and interesting is the attitude of the Boston
populace and their leaders. In a worse disciplined and organised community
there would have been an outbreak of something like civil war. Instead of this,
a town-meeting was at once held in orderly fashion, and a deputation sent to
demand the removal of the troops from the town. To this Hutchinson, who had now
succeeded Bernard as governor, after some pressure consented. It is also to be
noticed that no vindictiveness was shown towards Preston, and that two leading
members of the popular party, John Adams and Josiah Quincy, acted as counsel in
his defence. At the same time everything was done, not to inflame the passions
of the populace, but to instil into them an abiding sense of injury and
distrust. In the following and in each successive year the anniversary of the
“Massacre” was celebrated by an oration, designed to inculcate a belief that
military brutality was a necessary incident in British rule.
Meanwhile
there were important political changes in England. In the autumn of 1767
Townshend had died. Shortly afterwards Chatham retired, and Grafton became the
recognised head of the Ministry. Townshend’s place, as Chancellor of the
Exchequer, was filled by Lord North. The Cabinet were resolved to adopt a
conciliatory policy towards America, but differed as to the length to which
such conciliation should go. Grafton and one of his principal col1
eagues, Shelburne, were for a total repeal of Townshend’s colonial taxes. North
was for retaining the tax on tea as an assertion of right; and his view
prevailed in the Cabinet, though only by a single vote. It was on the 1st of
May, 1769, that the Council, while repealing the other duties, decided to
retain that on tea. In the following January Grafton resigned. With all his
infirmities of character, his departure was, in what concerned the colonies, a
loss. His distaste for a coercive policy was no doubt in some measure the
indifference of an easy-going voluptuary. But it also rested on a foundation of
Whig principle, and it was the temper needed to deal with the colonies. Grafton
was succeeded as Prime Minister by North. North’s facile and placable temper
was dominated by the stronger will of the King, who demanded from the colonies
nothing short of unqualified submission. Thus North was in the unhappy position
of having to administer, as far as he might with moderation and intelligence, a
harsh and unintelligent policy.
The situation
was complicated by the reappearance of Chatham, recovered and in opposition. As
was said before, we can hardly credit Chatham with a complete and effective
constructive policy, fitted to meet existing difficulties. Even if it had been
possible to induce Parliament to grant the full demands of the colonists,
Chatham’s views would have hardly gone the length of such a concession; nor, on
the other hand, is it likely that his influence would have induced the
colonists formally to abate their demands. But it is a matter of mere curiosity
to enquire what, in other circumstances, he might have done. As a matter of
fact, his influence was now greatly weakened by his inability to co-operate
continuously with any political allies—an inability due partly to an imperious
temper, partly to intermittent outbreaks of illness which incapacitated him,
mind and body.
The incidents
of the next four years (1770-73) may be taken as a crucial test of the real
attitude of the popular party at Boston. The repeal of Townshend’s taxes was
undoubtedly a step, though perhaps a clumsy and incomplete step, towards
conciliation. Had there been any strong desire for continued union, every
attempt would have been made to build on that basis. Those who directed and
controlled popular feeling at Boston would have done their utmost to modify
prejudices; they assuredly would not, as they did, have confined themselves to
vague and general professions of loyalty, while using every trifling incident
of maladministration as a means to keep alive ill-feeling. They may have been
justified in such conduct; they may have had good reason to believe that the
temper of the King and that of Parliament made lasting union impossible,
except on terms which would have been fatal to the liberties of the colonies.
But no one who recalls the incidents which followed can speak of the colonists
as loyal subjects goaded into rebellion by persistent ill-treatment.
After the
repeal of the duties imposed by Townshend, two years passed without any marked
or definite change in the situation. But a dispute which arose over a question
of no great importance in itself showed how far the colonial leaders had
travelled beyond the attitude taken up even at the time of the Stamp Act. In
1771 the Governor of Massachusetts received instructions from the Crown that
the salaries of the Commissioners of Customs were not to be taxed. Accordingly,
•when a bill was passed by the Assembly containing such a clause, he refused
his consent. The Assembly remonstrated, and in their remonstrance used the
words, “We know of no Commissioners of His Majesty’s Customs nor of any revenue
His Majesty has a right to establish in North America; we know and we feel a
tribute levied and extorted from those who, if they have property, have a right
to the absolute disposal of it.” Five years earlier no responsible person
speaking in the name of the colonists would have denied the right of the Crown
to levy duties on trade.
156
[1773
At the same
time it must be granted that the British government was not always forbearing
or duly anxious to avoid making opportunities of strife. It was an ill-chosen
time for asserting the principle that the governor and the judges should
receive their salaries direct from the Crown and not from the Assembly, though
it might well be that in the existing state of feeling such a measure was
temporarily required. It was an equally ill-chosen time for asserting and
maintaining with special stringency the right of the Crown to a monopoly of
ship-timber. Moreover, though Hutchinson was, according to his lights, as loyal
to his native state as any of the so-called patriots, yet he had none of the
arts by which administrative difficulties are smoothed over, and could never
rise above an exact and technical interpretation of the system under which he
had to act.
An incident
which took place in the year 1773, and in which Hutchinson was conspicuously
concerned, was perhaps the most discreditable to the popular cause of all that
took place during the struggle. Hutchinson and others had written letters to
Whately, an English member of parliament, setting forth their views on the
state of affairs at Boston. Some of the letters contained such querulous denunciations
of the colonists as might be expected from officials with no wide political
outlook. There was not in Hutchinson’s own letters a single expression which
went beyond what he had plainly and openly avowed in public. These letters came
into Franklin’s possession, and were forwarded by him to his friends in
Massachusetts. The conduct of Franklin in obtaining possession of these letters
was then and has been often since severely censured. The whole tenour of
Franklin’s life shows him to have been a man with no delicate sense of honour;
and there are other incidents which prove that in what he believed to be a good
cause he could be unscrupulous in his choice of means. But what is strange is
that while Franklin has been freely condemned, little blame has ever been
assigned to the far worse conduct of his allies in Massachusetts. Their use of
the letters was shameless in its dishonesty and merciless in its cruelty. They
were not at once made the subject of a formal indictment of the writers. Had
this been done, Hutchinson would have had no difficulty in proving how
innocuous was his own share in them. But they were privately circulated among a
few persons; vague rumours got about that the governor was at the head of a conspiracy
against the liberties of the colony; and, by the time that the letters were
formally laid before the Assembly, public opinion had been so warped and
prejudiced that impartial inquiry was impossible.
The result of
the public production of the letters was a petition from the Assembly of
Massachusetts to the Crown for the dismissal of Hutchinson and of Chief Justice
Oliver. This petition was referred to a Committee of the Privy Council, and the
petitioners were heard by counsel, while the solicitor-general, Wedderburn,
watched the case on
1772-3]
Franklin before the
Privy Council.
157
behalf of the
Crown. His attitude was that of an unscrupulous partisan, prosecuting Franklin
for theft. Franklin’s conduct may have been dishonourable ; but some
consideration was due to one who had spent his life in the public service, who
had been a laborious and devoted friend to America, and assuredly not a
disloyal citizen of Great Britain. In alienating him, Wedderbum was alienating
one who could do invaluable service as the representative and mouthpiece of
colonial opinion in its less violent form. But Wedderburn was restrained
neither by decency nor by policy. Himself the shiftiest of politicians, the
most unscrupulous of self-seekers, he could not urge the plea of being carried
away by moral indignation. The temptation of letting off rhetorical fireworks
and displaying powers of sarcasm overpowered all sense either of propriety or
policy. The Privy Council, by its approval of his conduct, degraded itself from
a judicial tribunal into a body of partisans; and, when Franklin left the
meeting, the loyalty which the events of the last six years had been
undermining was finally shattered. Henceforth, as his writings plainly show,
his attitude towards England was one of dislike and contempt, kept in check
only by considerations of what was expedient for America.
There is a
certain irony in the fact, that one of the most serious incidents in the whole
course of the colonial dispute, and one which perhaps more than any other
precipitated the conflict, was due to what can hardly be called an
administrative blunder. A Bill for the relief of the East India Company was
introduced by Lord North in 1772, and somewhat extended in 1773. On neither
occasion does it seem to have met with any opposition. The Bill provided that
the East India Company might export tea to America direct, without passing
through an English seaport, and that if it was landed in England and reexported
to America the duty, a shilling on every pound of tea, should be remitted. The
measure was no doubt primarily designed for the good of the East India Company,
but it was also a substantial benefit to the colonies. Before Townshend had
imposed his tax the total duty on tea imported from the East to America was a
shilling a pound. It was now to be only threepence a pound in America; and the
tea could therefore be sold proportionately cheaper. It is to be observed that
this benefit was limited to the British colonies in America. There can be no
doubt that North intended the measure as a conciliatory one; and, but for the
preceding disputes, it would have been accepted as such. But the colonists had
come to regard the fiscal system adopted towards them as part of a
comprehensive attack on their liberties. They coupled the question of taxation
with the declared project of a civil-list and with the rumoured project of an
episcopate. It was immaterial, from their point of view, whether a special
incident of taxation- pressed a little more or a little less hardly.
Thus the very
measure which was designed to promote peace
furnished
the anti-British party in America with the opportunity which they wanted of
making a hostile demonstration. Hitherto there had oeen no special motive for
the tea-dealer to force upon the colonies a commodity which they, received with
disfavour. In the autumn of
1773, cargoes of tea were exported by
the East India Company to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charlestown. At
none of these ports was the tea allowed to be sold ; but, except at Boston, the
colonists were content to put such pressure on the vendors as to induce them to
withdraw the tea. In this case, however, as throughout the struggle, Boston
gave the signal for definite and forcible resistance. When the arrival of the
tea-ships was imminent, town-meetings were held, at which the persons to whom
the tea was consigned were asked to resign that charge. On their refusal, a
riot ensued, and the house of one of the consignees was destroyed. The governor
endeavoured to induce the Council to take special steps for keeping the peace,
but in vain. When the first ship actually appeared, a town-meeting was
summoned. In the notice calling it, the tea was denounced as “ the worst of
plagues,” and its introduction as the “last, worst, and most destructive
measure of administration.” Another unauthorised notice was posted, stating
that to allow the tea to be landed would “betray an inhuman thirst for blood,”
and that “ those who made the attempt would be considered and treated as
wretches unworthy to live, and be made the first victims of popular
resentment.” The fable of the wolf and the lamb has seldom found a better
illustration. A meeting was held, at which not only the citizens of Boston but men
from the neighbouring towns attended; and a resolution was passed, prohibiting,
as if by legal authority, the landing of the tea. ,
The best
solution undoubtedly would have been the departure of the obnoxious vessels.
There were in truth only two courses which government could with any safety
adopt. The one would have been to be prepared with such armed forces as could
suffice to put down any riot. The other was to leave the colonists without a
rational grievance and then enforce authority. Unhappily the return of the
vessels was hindered by legal technicalities. The goods, having once entered
the harbour, could not leave it till they had paid the Customs duty; and this
they could not do without being landed. One would have supposed that, when the
process of landing was rendered impossible by a display of violence, it might
have been dispensed with, so long as all the other legal forms were observed.
Even the refusal of the Customs officers need not have been final, since it
might have been overridden by a special permit from the governor. He refused,
however, on the very pedantic plea that his oath of office bound him to carry
out the revenue laws, and that these would be broken if he permitted a vessel
to evade the Customs regular tions. The regulations also required that the
cargo should be landed and duty paid on it within twenty days of the ship
reaching the port.
The popular
leaders were determined to anticipate such a possibility. A mob disguised as
Indians took possession of the vessels and threw the whole of the cargoes into
the harbour (December 16, 1773).
Two features
of this affair are specially worthy of notice. The action of the town-meeting
was virtually a claim to override the established government. If the tea had
been landed, there was not the smallest compulsion on any individual citizen to
consume it. The whole of it might have been left to rot in the warehouses of
the consignees. The town-meeting claimed the right to restrict individual
liberty of action, and to prohibit individual citizens from consuming a certain
article and paying duty on that article even when they wished so to do. At the
same time the tea riot illustrated most effectively the control which this de
facto government could exercise. From first to last, Samuel Adams and those who
acted with him in directing the action of the mob never suffered it to get out
of hand.
One can
hardly suppose that any citizen of Boston expected the home government to pass
over such an outrage as the tea riot. In March, 1774, Lord North proposed certain
penal measures. One was to close the port of Boston, and transfer all its
rights to Salem, till compensation had been made for the destruction of the
tea. Appointments and renewal of judges, justices of the peace, and other
minor officers were to be vested in the Crown. Offenders might, at the discretion
of the Crown, be removed to England for trial. At the same time the resignation
of Hutchinson gave the home government the opportunity of consolidating
military and civil authority by the appointment of General Gage as governor.
Gage had the misfortune to be denounced by the King for mildness, and by the
colonists for tyranny. As a matter of fact Gage seems to have been a
respectable official, intelligent enough to understand the difficulties with
which he was confronted, but not vigorous or independent enough to face them
effectively.
Since the
repeal of the Stamp Act, American affairs had awakened no great interest in the
House of Commons. Now, however, each of North’s punitive measures was the subject
of a long and hardly-fought debate. A lack of definiteness and a failure to
recognise the patent facts of the case or the general principles of colonial
administration run through the whole discussion. This is true alike of the
Ministry and of the Opposition. North and his supporters argued as if they had
before them a disorderly town, not a continent on the brink of civil war. As
essays on the general principles on which dependencies should be governed,
Burke’s speeches on this and later occasions are admirable. They are not
altogether satisfactory as solutions of the administrative difficulties in
which the country had been landed by the factiousness of subjects and the
ignorance and misjudgment of rulers.
North’s
majority was enough to carry all his measures without
difficulty.
But, as each month passed, events were making it more clear that the cause of
Boston was the cause of the whole body of colonies. The day on which the Act
for closing the port of Boston came into force was kept as a fast-day in
Virginia and other colonies. Virginia and Maryland resolved to export no
tobacco. The former colony helped Boston with a public contribution of com,
South Carolina with one of rice. Prom almost all - the colonies came words of
approval and encouragement.
The
resistance to the Stamp Act had, as we have seen, given birth to a policy of
corporate action on the part of the various colonies. No attempt had been made
in the meantime to revive such a movement; but the subject had not been
overlooked or forgotten. In the autumn of 1773 two letters appeared in the
Boston Gazette, which were known to issue from the pen of Samuel Adams. The
first set forth the necessity for a Congress; and it is noteworthy that the
expression used was not a Congress of “Colonies” but of “States.” The Congress
was to draw up a Bill of Rights; it was to be an annual institution, and was to
have an ambassador at the British Court. In the second letter the question was
asked, “ How shall the colonists force their oppressors to proper terms ? ” And
the answer is, “ Form an independent State or American Commonwealth.” In
estimating the policy of British statesmen towards the colonies We must never
forget that those words had been written by one who was no mere rhetorician,
but one of the subtlest, the most patient, and the most persistent of
organisers.
For more than
a year Committees of Correspondence had been established to enable the colonies
to concert measures of resistance. These committees were now employed to call
into existence a Congress, to which all the colonies, Georgia excepted, sent
delegates. Gage endeavoured to prevent the Assembly of Massachusetts from
electing representatives to the Congress, and refused to approve of a vote of
money from the public chest for their expenses. The Assembly, however, locked
its doors and completed the election before Gage could intervene, and raised
the necessary funds by a special rate. It is clear that in other colonies there
was no regular and definite process by which the members of Congress were
chosen, nor any precise qualification for voters. That this should have passed
unchallenged is a strong proof of that lack of purpose, of organisation, and of
method, which throughout the whole struggle characterised the supporters of
the British government in America.
The
proceedings of the first Congress, which met in 1774, are fully recorded by
John Adams, who was one of the Massachusetts delegates. He tells how in New
York he and his colleagues were warned not to alarm the southern delegates, who
were prepared to regard the New Englanders as dangerous incendiaries; how they
acted on the hint and modified their language, with the result that they were
set down as
1774]
161
half-hearted
cowards. At the very opening of the Congress a striking incident illustrated
Samuel Adams’ tact and self-restraint. Strongly opposed though he was to the
Church of England, yet, in order to conciliate Episcopalians from the middle
and southern colonies, he moved that prayers should be read by Jacob Duche, a
clergyman of that persuasion.
It was found
difficult on later occasions to induce the best men to detach themselves from
the business of their own colonies and to take a part in Congress. The first
Congress suffered from the opposite complaint. Each colony sent its ablest and
most energetic men, with the result that members were at times reluctant to be
mere listeners. It is clear that the discussions which ensued suffered somewhat
from that vagueness which is apt to beset a body discharging no executive
functions. The main value of the Congress was to declare to the world the
united purpose of the colonies, and to enable the representatives to understand
one another and acquire habits of co-operation. Above all, its action
effectively checkmated North’s policy of isolating Massachusetts. It extended
the field of battle from Boston to the whole continent.
The Congress
found itself at once brought face to face with the standing difficulty which
attaches to every form of federal action. Were all the States to be on an
equality, or were their voting powers to be proportioned to their numbers? And,
if so, was the slave population to be reckoned ? Finally, it was resolved that
the States should vote as equal units, but that this should not be regarded as
a final settlement. The Congress addressed a petition to the King, and a
memorial to the people of Great Britain, setting forth the hardships inflicted
on the colonies and promising loyalty if only redress were granted. Taken by
themselves, these documents offered a perfectly satisfactory basis for
agreement. But unfortunately they had to be taken in conjunction with the
revolutionary speeches of Warren and Henry, with the persistent determination
to make the most of every trifling official error, and with the uncompromising
attitude of resistance taken up by Massachusetts. The Congress also drafted an
address to the people of Canada. In this the Act recently passed by Parliament
for the government of Canada was denounced because it did not give full civil
rights; and an appeal was made to the Canadians to make common cause with the
colonists.
While
Congress was still sitting a public meeting was held at Suffolk, near Boston,
at which certain resolutions were passed which went further in their defiance
of British authority than any formal or authorised declaration had yet gone.
They declared that “ no obedience was due to the recent Acts of Parliament ”;
and these were denounced as “ the attempts of a wicked administration to
enslave America.” If any political arrests were made, government officials were
to be seized in
retaliation.
Not only were these resolutions passed, but they were transmitted to Congress,
and approved by that body. We may doubt whether they really expressed its
views, but here, as usual, unity, organisation, and definiteness of purpose
gave the minority a victory over half-hearted opponents.
Nevertheless
Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania, who may be regarded as the leader of the
moderate party, brought forward a scheme for conciliation. He proposed to call
into existence a Grand Council, elected for three years by the various colonial
legislatures. The President of this body was to be appointed by the King, and
to hold office during his pleasure. Either the Council or Parliament might
initiate legislation for the colonies, but both must approve. The scheme was
not wholly unlike that proposed twenty years earlier by Franklin. Apart from
its practical merits or defects, it was quite certain that the time was quite
unfit. Such a project might possibly have worked had there been a strong
general desire for co-operation. In an atmosphere filled with suspicion and
ill-will it was inevitably doomed to failure.
In the autumn
of 1774 a general election took place in England; and on November 1 a new
Parliament met. American affairs were naturally the all-absorbing topic. The
measures proposed by Lord North showed that he understood that he was no longer
faced by the disaffection of Massachusetts alone, but by that of the whole body
of colonies. The military forces in America were to be strengthened; and all
the colonies, New York, Delaware, and North Carolina excepted, were to be cut
off from the American fisheries and from trade with the mother-country.
The policy of
the Ministry was met in both Houses by counterproposals of conciliation. A
bill was introduced into the House of Lords by Chatham, taking up a line
similar to that adopted by the Rockingham Whigs when they withdrew the stamp
duty and passed the Declaratory Act. The bill affirmed the right of Parliament
to control the colonies in matters of trade, and also to quarter soldiers on
the colonists. An elective body representing the colonies and constituted on
the same lines as the present Congress was to be called into existence, and was
to make a free grant to the imperial exchequer. The proposal was open to two
obvious objections. Like Galloway’s scheme, it could only work where there was
a genuine wish on both sides for co-operation, not when they approached the
question with mutual aversion and distrust. Moreover the division between
internal taxation and commercial regulation could never be drawn with exact
precision. Nevertheless the respect due to the name and authority of Chatham,
and the importance of fully considering at such a crisis every possible remedy,
should have saved the bill from rejection on the first reading.
In the House
of Commons, Burke and David Hartley moved resolutions on the same lines as
Chatham’s scheme, proposing to leave the question of taxation entirely to the
colonists themselves. No one now
can doubt
that this would have been treated by the colonists as a total abandonment of
all fiscal rights; it virtually meant the final overthrow of that commercial
and colonial policy which had hitherto been unquestioned on this side of the
Atlantic. To have frankly adopted this attitude would no doubt have saved Great
Britain from much loss and humiliation; but Burke’s position would have been
logically stronger if he had treated his proposal as one not of compromise but
of surrender. He would have shown better judgment had he accepted, as a basis
for legislation, the conciliatory proposals made by North himself.
In February,
1775, the Prime Minister proposed in the House of Commons that any colony which
would make such a contribution for the purposes of common defence and civil
government as should satisfy Parliament should be exempt from taxation. This
concession was so distasteful to North’s own followers that it was only carried
by a rigid application of party discipline. Yet it did nothing to pacify the
Opposition. There could be no stronger illustration of the evils of the party
system than the fact that North’s scheme was contemptuously condemned by the
Opposition, instead of being treated as a genuine though ineffectual attempt at
a pacific solution.
While
Parliament was discussing suggestions for compromise, the colonists had taken
steps which effectually rendered all such solutions impossible. Gage, alarmed
by the tone of the Suffolk resolution, refused to call together the
Massachusetts Assembly; but an elective Congress, constituted precisely as the
Assembly would have been, met at Salem (October 5, 1774). That its members
should pass resolutions severely denouncing the policy of the British
government was a matter of course. They also protested against the preparations
which Gage was making for fortifying Boston against an invasion from the
mainland. They took steps for raising public funds, for providing fire-arms and
military supplies, and for securing the alliance of the Indians. Outside the
Congress a reign of terror had been organised, under which all who ventured to
express any approval of the British government were liable to brutal and
humiliating punishments.
Massachusetts,
though still first, was no longer alone in its display of overt disaffection.
There was hardly a colony in which British authority was not openly challenged.
In New Hampshire a mob seized the whole supply of arms and ammunition stored in
the fort. In Rhode Island the governor and the Assembly in conjunction, and in
direct contravention of an order from the British government, took steps to
prevent such cannon as there were in the colony from coming into the hands of
British officers, and further proceeded to raise and arm troops. In Connecticut
the Assembly appointed officers for the militia, and enforced regular drills by
fines for non-attendance. In Maryland a convention had pledged the colony to
resist any attempt by the British government to carry out the recent Acts in
any colony and
had
recommended in general terms the organisation and arming of the militia.
The
conditions of life in the southern colonies made it impossible for public
opinion to express itself with the same promptness and uniformity as in New
England, or for a majority to force its will on a minority with equal
effectiveness. But in her resentment of administrative interference, and
especially of financial interference, Virginia was not one whit behind New
England. Moreover the governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, had irritated the
colonists by what they regarded as his half-hearted conduct in regard to a
campaign against the Indians in the summer of 1774. Virginia too had yet
another grievance against the British government. Many of the best and wisest
men in the colony, Henry among them, were becoming keenly alive to the social
and economical evils of slavery, evils clearly seen and denounced somewhat
later by Washington and Jefferson. In 1772 an address on this subject was
presented to the Crown. The British government unhappily showed no desire to
co-operate with the colonists in the endeavour to check the evil. In Patrick
Henry, Virginia had a leader who could at once inspire and organise. As a
speaker he constantly pressed his rhetoric to the verge of extravagance, yet
never lost his grasp of concrete facts. Behind the appeal to sentiment there
was always some definite incitement to action. The speech which he addressed to
the Virginian Convention in March, 1775, was virtually a declaration of armed
rebellion. He proposed that a force should be raised, not as a mere measure of
precaution or in any hopes of securing better terms by a show of resistance,
but because, in his own words, “ we must fight.”
Three
colonies alone, New York, Georgia, and North Carolina, were exempted from the
punitive measures of Lord North’s government. The poverty and barbarism of
North Carolina and Georgia made their adhesion a matter of no great moment to
either side. But, if Great Britain could hold New York with its wealth, its
noble harbour, its central position, and its command of the Hudson, the cause
of colonial resistance would be seriously crippled. There had always been a
lack of strong corporate feeling among the people of New York; and in no colony
had habits of luxury and love of wealth taken so firm a hold. The Assembly of
New York refused in 1774 to be led by the action of Congress, or to acknowledge
the services of the delegates there, and declined to elect delegates for the
next Congress. The adjacent colonies, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, had accepted
the resolutions of the Congress, and had thus put themselves outside the pale
of exemption. Pennsylvania indeed might be regarded as specially guilty, since
the Congress had met within her boundaries; Yet that old Quaker spirit which,
coupled with meaner motives, had repeatedly held back Pennsylvania and New
Jersey from military co-operation, was still at work. Thus it seemed as if, in
the
struggle
which was now inevitable, the whole territory between the Hudson and the Chesapeake
might be a stronghold of British authority.
It would be
rash to assume that at this stage the disaffected were the majority even in
those colonies which were foremost in opposition. But it is clear that they had
that ascendancy of will and that superior form of organisation, which enable,
if they do not entitle, a section to speak in the name of the whole community.
This was plainly shown by the reception given to Lord North’s scheme of
conciliation. It was duly submitted to the various colonial assemblies: not one
of them showed any inclination to accept it favourably.
But by the
time when North’s proposals reached America, even if the other colonies had
been willing to receive them favourably, the action of Massachusetts had wholly
altered the situation. On February 26,1775, Gage sent out a party to seize some
cannon at Salem. It was needful for the troops to cross a drawbridge. The
country people assembled and held the bridge against the troops, and scuttled
the only boat available. At length, persuaded by a peace-loving clergyman, the
crowd gave way and allowed the bridge to be lowered; but it was then too late
in the day for the troops to follow up their attempt. Nearly two months passed
without any overt act of hostility. On April 19 Gage, hearing that the
colonists had collected a large supply of arms and ammunition at Concord,
twenty miles from Boston, sent out two detachments, making 1800 men in all,
under the command of Lord Percy, to capture these stores. The arrangements of
the colonists for spreading an alarm through the colony, on learning the
movements of the royal troops, were thoroughly well-organised and effective. At
Lexington, about four miles short of Concord, the soldiers found an armed force
drawn up to resist them. A skirmish followed, after which the provincials fell
back and dispersed, but resumed the attack nearer Concord. One British
detachment, however, kept the enemy in check, while the others destroyed the
stores. This they accomplished, but they had immediately to endure another
vigorous attack. As Percy marched back to Boston, armed provincials kept
pouring in from all parts of the country, taking their places with that
readiness and unpremeditated discipline which was largely the secret of the
American success throughout the war. Hot and weary, the heavily accoutred
regulars toiled along the road, harassed by an incessant fire from houses,
walls and hedgerows, and, when they reached Boston at sunset, they had lost 65
killed, and 185 wounded. The provincial loss was estimated at about 50 killed
and somewhat fewer wounded.
A few days
later the colonists struck another blow even more decisive in its immediate
effect. A party of volunteers numbering about 150, without any sort of formal
commission, though not without the knowledge and approval of the government of
Connecticut, succeeded in surprising the strong and well-armed fortress of
Ticonderoga,
the key to
Canada, won at heavy cost from the French. This was followed immediately by the
capture of the small subsidiary post of Crown Point.
Before the
news of any of these reverses had reached England the Ministry, alarmed by
Gage’s reports, had taken steps to strengthen their military position at
Boston. Gage was superseded by Sir William Howe, who took out with him
reinforcements bringing his whole command up to 10,000 men. Howe and his
troops reached Boston about the middle of May, 1775. By that time the second
Continental Congress was in session at Philadelphia. Their treatment of North’s
proposals is an effective answer to those who speak of the colonists as loyal
and submissive subjects, goaded into rebellion by a Ministry who turned a deaf
ear to every reasonable complaint. The task of drafting a reply was entrusted
to Thomas Jefferson, a young Virginian, who was perhaps more than any other of
the popular leaders under the dominion of abstract beliefs in the rights of
man. His answer was a rhetorical onslaught on the British government,
calculated to fill with despair any one who had any real desire for compromise
and peace. To assert any right of taxation was “ to leave us without anything
we can call property.” Not one word was said of the many provocations received
by the mother-country. The isolated and irresponsible utterance of a half-mad
country member, Van, who said of Massachusetts “ Delenda est Carthago,” was
quoted as expressing the sentiments of the Ministry. On that principle it might
have been argued that the American Congress had not merely condoned but
advocated armed rebellion a hundred times over. It may well be that North’s
scheme, as it stood, did not offer any practical solution. But at least it
offered a basis for negotiation. The best justification that can be offered for
the action of the colonists no doubt lay in the character and antecedents of
the King himself. The colonists might feel, much as the Parliamentarians felt
respecting Charles I, that the royal conception of public morality and of the
relations between sovereign and subject made negotiations impossible. It was in
this spirit that Congress drew up vehement and rhetorical appeals for sympathy
and support, addressed to the people of Ireland and of Jamaica. To make a
general attack on the whole fabric of the British empire was virtually to
declare that all desire for reconciliation was at an end.
One incident
of the Congress was thoroughly characteristic of the temper shown on each side,
of the desire of the rebels to comply with, so far as possible, and to utilise
constitutional forms, and the ineptitude of the loyalists in letting slip
opportunities of protest and resistance. When Congress met, one representative
appeared from Georgia, elected not by any representative convention of the
colony, but by one parish. Congress, after considering his claim to membership,
decided that he might attend and take part in the deliberations, but might not
have any voice in the decisions. Georgia plainly was not unanimous. Yet
1775]
Washington made
commander-in-chief. 167
we can trace
no attempt by the loyal party to protest or to organise any opposition to Congress.
The great
work of the Second Congress was the raising of a continental army. The
Congress boldly announced the existence of some kind of confederation. The
colonies were spoken of in formal resolutions as “united” and “confederated.”
But the nature of the federal tie and the machinery which was to give it effect
were left wholly undetermined. No doubt the Congress was wise in taking that
course. Time urgently needed for other purposes would have been ill-occupied in
debating on the form of a federal union. The Convention of Massachusetts took
an important practical step by placing the forces of that colony under
Congress, and thus forming the nucleus of a continental army. This was
supplemented by raising further troops. Pay was provided for by the issue of
bills of credit to be redeemed by the twelve colonies, exclusive of Georgia.
What amount was to be redeemed by each colony individually, and when such'
redemption was to take place, were questions left open for the present. The
tendency to independent and disconnected military operations was kept in check
by an order that no colony was on its own responsibility to attempt any
operations against Canada.
But by far
the most important act of Congress in its immediate and even more in its
ultimate results was the choice of Washington as commander-in-chief. That
choice was no doubt in a great measure determined by considerations other than
personal fitness. If the southern colonies were to take their full share of
interest in the struggle, it was clear that it must not be left'to a New
England army under a New England general. But we may be sure that the choice,
desirable in itself, of a southern general, was made much easier by the
presence of a southern candidate so specially fitted for the post as Washington.
Not indeed that his fitness was or could be as yet fully revealed. Intelligence
and public spirit, untiring energy and industry, a fair share of technical
military skill, and courage almost dangerous in its recklessness—all these were
no doubt perceived by those who appointed Washington. What they could not have
foreseen was the patience with which a man of clear vision, heroic bravery, and
intense directness, bore with fools and laggards and intriguers; and the
disinterested self-devotion which called out all that was noblest in the
national character, which shamed selfish men into a semblance of patriotism and
factious men into a semblance of union. Still less could it have been foreseen
that, in choosing a military chief, Congress was training up for the country
that civil leader, without whose aid an effective constitution would scarcely
have been attained.
While
Congress was sitting, the troops whom Washington was to command had taken the
first step in the transition from an undisciplined mob to a seasoned army. To
understand the battle of Bunker Hill it is
necessary to
know the physical changes which Boston and Charlestown have passed through.
Each at the time of the Revolution was separated from the mainland by a narrow
isthmus which could easily be defended. Successive reclamations from the sea
have widened each isthmus to many times its original dimensions; and Boston
Neck has to be sought for imbedded amid streets and houses. Bunker Hill, too,
has been lowered, and no longer commands the surrounding ground as it formerly
did.
Gage had
effectually guarded Boston Neck. But so completely was the town dominated by
Bunker Hill that the occupation of that height was absolutely necessary to the
safety of the town. There had now gathered together on the mainland a large
force of men, whom the Massachusetts Convention had placed under the command of
Artemas Ward. He was old and inactive, and it was probably well for the
colonists that their laxity of discipline allowed his younger and more vigorous
subordinates a large share of initiative. On June 16, 1775, the Americans
learnt that it was the intention of the enemy to secure Bunker Hill. Thereupon
a force of colonists crossed Charlestown Neck under cover of night, and threw
up a redoubt about a foot high on the summit of the hill. The weak and, as it
ultimately proved, fatal feature of the defence was the inadequate supply of
powder. Bayonets, it hardly need be said, formed no part of the American
equipment, nor could untrained men have used them. Two methods of dislodging
the enemy from the hill were open to the British. They might make a direct
attack from the east, or they might endeavour to cut the communications
connecting the advanced force on Bunker Hill with the main body on the
mainland; but the latter course would have exposed them to an attack on each
flank, and on one from a largely superior force. Probably the safest method
would have been to rake the Neck by a fire of gun-boats on each side, while the
artillery in the town played on the hill.
The British
commanders, however, probably underrating the tenacity of their opponents and
their skill as marksmen, decided to dislodge them by a direct attack. About
mid-day on June 17 Howe landed on Charlestown peninsula with about 1600 men.
After measuring the strength of his enemy, he sent back for reinforcements; and
these brought his whole force up to about 2200, with which he proceeded to
attack. The British force were encumbered by the standing hay through which
they had to march, and by their ponderous accoutrements. Twice they climbed the
hill, and twice they fell back before the fire of their opponents. Officer
after officer fell; and Howe, who himself led the attack, was left alone near
the enemy’s works. A third time, leaving their knapsacks behind, the British
troops renewed the attack. Had the Americans been supplied with powder it is
hard to say how the day might have ended. As it was there was no course open to
the colonists but retreat. With raw troops a retreat usually becomes a rout. In
this case the
British were too much exhausted to press the enemy effectually; and the main
body of the provincials, on whom the defenders retreated, were close at hand.
But they were harassed in their passage of the Neck by a flanking fire; and
that they should have crossed it in good order is no slight proof of their
instinctive discipline and selfcontrol.
The British
loss was reckoned at 226 killed, and 828 wounded; the American at 150 killed,
and 300 wounded. Gage was under no delusion as to the lessons to be learnt from
the battle. His letter to the Secretary of State a week later contained these
words: “ The rebels are shown not to be the disorderly rabble too many have
supposed. In all their wars against the French they have showed no such conduct
and perseverance as they do now.”
Next to
Massachusetts, Virginia had been the chief stronghold of disaffection, and it
was now the next colony to take up arms. The governor, Dunmore, had lately
increased his unpopularity by reporting to the home government that the
disaffection of the colony was largely due to the financial embarrassments of
the planters. He had also, as a measure of precaution, removed the gunpowder
from the public magazine at Williamsburg and placed it on shipboard. With Henry
and his allies openly inciting to violence, and with other colonies in arms,
this was no more than a needful measure of precaution; yet it was treated by
the Assembly as an act of high-handed tyranny. In June, 1775, Dunmore, finding
that the Assembly refused even to consider North’s scheme, and learning that
Henry was in the field at the head of a large armed force, withdrew from
Williamsburg. After some disputes with the rebels, he set up the royal
standard, proclaimed martial law and promised liberty to any slaves who would
join him. Finally, on December 8, he dispatched a force against the rebels,
which was repulsed. He then went on shipboard. After some desultory
operations, in which the town of Norfolk was burnt and much injury inflicted on
the river-side plantations, Dunmore and his followers sailed to New York. For
the destruction of property it is clear that both sides were in a measure to
blame ; but, in the existing state of opinion, it was certain that the whole
discredit of it .would fall on Dunmore and the British government. A somewhat
similar incident took place in New England in the following October. A British
vessel bombarded and wholly destroyed the town of Falmouth, on the coast of
Maine. In the two Carolinas the symptoms of rebellion were so alarming that the
governors of both provinces took refuge on British ships.
We have
already seen how the unauthorised action of a party of volunteers had placed
the Americans in a position for a successful attack on Canada. The expediency
of such measures might be doubted. If there was any hope of a peaceful solution
still left, that hope must be seriously impaired, if not destroyed, by such an
attack. In theory, no
doubt, an
invasion may be merely a necessary measure of defensive policy. The recognition
of the New England forces as a continental army and the appointment of a
commander-in-chief were virtually declarations of war; and there was no
essential difference between fighting in Massachusetts and fighting on the St
Lawrence. But to the ordinary man taking obvious and superficial views, Bunker
Hill would seem no more than resistance to local tyranny. It was practically
certain that very few of those who wished to see Great Britain retain her
sovereignty over the colonies in any form would continue their sympathy after
British territory had been invaded. On the other hand, the leaders of the
rebellion might well feel that the sooner the colonies were committed
decisively and irrevocably, the better; and that a bold policy of aggression
would be the most likely means of winning foreign support.
Yet the whole
of their past history might well have warned the colonists of the magnitude of
the task they were undertaking. It was no light matter to maintain
communications and to arrange for supplies in such a country as that which
separated the colonies from the St Lawrence. This difficulty was increased by
the fact that the invasion was to be made by two separate forces starting from
widely separated bases. The main body was to advance from Ticonderoga, capture
Montreal and then descend to Quebec. This force, numbering 2400 men, was under
the command of Richard Montgomery, a retired British officer, of great courage
and personal attractiveness of character. He had served in the late war against
Prance in Canada, and, having married a native of New York, regarded himself as
an adopted son of that colony.
A smaller
subsidiary force, 1100 in number, was to undertake the far more difficult task
of following the Kennebec, then crossing the watershed and striking the upper
waters of a stream which ran northward into the St Lawrence. This involved a
march through more than two hundred miles of forest, where no supplies could be
obtained and transport was a matter of great difficulty. This force was placed
under the command of Benedict Arnold of New York, who had already done good
service as a volunteer in the capture of an English vessel on Lake Champlain;
and probably no leader could have been found better fitted to inspire men
engaged in a desperate enterprise with fearlessness and confidence.
In September,
1775, the invasion was commenced. Everything went well for a while with
Montgomery’s force. The frontier forts of Chamblee and St John’s, inadequately
supplied and garrisoned, made but little resistance; and after their fall the
British commander thought it prudent to evacuate Montreal. As might have been
foreseen, the real difficulty lay with the eastern branch of the expedition. It
did not start till the middle of September, and thus all the hardships and
difficulties of the march were greatly increased. Moreover, the only means of
communicating
with Montgomery was by Indian runners; and, either through their faithlessness
or their blundering, the messages came into the hands of the British.
But few of
the British commanders passed through the war without reputations for
soldiership more or less impaired. Among these few was General, afterwards Sir
Guy, Carleton, who was at this time Governor of Canada. That the American
invasion failed was largely due to the promptness and energy with which he used
the scanty military resources at his disposal, and perhaps more to the
diplomatic tact with which he secured the loyalty of the Canadians. Warned of
Arnold’s presence by an intercepted message, he at once took vigorous measures;
and, when the two American generals met on December 1 before Quebec, the town
was in a good state of defence. Death and defections had reduced Arnold’s force
to 600. One New England regiment had deliberately turned back, if not with the
approval of their officers, at least without any attempt at control; but we
should perhaps rather praise the spirit of those who persevered through such
hardships than blame those who failed. Montgomery had been compelled to
distribute the greater part of his own troops as garrisons in the forts that he
had taken; and thus the force at his disposal numbered only 900. To have
brought up siege artillery would have been impossible: the only chance of
success lay in a surprise or an insurrection on the part of sympathetic inhabitants.
Carleton had baffled both these hopes. Small-pox broke out among the American
troops; and some of the New England soldiers, whose period of enlistment was
to be over at the end of the year, declared that they would not stay a day
beyond their term. Small though the chances of success seemed, yet an assault
was made, in which Montgomery was killed and Arnold severely wounded. The
attack failed, but Arnold did not withdraw. He received some small
reinforcements; and the garrison were content to remain on the defensive. At
length the evacuation of Boston by the British set at liberty a portion of the
besieging army; and Arnold received substantia] additions to his force. But it
was too late. The ice had melted on the St Lawrence; a British fleet was able
to come to the relief of the town; and in June, 1776, the invading force
withdrew, fighting in its retreat more than one unsuccessful engagement.
In another
and a more important quarter the Americans fared better. During the autumn and
winter of 1775 the English army pent up in Boston suffered great hardships. Not
only did the besieging force effectively cut them off from the mainland, but no
adequate steps were taken to protect the vessels that should have brought their
supplies. Whale-boats, manned by the bold and dexterous seamen trained in the
American fisheries, watched the harbour, and were suffered through the
supineness of the British government to be masters of the sea. Dispirited and
weakened by want of food and by disease, the garrison was unable
to make
effect' re sallies; and Washington was left in peace to drill his raw levies
into adequate soldiership. Then, as throughout the war, his difficulty was to
retain his civilian troops, eager to return to their farms or business the
moment that the period contracted for had expired. Another evil from which the
American army suffered was lack of ammunition. Nevertheless Washington
succeeded, early in March, 1776, in occupying the heights to the south-west of
the town, whence he was able to carry on a bombardment to which the British
could make no effective reply. After enduring this for a fortnight, Howe
decided to evacuate the town. He was able to provide a sufficiency of
transports to carry off his army together with those inhabitants who, by their loyalty
to the British cause, had incurred the vengeance of their countrymen. The
British fleet, though it had not been able to check the isolated operations of
American whale-boats, succeeded in guarding Howe’s transports, which reached
Halifax unmolested.
In England
the friends of the colonists were still fighting a losing and, as it must now
have seemed, a hopeless cause. In August, 1775, the delegates from Congress had
reached England, armed with a petition or, as it might be more fitly called, a
remonstrance, addressed to the King. It was hardly a matter for complaint if
the Ministry refused to receive a petition from subjects who were actually
raising troops against the Crown and countenancing men who had fired on the
King’s soldiers. Complaint at least did not fitly lie in the mouth of Congress,
after their own refusal to consider seriously North’s scheme of conciliation.
On October 26
Parliament met; and the colonial policy of the Ministry was set forth in the
King’s speech. To the general announcement that the colonists would be dealt
with vigorously as rebels was added the statement that it was intended to
procure foreign troops to act against them. When that took the form of a
definite ministerial proposal, it at once met with protest; and, when the news
reached America, it did much to exasperate the colonists and confirm their
spirit of resistance. Indeed among the many errors committed by the English
government in the prosecution of the war there was hardly any more harmful than
the hiring of Hessian troops. It emphasised the fact that Englishmen no longer
looked upon the colonists as fellow-subjects; while the anger caused by the
misconduct of which some of the Germans were guilty, and the discredit which
was thus brought on our army, far more than outweighed their military services.
Undeterred by
the failures of the previous session, the friends of America still strove
against the policy of the government. Burke in the House of Commons proposed a
bill embodying a compromise. The formal question of the right to tax was not to
be touched upon. In practice the right was to be abandoned, but commercial
duties might be levied, the application of the proceeds being left to each
individual colony. All the measures complained of by the Americans were to be
repealed, and
an act of amnesty passed. In the House of Lords, Grafton, who had now left the
Ministry, proposed that the colonists should be invited to embody their
grievances in a petition, and that such petition should be considered by
Parliament. It was not difficult for the supporters of the government to point
out the evil of negotiating with armed rebels, and of condoning attacks on the
King’s troops and such an outrage as the Boston tea riot; and the government
majority was too strong and solid to give either Grafton or Burke a chance of
success.
The beginning
of 1776 saw the area of war extended to the southern provinces. In North
Carolina both the governor, Martin, and the Convention of the colony raised
troops. Apparently the object of the loyalists was to get possession of
Wilmington, the capital of the colony. On their way thither they were
intercepted and defeated. In South Carolina the British cause fared no better.
After the evacuation of Boston, General Clinton was instructed to take such measures
as might seem expedient to advance the British cause in the south. It would
have been a severe blow to the commerce and resources of the south if he could
have obtained control over Charleston harbour. To do that it was necessaiy to
get possession of Sullivan’s Island, which commands the harbour on the south.
The swampy character of the soil made a land-attack impossible. On June 28 a
squadron of eight sail commenced a bombardment of the island. The fire produced
no effect: one ship ran ashore and was burnt to prevent the enemy getting
possession of her; and the attack was abandoned.
In May, 1776,
the third Congress met at Philadelphia. Only a superstitious reverence for
forms could any longer withhold the Americans from throwing off that allegiance
which they had practically reduced to a nullity. The situation was not only
anomalous but practically inconvenient. Congress was in its nature a transitory
body, incapable of making any permanent contract, or of issuing any permanent
command. We may be sure too that such astute and far-sighted men as Franklin
and Samuel Adams had present to their minds the necessity of foreign alliances;
and for these a permanent government was an absolutely requisite condition.
Moreover a new influence was at work, by which colonial sentiment was not
merely reconciled to separation but eagerly impelled towards it. Hitherto none
but a few specially clear-minded and far-sighted men entertained more than a
sense of isolated grievances and a vague desire for some relaxation of British
control. The publication of Common Sense (1776) by Thomas Paine did much to
give definiteness to these vague aspirations.
The
instinctive conservatism of Englishmen did something to delay the result, but
it was inevitable. The strength of the nationalist party lay largely in the
fact that the moderate men had no ideal, at once definite, practicable and
satisfactory, wherewith to confront the scheme
of
independence. Accordingly, on July 4, 1776, Congress passed the resolution
which made the colonies independent communities, issuing at the same time the
well-known Declaration of Independence. If we regard the Declaration as the
assertion of an abstract political theory, criticism and condemnation are easy.
It sets out with a general proposition so vague as to be practically useless.
The doctrine of equality of men, unless it be qualified and conditioned by full
reference to special circumstance, is either a barren truism or a delusion.
But, though this limitation is not explicitly stated, it is present. We must
judge the opening sentence with reference to what follows and to the actual
facts present in the minds of those who drafted it. That sentence is little
more than a formal preamble to what follows, namely to the statement of the
wrongs which the colonists had suffered from their sovereign. No one now would
accept that statement as a fair historical account of what had happened. Of the
eighteen heads of indictment, each beginning “ he has,” there is hardly one
which does not demand some modification or admit of some palliative. That part
of the Declaration must be looked on as a criminal indictment drawn by an
advocate, with just that lack of scruple which advocacy is generally held to
justify. And though the assertion of human equality may have no exact or
scientific basis, yet it is a description roughly correct of the theory which
underlay the political life of the colonies, and which had been gradually
separating them from the mother-country. In the Declaration of Independence
that democratic system which had gradually, through force of circumstances,
established itself in the colonies was blended with that element of sentiment,
rhetorically expressed, which was needed if democracy was to be the quickening
principle of a great popular movement.
We may
reverse this view, and say that the sentimental and rhetorical conception of
democracy lost its dangers when it could embody itself in familiar and fully
tested habits of action. When the teaching of Rousseau found its way to
America, it was used, not in attempts to create a new heaven or a new earth,
but to give the dignity of idealism and the attraction of romance to practical
canons of conduct which had been slowly developing under the pressure of
outward events. A little later we meet that principle in the Old World
emancipated from these safeguards. Its expectations are no longer steadied by
contact with historical facts, and it may at any moment become the
stock-in-trade of charlatans or the ignis fatuus of dreamers. The ideal of
liberty and equality recovers its value when it passes out of the area of
abstract propositions and becomes a standard of perfection whereby to measure
actual forms and institutions which have their origin not in theory but in
history.
THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. (1761—1776.)
The struggle
between Great Britain and her colonies in America, after it had become acute,
and the struggle which followed, over the form of government of the American
States, after the War of Independence, concerned one and the same thing, the
theory, in public and private relations, of legal right; the popular name for
which, both in England and America, was liberty or freedom. It is proper to put
aside, as declamatory, the violence of the few on the one side who flouted the
idea that the colonies or colonists had “rights” against the State which made
them, and of the many on the other who profaned the name of liberty or used it
in ignorance; and then it will be found that both sides to the struggle, and
all sides, sooner or later, came to agree upon the question at issue. Every
argument, finally, as the struggle went on, planted itself in legal right.
Whether the question was of the issuance of “writs of assistance,” or of the
extension of admiralty jurisdiction, or of the general powers of Parliament
over the colonies—whether it was one of private or public right—it was in
reality a question of legal right. Right according to English law is a train of
light—running through the whole dark time of trouble and anxiety—by which both
sides professed to be led.
The genera]
meaning too of legal right was agreed upon by most of the leaders and thinkers,
on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans had learned from England that legal
right exists where States and men have and hold their own without unjust
interruption, and where, in time of need, one must yield to another, but no
further than need requires; which is but saying that legal right exists where
equal rights prevail. This was the common law of England, which was the
“birthright” of Americans. If the teaching that legal right imports equality
before the law had not, by the middle of the eighteenth century, come to be
universal in England, it was at any rate the general teaching of the Courts, of
Parliament, and of jurists there. It had long been the prevailing idea in
America, as doctrine; it became universal as law, from the War of Independence.
Indeed the few Englishmen who
176
Legal
right. Theory of equality.
[i76i
dedared that
colonies had no “rights’’ against the parent-State, probably held that
language, where it was not mere declamation or violence, upon the very footing
that rights, in the English legal sense, imported equality; and the equality of
the colonies with England was of the very substance of what they denied. And as
for that, if rights in the sense of equality meant the equality just named,
most Englishmen and many Americans, perhaps a majority of Americans, even at
the time of the Declaration of Independence, held the same view. It was never
contended in America that the colonies had equal rights, in the largest sense,
with England. Such a contention would have been false and silly. It was legal
right, as they understood the term, rather than equal rights with England, that
they were contending for.
There was
however a plain sense in which the Whigs (if not the loyalists) of the colonies
contended for equality with the mother-State, even in matters in which they
admitted their subordination. Legal right, in the sense of equality, was
consistent, they said, with a certain degree of subordination. Nothing was more
familiar to lawyers and jurists, not to speak of philosophers, than the idea of
subordination in equality, nay, of subordination as necessary to equality in
the social organism of the State. Evil besets mankind; rights are constantly
being invaded; and the breach must be made good, if equality is to be kept up.
But the redress of broken rights may bring hardship upon innocent men; and so
may the ordinary exercise of legal rights, as distinguished from the redress of
broken rights; still innocent men must yield, they must suffer, just so much as
in reason is necessary for redress of the wrong; otherwise there could be no
equality, and legal right would be only a name. All this was familiar enough;
and it was virtually applied by most of the Whigs to the relation of the
colonies to Great Britain. The colonies, consistently with having legal rights
against Great Britain, must yield to demands for redress—of one colony for
instance, against another; they must yield to Great Britain, where it was
reasonably necessary to do so to enable Great Britain to maintain her rights.
All this was considered sound theory; but most Americans, who opposed the
English Ministry, took their stand there. Further they would not go; there
legal right on the one side met legal right on the other; there, at the line of
meeting, the colonies stood upon equality with the mother-State. “ The theory
is just, and time will establish it,” said the Maryland jurist Dulaney, a man
of ability and moderation.
The real
question therefore was whether the English and American doctrine of legal
right, in the sense of equality in subordination, should be applied to the
relation of England to the colonies. America held that it should; England
denied and refused, and separation followed.
Three classes
of complaint were made against Great Britain by the colonies, namely:
1. Abuse of authority ; the authority of
government admitted, that
i76i] Paocton's case. Writs of assistance.
177
authority had
been unduly exercised in the issuance of general “writs of assistance,” in
prohibiting and breaking up “assemblies,” in suspending and refusing assent to
acts of legislation, in laying unduly burdensome restrictions upon trade, and
in other things.
2. Discriminating legislation; passing by the
question of the general powers of Parliament over the colonies, Parliament had
lately extended admiralty jurisdiction in America over matters not within it in
England, and had proposed to deprive Americans accused of treason of the right to
be tried by a jury of the vicinage.
3. Interference in the affairs of the colonies
under claim of universal authority, “ in all cases whatsoever.”
These topics
cover the American theory, at the time, of the true relation of the colonies to
the mother-State. Let us take them in order.
(i) Abuse
of Authobity.
The acute
stage in the troubles between England and the colonies began, it may fairly
enough for the present purpose be said, with a cause in Court touching private
right. In the February term, 1761, of the Superior Court of Massachusetts Bay,
application was made by Charles Paxton, Surveyor and Searcher of the Port of
Boston, and by other officers of the customs, for a renewal of certain revenue
process called the writ of assistance or “assistants.” This was King’s debtor
process of the Court of Exchequer in England. The writ had been framed under
statutes of the reign of Charles II, passed in aid of the officers of revenue;
which legislation had by statute of the reign of William III been extended to
America. The writ was addressed to all justices of the peace, sheriffs,
constables, and other officers and subjects of the King. Reciting the statutes
and the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, the writs now asked for declared,
in substance, that the officer serving the process had power to enter any ship,
bottom boat, or other vessel, and any shop, house, warehouse, hostelry or other
place whatsoever, to make diligent search into any trunk, chest, pack, case,
truss or any other parcel or package whatsoever, for any goods, wares, or
merchandise prohibited to be imported or exported, or whereof the customs or
other duties had not been duly paid, and to seize the same to his Majesty’s
use. It then commanded the persons addressed to permit the revenue officers, by
night and by day, to enter any ship, boat, or other vessel, within or coming to
the port of Boston or places pertaining thereto, to search and oversee, and
strictly to examine, the persons therein touching the premises, and also, in
the daytime, to enter the vaults, cellars, warehouses, shops, and other places
where any prohibited goods, wares and merchandise, or any goods, wares and
merchandise for which the customs or other duties had not been duly paid, lay
concealed or were suspected to be concealed; that
they inspect
and oversee and search for the said goods, wares and merchandise; and that
they, from time to time, be aiding, assisting and helping the revenue officers
in the execution of the process. The process (which was against goods alone; it
did not authorise arrest of men) ran through the particular re;gn in
which it was granted, and for six months afterwards.
Writs of the
kind had been granted by Crown judges or governors before in Massachusetts, as
the statement above rnide, that the application was for a renewal of process,
implies; but former applications had not created excitement. Still the use
made, or to be made, of the writs had not passed unnoticed; and now that, at
the outset of the reign of George III, the old writs were about to expire, and
new ones were asked for, to run of course indefinitely in time, the whole
situation was at once changed. The public was aroused; it seemed indeed as if
all the people of Massachusetts had become parties to the cause The merchants
of Boston formally asked and obtained leave to be heard by counsel on the
question whether the Crown really had the right, by law, to invade private
premises, and to seize property, under process, not based on oath, which was
not to name the premises or the property, or to allege any ground for supposing
that an offence against the revenue laws had been committed. The case was
argued twice.
The ground
taken for the petitioners is shown in the opening words of the petition; “they
cannot,” they allege, “fully exercise their offices in such a manner as his
Majesty’s service and the laws in such cases require, unless your Honours, who
are vested with the power of a Court of Exchequer for this province, will
please to grant them writs of assistants.” Gridley, who appeared for the
petitioners, admitted that the writ of assistance took away the common
privileges of Englishmen; but so did process in cases of crime; officers might
break and enter houses to serve process in common law cases of felony. The
necessity of the case justified the writ. Smugglers would elude the law if they
had notice, and government would lose its means of support. Was not the revenue
the sole support of fleets and armies abroad and ministers at home? Could the
nation be preserved without such help ? Was not this a matter infinitely more
important than the punishment of thieves or even murderers ? Indeed the power
in question was the same as that given by law of the province to treasurers for
collecting taxes. Individuals must yield in such cases; the necessity of having
public taxes and public revenues speedily collected was of much greater moment
than the liberty of individuals.
In the course
of the second hearing Gridley further argued that the writ in question was a
writ of assistants, not of assistance; it was not intended to give greater
power to officers, but to provide a check upon them; they were to have
assistants to watch them. They could not enter a house without the presence of
the sheriff or some other civil
officer to
have an eye over them; that would save the writ from objection.
Thacher, who
was with Otis for the merchants of Boston, contended that the Superior Court
had solemnly disclaimed the authority of the English Court of Exchequer. But
assuming that the Court had the power of the English Exchequer, there were many
circumstances which made the English practice an improper precedent for this
case. There the officers were sworn in Court, and were accountable to it—they
were obliged to pass their accounts there weekly; that was not the case here.
In the English Court too cases were tried and tried finally; which was another
difference. Again, the officers of the customs in England were officers of the
Exchequer, and could be punished corporally for misbehaviour. No such
authority had been given to this Court by the statute under which alone the
petition was drawn. On the merits of the question, Thacher said that it was
either a case in which the judges must act, or it was one of discretion. The
statutes did not support the first view; as for the second, it could not be
within the power of a judge, at discretion, to determine whether a man’s house
should be broken open, any more than to determine, at discretion, whether a man
should be hanged or not.
Thacher’s
argument did not touch the authority of Parliament; his contention was, that
the writs desired by the Crown officers were not authorized by the statutes of
England. Though such writs were good there, they were invalid in America; a
distinction made also in Pennsylvania by John Dickinson.
Otis argued
against the very writ itself. It was an unlawful thing in very substance; it
was against the fundamental principles of law. A man’s house was his castle, a
place privileged from officers of government in matters of debt and civil
process of any kind, including that of the Exchequer. Houses might, he
admitted, be broken open to serve process of felony, as Gridley had said; but
that could be done only by special (as distinguished from general, indefinite)
warrant,' granted on oath, naming the house to be searched as suspected, and
alleging good grounds of suspicion. Let the officers now make oath and get such
special warrants, if they needed to break open houses; that was what the Acts
of Parliament meant; they did not authorize these general writs sprayed for by
the petitioners.
Referring to
the precedents, admitted to be few, Otis argued that all precedents were
subject to the principles of law. He quoted Lord Talbot, who had said from the
bench: “I think it much better to stick to the known general rules than to
follow any one particular precedent which may be founded upon reasons unknown
to us.” The argument thus far was consistent with the idea that the statutes
were sound; the statutes did not justify the writs in question; the writ might
have been framed by “some ignorant clerk of the Exchequer.” But Otis went
further; if
the writ was authorised by Act of Parliament, then the Act of Parliament itself
was unauthorised—it was against the constitution and was void. “An Act of
Parliament...in the very words of this petition...would be void.”
Otis did not
deny the authority of Parliament over the general affairs of the colony. He had
no occasion to do so now, even if he believed that Parliament had no such
authority, for the question before the Court pertained to external trade, over
which the authority of Parliament was not questioned. But even had it not been
so, there would have been no difference; Otis held that Parliament had full
authority to regulate the internal, as well as the external, affairs of the
colonies. His denial here of the constitutionality.of any Act of Parliament
which really should authorise these Writs of assistance, was a denial of the
validity of such a statute over America.
The
justices, four in number, or some of them, had doubts at the first hearing in
regard to the practice in England; but having meantime satisfied themselves on
that point, they were on the second hearing unanimously of opinion that the
writ should be granted, and gave judgment accordingly. “The child Independence
was bom on that occasion,” afterwards wrote an eager listener, who lived to be
President of the United States. ■
How the
matter was looked upon at the time may be seen in the heated columns of the
newspapers, in pamphlets, and especially in the action of the legislature of
Massachusetts in the February following the decision. At that time a bill was
passed “for the better enabling the officers of his Majesty’s customs to carry
the Acts of trade into execution.” After a short prearn ble, ironically
expressing the desire of the colony to assist his Majesty’s officers, the bill
declared that upon application, on oath, to the Superior Court, or other Courts
named, by an officer alleging that he had information of a breach of the
revenue laws, and that he verily believed or knew such information to be true,
it should be lawful for the Court, upon reducing such oath to writing, with the
name of the person informing and the place informed against, and not otherwise,
to issue a writ or warrant of assistance; the form of which followed. The
governor rejected the bill; afterwards, in a letter to the Lords of Trade,
saying that “the intention of it was to take away from the officers the writ of
assistance granted in pursuance of the Act of William 3,” and to substitute for
it a writ “wholly inefficacious.” The governor adds, that the bill “was very
popular,” and that he silenced all clamour by the manner in which he rejected
it; that this “ reduced the popular cry to a murmur only, which soon ceased,” and
he believed there was “now a total end to this troublesome altercation about
the custom house officers.” The business of issuing these writs now went on in
Massachusetts, for some years, without effective resistance.
Writs of
assistance, not before in use elsewhere in the thirteen:
1762-74] Interference with “assemblies
181
colonies, now
began to spread. They appear in New Hampshire in 1762, and in one or two other
colonies after the passage of the Act of George III, 1767, specifically giving
jurisdiction to the Superior Courts of the several colonies to grant writs of
assistance. They were thus granted in New York, refused in Pennsylvania,
refused in Virginia as general writs, but granted as special ones, and not
granted or refused apparently in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland, and other
colonies.
After the
Declaration of Independence, State after State,put into its constitution
provisions against the issuance of general search warrants, of whatever kind;
and one of the ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States, brought
forward and adopted at the beginning of the new government, followed the lead
of the States. This was only in conformity with the general common law of.
England; to which the granting of writs of assistance in the English Exchequer
itself was finally made conformable, in the year 1817.
The complaint
that gatherings or assemblies of the people to consider supposed grievances
against Great Britain had been prohibited and broken up by the government, and
that legislation of the colonies had been suspended and denied assent, may be
shortly disposed of. The complaint generally was of the abuse, not of the want,
of authority; enough that it was abuse—it was therefore an invasion of legal
right. Little if any attempt was made to find the boundary of authority. Indeed
no bounds could be laid down; all that could be done was to declare that Great
Britain was invading the rights of her colonies. The Continental Congress at
Philadelphia, in the autumn of 1774, referring particularly to the troubles in
Massachusetts, acute as they were, could only say that assemblies had been
frequently dissolved, contrary to the rights of the people, when they were
attempting to deliberate upon their grievances, and resolve that the people
have a right peaceably to assemble, consider their grievances, and petition the
King for redress, and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations and
commitments in such cases were illegal. The subject passed into the
constitutions of the various States and into the first amendment to the Federal
Constitution ; but, so far as gatherings of the people were concerned, it was
still impossible to use terms of definition of authority. The most that could
be said was that “ The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner,
to assemble to consult upon the public good,” as the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights put it. As for suspending legislation, that of course could be dealt
with effectually, at a single blow. “ The power of suspending the laws, or the
execution of the laws, ought' never to be exercised but by the legislature, or
by authority derived from it,” said the same Declaration of Rights; and so in
effect the constitutions of the States generally. The division of powers
between the federal and the State governments prevented, it was thought, after
much debate in the Constitutional Convention, the need or propriety of any
declaration in
the Federal'
Constitution in regard to suspending State legislation ; and the powers of the
departments of federal government were so laid down as to make it unnecessary
to declare that Congress alone could suspend federal laws. A single exception
was made with regard to State legislation, such as there had been under the
previous state of things, laying duties on imports; duties were declared
thereafter to be for the use of the United States, and the laws themselves to
be subject to the control of Congress. As for the exercise of the power of
veto, that was given to the governors by various, but not all, State constitutions,
and to the President by the Constitution of the United States, under particular
restrictions.
The right of
Great Britain to regulate the external trade of the colonies was admitted. “
The sea is yours,” said Franklin to the House of Commons during the troubles
over the Stamp Act; “you make it safe for navigation; you keep it clear of
pirates. You are therefore entitled to some toll or duty on merchandise carried
through the seas, towards the expense.” “ There are many things beyond the
reach of our legislatures,” said Governor Hopkins; one was the commerce of the
whole British empire collectively, and of each kingdom and colony as parts of
it. The Continental Congress of 1774, putting it broadly, said “ From the
necessity of the case and a regard to the mutual interests of Great Britain and
the colonies, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such Acts of the
British Parliament as are bona fide restrained to the regulation of our
external commerce.” The power of Parliament to regulate trade was the only
bond, as Dickinson admitted, that could have held the colonies together.
No American
attempted to define the bounds of the right of Great Britain; general theory
was all that was urged. What this theory was, was expressed in one of the
resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, in 1765. Assuming that the increase,
prosperity, and happiness of the colonies were desired by Great Britain as well
as by themselves, the Congress resolved that such things depended upon the full
and free enjoyment of the rights and liberties of the colonies, “and an
intercourse with Great Britain mutually affectionate and advantageous.” On that
footing, recent legislation in Parliament restricting the foreign trade of the
colonies had infringed the rights of Americans; the effect of it was to prevent
“an intercourse with Great Britain mutually affectionate and advantageous.” The
colonies were now obliged to take from Great Britain alone the manufactures
which they required from abroad. The British manufacturer accordingly set his own
price; and the colonists must pay more than they would have had to pay in other
markets. So complained Samuel Adams, for the Massachusetts House of Representatives,
to Lord Sherburne. It amounted to “a tax, though indirect, on the colonies,”
the plainest sort of invasion of legal right.
The pecuniary
condition of the country added sorely to the grievance; the people were borne
down with debt in some of the greatest of the
colonies.
“The restraints imposed by several late Acts of Parliament on the trade of this
province,” declared the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, in 1765, “must of
necessity be attended with the most fatal consequences.” The balance of trade
between Great Britain and the colonies was much against the colonies. Formerly
the trade with foreign countries enabled them to keep up their credit with
Great Britain, by applying the balance they had gained against foreigners; now
the trade was so fettered that it could not be carried on with profit. The
supply of coin in the country was small; and, such was the effect of the
legislation in question, it could not be much increased. Once exhausted, as
soon it must be, it could not well be replaced; no gold or silver mines had
been discovered. How was the balance against them to be discharged ? And what
of the future ? To go on was ruin. So in effect Dulaney wrote and lamented.
Moderate men
and houses of legislature in the colonies could not believe that Parliament had
had accurate knowledge; what reason, said Governor Hopkins, could be given for
a law to cramp trade and ruin the colonies, which must at the same time lessen
the consumption of British goods ? Perhaps, as Hamilton later thought, it was
punishment; if it was, the Massachusetts House of Representatives feared that
the colonies had been misrepresented as undutiful and disaffected, and so
stated to the ministry. But feeling ran high, and England persisted after
hearing. The issue then was this—the English theory was that the colonies
should be of advantage to the mother-country; their prosperity was desired, but
desired to that end; the colonies must trade with the mother-country, and, with
trifling exceptions, not elsewhere. The American theory was that the colonies
should indeed be of advantage to Great Britain, but not to their own disadvantage
; intercourse should be “ mutually advantageous.” Settled American theory did
not reach the point afterwards reached in England, that the government of the
colonies should be for the benefit of the colonies alone, though Hamilton,
Dulaney and others fell little if at all short of it.
The subject
was peculiar to the colonial relation, and could find no place in the State or
Federal constitutions; there was no territorial separation of the federal
government from that of the States; all commerce was necessarily carried on
with or through the States. The Constitution therefore needed only to declare
for uniformity of duties, imposts, and excises, and against preferences in
commerce of the ports of one State over those of another.
There were a
few other complaints falling under the head of abuse of authority; complaints
that private citizens were unnecessarily disarmed, that armies were kept in the
colonies, without consent, in time of peace, and that soldiers were wrongfully
quartered in private houses. These things, with some variation, found their way
into State and Federal constitutions. But the Federal Constitution recognises
the right of the
States to
maintain a body of militia, and to have command of it when not employed in the
service of the United States; as Great Britain had done in the colonial time.
(ii) Discriminating
Legislation.
Of
discriminating legislation there was much concerning which no serious complaint
was made. The subordination of the colonies implied some discrimination against
them, according to theories of government prevailing in the eighteenth century
and admitted by the colonies. What was understood by “regulation of trade,”
that is, of external and inter-colonial trade, was the ever-present example.
The colonies must not trade with foreign countries, except as permitted by
government; they were subject to trade-duties peculiar to them as colonies. But
there was somewhere a limit beyond which it was agreed discrimination ought not
to go; to pass that limit was to violate legal right. Where was the limit ? No
general answer was given ; no one indeed contended that there was any fixed
boundary line; each case was treated as standing more or less by itself. The
American contention then, arising out of particular cases, was simply this:—assuming,
or waiving the question of, the authority of Great Britain, authority had been
exercised so as to discriminate unduly against America.
Leaving for
later consideration questions whether certain complaints belong to this head or
to another, and taking up none but admitted cases, the first thing to be
noticed must be the legislation touching the jurisdiction of the colonial
Courts of Admiralty.
Complaint was
five-fold. First, it was complained that the revenue jurisdiction of the Courts
of Admiralty in America, which theretofore had been local, had now been
extended, for every Court, over the entire coast of the colonies. Secondly,
that jurisdiction had been given to the colonial Courts of Admiralty in matters
beyond the jurisdiction of the Admiralty in England, namely in matters of the
common law; whereby Americans had, so far, been deprived of the Englishman’s
right of trial by jury. Thirdly, that, while in England damages could, in case
of acquittal, be recovered against officers who seized goods, in America no
action could be maintained if the judge in Admiralty would only certify that
there had been probable cause for the seizure. Fourthly, that the judge in
Admiralty held office at the pleasure of the Crown, instead of during good
behaviour as in England. Fifthly, that the judge was paid in fees, a large
percentage being payable to him for every condemnation of goods, much larger
than in cases of acquittal.
The
complaints of political bodies usually took the form of resolutions or
declarations, without stated argument. The Stamp Act, and other Acts of
Parliament—so the Stamp Act Congress declared, in October 1765—“by extending
the jurisdiction of the Courts of Admiralty
beyond its
ancient limits, have a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of
the colonists.” “Trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every
British subject in these colonies.” Trial by jury in these cases of the
revenue—so said the address to the King, on the same occasion—is a security
against the arbitrary decisions of the executive. His Majesty’s subjects in
America are required to submit to the determination of a single judge, in a
Court not restrained by the wise rules of the common law, the birthright of
Englishmen and the safeguard of their persons and property. The colonies have
the misfortune to find, said the address to the House of Commons, that all the
penalties and forfeitures mentioned in the Stamp Act and other late Acts axe,
at the election of the informers, recoverable in any Court of Admiralty in
America. A newly-elected Court of Admiralty has general jurisdiction over all
British America, so that his Majesty’s subjects are liable to be carried at the
greatest expense from one end of the continent to the other. It is painful to
see such a distinction made between the subjects of England and the colonies;
there the like penalties and forfeitures are recoverable only in his Majesty’s
Courts of Record (i.e. the common law Courts).
Individual
leaders also took part in the matter, in newspapers and pamphlets. Governor
Hopkins dwelt upon the territorial extension of jurisdiction. Goods lawfully
imported may now be seized in Georgia and carried to Halifax, for trial there;
and if the judge can be prevailed upon to certify that there was probable cause
for the seizure, the unhappy owner, if he has followed his goods, may return to
Georgia quite ruined. The power given to Courts of Admiralty, said Thacher, who
with Otis had argued against the writs of assistance, alarms the people. The
common law is the birthright of every subject; trial by jury is a darling
privilege. It was so long before the colonies were planted; our ancestors had
many struggles against attempts of the Court of Admiralty to inundate the land.
What chance has the subject for his rights when the judge is to have a hundred
or perhaps five hundred pounds for condemning, and less than twenty shillings
upon an acquittal—the judge too acting alone, without a jury? Worse than that,
the seizor may at his pleasure inform in any Court of Admiralty in the
particular colony, or wherever in America a Court may sit. Thus a malicious
seizor may take any man’s goods, however lawfully imported, and carry the trial
a thousand miles away, and the owner shall lose his right from sheer inability
to follow. The Act of Parliament makes other distinctions. In Great Britain no
jurisdiction is given to any other than the common law Courts; and there the
subject is near the throne, and can soon be heard. In England the officer
seizes goods at his peril; if the goods are not liable to forfeiture, the
seizor must pay the claimant his costs, and is besides liable to an action for
damages.
These
complaints were answered by the English Ministry, by judges, and by loyalists.
The Stamp Act itself, it was pointed out, had recognised the grievances and
proposed a suitable remedy. It contained a clause providing for the creation of
such a number of Courts of ViceAdmiralty as would bring trials within the
reach of every subject in America. In the execution of that purpose the then
Commissioners of the Treasury had in fact formed and submitted to the Privy
Council a plan for creating three such Courts, with proper districts, and with
ample fixed salaries for the judges, in lieu of all fees. But the repeal of the
Stamp Act followed; “ and the Americans will owe the grievances which they
suffer from the present situation and constitution of the Court of Admiralty to
the administration which” caused the repeal.
The extension
of jurisdiction of the colonial Admiralty over matters of the common law was
itself justified, as the ministry, Crown judges, and loyalists held, on the
ground of necessity. “ The reason for putting these causes,” arising under the
Stamp Act, “in a course of trial without any jury undoubtedly arose from an apprehension
that juries in these cases were not to be trusted.” The force of that reason
might be abated, it could not be wholly destroyed; no candid man would “take it
upon him to declare that at this time an American jury is impartial and
indifferent enough to determine upon frauds in trade.” It was declared to be
“notorious that smuggling had well-nigh become established in some of the
colonies.” “The way to Holland and back was well-known”; and then Whig and
smuggler had been “playing into each other’s hands.” Smuggler had been
protected by Whig, Whig in turn had been supported by smuggler, bitterly
observed a New England loyalist—with truth, if not with the whole truth.
“What,” said another, “could the government do but apply a remedy as desperate
as the disease ? ”
No definition
of Admiralty jurisdiction was given in any of the American constitutions. The
subject was probably referred to in certain provisions of State constitutions,
or bills of right, that “in controversies respecting property” trial by jury
was “preferable to any other,” or was matter of “right” except where it had
been “otherwise used and practiced.” The seventh amendment (passed in 1789) to
the Constitution of the United States provides that “ in suits at common law,
where the controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved.” Great difficulty was found in the Federal Convention in
fixing jury trials, in civil cases, through the States; and the subject was
finally dropped, and left to the States. As for Admiralty powers, the Federal
Constitution simply declares that “The judicial
power
of the United States shall extend to all
cases of Admiralty
and maritime
jurisdiction.” The Courts therefore were to determine what that was. Rights of
action for damages for improper seizure of goods under revenue laws (to be
passed) were left for legislation and the Courts. Judges of the federal Courts
were to hold office during good
behaviour,
and to receive fixed salaries without fees. Such, altogether, was the net
constitutional result, federal and State.
The trouble
which arose over the determination to take Americans accused of treason to
England for trial, is a shorter matter Orders had gone forth for closing the
port of Boston; and, in anticipation of resistance, riots and bloodshed in
enforcing the same, the legislation in question had been passed by Parliament.
It had lately been resolved in Parliament, said the Continental Congress of
Philadelphia in the autumn of 1774, that by force of a statute of the time of
Henry VIII, colonists may be transported to England and tried there upon
accusation for treason and misprisions, or concealment of treason, committed in
the colonies; and by a late statute such trials had been directed in cases
therein mentioned.
Against this
and other new legislation affecting Massachusetts, it was resolved that at the
time of the emigration the colonists were entitled to all the rights, liberties
and immunities of free natural bom subjects within England; that they had not,
by their emigration, forfeited, surrendered, or lost any of those rights; and
that their descendants were still entitled to exercise and enjoy the same so
far as circumstances enabled them to do so. Accordingly, the colonies were
entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable
privilege of being tried for crime by their peers of the vicinage, by the
course of that law. The legislation in question was unjust, unconstitutional,
destructive of the rights of Americans.
Necessity was
of course the justification urged. Boston juries could not be depended upon to
convict Boston citizens of crime in resisting officers of the British
government, or to acquit officers under indictment for acts done by them in the
discharge of their duty; to which sarcasm might reply, that British juries
could be depended upon to convict in the one case and acquit in the other, for
want of witnesses who heard and saw. Men accused of crime in Massachusetts must
be tried by a Massachusetts jury, not merely because British juries would be
apt to be prejudiced against them for what they had done against natives of
England, but because witnesses in favour of the accused would not be present at
the trial there, or if present would probably be overawed. So Americans
maintained; and that view passed into the State constitutions and then into
the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
' (iii) Interference under Claim of Universal
Authority.
The great
dispute between the colonies and Great Britain was of the true relation between
the two parts of the British empire. Parliament, first distinctly claiming the
right to tax the colonies for the support
188 Universal authority of Parliament denied.
[1774
of the empire
upon the close of the French war in America, shortly afterwards put the claim
of right, plainly following on the first position, universally; Parliament had
the right to legislate for the colonies, “ in all cases whatsoever.” As the
first claim was denied in the colonies, so still more, of course, was the
second. Thus was raised one of the greatest issues of legal right which hias
ever stirred the English race. Well for the world that there were men in
America equal to their part in it; for the dispute was of a kind to affect the
history of the world; the future of distant and foreign races, as well as of
all those of English blood, might be turned by it.
During all
the time embraced in the troubles now under consideration, all Americans,
Whigs or “patriots,” with few exceptions, as well as Tories or “loyalists,”
were devoted to the colonial relation. The stand taken by the Whigs against the
mother-country was taken accordingly; and it should be distinctly observed that
their opposition to the policy adopted by the British government was the
opposition of colonists, seeking their ends for the colonies as such. In other
words, their theoiy of rights was a theory of the colonial relation between
Great Britain and her American possessions, the thirteen colonies ; they
believed it to be the true theory of rights touching that relation. The
sincerity of the professions of loyalty by the Whig or generally dominant party
in the colonies was indeed doubted in England and sneered at by the Tories in
America; but the profession was stoutly made throughout the time in question,
and there is evidence enough that it was made with sincerity. But even if it
were true that the Whigs were already bent upon separation, the basis of their
contention was the colonial relation; and the subject must be considered upon
the ground upon which it was put.
The
Continental Congress of September, 1774, put the claim of exemption of the
colonies from the general authority of Parliament on three grounds of legal
right, to wit, rights fixed (a) by the “immutable laws” of human nature, (6)
by the British Constitution, and (c) by the colonial charters. How was the
claim supported ? How was it opposed in America, that is by the loyalists? The
several grounds will be considered in order, by way of answer. First, then, of
the laws of nature.
(a) Laws of Nature.
The
contention on this point, beginning with the Stamp Act troubles, in 1764, was,
that the rights of the colonists were not all or chiefly derived from the
sovereign power of Great Britain, or from Great Britain in any way. Rights were
not necessarily created by legislatures or by municipal law; they were not
necessarily created at all. The greatest rights were original, inherent in man;
they arose from law indeed, but from that law only which, through the social
instinct, draws
1765]
Laws of nature.
Calvin's case.
189
men together
in social relation. The State itself was nothing but a body of men in social
relations, with power given to it, or created with power, to enforce the
obligations arising therefrom. In other words, Americans contended that the
chief rights of men arose from human nature. Instead of being created by
municipal law, these rights themselves gave rise to all laws enforced by the
State.
This theory
of legal right was put as English doctrine. American jurists, including
loyalists, were in the habit of quoting Calvin’s case, of the time of Coke. In
that case all the authorities had been examined, and the judges had unanimously
resolved, first, that the laws of nature are part of the law of England;
secondly, that the laws of nature cannot be changed; thirdly, that protection
and government are due to the subject by the laws of nature; fourthly, that
neither “ligeance” nor protection is tied to municipal law, but is due by the
laws of nature.
Plainly then
there was, at the time of the settlement of the colonies, a “law of nature”
which was not derived from Parliament, a law which Parliament could not change.
Indeed Americans believed that doctrine without regard to Calvin’s case; the
doctrine did not rest on “ musty records”; it was sound in itself. So in effect
it was put by all the leaders —by Otis, Hopkins, Samuel Adams, John Adams, and
Hamilton. “The sacred rights of mankind,” said Hamilton, “are not to be
rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a
sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of the Divinity
itself, and can never be erased or obscured.”
The rights
referred to as derived from the laws of nature were generally spoken of, as
Hopkins put them, as inherent and indefeasible; they were Blackstone’s
“absolute rights” of individuals to life, liberty, and property, and his
secondary, consequent rights of legislation. The term “birthright” was
constantly applied to the first. But the doctrine that these or any other
rights of the colonists were beyond the power of Parliament was denied in
England and by loyalists in America. Discussion began with the rights of
individuals.
Howard, a
Rhode Island loyalist and lawyer, said that, in speaking of the rights of firee-bom
Englishmen, personal and political rights were confounded. He put the case, in
substance, thus: 1. Political rights axe not “natural”; these come from
Parliament, and Parliament comes from the constitution of England, which was
the common law. These rights, in the case of the colonists, are derived,
immediately, from the charters. 2. Personal rights of life, liberty, and
property, called “inherent, indefeasible” rights, are not “natural”; these come
from the common law. These, too, in the case of the colonists, are derived,
immediately, from the charters. 3. All the rights of the colonists therefore
are derived immediately from the charters, ultimately from the common law 4. If
then the colonists claim the common law, as they do, as the source of these
personal rights, they must accept Parliament
190 Foundation of civil
and political rights. [i765
also,, for
Parliament too was the offspring of the common law. 5. But corporate rights
were matters of grace and favour of the donor or founder. 6. Therefore the
rights of the colonists, political and personal alike, were matters of grace
and favour.
Otis denied
Howard’s distinction between personal and political rights; it was “a new
invention.” The rights of men were natural or civil (“political”), and they
might be both, at the same time, for the two divisions were not opposed to each
other; which, it may be remarked, meant that all rights were civil, but certain
civil rights were “ natural.” Civil rights were principally three, rights of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property; these by Blackstone
were called absolute civil or political rights, and these were natural. Now
natural, absolute (Howard’s “personal”) rights, so far from being opposed to
civil or political rights, were the very basis of all municipal laws of any
great value.
Howard’s
distinction too had led him to confound the rights of bodies politic or
corporate with the civil or political rights of natural persons. Because the
rights of bodies corporate, so far as they depended upon charter, were matters
of grace and favour of the donor or founder, Howard had inferred that the
colonies, as bodies corporate, had no rights independent of their charters. But
this, said Otis, contradicted his statement that by “the common law” every
colonist had a right to his life, liberty and property.
Rights of
life, liberty, and property, by nature and by the common law, were civil or
political rights. But in the colonies these and all other rights, according to
Howard, depended upon charter. It must follow that the people of those colonies
(New York, for instance) which had no charters, had no right to life, liberty,
or property. And even in the colonies which had charters, these rights depended
upon the mere good-will, grace, and pleasure of the supreme power. That could
not be true; the origin of these rights was found in the law of nature. If all
the charters were abolished, this would not shake one of the essential rights
of the colonists; the colonists would still be men, citizens, British subjects.
No Act of Parliament could deprive them of the liberties of such. It
followed—although Otis left the plain deduction to the reader —that the
colonists could claim the common law, without admitting the authority of
Parliament, even if it were true that the British Constitution was, properly
speaking, the common law in such a way that Parliament, like the rights of
life, liberty, and property, could be said to be the offspring of it. Otis made
no allusion to this point; his argument was not affected by it. It was enough
that the “personal” rights in question, being civil or political, were at the
same time natural, and hence above charters or Parliaments.
Otis however
did not deny that Parliament had the right to lay taxes upon the colonies, and
so far take the property of the colonists
without their
consent. On the contrary he in terms affirmed the right: “the Parliament of
Great Britain has a just and equitable right, power, and authority, to impose
taxes on the colonies, internal and external, on lands as well as on trade.”
This was involved in the idea of the sovereign power of the State. But he held
that it would be inexpedient and unreasonable for Parliament to exercise the
right without allowing the colonies actual representation. Otis was writing in
1765; but even then the whole Whig party was against him. The Whigs carried the
doctrine of rights under the laws of nature to the conclusion that Parliament
had no authority to lay taxes upon the colonies ; the rights of “personal
security, personal liberty, and private property” were beyond the reach of
Parliament, except as incident to the right of Parliament to regulate the
external affairs of the country. That would have been said to be the true
effect of Otis’ own argument.
So far as
individual rights were concerned, these absolute rights were perhaps all that
the colonists meant when they spoke of rights derived from the laws of nature.
“Birthright” had a wider, an indefinite meaning; it was often used to include
the common law, the great English statutes, and the British Constitution; hence
many things having no bearing on the question of exemption from Parliamentary
control.
As a direct
consequence of the claim to such exemption in respect of the great individual
rights, the Whigs claimed exemption in respect of the means whereby those
rights were protected; they had rights to legislatures and Courts of their own.
And these rights of direct consequence they also called inherent and
indefeasible, and therefore “natural.” “The supreme and subordinate powers of
legislation should be free and sacred in the hands where the community have
once rightfully placed them,” as “a natural, essential, inherent, and
inseparable right.” A legislature of the colonies might be forfeited (in virtue
of allegiance) to the Crown, for good cause, according to Otis, who, writing in
1764, went further than the Whig leaders ten years later; but forfeiture of the
kind could not affect the natural persons of the members of the legislature or
of the inhabitants of the colonies in their rights of legislation. The
colonists would still have the right either to be represented in Parliament or
to possess a new subordinate legislature.
Seabury, a
rector of New York, an able, caustic writer, denied that the colonies had any
inherent or natural right of legislation; their powers of legislation were
derived from the indulgence or grant of the parent-State. “Upon the supposition
that every English colony enjoyed a legislative power independent of the
Parliament, and that the Parliament has no just authority to make laws to bind
them, this absurdity will follow, that there is no power in the British empire
which has authority to make laws for the whole empire; that is, we have an
empire without government;...we have a government which has no supreme power.”
Supreme power must be lodged somewhere.
192
Supreme authority,
where lodged.
Hamilton
answered Seabury, first discussing the theory of the authority of the House of
Commons by way of showing that the authority of Parliament must be limited to
Great Britain. The House was a check against despotism in various ways peculiar
to the mother- country. The very aim of this part of the government was to
secure the rights of the people, that is, the people of Great Britain. The
House of Commons represented them ; their own interests were in every way
connected with those of their constituents. Again, as Governor Hopkins, writing
in 1765, had put it, all the powers of the House were derived from its
electors, and these were persons of Great Britain; it followed that all its
authority was confined to Great Britain. “ The power which one society bestows
upon any man or body of men can never extend beyond its own limits.”
Proceeding to
Seabury’s proposition that supreme power must be lodged somewhere in
government, Hamilton denied the inference that, unless the supreme authority be
lodged in one part of the empire over all the other parts, there can be no
government. Each part might enjoy a distinct, complete legislature, and still
good government might prevail everywhere. It was vain to deny that two or more
distinct legislatures could exist in the same State. Such a denial might hold
good as regards a single community; there could not be two legislatures in
England or in New York. But it did not hold good of a number of distinct
societies or bodies politic under one common head; thus there might be one
legislature in England, another in Ireland, and another in New York; and still
these several parts might form but one State. There must indeed be some
connecting, pervading principle; but that was found in the King. “ His power is
equal to the purpose, and his interest binds him to the due prosecution of it.”
How could this frustrate or obstruct government ?
He affirmed
then that legislation was an inherent right of the colonies, not a matter of
indulgence or grant. All men were equal by birth; natural liberty was the gift
of the Creator to the whole human race; and “civil liberty is only natural
liberty, modified and secured by the sanctions of civil society,” which of
course included legislation. Neither Parliament nor Crown had bestowed natural
liberty upon the colonists, or could bestow it.
(b) The
British Constitution.
How did
Americans claim exemption from Parliament in virtue of the British Constitution
? The chief answer to that question is found in the English doctrine, running
back to Magna Carta, and the various stages of representation. Property could
not be taken without consent of the owner given personally or by his
representatives; that was the ordinary, specific way of putting it, but the
ground taken was general—
Parliament
had no authority over individuals in the colonies (except incidentally, in the
regulation of their external affairs) for want of representation by them.
In answer to
this position it was contended that what came to be called “virtual
representation” satisfied the meaning of the constitution; and in that sense,
America, it was said, was represented in Parliament. The maxim, as the loyalist
Howard was willing to call it, that Englishmen could not be taxed without
their consent, was a “dry maxim”; it was not to be taken literally. Rightly
explained, it did not support the Whig case. It was, said Howard, the opinion
of the House of Commons, and might be considered as a “ law of Parliament,”
that the Commons were the representatives of every British subject, wheresoever
he might be. In that view the maxim in question was fully vindicated, and the
whole benefit of it extended to the colonies. In a literal sense the maxim never
was and never could be carried out. Was the Isle of Man, or Jersey, or Guernsey
represented in that sense? What was the value of the representation of each man
in the kingdom of Scotland, which contained near two millions of people, and
yet not more than three thousand had a vote in the election of members of
Parliament ? The moneyed interest of Britain, though vast, had no share in the
representation; and copyholders could not vote for members of Parliament.
Otis replied
with legal sarcasm. Howard had said that the opinion of a House of Commons was
a “ law of Parliament.” Therefore it was determined by Act of Parliament, that
Americans were, and should believe they were, in fact represented in the House
of Commons! Would any man’s calling himself an agent or representative make him
such ? Howard saw no difference between a literal sense of his “ dxy maxim” and
no sense at all. Could it be argued that, because it was impracticable that
each individual should in fact be represented, there should be no representation
whatever P
Seabury said
that the Whig doctrine had arisen from an artful change of terms. To say that
an Englishman was not bound by laws to which the representatives of the nation
had not given their consent was to say what was true. But to say that an
Englishman was bound by no laws but those to which he had consented in person,
or by his representative, was saying what never was true, and never could be
true. A great part of the people of England had no share in the choice of
representatives. One of the Commissioners of the Treasury, in England, speaking
more directly still, said that the merchants of London, the proprietors of the
public funds, the inhabitants of Leeds, Halifax, Birmingham, and Manchester,
and the East India Company, did not choose representatives; and yet they were
all represented in Parliament. “ And the colonies, being exactly in their
situation, are represented in the same manner.”
194
Virtual
representation explained.
[1764
It fell to
Dulaney to make the chief answer. The non-electors of England were under no
personal incapacity to vote. All the inhabitants of the towns named, the
members of the East India Company, and the rest might acquire the franchise. In
point of fact there-were electors in the towns, and even members of Parliament.
Further, the interests of the non-electors, the electors, and the
representatives, were individually the same; to say nothing of the connexion
among neighbours, friends, and relatives. The security of the non-electors
against oppression was that oppression of them would fall also upon the
electors and the representatives. Again, if non-electors should not be taxed by
Parliament, they would not be taxed at all; and it would be iniquitous that
they should enjoy the benefits resulting from taxation and yet not bear any of
the burdens. In that state of things a double virtual representation might
reasonably be supposed. The electors, who were inseparably connected with the
non-electors in interest, might in voting be deemed to represent the non-electors;
and the persons chosen were therefore the representatives of both. This was the
only rational explanation of virtual representation. The inhabitants of the
colonies, as such, were incapable of being electors; if everyone in America had
the requisite freehold interest, not one could vote. Nor was there any intimate
and inseparable relation between the electors of Great Britain and the
colonists which must involve them in the same taxation. Not a single elector in
England might be immediately affected by a taxation in America imposed by a
statute having a general operation in the colonies. The latter might be
oppressed without any sympathy or alarm in England. Indeed oppression of the
colonies, by taxation, might be popular in England, as giving ease to the
people there. Ultimately England would be liable to be affected, but not soon
enough to cause alarm.
Dulaney wrote
in October, 1764; in January, 1765, Pitt adopted the argument in a speech in
favour of repealing the Stamp Act, referring to Dulaney’s pamphlet in terms of
admiration. The argument was destined to prevail through the world as
established British doctrine.
Another
complaint arising in virtue of the British Constitution, as the colonists held,
was that the departments of the local governments were interfered with in
England and confused. “It is indispensably necessary to good government,”
declared the Continental Congress of
1774, “and rendered essential by the British
Constitution, that the constituent branches of the legislature be independent
of each other; that therefore the exercise of legislative power in several
colonies, by council appointed, during pleasure, by the Crown, is
unconstitutional, dangerous and destructive of American legislation.”
It was a
common objection to the American contention that the colonies were only
corporations engaged in trade, agriculture, and other pursuits, and that
accordingly the colonists were no more entitled to
1775] The colonies as corporations.
Representation. 195
exemption
from taxation by Parliament because of want of representation, than were other
corporations—than was indeed the City of London. Dulaney met this argument
thus. The colonies had complete legislative authority, and the people were
represented in their legislatures, and in no other way. The power of making
bye-laws vested in corporations, such as the City of London, was incomplete,
being limited to a few particular subjects. And as for London, the Common
Council were actually represented in Parliament, having a choice of members.
The power of the colonies to make laws was not limited by anything else than
what resulted from their subordinate relation to Great Britain. The term
bye-law would be as improper when applied to the assemblies as the expression
Acts of Assembly would be if applied to Parliament. Thacher, writing about the
same time, said that it was impossible to consider the colonies as
corporations, in the sense of corporations existing in England. Distance had
made it necessary that the colonies should have the power of legislation; the
colonies could not have existed otherwise. Now the colonies had always taxed
themselves in their own legislatures, and had supported a complete domestic
government among themselves; was it then just that they should be doubly taxed ?
The loyalist
Galloway of Pennsylvania, lately Speaker of the House of Assembly of that
province, agreed with this view, as expressing the purport of the charters;
which however he regarded as usurpations. The inferior corporations of England,
he said, were governed by the general laws of the State, and their powers were
so confined that they had frequent occasion to apply to Parliament for laws and
regulations necessary to their own welfare. The colonies “ were made competent
to every act which could be necessary in a society perfectly independent.”
There was nothing for which they had to look to Parliament. They were not
obliged by their charters to send any of their transactions for the inspection
or control either of the Crown or Parliament; and they could declare war or
make peace, in virtue of their charters. Galloway had indeed in 1775 thought
that the colonies ought to be represented in Parliament, under the British
Constitution, regardless of their charters. The rights of Americans, he
believed, could be traced to no other source than the constitution of the
British State; and this was founded upon real property as the thing to be above
all protected. Hence real property in England was represented in Parliament.
Real property in America ought also to have representation there; the emigrants
had neither surrendered, forfeited, nor lost their rights of representation by
coming to America; Americans, as the subjects of a free State, were justly
entitled to participate in the government of it; they should be restored to
their ancient and essential right of sharing in the making of laws. That right
originally was, and still is, of the essence of the British Constitution. As
the case now stood, the British government was as absolute and despotic over
the colonies as any monarch could be. That
196
Loyalist view of the
charters.
was a
situation in which people accustomed to liberty, especially Americans, could
not easily acquiesce.
To the
suggestion that. the Parliament might grant the colonies representation if
request were properly made, the answer on both sides of the Atlantic uniformly
was, that the situation of the colonies made the idea impracticable; with a
play upon the favourite Whig phrase* Leonard of Boston, a loyalist, said that
by “the immutable laws of nature” we cannot enjoy it. And history has made good
the answer. Representation was out of the question, and therefore the colonies
were not to be subject to the general authority of Parliament—such was the Whig
or American position.
(c) The Charters.
The Whigs
generally held that the charters confirmed their view that the colonies were
exempt from the general authority of Parliament. Most loyalists, but (as will
be seen) not all, held with the ministry the contrary view. Howard had been
content with making the statement that the charters had not taken away
Parliamentary jurisdiction—a statement which, coming from a lawyer of high
standing, might under other circumstances have been accepted by laymen. But
this was not a time for bare assertion on such a question; and other loyalists
proceeded to call attention to the very language of the charters. Seabury published
extracts from them in one of his pamphlets, and summing up said: “ These
extracts abundantly prove that the colonial charters by no means imply an
independence of the supreme legislative authority of Great Britain.” Leonard,
an able lawyer of Boston, put the case of the Massachusetts charters, which
were thought by Galloway to go to the furthest length of them all, in this way:
to interpret the clause about liberties and immunities of free and natural bom
subjects as exempting the colony from Parliament, they must throw away all the
rest of the charter, for every other part indicated the contrary. The meaning
of the clause in question was this: if a person bom in England removed to
Ireland, he and his posterity were still subject to Parliament; and so if he
removed to any other part of the British dominions. “ So that the inhabitants
of the American colonies do in fact enjoy all the liberties and immunities of
natural born subjects. We are entitled to no greater privileges than those that
are born within the realm; and they can enjoy no other than we do when they
reside out of it.” The clause amounted only to a royal assurance that the
colonies were part of the British empire. That the powers of legislation were
subject to Parliament was shown by the words relating to them, “So as the same
be not repugnant or contrary to the laws of this our realm of England.” Our
patriots had made many nice distinctions to evade the force of these
1768-75]
Whig view. The Virginia charters.
197
words, but to
no purpose. Finally, the Crown could neither alienate part of the British
dominions nor impair the supreme power of the empire.
The Whig
contention was best put by Samuel Adams, by Dulaney, and by Hamilton.
Adams and
Dulaney, taking the same ground substantially, treated the charters as
contracts, or “compacts,” this being a term generally in use at the time with a
somewhat broader, and, at its borders, vaguer meaning than contract. As the
term however was applied by jurists to the charters, it appears generally to
have been used in the sense of contract, i.e. binding agreement. The original
contract between the King and the first planters was, said Adams, writing in
1768, a promise on behalf of the nation, by authority not till lately
questioned, that if the adventurers, at their own cost, would purchase the
country, subdue the wilderness, and thereby enlarge the King’s dominions, they
and their posterity should enjoy such rights and privileges as in their
respective charters were expressed; which in general were all the rights,
liberties, and privileges of his Majesty’s natural bom subjects within the
realm. The principal privilege, implied by some and expressed by other
charters, was freedom from all taxes but such as they should consent to in
person or by representatives chosen by themselves.
Hamilton,
“the marvellous boy”—he was then an undergraduate in college, little more than
eighteen years of age—made the most original and telling argument in the great
debate. He took the position that the colonies were “without the realm and
jurisdiction of Parliament,” and that the charters, and British action touching
them, showed the fact. He argued the case thus:—
King James
had granted three charters to the Virginia Company. The first one ordained that
the colonies to be established should have a council which should govern all
matters within them, according to such laws, ordinances, and instructions, as
should be given and signed by the King; and that the colonists should have and
enjoy all liberties, franchises, and immunities within the King’s*“other”
dominions, as if abiding and bom in England. The King could not have granted
such a charter if the colonies had been part of the realm, or within the
jurisdiction of Parliament. The second and third charters only enlarged the
first. The present government of Virginia was modelled after the third charter;
by this the company were to have “ one great, general, and solemn assembly,” to
dispose of affairs of every sort, with full power to make laws for the good of
the plantation, “ so always as the same be not contrary to the laws and
statutes of this our realm of England.” By this charter King James had divested
himself wholly both of legislative and executive authority, but for his own
security had prescribed a model for their civil constitution. The laws were not
to be contrary to those of England; this was inserted in all later charters,
with some little variation. The object of the provision was only to present to
the
colonies a
general model in the British Constitution. The conduct of James I and Charles I
made the case still clearer. When in the year 1621 a bill had been introduced
in the House of Commons to give to English subjects fishing privileges on the
coasts of America, the Secretary of State, by command of the King, informed the
House that “America was not annexed to the realm, and that it was not fitting
that Parliament should make laws for those countries.” So when, in the time of
Charles I, the same bill was again proposed, the King declared that “it was
unnecessary; that the colonies were without the realm and jurisdiction of
Parliament.” This showed that the clauses quoted (that the laws should not be
contrary to those of England) “were not inserted to render the colonies
dependent on Parliament, but only... to mark out a model of government for
them. If then the colonies were, at first, without the realm and jurisdiction
of Parliament, no human authority could afterwards alter the case without their
own consent.”
Hamilton then
considers the other colonial charters; first those of New England. The object
of these colonists “was to be emancipated from their sufferings under the
authority of Parliament and the laws of England.” In evidence of this, Hamilton
quotes the compact on the Mayflower, in full. Soon afterwards King James issued
his Plymouth charter “ for the planting, ordering, and governing of New England
in America,” with a charter to the same effect as the charters of Virginia.
There was to be a Council having “sole power of legislation”; the right of
electing all officers, civil and military, and authority to coin money, and to
make war and peace, were also conferred upon the colonists. The charter of Charles
I to Massachusetts Bay was similar. The charters of the other colonies were
reviewed, with the same result, except in the case of that of Pennsylvania.
This contained a clause which was “ a reverse, in favour of Parliament,
perfectly singular and unprecedented in any foregoing charter, and which must
either be rejected or the general tenour of the grant becomes unintelligible”—a
statement with which the loyalist Galloway agreed. Reference is then made to
the revocation of the Massachusetts charter and the granting of the new one by
William and Mary. The agents of the colony would not accept the new charter
until they had consulted competent authority; which done, the agents drew up a
declaration in which they said: “The colony is now made a province; and the
General Court has, with the King’s approbation, as much power in New England as
the King and Parliament have in England. They have all English privileges and
liberties, and can be touched by no law and by no tax but of their own making.”
The troubles
in Virginia over the first Act of Parliament imposing duties in America, in the
25th year of Charles II, were then referred to; and although this was only a
matter of the regulation of trade,
1775—so] New England
charters. Pennsylvania charter. 199
the result
was a declaration, under the King’s privy seal, that “taxes ought not to be
levied upon ... a colony but by the consent of the General Assembly.” And this
declaration had been directly acted upon under Governor Culpeper in Virginia,
measures intended to raise revenue for protecting the colony being “passed into
law by the King’s most excellent Majesty by and with the consent of the General
Assembly ” of the colony. “If the Virginians had been subjects of the realm,
this could not have been done without a direct violation of Magna Carta, which
provides that no English subject shall be taxed without the consent of
Parliament.”
As for the
admitted jurisdiction of Parliament over the regulation of commerce, which
Hamilton’s reasoning seemed to cover, the answer was, “It is enough, we have
consented to it.”
By the year
1780 Galloway, who had cut loose all connexion with America and gone to
England, agreed in effect with Hamilton. In 1775, while there was still hope
for his famous Plan of Union, he could “discover no exemption or discharge from
the authority of Parliament in any of ” the charters, save that of
Pennsylvania; and there it was only partial, while other parts of the same
charter were to the contrary. But disappointed hopes and five years of revolution
had their effect; he could now condemn the New England charters as inculcating
independence, so far as Parliament was concerned. By the Plymouth charter of
1628 “ every prerogative of the Crown, and all the rights of the aristocratic
part of the British Constitution, were sacrificed to the republican views of
the grantees.” There was no control over “ this complete legislative
authority,” except that nothing contrary to the laws of the realm should be
done. The people of Massachusetts had been “ educated under the unlimited and
[therefore] unconstitutional powers of their former and present charters.” So
of the other charters ; they contained “the same unlimited and unconstitutional
powers.” All supervision over their legislative, executive, and federative
powers had been given up; the colonies made what laws they pleased, and
executed them as they pleased; they made peace and war with whom they pleased.
By their several charters they were constituted “ so many complete, independent
societies ” within the State.
The
exceptional clause in the charter of Pennsylvania was to the effect that the
King grants that he will levy no taxes on the inhabitants of the province
unless with the consent of the General Assembly or by Act of Parliament.
Franklin, asked on examination by the House of Commons how the assertion could
be made that laying taxes on his people by the Stamp Act infringed their
rights, in the face of that clause, explained the provision thus. By the same
charter, and otherwise, his people were entitled to all the privileges and
liberties of Englishmen; one of those privileges was, that they were not to be
taxed but by their common consent. They had therefore relied upon it that
200 The King as
representative of Great Britain. [1768-
Parliament
would not and could not tax them until it had qualified itself to do so by
admitting his people to representation, who ought to make part of the common
consent.
But were not
these charters of the colonies, though granted in fact by the Kings of England,
granted in law by Parliament as the sovereign power of the nation ? The Whigs
said that they were not; though the elder Adams, inconsistently with that idea,
had in 1768 spoken of the charters as a royal promise “on behalf of the
nation,” for making which it had never till very lately been “questioned but
the King had power.” The Whigs generally however would have said, then or
later, that that was a mere slip or inadvertence. That they generally held that
the King’s promise was made in his own right alone is clear. Galloway, speaking
with ample knowledge, said of the idea, “We find it in all the resolves and
petitions of the American assemblies, town meetings, and provincial committees,
and even in the proceedings of the Continental Congress," which indeed had
declared upon it.
Galloway
pronounced the idea a delusion, “a distinction nowhere to be found the charters
had been granted by the King as representative of Great Britain; they had
therefore been granted by Parliament, and hence the colonies derived their rights
from the British legislature. He supported the proposition thus. The King held
the great seal in his representative capacity only. One right which he had
under the seal was to form territory within the realm into inferior bodies
politic, vesting in the people there the power to make laws for the regulation
of internal police, but not to discharge the people from obedience to
Parliament, because that would weaken and dismember and in the end destroy the
State. The colonies were by their own admission members of the State; which he
seems to lead the reader to infer, was bringing them “within the realm.” Every
colony in America had been settled under licence and authority of the great
seal, “affixed by the representative of the body politic of Britain,” to the
charters. There was no other source from which the King could derive authority.
He brushed aside the position taken by some that the oath of allegiance in
America was professed to the King, not as representative of Great Britain, but
as representing the several legislatures of the colonies; it was “a new and
unheard of capacity of his Majesty”; it made his Majesty the representative of
his own representatives, delegates or substitutes.
Seabury dealt
with the matter thus: “To talk of being liege subjects to King George while we
disavow the authority of Parliament is another piece of Whiggish nonsense.. .If
we obey the laws of the King, we obey the laws of Parliament. If we disown the
authority of the Parliament, we disown the authority of the King. The King of
Great Britain was placed on the throne by virtue of an Act of Parliament, and
he is King of America by virtue of being King of Great Britain. He is therefore
King of America by Act of Parliament.”
-1775]
The
King as source of authority.
201
To this
Hamilton replied, that the Act of Parliament was not the efficient cause of his
Majesty’s being the King of America; it was only the occasion of it. He was “
King of America by virtue of a compact between us and the [former] Kings of
Great Britain. These colonies were planted and settled by the grants and under
the protection of English Kings, who entered into covenants with us, for
themselves, their heirs, and successors.” From these covenants the duty of
protection by them and of obedience by us arose. “Our compact takes no
cognizance of the manner of their accession to the throne." It could
therefore make no difference that King James and the first and second Charles
were in truth parliamentary Kings. Passing to the distinction itself between
allegiance to the King and subjection to Parliament, Hamilton said that there
were valid reasons for such a distinction. The people of America held their
lands, by virtue of charters, from the King; they were under no obligation to
Lords or Commons for them. “Our title is similar, and equal, to that by which
they possess their lands; and the King is the legal fountain of both.” But the
chief reason was, that the colonists had the right to claim protection from the
King of Great Britain. It had been said that they owed this to Great Britain.
That was not true; the King, as executive, was the supreme protector of the
empire. He it was who had defended the colonies; to him alone were the colonies
oound to render allegiance and submission. “The law of nature and the British
Constitution both confine allegiance to the person of the King.” Calvin’s case
had so decided. That is, allegiance was “confined" to a “person” who
simply bore the name and title of King of Great Britain.
Hamilton made
no reference to the fact that the Stewart Kings, under whose charters most of
the colonies held, had claimed authority above Parliament, probably because in
the contest with Charles I the colonists mainly were with Parliament; and he
was replying to Seabury, not to Galloway, who wrote perhaps a little later.
With Galloway’s argument before him for answer, there can be little difficulty
in supposing that Hamilton would have alluded to the professions of the
Stewarts. Was it true, he would have been likely to say, that the Stewart Kings
affixed the great seal to the charters as representatives of another ? And even
if they had forgotten, for the moment, the divine right of Kings, could any
King, by using the great seal, or in any other way, without sufficient notice
to the grantees, constitute himself a representative of others, to the
prejudice of the grantees?
This part of
the subject may be closed with a statement of the chief resolutions of the
Continental Congress, of the year 1774, as the final summing up of the whole
case. In virtue of the three sources of right above considered, the Congress
resolved—First, that the inhabitants of the British colonies in North America
were entitled to life, liberty, and property, and that they had never ceded to
any foreign power whatever
a right to dispose
of either without their consent. Secondly, that their ancestors, who first
settled the colonies, were at the time of their emigration entitled to all the
rights, liberties and immunities of free and natural bom subjects within the
realm of England. Thirdly, that by such emigration they had not forfeited,
surrendered, or lost any of those rights, but that they and their descendants
were entitled to exercise and enjoy all such of them as their local or other
circumstances would permit. Fourthly, that the foundation of English liberties
and of all free government was a right in the people to participate in their
legislative council; and as the English colonists were not represented, and
from their local circumstances could not properly be represented, in
Parliament, they were entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation in
their several provincial legislatures, where their right of representation
could alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, subject
only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as had been theretofore
used and accustomed. But from the necessity of the case, and from a regard for
the mutual interests of both countries, the colonies cheerfully consented to
the operation of such laws of Parliament as were bona fide restrained to the
regulation of their external commerce, excluding every idea of taxation,
internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America without
their consent. Fifthly and Sixthly, that they were entitled to the common law,
and to such English statutes as they had by experience found applicable to
their several localities and circumstances. Seventhly, that they were entitled
to all the immunities and privileges granted and confirmed to them by royal
charters and secured by their own provincial laws.
Several
resolutions followed pertaining to other grounds of complaint. ,
(iv) General
Objections.
There were
certain objections to the American position which applied alike to all claims
of exemption from the authority of Parliament. One was that the colonies as
members of the empire ought to contribute to the support of the general
government. Thus the money laid out by Great Britain in establishing and
protecting the colonies, especially in the late war with France, gave to the
government a right of compensation in taxes. This objection was answered by
many of the Whig writers. Governor Hopkins, writing in 1765, considered that
there was no foundation for the claim. As for the late war, many of the
colonies, especially those of New England, took the charge upon themselves
entirely. The same was true of the expenses of protection against the savages
and other enemies, for a hundred years. The colonies had been called upon
indeed to raise men and send them out for the defence of other colonies, and
even to make conquests for the Crown. They had dutifully obeyed, until all
Canada and even Havana, had been
1774]
Support
in return for protection.
203
conquered.
They had responded cheerfully, but they reaped no benefit: everything obtained
belonged solely to Great Britain. As for bearing a share of the general
expenses of government, was it not enough that the colonies, of themselves,
supported a government as expensive to them as was the internal government of
Great Britain to its inhabitants ? And had they not always responded cheerfully
when called upon by the Crown ? Why then distrust them now ?
Dulaney too
pointed out that the British Ministry, in the time of the late war with France,
so far from thinking it proper for the House of Commons to “give and grant” the
property of the colonists to support the war in America, had directly applied
to the colonies to tax themselves ; and he added that they had promised to
recommend Parliament to reimburse the colonies in the expenses they had borne,
a promise which was made good.
Hamilton, in
1774, referring to claims upon the colonies for the support of the British
navy, because of its protection of America, replied that Great Britain enjoyed
a monopoly of the trade of the colonies. The colonies were compelled to trade
with the mother-country, and the profits were a great source of wealth to her;
were not these sufficient recompense? Franklin’s answer, as will be seen below,
was that Great Britain was entitled to a toll or duty for guarding the seas.
Another
objection was, that a power of regulation by government was a power of
legislation; and a power of legislation must be universal and supreme. The
conclusion drawn was, that as the colonies had acknowledged the power of
Parliament to regulate their commerce, they had thereby acknowledged every
other power of legislation by that body. Dickinson answered that the objection
was based upon confusion. There was a time when England had no colonies; trade
was the object for which they had been encouraged. Love of freedom was a chief
motive of the adventurers: the connexion of colonies with the parent-State was
a new thing in the English laws. That the rights of England extinguished the
rights of the adventurers—rights essential to the freedom they would have had,
had they stayed at home—was against reason, humanity, and the constitution of
England. Colonies could not have been planted on such terms. The colonists
simply claimed what they would have had had they never left England. But there
was another principle touching trade. All the power of Parliament could not
regulate trade at pleasure. It had to be regulated by treaties and alliances
formed by the King, without the consent of the nation, with other States. When
a universal empire was established, and not till then, could regulations of
trade properly be called Acts of the supreme legislature. But let it be
admitted that the power to regulate trade is vested in Parliament. Still,
commerce rested on concessions and restrictions mutually stipulated between the
different powers of the world. How the people of England shall trade must be
determined by Germans, Frenchmen, Spaniards.
The right of
acquiring property depended on the rights of others; the right of acquired
property solely on the owner. Why should this right be sacred in England, and
an empty name in the colonies ? From the principle stated arose the power of
England; should that power now be exerted in suppression of the principle ?
Dulaney,
Hamilton, and others pointed out that the past regulations of trade plainly
were not taxation. The whole remittance from all the taxes in the colonies, on
an average of thirty years, had not amounted to £1900 a year, of which not
above £800 had been remitted from North America; while the cost of the
machinery necessary to collect the sum amounted to £7600 a year. It would be
ridiculous to suppose that Parliament would raise a revenue by taxes in the
colonies, when to collect them would cost three times the amount of revenue.
But how could
any distinction be made between legislation generally and legislation over
commerce ? The nature of the Act must, Dickinson answered, determine whether
the object was to raise revenue or to regulate trade. Sometimes it might indeed
be difficult to decide, and in a case of doubt it would be wise to submit. It
signified nothing that certain taxes were called external; although the duties
lately imposed on paper and glass had been thus distinguished from those of the
Stamp Act. There was no distinction in fact between the two. Parliament had no
power to lay any tax whatever on the colonies; and a tax was a burden laid for
the sole purpose of raising revenue, under whatever name. Otis, who also had
denied the distinction, put the case thus: the tax on trade is a tax on every
one concerned in it, or it is not. If it is not, it is unequal. If it be said
that such a tax is an equal tax on all, what becomes of the distinction between
external and internal taxation ?
Duties
imposed in the regulation of trade were however sometimes called external
taxes. In that use of the term the question whether there was any distinction
between duties or “external taxes” imposed in regulating trade, and internal
taxes, was put to Franklin on his examination by the House of Commons, 1765, in
regard to the repeal of the Stamp Act. “I never heard any objection,” Franklin
had said, “to the right [of Parliament] of laying duties to regulate commerce;
but the right to lay internal taxes was never supposed to be in Parliament, as
we are not represented there.” Could he name any Act of Assembly, or public Act
of the colonial governments, that made such a distinction ? “ I do not know,”
was the reply, “ that there was any. I think there was never an occasion..
.till now that you have attempted to tax us. That has occasioned resolutions
of Assembly, declaring the distinction, in which I think every Assembly on the
continent.. .has been unanimous.” “Now can you show that there is any kind of
difference between” external and internal taxes “to the colony on which they
may be laid?” “ I think the difference is very great. An external tax is a duty
laid on commodities imported; that duty is added to the first cost and other
charges on
the commodity, and when it is offered for sale makes part of the price. If the
people don’t like it at that price, they refuse it; they are not obliged to pay
it. But an internal tax is forced from the people without their consent, if not
laid by their own representatives. The Stamp Act says, we shall have no
commerce, make no exchange of property,...neither purchase, nor grant, nor
recover debts,...neither
marry
nor make our wills, unless we pay such and such sums___ ” “ But
supposing the
external tax or duty to be laid on the necessaries of life imported into your
colony, will not that be the same thing in its effects as an internal tax?” “I
know not a single article imported into the northern colonies but what they can
either do without or make themselves ”....“ If an excise was laid by
Parliament, which they might avoid paying, by not consuming the article
excised, would they not then object to it?” “They would certainly object to it,
as an excise unconnected with any service done, and as merely an aid which
they think ought to be asked of them, and granted by them, if they are to pay
it, and can be granted for them by no persons whatsoever whom they have not
empowered for that purpose.” “You say they don’t object to the right of
Parliament to laying duties on goods, to be paid on their importation; now is
there any kind of difference between a duty on the importation of goods and an
excise on their consumption?” “Yes, a very material one; an excise, for the
reasons I have just mentioned, they think you can have no right to lay within
their country. But the sea is yours; you maintain by your fleets the safety of
navigation in it, and keep it clear of pirates. You may therefore have a
natural and equitable right to some toll or duty on merchandise carried
throughout that part of your dominions, towards defraying the expense you are
at in ships to maintain the safety of that carriage.”
For similar
reasons, Franklin said, the post-office was not a tax on the colonies; postage
was payment for service done, and no one was compelled to pay if he did not
choose to receive the service. Dulaney thought the establishment of the
post-office came nearer to being a tax than any other regulation of trade; but
still it was materially different. For the same reason that an Act of
Parliament was necessary to secure the discipline of the provincial troops
acting with those of Great Britain in the late war with France, the authority
of Parliament might be properly exercised in establishing a regular
post-office. All the laws of each colony were confined to that colony, and
therefore local prohibitory and coercive clauses designed to enforce a general
obedience, without which the scheme would fail, might be eluded. This matter of
the post-office might then be referred to the general superintending authority
of the empire.
(v) Conclusion.
Such were the
three great grounds of complaint of the colonies against England; such the
arguments supporting and opposing them in America. The patriot party, to sum up
the case, believed that the true basis of the relation of the colonies to the
parent-State was equality in all respects consistent with the relation. No
single part, even though far greater than another, was entitled, in virtue of
its greatness, to make laws for a smaller part. What control the greater might
rightfully exercise, on the footing of being the superior in government,
depended upon the nature of subordination of the smaller. When powers compatible
with the relation between the two might be exercised by the less without injury
to that relation, the greater had no right to interfere. The line, then,
appeared to lie between things that were necessary or proper for securing the
dependency of the colonies, and things that were not. So held Dulaney; so the
Whigs generally; so held some of the loyalists. The effect was, that Parliament
was entitled to act, when entitled at all, only upon the colonies, as political
bodies, not upon the citizens of the colonies, except incidentally under
regulations of commerce or other external affairs; though what the King might
do, in virtue of the allegiance to him, was another question.
The people of
the colonies and Great Britain were equally important to each other; each must
suffer with the misfortunes of the other. Commerce therefore should be as free
as the relation justly permitted. What difference to England, said Dulaney,
whether the merchants who carried on trade in commodities not wanted in England
lived in Philadelphia or in London ? The balance of trade due in England was
equally well discharged. The colonists ought not to be restrained in their pursuits
and interests, said Governor Hopkins, but for the manifest good of the whole
people; they should enjoy equal freedom with the people of the mother-State. In
particular, they ought to have ample notice of any new measure proposed by
government, which would affect their interests, so that they might give to
government the benefit of whatever knowledge they possessed.
Even the
staunch loyalist Galloway agreed to all this. According to him, the colonies
were not upon their rightful footing; there was one great lack, already
noticed; “some new provision...should be adopted,” “some constitutional union
between the two countries,” to put the colonies right, to give them a share in
making the laws. In other words, the true idea of the colonial relation was equality,
according to the nature of the case.
The Whigs
drew this doctrine from the proposition, stoutly maintained by them, but as
stoutly denied by loyalists, that all men are bom equal; that superiority is
acquired only, not innate; and that government and governors are only set up
for the good of the people.
Pamphlets
poured forth in a constant stream from Whig and loyalist press; newspapers were
filled with articles on the one side and the other from a thousand sources. But
a time came when there was an end of sober, or at least of mutual, discussion.
The “ force of argument ” gave way to the “argument of force” at Lexington and
Bunker Hill; the loyalists withdrew sullenly from the contest; and now, true to
the grim facts of history, patriots, from haters of persecution, turned
persecutors ; they pillaged the houses of loyalists, and harried the inmates
out of the land. Still, though the Whigs were trooping to war, it was not yet
to win independence, but only to defend and maintain the colonial theory they
had so long championed. They were still ready for concession and
reconciliation; they would reject Lord North’s great proposal of autonomy, only
because it was not to be permanent. Another year was necessary to convince them
that their cause, as colonists in the colonial relation they upheld, was
hopeless.
A young
Englishman, somewhat discredited in his native land, whence he had lately
arrived, must publish the news to America, far and wide, that kings were an
abomination and a sin, and hereditary succession an evil even more than an
absurdity. Paine could quote Scripture at such a time with telling effect.
“Your wickedness is great, which ye have done in the sight of the Lord, in
asking for a king.” At last the people in their distress cry unto Samuel, “
Pray for thy servants unto the Lord thy God, that we die not, for we have added
unto our sins this evil, to ask a king.” The notion too that hereditary
succession had saved people from civil wars was the most barefaced falsehood
ever imposed on mankind. Monarchy and succession had laid the world in blood
and ashes.
No pamphlet
was so timely, none had such an effect, as Paine’s Common Sense; which was to
sweep away, for the time, all the vain arguments about constitutional law and
government. Amidst general doubt everything was ready, and Common Sense struck
the note. The people were called upon to come out and separate themselves from
kings. “ 0 ye that love mankind; ye that dare oppose not only the tyranny but
the tyrant, stand forth; every spot of the old world is overcome with
oppression. Freedom hath been hunted round the globe.. .England hath given her
warning to depart. O receive the fugitive, and prepare, in time, an asylum for
mankind.”
A few months
later, by midsummer, 1776, the Continental Congress was ready, and found the
countiy ready, to declare independence.
The
Declaration of Independence is a short and somewhat rhetorical statement of the
case of the colonies, and of their determination to separate from Great
Britain. A virtual preamble recites that “ a decent respect to the opinions of
mankind ” requires a declaration to the world of the causes of separation. Then
comes a summing-up of Whig doctrine. “We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created
equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these
rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles,
and organising its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their safety and happiness.” The statement follows that “Prudence indeed
will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light
and transient causes.”
The foregoing
makes up the constitutional part of the document. The rest is a statement of
grievances against, chiefly, the Ring of Great Britain, of the vain appeal to
the “ native justice and magnanimity ” of “ our British brethren,” and then the
solemn declaration that “ these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be,
free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the
British Crown, and that all political connexion between them and the State of
Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved ”; and that they have full
power to do all acts “ which independent States may of right do.”
The
Declaration, with some slight alterations introduced in committee, was by the
hand of Jefferson.
THE WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE.
The Congress of 1776, in issuing its famous proclamation,
not only declared the colonies independent: it invited and authorised each of
them to form a constitution. Happily for the colonies, that was a process which
involved no revolutionary change. All that was needed was to place all the
colonies, or, as we may now call them, States, on the same footing as
Connecticut and Rhode Island by making the Governor and Council, who had
hitherto been the nominees either of the Crown or the Proprietor, elective. The
sovereignty of the Crown was an external force, standing above and outside the
ordinary action of government. It could be removed without deranging the
machine.
The real
weakness of the colonial cause lay in the lack of any coercive powers whereby
Congress could enforce its wishes on the various State governments. The
colonists, just emancipated from one form of central authority, shrank from
placing themselves under another; and the attempt to formulate a really
effective federal constitution called forth so much distrust and jealousy as to
make it clear that the mere attempt would be fatal to union. A constitution was
drawn up, investing Congress with military and diplomatic powers; but no fixed
conditions were imposed as to the number and proportion of representatives.
The general charges incurred by Congress were to be met by a voluntary
contribution from each State ; but no coercive machinery of any kind was
provided whereby such a contribution could be exacted. An American statesman at
a later day might well denounce the original Federal Constitution as “a rope of
sand.” The central government had to rely on the spontaneous loyalty of its
subjects, a loyalty which waxed cold under the prolonged strain of war.
Whenever its interests came into conflict with those of an individual State,
the latter was sure to prevail. In engaging soldiers the State governments
outbade Congress; and the ablest men preferred serving their State legislatures
to attending Congress. This danger was increased by an article in the Federal
Constitution, which allowed any State to change its delegates as often as it
pleased during the session of Congress
—a system
fatal to continuity of policy and to administrative experience. Yet, from a
military point of view, this had its good side. If State independence crippled
the American cause when it needed central and collective action, it enhanced
the difficulties of piecemeal conquest and occupation. Over and over again it
fell out that, as soon as the British army had left a conquered district where
all resistance seemed to have been stamped out, the national party reasserted
themselves in full vigour.
But the
greatest immediate advantage secured by the Declaration of Independence was
that it put the United States in a position to negotiate openly for foreign
alliances. The foreign affairs of Prance were now in the hands of the Comte de
Vergennes, a clear-sighted, ambitious, and energetic politician. It was certain
that he would lose no chance of wiping out the disgrace and redeeming the
losses of the Seven Years’ War. So early as 1775 it was known that French
emissaries, not formally authorised, were in America sounding public opir.ion.
For some time there had been private negotiations, in which the actors were, on
the French side, Beaumarchais, best known to posterity as the author of the
Manage de Figaro, and on the American side, Arthur Lee. At a later stage of
affairs Lee’s factious egotism was a serious hindrance to the diplomatists with
whom he had to work; but he had been educated at an English public school, and
thus enjoyed special facilities for studying English opinion and carrying on
intrigues in England.
In 1775
Congress appointed a Committee of Secret Correspondence. Early in 1776 that
committee authorised a commission to go to France to purchase arms, ammunition,
and clothes. The commission was vested in Silas Deane of Connecticut, a shrewd
man of business. The transactions were necessarily secret, and it is therefore
hardly possible to ascertain the extent of the help given by the French
government; but it seems certain that Vergennes connived at the purchase of
supplies and arms, and that the King advanced money for that purpose. After
independence had been declared, Congress was able to approach the French
government more openly; and Lee and Franklin were associated with Deane. Lee’s
vanity and irritable jealousy made him a most embarrassing colleague. The
selection of Franklin, on the other hand, was a most fortunate one. He was a
thorough man of the world, who could yet pass himself off as a model of that
republican simplicity which it was the fashion in France to admire, while his
eminence in natural science fell in with what was then a popular taste in
Parisian society.
It was
unlucky for the Americans that they could not rid themselves of a superstitious
reverence for the military experience of the Old World. Deane had not
sufficient knowledge of men or of French life to exercise any discretion in his
choice of French officers who volunteered for
1776] British and American
commanders.
211
America; and,
with a few exceptions, among whom Lafayette was conspicuous, those who joined
the American army were vain, exacting, and incompetent. The same exaggerated
value for European soldiership had a direct effect on the American army itself.
Lee and Gates, Washington’s two chief subordinates in the early part of the
war, had both served in the English army. Both were vain, shallow men, with
little real devotion to the cause which they had embraced. There is much reason
to believe that Lee, while holding a command in the colonial army, was actually
carrying on a treasonable correspondence with the British government, and
advising them as to military operations. No suspicion of dishonesty or
disloyalty attaches to Gates ; but his egotism made him the tool of
unscrupulous men.
But in regard
to the chiefs in control of affairs, whether at home or abroad, Great Britain
was far worse off than America. Whatever may be our view as to the influence of
individuals on the events of history, one may safely say that the
mother-country in the struggle with her colonies was singularly unfortunate
alike in her military administrators and her commanders. The Secretary at War
was Lord George Germaine, a man whose own military career had been tainted with
grave suspicion of cowardice, a cold formalist without the redeeming virtues of
method and exactitude, and wholly incapable of inspiring colleagues or
subordinates with any enthusiasm. The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir William
Howe, had little but personal courage to recommend him. He was an inert,
pleasure-loving man. What was worse, his sympathies were in a great measure
with the colonists; and he had not learnt the simple lesson that, however
desirable compromise and conciliation may be, the lukewarm conduct of a war is
the worst possible way in which to obtain them. More than one of his
proceedings can hardly be explained except on the theory that he dreaded a
decisive victory: some actions of his opponents can hardly be explained unless
we suppose that they knew and counted on his weakness. Of Howe’s two chief
subordinates, Burgoyne and Clinton, the former was a man of fashion with a
taste for literature, with plenty of courage, many attractive qualities, and
some military experience, but with none of the special gifts needed for the
heavy tasks laid upon him. Clinton was probably a better soldier than either
Howe or Burgoyne, but he seems to have had an unfortunate incapacity for
effective co-operation.
In Great
Britain the Declaration of Independence did less to consolidate opinion than
might have been expected. Yet in truth those who had not been alienated by such
proceedings as the Boston tea riot and the invasion of Canada would have been
very illogical if they had been influenced by the frank avowal of a doctrine on
which the colonists had been acting for some two years. Before the news of
these events reached England, the Ministry had decided to make one
212
[l776
more attempt
at a peaceable settlement. Lord Howe was sent out with a fleet to co-operate
with his brother’s army; but the two brothers were at the same time appointed
commissioners to treat for peace. Franklin was their, personal friend, and they
began by sounding him on the subject. His answer was that, in his belief,
nothing short of independence and indemnity for all injury done in the war
would induce America to make peace. The Americans showed no wish to negotiate;
and the only effect of this commission was somewhat to delay military
proceedings, in which speed was all important.
Howe’s first
move was to secure New York, and with it the command of the Hudson. Washington,
apprehending this, had posted his army in front of the city on a line of
heights which runs nearly the whole way across Long Island. The position was
well chosen, save that the American army, numbering about 15,000 men, was
hardly large enough to guard it. On August 27, 1776, Howe attacked, and after
some hard fighting routed the Americans ; but deterred, as some have thought,
by recollections of Bunker Hill, he forbore to assault the enemy’s lines. The
American loss had, however, been heavy; and two days later Washington evacuated
his position and transported his whole army with their equipage across the East
river, which separates Long Island from New York. The retreat was covered by a
heavy fog; but even so, to have effected it wholly without loss does the
greatest credit to Washington’s power of organisation and command. Yet it is
almost' certain that if the pursuit had been followed up with energy, or if
Howe had only utilised his command of the East river, and posted men-of-war
there, the whole American army must have been captured or destroyed. With a
British fleet in the East river and a British army occupying Long Island, it
was clearly impossible for Washington to hold New York ; and the town was
evacuated on September 15. Again Howe threw away an opportunity by the
slackness of his pursuit. Washington now posted himself on high ground to the
west of New York. Thence too after some hard fighting he was dislodged, while
at the same time the British position was strengthened by the capture of two
American forts a few miles above New York, one on each bank of the Hudson.
Washington now crossed the Hudson into New Jersey, hotly pursued by the ablest
and most energetic of Howe’s lieutenants, Lord Cornwallis, whose attempts to
bring him to action were however baffled by dexterous and rapid movements.
In November
Howe carried his whole army across the Hudson and posted them in winter
quarters. He was blamed for dispersing his troops in small cantonments instead
of at once occupying Philadelphia. It is possible that the difficulty of
transporting supplies may have been a sufficient reason for this; but there was
assuredly no excuse for entrusting Trenton, an important post, to the Hessians,
whose ignorance
1777] Trenton,
Brandywine, and Germantown. 213
of the
language and unpopularity with the colonists made it impossible for them to
obtain intelligence. Washington saw that some bold stroke, leading to tangible
and immediate success, was needed to restore that confidence which had been
shaken by recent reverses. To this end he in person made a night-attack on
Trenton and, surprising the division of Hessians, many of whom were engaged in
plundering, carried off a thousand prisoners and a considerable number of
cannon. Some operations followed, in which Washington, while avoiding a
decisive battle, contrived to obtain virtual command of New Jersey, a success
to which the ill-feeling created by the pillaging and bad discipline of the
British contributed not a little.
The campaign
of 1777 began with some unimportant British successes on the Hudson, balanced
by an American attack on an outpost on Long Island, in which ninety prisoners
were taken and a large quantity of stores destroyed. In August, 1777, Howe
obtained the first decisive success that had attended him since the battle of
Long Island. He landed his main army at the head of the Elk river, opening into
Chesapeake Bay, and advanced on Philadelphia. Washington posted himself to
cover the town, with the Brandywine, a tributary of the Delaware, in his front.
Lord Cornwallis crossed the upper fords of the stream and attacked and defeated
the American right; and in the general action that ensued the colonists were
routed with considerable loss. A resolute pursuit might have brought about the
entire destruction of the American army; but Howe was content to advance
cautiously, and was suffered to occupy Philadelphia without resistance.
The town was
garrisoned only by a detachment under Cornwallis, the bulk of the British army
being posted at Germantown, a village about three miles from Philadelphia. Howe
was compelled somewhat to weaken his force by sending off detachments for
isolated operations on the Delaware. This encouraged Washington to make an
attack on Howe’s position, which he carried out with a force of 8000 men,
divided into five detachments. The attack was helped by a fog, and was at first
successful; but the same cause which favoured the first attack made subsequent
co-operation difficult. A portion of the British force occupied a large stone
house from which they kept up a fire which ended in the discomfiture of the
Americans. Here again Howe made no attempt to follow up his success. To attack
an army strongly posted on ground of its own choosing with inferior and
comparatively untrained troops, under such conditions that any failure in exact
co-operation must lead to disaster, could only have been justified by the
urgent necessity of some conspicuous success to wipe out the moral effect of
the defeat on the Brandywine. Even so the venture furnishes a striking
illustration of Washington’s contempt for Howe’s generalship. Before evacuating
Philadelphia, the Americans had
impeded the
navigation of the Delaware by various obstacles, and also by fortifying two
Small islands. These fortifications were reduced and the impediments cleared
away. But the success, such as it was, was effected at so great a cost of life
and after such delay that the moral discouragement went far to outweigh the material
gain.
Meanwhile
these qualified and incomplete victories were far more than outweighed by a
crushing defeat of the British in another quarter. The one really brilliant
success which, so far, had been obtained by the British army was the defence of
Canada. Nevertheless Carleton was superseded in favour of Burgoyne, a man of
undoubted personal courage, but immeasurably inferior to Carleton in every
other quality of soldiership, as well as in colonial experience. A plan of
campaign was arranged, probably on Burgoyne’s suggestion, theoretically
practicable, but so complex and so beset with difficulties of detail, and
threatening, in the case of failure, consequences so disastrous, that any
prudent commander would have shrunk from it. Burgoyne was to advance from
Canada by the lakes and the upper Hudson. A co-operating force was to ascend
the Hudson and join hands with him. Had the scheme 'ucceeded, the result would
have been to isolate the New England colonies. If, as a first step, the British
had secured the control of the lower Hudson and then placed at or near Albany a
force strong enough to keep in check any American troops that might endeavour
to move in the direction of the lakes, the enterprise might have been
feasible; but to adjust two simultaneous movements so far apart would in no
circumstances have been easy; and the difficulty was enhanced by the character
of the country in which Burgoyne had to operate. Whatever chances of successful
co-operation there might have been, these were finally destroyed by a gross
official blunder, through which the orders explaining the campaign to Howe were
delayed and did not reach him till after he had committed himself to operations
on the Delaware. The blame of this was laid, probably with justice, on Germaine.
In July,
1777, Burgoyne set out with close upon 3000 troops, including 500 Indians.
Whatever might be Burgoyne’s failings as a soldier, he was a humane and
honourable gentleman; and his determination to restrain the ferocity of these
allies led to disputes which rendered them a hindrance instead of a help. At
the outset all went well. The Americans evacuated Ticonderoga. In their flight
several of their boats were captured; and a detachment of Burgoyne’s army under
General Fraser overtook a portion of the retreating force, and bringing them to
action, defeated them with heavy loss. When the descent of Lake Champlain was
completed and it became necessary to advance by land, Burgoyne’s difficulties
began. Encumbered with heavy baggage and a large artillery train, he had to
make his way through swampy forests. This was fatal in a case where everything
depended on rapidity of movement. For now, as throughout the war, the British
were fighting
not against an organised army, needing fixed bases of supply with regular
communication, but against an armed population only wanting local pressure to
call them into activity. As Burgoyne advanced, recruits kept pouring into the
enemy’s force from the farmsteads of Connecticut and New York, hardy and
skilful marksmen, well fitted for the irregular, backwoods fighting which was
before them. The American army was under the command of Gates. His military
capacity was that of a second-rate and commonplace European soldier. Happily
for the American cause he had under him Arnold, Morgan, and Starke, three
subordinates not only of extraordinary daring, but also possessing a full
comprehension of the task before them and of the special qualifications of
their troops.
To secure his
line of march, Burgoyne threw out two strong flanking bodies, one to the
north-east to act in Connecticut, the other up the valley of the Mohawk in New
York. With strange lack of judgment, and in defiance of the remonstrances of
his ablest subordinate, General Fraser, Burgoyne chose for the former task a German
regiment, known to be slow marchers and certain to be hindered by their
ignorance of English. They were met by Starke at Bennington and defeated,
losing their commanding officer and their artillery. A second German force,
sent to support them, fared no better. The discomfiture of the force in the
Mohawk valley under Colonel St Leger was less conspicuous and less humiliating,
but hardly less complete in its practical effects. In his first encounter with
the Americans at Oriskany he was successful. But the main object of the
expedition, the reduction of Fort Stanwix, was frustrated by the desertion of
the Indian allies, the lack of siege artillery, and the unexpected arrival of
Arnold with a relieving force of 2000 men.
On September
13 and 14 Burgoyne crossed the Hudson near Saratoga and advanced along the
right bank. There on September 19 he was attacked, losing about 600 men and
inflicting equal loss on the enemy. In the meantime the Americans had thrown a
force across Burgoyne’s rear, which intercepted his supplies at the foot of
Lake George, while at the same time they made an unsuccessful attack on
Ticonderoga. Burgoyne’s position was now deplorable. His Indian allies deserted
in a body. His horses were dying for lack of forage. There were no tidings of
any British force advancing from the east. Yet the bare possibility that
Clinton might be on his way forbade him to retreat, while every day’s delay
made retreat more hopeless. All that he could do was to entrench himself, and
hold out as long as supplies lasted, in the faint hope that the advance of
Clinton or some unlooked-for turn of events might bring relief. On October 6
Burgoyne decided to retreat, and, with a view to clearing the way for his main
army, advanced with a detachment of 1500 men against the enemy’s lines. The
Americans, however, acted on the offensive. Burgoyne was driven back within his
lines
and a fierce attack was made, in which part of the entrenchments were stormed,
and many of the British, among them some of Burgoyne’s best officers, fell. Two
days later Burgoyne succeeded in moving a few miles to the rear. But every step
that he took was attended with loss of equipage, supplies, arid, what was most
valuable to the captors, ammunition. Burgoyne’s forcie had now shrunk to 3500 men,
hardly a fourth of the American army, which was daily increasing. Only about
eight days’ provisions remained, and the total destruction of Burgoyne’s
communications made it impossible to obtain further supplies. On October 13,
1777, he opened negotiations for a surrender, and on the 16th these were
completed. ,
Burgoyne’s
conduct was, at his own request, made the subject of a parliamentary enquiry.
His main error no doubt was the immense train of artillery with which he
encumbered himself. It is clear too that there was no cordial co-operation
between Burgoyne and Carleton, who still remained Governor of Canada. Burgoyne
might also be justly blamed for want of care in maintaining his communications,
inasmuch as the failure of the co-operating force might at any time make a
retreat necessary. Yet the main blame must attach to those who planned a
combination attended with such manifest difficulty, and took no special
measures to guard against failure. Some minor successes on the lower Hudson
were no compensation for Burgoyne’s defeat. By combined action of the fleet
and land force, and by conspicuous courage on the part of the British soldiers,
two strong forts on the right bank of the Hudson were seized and the navigation
of the river was secured.
Important as
was the surrender of Saratoga from a military point of view, its political
effects were still greater. The doubts which the French government had felt as
to taking up the American cause were removed; and on February 6, 1778, two
treaties were signed by the representatives of France and the United States.
The first bound the two nations to commercial unity, and pledged each to
protect the ships of the other. The second provided that,, if the first treaty
led to hostilities between France and England, there should then be an
offensive and defensive alliance between France and the United States, and that
neither should make peace till Great Britain had acknowledged the independence
of the colonies. The difference between an open alliance and that covert help
which France had hitherto given to the United States was of vast importance.
The command of the sea was an indispensable condition of British supremacy over
the colonies. If once that command should cease to exist, even for a short
space, a decisive military blow might shatter the British power in America
beyond hope of recovery.
Yet the
victory at Saratoga was not all gain. To shallow thinkers it suggested a
contrast between the brilliant and decisive success of Gates and the cautious
strategy of Washington; and it thus furnished
material for
a factious agitation, which, with a man less resolute and self-reliant and more
susceptible of personal jealousy than Washington, might have had disastrous
results. Indeed it might have seemed at the time as if all that had been won on
the Hudson was to be thrown away elsewhere. After the engagement at Germantown,
Washington established himself in winter quarters at Valley Forge, some fifteen
miles from Philadelphia. Washington was no grumbler and no rhetorician, but in
a letter to the President of Congress he describes his soldiers as “ naked and
distressed on a cold bleak hill,” “ sleeping under frost and snow without
clothes or blankets.” Meanwhile Howe had occupied Philadelphia. There his
officers lived in sloth and dissipation; and when in May, 1778, he was
superseded by a better soldier in Clinton, he was honoured by the solemn
buffoonery of a sham tournament, in which Andre, not long afterwards the victim
of a strange and tragic fate, took a conspicuous part.
Early in 1778
North made a further attempt at conciliation. He introduced into Parliament and
carried two bills. One repealed the tea-tax, and declared that no duty should
be imposed on any colony except for purposes of trade regulation, and that the
proceeds of any duty so levied should be disposed of by the assembly of the
colony in which the money was raised. The other Act appointed commissioners to
negotiate, with authority to proclaim a cessation of hostilities, to grant
pardons, and to suspend all Acts of Parliament passed since 1763. But when the
commissioners laid these proposals before Congress, that body at once barred
the way to negotiation by requiring an acknowledgment of American Independence
as a first preliminary. The total failure of this attempt, followed as it
immediately was by the declaration of the French alliance, put an end to any
possibility of a peaceful settlement; and the only effect of the negotiation
was to beget a feeling of discouragement among the colonial supporters of Great
Britain.
From the
beginning to the end of the war, the military policy of Great Britain was
marked by a total absence of definiteness and continuity. Clinton’s first step
was to transfer his army from Philadelphia to New York. Had Washington been of
the same temper as the British generals, there is little doubt that Clinton
would have been suffered to carry out his march unmolested. Washington’s lack
of resources often drove him into what his detractors called a “Fabian” policy,
but he never lost sight of the truth that the best defensive policy is often
one of attack. On June 18, 1778, Clinton quitted Philadelphia. Washington hung
on his line of march, harassing him with his advanced detachment. On June 28,
near Freehold Court House, Clinton turned on his pursuers. Lee, who was in
command of the American advanced guard, avoided an engagement; and, when
Washington with the main body of his army arrived, Clinton resumed his march,
and reached New York without further molestation. Lee’s
conduct has
been variously judged. A British military historian of authority, Stedman,
himself a practical soldier, considers that Lee’s caution saved the American
army from defeat and possibly from destruction. On the other hand Washington
held and forcibly expressed on the spot the opinion that an opportunity of
striking a decisive blow had been thrown away. Documents which have come to
light in comparatively recent times raise a strong probability that Lee was at
this time in the confidence of the British government and acting in their
interests.
The summer of
1778 witnessed an extension of the area of the war, and, as a consequence, a
series of scattered and indecisive operations. Of these the most important in
conception, though not in execution, was the joint action of the French fleet
and an American land-force against Rhode Island. In December, 1776, the British
had occupied Newport: the Americans however retained possession of Providence.
Though trifling hostilities took place, no serious attempt was made for some
time by either side to dislodge the other. But in the summer of 1778 the
appearance on the American coast of a French fleet under Admiral d’Estaing gave
the signal for active operations. A small British fleet lay off Newport, upon
which the British forces depended for supplies and, in case of need, for
assistance. D’Estaing’s superiority in numbers enabled him so to hem in several
of the British ships in the strait between the island and the mainland, that
they were only saved from capture by being burnt. Fortunately for the British,
a storm arose which dispersed d’Estaing’s fleet, damaging it to such an extent
that he insisted on going to Boston to refit. Thence he sailed to the West
Indies without attempting, for the present, anything further. This defection compelled
the Americans to abandon their designs against Rhode Island, and called forth
an amount of mutual ill-feeling which almost threatened a rupture of the lately
formed alliance.
The year 1778
also witnessed the extension of the war westward and southward. The western
branch of the war, as one may call it, was so detached that it is simpler to
deal with it collectively somewhat later. In the south there had been no
regular operations since 1776. But bands of loyalists and fugitives from
Georgia and the Carolinas had established themselves in Florida, then part of
the British dominions, whence they harried Georgia, and were themselves
harassed in turn. War was made a pretext for plunder; and, in consequence, the
fighting in the south was from the outset marked by a ferocity and lawlessness
which did not disappear even when the war assumed a more regular character. In
the autumn of 1778 raids were made on each side: they were more deliberate and
better organised than before, but had no lasting effect. Simultaneously Clinton
was planning a regular expedition for the reduction of Georgia. Colonel
Campbell, with a force of 3400 men, supported by a small squadron, was sent by
sea to attack
Savannah;
while General Prevost, the governor of East Florida, was to co-operate from the
south. An American force under General Robert Howe covered Savannah. The swampy
nature of the ground gave great advantages to the defensive, but it made the
American commander over-confident. A British detachment, guided by a negro along
a path through a rice-swamp, fell on his flank, while at the same time the
British artillery secured a post of vantage; and the action resulted in the
total defeat of Howe and the capture of Savannah with large stores. So
expeditious were Campbell’s movements that the victory was won before Prevost
reached the scene of action. The whole of the southern bank of the river was
secured as far as Augusta, a hundred and fifty miles above Savannah; and the
bulk of the inhabitants readily took the oath of loyalty and were formed into
companies for the defence of the country.
Congress soon
took steps to retrieve these defeats. A force was raised in the Carolinas and
placed under the command of Lincoln, a general who had acquired some reputation
in the campaign against Burgoyne. The British force was too small to guard a
line of a hundred and fifty miles against the attack of a regular army; and
accordingly Augusta was abandoned. Lincoln, however, in his advance on Augusta,
imprudently divided his force, with the result that Colonel Prevost, a brother
of the general, with 900 men fell upon a detachment numbering about 2000 and
utterly routed them, capturing arms, ammunition, and baggage, and driving those
who escaped across the river, in which many perished. Lincoln was soon
reinforced, and renewed his project of invading Georgia. General Prevost,
instead of remaining on the defensive, at once replied by a counter-invasion
of South Carolina. By threatening Charleston he succeeded in drawing off
Lincoln from Georgia. Prevost however was not strong enough, either in men or
artillery, to hazard an attack on Charleston; and, after some unimportant
operations along the coast, he withdrew to Savannah, leaving a detachment
established at Beaufort on the coast of South Carolina. The security of the
British alike at Savannah and Beaufort depended on the command of the sea.
Accordingly the governor of South Carolina invited d’Estaing, who had just
obtained some success in the West Indies, to co-operate with Lincoln against
Savannah. Prevost, on hearing of the intended attack, at once blocked the river
by sinking six vessels, and called in his detachment at Beaufort. This force,
under the command of Colonel Maitland, succeeded by great energy in evading the
French and making its way through swamps and shoals to Savannah. The French
landed 5000 men, and were joined by Lincoln with as many more; whereupon the
combined force laid siege to Savannah. Here, however, as at Rhode Island,
jealousy and ill-feeling prevented hearty co-operation; and after an assault,
courageously repulsed, the siege was abandoned.
220
[1778—9
During the
summer of 1779 other operations of a desultory kind went on against the
northern and middle colonies. The British, using New York as their base, made a
raid into Connecticut, carrying off and destroying stores. A naval expedition
of the same kind against Virginia was even more successful, the captures in
stores and shipping being reckoned at half a million of money. Clinton also, by
the capture of various posts, established his control on the Hudson for about
fifty miles above New York. One of these however, Stony Point, was recaptured
by a display of great daring on the part of Anthony Wayne, one of Washington’s
best officers; and, though the place could not be held, yet the exploit did
much to restore the confidence of the Americans, and to destroy the moral
effect of Clinton’s successes.
Though the
American navy had never from the outset of the war been sufficiently strong or
numerous to contend for the control of the sea, yet it had done much, by
intercepting convoys and merchantmen, to increase the difficulties of the
British. In the spring of 1778 one of the most daring of the American
sea-captains, Paul Jones, had landed on the coast of Scotland, doing some
damage to private property, and in a sea-fight off Scarborough had captured two
British vessels. In July, 1779, the government of Massachusetts organised an
expedition of 19 sail, with 3000 troops in transports, to attack the British
settlement at Penobscot, on the coast of what is now New Brunswick. The attack
was frustrated by the appearance of a British squadron. The invading force was
driven ashore, and suffered heavily in their retreat through a wild and
ill-provided country.
Throughout
the whole course of the war the ferocity displayed increased in proportion to
the remoteness of the locality. Not only were the outlying inhabitants on the
frontier less amenable to control, but they had grown up in habits of violence
and had learnt to hold their own lives and those of others cheap. Moreover it
was on the frontier that the Indian alliance really became an effective aid;
and, when the spirit of savagery had been once introduced, the desire for
retaliation made it wholly impossible to keep within the bounds of civilised
warfare. During 1778 parties of Indians, assisted by frontier men hardly less
barbarous, harried the western portions of New York and Pennsylvania. Few
incidents of the war did more to embitter American feeling against the British.
In 1779 Congress took resolute measures to deal with this trouble. A force of
2100 men was sent into the Wyoming valley, the scene of the worst Indian
outrage. The Five Nations, against whom the attack was directed, came nearer
than any other Indian tribes to the condition of a settled community* and were
therefore more open to injury by invasion. They occupied substantial fortified
villages of wood, surrounded by orchards and cultivated fields. But the
American army met with no effective resistance, and the country was turned into
a wilderness.
1776—8]
Clarke's campaigns in the Ohio valley.
221
In the
meantime a contest of the greatest importance to the future of the United
States was being waged in the west. The conquest of Canada had transferred the
Ohio valley from France to England. The two great motives which had stimulated
the more far-sighted of the colonists to take up an aggressive attitude against
France were the danger from Canada itself, as a base for Indian raids, and the
dread that French occupation would form a belt round the colonies from the
mouth of the Mississippi to the Canadian lakes, and thus bar the possibility of
expansion westwards. If America and Great Britain were to be hostile or even
separate powers, these dangers would revive.
That the Ohio
valley became American and not British territory was due mainly to the clear
sight, the enterprise and the military ability of one man, George Clarke.
Fortunately too for America, there had come into existence a border population
pre-eminently fitted for the task before them. From 1769 onward there had been
a steady influx of settlers, mostly from Pennsylvania, into the territory which
is now Kentucky and Tennessee. The settlers were frequently, if not mainly,
Presbyterians from the north of Ireland, gifted with the more than Scottish
stubbornness, tenacity, and self-reliance of their race. The conditions of
their life were such that the law of the survival of the fittest operated with
full force. Constant danger from Indians begot watchfulness, resource, and
merciless hatred for the savage: and this hatred was naturally extended to the
British government, which in that quarter had been making full use of the
savage alliance.
During 1776
and 1777 continuous raids were made on their newly- formed settlement. Early in
1778 Clarke conceived the project of a counter-attack, not a mere raid, but a
conquest and political occupation of the Ohio valley. To effect this, he
reckoned on the neutrality if not the good-will of the French inhabitants.
Resolute though the border settlers were in the defence of their homesteads,
yet they were primarily a population of farmers struggling hard for
subsistence, and therefore unavailable for a long campaign far from their
homes. A few of the more strenuous and adventurous joined Clarke; but he had to
raise his main force in Virginia, having obtained from the government of that
State approval of his scheme, though very little in the way of practical
support. With less than two hundred men Clarke advanced stealthily on
Kaskaskia, a settlement where the French inhabitants appeared so loyal to their
new masters that the fort was entrusted to a French garrison. The surprise was
completely successful: the place was seized before the garrison could take any action.
Not only was TCaskaskia. secured, but the whole of the neighbouring population
transferred their allegiance to the Americans, and proceeded to organise
themselves under Clarke to repel a British invasion.
Clarke’s
merits as a commander did not end with his sagacity in ^signing a scheme of
conquest, or his promptitude in executing it.
222 Conquest of the
Ohio.—Siege of Charleston, [ms-so
Even more
extraordinary was that control over his troops which restrained them, composed
and trained as they were, from any act of outrage which could alienate the
inhabitants. Moreover, by diplomacy and by the sheer force of a superior mind,
he succeeded in securing the neutrality of the neighbouring Indian tribes. In
the following winter (1777-78), Hamilton, the British commander at Detroit,
headed an expedition and re-occupied Vincennes, one of the towns which had
submitted to Clarke, but which he had been compelled to leave in the hands of a
French garrison. Two hundred and forty miles of wilderness separated Clarke at
Kaskaskia from the enemy. Nevertheless, regardless of the season, he set out
early in February, 1778, and invested the fort at Vincennes, which was occupied
by Hamilton. With the active support of some of the inhabitants and the
friendly neutrality of the rest, Clarke reduced Hamilton to surrender. The Ohio
valley was thereafter the scene of raids and desultory fighting, but till the
end of the war it remained defacto American territory.
The conduct
of the French population recalls the successive conquests of New York and the
tranquil acquiescence with which the Dutch population were handed backwards
and forwards. It is clear that while on the whole their sympathies were with
the Americans, those sympathies were not strong enough to nerve them to anything
like a sustained effort. Their attitude might have been widely different if
there had been on the British side a commander gifted, like Clarke, with the
instincts of a bom leader.
The campaign
of 1780 opened with an attack by Clinton on the hitherto impregnable fortress
of Charleston. The situation of the town, strong from one point of view, has an
element of weakness. It is connected with the mainland by a swampy neck,
difficult to cross in the face of an effective fire, especially for a force encumbered
with siege artillery. On each side of the town is a navigable river—the Cooper
on the northern side, the Ashley on the southern—giving water-communica- tion
with the inland country. In proportion to the size of the harbour, the entrance
is narrow. Given a sufficient superiority of naval power to keep up
communication with the sea and sufficient command of the inland country to
harass and impede a force endeavouring to cross the neck, the position is one
of absolute security. But let an enemy once get possession of the neck and of
the mouth of the harbour, and the city with its garrison must be doomed; for
the same swampy conditions, which make the neck difficult to occupy, render the
position of a blockading force, once established there, secure. The fate of
the town was virtually sealed when the American naval commander, who lay at the
mouth of the harbour, retreated to Charleston, sending some of his ships to
block the mouth of the Cooper river. The British fleet then entered the
harbour. Clinton was now rendered independent of any landward communication. He
was able to operate freely by detached
1780—l] Capture of Charleston.—
War in the Carolinas. 223
parties
against the American communications, to cut off any troops that were coming to
their assistance, and thus to advance his siege-works on the neck unmolested.
Defence was clearly impossible; and on May 12,1780, the garrison, numbering
5000 soldiers and 1000 seamen, with 400 guns, surrendered. The British loss was
estimated at about 250 killed and wounded.
The capture
of Charleston changed at once the scene and the character of the war. The two
remaining campaigns were mostly fought out on the soil of the Carolinas. The
nature of the country, woody, swampy, and even at the present day insufficiently
provided with roads for heavy traffic, made it scarcely possible to move large
forces. Consequently the war was more and more fought out by small bodies of
men lightly equipped; and knowledge of the country and rapidity of movement
became of primary importance. Moreover, the British commanders were able in
the south to do what elsewhere had been, save in very small measure,
impracticable, namely, to draw on the population for reinforcements. There
was, it is true, no widespread loyalist feeling. Over and over again British
generals found that the promise of local support was a reed which pierced their
hands when they leaned on it, and that pardoned rebels relapsed wholesale the
moment that British protection or control was withdrawn and pressure was applied
from the other side. Still the loyalists were strong enough to give to the
struggle something of the character of a civil war. This, coupled with the
difficulty of enforcing discipline among small parties scattered over a wide
country, induced in the southern campaigns a ferocity unknown in other
quarters. It is scarcely possible to apportion the blame judicially, quite
impossible to acquit either party altogether. On both sides there was a
tendency to claim the rights of belligerents, while meting out to enemies the
treatment of rebels. Much too was done by irresponsible persons for which
neither party can fairly be blamed. War was made the pretext for acts of rapine
and brutality.
It is not
however to be thought that this guerilla warfare was the sole or even the chief
part of the war in the south. On the contrary, the campaigns of 1780 and 1781
in the Carolinas are from a military point of view the most interesting of the
whole war. Hitherto we have seen on one side inert and half-hearted generals,
on the other an ill-provided and imperfectly disciplined army with which a
commander could only venture on defensive or partial movements, never
attempting any comprehensive policy of attack. Now for the first time we find
face to face two well-seasoned armies, each under a daring and skilful leader.
On the British side Cornwallis had already shown that he had fully grasped the
truth, so imperfectly understood by his colleagues, that, if the rebellion was
to be crushed, it must be crushed by a resolute, persistent, and quickly moving
policy of attack. His opponent, Nathaniel Greene, was beyond doubt the best
commander, except
Washington,
that fought under the American flag. He had devoted himself to the literature
of his profession, and in technical skill was probably little if at all
inferior to Washington, as he was certainly not inferior to him or to any other
man in personal courage. Where he fell short of his chief was in force of
character and administrative capacity. His kindliness and simplicity of nature
always won the love of his subordinates; he sometimes lacked the strength of
will needful to win their obedience.
The
individual battles of the campaign are, with perhaps one exception, of no very
great interest. In no case did the ground give any great scope for tactical
skill. The battles were for the most part matters of hard fighting, in which
abundant courage was shown on each side. Usually the Americans had some
numerical superiority, equalised by the better discipline and longer experience
of the British. The real interest lies not in individual engagements but in the
strategy of the campaign as a whole. To understand this, it is needful to have
a clear comprehension of the physical peculiarities of the country. We may look
on South Carolina as divided into parallelograms, separated by rivers, each
fringed by wide belts of morass. For troops to cross these obstacles, even in
small parties, great care and local knowledge were requisite. The transport of
artillery and stores was out of the question. Moreover, the unhealthy nature of
the climate made prolonged sojourn in the lower districts impossible. Further
inland the rivers branch into smaller streams, the soil becomes firmer, and the
air more wholesome. Thus, throughout the campaign we see each combatant
endeavouring to shoulder his opponent eastward and to secure the advantage of
the more traversable country.
Immediately
after the fall of Charleston, Clinton sent Cornwallis to cut off a body of
troops under Colonel Burford, who, having arrived too late tp join his
countrymen at Charleston, was on the north bank of the Santee river. Burford
fled inland. Cornwallis pursued him for some way with his whole force, but
finally detached Tarleton, a vigorous commander of light horse, in pursuit. Tarleton
overtook Burford at Waxhaws on the border of North Carolina and cut his whole
force to pieces. It was said that he refused quarter; and the recollection of
his alleged ferocity did much to embitter feeling. The disaffection of the
inhabitants was further increased by Clinton’s administrative policy. He issued
a proclamation stating that all loyal subjects would be expected to serve in
the militia if required. At first he allowed his prisoners to remain at liberty
on parole, but he subsequently cancelled the paroles and required as a
condition of freedom a declaration of loyalty, involving the obligation to
serve under the British flag. The result was that the ranks of the militia were
largely filled with disaffected men; and many who, if their paroles had been
continued, might have remained neutral, felt no scruple about breaking an oath
thus extorted.
In June,
1780, Clinton returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis in command in the
Carolinas. He established his head-quarters at Camden, and was there joined by
about 800 loyalists from North Carolina. The American army, at the outset of
the campaign, was under the command not of Greene but of Gates. At the head of
about 6000 men, Gates advanced against Camden. At the same time about 800 of
Cornwallis’ men were on the sick-list at Camden, while his communications with
the coast were in serious danger from Sumpter, one of the most venturesome and
able of the American guerilla leaders. Cornwallis, risking his communications,
drew in his outposts, left a weak garrison at Camden, and with the bulk of his
force, about 2000 men, marched out, attacked, and utterly routed Gates. This
was followed up by a minor success. Sumpter, immediately upon Gates’ defeat,
retreated. Tarleton was sent in pursuit, and marching with great speed overtook
the enemy, cutting them to pieces and nearly capturing Sumpter.
These
successes were, however, counterbalanced by a serious reverse in another
quarter. Colonel Patrick Ferguson had greatly distinguished himself in the
British service in the earlier part of the war. Not only was he a good soldier,
but he possessed, what was rare in the British army, that versatility and
inventiveness which enable a commander to adapt himself readily to new
conditions. He was now sent by Cornwallis to organise an irregular force among
the loyal inhabitants on the western frontier of the two Carolinas. Ferguson,
unlike too many of the British leaders, was fully alive to the importance of
conciliating the inhabitants and restraining excess. He succeeded in getting
together an effective force, and, after various small successes, sent a message
to the settlement in the extreme west that if the Americans there did not lay
down their arms they would be dealt with as rebels. The action of the settlers
illustrates the same truth as was shown by Burgoyne’s defeat. The British might
win pitched battles: it was a very different matter to keep in permanent
subjection a hardy and courageous population trained to the use of arms.
Ferguson’s message, so far from striking terror, at once called into existence
an armed force. The most remarkable feature of the matter was that there were
no regular troops in the far west to serve as a nucleus, and no leader acting
under the authority of Congress or of the State-government. Spontaneously some
of the leading men gathered together a mounted force, armed with rifles, and
marched eastward. They numbered about 1000 men, and were joined in the march by
250 North Carolina militia and some independent parties. At first it was
proposed that the supreme command should be put in commission, so to speak,
going in rotation among the recognised leaders. That, however, was found
unsatisfactory; and by common consent the command was vested in Campbell, a
Virginian.
Ferguson
posted himself on the top of a hill in the range of which the chief point is
King’s Mountain. The position would have been a
226
King’s
Mountain.—Arnolds treason. [mo
strong one
against regular troops attacking with the bayonet. But Ferguson seems to have
overlooked the truth impressed on our own generation by the battle of Majuba
Hill, that to skilled riflemen the lower position is no disadvantage. His force
amounted to about 1000, a number probably somewhat less than that of his
assailants, which had been augmented by reinforcements but depleted by
departures. On October 7, 1780, the Americans made their attack. The fight
lasted about an hour. Ferguson was shot down in the middle of the engagement ;
about 300 of the loyalists were killed or wounded; the rest, save a few who
contrived to slip through, were captured. It is impossible to overrate the
importance of King’s Mountain battle in its effect on the coming campaign. The
main American army was still hopelessly disorganised by Gates’ defeat at
Camden. If Ferguson could have secured the inland country, it is difficult to
see what could have prevented Cornwallis from advancing through the Carolinas
and Virginia and joining hands with Clinton. Another effect of the American
victory was to bring back into the field Sumpter and another guerilla leader,
Marion, both of whom harassed Cornwallis’ communications, exhausted his
cavalry, and intimidated British sympathisers.
Outside the
Carolinas the most noteworthy event of the year 1780 was the almost successful
treason of Arnold. He was in command of West Point on the Hudson, a place
indispensable to the Americans if they were to maintain communications between
New Jersey and the colonies north of the Hudson. After the evacuation of
Philadelphia by the British, Arnold had been placed in command of the town. He
had married a fashionable and extravagant wife, and had contracted expensive
habits. Getting into money difficulties, he tried to extricate himself—so it
was alleged—at the public expense. Thereupon he was tried by court-martial for
jobbery, and convicted. Embittered and vindictive, he opened negotiations with
Clinton for the surrender of West Point. The emissary chosen to conduct the
negotiations on behalf of the British was Major Andr£. On his way to visit
Arnold Andre was captured by three militia men. He produced a pass signed by
Arnold, and also strove to bribe his captors, offering them money and promising
them preferment if they would join the British. This failed, but he contrived
to inform Arnold of his arrest, and thus enabled him to escape to the British
lines before his treason had been reported at head-quarters. Andre himself was
tried by an American court- martial, sentenced as a spy, and hanged. There has
been much discussion as to the legality of the procedure. The question
practically turns on one point; was a pass valid if granted for a treasonable
purpose by an officer engaged in treasonable negotiations? Andre was a man of
attractive character, many accomplishments and some literary taste; and his
fate excited deep sympathy. Yet, in attempting such an enterprise, he took his
life in his hands; and the
1780—l] Battle of
Cowpens.—March of Cornwallis. 227
Americans cannot be blamed for exacting the full penalty according to the
rules of war.
As a result
of Ferguson’s defeat, Cornwallis withdrew the main body of his force into South
Carolina. A detachment of about 1500 men had been sent out from New York under
General Leslie to join Cornwallis. Originally they were intended to advance by
land through Virginia and join Cornwallis in North Carolina. Ferguson’s defeat
made this impossible; and Leslie sailed to Charleston. Meanwhile Greene
proceeded to take the offensive. He did not however feel himself strong enough
for a general attack on Cornwallis. Accordingly he adopted the somewhat
dangerous strategy of dividing his force and sending a strong detachment of
about 600 men under Morgan to cut off supplies and interrupt communications,
while his main body, of nearly 3000 men, moved cautiously through the upper
country. To meet this Cornwallis detached a force under Tarleton to deal with
Morgan, while he himself advanced, intending to intercept Morgan and then turn
against Greene. On January 17, 1781, Tarleton met Morgan at a place called the
Cowpens, and sustained a crushing defeat. Nearly the whole of his force were
taken prisoners; and the loss of the light troops crippled Cornwallis through
the whole of his campaign.
In spite of
his victory, Morgan fully understood the danger of his position, and he at once
turned to rejoin Greene. If Cornwallis had been able to carry out his original
intention, Morgan would have found a British force across his line of march.
Cornwallis however did not feel strong enough to advance till Leslie, who was
on his way from Charleston, had joined him. This delay enabled Morgan to
escape. His retreat was facilitated by local knowledge and by an opportune rain
which rendered the fords behind him impassable. It is to be noticed that the
delay which saved Morgan was due to the necessity of sending Leslie round by
Charleston; and that itself was a consequence of Ferguson’s defeat. The main
body of the American force also retreated. Thus the three forces were pressing
northward in what one may call a broad-arrow formation, with Cornwallis in the
middle. When he reached the banks of the Catawla, Cornwallis, feeling that all
turned on the rapidity of his pursuit, destroyed the whole of his baggage and
stores except what was absolutely necessary. In acting thus he was practically
staking the whole result on the double chance of intercepting and defeating
Morgan, and then annihilating Greene’s force. If he could sweep that army out
of existence it might be possible to advance into Virginia, living on the
country and forming bases of supply as he went along. To do this with an army
hanging on his flank would have involved a terrible risk; nor would the mere
chance of cutting off Morgan’s detachment without ulterior results have been
worth the sacrifice. Yet it well may be that the calculation was sound. For if
Cornwallis failed to catch Morgan, he might
as well at
once fall back on bis base; and the loss of a few supplies would matter little.
The Catawla
was crossed, with great boldness and some good fortune on the part of the
British, since, through a blunder of their guide, they forded the river at a
place for which they were not making and which was therefore left unguarded. On
February 5, 1781, the two divisions of the American army met near Guildford
Court House. Greene had hoped for a sufficient reinforcement of local militia
to enable him to attack Cornwallis. But they failed to join him; and, after a
council of war, it was decided to retreat towards Virginia. Cornwallis still
continued his pursuit of the united force, and with sound strategy drew towards
the west, thus taking the route where the streams were fordable. Greene’s
experience, as quarter-master to Washington, had familiarised him with
questions of transport. He succeeded in getting together enough boats to cross
the Yadkin below the British force with a speed wholly beyond Cornwallis’
expectations; and he continued his retreat, protected by a rear-guard of 700
men under Colonel Lee, perhaps the best cavalry officer in the American army,
who held Cornwallis in check. In Greene’s short but brilliant career as a
soldier there is perhaps no finer exploit than this march to the Dan.
Retreating rapidly, he held together his raw and imperfectly trained troops,
without any loss of steadiness or discipline, or any subsequent detriment to
their fighting power. He succeeded finally in crossing the Dan, the river which
separates Virginia from North Carolina. There Cornwallis abandoned the pursuit
and withdrew to Hillsborough in North Carolina.
Greene only
waited for reinforcements from Virginia to resume active operations and to
advance into North Carolina. At the very outset he was encouraged by the
capture of a whole detachment of loyalists who' mistook Lee’s dragoons for
British soldiers. As Greene advanced he was joined by further reinforcements. He
had no longer any motive for avoiding that engagement for which Cornwallis had
been striving. On March 15 the armies met near Guildford Court House and joined
battle. No engagement throughout the whole war so impressed those who saw it
with a sense of stubborn determination on both sides. The Americans occupied
the higher ground with a deep ravine in their rear, behind which the slope rose
steeply. The British numbered about 2500, the Americans about 4500; but of
their force a considerable part consisted of comparatively unseasoned militia.
The Americans were posted in three lines, with a small reserve. A little before
two o’clock the engagement began. The first American line gave their fire and
withdrew, whether in panic or obedience to orders seems uncertain. But the
second line stood firm. So stubborn was their resistance that Cornwallis had to
extend his line and bring up his whole reserve. The riflemen on the American
right and the British troops opposed to them became detached and kept up a
separate fight in the
woods.
Steadily the whole British line gained ground and reached the ravine. But in
the process of advance, owing to the wooded nature of the ground and the
different degrees of resistance offered, the British line had become dislocated
and forced into an irregular ichelon formation. Thus the first detachment that
crossed was exposed to a flank attack and driven back into the ravine, where
they rallied. A second detachment met the same fate. So critical did the
position seem that Cornwallis ordered his artillery to fire on the Americans,
regardless of the inevitable injury to his own men. The desperate expedient
answered. Some of Cornwallis’ own troops fell, but the attack was stayed. At
the same time the detachment which had been separately engaged in the wood,
having disposed of its enemy, reappeared and joined the main British force.
Thus strengthened, Cornwallis made ready for a general attack. Thereupon Greene
retreated in good order, without any serious attempt being made at pursuit.
Guildford has
been claimed, both at the time and since, if not as an American victory, at
least as a drawn battle. The claim can hardly be maintained. During the
afternoon of a March day the Americans were driven back fully a mile. Yet, so
far as the honour of the battle went, if a portion of the American force gave
way, their failure was more than atoned for by the valour of their comrades. No
regiment won greater glory on that day than the 1st Maryland, who, having withstood
and repulsed the onslaught of the 33rd, then instantly turned on the 71st and
drove them likewise in confusion into the ravine. And, if Guildford was a
victory for Cornwallis, it was a Pyrrhic victory. His loss in killed and
wounded was little less than a third of his whole army, including thirty
officers. So weakened was his already reduced force that it became almost
valueless as a weapon for offensive operations. From the day of Guildford, the
British invasion of the Carolinas was practically at an end.
It may be
best, at the expense of strict chronology, to deal with the rest of Greene’s
campaign, before coming to those more important operations in which Cornwallis
was soon engaged in Virginia. After Guildford Cornwallis withdrew to
Wilmington, leaving the defence of South Carolina in the hands of Lord Rawdon
at Camden, with British garrisons dotted to the south-east and south-west.
Greene, apprehending no further danger from Cornwallis, advanced against
Rawdon. On April 25 Greene was strongly posted at Hobkirk Hill, about three
miles from Rawdon’s head-quarters. Rawdon, having the advantage of the ground,
determined to attack. He succeeded in surprising Greene and defeating him in a
hard-fought action, with about equal loss on both sides. Rawdon’s bold strategy
probably saved his own force from a crushing defeat, but it had little effect
on the campaign as a whole. Greene advanced, receiving at every stage of his
march popular support, which was met by no similar display on the part of the
loyalists. Fort
after fort
fell. One alone, Fort Ninety-six, constructed with great engineering skill and
defended with conspicuous valour, held out; and the whole of South Carolina
practically passed under the control of Greene. Ill-health compelling Rawdon to
return to England, he handed over the command to Colonel Stuart, who on
September 8,1781, attacked Greene at Eutaw Springs and fought another
indecisive battle, both suffering and inflicting considerable loss, but without
doing anything to weaken Greene’s hold on the country.
In March,
1781, Clinton had sent a British force of about 3600 men, under General
Phillips, to co-operate with Cornwallis, who at that time was advancing
northwards. Washington thereupon detached Lafayette to follow and harass
Phillips and, if practicable, to force him to an engagement. The death of
Phillips transferred the command of his force to Arnold, now in the British
service. On May 20 Cornwallis and Arnold joined forces at Petersburg in
Virginia; and the former took command of the whole army. Lafayette’s
inferiority of numbers compelled him to act wholly on the defensive and to
evade an action, while Cornwallis’ troops patrolled the country and carried off
stores. The finances of Congress were in a deplorable condition. A portion of
Washington’s troops had mutinied; and it seemed as if he might be forced to
disband his army for lack of provisions.
The French
alliance now proved, for the first time during the war, of supreme value. The
French fleet, acting in co-operation with Washington, first menaced New York
and thereby induced Clinton to withdraw a portion of Cornwallis’ force.
Cornwallis, it is clear, was embarrassed by the necessity of obeying orders
sent to him by Clinton at a distance from the scene of action, which, by
allowing him a certain amount of discretion, imposed on him responsibility
without giving full freedom. An attempt was made by the British fleet to
co-operate with Cornwallis. It was, however, opposed and defeated by the French
fleet at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay ; and the English Admiral, Graves, withdrew
to New York to refit. Meanwhile Washington had been joined by a considerable
body of French troops, and had put his army in such order as to enable him to
advance to Virginia. The French fleet, having uninterrupted control of
Chesapeake Bay, was able to transport the troops, saving them a long march; and
a junction with Lafayette was effected. Cornwallis entrenched himself at
Yorktown, on a peninsula between the York and James rivers. Here he was
effectually cut off by a superior force from all possibility of escape by land.
Clinton had promised to send relief; and, if only a co-operating fleet could
command the sea, Cornwallis would have a base of supplies, a possibility of
reinforcements, and, at the worst, a means of retreat. Accordingly Cornwallis
took up a purely defensive attitude, employing his army entirely in the
construction of fortifications and earthworks. On September 1 he received from
Clinton a promise
of
reinforcements, and this was renewed on the 24th. In the meantime the united
American and French force closely invested Cornwallis’ position at Yorktown.
The disaster
of Saratoga was about to repeat itself under slightly varied conditions. On
October 11 an attack was made on two redoubts, from which the British were
inflicting annoyance on the enemy. Washington sagaciously divided his force,
entrusting the capture of one redoubt to the French, the other to the
Americans. Each was carried by a resolute assault at night, and none among the
American officers won more glory than Alexander Hamilton, afterwards the ablest
and most trusted of Washington’s political supporters. Five days later
Cornwallis made a resolute sortie, inflicting considerable loss on the French
and doing some injury to their works, but in no way changing the main situation.
It was clear that no reliance could be placed on any aid from New York. One
faint chance remained for Cornwallis— to make his escape by water. With this
view he embarked a portion of his troops, intending to cross the York river,
surprise a detachment of French cavalry posted at Gloucester and, with the help
of the horses thus captured, make his way northward to join Clinton. The
enterprise was well-nigh desperate, but it was not fated to be tried. A storm
that arose in the river, after a few of the boats had crossed, made the passage
of the rest impossible.
Cornwallis’
defences were now battered to pieces by the American artillery, while his men
were too much weakened by illness and privation to resist an onslaught.
Accordingly on October 19, 1781, Cornwallis surrendered his land-force to the
Americans, his seamen and ships to the French. Five days later the British
fleet arrived. The delay in departure was due to the extensive repairs rendered
necessary by the action with de Grasse and the storm which accompanied it. With
the surrender at Yorktown, the war might be regarded as practically at an end.
Charleston and Savannah were evacuated; New York was the only important port
which remained in British hands; and no attempt was made to carry on hostilities.
The reception
of the news by the Ministry and by Parliament clearly showed that the end was
at hand. Lord George Germaine, the one minister who really shared the King’s
conviction that the war was just and politic, resigned; among North’s followers
there were signs of general disaffection. If the United States had been the
only enemy of Britain, peace would in all likelihood have been soon made. But
America could not make terms independently of her allies; and the war between
France and Great Britain was still raging in the West Indies, while a Spanish
force was blockading Gibraltar. Never did the whole fabric of the British
empire beyond seas seem so near to total downfall. But by the end of 1782 the
great victory of Rodney in the West Indies, and the gallant and successful
defence of Gibraltar by
General
Elliot, had materially altered the situation, and brought hopes of a not
dishonourable peace.
The changes
of Ministry during 1782, the transfer of power from North to Rockingham, from
Rockingham to Shelburne, and from Shelburne to the Coalition Ministry, count
for little in the history of the negotiations with America. Though no
definitive treaty could be signed unless France were a party to it, yet
informal negotiations were carried on at Paris during 1782, in which the United
States were represented by Franklin and John Adams, the British government by
Richard Oswald, a man of business in London who was in the confidence of Lord
Shelburne, and who had been on friendly terms with Franklin in England. The main
point of difficulty was the compensation of loyalists for losses inflicted on
them by the Americans. The difficulty of arranging any such scheme of
compensation lay in the fact that Congress had no effective authority over the
various States; and finally the claim was abandoned. On November 30, 1782, a
provisional treaty was signed, to become actually operative as soon as peace
was made between Great Britain and the allies of America. The treaty fully
acknowledged the independence of the United States; it fixed boundaries which
included the whole existing territory of the thirteen colonies; and it gave
them unlimited expansion westward. The navigation of the Mississippi and the
use of the Newfoundland fisheries were to be shared by Great Britain and the United
States; and Congress was to endeavour to secure from the various State-
govemments the restitution of land which was the property of British subjects
who had not borne arms. Negotiations with Spain and France were so long delayed
that it was not till September 3, 1783, that these provisional articles were
embodied in a formal treaty.
A few words
may be added as to the causes which had brought about a result so disastrous to
Great Britain. These causes were in part military, in part political. Of the former
some were due to what may fairly be called accidental conditions; others were
inherent in the nature of the problem. England was at the time undoubtedly
suffering from an exceptional lack of competent Generals. The comprehensive
view and fiery promptness of Wolfe, or the resourcefulness of Clive, would now
have been invaluable but were wholly wanting. Moreover British discipline and
equipment were totally unsuited to the task imposed upon the army. Burgoyne’s
expedition is typical. Speed and mobility were all-essential. The British
troops were encumbered with heavy artillery and transport, and they laboured
under the weight and hindrance of elaborate uniforms. Moreover the tactics
learnt in Europe were applied by British commanders to a country where the
conditions were wholly different, in a war in which skilled marksmen, using
what in comparison with their opponents’ arms were weapons of precision,
fought
against troops who knew no formation but close order. Of all the British
commanders, Ferguson was the only one who methodically adapted his tactics to
the special conditions of the country.
On the
American side colonial life was specially fitted to develop that versatility
and self-reliance which are so important in the irregular warfare suited to a half-reclaimed
country, where it is impossible to employ troops in large masses. The Americans
had always a reserve of civilians who under the pressure of local invasion
became effective combatants. The one counterbalancing defect in the American
system which enabled the British to prolong the struggle was the short period
of enlistment. This was aggravated by the fact that the several colonies
offered to their local forces higher pay than Congress did, and thus hindered
the process of recruiting for the general continental army. Where invasion had
to be repelled from a particular district, there was no lack of zeal; but when
an American commander undertook connected operations on a large scale, as
Washington did against Howe in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or Greene against
Cornwallis in South Carolina, he was liable to be perpetually hampered by
defections, and by the impossibility of reckoning with certainty on the number
of soldiers at his disposal. On the other hand the Americans enjoyed a great
advantage over their opponents, in that they were practically fighting with a
number of moveable bases. An American army situated as Burgoyne’s was would
have broken up, dispersed and become available for future service. The British
were fighting with one base—the ocean. It is at this point that the supreme
value of the French alliance comes in. As we have seen, the actual co-operation
of the French never became effective till the very last act of the drama. But
the presence of a French naval force in the West Indies was a factor of vast
importance. It distracted British operations by sea, and compelled Great
Britain to devote to the protection of the Islands those resources which might
have been used to maintain communications with the force in America. Nor must it
be forgotten that a European coalition was gradually formed to assist the
revolted colonies. The relations of the United States with France brought as a
consequence, not indeed the alliance, but the help of Spain. The Spanish
government at first declined to enter into direct communication with the
revolted colonies, and was with difficulty persuaded to take any part in the
quarrel. But ultimately French diplomacy prevailed. In April, 1779, a treaty
was signed between Spain and France, which committed the former Power to
hostility with England; and in the following June Spain declared war. In the
next year (1780) a league of the Baltic kingdoms was formed on the initiative
of Catherine of Russia, and accepted by Denmark and Sweden. It was entitled the
Armed Neutrality, and had for its main object the practical enforcement of the
principle that the vessels of a neutral Power might carry without molestation
goods belonging to the subjects of a belligerent.
To this
league France, Spain, and Holland soon afterwards acceded. In September, 1780,
an English frigate captured an American packet. On board was Henry Somers, a
leading American who had not long before been President of Congress, and who
was now on his way to the Hague on a diplomatic mission. His papers showed that
for two years there had been negotiations between Holland and the United
States. Sir Joseph Yorke, the British Minister at the Hague, was instructed to
demand from the Dutch government an explicit disclaimer of hostile intentions.
This he did with a degree of harshness which made a rupture inevitable. The
required assurance was refused; Yorke was summoned home; the Dutch Minister in
London was dismissed. On the 10th of December, 1780, Holland joined the Armed
Neutrality and four days later England declared war on Holland. That Great
Britain found it impossible to overcome resistance in America, in the face of
Europe combined against her in active or passive hostility, is not perhaps
surprising.
Finally,
apart from all these military difficulties, one may doubt whether, even if the
British arms had been successful, there were not political hindrances to
effective and permanent control of the colonies more insuperable still. For a
while at least government would have had to take the form of armed occupation,
and it is not likely that armed occupation would ever have passed into peaceful
civil administration, loyally accepted by the colonists. Almost from the hour
of their foundation the colonies had been developing not only political methods
but political ideals different from those of the mother-country. The material
interests which bound them to Great Britain were real, but they were too
indirect and remote to appeal readily to ordinary men. The tie of sentiment was
actually weakened by the necessary closeness of administrative relations. The
vague reverence of the medieval ecclesiastic for the grandeur of Rome failed as
he was brought face to face with the intrigues and corruptions of the papal
Court. Not dissimilar were the feelings of the colonist who like Franklin was
driven to contrast the vast responsibilities of the British government with the
sordid realities of parliamentary corruption and ministerial intrigue.
THE
CONSTITUTION.
(1776—1789.)
In the scheme of these pages the forms of
government, federal and State, lying between the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution of the United States, are only stepping-stones to the
latter, or rather prophecies of it. Much, therefore, which might be of interest
and of importance in itself, or from some other point of view than the present,
must be passed over. The whole period intervening between the two dates may
indeed be shortly disposed of here. It will be enough to call attention to the
general forms of government under the Confederation and the State
constitutions; taking the latter term to include, as it did, the Bills or
Declarations of Bight of such among the States as considered it desirable to
set forth formally their theory of government, at the foundation of their constitutions.
(i) The
Confederation.
On
June 11, 1776, some three weeks before the Declaration of Independence, the
Continental Congress appointed a committee to prepare a plan of confederation
of the colonies. On July 12, the committee reported a draft by John Dickinson;
and the subject was then debated from time to time until November 15, 1777,
when Congress finally agreed upon the articles. At the same time Congress
directed that the articles be proposed to the legislatures of the several
States; which were advised, if they approved of the plan, to authorise their
delegates in Congress to ratify it. On July 9, 1778, the delegates of eight of
the States in Congress ratified the articles, in accordance with the action of
their several legislatures. The delegates from the other five States ratified
them afterwards, at different times, as they became authorised; the last State,
Maryland, not giving her consent until the year 1781. ^
The articles
were called “Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States,”
the thirteen being named. The Confederation
was declared
to be “ a firm league of friendship,” for the common defence, security, and
welfare. Professing to be no more than a “ league ” of the States, the
Confederation did little more than make provision touching general public
affairs, not wholly unlike what, according to late American theory, should have
obtained between Great Britain and her colonies. The rest may be told in a few
words. 1. The small States, by dint of persistence in stress of overwhelming
danger, prevailed over the large, in the demand that political existence and
not relative importance should be the basis of all legislation; each State,
large or small, was to have one vote, and but one, in one Chamber. That alone
would have been enough to prevent the Union from being “perpetual.” 2. But,
with still greater fatuity, the new government was permitted to deal only with
the States as corporate bodies; it could not act upon individuals except
incidentally. 3. And then, to make inefficiency complete, the Confederation was
to have, over the States themselves, no coercive authority. As Great Britain
had done in the colonial period, before the Stamp Act troubles, the Confederation
made only requisition, that is request, upon the States, for supplies; if the
supplies were not furnished, the Confederation, unlike the mother of the
colonies, was helpless beyond appealing to the patriotism of the defaulting
member. The only way to avoid the need of coercive authority over the States, which
would never have been given, was to do what the country was not yet ready
for,—to give to the federal government, what the Constitution of the United
States afterwards gave, authority over individuals.
No division
of the departments of government was provided for in the articles, the whole
government being vested in a Congress of delegates from the States; though
power was given to Congress to “ appoint Courts for the trial of piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas,” and “ to appoint one of their number to
preside ” over the body, “ provided that no person' be allowed to serve in the
office of president more than one year in any term of three years.”
Such a
government could not stand when peace, with its centripetal tendencies,
returned; the war alone pressed the States together. Failure was written in the
very lines of the Confederation; the scheme held out a few years, but its life
was only a tossing about in an unmanageable sea of troubles. By the time of the
meeting of the Convention to form the Constitution of the United States, in
1787, it was ready to give up the struggle and go down. But the States were
jealous and justly suspicious of each other, and the experience of the
Confederation was both needful and wholesome; without it the Constitution would
have been impossible at the time; by it, though by means of distress, came at
last peace and order in the new and better form of government. And whatever was
deemed of permanent value in the Confederation prevailed, in some form, in the
Constitution.
The subject
cannot be particularly entered into in these pages; though it will come up
again in dealing with the formation of the Constitution. For the rest, it need
only be stated that the Continental Congresses, beginning in the year 1774, and
hence often called the Revolutionary Congresses, were composed of delegates
chosen by the various colonial or State legislatures, and meeting in
Philadelphia; that they sat, in secret, as one chamber; that the voting was by
colonies or States, each having one vote; and that they carried on the war and
conducted the more general affairs of the country in such way as they could.
(ii) State
governments.
The
contention of the colonies as colonies failed, because there were necessarily
two parties to it, and the other party refused. When the time came that there
was but one party to the business, when each colony or State had to deal with
itself only, what before had been found impossible was effected without
difficulty. The new articles of government of the colonies and States—some of
which were adopted during the colonial period, in hope of reconciliation—are
exemplifications of the late Whig theory of government. Difficulties were to
arise later in fixing upon a general government in the Articles of Confederation,
and later still, in the Constitution of the United States; for the present the
Continental Congress had but to advise the formation of new governments, and
it was done. If the first venture failed, as it did fail in one or two States,
the second succeeded easily.
The
constitutions of seven of the States are accompanied by formal Bills or
Declarations of Right; the constitutions of four, New York, Delaware* South
Carolina, and Georgia, are not; but of these four the Constitutions of all but
Delaware are introduced by preambles of greater or less length, reciting the
causes which led to the formation of the new governments. Rhode Island and
Connecticut continued under the form of government created by their colonial
charters, those two colonies having retained to the last full control over
their governments and governors. They therefore did not provide themselves
with Hills of Right or new constitutions.
The first of
the Bills of Right was that of Virginia, which, followed shortly afterwards by
the State constitution, was published on June 12, 1776, three weeks before
independence was declared. This Bill of Rights may be considered as furnishing
a general model for the articles of the other States, or at least the substance
of what went into them. It contains sixteen articles, setting forth the general
principles or theory on which the government of the State, in the accompanying
constitution, was framed. The first section, anticipating somewhat the language
of the Declaration of Independence, declares
“that all men
are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which,
when they enter into society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.” The second article declares that all power is vested in and derived
from the people, and that magistrates are their trustees and servants. The
third, that government is or should be for the common benefit, protection and
security of the people* nation, or community; and that when it fails of its
purpose, the people may of inalienable n,rht reform, alter, or abolish it. The
fourth, that public service alone should be the consideration of emoluments or
privileges from the community, and that office should not be hereditary. The
fifth, “that the legislative and executive powers of the State should be
separate and distinct from the judiciary; and, that the members of the two
first may be restrained from oppression by feeling and participating the
burdens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private
station, return into that body, from which they were originally taken, and the
vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular elections, in which
all or any part of the former members are to be again eligible or ineligible,
as the laws shall direct.” The sixth, that election of members of the
legislature ought to be free; that all men having evidence of sufficient
interest with and attachment to the community should have the right of
suffrage; that men should not be taxed or deprived of their property for public
use without their own consent or that of their representatives, or bound by any
law to which they have not thus assented. The seventh, that power of suspending
or executing laws by any authority without consent of the representatives of
the people ought not to be exercised. The eighth, that in criminal trials the
accused should have the right to know the nature of the accusation, to be
confronted by the witnesses, to have evidence in his own favour, and a speedy
trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage; and “that no man
should be deprived of his liberty except by the law of the land or the judgment
of his peers.” The ninth, that excessive bail should not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. The
tenth, in effect, that general search-warrants should not be granted. The
eleventh, “that in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man
and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be
held sacred.” The twelfth, “that the freedom of the press is one of the great
bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments.”
The thirteenth, that a well- regulated militia should be maintained; that
standing armies in time of peace should be avoided, and that the military
should always be subordinate to the civil power. The fourteenth, that the
people have
1776-80] Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
Declarations. 239
a right to
uniform government; and hence that no government should be set up, independent
of that of Virginia, within the limits thereof. The fifteenth, that liberty can
be preserved only by adhering to justice, temperance, and virtue. The
sixteenth, that religion should be governed by reason and conviction, not by
force; that all men are entitled to freedom of religion, according to
conscience; and that it is the duty of all men to practise Christian
forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.
The
Declaration of Rights of Pennsylvania, next in order of time, following shortly
after independence had been declared, also contained sixteen articles,
beginning with a preamble. The preamble recites that the object of government
is to secure and protect the community as such, and to enable the individuals
composing it to enjoy “their natural rights and the other blessings which the
Author of existence has bestowed upon man.” Other recitals, which need not be
stated, follow. The declaration contains some affirmations not in the Bill of
Rights of Virginia, touching freedom of emigration, and the right of the people
to assemble and consult for the common good and to petition the legislature for
redress of grievances; otherwise it is substantially the same as its
predecessor in Virginia.
The
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, also beginning with a preamble, contains
thirty articles. The Declaration and the State constitution were adopted in
1780, a constitution proposed two years before having been rejected by popular
vote. The preamble to the •Declaration in question recites the object of
government as in the corresponding preamble of the Pennsylvania declaration,
and proceeds to affirm that the body-politic is “a voluntary association of
individuals...a social compact by which the whole people covenant with each
citizen, and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by
certain laws for the common good”; and then that the people “ ordain and
establish the following declaration of lights and frame of government as the
constitution of the State.” The Declaration is more minute than that of
Pennsylvania or Virginia, but without material difference in effect. The
provision in regard to religion is more particular, towns being required to
provide, at their own expense, for “the public worship of God and for the
support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and
morality in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily.” The
legislature may “ enjoin upon all the subjects an attendance upon the
instructions of the public teachers aforesaid, at stated times and seasons, if
there be any on whose instructions they can conscientiously and conveniently
attend.” All denominations of Christians “demeaning themselves peaceably and as
good subjects ” should have equal protection of the law. “ Freedom of
deliberation, speech and debate,” as well as of the press, is declared. The
last article provides that “the legislative department shall never
exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them,” and so of each of the other
departments respectively.
The Maryland
Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1776, contained some special features. One of
these was that the people of the State were entitled to the common law of
England, and to trial by jury according to the course of that law, and to the
benefit of such English statutes as existed at the time of the first
emigration, so far as the same had been found applicable to their local or
other circumstances, and of such others as have since been passed in England
and have been introduced, used, and practised by the courts of law or equity.
Another was a declaration against poll taxes, as grievous and oppressive.
Another, found also in other State declarations, was against ex post facto laws
in criminal law. Another was against endowments of religion by lands or goods,
without leave of the legislature, except gifts of lands not exceeding two acres
for a church or burying-ground.
The foregoing
embrace all the important features of the bills or declarations of the several
States having such provisions.
In accordance
with these Bills of Rights, or, when such were wanting, in accordance with the principle
set forth in them, the constitutions of the States generally provided with
greater or less emphasis for a separation of the three departments of
government—the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive. In special
furtherance of this provision, the power of the governor, or president as he
was called in two or three of the States, was particularly limited in relation
to the legislature of his State. Thus, by the constitution of Virginia, the
governor was not to prorogue or adjourn the legislature, during its sitting,
nor dissolve it at any time; though, with the advice of the Council, or on
application of a majority of the House of Delegates, he might call the
legislature together before the time to which it stood adjourned. In
Massachusetts the governor, with advice of the Council, in case of disagreement
between the two houses of the legislature, in regard to adjournment or
prorogation, should have power to adjourn or prorogue the legislature for a
period of not more than ninety days. These are typical provisions.
The principle
of separation was not, however, fully carried out in all the States, especially
in the majority of them which had a Council distinct from the legislature; that
body being a sort of inheritance from the confusion of the colonial period.
By the
constitution of Virginia, adopted in 1776, a “ Privy Council or Council of
State” was created, to consist of eight persons. These were to be chosen by
joint ballot of the houses of the legislature, “either from their own members
or the people at large”; and they were “ to assist in the administration of
government.” They were also to choose, out of their own members, a “ president,
who in case of the death, inability, or absence of the governor from the
government,” was to
aqt as lieutenant-governor.
But members of the Council, while holding that office, were incapable of
sitting in the legislature.
The
constitution of North Carolina (1776) provided that the two Houses of the
legislature should by joint ballot elect a governor for one year, who should
not be eligible to that office during more than three out of six successive
years. The two Houses should also elect in the same way seven persons to be a
Council of State for one year, who should “advise” the governor in the
execution of his office. No member of the Council could have a seat in the
legislature; no judge of the Supreme Court or of Admiralty should have a seat
in the legislature or in the Council. The governor and other officers might be
prosecuted if impeached by the legislature on presentment of the grand jury of
any Court of supreme jurisdiction; by whom the cause was to be tried, was left
to inference.
The
constitution of South Carolina (1778)—to pass over the provisional
constitution of 1776—provided that the two Houses of the legislature should
choose by ballot, from among their own number or from the people at large, a
governor, lieutenant-governor, and a Privy Council of eight members besides the
lieutenant-governor. If the governor or lieutenant-governor chosen was a member
of either branch of the legislature, he should vacate his seat there. A member
of either House chosen to the Privy Council should not thereby lose his seat in
such House, unless elected lieutenant-governor. The Privy Council was to “
advise ” the governor, but the governor was not bound to consult the Council
unless directed by law. Impeachment of officers not amenable to any other
jurisdiction was vested in the House of Representatives, and the senators and
such of the judges as were not members of the House of Representatives were
constituted a Court for trying impeachments. The lieutenant-governor and a
majority of the Privy Council were to constitute a Court of Chancery.
In
Massachusetts, and in New Hampshire also, the Council was to be purely an
advisory body to the executive alone; but its members in both States were to be
elected annually by the legislature, on joint ballot of the two Houses. In
Massachusetts the Council, to consist of nine persons, was to be elected from
the senators just elected; in New Hampshire the legislature was to elect two
members of the Senate and three of the House of Representatives to the office.
In both States impeachments were to be presented by the House and tried by the
Senate.
The
constitution of Pennsylvania (1776) created a “supreme executive Council,” of
twelve persons, to be elected by the freemen of the State, and to have a
president and a vice-president. Vacancies might be filled by the legislature,
unless the president and Council appointed an election to fill the same. No
member of the legislature or of Congress should be chosen to the Council; but
the president
242
Council.—Division of
legislature.
[1T77
and
vice-president of the Council were to be chosen annually by joint ballot of the
legislature and Council, out of members of the Council. The president or
vice-president, “with the Council,” had power to appoint judges, naval and all
other officers, civil and military, such as were not to be chosen by the
legislature. They were to correspond with other States, and transact' business
with the officers of government, “and to prepare such business as may appear to
them necessary to lay before the legislature.” “They shall sit as judges, to
hear and determine on impeachments, taking to their assistance, for advice
only, the justices of the Supreme Court.”
By
the constitution of New York (1777), the Council was to have important
functions in relation to legislation. It was provided that the governor, the
chancellor, and the judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them with the
governor, should constitute “a Council to revise all bills about to be passed
into laws by the legislature”; “and that all bills which have passed the Senate
and Assembly shall, before they become laws, be presented to the said Council
for their revisal and consideration; and if, upon such revision and
consideration, it should appear improper to the said Council...that the said
bill should become a law...that they return the same, together with their
■objections thereto in writing, to the Senate or House of Assembly... who
shall...reconsider the said bill.” If the bill were then passed again by each
house, by two-thirds of the members present, it should become a law. A Court
was to be instituted for the trial of impeachments and the correction of
errors, “to consist of the president of the Senate, and the senators,
chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, or the major part of them”;
impeachment to be by the House of Assembly (Representatives). .
All the State
constitutions, with one exception, provided that the legislature of their
States, usually called the General Assembly, but in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire the General Court, should be divided into two branches, the first to
be called the House of Representatives, of Delegates, or of Assembly—in North
Carolina, the House of Commons; the second, the Senate. In Delaware the second
branch was to be called a Council; a body not to be confounded with the Council
of other States. The members of both branches were to be elected by popular
vote; the suffrage being generally somewhat restricted, as for instance to
freeholders, and often being more restricted in regard to the Upper than to the
Lower House. The Lower House was generally the more numerous body, and was
called the popular branch. In Delaware the Council was larger than the Lower
House. Pennsylvania was the one exception; in that State, as in the Continental
Congresses and the Congress of the Confederation, there was but one Chamber of
the legislature.
The executive
department of the State governments was generally
vested in a
single governor or president, to whose office was attached, or not, as has been
seen, a Council to “ assist ” or to “ advise ”; in Pennsylvania the executive
power was vested, as has been stated already, in an executive Council, presided
over by a president. The executive was elected by the people or, in two or
three States, by the legislature.
The judiciary
department was vested in Courts having judges appointed by the executive, or by
the executive “and” or “with advice of” the Council, or elected by the
legislature.
All officers
concerned with government, in all the States, were to hold office for definite
terms less than for life, or during good behaviour; only the higher judicial
officers holding in the latter way. Salaries were generally to be provided for
the governor and judges and other superior officers, without allowance of fees.
Delegates to Congress were to be elected by the State legislatures.
Thus, in the
separation, perfect or imperfect, of the departments, in the division of the
legislature, and in the establishment of fixed terms of service for officers
and the substitution of salaries for fees, the States for the first time
applied, more or less completely, on their own behalf the theory of good
government evolved by them.
(iii) The
Constitutional Convention.
What led to
the Convention may be shortly told. The Confederation was an utter failure,
and now was sinking, a helpless hulk, amidst general contempt. Meanwhile, a few
of the States, such as Rhode Island and New York, which had harbours suitable
for foreign commerce, were making spoil in their day. Free in fact from all external
restraint, they sat at the seat of custom, laying heavy tribute upon those of
their neighbours whose wares must pass through their avaricious gateways.
Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Carolina suffered much. Connecticut was
drained on one side by Rhode Island, on the other by New York; New Jersey,
lying between New York and Pennsylvania, was “a cask tapped at both ends”;
North Carolina, between Virginia and South Carolina, was “ a patient bleeding
at both stumps.”
The state of
the country was alarming, and was growing worse and worse every day. Even the
dry language of legal documents was eloquent of the fact. “ Whereas,” ran the
commission of the New Hampshire deputies to the Constitutional Convention, “the
limited powers, which, by the Articles of Confederation, are vested in the
Congress of the United States, have been found far inadequate to the enlarged purposes
” in view; “ and whereas Congress hath, by repeated and most urgent
representations, endeavoured to awaken this and other States of the Union to a
sense of the truly critical and alarming situation in which they may inevitably
be involved, unless timely
16—2
244
[1782-86
measures be
taken...to avert the dangers which threaten our existence as a free and
independent people,” it was therefore enacted etc. How acute was the danger,
and what various forms it took, may be seen from the pathetic description of
Hamilton, in the fifteenth number of the Federalist, and from the words of
Madison, in his Introduction to the Debates in the Convention. “The federal
authority had ceased to be
respected
abroad At home it had lost all confidence
and credit. The
unstable and
unjust career of the States had also forfeited the respect and confidence
essential to order and good government, involving a general decay of confidence
and credit between man and man.”
The weakness
of the Confederation was early felt outside of Congress. In the year 1782 the
legislature of New York unanimously passed resolutions, in which it was
declared “ that the Confederation was defective, in not giving Congress power
to provide a revenue for itself, or in not investing them with funds from
established and productive sources; and that it would be advisable for Congress
to recommend to the States to call a general convention to revise and amend the
Confederation.” Nothing however came of this, beyond a reference to it by
Hamilton in Congress, with a statement by him that he intended to propose to
Congress a plan for the purpose. This was in 1783. It remained for the States
which were suffering from the commercial exactions of their neighbours to
suggest a consideration of the most pressing needs of the country. .
Virginia was
the first to respond. In January, 1786, a resolution of the legislature of that
State was passed, inviting a meeting of deputies from all the States to meet
deputies named by Virginia, to consider the trade of the United States; “ to
examine the relative situations and trade of the States; to consider how far a
uniform system in their commercial regulations might be necessary to their
common interest and permanent harmony”; and to report a constitutional
provision to the States such as, when ratified by them, would enable the United
States, in Congress, effectually to provide for the purpose.
The deputies
were to meet in Annapolis, Maryland, in September of that year (1786). The plan
was received with much local favour; but the feeling was not general enough to
bring together deputies from more than five States, Virginia, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Desire for action was however growing
stronger and stronger, and when the deputies met they did not hesitate to make
recommendation in vigorous terms; more than that, in the absence of a majority
of the States, they of course could not properly do. But they did not stop at
advising the call of a convention to consider the trade of the States; other
things equally deserved attention. The commission of the deputies from New
Jersey had pointed to this; the deputies from that State were empowered “ to
consider how far a uniform system in their commercial relations, and other
important matters, might be
necessary to
the common interest and permanent harmony of the several States.” And that
suggestion was acted upon.
An address
was accordingly prepared, by the hand of Hamilton, to the legislatures of the
States, urging that speedy measures be taken to bring about a general meeting
of the States in a Convention to consider questions of trade and commerce, and
for “ such other purposes as the situation of public affairs may be found to
require.” The proposal met with favour in Congress, and in all the States,
excepting Rhode Island, in greater or less degree, according as the result was
likely to affect them. Congress, in February, 1787, resolved that it was
expedient that a convention of delegates from the several States be held in
May, at Philadelphia, “ for the sole and express purpose of revising the
Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several
legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to
in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the Federal Constitution
adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.”
Some of the States had already taken action and appointed deputies; all the
rest (except Rhode Island) followed, some with reluctance, before the meeting
of the Convention. The commissions varied. Those of Massachusetts and New York
limited the deputies in terms of the language of Congress. Some were in broader
terms. The commission of the deputies of New Hampshire authorised them “to
discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remedy the defects of our
Federal Union, and to procure and secure the enlarged purposes which it was
intended to effect”; that of New Jersey, to take “into consideration the state
of the Union as to trade and other important objects ”; that of North Carolina,
to “ revise the Federal Constitution.”
The meaning
of legal right between States drawing into closer union was now to come before
the Convention, in somewhat the same way as in the struggle with Great Britain.
An efficient external government was to be established, and in some way set
over the same political bodies which as colonies had struggled as to rights
with the mother-country. What now was to be considered legal right ? Surely
nothing less than what the colonies had contended for against England,—equality
in subordination, equality in some near resemblance to equality touching
private right. The States had now become more unequal than they had ever been
before, often by unfair means; some had grasped, and were determined to hold,
more than was their right; others of course had lost, and were suffering
accordingly. The former must now yield what they ought not to have taken; the
latter must be put upon the footing to which they were entitled in a nation
based upon equality. And then, thereafter, it would have to be understood that
some must perforce give way, in time of need, to the just requirements of
others, whether sister-States or the general government. But would the States
now accept for themselves what the colonies had desired of England, equality in
subordination ? No man knew; the
Convention
was to meet amidst widespread doubt and distrust without, and signs of discord
within. But it was to be the counoil-seat of great men, and men of experience,
filled with solemnity and a high and earnest purpose.
Sixty-five
delegates in all had been appointed; ten of the number never attended, some of
them refusing out of unfriendliness. Forty-two were present at the close of the
Convention; and, of these, thirty-nine signed the Constitution. In order to
save constant repetition of the names of the States represented by deputies who
took part in the debates, these debaters and their States will be named here;
and as the Convention was largely a struggle between the greater States and
their allies on the one hand, and the smaller States on the other, the list
will be made out accordingly.
The greater States- Virginia: Randolph, Madison,
Mason. Massachusetts: Gerry, Gorham, King. Pennsylvania: Franklin, Wilson,
Gouvemeur Morris. Allies (more or less). North Carolina: Williamson, Spaight.
South Carolina,: Rutledge, Charles Pinckney, General Pinckney, Butler, Georgia:
Baldwin.
The smaller States. Connecticut: Shennan, Ellsworth,
Johnson. New York: Hamilton, Yates, Lansing. New Jersey: Patterson, Brearly.
Delaware: Dickinson, Read, Bedford. Maryland (a State more or less divided):
Martin, Mercer. New Hampshire (not present until July 23, too late to take much
part in the contest between the great and the small States): Langdon.
Rhode Island
declined to take part in the Convention.
(iv) The
Federal Constitution.
The day fixed
for opening the Convention was May 14,1787; but it was not until the 25th of
the month that a majority of the States appeared. On that day deputies from
seven States were present; the Convention was organised accordingly, and
Washington was chosen presiding officer. Ultimately twelve States, as the
foregoing list shows, were represented. The presence of seven States was fixed
upon as necessary for a quorum; the voting to be as in the Confederation and
the Continental Congress. The Convention was to sit, and did sit, in secret;
its work was not to be undone or embarrassed by premature criticism.
Virginia,
which had been the most active in bringing about the Convention, now took the
lead in it, and on May 29, through Governor Randolph, one of her deputies,
brought forward a series of fifteen resolutions, usually called the Randolph or
Virginia resolutions, proposing the working material of a constitution; and
they were treated accordingly.
The
resolutions having been presented and explained} the Convention
resolved
itself into a committee of the whole House, to consider the state of the
American Union, and referred the resolutions to that committee.. On the same
day Charles Pinckney laid before the Convention a draft, in specific form and
detail, of a Federal Constitution, founded upon the same principles. This too
was referred to the committee; but no further official action was taken in
regard to it.
The committee
now proceeded to take up and consider, one by one, clause by clause, step by
step, the Randolph Resolutions, until they were all disposed of. On June 13 the
committee rose and reported the result, in nineteen resolutions substantially
founded upon those offered by Randolph. The resolutions originally drawn, and
those now reported, were directed, not merely to amending defects in the
Articles of Confederation, but to the formation of a new government radically
different, and designated in the report as a “ national government."
Opportunity
was now given for presenting other plans; and on June 15 what were known as the
Patterson or New Jersey resolutions were read. The resolutions reported were
now recommitted, that they might be considered again along with those brought
before the committee by Patterson. Patterson’s resolutions, which, instead of
providing for a new form of government, proposed no more than certain amendments
to the Articles of Confederation, were set up against those which the committee
had reported. The first resolution contained the keynote, as indeed did, in
intent if not in terms, the first of the resolutions of the report. The
“national government” of the report was understood by all to mean a government
unlike the Confederation, a government indeed such as actually came to pass. In
contrast with that idea, the Patterson plan, in its first resolution, declared
“that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected, and
enlaiged, as to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of
government and the preservation of the Union.’’
The
resolutions of the committee, calling for a “national government,” had been
supported by the larger States, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, with
the help of States further south which were expecting to take higher rank in
population in the near future. The Patterson resolutions, proposing what was
called a “purely federal” plan, were the work of the smaller States,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and to some extent Maryland,
uniting however upon different grounds. Connecticut and New York were opposed
to any radical departure from the Confederation; while New Jersey and Delaware
opposed a “ national government " chiefly because proportional
representation was likely to go with it, whereby they would lose rank at any
rate.
The general
difference between the two plans may be shortly stated thus. By the first plan
there were to be two branches of the legislature; by the second, there was to
be only one. By the first, there was to be
248
representation
by the people at large, the States severally having representation according
to population; by the second* the States were to: be equal in the
legislature. By the first, the executive was to be single; by the second,
plural. By the first, the national government was to have power to act directly
upon the citizens of the several States; by the second, it was to act only upon
the States in their corporate capacity, requisitions being made, as theretofore,
upon the States for supplies, coercion (of the States) to follow in case of
failure. By the first, the executive was to be removable on impeachment and
conviction; by the second, to be removable at the instance of a majority of the
executives of the States. By the first, the legislature was empowered to create
inferior federal Courts; by the second, it was not.
The Patterson
resolutions being now under consideration in committee of the whole, Hamilton,
who was not satisfied with either of the plans proposed, brought forward a plan
of his own, not indeed as a formal measure for action—what the Convention was
likely to do was already indicated—but as a definite expression of theories of
government which he had just set forth at length in a speech before the
committee. This plan proposed a legislature having two branches, an Assembly
and a Senate; the members of the Assembly to be chosen by the people for three
years, those of the Senate to be appointed by electors chosen by the people and
to serve during good behaviour. The executive authority was to be. vested in a
governor, to be appointed by electors chosen by the people and to serve during
good behaviour. Besides having the duties incident to the office, the executive
was to have a right of negative on all Acts of the legislature before they
became laws; with the advice and consent of the Senate he was to have power to
make treaties; he was to appoint federal officers, certain of them with the
advice and consent of the Senate; he was to have the power of pardon except in
cases of treason. The Senate was to have the sole power of declaring war. The
supreme judicial authority was to be vested in judges holding office during
good behaviour, and was to have original jurisdiction in cases of capture and
appellate jurisdiction in matters concerning the federal revenue or citizens of
foreign nations. The legislature was to have power to institute Courts in each
State for determining all matters of general concern. The governor, senators,
and all officers of the United States, were to be liable to impeachment before
a Court of judges from the highest Courts of the States, one from each State.
All laws of the States contrary to the constitution and laws of the United
States were to be void; and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the
governor of each State was to be appointed by the general government, and was
to have a negative upon laws about to be passed in the particular State. No
State was to have land or naval forces; the militia of the States was to be
under the sole direction of the United States, and its officers were to be
appointed by them. The plan was
afterwards
worked out in detail by Hamilton, and given by him to Madison towards the close
of the Convention, as a constitution for the United States which he would have
wished the Convention to adopt.
The Virginia
and the New Jersey plans of government were now considered together, for one
day, in their entirety. Debate ran mostly upon the power of the Convention,
under the action of Congress in proposing it, and the commissions of the
deputies issued in virtue of Acts of the State legislatures, to depart
radically from the Articles of Confederation. But the friends of the Virginia
plan pointed out that the action to be taken would only be a proposal; it could
compel no one; the people could reject it. And then the dangers of the country
were urged as calling upon the Convention to do whatever should be deemed
necessary for the public welfare. The States had sent them there, said
Hamilton, “ to provide for the exigencies of the Union ”; to propose any plan
not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it was not within their
powers, would be to sacrifice the end to the means.
The committee
voted to adhere to the report already made. The Randolph resolutions as amended
and reported were now before the House in Convention, and the serious business
of framing the Constitution was taken up and prosecuted to the end. The first
result was the adoption of a new series of twenty-three similar resolutions,
declaring the sense of the Convention in regard to what the Constitution
should contain. These resolutions were then given, on July 26, to a committee
of detail, to prepare and report a draft of the Constitution. The draft
Constitution was reported by the committee on August 6; on the next day it was
taken up by the Convention and considered, as the original Randolph resolutions
had been considered, point by point, until September 10. The work was now given
to a committee of style and arrangement; the committee reported a revised draft
of the Constitution on September 13; and the Convention, having made a few
small changes, adopted the Constitution in its final form on the 17th of the
same month.
The original
Randolph resolutions will now be taken up in order and carried through their
various stages until, excepting such as disappear on the way, they find
lodgment in the Constitution. All the greater and most of the minor theories of
government, advocated or proposed in the Convention, will in course of the
survey come before the reader.
(1) “National”
government.
The first of
the Randolph resolutions proposed that the Articles of Confederation ought to
be so corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by them,
namely, common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare. This
resolution was postponed (and not
250
“ National”
government. ■ [1787
called up
again), to consider one declaring that a national government ought to be
established, consisting of supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments. The committee readily adopted the resolution, on May 30; six
States voting for it, one, Connecticut, against it, and one, New York, being
divided.
The
resolution, thus adopted by the committee of the whole House, came before the
Convention on June 19. The debate, turning on the word “national,'" was
opened by Wilson in favour of the resolution. He observed that, according to
the meaning which he attached to the words ■ “ national government,” the
proposed government would not swallow up the State governments, as some of the
delegates seemed to wish. He was strongly in favour of preserving the States.
Contrary to what he had understood to be Hamilton’s opinion, he thought that
the States might not only subsist, but subsist on friendly terms with the
national government. The States were necessary for purposes which the national
government could not reach; all large governments must be divided into smaller
jurisdictions.
Hamilton, who
also favoured the resolution, said that he had been misunderstood. He would do
away with the States in the sense only of drawing no boundary between the
national and the State legislatures; the former must therefore have indefinite
authority. If it were limited at all, the States would gradually subvert it.
Even as corporations, some of them would be formidable; as States, he thought
that they ought to be abolished. He admitted the need of them as subordinate
jurisdictions.
King
conceived that the terms “ States,” “ sovereignty,” “ national,” and “federal”
had been inaccurately used. The States were not sovereign in the sense
contended for by some. They could not make war or peace, or alliances or
treaties. They could not speak or listen to foreign sovereigns; they could not
of themselves raise troops or equip vessels for war. If a union of the States
comprised a confederation, it comprised also consolidation. Union of the States
was a union of the men composing them; whence a national character. Congress
(of the Confederacy) could act alone, without the States; it could act against
instructions from the States. If Congress declared war, war was de jure
declared; the States could not change the situation. If then the States
retained some portion of sovereignty, they had divested themselves of essential
portions of it; if they formed a confederacy in some respects, they formed a
nation in others. He doubted whether it were practicable to destroy the States,
but thought that much of their power should be taken away.
Martin
considered that the separation from Great Britain put the former colonies in a
state of nature towards each other; that this would have continued but for the
Confederation; that they entered it on terms of equality; and that they were
now to amend the articles
1787] Effect of thefrst resolution.—Second
resolution. 261
upon the same
footing. He could never agree to inequality, putting ten States at the mercy of
Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.
Wilsqn
disputed the contention that independence gained from Great Britain made the
colonies independent of each other. The Declaration of Independence spoke of
the “ United Colonies ” as free and independent States, that is, independent
unitedly, not individually.
Hamilton was
of the same mind; he denied that separation from Great Britain had thrown the
colonies into a state of nature. He admitted that they were now met on
equality, but could see no inference that the form of government could not be
changed. He would however allay the fears of the smaller States by mentioning
two facts which would make them secure in a national government, though without
their present equality. One was, the local situation of the largest three
States; Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania were separated by distance
and by all such peculiarities as distinguished one State from another. Hence
there need be no fear of combination. The other was, that as there was a
gradation in the States, from Virginia down to Delaware, it would always happen
that ambitious combinations among a few States might and would be counteracted
by defensive combinations of greater extent among the rest. The closer the
union of the States, the less the opportunity for the stronger to injure the
weaker.
On the next
day it was moved by Ellsworth to drop the word “national” and make the resolution
read, that “the government of the United States ought to consist” etc., which
was agreed to without dissent. So the resolution went to the committee of
detail, to be put into form on August 6, in the draft Constitution. There it
was divided into Articles I and II; the first declaring the style of the
government to be the United States of America, with a declaration prefixed that
“We, the people of the States of” etc., finally changed to “ We, the people of
the United States,” ordain etc.; the second, that the government should consist
of supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Both, with the
declaration, were at once adopted by the Convention. But, without further
debate upon the merits of the subject, both articles, reserving the declaration,
were ultimately dropped by the final committee on style and arrangement as
unnecessary by way of formal provision.
(2) Representation.
The second of
the Randolph resolutions provided “that the rights of suffrage in the national
legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the
number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule might seem best in
different cases.”
This
resolution touched a vital point; it would make a radical
change in the
existing order; it would put the States upon the footing of their relative
importance. The smaller States, excepting the Caro- linas and Georgia, took
their stand at once, and maintained it, in one way or another, to the end. The
deputies of Delaware, the smallest of the States in importance, were indeed
restrained by their commission, in express terms, from consenting to anything
whereby the existing equality of the States would be disturbed.
The House in
committee took up the particular Randolph resolution on May 30. The language of
the resolution was not acceptable to the leaders of the great States, though it
ran in the right direction; and various attempts were made to change it, in the
way of broadening it. In this state of tl ngs Read moved that the resolution be
postponed ; at the same time reminding the committee that, if any change in
the rule of suffrage should be made, it would be the duty of the deputies from
Delaware, according to their commission, to retire from the Convention.
Gouvemeur Morris and Madison strongly asserted the determination of the larger
States for proportional representation as fundamental. Whatever reason, said
Madison, might have existed for equality under a “ federal ” union among
sovereign States, it must cease when a “national” government was put in its
place. In the former case, the Acts of Congress had depended so much on the
co-operation of the States, that the States had rights nearly in proportion to
their extent and importance; in the latter case, the Acts of the government
would take effect without calling upon the States for aid, and there would be
the same reason for difference in representation of the States as there was in
that of counties of varying importance within particular States.
The motion
for postponement was agreed to. On June 9 the subject was brought before the
committee again, and debate was opened by Brearly. The same question, he said,
had been much agitated in forming the Confederation, and had then been rightly
settled; and the smaller States had been saved. He admitted that the
substitution of a ratio carried fairness on its face; in reality it was unfair.
Virginia would have sixteen votes, Georgia but one, out of a total of ninety
members in the legislature. The large States would carry everything before
them. In his own State (New Jersey), where large and small counties were united
for electing members of the State legislature, the large counties always
carried their point. He would not say that it was fair that Georgia should have
an equal vote with Virginia; the only remedy was to wipe out existing
boundaries and have a new partition into thirteen equal parts.
Patterson
considered the proposition for proportional representation as striking at the
existence of the smaller States. If they were to be a “nation,” State distinctions
must be abolished, the whole thrown into hotch-pot and an equal division made;
that was the only way to secure the equality desired by the greater States.
There was no more reason
that a single
great State, contributing much, should have more votes than a small one
contributing little, than that a single rich man should have more votes than a
poor man had. “ If the rateable property of A was to that of B as forty to one,
ought A, for that reason, to have forty times as many votes as B ? ” If A had more
to be protected, he ought to contribute more. Give to the large States
influence in proportion to their importance, and their ambition would be
increased accordingly, and the small States would have everything to fear. New
Jersey would never confederate on the plan before the Convention.
Wilson
contended that, as all authority was derived from the people, equal numbers
ought to have an equal number of representatives, and different numbers should
have different numbers of representatives. That principle, under pressure, had
been violated in the Confederation. As to the A and B argument, he said that in
districts as large as the States, the number of people was the best measure of
their wealth; hence whether wealth or numbers formed the ratio, it would be the
same. Persons, not property, had been admitted to be the measure of suffrage;
were not the citizens of Pennsylvania equal to those of New Jersey? Did it
require one hundred and fifty of the former to balance fifty of the latter?
They had been told that each State being sovereign, all were equal. So each man
was “ naturally ” a sovereign over himself, and all men therefore were
“naturally” equal; but the individual could not retain this “natural” equality
when he became a member of civil government; nor could a sovereign State when
it became a member of a federal government.
On the
following day a change took place, which narrowed the question before the
committee. Sherman made a suggestion that representation be put upon a
different footing in the two branches of the legislature; proportional
representation to be the rule in the first branch, equality in the second. And
now King and Wilson brought the question to a point, by a motion that the right
of suffrage in the first branch should not be according to the Confederation,
but according to some equitable ratio; thus eliminating the second branch, for
the present, from consideration. The debate proceeded accordingly, though more
or less upon the broader ground of the original resolution.
Franklin said
that he had at first thought that the members of the national legislature
should consider themselves representatives of the whole country rather than of
their particular States; in which case the proportion of members from each
State would be of small importance. But as that idea had not been accepted, he
thought that the number of representatives should bear some proportion to the
number to be represented. He did not believe that the greater States would
swallow the smaller; they would have nothing to gain by it. A like fear had
been expressed when the union of England and Scotland was under consideration.
Scotland would be ruined unless she had an equal number of representatives in
Parliament with England; but the fear had proved
^oundless.
Indeed, under the present mode of voting by States it was in the power of the
smaller States to swallow up the greater. Suppose, he said, that seven smaller
States had each three members in the House, and the six larger, on an average,
six members each, and that upon a given question two members of each smaller
State should be in the affirmative and one in the negative, making fourteen
affirmatives and seven negatives, and that all the larger States should be
unanimously in the negative, making thirty-six negatives. The result would be,
fourteen affirmatives, forty-three negatives; and yet the affirmatives, the
minority, would prevail. The larger States were as unv illing as the smaller
ones to have their interests left in the hands of others. There had been a hint
of equalising the States, to avoid the difficulty; the idea was fair,' and he
would not oppose it if it were practicable. Formerly the idea could not have
been entertained; the provinces had had different constitutions, some having
greater privileges than others, and then it was a matter of importance to the
borderers on which side of the line they were placed. Now these differences
were done away, and the location of boundaries was less important. The
interests of a State were made up of the interests of its individual members;
if the individuals were not injured, the State was not injured; and small
States were more easily and happily governed than large. If then, in making a
new division, it should be found necessary to cut down Pennsylvania, he would
not be unwilling to give part of it to New Jersey and part to Delaware. But
there would be difficulties in the way; equality would soon disappear in the
varying increase of population, and new divisions would then again be called
for. He had what he believed a better and more permanent plan to propose. It
was this :—
Let the
weakest State say what proportion of money or force it was able and willing to
furnish for the Union; let the rest agree to famish severally an equal amount;
the whole to be absolutely in the disposal of Congress; the Congress to be
composed of an equal number of delegates from cach State, and a majority of the
delegates voting individually to prevail. If the supplies thus furnished should
be insufficient, let Congress make requisitions on the greater States for
further aid, to be offered voluntarily, accord' ng to the view taken by each
State of the need of the aid and of the amount to be given.
The plan,
Franklin said, was not new; it had been successfully tried in England with
Ireland and with the American colonies. We sometimes gave even more than had
been expected of us or than had been thought proper; England had given back to
us in five years a million sterling. We should probably have continued these
contributions, as occasion called, had England not chosen to force us and thus
to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of acting voluntarily. If this was done
towards a government in which we had no representation, it would not be refused
to the government now proposed.
The motion of
King and Wilson however prevailed; seven States, among them Connecticut, voting
aye, three States, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, nay. Maryland was
divided.
Questions of
ratio were now briefly considered and agreed to; New Jersey and Delaware
opposing. The result was reported to the Convention in one of the resolutions
of June IS. On the introduction of the Patterson resolutions, two days later,
the subject was reopened by a further commitment of the resolution of June 13.
Wilson again urged proportional representation. Inequality had always been a
poison. It was so in Great Britain; the political liberty of that country,
owing to the inequality of representation, was at the mercy of the rulers.
Small bodies, further, were more easily seduced than large ones; and inequality
would aggravate the difficulty. Hamilton considered that equality of suffrage
would be fatal. The large States would not consent to it; or, if they did,
would not do so for long. It shocked all ideas of justice.
These remarks
of Wilson and of Hamilton were made in the course of speeches in relation to
the two plans of government, taken as a whole, which were then before the
committee. The New Jersey plan was rejected a few days later in committee, and
the Randolph resolutions as reported were at once reaffirmed. On June 26 the
Convention accordingly took into consideration the resolution in regard to
suffrage in the first branch of the legislature.
The debate
was opened by Martin, who strongly opposed proportional representation. The
States, he said, were equally sovereign and free; and being equal, they could
not in his opinion confederate so as to give up equality without giving up
their liberty. The proposition before the Convention therefore was a
proposition for enslaving ten States; Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania
had forty-two ninetieths of the votes of the country, and could do what they
pleased unless some miraculous union of the other ten took place; they had to
gain but one of them to make themselves complete masters. If the large States
had no interest in doing wrong to the smaller, there could be no danger in
equal suffrage. In regard to dangers of dissolution, he said that the large
States were weak in proportion to their extent, and powerful only in their
votes. The small States therefore would have nothing to fear from dissolution;
and he would rather have partial confederacies than the plan before the House.
Williamson,
on the other side, considered it mathematically plain that States which were
equally sovereign at first would, on parting with an equal proportion of
sovereignty, remain equally sovereign. He thought they should also take into
account the prospect of the addition of new States from the West. These would
be small and poor, and would accordingly be tempted to combine to lay burdens
upon the older States, which they could the more easily do under equal
suffrage. This suggestion concerning the West was repeated by others.
256
Argument from
experience and history.
Madison was
disposed to concur in any plan, consistent with fundamental principles, for
removing the difficulty in question; but equality was neither just nor
necessary. Those who asked for equality, on the ground of the equality of
sovereign States, had confused the effect of treaty-making pure and simple,
with compacts for other purposes, such as raising money or troops. France might
enter into treaty with the Prince of Monaco for the regulation of commerce,
upon a footing of equality; but would the millions of France submit their
fortunes to the thousands of Monaco in the matter of raising money or troops?
Why were countries represented in proportion to numbers? Was it because the
representatives were chosen by the people themselves ? The same would be true
of the representatives in the national legislature. Was it because the larger
had more at stake than the smaller ? The same would be true of the larger and
smaller States. Was it because the laws operated immediately upon persons and
property ? The same was true in some degree under the Confederation; the same
would be true generally under the plan in question. That equality was not
necessary he considered equally true. Was a combination of the large States
dreaded ? Their interests were not common, and equality in size was no reason
for combining. The journals of Congress did not show any tendency that way.
Contention rather than combination was likely, if they could judge from the
experience of other countries. Carthage and Rome tore each other to pieces,
instead of uniting to devour weaker nations; Austria and France were hostile so
long as they remained the greatest powers of Europe. England and France had now
succeeded to pre-eminence and to mutual enmity, and America had gained its
liberty in consequence. Were the large States, singly, dangerous to the smaller
States ? Then the latter ought to desire a government strong enough to control
the former. Here again experience was instructive. What was the situation of
minor sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which the more
powerful were under no control except that of the law of nations ? Was not the
danger to the weak in proportion to their weakness ? Let them note the position
of the weaker members of the Amphictyonic Council. What was the condition of
the minor States in the Germanic Confederacy ? They owed such safety as they
had partly to enlisting under the rival banners of the great members, partly to
alliances with neighbouring princes, where such were not prohibited. Two
extremes were before the Convention, a perfect separation, and a perfect
incorporation of the thirteen States. By the first, they would be independent
nations, subject to no external law but the law of nations; by the second, they
would be mere counties of one entire Republic, subject to one common law. By
the first, the smaller States would have everything to fear from the larger; by
the second, nothing. The true policy for the smaller States therefore lay in
promoting a form of government which would most nearly place the States upon
the footing
of counties.
They could never expect a partition of the larger States if the general
government was feeble; for in that case all their strength would be needed by
themselves. Given energy and stability in the general government, and
partitions might follow.
Wilson said
that, according to the other side, borough representation in England was right.
Indeed Old Sarum had ground of complaint; London sent four representatives to
Parliament, while entitled to but two on the theory of equality.
Sherman
argued that it was right for some of the States to^give up more than others.
The rich man who entered society along with the poor man gives up more than the
poor man, yet with an equal vote he is equally safe; if the rich man were to
have more votes, in proportion to his stake, the poor man would not be safe.
At this stage
of the Convention (it was now June 28), a notable speech was made by Franklin.
The Convention, he said, had been in session for four or five weeks, and there
had been little else than contention. “We indeed seem to feel,” said he, “our
own want of political wisdom, since we have been running about in search of it.
We have gone back to ancient history...; we have viewed modem States...
but
find none of their constitutions suitable to our circumstances_______
Groping as it
were in the dark,...how has it happened” that the Convention has not sought
light from the “ Father of lights ” ? He moved that the House be opened every
morning with prayers.
No vote was
taken; and the incident is mentioned here only to show the strain under which
the Convention was now labouring. The question thus far was whether one side
would yield to the other; whether there was any common ground between them had
not been seriously considered. On the next day Johnson pointed out that there
was such ground; there were aristocratic and other individual interests, and
there were interests of the States as such, to be guarded. Let the States be
treated in certain respects in their political capacity, in others as districts
of individual citizens, and the two ideas be combined instead of being treated
as opposed to each other; let one branch be represented by the people at large,
the other by the States corporately—a suggestion like that made by his
colleague Sherman on June 10.
Nothing
however, for the present, came of it, and the strain continued. The danger of
disruption, with its grave consequences, was before the Convention. Gorham
warned the delegates from the smaller States that these would have more to lose
than the larger. The large States would be more able to take care of
themselves; the weaker therefore were more interested in creating a stable
government. The weaker States would be at the mercy of the stronger in case of
disruption; Delaware would be at the mercy of Pennsylvania. So it had been
formerly when Massachusetts was composed of three colonies; but all danger had
ceased after they were united. So it had been in
258 Dangers of disruption.—Buie of suffrage.
[i787
Connecticut;
so in New Jersey. If disruption took place, the fate of New Jersey would be
worst of all; she had no foreign commerce, and could have none; she would be
ruined between New York and Pennsylvania. In view of such perils, he must stay
there as long as any one would meet him, to find some plan to submit to the people.
Others too
spoke of the danger; Read, for Delaware, scouted it; the larger States, he
said, wanted a general government because they felt their own weakness.
Madison
entreated the small States to renounce a principle which was unjust, and never
could be admitted in a constitution which they wished to last for ever. He
urged them to ponder the danger of disruption. It had been said that want of
energy in the large States would be security for the small ones; but that want
of energy would proceed from the supposed security of the States against
external danger. Let each depend upon itself for security, and let danger arise
from distant powers or neighbouring States, and the languishing condition of
all the States, large and small, would be changed into vigour. His fear was
that they would then show too much energy, that they would be dangerous not
merely to each other, but to the liberty of all. And danger from disruption
would follow, whether an entire separation between the States took place or
partial confederations were formed.
Hamilton said
that as States were a collection of individuals, nothing could be more
preposterous than to sacrifice the latter to the artificial beings which they
created. It had been said that if the smaller States gave up their equality,
they gave up their liberty; the truth was, it was a contest for power, not for
liberty. Would the people of the smaller States be less free than those of the
larger? Delaware, with forty thousand inhabitants, would indeed lose power if
she had but a tenth of the votes allowed to Pennsylvania, with four hundred
thousand; but would the people of Delaware be less free if each citizen had an
equal vote with each citizen of Pennsylvania? He spoke earnestly of the dangers
of dissolution. This was the critical moment; it was a miracle that they were
there; it would be madness to trust to future miracles.
The debate
came to an end on the same day, and the States voted, six against four, “that
the rule of suffrage in the first branch ought not to be according to that
established by the Articles of Confederation.” The four votes against changing
the rule of equality were given bv Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and
Delaware; the large States were supported by North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia. Maryland was divided. The question had been before the Convention
for three days; it was now June 29.
The result
was put into the hands of the committee of detail, without further change, and
by that committee into the draft Constitution of August 6. There it was
accordingly provided that the members of the House of Representatives should be
chosen by the people of the
States, the
number of representatives being declared for the several States proportionately
to population, with provision for change in the case of changes of population.
This, so far as the principle of proportional representation was concerned,
was adopted by the Convention, and was without further difficulty introduced
into the Constitution (section 2 of Article I).
The rule of
suffrage in the Senate, or second branch of the legislature, was taken up by
the Convention on the same day; and the struggle as to equality was renewed.
The resolution reported by the committee of the whole House declared in favour
of the same rule in the Senate as in the first branch. Ellsworth now moved that
the rule in the second branch be the same as that in the Confederation. He did
not regret the result of the vote fixing the rule for the first branch; he
hoped it would furnish ground of “ compromise ” for the rule in the second. The
Virginia plan was partly national, partly federal; proportional representation
was conformable to the national principle, equality to the federal. The former
would secure the larger States, the latter the smaller. The large States would
still have an influence which would maintain their superiority. Holland had a
prevailing influence in the Dutch confederacy, notwithstanding equality. The
small States must have the power to defend themselves; he could not admit there
was no danger that the larger States would combine. Combination among the
smaller States would be more difficult because they were numerous. Besides, had
they not plighted their faith to the existing article of the Confederation
touching suffrage P New England, excepting Massachusetts, would not agree to
the government proposed by the Randolph resolutions.
Wilson,
refusing to be moved by hints of disruption on the part of “ twenty-two against
ninety of the population,” went on to say that the rule fixed for the first
branch did not remove the objection to equality in the second. Equality in the
Senate would enable the minority to control the majority in all cases. Seven
States would control six, though the former had but twenty-four (sic)
ninetieths of the population. They were framing a government for men, not for
States. On every principle the rule of suffrage should be proportional in both
branches of the government. The danger of combination among the larger States
was imaginary; rivalry was more likely, as Madison had said. Sometimes
monarchy, sometimes aristocracy, had been feared by the other side; if the
executive were taken from one of the large States, would not the other two be
thrown into the scale with the rest? Whence then the danger of monarchy ? Were the
people of the three larger States more aristocratic than those of the smaller?
How then could a danger of aristocracy arise from them ? They talked of States,
and forgot what States were composed of. Was a real majority a hotbed of
aristocracy ? Aristocracy was a government of the minority. Bad governments
governed too
260 Arguments from
other governments.—Slavery. [i787
much or too
little. Which of these evils afflicted the United States ? It was the
latter,—weakness and inefficiency. They had been sent to the Convention to find
a remedy; if the motion prevailed, the country would be left fettered as
before, with the further mortification of seeing the principle adopted in the
first branch defeated in the second.
The argument,
said Ellsworth in reply, that the minority would rule the majority, if his own
motion prevailed, was unsound. Power was given to the few to save them from
destruction by the many. Was the idea novel ? He pointed to the British
Constitution, to the negative of the House of Lords. No instance of a
confederacy without equality had in fact existed. They were razing the
foundations when only the roof needed repairs. No salutary measure had ever
been lost for want of a majority of the States to favour it. And he appealed
again to the House to remember the plighted faith under which each State, great
and small, held an equal right of suffrage in the government.
Madison,
replying, said that it was a mistake to assert that there was no instance in
which confederated States had not equality of suffrage. Passing over the German
system, in which the King of Prussia had nine votes, he spoke of the Lycian
Confederacy, the members of which had votes according to their importance; a
government recommended by Montesquieu as the fittest model of a confederacy. To
the appeal to plighted faith, he replied that those who required the keeping of
faith should themselves be guiltless. Of all the States, Connecticut was perhaps
least able to urge the point; by a recent vote that State had positively
refused to comply with requisitions of Congress, and had sent a copy of the
vote to that body. It was not enough that proportional voting governed one
branch of the legislature; the majority of the States might still injure the
majority of the people, by obstructing their wishes and by extorting measures
from them. He contended that the division between the States was not between
great and small; they were chiefly divided in regard to slavery. The division
lay between northern and southern States; and if defensive power was necessary,
it should be given accordingly. He had been so impressed with that fact, that
he had been seeking a solution of the question before the Convention in that
direction. The one which had occurred to him was, that representation in one
branch should be according to the number of free inhabitants, and in the other
according to the whole number, slaves counted as free citizens. But he would
not add new difficulties to the problem.
Signs of
willingness to make concession in favour of the smaller States now began to
appear; but no one would go far enough. Wilson admitted that there might be
trouble with the number of senators, on the Virginia plan. He made this
suggestion: let there be one senator to each State for every one hundred
thousand inhabitants; States not having that number having still one senator.
Franklin proposed a plan drawn from the adjustment of rights in fitting out a
ship having
1787]
Equal suffrage
lost.—New plan.
261
several
owners. It was in substance as follows. The legislatures of the States should
send an equal number of delegates to the second branch. In questions affecting
the States themselves, or the extent of authority over their citizens, there
should be equal suffrage; so with appointments to civil office in which the second
branch had a part. In fixing salaries, and in providing for public expenses and
revenues, the States should have suffrage in proportion to the sums which they
severally contributed.
King was
alarmed at the willingness to sacrifice the rights of men to the phantom of
State sovereignty. He was prepared for any event rather than yield to a vicious
principle. He might yield to some such expedient as that suggested by Wilson;
he would not listen to a proposal of equality. Madison too was willing to follow
Wilson’s suggestion, provided that due independence be given to the Senate.
Bedford
argued that the Convention should provide against ambition and avarice. The
voting in the Convention itself had been dictated by those passions. The large
States were seeking to aggrandise themselves at the expense of the small.
Georgia was indeed a small State, but was actuated by the prospect of being
great; South Carolina was actuated both by present interest and future
prospects. So of North Carolina; so of the three great States. Could the small
States act from pure disinterestedness? They would be ruined by inequality,
whether through combination or through competition of the greater States. The
small States would meet the large on no ground but that of the Confederation.
They had been told that this was the last chance; he had no fear. The large
States dared not dissolve the Confederation; if they did dissolve it, the small
would find foreign allies of higher honour and good faith.
Ellsworth’s
motion for equal suffrage was lost, on July 2, by an equal division; and the
debate was continued on the report of the committee in favour of proportional
suffrage. But the Convention was soon at a full stop, as Sherman said;
unwilling that it should break up, he proposed the appointment of a special
committee to devise, if possible, some expedient. The suggestion was adopted.
Three days
later this committee brought in a report, founded upon a motion made before it
by Franklin, the purport of which was, that all money bills should (as in most
of the States) originate in the first branch of the legislature, and that such
bills should not be amended in the second, and that in the second branch each
State should have an equal vote. Both of these proposals were to be adopted, or
neither. The members of the committee had been of different minds; the report
was brought forward merely to suggest some ground of accommodation. It was but
barely agreed to by those opposed to equality; the other side considered that
they had practically gained their point. The concession in regard to money
bills was not generally acceptable to the larger States. Experience, Madison
said, had proved that such concessions
262
Money bills.—Heated
debate on union.
were useless.
If seven States in the Senate wished a bill, they could find someone in the
other branch who would set it in motion. And amendments could be handed in
privately by the senators to members of the other House. Experience had also
shown that such regulations were a source of frequent and obstinate
altercation. A like motion, judged on its own merits, had been rejected on a
former occasion, for these reasons. He considered that the Convention was
reduced to the alternative of departing from justice to conciliate the smaller
States and the minority, or of displeasing these by justly gratifying the
larger States and the majority. He could not hesitate. It was vain to purchase
concord on terms which must bring discord. The Convention ought to adopt a plan
which would bear examination; if at first men judged of the system by the
Convention, they would at last judge of the Convention by the system.
Gouverneur
Morris believed that if they recommended a plan which was reasonable,
reasonable minds would embrace it everywhere. The ties of interest, kindred,
and common habits were too strong to be broken easily. He was sure of New
Jersey. The country at any rate must be united; if persuasion did not unite it,
the sword would, and the gallows and the halter would finish the work. He did
not like the plan of equality in the Senate; it would cause constant dispute
and appeal to the States, and thus undermine the government. Suppose that the
delegates from Massachusetts and those from Rhode Island, in the Senate, should
disagree, and that the former were outvoted ; what would be the result? They
would declare that their .State would not abide by the decision. State
attachments had been the bane of the country; he would have their ideas
enlarged. Who could say whether he, much less his children, another year would
live in this State or in that?
Comments on
the warmth of the debate, with disclaimers and explanations, followed; and then
discussion went off upon other parts of. the special report, which may be
passed over. Two days later (July 7) the question of equality in the Senate,
under the special report, was again taken up. Gerry would agree to the report
rather than have no accommodation. A government short of a proper national one,
if generally acceptable, would be better than a proper government which, if carried
out at all, must deal with discontented Staces. An equal vote in the Senate
would, in the opinion of Sherman, be most likely to give to the government the
requisite vigour. The small States had more vigour than the large ones; hence
the more influence the large States had, the weaker would be the government. If
they voted by States in the Senate, equally, there must always be a majority of
States on the side of public measures; if they did not, there might be a
majority of States against them. The government would find it hard to compel a
majority, and would be weaker than ever.
After further
remarks by Wilson against yielding, a vote was taken
1787] Equality adopted.—Adjustment of numbers.
263
on the words
of the special report, “that in the second branch each State shall have an
equal vote,” and this part was adopted; six States voting for it and three
against, to wit, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. Massachusetts and
Georgia were divided. One week later, on July 14, the subject was, on the motion
of Wilson, reconsidered. He said that had their constituents voted as they had
themselves, the vote would have stood as two-thirds to one-third against
equality. The state of the case would yet become known; it would appear that
this fundamental point had been carried by one-third against two-thirds.
An adjustment
was now moved by Charles Pinckney, making the Senate consist of thirty-six
members; the two smallest States, Rhode Island and Delaware, having one member
each, the largest, Virginia, having five, and Massachusetts and Pennsylvania,
four members each. Wilson, Madison, and King, from the three large States,
favoured the motion, but without abating their belief in proportional suffrage.
Gerry opposed the motion; there was no hope, he said, that it would succeed;
adjustment must go further in favour of the smaller States. King preferred
doing nothing to yielding to equality. The objection to proportional voting in
the Senate, drawn from “ the terms of the existing compact ” in the
Confederation, was inapplicable; the rule in the Confederation for apportioning
the public burden was fixed; in the proposed government it could not be fixed,
because indirect taxation was to be adopted. The objection from danger to the
smaller States had little weight with him; the general government could never
wish to intrude upon the States; there could be no temptation.
Madison too
was still firmly opposed to equal suffrage in the Senate. If the smaller States
really wished for a strong government, one that could enforce obedience upon
the larger States as well as upon themselves, they were mistaking the means.
He reminded them of the consequences of establishing the Confederation upon
wrong principles. All the chief parties to it joined at once in fettering the
government. It had been said that the government was to be partly federal,
partly national. It did not follow that in one branch of the government equal
suffrage, based on the equality of the States, should prevail, while in the
other proportional suffrage based upon general population, should govern. The
true ground for compromise, if there was any, was this : in all cases in which
the government is to act upon the people, let the people be represented and the
votes be proportional; in all cases in which the government is to act upon the
States as such, let the States be represented and the votes be equal. But
there was no ground for compromise. He called for a single instance in which
the general government was not to operate upon the people individually. The
large States would find some way to have an influence in the government
proportionate to their importance; if they could not have proportional
representation, their co-operation must be voluntary. Even in the Confederation
264
Delaware had
not the weight of Pennsylvania. He repeated, that the real difference between
the States was not between large and small, but between northern and southern,
States. Slavery was the dividing line; there were five States south, and eight
States north of it. Under proportional representation the northern States
would outnumber the southern; but every day would tend towards equalising them.
Wilson would
agree to equality if the error were one that time would correct, but it was
not; the error was mortal. He had considered the argument that equality was
necessary to the preservation of the smaller States; but he believed it
unsound. Was there any reason to suppose that if their preservation should
depend mainly on the large States, the safety of the States against the general
government would be lessened? Were the large States less attached to their
existence than the small ones ?
Pinckney’s
motion was voted on shortly afterwards, and lost; four States voting for it and
six against. Virginia and Pennsylvania were with the ayes, Massachusetts with
the nays. On the next day the whole report of the special committee, amended in
several respects, was adopted, with the provision for equal voting in the
Senate; the vote standing five ayes to four nays. Pennsylvania and Virginia
were among the nays; Massachusetts was divided. New York, which doubtless would
have supported the affirmative, was not represented; Yates and Lansing had left
the Convention on the ground that it was exceeding its powers; Hamilton was
absent, and would hardly have cast the vote of New York had he been present.
The delegates
from the larger States were still unwilling to accept the decision of the
House; but in the actual state of things there was no use of further discussion.
Randolph accordingly suggested adjournment for the day, that the larger States
might decide what to do in the solemn crisis, and that the smaller might
deliberate on means of conciliation. The suggestion prevailed; but adjournment
failed to help matters. A meeting of members from the larger States, with
several from the smaller, took place on the next morning, before the Convention
came together, and informally considered the situation, but without arriving at
any agreement. Those who opposed equality were divided among themselves in
regard to the course to be pursued, with the result that the delegates from the
smaller States were encouraged to hold to the point they had gained; which they
did.
The decision
in favour of equality therefore stood. A week later, individual voting among
senators was agreed upon. The result was given accordingly to the committee of
detail, and by that committee put into the draft Constitution of August 6.
Thence the provision was without further difficulty inserted in the Constitution
itself, as the first part of section 3, Article I.
Closely
connected with the question of proportional representation
in the House
of Representatives was the question of the basis of representation. What
should the proportion rest upon? The Randolph resolution declared, as has been
seen, that it should rest upon the quotas of contribution, or the number of
free inhabitants, as might seem best in different cases. The substituted
resolution of King and Wilson, referred to above, eliminating the Senate,
provided for the House of Representatives “ some equitable ratio of
representation.” The discussion of the resolution, running more or less on
both lines, as a matter of fact in the first instance turned on the basis of
proportion. That branch of the discussion will now be followed out.
Opening the
debate, Dickinson urged that actual contributions by the States to the general
government should be taken as the basis of representation. If duty were
connected with interest, the States would not fail. King however pointed out
that, as imposts were to be one source of the public revenue, the non-importing
States would be in a bad situation; it might happen that they would have no
representation. Franklin then proposed the plan already stated, of joint and equal
supplies, with equality in the number of delegates. But nothing came of the
proposal; and the committee, having already adopted the motion in favour of
departing from the rule in the Confederation, now voted, nine States to two,
for representation in proportion to the whole number of free inhabitants and
three-fifths of all other persons, except Indians not taxed; adding the
provision to the words “equitable ratio of representation ” just adopted. So
the committee reported to the Convention on June 13.
Later, on
July 5, came the special conditional report before mentioned, giving to the
first branch the origination of money bills. This report also proposed that
representation in that branch should be on the scale of “ one member for every
forty thousand inhabitants of the description reported ” by the committee of
the whole as already stated.
Gouvemeur
Morris objected to the scale. He thought that property ought to be taken into
consideration, as well as the number of inhabitants. The acquisition of property
was the main object of society; he did not believe that life and liberty were
of more value than property. Property ought then to be one measure of influence
in the government. Further he looked to the admission of new States from the
West. The Atlantic States ought to be secure of their power in the government;
provision should be made to prevent their being outvoted.
Rutledge was
of the same opinion; property was the chief object of society; and if numbers
should be made the basis of representation, the Atlantic States would be
overborne by the western. He accordingly moved that suffrage should be
proportioned to the sums to be contributed by the inhabitants of the States
respectively, with provision for a census at stated times. The motion was lost,
South Carolina alone voting for it. A recommitment was now ordered, and a
substitute
report made
three days later; which, after fixing the number of representatives in the
first branch, for the present, at fifty-six, proposed that the national
legislature should have authority, from time to time, to increase the number,
and in case of division or union of States, or of the creation of new ones, to
regulate representation upon the principles of wealth and population.
Gorham, a
member of this special committee, said in explanation of the report that two
objections had prevailed against the proposal of one member for every forty
thousand inhabitants. The first was, that the representation would soon be too
numerous; the second was, that the western States might, on that principle,
outvote the Atlantic. Both objections were now removed. The total number fixed
upon was small and could be kept so; and the Atlantic States, having the
government in their own hands, could take care of their interests, dealing out representation
to the western States in safe proportions.
Patterson
opposed the report; an estimate according to the combined rule of numbers and
wealth was too vague. Slaves were property only; like other property, they were
entirely subject to the will of the master. Had a man in Virginia a number of
votes in proportion to the number of his slaves ? If then slaves were not
represented in the States to which they belonged, why should they be
represented in the general government? Did the slaves themselves vote? Why
then should they be counted ? The plan reported would also encourage the
slave-trade.
Madison
suggested what he had already referred to, that the States should be
represented in the first branch according to the number of their free
inhabitants, and in the second—which, he said, had for one of its first objects
the protection of property—according to the whole number, including slaves.
King had
always believed that as the southern States were the richest, they would not
join the northern unless that fact was respected. If the north wished to be
protected in their greater commercial interests, they must give something in
return. Slaves were to be considered in apportioning taxes; and taxation and
representation ought to go together.
The number fixed
for present representation having been raised by the Convention to sixty-five,
and apportioned among the States accordingly, an amendment to the rest of the
special report was moved by Randolph to the effect that, to ascertain the
changes in the population and wealth of the States, the legislature should be
required to cause a census to be taken periodically, and should arrange the
representation accordingly.
This was
opposed by Gouvemeur Morris and by Sherman, as fettering the legislature.
Morris said that new States, in time of war or when war was imminent, might
take advantage of the power to extort favours. Such provisions in the
constitutions of the States had been found pernicious.
The new
States from the West would preponderate in the scale; in time they would
outnumber the Atlantic States in population. He would give power to the
existing States to keep a majority of votes in their own hands.
Mason
favoured the motion. There ought to be a revision from time to time. The
apportionment of the sixty-five members properly gave a majority to the
northern States; but the northern States ought not to outweigh the southern
when the reason ceased. Those who had power would not give it up, unless
compelled; if the southern States should have hereafter three-fourths of the
people of America, the northern States would hold fast the majority of
representatives; there would be no relief. The argument of danger from new
States was selfishness. If the western States were to be admitted to the Union,
they should be treated as equals.
Randolph’s
motion was now postponed for a substitute offered by Williamson, by which, to
ascertain changes in population and wealth, a census should be taken
periodically “ of the free white inhabitants and three-fifths of those of other
descriptions.” Gouvemeur Morris and Rutledge opposed the substitute on the
ground that numbers were no just estimate of wealth; which Madison and Sherman
contested. Morris would leave the regulation of representation to the
legislature. He held the same opinion he had before expressed in regard to the
western country. The West would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened
in government with those from the Atlantic States; it was in the busy haunts of
men, not in the remote wilderness, that political talents were schooled. If the
western people should get power, they would ruin the Atlantic States. As for
admitting the blacks into the census, the people of Pennsylvania would not be
put upon the footing of slaves. He urged members from the south to put aside
distrust; they need have no fear from leaving the adjustment of representation,
from time to time, to the discretion of the legislature; duty, honour, and oath
would govern. It was best to leave the interests of the people to the people’s
representatives.
Madison
argued that population in America was a just measure of wealth; he would
therefore fix the representation rather than leave the question to the
legislature. Nor would he make any discrimination against the West. Imports and
exports would be the chief source of revenue for the government; and as soon as
the Mississippi river (controlled by Spain) was opened, which must happen when
the West increased enough in population and ability to share the public
burden, imposts on their trade could be collected at less expense and with
greater certainty than on that of the Atlantic States. Meantime, as their
supplies must pass through the Atlantic States, contributions from the West
would be levied like those from the East. He would fix a perpetual standard of
representation. It had been said that representation
268
Periodical census.—Slaves.
[l787
and taxation
were to go together; that taxation and wealth ought to go together; that
population and wealth were no measure of each other. He admitted the last
statement when applied to different climates with differing forms of government
and differing stages of civilisation. He contended that the case was otherwise
with the United States. Climate indeed varied; yet as government, laws, and
manners were nearly the same, and intercourse was free, population, industry,
arts, and labour would constantly tend to equalise themselves. The value of
labour might be considered as the principal criterion of wealth and of ability
to pay taxes, and would find its level in different places where intercourse
was easy and free, with as much certainty as the value of money or anything
else.
The
Convention agreed to the part of the Williamson motion providing for a
periodical census of free inhabitants, and went on to consider the provision
for counting the slave population as three to five of the free. This was
objected to by certain members from the North, on the ground already mentioned,
that it would cause discontent among their people. In the further discussion of
this part of the motion, Gorham said that estimates had been made in various
towns of Massachusetts, and it had been found, even including Boston, that the
most exact proportion prevailed between numbers and property. Wilson had
observed a like relation in Pennsylvania; comparing the newer settlements even
with Philadelphia, he could find little difference between numbers and wealth.
This part of
Williamson’s proposition was defeated; and finally the whole was rejected, no
State voting for it as it then stood. The Convention was now thrown back upon
the motion of Randolph, proposing a periodical census of wealth and population,
to which was added a provision, agreed to by all, that “ direct taxation ought
to be proportioned to representation.” Again it was chiefly a question of
slavery; and members from the South, spoke very plainly. Randolph urged that
express security should be provided for including slaves in the representation.
He regretted the existence of that kind of property; but it did exist, and the holders
of it would require the security he asked for.
A motion to
make the blacks equal to the whites in representation received the votes of
only two States, South Carolina and Georgia. Finally the Convention adopted,
entire, a proposal to apportion representation to direct taxation, the blacks
to be as three-fifths of the whites in both particulars, and a census to be
required within six years and within every ten years thereafter; six States
voting for it, two against it, and two being divided. The South was now willing
to strike out the word “ wealth,” and so moved. Gouvemeur Morris, opposing,
foresaw a transfer of power, in the plan as it stood, from the North to the
South and the interior, in other words from the maritime to the landed
interest; and the result would be that commerce would be oppressed.
He should
accordingly be obliged to vote for the vicious principle of equality in the
Senate, to provide some defence for the North. He did not believe in giving
security to special interests; there would be no end of demands. If slaves were
property, as the three-fifths rule imported, the word “ wealth ” should not be
struck out.
On the motion
to strike out the word “ wealth ” all the States voted aye, except Delaware,
which was divided. This was on July 13; no material change was afterwards made.
The clause accordingly passed through the committee of detail and the draft
Constitution of August 6 into the Constitution itself, as the third part of
Article I, section 2. There it reads, in substance, that representatives and
direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, these to be determined by adding to the whole number of
free persons, excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.
The qualification
of electors voting for representatives in the first branch caused some debate,
which may be passed over. The Randolph resolutions were silent upon the
subject; but it was finally voted that the qualification should be the same as
that for electors in the several States respectively for the most numerous
branch of their own legislatures ; and so the rule went into the Constitution,
in Article I, section 2.
(3) Division of the Legislature.
The third of
the Randolph resolutions, providing for a legislature to consist of two
branches, had been agreed to in committee of the whole, on May 31, without
debate or dissent. On June 16, the Patterson resolutions being now before the
same committee, the question whether the legislature should be divided or not
was debated.
Patterson
argued that the reason for dividing a State legislature into two branches was
not applicable to that of the Union. In the States party heat prevailed, and a
check to hasty or ill-considered legislation might be necessary. In such a body
as (the existing) Congress, the check was less necessary; and, besides, the
delegations of the different States were checks upon each other. He urged also
the objection of expense.
Wilson
replied that there was danger of legislative despotism. If the power of the
legislature were not restrained, there could be neither liberty nor stability;
and it could be restrained only by dividing it into distinct and independent
branches. In a single House there was no check but the virtue and good sense of
its members.
These remarks
were made in considering the New Jersey plan in general. A more significant
discussion took place a few days later, when the resolution of the committee
(in favour of two Houses) came before the Convention; it was now once more a
case of the great States
270
Argument
for a single House.
[i787
against the
small. Voting by States, in the second branch, had been adopted in committee of
the whole; but still the smaller States were in favour of a single House; and,
if they could secure voting by States in this, they would gain the day
completely. They preferred that to any advantage of checks between two Houses,
one of which they could not control.
The
resolution being before the Convention, Lansing moved to substitute for it a
provision that the powers of legislation be vested in the United States in
Congress, as in the Confederation. His reasons were, the want of power in the
Convention to depart from the principle of the Confederation, and the state of
the public mind. Mason replied to both points. The first was of no weight, as
the decision was not to be made there but by the people; as for the second, he
was sure the people were attached to legislatures with two branches. Their
constitutions were so much in accord in this respect that they seemed almost to
have been preconcerted. Pennsylvania and the existing Congress were the only
exceptions. Martin however saw no need of two branches; if there were need, the
legislature might be organised in two parts. Sherman also thought that there was
no need of dividing the legislature, though he admitted that it was otherwise
with the States; all confederacies had single chambers of legislation. Congress
had carried the States through the war perhaps as wdl as any government could
have done. The present complaint was, not that Congress was unwise, but that
the powers of Congress were insufficient. To add another branch to Congress,
to be chosen by the people, would only work embarrassment. The people would
take no interest, and in the large districts the business would fall into the
hands of designing men. He did not believe, what others professed, that the
State legislatures would be unfriendly to the national one. The disparity of
the States was the main difficulty, and the reason for the resolution of the
committee. If that difficulty, which was one of representation, could not
otherwise be got over, he would agree to the resolution, with proportional
representation in one branch, provided that each State should have an equal
voice in the other.
Wilson urged
the need of two branches. If no model could be found, this was not strange. The
number of confederacies was small, and their duration often short. He had
himself been a member of Congress for six years, and had felt its weakness to
the full. He appealed to the recollection of others, whether the public
interest had not often been obstructed by the smaller States. The success of
the Revolution had not been due to Congress; the war went on in spite of
difficulties arising from Congress. The large States had indeed acceded to the
plan of Confederation; but that was from necessity, not of choice. Jealousies
between the State legislatures and the national legislature would, he believed,
exist, and there ought therefore to be a branch of the legislature not
representing the States.
1787] The principle of
two branches adopted. 271
The
Convention voted against Lansing’s motion; the four smaller States of
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware alone supporting it. On the
following day Johnson wished to know how the States could be preserved unless
equal voting were given to them—a thing which could not be effectual unless it
extended to the whole legislature. Wilson turned the question, asking how the
general government could be secured against the States; the means of defence
ought to be reciprocal. The States were to have their means of defence in one
branch of the legislature; the general government should be able to defend
itself in the other, which it could do only if that were placed beyond the
control of the States as such. Further, he saw no danger to the States from the
general government; alarm would follow and defeat combinations, if attempted,
among the large States. The general government would be as ready to protect the
States as the States were to protect individuals. Madison believed that there
would be less reason to fear the general government than to fear the States,
and that encroachment by the former would be less mischievous than
encroachment by the latter.
A vote was
now taken, which resulted in the adoption of the committee’s resolution; seven
States voting aye; three, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, nay; one,
Maryland, being divided. The resolution then went through the regular course
without further discussion and passed into the Constitution as section 1 of
Article I.
(4) Election
of the first branch.
The fourth of
the Randolph resolutions declared, in its first clause, that the members of the
first branch of the legislature should be elected by the people of the several
States. This resolution was reached in committee of the whole House on May 31,
and debate upon it began at once.
Sherman
opposed the resolution; he argued that the people should have little to do with
the government; they lacked knowledge and were likely to be misled. The
election should be by the State legislatures. Gerry considered that the evils
experienced by the countiy flowed from too much democracy; the people were not
wanting in virtue, but they were the dupes of pretending patriots. Still he favoured
election to the first branch by the people, in order, as he said later, to
inspire them with confidence in the government.
Mason
favoured election by the people. The first branch of the legislature was to be
the depositary of the democratic principle; it was to be the American House of
Commons. It should therefore be in sympathy with every part of the community.
We had been too democratic, but there was danger of running into the opposite
extreme.
Wilson urged
that the most numerous branch of the legislature should be drawn immediately
from the people. No government could exist long without the confidence of the
people. Further, it would be wrong to increase the weight of the State
legislatures by making them electors of the national legislature; all
interference between the general and State governments should be avoided so far
as possible. Opposition to federal measures had proceeded more from officers of
the States than from the people. Madison favoured refining the second branch by
successive filtrations; but popular election of one branch was essential to
free government.
The
resolution prevailed, six States voting for it and two against it, two being
divided. New York was now with the majority, South Carolina with the minority;
the three great States voted in the affirmative. This was on May SI. On June 6
Charles Pinckney, upon reconsideration, moved that the election be by the State
legislatures. He contended that the people were not fit judges, and further
that the State legislatures would be less likely to aid the adoption of the new
Constitution if they were excluded from all share in the government. Wilson
wished for vigour in the government, but he would have the vigour flow
immediately from the true source of all authority. The legislature ought to be
an exact transcript of the whole society. Representation was necessary only
because it was impossible for the people to act collectively. Sherman argued
that elections by the people would be fatal to the State governments. If the
State governments were to be continued, it was necessary, in order to secure
harmony between the general government and the States, that the former should
be elected by the latter. Mason observed that, since the new legislature was to
act upon the people individually, the people should choose the representatives.
The people too would send sounder men to the seat of government than would the
State legislatures. Madison argued, in addition to what he had urged before and
now repeated, that election of one branch by the people would prevent the
States from exerting too great an influence on the general government. General
Pinckney considered it impracticable that either branch of the government
should be elected by the people, scattered as they were in many States, particularly
in South Carolina. He did not agree with those who believed that election by
the people would furnish safer men than election by the State legislatures, and
referred to the paper money agitation in his State; the people wanted paper
money, but it had been refused by the legislature.
The motion
was lost, three States voting for it and eight against it; and the resolution
as originally drawn, in favour of election of the members of the first branch
of the government by the people, prevailed in the committee. General Pinckney
raised the question again in the House, in Convention, moving, on June 21,
“that the first branch,
instead of
being elected by the people, should be elected in such manner as the
legislature of each State should direct.” That would give more satisfaction,
since the legislatures could accommodate the mode to the convenience and
opinions of the people; it would also provide a way of avoiding the undue
influence of large counties.
The motion
was lost, four States voting aye, six no, with one divided; and then it was
voted by the Convention, nine States to one, with one State divided, that
election to the first branch of the national legislature should be by the
people. So the result went to the committee of detail and then passed into the
draft Constitution of August 6, and finally into the Constitution, as the first
part of Article I, section 2.
(5) Election of
the second bkanch.
The fifth of
the Randolph Resolutions had provided that the members of the second branch of
the legislature should be elected by those of the first, out of the proper
number of persons nominated by the State legislatures.’ Randolph observed, when
the subject first came before the committee of the whole House, that the
general object of the Senate was to provide a cure for the evils under which
the country laboured; that in tracing these evils home every one had found that
they came of the turbulence and follies of democracy; that some check was to be
found; and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose.
Wilson was of
opinion that both nomination by the State legislatures and election by the
first branch of the national legislature were wrong, because the second branch
ought to be independent. Both branches ought to be chosen by the people, though
he was not prepared to say by what method; but he referred to the mode of
choosing senators in New York, where several districts of election for the
first branch were united into one. Later, Wilson said that dissension would
arise between the two branches if one were chosen by the people and the other
by the State legislatures. Madison thought that election by districts would
destroy the influence of the smaller States associated with the larger in the
same district; the latter would choose from themselves, though better men might
be found in the former. They had had such experience in Virginia (in elections
to the State legislature).
The Randolph
resolution was now rejected; three States voting for and seven against it. A
week later (June 7) Dickinson, in the interest of the smaller States, moved in
the committee that the members of the second branch be chosen by the State
legislatures. He had two reasons; first, the sense of the States would be
better collected through their legislatures than from the people; secondly, he
wished the Senate
to consist of
the men most distinguished in rank and property, so that it should bear as
strong a likeness as possible to the British House of Lords; and such men were
more likely to be elected by the State legislatures than by the people. And he
favoured a large number; this he said in evident anticipation of the suggestion
that proportional representation, already adopted for the first branch, would
make the Senate too large. If the motion prevailed, it would therefore help the
smaller States, as it actually did, in the struggle for equality in the Senate.
The motion was supported by Sherman, who argued that the States would thus
become interested in supporting the national government, and that due harmony
would be maintained.
Madison said
that if the motion prevailed they would have to depart from proportional
representation or admit into the Senate a very large number of members. The
first was unjust, the second inexpedient. Enlarge the number of senators, and the
vices which they wished to correct would increase. The weight of the Senate
would be in inverse ratio to its numbers. The Roman tribunes lost influence and
power as their number was increased; they fell a prey to their aristocratic
foes. So the more the representatives of the people were multiplied, the more
they would have of the infirmities of the people. When the weight of a set of
men depended only on personal character, the greater their number the greater
their weight; when it depended on the degree of political authority lodged in
them, the smaller their number the greater their weight.
Gerry
observed that four methods' of appointing the Senate had been mentioned, to
wit: first, by the first branch of the national legislature. That would create
dependence, and hence defeat, the end proposed. Secondly, by the national
executive. That would be a stride towards monarchy. Thirdly, by the people. The
people composed two great interests, the landed and the commercial; to draw
both branches from the people would leave no security to the commercial
interest, that of the people being chiefly agricultural. Fourthly, by the State
legislatures. The elections being carried through this refinement, there would
be apt to result some check in favour of the commercial interest against the
landed. He favoured this last method.
Dickinson
argued the question with reference to the possibility that the smaller States
would lose ground unless election to the Senate should be fixed in the State
legislatures. That method fixed, the smallest as well as the largest State must
have representation in the Senate, and have it by the State in its corporate
capacity; while otherwise, if proportional representation should be adopted
for the Senate, it might be necessary to join the smallest States, Delaware and
Rhode Island, to others in order to make up for their lack of population. It
was indispensable to secure a certain degree of influence for the States; this
would establish a desirable check between the authorities. The proposed
national system
was like the
solar system, in which the States were the planets and ought therefore to be
left to move freely in their own orbits. Wilson, he said, wished to extinguish
the planets. But if the State governments were excluded from all agency in the
national system, and all power drawn from the people at large, the result would
be that the national government would move in the same direction as that in
which the States now moved, and would run into the same mischiefs. He adhered
to the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of a large number, and that
the influence of the body, from family and other causes, would be increased
thereby. He did not admit that the Roman tribunes lost weight as their number
was increased.
Wilson agreed
that the question was a difficult one; but they must settle it. He denied that
the British Constitution could be a model for them ; there were no materials
for anything like it. He did not see the danger of the States being devoured by
the national government; the danger was the converse. But he was not for
putting out the planets; nor did he believe that they would warm or give light
to the sun. They must be suffered within their proper orbits, for subordinate
purposes, for which they were made essential by the great extent of the
country. He was for election by the people, in large districts, regardless of
the size of the States.
Madison could
not understand how family weight would be carried into the Senate more
certainly on Dickinson’s plan than in other ways. The great question was, how
to make the best choice. If other modes would give the Senate as good men,
there could be no need of appointment by the State legislatures ; nor was it
apparent that Dickinson’s plan would afford a better check than other plans.
The legislatures ran into bad schemes of paper money and the like whenever the
people asked for them, and sometimes when they did not.
Geny
re-asserted that the commercial interest would be more secure in the hands of
the State legislatures than in the hands of the people. The former had more
sense of character; in Massachusetts the county conventions had declared for a
depreciation of paper that would sink the project. Besides, there were two
branches of the State legislatures, one of which was somewhat aristocratic;
there would therefore be, so far, a better chance of refinement. He objected to
election by districts for several reasons; one had already been referred to,
that a small State would form but part of the same district with a large one,
and hence would have no chance of gaining an appointment for its own citizens.
Dickinson’s
motion prevailed (June 7), all the States present voting for it. The question
came before the House in Convention on June 25; where, on the same day, the
vote in committee was affirmed, nine States aye, two States, Pennyslvania and
Virginia, nay. The decision went accordingly to the committee of detail, and
thence into the
draft
Constitution of August 6, and without further discussion into the Constitution.
There it appears in the first part of Article I, section 3.
(6) Powers of
Congress.
The sixth of
the Randolph resolutions, as originally laid before the Convention, declared
that each branch of the national legislature ought to have the right to
originate Acts; that the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy
the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and moreover to
legislate in all cases for which the separate States were incompetent, or in
which the harmony of the United States might be interrupted by the exercise of
individual (i.e. State) legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several
States contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the Articles
of Union or any treaty subsisting under authority of the Union; and to call
forth the force of the Union against any member of the same failing to fulfil
its duty under the said articles. This came up in committee on May 31.
The whole
resolution, excepting the last clause, was speedily adopted, the only debate
arising upon the word “ incompetent ” in the second clause. The word was
thought by some to be too vague; the powers of the States were left in doubt by
it. The real question was, whether or not there should be an enumeration of the
powers of the general government. Madison had come to the Convention with a
strong feeling in favour of enumeration and definition; but he had also brought
doubts whether the idea was practicable. His wishes remained unchanged; but his
doubts had grown stronger ; what he might think later he knew not. He would not
shrink from anything which might be found necessary to a form of government
which would provide for the safety, liberty, and happiness of the countiy. All
means necessary to that end must be granted, however reluctantly.
In regard to
the last clause, providing for the coercion of States, Madison looked upon the
proposal with disfavour. A union of States containing such an ingredient would
provide for its own destruction. To use force against a State would look more
like a declaration of war against it than like punishment for disobedience, and
would be apt to be taken as a dissolution of the bond by which it was bound to
the Union.
The clause
was postponed and finally dropped; the rest of the Randolph resolution was
reported to the Convention.
The question
in regard to the word “ incompetent ” was now renewed; indeed the whole clause
containing the word was objected to for vagueness. Accordingly, as a
substitute for it, down to the words “ individual legislation” inclusive, Sherman
moved the following: “to make laws binding on the people of the United States
in all cases which may concern the common interests of the Union, but not to
interfere with the
government of
the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect the
government of such States only, and wherein the general welfare of the United
States is not concerned.” In explanation the mover read an enumeration of
powers which he conceived to fall within the meaning of the provision, this
enumeration not including direct taxation—a fact which was noticed and
commented upon. The motion failed, two States only voting for it.
The following
provision was now substituted by the House for the remainder of the clause
after the words “ to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation ”—which words themselves were not disturbed: “and moreover to
legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in
those to which the States are severally incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may he interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation.” And then, with this amendment, the whole clause was adopted, two
States, South Carolina and Georgia, voting in the negative.
The clause
giving to the legislature power to negative State legislation was now taken up,
and disposed of on the same day. Sherman thought it an unnecessary power; the
Courts of the States, he said, would not uphold laws which contravened the
authority of the Union. Martin, also opposing the idea, inquired whether all
the laws of the States were to be sent up to the general government before they
could take effect.
Madison, on
the other hand, argued that the negative in question was essential to the
efficacy and security of the general government. The necessity of a general
government arose from the propensity of the States to pursue their particular
interests, in opposition to the general interest. That propensity would
continue to disturh the system unless effectually controlled; nor would
anything short of a negative control it. The States would pass laws to
accomplish their harmful purposes before they could he repealed by the national
legislature or set aside by the national tribunals. Alluding, it seems, to the
remark of Sherman concerning State Courts, he said that confidence could not
be put in the State tribunals as guardians of the national authority. In
Georgia the judges were appointed annually; in Rhode Island judges who had
refused to enforce an unconstitutional statute were removed and others put in
their place by the legislature, who would ohey their masters. The power to
negative bad laws was the mildest and also the most certain means of preserving
the harmony of the system. He referred to the British system; nothing could
maintain the harmony and subordination of the various parts of the empire but
the prerogative by which in every part the Crown stifled in the birth every Act
tending towards discord or encroachment. The prerogative had, it was true, been
misapplied sometimes, through ignorance or partiality; but there was not the
same reason for fear in the present case. As for sending all laws up to
the national
legislature, that might be made unnecessary by some “ emanation of power into
the States ” (sending persons into the States accredited with power) to give
temporary effect to urgent legislation.
Gouvemeur
Morris said that the proposal would disgust all the States. The true way* was
to leave the improper law to be set aside by the judiciary, failing which the
national legislature might repeal it.
The question
being put, the proposal was rejected; three States only, Massachusetts,
Virginia, and North Carolina, voting for it. The result was to leave the
portion immediately preceding, as the basis of an enumeration of powers. The
subject now went to the committee of detail, by which an article enumerating
the powers of the national legislature was prepared and reported in the draft
Constitution of August 6. The Convention proceeded to consider the article on
August 16, and two days later completed the enumerating portion of it, with the
exception of a clause giving power to the legislature to call out the State
militia, which caused some trouble. Most of the other proposed powers were
adopted with little difficulty.
By the first
clause in the proposed article, power was given to the legislature to levy
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. Objection was made by members from the
southern, or exporting, States that, under this power, the legislature might
lay a tax on exports. Mason desired to have the clause modified, so as to
render it clear that such taxation was not permitted, and he made a motion to
that end. He hoped that the northern States would not deny to the southern this
security; it would be as desirable to the North in the future, when the South
became the most populous part of the country. Gouverneur Morris was opposed to
the motion; in some cases it might not be equitable to tax imports without
taxing exports also, and taxes on exports would often be the easiest to
collect, and the most proper.
Madison
opposed the motion for several reasons. First, he considered that the power of
laying taxes on exports was proper, and as the States could not well exercise
it, this power should be vested in the general government. Secondly, the power
might be used with especial advantage in regard to articles in which America
had no rival in foreign markets, as in tobacco. Thirdly, it would be unjust to
the States whose produce was exported by their neighbours to leave it to be
taxed by them. A like grievance in respect of imports had already filled the
non-commercial States with loud complaints. Fourthly, as the southern States
were in most danger from abroad, and in most need of naval protection, they
could not complain if the burden fell somewhat heavier upon them.
Mercer
supported the motion. The States had now a right to tax both the imports and
the exports of their non-commercial neighbours; it would be enough for them to
sacrifice half the power. Nor would he admit that the southern States had most
need of naval protection. The contrary was true; were it not for promoting the
carrying trade of the
northern
States, the southern States could let the trade go into foreign bottoms.
Sherman
argued that it would be wrong to tax exports except in respect of articles
which ought not to be exported. The complexity of business in America would
make it impracticable to lay equal taxes on exports. Any oppression of the
non-commercial States was to be guarded against by authorising the regulation
of trade between the States. To give power to tax exports would wreck the whole
work.
The motion to
modify the clause was unsuccessful; but the failure of the motion affected the
subject only in its relation to the first section of the article as to powers.
Section 4 of the same article, in the reported draft of the Constitution,
contained the following provision: “ No tax or duty shall be laid by the
[national] legislature on articles exported from any State; nor on the
migration or importation of such persons as the several States shall think
proper to admit; nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited.”
This section
should be considered in connexion with section 6 of the same article, which
read: “ No navigation Act shall be passed without the assent of two-thirds of
the members present in each House.” Both sections were framed in the interest
of the southern States; the first clause of section 4 in that of all the
southern States, as the chief producing and exporting region; the second and
third clauses of the same section in the particular interest of South Carolina
and Georgia, and, in less degree, of North Carolina; while section 6 was
intended to prevent the more populous commercial States of the North, and East
from passing legislation in matters of navigation which might be to the injury
of the southern States.
The
Convention having, on August 21, reached section 4, the debate was renewed over
the clause in regard to exports. The clause favoured of course those northern
producing States which, having no harbours, were compelled to send their
products through the ports of other States; but, according tc some of the
northern members, it did not go far enough, for it still left them liable to be
taxed by the States of whose ports they had to make use. Langdon, of New
Hampshire, a producing State without a port, raised the point; the prohibition,
he said, should be extended to the States—which was subsequently done.
Ellsworth, of Connecticut, a State also without harbours but with little to
export, was satisfied with the clause, urging that the power of regulating
trade between the States, which was to be given to the general government,
would afford protection to States having no ports. If it did not, the attempt
of one State to tax the products of another passing through it would force
direct exportation by the latter. But Congress should, he thought, be
restrained. Taxing exports would discourage industry, and the products of the
different States were such that there could be no uniformity. There were but
few articles which could be
taxed at all;
rice, tobacco, and indigo might be reached, but a tax on those articles alone
would be partial and unjust. Further, to tax exports would create incurable
jealousies.
Gouverneur
Morris was opposed to depriving the government of power to tax exports; if the
government could not tax exports, an embargo could not be laid. He mentioned
tobacco, lumber, live-stock, and masts for ships, as the products of different
States; these were proper subjects of export duty; and to these the future
would add skins, beaver, and other raw material, on which it might be politic
to lay export duties in order to encourage American manufacturers. Dickinson
and Madison also would have the Convention look to the future. A proper regulation
of exports, however inconvenient then, might and probably would, in Madison’s
opinion, be necessary thereafter, and for the same purpose as the regulation of
imports, namely, in aid of revenue, domestic manufactures, and just
arrangements with foreign countries. An embargo too, as had been suggested,
might be necessary, and that could be effected only by the general government.
The regulation of trade between the States could only hinder a State from
taxing its own exports, by authorising its citizens to carry their commodities
freely into a neighbouring State which might not tax exports. He considered as
groundless the fear that the burden of taxation would fall with undue weight
upon the southern States. Most of the revenue was to come from trade, and it
mattered not whether all the revenue from that source came from imports or half
of it from imports and half from exports; imports and exports would be nearly
equal in every State, and relatively the same among the different States.
Wilson was of
like mind, though he was opposing the interests of his own State. Those who
opposed the clause reported wished only to authorise, not to compel, the
government to tax exports. To deny the power was to take away from the
government half the regulation of trade; it was his opinion that power to tax
exports might be more effectual than power to tax imports, in obtaining
beneficial treaties of commerce.
Gerry was
strenuously opposed to giving the power to the general government. It might be
used to compel the will of the States. They were carrying things too far; they
had already given powers to the general government of which they did not
understand the exercise; with them the general government would be able to
oppress the States. Mason feared the northern majority; the majority, when
interested, would oppress the minority. And he argued that exports stood on a
different footing from imports, in the matter of taxation. Imports were the
same throughout the States; exports varied greatly.
As an
adjustment of the difficulty Madison now moved that a two- thirds vote of
Congress should be required for a law taxing exports. The motion was lost, five
States voting for it, and six against it. On the
affirmative
side was one southern State, Delaware; on the negative, one northern State,
Connecticut. The clause as reported, forbidding Congress to tax exports, was
now adopted, seven States voting aye, four voting nay. All the southern States,
except Delaware, voted aye. Later a provision was adopted by the Convention, as
part of the next section, prohibiting the States from laying duties on imports
or exports; an extension of the draft report, which had only prohibited the
States from taxing imports.
The clause
against taxes on migration or importation of slaves now came before the
Convention. The subject aroused warm debate. Martin strongly opposed the
restriction. The clause as reported would encourage the slave-trade, because of
the provision already adopted reckoning five slaves as three freemen for
representation. Again, slaves weakened one part of the Union, which the other
parts were bound to protect, by preventing further importation. And, further,
the idea was opposed to the principles of the Revolution, and dishonourable to
the character of Americans.
Rutledge took
issue with most of the views just expressed; he denied the relevancy of the
last one. The question was simply one of interest; it came to this: should the
southern States (i.e. the three southernmost States) be parties to the Union ?
He was supported by his colleague Charles Pinckney. South Carolina would never
adopt the Constitution if it prohibited the slave-trade. In every proposed
extension of the powers of Congress, South Carolina had expressly objected to
any meddling with the importation of negroes.
Mason opposed
the clause; the slave traffic was infernal. Maryland and Virginia had already
prohibited it; North Carolina was doing the same thing in substance. But that
was vain if South Carolina and Georgia were to be at liberty to import slaves.
The western people were already calling out for slaves for their new lands, and
would fill the West with them if they had an opening. He spoke strongly against
slavery itself; from every point of view he held it essential that the general
government should have power to prevent the increase of it.
General
Pinckney declared it to be his firm opinion that no amount of personal
influence would prevail upon his constituents to consent to the Constitution,
if Congress was to have power to prohibit the slave- trade. South Carolina and
Georgia could not do without slaves. Virginia would gain by stopping
importation; she had more than she wanted, and her slaves would rise in value.
It would be unjust to require South Carolina and Georgia to federate on such
unequal terms. He should consider that rejecting the clause was excluding South
Carolina from the Union.
Dickinson
considered it inadmissible, on every principle of honour, and safety, that the
importation of slaves should be authorised by the Constitution. The true
question was, whether the happiness of
282 Importation of
slaves.—Navigation laws. [i787
the country
would be helped or hindered by importation; and this question ought to be left
to the national government, not to the States particularly interested. He could
not believe that any State would refuse to federate on that basis.
Most of the
leading members from the northern and New England States, unwilling to give
cause for any State in the South to refuse to come into the Union, actively
favoured the provision; but, finally, owing to the differences above indicated,
it was thought best to recommit the clause, together with the rest of the
section to which it belonged, and also section 6, in regard to navigation laws,
for adjustment. A committee of eleven, one from each State then represented,
was chosen accordingly, and hit upon a compromise, reported three days later,
August 24. The report proposed “that the migration or importation of such
persons as the several States now existing shall think proper to admit shall not
be prohibited by the legislature prior to the year 1800”; that a tax or duty
might be imposed on such migration or importation not exceeding the average of
the duties laid on imports; and that the sixth section should be struck out. On
the next day General Pinckney moved to extend the limit of time for migration
and importation to the year 1808. Gorham seconded, and Madison opposed, the
motion; the latter declaring that it would be more dishonourable to America to
extend the time so far than to say nothing in the Constitution about the
matter. The motion was carried; seven States, those of New England among them,
voting for it, and four against it. The four were New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Virginia. The whole clause as amended was now adopted by the same
vote; and then the clause concerning taxation was amended so as to give to
Congress the power to impose a tax or duty on the importation of negroes of ten
dollars for each person, and in that form was adopted.
Five days
later, August 29, the report of the committee in favour of striking out the
section requiring a two-thirds vote to pass any navigation Act, was taken up.
Objections were still raised by the South, notwithstanding the compromise
agreed upon by the committee of eleven. Charles Pinckney enumerated the
different interests of the States, and urged that these would be a source of
oppressive navigation laws if a bare majority were to be sufficient to pass
them. The power of regulating commerce at all was a pure concession on the part
of the southern States; they did not need the protection of the northern States
at present.
General
Pinckney also said that it was for the interest of the southern States to have
no regulation of commerce by the general government; but he was willing to
yield the point in view of the loss of commerce brought upon the New England
States by the Revolution, of their liberal conduct towards South Carolina
(referring
to the
compromise in regard to the importation of slaves), and of the interest the
weak States of the South had in being united with the strong States of the
East. He accordingly thought that the power of regulating commerce should not
be fettered.
To require
more than a majority vote had, according to Sherman, always proved
embarrassing; the country had had experience of this under the Confederation,
in cases requiring the vote of nine States in Congress. A navy, Gouvemeur
Morris argued, was essential to the security of the States, particularly of the
southern; and it could be had only by navigation laws encouraging American
bottoms and seamen. Shipping too was a precarious kind of property and stood in
special need of favour. Williamson, answering Sherman, did not believe that any
useful measure had been lost in Congress for want of the votes, when necessary,
of nine States; and he thought that the interests of the South required that
navigation laws should not pass by a mere majority vote. The weakness of the
South, to which reference had been made, did not trouble him; the climate was
unhealthy and would forbid foreign interference. Mason argued that the South
should not be bound hand and foot to the Eastern States, as it might be if
navigation Acts were to be passed by a majority vote.
Madison went
into a full review of the subject. The disadvantage to the southern States from
a navigation Act lay chiefly in a temporary rise of freight; but that would be
compensated by an increase of shipping and by a removal of the troublesome
retaliations by one State upon another. The power too of foreign countries to
obstruct by corrupt influence American retaliation upon them, would be less if
legislation could be passed by a majority. And he thought that any abuse of the
power acquired by the North would be rendered improbable by the provision of
two branches of Congress, by the independence of the Senate, by the negative to
be given to the executive, by the interests of Connecticut and New Jersey,
which, like the southern States, were agricultural, by those of the interior,
which were agricultural even in the most largely commercial of the States, and
by the admission of western States, which would be wholly agricultural. And the
South would derive material benefit from increase of maritime power; the
southern States, especially Virginia, were exposed to danger.
A motion to
postpone this part of the report was hereupon lost, though favoured by four
States, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia. The report was then
agreed to without dissent, and the clause requiring a two-thirds vote to pass a
navigation Act struck out of the draft.
The whole
subject of the powers of the legislature was now with little difficulty put
into final form in the Constitution in Article I, sections 8 and 9.
(7) The executive.
The seventh
of the Randolph resolutions, as originally presented to the committee of the
whole House, declared that a national executive should be instituted; to be
chosen by the national legislature for a term left blank; to receive a fixed
compensation, not to be increased or diminished so as to affect a magistracy
then existing; not to be eligible a second time; and besides having general
authority to execute the national laws, to enjoy the executive rights vested in
Congress by the Confederation.
The committee
proceeded to consider this resolution on June 1. The question first raised was
whether the executive should consist of a single person or of more than one.
Wilson moved that it should consist of but one—this with a view to giving
energy, despatch, and responsibility to the office. Rutledge favoured the motion,
especially on the ground of the greater sense of responsibility residing in a
single executive. Sherman looked upon the office as but an agency, intended
only to carry out the will of the legislature; the office ought therefore to be
filled by the legislature itself as the best judge of the matter. He would
leave it to the legislature to appoint one or more persons, as experience might
dictate. Randolph strongly opposed unity in the executive, as the germ of
monarchy ; to that the fixed spirit of the people was opposed.
The committee
now adopted the part of the clause in favour of a national executive, but felt
unprepared to go on with the question of unity ; and Wilson’s motion for a
single magistrate was postponed.
Madison
thought that it would be proper first to fix the executive powers, on the
ground that, as certain powers were in their nature executive, and hence must
be given to that department whether it was to be held by one or by more than
one person, a definition of the extent of the executive powers would assist the
committee in determining whether to entrust the office to a single individual
or not. He accordingly made a motion which, as amended by the committee,
prevailed, to the effect that the following provision be substituted for that in
the Randolph resolution—that the national executive have power to carry into
effect the national laws, and to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise
provided for.
The committee
next considered the clause in which the duration of the executive term had been
left open. Opinion varied between a term of three and a term of seven years; by
a bare majority the committee fixed upon seven years.
The mode of
appointing the executive stood next in order; and Wilson now moved that,
instead of the mode provided by the resolution, the appointment should be by
electors chosen in electoral districts, into which the States were to be
divided. He was in favour of an election by
the people
rather than by the national legislature; the people however voting not directly
for the executive, but for electors who were to make the actual choice. This
mode would give the people more confidence in the chief magistrate than if he
were to be elected as proposed in the Randolph resolution.
Gerry also
opposed election by the national legislature; that would create constant
intrigue; the legislature and the candidates would bargain, and play into each
other’s hands. At the same time he feared that the mode proposed by Wilson
would give a handle to the partisans of State authority, as tending to do away
with the States. He seemed to prefer taking the suffrage of the States to that
of electors, but was not dear in regard to the best course.
Wilson’s
motion was lost, only two States voting for it; and the provision of the
Randolph resolution was then agreed to. Postponing the question of salary, the
committee proceeded to consider a motion by Dickinson that the executive be
removable by the national legislature, on the request of a majority of the
legislatures of the States.
This was a
counter-motion to Wilson’s. Wilson wished to reduce the small States to their
place in a rule of proportion; Dickinson to give the small States theft place
as States, at every point in the system. Madison and Wilson accordingly opposed
the motion. It would enable a minority of the people to prevent the removal of
a magistrate justly considered removable in the eyes of the majority; it would
also open the door to intrigue against a magistrate whose administration,
though just, was in some States unpopular.
In reply,
Dickinson, setting out with the proposition that the legislative, executive,
and judiciary departments of the government should be made as independent as
possible, said that an executive such as some appeared to have in mind (meaning
a strong executive) was not consistent with a republic. A firm executive could
exist only in a limited monarchy; and though he considered a limited monarchy
one of the best kinds of government, such a government was out of the question
here. For the present plan the sources of stability were first, the division of
the legislature into two branches, and secondly, the division of the country
into States. That division ought to be maintained and considerable powers left
with the States. Hence the States ought to possess influence as to removing the
chief magistrate, upon occasion.
The motion
was lost, Delaware alone supporting it.
It was now
moved that the executive office be filled by one person. The motion was
earnestly opposed by Randolph. First, it savoured of monarchy, to the very
semblance of which the people were adverse; secondly, unity was unnecessary;
thirdly, the needful confidence would never be reposed in a single magistrate;
fourthly, appointment would generally be from the neighbourhood of the capital,
and the remoter parts of the countiy would have no standing.
286 Unity of the
executive adopted.—Mode of election. [i787
In answer to
the last statement Butler contended that a single magistrate was most likely to
meet the purpose of the remote parts of the country. A single magistrate would
be responsible to the whole, and impartial to its varying interests. If three
or more (the suggestion of three was a favourite one with those who opposed
unity) should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle
for local advantages. In military matters this would be particularly
mischievous. He himself had witnessed how a plurality of military heads had
distracted Holland.
Wilson saw no
evidence that the people were opposed to a single magistrate; they knew that a
single magistrate was not a King.. All the thirteen States, though agreeing in
little else, agreed in having a single magistrate. Besides giving energy,
despatch, and responsibility to the office, a single magistrate would secure
tranquillity. Among three equal members he foresaw nothing but uncontrolled and
continued animosi y.
The motion
for a single magistrate prevailed; seven States voting for, and three against
it. The latter were New York, Delaware, and Maryland; a majority of the
delegates from Virginia being opposed to Governor Randolph, Virginia voted for
the motion. The subject was not further agitated, and passed on through the
draft Constitution of August 6 into the Constitution. There it appears in
section 1 of Article II.
On the next
clause of the same seventh Randolph resolution, according to which the
executive was to be elected by the national legislature, there was much debate,
with alternating and conflicting results. Gouvemeur Morris, opening the debate,
again strongly opposed the clause. The executive would be the mere creature of
the legislature if both appointed and impeachable by that body. He should be
elected by the people at large. If the people elected the chief magistrate,
they would not fail to prefer a person of distinction for character and
services; if the legislature elected, the choice would be the work of intrigue,
cabal, and faction. He accordingly moved to strike out the words “national
legislature” and insert “ citizens of the United States.”
Sherman
believed, as he had expressed himself in committee, that the sense of the
nation would be better expressed by the legislature than by the people at
large. The people would not be sufficiently informed; and further, they would
never give a majority of all the votes to one man. They would generally vote
for someone of their own State, and the largest State would have the best
chance.
Wilson,
replying to the argument that there would never be a majority for one person,
said that a majority was not a necessary principle of election, nor was it
required in any of the States. But allowing it full force, the difficulty might
be overcome by the expedient adopted in Massachusetts, where the legislature,
by a majority vote,
decided in
case a majority of the people should not concur in favour of any candidate.
Charles
Pinckney opposed election by the people. The people would be led by a few
active, designing men ; and the most populous States, by combining, would be
able to carry their point. The national legislature, on the other hand, being
most directly interested in the laws made by it, would take the most care to
choose a fit person to carry them out.
Both points
made by Pinckney were contested by Gouverneur Morris. Instead of a combination
of the people of the populous States, there would be combinations in the
legislature. As for the influence of a few designing men, that could prevail
only in small districts. In the election of the governor of New York that sort
of thing sometimes happened in particular localities, but the general voice of
the State was never affected. He also answered the argument from lack of
information by the people; the people would not be uninformed of those great
characters who merited their esteem and confidence.
Mason, on the
other side, thought a government with a chief magistrate to be elected by the
people impracticable; it was as unnatural as to refer a trial of colours to a
blind man. The extent of the country rendered it impossible for the people to
judge of the merits of the candidates; to which Williamson added, that while
there were at the present time distinguished characters, known to everyone, it
would not always be so.
A vote was
now taken, and only one State favoured the Morris motion. Hardly better fared a
motion to the effect that the executive should be chosen by electors chosen by
the State legislatures. It was then (July 17) voted unanimously that the
executive be chosen by the national legislature. A change, on July 19, to
election by electors appointed by the State legislatures, was in its turn set
aside, and election by the national legislature was again agreed upon, on July
24.
The mode of
election bore directly upon the independence of the executive; and the vote
last taken brought on motions, on the one hand, for re-eligibility, and, on the
other, for extending the term of office beyond the seven years, which opened
the whole subject again.
If the chief
magistrate must be elected by the national legislature, Wilson would give him a
single, long term of office; dependence of the executive must be prevented as
far as possible. Gouverneur Morris again earnestly opposed election by the
legislature. When the personal interest of members was opposed to the general
interest, the legislature, otherwise trustworthy, could not be too much distrusted.
In all public bodies there were two parties; the executive would necessarily be
more connected with one than with the other. There would be a personal
interest, therefore, in one of the parties to oppose, in the other to support,
it. Much had been said of the intrigues which would be practised by the
executive to get into office; nothing had been said of
288
Various modes of
election proposed.
the intrigues
to get him out. Men would covet his place, and cabal with the legislature,
until the end was gained. As for the danger of monarchy, they might have
something worse, if the executive should not be properly chosen. To get rid of
dependence of the executive on the legislature, the expedient of making him
ineligible a second time had been devised. In other words, we should have the
benefit of experience, and were then to deprive ourselves of the use of it. The
chief magistrate at the end of a long term would not cease to be a man; he
would wish to continue in office. The road by the Constitution would be cut
off; so he would make a road with the sword. It was a difficult thing rightly
to balance the executive. Make him too weak, the legislature would usurp his
authority; make him too strong, he would usurp legislative powers. He preferred
a short period, with re-eligibility, but a different mode of election from that
which had been provided for.
Various
expedients were now brought forward; by Wilson, in favour of electors to be
taken by lot from the national legislature; by Ellsworth, for appointment by the
national legislature, with re-eligibility by the choice of electors appointed
by the State legislatures; and by Gerry, for appointment by the governors of
the States with the advice of their Councils, or, if there were no Council, by
electors chosen by the State legislatures. Ellsworth made a formal motion in
favour of his proposal.
The subject
was discussed by Madison. There were objections to all modes. Election must be
by some authority under the national or State constitutions, or by some special
authority derived from the people, or by the people themselves. Election by the
judiciary was out of the question; the only other national authority was the
legislature. But there were in his judgment insuperable objections to such
election. Apart from the effect upon the independence of the chief magistrate,
such election would agitate and divide the legislature so as to interfere with
public interests. In the next place, the candidate would intrigue with the
legislature; he would owe his election to the predominant faction, and then
would be apt to be subservient to that faction. Further, the ministers of
foreign powers would use the opportunity to mix their intrigues in the
election. Germany and Poland were witnesses to the danger. He then considered
the three branches of the State governments, and found objections to election
by any of them. The State legislatures had betrayed a propensity to pernicious
measures; one object of the national government was to control that propensity;
and one object of giving the national executive a negative on legislation was
to control the national legislature so far as it might be infected with a like
propensity. Refer the appointment of the executive to the State legislatures,
and that purpose might be defeated. Appointment by the State executives was
liable to the objection that they could and would be courted and intrigued with
by the candidates, by their partisans, and
by foreign
powers. The State judiciaries could not be thought of. The choice then lay
between appointment by electors chosen by the people and an immediate election
by the people. He thought the first was free from many of the objections urged,
and far preferable to appointment by the national legislature. The electors
chosen would meet at once and proceed immediately to an appointment, so that
there would be little chance for cabal or corruption. This mode had however
been rejected so recently by the Convention that it could hardly be proposed
again. He passed therefore to election immediately by the people. That, he
believed, would be the best mode. He would notice but two objections; first,
the disposition of people to prefer a citizen of their own State, and hence the
disadvantage to which the smaller States would be exposed. This objection he
thought less important than objections to other modes; and it might be
obviated. The second arose from the disproportion of voters in the northern and
southern States, and the consequent disadvantage to the latter. The answer was,
first, that this disproportion would be continually decreasing, and secondly,
that local considerations must give way to the general welfare.
Ellsworth’s
motion was hereupon lost; four States favouring, seven opposing it. Charles
Pinckney then moved that election by the national legislature be qualified with
a proviso, that no person should be eligible to the executive office for more
than six in any twelve years. The motion was favoured by Mason and Gerry, and
opposed by Gouverneur Morris. Morris was against rotation in office (this was a
popular watchword), in every form; rotation was a school in which the scholars,
not the masters, governed. The evils to be guarded against were, first, the
undue influence of the legislature, secondly, the instability of counsel,
thirdly, misconduct in office. To guard against the first, they ran into the
second; rotation produced instability; change of men was followed by change of
measures. They had seen it in Pennsylvania; Rehoboam would not imitate Solomon.
Nor would rotation prevent intrigue and dependence upon the legislature. The
magistrate would look forward to the time, however distant, when he would be
re-eligible. Finally, to avoid the third evil, impeachments would be
necessary—another reason against election by the legislature. He favoured election
by the people, and next, the suggestion of Wilson, that it should be by
electors chosen by lot from the legislature.
A motion was
now made that the people should elect the executive upon the plan of each man
voting for three candidates. One, it was suggested, would probably be from the
voter’s own State, the other two from other States; and thus the small States
would not be at a disadvantage. The plan was favoured by Gouverneur Morris and
Madison, and opposed by Gerry. The motion was lost; five States voting aye, six
nay. Then Charles Pinckney’s motion was rejected, also by a majority of one.
The resolution in regard to the executive, except the part
making the
executive consist of one person, was next referred to the committee of detail.
A motion now prevailed reinstating the clause that the executive be appointed
for seven years and be ineligible a second time; and then the whole resolution,
as it had first been reported by the committee of the whole House, was passed
and sent to the committee of detail, to prepare from it a formal article in the
draft Constitution. There it appeared, August 6, as Article X. The article
contained also a provision for the removal of the executive, now named
President, by impeachment, in case of misconduct—a provision not in the
Randolph resolutions.
On August 24
a motion was made once more to substitute election by the people for election
by the national legislature; but only two States voted aye. Election by State
votes in the legislature was rejected by a majority of one, and election by a
majority vote of the members present in the legislature was provisionally
accepted, only one State voting nay. An attempt to change the decision in
favour of election by the legislature into appointment by electors to be
chosen by the people having been rejected by a majority of one, further
consideration of the subject was postponed; and later a special committee of
eleven, one from each State present, was appointed to consider and report some
substitute for the whole plan. The Committee reported on September 4, in
substance as follows.
The President
and Vice-president were to hold office for four years, and were to be chosen by
electors, as the State legislatures should' direct, equal in number to the
total of senators and representatives in Congress to which the States
respectively were entitled $ these electors to vote for two persons, one not of
their own State, and to send their votes to the Senate to be counted. The one
having the highest number of votes, if a majority of the electors, was to be
the President; if no election resulted, the Senate was to choose as President
one of those having a majority if more than one had a majority, or one of the
five having the highest number if no one had a majority; and after the choice
of the President the person having the greatest number of votes was to be
Vice-president, the Scaate deciding the question in case two or more had the
same number of votes.
Strong
opposition to the plan was made by Charles Pinckney, Rutledge, Williamson, and Randolph;
while others, among them Wilson and Madison, desired one modification or
another. The chief objection was that the plan would give too much power to the
Senate, laying the foundation there for an aristocracy. However a motion made
by Wilson to strike out “ Senate ” and insert “ legislature ” failed; three
States voting for it, seven against. It was still a question largely of the
greater against the smaller States. King observed that the influence of the
smaller States in the Senate was somewhat balanced by the influence of the
large States in bringing forward candidates, and also by
the
concurrence of the small States in the clause vesting the origination of money
bills exclusively in the House of Representatives. Wilson pressed the objection
that the whole plan now ran towards an aristocracy in the Senate. The Senate
would have the appointment of the President (in event of failure of the
electors to make a choice), and through his dependence upon that body, the
virtual appointment to offices, among others to the judiciary. The Senate was
to make treaties, and to try impeachments. That, taken with what was now
proposed, would combine the powers of the legislature, the executive, and the
judiciary in one body.
Gouverneur
Morris contested this view; and Hamilton, though disliking the general scheme
of government, liked much of the plan of the special committee. In the draft
Constitution the President was a monster, elected for seven years and
ineligible afterwards, having great powers of appointment to office, and
constantly tempted, by being allowed but one term, to abuse his power in order
to subvert the government. Eligibility to another term would not help matters,
if the President was to be elected by the legislature; he would still be
tempted to use corrupt influence in order to secure continuance in office. Considering
the different feelings of different States, and the variety of districts,
northern, middle, and southern, it would probably happen, as had been
suggested, that the votes would be scattered, and that, according to the mode
now favoured, the election would devolve upon the Senate. He too deprecated
such a result, and suggested as a remedy that the highest number of votes,
whether a majority or not, should elect. A small number might then, it was
true, decide the question; but as the plan now stood, the Senate might elect as
President the candidate having the smallest number of votes.
The whole
clause of the special report, providing for election of President and
Vice-president, for a term of four years, by electors etc., was now adopted,
only two States voting against it. The House of Representatives, voting by
States, was then substituted for the Senate as the body to elect in case of
failure of the electors to do so; the Vice-president was to be ex officio
President of the Senate; and with slight alteration the work was done, and
became part of the Constitution, in Article II, section 1.
The provision
for removal of the President on impeachment and conviction passed the committee
without debate. But in Convention objection was raised, and a motion was made
by Charles Pinckney and Gouverneur Moms to strike out the clause. Pinckney was
of opinion that the President ought not to be subject to impeachment while in
office; Morris thought that it would be enough to punish his coadjutors, and
found practical difficulties in the method proposed by the resolution. Was
impeachment to suspend his functions ? If not, the mischief would go on; if it
was, the impeachment would be nearly
equivalent to
displacement, and would make the executive dependent upon those who were to
impeach.
Mason was
opposed to the motion; should he who might commit the greatest wrong be above
justice? He would punish principal as well as coadjutor. Appointment by
electors would furnish a peculiar occasion for impeachment; the electors might
be corrupted by the candidates. Franklin was in favour of retaining the clause,
as just to the executive. History furnished but one example of a first
magistrate being formally brought to public justice. What had been the method
before? Assassination. Madison thought it indispensable that provision should
be made to save the country from incapacity, negligence, or perfidy. The
limitation of the term was not a sufficient security. In the case of a single
executive, loss of capacity or corruption was particularly within possibility.
King made the
chief reply. He expressed a fear that extreme caution in favour of liberty
might enervate the government. He would have the House recur to the maxim, that
the three great departments of State should be separate and distinct; that the
executive and judiciary should be so as well as the legislature; that the
executive should be so equally with the judiciary. Would that be the case if
the executive should be impeachable? The judiciary, who were to be impeachable,
stood on different ground; they were to hold office during good behaviour,
while the executive would hold but for a short term, like the members of the
legislature. Like them, he would be tried by the electors periodically for his
behaviour, and continued in office or not, according to the manner in which he
had executed his trust. Like them therefore he ought not to be subject to an
intermediate trial by impeachment.
Randolph,
while favouring a provision for impeachment, still saw the difficulties and the
need of caution. He suggested an idea which had fallen from Hamilton, of
forming a body out of the judges of the State courts, and even of requiring
some preliminary inquest whether just ground of impeachment existed.
The motion to
strike out the clause was lost; and the provision that the executive should be
removable on impeachment was adopted, two States, Massachusetts and South
Carolina, voting nay. The subject went later, for adjustment in regard to the
mode of impeachment, to the special committee of eleven, with other matters;
which committee reported on September 4 a provision that the President should
be removed on impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by
the Senate for treason or bribery. The Vice-president was then to exercise the
powers of the office until the election of another President. The Convention
added to “ treason or bribery ” the further words “or other high crimes or
misdemeanours”; and the provision then passed into the Constitution, partly as
one of the regulations
touching the
House of Representatives, partly as one of those touching the Senate, and
partly as the last section of the article relating to the executive.
(8) Council.—Executive
veto.
The eighth of
the Randolph resolutions provided that the executive and a convenient number of
the national judiciary ought to compose a Council of Revision, with authority
to examine all Acts of the national legislature before going into operation,
and all Acts of the State legislatures, before a negative thereon should be
final; and that the dissent of the said Council should amount to a rejection,
unless the Act of the national legislature should be passed again, or that of a
State legislature be again negatived by (a blank number of) members of each
branch.
The first
clause of this resolution came on for consideration in committee of the whole
House on June 4. Gerry doubted whether the judiciary ought to form part of the
Council; the judges, in their official capacity as judges of the
constitutionality of laws, would be able to check encroachments upon their
department. He accordingly made a motion, which prevailed, to postpone the
clause, in favour of one giving to the executive alone the right to negative legislation
of the national government unless overruled by a vote (of two-thirds, as afterwards
provided) of each branch. A motion by Wilson and Hamilton to give the executive
an absolute negative was at the same time, after some debate, rejected by vote of
all the States represented. The effect of adopting the Gerry motion was to set
aside the whole of the eighth Randolph resolution, as it did away entirely with
the proposed Council of Revision.
On
reconsideration Wilson moved to add to the Gerry proposal “a convenient number
of the national judiciary.” He thought it expedient to strengthen the executive
by the influence of the judiciary in the negative of laws.
The amendment
was favoured by Madison. The great difficulty in making the executive office
equal to its own defence arose from the nature of republican government. That
form of government could not give to an individual citizen the settled
pre-eminence, the weight in respect of property, the personal interest against
betraying the nation, which belonged to a hereditary magistracy. In a republic
merit alone must be the ground of political preferment; but it would seldom
happen that merit would be so great as to secure universal approval. The
executive would be envied and assailed by disappointed competitors; it would
therefore need support. It would not have the great profits of office, or the
permanent stake in the public welfare, which would place it beyond the reach of
corruption from abroad; it would therefore need
294
to be controlled
as well as supported. The association of judges with it in the power over
legislation would both double the advantage and diminish the danger. This would
also the better enable the judiciary to defend that department against
encroachment by the legislature. There were two objections: the first, that the
judges ought not to be subject to the bias which their share in making the laws
might give them when they came to expound them ; the second, that the judiciary
department ought to be separate and distinct from the other departments* The
weight of the first objection was less than it seemed to be; only a small part
of the laws coming before a judge would be laws about which he had been
consulted, and of these laws only a few would be so ambiguous as to leave room
for his prepossessions; and during the life of a judge few cases of this kind
of ambiguity would probably arise. The second objection had no weight, or it
applied with equal force to the executive. There would be no improper mixture
of the departments.
On a vote,
only three States were in favour of the amendment. Later, in Convention, a
determined effort was made, upon a motion by Wilson, to overturn the decision
thus reached in committee. The arguments now were somewhat different, more insistent,
and more definite than before.
Wilson urged
that the judges ought to be able to remonstrate against encroachment upon the
people as well as upon themselves. It was not enough that they would have an
opportunity, as expounders of the law, to defend constitutional rights; laws
might be unjust, unwise, and dangerous, and yet not unconstitutional. Let the
judgeis share in the revisionary power, and they could then counteract the
attempt to enact such laws. Ellsworth supported the motion. It would strengthen
the executive especially in dealing with questions of the law of nations. In
addition to what he had said in committee, Madison now urged that the plan
would be useful to the legislature, by helping to preserve consistency,
conciseness, perspicuity, and technical propriety in the laws, things much
needed and much wanting. It would not give too much strength either to the
executive or to the judiciary; both of those branches would be apt to be
overmatched by the legislature, even with such co-operation. Experience had
shown, in all the States, that the legislature was a vortex into which all
power was apt to be drawn; that was the real source of danger for America.
Gerry opposed
the plan as mixing up the branches of government; it was making statesmen of
the judges, and setting them up, instead of the legislature, as guardians of
the people; it was making the expounders of the law the legislators.
Gouverneur
Morris thought that the executive, with a short term, and liable to impeachment
in office, would not be a very strong check upon the legislature. To the
objection that those who were to expound
1787] Ninth resolution.
Supreme and inferior Courts. 295
the laws
ought not to have part in making them, he referred to England, where the judges
had a great share in legislation. They were consulted in difficult and doubtful
cases ; some of them were members of the legislature; some were members of the
Privy Council, where they could advise the executive. There was much more
ground for helping the executive here. He feared that the help of the judiciary
would not be sufficient. It had been said that the legislature was the proper
guardian of liberty. The plain answer was, that experience showed that there
would be real danger of bad legislation; a strong check was therefore needed.
Martin
considered the plan a dangerous innovation, and also not likely to produce the
benefit expected. The judges in their official character would have a negative;
join them to the executive and they would have a double negative. And the
judiciary would lose the confidence of the people if they were to be able to
remonstrate against popular measures of the legislature.
Madison did
not think the plan a mixing of departments. Experience had taught them to
distrust paper discrimination of the departments; it was not enough to lay down
the theory in the Constitution, they ought to add defensive power to each
department.
Gorham argued
that, as the judges would outnumber the executive, they could take the power
out of his hands and sacrifice him; to which Wilson replied that a rule of
voting might be provided which would guard against that result.
The motion
failed, only three States voting for it. Later, a project to provide a Privy
Council, or Council of State, for the President, with heads of bureaux, like
the “cabinet” officers afterwards created by Congress, also fell through as a
constitutional provision.
(9) The
judiciaey.
The ninth of
the Randolph resolutions, as sent to the committee of the whole House, declared
that a national judiciary should be established (to consist of one or more
supreme tribunals and of inferior tribunals), to be chosen by the national
legislature; the judges to hold office during good behaviour, and to receive
compensation, in which no increase or decrease should be made so as to affect
the persons actually in office at the time thereof. The jurisdiction of the
inferior tribunals should be to hear and determine, in the first instance, and
that of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in last resort, all piracies
and felonies on the high seas; captures from an enemy; cases in which
foreigners, or citizens of other States applying, might be interested; or which
regarded the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of national
officers, and questions involving the national peace and harmony.
The committee
began the consideration of the resolution on June 4, and adopted the first
clause, establishing a national judiciary, at once without debate or dissent.
It also adopted at once the next clause, which now read “ to consist of one
supreme tribunal and of one or more inferior tribunals” (so changed from the
clause, cited at the beginning of the preceding paragraph, which had itself
been added as an entirely new clause to the original Randolph resolution, and
which is not in those resolutions as given in the journal of the Federal
Convention); the words “ one or more ” being struck out on the next day.
The clause
following, which provided for the appointment of the judges by the national
legislature, came on for consideration on the second day. Wilson opposed the
plan. Experience showed that it was improper for numerous bodies to make such
appointments; intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary
accompaniments. A chief reason for unity in the executive was, that officers
might be appointed by a single, responsible person. Rutledge would not give
such power to a single person; the people would think that they were leaning to
monarchy. Besides, he was against any but a supreme tribunal for the nation;
the State tribunals should decide questions in the first instance. Madison
disliked the election of judges by the legislature or by any numerous body.
Intrigue and partiality apart, many of the members of the legislature were incapable
of deciding upon the necessary qualification of judges. Nor was he satisfied
with giving the appointment to the executive; he inclined to give it to the
Senate. He moved to strike out appointment by the legislature and leave a blank
for more mature reflexion. This proposal, put at once, prevailed. Notice of a
motion to reconsider followed; and another in regard to the clause relating to
inferior tribunals.
The clauses
concerning the term of office and compensation were then adopted without
debate. The rest of the resolution was postponed for the time; and Rutledge now
moved that the part of the resolution relating to inferior tribunals be struck
out. The clause proposed an unnecessary encroachment on the States. Madison
observed that, unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the
Republic, with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to
an oppressive degree; and appeals would not always be a remedy, at best.
Sherman favoured the motion, and dwelt upon the expense of creating Courts when
the State Courts would answer the purpose.
Rutledge’s
motion prevailed, six States voting for it, four against, and one being
divided.
Wilson and
Madison now moved, in accordance with a suggestion thrown out by Dickinson,
that a clause be inserted, that the national legislature be empowered (not
required) to institute inferior tribunals. Discretion, they argued, ought to be
given to the legislature. The motion prevailed by vote of eight States to two,
with one State divided.
Later, the
part of the resolution relating to the jurisdiction of the
courts was
changed so as to make it read, “ that the jurisdiction of the national
judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national
revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the
national peace and harmony." Appointment of the judges by the Senate
rather than by the whole legislature was agreed to; and then the committee made
report to the Convention in three resolutions, accordingly. The first one
provided for a Supreme Court, the judges to be appointed by the Senate; the
second that the national legislature might appoint inferior tribunals; the
third related to jurisdiction.
The first
resolution came up for consideration by the Convention on July 18. That a national
judiciary should be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, was at
once agreed to without dissent. The next clause, on the appointment of the
judges, was a subject of difference. Gorham preferred appointment by the Senate
to appointment by the whole legislature; but even the Senate would be too
large a body to make a good choice. He suggested appointment by the executive,
with the advice and consent of the Senate; that mode had long been practised in
his own State and had worked well. Wilson preferred appointment by the
executive, with the Massachusetts plan as a second choice. He accordingly moved
that the judges be appointed by the executive.
Martin
favoured election by the Senate; taken from all the States, the Senate would be
well informed, and able to make a fit choice. Mason made the point that the
question might depend somewhat on the mode to be adopted for trying an
impeachment of the executive; if the judges were to try the question, they
should not be appointed by the executive. Besides, he found insuperable
objections against giving the appointment to the executive; mentioning, for
one, that as the seat of government must be in some one State, the executive,
remaining there during his term, would form local and personal attachments which
would too much influence his choice.
To the last
suggestion Gorham replied that the executive would be responsible, not indeed,
as he afterwards said, under any other penalty than the public censure, but
still to that extent, for the discharge of his trust, and would therefore be
careful to look through the States for proper men. Senators would be as likely
to form local attachments, during their long terms, at the seat of government,
as would the executive; and public bodies felt no personal responsibility.
Bhode Island was an illustration.
Gouverneur
Morris thought that it would be improper that impeachment of the executive
should be tried by the judges. The judges, in such a case, would be drawn into
intrigue with the legislature; and as they too would be much about the seat of
government, they might be improperly consulted beforehand. Hence it was not
desirable that the judges should try an impeachment of the executive. Madison
suggested
that
appointment might be made by the executive, with concurrence of a third of the
Senate; this plan would unite responsibility in the executive with security
against incautious or corrupt nominations. Sherman said that the Senate would
be composed of men nearly equal in ability to the executive; together the senators
would bring more wisdom and wider knowledge of men. And it would not be so easy
for candidates to intrigue with them as with the executive.
There was in
the question again more or less feeling in regard to the influence of the
smaller States, for in the Senate they were to have an equal voice with the
rest. Randolph accordingly observed that, when the appointment of the judges
had been given to the Senate, equality of suffrage there had not yet been
given. Still he would leave the appointment there rather than give it to the
executive. He thought that the advantage of personal responsibility might be
had in the Senate by requiring the names of those voting to be entered in the
journal. He too thought it would be an advantage that senators would come from
all the States.
The motion
for appointment by the executive was lost; only Massachusetts and Pennsylvania
voting for it. Gorham now moved the adoption of the Massachusetts
plan—appointment by the executive with advice and consent of the Senate. The
motion, taken at once, was lost; four States, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Virginia, voting for it, four against it, others now absent, or
not voting.
The question
then went over until July 21, when a motion, made by Madison before the postponement,
was taken up, that the judges be nominated by the executive, the nomination to
become appointment unless disagreed to by two-thirds, afterwards changed to a
majority, of the Senate. Madison argued, first, that this would secure
responsibility in the matter; secondly, that it would defeat gross partiality
or mistake in the nomination; thirdly, that it was required by the principle
adopted in other cases—concurrence of two authorities in one of which the
people, in the other the States, should be represented. If the second branch
alone should have the appointment of the judges, they might be appointed by a
minority of the people though by a majority of the States. Moreover it would
throw the appointment entirely into the hands of the northern States.
Ellsworth
opposed and Gouverneur Morris favoured the motion. Ellsworth might be willing
to allow the executive a veto upon a nomination by the Senate, subject to being
overruled by two-thirds of the senators, but he preferred absolute appointment
by the Senate. Increase of power in the executive would be disliked by the
people. Morris said, first, that the States would often have an interest in the
choice of judges, hence the Senate, where the States were to vote, should not
appoint; secondly, that the executive, in the necessary intercourse with every
part of the country, would or might have better information than the Senate;
thirdly, that
if the executive could be trusted with command of the army, they need not fear
the people in this particular.
Madison’s
motion was lost, only Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia voting for it.
The clause as it stood, vesting appointment in the Senate, was then adopted;
the same States, and no others, voting nay. Thus it was reported by the
committee of detail; and thus it passed into the draft Constitution on August
6, under the powers of the Senate. The rest of the first resolution of the
committee, in regard to the term of office and compensation, was agreed to
without debate, except that the words “no increase” of compensation were struck
out. The resolution authorising the creation of inferior tribunals was
similarly adopted. The resolution in regard to the jurisdiction of the national
courts was then taken up; the clause giving to the judiciary trials of impeachment
of national officers was at once struck out; and the rest made to read that the
jurisdiction should extend to all cases arising under the national laws and to
such as involved the national peace and harmony. These resolutions were
reported accordingly and passed also into the draft Constitution.
The
resolution in regard to appointing the judges went into the draft, with other
matters touching the powers of the Senate, in a distinct section. This section,
with other matters of difference, was on August 24 sent to a special committee
of five, already referred to, with tbe result that that committee, on September
4, reported, as a substitute for the section, a provision that the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, should appoint the judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States not otherwise
provided for—which included appointment to the inferior federal Courts. The
report was adopted by the Convention without difficulty on September 7, and the
provision passed accordingly into the Constitution. There was no further
discussion as to the creation of inferior Courts or over jurisdiction. All that
remained therefore was to expand the terms of the resolution upon the
last-named subject and put them into the Constitution. The whole subject
appears in sections 1 and 2 of Article III.
(10) Other
Randolph resolutions.
The substance
of the Constitution was now determined; only certain outlying parts remained.
The tenth of
the Randolph resolutions made provision (omitting details) for the admission of
States “ lawfully arising within the limits of the United States.” The
resolution was agreed to in committee of the whole House, without question, and
was reported accordingly to the House, which adopted it; and it was put into
the draft Constitution. As it appeared there, the new States were to be
admitted on the same terms
as the
original ones; but the national legislature might make stipulations with them
concerning the public debt then subsisting.
When the
subject was reached by the Convention, Gouvemeur Morris moved that the last two
sentences be struck out; he would not bind the legislature to admit western
States on the terms there laid down. Madison opposed the motion, insisting that
the western people neither would nor ought to submit to a union which would
degrade them. The motion was rejected, only two States favouring it, Maryland
and Virginia, both of which had regions to the West. Morris now moved that the
following be substituted for the whole draft provision: “New States may be
admitted by the legislature into the Union; but no new States shall be erected
within the limits of any of the present States without the consent of the
legislature of such States as well as of the general legislature.” This was agreed
to, after strong objection by Martin against requiring consent of the States to
erecting new ones within their territory; six States voting aye to five nay.
Opposition
was now raised to the provision as amended, on various grounds. One objection
was that it would alarm the new regions; another was, that it was unnecessary,
because the Union could not dismember a State without its consent; another
was, that certain regions contested jurisdiction over them by any State, as in
the case of Vermont. Amended to meet the last-named objection, the provision,
with some verbal changes, was adopted. A provision was now added, against
forming States by joining two or more, or by joining parts without consent of
the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of Congress. And so the
whole passed into the Constitution; where it is the first half of section 3,
Article IV.
The eleventh
Randolph resolution declared that a republican government, and the territory
of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of government and
territory, should be guaranteed by the United States to each State. This
provision passed through several changes of form, intended only to make it more
clear and definite. In its final form it declares that the United States shall
guarantee to each State a republican form of government, protecting it from
foreign invasion and, on request of the State legislature or of the executive
if the legislature cannot be convened, from domestic violence. Thus it appears
in section 4, Article IV of the Constitution.
The
thirteenth of the Randolph resolutions declared that provision ought to be made
for the amendment of the Articles of Union whenever it should seem necessary;
and that the assent of the national legislature ought not to be required.
This
resolution first came before the committee of the whole House on June 5. It was
then postponed, and taken up again on June 11. Several members now thought the
resolution unnecessary; but if necessary, the consent of the national
legislature ought to go with it. Mason urged
the need of a
provision for amendments. The present plan would doubtless be found defective;
amendments would be needed; and it would be wise to provide for them in an
easy, regular, and constitutional way, instead of trusting to chance. But he
would not require assent of the national legislature, because that body might
abuse its powers and then refuse assent.
This part of
the clause was subsequently dropped, and the rest of the resolution reported to
the House. The House agreed without dissent, on July 23; and the resolution
went to the committee of detail, for the draft Constitution. There it appeared,
on August 6, as a distinct article, in the following words: “ On the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the States in the Union, for
an amendment of this Constitution, the legislature of the United States shall
call a convention for that purpose.”
The article
came before the House on September 10, upon a motion by Gerry to reconsider.
The Constitution, Gerry observed, was (by an article in the Constitution) to be
paramount over the State constitutions. It followed from the article under
consideration that two-thirds of the States might obtain a convention a
majority of which could bind the Union to innovations subversive of the States
altogether.
Hamilton
favoured the motion, but with a different view. He did not object to the
consequences of which Gerry had spoken; it was no greater evil to subject the
people of the United States to the voice of a majority than the people of a
particular State. It was desirable that there should be a ready way of
supplying defects which would be likely to appear in the new system. The mode
proposed by the article was not adequate. The State legislatures would not
apply for alterations, except with a view to increase their own powers. The
national legislature would be the first to perceive the need of amendments, and
the most sensible of it, and ought to be empowered, when two-thirds of each
branch concurred, to call a convention.
The motion to
reconsider prevailed; and Sherman now moved to add to the article the words, “
or the legislature may propose amendments to the several States for their
approbation; but no amendments shall be binding until consented to by the
several States.” The words “ three- fourths of” having been inserted, on the
motion of Wilson, before “the several States,” Madison moved to postpone the
proposition, and to take up the following: “ The legislature of the United
States, whenever two- thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the
application of two- thirds of the legislatures of the several States, shall
propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid, to all intents
and purposes, as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by
three-fourths at least of the legislatures of the several States, or by
conventions in three- fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification
may be proposed by the legislature of the United States.”
The
postponement was agreed to, and Madison’s proposition adopted, after an
amendment proposed by Rutledge, to add to it the words, “ provided that no
amendments, which may be prior to the year 1808, shall in any manner affect
the” provision that Congress should not interfere with the African slave-trade
before that year. The subject was completed by the addition of the words, that
“no State, without its consent, should be deprived of its equality in the
Senate,” And the whole passed accordingly, after certain verbal changes, from
the committee of detail into the Constitution, where it appears as Article V.
(11) Articles
VI and VII of the Constitution.
Two articles
of the Constitution remain, so much a matter of course that to state the
substance of them will be enough. Article VI provides for the debts of the
country, already created; that the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and all treaties, shall be the supreme law of the land; that senators and
representatives in Congress, members of the State legislatures, and executive
and judicial officers of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution; and that no religious
test shall be required as a qualification to office under the United States.
Article VII provides that ratification of the Constitution by nine States shall
be sufficient to establish it between such States.
The
Constitution was signed by thirty-nine out of forty-two deputies then present;
and the Convention was dissolved on September 17, after a session of nearly four
months.
(12) Ratification
and amendments.
The
proceedings were now to be reported, in accordance with the action of the
Convention, to the Congress then in session; afterwards the Constitution was to
be submitted to conventions in the several States, to be composed of persons
chosen by the people, whose Constitution it professed to be. All this was done;
and the question of adopting the Constitution was before the country.
Ratification
was voted for without difficulty by some of the conventions ; by others, not
without the most persistent opposition. Delaware, the smallest State in
importance in the Union, with everything to gain, was the first to act,
accepting the Constitution on December 7,1787; Rhode Island, the smallest in
territoiy, with much to lose, was the last, not voting for ratification until
May 29, 1790. New Hampshire, voting on June 21, 1788, was the ninth to ratify,
thus making Up the
1787-89]
Ratification followed by amendments. 303
required
number of ratifying States. North Carolina at first refused, by a large
majority, to ratify, though she did not reject, the Constitution; but a later
convention of the State accepted it on November 21, 1789. Meantime, on April 30
of the same year, Washington had been inaugurated President; the people of
eleven States having at that time ratified the action of the Convention.
Opposition to
the Constitution was based on various grounds. A few persons wished for
monarchy; but these were out of touch with the people, and neither made nor
sought to make headway. Many opposed a general union altogether, preferring a
division of the States into three or more confederacies ; some would have
things as they were; some would have no union at all. It was commonly asserted
and believed that the leaders of these classes were in general restless,
ambitious men, who hoped to make gain for themselves out of disruption and saw
little to hope for under a stable government. In some States, these men, taking
up the watchword “ liberty,” which the masses passionately worshipped, spread
the cry everywhere, and swept most of the common people into the ranks of
discontent and opposition. Others opposed the Constitution for what they deemed
its shortcomings; it had failed to promote cherished principles or projects.
The absence of a Bill of Bights was one of the chief objections thus raised;
the absence of a declaration in favour of freedom of religious worship was
another; the absence of a provision for general trial by jury created
widespread distrust; the absence of any reference to the interests of the
western regions in the free navigation of the Mississippi was made a most
serious cause of offence in States, such as Virginia, which had territory
extending to that river.
Amendments
were accordingly demanded on every side; and the thoroughgoing foes of the
Constitution, in order to defeat it entirely, declared and insisted that these
ought to be made before it was adopted. With a new convention everything would
be thrown open again. The friends of the Constitution set forth the dangers of
such a course in the strongest light. Their arguments prevailed with a
sufficient number, and amendments were put off until after ratification; but
they were called for in the Acts ratifying the Constitution.
It does not
fall within the purpose of the^e pages to speak in particular of the State
conventions; of the great struggle in Massachusetts; of the fight made by
Patrick Henry in Virginia against the Constitution at every point; of the
matchless skill put forth in defence of the Constitution, first in the
Federalist and then in the Convention of New York, by Alexander Hamilton,
youngest and greatest man of them all. Enough to say, that argument prevailed
over argument, and that the Constitution was everywhere ratified on its merits.
Twelve amendments
to the Constitution were proposed at the first session of the new Congress, in
the spring of 1789. Ten of these were
304
[l789
there
adopted, and then sent to and ratified by three-fourths of the States. Of the
two which failed, one related to the number of representatives in the lower
House of Congress, the other to the compensation of senators and
representatives. Of those which prevailed, the first prohibited Congress from
making any law. respecting an establishment of religion, or abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press; the second related to the right to bear
arms; the third, to quartering soldiers in private houses; the fourth, to
security against general search warrants; the fifth, to trials for capital and
other crimes, and to compensation for taking private property for public use;
the sixth, to other matters relating to trials for crime; the seventh, to trial
by jury in civil cases; the eighth, to bail; the ninth declared that the
enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights should not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people; the tenth, that the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, were reserved to the States or to the people.
These
amendments may be said to have completed the Constitution, in the sense that it
was urged, and in effect admitted, that what they contained deserved a place in
the instrument itself. All that was left was for the Supreme Court to make it
plain that the Constitution was really “ adequate to the exigencies of
government and the preservation of the Union.” This was done when, under the
guidance of John Marshall, it was shown that in giving powers to the nation,
the Constitution had, with a few well-marked exceptions, given those powers to
the full, with every incident suitable to them.
A word more
must close this chapter. The record of debates in the Federal Convention tells
the truth, but not the whole truth. Every great undertaking has its master
spirit; the master spirit of the Convention which framed the Constitution of
the United States, and of all that led to it, was Alexander Hamilton* There
were other strong leaders, leaders who played a greater part in the long series
of debates, Madison, Gouverneur Morris, Wilson; but Hamilton, present or
absent—he could give counsel from New York, while his vote in the Convention
was to be silenced by his colleagues Yates and Lansing—was chief among them.
Hamilton had already thought out the idea of a Constitution, clear, definite,
and strong to withstand domestic feuds and foreign greed. He had thought out,
and he laid before the Convention, a form of instrument which he considered
better than any likely to be adopted; but if he knew that the mark was too
high, it was still to be the mark. A nation was to be created and established,
created of jarring commonwealths and established on the highest level of right.
THE STRUGGLE
FOR COMMERCIAL INDEPENDENCE.
(1783—1812.)
On
November 3, 1783, the definitive treaty which recognised the independence of
the English colonies in America was signed at Paris; and the rebellion came to
a triumphant end. Though the work of revolution, the work of demolition, was
thus accomplished, that of reconstruction was yet to begin. An enormous debt
was to be paid off; a depreciated currency was to be restored; a national
currency was to be created; public credit was to be established; commerce was
to be built up; a foreign policy was to be framed suitable to the high rank
which the United States was expected to take in the family of nations, and such
a domestic policy was to be adopted as would unite the conflicting interests of
thirteen jealous republics. Under the best of governments the task would have
been a hard one. But the Continental Congress was called on to perform it under
one of the worst.
The Articles
of Confederation adopted by Congress in 1777, and ratified by the thirteen
States on March 1,1781, provided for a Congress of one House, to which each
State must send at least two delegates, and might send any number up to seven.
The delegates were chosen annually by the States, might be recalled at any
time, could not serve more than three years in any period of six, and were paid
by the States that sent them. Once seated in Congress, these men found
themselves members of what a few years later would have been denounced as a “
dark and secret conclave.” The doors of their chamber were shut; the debates
took place in private; and no reports of them were published. Their
deliberations were controlled by a President annually elected by the Congress
and looked up to as the representative of the sovereignty of the States united
for common defence; but he was merely the President of Congress and never the
President of the United States.
Congress had
power to make war and peace, coin money, establish post-offices and
post-routes, appoint all officers in the land and naval forces of the United
States, except regimental officers, appoint a
Committee of
the State to sit during a recess, ascertain the sums of money to be raised for
the use of the United States, apply this money to public uses, borrow money,
build and equip a navy, raise and equip armies, and establish rules for the
disposition of prizes and captures made during war. The States were forbidden
to tax the property of the United States, to send or receive embassies, to
conclude treaties, or to lay duties on imports that would interfere with any
stipulations in any treaty made by the United States. No State could keep a
standing army or navy in time of peace, or fit out privateers or engage in war
without the consent of Congress, or lay any restriction on the trade and
commerce of another State not laid equally on its own citizens. In Congress
each State had one vote; and the affirmative votes of nine States were
necessary to enable Congress to pass any ordinance of importance. To amend the
Articles of Confederation, the consent of each one of the thirteen States was
required. Congress had no power to levy a tax of any kind, to regulate trade
with foreign countries or between the States, or to compel obedience to its own
ordinances.
The defects
of this system of government were many and great. In the first place the system
of representation was bad. No thought was taken of the population. The immense
State of Virginia, whose territory contained the homes of 700,000 human beings,
was to have no more influence in the councils of the nation than the petty
State of Rhode Island, which had less than 70,000 inhabitants. But this
absolute equality of the States was more apparent than real, for Congress
possessed no revenue; and the burden of supporting the delegates was cast on
those who sent them. As the charge was not light, a motive was at once created
for preferring a representation of two to a representation of seven, or,
indeed, for sending no delegates at all.
While the war
was still raging and the enemy marching and countermarching within the borders
of several States, a sense of fear kept up the number of delegates from each
State to at least two. Indeed, some of the wealthier and more populous States
often had as many as four Congress-men on the floor of the House. But the war
was now over; the stimulus derived from the presence of a hostile army was
withdrawn; and both representation and attendance fell ofF fast. Delaware and
Georgia ceased to be represented. From the ratification of the treaty to the
organisation of the government under the Constitution six years elapsed; and
during those six years Congress, though entitled to ninety- one members, was
rarely attended by so many as twenty-five. The House was repeatedly forced to
adjourn day after day for want of a quorum. No occasion, however impressive or
important, could produce a large attendance. Seven States, represented by
twenty delegates, witnessed the resignation of Washington in 1783. Twenty-three
members, sitting for eleven States, voted for the ratification of the treaty
with Great Britain.
The inability
of Congress to enforce its ordinances and the stipulations of its treaties
brought the country at once into conflict with Great Britain. By the fourth,
fifth, and sixth articles of the treaty no impediments were to be put in the
way of the recovery of debts ; the States were to be recommended to repeal their
Confiscation Acts; and there were to be no future confiscations nor
prosecutions of any sort against any person because of the part taken in the
late war. But the States gave no heed whatever to these articles. The
Confiscation Acts were not repealed; impediments were placed in the way of the
recovery of debts; and thousands of Loyalists were driven from the country.
Indeed, the ink was scarcely dry on the treaty when the Loyalists, well knowing
that its provisions would be set at naught by a people embittered by a
desperate struggle, began to flee the country by thousands. As garrison after
garrison was withdrawn, this flight became an exodus. When Savannah was given
up to the Americans, 2000 Loyalists with 5000 slaves sailed away to St
Augustine and Charleston. Those who went to Charleston arrived just in time to
join the 3000 who fled from that city to Jamaica, St Augustine, Halifax, and
New York. During nearly seven years New York had been in British hands. It was
situated in the very heart of the most loyal section of the country, near the
places where the great battles of the revolution—Trenton, Princeton, Saratoga,
Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth—had been fought, and it became the haven of
refuge for thousands of Loyalists. It was the last of the cities to be given up
to the Americans, and as such it now became the port to which all Loyalists,
eager to depart, turned their steps.
The King had
offered to transport all subjects who could prove residence within the British
lines for twelve months, and show that the houses assigned them were in good
repair and that the rent had been duly paid to the provost marshal. His Majesty
agreed further to supply them, on their embarkation, with provisions for a
year, with twenty-one days’ rations for the passage by sea, with clothing for
men, women, and children, and with medicines, tools for farming, and arms and
ammunition for defence. Such was the press to secure these benefits that the
evacuation of the city, which was expected to take place in April, 1783, was
delayed till late in November; and December came before the last of the
transports bearing the army sailed from Staten Island. During these months
29,000 Loyalists were carried away; and many more withdrew at their own cost.
In all, 60,000 are believed to have left the country for Canada, Nova Scotia,
and other British possessions. Their departure was hailed by the American Whigs
with unbounded delight.
As already
remarked, the States declined to carry out the provisions of the treaty with
respect to the refugees. When, therefore, the demand was made for the delivery
of the eight frontier posts on the American side of the boundary from Lake
Michigan to Lake Champlain, the
British
Minister replied that they were held because of the failure of the American government
to secure from the States the restitution of confiscated property of the
Loyalists. The States on their part justified their refusal by the assertion
that Sir Guy Carleton had carried off thousands of negroes in violation of the
seventh article of the peace. No argument could move either side; and for
thirteen years the posts remained under the flag of Great Britain, and the
fur-trade of which they were the centre was lost to the merchants of the United
States.
The inability
of Congress to levy taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, deprived it of a
revenue sufficient to pay its debts, and brought the Confederation to the verge
of bankruptcy. The debts of the Confederation were of two kinds, those due at
home and those due abroad. The domestic debt consisted of paper money, issued
in great quantity by the Continental Congress, and so depreciated that it had
become worthless; of loan-office certificates, interest indents, and an immense
amount of paper obligations issued by various departments. Towards the payment
of this domestic debt Congress proposed that States claiming land between the
Great Lakes, the mountains, and the Mississippi should cede their lands west of
the mountains. It was promised that the territory so obtained should be divided
into Sides, which in time should be admitted into the Union on the same footing
as the original States; and that the proceeds of all land sold to settlers
should be used to pay the domestic debt of the Confederation. Six States—Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia—claimed such
territory by virtue of the “ sea to sea ” charters granted by James I, Charles
I, Charles II, and George III. New York also held Indian rights acquired by
treaty.
The appeal
was successful; and between 1780 and 1787 cessions were made and deeds
delivered to Congress by New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.
In July, 1787, Congress passed an ordinance providing for the government of the
territory thus ceded between the Great Lakes and the Ohio, the western boundary
of Pennsylvania and the Mississippi. These lands became known as the North-West
Territory, and were subsequently divided into States. The money derived from
the sale of land was scrupulously applied to pay the domestic debt. North and
South Carolina and Georgia also made cessions; and the lands ceded by them were
used for the same good purpose.
Towards the
payment of the money due to France, Spain, and Holland, Congress could obtain
no provision, nor did it ever secure a revenue sufficient to meet its current
expenses. The cost of government and the expenses of the war were, according to
the Articles of Confederation, to be paid by assessments on the States, the
quota of each to be in proportion to the value of its surveyed and occupied
lands. But, when calls were made, the States could not, or would not, respond.
Driven to desperation, Congress, in 1781, proposed an amendment to the
Articles
giving it power to lay a duty of five per cent, ad valorem on all imported
goods. This required the assent of each State in the Union. Two flatly refused,
and the scheme failed. Not discouraged by failure the Continental Congress in
1783 again asked for an amendment to the Articles, giving it power for
twenty-five years to levy certain moderate duties, to be collected by officers
appointed by each State. This proposed amendment consisted of two parts,
relating to the impost and to the supplementary funds. The impost was to be a
specific tax on tea, coffee, sugar, cocoa, molasses, pepper, and Madeira wine,
and an ad valorem duty on imported goods of every other sort. The revenue so
raised was to be pledged to pay the interest and the principal of the foreign
debt. The supplementary funds were to be raised by a special tax levied by each
State and paid into the Continental treasury to meet the current expenses of
government. In the course of four years, twelve States, with many misgivings
and further restrictions, consented. But New York refused, and all hope of a
revenue amendment was abandoned.
It mattered
little, however, for by that time a third proposition to amend the Articles had
been rejected; power to regulate trade with foreign nations had been refused;
and the Confederation in consequence was doomed. When the Revolution ended, it seemed
not unlikely that the old commercial dependence on Great Britain was over; and
that in a little while Frenchmen, Spaniards, Dutchmen, Italians, and Portuguese
would be contending for that lucrative trade which Great Britain had once
enjoyed, and to secure the monopoly of which she had even risked a war. Pitt
however was anxious to recover it for England, and, in March, 1783, framed a
plan which did credit to his statesmanship. Vessels owned by citizens of the
United States were to be treated in all respects on the same footing as those
owned by the subjects of European powers. Articles grown or manufactured in the
United States, and carried in American vessels to British ports, were to pay no
more duty than would have been exacted had the goods been owned by British
subjects and been brought in British ships.
But before
the plan could be put in operation, Pitt went out of office. The Ministry that
succeeded him held a precisely opposite view, and obtained an Act of
Parliament, which they immediately put into force, giving the King in Council
power to regulate trade between the United States, Great Britain, and her
dependencies. In their opinion the plan proposed by Pitt was bad, because it
would ruin the merchant marine of Great Britain and foster the merchant marine
of the United States, and would destroy the monopoly of British colonial trade;
and they pointed out that Congress, having no power to regulate trade, could
not retaliate by counter-restrictions. They began therefore (July, 1783) by
closing the ports of the West Indies to American ships and American fish, and
imposed duties practically prohibitive on the importation of American goods to
British ports except in British vessels.
Congress, as
was foreseen, could not retaliate; the States, jealous of each other, would not
impose restrictions; and in a few months the wharves of New York and Boston,
Charleston and Savannah, were crowded with British vessels, and the native
merchants half ruined by British factors who sold for cash shiploads of British
goods. The merchants declared that ruin stared them in the face. The demand
(they said) for tammies, callimancoes, durants, brocades, damasks, Irish
linens, had never been so great; yet from this lucrative trade they were
excluded. If they loaded their vessels with rice, indigo, flour, whale-oil,
lumber, pitch, tar, or tobacco, and entered the port of London or Liverpool, an
enormous duty was laid on them because they were not Englishmen. This duty
(they argued) was a clear loss. If they attempted to recover it in England by
adding it to the price of the goods they imported, they were undersold by
Englishmen who had brought in the same kind of goods free of duty. If they
attempted to recover it in America by adding it to the price of the goods they
brought home, they were again undersold by British factors who had no such duty
to pay in America. If this went on, the trade and commerce of the United States
would soon be in the hands of Englishmen.
Of this
danger Congress was fully aware, and early in 1784 appointed a Grand Committee
to report what should be done. The Committee reported that, in their view, the
anticipations of the merchants were correct. They therefore recommended that
Congress should urge the State Legislatures to make over to it, for fifteen
years, the management of commercial affairs, and give it power to forbid
merchandise to enter American ports unless brought in ships owned or sailed by
American citizens, or by the subjects of such Powers as should, from time to
time, make treaties of commerce with the United States. As this power to
regulate trade could only be given by amending the Articles of Confederation,
and the Articles could only be amended with the consent of each one of the
thirteen States, it was anticipated that a considerable time would elapse
before it could be obtained. So heedless were the States that eighteen months
later only Maryland and New Hampshire had acted on the recommendation.
This delay is
to be ascribed partly to apathy, but partly also to the fact that the States
were attempting to regulate trade for themselves. Early in 1785, while the
legislature of New York was in session, the merchants of New York City
addressed it in a long memorial, and solemnly recommended it to give Congress
power over trade. The legislature, in response, imposed a double duty on goods
imported in British vessels. A month later the Boston merchants met, addressed
their own legislature, as well as Congress, appointed a committee to correspond
with merchants in other States, and pledged themselves not to buy any goods
from the British factors then in Boston. When the General Court of
Massachusetts assembled, the Governor in his turn made
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311
a strong
appeal. After some debate, the General Court gave it as their opinion that the
powers of Congress were not adequate to the great purposes they were designed
to effect, and passed a resolution that it would be expedient to summon a
convention of delegates from every State for the sole purpose of revising the Articles
of Confederation. They also instructed the Governor to write to the executives
of the other twelve States urging them to recommend the passage of laws likely
to hinder the monopolising policy of Great Britain, passed a Navigation Act
forbidding the export of American goods from Massachusetts in British bottoms,
and laid a tonnage duty on foreign ships. New Hampshire and Rhode Island passed
similar Acts.
Imitating the
merchants of New York and Boston, the people of Philadelphia met, resolved that
the oppression under which commerce languished could only be relieved by
granting Congress full power to regulate trade, appointed a committee of
correspondence, and called on the legislature of Pennsylvania to shut out
foreign goods by high duties. This the legislature did; and the agitation in
behalf of the amendment was again taken up by New York. Encouraged by the
action of Boston and Philadelphia, and dissatisfied with the action of their
own legislature, the Chamber of Commerce of New York, in the autumn of 1785,
made a new appeal to the legislature, the States and the people.
The movement
now spread to Virginia. The Potomac river had always been regarded as the
boundary between Virginia and Maryland. The charter of Lord Baltimore had so
defined it, but had made the jurisdiction of the colonial governors extend
across the river to the southern shore. By the constitution of 1776, Virginia
had recognised this charter, and ceded to Maryland all the territory claimed by
it, with all rights demanded, except the free use and navigation of the Potomac
and Pokomoke rivers from source to mouth. The language conveying the grant was
broad and general, and might, without much sophistry, be construed into a
complete relinquishing by Virginia of all jurisdiction over both rivers. Yet
the matter seems to have escaped notice till after the peace, when Madison,
hearing of the many flagrant evasions of Virginian laws by the captains of
foreign vessels loading on the Virginia side of the river, suggested a joint
commission from Maryland and Virginia to define the powers of each on the
Potomac. This commission was appointed, and in a supplementary report set forth
how, in the course of their labours, they had been deeply impressed by the want
of legislation on the currency, on duties, and on commercial matters in
general, and proposed that two commissioners should be appointed annually to
report upon the details of a commercial system for the following year. The
legislature of Maryland was the first to act on the report. In doing so, it
went beyond the suggestion of the commission, and proposed that Delaware and
Pennsylvania should be invited to join Virginia and Maryland in a common system
of
commercial
policy. Virginia went still further, and issued a call for a Convention of
delegates from all the States to meet at Annapolis in September, 1786, and
there agree on such a plan as, when adopted by the States, would enable
Congress fully to protect the trade of the United States.
But the
Navigation Acts of the States and the good resolutions of the people came too
late. The mischief was done. During the few months which had elapsed since the
return of peace, the importation of British goods had been enormous. In 1784
the value of imported goods was reckoned at £1,700,000. Exports to Great
Britain in the same time were valued at only £700,000. The difference had to be
paid in cash, for since the refusal of the States to allow the recovery of
British debts in court, no American merchant could get credit in England. As a
consequence, every sort of specie money was secured and sent out of the
country. The country was quickly stripped of gold and silver; the need of a
circulating medium began to be seriously felt; and the old cry went up for
paper money. With a keen recollection of the dark days of 1779, when forty
dollars had been paid for a hat, when fifty pounds in paper would not buy fifty
pounds of sugar, and when a hundred dollars in bills of credit were asked for a
barrel of flour, the multitude were not deterred from demanding a new issue of
paper and a new Act to make it legal tender. Their demands were heard; and,
before the summer of 1786 was over, the presses in Pennsylvania, in North and
South Carolina, in Georgia, in New Jersey, in New York, in Rhode Island, were
hard at work printing paper money. The history of that paper money was the
history of the old continental issues retold. First came the bills; then came
depreciation; and finally tender-laws, force-acts, and ruin.
Nowhere was
this so fully illustrated as in Rhode Island. There, so early as 1784, the
supporters of paper money had attained to formidable numbers. In the spring of
1786 they carried the elections, secured the legislature, remitted the
land-tax, suspended the excise, and issued £100,000 of paper money. The law
declared that the bills should be loaned according to the apportionment of the
late tax; that they should be paid into the treasury at the end of fourteen
years; and that every farmer or merchant who came to borrow a few hundred
pounds must pledge real estate for double the sum demanded. Many persons made
haste to avail themselves of their good fortune, and mortgaged fields strewn
thick with stones for sums such as could not have been obtained for the richest
pastures. They had, however, no sooner obtained the money and sought to make a
first payment at the butcher’s or the baker’s, than they found that a heavy
discount was taken from the face- value. This, in the opinion of the holders of
the paper, was an outrage. They maintained that, if it were lawful for the
State to issue hard money, it was also lawful to issue paper money; and that
every man who did
not take it
willingly should be compelled to take it unwillingly. A Forcing Act was
therefore passed, imposing a fine of ^6*100 and the loss of civic rights on
anyone refusing to take the bills in payment of a debt or discouraging their
circulation. But the law only made matters worse than before. The merchants
denounced it as iniquitous, and refused, almost to a man, to make any sales.
The traders closed their shops, or disposed of their stock by barter. Business
was at a standstill, and money almost ceased to circulate.
Eventually
the question of the constitutionality of the Force Act came before the courts.
One John Trevett had purchased from a Newport butcher named Weeden a few pounds
of beef, and tendered in payment some of the new money. Weeden refused to take
paper shillings at their par value, whereupon Trevett lodged a complaint
against him. When the case came on, each side was represented by able counsel,
for the contest was in truth not between Trevett and Weeden but between the
farmers and the merchants—between those who, having mortgaged their lands for
the paper issue, now struggled hard to keep it at par, and those who, recalling
the disastrous times of 1779, did their best to keep the paper out of their own
pockets. The court decided in favour of the latter, refused to execute the law,
and declared the information not cognisable before them.
In
Massachusetts the advocates of paper money went to the verge of treason. There,
as elsewhere, they formed the debtor part of the community ; and there, as
elsewhere, they were early infected by the rage for a paper medium. Taxes were
high; trade and commerce languished; money was scarce; and, as their creditors
were pressing for settlements, they determined that the State should provide
the means. One bill which they introduced into the Assembly made real and
personal estate a legal tender; defeated in this, they brought in a paper money
bill providing for a currency which should never be redeemed, but should
depreciate at certain fixed rates till it had no value left, and so be
extinguished. Again defeated, they resolved on violence, and began to stop the
sittings of the courts in order that property should not be taken by distress.
For a while the Governor submitted in patience. But, when the malcontents began
to gather in force and threatened to march to Cambridge and stop the sitting of
the Court of Common Pleas, warrants were issued, and two of the leaders were
lodged in Boston gaol. This served but to make matters worse. Under the command
of Daniel Shays, the “Regulators,” as they called themselves, mustered in such
numbers at Worcester that the Governor put Boston in a state of defence, raised
an army of 4000 men, and sent it into the field under the command of General
Lincoln. After fighting pitched battles at Springfield and Pelham and many
skirmishes elsewhere, the malcontents were at last driven over the line into
New Hampshire and Vermont.
In the midst
of this widespread disorder and distress the Trade
314
Annapolis and
Philadelphia Conventions. [1786-9
Convention
met at Annapolis. The attendance was small. No delegates came from Georgia,
South Carolina, or any State to the east of the Hudson. Three elections had
been held in Massachusetts. Twice the delegates refused to serve. On the third
occasion those chosen accepted and set out, but, like the delegates from Rhode
Island, were met on the way by news that the Convention had broken up. The session
was a short one, for the few who came had such limited powers that they
contented themselves with lamenting the wretched state of national affairs, and
urging that Congress should call a new Convention, with enlarged powers, to
meet at Philadelphia in May, 1787. This was eventually done; and the Convention
so gathered produced the Constitution of the United States.
That noble
instrument, under which the United States has attained to such astonishing
prosperity, is based on no mere theory of government framed by speculative
politicians. It was drawn by practical men to meet a pressing need, and bears
throughout the marks of experience gained during the dark days which followed
the war for independence. Congress now had sole power to coin money and to determine
its value, and to regulate trade with foreign countries and between the States.
It was empowered to levy taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts
of the United States; and to provide for the common defence and general
welfare. No State, on the other hand, could issue bills of credit, or coin
money, or make anything else than gold or silver a legal tender for debt.
The
Convention, having framed the Constitution, sent it to Congress to be
transmitted to the States for consideration, and requested that when nine
States had ratified it, Congress should take the necessary steps to put the new
government into operation. By July, 1788, eleven States had adopted the
Constitution ; and Congress then made preparations for its establishment. It
was ordered that New York City should be the seat of government; that on the
first Wednesday in January, 1789, the States should choose presidential
electors; that the electors should meet and vote in their respective States on
the first Wednesday in February; and that the Senate and the House should meet
and count the electoral vote at New York City on the first Wednesday in March,
1789.
Towards
sunset on March 3 a salute was fired from the battery as a farewell to the old
Confederation. At daylight, at noon, and at six in the evening on Wednesday the
4th guns were again fired, and all the church bells rung, as a hearty welcome
to the new Constitution. But no other celebration was attempted; and nothing
further was done to mark the fact that the weak and crumbling Confederation had
given place to a strong and vigorous government. No President was inaugurated
; no Senate, no House of Representatives was ready to begin business. Indeed,
the new Congress seemed to have inherited all the
1789]
315
sloth, all the torpor of the old. The Senate was to consist of twenty-two
members and the House of fifty-nine. Yet, while the cannon were firing and the
bells ringing, there were but eight Senators and thirteen Representatives in
the city. The sixth of April arrived before both Houses had a quorum. Then the
electoral votes were counted; and Washington and Adams were declared
respectively President and Vice-President. On April 22 Adams was inaugurated;
and a week later Washington, standing on the balcony of the Federal Hall, took
the oath of office in the presence of a great crowd of his fellow-citizens.
The task which now lay before him was unique. No such duty had ever
before been laid on any man. “ My station,” said he to the crowd that saw him
take the oath of office for the first time, “ is new. I walk on untrodden
ground.” He did indeed walk on untrodden ground. When the Constitution became
the supreme law of the land, scarce a vestige of government existed. The
Continental Congress, a body whose name should never be mentioned without a
grateful recollection of its noble work, had months before expired
ignominiously for want of a quorum. Save a Secretary of Foreign Affairs with
scarce a letter to write, a Secretary of War with an army of eighty men, a
Board of Treasury in whose coffers there was not a shilling, not a piece of the
machinery of the defunct and discarded system remained in operation. About the
President on every side lay the wreckage of a demolished government, and in his
hand was a brand-new Constitution investing him with untried powers of the
largest kind. A man who in our time comes to the Presidency finds his way made
straight by customs, traditions, precedents, and established forms, and
administers government under a Constitution simplified by the interpretations
of a hundred years. To Washington these helps were all denied. On him rested
the solemn responsibility of so starting the young Republic on its way that its
future career should not fail to be honourable to itself and beneficial to
mankind.
The United States was at that time a small country. On the west it just
touched the Mississippi river. It nowhere touched the Gulf of Mexico, and it
contained but half as many human beings as to-day dwell within the borders of
Pennsylvania. Its foreign relations were strained and in disorder. There was as
yet no commercial treaty with Great Britain, and none of any sort with Spain,
Portugal, or Italy, or with any commercial nation of Europe, save France,
Holland, and Prussia. In spite of the Treaty of Independence, British troops
still held the frontier forts from Lake Champlain to Michigan. In defiance of
right, Spain held part of what is now Alabama and Mississippi, and displayed
her flag on the site of what is now Memphis.
The finances were in confusion. On the books of the treasury was a debt
due to France, Spain, and Holland, the principal of which had begun to fall due
and the interest on which had often been unpaid. To the people the State owed a
still greater debt, the paper evidence of which
seemed
scarcely worth preserving. No national currency existed; but in its place were
thirteen kinds of paper issued by the States, and reduced to token-money by the
provision in the Constitution that no State should issue bills of credit or make
anything else than gold and silver legal tender for debt. Trade and commerce
were all but ruined. American ships and sailors were excluded from British
ports in the West Indies; American products were discriminated against abroad;
and American merchants were undersold at home by foreign manufacturers. Everywhere
was chaos; and out of this chaos must come order and prosperity, or the new
Constitution would go down in ruin.
To the duty
which thus lay before it, Congress now set itself in serious earnest; and,
before two years had passed, the machinery of government was well under way.
Departments of State, of War, and of the Treasury were established; the
Supreme, Circuit, and District Courts were created; taxes were levied; a census
was taken; and twelve amendments to the Constitution (of which ten were
adopted) were submitted to the States. A Coinage Act was passed, and a mint set
up; the District of Columbia was defined, and the city of Washington planned;
the temporary seat of government was removed from New York to Philadelphia,
there to remain until 1800; the debts contracted by the Continental Congress
and by the separate States in the long struggle for independence were funded; a
national bank was chartered; and provision was made for the naturalisation of
foreigners, the granting of patents and copyrights, the building of
lighthouses, the regulation of trade and intercourse with the Indians, and for
continuing the post office as already established.
Most of this
legislation met with little opposition; but the funding of the Continental debt
and the assumption and funding of the debts of the States, the chartering of
the Bank of the United States, and the Excise Act, aroused bitter resistance in
Congress and split the people into two great political parties. Those who
supported the Administration and looked up to Washington and Adams, Alexander
Hamilton and John Jay as leaders, became known as the Federalist party. Those
who opposed the policy of the Administration and were led by Jefferson, Madison
and Monroe, took the name of Federal Republicans. The Federalists were
strongest in the commercial States, and the Republicans in the farming and
planting regions.
The
Republicans complained of the high salaries paid to public officers; believed
that the national debt was unnecessarily large because the depreciated
Continental paper had been funded at its face-value and not at its market
price, and because the debts of the States had been assumed by the Federal
government; denied that Congress had power to charter the Bank ; insisted that
the Constitution should be construed strictly; and saw in the attempt to give
the President a title, and in his levees and his refusal to mingle with the
people, in the secret sessions of
the Senate,
and in the gowns worn by the judges of the Supreme Court, unmistakeable signs
of a lingering fondness for aristocracy and monarchy. The Federalists, on the
other hand, believed in a broad and liberal construction of the Constitution ;
insisted that every bill of credit, every loan office certificate, every
promise to pay issued by authority of the Continental Congress, should be
redeemed at its face-value; held that the debts which the States had incurred
in the struggle for independence were part of the price paid for liberty and had
very properly been made part of the national debt; scoffed at the charge of
aristocratic and monarchical tendencies; and declared that the tariff and the
excise were no higher than was necessary to support such a government as the
people, the States, and foreign Powers would respect.
Scarcely were
the people thus definitely parted by domestic issues into Federalists and
Republicans, when the course of events compelled them to take sides in the
great war which began in Europe in April, 1792, and forced them to enter on a
struggle, of two and twenty years’ duration, for commercial independence.
From the day
when the news of the fall of the Bastille reached America, the progress of the
French Revolution had been watched with the deepest interest by the people of
the United States. The treaty of alliance which bound the two countries, the
grateful recollection of independence recognised, of money lent, of ships and
troops furnished by France, and the belief that the uprising of the French
people was largely due to the example set by America, aroused all over the
United States an interest in the French Revolution and a sympathy with it which
could not be felt elsewhere. When therefore, in December, 1792, it became known
that the French were slowly making headway against the Allies, the delight of
Federalists and Republicans alike found expression in bell-ringings, bonfires,
cannonades, and illuminations. Civic feasts were held, “liberty poles” adorned
with the red cap erected, democratic societies formed, and tricolour flags hung
up in inns and taverns. Men ceased to be Americans and became all but
Frenchmen. They doffed small clothes and put on pantaloons, cut their hair in
the “Brutus crop,” dropped such old-fashioned terms as “ Sir ” and “ Mr,” and
called each other “ Citizen.” They erased from the streets of cities and towns
such names as King, Queen, and Prince; and were in transports of joy when they
heard (in April, 1793) that war had broken out between France and Great
Britain, and that the first minister plenipotentiary to the United States from
the Republic of France was on his way across the ocean.
The mission
of that functionary, Edmond Genest, was a matter of serious concern to
Washington. In the early days of the revolutionary war the King of France had
made a treaty of alliance with the little league of States, then struggling
desperately for independence. Louis XVI guaranteed the sovereignty and
independence of the United States for ever;
Congress, in
the name of the States, pledged itself to defend for ever the French
possessions in America. France had made good her promise and fought in behalf
of America till liberty, sovereignty, and independence were obtained. Might she
not now call on the States to make good their promise and defend her West Indian
possessions ? And, if so, would the United States accede, and once more take up
arms against Great Britain? The answer of every sympathiser with France was,
Yes! France, they said, is our old friend: England is our old enemy. We are
bound to France by gratitude, by a treaty of alliance, by the sympathy which
one republic cannot but feel for a sister republic struggling for life. No tie,
no treaty of any sort, binds us to Great Britain. To this it was replied that
the French alliance was defensive, not offensive; that it was contracted with
the King, not with the government which had cut off his head; and that to go to
war while Spain was in full possession of the Mississippi, with the Indians on
the war-path, and British garrisons in the forts along the Canadian frontier,
would be the height of folly.
On hearing
that war between England and France had begun, Washington, who had just entered
on his second term of office, hastened to Philadelphia, and summoned his
Secretaries for advice. Is it wise, he asked them, to assemble Congress ? Shall
neutrality be declared ? Are the treaties made with France when under a King
still in force now that she is ruled by a revolutionary government ? Does the
treaty of alliance apply to an offensive as well as to a defensive war ? Is
France engaged in an offensive war ? Shall the plenipotentiary of the French
Republic be received ? It was the opinion of the Cabinet that Congress need not
be called together; that, although the country was under no treaty obligations
to show Great Britain any consideration, it was politic to remain neutral;
that, as France had declared war against England, she was engaged in offensive
war, and could claim no aid under the treaty; and that it would be well to
receive the French minister.
Thus advised,
Washington issued a declaration of neutrality on April 22, 1793. Had he
proclaimed a monarchy he could not have been more savagely reviled. He was
accused of base ingratitude to France; he was a tool of Great Britain; his
anti-republican tendency was now quite plain, for he had placed on the same
footing a republic that the States were bound to aid, and a monarchy that held
their forts, insulted their flag, and would not so much as make a treaty of
commerce with them.
To proclaim
neutrality was easy. To enforce it was hard, and was made harder by the conduct
of Great Britain. France, having declared war, opened her ports in the West
Indies to neutral trade. This trade Great Britain declared illegal, as giving
to neutrals in time of war a trade they did not enjoy in time of peace, which
was contrary to the rule of 1756. In March, 1793, she made a treaty with
Prussia by
which the two
contracting parties agreed to stop the trade in question. In May France
retaliated, and ordered the seizure of neutral ships loaded with provisions for
an enemy’s ports. Gouverneur Morris, then American minister at Paris, protested
so vigorously that in the space of eight weeks the decree was twice repealed
and twice again put in force. In June British cruisers were commanded to bring
into port every neutral ship found carrying flour, com, or meal, to any port of
France. Not content with this the British government issued, in November, 1793,
an Order in Council, aimed at the trade of neutrals with the French colonies.
Commanders of British cruisers and privateers were bidden to send in for
condemnation neutral vessels carrying provisions to a French colony, or
bringing away anything that a French colony produced. They also began to search
American ships for British seamen. France then laid an embargo on neutral ships
in the port of Bordeaux; and at the close of the year 1793 one hundred and
three American ships were in French hands. Hundreds more were in the ports of
the French Antilles; and these, as they came forth on their homeward voyage,
were seized by English cruisers and hurried to the nearest Vice-admiralty Court
for judgment. For months the maritime news of the Advertisers and Gazettes
consisted chiefly of accounts of ships condemned at Halifax, at New Providence,
at Nassau, at St Kitt’s. A great cry went up from the ruined merchants of
Portsmouth, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston; and Congress at its
next session was appealed to for help. The response was speedy. Resolutions for
discriminating tonnage duties were introduced; appropriations were voted for
building arsenals, purchasing ammunition, erecting coast fortifications, and
building six frigates; an embargo for thirty days was imposed; a resolution to
sequester debts due to British merchants was offered; and a bill to declare
non-intercourse with Great Britain, after passing the House, was defeated in
the Senate by the casting-vote of the Vice-President.
Alarmed at
the rising spirit of hostility towards Great Britain, Washington determined to
make a great effort for peace, and, with the consent of the Senate, sent Chief
Justice John Jay to London with the offer of a treaty of amity and commerce. In
the midst of this excitement Great Britain recalled her Order of November,
1793, and issued a new one (January 8, 1794). Naval officers and masters of
privateers were instructed to send in for judgment such neutral vessels, and
such only, as were found trading directly between any port in the French West
Indies and any port in Europe. With this prohibition on direct trade she rested
content; and during four years the Order remained in force.
The chief
grievances against Great Britain were now eight in number. The delimitation of
the North-East boundary was still in dispute. The forts on the Canadian borders
were still in British hands. No compensation had been made for the negroes
carried off at the evacuation of
320
[1795-6
New York City
in 1783. She had. discriminated against American commerce; imprisoned American
sailors; declared paper blockades; changed the meaning of contraband of war;
and enforced the rule of 1756. To obtain redress for all these grievances was
impossible. But Jay undoubtedly did the best that could be done, and in
November, 1794, signed a treaty of amity and commerce, which the President and
the Senate approved in July, 1795. The frontier forts were to be surrendered.
The debts due to British merchants at the opening of the Revolution were to be
paid by the United States. The damages suffered by American merchants under the
Order in Council of November, 1793, were to be paid by Great Britain. The
British West Indies were opened to American ships of not more than seventy tons
burden. A Commission was to settle the Maine boundary. But nothing was said
about search, or impressment, or paper blockades, or indemnity for the negroes
whom Carleton took away in 1783.
Disappointed
in their hope that negotiations would fail and war with England follow, the
Republicans attacked the treaty with fury. Jay was burned in effigy, guillotined
in effigy, hanged in effigy, from Maine to Georgia. The press teemed with
pamphlets, coarse, spiteful, and serious; and for months the chief newspapers
gave up whole columns of each issue to attacking or defending the work of Jay.
The democratic societies, the people at public meetings, the State legislatures,
denounced or praised the treaty. It is not surprising that it was bitterly
resented in France. The time was drawing near for the election of a successor
to President Washington; and, that great man having declined (September, 1796)
to serve a third term, the Federalists nominated John Adams, and the
Republicans Thomas Jefferson. The canvass was hotly contested; and in the midst
of it Adet, the French minister, not deterred by the fate of his predecessor,
Genest, who had been dismissed for intriguing against the government, openly
espoused the cause of the Republicans. He even went so far as to write to the
Secretary of State, and to make public through the press, a letter in which he
stated the grievances of France and threatened war. If the policy of the
government were altered—that is, if Jefferson were elected and the Republicans
put in power—the complaints of France, he said, could easily be satisfied; but
if the policy of the government were maintained, America might expect the
worst.
Adams was
elected President, and the French government retaliated. Monroe, whose lack of
spirit in explaining and defending the treaty with Great Britain had offended
Washington, had been recalled from Paris in 1796, and Charles C. Pinckney sent
to France in his stead. But the Directory now refused to receive Pinckney, and
expelled him from France. When news of this act reached the United States,
Adams, who had just been inaugurated, called a special session of Congress to
put the country in a state of defence. War, however, was to be
a last
resort; and, as a means of preserving peace, two envoys, John Marshall and
Elbridge Gerry, were appointed, along with Pinckney, to treat with the
Directory. Their powers were ample and their instructions clear. They were
bidden to consult, negotiate, and treat on all claims and causes of differences
between the United States and France. They might even sign a new treaty or
convention; and, in that event, five leading principles were to be their guide:
the United States would tolerate no blame or censure for her conduct, and
therefore, would bestow none on France; no aid was to be promised during the
present war; no engagements were to be made inconsistent with prior treaties; no
restraint on commerce was to be admitted; and no stipulations might be accepted
under which French tribunals could be set up within the United States.
With such
powers and instructions the envoys entered Paris on October 4,1797. Talleyrand
was then Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Directory. By him they should
have been received and formally recognised as Ministers Extraordinary from the
United States. But, in place of meeting Talleyrand, they were visited by three
political agents of the Directory, who told them plainly that, if they wished
to make a treaty, they must do three things; they must pay each of the five
Directors $50,000, apologise for certain remarks in Adams’ speech to Congress,
and, by way of tribute to France, buy from her an extorted Dutch loan, the
market value of which was a million of dollars. The apology, the bribe, and the
tribute money were stoutly refused. But Talleyrand stood firm, and the envoys
returned to the United States. In their dispatches the names of the three French
agents, Bellamy, Hottinguer, and Hauteval, were given, but in the translation
laid before Congress they were suppressed, and the letters X, Y, and Z
substituted. These papers have ever since been known as “the XYZ dispatches.”
Their
publication, in April, 1798, moved the people as they had never been moved
since the days of Lexington and Bunker Hill. “ Millions for defence, but not a
cent for tribute,” became the Federal cry, and was taken up and repeated over
all the land by men who, much as they loved France, were still determined that
her demands should never be forced upon the nation by threats of war. Every
hour the war fever grew hotter, till the whole people seemed ready to rise in
arms. In the inland towns volunteer companies were formed, and addresses,
inflamed with Federal zeal, were prepared. Along the Atlantic border no town
felt too poor to start a subscription to build and lend to the government an
armed ship. At Boston the subscription ran up to $125,000 in a few weeks, and
the keels of two frigates were speedily laid. At New York $30,000 were raised
in one hour. Then came the days of the “ black cockade,” of the “ addresser,”
of the “ associated youth,” and of the “ quasi-war ” with France. The old
treaties of 1778
322 Alien and Sedition
Acts.—French Convention, [ms-isoo
were
suspended; merchant ships were authorised to repel French insolence with force;
privateers were commissioned; and what the Federalists called “our infant navy”
was created.
Opposition to
the Administration now disappeared; and the Federalists, in complete control
of both House and Senate, proceeded to enact four memorable laws, a new
Naturalisation Act, two Alien Acts, and a sedition law. The first prolonged the
time of residence in the United States, before citizenship could be acquired,
from five to fourteen years. One Alien Act authorised the President, for two
years to come, to send out of the country such aliens as he should deem
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States: another empowered him
in time of war to seize or remove all subjects or citizens of the hostile
government (June, 1798). The Sedition Act prescribed fines and imprisonments
for any who, by conspiring with others, sought to hinder the execution of any
law of the United States, or by writing, printing, and publishing false,
scandalous, and malicious writings against the Government j either House of
Congress, or the President, sought to bring any of them into contempt and
disrepute. A provisional army was organised, with Washington in command as
Lieutenant-General. The Navy Department was created, and the first Secretary
of the Navy appointed; and three little squadrons were sent forth (July, 1798)
to wage war against the French in the West Indies, where several French ships,
including a frigate, were captured.
Brought to
its senses by this spirited action, the Directory intimated to the American
Minister at the Hague that any minister sent by the United States to France
would be received “ with the respect due to the representative of a free and
independent nation.” The Presidential election was near at hand; and Adams, to
the delight of the Republicans and the deep disgust of the Federalists, once
more despatched a commission. This time they were well treated; but they found
that the Directory had been swept away (November, 1799) and that Napoleon as
First Consul was master of France. The envoys had been instructed to claim
compensation for spoliation committed by France on American commerce, and to
secure the abrogation of the guarantee imposed on America by the treaty of
alliance of 1778. Napoleon would grant either, but not both. The price of
damages was the retention of the treaty of alliance; the price of the
abrogation of the treaty was the abandonment of the claim for indemnity. Unable
to agree to this, the envoys at last signed a convention which secured better
terms for neutral trade, but in its second article declared that, “not being
able to agree at present respecting the treaty of alliance and the treaty of
amity and commerce, nor upon the mutual indemnities due or claimed, the parties
will negotiate further on these subjects at a convenient time.” That time never
came. When the Senate ratified the convention, it struck out this second
article, and by so doing expunged all provision for future
1798-9] Neutral trade;
“broken” voyages.
328
negotiation,
laid aside the question of indemnity, and turned what was intended to be a
temporary adjustment into a permanent adjustment of all past difficulties. That
this might not be misunderstood, Napoleon, when he in turn ratified the
convention, wrote across it these words— “Provided, That by this omission
(retrcmchement) the two States renounce the respective pretensions which are
the objects of that article.” The claims thus renounced by the United States
were the claims of private citizens for injuries done under the decrees issued
by France between 1793 and 1800, and constitute what have been subsequently
known as the French Spoliation Claims.
Thus were the
commercial troubles with France arranged. But those with England went on
continuously. The Order in Council of 1794, forbidding direct trade between
France and her colonies, had been amplified in 1798 by another forbidding
direct trade between France, Spain, and Holland, and their colonies. The
restriction, however, fell lightly on neutrals, and they were soon evading it
in two ways. Some would load at colonial ports and, under pretence of sailing
to their own country, make direct voyages from the colony to the parent State.
This was the favourite trick of the neutrals of northern Europe who, as they
passed the coast of France or Holland, would run in. To stop this, Great
Britain in 1799 declared the whole coast of Holland under blockade. Following
this way of trading, the American merchant would send his ship to a port in the
French or Spanish West Indies, take in a cargo suitable for the European
market, sail to Charleston, and enter the cargo for import. This done, the
captain would immediately export the goods, draw back the duties, and, with a
clearance from an American port, set sail for a port in France or Spain. The
voyage was not direct; it had been broken at Charleston, and did not fall under
the Order in Council. But a test case soon arose and was carried on appeal to
the High Court of Admiralty in England, where the rule was laid down that such
a voyage was not broken, because the cargo had not been put ashore. This
decision necessitated a further change of plan. The American captain now took
his vessel to some ship-building town in New England, landed the cargo, and
stored it in a warehouse, while his ship was cleaned and repaired. This done,
he reloaded the goods, and with an American clearance sailed for an Old-World
port. Again a test case was brought before the High Court of Admiralty, which
now ruled that the goods had been truly imported into the United States, and
that the voyage had been “ broken,” thus legalising this method of trade.
To trouble
with France and Great Britain had meantime been added trouble with Spain.
During twelve years after the recognition of the independence of the United
States by Great Britain, Spain ignored the southern boundary, occupied the
greater part of what is now Alabama and Mississippi, and closed the Mississippi
river to American trade. In 1795 the war in Europe forced her to give way. A
treaty was made, in
324
Retrocession
of Louisiana by Spain. [isoo
which Spain
acknowledged the parallel of 31° north latitude as the southern boundary of the
United States, agreed to withdraw her troops from American territory, and made
New Orleans a port of deposit for American traders. But when, in 1797,
commissioners were sent to take possession of the Spanish forts and posts in
the disputed territory, the quarrel with France was at its height; and Spain,
hoping in the event of war to be able to acquire the converted region for ever,
put forward one excuse after another, and retained some of the forts down to
1799. To France the Spanish treaty of 1795 was as displeasing as that with
Great Britain. The news that Spain had adjusted her long dispute with the
United States and was about to withdraw south of the parallel of 31° alarmed
Talleyrand. “ The Court of Madrid,” he wrote in 1798 to the new minister whom
he was sending thither, “ever blind to its own interests and never docile to
the lessons of experience, has again quite recently adopted a measure which
cannot fail to produce the worst effects upon its political existence and on
the preservation of its colonies. The United States has been put in possession
of the forts situated along the Mississippi, which the Spaniards had occupied
as posts essential to arrest the progress of the Americans in those countries.”
In his opinion the Americans should be shut up “ within the limits which nature
seems to have traced out for them.” But, as Spain was in no condition to
accomplish this herself, she should cede to France East and West Florida, which
bounded the United States on the south, and the vast wilderness called
Louisiana (ceded by France to Spain in 1763), which bounded it on the west. The
scheme for the time being failed; and a year later Talleyrand fell from power.
But, with the rise of Napoleon, Talleyrand was recalled to office; and Spain
was again asked to give up Louisiana. This time the demand was obeyed; and on
October 1, 1800, a treaty retroceding Louisiana to France was secretly signed
at San Ildefonso.
In America at
that time the canvass for a Presidential election was well under way. The
Federalists had selected John Adams and Charles C. Pinckney as their candidates
for President and Vice-President, and the Republicans Thomas Jefferson and
Aaron Burr. Already the triumph of the Republicans seemed assured. The steady
growth of the party for years past, the unwise enactment of the Alien and
Sedition Acts, the new taxes necessitated by the French war, the widespread
belief that the Federalists were a British party bent on establishing a
monarchy, had done their work; and, when the electoral votes were counted, it
appeared that Adams and Pinckney were defeated. But neither Jefferson nor Burr
was elected. As the Constitution then read, each elector wrote on his ballot
the names of two men. When the ballots were opened and counted in the presence
of Congress, the candidate who had received the highest number of electoral
votes, provided this were a majority of the total cast, was to be declared
President; and he who received the next highest number, even though less than a
majority,
1802]
The Mississippi closed
to trade.
325
was to be
Vice-President. In 1800 every elector who voted for Jefferson voted also for
Burr. Each candidate therefore received the same number of votes; and, though
this number was the highest and a majority of all the votes cast, neither was
elected. The duty of choosing between Jefferson and Burr now passed to the
House of Representatives, which, after a long and bitter struggle, decided in
favour of Jefferson.
By an Act of
Congress, passed in 1790, Philadelphia was made the seat of government till
1800, after which date the city of Washington was to take its place. In
obedience to the law, all departments of government were removed to the banks
of the Potomac during the summer of 1800; and there, in the half-finished
Capitol, Congress assembled for the session of 1800-1. It was at Washington
therefore that Jefferson was inaugurated on March 4, 1801. There is still
current among his countrymen an idle story that on Inauguration Day Jefferson,
mounted on a white horse, rode alone to the Capitol, hitched his horse to a
fence, entered the building unattended, and took the oath of office. The story
is pure fiction. He walked to the Capitol attended by militia and a great crowd
of admirers and partisans, drawn to Washington by the excitement of the
contested election, was greeted at the Capitol by a salute of guns, and took
the oath with all the usual ceremony.
Scarcely was
he settled in office, when he heard rumours of the secret treaty of San
Ildefonso and the retrocession of Louisiana to France. A copy of the treaty
which he received towards the close of 1801 turned the rumours into a
certainty; and the action of Don Juan Ventura Morales, the Spanish Intendant at
New Orleans, roused the whole Mississippi valley, and brought affairs to a
crisis. By the treaty of 1795 the King of Spain was bound to permit the
citizens of the United States, for three years to come, “ to deposit their
merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them thence
without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of stores.” Should
his Majesty at the end of three years see fit to close New Orleans to American
traders, he was “ to assign to them on another part of the banks of the
Mississippi an equivalent establishment.” In flat violation of this
stipulation, Morales, in October, 1802, forbade Americans to deposit their merchandise
at New Orleans, but did not assign any “ equivalent establishment.” As the
news passed up the valley, the people of Tennessee and Kentucky cried out for
war. The Federalists of the East joined in the cry; and, when Congress met, an
earnest effort was made to force the Administration to take possession of New
Orleans. But Jefferson obtained an appropriation of $2,000,000 for the purchase
of West Florida and New Orleans, and, with the consent of the Senate, sent James
Monroe to Paris to aid Livingston, the American minister there, in making the
purchase. A renewal of war between France and Great Britain was at this moment
(January, 1803) imminent, and Napoleon was anxious to avoid complications in
America. Accordingly, before Monroe reached
326
[1803-6
Paris, the
First Consul made a counter-proposition that the United States should buy all
Louisiana as ceded to France by Spain. The offer was gladly accepted, and the
price of 80,000,000 francs, or $15,000,000, agreed on. The treaty was signed in
May, 1803, and ratified by the United States Senate in October; and the
province was formally delivered, with no little ceremony, at New Orleans in
December, 1803.
Concerning
this splendid domain hardly anything was known. No boundaries were given it on
the north, the west, or the south; but it was understood that Louisiana
stretched from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains on the west, and from the
boundary of the British possessions on the north—a boundary yet to be
determined—to the Gulf of Mexico, according to some, even to the Bio Grande.
East of the Mississippi the United States claimed West Florida as far as the
Perdido river. But Spain denied that any part of West Florida had been included
in the Louisiana cession to France; and during fifteen years this question
remained unsettled.
That the
unknown West ought to be explored had been a favourite idea of Jefferson for
twenty years; and he had tried to persuade learned men and learned societies to
organise an expedition to cross the continent. Failing in this, he turned to
Congress, which, in 1803 (before the purchase of Louisiana), voted a sum of
money for sending an exploring party from the mouth of the Missouri to the
Pacific. The party was in charge of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark. Early
in May, 1804, they left St Louis, then a frontier-town of log-cabins, and
worked their way up the Missouri river to a spot not far from the present city
of Bismarck, North Dakota, where they passed the winter with the Indians.
Besuming their journey in the spring of 1805, they followed the Missouri to its
source in the mountains, after crossing which they came to the Clear Water
river. Down this they went to the Columbia, and to a spot where, late in
November, 1805, they “ saw the waves like small mountains rolling out in the
sea.” They were on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. After spending the winter
at the mouth of the Columbia, the party made its way back to St Louis in 1806.
Lewis and Clark, however, were not the first citizens of the States to see the
Columbia river. In 1792 a Boston ship-captain named Gray was trading with the
Pacific coast Indians. He was collecting furs to take to China and exchange for
tea to be carried to Boston, and, while so engaged, he discovered the mouth of
a great river, which he entered and named the Columbia in honour of his ship.
By right of Gray’s discovery, the United States was entitled to all the country
drained by the Columbia river. The exploration of this country by Lewis and
Clark made the title stronger still; and it was finally perfected a few years
later, when trappers and settlers went over the Rocky Mountains and occupied
the Oregon country.
War broke out
again between France and Great Britain in May, 1803; and the United States
entered on that long struggle for “ free trade and
1803-5] British
blockades and Admiralty decisions. 327
sailors’
rights” which ended, nine years later, in her second war with Great Britain.
The United States was once more a neutral power; and her merchants began to
trade with Europe and with the West Indies, as during the later war, by means
of the “ broken voyage.” In two years’ time almost the whole carrying trade of
Europe was in American hands. The merchant flag of every belligerent save Great
Britain almost disappeared from the sea. France and Holland ceased to trade
under their own flags. Spain for a time carried her specie and her bullion in
hei own ships, protected by her men-of-war; but this practice was soon
abandoned, and before 1806 the dollars of Mexico were brought to her shores in
American vessels. It was under the Stars and Stripes that the gum trade went on
with Senegal, that ingots and dollars were exported from Vera Cruz and La
Plata, that hides were carried from South America, and sugar from the ports of
Cuba. From Cadiz, from Barcelona, from Lisbon, from Emden and Hamburg, Goteborg
and Copenhagen, from the ports of Cayenne and Dutch Guiana, from Batavia and
Manila, fleets of American merchantmen sailed to the United States, there to
break the voyage and then go on to Europe.
But this
great trade was now doomed to destruction. It was attacked in two ways—by paper
blockades and Admiralty decisions. In January, 1804, Great Britain blockaded
the ports of Guadaloupe and Martinique; in April she closed the ports of
Curafoa; and in August she extended her blockade to the Straits of Dover and
the English Channel. In May, 1805, came a blow from the Lords Commissioners of
Admiralty. A ship named the Essex had taken on board a cargo at Barcelona in
Spain and landed it at Salem in Massachusetts, had paid duties, and, after
undergoing repairs, had cleared, laden with the same cargo, for Havana. This
was the legal “ broken ” voyage. But on her way to Cuba the Essex was seized,
sent in for examination and condemned. The court now looked into the intention
of the claimants, declared that the cargo had never been intended for sale in
the markets of the United States, but had been exported from Spain for sale in
Cuba, and that the voyage was therefore, in effect, direct. They accordingly
condemned the ship and cargo; and the Lords Commissioners sustained the ruling.
It was July,
1805, when the final decision was made in London, and September when the news
reached the United States. It threw the commercial world into a flurry of
excitement. Insurance companies, chambers of commerce, mass-meetings of
merchants in all the large seaports, called on Congress to retaliate; and in
April, 1806, the first of a long series of retaliatory measures was signed by
the President. The Non-importation Act of 1806, as it was called, forbade the
importation from Great Britain or her dependencies of a long list of goods. The
Act came into force on November 15, but six weeks later it was sus-
328
[l790—6
Scarcely had
this law been passed, when the act of a British naval officer off the harbour
of New York called forth another measure of retaliation more futile still. As
the coasting schooner Richard was approaching Sandy Hook one evening in April,
1806, and was less than half a mile from shore, the British ship Leander, which
had long lain in the offing, fired two shots across her bows as a signal to
heave to and be searched. The Richard was quickly rounded: but at the same
moment a third ball badly directed struck the tafirail and carried off the head
of the helmsman. In New York excitement rose high. Flags on the vessels were
put at half-mast; the people wore mourning; a public funeral was given to the
murdered man; and resolutions were adopted, denouncing in strong terms the tame
submission of the government. The President did what he could. He issued a
proclamation calling for the arrest of Captain Whitby of the Leander; ordered
the Leander, the Cumbria, and the Driver to leave the ports of the United
States; forbade the people to repair them, pilot them, or supply them with
food; and commanded their officers never again to enter the waters of the
United States.
Meanwhile the
question of impressment had grown into a serious issue between the two
countries. In 1790, Spain having seized a couple of British ships in Nootka
Sound, Great Britain made ready for war; and one night in May a press-gang went
the rounds of sailor resorts in London. So many American sailors were seized
that the captains of the American vessels in port applied to Gouverneur Morris
for aid. Morris was on a private visit to London, but had been requested by
Washington to inquire into the disposition of the ministry to send a minister
to the United States. He now undertook this mission, had interviews with Pitt
and the Duke of Leeds, was assured that Great Britain had no wish to molest
American sailors, and was told that the trouble arose from the difficulty of
distinguishing the subjects of his Majesty from the citizens of the United
States. Morris then asked if certificates of citizenship issued by the
Admiralty Courts would be sufficient protection, and was told they would. But
Washington would hear nothing of certificates; and when Thomas Pinckney went
out as American minister he was especially instructed on this matter. Nothing
however had been accomplished when the French war opened and impressment began
in earnest. In 1793 consuls were permitted to issue certificates of
citizenship. But Great Britain held that this was not a consular power, and the
certificates were not respected. In 1794 Jay concluded his treaty; but it was
silent on impressment, and in 1796 Congress interposed. Collectors of the ports
were now authorised to issue protection papers to American sailors; and two
agents were to be appointed to reside abroad, inquire into the situation of the
impressed Americans, and report to the Secretary of the Treasury. Under this
law, between 1796 and the peace of 1802, 35,000 seamen
1806-7] Deserters.—The
Leopard and Chesapeake affair. 329
were
registered by the collectors, and the release of 1940 was asked for by the
agent in London.
Meantime,
together with impressment there had grown up another difficulty, which deeply
concerned Great Britain. The sudden expansion of the commerce and the ocean
carrying trade of the United States increased the demand for sailors. As the
supply was inadequate, wages rose from eight to twenty-four dollars a month;
and British sailors, tempted by such pay, deserted from every war-vessel that
entered an American port. So serious a matter did this become that in 1798 an
offer was made, and revived in 1800, for the addition to the treaty of 1794 of
an article concerning the return of deserters. But the article, not
sufficiently providing against impressment, was declined; and desertion went on
more defiantly than ever.
After the
rupture of the Peace of Amiens, these two issues of impressment and desertion
reached a crisis. The coast of the United States from Maine to Charleston was
fairly blockaded by British vessels of war. Some cruised along the coast from
Eastport to Cape Ann. Others lay off the Long Island shores and impressed
sailors within a league of Sandy Hook. One squadron passed within the capes of
Chesapeake Bay and inflicted on Norfolk, Hampton, and Baltimore all the rigours
of a blockade. Their launches scoured the waters of the Bay, fired on vessels
that would not stop when summoned, searched those that did, and on one occasion
gave chase to a revenue cutter with the Vice-President on board.
One of these
blockaders, the Melampus, happening to be at anchor in Hampton Boads in the
month of February, 1807, the officers gave an entertainment on board. When the
festivities were at their height, five of the crew slipped over the side of the
Melampus, seized the captain’s gig, rowed ashore, and fled to Norfolk. There
three of the men engaged for service on the United States frigate Chesapeake,
which was soon to set sail for the Mediterranean. A demand was made for their
return. But while letters were passing to and fro, five sailors deserted from
the Halifax, and next day took service on the Chesapeake.
As soon as
these desertions, and the refusal of the American authorities to return the
men, were reported to Vice-Admiral Berkeley at Halifax, he despatched an order
to the commanders of his Majesty’s vessels on the North American station to
watch for the Chesapeake at sea, and to search her for the deserters from the
Halifax. Three weeks later the Leopard, bearing this order, reached Hampton
Roads, just as the Chesapeake came down the Elizabeth river from Norfolk, and
anchored in the Roads. The next day, when she stood out to sea, the Leopard
followed till well beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, and then spoke
her. Supposing the communication to be of a peaceful character, Commodore
Barron hove to; and an officer from
the Leopard
was soon on deck with a letter containing a request to search for the deserters
and enclosing a copy of Admiral Berkeley’s order. Barron refused to muster his
crew; whereupon the Leopard ranged alongside and opened fire. To return it was
impossible, for the Chesapeake was just off the stocks, and had been sent to
sea so hurriedly that but a few of her guns were mounted. Not a rammer could be
found; not a powder horn was full: the matches were mislaid. Twenty minutes
passed before a gun could be loaded and fired with a live coal from the cook’s
galley. Meantime twenty-one shots from the Leopard struck the hull of the
Chesapeake; the foremast and mainmast had been destroyed and the mizzen mast
injured; the rigging was badly cut; three men were killed and eighteen wounded.
Then Barron hauled down his flag and the Chesapeake was a prize. Searchers from
the Leopard found but one deserter from the Halifax, the rest having deserted
before the Chesapeake left harbour; but they took away three sailors, each of
whom was a citizen of the United States. The Chesapeake was then suffered to
make the best of her way back to port.
As the news
of this action spread over the country, the people were deeply moved. They put
on badges of mourning, cried out for war, and, in resolutions from a score of
towns, pledged their lives and fortunes in support of any measure, however
vigorous, that the Administration might adopt. The President, however, merely
issued a proclamation commanding all British armed vessels to leave the ports
of the United States, and despatched an agent to England to demand a disavowal
of Berkeley’s order, and to seek reparation for the insult. No heed was given
to the proclamation. The vessels in Lynnharm Bay came and went as they pleased;
and five years passed before the three American sailors taken from the
Chesapeake were returned to the deck of an American frigate.
While popular
indignation was still burning fiercely, Napoleon added to the flame by another
blow at the carrying trade of neutrals. In May, 1806, King George, by an Order
in Council, had declared a paper blockade of the coast of Europe from the river
Elbe to the port of Brest, and forbidden neutrals to enter a port within these
limits unless they carried the products of their own country or of British
looms and factories. That Napoleon would not tamely submit to this Order was
certain; but he bided his time till the battle of Jena made him master of
central Europe. Then he issued his Berlin Decree, and on November 21, 1806,
laid the British Isles under blockade. It was now the turn of Great Britain to
strike; and accordingly, on January 7,1807, a new Order in Council forbade
neutrals to trade between any two ports which were in the possession of France
or her allies. As time passed, and these new orders produced no apparent
effect, the British government went a step further. On November 11, 1807, a
third
1807-9~\ Milan Decree; Embargo and Non-Intercourse
Acts. 331
Order in
Council declared that every port, from which for any reason the British
merchant flag was excluded, should be shut to neutrals unless they first
stopped at some port in the United Kingdom, or at Gibraltar or Malta, paid
certain duties, and took out a license to trade. Finally, Napoleon, in the
Milan Decree of December, 1807, ordered the confiscation of every neutral ship
that had allowed itself to be searched by the British. Meanwhile the treaty of
1794 with England had expired (1806); Jefferson’s efforts to make a new one
failed; and American merchants were left unprotected, to be crushed between the
two belligerents.
Between the
Orders in Council and the Berlin Decree there was but one of three courses left
for the United States to pursue. She must fight for her neutral rights, tamely
submit, or abandon the ocean. Jefferson chose the last. In December, 1807, he
put the Non-importation Act of 1806 into force, and asked Congress to close the
ports of the United States to foreign trade and commerce. An Embargo Act was
quickly passed; and from December, 1807, to March, 1809, all trade with foreign
countries ceased. On France and Great Britain the Act produced no effect; that
on America was ruinous. The people along the frontier evaded the law openly. A
long series of supplementary Acts was carried, designed to enforce the embargo
and ending with a Force Act, authorising the President to use the army and the
navy to execute the law. Wherever it was possible, the Acts were defied.
Against the Force Act the commercial part of the country rose as one man; and
in March, 1809, the embargo was lifted. In its stead a non-intercourse law was
enacted. By this all trade was forbidden with France and Great Britain, and the
colonies, dependencies, and ports under their flags. Nothing could be carried
to them; nothing could be brought from them. But should France revoke her
decrees, or Great Britain her Orders in Council, the law might be suspended, as
to the country so doing, by proclamation of the President.
Three days
after signing the Non-intercourse Act, Jefferson closed his second term of
office; and James Madison became President of the United States (March, 1809).
Scarcely was he fairly settled in his new office when David Erskine, the
English minister, appeared before the Secretary of State with an offer from his
government to recall the hated Orders. The proposition was accepted, and in
April three pairs of notes were exchanged. In the first of these Erskine, in
the name of his Majesty, offered reparation for the attack on the Chesapeake,
disavowed the order of Admiral Berkeley, and engaged to return the three
American sailors and make provision for the families of the slain. In the
second he announced the willingness of his Majesty to recall the Orders of
Council, if assurance were given that the United States would renew intercourse
with Great Britain. In the third he named June 10,
1809, as the day whereon the Orders should be
recalled in respect of the
332 ErsMne’s agreement.—Bambouillet Decree.
[1809-10
United
States. To each note presented by Erskine a suitable answer was returned; and,
everything having been arranged, a proclamation made known to the country that
on and after the 10th of June trade with Great Britain and her colonies would
once more be open to the merchants of America.
The joy in
the shipping ports was great indeed. The riggers and sailmakers could not do
half the work offered them. Every shipyard was crowded with vessels waiting to
be scraped and cleaned. Long columns of notices of ships for charter and ships
for sale appeared in the newspapers; and, when the appointed day came, a fleet
of more than 600 vessels loaded to the water’s edge set sail. Meantime the
report of Erskine’s agreement had reached his government, which promptly
disavowed his act and recalled him. It was late in July when news of these
proceedings reached Madison, who as speedily as possible issued a second
proclamation, recalling the first and again stopping commercial intercourse
with Great Britain. Erskine’s successor was Francis J. Jackson, whose conduct
at the court of St Petersburg and later at Copenhagen had won for him an
unenviable reputation. This he fully maintained by so grossly insulting the
American government that all communication with him was refused; and he
returned to England, with nothing done. A third minister, Rose, was equally
unsuccessful, and withdrew in 1810.
The
Non-intercourse Act having failed to bring about a repeal of the French Decrees
or the British Orders in Council, Congress now tried another form of
retaliation, and Macon’s Bill No. 2 was placed on the Statute-books (May 1,
1810). This law repealed the Non-intercourse Act of 1809, and opened trade with
all the world. But it authorised the President, in case either Great Britain or
France should, before March 3, 1811, revoke her edicts or so modify them as to
damage the neutral trade of the United States no longer, to stop trade with the
nation which still refused to revoke or modify its edicts. Of this provision
Napoleon now pretended to take advantage.
The Emperor
had replied to the Non-intercourse Act of 1809 with the Rambouillet Decree of
March, 1810. This Decree ordered the seizure of every American ship and cargo
that, since May 20, 1809, had entered a port of France, or any of her colonies,
or any country occupied by her army, or which it might enter thereafter. Though
signed in March, the Decree was kept secret till May, by which time cargoes to
the value of $10,000,000 had been seized in the ports of France, Spain, Holland,
and Naples. Under the Decree they were soon sold, and the money placed in the
caisse (Tamortissement.
While this
high-handed robbery was going on, a copy of the United States Gazette
containing the Macon Act of 1810 reached the American Minister at Paris. He
forwarded the Gazette to Champagny, who in turn showed it to Napoleon. The
chance for a new act of treachery was too
1810—li] Napoleon's conduct; tension with Great
Britain. 333
good to be
lost. The Emperor at once decided to accept the offer; and Champagny in August
informed the American Minister that on November 1, 1810, the Decrees of Berlin
and Milan would be revoked if, by that time, Great Britain recalled her Orders
in Council, or the United States caused “ her rights to be respected by the English.”
On November 2,
1810, President Madison accordingly issued a
proclamation serving three months’ notice on Great Britain and naming February
2, 1811, as the day when non-intercourse would come into effect as to Great
Britain, unless, before that date, the Orders in Council were revoked. When the
day came, Great Britain had not recalled her Orders; and Congress three weeks
later passed a bill which revived nine sections of the Non-intercourse Act of
1809 and prohibited all importation of British goods.
By this time
the relations of Great Britain and the United States had become more strained
than ever. The British government had appointed no successor to Rose; the
American Minister therefore asked for his passports and left London. Thereupon
the British government in alarm appointed Augustus Foster, who reached
Washington in July,
1811. His instructions empowered him to do one
thing only—to settle the Chesapeake affair in any manner satisfactory to the
United States. It would have been well, therefore, if he had set about this at
once. But he began his mission with a protest against the Non-intercourse Act,
a declaration that the Decrees of Berlin and Milan had not been repealed, and
an assurance that, till they were repealed, the Orders in Council which depended
on them would never be revoked.
That the
Decrees had not been repealed was true, for since November 1, 1810, several
American vessels which had visited British ports had been seized and their
cargoes confiscated; and sixteen others which came direct from the United
States had been sequestered. The latter were soon released; but those captured
for having touched at British ports were not set free. All this, according to
Napoleon, was quite regular. The Berlin and Milan Decrees had been repealed so far
as regarded the United States, but the municipal ordinances of the French ports
were still in force; and it was under these that the seizures had been made—a
statement just the reverse of the truth, for the vessels retained had come from
British ports, and therefore, falling under the Decrees, should have been
released, while those set free came direct from America and had not violated
the Decrees at all. Madison, however, accepted the explanation, and, finding
that Foster persisted in stating that the Decrees were yet in force, and
therefore in his refusal to revoke the Orders, issued a proclamation summoning
Congress to meet in special session on November 4,1811. In his message to that
body he complained that the repeal of the French Decrees had not induced Great
Britain to recall her Orders; that they were at that moment more aggressively
enforced than ever, while the United States had been given to understand that a
continuance of the Non-importation Act would provoke retaliation;
that
indemnity and redress for old wrongs were still withheld; and that the coasts
and the harbours of the United States were again witnessing scenes not less
derogatory to the national rights than vexatious to trade. Accordingly the
President asked that the United States should be put “ into an armour and an
attitude demanded by the crisis.”
The appeal
did not fall on deaf ears; and the House and Senate proceeded with due
diligence to prepare for war. The ranks of the regular army were ordered to be
filled; the number of regiments was increased; money was voted for the army and
navy; provision was made for accepting the service of 50,000 volunteers; and in
April, 1812, an embargo was laid on all foreign shipping for thirty days. On
June 1 the President sent a message to Congress advocating war on the grounds
that Great Britain had urged the Indians to attack the whites, had ruined
American trade by the Orders in Council, had practically blockaded American
ports, and had impressed American seamen to serve in her own ships. The House
and the Senate passed the necessary Act by majorities of about two to one; and
on June 19,1812, Madison, by proclamation, declared that a state of war existed
between Great Britain and the United States.
THE WAR OF
1812.
The outbreak of
war in 1812 between Great Britain and the United States was the result of
causes described in the previous chapter. As the United States was the chief
neutral carrier at that time, American commerce was severely hampered by
Napoleon’s Decrees as well as by the British Orders in Council. But American
sympathy with Napoleon was strong, especially in the southern States, which at
that date dominated the Union; and, though his action had provoked the Orders
in Council, while his dealings with American shipping showed a supreme disdain
for laws and treaties, Great Britain had to bear the full brunt of American
indignation. This feeling of ill-will was increased by the severity with which
British naval officers impressed American sailors and searched American ships for
deserters and British seamen. The affair between the Leopard and the Chesapeake
(1807) has already been mentioned; and the steadily increasing friction between
the two Powers was intensified by another encounter, between the American
frigate President and the British sloop Little Belt (May, 1811), in which the
latter was captured. On June 23, 1812, five days after the declaration of war
by America, the British government revoked the Orders in Council; but the news,
which did not reach the United States for some weeks, was too late to avert the
conflict.
It is quite
clear—and the fact is now admitted by impartial American historians—that Great
Britain was anxious to avoid the conflict thus forced upon her. In a despatch
to Sir G. Prevost, the Governor of British North America, in 1812, the British
government frankly avowed its desire to preserve peace with the United States,
and to pursue uninterruptedly with the whole available force of the nation the
far greater interests at stake in the war with Napoleon. Yet, to withdraw the
Orders in Council, and to abandon the right of search, would have been to
surrender two weapons almost indispensable for the successful prosecution of
that conflict. With able management, it is just possible that war with the
United States might have been averted; but on neither side was the diplomacy
able, and in spite of their wish to avoid
336
[1812
war the
British Ministers were swept into it. This result caused very grave
embarrassment to England. Her strength was already taxed to the utmost by the
prolonged struggle with Erance; her best seamen and ships were needed to
maintain the blockade of the French ports; her trade was in a depressed
condition; and acute foreign observers, such as Mettemich, thought that the
fabric of her empire was tottering. Napoleon was on the eve of his invasion of
Russia when the United States declared war; and Continental opinion anticipated
his speedy success— a success the more certain if British energy were diverted
to a new field in America. But for the disasters of the Russian campaign,
followed by the crushing defeat of Leipzig, the war of 1812 might have rung the
knell of freedom in Europe for a generation. The winter of that year was the
crisis of the gigantic conflict; and the feeling that at such a moment they
were being assailed by their own kindred undoubtedly accounts for the peculiar
bitterness which the British displayed towards the Americans in this war.
In throwing
down the gage of defiance the people of the United States had neglected to make
due preparation for war. Their navy was insignificant, though what there was of
it was of the finest quality, manned by excellent seamen and commanded by young
officers. It counted only seven efficient frigates and nine smaller craft. The
frigates were of the largest size, with batteries superior to those on board
British ships of their own class, and with much stronger hulls. But for this
state of affairs British officers were to blame. Captains of the royal navy had
inspected one of the American frigates in a British harbour, and reported to
the Admiralty that she did not differ in any essential from a British frigate,
thus failing to grasp the preponderance in the vital elements of naval force
which she possessed. Yet after two or three actions we find the British navy
protesting that American frigates were really “ ships-of-the-line in disguise.”
The army of
the United States at the declaration of war numbered 6744 regular troops.
Congress had previously sanctioned the further enlistment of 25,000 men; but
only 4000 raw recruits had been enrolled by June, 1812. In addition, the
President was empowered to call for
50,000 volunteers and 100,000 militia, the latter
to be provided by the various States according to their quotas. But these
figures were never attained; recruits did not come forward in the number
required; volunteers did not respond to the call; and the militia were so
devoid of training, and so ill-provided with experienced officers, that their
value for offensive war was slight. Moreover, the militia were under the State
governments; and, as the New England States were bitterly opposed to the war,
this was a serious impediment to the effective employment of the force. The
Governor of Connecticut refused to permit his militia to serve outside his
State, and was supported in this rebellious attitude by his State legislature.
The Governor of Massachusetts declined to keep
his militia
embodied, on the score of expense; the Governor of Vermont in 1814, at a
critical moment, followed the example of the Governor of Connecticut. There was
a general want of arms, equipment, ammunition, and transport. Yet it must not
be supposed that the difficulties were all on one side. Canada, with a
population which at this date did not exceed 300,000, was everywhere open to
attack; and her immense land- frontier of 1000 miles was defended by only 7000
regular troops, including invalids. There was also a certain amount of
disaffection to the British cause, which showed itself near Montreal, in June,
1812, in armed resistance to the attempt to draft men for the militia under the
Militia Act; and, though this resistance was easily overcome, 367 Canadians
joined General Hull in his invasion of Ontario, while, late in 1814, eight
Canadians were executed at Burlington for high treason. One important auxiliary
the British had on their side. Under the leadership of that romantic figure,
the Shawnee chief Tecumthe, the Indians of the North-West had in 1811 attacked
the Americansand, when England became involved in hostilities with the United
States, their aid was offered to her and was not declined.
On land the
war centred mainly about the two extremities of Lake Erie, command of which by
a naval force was the deciding factor of success. At the outset the British had
the superior flotilla on lake waters. The American plan was to invade Upper
Canada, as the province of Ontario was then called, from each end of Lake Erie,
by crossing the Niagara and the Detroit, on which latter river the strongest British
post was Malden, near Amherstburg. The first move was made by the American
general Hull, who, after a tedious and difficult march through the wild forests
of Ohio, crossed the Detroit in July, 1812, with 1850 men, and menaced Malden.
His troops, however, were ill-equipped and undisciplined; he himself was old,
timid and unenterprising, except in his proclamations, which threatened the
Canadians with a war of extermination if they dared to employ Indians; and,
when at the end of July news reached him that the post of Mackinaw, at the head
of Lake Huron, had been captured by the British and Indians, he became anxious
about the north-west and his communications, which were now exposed to Indian
attack, and hurriedly retired to Detroit. Already the British were moving
against him. On August 12 Major-General Brock met the Indian chief Tecumthe at
Amherstburg and concerted with him measures against the enemy. Over that
meeting floats a halo of romance, and in Canada it is still celebrated in song
to this day. Both leaders were of singular capacity and daring; both were
doomed to heroic and premature death in battle.
The Indians
having cut Hull’s communications, Brock boldly moved against, him, and with 750
white troops and 600 Indians actually prepared to assault his defences. Hull’s
position, separated as he was from his supports, was dangerous; and, seeing
only the gloomy side, he
capitulated,
involving in his capitulation other detachments not under his direct command.
In all, 2500 men and 33 guns were surrendered to the British. For his conduct
Hull was tried by court-martial and sentenced to death; but the sentence was
commuted. The British reaped no great advantage from their success, as Prevost,
in the hope of patching up a peace, had agreed to an armistice with the
American commanders; and this respite enabled them to bring up reinforcements.
Harrison succeeded Hull; but under the new commander the Americans failed once
more in an attempt to capture a British post on the Maumee river.
At the
eastern extremity of Lake Erie the Americans were not more successful. On
October 13 the American general van Rensselaer attacked Queenstown on the
Niagara. Fortune seemed at first to smile upon the Americans, and the British
general Brock fell in attempting to drive his enemy back. But, at the crisis of
the combat, 3000 American militia discovered that they had constitutional
objections to crossing the frontier; and, as they refused to move, 900 men who
had crossed were beaten under their very eyes, and compelled to surrender to
the British. A second attempt to invade Canada in this quarter was made by
General Smyth with no better issue.
But for a
series of brilliant ship-actions at sea, the complete failure of the United
States land forces, combined with the seditious opposition to the war in New
England, might have resulted in peace. But on the element which Great Britain
had come to regard as peculiarly her own, the overweening confidence of British
naval officers and their neglect of gunnery caused reverse after reverse. In
order to avoid provoking American susceptibilities, the fleet on the coast of
the United States had not been adequately reinforced before the outbreak of
hostilities. The following figures give the sea-going strength of the British
squadrons in North American waters at the opening of five successive years, and
show the progressive increase in the force employed.
|
|
Rates |
1811 |
1812 |
1813 |
1814 |
181E |
|
Ships
of the Line |
(1-3) |
3 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
21 |
|
Intermediates |
(4) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
|
Cruisers
and Frigates |
(5-6) |
19 |
21 |
34 |
28 |
45 |
|
Small
craft |
|
73 |
53 |
47 |
70 |
92 |
|
|
|
95 |
77 |
89 |
115 |
163 |
But it must
be remarked that the figures for 1814s and 1815 are not official, and are
therefore far from exhaustive; while of the West Indian squadrons, which are
included in the table, a considerable portion was occupied in watching pirates,
and, until the peace with France, in protecting British commerce against French
privateers. In view of the fact that Great Britain possessed, in 1815, 219
ships of the line and 296 frigates, and had been at peace with France for eight
months, the force employed in that year seems quite inadequate.
The first
naval action was fought on August 19, 1812, when the American frigate
Constitution, 44, met the British Querriere, 38, and after twenty-five minutes
of firing reduced her to a complete wreck and compelled her surrender,
receiving but insignificant damage in return. In weight of metal the American
was incontestably superior, but she was also far better handled, and her
shooting was such as to astonish the British crew. This victory caused
extraordinary elation in the United States, while in London it produced
corresponding gloom and depression. It was followed by three similar incidents.
On October 18 the American sloop Wasp captured the British sloop Frolic of equal
force but inferior nautical quality, and captured her with a loss to the
Americans of only 10 men, against a British loss of 62. A week later, on
October 25, the American frigate United States, 44, encountered the British
frigate Macedonian, 38, and after a terrible combat of one hour’s duration, in
which the Americans inflicted a loss of 104, with only 13 casualties in their
own ship, compelled her to strike her colours. Again the American was much
superior in force; again the American captain, Decatur, handled his vessel far
better than his British opponent. To complete the tale of British reverses, on
December 29 the British frigate Java, 38, with a crew largely composed of
landsmen, unskilled in gunnery, was captured by the American Constitution, 44,
after an action in which the Java lost her captain and one-third of her crew.
These
disasters led to the issue of an order by the British Admiralty, directing
captains not to engage American ships of superior force. This order at once
produced the required result; and the long succession of American victories was
interrupted. While the warships of the United States were giving so good an
account of themselves, the depredations committed by American privateers on
British shipping were producing a state of exasperation among British traders.
No less than 500 British merchantmen were posted in Lloyd's List as having been
captured during the seven months of war from October, 1812, to May, 1813. On
the other hand, American foreign trade was destroyed and coastwise traffic was
interrupted—a serious matter at a date wben there were no railways, and
communication by land was slow and uncertain. The United States, indeed, was in
danger of being sundered strategically into a number of isolated fragments, and
this though the British naval force on the American coast was as yet weak. Not
till June, 1813, was the coast south of New York closely watched; and even then
privateers and warships from time to time managed to evade the blockade.
The campaign
of 1813 opened in the North-West with further American reverses. The American
general Winchester, while marching to the relief of Frenchtown on the river
Raisin, which was threatened by a Canadian force, was attacked on January 22 by
the British colonel Proctor with a force of 1100 regulars, militia, and
Indians, and was compelled to surrender with 500 men. A part of his force was
overpowered
by the Indians and massacred, as neither Indians nor Americans gave quarter to
one another. Even those Americans who surrendered to Proctor were not all
saved, and 30 of their wounded were murdered by these British auxiliaries—some,
it is alleged, under circumstances of unusual atrocity which reflected the
utmost discredit on Proctor. Harrison had previously been preparing to take the
offensive, but on the news of this reverse he fell back; and Proctor laid siege
to Fort Meigs on the Maumee, but without success. After an indecisive action
before this place the British retired to Canada. An attack on the American post
of Fort Sandusky, later in the summer, was even more disastrous to the British
cause, the British troops being repulsed with heavy loss.
Command of
Lake Erie being the essential factor of success in Upper Canada, it was natural
that both sides should turn their attention to the provision of a powerful
flotilla upon its waters. So far the British had had the advantage, and in
consequence had been able to move their troops and supplies by water, while the
Americans were compelled to resort to land-transport along tracks which at that
date led through sparsely settled country. The American Commodore Perry,
however, had been busily building ships at Presqu’Isle, now known as Erie ;
and, as his resources were greater and near at hand, while he also had a large
supply of good seamen and cannon, the ships which he produced were superior to
the British. Commander Barclay, an officer of great capacity and courage, was
at work on the Canadian side of the frontier; but he was badly supported by the
Canadian authorities, and, probably because the British navy could hardly find
men enough for its sea-going ships, he did not obtain the seamen he needed to
work his flotilla, while his guns were wretched little weapons of feeble
calibre. In August the American flotilla was ready for service, and Perry
issued from his harbour of Erie. Injudicious orders from Prevost and the want
of supplies compelled Barclay to fight; and on September 10 the two squadrons
met in combat. On the American side were nine vessels with a total broadside
of 896 lbs.; on the British six, with a broadside of 459 lbs., and so
indifferently equipped that there were no locks for firing the guns. The action
was fiercely contested, the commanders on either side behaving with the utmost
bravery and resolution. Perry’s flagship, the Lawrence, was knocked to pieces;
but he shifted his flag and continued the action till his superior weight of
metal made itself felt, and Barclay’s force was compelled to surrender. Barclay
himself received wounds so terrible that the sight of his shattered body and
the remembrance of his bravery produced the unwonted effect of melting to tears
the court- martial which tried him for his defeat. This encounter was decisive
in the west. Lake Erie henceforth became American; the campaign on land turned
in favour of the United States; and the American troops once more entered Upper
Canada. On October 5 they inflicted a
complete
defeat upon Proctor on the river Thames, capturing eight of his guns and the
greater part of his force. Proctor fled in his carriage; the Indian chief
Tecumthe died gallantly in action, striving to retrieve the day; and his body
after death was mutilated by the victors.
On Lake
Ontario, the Americans, directed by Captain Chauncey, had constructed a
squadron superior in power to the British force under Captain Yeo; and in the
spring of 1813 they utilised their preponderance for an attack upon York, now
known as Toronto. On April 27 the place, with 300 prisoners, fell into their
hands. The Americans burnt the Parliament House, an act which was afterwards
cited as justifying the British proceedings at Washington. Exactly a month
later Chauncey covered a successful attack upon Fort George, on the Niagara,
and compelled the British to abandon the fort and the line of that river. On
May 29 Yeo’s flotilla, with a military force, made a raid upon the American
naval base of Sackett’s Harbour, but was repulsed with heavy loss, though a
large quantity of American naval stores was destroyed. For the next few months
a peculiar situation existed on this lake. Each side was building ships; and,
as these ships were completed, first one side and then the other obtained a
temporary command of its waters. While the two navies were thus occupied, a
fresh reverse befell the American land forces under General Dearborn, which had
now been driven back to the neighbourhood of the Niagara river. On June 24 a
detachment 570 strong was cut off by a small force of Indians at Beaver Dam,
and captured. The military situation was made still worse by the failure of an
expedition against Montreal, in which an American force of 2000 regulars under
General Wilkinson was defeated by 800 British troops at Williamsburg, on
November 11. In June, also, the American flotilla upon Lake Champlain had been
checked; and in July, Plattsburg, on that lake, fell into the hands of the
British, who destroyed the barracks and military stores there. In December the
Canadian village of Newark was burned by the American general McClure, without
provocation, an act which added fuel to the flames of British indignation.
At sea the
British navy made its power felt during the year, as reinforcements arrived.
The estuaries of the Delaware and Chesapeake were entered and used as British
bases by British squadrons, which harassed the coast population, attacked the
militia, burned houses where any resistance was offered, and raided small
towns; in fact, they employed exactly the same methods of severity which fifty
years later Sherman and Sheridan brought to so high a pitch of perfection. The
apathy of the coast population was remarkable; and the American navy, in the
absence of ships of the line capable of meeting the British seventy-fours, was
unable to afford any. real protection. On the open sea the tide of victory no
longer flowed uninterruptedly in favour of the United States. Warned by the
disasters of 1812, British captains were paying more attention to gunnery, so
that it was said, with no small amount of truth,
that a
British frigate of 1813 was twice as efficient as one of 1812. More care was
shown in selecting the crews, and the armaments were strengthened; while the
commanders of weak ships no longer recklessly closed with powerful opponents.
On June 1 the Chesapeake, 38, Captain Lawrence, engaged the British Shannon,
38, Captain Broke, off Boston. In force the two ships were equally matched. The
American had a very slight preponderance in metal, and a crew larger than her
antagonist; but Lawrence was a stranger to his men, having only received
command of his ship a fortnight before. The fight which followed was brief and
bloody; in fifteen minutes from the first shot the British, superbly led by
Broke, swept on board and carried the American. The enhanced estimation in
which American fighting capacity was now held in England was proved by the enthusiastic
applause which this action evoked from the British navy and nation. The British
captain was famous in his service for his attention to gunnery, and thoroughly
deserved his success. He was badly wounded; his opponent Lawrence fell in the
combat, adjuring his officers, in a phrase now historic, not to give up the
ship ; he was followed to the grave by the British officers at Halifax, who
admired his heroic character and his knightly devotion. In small ship
encounters the luck was evenly balanced. The American sloop Hornet, on February
24, sent to the bottom the British Peacock, famous not for gunnery but for the
tasteful decoration of her deck; the British Pelican captured the American
Argus of inferior force, in St George’s Channel; and the American Enterprise
took the British Boxer off the coast of Maine.
The effects
of American depredations upon British commerce were, painfully felt in the
United Kingdom during 1813. American cruisers of all kinds appeared in British
waters, and rendered even transit to Ireland unsafe. In fact, while British
ships were blockading the coast of the United States, something approaching a
blockade of the British Isles had been established by these audacious
antagonists, using the French ports as their bases. The Admiralty appeared to
be quite unable to expel the intruders; and the force of British cruisers in
home waters was much below strategical requirements. Premiums of 13 per cent,
were paid for the insurance of British ships even on the Irish Sea; the rate on
vessels trading to America increased by 33 per cent. To be safe it was
necessary to sail under convoy. Lumber and cotton, articles for which the
British consumer depended mainly upon the American producer, rose to enormous
prices. In March, 1813, New Orleans cotton was selling at 3s. to 3s. 2\d. per
pound, though it was stated in Parliament that England had a two years’ supply
of this raw material for her manufactures. Fortunately for her the price of
wheat had fallen, while the retreat from Russia and the battle of Leipzig had
destroyed the supremacy of Napoleon; or even the British nation, for all its
stubborn persistence, might have flinched.
1814]
343
The opening
of 1814 was marked by more strenuous efforts on the part of Great Britain to
bring her antagonist to reason; and powerful reinforcements were despatched
from the Peninsular army to Canada and the littoral of the United States. But,
even now, British resources were not intelligently employed; and the importance
of commanding the Canadian lakes does not seem to have been grasped. The heterogeneous
American land forces were acquiring some degree of discipline, and were
becoming more formidable than they had been; and in the course of the year they
were to vindicate their ability to encounter the finest troops that England
possessed—troops who had proved their worth upon the battle-fields of Spain. In
March, at La Colle Mill, near Lake Champlain, a considerable American force
under General Wilkinson was repulsed by a small British detachment; but against
this were to be set two British failures, in attacks upon Oswego and Sackett’s
Harbour. In July the Americans assumed the offensive on the Niagara line, and
with 4780 men entered Canada. On July 5 they encountered the British Major-General
Riall at Chippewa, with a force equal to his own, and defeated his regulars
after a sharp engagement, in which they inflicted upon him considerable loss.
On July 25 the most hotly-contested action of the war was fought at Lundy’s
Lane. The British numbered 3000; the American force present for duty was 2644;
so that the odds were slightly in favour of the British. Both armies fought
with great determination and bravery; nothing could surpass the spirit with
which Ripley’s American brigade charged the British guns and captured them,
bayonetting the gunners. But, though forced back, the British regulars rallied,
three times returning to the battle; and in the end their stubbornness was
rewarded by the recovery of the guns. The loss on each side was about equal;
the British had 878 men hors de combat, and the Americans 853. Each side
claimed the victory; but the truth is that the action was an indecisive one and
had no strategic result. The Americans, on the arrival of British
reinforcements, were compelled to retire to the line of the Niagara; while the
British advanced, laid siege to Fort Erie, which was evacuated by the Americans
on November 5, and unsuccessfully attacked Buffalo.
The general
results of the campaign in this quarter were thus not unfavourable to the
British, who at least held their own, while in the Far West they repulsed an
attack upon Mackinaw. Towards the close of the year the Americans withdrew from
Upper Canada, in part, no doubt, because of the pressure which the British
expeditions were bringing to bear on the American seaboard. In September
Prevost led
10,000 men, supported by a small flotilla on Lake
Champlain, into the State of New York, with the object of conquering the
territory adjacent to Lower Canada. He was not successful in his expedition. On
September 11 the Americans completely defeated his flotilla, whereupon he
precipitately retired, not venturing without naval support to assault
the works
which the Americans had constructed. Though he was bitterly censured at the
time for his failure, subsequent experience at New Orleans suggests that his
retreat was prudent. He cannot, however, be excused for abandoning his wounded
and sick, with a considerable quantity of stores. His recall followed
immediately after this fiasco.
On the
seaboard of the United States the blockade was maintained with energy, and, on
April 25, was extended northward, so as to include the New England ports, which
had hitherto been left open for motives of policy, as feeling in New England
was more than ever hostile to the war. A small expeditionary force under
Major-General Ross was despatched to the American coast, and instructed to
strike against Washington and the other large towns near or on the coast, with
the object of diverting American attention from Canada and making the people of
the United States feel the miseries of war. At the same time orders were issued
for the conquest of so much of Maine as would give Nova Scotia easy
communication with Canada proper. Owing to the great naval strength of Britain
the whole coast-line of the United States was open to attack, for it was
manifestly impossible to protect 2000 miles of seaboard by fortifications and
ill-organised militia. The conquest of eastern Maine was expeditiously achieved
by a combined expedition, which seized Eastport on July 11, and in September
cleared the zone east of the Penobscot. Nor was any time lost in attacking
Washington. Though the British intentions were known to the American
government, no serious effort had been made to fortify the place or to prepare
for its defence. Lamentable confusion and disorder reigned at headquarters; and
a mere rabble of men had been collected to meet the enemy, whose strength was
grotesquely exaggerated. The militia of Pennsylvania and Maryland did not come
forward with alacrity; volunteers did not respond to the appeals of the
President; the few regulars at hand were raw recruits; and, worst of all, there
was a great want of money. Landing unopposed at the head of the Patuxent, a
British force about 3500 strong, under General Ross, marched slowly on the
capital, and on August 24 easily routed the American levies 7500 strong, under
General Winder, at Bladensburg, with a loss to the British of 256 men. On the
25th Ross entered Washington. It is difficult to approve the acts which
followed, though they were afterwards justified as a retaliation for the
destruction of Canadian private property, and were within the strict letter of
the laws of war, as interpreted at the time. The public buildings, including
the Capitol and the President’s house, and one or two private houses, were
burned, and a quantity of stores destroyed. Having done all possible damage,
the British force withdrew. Simultaneously the town of Alexandria, opposite
Washington, was held up to ransom by an independent naval expedition.
The next
point attacked was Baltimore, whither the squadron and the troops proceeded
early in September; but the enemy had had
1814]
British attack on New
Orleans.
345
time to
collect men and raise fortifications. A surprise was for this reason
impossible; and, General Ross having fallen in a skirmish, the attempt on the
place was abandoned, chiefly because the navy was prevented from co-operating
by vessels sunk in the entrance to the harbour. The British land force
re-embarked without molestation, and now proceeded south towards the littoral
of the Gulf of Mexico. Here operations had been already undertaken by the
British, with the object of supporting the Creek Indians, who had risen in 1813
at Tecumthe’s instigation, massacred some hundreds of whites at Fort Mimms, and
threatened eveiy American post and every home in Georgia and Tennessee. This
rising was crushed by the Americans under General Andrew Jackson after severe
fighting early in 1814; and the tribe was compelled to agree to a
disadvantageous peace in August of that year.
A small
British detachment had disembarked at Pensacola, which nominally belonged to
Spain, in July, and was so active in issuing proclamations of an insulting
nature that it absorbed all Jackson’s attention, when he should have kept his
eyes fixed upon New Orleans, which was the place marked down for the next
serious attack. Pensacola was cleared of the invaders by Jackson in November;
but in December the same force which had captured Washington, now reinforced to
a strength of about 6000 men, appeared off Lake Borgne and the mouth of the
Mississippi, and destroyed the American gunboats on the lake. In New Orleans
there was no great devotion to the American cause; and, but for the presence of
Jackson, the city would probably have capitulated tamely enough. Jackson,
however, after weeks of indolence, displayed remarkable energy. He organised
the defences as well as was possible at the last moment; proclaimed martial
law, ignoring the Louisiana legislature; and was opportunely reinforced by
levies from the Mississippi States. On December 23 the British arrived within
seven miles of the city, unmolested and unwatched. For some hours New Orleans
was at their mercy; and, had they boldly attacked, the town must have fallen.
But the British vanguard was numerically weak ; and Major-General Keane, who
was in command, thought it wiser to wait for the arrival of the bulk of the
force before delivering his attack. That same night Jackson, having recovered
from his first surprise, took the offensive, attacking the British and
inflicting upon them heavy loss in an indecisive action. On the 25th
Major-General Sir E. Pakenham arrived and took command; but he hesitated before
ordering an assault, and determined to try the effect of a regular artilleiy
preparation. Heavy guns were dragged up, and days were wasted, during which the
American forces were growing in number, and their defences in strength. Their
works consisted of three successive lines, on the east bank of the Mississippi,
running across a strip of land, a mile wide, from the river to a swamp, so that
they could not be turned. In front of the southernmost ran a canal, of varying
width and four feet deep. The rampart
behind this
canal was excessively slippery; the ground in front of it was as bad; the
physical obstacles were thus of a serious nature.
The British
artillery attack on the southernmost line was a complete failure. The American
gunners obtained the upper hand and drove the British from their guns. Nothing
therefore remained but to try a night assault, in which it was reasonable to
suppose that the discipline of regular troops would stand them in good stead.
But to deliver an assault with success on the east bank it was necessary to
capture a small advanced American work on the west bank of the river, which
enfiladed the front of the line of entrenchment. It was finally decided to
attack simultaneously on both banks of the stream at dawn of January 8,1815.
Twelve hundred men, under Colonel Thornton, were to cross in the course of the
night to the west bank. But the difficulties encountered in moving this
detachment across were greater than had been anticipated. The boats conveying
it had to pass from Lake Borgne, up a canal into the Mississippi; and the
journey occupied far more time than had been allowed for it, mainly by reason
of a fall in the level of the river and the strong current. The troops on the
east bank waited till day was breaking, and then, though the force on the west
bank was not yet ready for the attack, moved forward to the assault. From their
works the Americans saw, not without emotion, this gallant army form up in all
the glory of Old World uniforms and advance in admirable order to the attack.
Forthwith there burst forth from their line of entrenchments a storm of fire,
more vehement than any that the British troops had hitherto experienced. The
roll of musketry was so terrible, so continuous, that it dwelt in the memory of
the assailants as most like to the unceasing roar of tropical thunder. Under
the hail of bullets, in the growing light, the British troops went down in
hundreds. The ladder- bearers and fascine-bearers, who were in front, were the
first to fall, but the assailants closed on the work splendidly and
determinedly. They reached the edge of the ditch, where they staggered, under
the fire, and rccoiled. Pakenham recklessly exposed himself in the front, a
gallant figure, mounted on horseback, and waving his hat; but he was instantly
shot down. At the same moment two other generals were wounded, whereupon the
whole force retired in great confusion, leaving behind it 2037 killed, wounded,
and prisoners. The loss of the Americans was only 333. It is possible that the
repulse would have had even more disastrous results but for the fact that on
the west bank of the river Thornton had now carried the detached American work.
He was recalled, and the army re-embarked without molestation. It proceeded to
Mobile, where it seized Fort Bowyer, and was preparing to attack Savannah when
peace put an end to its operations.
The naval
actions of this closing period of the war were unimportant. The American
frigate Essex, 32, after harrying the British whalers in the southern Pacific,
was attacked by the British ships Phoebe, 36, and
Cherub, 18, in neutral waters, on March 28, 1814,
and easily captured, the British having a great superiority in force. In
Atlantic waters the same fate befell the American sloop Frolic, which was
captured by a British vessel of superior class. On the other hand the American
Peacock took the British itpervier, a vessel wretchedly manned, with a large
proportion of foreigners in her crew; and the Wasp took the British Reindeer,
and sank the Avon. The closing engagements were the capture of the American
frigate President by two British vessels of her own class; the capture of the
British sloops Cyane and Levant by the large frigate Constitution; and the
surrender of the British Penguin to the Hornet, after a sharp action in which
the British ship failed to hit her opponent once with her great guns. Such an
encounter shows to what lengths neglect of gunnery had proceeded in the
British navy as the result of a supremacy unchallenged for seven years.
Negotiations
for peace had been opened in 1814; and commissioners representing the two
Powers met at Ghent in August of that year. Each side at first put forward
demands which the other considered impossible; and, in the end, a settlement
was only reached by tacitly ignoring the very issues which had caused the war,
no doubt because peace with France in Europe had rendered them matters which no
longer were of vital moment for Great Britain, and because it was important for
her to have her hands free in order to exercise her full influence in the Congress
of Vienna. The treaty signed on December 24, 1814, but not received in the
United States until some weeks later, virtually re-established the status quo,
with the provision that various disputes which had arisen as to the exact
delimitation of the frontier should be referred to a joint commission, and, if
this commission could not reach a decision, to foreign arbitration. A
declaration was appended, binding both Powers to use their best endeavours for
the suppression of the slave-trade.
The peace was
certainly more satisfactory to the United States than to Great Britain,
concluded as it was before the disaster at New Orleans had occurred. The United
States had suffered far more than Great Britain in the war. Their naval
victories, with the exception of the battles on the lakes, were of no strategic
importance, and had little influence upon the issue. On land their forces
failed to gain any decisive success, and at the best merely repulsed British
attacks, though at New Orleans they inflicted terrible loss upon their
adversaries. Their trade was destroyed, their exports having fallen from
£22,571,000—at which figure they stood in 1807—before the Non-Intercourse Act,
to £8,026,000 in 1812, £5,813,000 in 1813, and £1,443,000 in 1814. No less than
1400 warships and merchantmen, flying the American flag, with 20,961 seamen,
were captured by the British cruisers. These losses and the suspension of trade
caused acute commercial and financial distress in the Union. A loan of
£1,200,000, issued by the Federal government in July, 1814,
failed
signally, only £500,000 being subscribed, and that at a discount of 20 per
cent. In November of the same year the government failed to pay interest on its
loans; and in January, 1815, United States Six per cents, were at only 50 to
60. A financial crisis occurred in the middle States during August, 1814; in
New England sedition grew more and more formidable. Delegates from the New
England States met at Hartford in December, 1814, and, while waiting for a
British success at New Orleans as the signal for revolt, showed open signs of
an intention to secede from the Union. Even the South, which had made the war,
was lukewarm; and Virginia failed to raise the force which the President had a
right to expect of her.
On the
British side the war was conducted with no great capacity, though, no doubt,
this was due in part to the fact that attention was fixed upon the continent of
Europe, even after Napoleon’s fall. Twice, at least, great advantages were
thrown away by armistices, with the object of patching up a peace. The navy was
not skilfully employed; and the failure to provide for the security of the
Irish Sea and the English Channel was inexcusable. The importance of obtaining
and holding the command of the great lakes was not perceived; and, when the
close of the war with France placed at the disposal of the government the pick
of Wellington’s army, this force was not used to the best advantage. The raid
on Washington exasperated America; the great force assembled in Canada during
the later months of the struggle effected nothing. The one lesson of importance
taught by the conflict was the power of a weak navy to inflict enormous damage
upon a commercial State. Sixteen British warships, and 1607 British
merchantmen were taken by the Americans, while the loss of our flourishing
trade with America was in itself a disaster, only matched by the heritage of
bitterness which the war bequeathed.
THE GROWTH OF
THE NATION.
(1815—1828.)
The bonfires, the
bell-ringing, and the cannonading which welcomed the joyful news of the Peace
of Ghent marked the dawn of a new and glorious era in the history of the United
States. For two-and-twenty years past, the issues which divided parties,
tormented Presidents and Congresses, and affected the whole course of events in
America, sprang directly from the long wars abroad. From 1793 to 1815 the
questions which occupied the public mind were neutral rights, Orders in
Council, French Decrees, the Rule of 1756, impressment, search, embargoes, non-intercourse,
non-importation, the conduct of Great Britain, the insolence of the French
Directory, the X Y Z affair, the war with Great Britain, the triumphs, the
ambition, the treachery of Napoleon. With the return of peace these issues
disappeared. Napoleon was at Elba; the old rulers were back on their old
thrones; old conditions in great measure returned; and the United States, free
to turn its attention to its own domestic affairs, entered at once on a career
of rapid development.
The questions
which for twenty years to come occupied the thoughts of the people, broke up
the old parties and produced new ones, and rose in time to be great national
issues, were purely domestic in origin. The state of the currency; the use of
the public lands; the building of roads, canals, and turnpikes at the expense
or with the aid of the Federal government; the protection of manufactures ; the
treatment of the Indians; the authority of Congress to charter a national bank;
the extension of slavery to the territory beyond the Mississippi; the authority
of the Federal Courts; the right of a State to nullify an Act of Congress
—these and many other issues of a similar nature now became the questions of
the day. Just as diversity of opinion regarding the financial and the foreign
policy of the government in the days of Washington and Adams parted the people
into Federalists and Republicans, so diversity of opinion on these new issues
destroyed old party lines and replaced Federalists and Republicans by Whigs and
Democrats.
The
transition was, of course, gradual. First, the Federalists disappeared as a
national party, and after 1816 never again nominated a candidate for the
presidency. Then came “ the Era of Good Feeling ” as it was called, an era
which opened with the inauguration of Monroe in
1817, and was in reality the transition period
between the old and the new. The old issues were dead; the new were still
sectional and had not risen to national importance; and during this period
there was but one national party. So completely were the Republicans under
control that in 1820 but one candidate, Monroe, was nominated for the
presidency, and to him was given the electoral vote of every State in the
Union.
Such complete
harmony was of short duration, and on the day Monroe was a second time
inaugurated (March 5, 1821) the “Era of Good Feeling” ended; the once
omnipotent Republican party began to fall to pieces; rival and sectional
leaders struggled for mastery; and in the election of 1824, Adams, Clay,
Jackson, and Crawford, each a staunch Republican and each representing a
section of the Union, were candidates for the presidency. No one of them
received a majority of the electoral votes; and for the second time the duty of
electing a president fell upon the House of Representatives. Adams was chosen;
Clay became his Secretary of State; and from the union of the friends of these
two leaders sprang, ten years later, the Whig party. The supporter? of Jackson
and Crawford, driven into opposition by the defeat of their leaders, formed in
time the nudleus of the Democratic party.
To make it
clear how these things came to pass, the story of the rise of the new issues
and of the economic development from which they sprang must be told with some
fulness of detail. A quarter of a century had now passed since the old
Confederation fell to pieces and the States came under “ the New Roof,” as the
Constitution was fondly called. In the course of these five-and-twenty years
the material progress of the country was astonishing. The population had risen
from a little less than four millions in 1790 to a little less than eight
millions in 1815. The States had increased in number from thirteen to eighteen;
and the area of the country had expanded from the Mississippi river to the
Rocky Mountains and the shore of the Pacific Ocean.
The enormous
trade enjoyed during the long war in Europe brought prosperity to New England
and the commercial States. The demand in the West Indies for American lumber,
grain, flour, and food products, brought wealth to the farming sections of the
Middle, States. The rise of cotton-planting in the South gave to that region a
staple crop which, for a century to come, Overshadowed every other form of
industry, and powerfully affected the economic and politidal history of the country.
Before the adoption of the Constitution, cotton, as a staple, had never been
cultivated in the United States. But the repeated destruction of
1792-1815] Growth of
trade and manufactures.
351
the indigo
plant in the South by insects led to the attempt to supplant indigo by cotton.
The venture was successful; but the cost of cleaning the fibre of seeds by hand
made it impossible to sell at a profit. At this juncture Eli Whitney invented
the gin; and from that moment the prosperity of a new branch of industry was
assured. In 1792, before the gin was invented, 192,000 lbs. of hand-cleaned
cotton was exported. In 1795, after the invention of the machine, 6,000,000
lbs. found a foreign market. Year after year the acreage and the crop increased
with astonishing rapidity, till, in 1894, one hundred years after Whitney
received his patent, cotton amounting to nearly 7,000,000 bales of 500 lbs.
each was grown in the planting States.
As the
country grew in wealth and population, great improvements were made in the means
of inter-State communication. The large rivers were bridged; thousands of miles
of turnpike were constructed; and the great cities of the country were brought
nearer together. When Washington was inaugurated at New York, the traveller
spent two days in going from Philadelphia to New York and a week on the journey
from New York to Boston. In 1815 such trips could easily be made in half the
time. In 1807 Robert Fulton placed on the Hudson river the first practical
steamboat the world ever saw. In 1815 steamboats were plying up and down the
Hudson, the Delaware, the Ohio, the Mississippi, and on many of the bays along
the Atlantic coast. In 1780 there were no banks in America; in 1791 only four
were in existence ; in 1815 they were to he found in every State. In the
Eastern and Middle States manufactures had sprung up; and new means of earning
a livelihood had been opened to tens of thousands of people. Whatever tended to
abridge distance, facilitate communication, spread information, unite the
country, had been so developed that the United States which fought the second
war with Great Britain formed a nation very unlike the thirteen little
republics that fought the War of Independence.
At the close
of the second war the issue which pressed most urgently for settlement was the
state of the currency. Under the Articles of Confederation and before the
adoption of the Constitution, the currency of the country was made up of very
heterogeneous elements—foreign coins which had come in through the channels of
trade, or had been introduced by the troops sent over by France during the War
of Independence; thirteen kinds of paper money or bills of credit issued by the
thirteen States; some small change coined by a few of the States; and tickets
of small denominations issued to meet a serious public need by churches, town
treasurers, stage companies, ferry companies, and merchants. Under the
Constitution the States were deprived of the power to coin money, or to issue
bills of credit, or to make anything else than gold and silver legal tenders
for debt. The duty of furnishing a uniform circulating mediuih now rested
solely on Congress, and was performed in three ways—by authorising the Bank of
the United States,
which was
chartered in 1791, to issue notes not exceeding in amount $10,000,000; by
establishing a mint and coining American money; and by making certain foreign
gold and silver coins legal tender at specified rates for a short time. But the
Bank put out no notes of small denominations ; the annual coinage at the Mint
fell very short of the needs of the country; and, had it not been for the rise
of State banks and the action of corporations and individuals, the people would
have been almost without money suitable for the transactions of the market and
the shop.
The State
banks, which increased from four in 1790 to eighty-eight in 1811, issued notes
in denominations of one and two dollars; merchants, unincorporated
associations, steamboat companies, ferry companies, private bankers, issued
change bills, tickets, due bills, and promissory notes drawn for fractions of a
dollar to serve as small change; and the money of the people thus became a
paper medium which did not bear the stamp, and was not under the control, of
the Federal government. In 1811 the charter of the Bank of the United States
expired; and a re-charter was refused by Congress. Partly because of the
struggle to secure its business and the government deposits, partly because of
the lapse about the same time of the charters of scores of State banks, and partly
because the westward movement of population had opened great areas of country
in which no financial institutions were to be found, a mania for banks swept
over the country. In three years the number rose from 88 to 208; and, as each
put out notes, the circulating medium of the country became a paper currency
which could not possibly be redeemed in specie.
Such was the
condition of the currency, when, in the summer of 1814, a British army landed
on the shore of Chesapeake Bay, marched to the city of Washington and burned
the Capitol, the President’s house, and the public buildings. That Baltimore
would be next attacked was so certain that the banks in that city sent their
gold and silver into the country, where it was buried; and, of necessity, specie
payment on their notes was stopped. When news of this reached Philadelphia, the
depositors rushed to the banks to demand specie and forced the banks of that
city to suspend payment. The banks of other cities quickly followed their
example ; and in a few weeks not a bank in any seaboard State outside of New
England was redeeming its notes in coin. Nothing in the nature of a uniform
circulating medium passing at its face-value all over the country now existed;
and business of every kind was paralysed. Specie small change having
disappeared, resort was again had to small paper bills issued by merchants,
tradesmen, manufacturers, stagecoach companies, even by towns and villages.
Thus the city of New York issued $190,000 in one, two, and six cent notes,
which were bought with bank-notes by the citizens and were receivable in
payment of taxes by the city. The banks at New York and Philadelphia printed
notes in
denominations
of 6^, 12^-, 25, and 50 cents; and the New York and New Jersey Steamboat and
Ferry Companies did likewise.
When peace
was proclaimed in 1815, it was supposed that specie payments would speedily be
resumed. But 1815 passed and 1816 came without a bank showing any signs of
resumption. Then Congress, in desperation, determined to exercise its powers to
regulate the currency, chartered the second Bank of the United States as a
regulator, and fixed a day in February, 1817, on and after which nothing but
specie, or bank-paper convertible on demand into specie, should be received for
duties, taxes, and debts due to the United States. These measures forced the
State banks to resume. Specie again went into circulation, and, with the notes
of the new Bank of the United States, formed a circulating medium which passed
at its face-value in every State of the Union.
Congress next
tinned its attention to manufactures, for the protection of which urgent
appeals had come from many States. The extraordinary development of commerce
which followed the opening of the war in Europe had done much to retard the
growth of manufactures. The demands for ships and cargoes to put into them, the
ready markets for fish, lumber, flour, grain, cotton, and food products of
every sort, had greatly stimulated the shipping and agricultural interests of
the Eastern and Middle States and of Kentucky. The demand for cotton had
already made it the staple of the Southern States; and, under the stimulus thus
afforded by the long war abroad, capital, enterprise, and business energy had
been drawn into commerce and agriculture rather than into manufacturing. So far
had this gone that when, in 1806, it was proposed in Congress to cut off all
intercourse with Great Britain, it was clearly shown that the people of the
United States were so dependent on Great Britain for manufactures of prime necessity
that such a measure would be ruinous. China, glass, pottery, hardware, cutlery,
edged tools, blankets, woollen cloths, linen, cotton prints, and a hundred
other articles of daily use came from Great Britain in such quantity that the
value of each year’s imports amounted to $35,000,000, and the duties paid on
them to $5,500,000, or nearly one-half the entire receipts of the Treasury from
customs.
In spite of
these facts measures of retaliation soon became imperative; and when the Orders
in Council and the Berlin Decree placed American ships and commerce under ban,
the “ long embargo ” was laid; and in December, 1807, all trade with Europe and
her dependencies was cut off. From that moment the encouragement of home
manufactures became the duty of every patriotic American. The Embargo Act was
not eight days old when the men of Baltimore organised the Union Manufacturing
Company of Maryland. The Philadelphia Premium Society offered prizes for the
best specimens of broad-cloth, fancy cloths for vests, raven duck, and thread
in imitation of that made at Dundee. The
354 State encouragement of manufactures. [1807-15
men of
Richmond determined to set up a cotton-mill. At Petersburg a Manufacturing
Society was organised; and the cavalry troop of that town voted to appear on
the Fourth of July clad in white cloth of Virginia make. The Culpepper Society
for the Encouragement of Domestic Manufactures offered prizes for the best
pieces of home-made linen, cotton cloth, and woollen cloth. In the great cities
the people formed associations, and pledged themselves to wear no garments of
which the raw materials were not grown and the fabrics were not made in the
United States.
From the
people the enthusiasm spread to the legislatures of the States. In 1808 the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives asked its members to wear none but
American-made cloths. In Kentucky a like resolution passed the legislature. In
Virginia the legislature fixed December 1, 1809, as the date on which its
members should appear dressed in American-made clothes; and the example of
these States was followed in Ohio, North Carolina, and Vermont. New Hampshire
took off all taxes on cotton and woollen mills if their capital was between
$4000 and $20,000. Pennsylvania laid a tax on dogs, and ordered the money to be
used for the purchase of merino rams.
Thus
stimulated, mills, factories, workshops, foundries, rope-walks, sprang up with
surprising rapidity. From 1809 to 1812 the statute- books of the States exhibit
unmistakeable signs of the progress of the industrial revolution. In New York
32 charters were granted to manufacturing companies in 1810 and 1812. The
policy of protecting these rising industries by duties on imports was brought
before Congress in 1809 by Kentucky, which had then become the great
hemp-growing and hemp-manufacturing State in the Union. To ensure a basis of
knowledge for intelligent action, Congress ordered that in the Census of 1810
the enumerators should gather statistics of manufactures. From the information
thus collected it appeared that goods valued at $198,000,000 were manufactured
annually in the United States.
The
Non-Importation Act, the Non-Intercourse Act, and the war afforded protection
of the strongest kind, diverted capital from ships and commerce to
manufactures, and had brought them to a prosperous condition when peace opened
the ports to foreign trade and competition, and threatened them with ruin. The
manufacturers of Great Britain, well knowing the needs of the American markets,
made haste to send over their goods, which, in the early summer of 1815, began
to arrive in fleets of merchant vessels, in such quantities as had never before
been known. Coming over consigned to nobody, the goods were hurried by the
super-cargoes and captains in charge of them to the auction block, where, to
the surprise of the owners, high prices were obtained by the sharp competition
of eager buyers. A cargo of earthenware costing £1100 sold in Philadelphia for
$12,000—an advance of about 120 per cent. A cargo of salt and earthenware from Liverpool
fetched $16
1815]
The
Peace. Demand for Protection. 355
per pound
sterling at New York. In one week the auction sales of British goods exceeded
$460,000. During the same week the customhouse receipts from British goods at
New York, Boston, and Philadelphia rose to $1,800,000. During April, May, and
June, 1815, the duties paid at the New York custom-house on goods, wares, and
merchandise brought from England amounted to $3,960,000.
When the news
of the great profits and quick sales at auction reached Great Britain, whole
fleets of vessels were loaded and despatched to America. On one day in
November, 1815, twenty square-rigged ships came up the harbour of New York. On
another day fifteen ships and eight brigs arrived; and what went on at New York
was repeated at every seaport along the Atlantic coast. The gainers by this
unusual trade were the British manufacturers, the British ship-owners, the
auctioneers, and the Federal and State treasuries. The sufferers were the
American importers, manufacturers, and wholesale merchants, who without delay
appealed to Congress for protection.
The
manufacturers of cotton cloth, in their memorial, assured Congress that unless
all cotton fabrics made at places beyond the Cape of Good Hope were absolutely
shut out and heavy duties laid on those brought from other lands, an industry
which gave employment to millions of capital and thousands of hands would go
down in ruin. The woollen manufacturers of Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Delaware declared that, unless protected by a heavy ad
valorem duty on woollen goods, investments representing $12,000,000 and a
yearly production of $19,000,000 would be lost to the country.
The appeal
was made at an opportune time, for the House in the last session of Congress had
called on the Secretary of the Treasury to produce a plan for the revision of
the tariff; and the Secretary, in his report, had made a strong appeal for the
protection of home manufactures. He reminded the House that the United States
had always regarded the establishment of home industries as an object of its
policy; that the first Tariff Act under the Constitution had been expressly
connected vvith the policy of protecting manufactures; that in 1790 Hamilton
had reported on the subject; and that in 1810 a census of manufactures had been
taken with a view to their protection. He declared that, mindful of all these
things, he had, in framing the proposed new tariff, been careful so to adjust
the duties as to encourage such manufactures as then existed. These, he said,
could be arranged in three classes, comprising (1) those which had been long
established and could fully supply the home market; (2) those which had been
recently set up and could but partially supply the market; (3) those which were
just being introduced and for which the country, to some extent, was still
dependent on foreign sources of supply. To protect the first class he would
impose prohibitory duties, for the second a protection tariff’, and for the
third a tariff for revenue.
The House
sent the Secretary’s report to the appropriate committee, and soon had before
it a Bill in accordance with his suggestions. The debate which followed made it
clear that the majority of the House was in favour of protection, but that the
greatest diversity of opinion existed as to the amount necessary. Some members
adopted an attitude friendly to manufactures as they then existed, but opposed
to any policy aiming at the production of manufactures. Others held that
protection should be limited to such articles of manufacture as were of
absolute necessity in time of war, and of the first importance in time of
peace. Others again favoured protection as a national policy designed to
produce the industrial independence of the United States; while a fourth class objected
to protection in any form. The result was the passage of an Act (1816) which
established prohibitive duties on cotton and woollen cloths and foreign
articles of which a full supply could be made at home, put a duty of 20 per
cent.’ on articles of which a full supply could not be manufactured at home,
and laid a tariff for revenue on a long list of articles consumed in large
quantities but almost entirely made abroad. To establish protection as a
permanent policy was not the purpose of the Act. It was provided, therefore,
that after three years the duty on cotton and woollen goods should fall to 20
per cent.
The economic
conditions which contributed so powerfully to the building up of manufactures
were also instrumental in producing political changes of great importance. They
brought about a period of business depression and hard times, threw tens of
thousands of persons out of employment, turned the thoughts of men to the West
where land was cheap and taxes nominal, and started a wave of migration from
the seaboard to the Mississippi Valley. When peace was made with Great Britain
in 1783, and the United States was recognised as an independent nation,
three-fourths of the country were not inhabited by white men. West of the
mountains, in the Mississippi Valley and on the shores of the great lakes,
there were, indeed, a few outlying settlements; but the mass of the people
lived on the Atlantic slope, across which from the earliest colonial times they
had been slowly moving westward. Had the western frontier been defined in 1783,
it would have skirted the coast of Maine, crossed central New Hampshire and
northern Vermont, passed round Lake Champlain to the Mohawk Valley, gone down
the Hudson Valley and over New Jersey and the mountains of Pennsylvania to Pittsburg,
and, following the Alleghany Mountains to central Georgia, would have crossed
that State to the sea. West of this line were a few outlying settlements in
Kentucky and Tennessee, and at Kaskaskia and Vincennes and Detroit, still
struggling outposts of civilisation in the heart of the Indian country.
The area of
this inhabited belt was, in round numbers, 240,000 square miles; and on it
dwelt, about the year 1783, a population of men, women, and children, black and
white, slave and free, of less than
3,500,000.
Yet sparse as the population was, a rage for migration had infected it.
Commerce was almost gone; trade was dull; times were bad ; many of the States
owned western lands which they were trying to sell; and thousands of families,
disposing of what little they had, gladly bade farewell to the East and hurried
westward to seek new homes in the wilderness. Every small farmer whose barren
acres were covered with mortgages or whose debts pressed heavily upon him,
every young man whose roving spirit or love of adventure gave him no peace, was
eager to quit his old home in the East and begin life anew in central New York,
or in the yet more favoured region on the banks of the Ohio. Such was the rush
to the Ohio country that, every spring and summer, hundreds of arks heavy with
cattle and household goods went down that river from Pittsburg. One observer at
Fort Pitt wrote home that during six weeks he saw fifty flat-boats set off for
the new settlements. Another at Fort Finney saw thirty-four boats float by in
as many days. The adjutant at Fort Harmer had taken pains to count the boats
which went by between October, 1786, and May, 1787, and declared that they
numbered 177 and carried 2700 souls. Another authority estimated that no less
than 10,000 emigrants passed Marietta during 1788. When the first census of the
population was taken in 1790, 73,000 persons were living in Kentucky.
In general,
this movement consisted of three great streams pouring out of the three centres
of population, the Eastern, the Middle, and the Southern States. One stream,
made up of New Englanders, pushed up the Mohawk Valley into central New York. A
second, crossing Pennsylvania and Virginia, went down the Ohio and settled in
Kentucky and on the government lands at Marietta and Cincinnati. Further south,
a third stream from Virginia and North Carolina crossed the Blue Ridge
Mountains and settled about the headwaters of the Tennessee. While emigration
along these lines was at its height, a series of events occurred which powerfully
affected it. The appearance of the little bands of settlers north of the Ohio
in 1788 was followed in 1789 by an Indian rising, which aimed at the expulsion
of all settlers north of that river. From 1789 till 1794, when Anthony Wayne
broke the Indian power in the great battle at the rapids of the Maumee river,
and gave peace to the frontier, little inducement existed to lure settlers into
the North-west Territory. The second stream, therefore, went into Kentucky,
which became a State in 1791; and the third stream into Tennessee, which
entered the Union in 1796, when the North-west Territory was still scarce
better than a wilderness.
The trading
and commercial States, from which the first stream was moving out, had meantime
begun to prosper greatly. The severe depression which followed the peace of
1783 passed rapidly away under the Constitution. The funding of the National
Debt, the establishment of the National Bank, and the financial policy of the
government in
general
restored confidence and credit. The war between France and Great Britain, which
began in 1793, was followed by the return of good times in the commercial
States. The demand for ships and sailors, lumber, fish, and breadstuff's,
caused by the opening of the ports in the French West Indies, gave employment
to hundreds of thousands of people and checked the rush of emigrants westward.
But in the southern States the movement still continued; and when the century
closed nearly
400,000 persons were living west of the Alleghany
Mountains.
The early
years of the nineteenth century sent another wave of population over the
mountains. The peace in Europe from 1801 to 1803 brought back dull times on the
seaboard. The trade with Europe and the West Indies fell off. The demand for
American lumber, fish, and farm produce declined. The government was selling
its land on credit; and so many emigrants went west that, in 1803, Ohio was
admitted into the Union as a State. Then came the renewal of war in Europe, the
opening of a greater trade than ever, and four years of wonderful prosperity.
But the “ long embargo ” from 1807 to 1809 ruined trade and commerce; and
though the rise of manufactures gave some relief to the unemployed, times again
became hard. Men again souglit the West; and, when the census was taken in
1810, more than one-seventh of the population dwelt in the States and
Territories west of the Alleghany Mountains.
The
commercial restrictions of 1810-12 and the second war with Great Britain
swelled the stream of emigrants, which after 1815 became enormous. There was
then no longer any great demand for American ships and sailors, or for the
produce of American farms. Great Britain closed her West Indian ports to
American ships, and flooded the markets of the United States with British
manufactures. Business of every sort was ruined; the currency was in disorder;
the few manufactures which had grown up since embargo days were seriously
threatened; the ocean cariying-trade was passing into the hands of foreigners ;
and the country entered on a period of four years of the hardest times ever
experienced.
A wild rush
for the West now began; and from 1816 to 1820 the great western highways were
choked with emigrants. By 1817 this emigration was at its height; and in the
spring of that year families set out for the West from almost every city and
town on the seaboard. The few that went from any one town might not be missed,
but gathered on the great highways to the West they made an endless procession
of waggons and travellers. On one of the western highways in New York 260
emigrant waggons passed a tavern in nine days, besides hundreds of persons on
foot or on horseback. A gatekeeper on a Pennsylvania turnpike reported 2001
families as having passed between March and December, 1817, all bound West. At
Easton, Pennsylvania, a town on the route from the Eastern States to Pittsburg,
511 waggons and 3000 persons were counted going West during one month. A
traveller,
while on his
way from Nashville in Tennessee to Savannah in Georgia, found the roads
thronged with “ movers " on their way to the cotton lands of Alabama.
Once on the
frontier, the “mover,” the “new-comer,” the emigrant would take up a quarter
section (160 acres) of government land on credit, cut down a few saplings, make
a “half-faced camp,” and begin a clearing. The “half-faced camp” was a shed,
three sides of which were made of tree-trunks, the fourth being left open. The
roof was of bark laid on saplings. Here the settler would live till he had cut
down enough trees to build a log cabin, which, in the course of time, would
give way to a comfortable two-storeyed house. The clearing was made by grubbing
up the bushes and cutting down the trees under a foot in diameter, and
“girdling” the large ones by cutting rings around them deep enough to stop the
sap and prevent the growth of leaves. If the settler were indolent, the girdled
trees stood till they fell; if he were industrious, he cut them down as soon as
he could. In the soil thus opened to the sun and rain he planted his crops.
Fed by this
never-ending stream of emigrants, the West was transformed. Towns and villages
sprang up with amazing rapidity; trade increased; and every affluent of the
Mississippi became a highway of commerce dotted with “ broad-homs,” arks,
flat-boats, rafts, and steamboats. In the East this movement of population was
not visible to the eye, but, when the fourth census was taken in 1820, it was
distinctly visible in the returns. Between 1810 and 1820 the population of New
York City increased by less than 3600 souls. Philadelphia added no more than
12,000 to her numbers; Baltimore only 17,000; and Boston only 11,000. During
the decade 1810-20 the population of Charleston increased by 80. In the State
of Delaware the increase was 75: in the previous decade it had been 8000. In
the New England States, during twenty years, population had increased but 35
per cent.; in the Middle States of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania but
92 per cent.; while in the western States of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee the
increase was 321 per cent.
The first
result of this great exodus was the formation of five new States in the West,
and the admission into the Union, within four years, of Indiana, Illinois,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Missouri. Louisiana had been admitted in 1812; and
these, with Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, made nine States in the Mississippi
Valley, and raised the number of States in the Union to twenty-four. The West
now sent to Congress eighteen Senators and twenty-eight members of the House,
and at the next presidential election in 1820 would be entitled to cast
forty-six electoral votes. The West, in short, had attained its majority, and
henceforth would have much influence in deciding the conduct of national
affairs.
A second
result of this “building of the West” was the establishment
there of
State constitutions of an extreme democratic type. Property qualifications for
the franchise, so prevalent in the East, were not required; and manhood
suffrage was introduced. The power of the governor was increased; the power of
the legislature was curtailed. Some of the new States abolished life-term
offices; some prohibited imprisonment for debt; others provided that the
estates of suicides should be divided among the heirs, as in cases of natural
death; others made truth a good defence in suits for libel; others made
population the basis of representation. In all these new States the rights of
man as man were recognised; and the old distinctions in the East arising from
the ownership of property were generally disregarded.
A third
result of the rapid growth of the West was the rise into national importance of
the question of internal improvements made at Federal expense. The West was now
a great country by itself. Along the banks of its magnificent rivers and the
shores of the Great Lakes dwelt more than a million of hardy, enterprising, and
progressive people. Down these rivers—the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee,
the Missouri, the Mississippi—were floated, on raft and flat-boat to New
Orleans, pork and lumber, flour, grain, hemp, furs from the North-West, lead
from Missouri, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and provisions of every sort. Before the
days of steam, navigation up the rapid and winding Mississippi from New Orleans
was all but impossible. The flat-boats, barges, rafts, and “broad-homs” were
therefore sold for cash with their contents; and the money was brought back to
Pittsburg or Wheeling, there to be expended in the purchase of the manufactures
of Europe or the eastern States. But now a score of steamboats, laden with the
manufactures of the Old World obtained at New Orleans, ascended the Mississippi
and the Ohio to St Louis, Cincinnati, Louisville, and Pittsburg. Commercially
the West was no longer dependent on the eastern seaboard States; and the
western trade of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore was seriously
threatened. If this great trade was to be maintained, cheap communication must
be had between the seaboard and the West. With this object, appeals were made
to Congress for aid; and in 1817 a fund, consisting of the $1,500,000 to be
paid by the National Bank as a bonus for its charter, and the dividends to be
paid on the $7,000,000 of its stock owned by the United States, was set apart
for the building of good roads and canals and the improvement of river
navigation, and was to be distributed annually among the States on the basis of
representation in Congress. But Madison, in the last hours of his term of
office, vetoed the bill on constitutional grounds; and the attempt to pass it
over the presidential veto failed.
The work of
opening cheap communication with the West was, however, merely delayed, not
prevented. New York at once began the digging of the Erie Canal, and finished
it in 1825, thus joining the waters of Lake Erie with those of the Hudson
river. Pennsylvania
1783-1819]
The slavery question. Missouri.
361
appropriated
$500,000 for the construction of roads and bridges; and Maryland, Virginia, and
North Carolina appointed committees to prepare plans. The question of
congressional aid to such undertakings became a national one; and from 1817 to
1832 no session of Congress was allowed to pass without the agitation of the
question in some form or other.
A fourth
result of the “ building of the West ” was a struggle with slavery. While the
colonies were under the British Crown, slavery and the slave-trade existed in
each one of them. But in those where no great staple such as rice or tobacco
was grown, where, for climatic and economic reasons, slavery was not a
profitable form of labour, and where the demand for skilled and unskilled
labourers was fully supplied by “redemptioners” and “bondservants,” the moral
aspects of slave-holding aroused strong feeling; and repeated attempts were
made to cut off the slave-trade and stop the source of supply. Every law
enacted for the purpose, however, was disallowed by the King in Council; and
slavery as an institution was forced on the colonies by the mother-country. The
feeling against it, however, suffered no abatement; and, when the Revolution
came and the colonies became independent States, the old attacks were
vigorously renewed. Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Connecticut enacted gradual
abolition laws. Vermont was never a slave-holding State. New Hampshire and
Massachusetts became free soil by the interpretation of their constitutions;
and when, in 1787, the Continental Congress framed the Ordinance of Government
for the territory of the United States north-west of the Ohio river, slavery
was excluded, and a magnificent domain was added to the Free-Soil area. In
time, New York and New Jersey adopted gradual abolition laws, and by so doing
made the southern boundary of Pennsylvania (the Mason and Dixie line) and the
Ohio river the dividing line between the Free and the Slave States. The
Republic, in fine, was almost equally divided into slave-soil and free-soil;
and, as new States entered the Union, they were admitted alternately slave and
free. By 1819, twenty-two were in the Union ; and of these, eleven were
slave-holding and eleven free. As each had two members of the Senate, that body
then consisted of forty- four members; and the two great sections of the
country were equally represented. In 1819, however, the legislature of Missouri
besought Congress to cut off a piece of the Territory, authorise the people
dwelling on it to form a State to be called Missouri, and admit it into the
Union. The proposed State lay wholly west of the Mississippi river, and was
part of the Louisiana Purchase, the soil of which had as yet been made neither
slave nor free. Should the people of Missouri be left to do as they pleased, it
was well known that they would form a Slave State. The Free-Soil members of
Congress determined, therefore, that slavery should be prohibited in Missouri;
members from the slave-holding States were equally determined that it should
not be prohibited. The question
362
Boundary dispute with
Spain.
[1803-19
therefore
came to be, whether slavery should be extended to the Louisiana Purchase, or
not. During the session of Congress (1819) the struggle went on fiercely, till each
side yielded something, and the famous Missouri Compromise was effected (1820).
Missouri, it was then agreed, should be admitted as a slave-holding State. But
in all the territory west of the Mississippi river bought from France and known
as the Louisiana Purchase,' and lying north of the parallel 36° 30' (except in
the State of Missouri), slavery was prohibited for ever. Maine, meantime, had
applied for admission as a Free State. This was granted as part of the
compromise. This, made up the number of States in the Union to twenty-four, of
which twelve were slave-holding and twelve free; and the balance in the Senate
was thus preserved.
When
Louisiana Territory, thus parted into slave-soil and free, was acquired from
France in 1803, no boundaries of any sort were fixed. The United States took up
the position that, when La Salle, following up the discovery of the Mississippi
by Marquette and Joliet, floated down the great river to its mouth and,
standing on the shore of the gulf, named the country Louisiana and claimed it
for France, he applied that name to the drainage basin of the Mississippi; that
when a year later he landed his band of settlers on the Texan coast and built
Fort St Louis of Texas, he extended the authority of France half way to the nearest
Spanish settlement, or to the Rio Grande; that later settlements at Biloxi and
Mobile carried the authority of France east of the Mississippi as far at least
as the Perdido river; and that, therefore, the Louisiana Purchase included much
of West Florida, and all the country west of the Mississippi to the Rocky
Mountains and the Rio Grande. Spain, on the other hand, denied that West
Florida and Texas were included in the purchase. During twelve years no
progress towards a settlement was made. On the overthrow of Napoleon, the
return of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain, and the end of the war with
Great Britain, negotiations were renewed; and, after four years of diplomatic
bickering, a treaty was signed in 1819. The United States abandoned all claim to
Texas, agreed to pay the claims of her citizens against Spain to the amount of
$4,500,000, and received the two Floridas, East and West. Spain, on her part,
accepted as a boundary for her Mexican possessions a line which started from
the Gulf of Mexico west of the Mississippi and passed northward and westward
across the country to the shores of the Pacific.
While these
negotiations with Spain were dragging on, difficulties of a serious nature had
arisen between Great Britain and the United States. When the British Peace
Commission at Ghent presented, in 1814, the list of topics for discussion, they
surprised the Americans by stating that the liberty, so long enjoyed by
American citizens, of fishing within British waters and drying and curing their
catch on British soil was to be withdrawn. As defined in the third article of
the Treaty of
Paris, the
people of the United States were to continue to enjoy, unmolested, the right to
fish on the Grand Banks and on all the other banks of Newfoundland, in the Gulf
of St Lawrence, and at all places in the sea where the inhabitants of both
countries used to fish in colonial times. American fishermen might also take
fish of every sort on such portions of the coast of Newfoundland as were free
to British subjects, and on all other coasts and in all other harbours, bays,
and creeks of His Majesty’s dominions in America. But the only places where
fish could be dried and cured were the unsettled shores of the harbours, bays,
and creeks of Nova Scotia, the Magdalen Islands, and Labrador.
From the
signing of the treaty to the adoption of the Constitution the fishing industry
steadily declined, till the average yearly earnings of each vessel were less
than the annual cost. Under the Constitution, Congress came to the relief of the
fishermen, and by bounties and annual allowances did much to revive the
industry. The opening of the French West Indian ports in 1793 did more; and by
1800 British colonial fishermen were complaining that they were undersold by
the Yankees. Unable to get help from the mother-country, the colonists took the
matter into their own hands. In 1806 the Americans complained to Congress that
their vessels were stopped, fired on, and searched; that they were forced to
pay toll as they passed through the Gut of Canso; and, if they anchored in any
bay, were made to pay light money and anchorage dues. From this competition the
British were relieved by the “long embargo,” the restrictive measures which
followed, and by the war, which was hailed with delight by the fishermen of the
Provinces. The war, they claimed, cancelled the Treaty of 1783. The liberty of
fishing in British waters granted by that treaty was therefore a thing of the
past; and in a memorial drawn up at St John’s, the mother-country was urged
never again to suffer foreigners to fish in colonial waters.
The Treaty of
Ghent was silent on the matter of the fisheries. The colonists, therefore,
believed that Americans were excluded; and in the summer of 1815 the captain of
a British ship of war seized some American vessels while fishing off the coast
of Nova Scotia, and wrote across the enrolments and licenses of others the
words, “Warned off the coast by His Majesty’s ship Jaseur. Not to come within
sixty miles.” Complaint was made to the British government, which disavowed the
act of the captain of the Jaseur; but Lord Bathurst declared that after 1815 no
American fishing vessel would be allowed to come within one marine league of
the shores of His Majesty’s North American possessions, nor be permitted to dry
and cure fish in the unsettled ports of those territories. A long discussion on
the character of the Treaty of Paris followed. John Quincy Adams, the American
Minister, laid down the doctrine that the Treaty of 1783 was of a peculiar
character and was not annulled by a state of war. The treaty acknowledged the
independence of the United States, and defined its boundaries; and, as these
things
364 The North-West
frontier, and Oregon. [i783-i8i8
were
permanent and could not be revoked, the treaty was permanent and could not be
abrogated by a declaration of war. Lord Bathurst denied this. He knew of no
exception to the rule that every treaty is abrogated by war between the
parties. Whatever in the Treaty of Ghent was described as a right, e.g. the right
to catch fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, was, like the acknowledgement of
independence, irrevocable. But whatever was described as a liberty, e.g. the
liberty to dry and cure fish on certain unsettled shores, was a concession
granted by the treaty and perished with the treaty.
While
negotiations dragged on, the fishing seasons of 1816 and 1817 came and went;
and during each of them American fishermen were warned, seized, or driven from
the forbidden waters by British ships Of war. Matters had now come to such a
pass that something must be done; and accordingly, in 1818, the American
Minister proposed the immediate negotiation of a treaty for the settlement of
the fisheries’ dispute and other grievances of long standing. Among these were
the northern boundary from the Lake of the Woods to the Pacific Ocean; and the
respective claims of the two Powers to the Oregon country, which lay between
the Rocky Mountains and the sea.
The treaty of
1783 had defined the extreme north-western boundary of the United States as a
line running due west from the most northwesterly point of the Lake of the
Woods to the Mississippi river, then supposed to rise in British America. To
draw such a line was impossible; and by 1794 this fact had been so well
established that the treaty then made with Great Britain promised a joint
survey of the upper Mississippi, and the determination, if necessary, of a new
line from the Lake of the Woods. But the survey was not made; and when, in
1803, Rufus King concluded a convention, it was stipulated that the boundary
should be the shortest line from the Lake of the Woods to the river. But the
convention was never ratified, and the boundary was still unsettled when
Louisiana was purchased; when the possessions of the United States in the North-West
were expanded to the Rocky Mountains; and when the Mississippi, as a boundary,
disappeared. The next treaty was negotiated in 1806; and the 49th parallel of
north latitude was accepted as the boundary from the Lake of the Woods westward
“as far as the respective territories of the parties extend on that quarter.”
This treaty Jefferson refused to send to the Senate; so the boundary was still
undetermined when the peace commissioners met at Ghent, and left the question
where they found it.
Beyond the mountains
lay the Oregon country, to which both Great Britain and the United States laid
claim. The discovery and naming of the Columbia river by Captain Gray (1792);
the exploration of the Columbia and its tributaries by Lewis and Clark
(1804-6); the erection near the mouth of the river of the fur-trading port of
Astoria (1812)—such were the grounds for the pretensions of the United States
to ownership
and absolute jurisdiction, grounds which may be briefly stated as those of
discovery, exploration, and settlement. Great Britain denied the claim of the
United States to absolute jurisdiction, founding her pretensions on the
discovery of Nootka Sound by Captain Cook (1778); the building of a small
vessel in a harbour in the Sound in 1788; the fact that the persons who built
the vessel resided in a hut on shore; the Nootka Sound Convention with Spain
(1790); the discovery of the Frazer river by Sir Alexander Mackenzie (1792);
and the establishment of a fur-trading post west of the Rocky Mountains
(1806). She claimed the right of her subjects to navigate the waters of the
Oregon country, to settle in it, and to trade freely with its inhabitants and
occupiers; and she conceded the same rights and no others to the United States.
These
disputes were shelved for a time by an arrangement made in
1818. As to the fisheries, it was agreed that
citizens of the United States might for ever catch fish on certain parts of the
coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador, and of the Magdalen Islands; and that
American fishermen might for ever dry and cure fish on any of the unsettled
bays, creeks, and harbours of certain parts of Newfoundland and Labrador; while
the United States renounced for ever the daim of its citizens to take, dry, or
cure fish within three miles of any other of the coasts, bays, creeks, or
harbours of the British possessions in North America; and agreed that the
fishermen of the United States should never enter any of these harbours, bays,
and creeks for any other purpose than procuring water, buying wood, seeking
shelter, or repairing their vessels. As to the northern boundary it was agreed,
that the line of demarcation between the British possessions in North America
and the United States should be the 49th parallel of latitude, running from a
point south of the Lake of the Woods to the summit of the Rocky Mountains; and
that in the Oregon country, for ten years to come, the harbours, bays, and
creeks, and the navigation of the rivers should be free and open to the
vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two Powers. It was, in short, an
agreement for joint occupancy, leaving undecided the claims of either party to
absolute control of the country.
Trouble next
arose with Spain over the delivery of the Floridas. Early in 1818, while the
negotiations were still going on, Ferdinand of Spain granted to three Court
favourites areas of land so extensive that it seemed likely that every foot of
Florida, not already given away, had been alienated by the Crown. The King’s
intention seemed to be to deprive the United States of the ownership of the
soil and to leave to that country nothing but the jurisdiction. Adams was
determined to prevent this, and inserted in the treaty the words, “All grants
made since the said 24th January, 1818, are hereby declared and agreed to be
null and void.” But when the treaty reached Madrid (in May, 1819), the King, on
one pretext or another, put off the ratification. The six months’ time-limit
expired; and eight months elapsed before a minister appeared
at Washington
to make an explanation. Adams was then informed that such a scandalous system
of piracy had been carried on from the ports of the United States against Spain
and her possessions, and such a spirit of hostility displayed, that His Majesty
could not, with due regard to his honour, ratify the treaty till assured that
these things would stop. He demanded pledges that no more armaments should be
fitted out in the ports of the United States; that no more expeditions should
be allowed to go forth to attack the dominions of Spain in the New World; and
that the United States should not recognise the independence of the so-called
South American Republics. The refusal of Adams to commit the government to any
line of conduct regarding the rebellious colonies of Spain afforded an excuse
for so much further delay that the treaty was not put into force till late in
February, 1821.
Meantime, the
true cause of Spain’s procrastination became manifest. After the defeat of
Napoleon at Waterloo and the entry of the Allies into Paris, the so-called
Second Peace of Paris was signed by the representatives of the Four Allied
Powers, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Great Britain. On the same day (November
20, 1815) they signed a further agreement, based oh the Chaumont Treaty of
March 1, 1814, and upon the subsequent proceedings at Vienna. This Quadruple
Alliance bound the Four Powers to exclude Napoleon for ever from the throne of
France, to maintain the restored monarchy, to resist any attack on the army of
occupation, and to meet at stated intervals in order to consult concerning the
common interest and to take such measures as might best serve the peace and
happiness of Europe. True to this pledge, the representatives of the Four
Powers met at Aix-la- Chapelle in the autumn of 1818, and reviewed the events
of the last three years. The Bourbon monarchy seemed so firmly established in
France that the army of occupation was withdrawn. But in Spain matters had gone
from bad to worse. During ten years her colonies in the New World had been in a
state of revolt, first against Joseph Bonaparte, then against the Cortes of
Cadiz, and, since the restoration of 1814, against the King. Every resource of
the Crown had been used, and used in vain; and now that the last dollar had
been drawn from the treasury, Ferdinand appealed to the Allies for help. They
had restored him to his throne. Why not restore to him his colonies ? Why not
let the work of subjugation be done by Great Britain ? But Great Britain was
not at all inclined to destroy the lucrative trade she had built up with the
Spanish colonies since 1808; and, as no aid could be had from her, the Russian
government, through its active ambassador Tatistcheff, came to the relief of
Ferdinand and placed at his disposal a fleet of warships. But, when the vessels
reached Cadiz, not one of them was found to be in a fit condition for crossing
the Atlantic.
The
expedition was put off (April, 1818); and six months afterwards Russia and
France (the latter of whom had now been admitted into the Alliance of the
Powers) brought the condition of affairs in Spanish
America
before the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. But Great Britain’s commercial
interests prevailed on this occasion over her general willingness at this time
to fall in with the policy of the Continental Powers; and the Congress declined
to interfere. Left to herself, Spain made one more attempt at subjugation, just
at the time when the Boundary Treaty was concluded at Washington. Should the
attempt to reconquer her South American and Mexican colonies succeed it would
be unwise to part with the Eloridas. Ratification was therefore delayed; an
army was gathered at Cadiz; and preparations were made to send it to America.
Ere it could go, however, yellow fever broke out; the troops went into camp;
and, while there, were won over to the cause of constitutional government by
the agents of a great conspiracy against the King. On January 1, 1820, the
troops rose and declared for the Constitution of
1812. Rebellion now spread far and wide; and
Ferdinand in alarm promised to assemble the Cortes. But his people distrusted
him, and on March 9, 1820, forced him to take an oath to support the
Constitution.
Tidings of
the collapse of absolute monarchy in Spain were received in the United States
with unconcealed delight. That the people should look with indifference on the
gallant struggle for liberty going on at their very doors was impossible. They
were deeply concerned, and, as time passed, grew convinced that something more
than the independence of a few colonies was at stake; that Spain was quite as
eager to stamp out republican ideas as to put down rebellion; that, rather than
see her fall, Europe would aid her; and that, if they succeeded in South
America, it was just possible that the United States, whose example was the
cause of so much political unrest, might be the next republic to feel their
vengeance. The rising in Spain was therefore hailed as a blow at European
interference; and the cause of the Southern Republics became more popular than
ever. It found no truer friend than Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of
Representatives. That the Republics should be recognised by the United States
was his earnest wish. Towards this the House of Representatives could do
little; but that little it did in May, 1820, by the passage of a resolution that
it was expedient to provide a suitable outfit and salary for such Ministers as
the President might send to any of the governments of South America which had
established and were maintaining their independence of Spain. President Monroe
did not act upon the resolution, for the treaty with Spain was still
unratified; and he was determined to give Ferdinand no excuse for refusing to
sign. But Clay was not to be turned from his purpose, and, in the next session
of Congress, moved an appropriation for sending a Minister or Ministers to the
South American Republics. When this was voted down, he moved a resolution
expressing the sympathy of the people of the United States with the people of
the Spanish provinces struggling for liberty and independence. By that time the
Spanish treaty had been ratified by Ferdinand; the resolution could do no harm;
and the House therefore passed it in 1821.
In Europe the
struggle with liberalism was fast coming to a crisis. The revival of the
Constitution of 1812 in Spain, in March, 1820, was followed by the enforced
acceptance of a similar Constitution by the King of the Two Sicilies in July,
1820; and by the overthrow (in September) of the Regency in Portugal, the
establishment of a Junta, and the election of a Cortes to frame a Constitution.
Even France showed signs of revolt against absolutism, which so alarmed Louis
XVIII that he called for a meeting of the Powers. In October, 1820, the Emperor
of Austria, the Czar, the King of Prussia, an ambassador from Great Britain,
and two envoys from France met in the little town of Troppau in Moravia. The
British ambassador did nothing; the envoys of France were careful to take
opposite sides, and so committed their country to nothing. But the three
Eastern Powers called on the people of Naples to abandon their Constitution or
fight, and framed a circular, a copy of which was sent to every Court in
Europe. The events of March and July, said the circular, had produced a feeling
of disquiet and alarm, and a desire to unite and save Europe from the evils
ready to burst upon her. That this feeling should be strongest with governments
which had lately conquered the Revolution, and now saw it again appearing
triumphant was no more than natural. The Allied Powers had, therefore, decided
to take common measures of precaution, and restrain such States as, having
overthrown legitimate governments, were seeking to introduce their disorders
and insurrections into others.
The decision
to apply armed intervention having been reached, it was resolved to apply the
new doctrine at once to Naples. The King was summoned to meet the Allies at
Laybach in January, 1821. Thither, accordingly, the old King went, leaving his
son to act as Regent, only to be told that unless the deeds of July were at
once undone an Austrian army would occupy Naples. When these things were known
at Naples, the Parliament assembled, and, considering the King to be under
constraint at Laybach, bade the Grand Duke defend the State. A rush to arms
followed; the old King abdicated; an Austrian army entered Italy, crushed the
liberal risings in Naples and Piedmont, and in spite of his abdication restored
Ferdinand to the throne. From Laybach went forth another circular, in which the
world was told that henceforth all “ useful or necessary changes in the
legislature and administration of States must emanate alone from the free will,
the reflecting and enlightened impulses, of those whom God had rendered
responsible for power.”
Thus
committed to the extermination of popular government, the Allied Powers next
turned their attention to Spain, and for this purpose agreed to meet at Vienna
in 1822. In the United States meantime the cause of the South American
Republics (Mexico, Colombia^ Chili, Peru, and Buenos Ayres) became more popular
than ever. President Monroe, who, so early as May, 1818, had proposed to his
Cabinet that the United States should countenance no pacification short of the
independence of the Spanish colonies, but had not taken any overt steps in that
1822-3] Congress of Verona. Monroe's Declaration.
369
direction,
now took heart, and in March, 1822, recommended recognition. In this the House
of Representatives gladly concurred, and without one dissenting vote
appropriated $100,000 to meet the expense of sending Ministers. The Senate agreed,
and on May 4, 1822, Monroe signed the Bill. In this way the United States
recognised the independence of the South American Colonies of Spain.
In September
the Allies met at Vienna, but soon adjourned to Verona, where in October, 1822,
the affairs of Spain were carefully considered. Certain changes, it was
agreed, should be demanded in the Spanish Constitution; and, if they were not
made, a French army, supported, if necessary, by troops from Russia, Austria,
and Prussia, should invade Spain. The demand was made and refused; the
Ministers of the Allies left Madrid; and on April 7, 1823, a French army
entered Spain. Then Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, began to act. He
knew, as everybody knew, that when the Allies had restored absolute monarchy in
Spain they would go on and attempt to restore to her the rebellious colonies in
South America lately recognised by the United States as independent republics.
Turning to the American Minister, Richard Rush, he asked if the United States
would join with Great Britain in a declaration that, while neither Power
desired the colonies of Spain for herself, it was impossible to look with
indifference on European intervention in their affairs. Rush had no *
instructions, but he replied that the United States “would regard as highly
unjust, and as fruitful of disastrous consequences, any attempt on the part of
any European Power to take possession of the colonies by conquest, by cession,
or on any other ground or pretext whatsoever”; and he promised to join in the
declaration if Great Britain would first recognise the independence of the
little republics. This Canning would not agree to; so the joint declaration was
never made. When Rush’s report of his conversation -with Canning reached the
Secretary of State and was shown to Monroe, the President was sorely puzzled
how to act. He turned, therefore, for advice to ex-presidents Jefferson and
Madison, and, encouraged by them, laid the matter before his cabinet. With its
approval he announced in his Annual Message to Congress, on December 2, 1823,
the three principles ever since known as the Monroe Doctrine.
The first
related to the conduct of the Allies, and reads thus : “ We owe it, therefore,
to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and
those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to
extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we
have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have
declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have,
on great consideration and on just principles
370
[l823
acknowledged,
we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any
other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the
United States.”
The second
announced the policy of the United States towards affairs in Europe, in these
words: “ Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of
the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless
remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of
its Powers ; to consider the government, de facto, as the legitimate government
for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those
relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just
claims of every Power, submitting to injuries from none. But, in regard to
these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It
is impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their political system to
any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness;
nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would
adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we
should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference.”
The doctrine
was to hold good for all time, and, put in plain language, was this : (1) The
United States will “ not interfere in the internal concerns ” of any European
Power. (2) “ But, in regard to these continents [North and South America],
circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different ”; and, if any European
Power attempts at any future time to extend its political system to any part of
this hemisphere “ for the purpose of oppressing ” the nations or “ controlling
in any other manner their destiny,” the United States will interfere.
The third
principle was called forth by the claims of Bussia to the north-western coast,
and was stated as follows: “ In the discussions to which this interest has
given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion
has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and
interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by
the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any
European Powers.” In February, 1822, the Russian Minister, Chevalier de
Politica, had placed in the hands of the Secretary of State a copy of an edict
of the Emperor Alexander, which set forth that the pursuits of commerce,
whaling, and fishing, and indeed of all other industries, whether on the
islands or in the ports and gulfs of the north-western coast of America, from
Behring Straits to 51° north latitude, were exclusively granted to Russian
subjects. Foreign ships were, therefore, not to come within one hundred Italian
miles of coasts or islands. So unexpected an attempt to define the limits of
the Oregon country alarmed the President; and
I822-7] Conventions with Russia and Great
Britain. 371
Adams was
instructed to demand the grounds on which the claim was based. He was told that
the Russians had long maintained a settlement at Novo-Archangelsk in latitude
57°, and that latitude 51° was about half-way between that settlement and the
mouth of the Columbia river. The restriction forbidding an approach to the
coast was made to prevent foreigners carrying on illicit trade with the natives
to the injury of the Russian American Fur Company. Adams protested against
these doctrines; but the Russian Minister declined to discuss the question; and
Monroe, in December, 1822, suggested to Congress that the time had come to
think seriously of occupying Oregon. Congress refused to consider the question;
and so the matter rested when Baron de Tuyl, the new Russian Minister,
requested that the issue should be settled by negotiation at St Petersburg. The
invitation was accepted; and, while Adams was preparing instructions, the Baron
called one day at the State Department and was told that Russia’s claim to a
right to colonise the Pacific coast could not be listened to; and that both
North and South America were closed to colonisation by European Powers because
of the independent position the nations of the New World had assumed and
maintained. The Minister dissented vigorously; but Adams stood firm. He
reasserted the principle in his instructions to the American Minister at St
Petersburg; and Monroe announced it in his famous message of December, 1823.
Great Britain
meantime had protested against the imperial ukase, and had likewise been
invited to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary issue. But, when it was
found that the British envoy could discuss but could not settle the question,
the American Minister offered 55° as the northern boundary of Oregon. Russia
offered 54° 40', which was accepted and embodied in a convention with Russia,
signed in April, 1824. Great Britain in a convention with Russia in 1825
accepted the same line; and 54° 40' became the boundary between Alaska and
Oregon. In 1827, as the ten-year period of joint occupancy was drawing to a
close, Great Britain and the United States, by a new convention, continued the
agreement indefinitely.
The
announcement of the principles which compose the Monroe Doctrine was hailed,
both in Great Britain and America, with delight. The British people, press, and
statesmen were loud in their praise of the firm stand that Monroe had taken
against the Allies. “The question,” said Brougham, “ with regard to South
America is now disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently happened
than which no event has dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over
all the freemen of Europe. That event, which is decisive of the subject in
respect to South America, is the message of the President of the United States
to Congress.”
In America
the interest aroused by the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine was soon
overshadowed by a hotly contested presidential election. No part of the
Constitution gave less popular satisfaction
than the
method of electing a President. As originally provided, each State was to
appoint, in such manner as the State legislature might direct, as many
presidential electors as it had senators and representatives in Congress. The
electors were to meet in their respective States; and each was to write upon a
ballot the name of two persons. A list of all names voted for and the number of
votes for each was then to be made, and a certified copy sent to the President
of the Senate, who, in the presence of the House and Senate, on the appointed
day, was to open and count the votes. The person having the greatest number of
votes (if a majority of the whole) was to be President of the United States;
and he who received the next highest was to be Vice-President. Under this
system the President was to be an official chosen and elected by sundry
citizens having no connexion with the government, for no senator,
representative, or office-holder may be an elector; he was to be eligible for
any number • of terms; and he was to enter upon his high office bound by no
pledges, representing no section, and belonging to no party. He was to be the
choice of fellow-citizens called from private life to act as electors without
collusion, and perfectly free to vote for any duly qualified men they pleased.
So long as
Washington consented to serve as President, the system of election worked well;
but in 1796 he declined to serve a third term; and the first contest for the
Presidency took place. The Federalist electors gave all their votes for the
office of President to John Adams, but scattered them so widely for that of
Vice-President that their second candidate, Thomas Pinckney, fell twelve votes
behind Adams. The Republicans agreed to vote for Thomas Jefferson, who was but
three votes behind Adams, intervening between the two Federalist candidates,
and was thus elected Vice-President. The defects of the system from the point
of view of party government were now clearly illustrated. Pinckney was defeated
because the Federalist electors had scattered their votes among many candidates
instead of concentrating them on two. When the next election occurred, in 1800,
both parties attempted to prevent the recurrence of such a defeat. Each
Federalist elector was instructed to vote for John Adams, and all save one to
vote for Charles C. Pinckney; and they implicitly obeyed. The Republican
leaders at a private “ caucus ” selected Jefferson and Burr as their
candidates, but failed to designate the man who should not vote for Burr. In
consequence of this omission Jefferson and Burr received an equal number of
votes—73 each; and therefore neither was elected President. But, as this number
exceeded by eight the votes cast for Adams, he was defeated. Consequently no
President was chosen by the electoral colleges of the States. The duty of
deciding whether Jefferson or Burr should be President thus devolved on the
House of Representatives ; and Jefferson was chosen.
The
Constitution plainly needed amendment; and, before the election
of 1804
occurred it was altered by providing that each elector, instead of writing two
names on one ballot without designating which was his choice for President,
should cast two separate ballots, one for President and one for Vice-President.
But the Republicans went a step further, and, at a “caucus” of Republican
members of Congress, formally nominated Jefferson and George Clinton as their
candidates. By so doing they deprived their party electors of all choice,
required them to vote for these two men and no others, and thus reduced the
electoral colleges to mere boards of registration. The custom of “caucus”
nomination thus introduced was followed in 1808, in 1812, in 1816, in 1820,
and, for the last time, in 1824. The Federalists, though hopelessly in the minority,
continued to put forward candidates (selected in private “ caucus ” by free
leaders) till 1816, when they ceased to be a national party, and never again
named candidates. From the election of Monroe in 1816, therefore, there was but
one great national party—the Republican. The old issues, growing out of
foreign complications, disappeared with the peace of 1815. No domestic issues
which could divide the people into two great parties existed; and, while they
were growing up afresh, the Republicans formed the only national party. In
1820, therefore, Monroe had no competitor. He was the only candidate before the
electors, and would have received every electoral vote, had not one elector
thrown away his vote lest Monroe should be unanimously elected, an honour never
conferred on any man save Washington.
With the
second election of Monroe the Republican party began to go to pieces. The old
leaders of Revolutionary days were now dead or in retirement. Among the active
party leaders there was none whose services so overshadowed those of others as
to point him out as the one man entitled to party support. The friends of each
leader therefore rallied about their favourite; and, in the course of two
years, five candidates representing the four great sections of the country and
nominated by members of State legislatures, by mass meetings, and by the
Congressional “caucus” were put before the public. These men were John Quincy
Adams of Massachusetts, Secretary of State; Henry Clay of Kentucky, Speaker of
the House of Representatives; Andrew Jackson, a citizen of Tennessee; John C.
Calhoun of South Carolina, Secretary of War; and William H. Crawford of
Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury, who was chosen by the Congressional “
caucus.”
The selection
of these men is notable for many reasons. It meant the absence of great party
issues; it meant a revolt against the old method of “caucus” nomination, a
method now denounced throughout the country as “King Caucus”; it meant the
assertion by the people of a right to have a voice in the nomination and
election of a President, a condition which the framers of the Constitution
never contemplated. In the first election (1789) eleven States participated. In
four of these the people took part in the election of electors ; but in seven
the State legislatures
made the
appointment, and the people had no part. During the five- and-thirty years that
had since elapsed, political ideas had greatly changed. The property
qualifications required of the voter in 1789, and the religious and property
qualifications required of office-holders, had been swept away in whole or in
part. The franchise had been extended; the number of nominative offices had
decreased and that of elective offices had increased. Government had passed to
the people; and, now that they chose their State officers, it was but natural
that they should insist on electing the President. So great had been the change
that, of the twenty-four States composing the Union in 1824, there were but six
in which the legislatures appointed presidential electors, while in eighteen
the people voted directly. The election of 1824, in short, marks the transition
between the old way and the new. Henceforth “ the will of the people,” not that
of the “ caucus,” was to decide who should be President.
The contest
of 1824 resulted in another failure to elect. All factions agreed on Calhoun as
the fit man for the Vice-Presidency; and he was chosen by the electoral
colleges. But neither Jackson, Adams, Crawford, nor Clay received a majority of
the electoral votes; and the choice passed to the House of Representatives,
which, according to the Constitution, was obliged to elect either Jackson,
Adams, or Crawford; for, in such cases, only three names, and those the highest
on the list, may come before the House. In those States where the people chose
the electors, Jackson had received 45,000 more votes than Adams, and 106,000
more than Crawford. In the electoral colleges, the votes for Jackson exceeded
by fifteen those given for Adams, and by fifty-eight those given for Crawford.
Jackson was therefore clearly the people’s choice; and, in the opinion of his
followers, the House was in duty bound to elect him. This claim was the
assertion of the new democratic idea, that the people had a right to choose their
rulers; but it was not regarded by the House, which elected Adams President.
The country
over which Adams was thus called to rule in 1825 was now more than ever before
divided into the North and the South. Whitney’s invention of the cotton-gin
made cotton-planting profitable. The invention^ of Hargreaves, Crompton, and
Arkwright had stimulated the demand for cotton ; and these two conditions
combined—the existence of a market and the possibility of supplying it with
ease and profit— made cotton-planting the chief industry of the South, absorbed
the energy, enterprise, and capital of her citizens, and determined every
economic condition. In the South the arts and sciences were little practised;
great national resources were allowed to lie undeveloped; manufactures were
neglected; and trade and commerce were suffered to pass into the hands of
foreigners, in order that one sort of agriculture might flourish. The firm
belief that none but black men could cultivate cotton fastened negro slavery on
the South, shut out free labour, and
I820-5] North and South: manufactures and
Protection. 375
deprived the
Southern States of all the blessings attaching to a condition of society in
which all men, from the richest to the poorest, are striving for the betterment
of their conditions.
The North, on
the other hand, was the home of diversified industries. Land was being taken
up; towns and villages were being founded, new cities built, old cities
rebuilt; canals and turnpikes were in course of construction; steamboats were
multiplying in number; the great coal-fields of Pennsylvania were developing;
water-works and gasworks were established in the chief cities ; manufactures
were increasing at an astonishing rate ; and trade and commerce were once more
flourishing. In New Hampshire there were 60 cotton-mills, 300 tanneries, 200
bark-factories, and half a score of paper-mills. Vermont sent down the Hudson
and Champlain Canal and the Hudson river to New York copper, iron, and wool. In
Massachusetts there were 260 mills and factories, giving employment to
$30,000,000 of capital. In Rhode Island there were 150 mills, affording a
livelihood to 30,000 people. The people of New York made salt, iron, leather,
glass, paper, woollen and cotton cloth; and those of New Jersey manufactured
cotton cloth, iron, glass, porcelain, carpets, and linen. In Philadelphia there
were 4000 weavers, and in one county some 157 mills and factories. Pittsburg
was the manufacturing centre of the Mississippi Valley. In 1820 the capital
invested in manufactures amounted to $75,000,000, and the number of hands
employed to 200,000. In 1825 the capital had increased to $160,000,000, and the
number of hands to 2,000,000.
As new
manufactures arose and old ones expanded, it was but natural that the demand
for protection should be renewed, and that this demand should receive
attention. But the struggle was a long one. A Bill introduced in 1820 passed
the House, but was defeated in the Senate by the commercial and agricultural
interests. The Bill of 1821 did not pass the House. In 1822 no Bill was
considered. The Bill of 1823 perished in Committee of the whole House. In 1824
the House was flooded with petitions for and against a protective tariff.
Anti-tariff men declared that Congress had no power to tax imports for any
purpose except to raise revenue in order to pay the debts of the United States;
that the rapid decline in the price of agricultural products in the South had
produced an appalling amount of suffering; that many of the articles which it
was proposed to tax could not be dispensed with by the South, and would have to
be purchased at high prices in the North; that imports would decrease, tbe
revenue fall off, and internal taxation become necessary. The policy of
protection was, it was said, of British origin, and would entail on America
what it had brought on Great Britain— pauperism, taxes, and debt. The
protection of manufactures was unjust, unequal, and burdensome. The East and
the North could manufacture, for those sections had capital, dense population,
and free labour; but the West and the South were not in a position to follow
their example; any
increase in
the tariff would therefore be, in effect, a tribute paid by the South to the
North. Despite these arguments the Bill passed; and protection as a policy was
fastened on the United States.
For a while
all went well under the new tariff of 1824. Money hitherto invested in ships
and foreign commerce began to be withdrawn to erect cotton-mills and woollen
mills, and to build villages composed entirely of the homes of operators. But
conditions not foreseen soon laid prostrate the wool and woollen cloth
industries. Competition produced by the increase of mills at home and large
imports from abroad brought down prices. The reduction of the duty in Great Britain
on imported wool from a shilling to a penny a pound enabled her manufacturers
to sell more cheaply than ever; the evasion of the ad valorem duty on woollen
cloth in American ports by false valuations enabled British exporters to break
down the tariff; the sales of imported goods in original packages at auction
secured a quick market; and by 1826 woollen manufactures were prostrate.
Massachusetts
was then the chief seat of the woollen industry. In the autumn of 1826
manufacturers of woollens from all parts of New England assembled at Boston,
and framed a memorial which was sent to each manufacturer of woollen goods in
the United States. The remedy, they declared, was such an increase in the
tariff as would secure protection. To obtain this, increase meetings must be
held, committees of correspondence appointed, members of Congress interviewed,
and delegates sent to Washington to urge the passage of a new Tariff Act.
These things were done; and in January, 1827, a Bill granting all that was
asked passed the House, but was tabled in the Senate by the casting vote of
Calhoun.
In the
planting States the defeat of the Bill was hailed with delight. The planters
declared that if the proposed tariff were needed to produce revenue they would
willingly pay the duties, heavy as they might be. But they argued that there
was no need of more revenue. The Federal treasury was full, and the national
debt rapidly decreasing. The real purpose of the proposed tariff was to force
capital into channels in which it could not naturally flow, and to produce a
ruinous change in the pursuits of the Southern people. Of the 600,000 bales of
cotton sold annually, two-thirds were sent to foreign countries, which sent in
return almost every manufactured article used in the South. The duties
contemplated would therefore fall with especial severity on the South, and were
in the nature of a tax on the industry of one part of the country for the
benefit of the manufactures of another.
As the autumn
of 1827 wore away, these sentiments found expression in resolutions and
memorials of public meetings. Senator Hayne of South Carolina told the Chamber
of Commerce of Charleston that the rich manufacturers of the North originated
the Bill, in order that they might secure a monopoly of the home market and
enhance their profits;
1827-8] The “ Tariff1
of Abominations
377
that the
Woollens Bill would be revived in the next session of Congress ; and that
nothing but a firm remonstrance from the planting States could prevent the ruin
of the South. The Chamber thereupon framed and sent to Congress a remonstrance
declaring the proposed tariff to be unjust and unconstitutional, and warned
Congress to give heed to the rising spirit of opposition. “ Have you,” said
another memorial, “ ascertained beyond the possibility of deception how far the
patience of the people of the South exceeds their indignation, and at what
precise point resistance may begin and submission end ? ” In the North,
meantime, the growers of wool were waiting for action. State conventions were
held and delegates chosen to attend a national convention which met at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in July, 1827. After a session of five days, the
convention appointed a committee to draw up an address to the people, and
adopted a memorial to Congress which was duly presented to the House of
Representatives when that body met in December.
Memorials
both for and against a revision of the tariff came pouring in from all sections
of the country, together with resolutions of a very threatening kind from the
legislatures of many States. Those from Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and New
York approved of revision, and called for adequate protection to the cotton,
wool, hemp, iron, and flax industries. North Carolina declared that the use of
the taxing power for any other purpose than revenue was a usurpation of
authority by Congress. South Carolina took the same view. Georgia declared for
a strict construction of the powers of Congress, and would “ submit to no
other.” Alabama held that power to protect manufactures had never been granted
to Congress, had no limits, was dangerous, odious, productive of monopoly,
tended to heap up wealth in the hands of the few, and spread poverty, misery,
and vice among the many. Ohio and New Jersey were urgent for protection. Of fifty-seven
memorials from the people, twenty-five favoured protection, while thirty-two
were hostile.
Towards the
close of January, 1828, a Bill was reported which it was expected would never
pass. Indeed, it was carefully prepared to invite defeat, for in 1828 a
President was to be elected; and each party, fearing to pass the Bill, sought
to throw the odium of defeat on the other. But the Bill, with all its excessive
duties on raw materials and imported manufactures, passed both Houses of
Congress, and was accepted by the President. It has ever since been known as
the “ Tariff of Abominations.”
COMMERCE,
EXPANSION AND SLAVERY.
(1828—1850.)
When the passing of the Tariff Act became known in the
South, angry protests and loud threats of resistance were heard. The ships in
Charleston harbour flew their flags at half-mast. Anti-tariff meetings were
held in South Carolina; and the governor was urged to summon the legislature in
special session. Proposals were made to stop all trade with States whose
representatives in Congress had voted for the Act, and for an anti-tariff
convention of delegates from the planting States. From grand juries, from the
muster-grounds, from Fourth of July meetings, from gatherings of all sorts came
demands that the legislature should defend the rights of South Carolina.
In the midst
of this excitement in the South the time arrived for the choice of presidential
electors. The defeat of Jackson in the House of Representatives in 1825 was
quickly followed by his renomination for the Presidency by the legislature of
Tennessee; and during three years a bitter personal campaign was carried on in
Congress and before the people. The friends of Jackson insisted that the
election of Adams was the result of a corrupt bargain by which Clay bound
himself to use his influence in the House of Representatives to secure the
election of Adams, and Adams bound himself in return to appoint Clay Secretary
of State; that the sovereign will of the people had been disregarded by the
House of Representatives; and that the “will of the people” must be vindicated.
In their ranks were to be found all who were opposed to internal improvements
at the Federal expense; all who believed the Tariff Acts to be oppressive,
partial, and unconstitutional; all who believed the story of the corrupt
bargain; all the great body of office-holders; and all who for any reason hated
Adams or Clay. No great principle of national policy as yet bound them
together; but the lack of such a bond was more than compensated by the belief
that Adams stood for aristocratic principles of government, and Jackson for
government by the people.
Political
affairs were still further complicated by the rise of the most extraordinary
political party that has yet appeared in American history
1826-8] Presidential election.—The Anti-Masons.
379
—the
Anti-Masons. In 1826 William Morgan, a poor bricklayer in the village of
Batavia, New York, announced his intention to publish a book revealing the
secrets of Freemasonry. Batavia was then a frontier village inhabited by men of
scanty education, little accustomed to think before they acted. To the local
Masonic lodge Morgan’s purpose seemed abominable; and attempts were at once
made to get possession of the manuscript. When these failed, Morgan was imprisoned
for a small debt. He was however released, but as he came out of the gaol about
midnight he was seized, forced into a carriage, and carried across the State to
a ruined fort on the Niagara river. There all trace of him disappeared; and to
this day his fate is unknown. The man had been kidnapped; and his captors were
punishable by law. But the people, in their excitement, instead of demanding
the arrest and punishment of the individual offenders, turned their wrath
against the whole Masonic body; and for this the Masons were largely to blame.
Attempts to investigate the affair were obstructed by Masons in public office.
When indictments were procured against four Masons, they pleaded guilty and so
defeated all attempts to discover the fate of Morgan. Then the anger of the
people rose high. Public meetings were held in all the western counties of New
York; and resolutions were passed declaring Masons unfit for public office and
charging them with putting allegiance to their society above allegiance to the
State. At the spring elections of 1827 anti- Masonic candidates were nominated
in many places; and the people divided, politically, into Masons and
Anti-Masons. To break off connexion with the Masonic fraternity now became the
most popular act that a politician, a physician, a clergyman, or a small
tradesman could perform. Anti-Masonic newspapers appeared in great numbers ;
and in the summer of 1828 a convention of Anti-Masons nominated candidates for
the posts of governor and lieutenant-governor of New York. In the congressional
districts Anti-Masons had already been named for Congress and the State
legislature. In short, a new political party had arisen and seriously
complicated political affairs in New York, which cast the largest electoral
vote of any State in the Union.
The choice of
presidential electors in the States did not then, as now, take place everywhere
on the same day. Each State fixed for itself the date of election; and December
came before the returns were all received. But before that time it was well
known that Adams was defeated and Jackson elected. As was truly said, the
election marked a great uprising of the people. It was not the mere expulsion
from office of a man and a party, but a triumph of democracy, another political
revolution, the like of which the country had not seen since 1800. Hundreds of
thousands of voters sincerely believed that the country had been rescued from a
real peril; that a corrupt and aristocratic administration, which encroached on
the rights of the States, had been overthrown; and that the liberties of the
people had been saved almost at the last gasp. In all the States
380
The “South Carolina
Exposition[i828
south of the
Potomac river and west of Pennsylvania Adams failed to receive a single
electoral vote. In all New England Jackson received but one. Politically the
South and West were now arrayed against the East. The Middle States were,
however, divided; for New York and Pennsylvania were carried by Jackson; and
New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland by Adams.
In South
Carolina, meantime, resistance to the tariff of 1828 had come to a head. The
political leaders, turning with one accord to the Vice-President, John C.
Calhoun, urged him to prepare a memorandum on the subject to be considered by
the State legislature in its winter session. Calhoun complied, and wrote for
them what has ever since been known as the “ South Carolina Exposition” of
1828. This famous document opens with the assertion that the Tariff Act of 1828
is unconstitutional, oppressive, and unequal; it states the reasons on which
each of these charges is based, and then proceeds to discuss the right of the
State to declare the Act null and void within her boundaries. The government of
the United States, Calhoun declared, was formed by the States and not by the
people. The Constitution is a compact or contract, to which each State is a
party. Each State, therefore, has a right to judge for itself of any infraction
of the Constitution by Congress; and, in case of a deliberate, dangerous, and palpable
exercise of power not granted, has a right to interpose to stop the progress of
the evil. How to use this power of interposition a State alone can decide.
Interposition is, indeed, a last resort; but if, in the opinion of a State, it
becomes necessary, the proper course for a State to follow is to call a
convention in order to declare the Acts in question null and void and not
binding on her citizens. This would force the Federal government to pause, and
either to compromise or to submit the question in dispute to a convention of
all the States. Should three-fourths of the States thus assembled in convention
decide against the protesting State, a disputed power would be converted into
an expressly granted power; and the aggrieved State would then have to submit
or secede from the Union. Calhoun held that the Tariff Act undoubtedly
presented a case calling for such interposition ; but, considering that a
great political revolution had taken place, and that Andrew Jackson would soon
be in the presidential chair, he thought it would be well for South Carolina to
withhold her veto till one more session of Congress had closed. So fully did
the “Exposition” set forth the attitude of the leaders that the legislature
promptly adopted it in the form of a report from the committee, and passed
resolutions which were sent to the legislature of each State in the Union.
Nor was South
Carolina alone in her opposition. In 1828 (December 20) Georgia addressed a
long memorial to the anti-tariff States, and bade her governor, in the event of
the failure of the present Congress, repeal or modify the tariff, and appoint
delegates to meet a convention of the Southern States in order “to deliberate
upon and devise
1828-32] “ Nullification ” in the South.
381
a suitable
mode of resistance to that unjust, unconstitutional, and oppressive law.” In
1829 Mississippi declared the tariff to be oppressive and impolitic, and
advised resistance; while Virginia resolved that the tariff was partial
oppression on the people of the South, and ought to be repealed.
In 1830
Kentucky, Louisiana, Vermont, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Delaware answered these
resolutions, affirmed the constitutionality and expediency of the tariff,
denied that it was oppressive, and opposed a repeal. Jackson gave his famous
toast at the dinner on Jefferson’s birthday, “ Our Federal Union! it must be
preserved.” A great debate took place in the Senate (1830) on Foot’s resolution
touching the sale of public lands, in which Hayne of South Carolina stated and
defended the doctrine of nullification and secession; and Webster enforced the
national view of the Constitution, maintaining that it was not a compact
between States, but an instrument of government “ made for the people, made by
the people, and answerable to the people.”
In 1831 the
South Carolina Nullifiers, abandoning all hope of relief from Congress or of
aid from Jackson, began a campaign for the catling of a State convention to
nullify the tariff. The people ranged themselves under the banners of two
local parties—“ The State Rights and Free Trade Party” (or the “ Nullifiers ”),
and “ The State Rights and Union Party.” The failure of the Nullifiers to
secure a two-thirds majority of each branch of the legislature in the autumn of
1831 prevented the calling of the convention; and the issue went back to
Congress to be thrashed out again on the floor of the House and the Senate.
This time Congress gave way. In July, 1832, it amended the Tariff Act of 1828,
removed the duties on a long list of imports that did not come into serious
competition with American manufactures, rcduced the revenue by many millions of
dollars, and fixed March 3,1833, as the day whereon the new tariff should come
into effect.
The
concession was a great one; but the tariff was still protective, and to the
minds of the people of South Carolina was a new defiance, a new act of
oppression. Excitement now rose higher than ever; and in the autumn elections
the Nullifiers carried all before them and elected two-thirds of both branches
of the legislature, which the governor at once called in special session. A
State convention to nullify the tariff was promptly ordered. When it met in
November,
1832, the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 were
solemnly declared null and void; and February 1, 1833, was chosen as the day on
and after which they should no longer be “ binding on the State, its officers
or citizens.” The President now defined his position and his duties in a long
proclamation to the Nullifiers, which Hayne, who had just been inaugurated
Governor of South Carolina, answered in a counter-proclamation. Calhoun at once
resigned the Vice-Presidency, and was sent to the Senate in Hayne’s place.
382
The Tariff reduced.
Jackson re-elected. [1329-33
Jackson now
asked Congress for authority to collect the tariff duties in South Carolina by
force, if necessary; and his wishes were embodied in the Revenue Collection
Bill—the “ Bloody Bill,” the “ Force Act,” as the Nullifiers called it; while
Clay, to the amazement of his followers, introduced a new tariff bill. All
existing duties, he proposed, should be reduced to an ad valorem basis of
twenty per cent. Such as exceeded that rate were to be diminished gradually,
one-tenth of the excess coming off in each of the years 1833, 1835, 1837, and
1839. One-half the remainder was to be removed in 1841, and the rest in 1842,
when there would be a uniform tariff of twenty per cent, ad valorem on all
dutiable goods. The struggle over each bill was long and bitter; but they were
both passed, the one to satisfy the North, the other to appease South Carolina.
While the debate on the Force Bill was going on, the day when nullification was
to come into effect drew near; but the ordinance was suspended by a
mass-meeting of Nullifiers at Charleston. Now that South Carolina had triumphed,
the convention reassembled in March, 1833; the ordinance of nullification was
repealed, and the Force Act nullified; and the first phase of the great
struggle for State Rights passed into history.
Two days
after the passage of the Compromise Tariff and the Force Act, Jackson was a
second time inaugurated President of the United States. The election is
memorable because the Anti-Masons for the first time placed a candidate in the
field; because the candidates of each of the three parties were nominated by
national conventions of delegates chosen by the people and not by the
Congressional caucus or the State legislatures; and because the issue between
the friends of Jackson and the friends of Clay was the re-charter of the Bank
of the United States. The charter granted by Congress in 1816 was to continue
for twenty years, and would not lapse till 1836. The Bank was the greatest
financial institution of the country; it received and disbursed the revenues of
the government, transacted the monetary affairs of the treasury abroad, had
branches in the chief cities at home, provided the merchants with cheap
exchange and the people with a uniform circulating medium, and did much to
prevent an over-issue of paper money by the State banks which flooded the country
with their notes. The political influence which such an institution might exert
was apparent: and no sooner was Jackson inaugurated in 1829 than his party
leaders endeavoured to force the Bank into politics on the side of the new
Administration. The Bank resisted, and by so doing brought down upon it the
wrath of the Jacksonian leaders, who found no difficulty in pushing the
President into a long and bitter struggle which inflicted on the country great
and unnecessary distress. Year after year, in 1829, 1830, and 1831, the
President in his annual message denounced the Bank as unconstitutional, charged
it with failure to regulate the currency, and questioned the safety of the
government deposits. Year after year
1833]
Jackson and the United
States Bank.
383
committees of
each House reported in favour of the Bank and against the President. But the
renomination of Jackson in 1831 led Clay to believe that the question of
re-charter should be decided at once. In the session of 1832 accordingly the
Bank, much against its will, applied for a re-charter. A bill for that purpose
was passed in each branch of Congress, and was promptly vetoed by the
President. It could not be passed over the veto; and the issue thus raised went
before the people in the presidential campaign. To Jackson his re-election
appeared to be a definite instruction from the people to destroy “ the monster
”; and with this end in view, he informed his Cabinet, in September, 1833, of
his determination to remove the government deposits from the Bank, and take all
responsibility for the act. The official order for removal could, however, be
issued by no one save the Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretary, William J.
Duane, stoutly refused to obey Jackson’s directions. He was instantly removed
from office, and Boger B. Taney was appointed in his place. Then the order was
issued; and collectors of the revenue were commanded on and after October
1,1833, to make no more deposits in the Bank of the United States or any of its
branches, but in such State Banks, and in such only, as the Secretary might
designate.
The effect of
this arbitrary and unnecessary order on the business of the country was
disastrous. The government money in the Bank and its branches was to be
gradually withdrawn to meet current expenses till no more of it remained. In
order to meet the drafts promptly, the Bank was forced to call in loans, and to
refuse to discount paper. The State Banks, fearing that the central Bank might
call on them for a settlement of accounts, followed suit; and in a few weeks
the business world had to face a money famine. All building operations stopped
in the great cities; manufacturing establishments shut down; thousands of
workingmen were thrown out of employment; and the price of money and exchange
rose to a ruinous height. When Congress met in December,
1833, the Senate placed on its journal a
resolution censuring the President for ordering the deposits to be removed, and
refused to confirm the appointment of Taney as Secretary of the Treasury; while
the people beset both Houses with petitions praying for a restoration of the
deposits and an Act to regulate the currency. These “distress petitions,” as
they were called, numbered more than 600, were signed in some instances by from
5000 to 10,000 names, and came from mass- meetings, from members of various
trades and occupations, from chambers of commerce, banks, the governing bodies
of cities and towns, and the legislatures of many States. But the President
stood firm; Congress took no action; and the deposits continued to be made in
the “ pet banks,”—this being the name given to the State institutions
designated as government depositories.
While the
excitement aroused by the removal of the deposits was at its height, the spring
elections came on in some of the States. The
friends of
Clay now assumed the name of Whigs. They were contending, they said, against a
government just as arbitrary, just as tyrannical, as that of George III against
which their fathers had rebelled. It was time therefore to return to the principles
and assume the name of the American Whigs of the Revolution. The suggestion was
approved; and during the rejoicings which followed the triumph of the party in
the spring elections the name came into general use as that of a distinct
national party.
As time
passed and it was seen that the deposits were not to be restored, that the
great Bank was not pressing the small ones, and that the “pets” were ready to
advance money on easy terms, confidence returned and the money famine passed
away. But the end was not yet. A rage for State banking swept over the country.
A host of new institutions with State charters sprang up to share the business
once done by the Bank of the United States; the banking capital of the country
increased from $196,000,000 in 1834 to $281,000,000 in 1836; and millions of
additional bank-notes were put into circulation. Despite the biennial
reductions in tariff rates, the revenue from imports steadily increased from
$16,000,000 in 1834 to $23,400,000 in 1836; and, the national debt having been
paid in full (January 1, 1835), a surplus began to roll up in the “ pet ”
banks, which were instructed to lend it out on as easy terms as possible.
Everything thus combined to make money cheap; and, being cheap, it was quickly
borrowed and used in wild speculations of every sort. Cotton, city lots, town
lots, imported goods, in short, almost everything that could be bought and
sold, became a subject of speculation. But the article whose sale affected the
revenues and contributed most to swell the surplus was government land. Before
the year 1834 the annual sales of land had never amounted to $3,000,000; but in
1835 they rose to $14,757,000, and in 1836 to $24,877,000. In consequence of
these abnormal receipts the surplus grew rapidly. In 1835 (October 1) it stood
at $18,000,000; in 1836 (March 1) it was $33,500,000, and seven months later
$41,500,000.
The two
questions now before the Administration were how to prevent the further
increase of the surplus, and what to do with that already accumulated. It was
finally decided to distribute the annual sales of public land among the States,
and to present them also with the existing surplus. To give it outright was
held to be unconstitutional; but this difficulty was avoided by an agreement to
deposit the money with the States, subject to recall at any time, after due
notice, by the Secretary of the Treasury—a call which everybody knew would
never be made. These two measures—the distribution of the land sales and the
deposit of the surplus—were combined in one bill, which became law in 1836.
From the surplus on the books of the Treasury on January 1, 1837, $5,000,000
were to be deducted, and the balance was to be deposited with the States in
four instalments payable on the first days of January,
1836-7]
The surplus: change of
policy.
385
April, July,
and October, 1837. The share of each State was to depend on the number of its
representatives in Congress.
This decision
gave rise to a host of difficulties. In many States the amount on deposit in
the banks greatly exceeded their shares. This necessitated an actual removal of
money from State to State. No bank in future was to have on deposit government
money exceeding in amount three-fourths of its paid-up capital. But there were
many banks which held government money far exceeding the amount of their
capital. It therefore became necessary to transfer money from bank to bank. But
the money to be thus moved was not in the banks; it had been lent out and
largely used for speculation. As the first instalment, amounting to $9,367,214,
was to be removed on January 1,1837, the banks early in November, 1836, began
to stop discounting, and called in loans; and, as this took place all over the
country, a general liquidation of debts followed. No sooner was the first instalment
removed than preparations were made for the second, which fell due on April 1,
1837. The distress grew more severe; and, when the day came, great
business-houses in New York, unable to stand the strain, failed. In one week
there were 98 failures ; nine days later they reached 128; and before the end
of the month all the large cities were in the same condition. The blame for
this state of affairs was of course laid on the government; and at a meeting of
merchants in New York a committee of fifty was appointed to go to Washington
and urge Van Buren (who had succeeded Jackson on March 4,1837) to call a
special session of Congress for the purpose of stopping the distribution of the
surplus. The President refused; and early in May the banks of New York City
suspended specie payments. Those of other cities followed the example; and the
country was soon in the midst of a grave financial panic. The President was now
forced to yield. A proclamation was issued assembling Congress in special
session ; and that body took prompt measures to remedy the evil. The payment of
the fourth instalment of the surplus was suspended; an issue of $10,000,000 in
treasury notes was authorised, in order to enable the government to meet its
obligations; and the time of payment of the merchant bonds was extended. The
worst was then over; but a year passed before the banks redeemed their notes in
specie.
It is now
necessary to consider another issue, which in the course of fifteen years had
grown to be a serious and troublesome problem, and was destined during the next
quarter of a century to become the most portentous question that the people had
ever been called on to settle. This issue was slavery. The story of the long
struggle with it falls naturally into well-marked periods, in each of which
certain phases were presented, discussed, and, it was supposed, settled for all
time to come.
Between the
opening of the War of Independence and the close of the second war with Great
Britain, all the Eastern and Middle States save Delaware became free soil:
slavery was prohibited in the
North-west
Territory; the first law for the rendition of fugitive slaves was enacted;
citizens of the United States were forbidden to engage in the slave-trade of
foreign countries; subjects of foreign countries were forbidden to engage in
the domestic slave-trade of the United States, or to use its ports to lit out
slavers for trade with other countries; the authority of Congress to abolish,
or in any manner meddle with, slavery in the Slave-holding States was denied;
and after 1808 the importa tion of slaves into the United States was prohibited
by law.
During the
second period, which closed with the formation of the American Anti-Slavery
Society in 1833, the Missouri Compromise was adopted, and the possessions of
the United States west of the Mississippi were divided between slavery and
freedom; three Free and three Slave-holding States were admitted into the
Union; the slave-trade was made piracy; the American Society for the
Colonisation of Free Negroes in Africa was founded; the colony of Liberia was
planted on the west coast of Africa; the attempt to change Illinois from a Free
to a Slave-holding State was defeated; a host of journals devoted to the treatment
of the slave problem came into existence; countless appeals, thoughts,
pictures, brief views, remarks, sketches, letters, treatises, reports, bearing
on some phase of slavery, were written and published; and numerous anti-slavery
and colonisation societies were organised, chiefly in the Slave- holding
States. Hostility to slavery, as a moral and political wrong, spread widely and
grew in intensity. The people of the cotton-belt, regarding slavery as a
domestic State institution, denounced the work of anti-slavery enthusiasts as
fanaticism. The people of New England, bound to the Cotton States by ties of
business interest, and having settled the issue in their own section, were
indifferent. But in the middle belt of States, from Pennsylvania to North
Carolina and from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, the friends of the black man
were very active. Of 101 anti-slavery societies in existence in 1826, 95 were
in this region. Of 98 societies auxiliary to the American Colonisation Society
in 1828, 80 were in this same strip of country.
Such was the
condition of the slavery issue when, in 1829, a negro named David Walker wrote,
printed, and scattered over the South a pamphlet entitled Walker's Appeal. It
was addressed to the free blacks, who were urged to make the cause of the slave
their own; it censured the meekness and non-resistance of the blacks; and, in a
third edition published in 1830, it went so far as to touch on the superiority
in numbers and bravery of the blacks over the whites, and to advise an
insurrection when the time was ripe. The effect was immediate. Copies found in
the hands of negroes in Richmond (Virginia), in New Orleans, in Savannah, in
Tarborough (North Carolina), were seized and formally transmitted by the
governors of Virginia, Louisiana, Georgia, and North Carolina to their respective
legislatures; and sharp laws against the free blacks were enacted by Georgia
and Louisiana.
I829-35] Walker's Appeal. The
Liberator.
387
The
excitement produced by Walker’s Appeal had not subsided when the danger of
writings of this sort was brought home to the slave-owners by a rising of
slaves in Virginia—an outbreak known as “Nat Turner’s Insurrection.” It was
quickly put down; and every negro concerned in it, together with many who were
not, was hanged, shot, mutilated, or beheaded. The insurrection was at once
attributed to negro preachers and “ incendiary publications ” such as Walker’s
pamphlet and the Liberator, a newspaper recently started at Boston by William
Lloyd Garrison. To attack the Liberator now became habitual in all Slave-
holding States. The corporation of one city forbade any free negro to take a
copy of it from the post-office. A vigilance committee in another offered $1500
for the detection and conviction of any white person found circulating copies.
The governors of Georgia and Virginia called on the mayor of Boston to suppress
it; and the legislature of Georgia offered $5000 to any person who should
secure the arrest and conviction of Garrison under the laws of the State.
Undeterred by these attacks, Garrison gathered about him a little band of
Abolitionists, and towards the close of 1831 founded at Boston the New England
Anti-Slavery Society, and in 1833, at Philadelphia, the American Anti-Slavery
Society. The mission of the Society was to labour for the abolition of slavery
and the immediate emancipation of the slaves, and to carry on this work by
organising societies, sending out orators, and enlisting the pulpit and the
press, and by the circulation of anti-slavery books, pamphlets, newspapers, and
pictures.
The
slave-holders, on their part, made loud demands that the Northern States should
suppress the Abolitionists by force. They insisted that Abolitionist orators
should be imprisoned, their presses stopped, the circulation of their tracts
prevented. Nor was the North heedless of their demands. Mobs broke up
Abolitionist meetings, destroyed their printing-offices, and threatened their
leaders with death. In Connecticut and New Hampshire schools which received
negroes were sacked. In Utica, New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, disgraceful
attacks were made on anti-slavery meetings. In Cincinnati the presses of an
anti-slavery newspaper edited by James G. Bimey were destroyed. Throughout the
North friends of the South held meetings and condemned the proceedings of the
Abolitionists. Yet the agitation went on with renewed energy; and the flood of
anti-slavery tracts that poured over the South became greater than ever. Then a
bold step was taken, and one night the post-office at Charleston was entered by
a mob, and sacks of anti-slavery literature, which had come from New York by
steamer and which the postmaster refused to deliver, were burned in the public
square. The Postmaster-General approved this act; and Jackson, in his annual
message (December, 1835), asked for a law “prohibiting under severe penalties
the circulation in the Southern States, through the mails, of incendiary
publications intended to
instigate the
slaves to insurrection.” This did not suit Calhoun, who presented a bill
forbidding any postmaster knowingly to deliver to anyone a printed paper
touching slavery in any State or Territory where such publications were
prohibited by the State or Territorial law. A warm debate followed, and the
bill was lost, as were others in many northern State legislatures, prohibiting
the printing of such documents.
Defeated in
this attempt to destroy the freedom of the mails, the pro-slavery party next
attacked the right of petition. Though Congress had no authority to abolish
slavery in the States, it could do so in the District of Columbia, where, under
the Constitution, it has absolute jurisdiction. The opponents of slavery
therefore began, so early as 1830, to petition for the abolition of slavery and
the slave-trade in the district. These petitions were received, sent to a
committee, and never heard of more. But after 1833 the Abolitionists sent them
in such a steadily increasing stream that in 1836 the House of Representatives,
after a long and stormy debate, adopted a “gag” rule, which ordered that “all
petitions, memorials, resolutions, or papers, relating in any way or to any
extent whatever to the subject of slavery or the abolition of slavery, shall,
without being either printed or referred, be laid upon the table, and that no
further action whatever shall be had thereon.” This rule remained in force for
several years. Its effect was disastrous. The sacred right of petition had been
assailed, and the cause of abolition helped forward. The petitions presented in
1835-6 bore 34,000 signatures. Those presented and dealt with under the “gag”
in 1837-8 bore
414,000 names. Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode
Island, New York, Ohio, and Michigan censured Congress for refusing to receive
the petitions; Connecticut repealed her “black code”; and a new political party
arose among the people.
The men who
joined anti-slavery societies, signed anti-slavery petitions, and contributed
money to aid the cause, were chiefly members of the Whig, the anti-Masonic, and
Democratic parties. In the hope of drawing them from their parties and inducing
them to act together, the anti-slavery State conventions began, about 1838, to
urge the formation of a national anti-slavery party, in order to put a
presidential candidate into the field in 1840. The suggestion' was well
received; a national convention was called; delegates from six States attended;
and in April, 1840, James Gillespie Bimey and Thomas Earle were nominated for
the offices of President and VicePresident respectively. No name was given to
the new party till 1844, when it became known as the Liberty party.
The
presidential campaign of 1840 was the most extraordinary that the country had
ever known. The candidate of the Democratic party was Martin Van Buren. The
nominees of the Whigs were William Henry Harrison, an ideal popular favourite,
and John Tyler. As delegate to Congress from Indiana Territory in 1800,
Harrison did
much to
secure that liberal system of selling government land which laid the foundation
of the Ohio Valley States. As Governor of Indiana Territory in 1811 he won the
famous battle of Tippecanoe and broke the Indian power. As a general in the
American army during the second war with Great Britain, he was conspicuous in
the defence of the North-West, and, leading his army into Canada, won the
battle of the Thames, and recovered all that had been lost by Hull’s surrender
at Detroit. As a friend of Clay and minister to Columbia, he was among the
first to feel the vengeance of Jackson in 1829, and had since lived in
honourable poverty on his Indiana farm. For Van Buren to defeat such a candidate
would have been difficult at any time. It was made more difficult by the
popular discontent caused by the financial policy of Jackson, the panic of 1837
and the hard times of 1839; and it was finally made impossible by an ill-timed
sneer of a Democratic journal, which remarked that Harrison would be more at
home in a log-cabin than in the White House.
The Whigs had
no platform; but this sneer at Harrison’s poverty gave them just the cry they
needed. Nothing was dearer to the heart of the American people than the
log-cabin. That humble abode, with its puncheon floor, its mud-smeared sides,
its latch-string, its windows in which greased paper did duty for glass, was
then, and had ever been, the symbol of American hardihood. It had been the home
of the pioneers, fie home of the commonwealth-builders ; and round its hearth
had been reared millions of men and women then living. No insult could have
been more galling than this sneer at the early home of the makers of the
nation. The log-cabin at once became the Whig symbol. On vacant lots in every
city and town of the North, on ten thousand village greens, the cabin, with a
coon-skin on its wall, the latch-string hanging out in token of welcome, and a
barrel of hard cider close beside the door, became the true Whig headquarters.
Mounted on wheels and occupied by speakers, it was dragged from village to
village. Log-cabin raisings, log-cabin meetings, medals, badges, almanacs,
songs, pictures were everywhere to be seen. Mass-meetings were held, at which
enormous numbers of people were present. Weeks were spent in getting ready for
them. In the West, men came in covered waggons, camped on the ground, and for
days listened to stirring harangues. At Dayton, Ohio, 100,000 people attended,
and covered ten acres of ground. In the Whig prints Van Buren was stigmatised
as an aristocrat; and the White House was represented as a gilded palace with
damask sofas, satin chairs, porcelain vases, magnificent chandeliers, and
golden spoons. Harrison was the poor man’s candidate, the plain American living
in a log-cabin, the simple farmer of North Bend. These things told powerfully
on the voters; and, when the election was over, the Whigs had swept the country
and elected Harrison and Tyler. In the great popular excitement the new
anti-slavery party and its candidate were forgotten. Yet
it is
significant that, despite the commotion, 7300 votes were cast for Birney.
Harrison was
inaugurated on March 4, 1841, and died in the following April. John Tyler then
became President, and began an administration memorable for his quarrel with
the Whigs, the negotiation of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, and the annexation
of the slave-holding Republic of Texas. The inauguration of Harrison was
quickly followed by a proclamation calling a special session of Congress to
carry out the reforms to which the Whig orators had pledged the party. But,
when Congress presented the new President with a bill to charter a great
national bank, to be called the Fiscal Bank of the United States, Tyler sent it
back with his veto. The Whigs were furious and the Democrats delighted. But
Tyler well knew the seriousness of the situation, and authorised the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of the Treasury to confer with the leaders of the
Senate and the House about the details of a new bill. An institution described
as the “Fiscal Corporation” was accordingly planned; and the bill to create it
was passed rapidly through both Houses. Again the President interposed his
veto. The same night all the members of the Cabinet save Webster, Secretary of
State, met at the house of the Secretary of the Navy and agreed to resign one
after another on Saturday, September 11. As Congress was to adjourn on Monday,
the President would thus be forced to find a new Cabinet between Saturday and
Monday. But Tyler was equal to the emergency, and, when Monday came, sent to
the Senate the names of five Jackson Democrats as Secretaries. Webster alone
retained his place. The Whig members of Congress now read Tyler out of the
party, and in a manifesto denounced the President for having disappointed the
just expectations of those who had elected him.
A sincere
desire to serve his country kept Webster in the Cabinet after his colleagues
had resigned. Many grave questions, some of long standing, between Great
Britain and the United States, were pressing for settlement. After fifty-eight
years of discussion the north-eastern boundary of Maine was still undefined;
and the people of that State were in such a frame of mind that, according to
the governor’s report, the settlers along the border could with difficulty be
kept from collision with the British. The destruction of the steamer Caroline,
the arrest of McLeod for participation in that affair, the assumption by the
British government of all responsibility, and the demand for the release of
McLeod, had so excited the people in western New York that it seemed quite
likely that troops would be needed to keep the peace along the border. The
recent assertion of the right to search American ships supposed to be engaged
in the slave-trade revived an old question, once a cause of wax; while the
liberation of slaves thrown on the coasts of the British West Indian islands by
the perils of the sea, or brought thither by force, and the belief that Great
Britain desired to purchase
I841-2] The Webster-Ashburton Treaty.
391
California,
retain Oregon, and meddle in the affairs of Texas, inflamed the South and made
the annexation of Texas and war with Mexico, should this appear unavoidable,
more popular than ever.
Dark as was
the prospect for peace when Webster took office in 1841, a great change for the
better had since occurred. Lord Melbourne’s Administration had been beaten in
the House of Commons; he and his colleagues had resigned (August, 1841); and
Lord Palmerston had been succeeded by Lord Aberdeen as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. Shortly afterwards, Edward Everett, who had succeeded Stevenson as
Minister, reported to his government (January, 1842) that Lord Ashburton had
been appointed to visit Washington in order to settle all questions in dispute
between Great Britain and the United States. The details of the negotiation
which led to the famous treaty that still bears the name of the distinguished
negotiators need not be reviewed. It is enough to say that a compromise line
was agreed on for the north-eastern boundary of Maine; that each nation agreed
to keep on the western coast of Africa a squadron of at least eighty guns to
act in concert for the suppression of the slave-trade; and that Webster did
not, as he said, “ leave the question of impressment where he found it.” In a
strong letter to Lord Ashburton he announced that “in every regularly
documented American merchant vessel, the crew who navigate it will find their
protection in the flag which is over them ”; and that “ the American government
is prepared to say that the practice of impressing American seamen from vessels
cannot hereafter be allowed to take place.” The discussion respecting the
Caroline affair led to the stipulation for the delivery to justice of persons
who, being accused of murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, or the utterance
of forged paper, committed within the territories of either Power, shall be
found within the territories of the other. This, in the opinion of Webster, was
the best part of the treaty. “I undertake to say,” he remarked when defending
his work before the Senate in 1846, “that the article for the extradition of
offenders, contained in the treaty of 1842, if there were nothing else in the
treaty of any importance, has of itself been of more value to this country, and
is of more value to the progress of civilisation, the cause of humanity, and
the good understanding between nations, than could be readily computed.” An
example was set which was quickly followed; and in a few years treaties
containing similar provisions were negotiated between the United States and the
Powers of Europe, and between the European nations themselves. The treaty once
concluded and ratified by the Senate, even the friends of Webster as well as
his party demanded that he should leave the Cabinet; and in 1843 he resigned.
Upshur, a Democrat and an ardent pro-slavery man, was then made Secretary of
State; and the President turned all his energies to the annexation of Texas.
During the
early part of the nineteenth century the old Spanish
province of
Texas had a separate political organisation ; but in 1824 the Constituent
Congress of Mexico united it temporarily with the State of Coahuila, under the
solemn promise that it should become a State of the Mexican Confederation so
soon as circumstances would permit. About the same time a large and increasing
number of citizens of the United States settled in the country. The abolition
of slavery in Mexico in 1829, the exclusion of settlers from the United States
in 1830, the military occupation of the province, and the arbitrary and extortionate
government of the Mexicans, led the people in 1833 to desire separation from
Coahuila, and to request the admission of Texas as a State into the Mexican
Confederation. The refusal of this request and the military despotism set up by
Santa Anna were followed in 1836 by a declaration of the independence of Texas,
which led to civil war, the bloody and cruel massacres of Goliad and of the
Alamo, and the defeat and capture of Santa Anna by the Texans in the battle of
San Jacinto (April, 1836). In the following year Texas was recognised as an
independent State by the United States; and its example was subsequently
followed by Great Britain, France, and Belgium.
A formal
application was now (August, 1837) made by Texas for admission into the union
of the United States. Against this proposal eight States protested; Van Buren
would not hear of it; and so the matter rested when Harrison died and Tyler
became President. Tyler was an ardent annexationist, and, when in 1842 the
Texan minister renewed the proposal for annexation, would gladly have accepted
the tender; but Webster opposed it, and a second time the United States
declined the proposition. On the resignation of Webster in the spring of 1843,
Secretary Upshur at once made ready to carry out the wishes of the President,
and in October, 1843, informed the Texan minister that the government of the
United States was ready to negotiate a treaty of annexation whenever he should
receive the proper powers. The immediate cause for this offer was a rumour that
an agent of the Abolitionists of Texas had proposed to Lord Aberdeen that a
company should be formed in England to buy the slaves, receiving in return
Texan lands; and that the proposition had been well received. It was believed
that Great Britain was using her influence to persuade Mexico to acknowledge
the independence of Texas, on condition that slavery was abolished; and certain
remarks of Lord Aberdeen in Parliament were construed to mean that negotiations
for that purpose were going forward. When these things were brought to the
attention of the British government, all desire or intention to establish any
dominant influence in Texas was disavowed; and the United States was assured
that, much as Great Britain desired to see slavery abolished in Texas, as
elsewhere, she would not unduly interfere, nor seek, by any improper assumption
of authority, to coerce either party. She would give advice, but do nothing
more.
To the
surprise of Upshur, the offer of a treaty was at first declined by Texas ; but
in January, 1844, the question was asked, whether, if the offer were accepted,
the United States would protect Texas against attack before the treaty was
ratified ? Upshur made no answer ; but the American agents in Texas, when asked
the same question, answered yes; and the next day an envoy was sent to the
United States, with full powers to frame a treaty of annexation. Before his
arrival, Upshur was killed by the explosion of a gun on the U.S.S. Princeton;
and John C. Calhoun became Secretary of State. The treaty now went rapidly
forward. On April 12, 1844, the instrument was signed; ten days later it was
sent to the Senate; and the question of annexation was forced into the presidential
campaign.
Neither of
the prospective candidates desired such an issue. Indeed, both Clay and Van
Buren, in letters published in the newspapers, declared themselves opposed to
annexation at that time, on the ground that its constitutionality was doubtful,
and that it was sure to bring on war with Mexico. But the Democratic National
Convention which assembled in May rejected Van Buren and nominated James K.
Polk, and in its platform declared for the “re-annexation of Texas and the
re-occupation of Oregon at the earliest practicable period.” The Whigs
nominated Clay, and said nothing about Texas or Oregon. The Liberty party chose
for their leader James G. Bimey. Scarcely had the news of the nomination of
Polk spread over the country when the Senate rejected the treaty (June, 1844),
chiefly because many members did not believe that annexation could be
accomplished by treaty. Congress, says the Constitution, may admit “ new States
” into “ this union ”— words that were interpreted to mean that Congress, and
not the treaty- making power, viz. the President and the Senate, may admit
States. Tyler now appealed to the House of Representatives to take such steps
as might be necessary; but the House did nothing, and the issue was left to be
settled by the people. The contest in any event would have been close; but
Clay’s letter drove great numbers of Whigs into the Liberty party, lost him the
electoral votes of New York and Michigan, and gave the election to Polk.
This triumph
of the Democrats was hailed by Tyler with delight; and, in his annual message
of December, 1844, he asserted that a “controlling majority of the States” had
declared for immediate annexation; that both branches of Congress had been
instructed; and that, in his opinion, measures should be taken to carry out the
will of the people. That the Senate would consider itself instructed, and that
two-thirds of the members would approve a new treaty of annexation, was far
from likely. The House of Representatives therefore passed a joint resolution
annexing Texas, with the proviso that in such State or States as should be made
from territory north of 36° 30' slavery should be prohibited. To this the
Senate, after a long debate, added an
394
Texas annexed. War with
Mexico.
[1845-6
amendment
giving the President the option of submitting to Texas the joint resolution or
opening a new negotiation for annexation by treaty. Tyler chose to offer
annexation under the joint resolution ; and on March 3,1845, a messenger was
accordingly despatched to Texas. The Texan Congress adopted the resolution in
June; a convention of the people ratified annexation in July; and in December,
1845, Congress formally admitted the State of Texas into the Union.
The Mexican
government had repeatedly informed the United States that the annexation of
Texas would be regarded as a declaration of war. No sooner therefore did the
joint resolution pass than the Mexican Minister asked for his passports and
left Washington. The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, on hearing of the
resolution, dismissed the American Minister; and in March, 1845, all diplomatic
relations were severed. In the following June, General Zachary Taylor was
ordered to march from New Orleans to the mouth of the Sabine river, a part of
the boundary line between Texas and the United States. On July 30, 1845, Taylor
was instructed to occupy and defend Texas so far as it was occupied by Texans;
and in August the army of occupation camped at Corpus Christi on the Nueces
river, across which the jurisdiction of the Republic of Texas had never
extended. An Act of the Texan Congress had indeed (December 19, 1836) declared
the Rio Grande from its mouth to its source, and a meridian from its source to
degree 42 of north latitude, to be the western boundary of the Republic; but between
the Nueces and the Rio Grande was the Mexican State of Tamaulipas; and above
this and bounding Texas on the west and north-west were Coahuila, Chihuahua,
and New Mexico. At Corpus Christi Taylor remained till March, 1846, when, in
obedience to orders, he crossed the Nueces and stood on Mexican soil. A march
of seventeen days brought the army to the east hank of the Rio Grande, where
Taylor pitched his camp, built Fort Brown, and trained his guns on the public
square of the Mexican town of Matamoras on the western bank of the river. On
April 11 General Ampudia entered Matamoras with 2500 men, and notified Taylor
to break up his camp within twenty-four hours and retire behind the Nueces.
Taylor replied that he was under the orders of his government ; and that, if
Ampudia crossed the Rio Grande, the act would be considered that of an enemy
and as such would be resisted. Twenty- seven miles east of the American camp
and on the shore of an inlet from the Gulf of Mexico was Point Isabel, where
Taylor had established a depot of military supplies for the army of occupation.
Hearing that bodies of Mexicans had crossed the river above and below Fort
Brown, Taylor at once sent out a squadron of dragoons in each direction to
reconnoitre. The squadron sent below the camp reported no enemy in sight, but
that which went above was surprised, surrounded, and captured (April 23).
In this
condition of affairs an officer rode into camp, reported the
1846] Taylor in Texas. Fremont in California. 395
enemy to be
in force near Point Isabel, and gave the number as 1500 men. Taylor, leaving
the camp with orders to defend it to the last, hurried with 600 men to the
relief of Point Isabel, and reached it without finding the enemy on the way.
But no sooner did General Arista, who had succeeded to the command of the
Mexican army, hear of the departure of Taylor than he marched to Fort Brown and
opened the attack. During seven days the little garrison held out manfully,
when the enemy raised the siege and retired.
After
reaching Point Isabel, General Taylor collected a train of provisions,
ammunition, and cannon for Fort Brown, started on his return (May 7), and
camped the first night some seven miles from Point Isabel. On the morning of
the 8th the march was resumed; and about noon, while at the water-hole of Palo
Alto, the Mexican army was discovered drawn up across the plain. Though greatly
outnumbered, Taylor attacked at once, drove the Mexicans from one position to
another, and, when the sun went down, was master of the field. Following up
this victory, Taylor on the next afternoon met the enemy well posted at Besaca
de la Palma, beat him a second time, and forced him to raise the siege of Fort
Brown. Taylor now crossed the Bio Grande and captured Matamoras.
While these
events were happening on the Rio Grande, Taylor’s dispatch announcing the
surprise and capture of his reconnoitring party reached Washington, and was
formally announced to Congress in a message (May 11, 1846) in which Polk
declared that war existed by the act of Mexico herself. Authority was at once
given to the President to call for 50,000 volunteers; $10,000,000 were
appropriated for war expenses; and General Kearny was sent to capture Santa Fe,
which lay east of the Rio Grande in the Mexican State of New Mexico, but within
the boundary of Texas as claimed by her when a Republic. Kearny entered the
city without firing a shot, took possession of all New Mexico in the name of
the United States, proclaimed the inhabitants citizens of the United States,
and gave them a temporary civil government. From Santa Fe Kearny now set out to
conquer California; but on the way (October 6) was met by the news that the
conquest had already been completed by Colonel John C. Fremont and Commodore
Stockton.
In the spring
of 1845 Fremont had been despatched on his third expedition for the exploration
of the West, with orders to examine the Great Basin, and find a short route
from the base of the Bocky Mountains to the mouth of the Columbia river. Aware
of the strained relations between Mexico and the United States, Fremont took
care, when he reached California, to assure the governor of his peaceful
intentions and to obtain leave to pass the winter of 1845-6 in that country.
Permission was granted; but soon afterwards he was ordered to quit the country
or take the consequences. Disregarding these orders, he went slowly up the
Sacramento Valley, and had reached Oregon, when, in May, 1846,
396 Battle of Buena Vista. Occupation of Mexico.
[i847
he was
overtaken by a messenger from Washington bearing verbal orders to return to
California. There he aided the American settlers in their revolt against the
governor, encouraged them to proclaim California an independent republic, and
assisted Commodore Stockton in his conquest of the country.
General
Taylor had meantime remained at Matamoras, preparing to march against Monterey,
the capital of the State of New Leon, and a strongly fortified city. In
September all was in readiness; and, leaving Matamoras, Taylor laid siege to
Monterey. He stormed the walls, and forced Ampudia to surrender the town, but
allowed him to withdraw with his troops. Taylor then began preparations for a
vigorous winter campaign, and was engaged in concentrating his forces for that
purpose, when General Winfield Scott arrived at the Rio Grande and drew from
him so many officers and men that he was obliged to abandon the campaign and
stand on the defensive. Santa Anna, who in December, 1846, had been elected
Provisional President of Mexico, now gathered a force of some 20,000 men, and
in February, 1847, set out for Saltillo, where a part of the American army was
stationed under General Wool. Apprised of this intention, Taylor hastened to
join Wool, and then, advancing toward Santa Anna, took up his position in a
narrow defile in the mountains directly facing the hacienda of Buena Vista.
There, on the morning of February 23, 1847, Santa Anna, with an army five times
as numerous as that of the American General, opened the attack. All day long
the battle raged; but, when night came, the Mexicans had been defeated, and
under cover of darkness retired.
General Scott
was then on his way with land and sea forces to capture the city of Vera Cruz
and the castle of San Juan d’Ulloa. Both of these surrendered on March 27,
1847; and on April 8 the American army began its memorable march along the
national highway towards the city of Mexico. The American army at the outset
numbered less than 9000 men; the Mexican army was often over 20,000 strong. At
every step the ranks of Scott grew thinner, and those of Santa Anna fuller.
Hundreds of Americans perished in battle; hundreds more died on the way of
disease. Yet neither sickness nor heat nor fatigue could turn Scott back; and
victory succeeded victory with astonishing rapidity. On April 18 the heights of
Cerro Gordo were carried by storm, the Mexican army was utterly routed, and
Santa Anna was forced to' leap from his carriage and flee away upon a mule. On
April 19 the army entered Jalapa; on the 22nd Perote fell; and on May 15 the
ciiy of Puebla surrendered. There Scott rested till. August 7, when the march
was once more resumed. On the 17th the spires of the City of Mexico came into
view. The victories of Contreras, Churubusco, and Molino del Rey followed; the
fortress of Chapultepec was stormed; and on September 15 the City of Mexico was
occupied.
Mexico was
now at the feet of her conqueror. United States troops
1847-8] Peace with
Meccico. The Wilmot Proviso.
397
held New
Mexico and California. The army of Taylor occupied eastern Mexico; United States
naval vessels were in her seaports; and General Scott was in possession of her
capital city. Nothing remained but to make peace on such terms as could be
obtained; and these were finally set forth in a treaty signed on February 2,
1848, at Guadalupe Hidalgo. Mexico ceded New Mexico and Upper California to the
United States, recognised the Rio Grande from its mouth to the southern limit
of New Mexico as the boundary of Texas, received $15,000,000, and was released
from the payment of claims, amounting to $3,000,000, which American citizens
had against her. On May 30,1848, the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged
at Queretaro; and the United States came into possession of an immense area,
including, in addition to Texas, the present States of California, New Mexico,
Nevada, Arizona, Utah, with parts of Wyoming and Colorado.
This
territory had been made free soil by Mexico ; and the question of the hour
became, whether it should or should not remain free ? The strength of the
Democratic party lay in the Slave-holding States, and forced it to lean towards
an extension of slavery to New Mexico and California. But without the aid of
northern Democratic States the party could not elect a President. The strength
of the Whig party was in the Free States, and it therefore leaned towards the
exclusion of slavery from the new Territories. But without the aid of Southern
slave-holding Whigs the party could not carry the approaching national
election. Both parties therefore faced the issue with dread. It was troublesome
and dangerous, and was made more troublesome by the continued activity of the
Liberty party and the discussion of the “Wilmot Proviso.” Scarcely had war been
declared to exist when President Polk applied to Congress for an appropriation
of $2,000,000, to be used as a cash payment to Mexico in case she should
conclude a peace involving the cession of territory. On the introduction into
the House of Representatives of a bill appropriating this sum, David Wilmot, a
free-soil Democrat, moved an amendment providing that, in all territory to be
acquired from Mexico, slavery, should be forbidden. This was the famous Wilmot
Proviso. The appropriation bill, with this proviso attached, passed the House,
but failed in the Senate. In the next session of Congress Polk asked for
$3,000,000 for the purpose of negotiating a peace. Again an appropriation bill
(January 4, 1847) appeared in the House; and again the Wilmot Proviso was
added. It was struck out by the Senate; and the House now yielded and passed
the bill without the proviso, though the Free-State legislatures instructed
their senators and requested their representatives to support it. But the issue
was not thereby decided, for at this point Calhoun took it up, and (February,
1847) introduced a series of resolutions declaring that the Territories
belonged to the States in common, and that any law forbidding a citizen of any
State to emigrate with his property (and
398
Squatter sovereignty.
Oregon divided.
[1846-8
slaves were
property) into any territory would be a violation of the Constitution. These
resolutions were never voted on by the Senate, but they were at once accepted
by Calhoun’s followers, and were reasserted in resolutions passed by the
legislatures of Alabama and Virginia.
When Congress
met in December, 1847, Daniel S. Dickinson, a member from New York, went a step
farther, and introduced certain resolutions declaring that the spirit of the
Constitution and the welfare of the Union would be best served by leaving all
questions of the internal affairs of the Territories, even that of slavery, to
the Territorial legislatures. In this respect the people of the Territories
had, he claimed, the same sovereign rights as those of the States. This was the
principle of “squatter sovereignty.” At the same time Lewis Cass, a leader of
the Democratic party in the North-West, and already anxious to be nominated by
his party as a candidate for the Presidency, set forth the same doctrine in a
letter which soon found its way into print. All this, as yet, was but the
expression of the personal opinion of individuals, or of the ideas of State
legislatures. But a serious attempt was now made to make the new Territories
slave soil.
The
Democratic party, having by its action in 1845 made good its promise to
re-annex Texas, had been called on to redeem its pledge respecting Oregon; and
in 1846 the year’s notice of abrogation required by the treaty of 1827 was
served on Great Britain. This brought the question of the ownership of Oregon
definitely before the two countries. The more hot-headed members of the party
demanded the cession to the United States of the whole territory in dispute,
extending to latitude 54° 40' North, and raised the cry “ Fifty-four forty, or
fight.” The spirit of the country became so bellicose that at one time it
seemed likely that the United States would go to war with Great Britain as well
as with Mexico; but fortunately a more pacific temper prevailed. In June, 1846,
a treaty was signed, by which the parallel of 49° north latitude, running from the
summit of the Rocky Mountains to the coast and continued down the Straits of
Juan de Fuca, was established as the northern boundary of Oregon, thus leaving
Vancouver Island in the possession of Great Britain.
The question
of sovereignty having thus been settled, Congress was soon called on to provide
a Territorial government. In 1847 a bill for that purpose passed the House, but
was tabled in the Senate because it contained a provision excluding slavery. In
the next session (1848) a bill appeared in the Senate without this provision. A
Free-Soil member therefore moved an amendment intended to exclude slavery. This
brought on a long debate, in which the slavery extensionists vigorously
resisted the amendment, not because they hoped to introduce slave labour into
Oregon, but because they feared the application of the principle to California
and New Mexico. As the House was unable to agree, the subject was referred to a
special committee, which reported a
bill
providing territorial governments for Oregon, New Mexico, and California,
prohibited slavery in Oregon, but left the question whether the Constitution
permitted slavery in California and New Mexico to be decided by the Territorial
courts, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. The
bill passed in the Senate, but was tabled in the House. Thereupon the House
prepared and sent to the Senate a bill prohibiting slavery in Oregon, to which
the Senate added an amendment carrying the Missouri Compromise line of 36°30'
N. from the 100th meridian to the Pacific. The House disagreed with the
amendment; whereupon the Senate on the last day of the session gave way, and
passed the bill with the express prohibition of slavery.
In the
meantime the National Conventions had nominated their presidential candidates.
The first to act was the Democratic Convention (May 22, 1848), which was
attended by two rival delegations from New York, the one representing the “
Hunker” wing of the party, whose State convention had rejected a resolution
approving the “ Wilmot Proviso,” the other representing the “ Barnburner ”
wing, whose convention had declared against the further extension of slavery
in the Territories. The National Convention seated both delegations and
divided the State vote between them, which so displeased the “ Barnburners ”
that they left the Convention, while the “ Hunkers ” refused to take any part
in the proceedings. Lewis Cass of Michigan and W. O. Butler of Kentucky were
then nominated.
The Whig
National Convention met in June, nominated General Zachary Taylor and Millard
Fillmore, shouted down a resolution condemning the “ extension of slavery by
conquest,” and adjourned amidst general confusion without adopting a platform.
Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, afterwards Vice-President under Grant, and many
others left the Convention, and declared themselves no longer Whigs. These
dissatisfied delegates met and called for an anti-slavery convention to meet at
Buffalo in August. The “ Barnburner ” wing of the New York Democracy also
called a convention, to meet at Utica in June. Martin Van Buren and Henry Dodge
were nominated. It was decided to attend the Buffalo Convention, which was
attended by delegates from seventeen States. Van Buren and Charles F. Adams
were nominated; and a platform was adopted declaring that slavery was a State
institution; that Congress had no more power to make a slave than to make a
king; that slavery should be excluded from all free territory; and that the
answer to the slavery party should be “ no more Slave States, no more Slave
Territories,” and “We will inscribe on our banners Free Soil, Free Speech, Free
Labour, and Free Men, and under it we will fight on and fight ever till a
triumphant victory shall reward our exertions.”
In November,
1847, the Liberty Party had nominated John P. Halp as a candidate for the
Presidency. But when the anti-slavery party at Buffalo selected Martin van
Buren as their candidate Hale withdrew;
400
Discovery of gold in
California.
[l848
and the
Liberty Party was absorbed by the new Free-Soil Party, as it was called. When
the election was over it appeared that the split in the Democratic party in New
York had decided the issue. The thirty-six electoral votes of New York were
given to Taylor; and the majority of Taylor over Cass in the electoral college
numbered exactly thirty-six.
The vigour of
the Free-Soil movement in the North and the triumph of the Whigs were
sufficient to have brought the question of freedom or slavery in the new
Territories to a crisis. But the discovery of gold in California, rumours of
which began to reach the East in the fall of 1848, greatly hastened and
complicated the issue. Some years before this time, a Swiss emigrant named J.
A. Sutter obtained from the Mexican Governor of California a great tract of
land in the Sacramento Valley, and on it, at the junction of the American and
Sacramento rivers, had built what was called Sutter’s Fort. Over his land
roamed thousands of cattle, sheep, and horses. In his employment were hundreds
of labourers; and about his fort many American citizens had settled. As Sutter
used a great deal of lumber, he employed a man named James Marshall to build a
saw-mill at a place called Coloma, some fifty miles away. The saws were to be
moved by a water-wheel; but, when the wheel was finished and the water turned
on, the ditch which was to carry off the water proved to be too small. In order
to enlarge it, water was rushed through, and a bed of mud and gravel was
consequently formed at the end of the ditch. As Marshall stood looking at this
bed of mud one day in January, 1848, he saw some glittering particles. These he
picked out, examined, and beat between two stones, and, finding them malleable,
at once guessed that they were gold. Gathering a few more, he set off for
Sutter’s Fort, reached the place at dead of night, and roused Sutter, who
easily proved that the flakes found by Marshall were gold. To keep the secret
was impossible. Sutter and Marshall acted so strangely that a workman watched
them and found some gold. Then the news spread fast; and a rush for the
gold-fields began. The whole social condition of California was instantly
changed. Labourers left their fields, tradesmen their shops. Seamen deserted
their ships in every harbour; soldiers defiantly left their barracks. Neither threats
nor punishment could hold men to their legal engagements. In May one hundred
and fifty people left San Francisco. Day after day the bay was covered with
launches loaded with the goods of people hurrying up the Sacramento. On May 29
the Californian newspaper suspended its issue because editor, type-setter, and
printer’s devil had hurried to the mines. On June 14 the Star stopped for a
like reason; and California no longer possessed a newspaper. By July immigrants
were crowding in from Monterey, Santa Cruz, Los Angelos, and Oregon. In October
Commodore Jones reported from Monterey to the Secretary of the Navy: “Nothing
can exceed the deplorable condition of things in California, growing out of the
maddening effects of the gold mania. For the present and for
years to
come, I fear it will be impossible for the United States to maintain any naval
or militaiy force in California, as at present no fear of punishment is
sufficient to make binding any contract between man and man. To send troops out
here would be useless, for they would immediately desert. Among the deserters
from the squadron are some of the best petty officers and seamen, having but a
few months to serve and having large balances due to them amounting to $10,000.
The commerce of this coast is wholly cut off. No sooner does a ship arrive at a
port of California than captain, mate, cook, and hands all desert her.” A
paymaster wrote, “I arrived here (Monterey) and have paid all the men of the
First New York Regiment. They have all started for the mines.” Individuals made
$5000, $10,000, $15,000 in a few days. One man dug $12,000 in five days; three
others $8000 in one day. Such cases were abnormal, but it is certain that every
miner was earning such sums as he had never seen before, and such as, a few
months earlier, he would have thought fabulous.
By November,
1848, the news had reached the Eastern States, where it speedily became the one
inexhaustible theme of conversation. Before December thousands were hurrying
west. The records show that between December 1, 1848, and February 9, 1849, 137
ships, with 8098 “Argonauts,” had sailed for California. By the end of March
270 ships with 18,341 emigrants had left New York alone. In February, 1848,
there were but 2000 Americans in all California: in December there were 6000.
By July, 1849, this number had grown to 15,000, and six months later to 53,000.
Never was the need of a strong government in California more imperative.
President Polk assured Congress, when it met in December, 1849, that the state of
affairs in the Territories was such as “imperiously” demanded that Congress
should not allow the session to close without establishing government in
California and New Mexico. The House, well aware that the President’s statement
was true, promptly instructed the Committee on Territories to report a bill or
bills for the organisation of governments in New Mexico and California, with
distinct prohibitions of slavery. Alarmed at this, Senators and Representatives
from slave-holding States under the lead of Calhoun met and adopted an “Address
of the Southern Delegates in Congress to their Constituents.” It charged the
North with gross, systematic, and deliberate violation of the constitutional
obligation to return fugitive slaves, denied that Congress had any authority
over slavery in the States or in the Territories, complained of the constant
agitation of the slavery question by the Abolitionists, and declared that this
would result in a complete reversal of the relations of whites and blacks in
the South and would force the former to leave the land to their former slaves.
The purpose of the address was said to be to unite the South. A little later
the legislature of Virginia adopted resolutions declaring that an attempt to
enforce the
402 Organisation of
California. Slavery in the House. [i849
Wilmot
Proviso “would rouse the people of Virginia to determined resistance at all
hazards and to the last extremity.” Missouri also protested against the
principle of proviso. In the Free States feeling ran quite as high. The
legislatures of all save Iowa resolved that Congress was in duty bound to
prohibit slavery in the Territories; and many of them instructed their members
in Congress to strive for the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade in the
District of Columbia. Attempts to accomplish this end were made and failed, as
did every proposal to establish governments in the Territories; and the Th:
tieth Congress closed without settling the question.
When the news
that Congress had not provided a government for California reached the people
of that country, they proceeded to establish one of their own making. Men from
every part of the world were hurrying to the goldfields; villages and mining
camps were springing up by hundreds; an extensive commerce already existed with
Mexico, Chili, and Australia; and no legal provisions adequate to the emergency
were in force. Fully comprehending the needs of the hour, General Riley, the
military governor, who was then acting as civil governor, issued in June, 1849,
a proclamation calling for the election of delegates to a convention in order
to frame a State constitution. The convention, thus sanctioned, assembled at
Monterey in September, and drew up a Free-State constitution which the people
ratified. State officers, a legislature, representatives to Congress, and
Senators, were then elected; and, when Congress met, application was formally
made for the admission of California into the Union as a State.
The first
duty of the new House of Representatives, when the members assembled in
December, 1849, was the election of a Speaker. But slavery had by this time
become a part of every political issue, and nearly three weeks passed before
the final ballot was taken and a presiding officer chosen. By no one was this
scene of sectional strife witnessed with deeper concern than by Henry Clay.
After an absence of nearly eight years he had been persuaded to return to the
Senate, and had come to Washington fully determined, he said, to take no
leading part. But he had not been many days in Washington before he was
convinced that the threats of disunion were serious, that the Union was really
in danger, and that the secessionist spirit arose from the fear that the
institution of slavery was no longer safe. To quiet this fear and subdue the
spirit of disunion, concessions, he held, must be made by both sides. The time,
in short, had come for another compromise; and towards the accomplishment of
this great end Clay now bent all his energies. The obstacles to be overcome
were five in number. (1) The South resisted the admission of California as a
Free State, because it would upset the balance of power between the Free and
Slave States in the Senate by making sixteen free-soil States to fifteen
slave-holding. (2) The Mormons, when driven from Illinois in 1846, went to
Mexico and founded
Salt Lake
City. But the acquisition of California brought them again under the
jurisdiction of the United States; and they now applied for the admission of
their country as the State of Deseret, or for its organisation as a Territory.
To Deseret (afterwards called Utah) and New Mexico the North insisted on
applying the Wilmot Proviso, while the South declared such an application would
be followed by secession. (3) Texas claimed the Bio Grande as her western boundary.
But the larger part of New Mexico lay east of the Rio Grande; and the pretensions
of Texas were so stoutly resisted that an appeal to arms seemed not unlikely.
(4) The South demanded more stringent legislation for the capture and return of
fugitive slaves. (5) The North insisted on the abolition of slavery and the
slave-trade in the District of Columbia.
Taking these
demands as the basis for a plan of compromise, Clay worked out a scheme which
he laid before the Senate (January 29,1850) in eight resolutions, providing;
1. For the admission of California as a Free
State.
2. For the
organisation of territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah without any
restriction on slavery.
3. For the settlement of the boundary between
Texas and New Mexico.
4. For the payment of the debt contracted by
Texas before annexation, provided that she should relinquish all claim to any
part of New Mexico.
5. That it is not expedient to abolish slavery
in the District of Columbia without the consent of the people of the District,
and of Maryland, and without compensation to owners of slaves. (That part of
the District which had been in Virginia had been retroceded several years
before.)
6. That the slave-trade ought to be abolished
in the District.
7. That
more effectual provision ought to be made by law for the return of fugitive
slaves.
8. That Congress has no power to meddle with
the slave-trade between the States.
The debates
which followed the presentation of these resolutions are beyond all question
the greatest in the annals of the country. Clay’s eloquent defence of his
compromise plan, the speech of Calhoun summing up the grievances of the South,
the sensational “Seventh of March” speech of Webster, the “ Higher Law ” speech
of Seward, the speech of Jefferson Davis (soon to become the leader of a great
rebellion) setting forth what the South would accept, and the bitter and fiery
utterances of a host of lesser men, impart an interest which attaches to no
previous congressional discussion. On April 18, 1850, Clay’s resolutions went
to a Committee of Thirteen, which reported on May 8 :
1. That the admission of any new State or
States made out of Texas be postponed until they shall present themselves, when
it will be
the duty of
Congress to admit them in accordance with the compact made with Texas.
2. That California be admitted into the Union.
3. That territorial governments, without the
Wilmot Proviso, be established in Utah and New Mexico.
4. That the two last measures be combined in
the same bill.
5. That all New Mexico be taken from the
jurisdiction of Texas; that a pecuniary equivalent be given to Texas; and that
a section for this purpose be incorporated in the bill to admit California.
6. That a more effectual law for the return of
fugitive slaves be enacted.
7. That the slave-trade, but not slavery, be
prohibited in the District of Columbia. Bills to carry out these provisions had
been prepared and were presented with the report.
While these
measures were still under discussion President Taylor died; and Millard Fillmore
was sworn into office as President. The old Cabinet at once resigned; and
Webster, as Secretary of State, took the lead of the new. After the funeral of
Taylor, debate on the Compromise Bills was resumed till July 31, when the Utah
Bill passed. On August 9 a bill somewhat reducing the limits of New Mexico, and
offering Texas $10,000,000 for surrendering her claim, was passed. On August 12
the California Bill passed; on the 15th the New Mexico Bill; and on the 26th
the Fugitive Slave Bill. Action on the Bill to prohibit the Slave-trade in the
District of Columbia, a distinctly Northern measure, was delayed in the Senate
till the House should have acted on the measures already sent down to it. By
September 12 all had passed the House; and on the 16th the District of Columbia
Bill was allowed to go through the Senate. The House of course approved; the
President signed each bill; and the Compromise of 1850, from which so much was
expected, was accomplished.
STATE RIGHTS.
(1850—1860.)
When the historian of the United States reaches the
year 1850, he finds himself at a point at which it is convenient, at which it
is indeed necessary, that he should pause and “ look before and after,” in
order that he may reckon the forces amidst which he stands and scan the whole
stage of affairs. The “Compromise of 1850” settled nothing; but it was
compounded of every element of the country’s politics and may be made to yield
upon analysis almost every ingredient of the historian’s narrative. Its object
was the settlement of all urgent questions. Texas had been admitted to the
Union with disputed boundaries which needed to be definitely determined;
territory had been acquired from Mexico, by conquest and purchase, for which it
was requisite to provide a government; opinion in one section of the country
was demanding that the slave-trade should be excluded from the District of
Columbia, the seat of the national government, and slavery itself from the new
territory; opinion in another section was demanding, with an air almost of
passion, that the question of slavery in the Territories be left to those who
should settle and make States of them, and that property in slaves should
everywhere be adequately protected by effective laws for the apprehension and
return of fugitive negroes. It was the question of the extension or restriction
of slavery that made the adoption of a plan of organisation and government for
the new Territory perplexing and difficult, and the determination of the
boundary of Texas a matter of critical sectional interest; and yet the rapid
growth and development of the country rendered it imperative that action should
be taken definitely and at once. Something must be done, and done promptly, to
quiet men’s minds concerning disturbing questions of policy and to keep parties
from going utterly to pieces. That was the object of the “Compromise of 1850.”
It consisted
of a series of measures framed and introduced by a committee of which Henry
Clay was chairman, and urged upon Congress with all the art, energy, and persuasiveness
of which the aged Kentuckian was so great a master even in those his last days.
It was agreed
(1) that
Texas should be paid ten million dollars to relinquish her claim upon a portion
of New Mexico; (2) that California should be admitted as a State under a
constitution which prohibited slavery; (3) that New Mexico and Utah should be
organised as Territories without any regulation in respect of slavery, leaving
it to the choice of their own settlers whether there should be property in
slaves amongst them or not; (4) that the slave-trade should be excluded from
the District of Columbia, but be interfered with nowhere else by Federal law;
and (5) that the whole judicial and administrative machinery of the Federal
government should be put at the disposal of the Southern slaveowners for the
recovery of fugitive slaves found within the Free States.
Every measure
in the list touched the politics of the time at some vital point. Fourteen
years earlier (1836) Texas had established herself as an independent State by
secession from Mexico, which Santa Anna had transformed from a republic into a
military despotism ; and in 1845 she had been admitted with all her vast domain
into the United States. Her admission into the Union had led almost immediately
to war with Mexico (1846); for her southern boundary line was in dispute. The
Federal government supported her claim to the tract of land which lies between
the Nueces and the Rio Grande rivers, and by occupying it with an armed force
compelled Mexico to fight for its possession. In the war which ensued, the
forces of the United States took possession not only of the little region in
dispute but also of all the Pacific slope from Oregon to Texas, Mexico’s
Territories towards the north. It was this war, and the acquisition of a new
and vast domain on the Pacific, which had brought Congress once more face to
face with the question, What shall be done with regard to slavery in the new
Territories ? Shall its introduction be forbidden there, or permitted? And it
was this question which had stirred parties and sections to the renewal of an
old and bitter conflict, which threatened to disturb every ancient compromise
and make peace and union infinitely difficult.
It was a
return to the question which politicians had hoped to have dismissed in the
“Missouri Compromise” of 1820, when it had been agreed that Missouri should be
admitted into the Union with a constitution which legalised slavery, but that
thenceforth no other Slave State should be formed out of any territory of the
United States which lay north of latitude 36° 30', the southern boundary of
Missouri extended; but here was new territory to which that old compromise of a
generation ago, it was said, did not apply. The question was as old, almost, as
the Constitution itself. It had been touched first and most definitely by the
notable Ordinance of 1787—a law as old as the Constitution—which had decreed,
once for all, that slavery should not enter the North-west Territory, the vast
dominion made over by Virginia and her sister States to the Confederation which
had fought the war for independence. But it was a matter which statutes could
not quiet or
conclude. So long as there was new territory to be filled with settlers, and
formed into States with institutions and laws of their own, there must continue
to be strife and controversy regarding what should be done in respect of
slavery; for the slave-owners insisted that they should be insured by law
against the risks of change, that they should be made safe against being left
in a minority in a country where everything was changing and no one could
surely foresee majorities either for or against any institution whatever. Such
a contest could not be closed till movements of population and opinion had
themselves come to an end.
Although no
man could certainly foretell, even in 1850, what would be the outcome of the
contest between the advocates and the opponents of the extension of slavery
into the new Territories, and thus also into the new States which should be
formed from them, it was very much plainer then what this was likely to be than
it had been in 1821 or in 1787. Southern statesmen did not deceive themselves.
They saw as clearly as anyone could see that the great movement of population
into the new lands in the West was not only a natural and inevitable economic
movement of men seeking to better their fortunes in new homes, but also a game
of power, and a game at which they were likely, if not sure, to lose. There was
no mistaking the signs of the times or the magnitude of the forces engaged. It
was a contest between sections which every year became more and more widely
contrasted in life and purpose.
It was
slavery, of course, which made the South unlike the rest of the country, unlike
the rest of the world. The contrast was to her advantage in some respects,
though to her deep disadvantage in many others. She had men of leisure because
she had slaves; and nowhere else in the country was there a ruling class like
hers. Where men are masters they are likely to be statesmen, to have an outlook
upon affairs and an instinct and habit of leadership. Privilege and undisputed
social eminence beget in them a pride which is not wholly private, a pride
which makes of them a planning and governing order. It was this advantage, of
always knowing her leaders, and of keeping them always thus in a school of
privilege and authority, that had given the South from the first her marked
preeminence in affairs. Her statesmen had led the nation in the era of the
Revolution. The Union seemed largely of her making. Madison’s had been the
planning mind in its construction ; Washington’s mastery had established it;
Jefferson had made it democratic in practice as in theory. For thirty-two out
of the first forty years of the existence of the Union Virginian statesmen had
occupied the presidential office, and had guided as well as presided over
affairs. The coming-in of Jackson in 1829 had marked a revolutionary change in
the politics of the country. The older generation and the older methods of counsel
and action were thrust aside; ruling groups of
statesmen
thenceforth counted for less, and popular conventions for more. Delegations of
local politicians were substituted for Congiess’ona] committees; the influence
of unknown men displaced the authority;of responsible leaders. But, even after
that notable break-up, the South kept her place of authority in party counsels,
in cabinets, and even in the choice and policy of Presidents. Men drawn from
her school of privilege were as prominent as ever, and ruled conventions as
they had ruled groups of consulting statesmen. Their initiative was not daunted
or discouraged. No one could deny that the South had all along played a part in
the control of parties which was altogether out of proportion to her importance
in wealth or population.
But every
year relaxed her hold upon affairs and more definitely and obviously threatened
her mastery with destruction. The country was growing away from her. It had
grown away from her in the years which preceded the coming-in of Jackson and
the rough western democracy which despised tradition; but the fact had not been
upon the surface in those days. In 1850 it was plain to see. During the twenty
years which had passed, the country had grown at an infinitely quickened pace,
and in ways which could escape no man’s observation, while the South had almost
stood still. Her order of life was fixed and unchangeable. She could not expect
manufacturers to make their home with her; she could not induce immigrants to
settle on her. untilled lands. Diversification of industry was for her, it
seemed, out of the question. She had begun to perceive this twenty years ago,
and had been deeply moved by the discovery. She could not forget the
controversies which had raged about the tariff legislation of 1828 and 1832, or
rid herself of the painful impression of what had been done and said and
threatened when South Carolina made her attempt at “nullification.” Time had
but made the issues of that conflict more distressingly plain and significant.
The South
could not compete with the North in the establishment of manufactures because
she could not command or maintain the sort of labour necessary for their
successful development; nor could she compete with the North in the
establishment of agricultural communities and the building of new States in the
West, if her people were to be forbidden to take their slaves with them into
the national Territories. Her statesmen had felt a great enthusiasm for
national expansion at the first, had favoured moderate tariffs and the
diversification of industry, had spoken like men of a race, not like men of a
section, until they saw at last ho\y the very organisation of the communities
they loved best and most passionately seemed to shut them out from sharing in the
great change and growth which were to command the future. Then, as was but
natural, they began to draw back and to doubt as to the course they,had taken.
To put tariff-charges on imports in order that manufacturers might get higher
prices for their goods in the markets of the
185Q]
409
States, was,
they said, when viewed from the side of the effects it would have upon their
own people, only an indirect way—and not a vexy indirect way either—of making
the South, which could not engage in manufactures, support the people of the
North, who could. It would curtail the commerce of the southern ports and
markets without furnishing any countervailing advantage to offset the loss.
That had been
the ground of South Carolina’s “ nullification.” Calhoun had not led her into
that singular course: he had followed her into it. He had hitherto held his
mind to a national scale of thinking; but the distress of his own people swung
him about, to study the causes of their disquietude. He accepted, when it was
pressed upon him, their own explanation of the decline of their commerce and
the falling off in the price of their cotton. He believed, as they did, that
these things were due to an inequitable distribution of the burdens of federal
taxation: that the South was being made to pay for the maintenance of
manufactures in the North. He accordingly supplied them with weapons of
defence, with constitutional arguments which went the whole length of an
absolute refusal to obey oppressive and unequal laws, with the full-wrought
doctrine of nullification.
Calhoun did
not invent the doctrine of nullification. It had been mentioned and urged in
South Carolina again and again before he had been brought to accept
it—mentioned very explicitly and urged very passionately. He had turned vexy
reluctantly from national plans to sectional defence; and only because men who
were his intimate friends and close political associates at home, as well as
events happening under his own eyes at Washington, convinced him of the
critical peril of the southern States. But when he did turn it was with eyes
wide open and with all the passion of his nature, and with the passion of his
mind also, that singular instrument of power, which gave order, precision, and
a keen and burning force to whatever it touched. The doctrine of State Rights,
which other men had used for protest, for exhortation, for advantage in debate,
he used as if for legal demonstration. He made of it a philosophy of right, a
statesman’s fundamental tenet. The very coolness and precision of his way of
reasoning seemed to make the doctrine a new and wiser thing. In every sentence,
too, there was added to the sharp lines of reason the unmistakeable glow of
conviction. Once convinced of the necessity of this his new line of action, he
followed it with the zest of a crusader. “As to the responsibility necessarily
incurred,” he said, “in giving publicity to doctrines which a large portion of
the community will probably consider new and dangerous, I feel none. I have too
deep a conviction of their truth and vital importance to the Constitution, the
Union, and the liberty of these States, to have the least uneasiness on the
point.”
He believed
“the great and leading principle” of the political life of the Union to be,
“that the general government emanated from the
410
[i860
people of the
several States, forming distinct political communities and acting in their
separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one
aggregate political community; that the Constitution of the United States is,
in fact, a compact, to which each State is a party, in the character already
described; that the several States, or parties, have a right to judge of its
infractions; and, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of
power not delegated, have the i ;ht also, in the last resort (to use the
language of the Virginia Resolutions), ‘ to interpose for arresting the
progress of the evil, and for maintaining, i ith i their respective limits, the
authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.’” Madison had framed
the Virginia Resolutions, as Vi gir a’s protest against the Alien and Sedition
Laws of 1798, which he considered “a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous
exercise of power not delegated ” by the Constitution, either explicitly or by
reasonable implication; but he was still living when Calhoun put forth his
doctrine of nullification, in imitation, as he supposed, of the precedent, and
on the firm ground of the “good old Republican doctrine of ’98,” and he
emphatically denied having meant by his doctrine what Calhoun meant by his
principle of virtual resistance.
The
resolutions which Kentucky had adopted in 1798 were nearer Calhoun’s tone and
meaning. They had declared that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and
dangerous exercise of unconstitutional powers by the Federal government, “as in
all other cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party
has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infractions as of the
mode and measure of redress.” But even these might be read as the terms of
agitation rather than as those of revolution. The States were the only organic
bodies capable of authoritative action outside the organisation of the Federal government
itself, and they had seemed to the statesmen of Virginia and Kentucky the
natural and proper instruments of agitation in cases where the action of the
Federal government called for organised, though peaceful and constitutional,
opposition and a concerted effort for redress. Calhoun’s thought went much
further. He conceived the States to be the only members of the Union. The
people had no citizenship, as it seemed to him, except in the States under
whose authority they were grouped. They had no direct connexion with the
Federal government, but dealt with it, and acted in its affairs, in
communities. The Union was a Union of States, and the people acted in its
affairs, not directly and as a nation, but segregately, by joint action, as
sovereign but assoc ^ted commonwealths. The States, therefore, as the sole
constituent members of the Union, were not only the natural and proper agencies
of agitation; they were the only proper, the only possible parties to a change.
The initiative was theirs by constituent right: and each of them must look for
itself to the keeping of the general compact, acting upon its own individual
responsibility.
But what if a
single State should act? What if South Carolina should act alone, how far might
she go ? What was it her right to do ? This question the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions had not answered; but Calhoun answered it very explicitly. It was
her right, he said, when all reasonable hope of redress through any other
channel had failed, to call upon her electors to choose a convention, such a
convention as might amend her constitution and shape her exercise of
sovereignty in other matters; and that convention might declare the Acts
complained of null and void, because contrary to the federal pact, and
therefore not binding upon her citizens. Such a thing should not be done as an
act of revolution. It should be so planned and executed, with such
deliberations, delajs, and postponements, and such ample opportunities for
conciliation, compromise, and adjustment, that it would operate merely as a
check upon the national government and give both time and motive for a final
settlement. The escape from the crisis must be, not the revolt or permanent
recalcitrancy of a single State, but an appeal to the power which had made the
Constitution and which had the final right to interpret its intent and meaning,
to the association of sovereign States. If the general government was not
willing to yield in the matter in controversy, it must call a constitutional
convention, such as that “ for proposing amendments,” which the Constitution
itself provided for. With that convention, in which the States as principals to
the federal compact would be present in the persons of their delegates, it
would rest to determine, by a majority representing two-thirds of the sovereign
commonwealths, the merits of the controversy. If these sovereign principals, by
the constitutional majority of two-thirds, should declare the powers complained
of to have been rightly exercised by the Federal government, it would be as if
the Constitution had been amended and those powers explicitly added; and the
State, or States, whose protests had brought the convention together would be
in duty bound either to submit or to quit the Union. Calhoun was too sane a
drinker, too sincere a lover of the Union and of the ideals which it had set
before the world, too much of a statesman and master in affairs to be guilty of
so great a solecism as to maintain what some who had not examined his argument
supposed him to maintain, that a State could permanently “nullify” a law of the
United States and yet remain a member of the Union. Nullification was in his
doctrine but a means of bringing federal action to a standstill in respect of
some single matter of critical controversy until a power higher than
Congress—that power which he conceived to be the real and only sovereign power
under the Constitution—had acted, and a final determination had been made of
the question of right. He deemed the Supreme Court of the United States an unsuitable
forum in which to determine such matters of sovereign right, because it was but
an agency of the very government whose powers in the case supposed were in
dispute. Arbitrament must
lie with the
sovereign associates whose agent he conceived the Federal government to be:
Almost every
northern man who heard such views set forth considered them “new and dai.gerjus,” as Calhoun had foreseen. They
seemed a little ridiculous, too, when put into practice. On November 24,1832,
South Carolina actually did declare the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 null and
void within her jurisdiction and in respect of her people, acting in sovereign
convention, called in due form by her legislature. But no general convention of
the States was called; Congress lowered the tariff duties, but would not
abandon them or lower them upon the principle on which South Carolina had
insisted; General Jackson was President and showed himself ready to carry out
the laws of the United States, in South Carolina as elsewhere, by force of arms
if necessary, like the hard-headed, practical soldier he was; and South
Carolina was obliged to yield without bringing her doctrine to a final test.
She had gained enough, in the alteration of the tariff laws, she thought, to
make her retreat something less than a surrender, and was fain to content
herself with that. She laid her constitutional weapons aside until another
time.
Calhoun was
unequally compounded of logician and statesman. In outlook, in sympathy, in
insight, and in power among men a statesman, he was yet in all processes of
systematic thought a subtle and uncompromising logician, and projected his
argument without thought of time or limiting circumstance. There is in much of
his writing the touch and tone of the schoolman,—so refined is the reasoning,
so abstract the processes of the thought. It was this thorough-going way of
reasoning, from the careful premisses straight through to the utmost bounds of
the conclusion, that made him seem to practical men a radical, almost a
revolutionist. He made old doctrines seem “new and dangerous,” because he
pushed them beyond their old limits and gave them novel and disturbing
applications. His doctrine of the ultimate sovereignty of the States was not
new. It had once been commonplace to say that the Union was experimental, to
speak of circumstances in which the contracting States might deem it best to
withdraw. Webster had been prompt to challenge the doctrine of nullification
and draw it out into the open in his debate with Senator Hayne; and nobody who heard
him then could doubt either his extraordinary power or the breadth and wisdom
and impressiveness of his conceptions with regard to the national destiny and
higher law of growth. But, though he was the better statesman, Hayne was the
better historian.
Webster’s
greatness was never more admirably exhibited than in that famous debate. His
utterances on this occasion, moreover, sent a thrill through all the East and
North which was unmistakeably a thrill of triumph. Men were glad because of
what he had said. He had touched the national self-consciousness, awakened it,
and pleased
it with a
morning vision of its great tasks and certain destiny. Those who heard were not
so much convinced as aroused, stimulated, exhilarated. He had spoken for the
new generation. But the generation in the midst of which he stood was both new
and old. It was new on the whole stage of movement, of change, of struggle, of
achievement, where the nation was being re-established and transformed; but it
was old where change had not penetrated, where institutions had stood untouched,
where the organisation of society was in fact unalterable, and where thought
and habit held steady and undiverted to the old ways. The South stood still in
a fixed order. Since the making of the Constitution, Alabama and Mississippi
and Louisiana and Texas had been added to the South upon the Gulf, and
Tennessee and Kentucky, Arkansas and Missouri within the continent; but such
growth had been assured her almost from the first, and had resulted in a uniform
expansion, without essential change either in conceptions or in modes of life.
Wherever slavery was established, society took and kept a single and invariable
form; industry had its fixed variety and pattern; life held to unalterable
standards. Change had entry and freedom only in the great westward migration
which followed the parallels of latitude further to the north, and in the great
industrial expansion of the East. It was a process there which obliterated old
political boundaries, fused diverse elements of population, created community
in enterprise, quickened throughout wide regions the sense of co-operation, and
made the nation itself seem to those who took part in it a single great
partnership in material and political development.
No doubt the
whole country had felt a certain critical coolness towards the Constitution
throughout the generation which framed and adopted it. Statesmen defended,
praised, expounded, fortified it; Courts diligently wove its provisions into
the law of the land; success added prestige to the general government which it
had set up; but the little commonwealths of the long seaboard, which had agreed
to live under it, kept their old pride of separateness, thought of it at first
rather as a serviceable arrangement than as an unalterable law, respected it
but did not love it, and were ready enough to question it, asking once and
again, as they had asked at first, whether it was really, after all, calculated
to promote their interests. And this was the point of view which the South,
more than any other part of the country* had kept, because she more than any
other part of the country had remained unchanged. She did not feel her
dependence upon the national government as those did who were building up
manufactures under the protecting shadow of the federal tariff laws, or as
those did who were organising settlements and making new States out of the
national domain in the West. These men had always an image of enterprise,
union, and co-operation when they spoke of the nation; while public men in the
South thought only of the general government, the agent in certain
matters of
the States united. For a generation or more after the founding of the Union,
the South as well as the North had felt the pulses of growth and national
expansion; and Calhoun had once been at the front of a group of young statesmen
who were pushing forward internal improvements, advocating the acquisition of
territory, and supporting every national enterprise and policy. It was when the
movement quickened beyond the pace at which the South could follow it, when
States, threatened to multiply without end in the West, when railways shortened
the road of growth, and immigration swelled more and more the tide of new
peoples that poured in to join the northern, not the southern, hosts of
settlers and State-makers, that the South began to realise her separateness and
isolation. It was significant that it was in a debate concerning the right
policy to be pursued with regard to the western lands, the unoccupied national
domain, that Webster and Hayne came to their issue with regard to the doctrine
of nullification. It was the West that was making a nation out of the old-time
federation of seaboard States. Webster was insisting upon the new uses and
significance of the Constitution, Hayne was harking back to the old. The
Constitution had once been deemed almost, if not quite, susceptible of the
interpretation which the Senator from South Carolina still sought to apply to
it; but the national life had in these later days grown strong within it, and
it had become, at any rate for the major part of those who lived under it, the
instrument of nationality Webster understood it to be. No constitution can ever
be treated as a mere law or document: it must always be also a vehicle of life.
Its own phrases must become as it were living tissue. It must grow and
strengthen and subtly change with the growth and strength and change of the
political body whose life it defines, and must, in all but its explicit and
mandatory provisions with regard to powers and forms of action, take its
reading from the circumstances of the time. In the South circumstances had not
changed; in the North and West they had changed almost beyond recognition; and
the men of the two sections could no longer think alike with regard to the
fundamentals of their common government.
The days when
South Carolina attempted nullification were the days of the first full
consciousness of these momentous changes and of this disparity of interests
between the sections; and by 1850 these things could escape no thoughtful man’s
observation. Movements which had been slow had become rapid; issues which had
seemed far away were now obviously close at hand. The decade 1840-50,
particularly, had seen every process of modification quickened. The age of
railways and of labour-saving invention had set in, and with it the days when
movements of population were to be greater than ever. Before 1842 no year had
brought so many as a hundred thousand immigrants to the United States, but by
1847 the tide had mounted to 234,968, and by 1849 to
297,024. 1846
and 1847 were the years of the terrible famine in Ireland; 1848 was the year of
universal political disturbance in Europe, the year of revolution which made
refugees of so many thousands and unsettled the peoples of the Continent,
bringing discontent, restlessness, and even a touch of despair. And the
movement did not stop with the end of revolution and famine. It was but the
beginning of a new era of immigration. The stream of new comers grew rather
than diminished from year to year, and steadily augmented the forces of change
which inevitably crossed the sea with these swarming bands of strangers. Their
distribution within the Union proved easier and more immediate every year by
reason of the rapid extension of the railway system of the country. More than
six thousand miles of railway were constructed between 1840 and 1850,—an
increase of more than two hundred per cent, over the preceding decade; and the
electric telegraph was added just in the nick of time to facilitate the safe
operation of long lines of transportation. Morse’s invention came into actual
use in 1844, and promised that the most widely separated regions of the great
continent which was thus filling up with restless hosts of settlers would
presently be near neighbours to one another. It was but yesterday that steam
navigation had become an assured success upon the ocean (1838). The McCormick
reaper was no older than 1834. The world was but just beginning to feel the
full impulse towards that diversification of industry which was to transform
it.
The South of
course felt these forces at work within herself as well as upon her northern
neighbours and out upon the broad new-tenanted fields of the West, where
everything was new. She had railways among the first; the earliest inventions
of the new age had been those which made the production and manufacture of
cotton easy and exceedingly profitable, and from these she had reaped a great
increase of wealth. There had been a day when she had hoped for as great a
development as should come to any section or any region in the world. But she
had long since been disillusioned of that hope. While population grew elsewhere
by leaps and bounds, hers did not sensibly increase. While new sources of wealth
and power were added every year, as it seemed, to the resources of the rest of
the country, none that were new were vouchsafed to her. Even her own native
white population drifted away from her into the West, into the North, into the
newer portions of the South itself. The census of 1860 was to show that there
were in South Carolina only 277,000 white persons bom within her borders, while
193,000 bom within the State were living in other parts of the country. North
Carolina had kept only 634,000 out of 906,000; and Virginia only 1,000,000 out
of 1,400,000. Immigrants did not come down into those fertile valleys; and the
great plantations, with their crowding, docile slaves, thrust out even those of
native stock whose homes had been there. The race was towards the West. If
Southerners could carry their
416
[l850
slaves
thither, they might remain Southerners and spread and confirm the social
standards, the economic system, and the political ideals of their native region
; if they could not carry their slaves with them, they must become
“Westerners,” lose their identity, change the whole order of their lives, and
be added to those national forces from which the South feared nothing less than
extinction. No wonder the whole country felt that great issues were joined in
the compromise legislation of 1850. •
It was
significant, as one of the notable signs of the times, that one part of that
legislation had been determined beforehand, by forces which politicians could
neither divert nor control. While Congress was getting ready to organise
California as a Territory it became a State. Gold was discovered in California
in January, 1848, and all the region of the great discovery was suddenly
peopled, as if by magic. The whole world seemed all at once to send its most
aggressive spirits thither, a vast company of eager, resourceful, hard-fibred
men, fit to work and to shift for themselves. In they poured by shipload and by
caravan, from over the seas, around the two continents by the long way of the
Cape, around the northern continent by the shorter way of the Isthmus, across
the endless plain by aggon and train, out of the States, out of the frontier
communities of the western Territories, out of foreign lands east and west,
until California showed, before the census of 1850 could be taken, a population
of more than eighty thousand souls. They could not do without government: they
improvised it in some rough and suitable fashion for themselves. By the autumn
of 1849 they had held a general convention, framed and adopted a State
constitution prohibiting slavery (for in that quickly formed community they had
:no slaves and wished for none, but only asked leave to live and work for
themselves under rulers of their own choosing), and demanded admission into the
Union. They had been encouraged to take this course by General Taylor, the
frank, straightforward soldier who was then President. General Taylor was a
Southerner, but he was also a democrat, and it seemed to him both legitimate
and desirable that these self-sufficing pioneers in the Californian hills
should choose their own government, demand their natural rights under the
Constitution, and not wait upon the politicians at Washington. And they had
their own way. California was admitted at once as a State, and admitted under
the constitution which its inhabitants had framed.
It was a
bitter disappointment to the Southern statesmen. California, with its broad and
fertile valleys, its soft and kindly airs, its long area toward the south, had
seemed a more likely region than any other for the extension of slavery. But
these eighty thousand settlers who had rushed thither for gold had determined
that question; and the most that could be offered the South by way of
compensation was, that the question of the introduction of slavery into New
Mexico and Utah should not also be prejudged and settled. They also had framed
State
governments,
but with much less show of right than in the case of California; and Congress
did not hesitate to ignore their request to be admitted into the Union. It
organised them as Territories, with nothing said about slavery.
The only
thing of substance that the southern leaders seemed to have gained from the
bundle of bills which made up the “ Compromise,” as they looked back upon it,
was the Fugitive Slave Law; and there must have been some among them who
seriously doubted the profit that would accrue to them even from that. The
surrender of fugitive slaves was a matter which could never be settled in a way
to satisfy both sections of the country; and it soon became evident enough that
this • particular effort to settle it was likely to generate passions which
must grow hotter and hotter with each application of the law, promising, not
accommodation, but a more perilous conflict and separation of interests. The
new law was not novel in object or principle; it was novel only in character
and operation, and attracted attention because of the strong forces of opinion
now set hotly against it. The Constitution itself directed that not only
fugitives from justice, but also all persons “ held to service or labour in one
State under the laws thereof, escaping into another,” should be taken and
returned, to receive their punishment or fulfil their service; and so early as
1793 Congress had passed a law intended to secure the return of both classes of
fugitives. But this older law had proved less and less satisfactory with regard
to fugitive slaves, because anti-slavery sentiment had grown apace in the
North, and the officials of the northern States had become more and more slack
in assisting at the apprehension of negroes who had run away from their masters
in the South. The southern leaders, therefore, had demanded a law more
stringent and effectual; and the law of 1850 had been framed to meet their
wishes. Federal, not State, officials were to execute it, under heavy penalties
for any neglect on their part in the thorough fulfilment of the duties it laid
upon them. The mere affidavit of a master who claimed a runaway black was made
conclusive evidence of ownership. The law bound federal judges and
commissioners to issue the warrant of apprehension, obliged the marshals of the
United States to make the arrest and safely deliver their prisoner, and
operated even against the hearing of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus. Many southern masters used the law to the full limit of its rigour.
Negroes who had been living in the North for many years were reclaimed and
carried South under circumstances which greatly stirred the pity and sympathy of
those among whom they had been settled. Mobs frequently attempted the rescue of
apprehended fugitives, and sometimes succeeded, to the defeat of the law and
the greater exasperation of feeling on both sides. Men of influence and
position, besides such men as usually make up mobs, encouraged, and upon
occasion took part in, even the more violent sort of resistance to the
execution of the law,
418 Deaths of Calhoun,
Webster and Clay. [isso-2
and did not
hesitate industriously to organise every possible means of evading it. State
Courts and even State legislatures put every possible obstacle in the way of
the law’s enforcement; and for a while men could talk of nothing else but the
hateful operation of the Fugitive Slave Law.
The
disturbing effects of all this upon the composition and aims of parties, and
upon the action of the general government in affairs of domestic policy, were
enhanced by the disappearance of the old party leaders. Calhoun died in March,
1850, the central month of the great Compromise debates—died stricken at heart,
as it must have seemed to all who observed him closely, because forced in those
last days to see with his keen eye of prophecy what the years to come must
inevitably bring to pass. He had told those about him that the South was
stronger now than she could ever be again, and must insist now or never upon
what she considered her rights under the Constitution; that she had yielded too
much when she consented to the Missouri Compromise of 1820, and must utterly
lose the game of power if she conceded more; that the preservation of the Union
depended upon the maintenance of an equilibrium between the Slave States and
the Free, and that the Union must go to pieces unless that equilibrium, already
destroyed, should be restored. He knew in those last sad days that it could not
be restored, and that the Union he had loved and lived for must enter on its
struggle with death. His own hand, more than any other man’s, had wrought to
bring the struggle on, because what he deemed his duty had bidden him to the
work. He had drawn out the plot of the tragedy; but must have thanked God he
was not to see it played out. He had designed it to be a warning: it had turned
out to be a prophecy.
Webster and
Clay survived him two years. Clay died in June, 1852, and Webster followed him
in October. They had employed all their remaining power in the task of
maintaining peace between the parties under the Compromise of 1850. Webster had
gone about the country reproving agitation, speaking of the compromise measures,
in his solemn and impressive way, as a new compact, a new stay and guarantee of
the Constitution itself, the pledge and covenant of domestic peace. He had,
indeed, sacrificed a great deal to effect the adjustment he so earnestly
defended. He had lost many a friend and had infinitely saddened his own old age
by advocating accommodation between the contending forces of North and South.
Many thought this accommodation an utter abandonment of the gallant position
he had taken in 1832, when he had faced Senator Hayne so successfully with his
confident vindication of the sovereign authority of the general government.
Men who had once trusted him to the utmost now denounced him with cutting
bitterness as an apostate and an enemy of the Union. But he endured the shame,
as he thought, so that the Union might be
saved. Clay
also cried out to the last for peace, for good faith in the acceptance and
fulfilment of the Compromise, for a steady allegiance in the maintenance of the
old parties and the old programmes, against discontent and uproar and
disquieting agitation. Both men passed from the stage before they could know
what the outcome would be, hoping for the best, but doubting and distressed,
their veteran heads bowed as if before a breaking storm.
The year of
their death (1852) synchronised with the election of a President; and the state
of parties gave cause for the gravest solicitude, to the leaders who remained
as well as to those who were taken away. The Whigs uttered their usual
declaration of principles, and avowed themselves entirely satisfied with the
compromise measures of 1850; but they seemed to reckon for success rather upon
the popularity of their candidate, General Winfield Scott, the hero of the
Mexican war, than upon the attractiveness of their programme and principles.
There were scores of Whigs who had no stomach for the Compromise and were
alienated by their party’s support of it. They could not yet quite bring
themselves to act with the outspoken Free-Soil party, which met in convention at
Pittsburg in August and boldly pronounced the Fugitive Slave Law repugnant both
to the principles of law and to the spirit of Christianity, declaring its own
programme to be “no more slave States, no more slave Territories, no
nationalised slavery, and no national legislation for the extradition of slaves
”; but they held off from their old allegiance and would not help their party
against either the Free- Soilers or the Democrats. The Democrats, for their
part, spoke with their old-time confidence and acted with unity and spirit.
They declared, not only that they approved of the Compromise, but also that
they would “ faithfully abide by and uphold the principles laid down in the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799.” They regarded those principles,
they said, “ as constituting one of the main foundations of their political
creed,” and meant “ to carry them out in their obvious meaning and import.”
Their nominating convention found it impossible to choose between the three
leading candidates for the party’s favours, Lewis Cass of Michigan, James
Buchanan of Pennsylvania, and Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, and therefore
nominated Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, an affable and prepossessing
gentleman whom no one could condemn, and whom his supporters could admire for
his quiet serviceableness as a member of the legislature of his State and of
the federal House of Representatives, and for his unostentatious performance of
his duty as an officer of volunteers in the Mexican war. And Pierce was elected.
He received the electoral votes of every State except Vermont, Massachusetts,
Kentucky, and Tennessee—two hundred and fifty-four votes to General Scott’s
forty-two. The Democratic majority in the House of Representatives was, moreover,
increased by thirty-seven, and in the Senate by six. No influential
group of
public men had accepted the Compromise with quite such earnest heartiness as
the Democratic leaders had shown. They had therefore won the confidence of the
South; besides great States like New York and Pennsylvania, which had four
years before cast their votes for the Whig candidates, they had drawn North
Carolina and Florida, Louisiana and Georgia to their support. Their vote was
national. The popular vote of the Whigs had not materially fallen off, but the
popular vote of the Democrats had risen by nearly four hundred thousand, and
the vote of the avowed and aggressive Free-Soilers had diminished nearly
one-half. It looked to sanguine politicians like a clearing of the skies.
To those who
could see more than the surface of affairs, however, it was even then evident
that nothing of the kind had taken place. Parties were in fact rapidly going to
pieces. The Democratic party held together for the present only because it
allowed itself to be governed by its southern leaders, men of settled purpose
and definite opinions, experienced in counsel and in unhesitating and concerted
action. Every man who doubted and was troubled—as what practical man was not
?—by the ominous signs of the times turned instinctively to this party, thus
led, because it was at least confident, of good courage and united counsels,
knew its own mind and promised to bring peace and order out of confusion. But
the presidential election of itself settled nothing. Practical questions turned
with a sort of grim fatality upon the critical matter of the extension of
slavery, and came thick and fast, and in such pressing form that they could not
be put off or avoided; and the Democrats were presently touched as near the
quick by the disintegrating influences of the time as the Whigs had been. The
field of politics began to fill more and more with new parties, with new groups
within the old parties, with dissentient factions and a confused war of
opinions.
The fact was,
though politicians were very slow to perceive it, that parties had long ago
ceased to be amenable to the discipline of the older time, when a few men
trained to affairs in Virginia and Massachusetts had been able to dominate and
direct them by the authority of a sort of oligarchy. In the old days of “ the
Virginian dynasty,” the days from Washington to Monroe, parties had submitted
to a very simple government and discipline, effected by intimate counsel among
a few experienced leaders, by quiet conferences of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, by private correspondence and tacit understandings
with regard to personal precedence. A change had set in with the entrance into
national politics of those influences from the West which made Andrew Jackson
President of the United States. Until then Presidents had been nominated by the
party leaders who were in Congress or in the executive offices of the
government; and a sort of succession had been observed. The Secretaryship of
State, as the
-I860]
421
chief place
among those held by the President’s advisers, had come to be looked upon as
next to the Presidency itself in the line of party preferment, and statesman
after statesman had passed through it to the chief national office. It was a sort
of parliamentary regime inherited from England, where parties had long
officered the government with their real leaders in legislation and policy; and
it had been readily maintained because in almost all the older States the
franchise had been in some degree restricted, and because there was a virtual
social hierarchy in New England no less than in the South, where society was
obviously aristocratic in its ideals of authority and precedence. The lawyers
and the ministers, university men for the most part, and schooled to represent
the prestige of training, of established forms, of learning, and of experience,
still wielded in New England a power almost as substantial as that which had
marked the authority of the governing class in the old colonies during the
early eighteenth century; and the lawyers were of course the active
politicians, an unquestioned preference being accorded all the while to certain
families, as for instance the Adams family—an order of affairs which any
Englishman of that generation might have recognised as natural and familiar
enough. But a day came when the older States and communities of the seaboard no
longer held their former undisputed place of governance in the politics of the
Union. The great westward movement had set in. By 1850 Kentucky, Tennessee,
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, and
California had been added to the roster of the States from the western lands,
where frontiersmen had founded a new democracy. Limitations upon the suffrage
began to be discredited and broken down: the new States did not adopt them, and
the old States in the face of their example could not keep them. Men without
the training or the social standards of the older parts of the country made
their way into affairs and grew impatient of the unsympathetic domination of
the eastern leaders by prerogative. They pushed their own propositions and
candidates, and presently thrust aside Virginians and Massachusetts men to make
Andrew Jackson President.
The breaking
up of the old order was accompanied by many significant innovations and
changes. State legislatures began to nominate candidates for the presidency;
the younger men and the local political managers grew very jealous of the
private and exclusive authority of congressional committees and “caucuses”; and
by 1832 a new and popular machinery of nomination had been substituted, in
which the part of public leadership was minimised and the art of getting votes
and organising majorities magnified. This was the nominating convention, which
has ever since been one of the chief instruments of party action in the United
States, not only naming the candidates for the presidential office, but also
giving authoritative formulation to the legislative and administrative programmes
of the parties, and so binding
their leaders
by a sort of plebiscite. In its nominating convention each party had thereafter
a governing body of its own, unrecognised by law, made up under the management
of the smaller sort of local politicians in the innumerable voting districts of
the several States, but dictating to Congress, pledging presidents beforehand
to certain courses of action; itself irresponsible, unofficial, temporary,
subject to be manipulated, swayed by sudden winds of passion. It showed a
singular aptitude for affairs on the part of scores of unknown men in the
widely separated communities of the country that this new, miscellaneous and
occasional assembly should be so promptly devised, so easily handled, and so
rapidly made into an established instrument of party government. By 1852 the
nominating convention had already become the regular means by which party
policy was to be determined and the personnel of the federal Executive chosen.
The
parliamentary regime had broken down because there was no organised method of
leadership in Congress and no responsible ministry at the head of a dominant
party and of the law-making Houses. The President’s “cabinet,” though in the
early years selected from among men who had seen service in Congress and were
the known and acknowledged leaders of their party, had never had a place on the
floor of Congress. Congressional committees had for many years after the
foundation of the government accepted the suggestions of the President and his
advisers in matters of legislation; bills had often been framed in the
executive departments which the Houses showed themselves very ready to adopt;
and the early Presidents had counted upon exercising a guiding influence in
legislation as a natural prerogative in view of their position as accepted
representatives of the nation. But Congress had by degrees broken away even
from this private connexion with the executive, this connexion of advice and
common counsel; and there had never been any public connexion whatever. The Houses
looked more and more exclusively to their own committees or to their own
private members for the bills which they were to act upon, and grew more and
more jealous of “outside” suggestions or assumptions of parliamentary
leadership. There was still always a nominal “Administration” party, and always
a party also of the “ Opposition,” in the House and Senate; but the
“Administration” party had grown every session more and more disposed to
dictate to the President rather than submit to his leadership; and Congress was
not homogeneous enough to follow distinct or consistent lines of action. It
was itself a miscellaneous body, made up, as the nominating conventions were
made up, by the free, non-cooperative choice of separate and differing
localities. There was no responsible leadership either in Congress or out of
it. And so irresponsible leadership was substituted, the leadership whose
function was in the electoral districts, in local campaign committees, in
newspaper offices, in the management that was private and away from the forum
of debate
where
questions of statesmanship seemed the determining factors in affairs.
The effect
upon parties was profound, and, when the slavery question forced its way to the
front, revolutionary. Local movements of opinion readily made themselves felt
in nominating conventions. The delegates from particular localities reflected
the most recent opinion of the people from amongst whom they had come; the
business of a convention was not to frame legislation, or even to say how it
could be framed, but only to reconcile and express opinion; the initiative was
with any one who could command the votes. If men of radical views found
themselves silenced or ignored in the convention of the party with which they
had been in the habit of acting, they could break away and organise a
convention of their own. New parties were continually springing up in times of
agitation, drawing strength from the old parties, diverting attention to new
and singular issues which had found no place in the ordinary party programmes,
making the task of statesmanship and consistent legislation so much the more
difficult and perplexing, and weakening parties without guiding them. The whole
system facilitated group movement and an insistence on separate and sectional
issues. Group movement inevitably made the regular parties nervous,
vacillating, uncertain of their strength, prone to compromise and artificial
make-shift reconciliation.
It was by
such a process that the virtual dissolution of parties was being made evident
in the years which preceded and followed the year 1852; and the question of
slavery was the chief dissolvent. The feeling against slavery had grown very
rapidly of late: not the feeling that slavery ought to be abolished in the
States in which it was already established—for everyone knew that there it was
a matter which the Constitution left entirely to the choice of the several
commonwealths themselves and put beyond the reach of federal legislation, and
beyond the reach therefore of national parties—but the “ Free-Soil ” feeling,
the feeling against every attempt to extend the slave-holding system to new
regions of settlement and force it upon new States. America had shared with the
rest of the world the great philanthropic movements of the earlier part of the
century. An “American Anti-Slavery Society” had been established in 1833, the
year which witnessed the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire;
and the men who organised that Society desired what William Lloyd Garrison
demanded in the columns of the Liberator, founded two years before, the
immediate and total abolition of slavery throughout the country, with or
without the sanction of the Constitution; or, if that were indeed impossible,
then the separation of the Free States from the Slave, in order that they at
any rate might be purged of the offence. But such sentiments and purposes had
not spread among the mass of the people. The institutions of the country had
been built from the first, deliberately and consciously built,
and in the
sight of all the people, upon law; and a singularly vivid legal sense
eveiywhere pervaded the nation. No one to whom the country gave serious heed
proposed any interference whatever with slavery in the South or in any Slave
State. But the number steadily grew of those who demanded that the purpose of
the southern leaders to obtain new territory for slavery in the West should be
checked and defeated: it grew not only in New England, where the abolitionists
were most numerous, but grew also, and assumed an even more practical tone and
definite way of action, in the northern tier of States to the westward, where
free communities in Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois lay in close
vicinity to the lands concerning which the fight for “free soil” as against
slavery must be fought out. Wherever there were new communities but just
springing up, there was a fresh choice to be made, it seemed, with regard to
slavery, in spite of nominal compromise after compromise, notwithstanding
so-called settlement after settlement of the matter, in Congress. It was a
question always open or to be opened until it should break national parties
asunder. It could never be closed so long as unoccupied territories were at
hand for which the fateful choice remained to be made.
It was the
independent groups of thinking men who had made up their minds to resist the
extension of slavery that began the work of disintegration which by 1852 had
gone so far. At first they deliberately avoided the formation of an independent
political party. They were of both parties, Whigs and Democrats; they felt the
compulsion of party allegiance still strong upon them, and rejected with
unaffected distaste every proposal to break away from and oppose their old
associates, whose creed and practice alike they still relished and sympathised
with in most things. They realised, too, the weakness and probable instability
of a party whose existence was founded, and staked, upon a single issue. For
long, therefore, they contented themselves with questioning individual
candidates for Congress, named by the regular parties, concerning their
opinions and purposes upon the slavery question, and gave or withdrew from them
their support according as their replies pleased or displeased them. It was
only when they saw how ineffectual this must prove, how casual, unsystematic,
haphazard, that they found themselves at length constrained to take independent
action. Then at last they held their own conventions, and even ventured their
own independent nominations for the Presidency, assuming the role of a national
organisation, a distinct Free-Soil party. Democrats and Whigs alike joined them
at first; but as time went on it turned out that they were to draw their
strength from the Whig rather than from the Democratic ranks. The Democratic
party depended for its organisation and leadership upon the South much more
than the Whig party did. It formed its purposes with regard to slavery,
therefore, much more readily and confidently, and kept up its spirit much more
naturally
1852-eo] The Know-Nothing party.
425
and
spontaneously in the face of the accumulating difficulties of the time: so that
timid and busy men, and men accustomed to follow leaders and take their cue in
politics from the clearest and most confident voices, left off doubting and
searching for a party and followed it, electing Pierce and leaving the Whig
party to go to pieces at its leisure.
The
uneasiness of the time showed itself in all sorts of abnormal whims and
diversions from the regular game of politics. Utter demoralisation fell upon
the Whigs after their defeat in 1852, and, seeing their place vacant, a new and
novel party pressed hopefully forward to take it. This was the “ American ”
party, whose motto was, “ Americans must rule America.” It had been brought
into existence by fears concerning the effects which the great foreign
immigration of the time might have, under the country’s too liberal
naturalisation and suffrage laws, upon the control of affairs both local and
national. It had not escaped general attention that the political disturbances
then so acute in Europe had brought exiles of a new type to the United States,
exiled agitators, political malcontents, men likely to be bitter, ambitious,
covert, and astute in seeking their objects in a new field; and the “American”
party had been formed to keep the government of the country in the hands of
natives of the old stock. The organisation of the party centred in a secret
club or Order, with its private councils and governing hierarchy; but no member
of the Order would admit his connexion with it. They all with one accord
professed entire ignorance of any such organisation; and the country dubbed
them, with a sort of piqued amusement, “Know-Nothings.” Regular party men were
inclined to make merry over the mysterious new body. “ It would seem as devoid
of the elements of persistence,” laughed Mr Horace Greeley, “ as an
anti-cholera or an anti-potato-rot party would be.” Nevertheless the
Know-Nothings showed surprising vitality. To join them seemed to many of the
disconcerted Whigs a hopeful way of withdrawing attention from the troublesome
slavery question. In the large towns and more populous cities, too, their
objects seemed very practical and desirable indeed; for there the new
immigrants naturally thronged and made themselves at home in threatening
numbers, and showed an ominous indifference to American standards of life and
action. For one reason or another, therefore, this singular party drew strength
to itself and played for a little while the role of political successor to the
Whigs.
Politics
moved upon a confused stage during the next eight years, years of critical
interest every one of them; but determining events followed each other in
quick, unbroken succession. A storm gathered and burst, and the crisis all had
waited for and dreaded came at last. For a little while it seemed as if the
presidential and congressional elections of 1852 had cleared the air and
restored a certain calm to affairs. If other parties had been broken and thrown
into confusion, the Democrats at
least were
united and in full possession of power. The Free-Soilers had lost, not gained,
in strength. President Pierce made William Marcy his Secretary of State, a man
who exercised authority as a member of the “ Albany Regency,” a group of astute
politicians in the State of New York who understood better than any other men
in the country the new art of organising conventions, and of turning local
majorities not only to local but also to national use. Jefferson Davis of
Mississippi had become Secretary of War, and brought to the support of the new
Administration the great southern wing of the victorious party. The new heads
of the government seemed established in the confidence of both sections of the
country, supported alike by perfected party machinery and by a decisive general
sentiment, and served and guided by capable, masterful men familiar with the
movements of opinion. Both in Congress and at the executive mansion the
Democrats took heart to be very bold, and to show their mastery.
Before the
year of his installation was over, President Pierce had purchased still more
territory from Mexico, in the region to which it seemed most likely that
slavery would ultimately be extended. He had really little choice in the
matter. Mexico still claimed a considerable tract of land in the far south-west
which the United States deemed included in the cessions of the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, a tract of more than forty-five thousand square miles lying
to the south of the Gila river; and a Mexican army, under the notorious Santa
Anna, had actually entered the region, as if to renew the war if Mexico’s claim
were not admitted. Pierce rightly thought it a prudent act of statesmanship to
purchase the disputed territory for ten million dollars. The purchase was
effected through Gadsden, of South Carolina, in December, 1853; and the
anti-slavery men everywhere noted the transaction with profound chagrin.
But worse was
to follow. Bad as it seemed to northern men to purchase new lands which must
stand open to slavery, under the compromises of recent legislation, at any
rate until the day when States should be erected upon them, it was of course
infinitely worse to abandon those compromises altogether, and deliberately open
every part of the country not yet formed into States to the spread of the fatal
institution. And yet that was what Stephen A. Douglas actually proposed and
carried through Congress before the end of May, 1854. He was one of the
senators from Illinois, and was but forty-one years of age, full of the rude,
straightforward strength and audacity which showed him to have been bred in the
free communities of the western country. He had been bom in Vermont, but had
gone West as a lad to make his way, and had there grown into the short, square,
coarse-fibred, thick- limbed, aggressive, vehement, eloquent man who seemed in
the Senate a sort of dwarfed giant, compact of the energy and daring of the
West. He confidently deemed himself, what many accepted him to be,
1854] Douglas and popular sovereignty.
427
the spokesman
and leader of his party in Congress. He more boldly and explicitly than any
other man pronounced the question of the extension or exclusion of slavery
where the western lands were filling up a thing to be determined by the
settlers themselves, upon a free principle of selfgovernment with which
Congress and the federal authorities ought not to interfere. And there was a
particular part of the western country to which he wished to see his principle
applied at once. This was the broad “ Platte country ” which lay within the
Louisiana purchase to the northward and westward of Missouri. Across it ran the
direct overland route to the Pacific, along which frequent waggon-trains moved
to and fro between California and the East. There was some danger that it might
be assigned as a reservation to the Indians and closed to settlement; and ever
since 1843, when he was a member of the House of Representatives, before the
days of the Mexican cessions, Douglas had been urging the erection of this great
stretch of prairie into a Territory, not as a road to the Pacific—for in those
days no one knew of the gold in California—but as a new home for settlers and
commonwealths.
Early in
January, 1854, being chairman of the Senate’s Committee on Territories, and
seeing his own party in power, he returned to his favourite scheme and
introduced a bill which provided for the creation of a Territory to be called
Nebraska, in the Platte country. Every previous proposal for the erection of
Territories within the region covered by this bill had assumed, as a matter
settled and of course, that slavery was to be excluded from it, under the
Compromise of 1820; for it lay north of the southern line of Missouri; but this
bill explicitly provided that the States subsequently to be formed out of the
new territory were to be left to decide the question of the introduction of
slavery for themselves, in accordance with what Senator Douglas called the
principle of “ popular sovereignty.” His opponents called it the doctrine of “
squatter sovereignty.” The bill was presently withdrawn and amended. When
reintroduced from the Committee on January 23, it provided for the creation of
two Territories instead of one—a Territory of Kansas, west of Missouri, and a
Territory of Nebraska, north-west of the old compromise State. But the
“Kansas-Nebraska Bill” did not differ from the measure for which it was
substituted in the matter of slavery. It was declared in the new bill to be the
“ true intent and meaning ” of the Act, “not to legislate slavery into any
Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people
thereof perfectly free to regulate their domestic institutions in their own
way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.” It extended all
laws of the United States, including the Fugitive Slave Law, to the new
Territories, but explicitly excepted “the eighth section of the Act preparatory
to the admission of Missouri into the Union,”—the compromise section, which had
been considered one of the foundations of national politics. That
section it
pronounced “inconsistent with the principles of non-intervention by Congress
with slavery in the States and Territories, as recognised by the legislation of
1850,” and expressly “declared inoperative and void.”
It was
certainly an astonishing measure, conceived in the true spirit of the school of
statesmen to which Senator Douglas belonged. No doubt its very audacity was
what chiefly commended it to Douglas; no doubt, too, he believed it
strategically as wise as it was daring. The southern men had never dreamed of
demanding a measure which should repeal the now venerable Missouri Compromise,
and open all the Territories to slavery; parties wanted nothing so much as rest
and oblivion of past excitements, if that might be had; a session of ordinary
routine would have been welcomed on all hands as a pleasing programme of peace.
But to the party leaders who hearkened to Douglas’ counsels it seemed best to
use their present power to have done with compromises and make all the future
plain by the adoption of the simple, obvious and consistent principle of “
squatter sovereignty.” Unexpected and revolutionary as the Bill was, it of
course pleased the slavery men extremely, and majorities were found for it in
both Houses. In the Senate 37 to 14 was the vote; and in the House 113 to 100.
Forty-four northern Democrats voted against the measure in the House; but as
many more were ready to follow Douglas. Nine southern members looked askance
at the new thing and voted “No”; but most of them received it gladly. On May 30
the President signed the Bill, and it became law. He had been consulted
beforehand about it, as it seems, and had expressed his approval of it, saying
that he thought it founded “upon a sound principle, which the Compromise of
1820 infringed upon,” and to which he was willing to return.
Notable
debates had accompanied the passage of the Bill. There were men in both Houses
who were ready to speak very plainly even upon this most thorny question. The
most noticeable and influential group of these was to be found in the Senate.
There William H. Seward, of New York, and Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, had been
since 1849. The elections of 1849 had turned in no small degree upon the
question of the extension of slavery to the great Pacific region then newly
acquired from .Mexico; and the Whigs of the New York legislature had sent
Seward to the Senate to represent them in their wish that the new soil might be
free soil. Chase had been chosen by the Democrats of the Ohio legislature to
perform a like service for the “ Free-soilers ” of his party. They wanted no
new party. They held still very loyally to their party connexions. But upon the
subject of slavery their convictions would admit of no compromise. Four years
before, in the debates on the compromise measures of 1850, Seward had declared
that he deemed the common domain of the Union in tfye West devoted to justice
and liberty not only by the Constitution but
also by “ a
higher law than the Constitution ”; and had earnestly avowed the conviction
that slavery even within the Slave States must eventually give way “ to the
salutary instructions of economy and to the ripening influences of humanity.” “
All measures which fortify slavery or extend it,” he declared, “ tend to the consummation
of violence: all that check its extension or abate its strength, tend to its
peaceful extirpation.” This was a new voice and counsel in affairs; but since
1850 four more aggressive men of the same way of thinking had come to recruit
Seward and Chase in the Senate. Ohio had added Benjamin Wade; New York,
Hamilton Fish; Massachusetts had sent Charles Sumner, and Vermont Solomon
Foote; and Douglas had been obliged to take account of the rising influence of
every one of these in debate and upon the opinion of the country. He ought to
have been warned as much by the conservative temper as by the radical speech of
such a man as Charles Sumner. Sumner spoke upon occasion words of passion, but
never words of revolution. He knew the limits of the Constitution and did not
wish to transcend them. He had no desire, he said, to touch the system of
slavery where it was already established as part of the social order and upon
foundations of valid law; but he did mean to resist its extension to the
utmost, and brought talents of no mean sort to the task. He believed it
demonstrable that the Constitution gave Congress complete power, over this as
over every other matter, in the Territories.
Nothing,
however, shook the confidence or daunted the audacity of the Democratic
leaders. Every compromise was abandoned, even the Compromise of 1820, which had
stood and been reckoned on for a generation. The settlers upon new lands must
be permitted to admit or exclude slaves as they chose. But when ? Now, while
the districts they were setting up homes in were under federal law as
Territories; or after a while, when all the first processes of settlement were
past and finished, and the time had come to frame a State constitution ? The
Kansas- Nebraska statute did not answer that question; but no practical man, of
the stuff that settlers are made of, could hesitate long what answer must be
given. It would be too late when the time for constitution-making came: by that
time facts would have effectually answered it. Either the Territory would then
be full of slave-holders with their slaves, or it would not be. Whoever should
possess the land would make its laws. The federal authorities, it seemed, were
to stand aside, neutral, uninterested: thus, then, it must be determined by the
fact of possession, by whoever should have the power. Douglas and his
followers must have been startled to observe how instantaneously the country
saw and acted on these very obvious and practical considerations; and must have
trembled when they saw a race for possession turn into civil war.
There was no
longer debate; that was ended, and argument gave
430
[l854—6
place to
action. Kansas became the theatre of a perilous appeal to fact, which turned
out to be an appeal to force. A Slave State lay neighbour to it on the east,
and slave-owners were the first to pour across its borders and occupy it
against the day of final settlement; but, though the men out of the Free States
came later, they came in hosts and companies when they did come; they had
behind them the organised assistance of societies and large funds subscribed in
the Free States of the North and East; and they came bringing arms as well as
tools. The country almost held its breath as it waited to hear what news should
come out of Kansas; and it had not to wait long before it knew. Within two
years the demoralising game for power there had been played and lost and
won—won by the settlers out of the Free States; but not before blood had been
shed and Federal troops sent in to prevent anarchy. The Missouri settlers,
being first on the ground, had very promptly acted upon their initial advantage
; had organised a territorial government; and had enacted stringent penal laws
against whosoever should in any way interfere with the introduction or
perpetuation of slavery. But the Free-State settlers, pouring in from the
North, ignored what the Missouri men had done and attempted to set up a
government of their own. When they found that course forbidden by the federal
authorities, they took the other, of sending majorities to the polls where a
new territorial legislature was to be chosen. Partisans on both sides went
armed; there were fatal riots at the voting places; blood was shed deliberately
and by plot as well as in the heat of sudden brawls; fearful days of embittered
passion in the distracted Territory made men everywhere presently talk of “
bleeding Kansas ”; but out of the fire came a definite enough settlement at
last. A Free-State majority established “squatter sovereignty” very
effectually; and by midsummer of 1856 the House of Representatives had passed a
bill, which the Senate rejected, for the admission of Kansas into the Union
under a constitution which forbade slavery.
Here was
evidence plain enough for any man to read of the beneficent operation of
Douglas’ pretty theory of popular right in the organisation of Territories and
the formation of States. The country saw with sad forebodings what it meant;
partisanship everywhere was inflamed and put in a mind to go any lengths of
violence; individual passion broke through all restraints; and prudent men were
sore put to it to keep their comrades in affairs to the sober ways of
moderation and law. It was in May, 1856, that Preston Brooks, a young
Carolinian member of the House of Representatives, strode into the Senate and
assaulted Sumner where he sat, for words of personal bitterness uttered in
debate, striking him to the floor insensible; and it was one of the unhappiest
signs of the times that such an act of blind anger and passionate folly was
condoned and even applauded, not condemned, by the constituents of the man who
had done it. No wonder excitement
gathered head
and statesmen grew infinitely uneasy when such things could happen.
The year 1856
brought another presidential election. It was a year, therefore, when every
force that was astir came into the open and added to the manifest and
perplexing confusion of affairs. There had been signs beforehand of what was
coming. In the autumn of the very year in which the Kansas-Nebraska bill was
carried through the House of Representatives (1854), the majority which had
carried it was destroyed. All “ Anti-Nebraska men ” drew away from it to
destroy it. They did not draw together. Though “Free-Soilers,” they did not relish
as yet the idea of connecting themselves with the separate and avowed Free-Soil
party; but joined themselves for the nonce to any independent group which
promised them the satisfaction of uttering their protest against what the
Democrats were doing, without withdrawing them wholly from their old
allegiance. It was then that the Know-Nothings had their opportunity. A great
many of the most deeply discontented voters were Whigs. They were still
sensible of the compulsion of their lifelong party feeling; and it was more
palatable to them to be Know-Nothings than to join with radicals who seemed
inclined still further to jeopardise the peace of the country by forcing the
formation of a party of revolt, upon the single and dangerous issue of slavery.
In the elections of 1854, therefore, the Know-Nothings not only secured a
number of seats in Congress but also elected their candidates for the
governorship in Massachusetts and Delaware; and within another year they had
actually carried the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, Kentucky, and California, besides polling votes which
fell very little short of being majorities in no less than six of the southern
States, where the proper issues of the “ American ” party had no natural place
or significance at all.
The House of
Representatives chosen in the autumn of 1854 presented a curious and hitherto
unknown medley of groups and elements: Democrats, Anti-Nebraska men,
Free-Soilers, Southern pro-slavery Whigs, and Know-Nothings—no regular Whig
party being left, and as yet no fixed or certain combination of parties to fill
its place. It took two months to elect a Speaker and organise the House for
business; and, by the time that was done, the year had arrived in which a new
President must be elected, and parties were once more re-forming for a fresh
contest for the control of the Executive. When once the process of
recombination had been definitely and deliberately begun it was pushed forward
to its consummation with extraordinary rapidity. Before the presidential
campaign of 1856 had been set in order for the time of voting, a new party was
in the field, strong, confident, aggressive. Almost all “Anti-Nebraska men,” of
whatever former allegiance in politics, had drawn together as the “Republican”
party; and the first year of their new organisation did not go by before they
had won
popular
majorities in fifteen States, elected or won over to themselves one hundred and
seventeen members of the House of Representatives, and secured eleven votes in
the Senate. Representatives of all the older parties came together in their
ranks, in novel agreement, their purposes mastered and brought into imperative
concert by the signal crisis which had been precipitated upon the country by
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. They got their programme from the Free-
Soilers, whom they bodily absorbed; their radical and aggressive spirit from
the Abolitionists, whom they received without liking; their liberal views upon
constitutional questions from the Whigs, who constituted both in numbers and in
influence the commanding element among them; and their popular impulses from
the Democrats, who did not leave behind them their faith in their old party
ideals.
The contest
for the Presidency narrowed itself at once to a struggle between the Democrats
and this new union of their opponents. The Know-Nothings met in convention in
February, and nominated Fillmore; but when it came to the vote in November
they succeeded in choosing their electors nowhere but in the little State of
Delaware. The Republicans could not hold a really national convention : no
States south of Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky sent delegates to assist them
at their nomination; and they nominated no statesman of their new faith, but
John C. Fremont, a popular young soldier who had aided very efficiently in the
conquest of California in the war with Mexico, and who had hitherto been
reckoned a Democrat. In the election, nevertheless, they secured one hundred
and fourteen electoral votes for their candidate, as against one hundred and
seventy-four for the Democratic nominee. They carried every State of the north
and north-west except Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, and Illinois; showed
themselves practically the only party of opposition in the north-west; and
polled a popular vote of 1,341,264, to their opponents’ 1,838,169. The
political field of battle was once more ordered and in set array. The issue had
been very definitely joined. The Democrats had nominated James Buchanan, of
Pennsylvania, who was then the Minister of the United States in London. He had
been out of the country during these last years of heat and bitterness; but the
platform of principles adopted by the convention which nominated him had
endorsed the Compromise legislation of 1850 and what was now known to be its
natural corollary, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, as explicitly as the
Republicans had repudiated them; and Buchanan himself had joined with the
American ministers in France and Spain (October 18, 1854) in advising the
government of the United States to acquire the island of Cuba,—by purchase if
possible, by force if necessary. That was in substance to advise, as the
country then looked at it, the addition of more slave territory; and the advice
had been tendered just after the Gadsden purchase in the south-west, and at a
time, as it presently appeared,
when lawless
men were planning and organising armed expeditions for the conquest of still
more slave territory in Central America. Buchanan’s election to the Presidency
meant the ascendancy, at least for a time, of the party which, frankly enough,
supported the southern interest.
The four
years of his term of office (March 4,1857, to March 4,1861) afforded space
enough in which to fight the battle of parties to a finish. For a little while
the anxiety of the country was diverted from politics to business. The year
1857 was a year of very serious commercial depression, paying the penalty for
years of confident and adventurous speculation. For ten years, since 1846, the
country had felt the exhilaration and excitement of a rapid business expansion,
which the discovery of gold in California had greatly quickened. Capital had
run confidingly to new enterprises; loans had been easy to get; railroads and
steamships had opened the channels of commerce, old and new, wider than ever
before, both at home and abroad, and had greatly multiplied its routes in every
direction; an era of invention had accompanied and occasioned unprecedented
advances in the mechanic arts, affecting both agriculture and manufactures.
Under the unwonted stimulus, sound business methods had not unnaturally given
place to reckless speculation. Money was quickly enough invested, but was very
slow to yield an increase. Enterprise after enterprise proved a dead loss. The
banks of the country afforded no currency that could command confidence. Each
State chartered banks of issue, and made its own laws, good, bad, and
indifferent, for giving credit to their notes. There was no national regulation
or oversight; no one could know which issues were safe, which unsafe.
Enterprise was paid for in promises to pay, until of a sudden there came a day
of reckoning: the inevitable contraction of loans; a season of failures and
disillusionment; hard fact in the place of hope; painful disclosures of
wholesale dishonesty, of defalcations and systematic fraud. The entire fabric
of business came down with a crash, and panic had a long and doleful reign.
The
population of the country had kept to its steady rate of increase from decade
to decade as if unaffected by politics,—every ten years showing an increase of
from thirty-two to thirty-five per cent. The decade 1850-60 was no exception.
The numbers of the census rose by more than eight millions. But it was impossible
that population should follow industry as fast as it was being pushed between
1846 and 1857. Bail- roads were built where there were neither farms nor towns
to support them; sometimes upon open reaches of the continent, which the plough
had never touched. The federal government had helped trade forward as it could.
In 1850, while the great migration to the gold-fields of California was in full
stream, it had seemed certain that an inter-oceanic canal would be cut through
the Isthmus of Panama, and a most enlightened and satisfactory treaty with
regard to its political oversight, its neutrality and disinterested management
for the use of the world,
484
[l857
had been
entered into by Great Britain and the United States,—a treaty known in the
United States as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, because negotiated by John M.
Clayton, President Taylor’s Secretary of State, and Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer,
the British Minister. In 1854 trade had obtained the advantage of a reciprocity
treaty with Great Britain, by which important rights were given and taken in
respect of commerce with the British possessions in North America and the
fisheries of New England and Nova Scotia; as well as of a treaty with Japan,
negotiated by Commodore Perry, which secured a beginning, at any rate, of
commercial intercourse between that country and the United States. But no
growth of population or facilitation of trade could keep pace with the
artificial work of speculation. The bubbles of fatuous enterprise were pricked,
and a crisis of wholesale loss, panic, and depression occurred in spite of
every token of trade and profit to come.
Congress did
what it could to relieve the distress. It was feared that the high tariff rates
then prevailing were drawing too much of the money1 needed by the
banks into the Treasury of the United States; and a modification of the tariff
laws was promptly effected, in the short session of Congress which followed the
elections of 1856. Party interests no longer centred in financial questions: slavery
had drawn passion off, and the congressional leaders co-operated with singular
temperateness and sobriety in a modification of the law. Many of the raw
materials of manufacture were put on the free list, and the duty on protected
articles was reduced to twenty-four per cent. That was all that the government
could do. The crisis could not be prevented. Throughout the year trade and
industry were at a hopeless standstill: the autumn brought no revival. There
was nothing for it but to wait for a slow and painful recuperation.
Even in the
presence of almost universal pecuniary distress or anxiety, politics seemed
inevitably to take precedence of every private concern. President Buchanan’s
inauguration occurred in the very midst of the troubled times in Kansas, when
the struggle there still hung in a doubtful balance; and he had been in office
but a few days when the Supreme Court of the United States pronounced a
decision which added a new and deeply significant element both to the
importance and to the excitement of the contest in the unhappy Territory. This
was its decision in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford. Dred Scott was a negro
slave whose master, an army surgeon, had carried him for a brief period of
residence first into the State of Illinois, where slavery was illegal, and then
to a military post situated in the public domain further to the westward from
which slavery had been excluded by the Compromise legislation of 1820;
afterwards returning with him to Missouri, his home. The negro claimed that his
residence in the free State of Illinois had operated to destroy his master’s
right over him; and the case instituted in his behalf before the Courts had
come at this critical
juncture, by
appeal, to the Supreme Court. That tribunal held that the lower Court had had
no jurisdiction: that Dred Scott, at any rate after his return with his master
to Missouri, was a slave, and not a citizen, and had no standing in the Courts.
That was the only point it was necessary to decide, and might have ended the matter.
But a majority of the judges persuaded themselves that they should go further
jud expound the whole question of the status of slavery in the Territories of
the United States, though they must in doing so, in the opinion of every
discriminating lawyer, be speaking obiter. Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a
majority of his colleagues, declared it the opinion of the Court that it was
not within the constitutional power of Congress to forbid citizens of any of
the States to carry their property, no matter of what sort, into the public
domain, or even to authorise the regularly constituted legislature of an
organised Territory to forbid this, though it were property in slaves: that
only States could regulate that matter. If this were law, the Missouri Compromise
had been invalid from the first; even “ popular sovereignty,” to which Douglas
looked for the settlement of the question, could do no authoritative thing
until it spoke its purpose in a State constitution. The Free-Soilers were
beyond their right at every point.
To the
Republicans the decision could seem nothing less than a stinging blow in the
face. They were made to feel the smart of being stigmatised as disloyal to the
Constitution. No doubt the judges had thought to quiet opinion and sustain the legislation
of 1854; but instead they infinitely exasperated it. Their judgment gave the
last touch of dramatic interest to the struggle in Kansas, now nearing its
turning- point and culmination. In October, 1857, the Free-Soil settlers of
Kansas got control of the territorial legislature at the polls; but not before
the pro-slaver)r men, hitherto in power, had made a last attempt to
fix slavery upon the future State. They had hastened before the autumn
elections came on to assemble a convention and frame a constitution (September,
1857), and to see that their application for admission to the Union was at
Washington in due form before the Free-Soil men could intervene and undo their
work. President Buchanan decided to sustain them, judging at least the formal
right of application to be really theirs. But Congress would not go with him.
It was Democratic in both houses; but Douglas remembered his principles with
manly consistency. It was known before Congress acted that a majority of the
voters of the Territory did not in fact desire a pro-slavery State
constitution; and he would not force a constitution upon a majority. There were
members enough in his immediate following to control the action of the Houses,
and Kansas was refused admission to the Union—pending the further contest of
parties.
President
Buchanan’s Administration inevitably incurred the suspicion, throughout all
this trying business, of being conducted in the southern
436
Election campaign in
Illinois.
[l858
interest; and
in the excitement of the time the President was suspected of things of which he
was quite incapable. It was charged and believed that the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case had been a thing concerted between the
President and the Chief Justice, though the President’s character made such a
calumny inexcusable. He was a man of unsullied integrity, and punctilious in
the performance of what he considered to be his duty. He was past the prime of
life, had never possessed great courage or any notable gifts of initiative, and
of course suffered himself to be guided by the men whom he regarded, and had
good reason to regard, as the real leaders of the Democratic party. Only two
States in the North had voted for him, and only two in the North-West: the
Democratic party, which had chosen him President, was, happily or unhappily, in
fact a party chiefly manned and guided from the South. He had called southern
men of influence into his Cabinet in whose character and capacity he justly and
implicitly believed. He took their advice because he believed it to be honest
and authoritative. But the country grew infinitely restive and uneasy to see
one section rule. It was Mr Buchanan’s chief fault, if fault it was, not that
he yielded to improper influences, as his opponents unjustly believed, but that
he did not judge and act for himself. He was weak; and weakness was under the
circumstances fatal.
The year 1858
brought abundant signs of a great reaction, and it soon became only too plain
that the Democratic party was driving the bulk of the country into opposition.
It was the year of a general election. As the autumn approached, those who
watched affairs found the critical issues of the time more and more sharply
fixed and determined in their, thought, and their convictions grew more and
more vivid and definite. Nothing conduced more to this result than a notable
debate reported from Illinois. The Republicans of Illinois had made a
determined effort to keep Douglas from re-election to the Senate. They had
announced that, should they succeed in obtaining a majority in the State
legislature, they meant to send Abraham Lincoln to the Senate in Douglas’
stead; and the autumn campaign in Illinois became for ever memorable because in
its course Douglas and Lincoln went about the State together and argued their
claims for support face to face, upon city platforms and upon country
platforms, in the presence of the voters. The striking individuality of the two
men gave singular piquancy to the contest as well as their power of
straightforward, unmistakeable definiteness of speech. Douglas was a national
character, one of the acknowledged leaders of a great party; Lincoln was a
comparatively unknown mein, a shrewd lawyer and local politician. His long,
gaunt, ungainly figure, his slouching gait, his homely turns of phrase marked
him a frontiersman. His big, bony hands had wrought at the hard tasks of the
forest and the farm. But his rough exterior did not repel the plain people to
whom he spoke, alongside the more adroit and
1858]
437
finished
Douglas; and no one could hear his speech and think him common. He had taken
his own way of learning to the bar. The passion for letters had been strong
upon him since a boy, and his selftraining had with unerring instinct followed
a fine plan of mastery. By reasoning upon the principles of the law, as they
came to him out of a few text-books, by poring upon books of mathematics, by
reading up and down through such books of history or adventure as fell in his
way in search of the experience of other men, by constant intimacy of talk and
play of argument with men of every kind to whom he had access, he had made
himself a master of brief and careful statement, of persuasion, and of oral
debate: thoughtful, observant, steering in what he said by an unfluctuating
compass of logieal precision, and above all lucid, full of homely wit and
anecdote such as was fit to illuminate practical subjects, and uttering phrases
which found the heart of what he talked of, sometimes phrases which struck his
opponent like a blow, but fair, unmalicious, intellectual, not passionate.
His
definition of the matter to be settled between the parties was characteristic
of him. “ A house divided against itself,” he said, “ cannot stand. I believe
this government cannot endure half slave and half free. I do not expect the
house to fall, but I expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one
thing or all the other.” Douglas found him a veiy uncomfortable antagonist, who
drove him to awkward admissions. Before their debate was over Douglas was no
longer within reach of the Presidency; and Abraham Lincoln had won the ear of
the whole country. The southern men could not vote for Douglas as the nominee
and spokesman of their party. He had been forced under Lincoln’s fire to admit
that Congress could not empower a territorial legislature, its own creature, to
do what, if the Dred Scott decision spoke true law, it was itself unable to do;
that southern settlers, therefore, could no more legalise slavery within a Territory
than northern settlers could exclude it: that “ popular sovereignty ” was no
solution, after all. The Republicans did not obtain a majority in the Illinois
legislature; Douglas went back to the Senate; but he went back weakened and
with loss of authority. The elections of the autumn, taking the country as a
whole, gave the Republicans success enough to show how near at hand a crisis
was. They increased their numbers materially in both House and Senate, carried
Buchanan’s own State of Pennsylvania by a handsome majority, and made it very
evident that opinion was swinging their way. In the House of Representatives,
indeed, they were put in a position of virtual control: for no coherent party
had a working majority there. The “Douglas Democrats,” who had refused to vote
for the admission of Kansas with a pro-slavery constitution, were now hardly
an integral part of the Democratic party; there was still a group of twenty-two
Know-Nothings; and the Republicans held the balance of power.
438
Growth of anti-slavery
forces.
And yet the
President and his advisers were by no means daunted. It was after the elections
that Buchanan sent his annual message to Congress; and in it he insisted that
the United States ought to secure possession of Cuba, assume a protectorate
over severs1, of the nearer States of the dissolving Mexican
republic, and establish definite rights of control over the Isthmus. He was
still, as the Republicans read his motives, bent upon the acquisition of slave
territory. The entrance of the Republican party upon the stage of politics had
singularly quickened the pace of affairs. Its clear-cut, aggressive purposes
seemed to give definiteness also to the Democratic programme. A sharp rigour
pervaded the air. It startled conservative men to feel the movement as of
revolution in the stir of opinion. Such debates as now marked the whole course
of politics, such contests uncompromisingly provoked and ordered, gave plain
threat of what all men dreaded, of disunion,— nothing less. The South
explicitly threatened disunion, and yet disliked it as intensely and almost as
unanimously as it resented the exclusion of slavery from the Territories. The
North dreaded disunion infinitely; and yet dreaded the unchecked and general
ascendancy of the slave-interest even more. Both sides pushed forward; but both
with a great fear at their hearts. A sinister fate seemed riding at the front
of affairs.
The power
which obviously grew was the power of the North; the power which waned and was
obviously threatened with extinction was that of the South. In May, 1858, the
free State of Minnesota entered the Union, under an enabling Act passed by the
last Congress of President Pierce’s administration; and in February, 1859, the
free State of Oregon was admitted by the Congress which had refused to admit
Kansas under a pro-slavery constitution. Until 1848, when the slavery question
came finally to the top in politics, the sections had balanced one another in
the Senate: there were as many slave-holding States as free,—thirty senators
from States which legalised, thirty from States which forbade, slavery. But now
the balance was destroyed, as Calhoun had foreseen it would be: there were
still not more than thirty senators from slave- holding States, while there
were thirty-six from free States. In the House the numbers stood at ninety to
one hundred and forty-seven. For in the House population was represented; and
the South, which had stood equal with the North in numbers at the making of the
Constitution, had long since fallen far behind. Not only had the population of
the North grown very much faster, but to the North had been added the great
makeweight of the North-west, from the whole of which slavery was, in fact if
not in law, excluded, and, if the Republicans triumphed, excluded for ever. The
ways of compromise were abandoned, discredited : the one section or the other
must now secure everything or lose everything.
As if the
crisis were not already sharp enough, conspiracy was added to the open battle
of politics. On the night of Sunday, October 17,
1859]
439
1859, one
John Brown, at the head of a little band of less than twenty followers, seized
the United States arsenal at Harper’s Ferry in Virginia, meaning to strike
there a sudden blow for the freedom of the slaves, and, having set a servile
insurrection aflame, make good his retreat to the mountains. It was the mad
folly of an almost crazed fanatic; the man was quickly taken and promptly
hanged: his flame of war had flickered and died in the socket. But that was not
all. Brown was from Kansas; he had come to Virginia, at midsummer in that
anxious year 1859, with the stain still fresh upon him of some of the bloodiest
of the lawless work done there in the name of freedom: a terrible outlaw,
because an outlaw for conscience’ sake; intense to the point of ungovernable
passion; heeding nothing but his own will and sense of right; a revolutionist
upon principle; lawless, incendiary, and yet seeking nothing for himself. He
brought arms and means to Virginia with which he had been supplied out of New
England, not for use in the South, but for use in Kansas. But southern men were
not in a temper to discriminate. If northern men would pay for the shedding of
blood in Kansas, why not for the shedding of blood in Virginia also P Slavery
was the object of the attack, and the slaveholders saw little difference, great
as the difference was, between Abolitionists and Free-Soilers. And this
terrible warning at Harper’s Ferry was of a sort to put even cool men out of
temper for just and sober thinking. A slave insurrection meant what it maddened
southern men to think of: massacre, arson, an unspeakable fate for women and
children. If this was what “ anti-slavery ” meant, it must be met and fought to
the death, Union or no Union.
It was in
such a season of disturbed and headstrong judgment that the presidential
campaign of *1860 came on. The Democrats were the first to attempt a
nomination; but their convention proved a house divided against itself and went
hopelessly to pieces ; and the outcome was two “ Democratic ” nominations. One
section of the party nominated Douglas for the presidency; the other, which was
the southern section, named John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky as its candidate.
A new party sprang into existence, the “ Constitutional Union ” party, made up
of those who had been Know-Nothings until the Know-Nothing party died of
inanition, and of those who had left the other parties but had found it
impossible to digest the Know-Nothing creed—of all who feared alike the
Democratic and the Republican extremes of policy and doctrine, and still hoped
the quarrel might be composed. These nominated John Bell of Tennessee, and
declared in a platform of great simplicity and dignity that they recognised “
no political principle other than the Constitution of the country, the union of
the States,,and the enforcement of the laws.” The Republicans alone were united
and confident. They warmly disavowed all sympathy with attempts of any kind to
disturb slavery where it was established by law; but',they declared as flatly
as ever against the extension of slavery to the Territories;
and they
nominated, not Mr Seward, the chief figure of their party,—for many felt a
distrust of him as a sort of philosophical radical,—but Abraham Lincoln of
Illinois, the shrewd, persuasive, courageous, capable man who had loomed so big
in the memorable debates with, Do'iglas three years before. Their convention
had sat at. Chicago, in Mr Lincoln’s own State., , The cheers of the galleries
and the astute combinations and diplomacy of his, friends in their work among
the delegates had played as great a part as his own gifts and popularity in
obtaining for him the nomination. But when once he had been named the whole
country began to see how wise the choice had been. Eastern men for a little
while looked askance upon this raw western lawyer and new statesman: but not
after they had heard him. And when the votes were counted it was found that he
had been elected President of the United States. One hundred and eighty of the
electoral votes went to him; only one hundred and three to his three opponents
combined.
It was a
singular result, when analysed. The electoral votes of Virginia, Tennessee, and
Kentucky had gone to John Bell, the nominee of the “Constitutional Union”
party; the rest of the southern votes had gone to Breckinridge; Douglas had
received only the votes of Missouri and three of the nine votes of New Jersey.
And yet, although these amounted to but one hundred and three votes altogether
in the electoral college, the total popular vote at the back of them was
2,823,74)1, as against a popular vote for Lincoln of only 1,866,452, —a popular
majority of almost a million votes against the Bepublicans, —so large was the
aggregate minority in the States whose electoral votes the Bepublicans had won.
It was a narrow victory, no popular triumph; and Lincoln, like the other
leaders of his^party, was disposed to use it with the utmost good temper and
moderation.
But southern
men took no comfort from the figures and did not listen to protestations of
just purpose. They looked only at, the result, saw only that the government was
to be in the hands of the Bepublicans, regarded the defeat as final and
irreparable. Their pride was stung to the quick by the unqualified moral
censures put upon them by those who were now to be in power. “The whole course
of the South had been described as one of systematic iniquity.” Mrs Stowe’s
striking, and pathetic picture of what slavery sometimes led to, in her Uncle
Torres Cabin (1852), had been accepted in the North and by the Englishspeaking
world at. large as a picture of what it usually led to. “ Southern society had
been represented as built upon a wilful sin; the southern people had been held
up to the world as those who deliberately despised the most righteous commands
of religion. They knew that they did not deserve such reprobation. They knew
that their lives were honourable, their relations with their slaves humane,
their responsibility for the existence of slavery amongst them remote”; and
that now those who had most bitterly and unjustly accused them were to become
their
I860]
441
rulers. It
seemed to them, too, that the North itself had of late practised nullification
in its fight against them. More than a score of the States had passed “
personal liberty ” laws which were confessedly intended to bar and render
impracticable the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law. The South Carolina
legislature, which itself chose the presidential electors of the State, had
remained in session to learn the result of the election. When it knew that
Lincoln was to be President, it summoned a Constitutional Convention, which
severed the State’s connexion with the Union; and before Lincoln was inaugurated
six other southern States had followed South Carolina out of the Union.
The
inevitable disintegration of the Union, by reason of the operation of the
institution of slavery, had worked its perfect work. The South, which did not
change, had become a region apart; and it now put the Union aside in accordance
with the theory with respect to its authority which it conceived to have
obtained at its constitution. There was here nothing of the contradiction which
seemed to lie at the heart of nullification; the South was not resisting the
Union and yet purposing to remain within it. It had taken the final step of
withdrawal : the partnership was dissolved. If that were revolution it was at
least revolution within the original theory of the law as the South had learned
it.
The issue
was—slavery? Yes, upon the surface. Perhaps it need never have come to this,
had Douglas kept his hand from the law. The movement against slavery had been
weak, occasional, non-partisan until the Missouri Compromise was repealed, ten
years before. It was that which had brought the Republican party into existence
and set the sections by the ears. But now that the breach had come, it did not
seem to men in the South merely a contest about slavery: it seemed, rather, so
far as the South was concerned, a final question and answer as to the
fundamental matter of self-government. There were many men in the South who,
while they had no love for slavery, had a great love, a deep inherited
veneration even, for the Union, but with whom the passion for the ancient
principles, the ancient sentiment, of self-government was greater even than
these, and covered every subject of domestic policy. It was this they deemed
threatened now. Slavery itself was not so dark a thing as it was painted. It
held the South at a standstill economically, and was her greatest burden,
whether she felt it to be so or not. Bad men, too, could shamefully abuse the
boundless powers of a master. But humane sentiment held most men steadily and
effectually off from the graver abuses. The domestic slaves, at any rate, and
almost all who were much under the master’s eye, were happy and well cared for;
and the poor creatures who crowded the great plantations where the air was
malarial and where the master was seldom present to restrain the overseer, were
little worse off than free labourers would have been in a like case, or any
labourers who could live there.
Those who
condemned slavery as it existed in the South condemned it unjustly because they
did so without discrimination; and those who attacked it with adverse laws
seemed to invade the privileges of self- governing States under the
Constitution. Thus it was that Lincoln’s election meant secession, and that the
stage was set for the tragedy of civil war.
For the whole
country it was to be the bitterest of all ordeals, an agony of struggle and a
decision by blood; but for one party it was to be a war of hope. Should the
South win, she must also lose—must lose her place in the great Union which she
had loved and fostered, and must in gaining independence destroy a nation.
Should the North win, she would confirm a great hope and expectation, establish
the Union, unify it in institutions, free it from interior contradictions of
life and principle, set it in the way of consistent growth and unembarrassed
greatness. The South fought for a principle, as the North did: it was this that
was to give the war dignity, and supply the tragedy with a double motive. But
the principle for which the South fought meant standstill in the midst of change;
it was conservative, not creative; it was against drift and destiny; it
protected an impossible institution and a belated order of society; it
withstood a creative and imperial idea), the idea of a united people and a
single law of freedom. Overwhelming material superiority, it turned out, was
with the North; but she had also another and greater advantage: she was to
fight for the Union and for the abiding peace, concord, and strength of a great
nation.
THE CIVIL
WAR: I.
(1) President Lincoln.
The election of Abraham Lincoln as President of the
United States, on November 6, 1860, was the culmination and final decision of
the long political struggle between the North and the South over the question
of slavery.
Descended
from several generations of pioneers, Abraham Lincoln was bom in the backwoods
of Kentucky on February 12, 1809. His childhood and youth were passed amid the
poverty and rude experiences of the frontier. The fever of westward emigration
caused his father to move from Kentucky to Indiana in 1816, and from Indiana to
Illinois in 1830, when, having reached the age of twenty-one, the son,
following usual custom, left the home-cabin to begin life on his own account.
In rude elementary schools he obtained during his boyhood an aggregate of about
one year’s tuition from five different teachers. The reading, writing and
ciphering thus learned he supplemented with diligent study of the few books
that fell within his reach, so that at his majority, when he had grown to the
stature of six feet four inches, with unusual physical strength and skill in
frontier athletics, he also wrote a clear hand, and could express his thoughts
in plain but concise and forcible language. Two flat-boat voyages on the great
rivers to New Orleans, one from Indiana and the other from Illinois, gave him a
glimpse of his country beyond his immediate neighbourhood.
In the
representative institutions of the New World, politics afforded the most
frequent and easy avenue to distinction; and the acquirements and aptitudes of
the tall stripling, who had begun life as a day-labourer, gave him a popularity
which secured him four successive biennial elections to the State legislature.
In these new surroundings he also underwent the varied experiences of clerk,
village postmaster, captain of volunteers, deputy surveyor, and law student.
The political and social conditions of the West were in their most active
formative period. Between the date of Lincoln’s majority and his election as
President,
nine States
were added to the Union. Illinois rose in population from 157,445 to 1,711,951,
Chicago from a frontier trading-post to a commercial metropolis, Springfield
from a settlement to a flourishing State capital. Roads, post routes, towns,
commerce, courts, replaced the forest and prairie solitude. The dug-out canoe
changed to the steam-boat, the buckskin garb of the hunter to the broadcloth of
the doctor, the lawyer, and the clergyman. In this growth Abraham Lincoln took
an active and essential part. He personally helped to build his country’s
cabins, survey its roads, defend its frontier, frame its laws, administer its
courts of justice, shape its national policy. In this practical school of
applied politics he learned the fundamental principles of American
statesmanship.
In 1837 he
left his first home at New Salem to form a law partnership at Springfield, the
new capital of his State. In the political campaigns of 1840 and 1844 he was a
Whig candidate for the office of presidential elector. In 1846 he was chosen to
the Lower House of Congress, serving one term of two years. During the five
years which followed he practised law with marked success, and only re-entered
politics when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise aroused the whole country
to an intense heat of public discussion. In the exciting party strife over the
new question, Lincoln’s maturing intellect and growing oratorical power at once
attracted marked attention, and gave him such prominence that in 1855 he was
the candidate of his party before the Illinois legislature for the post of
Senator; and, though defeated, he maintained a leadership that secured to him
for the second time the unanimous nomination of his party for the same office,
when the term of Stephen A. Douglas was about to expire. Lincoln’s seven joint
debates with that popular and skilful Democratic champion in the Illinois
senatorial campaign of 1858, while they did not save him from a second defeat,
extended his fame and gave him high reputation as a national statesman.
Two speeches
made by him in that memorable campaign had deep influence on public opinion and
wrought far-reaching party consequences. The first was his address before the
Republican State Convention, in which he uttered the bold prophecy that, “This
government cannot
endure
permanently half slave and half free___________ Either
the opponents of
slavery will
arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest
in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates
will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old
as well as new, north as well as south.” This proposition he demonstrated by a
critical analysis of the course and consequences of the Kansas-Nebraska
legislation and the Dred Scott decision of the Supreme Court. The second was
his Freeport debate with Douglas, when he forced that adroit tactician to
declare that a territorial legislature might by “unfriendly legislation ”
exclude slavery in defiance of the Supreme Court dictum. For this avowal
Douglas was
branded as a
party apostate by his Democratic presidential rivals; the schism broke up the
Charleston Convention, and severed the Democratic party into two irreconcilable
factions. The prudent attitude which Lincoln maintained in his speeches between
the extremes of radical and conservative opinion on the slavery issue rendered
him the most suitable man to unite the somewhat heterogeneous elements of the
new Republican party; and the National Republican Convention at Chicago in May,
1860, nominated him for President of the United States on the third ballot,
over Seward, Chase, Cameron, Bates, and other prominent leaders. Six months
later the suffrages of the American people confirmed the choice of the Chicago
Convention.
In the
election of November 6, 1860, the popular vote chose a constitutional majority
of presidential electors, who a month later (December 5) cast 180 votes for
Lincoln. Of the other three candidates, Breckinridge received 72 votes, Bell
39, and Douglas 12, Lincoln’s majority over them collectively being 57.
Practically it was the vote of the eighteen Free States of the Union against
the vote of the fifteen Slave States divided among three candidates. Even had
there been only one instead of three opposing candidates, Lincoln would still
have been returned by the electoral college. A complete fusion of the
opposition vote, such as wholly or partly occurred in five States, would have
only diminished his electoral majority to 35. The verdict thus expressed gave
notice to the South that its dream of slavery extension was over, and that
thereafter the North held the political balance of power. But it is to be
remarked that a majority of the popular vote, even when the States of the
Confederacy were excluded, was against him. He was the choice of a minority—a
fact which renders his career as President still more remarkable.
While this
portended no danger to the Slave States, South Carolina immediately led off in
the long-meditated scheme of secession. Already a month before, her then
governor had sounded other Slave State executives on the project; and, though
receiving,but meagre assurance of support, he now convened his legislature in
special session, and sent it a revolutionary message. In response, that body
provided for promptly choosing a State convention, and enacted various military
measures. On December 20,1860, the newly elected convention passed an ordinance
of secession.
A week
earlier, on December 14, about one-half of the senators and representatives in
Congress from the Slave States issued at Washington a manifesto addressed “To
our Constituents,” in which they announced that the honour, safety, and
independence of the southern people required the organisation of a Southern
Confederacy, and that the primary object of each slave-holding State ought to
be its speedy and absolute separation from a union with hostile States.
Such a
recommendation naturally brought the elements of revolution
into speedy
action. Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Louisiana rapidly followed
the example of South Carolina. Legislatures were convened, conventions
organised, commissioners sent from State to State to encourage popular and
legislative action; military legislation was enacted; militia companies were
organised and drilled. Secession ordinances quickly succeeded each other
during the earlier half of January, 1861; and, almost- immediately afterwards,
the governors each sent a small military force to demand and receive the
surrender of the feebly ga/'isoned Federal forts within their respective States,
as well as to take possession of arsenals, custom-houses, mints, and other
public buildings and property of the United States. By this method twelve to
fifteen harbour forts along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, capable of mounting a
thousand guns, half-a-dozen arsenals with an aggregate of 115,000 arms, an
extensive navy-yard at Pensacola, Florida, three mints, four important
custom-houses, and three revenue cutters on duty at seaports, with a variety of
other miscellaneous government property, passed without opposition, almost
without effort, into the hands of the Secessionists.
There
occurred, however, three notable exceptions. The State of Texas, whose governor
opposed secession, was carried into the revolt by a military conspiracy and
usurpation. No attempt was made against Fort Taylor at Key West, Fort Jefferson
on Tortugas Island, or Fort Pickens on Santa Rosa Island near Pensacola, on
account of the distance and danger. The forts in Charleston harbour underwent
peculiar vicissitudes. Major Robert Anderson, a brave and loyal officer
commanding a garrison of about sixty men, finding his position in Fort Moultrie
on the mainland too much exposed, transferred his force by a sudden movement to
Fort Sumter, situated midway in the harbour’s mouth, and unapproachable except
by water. Here he maintained himself nearly four months, during which time he
was gradually surrounded by rebel batteries, and was only forced to capitulate
by a two days’ bombardment and the exhaustion of his provisions.
During most of
these proceedings the newly elected President was compelled to remain a silent
spectator. Though chosen in November, his term of office did not begin till the
following 4th of March. In the interim the outgoing President, James Buchanan,
was still responsible for the maintenance of the Government and Constitution of
the United States, which his official oath bound him to “preserve, protect, and
defend.” Unfortunately, President Buchanan was, by reason both of advanced age
and feeble will, totally unequal to the emergency. In the political struggle
just ended his personal sympathy and party connexion had been rather with the
South than with the North. He had championed the candidature of Breckinridge
for the Presidency; the leaders of the revolt had been his lifelong personal
and party friends; and he could not immediately free himself from the
influence of their past domination or present advice and suggestion. Three of
the seven members of his Cabinet were
-186l]
447
outspoken or
covert disunionists; and his annual message to Congress reflected not only his
own indecision, but the antagonism of his official advisers. Denying the right
to secede, he also denied the right to coerce. Confessing his duty to execute
the laws, he argued it impossible to do so against universal public opinion.
Warned by General Scott to reinforce the Southern forts, he treated the advice
with indifference, on the plea that the force at his disposal was insufficient.
Little by little also, he involved himself in a practical truce with the
authorities of South Carolina, beginning on December 8, 1860, and continuing
until February 9, 1861, agreeing that he would not reinforce Fort Sumter if
they would not attack it, and meanwhile leaving them free to build batteries
for its eventual reduction.
In spite of
all these efforts to steer a middle course, his perplexities constantly
increased. Cobb, his disloyal Secretary of the Treasury, resigned on December
8, to embark in active secession. The loyal members of the Cabinet could not
shut their eyes to the fact that disunion was rapidly changing to insurrection
and rebellion; and two days before the Congressional secession manifesto, Cass,
the Secretary of State, resigned because the President would not order the Charleston
Forts to be strengthened. A new Cabinet crisis arose, when on December 26
Anderson suddenly removed his force from Fort Moultrie to Sumter. Buchanan’s
disloyal Secretary of War, Floyd, indignantly demanded that he should be sent
back. This time, under healthier advice, Mr Buchanan refused thus to censure a
loyal officer for a brave act. He accepted Floyd’s resignation, promoting his
Postmaster-General, Holt, a firm Unionist, to be Secretary of War. The event
created great consternation in Secessionist circles, and on January 5 a
“caucus” of Cotton- State senators was held in one of the committee rooms of
the Capitol, at which a final programme of revolution was outlined, and the
following points were agreed upon. 1. Immediate secession. 2. A convention at
Montgomery, Alabama, not later than the 15th of February, to organise a
confederacy of seceding States. 3. That the Cotton-State senators should remain
in Congress “ to keep the hands of Mr Buchanan tied.” Most important of all,
the caucus appointed a committee, consisting of Senators Jefferson Davis,
Slidell, and Mallory, “ to carry out the objects of this meeting.” Thus the
future chief of the great rebellion was chosen to preside over its primary
organisation.
For the
present the resolutions of January 5 were withheld from the public. Under the
direction of Holt, the new Secretary of War, General Scott attempted to
reinforce Fort Sumter by secretly sending 200 recruits from New York in a
merchant steamer. But Thompson, the Secessionist Secretary of the Interior,
whom Buchanan had with, weak indulgence permitted to remain in his Cabinet, and
who by accident became informed of the movement, notified the Charleston
authorities; and when, on the morning of January 9, 1861, the Star of the West
448
attempted
to enter Charleston Harbour, with the men and supplies, she was fired upon by a
Confederate battery, and, turning back, abandoned the attempt. ■
A new crisis
and cabinet reorganisation grew out of this attempt and failure; and for the
first time President Buchanan had a council of united and loyal constitutional
advisers. All their patriotism however could only nerve the timid and
vacillating President to a few minor and secondary measures of national
defence. The most important of these was his permission to Secretary Holt to
concentrate at Washington 480 men of the regular United States army, and
organise a supplementary force of 925 men of the Volunteer Militia of the
District of Columbia, to secure the peace and order of the national capital
during the official counting of the presidential vote by the two houses of
Congress on February 13, 1861, as well as at the inauguration of the new
executive on the 4th of March.
During this
long interim the public opinion of the Free States, or as they were called the
North, had been in a somewhat conflicting state between apprehension, doubt,
and lethargy. In the presidential election the existence of four parties and
four candidates had greatly complicated party organisation, and produced
sectional jealousy and dissension. The Southern threat of disunion had long
served merely as a party menace. The recent more formal proceedings of Southern
legislatures and conventions appeared only a prolongation of well-worn
spectacular manifestations to extort compromise and concession from Northern
voters. It seemed incredible that the South would resist with arms the lawful
authority of a President, after having herself taken part in the election by
which he was chosen. Vigorous as were the expressions of political defiance,
neither North nor South believed that they would end in bloodshed and war. The
people of both parties not only hoped but believed that again, as on former
occasions, some compromise would allay the quarrel. Congress also reflected
this phase of public feeling. During the month of December the House of
Representatives appointed a committee of thirty-three, and the Senate a
committee of thirteen, to bring about such a result. Continuous failure,
however, attended the proceedings of both committees. No single plan among the
seven presented to the Senate committee, nor among the forty or fifty suggested
to the House committee, could obtain the assent of the majority; nor did any
better success attend the efforts of a peace convention composed of delegates
sent by the governors of fourteen States of the Union, all prominent, able and
influential men, which met in Washington City, and held earnest debate from the
4th to the 27th of February.
Amid all this
babel of demand and refusal, accusation and recrimination, there were but two
undercurrents of logical and consistent action. The South, persisting in her
demand for the full statutory protection of
I86i] Montgomery
Congress.—Lincoln's inauguration. 449
slavery in
the Federal Territories, proceeded without halting or delay in her movement of
revolution. Gradually the senators and representatives from the seceding States
withdrew from their seats in Congress. On February 4 the Secessionist delegates
met at Montgomery, Alabama, and began by organising a provisional congress. On
February 8 they formed a provisional government known as that of the
Confederate States of America. Finally, on March 11, they adopted a permanent
Constitution under the same title.
On the other
hand, the North, determined to maintain the decision of the people in the late
presidential election that slavery should not be extended into the Federal
Territories, and to uphold the lawful authority of the President-elect,
gradually fell into the role superficially of apathetic indifference, but
really of studied inaction, until by the lapse of time President Buchanan’s
term should expire, and President Lincoln enter upon the powers and duties of
his office.
Starting from
his home at Springfield, Illinois, on February 11, the President-elect made a
public journey to Washington, where he arrived on the 23rd, during which he
visited the capitals of the States of Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania, upon a non-partisan invitation from their several legislatures.
He was everywhere received by enormous crowds with very great enthusiasm. In
the course of the twenty or thirty addresses that he delivered, while
studiously refraining from any express declaration of policy, his words were
hopeful of the future, and breathed only peace and kindness to all sections of
the country. In the later stages of his journey he received information from
two independent sources that his public transit through the city of Baltimore,
Maryland, would involve personal danger to himself. As no official invitation
had come to him from either the legislature of the State or the municipal
authorities of the city, he yielded to the entreaties of personal friends and
high officials to deviate from his published programme, and made the journey
unobserved and with a single companion by night—a measure of precaution,
dictated not by personal fear but by a sense of the highest prudential duty to
the people and the government over whose destiny he had been called to preside.
On March. 4,
1861, his inauguration was celebrated with the usual impressive State
ceremonial. Standing among government dignitaries on the platform before the
east front of the Capitol, his personal appearance produced, as it had done
during his whole journey, a most favourable impression upon the throngs
assembled to hear him. Mr Lincoln was then 51 years of age, 6 feet 4 inches in
height, weighed 12 stone 7 lbs., and for his unusual stature was remarkably
well-proportioned. His hair was black, his eyes grey, his rather thin but
mobile features were strongly marked, with very prominent eyebrows and high
cheekbones. His bearing was erect and dignified, and his countenance, even in
repose, not unattractive; when lighted up in public
speaking by a
striking thought, or expressing a firm conviction, it became positively
handsome. The policy announced in his inaugural address was eminently peaceful
and conservative. He declared the Union to be perpetual and unbroken, and
secession ordinances and resolutions legally void. He announced that to the
extent of his ability he would execute the laws in all the States. He would
hold the exterior boundaries of the nation, and collect duties and imposts. He
would not force obnoxious officials upon disaffected interior communities, and
would furnish the mails unless repelled. After an earnest and patriotic appeal
to the South he added: “ In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow- countrymen, and
not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. You can have no conflict
without being yourselves the aggressors.”
On the
following day his Cabinet was nominated and confirmed. Its members were William
H. Seward, Secretary of State, Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury,
Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, Caleb B.
Smith, Secretary of the Interior, Edward Bates, Attorney General, and
Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General. It was a composite council, comprising
representatives from the principal parties out of which the new Republican
party had been formed. Four of the members, Seward, Chase, Cameron, and Bates,
had been candidates for the Presidency.
(2) North and
South.
The very
first question presented to the new Administration was both unexpected and
serious. Instead of being, as the public believed, secure in Fort Sumter, Major
Anderson reported that in a few weeks his provisions would be exhausted, and
that the rebel siege-works had become so formidable that it would require an
army 20,000 strong to relieve him. Since the government neither possessed such
an army nor could create one in time, the alternative presented was one of
starvation or withdrawal of the garrison. Commissioners also arrived at this
time from the Confederate authorities to discuss terms of separation and
independence for the South; but their application was rejected, and the envoys
were not even recognised. After about a month of investigation and discussion,
President Lincoln caused an expedition to be prepared, and gave notice to the
governor of South Carolina that an attempt would be made to send provisions to
the fort; and, if this were not resisted, no further effort to throw in either
men, arms, or ammunition would be attempted until further notice or in case of
attack. Upon this the Confederate government immediately sent an order to reduce
the fort; and after two days’ bombardment the garrison capitulated on April 14.
It had not lost any men, but was forced to surrender by want of provisions and
the burning of wooden buildings in the course of the bombardment.
War having
been thus begun by the unprovoked attack by the Confederate forces, President
Lincoln on April 15 issued his proclamation calling to the service of the
United States 75,000 three-months’ militia. To this every governor of a Free
State responded with enthusiastic loyalty, and tendered at least double the
number of regiments called for. A proclamation from Jefferson Davis, on April
17, proposing to issue letters of marque and reprisal against Federal commerce,
was met two days later by the counter-proclamation of President Lincoln,
instituting a blockade of the Southern ports and threatening privateers with
the laws against piracy. In both the North and the South the war-spirit and
hostile demonstrations rose to a high pitch, and the usual peaceful energies of
communities were quickly turned to enthusiastic and active military
preparation.
The regular
army of the United States numbered 17,113 officers and men. Scattered in small
detachments to guard the vast western frontier against hostile Indians, it
could not immediately be withdrawn. It was quickly seen that the 75,000 militia
called into service by the President’s proclamation would be insufficient to
meet the rapid development of the insurrection; and the formation of a new
army was immediately begun. By a proclamation of May 3, 42,034 three-years’
volunteers, 22,714 enlisted men (adding ten regiments to the regular army), and
18,000 seamen were called into service, swelling the entire military
establishment of the United States to an army of 156,861 and a navy of 25,600.
There existed no legal authority for this increase; but the special session of
Congress legalised the President’s action, and by additional laws, approved
July 22, 25, and 29, authorised him to accept the service of volunteers for
three years, or during the war, to a number not exceeding one million. Such was
the patriotic enthusiasm of the people of the loyal States that before July 1
seventy-two regiments and ten batteries had been enlisted and mustered in; and
within a year from the call 637,000 volunteers were in service.
Immense as
then seemed such a preparation for hostilities by a peaceful nation, it was but
the serious beginning of the war. During the following three years of conflict
ten additional calls were made by President Lincoln for troops to be furnished
from the several States by volunteering and by draft. In response to these
calls the enormous total of 2,690,401 recruits was obtained in periods of
enlistment varying from three months to three years; and this supply kept up
the total strength of the armies of the Union to 918,191 on January 1, 1863;
860,737 on January 1, 1864; 959,460 on January 1, 1865;
980,000 on March 31, 1865; and 1,516,000 on May 1,
1865. Concurrently with these changes, the navy of the United States was expanded
from 42 vessels, carrying 555 guns, with 7600 men afloat, to 671 vessels, with
4717 guns and 51,500 seamen.
If it be
asked why such prodigious numbers were needed for the
Union forces,
the reason is obvious. The eleven States eventually leagued in rebellion embraced
a territorial area of 733,144 square miles, equal to the combined areas of
Great Britain, France, Spain, Germany, and Switzerland. These States had a
sea-coast line of 3525 miles, and an interior border line of 7031 miles. The
war on their part was mainly defensive, while on the part of the United States
it was necessary, not only to enter and overrun the rebellious territory, but
permanently to hold and subdue it. At every step this necessitated leaving
behind garrisons and detachments to secure communications, as well as to
control the disaffected districts after they had been gained by marches,
sieges, or battles.
Equal popular
enthusiasm and equal official energy were shown in the Confederate States in
raising armies to support the rebellion, but not with equal results. In the
personal qualities of warlike spirit, courage, and devotion to what each side
considered a righteous cause, Americans of both the South and the North were
equal. In mere territorial area the opposing sections were not greatly
unequal, but in war strength there was a striking difference. By the census of
1860 the North had a population of nineteen millions, the South of only eight
million whites and four million slaves. Here was at once an immense disparity,
nineteen millions against eight millions—more than two to one—in that first
military requisite, men available for recruits; for at the beginning none but
white men were enlisted on either side. A similar, if not greater, disparity in
favour of the North existed in almost all other militaiy needs and resources.
Since the organisation of the Confederate government in February, four calls
had been made for Southern volunteers, amounting to an aggregate of 82,000. In
his message of April 29 to the Secessionist Congress, President Davis proposed
to organise and hold in readiness an army of 100,000 men. Volunteer enlistments
for a term of twelve months were provided for; but before the expiration of a
year Southern volunteering had so far ceased that the Confederate Congress passed
a Conscription Act, placing all white men within prescribed ages in the
military service, to be enrolled and called out at the discretion of the
Confederate president. Recruits were incorporated into the Confederate service
whenever and in whatever numbers they could be obtained; and under such a
system it is not surprising that no statistics could be preserved.
Practically
the war lasted four years, from the fall of Sumter to the surrender of Lee at
Appomattox and Johnston at Raleigh, though minor engagements and surrenders
occurred later. There were fought in all over 2000 battles and skirmishes,
extending east and west from Virginia to Texas, and north and south from
Missouri to the Gulf of Mexico, though the principal area of conflict lay
between Chesapeake Bay and the Mississippi river. It has been estimated that
there were 112 land battles, in which one side or the other lost over 500 in
453
killed or
wounded, and 1882 engagements in which at least one regiment participated. Probably
half a million lives on each side were lost in campaign, battle, hospital or
prison. Since it would be impossible to follow in detail this multitude of
incidents, it is proposed here to take note only of the leading and decisive
campaigns, battles and events that wrought out the grand results of the mighty
conflict.
Prior to the
fall of Sumter, only the seven Cotton and Gulf States, South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, had united to form the
Confederacy. In the other eight Slave States most of the executives and many of
the leading politicians were from the beginning resolved on secession, though
there was still such a division of sentiment among the people as to render
their eventual course uncertain. The governors of each of the States of
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri sent
insulting refusals to the President’s call for troops, and immediately threw
all their official authority in favour of secession. Four of them, Virginia,
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, lying in the interior, became
practically from that time a part of the Confederate States. The States of
Kentucky, Missouri, Delaware, and Maryland, bordering on the Free States,
though undergoing severe local struggles, were eventually saved to the Union,
partly by the presence of decisive Federal forces, partly by the stubborn
loyalty of a majority of their people.
Delaware,
because of her small remaining number of slaves, but more especially because of
her geographical position, inevitably went with the North; though local
sentiment was so far divided that Governor Burton made no official reply to the
President’s call, especially as there existed no organised State militia.
Nevertheless he issued a proclamation authorising the formation of volunteer
companies, and giving them the option of offering their services to the general
government. Under this authority Union regiments were organised by the loyal
people and sent to Washington.
In Maryland
Governor Hicks long maintained an apparently neutral attitude, until events
rather than official leadership brought on the crisis and its solution. When
the 6th Massachusetts, the first fully- armed and equipped regiment to reach
Washington under the President’s call, passed through the city of Baltimore,
the cars containing the last four companies were stopped, and as the men
attempted to march through the streets to the Washington railroad station, they
were set upon by a Secessionist mob, through which they had to fight their way,
their assailants using paving-stones and firearms, and the soldiers replying
with their rifles. The soldiers lost four men killed and thirty-six wounded,
the citizens perhaps two or three times that number.
That
afternoon a huge mass meeting was held, in which the whole current of
speech-making, the governor’s declarations included, was in
favour of
secession; and the municipal authorities, by officially burning railroad
bridges, refusing to allow further passage of Federal troops, calling out the
local militia, and adopting hasty measures to arm the city, put Baltimore in an
attitude of determined revolution. From Baltimore the frenzy spread to other
towns, and for a week or two the Federal flag seemed to have disappeared from
Maryland. But the revolutionary ardour soon subsided. Federal troops found a
new route to the capital by way of Chesapeake Bay and Annapolis; a
Massachusetts regiment occupied Baltimore and fortified Federal Hill,
commanding the city; and the Unionist citizens took courage, and, being in a
majority, manifested their strength and asserted their control. Under the
President’s order threaten ;ng the legislature with arrest, that
body shaded off its proposed secession ordinance into a mild protest against
Federal usurpation; and the governor, recovering from his panic, proclaimed his
firm allegiance to the government, and assisted heartily in the formation of
Unionist regiments. Thereafter, the substantial moral and military strength of
Maryland was given to the Unionist cause; and the belligerent Secessionists of
the State went south to enlist in Confederate regiments.
The State of
Virginia also underwent a series of stirring and dramatic events. Her strong
traditional interest in the Union as the “ Mother of Presidents” had in latter
years been much dwarfed and weakened by her coarser material interest in
slavery. The usual device of a State convention had been adopted, with a view
to passing a secession ordinance; but, to the surprise of the plotters, the
election returned a majority of what were believed by their constituents to be
Union members. Their proceedings however showed them to be loyal only on
conditions, and though for a time they shrank from the final plunge, they
clamoured loudly for concessions to slavery. On the fall of Sumter their
hesitation gave way, and on April 17 they secretly passed a secession
ordinance, and in a few days entered into a military league with the
Confederate States. Governor Letcher followed up his contumacious refusal to
furnish troops in answer to Lincoln’s call by sending immediate orders to his
State militia to effect the capture of the government arsenal at Harper’s Ferry
and the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk. Such a step had been anticipated; and a
ship of war was sent from Washington to bring away several United States
vessels. The relief, however, came too late. By the treachery of certain
officials of the Yard, the removal of a portion of the ships was rendered
impossible; and Commodore Paulding endeavoured to carry out his alternative
instructions on April
8,0 by firing
a dry dock and other buildings and such of the ships as he could not bring
away. The Harrier’s Ferry Armoury shared a similar fate. Lieutenant Jones,
deeming his small company insufficient to hold the post, burned the
establishment on April 18, and retreated toward Washington. In both cases,
however, the destruction was very
i86i]
Lee in Virginia; the
State divided. 455
incomplete.
The Secessionists were able to recover much of the valuable machinery in the
armoury, and at the Navy Yard the hulls of the burned ships (among them the
afterwards famous Merrimac), the partially disabled dry dock, and 1500 to 2000
serviceable cannon, formed a harvest of war material of great value and
immediate use to the Confederates.
One other
event was of yet greater importance. Among the officers of the small regular
army of the United States there was no general capable of performing active
duty in the field. Lieutenant-General Scott was physically unable to mount a
horse; General Twiggs, who surrendered the troops in Texas, had been cashiered;
General Wool was by reason of age unfitted for active duty. In making choice of
a commander for the Federal army, the General-in-Chief, Winfield Scott, looked
first to Robert E. Lee, whom Lincoln had recently promoted to the colonelcy of
the 1st Cavalry. Lee had more than once dedared himself against secession,
calling it not only a revolutionary but a ruinous act; and the Administration
informally tendered him the command. But whether because of family ties (he was
a Virginian), or of property interests, or of more alluring overtures from the
South, Lee on April 20 tendered his resignation to General Scott. On April 22,
before his resignation had been accepted, he was formally invested by the Virginia
Convention with the command of the Virginia troops hostile to the United
States, and in course of time became General-in-Chief of the Confederate
armies. He was, indeed, not the only loss to the United States. A similar
defection carried about one-third of the officers of the regular army and navy
into the service of the Confederates.
The
revolutionary impulse which so suddenly carried Virginia into secession did not
extend over the whole of the State. In the part of her territory lying west of
the Alleghanies, embracing more than one- third of her total area but only
about one-fifth of her population, an overwhelming majority of the people
remained loyal. Seeing that mere protest would be ineffectual there was
developed at once a spontaneous popular movement to bring about a political
division of the State. After a series of popular meetings, delegates from
twenty-five counties met on May 13, at Wheeling, and arranged plans, in
consequence of which a delegate convention, representing about forty counties
lying between the crest of the Alleghanies and the Ohio river, met in the same
city on June 11, and declared null and void the Secessionist proceedings at
Richmond. On June 19 it created a provisional State government, under which
Francis H. Peirpoint was appointed governor. Peirpoint in due time organised
his provisional government at Wheeling, and on June 21 made formal, application
under the Constitution of the United States for aid from the general government
to suppress rebellion and protect the people against domestic violence. The
Lincoln Administration responded favourably to the
456
McClellan’s rise to
high command.
[i86i
request, and
sent Governor Peirpoint authority under which he soon organised and placed in
the field four Union regiments. Sustained by Federal troops, the loyal reaction
against secession was fully maintained ; and in due course of time the new
State of West Virginia was consolidated and organised, and formally admitted
as a member of the Union.
West Virginia
lies contiguous to the State of Ohio; and, as the quota of three-months’
militia from that State under Lincoln’s first call consisted of thirteen
regiments, that quota itself formed a Major-General’s command. Upon advice
from eminent citizens of Cincinnati, Governor Dennison appointed to this office
Captain George B. McClellan,, an officer bom in 1826, reared and educated in
Philadelphia, who had graduated from the West Point Military Academy in 1846.
He had rendered gallant service in the Mexican war as a member of the engineer
corps, and afterwards discharged several special duties in exploration and
scientific work, also as member of a commission to gather military information
in Europe. He had resigned his commission as Captain of Cavalry in 1857, and
was at the moment serving as president of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad.
His appointment as Major-General of the Ohio Militia was especially gratifying
to General Scott, who had personal knowledge of his acquirements and talents;
and upon Scott’s suggestion, President Lincoln appointed him, on May 3, to the
command < of the Military Department of the Ohio. Ten days later, under the
imperative need of officers for the rapidly expanding military establishment,
the President appointed him a Major-General in the regular army, which changed
his three-months’ militia commission to one of permanent service. It was the
beginning of a series of rapid military promotions which make the history of
the first year of the civil war read more like fiction than reality. Only a few
months later McClellan was General-in-Chief of all the armies of the United
States, a leap in rank and power from a simple captaincy that eclipses
plausible romance.
General
McClellan was instructed to use the Ohio quota to guard the line of the Ohio
river, to encourage and support Union sentiment wherever it might be manifested
south of that stream, and especially to sustain the Unionists of West Virginia
in their movement of separation froni the eastern half. General Lee at
Richmond, pushing forward the organisation of Virginia Secessionist troops, had
scattered his proclamations and sent his recruiting agents through the western
half of the State, but they reported opposition and failure from the beginning;
whereupon he ordered a few companies to Beverly as a nucleus around which to
gather sufficient force to control the western end of, the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad. To meet this show of force, McClellan, under a call from the Union
leaders, moved forward four regiments to the railroad junction at Grafton. Porterfield,
the Confederate colonel, retired fifteen miles south to Philippi, at which
place he was, however, on June 3, routed and
186l]
457
dispersed by
Colonel Kelley at the head of a newly-formed West Virginia Union regiment.
Lee was still
disposed to dispute the possession of West Virginia, and sent forward about
five regiments, with one of which Colonel Pegram established himself in the
pass at Rich Mountain, while General Garnett, formerly a Federal major, held
the pass at Laurel Hill with the remainder. McClellan, taking the initiative,
sent five or six regiments under General Morris to confront Garnett at Laurel
Hill and threaten a main attack, while he himself moved with seven regiments to
carry the pass held by Pegram. But he found the latter so well entrenched that
he hesitated to make a direct attack in front, even with the numerical
superiority of seven to one. McClellan’s subordinate officer, however,
Brigadier-General Rosecrans, with a force of 1900 men, succeeded in making a
circuitous march, by a secret path, and in a heavy rainstorm gained the rear of
a small entrenched camp, held by 300 men and two guns, on the summit of the
mountain. On June 11 Rosecrans easily captured this camp, which placed him in
possession of the tumpike-road two miles to the rear of Pegram’s works. Finding
himself caught between the Federal forces, Pegram precipitately spiked his guns
and abandoned his camp, fleeing northward along the mountain-ridge to join
Garnett at Laurel Hill; but he was once more intercepted, and this time
compelled to surrender. On receiving news of the disaster Garnett himself
commenced a hurried retreat, but was pursued and overtaken by the Federal
advance guard at Carrick’s Ford, on June 13, where another engagement ensued,
between one regiment of the fleeing Confederates and three of the pursuing
Federals; and, shortly afterwards, Garnett himself was killed in a desultory
skirmish. The engagements at Rich Mountain and Carrick’s Ford, insignificant as
to numbers and casualties, were very important in their military and political
results. Thereafter the Confederates were unable to maintain any hold upon West
Virginia; and the militaiy frontier was permanently pushed back by this single
campaign. The laconic telegram in which McClellan summed up the combined three
days’ results made such an impression of generalship and energy that public
opinion at once singled him out as the coming leader, and gave him a prestige
which contributed largely to his receiving, at an early day, the command of the
army of the Potomac, and the rank of General-in-Chief.
(3) The Wae
in the West.
West of the
Mississippi river the Secessionist leaders had secured the adhesion of the vast
State of Texas, and also a veiy uncertain promise of allegiance from the
half-civilised tribes occupying the Indian Territory. President Jefferson Davis
sent Major-General Leonidas
458
[i86i
Polk to
command in the Mississippi country, with his headquarters at Memphis; and his
earliest enterprise was an aggressive campaign to seize and hold Missouri,
which would form the strong north-western bastion of the contemplated
Slave-Dominion. Certain conditions were very favourable to this plan. An
influential minority of the people of Missouri was enthusiastic in favour of
slavery, and had furnished the daring and reckless frontier material for the
border-ruffian invasions and episodes in Kansas, from 1854 to 1857. Here also,
as in other Slave States, the State officials, as well as a majority of the legislature,
were active supporters of secession. The usual Secessionist programme was begun
in January by a law to assemble a State convention, and a well-understood
agreement that the Federal arsenal at St Louis should be surrendered to the
Secessionist commander of the State militia.
These
intrigues were however effectually foiled by the help of an active Union Safety
Committee in St Louis, the principal city of the State, where a large German
population furnished a compact element of loyalty. The safety of the arsenal
was insured by sending Captain Nathaniel Lyon with a company of regulars to
command and guard it. The State convention, instead of adopting the secession
scheme, voted it down. Under President Lincoln’s authority, six regiments of
Unionist volunteers were organised, with which and his company of regulars
Captain Lyon on May 10 surrounded, captured, and dispersed Camp Jackson, near
St Louis, where Governor Jackson had assembled several regiments of State
militia to form the beginning of a Secessionist army. On June 12 the governor
threw off all disguise by issuing a proclamation of war, and calling into
service 50,000 State militia.
Lyon met this
demonstration with decisive energy. Embarking a portion of his force on swift
steam-boats he chased the Governor and his legislature from Jefferson City, the
capital, to Boonville, fifty miles further up the river, and thence, after a
slight skirmish, to the south-west comer of the State, where the fugitives set
up the pretence of a Secession-State administration. A new and loyal State
government was immediately substituted, through the action of the Missouri
State convention, which, after voting down secession, had taken a recess till
December. A loyal majority of its members was reassembled; and these in a
series of ordinances declared the State offices vacant, abrogated treasonable
legislation, provided for new elections, and, on July 31, inaugurated H. It.
Gamble as provisional. governor. His authority was immediately recognised by
the greater portion of the State. Missouri remained both in form and substance
a State of the Union; but such was the prevalence and intensity of pro-slavery
sentiment, and the ramification of Secessionist conspiracy, that there ensued
almost immediately a condition of smouldering rebellion and sporadic guerrilla
warfare, which, shifting from point to point, disturbed public order throughout
the State during the whole of the war and rendered
186l]
459
life and
property insecure. It led, however, to no important battles or decisive
campaigns, and was contemptuously known under the general designation of “
bushwhacking.”
The adhesion
of Missouri was of even greater importance to the North than to the South—a
fact thoroughly appreciated by President Lincoln, whose own State, Illinois,
was only divided from that of Missouri by the Mississippi river. On July 1,
1861, the President appointed John
C. Fremont a Major-General of the United States
Army, and assigned to him the command of the Western Department, consisting of
the State of Illinois, and all the States and Territories between the
Mississippi river and the Rocky Mountains. The entire West hailed the appointment
with gratification. His name had become a household word, through the reports
of his journeys of exploration in the Rocky Mountains, and the part he had
played in the conquest and admission of California to the Union, while his
local reputation broadened into national fame and representative value through
his nomination in 1856 as the Republican candidate for the Presidency of the
United States. The skill, courage and qualities of leadership he had displayed
in former difficulties seemed to point him out as the fitting man to organise
the enthusiasm and resources of the great West, in men and materials, into a
military force large and compact enough to force its course down the
Mississippi river against all obstacles by its own size and inherent energy.
One of the
first acts of General Scott had been to send a detachment of Illinois troops to
occupy Cairo, a city at the southernmost point of the State, which, by its
position at the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi, was the military key to
the entire Mississippi valley, and controlled the whole interior system of
river navigation. It was natural, therefore, that Cairo rapidly became a great
and busy military station both for the army and the river-gunboat service.
The high
hopes entertained by the general public of the abilities and usefulness of
Fremont were doomed to meet, from the first, a chilling disappointment. He
loitered more than three weeks in the east, before proceeding to his
headquarters in St Louis; and when he reached that place on July 25,
difficulties, which his presence might have averted, had already become
serious. Cairo seemed to be threatened from the south; the danger to Captain
Lyon in the south-west was almost beyond remedy; and there was pressing need
for prompt and capable administration at every point, in the forwarding of
troops and supplies. It was soon found that Fremont lacked the faculty of
organisation on a large scale, and, more important still, that of winning the
confidence and directing the energy of local authorities and leaders. In
addition, the death of Lyon deprived him of assistance which his own limited
military acquirements and experience could not replace.
In following
the fugitive governor, Lyon had taken post at Springfield
in
south-western Missouri, where from various sources he collected a Union force
of 7000 or 8000 men, which however, by the expiration of service of the early
three-months’ regiments, soon dwindled to about 5000. In the interim there took
place a rapid concentration of Confederate regiments moving northward from
Arkansas and the Indian Territory, and forming a junction with the local
uprising; the whole being commanded by General Benjamin McCulloch. Finding
their numbers were outgrowing his own, Lyon advanced, and on August 10 fought
the: battle of Wilson’s Creek, ten miles south of Springfield, driving the
enemy from the field, though he himself was killed while leading a gallant
charge.
For the
moment the Confederate commanders and forces were scattered. But when Lyon’s
successor retreated to the railroad terminus at Rolla, the south-western comer
of the State was again left under control of Price as Major-General of the
Southern forces in Missouri, who straightway began that system of summer
guerrilla campaigns which he repeated again and again during the war.
Confronted by no opposing force, Price was soon able to collect a large body of
followers, consisting of men who, as in a frontier foray, brought their own
backwoods rifles, with simple powder-hom, shot pouch and haversack for
equipment. There was no regular commissariat, supplies being furnished by the
friendly sympathy of the strong Secession communities. Moving leisurely
northward until by continued accessions his force numbered between
15,000 and 20,000 men, with 13 guns, Price
captured, on September 20, an entrenched Federal garrison of 2800 men with 8
guns, at Lexington on the Missouri river. Lexington having fallen, Price
immediately retreated southward, his army dwindling and dissolving as rapidly
as it had gathered.
This
disaster, seemingly so needless, added to the retreat from Wilson’s Creek,
brought upon Fremont the caustic criticism of the press and public of the loyal
West; and in the despatch to the War Department reporting the surrender, he
announced his intention to take the field himself. For a while the St Louis
newspapers were filled with reports and indications of great military activity,
and of the formation of an army of five divisions at various points in the
State, which should concentrate and move against the Confederates in the
south-west. But by this time the Washington authorities, warned by complaints
from trusted and influential friends in Missouri and adjoining States, grew
suspicious of the reality of these preparations; and the Secretary of War
himself made a visit to Fremont, now in the field. Upon personal investigation
he found that, while Fremont’s supposed army made a good show on paper,
figuring as an aggregate of nearly 39,000, it existed as yet only in scattered
detachments, entirely without the preparation necessary for a campaign, with
only a single brigade well provided for a march. Duped by his own scouts,
Fremont still kept up the dumb show of war, by publishing an
i86i]
Kentucky
refuses to secede.
461
order of
battle when there was no enemy within reach. At this point, however, he was
overtaken in his movement by an order from President Lincoln, made on October
24, removing him from command, and directing his successor to abandon the
pursuit of Price, and for the present to establish corps of observation at the
railroad termini of Rolla and Sedalia.
The State of
Kentucky, lying lengthwise immediately south of the Ohio river, extends from
Missouri on the west to Virginia on the east, a distance of 350 miles. Its
position in the coming civil war was decided by a long political contest,
rather than by a direct military struggle, or even by a formidable show of
arms. Like other border Slave States, its people were very much divided in
sentiment; but the majority was ardently attached to the Union. Here again, as
in most other Slave States, the governor and sundry State officials were, if
not Secessionist conspirators, at least active disunionists; while on the other
hand, the legislature contained a majority of Unionist members. In two
separate special sessions, which the governor convened, the legislature voted
down his recommendation of a State convention, the first time by adopting only
an anticoercion protest, and the second by resolutions and laws adopting an
attitude of defensive neutrality. To balance the governor’s “State Guard ”
militia, which was known to lean to secession, it authorised the formation of a
“ Home Guard,” and provided that privates and officers of both organisations
should be required to swear allegiance to both the State and the Union; in
addition it constituted a Unionist board of commissioners to control the
governor’s expenditures under the military bill.
Unlike
Virginia, where official proceedings promoted secession under the guise of
loyalty, the Kentucky Unionists were obliged to secure the adhesion of the
State to the Federal government by temporarily assuming an attitude of
qualified disloyalty. Though the governor had officially refused to furnish
troops under the President’s call, and though the legislature enacted that the
State arms and munitions should be used neither against the United States nor the
Confederate States, but only to protect Kentucky from invasion, abundant
intimations came to President Lincoln that Unionist regiments would be
privately organised. To this end he caused arms to be sent, and authorised
Major Robert Anderson, a native Kentuckian, of Sumter fame, to encourage and
receive such enlistments.
Meanwhile two
elections were held in Kentucky; one in June, at which nine out of the ten
congressmen elected were firm Unionists, and the second in August, at which a
three-fourths majority of Unionist members of a new legislature was chosen.
Notwithstanding this decisive show of popular sentiment on behalf of the Union,
an undercurrent of persistent and untiring Secessionist intrigue kept the
eventual course of the State in much doubt. Failing in all their attempts to
gain official
462
Confederates
invade Kentucky.
[i86i
control, the
Secessionist leaders finally attempted; to organise a revolutionary uprising
under the guise of popular peace-meetings to overawe or disperse the legislature;
but this effort also failed.
As the autumn
approached, events had so far progressed that the State could no longer
preserve the attitude of neutrality which she had maintained for nine months.
Despairing finally of gaining the State by intrigue, the Confederate General
Polk, in the early days of September, advanced his military lines into
Kentucky. Upon his refusal to withdraw from the soil of the State, as requested
by the Kentucky legislature, that body formally invited the Federal Major Anderson
to take command, and authorised the enlistment of 40,000 volunteers to repel
invasion, with a provision that they should be mustered for the service of the
United States, to co-operate with the armies of the Union. Hitherto there had
been no Unionist troops in Kentucky, except a single brigade privately enlisted
at Camp Dick Robinson, and the “Home Guards,” composed of carefully selected
Union men, organised under the State militia laws, and supplied with Federal
arms. All the while, however, Unionist forces stationed on the north shore of
the Ohio river had been ready to go to the aid of the Kentucky Unionist leaders
whenever the necessity should arise.
The invasion
of Kentucky by Confederate troops created the necessity. That invasion was
begun by General Polk, who ordered General Pillow, with a detachment of 6000
men, to cross from the Missouri side and occupy Columbus, Kentucky, the first
defensible point on the Mississippi river below Cairo. Polk further advised
Jefferson Davis that the important Confederate military enterprises begun in
the west should be combined from west to east across the Mississippi Valley,
and placed under the direction of one head, with large discretionary powers;
and he recommended General Albert Sidney Johnston for this command. Davis
approved the suggestion, and on September 10 appointed Johnston to the proposed
duty, creating for that purpose Department Number 2, comprising the States of
Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, with part of Mississippi and
part of the Indian Territory. Proceeding at once to Nashville, Johnston threw
forward a detachment of 5000 Confederates to Bowling Green, Kentucky, under
General Buckner, while a third column entered the State at its eastern end
through Cumberland Gap, under General F. K. Zollicoffer, who advanced with six
regiments to Cumberland Ford near Mill Spring.
It had now
become impossible to maintain any longer the neutral attitude in which peculiar
political conditions had kept the State of Kentucky since the preceding January.
Both sides were watchful of the coming crisis; and even before Polk’s movement,
Fremont, while still in St Louis, announced to the Unionist commander in
south-east Missouri his intention to occupy Columbus “as soon as possible.”
This intimation was sent by Fremont to an officer who
186l]
463
combined the
vigilance and the ability that destined him to a great career in the war just
beginning—Brigadier-General U. S. Grant. September % found Grant at Cairo, and
on the 4th he gave partial orders for the occupation of Columbus; but a gunboat
reconnaissance revealed that the Confederates were ahead of him. With true
military instinct, however, he saw the possibility of a compensating movement
and instantly adopted it. By midnight of the 5th he had hurriedly organised an
expedition of two gunboats, 1800 men, sixteen cannon for batteries, and a
supply of provisions and ammunition on transports, with which he proceeded up
the Ohio river to the town of Paducah, Kentucky, at the mouth of the Tennessee
river, where he landed on the morning of September 6, taking possession, and
making arrangements to fortify and permanently hold the place. The importance
of the seizure was appreciated by the Confederate General Buckner, who wrote
to Richmond, “ Our possession of Columbus is already neutralised by that of
Paducah.”
In response
to the invitation of the Kentucky legislature, President Lincoln at once
directed Anderson to take personal command of the Unionist troops in Kentucky;
and with him were sent two brigadiers of exceptional ability and future fame,
Generals W. T. Sherman and George H. Thomas. With such force as could hurriedly
be sent him, Sherman advanced and took position at Muldraugh’s Hill, fifty
miles south of Louisville, on the railroad to Bowling Green and Nashville;
while Thomas was sent to Camp Dick Robinson in eastern Kentucky to gather a
force and watch the Confederate force which had come through Cumberland Gap. It
soon turned out that Anderson’s health did not permit him to continue on duty.
He relinquished his command on October 8, and was succeeded by Sherman, who was
in turn, at his own request, relieved about the middle of November by
Brigadier-General
D. C. Buell.
No military
movements followed immediately in Kentucky; but Buell, whose headquarters were
at Louisville, where he was joined by regiments from the north-western States,
gradually accumxdated, organised and drilled a considerable army. McClellan, by
direction of President Lincoln, endeavoured, by many suggestions and almost
positive orders, to induce him to dislodge Zollicoffer and send a marching
column through Cumberland Gap, to occupy and hold East Tennessee, a mountain
region inhabited almost exclusively by loyal and devoted Unionists, who were
suffering greatly at the hands of Confederate troops. Thomas was anxious to
lead the expedition, and Buell at first promised compliance with the
President’s wishes. But, as the days passed, he systematically incorporated the
regiments sent him into his own command in middle Kentucky; and finally,
heedless of the desires of his superiors, admitted that he had abandoned the
idea of relieving East Tennessee, and adopted the plan of a southward campaign
toward Nashville.
464 Federal concentration at Washington. [i86i
(4) Bull Bun.
Washington
City, in the District of Columbia, lies on the Potomac river between the States
of Maryland and Virginia. The insurrectionary incidents, which occurred during
the week following the Sumter bombardment (April, 1861), interrupted for a few
days all communication either by rail, post or telegraph with the loyal States
of the Union. The danger to which the capital was exposed naturally caused the
concentration, for its defence, of the largest part of the three-months’
militia first called out by President Lincoln. Had the insurrection been
prepared with organised forces and a matured plan, the city might indeed have
been captured, as a member of Jefferson Davis’ Cabinet predicted it would be.
An attack was loudly urged by the more impulsive and sanguine leaders; but
General Lee discouraged the idea, and busied himself with strenuous efforts to
mobilise the forces of Virginia and to make defensive preparations. He
established a camp of instruction at Harper’s Ferry, and another at Manassas, a
railroad junction thirty- five miles south-west of Washington, a strategical
point between that city and Richmond, favourably situated for receiving help
from or rendering aid to Harper’s Feny.
Meanwhile,
since the arrival of the New York 7th on April 25, Washington had been entirely
secure and was rapidly filling with Federal troops. On May 24 a strong
detachment crossed the Potomac, occupied the neighbouring town of Alexandria,
and began the erection of a chain of forts and entrenchments some eighteen miles
in length on the Virginia side, while a complementary system of fortification
was also rapidly completed on the Maryland side of the city, rendering the
national capital practically impregnable against hostile attack when properly
manned. By this time a strong garrison had been gathered in and near Fortress
Monroe, the command of which was taken over by General B. F. Butler; while the
bulk of the Pennsylvania quota, with the regiments from other States, was
organised under the command of General Robert Patterson, and prepared for a
campaign against Harper’s Ferry. '
The popular
mind in the loyal States had been greatly inflamed by the quick succession of
reverses which attended the beginning of the struggle—the loss of Sumter, of
Harper’s Ferry, and of the Norfolk Navy Yard; the Baltimore massacre; the
isolation of the capital; the assassination of Colonel Ellsworth when
Alexandria was occupied. To this series of untoward incidents were soon added
two others, one occurring on June 17, at a little station called Vienna, near
Washington, where two cars filled with troops were incautiously run under fire
of a passing Confederate battery; and another on June 10, at Big Bethel, near
Fortress Monroe, where a badly ordered attempt to dislodge a rebel battery
1861 ] Federal advance to Manassas.
465
by a
night-march was defeated. In these cases, as before, the losses were relatively
trifling, but they had an exasperating effect on public opinion, still hot with
indignation over the Sumter bombafdment.
Unjust
criticism and imprudent clamour for energy, for action, for an advance, began
to pour in on the Administration, which was indeed quite as solicitous as the
public in this behalf, since the authorities plainly saw that the three-months’
term of enlistment of the seventy- five militia regiments was rapidly running
out. On June 29 President Lincoln called his Cabinet and principal military
officers to a council of war at the Executive Mansion. A crisis had been
reached in which political conditions seemed imperatively to require a vigorous
military demonstration against the rebellion. General Scott, with his, great
professional knowledge and experience, deemed such a course injudicious and
premature. Nevertheless, he gracefully withdrew his objection, and gave his
earnest co-operation and valuable judgment to the elaboration of a plan of
campaign, drawn up by Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell, against the Confederate
army at Manassas. That army, under the command of General G. T. Beauregard, who
had won much public applause throughout the South by his conduct of the siege
of Fort Sumter, was now estimated at 25,000 men, though it was actually only
22,000 strong. McDowell proposed to advance with a
force of 30,000 and to attack the main Confederate position.
The
principal danger in this plan was that the other Confederate army near Harper’s
Ferry, numbering ten to twelve thousand effectives under command of General J.
E. Johnston, might, either by means of available railroad transport, or even a
rapid march, succeed in forming a junction with Beauregard, thus conferring
numerical superiority on the defence. It seemed, however, quite possible to
prevent such a junction. General Robert Patterson, at the head of seventeen
Federal regiments, had advanced against Harper’s Ferry, and, finding it
evacuated, crossed the Potomac on June 16, though he soon again retired to the
Maryland side because a portion of his force had been withdrawn from him. Being
again strengthened, he once more moved across the Potomac on July 2, and
advancing, took position at Martinsburg, the enemy having retired to
Winchester. When, therefore, McDowell stated to the council that he could not
undertake to meet all the rebel forces together, General Scott assured him, “If
Johnston joins Beauregard he shall have Patterson on his heels,” and sent
orders intended to insure that result.
.
McDowell
started on his expedition on July 16, with a marching force of 28,000 men,
4>9 guns, and one regiment of cavalry. The rebels had some slight fieldworks
at Manassas, armed with 15 heavy guns and garrisoned by 2000 men. Beauregard’s
main army was posted along the south bank of a stream called Bull Run, that
flows in a south-easterly direction three miles east of Manassas. His line was
about eight miles
466
Defeat of the Federals
at Bull Run.
[i86i
in length,
his force having been increased to over 23,000 men with 35 guns. By an
unopposed but rather slow march, McDowell reached the village of Ceni arville,
opposite the enemy, on the 20th, and on the following day, Sunday, July 21,
crossing Bull Run by a circuitous march, attacked the enemy’s left flank.
Until noon he
drove the Confederates before him; and had General Scott’s promise been
fulfilled, would have secured an easy victory. The usual dispute exists whether
or not Patterson, in the Shenandoah Valley, obeyed orders, but the exact fact
remains that he neither attacked nor strongly threatened, and that on the 18th
Johnston marched away from him, with 9000 effectives, and got them safely into
Beauregard’s camp behind Bull Run on the afternoon of the 21st, increasing the
Confederate forces (at the close of the fight) to a total of 32,000 men with 57
guns. When therefore McDowell resumed his attack in the afternoon, his advance
was checked; and about four o’clock seven fresh rebel regiments suddenly came
out of the woods from the direction of the Manassas railroad station, against
the Union right flank. At this heavy onset from an unexpected quarter, the
Union soldiers gave up the fight, and half marched, half ran from the field,
convinced that Johnston’s army had at length arrived, and not knowing that they
had been fighting a portion of it all day.
The
Confederates were as much surprised as their foes at their sudden victory.
There was little pursuit. The vanquished regiments hurried to Centerville,
sweeping the reserves back with them in a general retreat upon Washington. The
losses, nearly equal on both sides, attest the common valour of the raw troops
which for the first time met in battle. The official reports show a loss to the
Union side of 25 guns, 460 killed and 2436 wounded and missing; on the
Confederate side, 387 killed, 1582 wounded, and a few prisoners. General
Sherman, who commanded a brigade in it, says, “ It was one of the best planned
battles of the war, but one of the worst fought.” General Johnston says, “If
the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have
been beaten.”
•
The
Confederate victory at Bull Run produced throughout the South a feeling of wild
exultation, and full confidence in its ability to achieve ultimate
independence. To the North, on the contrary, the Union defeat was a bitter
disappointment and a deep humiliation. The newspaper reports of the battle
greatly exaggerated the disaster, representing it as an unmitigated panic and
rout. What there was of panic had occurred among the fringe of teamsters and
camp-followers at the rear. It was this which came under the personal notice of
the newspaper correspondents, and gave colour to their whole recital of the
day’s events. In reality most of the regiments returned to the forts before
Washington in reasonably good order, though, as always happens, there were many
stragglers; and these, drifting in confusion through the national capital
i86i]
Consequences
of the defeat.
467
on the
following day, created there also the impression of widespread demoralisation.
To the Lincoln Administration, as well as to Congress^ which had met in special
session on the 4th of July, the result of the battle was naturally a painful
surprise. General Scott had confidently expected victory, and his preparations
and orders had indeed provided for one. But for the failure of Patterson to
hold Johnston at Winchester, the result would have been different.
Congress was
deeply agitated by the disaster. Several members went to the front to witness
the battle, and one of them, being taken prisoner, paid for his curiosity by
some months of military imprisonment at Richmond. The discussions which took
place in both Houses developed much harsh comment and criticism; and the event
laid the foundation for that partisan opposition from Democratic members, and
indeed from the bulk of that party, with many noble exceptions, which grew in
intensity and gave much annoyance, and even occasional grave embarrassment to
the Administration of President Lincoln throughout the remainder of the war.
On the whole,
however, the defeat at Bull Run had the effect of increasing and deepening the
zeal, courage, and determination of the Administration, the Congress, the army,
and the country. The first thing done was to call General McClellan to
Washington, where his pre-eminent skill as an organiser in a few days cleared
the city of stragglers, and restored system and order to every department of
military management. The three-months’ militia regiments were mustered out of
service; and out of the new regiments of three-years’ volunteers which were
pouring into the capital, his methodical supervision organised that body of
American soldiers destined to become famous as the Army of the Potomac.
McClellan
was' received with great cordiality and warm friendship by the President and
Cabinet, by General Scott, by officials and dignitaries of all grades, and
especially by the army and the public. He had youth, enthusiasm, industry, and
a winning personality. Besides he was the victor of Rich Mountain, so far the
only Unionist success. He received not only every attention, but every
assistance in his task, and over-eager public opinion prematurely imagined him
the coming hero. He was astounded at the power and consideration accorded him.
“ I find myself in a new and strange position here,” he wrote, “President,
Cabinet, General Scott and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of
magic, I seem to have become the power of the land.” Three days later he wrote,
“ They give me my way in everything, full swing, and unbounded confidence.”
The excessive
gifts which fortune had bestowed on him proved fatal to his usefulness and
fame. His astonishment lapsed at once into an inordinate self-esteem. He
accepted his honours as already won, and repaid the confidence of his superiors
with ill-concealed arrogance. His
468 McClellan the Federal General-in-Chief. [i86i
demeanour
toward his illustrious chief, General Scott, quickly ran from indifference to
neglect, and from neglect to defiance of his military authority and the
ignoring of his orders. In his private correspondence he sppke contemptuously
of the President, called the Cabinet “geese/ and avowed that he was “disgusted
with this Administration—perfectly sick of it.” He represented himself as “
called upon to save the country,” and announced, “ I would cheerfully take the
dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved.” He
regarded the Army of the Potomac as his own, claiming for it all the best
troops, the most experienced officers, and the newest arms. The favours he
could bestow quickly gathered about him a circle of flatterers; and he became
the idol alike of the Potomac camps and the Washington drawing-rooms, while newspaper
correspondents fulsomely dubbed him the Young Napoleon.
This
undercurrent of colossal vanity and these dictatorial dreams were unsuspected
at the moment. They only came fully to light in his autobiography and letters,
published after his death, and serve to explain at once the melancholy weakness
of his character, and the source of his military failure. The deplorable change
did not escape the keen observation of the President; but the General’s
assumptions were tolerated, and even his whims indulged, in the hope that his
brilliant professional accomplishments might be turned to the public service.
On November 1 General Scott, at his own request, was relieved, and McClellan
put in his place as General-in-Chief. This gave him control of all the forces
of the Union, with an army of nearly 125,000 effectives under his immediate
personal command, organised, drilled, armed and supplied with a thoroughness of
detail, a quality of material, and an average ability of subordinate command
only excelled in the most advanced military nations.
Opposed to
the Unionist army there lay around the battle-field of Bull Run the Confederate
army under Johnston, with an effective force of less than 50,000 men. Its
officers and the Richmond authorities had during the autumn planned several
offensive movements, only however to postpone or reject them for want of what
they considered adequate force, which with all their revolutionary enterprise
they could not bring together without too much exposing other points.
President Lincoln
had long hoped for some effective movement against the Confederacy from the
army under McClellan’s command; and that officer frequently hinted at the great
things he intended to do with it. At first he gave the Administration to
understand that General Scott was in his way; and, after his retirement,
answered the President’s suggestions with an alternation of promises and
excuses. With a superiority of three to one over the enemy in his immediate
front, he allowed the propitious season to wear away. Towards the end of
October, he ordered a reconnaissance on the upper Potomac, which
1861-2]
469
instead of a
victory brought on the affair of Ball’s Bluff, a small engagement, ending in a
discreditable Union defeat. The number of casualties was insignificant, but the
accidents of the battle so much resembled blunders that it had an exasperating
effect on public opinion.
Very soon
after, in the first week of December, Congress again met in annual session; and
the restless spirits in that body began to reflect the popular impatience with
increasing emphasis. As a consequence of the discussions it evoked, Congress
created a permanent joint committee of the two Houses, known as the Committee
on the Conduct of the War. It consisted of Senators Wade, Chandler, and Andrew
Johnson (afterwards President) and Representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and
Odell. It played an important part throughout the whole war by its investigation
into, and criticism of, military affairs; and the inaction of General McClellan
came in for an early share of both its confidential and public dissatisfaction.
While the
President defended the general against these strictures, insisting that he must
be allowed to take his own time, he admonished that officer that he must not
fail to take into account the official standing and influence of the Committee,
and the pressing need of action. But still day after day passed away in parades
and reviews, while little by little the enemy established batteries on the
Virginia shore of the Potomac, which in time enforced an almost complete
blockade of the river. Finally, McClellan’s magnificent army went into winter
quarters, and the daily newspaper report of “all quiet on the Potomac” passed
into a derisive popular byword. To crown all, McClellan fell seriously ill; and
in an interview with Generals McDowell and Franklin, on January 10, 1862,
President Lincoln made the sarcastic comment: “If something were not soon done,
the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not
want to use the army, he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it
could be made to do something.”
The public
and official impatience was not unnatural, when we remember existing
conditions. Until the beginning of the year 1861 the peace of the country had
been disturbed only once dining nearly half a century. The home experiences of
the Mexican War were little else than the enthusiasm of raising volunteers and
reading bulletins of victories. Excitement over the Utah and Kansas episodes
was political and not military. These recollections stimulated rather than
restrained the popular craving for results.
Since the
fall of Sumter, if we except the magnificent manifestations of patriotic
loyalty by the North, and the miniature victory of Rich Mountain, nearly all
the military incidents had proved a keen irritation to her people. Baltimore,
Big Bethel, Bull Run, Ball’s Bluff, were names at which resentment ever flamed
up afresh. The tension was somewhat relieved when Commodore Wilkes captured the
Confederate
470
[i86i
envoys Mason
and Slidell on their way from Havana to Europe, only however to be again
embittered by England’s peremptory demand for their release, and the necessity
of surrendering them, because the seizure had not been made in strict
accordance with international usages.
In reality
great preliminary progress had already been made toward the maintenance of the
government and the eventual suppression of the rebellion. A considerable navy
had been improvised; Port Royal, the finest Southern harbour, captured and
occupied; and an effectual blockade established along the whole vast line of
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The Confederate leaders had confidently expected
to secure the adhesion of the entire South; but this hope had been effectually
baffled. Maryland, Western Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, forming the whole
northern tier of the Slave States, were under the official control of the
Unionist government, and for the greater part within Union military lines. Half
a million Federal soldiers were under arms, ready- for future campaigns; and
there was as yet no perceptible abatement in the streams of volunteers flowing
to camps of instruction near the capitals of the Free States. The cool wisdom
of the President had averted a rupture with England; and Napoleon III, though
filled with unfriendly sentiment, hesitated in his ambitious designs.
With the
character and extent of the civil war thus much more clearly defined, it
becomes easier to trace out and comprehend the scope and succession of the
principal military campaigns destined to follow. Geographically the area of
insurrection fell into three great divisions, (1) from the Atlantic coast to
the Alleghany Mountains, (2) from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, (3) from
the Mississippi to the western frontier. But the political and strategical
fields did not immediately coincide with the geographical. If not of the
greatest, at least of the first importance was the blockade by which a barrier
of ocean patrol was stretched from Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Rio
Grande. It marked and guarded the sovereignty of the United States over that
part of the Atlantic seaboard which the President’s proclamation closed to the
commerce of the world. Except at the risk of capture and confiscation, no
foreign ship might enter its ports to bring arms or munitions to the
insurrection; no Confederate vessel might sail out of them to wage war or carry
cotton to exchange for gold in Europe. No commercial privileges could be
offered by the Confederate States to tempt a foreign nation to intervene. So
strictly was the blockade enforced that foreign luxuries disappeared from
Southern homes, and Confederate credit shrank to worthlessness.
Of the three
geographical divisions, that between the Atlantic coast and the Alleghanies
assumed from the beginning and maintained till the end the leading importance.
Washington City, the Federal
186l]
471
capital,
lying on the Potomac river between the Slave States of Maryland and Virginia,
had been the earliest point of danger, and necessitated the principal
concentration of Union troops. The Confederate capital, first located at
Montgomery, Alabama, where the Secessionist government was organised, was, about
June 1, 1861, moved to Richmond, Virginia. This town, lying on the James river,
115 miles nearly due south of Washington, was thenceforward the political and
military focus of the rebellion, requiring the support of the principal
Confederate army. The country between and around these opposing capitals
therefore became of necessity, with only occasional diversions, the main field
of conflict in the Civil War. In the resulting campaigns in this field, the
Union army by reason of its superior numbers almost constantly maintained the
aggressive, its object being to capture, and that of the Confederates to
defend, the city of Richmond.
The military
importance of the other two great geographical divisions lay primarily, not in
their vast territorial extent, but in the political and commercial value of the
Mississippi river, which divided them. As a military highway, as a principal
commercial artery, as a valuable and permanent asset in national and
international politics, the possession and control of that stream became the
leading object of the combatants in the western campaigns. On the Mississippi
were situated the two great commercial cities of the West, St Louis in Federal,
New Orleans in Confederate territory. The Confederates, being in possession, had
made what haste they could to fortify the stream at the most available points.
Meanwhile, on its part, the Union government had secured a peculiarly
advantageous position to attack it. The southern end of the free State of
Illinois, wedgelike in shape, runs down between the upper Mississippi and Ohio
rivers, to their junction at Cairo, thrusting free territory and anti-slavery
sentiment farther into the South than at any other point; while a group of
populous and energetic Free States lay immediately to the north, capable of
supplying a weight of men and resources, the onset of which it would be
difficult to resist, and which, if not resisted, would at once cut off and
paralyse the military strength of from one-third to one half of the territory
of the Confederate States.
After the
year 1861, therefore, the military operations of the Union armies for the
suppression of the rebellion followed three great lines of activity. First, the
maintenance of the Atlantic blockade, and the capture of all forts and harbours
on the seaboard. Second, the Virginia campaigns for the capture of Richmond.
Third, the opening of the Mississippi river, to be followed by a central and
closing campaign through Tennessee, Georgia, and the Carolinas. On the other
hand, all the efforts of the Confederates were put forth to counteract and foil
these efforts.
THE CIVIL
WAR: II.
(1) McClellan
in Virginia.
Owing to a slight disagreement in policy, which however
in no wise disturbed their friendly personal and party relations, President
Lincoln, about the middle of January, 1862, transferred Secretary Cameron to
the post of Minister ,to Russia, and appointed Edwin M. Stanton Secretary of
War to succeed him. Stanton had been Attorney General under Buchanan during the
last two months of his. administration, and in the Secession crisis had amply
proved his loyal devotion to the Union. Simultaneously with this change,
Lincoln on January 27 issued his President’s War Order, No. 1, directing all
the armies to move on the February 22 following. Two similar orders speedily
followed, one dividing the Army of the Potomac into four army corps, and
assigning to them senior division commanders, while the other relieved
McClellan from the duties of General-in-Chief, and appointed him to the single
task of conducting the campaign against Richmond. Thus far that general had
neither made any movement with his immense army, nor adopted any plan to that
end. On this point there had been from the first a disagreement between the
President and himself. With correct military instinct, the President believed
the war could be ended most quickly by fighting and conquering the Confederate
armies, instead of merely occupying the Confederate capital; and for that
purpose he wished the Army of the Potomac to move directly against the enemy at
Manassas. McClellan, on the contrary, preferred a flank movement down
Chesapeake Bay, and a land march from either Urbana or Fortress Monroe against
Richmond. Before this difference was adjusted, occurred the famous battle
between the ironclads Monitor and Merrimac in Hampton Roads, on March 9, 1862,
and on the same day the sudden retreat of the Confederate army under Johnston
toward Richmond, from its advanced position at Manassas to Gordonsville behind
the Rappahannock and
Rapidan. Had
McClellan, as directed by the President’s first War Order, moved against it on
February 22, as he might have done with double numbers, he could have won an
easy and invaluable victory.
Under the new
conditions the four corps-commanders met in a council of war on March 13, and
decided in favour of the route by way of Fortress Monroe. McClellan adopted the
plan ; and it was also accepted by the President, with the conditions that
Manassas should be occupied and permanently held, and Washington City be left
entirely secure. “Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac” wrote the
Secretary of War, communicating the President’s decision, “choosing a new base
at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or at all events, move
such remainder of the army at once, in pursuit of the enemy, by some route.”
Preparations for a movement by water had already been set on foot. The troops
began their embarcation on March 17, and on April 5 the officer charged with
the duty reported that he had transported to Fortress Monroe an army of 121,500
men with all their animals, waggons, batteries, pontoon bridges and other
impedimenta.
General
McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe on April 2 to lead his army up the
Peninsula between the York and James rivers. Had he pursued the prompt and
vigorous march he originally contemplated, he would have found no Confederate
forces between him and Richmond capable of resisting the greatly superior army
under his command. But from this point his campaign took on the double
character of a fault-finding correspondence with the President and Secretary of
War, and a feeble and hesitating advance; an approach that was more defensive
than aggressive, giving the enemy ample time to concentrate their scattered
detachments into a formidable army that successfully warded off the threatened
loss of their capital, and finally caused the whole expeditionary force to be
withdrawn. The two things of which McClellan chiefly complained, viz. that
McDowell’s corps was temporarily withheld, and that the navy did not render him
expected help, were due to his own neglect of the President’s positive
injunction, approved by his own council of war, that he should leave Washington
secure. Instead of the 55,000 men needed for the Washington forts, and a
covering force, he had left behind only 18,000; and this neglect rendered
imperative the temporary retention of McDowell, the greater portion of whose
corps was however finally sent to McClellan. The promise that the navy should
co-operate existed only in his own imagination. He had neither stipulated for
this, nor had he received any promise of the specific work which he now
declared it should have accomplished.
Besides
answering the general’s complaints, President Lincoln continually admonished
him to push his campaign with serious energy. “And once more let me tell you,”
he wrote to him on April 9, “it is indispensable to you that you strike a
blow. I am powerless to help this.
474
You will do
me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search
of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not
surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or
equal entrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is
noting now—that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy is but
the story of Manassas repeated.” Beginning his march with 50,000 men on April
4, McClellan found his first obstacle at Yorktown on the York river, which
place, with Gloucester Point opposite, the Confederates had strongly fortified.
But the Confederate General Magruder had only a garrison of 6000, with 5000
other troops spread along a line thirteen miles in length, to an inlet from the
James river. Instead of promptly breaking through this line, which his
overwhelming force of four to one would have enabled him to do, McClellan laid
regular siege to Yorktown, and spent almost a month in digging trenches and
building batteries. At midnight on May 3, when McClellan was ready to open his
bombardment with nearly a hundred guns, Johnston, who had superseded Magruder,
suddenly evacuated the place, marching away with the 50,000 men he had been
able to accumulate. He was well satisfied with the respite which McClellan had
allowed Magruder. To use his own language, “ It saved Richmond, and gave the
Confederate government time to swell that officer’s handful to an army.”
General
McClellan learned the evacuation of Yorktown at dawn on May 4; but the news
found him so thoroughly surprised and unprepared that noon came before he
could organise the pursuit. This gave the enemy ample time to prepare their
next point of delay at Williamsburg, where a number of redoubts and
entrenchments had previously been got ready. Here on May 5 was fought a battle
without plan, without guiding supervision, but not apparently without misunderstandings
between the Federal commanders that resulted in ample reinforcements idly
awaiting orders, while their comrades were being pressed and driven back by
greater numbers. McClellan only arrived on the scene late in the afternoon,
having stayed behind at Yorktown in order to send troops up the York river to
West Point, which was to be his principal depot of supplies. On the Unionist
side, parts of four divisions were engaged, and on the Confederate side about
10,000 men. Both sides claimed a victory, but the manifest advantage fell to
the Confederates, who were able to continue their retrograde movement
unmolested, while McClellan remained several days at Williamsburg. The
Confederate retreat, however, opened the James river to Unionist gunboats. The
enemy abandoned Norfolk, which was occupied on May 10 by an expedition from
Fortress Monroe under General Wool; and the Confederate ironclad Merrmac on the
Elizabeth river, thus caught between the Federal forces, was on May 11
abandoned by her officers and crew, set on fire, and blown up.
1862]
McClellan's demand for
reinforcements. 475
One
of McClellan’s besetting weaknesses was to overestimate the enemy’s strength.
His desire to ensure success and his fear of failure were both so great, that
his judgment was continually at fault about difficulties and obstacles. All the
previous autumn, while Johnston, with less than 50,000 men, lay at Manassas, watching
the Army of the Potomac about Washington, McClellan reported the Confederate
strength at triple its real number. After his landing in the peninsula the same
nightmare haunted his imagination. On the second day after his arrival before
Yorktown and Magruder’s line of 11,000 men, he wrote in his dispatch to the
Secretary of War: “It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the
enemy on my hands—certainly not less than 100,000, and probably more.” Five
days after the battle of Williamsburg, he wrote in another dispatch, “If I am
not reinforced it is probable I shall be obliged to fight double my numbers,
strongly entrenched.” And again on May 14, “I must attack in position, probably
entrenched perhaps double my
numbers.”
McClellan’s
clamour for reinforcements had its effect at Washington; and on May 18 the
Secretary of War informed him that the President, while unwilling to uncover
the capital entirely, had ordered McDowell to move with between 35,000 and
40,000 men to join him by a land march. “At your earnest call for
reinforcements he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond,
but charged in attempting this not to uncover the city of Washington; and you
will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out
of position to cover this city.” McDowell’s march however was quickly
interrupted; McClellan’s leisurely campaign had permitted Lee to send a
detachment to Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, with which that
commander made a rapid march northward, fighting and driving before him the
scattered Union forces, as far as Harper’s Ferry. It was both an audacious and
reckless expedition, offering a chance to intercept his retreat and capture his
entire command; and to effect this McDowell’s course was changed by orders from
the President. McDowell executed his new orders with all promptness; but
Fremont, who had been ordered to co-operate, was wanting. Stationed in the
mountains beyond the valley, he took a route other than that by which he had
been directed to proceed, and failed to reach the rendezvous at the appointed
time, thus enabling Jackson to escape between his pursuers.
Meanwhile the
slowly retiring Confederate army went into camp about three miles from Richmond
in front of the fortifications erected for that city’s defence, while McClellan
advanced his forces and placed them in position in a line about thirteen miles
in length on the left bank of the Chickahominy. Along this stream, a low swampy
creek in dry weather, expanding into a broad belt of half marsh, half river in
periods of rain, that rendered it entirely impassable except by bridges, the
Union army lay from Bottom Bridge to New Bridge; its route of supplies being
from
476
Battles
on the Chickahominy. [1862
West Point on
the York river, by way of White House on the Pamunky river.
So far from
having to overcome double numbers, as he continually reported, McClellan’s next
serious fighting occurred when his own army was just twice as strong as that of
the Confederates. On May 31 the Unionist forces under his command showed an
aggregate of 127,000, while that of the enemy under Johnston’s command was
about 62,000. It was not the want of troops, but the faulty position in which
General McClellan had placed a part of his army, that enabled the enemy
suddenly to fall upon it in superior strength. Two of McClellan’s army corps,
those under Heintzelman and Keyes, forming his left wing, had with much
bridge-building and entrenching been pushed across the Chickahominy to the
neighbourhood of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, five miles from the fortifications
of Richmond, while the remaining three corps were yet in their old position,
thus leaving the army divided by the treacherous stream.
McClellan’s
own report relates part of the result. “During the day and night of the 30th of
May a very violent storm occurred. The rain falling in torrents rendered work
on the rifle-pits and bridges impracticable, made the roads almost impassable,
and threatened the destruction of the bridges over the Chickahominy. The enemy,
perceiving the unfavourable position in which we were placed, and the
possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off
from the main body by the rapidly rising stream, threw an overwhelming force upon the position occupied by Casey’s
division.”
This attack,
begun by the Confederates on the afternoon of May 81, would probably have been
fatal to the isolated Unionist left wing, but for the energy of General Sumner,
commanding a Unionist corps nearest the battle-field. When he received orders
to cross the Chickahominy to the help of his comrades, one of his two available
bridges was already swept away by the flood, and the remaining one nearly
submerged; and this became totally useless immediately after his corps had passed
over it. But he arrived in time, if not to win a victory, at least to prevent a
defeat. When night closed, the combatants bivouacked on the field, and in the
desultory fighting of next morning, the Unionist troops regained their lost
ground, while the enemy withdrew. A serious battle had been fought, without
decisive result, except the loss of 5000 Federals and 6000 Confederates. Late
in the evening General Johnston was seriously wounded, and General Lee
succeeded him in command of the Confederate army.
Competent
critics have written that that was the opportune moment, when the Unionist
army, with its great superiority of numbers, with the inspiration of success,
with two-thirds of the Confederate army crippled, disheartened, and retreating,
could under a capable commander have immediately advanced and taken Richmond.
McClellan in his report
elaborately
argues the impossibility of his doing so, since his army was divided, the
bridges destroyed, the roads impassable. He states that it would have required
a march of twenty-three miles, occupying two entire days, to unite his right
wing with his left; but he remains innocently unconscious of the light thus
reflected on his own strategy, by his having placed his army in such a
situation, astride of so serious an obstacle.
The escape of
Jackson from the well-planned junction of the Unionist detachments in the
Shenandoah Valley, and the repulse of the Confederate attack at Seven Pines
and Fair Oaks on the Chickahominy, occurred simultaneously about June 1, 1862. After
that came two weeks of extremely bad weather, dining which General McClellan
reported his time to be fully occupied in repairing bridges and restoring the
roads carried away and damaged by the floods, and in preparation to unite his
separated army on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy. He telegraphed on June
10, “I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground permit, but there will be
a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether
abnormal.”
In response
to his continual call for reinforcements, the President ordered about 20,000
well-organised troops to his aid, half of them— from McDowell’s corps—to go by
water; and so rearranged the commands in the Shenandoah Valley that McDowell
with the remainder of his corps should join him by a land march. McClellan’s
report, written more than a year after the event, states that he intended to
attack about June 26; but there are indications in his dispatches to show that
he was already vaguely meditating a change of base to the James river. The
exact position of Jackson’s force was not known for some time owing to the
confusing rumours he set afloat, but toward the end of June it became evident
that he was returning to Richmond, which, with other indications, implied that
Lee either intended or expected a serious collision near that city.
It is quite
clear that President Lincoln had become convinced, from the tenor of General
McClellan’s correspondence during his whole peninsular campaign, that that
general’s expedition against Richmond would ultimately be more likely to fail
than succeed, though he continued to send him every encouragement. It must
have been some such feeling which prompted the President to visit General Scott
for advice on June 24, for on his return to Washington he called General Pope
from the west, and on June 26 gave him the command of the forces under Fremont,
Banks, and McDowell, to be called the Army of Virginia, assigning to it the
duty of guarding Washington and the Shenandoah Valley, and also of co-operating
in the campaign against Richmond.
The
precaution was taken not a day too soon. On the afternoon of June 25 McClellan
sent three telegrams to announce that he had that morning begun a general
forward movement, against which the
478
[l862
enemy was
making a desperate resistance. His second telegram, sent at three o’clock, said
it was not a battle; his third, sent at five, that he had fully gained his
point with but little loss. But at a quarter past six he sent a fourth and, this
time, a lengthy dispatch, in which President Lincoln, familiar with the
general’s quick changes of mood, at once read the presage of defeat. It
announced that Beauregard had arrived in Richmond with strong reinforcements;
that Jackson would attack his rear; that the total rebel force was reported at
200,000. “ I will do all that a general can do,” continued he, “ with the
splendid army I have the honour to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming
numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the
action, which will probably occur to-morrow or within a short time, is a
disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest
where it belongs.”
The distorted
rumours that threw McClellan into this gloomy state of mind had for their basis
only the fact that General Lee, taking advantage of McClellan’s inaction during
nearly the whole of June, gathered an army of 80,762 well-trained and
well-appointed Confederate soldiers and carefully prepared to attack and, as he
confidently hoped, destroy the Union army. To carry out this plan he recalled
Jackson from the Shenandoah Valley, and so early as June 13 sent General
Stuart, with 1200 Confederate cavalry and a few guns, on a raid entirely around
McClellan’s army, which that enterprising leader successfully accomplished,
burning two schooners laden with forage and fourteen government waggons,
besides doing other miscellaneous damage on the way. So confident of success
was Lee that he took the risk of dividing his force, sending two-thirds of it
north of the Chickahominy to drive McClellan’s right wing down the peninsula.
It was the movement thus begun on June 26 which inaugurated the series of
conflicts known as the Seven Days’ Battles.
Strong as he
had managed to make the Confederate army, its mere numbers did not yet render
it capable of performing the extraordinary task he set it. McClellan’s
effective force for the coming encounters has been carefully estimated to have
been 92,500—while his own official report, five days earlier, reckoned it at
105,445. It was that general’s chronic habit of over-estimating the enemy that
prompted his fear of being overwhelmed by 200,000, as expressed in his dispatch
to the President of June 25. Doubtless Mr Lincoln congratulated himself on
having organised a new army under Pope, which, in case of the defeat which
McClellan’s dispatch foreshadowed, he could interpose between Lee and
Washington; for the postscript of his reply to McClellan says significantly, “
General Pope thinks, if you fall back, it would be much better toward York
river than toward the James.”
McClellan’s
dispatch at noon of June 26 was more hopeful, for he promised to do his best
“to out-manoeuvre, outwit, and out-fight the
enemy.” But
this courageous mood did not last long. A little past midnight, reporting the
fighting of the 27th, he wrote to the Secretary of War in an uncontrollable
emotion of despair and insubordination, “I have not a man in reserve, and shall
be glad to cover my retreat
and
save the material and personnel of the army..................... If
I save this
army now, I
tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in
Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.”
There was no
occasion for the general’s absurd panic. On the 26th his troops had won a
splendid victory. On the 27th, though with great loss, they had firmly held
their ground against heavy odds. On the 28th they had, by the testimony of
eminent Confederate leaders, an advantage of position which, properly used,
would have made them masters of Richmond in a single day. On the 29th and 30th
they more than held their own, and on July 1 they won a victory at Malvern Hill
that shattered the Confederate army. It was only the discouragement of their
commander that caused their retreat to the shelter of the Union gunboats at
Harrison’s Landing on the James river.
The President
was less alarmed at the reported disaster to the army, than at the utter
collapse of McClellan’s courage and hope. He sent him a kind message to save
his army at all events, and hurried reinforcements to him from all available
points. Further news soon made it evident that there was no immediate danger,
for Lee had withdrawn his crippled army to Richmond. For the President,
however, the crisis had a wider import, and he now took prompt measures to meet
it. It was plain that an error had been committed when in April the recruiting
of the armies was stopped. Additional forces were needed east and west, and
that speedily. The President sent Secretary Seward to New York with a letter
addressed to the governors of the loyal States setting forth the military
situation, and adding: “Rather than hazard the misapprehension of our military
condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by proclamation, I have deemed
it best to address you in this form. To accomplish the object stated we
require, without delay, 150,000 men, including those recently called for by the
Secretary of War. Thus reinforced, our gallant army will be enabled to realise
the hopes and expectations of the government and the people.”
With this he
also addressed to Secretary Seward another letter, to be shown confidentially
to the governors, containing one of the most impressive official declarations
of his whole administration. “I expect to maintain this contest until
successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or
the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new
force, were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so
hard is it
to have a
thing understood as it really is.” Responding nobly to the suggestion, eighteen
governors immediately signed a joint tender of troops, under which a call for
300,000 volunteers was issued.
On July 8 and
9 the President visited Harrison’s Landing, and in a personal conference with
General McClellan and the commanders of the several army corps, made specific
inquiry of each, of the number of troops, their sanitary condition, the losses
in the late battles, and the expediency of renewing the campaign or withdrawing
the army. In a letter of July 3 McClellan said he doubted whether he had with
him “more than 50,000 men with their colours.” His tri-monthly return for July
10, one day after the President’s visit and a week after the battle of Malvern
Hill, shows present for duty equipped 98,631, aggregate present 117,714,
aggregate present and absent 157,038—of whom 34,472 were absent by authority.
Having
provided for an early increase of the armies, the President now also
inaugurated a change in their management. On his return to Washington he, by an
order of July 11, constituted General Halleck General-in-Chief of all the land
forces, and called him to Washington. Reaching the capital on the 22nd, Halleck
was immediately sent to Harrison’s Landing to acquaint himself with the
situation, and to conferwith General McClellan. The result was that, on
Halleck’s return, the Administration resolved to withdraw the Army of the
Potomac from Harrison’s Landing and bring it back to be united with the Army of
Virginia, under General Pope. McClellan persistently opposed the change, and by
various delays so thwarted its execution that he and his army did not reach the
neighbourhood of Washington till August 27.
By that date
General Lee, relieved from all danger to Richmond, had assumed the offensive
and marched against Pope. With his whole force he confronted that general near
the old battle-field of Bull Run, where three days later, on August 30, 1862,
he inflicted a second great defeat on the Unionist army, partly on the same
ground as that of the former battle. It is quite evident that this defeat
resulted from McClellan’s delays and the want of efficient co-operation between
him and some of his corps-commanders. There was then, and has been ever since,
angry controversy as to whether such delay and want of co-operation were
intentional or not. Under the firm belief that they were, a court-martial
cashiered General Fitz-John Porter, one of the corps- commanders ; and
President Lincoln approved the finding. Long years afterward General Grant
entertained a contrary opinion, and Congress reinstated Porter in his rank. At
the moment, however, in view of the discouragement and demoralisation caused by
the defeat and the imminent danger to the city of Washington, Pope was relieved
and assigned to other duty; and President Lincoln, recognising McClellan’s
great ability as an organiser and the unaccountable influence he seemed to
possess
1862]
481
with the Army
of the Potomac and most of its leaders, placed him, on September 2, in command
of the defences of Washington, to gather and consolidate the beaten and
dispirited troops. Mr Lincoln took this action against the judgment of a
majority of his Cabinet, simply because McClellan, dilatory as he was, was the
fittest instrument to avert a momentary danger; and the general, who for two
months had been contemptuous and half mutinous in his conduct toward the
President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck, now began again .to show
a zealous deference towards his superiors, and with unwonted personal activity
soon restored order and harmony in the reunited army.
General Lee,
seeing no chance of a successful attack on Washington, now conceived a plan to
extend his offensive campaign, and moved his whole army across the Potomac into
Maryland, by way of Leesburg and Frederick, with the double hope of causing a
rising among the Maryland Secessionists and drawing McClellan into a battle
favourable to the Confederates. There was also the possibility that, if he
could win a decisive victory, he might seize the communications with
Washington, or perhaps even advance into Pennsylvania, occupy Philadelphia, and
dictate a peace in Independence Hall.
McClellan’s
duty was to oppose defensive tactics to Lee’s movement, and to protect the
capital; but this plan of action was, without the previous consent of the
authorities, gradually changed into that of a campaign against Lee. It is not
likely that this would have been permitted had President Lincoln been possessed
of all the information which in the course of thirty years has subsequently
thrown light on McClellan’s character and conduct. But it was a time of
uncertainty and apprehension. Lee’s audacity portended greater danger than
really existed ; and the Governor of Pennsylvania called out his militia
reserves. At this point a rare piece of good fortune once more fell to
McClellan’s lot. On September 13 a private soldier picked up, in one of the
enemy’s abandoned camps, a copy of Lee’s General Order of September 9, which,
placed in McClellan’s hands, gave him full information as to the movements and
intentions of the enemy. It was to the effect that Lee had divided his forces,
leaving one portion in Maryland while the other recrossed the Potomac to capture
Harper’s Ferry; and that their weakened vanguard was within a twenty-miles
march.
But even this
brilliant opportunity of annihilating the foe was insufficient to rouse
McClellan to energy and expedition. With splendid weather, good roads, and the
President’s urgent telegram not to let the enemy get away without being hurt,
time equal to two full days slipped away in indecision and lethargy; and, when
at last battle was joined at Antietam on September 17, Lee’s reunited forces
were on the field and in the fight, while one-third of McClellan’s army was not
engaged at all, and the remainder was sent into action piecemeal, and under
orders so defective that co-operative movement and mutual
action were
practically impossible. It was a drawn battle, and only the approach of night
put an end to the appalling slaughter. While the losses were almost equal, the
Confederates were at a disadvantage because they had suffered the greater
proportional diminution; and, with the Potomac immediately behind them, it was
injudicious at once to begin a retreat. But here again McClellan’s hesitation
proved their deliverance. It was not till the morning of the 19th that he
ordered.a renewal of the attack; and by that time the Confederates had retired
over the river into Virginia, whereupon he reported! with evident satisfaction
that he had driven the enemy across the Potomac, and that Pennsylvania was
safe.
The first
reports about the battle of Antietam were received by the country as news of a
great victory; and victory in a measure it certainly was, since it inflicted
great losses upon the Confederate army and brought the invasion of Maryland and
Pennsylvania to an abrupt close. President Lincoln seized the opportunity so
presented to issue his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, a
far-reaching executive act, which will be more fully treated in another
chapter. But, as he became better acquainted with the facts in detail, Mr
Lincoln was profoundly grieved that McClellan had not used his unique opportunity
completely to destroy the Confederate forces and practically to end the war.
So decisive
an effort seemed to be as far as ever beyond the capacity of' the Union
commander. All his care was to remain idle near the battle-field, to reinforce
and reorganise his army, and to repair the wastes of the campaign. On October 6
Halleck telegraphed to him the (President’s peremptory order to cross the
Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south; but he wasted twenty
days more in excuses and complaints before he began his crossing, though he had
had for nearly a month over 100,000 men present for duty under his immediate
command, with as many more present for duty subject to his orders between him
and Washington. To his positive command the President also added repeated
criticism, advice and pressure. “ Change position with the enemy,” wrote the
President, “and think you not he would break your communication with Bichmond
within the next
twenty-four
hours? I say ‘try’! If we never try, we
shall never
succeed If we cannot beat him when he bears the
wastage of
coming to us,
we never can when we bear the wastage of going to
him ,.In coming to us he tenders us an advantage
which we should
not waive. We
should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him
somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far
away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being
within the entrenchments of Richmond.” But argument and expostulation were
alike wasted on McClellan. He was always haunted by the fear of defeat, never
1862]
Burnside defeated at
Fredericksburg.
483
inspired by
the hope of victory. The end of his military career came on November 5, 1862,
when an order of the President directed him to hand over the command of the
Army of the Potomac to Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, the ranking
corps-commander.
(2) Fredericksburg,
Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg.
Burnside was
a West Point graduate, who, having devoted himself to civil pursuits,
re-entered the military service at the beginning of the war as Colonel of the
1st Rhode Island regiment. He had commanded a brigade in the first battle of
Bull Run, and in the autumn of 1861 organised a half-military, half-naval
expedition, which in January, 1862, entered Albemarle Sound, captured Roanoke
Island, and by several minor expeditions took possession of nearly all the
interior coast-line of North Carolina. From this duty he had been recalled in
July, 1862, to reinforce McClellan, after the failure of that general’s
campaign against Richmond. In the battle of Antietam he nominally commanded the
right wing, but as his divisions became separated and went into action on both
the extreme right and extreme left, his subordinate generals rather than
himself exercised immediate control. His advancement, therefore, was due on the
one hand to his military training, handsome personal presence, and winning
disposition, and on the other to the steady course of regular promotion, rather
than to any manifestation of exceptional military genius.
So it was not
unnatural that his appointment to command the Army of the Potomac (an offer of
which he had twice before declined) was against his personal wish and
inclination. He instinctively and correctly doubted his ability to fulfil the
duty. Nevertheless, urged by personal friends and by McClellan himself, with
whom he was intimate, he accepted the command. His own lack of confidence,
however, soon communicated itself to the whole army and led to speedy disaster.
Against the advice of the President and General Halleck, he chose the
Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg as the point from which to advance toward
Richmond, and in his movement to it was so delayed by the non-arrival of his
pontoon train from Washington that he found the whole of Lee’s army impregnably
fortified on the hills behind the town when he arrived.
With such a
lion in his path, no better plan seems to have occurred to him than simply to
cross the river and attack the enemy in position. Bridges were thrown across the
stream at two points on December 11 and 12, 1862; and on the 13th the Federal
troops made an assault in force which, for desperate courage, hopelessness, and
frightful loss, has rarely been equalled. The effort resulted in a complete
repulse; and after two days of anxious suspense and indecision, the troops were
31—2
484
[1862-3
withdrawn in
an irritation and bitterness of spirit almost akin to mutiny. There arose, of
course, the usual controversy as to the causes of the defeat. With frank and
manly courage, Burnside himself assumed the responsibility and the blame,
giving due credit to the extreme courage and endurance of his troops. The
simple explanation was that he had set his army a task practically impossible.
The losses were 12,653 on the Federal side and 4,201 on that of the
Confederates.
This great
disaster intensified the want of confidence which the army felt in its
commander, and gave rise to such open expressions of discontent among officers
and men that the President cautioned Burnside to make no further movement
without his knowledge. This in turn led Burnside to demand an explanation of
the restraining order. The situation was frankly discussed between, them. In
order to relieve the embarrassment, the President requested General Halleck to
visit the army, examine Burnside’s further plans, and approve or disapprove
their execution; but Halleck refused the unwelcome task.
On January
21, 1863, Burnside, against the protest of several of his officers, started his
army on a second movement, which became known as the “Mud March,” because it
was cut short by a sudden rainstorm that rendered the roads absolutely
impassable. This was hailed as a providential relief by the unwilling soldiers.
Every day, every interview, and every letter brought to light increasing
mistrust and disagreement. Complaint and recrimination were beginning to
demoralise the whole army. On January 23 Burnside drew up an order dismissing
or relieving eight or ten of his general officers for various reasons, and
presented it, together with his own resignation, to the President, who, seeing
that all his efforts at conciliation had proved abortive, relieved him and
appointed General Joseph Hooker his successor.
General
Hooker was also a West Point graduate, who, re-entering the army at the
beginning of the rebellion as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, had risen
through the grades of division and corps commander to the command of
Burnside’s centre grand division. In the previous battles of Williamsburg, Fair
Oaks, Malvern Hill, Second Bull Run and Antietam, he had gained the sobriquet
of “Fighting Joe Hooker.” He had been loudest in his criticisms of Burnside and
in the manifestation of an insubordinate spirit. The selection was Lincoln’s
own act, and his reasons for so doing are set forth in one of the President’s
most characteristic letters. “I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier,
which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your
profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is
a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within
reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that, during General
Burnside’s command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition and
thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the
country
1863]
485
and to a most
meritorious and honourable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to
believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government
needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I
have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up
dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the
dictatorship.”
This missive,
notifying him of his appointment, written confidentially to Hooker on January
25, 1863, did not become public for long years afterward. At its close it
specially enjoined upon the new commander to “beware of rashness.” The generous
but searching criticism it contained doubtless made a deep impression upon
Hooker, for he appears to have endeavoured seriously to conform to the
President’s injunctions. He laboured hard and succeeded well in restoring the
morale of the troops, and by the middle of April had under his command about
130,000 soldiers on whose efficiency he felt he
could firmly rely, while both the army and the country had acquired a strong
faith in the new commander.
In the
interim he made several visits to Washington to confer with the President, and
finally laid before him a plan of campaign which in his judgment promised
success. Both armies remained in the same relative positions they had occupied
while Burnside was in command, and Mr Lincoln impressed upon Hooker the obvious
truth that his main objective should be, not Richmond, but the Confederate
army; that it should not be attacked in its entrenchments, but by operations on
its communications be drawn into an engagement outside of them.
Haring arranged
his plan on this theory and received the President’s approval of the
enterprise, Hooker began his movement on April 27 by strongly threatening Lee’s
right, a few miles below Fredericksburg, while he threw the bulk of his forces
across the Rappahannock on boats and pontoon bridges twenty-seven miles above.
On the 30th he had four army corps at Chancellorsville, eleven miles from
Fredericksburg, ready to attack the enemy’s rear. So far this movement had
practically been a surprise to Lee. The plan had been conceived with skill, and
up to this point executed with great energy and promptness; and it seems
conceded that, had the movement been pushed forward a short distance further,
the Confederate army would have been obliged to fight a very disadvantageous
battle.
Hooker’s
qualities as a leader are tersely expressed by one of his critics in the
phrase, “as an inferior he planned badly and fought well; as a chief he planned
well and fought badly.” Arrived at Chancellorsville, the energy of the
commander and the momentum of the army suddenly slackened. The delay gave Lee
time to bring up all his forces from Fredericksburg and entrench them in front
of the Union advance, as well as to organise a flanking movement under
Stonewall Jackson, which found its way round the unguarded Union
486 Battle of Chancellorsville.'—Death of Jackson. [i863
right, and by
an impetuous attack threw it into violent disorder. Gradually, during the next
four days, the Federal aggressive became changed to the defensive, and the
battle was lost. Two important personal incidents marked the occasion. On May
3, while Hooker was standing at his headquarters at Chancellor’s house, a
column of the portico was struck by a cannon shot and thrown violently against
him, the shock rendering him unconscious for half an hour; and, though he soon
became capable of giving directions, he seems not to have regained his full
powers of reason and will during the remainder of the action. The other
incident was a serious loss to the Confederate army and cause. Stonewall
Jackson, conducting the flank movement, rode under the excitement of success a
hundred yards in front of his lines, where by accident he came under the fire
of both Union and Confederate guns, and received wounds from which he died a
few days afterwards. On the evening of May 4 Hooker called a council of war,
and, although a majority of his commanders wished to remain and fight the
campaign to a finish on the south side of the river, he finally decided to
withdraw his army.
Hooker’s
defeat in the battle of Chancellorsville naturally diminished his prestige as a
commander, but not nearly so much as the repulse from Fredericksburg had
affected that of Burnside. The President and Secretary of War did not lose
faith in him; and Hooker’s subordinate generals gave as yet no sign of serious
discontent. While the army rested and recuperated in its old position, Hooker
conceived and suggested several new plans, in which the President neither
encouraged nor restrained him, but which the general’s own confidence was not
sufficiently strong to lead him to attempt.
During this
period of expectancy General Lee once more took the initiative, and for the
second time began an invasion of Pennsylvania. It was not alone his recent
victories in the two important battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville
that moved him to this course. Thus far in the several Virginia campaigns the
balance of success and advantage had been very decidedly with the Confederate
army. It was now at the point of its largest numbers and greatest efficiency.
The Southern Confederacy was in the flush of confidence and hope. For nearly a
year the North had made little apparent progress towards a final suppression of
the rebellion; while dissension was growing in its politics, and its debt was
increasing with frightful rapidity. To fill its armies it had been obliged to
enact a conscription law, the enforcement of which was meeting opposition, and
might create counter-revolution. Under such conditions, the Confederate
government urged a military policy of vigorous aggression, to which General Lee
and his army responded with more than ordinary goodwill.
About the
beginning of June, therefore, the Confederate army began moving northward,
leaving a strong rear-guard to occupy the attention
of Hooker.
This, however, did not long mystify that general, who reported the enemy’s
intentions to the President, and asked whether he might not venture to attack
the Southern army while thus weakened, or even try a dash at Richmond. Mr
Lincoln, however, disapproved both ideas. An attack on the Fredericksburg
entrenchments, he reminded Hooker, would necessarily be at a great
disadvantage; and he added: “ In one word, I would not take any risk of being
entangled upon the river like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be
tom by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the
other.” To the suggestion about Richmond he replied: “ If left to me, I would
not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee’s moving north of it. If you had
Richmond invested to-day, you would not
be
able to take it in twenty days I think
Lee’s army, and not
Richmond, is
your true objective point.”
In the new
campaign which General Lee was beginning, Hooker for several weeks manifested
all his former skill and energy, and successfully interposed the Union army
between Washington and the Confederate forces moving northward along the Blue
Ridge. But, like Burnside, he now began to experience a want of harmony in his
military councils, the most serious part of which was his own suspicion that
Halleck was unfriendly to him. Their disagreement gradually increased, though
the President made every effort to reconcile their estrangement. Just when both
armies had crossed the Potomac in their northward movement this irritation reached
its crisis, and Hooker asked to be relieved from command. While a change of
commanders at such a juncture was extremely hazardous, the President realised
that discordant directions or a lack of zealous co-operation would be yet more
dangerous. Accordingly, he relieved Hooker and appointed Major-General George
G. Meade to succeed him.
Meade was a
West Point graduate, had won distinction in the Mexican War, and from the grade
of Captain of Engineers entered the Civil War as Brigadier-General of Volunteers.
His service had been continuous in the Army of the Potomac, and he was at the
head of the Fifth Corps when called to the chief command. Though he had been
Hooker’s chief critic, the latter complimented him in general orders, a
courtesy which Meade heartily returned; and the change produced nothing more
than a ripple of comment and not an instant’s hesitation or derangement in the
march.
During the
earlier part of Lee’s march from Fredericksburg to the Potomac near Harper’s
Ferry, as well as Hooker’s pursuit, the movements of both armies were masked
by cavalry; and, in spite of numerous skirmishes, it was not until the enemy’s
vanguard had crossed the river that a serious invasion of the North became
evident. The discovery, of course, created intense alarm in Maryland and
Pennsylvania; and President Lincoln immediately issued, as a prudential
measure, a
proclamation
calling into service for six months 120,000 militia from those and the
contiguous States. Lee’s advance was somewhat slow after his whole force
crossed the Potomac. He pushed two advance detachments well toward the
Susquehanna, but kept his main army at and near Chambersburg until, on the
night of June 28, the same day on which the change of command had occurred in
the Union army, a scout brought information to Lee that his antagonist had
reached Frederick and seized the passes of South Mountain. Up to this time Lee
had made his preparations to march upon Harrisburg; but now, seeing his
communications menaced, he turned his course abruptly to the right and issued
orders to concentrate his whole army at Gettysburg, east of the mountains.
Meade, having
no certain information of the enemy’s plans, ordered a continuation of the
northward march which Hooker had begun. Within the next two days he learned the
enemy’s movements more accurately, and correctly divined that a collision must
necessarily soon occur. Having reached Taneytown, he, on July 1, carefully
selected a battle-field behind the line of Pipe Creek, whither he expected to
retire and receive Lee’s attack. But on that morning the advance guards of the
two armies, moving at right angles to each other, had already met and engaged
in conflict at Gettysburg, and that place became the principal battle-field of
the war.
Meade had
sent Reynolds, his second in command, with three corps forward to Gettysburg to
observe the enemy and mask the intended retrograde movement to Pipe Creek.
Arriving early on the morning of July 1, Reynolds found two brigades of Federal
cavalry skirmishing with the enemy’s advance two miles west of that town. His
advance division was not yet on the ground, but he hurried it up to support the
Federal cavalry; and the fight thus begun grew in strength and importance on
the arrival of additional forces from both armies. It continued throughout the
day with fluctuating results, until heavy Confederate reinforcements, coming
by converging roads from the north and north-east as well as from the
north-west, and outnumbering the Federals by two to one, drove back the
Unionist troops, first into Gettysburg, and then through and southward out of
the town to a line of hills called Cemetery Ridge.
Cemetery
Ridge is an irregular curved ridge which has aptly been compared with a
fish-hook, lying in general direction north and south, with the barb toward the
north and east. At its southern extremity is an elevation called Round Top, 400
feet high, and some distance north of it a lower elevation, called Little Round
Top. From these the ridge extends northward two miles, to within half a mile of
Gettysburg, and curving eastward, terminates abruptly in Culp’s Hill. Posted on
this ridge, the Union army found itself in a kind of natural fortress, the
broken and rocky crest of which the troops immediately strengthened by
improvised
entrenchments, in which work they had become very expert during their severe
Virginia campaigns.
When Meade,
fourteen miles away at Taneytown, received the report of this first day’s
fighting, he immediately accepted the advice of the generals who witnessed it,
and gave his whole army orders to make Gettysburg, instead of Pipe Creek, the
battle-field. All through the night Unionist reinforcements were arriving
behind Cemetery Ridge. The commanding general reached the ground after
midnight.
While thus,
on the morning of July 2, the Federal army was posted on an irregular
semicircle from the Round Tops on its extreme left to Culp’s Hill on its
extreme right, the army of Lee had also come up and taken position in a wider
semicircle in its front. This placed it at the disadvantage of having the
greater distances between its wings and its several corps, making the
transmission of orders and the movement of detachments in support slower and
more difficult. The first day’s success, however, had made Lee over-confident.
Besides, he did not know that Meade’s reinforcements had arrived during the
night. He vigorously attacked the Federal position on both right and left.
There was stubborn fighting for several hours at different points; but, though
the Confederates nearly gained possession of Little Round Top and actually at
night held a lodgment in the exterior entrenchment of Culp’s Hill, the result
was a general failure of the attack.
The crisis of
the battle came on July 3. Both armies had received their last reinforcements.
A corps reached Meade on the afternoon of the 2nd after a march of thirty-two
miles; and three brigades of Virginia veterans joined Lee on the morning of the
3rd. Both armies were now in a position which made the final struggle unavoidable.
Some fighting occurred very early in the day, in which the Union line regained
the ground on the right lost the evening before; and then ominous stillness
fell upon the battle-field till one o’clock. Half a mile west of Cemetery Bidge
was the long parallel elevation of Seminary Ridge, from which 130 Confederate
guns for two hours belched forth a furious cannonade, answered with equal
vigour by 80 Federal guns on Cemetery Ridge. Deeming the culminating struggle
near at hand, the Unionist chief of artillery first slackened, then stopped the
fire of his batteries to prepare for the coming assault. Half an hour
afterwards, there swept across the undulations of the intervening valley in
clear view of the opposing armies the attacking lines of 15,000 Confederate
veterans, upon whom, as they neared the Unionist entrenchments, was poured the
rapid and deadly fire of the Federal field batteries and the rifles of the
infantry regiments from behind their natural and extemporised defences. Under
this terrible ordeal the assaulting lines wavered, doubled, and broke, part
rolling like a spent wave back down the slope in indiscriminate retreat, while
the few fragments that rushed across the Union breastworks dropped their
battle-flags and bayonets
490
[l863
to remain as
prisoners. That single desperate charge ended alike the battle and the campaign
of invasion.
The
exhaustion and loss in three consecutive days of battle was such that Meade and
his council of generals decided to rest on the following day, July 4, to await
the intentions of the enemy. Lee, on his part, was only too glad of the
respite. During the day he continued to present a bold front, but as darkness
fell he began a hasty retreat, and his rear-guard disappeared before daylight
of the 5th. His loss amounted to 36,000 killed, wounded, and missing; that of
the Federals was 23,000. Meade at once began a pursuit, which proved him to be
a cautious rather- than a brilliant commander. Heavy rains fell during the next
few days, swelling the waters of the Potomac so as to render fording
impossible; and a Unionist detachment partly destroyed the pontoon bridge
which the enemy had used in his northward march. The Confederate army was
again, as it had been a year before, in imminent danger. President Lincoln was
intensely anxious that the opportunity should be seized to annihilate it and
end the war; and General Halleck’s dispatches conveyed his wishes in
unmistakeable language. “ Push forward and fight Lee before he can cross the
Potomac,” he telegraphed to Meade on the 7th. At the same time he communicated
to him a note from the President, that Vicksburg had surrendered to Grant on
July 4.
By the 12th
Lee had gained a strong position near, but still north of, the Potomac. There
he was compelled to wait for the river to fall; and Meade reported that he
would attack on the 13th. But at the last moment a council of war decided
otherwise; and by the morning of the 14th the Confederate army had found means
to cross the river and escape. Retreat and pursuit continued, with occasional
engagements, but no decisive battle; and by the end of the month the opposing
armies again lay north and south of the Rappahannock in central Virginia. From
that time until the wintry weather put an end to military operations, the plans
and movements of the opposing generals form an intricate game of strategy,
highly interesting to military students, but leading to no important or
decisive result.
The dead and
wounded of the Unionist army, as well as those abandoned by Lee, were humanely
cared for at Gettysburg; and, with a happy inspiration, the Governor of
Pennsylvania, in co-operation with the governors of all other loyal States
whose troops took part in the conflict, caused a portion of the battle-field to
be transformed into a national cemetery, in which the fallen soldiers found
orderly burial, and which was in due time embellished with monuments to their
heroism, as well as by all the skill with which landscape art can enhance the
loveliness of nature. It was dedicated to its sacred use on November 19,1863;
and the address which President Lincoln delivered during that imposing
ceremonial has become a classic in American
1863]
Lincoln’s
speech at Gettysburg. 491
literature.
After a finished and erudite oration two hours in length by Edward Everett, one
of America’s great orators and statesmen, the President rose and said:
“Fourscore
and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation,
conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal.
“Now we are
engaged in a great Civil War, testing whether that nation, or any nation so
conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field
of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final
resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live.
It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.
“ But, in a
larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate— we cannot hallow—this
ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here have consecrated it
far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long
remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is
for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which
they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be
here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honoured
dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full
measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have
died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and
that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish
from the earth.”
Two years of
stem warfare, surging to and fro over the field of conflict lying east of the
Alleghany Mountains, have thus far been traced, in which were fought the nine
or ten serious engagements in the peninsula, and later the pitched battles of
Bull Run (the second), Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. At the
end of this long and severe struggle the opposing armies again, in the winter
of 1863, confronted each other across the Rapidan, in Virginia, relatively not
very far south of where they lay in the winter of 1861, at the beginning of the
war. Before the reader attempts to form a comparative estimate of the
importance and value of the aggregate result, it will be necessary to examine
and study the course of the war in the West during the same period.
(3) The War on
the Mississippi.
When, on
October 24, 1861, Fremont was relieved of his command in the West,
Major-General David Hunter was temporarily appointed to the post. Two weeks
later the President created the new Department of Missouri, to include the
States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota,
492 Halleck’s movements
on the Mississippi. [i86i
Wisconsin,
Illinois, Arkansas, and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland river;
the whole to be commanded by Henry W. Halleck, whom the President had appointed
a Major-General in the regular army.
Halleck, now
forty-seven years old, had graduated as third in a class of thirty-one from
West Point Military Academy, and had devoted himself from the first to the more
serious studies of his profession. During the Mexican War he gained a brevet
captaincy by valuable service on the Pacific coast, and, after the conquest of
California, took prominent part in its political organisation and admission to
the Union as a State. Resigning his commission in 1854, he was not only
successful in civil pursuits relating to law, mining, and railroads, but also
became distinguished as a writer on military art and science. General Scott
originally called him to Washington to take command in the East; but, at the
moment of his arrival, emergencies in the West imperatively required that he
should be sent to succeed Fremont.
The
instructions sent him by General McClellan contained the intimation that he
should concentrate the mass of his troops on or near the Mississippi. This
direction taken in connexion with the fact that his Department had been
extended across the river into Kentucky, plainly indicated that the “ ulterior
operations,” at which the letter of instructions hinted, were to be a
well-prepared movement in force to open the Mississippi river from Cairo to the
Gulf. The military problem before him was not only novel and difficult, but on
a gigantic scale; and it was hoped that an officer of such acquirements,
experience and judgment, would be able to solve it.
From the
mouth of the Ohio to the sea, the Mississippi river runs through a great
alluvial plain, 500 miles long, and from thirty to fifty miles wide, with
serpentine windings giving it a total length of channel of nearly 1100 miles.
In this long course the stream has a fall of only 322 feet, making its windings
extremely eccentric, while almost its entire length is bordered with a network
of side channels, bayous and swamps. The valley is enclosed on each side by
ranges of bluffs or hills, also very tortuous and irregular in their course;
and as these heights approach the banks of the river at comparatively few
points, not many places are capable of being fortified effectively so as to
control the navigation of the stream.
During the
summer of 1861 considerable attention had naturally been paid by the
Confederates to fortifications of this character, for which the old Federal
arsenal at Baton Rouge supplied the cannon; and the necessity of speedily
closing the upper end of the Mississippi was probably the main cause of the
sudden Confederate advance into Kentucky, with a view to seizing and
effectively fortifying the heights at Columbus, twenty miles below Cairo. At
all events, great energy was expended in this work, and it was not long before
Columbus became popularly known as the “Gibraltar of the West.”
1861-2]
493
Halleck found
plenty of work on his hands when in November, 1861, he reached St Louis and
assumed command. To say nothing of prevailing local maladministration,
provincial feuds and guerrilla risings were breaking out at many points in
different parts of the State with alarming frequency and fierceness. The
deposed Secessionist Governor, Jackson, lingering in Confederate camps in the
south-west comer of Missouri, made a pretence of organising a hostile
legislature and State government; and the Confederate Congress at Richmond
passed an Act admitting Missouri to the Confederate States. Fremont had committed
the political blunder of declaring local military emancipation. Halleck now
committed an equal political blunder by issuing his Order No. 3, excluding
fugitive slaves from Federal camps on the allegation that they carried military
information to the enemy; whereas as a rule the very opposite was true. This
order brought upon him the severe censure of the anti-slavery press and
sentiment of the whole country, and rendered him for a time extremely
unpopular, until, a month later, he practically annulled the order by an
explanatory letter.
It was about
this time that the perplexities of President Lincoln culminated in the illness
of General McClellan; causing him to declare, not long after, that if something
were not done soon, the bottom would drop out of the whole affair. With the
close of the year 1861, the entire military machine seemed to have come to a
standstill. To the casual observer McClellan had nothing to show for his five
months of command at Washington. Buell in Kentucky had for sound military
reasons neglected the urgent and repeated directions to send a Union column into
East Tennessee. Fremont had proved a lamentable military disappointment and
political embarrassment; and when on December 31 the President sent a joint
telegram to Halleck and Buell, asking the pregnant question whether they were
acting in concert, Buell replied, “There is no arrangement between General
Halleck and myself”; while Halleck said, “ I have never received a word from
General Buell; I am not ready to co-operate with him.”
The
President’s telegram also contained a more pertinent inquiry. “When he (Buell)
moves on Bowling Green, what hinders its being reinforced from Columbus?” No
satisfactory reply came from either general, but the President’s questions had
the effect of starting a correspondence between them on the subject of a
forward movement, in which General McClellan, now somewhat recovered, took
part. Neither general, however, evinced any readiness to co-operate or to act
singly; and on January 7, 1862, President Lincoln followed up his inquiries
with a still more energetic monition. “ Please name as early a day as you
safely can, on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert
with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me
to have something definite. I send a like dispatch to Major-General HaHeck.”
In the
correspondence which both preceded and followed this episode, it had been
pointed out by Buell, and was, after examination, accepted and repeated by
Halleck, that the true line of operations was neither against Bowling Green nor
Columbus, but between these two points, up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers,
which, flowing out of Tennessee northward through Kentucky, emptied themselves
into the Ohio river less than fifteen miles apart, at Paducah and Smithland.
Still neither general showed any disposition to remove his ambitious gaze from
his separate objective. It remained for a subordinate officer to seize the
golden opportunity which led to victory and fame.
On the day
before President Lincoln’s telegram, Halleck had directed General Grant at
Cairo to make a reconnaissance and demonstration with land forces and
gun-boats, both towards Columbus, the Confederate stronghold on the
Mississippi, and the less important rebel defences of Fort Henry and Fort
Donelson on the Tennessee and the Cumberland rivers. Grant’s resources for
carrying out this order were quite as limited and defective as those which
caused his superiors so much hesitation and delay; but he accepted his task
cheerfully, and performed it promptly; and, from the date of this reconnaissance,
the military problem which Buell and Halleck had discussed in theory without
coming to agreement, and without any prospect of action for some months to
come, was by him taken up with enthusiasm, and rapidly solved in practice.
Ulysses S.
Grant, born in 1822, graduated from the military school at West Point in 1843,
and won a brevet captaincy for gallant behaviour in two storming assaults
during the Mexican War. He resigned in 1854, having reached the grade of full
captain. At the President’s first call for troops he assisted in drilling a
company at his home in Galena, Illinois, and for some weeks performed clerical
duty on the governor’s staff at Springfield. In a letter to the
Adjutant-General of the Army at Washington, he applied for service, stating
that he felt himself competent to command a regiment; but receiving no reply,
accepted from the governor the command of the 21st Illinois regiment of three-
years’ volunteers, and, having immediately performed active duty at several
points in Missouri, was soon promoted to be Brigadier-General. Since the
beginning of September, 1861, he had been in command of the important post at
Cairo. It was he who had seized Paducah, and afterward under Fremont’s orders
led the expedition to attack and break up a Confederate camp at Belmont on the
Mississippi, opposite Columbus, an engagement beginning with victory, and
ending with something very near defeat, in which Grant barely escaped capture
by the enemy.
The joint
reconnaissance made by land forces and gun-boats, under command of General
Grant and Commodore Foote, between the 9th and the 19th of January, 1862,
convinced both these commanders of the practicability of breaking through the
Confederate defensive line on the Tennessee river. Grant visited St Louis and
laid his views before
I862] Grant
captures Forts Henry and Donelson. 495
Halleck, but
was dismissed with scant ceremony. About this time news was received that
General Thomas had won a victory at Mill Springs in eastern Kentucky, breaking
up Zollicoffer’s entrenched camp, and driving his forces back through
Cumberland Gap; and after Grant had a second and third time asked permission to
attack, Halleck, on January 30, telegraphed to him: “ Make your preparations to
take and hold Fort Henry.” One week later, the joint expedition of Grant and
Foote ascended the Tennessee, and on February 6, after an hour’s bombardment,
Fort Henry surrendered. Grant immediately reported the victory, adding the
confident sentence, “I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th.”
If he could
have at once marched his land forces over the intervening twelve miles, he
might have made good his prediction, for even after the retreating garrison
from Henry reached Donelson, there were only 6000 or 7000 of the enemy in that
fort; but it was a much larger and stronger work. River floods delayed his
march until the 12th, and when on the 13th he invested the fort, the garrison
had been reinforced by about 12,000 Confederates under Generals Pillow, Floyd,
and Buckner. The next afternoon, Foote made a gun-boat attack, which was
repulsed; and on the morning of the 15th a vigorous sortie by the enemy drove
back the right of Grant’s line, and for some hours opened a pathway of escape,
of which the garrison, however, through some misunderstanding of orders, did
not take advantage. Learning what had happened, Grant ordered an immediate
assault, by which the entrenchments on the extreme left were carried, and the
break on the right closed. That night, in a council of war, the two senior
Confederate generals transferred their command to Buckner, the junior, who, on
Sunday morning, the 16th, proposed an armistice, to arrange terms of
capitulation. “ No terms,” replied Grant, “except unconditional and immediate
surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.”
Buckner had no alternative; and on the same day Grant was able to report the
capture of Fort Donelson, with two generals, about 15,000 prisoners, 20,000
stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery and 17 heavy guns. In recognition of his
success the press and people of the Union thereafter interpreted his initials
to mean “Unconditional Surrender” Grant.
The fall of
Fort Donelson caused the Confederate commanders without delay to abandon
Nashville and evacuate Columbus; but disagreement in the views of the Union
generals prevented their taking full advantage of the retreat and
demoralisation of the enemy. Buell wished to continue his separate campaign,
while Halleck boldly asked for supreme command in the West—an advantage which
McClellan was unwilling to grant him over his friend and favourite. Unable thus
to co-operate, Buell moved forward to Nashville, while Halleck gave preparatory
orders for an expedition up the Tennessee. Selfish rivalry,
496
Grant moves to Pittsburg
Landing.
[l862
however, had
soon to give way to the march of events. An advance from south-west Missouri in
December, led by General Curtis under Halleck’s orders, culminated in a Federal
victory at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, on March 7; and on March 9 was fought the
famous naval battle between the ironclads Monitor and Merrimac in Hampton
Roads, Virginia, ending in the disabling and retreat of the Confederate vessel.
Under these new conditions, President Lincoln, on March 11 issued his War
Order, No. 3, relieving McClellan from general command, and charging him with
the conduct of the campaign against Richmond; while the same order united the
three western Departments as far east as Knoxville, Tennessee, into the
Department of the Mississippi, which was placed under the command of Halleck.
Owing to
misunderstanding, Grant was for a few days in unmerited disgrace, and came near
being put under arrest; but on March 13 he was restored to the command of the
Tennessee expedition, for which a concentration of troops had been begun at
Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee. Three days later Halleck
telegraphed to Buell, whom he could now command, to move his forces as rapidly
as possible to the Tennessee to join Grant. For some days Halleck’s dispatches
were indefinite as to plan. Gradually, however, he indicated his intention to
go himself to the Tennessee and take command, and to attack the enemy at the
important railroad junction of Corinth, Mississippi, where a large force was
reported to be gathering. Little by little the Union camp at Pittsburg Landing
was changing its character. At the beginning of March it was intended to be
merely a temporary base, from which to operate against the enemy’s railroads.
By the end of the month it had become an army of five divisions, 33,000 strong,
with a sixth division camped a few miles to the north. All the troops were
comparatively raw ; two divisions had never been under fire. Many regiments
however, equally raw, had shown sufficient courage and steadiness at the
capture of Fort Donelson; and there was therefore no lack of confidence either
in men or officers. But one lesson they had not yet learned—that of prudence
and precaution. They knew perfectly well that a large Confederate force,
estimated at from 60,000 to 80,000 men, was concentrated at Corinth; but, their
thoughts being solely intent on an advance, they made not a single defensive
preparation. Sherman afterwards wrote; “At a later period of the wax, we could
have rendered this position impregnable in one night.”
In this
fancied security they remained until Sunday morning, April 6, when they
suddenly found themselves engaged in a desperate battle. With the hope of
crushing this force before Buell could effect his junction with it, 40,000
Confederate troops, under command of General Albert Sidney Johnston, had,
during the last two days, marched from Corinth, and now advanced in three lines
to the attack. It was not a complete surprise; sharp picket firing had put the
Federal camps on the alert,
1862]
Battle
of Shiloh: Northern victory. 497
and their
lines were speedily ready to meet the onslaught in a hotly contested fight,
lasting throughout the entire day. The ground was very irregular, and concerted
movements of large bodies were impossible. On the whole, however, the
Confederates steadily gained ground from breakfast to sundown. One entire
Federal division was captured; Johnston, the Confederate commander, was killed
in the afternoon. When the battle ceased at night, the Federal lines had been
driven back two miles, close to the banks of the Tennessee.
A turn had
however come in the fortunes of the battle. While the fight was going on,
Buell’s army at length arrived on the opposite bank; his advance division was
ferried across the river, and, with the expiring volleys of the evening, was
being deployed in front of the advancing enemy. At dawn of Monday, the 7th, the
battle was renewed, and though retreating with stubbornness, the Confederates
were slowly driven back from the ground they had gained, and by nightfall their
forces were returning in a disordered rout to Corinth. Among the Unionist
officers, Brigadier-General Sherman, commanding a division, was especially conspicuous
by his gallantry. It was his first fighting since, with the rank of Colonel, he
had commanded a brigade in the battle of Bull Run in July of the previous year.
The casualties were: on the Union side, 1754 killed, 8408 wounded and 2885
missing; on the Confederate side, 1728 killed, 8012 wounded and 959 missing.
Besides the
battle of Pittsburg Landing or Shiloh, as it is more commonly called, Halleck
had yet another important victory to report. Since the evacuation of Columbus,
the Confederates had with great skill and energy erected defences at the next
strategical point on the Mississippi river, Island No. 10, which lies opposite
the town of New Madrid in Missouri, seventy-five miles below Cairo. At that
point the Mississippi river makes a double bend, while swamps and lakes so fill
the adjacent country as to leave but little dry land on either side of the
river. The island, the Tennessee shore, and the town of New Madrid were
strongly fortified, and occupied by considerable garrisons, numbering about
3000 at the first, and 5000 at the last place. Towards the end of February, 1862,
General John Pope, acting under orders from Halleck, organised an expedition,
and, with an army of 20,000 men, appeared before New Madrid early in March.
Investing the town, he secured a lodgment for batteries nine miles below, which
closed the river at that point, causing the Confederates to evacuate New Madrid
on March 13. There still remained the problem of dislodging them from Island
No. 10, but this was happily accomplished by two novel military devices. On
April 4 Commander Henry Walke, courageously ran the gun-boat Carondolet past
the Confederate batteries at night during a thunderstorm—a feat which was
imitated by the gunboat Pittsburgh on the following night, and many times
afterwards elsewhere by other armed vessels, during the war. The river being
very high, and the surrounding
country
flooded, Pope’s engineers succeeded also in cutting a channel through a stretch
of timbered land to a neighbouring bayou, by means of which his transports were
able to pass to where the two gun-boats lay below the island. Seeing that he
now had command of the river, and could move his troops at will, the
Confederates surrendered Island No. 10; and the supporting force of about 6500
men, with three general officers, laid down their arms on the morning of April
8, the day following the battle of Pittsburg Landing.
Pope made
immediate arrangements to proceed with his forces down the Mississippi and
attack Fort Pillow, but was called away in another direction. Carrying out his
former intention, Halleck left his headquarters at St Louis and proceeded to
Pittsburg Landing to take personal charge of the further campaign in Tennessee.
There being no other troops from which to make up the losses in the recent
battles, he ordered Pope to join him with his whole army; and that officer
promptly obeyed, his transports reaching Pittsburg Landing on April 22.
The
determination of Halleck to take personal command of the united western armies
in the field was highly satisfactory to the Administration; and the Secretary
of War telegraphed to him: “ I have no instructions to give you. Go ahead, and
all success attend you.” The hope that his leadership would speedily secure
brilliant military results was fully justified by the favourable circumstances
which presented themselves to his skill and experience. Five days after the
arrival of Pope and his army, the inspiring news was telegraphed to Halleck
from Washington, that the fleet under Admiral Farragut had captured New
Orleans, and was under orders to push up the Mississippi river immediately to
Memphis without waiting for anything.
A campaign of
prime importance under conditions of almost certain success thus lay ready to
his energy and enterprise. The army under Halleck, and the fleet under Farragut
had only to join hands, and the great Mississippi river, from Cairo to the sea,
would be released from the enemy’s control, and nearly one half the territory
of the Confederate States would find its communications effectually severed
from the other half. Halleck himself had pointed out the possibility that Pope
and his army might capture Memphis. With the three armies under his command no
sufficient Confederate force could be concentrated to resist his prompt
southward march, which was to turn and compel the evacuation of every fortress
of the enemy on the Mississippi above Vicksburg; and even that stronghold would
be powerless to resist the combined strength of the army and the fleet.
It turned out
unfortunately that Halleck lacked either the mental grasp or the physical
energy to seize the great opportunity before him. For some days his orders and
dispatches indicated commendable vigour and promptness. To prepare for a march
on Corinth he organised his forces into three corps, making the army of Grant
his right wing, which
1862]
His dilatory march on
Corinth.
499
he placed
under the command of Thomas; that of Buell his centre, and that of Pope his
left; while nominally he made Grant second in command under himself. In his
dispatches he wrote confidently of being on the eve of a great battle, “and at
the enemy’s throat.” But at this point the courage of the strategist gave way
to the caution of the engineer. To make their attack at Shiloh, the Confederate
army had marched from Corinth, a distance of twenty miles, in a little more
than two days. Halleck, going over the same ground in reverse order, spent
thirty-seven days digging his way with pick and shovel in a siege-like advance,
only to find that Beauregard with his garrison of 50,000 Confederates had
evacuated Corinth. It was a pitiful anti-climax, when we remember that the
hundred thousand bayonets under Halleck’s command could by a prompt march have
captured both the works and the garrison.
While the
occupation of Corinth on May 30 was but the shell of a victory, it was still a
success of considerable importance. The strong fortifications of Forts Pillow
and Randolph on the Mississippi were hastily evacuated by the enemy; and the
Unionist'flotilla took possession of their deserted works on June 5. On the
next day the combined flotilla of five Unionist gun-boats and six steam rams,
which the talented engineer Colonel Charles EUet, under the authority of the
Secretary of War, had extemporised from strong river craft, made an attack upon
eight Confederate gun-boats ranged in two lines abreast the city of Memphis,
and in a fierce contest of twenty minutes, annihilated the enemy’s fleet, only
one of their gun-boats escaping. The damage to the Union flotilla was soon
repaired; but Commander Ellet was wounded, and died two weeks later. That afternoon
the Union flag floated over the city of Memphis.
Tardy as had
been Halleck’s advance on Corinth, there still remained to him the chance of
extending his campaign to a most brilliant conclusion. While Halleck was yet
on his way to Corinth, Farragut had ascended the Mississippi with the Union
fleet, received the surrender of all the fortifications below Vicksburg, and
arrived before that city on May 20. The Confederates placed such reliance on
the fortifications of the upper Mississippi, that very little had been done to
render Vicksburg secure. Serious work on its defences was not begun until May
12. The six batteries completed before Farragut’s arrival were strong, not
because of their number or armament, but because the guns of the fleet could
not be elevated to bear on them, posted as they were on blufls at the water’s
edge, two hundred feet high. As it was clear that a purely naval attack would
have no chance of success, and military co-operation could not be obtained, the
fleet withdrew, after vainly summoning the garrison of Vicksburg to surrender.
Returning to
New Orleans about June 1, Farragut received orders conveying the great desire
of the Administration to have the river completely opened; and he again steamed
up to Vicksburg, bringing
500
Halleck
transferred to Washington. [i862
with him
Porter’s mortar flotilla, and a land force of 3000 men. On the morning of June
28 Farragut’s ships, with the aid of a continued bombardment, ran past the
Vicksburg batteries, and on July 1 they were joined, north of the city, by the
Federal gun-boat and ram flotillas. Farragut now sent a direct appeal to
Halleck for help, as he estimated that at this time a force of from 12,000 to
15,000 men would have sufficed to take the works. Day by day, however, the fortifications
were growing more formidable; and on the 14th Halleck gave the decisive answer
that he could render no aid against Vicksburg. By this time the river was
falling so rapidly that Farragut could not remain longer; and, under orders
received from the Navy Department on July 20, he again ran past the Vicksburg
batteries, and returned to New Orleans.
Meanwh:”e new
conditions had arisen which brought about important changes in the western
army. The impending failure of McClellan’s campaign against Richmond caused the
President on June 26 to order General Pope to Washington to form and command
the Army of Virginia; and when, shortly afterwards, McClellan’s campaign ended
in a retreat to Harrison’s Landing, his immediate usefulness was so evidently
at an end as to necessitate more courageous as well as more comprehensive
military supervision of affairs in the east. To this end the President, on July
11, appointed Halleck to command the whole land forces of the United States as
General-in-Chief, with headquarters at Washington. Halleck had committed a
great blunder in quitting his western headquarters at St Louis in order to
assume personal command in the field; the President’s new appointment
transferred him to duty in every way better suited to his temperament and
qualifications.
The inference
to be drawn from Halleck’s orders and dispatches after he occupied Corinth, is
that, first, he meant to send Buell and his army eastward to seize and hold
Chattanooga, and thereby relieve, succour, and defend the loyal population of
eastern Tennessee—a measure which President Lincoln had been strongly urging
for nearly a year; secondly, to keep the bulk of his forces in western
Tennessee and northern Alabama in order to restore loyalty and repair
railroads; and thirdly, in the late autumn and winter, when danger from yellow
fever was past, to march southward and capture Mobile. But, whatever might in
his own mind have been the merits of such a combined plan, it was totally
disarranged by the transfer of himself and General Pope to Washington; while,
owing to his own faulty dispositions and orders, its practical execution by his
subordinate, General Buell, proved to be, during the remaining half of the
year, a mere scattering of troops, a waste of time and labour, affording the
enemy the possible chance—which fortunately they did not seize—of recovering
the ground they had lost.
During the
whole of Halleck’s campaign, from Shiloh to Corinth, Grant, though nominally
second in command, remained a mere figure-head, since his chief issued orders
directly to, and received reports directly from,
the other
generals. This status became so irksome to him that he asked to be relieved,
but he only received permission to change his headquarters to Memphis. When
therefore Halleck went to Washington, Grant remained in command of the district
of western Tennessee; but, as Buell with his army had previously been ordered
to march eastward towards Chattanooga, the forces left under Grant’s command at
Corinth and other points were so tied up in guarding railroads and performing
garrison duty, as to leave no surplus for active campaigning. Practically Grant
was placed on the defensive; and the two considerable battles which occurred in
his district during the autumn, that of Iuka on September 19, and that of
Corinth on October 4, were merely defensive engagements in which the
Confederates were handsomely repulsed.
(4) The Fall of
Vicksburg.
It was not
until the beginning of November, 1862, that Grant set on foot the initiatory
movements which gradually assumed the character of a formidable campaign
against Vicksburg, ending in the capture of that stronghold. It can hardly be
called one continuous campaign, but was rather a succession of experimental
movements, having in view from the first the ultimate object, but changing from
one line to another as insurmountable obstacles successively presented
themselves, which compelled an abandonment of the old, and a resort to new
efforts and expedients.
At Vicksburg,
the Mississippi river in its general course from the north-west strikes the
line of bluffs, having a general trend from the north-east, that form the
eastern limit of the wide, almost level alluvial plain through which it runs.
The river is so tortuous that in its immediate approach to the hills, it runs
for a distance of nearly five miles directly to the north-east, almost parallel
to the trend of the bluffs; then turning abruptly, it doubles completely upon
its course, and runs to the south-west, again parallel to the bluffs, leaving a
tongue of land a mile wide and three or four miles long, extending in a
north-easterly direction past the city. The Mississippi thus washes the very
foot of the hills on which Vicksburg stands; and the city batteries, 200 feet
high above the water, command both the approach and departure of vessels,
whether they go up or down the stream.
A direct
attack upon the front of the city either by cannonade or storming assault is
therefore practically impossible; and, for twenty miles below, the nearness of
the stream to the hills presents the same difficulties. Similar conditions
prevail also for twenty miles above, where the same line of hills, continuing
to the north-east, is washed or approached by the Yazoo river; while
innumerable affluents and hay mis intersect the alluvial level between it and
the Mississippi. It must
602 Grant's movements against Vicksburg. [1862-3
also be
remembered that all these difficulties of approach were rendered doubly
formidable by the heavy rains prevalent during the winter of 1862-3, which in
the ensuing spring months created floods and overflow in all directions, and
left but limited spaces of dry land in the river bottoms upon which an army
could land or camp or move.
It is
doubtful whether Grant had in his mind, at first, any distinct plan for the
capture of Vicksburg. Early in December, 1862, he organised an expedition under
the command of General Sherman, which, starting from Memphis on transports,
made a permanent camp at Milliken’s Bend on the Mississippi, twenty miles above
Vicksburg. Moving thence up the Yazoo river, and across the low swampy lands
between its banks and the line of hills, he delivered an assault on the works
at Chickasaw Bayou, on December 29, in order by surprise to gain a footing five
miles to the north and rear of the city. The effort was however unsuccessful;
and the expedition returned to Milliken’s Bend. Had this attempt succeeded,
Grant’s intention was to move southward from Corinth and to endeavour to form a
junction with Sherman.
Not only
Sherman’s failure but other causes also induced Grant, in the month of January,
1863, to proceed to Vicksburg and take command of the expedition in person.
With the co-operation of Admiral Porter, who now commanded a river squadron of
seventy vessels, eleven of which were ironclads, armed with 304 guns, and
manned by more than 5000 men, four different experiments were successively
tried.
Some years
before, in a quarrel over a question of boundary, the State of Louisiana had
begun the execution of a project to leave the city of Vicksburg inland, by
cutting a canal across the tongue of land in its front, and changing the
channel of the Mississippi. During the preceding summer, when Farragut was
endeavouring to capture Vicksburg, General Williams, who accompanied him with
3000 men, took up the uncompleted project of the State of Louisiana, with the
object of creating a channel up which Farragut might move his fleet, out of
range of the Vicksburg batteries. Now that Grant had come with considerable
reinforcements, 4000 men were for the third time set to work to finish this
military “ cut-off.” It seems to be agreed that the project was doomed to
failure, because of the faulty situation of the canal. But the abandonment of
the attempt was hastened by a sudden rise of the river, which broke into and
overflowed not only the canal but a considerable portion of the tongue of land.
The second
undertaking was an attempt made by Porter with ironclads and gun-boats to force
a passage up the Yazoo river, in search of a landing place and base from which
to move against the rear of Vicksburg. This scheme having turned out to be
impracticable, Porter’s flotilla next went 200 miles up the Mississippi to a
point where, through a succession of bayous, named Yazoo Pass and the Cold
Water river, he might enter the upper Yazoo and descend that difficult stream
1863] Grant passes Vicksburg and Grand Gulf.
503
to a landing
in the neighbourhood of Vicksburg. This attempt also failed, after having, like
the earlier scheme, placed his flotilla in extreme danger. Equally unsuccessful
was a fourth project to cut a canal westward into Lake Providence, seventy
miles above Vicksburg, and find a practicable waterway through the two hundred
miles of bayous and rivers into Red River, and thus reach the Mississippi far
below Vicksburg in order to establish communication and co-operation with Banks
and Farragut, who were engaged in an effort to capture Port Hudson.
Several of
these efforts went on simultaneously; but the months of Januaiy, February, and
March, 1863, passed away, notwithstanding all this labour, without having
brought the problem any nearer to solution. In the early days of April Grant
entered upon the prosecution of a new plan, which was in direct violation of
every recognised principle of military science, and was strenuously opposed by
all his ablest subordinate generals. Under his direction, Porter prepared a
number of his ironclads and several transports to run past the Vicksburg
batteries; and on April 16 nine vessels made the perilous passage with
comparatively little damage, except the loss of one transport and several
coal-barges, while on the 22nd six more steamers, with provision barges in tow,
repeated the undertaking with equal success. Meanwhile Grant marched his army,
by a very circuitous route of seventy miles, down the western bank of the
Mississippi.
Placing a
landing force of 10,000 upon transports, Grant next directed Porter with his
gun-boats to silence the batteries at Grand Gulf. These, however, proved to be
nearly as strong as those of Vicksburg; and the landing force was again put
ashore. Once more running his transports past the Grand Gulf batteries at
night, the general proceeded still farther down the river to Bruinsburg, from
which place a dry road across the two miles of river-bottom enabled the army,
consisting of about 33,000 men, to reach high land on the east side of the
Mississippi on April 30. A detachment pushed out twelve miles to Port Gibson
the same night, and next morning occupied that place after a considerable
battle. On the following day, May 2, the Confederates evacuated Grand Gulf, of
which Porter with his fleet took possession on the 3rd.
General Grant
tells us, in his memoirs, that his first intention was to secure Grand Gulf as
a base of supplies, and to co-operate with Banks in the reduction of Port
Hudson. But news received from that general led him to alter this plan. He now
resolved to move independently, cut loose from his base, destroy the rebel
force in rear of Vicksburg, and invest or capture the city.
Ten days
after the battle of Port Gibson, Sherman’s corps arrived from Milliken’s Bend;
and Grant started with a mobile force of 35,000 men and 100 light guns, with
two days’ rations in haversacks, and an improvised waggon-train to carry
ammunition. On May 12 his vanguard, under McPherson, struck a Confederate
detachment of 5000 men,
504
Grant’s victories in
Mississippi.
[l863
two miles
from Raymond. After an engagement of two or three hours, the enemy broke and
retreated through that town, and McPherson at once occupied the place. That
same evening Grant ordered an immediate advance upon Jackson, the capital of
Mississippi, fifty miles east of Vicksburg, where the Confederate General
Johnston had collected about
11,000 men. Grant had kept his several corps
within such easy supporting distance that he had an overwhelming force against
Johnston. The latter, after a defensive battle on May 14, which showed his
relative weakness, retreated; and Grant’s victorious army occupied Jackson.
Grant left one
corps in Jackson only long enough to destroy the converging railroads for
several miles in all directions, as well as to bum the bridges, factories,
arsenals, and military stores, completely ruining the place as a railroad
centre and military depot. His other two corps he immediately moved westward in
the direction of Vicksburg. On the 16th, with these, he encountered the bulk of
the Confederate forces, 20,000 strong, under General Pemberton, at Champion’s
Hill, about half-way between Jackson and Vicksburg. The Confederates were
strongly posted on a ridge sixty or seventy feet high. At this point occurred
the severest battle of the campaign, in which the Confederates were defeated,
losing 24 guns, 2195 prisoners, and perhaps an equal number of killed and wounded.
The Federal loss was a total of 2441. The Confederates were now forced to
retreat towards Vicksburg, with the Federal army in swift pursuit. On the 17th
Pemberton’s beaten army made its last stand at the bridge over the Big Black
River, from which however it was soon driven; and it found no rest until it had
shut itself up within the fortifications of Vicksburg.
Grant had
thus carried out one of the most brilliant campaigns in military annals. In
twenty days he had marched 180 miles with only five days’ rations, fought five
battles, in each of which he brought his practically united force against the
enemy’s separated detachments, capturing 88 guns, over 6000 prisoners, and
finally shutting up the opposing army in a fortified city, from which it could
not escape. All this he did in the enemy’s country, in bad weather, by swift
marching and skilful strategy, living for the greater part on the resources of
the country through which he was moving.
After
investing Vicksburg, Grant’s first care was to establish a line of supplies
from Milliken’s Bend, by way of the Yazoo river, to the bluffs north-east of
the city, where Sherman had made his first assault in the previous December.
Grant had hard fighting on the 19th, before he could bring his lines close to
the city fortifications, and on the 22nd he attempted by a general assault in
force to gain entrance, but without success. His army was not yet altogether
out of danger, for the Confederate General Johnston was still near Jackson,
only fifty miles away, with a force nearly as large as his own. But
reinforcements soon reached Grant; and by June 14 his numbers were increased to
71,000
1863]
Siege and capture of
Vicksburg.
505
men, with
whom he enclosed Vicksburg by a line fifteen miles long and a second series of
entrenchments facing eastward to guard against possible attack by Johnston’s
army, while Porter with his river squadron prevented Pemberton from escaping by
the Mississippi. Then followed the usual incidents of a six weeks’ siege;
slowly approaching trenches, parallels and mines, with increasing bombardment
from the outside; slowly gathering famine and the burrowing in caves for safety
inside the doomed city. The busy and anxious correspondence of the Confederate
government with its commanders could not long delay the crisis; its desperate
appeals to the generalship of Johnston were answered by his sombre reply that
he considered it impossible to save Vicksburg. On July 4, 1863, the day
following Lee’s crushing defeat at Gettysburg, Pemberton surrendered his army
of 31,600 men, with 172 cannon and
60,000 muskets, while Grant’s army marched into
the captured citadel and supplied rations to the famished Confederate soldiers
and citizens.
Simultaneously
with the fall of Vicksburg, another minor but striking success crowned the
Unionist arms on the banks of the Mississippi. Helena, Arkansas, on the western
side of the stream, between two and three hundred miles north, was the only
point on that side capable of being strongly fortified, and it was held by a Unionist
garrison of about 4000 under command of General B. M. Prentiss. A Confederate
column of about 10,000 men under General Holmes had been collected to recapture
it, and, at the very hour when Pemberton’s troops began stacking their arms,
was making a desperate assault against the Helena fortifications. The
assailants were however driven back in a hopeless repulse, and abandoned the
perilous undertaking.
Grant, in
anticipation of Pemberton’s surrender, had already made preparations to send an
expedition against General Johnston at Jackson; and General Sherman, with three
army corps, started eastward on this duty, even while Grant’s remaining troops
were entering the earthworks they had captured. By the morning of July 9
Sherman’s column was before the field works in front of Jackson. General
Johnston held out only long enough to ascertain that Sherman’s intention was
not a reckless assault, but a siege, which the Confederate army had not
sufficient supplies to withstand. Johnston therefore abandoned Jackson on the
12th, and retreated eastward, giving Sherman for the second time possession of
the capital of Mississippi.
(5) Chickamauga
and Chattanooga.
The surrender
of Vicksburg had opened 200 additional miles of Mississippi river navigation to
the patrol of the Union gun-boats; but the Confederates were still in
possession of Port Hudson, an almost equally effective barrier, with a garrison
of 7000, and works nearly as
strong as
those of Vicksbuig. General Banks, with a force of 30,000 men and with the help
of Farragut’s fleet, had invested Port Hudson about a week after Grant closed
round Vicksburg, and had since then made two separate assaults without success.
But when on July 7,1863, Banks received news of Grant’s success at Vicksburg,
and the salutes in the Federal trenches notified the beleaguered Confederate
garrison that their central stronghold on the Mississippi had fallen, the
Confederate commander, having been supplied with an official copy of Grant’s
letter, deemed further resistance useless. On the morning of July 9 the
garrison of Port Hudson laid down its arms, surrendering 6340 men, 51 guns,
5000 small arms, and considerable stores of ammunition, in exchange for which
it was glad to receive rations, being already at starvation point. This capture
completed the opening of the Mississippi river, which, though its banks were
often troubled by guerrilla and cavalry raids, did not thereafter undergo any
blockade or any serious interruption of commercial transport. The military
result of the campaign was to cut off from the central Confederate States the
supply of western recruits to their armies, and the important reserves of
provisions upon which they were so dependent. President Lincoln expressed the
nation’s deep feeling of relief, when in a famous letter dated August 26,1863,
he wrote: “The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to
the sea.”
General Grant
had exercised independent command about one year, when the Mississippi was
opened by the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Of that period, the last
half of 1862 was taken up by his defensive operations in western Tennessee, and
the first half of 1863 by his aggressive campaigns on the great river. To
understand better what followed, it is necessary to go back and narrate the
military events which occurred during the same period in other parts of
Tennessee and in Kentucky, and formed the preludes to Grant’s victory in the
West.
On May 30,
1862, within a few weeks after the fall of Corinth, Mississippi, the three
armies gathered for its reduction were separated. Halleck was called to
Washington to become General-in-Chief, Pope to command the Army of Virginia,
Grant remained to take local command, while Buell, with the Army of the Ohio,
started on a campaign towards East Tennessee, with directions to follow and
repair the railroad from Corinth to Chattanooga. This involved not merely the
protection of the road, but also the control of most of the extensive territory
of middle Tennessee, in which Secessionist sentiment strongly predominated. The
many detachments needed for this were peculiarly exposed to attack and capture
by local guerrilla risings, and sudden cavalry raids on the part of the enemy.
Meanwhile the
Confederate General Braxton Bragg, who succeeded Beauregard after the latter’s
retreat from Corinth, was also marching his command to Chattanooga, south of
the Tennessee river. Having no
I862]
The
Confederates invade Kentucky. 607
enemy to
oppose his progress, he reached that city and occupied it at the end of July,
while Buell was still advancing slowly through middle Tennessee. By lie end of
August, 1862, Bragg had gathered an army of
30,000 men, crossed the Tennessee, and after
several feints, started on a rapid march northward to invade Kentucky—a
movement dictated largely by the expectation, to which the Confederates clung
with vain tenacity, that that State, as soon as it could be relieved from
Federal domination, would unite its fortunes with the South. Buell, though on
the alert, did not immediately ascertain his antagonist’s intention, but
perceived the full import of the movement when he also learned that the enemy
had thrown a column of 12,000 through Cumberland Gap, into eastern Kentucky,
threatening Cincinnati.
Of the two
armies, Bragg’s was a rather shorter distance from Louisville; and during
September there ensued an exciting race between the two armies to reach that
city. It is conceded that the Confederates would have arrived first, but for
the fact that Bragg had to effect a junction with Kirby Smith, who had come
through Cumberland Gap; and that further delay was caused by an absurd
ceremonial at Frankfort, the capital of Kentucky, on October 4, when a
provisional Confederate governor for that State was inaugurated. His official
honours were of short duration. The reading of his inaugural address was
interrupted by the booming of cannon and the rush of his hearers to take their
places in the ranks. Four days later, on October 8, 1862, a battle occurred
between the armies of Buell and Bragg at Perryville, which, though indecisive,
had the effect of inducing the Confederate general to retreat. Buell’s slow
eastward march, and the retirement to Louisville to which Bragg had driven him,
were not wholly redeemed by his indecisive success at Perryville, especially as
he acknowledged in a letter to Halleck that he could not bring his men to equal
the enemy in marching and fighting. On October 24, 1862, Buell was somewhat
unjustly superseded by General Rosecrans, who had a few weeks before gained
under Grant the defensive victory at Corinth.
Rosecrans,
however, proved during the next three months as unable to perform
impossibilities as Buell had been. Bragg, posted at Murfreesborough, held
Rosecrans in check at Nashville, where the latter was occupied in gathering supplies
and accumulating cavalry to stop the continual and daring raids of the
Confederate riders. Without supplies and with his communications threatened, he
could not move. This discouraging state of affairs lasted until Christmas,
1862, when suddenly Rosecrans, seeing his opportunity, marched against Bragg,
and joined battle with him at Murfreesborough on the night of December 30. An
almost identical plan had been adopted by both commanders. Each army was to
stand fast with its own right, and throw the whole weight of its left on the
antagonist’s right. A fierce battle raged during the whole of December 81, and
at nightfall Bragg telegraphed
to Richmond
that he had driven the Unionist forces from every position except their extreme
left. During the whole of January 1, 1863, however, Bragg was greatly
surprised, that the army of Rosecrans did not retreat; and still more so to
find, on the morning of the 2nd, that it had taken up a threatening position.
To dislodge it from this, he renewed the attack, but his effort ended in a
disastrous repulse, and in the secret withdrawal of the Confederate army before
midnight of the 3rd. The forces engaged were nearly equal, about 43,000 on each
side; the Federal loss was 13,249; the Confederate 10,266. The superior steadiness
and condition of the Federal army and the courage and faith of its commander
changed defeat to a victory, which left the Unionist armies in full possession
of Kentucky and the greater part of Tennessee.
The battle of
Murfreesborough was decisive only to the extent that Rosecrans remained in
undisturbed possession of the field, while the Confederate forces retreated to
a strong position at Shelbyville, ten miles south. In this relative attitude
they remained nearly six months, confronting each other, and gathering
supplies. Excepting several considerable cavalry raids and counter-raids, no
important military change occurred in middle Tennessee until Grant completed
his investment of Vicksburg. Then Rosecrans moved again, and in a skilful nine
days’ campaign, ending the day before the Vicksburg surrender, pushed Bragg and
his army into a retreat southward, across both the Cumberland mountains and the
Tennessee river. The Confederates took up a strong position at Chattanooga on
the south bank of the Tennessee, the strategical centre and military key to the
heart of Georgia and the South; but their retirement gave the Unionist armies
complete possession of middle Tennessee, and restored the military position to
what it had been about one year earlier, at the time when Bragg started on his
march of invasion towards Louisville.
Dining the
whole of Rosecrans’ six months’ delay at Murfreesborough, the Administration
was almost constantly urging him forward, and its eagerness for results became
more pronounced at this culmination of recent successes. When therefore
Rosecrans again halted in his march for six weeks longer, the patience of the
President was well-nigh exhausted, and Halleck sent the general a peremptory
order to advance. Meanwhile a Unionist force of 24,000 had been organised in
eastern Kentucky under General Burnside, which, starting on August 16, and
advancing without serious opposition, reached Knoxville in eastern Tennessee on
September 4. It was received with demonstrations of heartfelt joy and gratitude
by the loyal Unionists who were in a great majority in that region, and who had
suffered severe persecution through the military domination of the Confederate
forces during the previous portion of the war.
About the
middle of August, 1863, Rosecrans was ready to move
again, and
began a movement southward round the left flank of Bragg’s army, with the
object of seizing the railroad communications in rear of the Confederates. The
plan promised great results, but its execution was extremely difficult and
hazardous, as it involved crossing not only the Cumberland mountains, but the
Tennessee river, and two mountain ranges beyond. Nevertheless, Bosecrans
executed it with such skill and celerity, that by September 9 Bragg had been
forced to evacuate Chattanooga; while the extreme left of Bosecrans’ army was
in possession of that city, and the mountain valleys several miles to the east
of the Tennessee river. The strategical success had been so easily won, and was
of such supreme importance, that it made Bosecrans over-confident, especially
as in connexion with it he also received news of Burnside’s safe arrival at
Knoxville. Assuming Bragg to be in full retreat, he somewhat heedlessly
scattered his detachments in pursuit.
Bragg, for
his part, had no intention to give up Chattanooga permanently; and the
Confederate government, alarmed at its recent serious defeats at Gettysburg and
Vicksburg, and Bragg’s continual retirement, was beseeching that general to
turn on his pursuer, and straining every nerve to send him assistance. Bragg,
having received strong reinforcements, not only promptly checked pursuit, but
assumed the aggressive; and on September 19 and 20, 1863, was fought the battle
of Chickamauga, one of the greatest and most fiercely contested battles of the
war.
Bragg’s first
effort was to take advantage of Bosecrans’ headlong pursuit, and crush his
separated detachments in detail; but this was thwarted by the failure or
tardiness of his own commanders. Before battle was joined, each army was well concentrated
on opposite sides of Chickamauga Creek, eight miles south-east of Chattanooga,
Bragg with 71,500 men, Bosecrans with 57,000. It would seem that the conflict
was finally brought on by accident rather than design, because, operating in a
mountainous and wooded region, the movements of each side were so well
concealed that only actual collision betrayed the proximity of brigades and
divisions. It thus resolved itself into a moving conflict, Bragg making
continual efforts to outflank and crush his antagonist’s left, while Rosecrans
shifted his divisions to meet and thwart the attack.
In the course
of these movements on the second day, through a mistake or misconstruction of
orders, a gap of two brigades was left open in Bosecrans’ line. The enemy discovered
this gap and poured through it with an energy before which the whole Unionist
right and part of the centre crumbled away, and dispersed in flight toward
Chattanooga. Rosecrans himself retired in the conviction that the day was
hopelessly lost, and on reaching Chattanooga telegraphed the disaster to
Washington. The day was however not yet completely lost. In the shifting
movement, Major-General Thomas, commanding the centre, had been sent to the
extreme left, where he found a strong position on the head of a ridge
510
Rosecrans blockaded
in Chattanooga. [1863
around which
he posted in a flattened semicircle his own command of seven divisions, and
gathered about it all the reserves which had not yet been under fire, with
fragments of brigades and regiments whose organisation remained undestroyed by
the defeat on the right. With these, forming a total of about one half of
Rosecrans’ effectives, he held his position against the whole of Bragg’s force,
flushed with victory, which repeated its assaults throughout the remainder of
the day, but without shaking the lines or the courage of the “Rock of
Chickamauga,” as Thomas was rechristened by his devoted troops. It is the
concurrent testimony of both Unionist and Confederate officers that better
fighting was never done on any battlefield during the war.
When night
came on the 20th, the Confederates had been unable to drive Thomas from his
position ; but that general, seeing that with his unequal forces he could not
hold this advanced and exposed point, began a retreat which he was able to
continue without serious molestation. By the morning of the 22nd, the Unionist
army was within the protecting fortifications of Chattanooga, which Bragg had
not destroyed when he evacuated the place, so confident was he of returning.
The Federal army lost 16,179 men, the Confedefate 17,804.
The army of
Rosecrans, though beaten and greatly weakened, was by no means destroyed; on
the other hand, it was still in danger. The victorious army of Bragg, now in
greatly superior numbers, was still before it, and immediately established a
close blockade. It was not long before the Confederates gained possession of
heights which enabled them to cut off Rosecrans’ supplies, both by the railroad
from Nashville and by boats on the Tennessee river, leaving the Federals
dependent upon waggon transport by a road sixty miles long and crossing almost
impassable mountains. The fifteen days’ provisions and forage were soon
exhausted; horses and mules perished by thousands; and famine was slowly
creeping on the beleaguered garrison. A week before the battle, orders from
Washington had directed all available reinforcements from Hurlbut at Memphis
and Sherman at Vicksburg to be sent to Rosecrans, while, from the first,
Burnside had been enjoined to assist him from the direction of Knoxville; but
none of these reinforcements had arrived in time. On the third day after the
battle 18,000 men under General Hooker were detached from Meade’s army in
Virginia and transported by rail in eight days to the vicinity of Chattanooga,
but owing to lack of supplies they could not immediately proceed to that place.
By October 19
the situation had become so critical that Rosecrans was relieved and Thomas
placed in command to succeed him, while General Grant was placed in control of
the three departments in the West, and ordered personally to Chattanooga, where
he arrived on October 22. Up to this time, things appeared to be going from bad
to worse under the management of Rosecrans; but his chief
engineer,
General W. F. Smith, had devised a plan which, approved by Grant on his
arrival, and by his direction executed under Smith’s command, once more gave
the Federal army control of a much shorter line of supply by the railroad and
Tennessee river, and, when the reinforcements under Hooker and Sherman came up,
at once changed the relative attitude of thesconfronting armies, placing the
Confederates on the defensive. Only a short time before they had been so
confident of success, that Longstreet with his corps of 20,000 was detached to
drive Burnside out of eastern Tennessee—an order which he attempted to execute
by a short siege and assault on Knoxville, ending in his repulse and retreat.
It was while his absence diminished Bragg’s forces that General Grant
personally supervised the preparations and directed the movements which
resulted in the battle of Chattanooga on November 23-25,1863. That attack drove
Bragg from the mountain heights which he had so elaborately fortified, into
precipitate and disastrous retreat, and permanently opened the gateway by which
Sherman in the following summer made his famous march through the heart of
Georgia to the sea.
The
battlefields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga lie in great contiguous mountain
valleys, parallel with each other, and almost parallel with the general course
of the Tennessee river. First on the east lies Chickamauga Valley, watered by
Chickamauga Creek, in which, eight miles south-east of Chattanooga, was fought
the battle of Chickamauga, on September 19 and 20. This valley is bounded on
the west by Missionary Ridge, fifteen miles long, a straight, narrow mountain
ridge 500 feet in height, which divides Chickamauga Valley from Chattanooga
Valley, watered by Chattanooga Creek and the Tennessee river, the creek flowing
northward, the river flowing southward, until they meet at the northern end of
Lookout Mountain, which is from 1000 to 1500 feet in height. From this point
the river makes a sharp turn, and flows for several miles nearly directly
north. Lookout Mountain is three miles south of Chattanooga city, and again
divides Chattanooga Valley from Lookout Valley, watered by Lookout Creek. All
the creeks mentioned empty into the Tennessee. Chattanooga city lies on the
east bank of the Tennessee river, where a great westerly bend of the stream
broadens Chattanooga Valley to a width of two miles between the city and
Missionary Ridge.
Grant’s
forces, numbering 100,000 effectives, were made up from three different armies;
the Army of the Cumberland, formerly commanded by Rosecrans, now by Thomas; the
Army of the Tennessee, under command of Sherman; and two corps from the Army of
the Potomac under command of Hooker, lately brought with unusual celerity by
rail from Virginia. Hooker’s command lay in Lookout Valley, west of Lookout Creek,
Thomas’ command in the city of Chattanooga, and Sherman’s command, with ready
pontoon trains, well concealed in the T-iills west of the Tennessee river.
All Grant’s
plans and preparations being ready, Sherman with four divisions; on the night
of the 23rd and morning of the 24th of November, crossed the Tennessee three
miles north of the city, and attacked the northern end of Missionary Ridge,
with the intention of sweeping southward along its top, to take the enemy’s
entrenchments in flank; but, having proceeded about a mile, he found his
progress barred by a deep depression in the ridge, which he had hitherto
supposed to be continuous. Here he entrenched and held his position against
heavy attacks. The next day, the 25th, he attempted to continue southward, but
found the enemy heavily massed against him, and made but little progress.
Simultaneously
with Sherman’s attack, on the previous day (the 24th) Hooker from Lookout
Valley had crossed Lookout Creek, and attacked the enemy on the northern slope
of Lookout Mountain, driving them from their works eastward round the northern
point and into Chattanooga Valley, so that by night he held a firm line of
three-quarters of a mile from the northern point of Lookout, to the Tennessee
river. On the next morning, the 25th, Hooker sent several parties to scale the
extreme heights of Lookout, which they gained with but little opposition, and
at daylight planted the stars and stripes on the northern summit, greeted by
the cheers of the whole army. Following *up this advantage, Hooker continued
his triumphant advance around Lookout, across Chattanooga Creek, and through
Missionary Ridge at Rossville Gap, the extreme left of Bragg’s position on the
ridge, four or five miles south of Sherman’s position at the enemy’s right.
The
topography of the place was such that General Grant, with Thomas and other
principal officers, on the top of Orchard Knob, midway between Chattanooga and
Missionary Ridge, had the whole great panorama in view, from Sherman’s movement
on the north to Lookout and Hooker’s advance on the south. Seeing the progress
that these generals had made against both flanks of the enemy, Grant now, at
about three o’clock on the afternoon of the 25th, ordered Thomas to make a
direct advance, by capturing: the rifle pits at the enemy’s centre,
along the west base of Missionary Ridge. At the agreed signal of six guns, two
divisions of Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland sprang from their trenches, and
formed a line a mile in length with such order that the enemy from the opposing
height thought they were about to execute some military parade. To them, the
idea of an effort to storm a line of thirty guns on the summit of an abruptly
steep and rocky face of a ridge, 500 feet high, with two advance lines of rifle
pits below, seemed preposterous; as indeed it was, even in the mind of Graint
himself.
But there now
happened one of those extraordinary battle incidents which it baffles cool
judgment to explain. As if animated by a single impulse, this magnificent line
swept over the intervening space, and drove the enemy pell-mell out of the
first line of Confederate entrenchments,
unmindful
of the fire of musketry and cannon on the sides and crests of the hill. This
accomplished, they halted for a moment, as their orders commanded them to go no
further. Grant had only intended this much, as a demonstration in aid of
Sherman’s and Hooker’s advance on the enemy’s flanks. But the men had waited
all day in a fever of excitement, and were still under the withering fire of
the enemy’s cannon and musketry, and by a common impulse regiment after
regiment started up the hill, not only without orders but in spite of them, to
the momentary dismay of the assembled commanders on Orchard Knob. First, in
something of a line, then broken into parties and groups by the rocks and
fallen timber that obstructed the steep ascent, the men worked their way
steadily and stubbornly upward over the second line of rifle pits, and still
pressed on, driving the retreating enemy before them, until, at the end of about
an hour after the signal guns, they broke almost simultaneously over the crest
of the ridge in six different places, capturing the batteries that up to nearly
the last moment had been firing on them—one of the most splendid exhibitions of
veteran courage and moral that military history has recorded. The final success
was so sudden, that Bragg, Breckinridge, and several other Confederate generals
barely escaped capture. It must not be supposed that this feat of arms was performed
without heavy loss. The regiments that made the assault were twice decimated;
they left twenty per cent, of their number in killed and wounded at the foot
and on the rugged sides of Missionary Ridge. Even this extraordinary effort,
however, did not completely exhaust their energies. Several of the brigades
swept down the opposite side of the mountain, and across Chickamauga Valley,
capturing another ridge on which were planted eight of the enemy’s guns. .
The defeat of
Bragg was so complete and overwhelming that the next morning, November 26,
found his whole army in rapid and demoralised retreat. The Unionist forces
pursued about twenty miles, making many additional captures, raising their
aggregate to over 6000 prisoners, 40 pieces of artillery and 7000 small arms.
The Union loss in killed and wounded was 5824, that of the Confederates 6687.
Grant took immediate measures to send an expedition under Sherman to the relief
of Burnside who at last accounts was held in close siege by Longstreet, at
Knoxville, 84 miles distant; but, before Sherman reached Knoxville, Longstreet
had been effectually repulsed. He rejoined Bragg’s retreating army; whereupon
active military operations in Georgia ceased for the winter.
THE CIVIL
WAR: III.
(1) The
Wilderness.
It will be remembered that after the battle of
Gettysburg and the retreat of Lee from Pennsylvania, the indecisive manoeuvres
of the autumn left the Federal and Confederate armies once more facing each
other in their winter quarters north and south of the Rappahannock during the
winter of 1863-4. In the West, the Tennessee campaign closed with the battles
of Chickamauga and Chattanooga, leaving the Unionist forces in winter quarters
at the latter city, and the Confederate army posted in the mountain passes
about Dalton, twenty miles to the south, ready to oppose their advance into
Georgia. From the winter of 1863-4 onward down to the spring months of 1865,
military operations gradually became centred in two great and final campaigns
of the Union armies, one in the East and the other in the West.
Early in
March, 1864, Grant was called to Washington to be invested with the grade of
Lieutenant-General, revived for him by act of Congress, and to assume command
of all the armies of the United States, with special direction of the campaign
against Richmond. He placed Sherman in command of the Western armies, and
concerted with that general the simple military policy that there should be two
leading campaigns; one to be conducted by himself in the East, against Lee and
Richmond, the other by Sherman in the West against Bragg’s successor, Johnston,
with Atlanta for its first objective. The two Confederate armies were 800 miles
apart, and should either give way, it was to be followed without halt or delay
to battle or surrender, to prevent its junction with the other. Sherman was
given full discretion as to the plan and details of his own movements in the
West; Meade was left in full command of the Army of the Potomac to execute the
personal orders of Grant. A minor campaign under Banks, from New Orleans
against Mobile, was also provisionally planned, though Grant thought this an
unwise diversion of strength which was more needed in other directions. The
underlying idea of Grant’s strategy was the continuous and
concurrent
employment of the maximum of force against the Confederacy —continual battle,
continual slaughter till the will of his adversary was broken. He saw clearly
that no manoeuvring and no capture of positions could end the war. His great
objective was the destruction of the armed forces of his enemy.
Until he
called him to Washington, President Lincoln had never seen Grant; but their
interviews during the few weeks of preparation established a cordial esteem and
confidence between them. On April 30 the President wrote to him as follows.
“ Not
expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express
in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so
far as I understand it. The particulars of your plan I neither know nor seek to
know. You are vigilant and self- reliant ; and, pleased with this, I wish not
to obtrude any constraints, or restraints upon you....If there is anything
wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And
now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you.”
To
this Grant made a generous reply on the following day: “ Your very kind letter
of yesterday is just received. The confidence you express for the future, and
satisfaction with the past, in my military administration is acknowledged with
pride. It will be my earnest endeavour that you and the country shall not be
disappointed. From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country
to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint—have never expressed or
implied a complaint against the Administration or the Secretary of War, for
throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what
appeared to me my duty. Indeed, since the promotion which placed me in command
of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and importance of
success, I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked
for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should my
success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is
not with y°u.” _
In the East,
the opposing armies lay confronting each other respectively north and south of
the Rapidan near Fredericksburg, only a short distance south of where the first
battle of Bull Run had been fought nearly three years before. Three years of
campaigning had not only changed their personnel, but transformed them from raw
recruits to seasoned veterans, tried in courage, and hardened to endurance. In
gain and loss of battlefields, in yielding and recovery of territory, in
balance of defeat and victory, they remained practically equal. The failure of
McClellan’s advance against Richmond was more than balanced by the failure of
Lee’s two invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Malvern Hill, Antietam, and
Gettysburg balanced Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville.
Serious as had been the fighting of the past,
it was about,
to be eclipsed by the stubbornness and sacrifice of the final struggle.
On April 30,
1864, Grant’s army numbered a total of 122,146, organised and equipped to a
degree of perfection rarely equalled anywhere. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia,
by careful estimate, numbered 61,953. Grant however estimates that according to
the Federal method of including details, extra duty men and absentees, it
should have been rated at 80,000. Grant’s numerical superiority was
counterbalanced by the advantage which Lee drew from a defensive campaign along
interior lines, over ground the topography of which he had learned by heart,
and amid a population where every white man was his ally and scout and Grant’s
enemy. But his greatest strength lay in the belief of the Confederate army in
its own invincibility. It did not stop to ask whether this belief was
well-founded; it knew that for three years it had effectually blocked the way
to Richmond. In the new ordeal, however, this defensive power was neutralised
by what it had not yet encountered, the imperturbable will and unyielding
determination of a single man, who now commanded the Union armies.
Grant’s main
conception of his new task was as simple as the combined policy agreed upon
with Sherman. His intention was to move directly against Lee’s army, and if
practicable crush it before it could reach Richmond. If he could not succeed in
this, then he would follow it thither, enclose it in the city, and capture it
by a siege. If it escaped, he would follow it wherever it went, and destroy it
before it could effect a junction with Johnston. Accordingly, nearly a month
before the movement began, he instructed Meade: “ Lee’s army will be your
objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also.” At the same date,
he had already decided upon two contributory movements. Butler with 30,000 men
was to ascend the James river from Fortress Monroe, seize and fortify City
Point, and endeavour to gain Petersburg, and destroy the surrounding railroads.
Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, and Crook in the valley of the Kanawha, were to
operate against the lines of communication north-west of Richmond. Butler’s
movement failed in everything except that he was able to seize and hold City
Point, subsequently of great use to Grant. The movements from the Shenandoah
and the Kanawha also had no immediate result, but underwent many fluctuations
between success and failure in the long months that followed.
On May 4,
1864, Grant, moving by the left past Lee’s right, began crossing the Bapidan;
and by the evening of the 5th his whole army, including a train of 4000
waggons, was safely over the stream. But already on the morning of that day,
Lee’s forces endeavoured to strike his moving columns in flank before they were
yet through the difficult region known as the Wilderness—a region of
interspersed forest, thicket and swamp, narrow and neglected roads, and only
occasional
1864] Battles of the
Wilderness and Spotsylvania. 517
farms or
openings. Here, where artillery and cavalry were useless, manoeuvring and
intelligent direction practically impossible, where opposing lines often could
not see each other until almost actually in contact, there raged for two days,
May 5 and 6, an irregular and scattered battle along a line of five miles, with
but little apparent result beyond mutual destruction.
In this first
fight were developed two peculiarities which became characteristic of the
campaign, and shaped its final result. Both sides resorted more industriously
than ever to the use of extemporised field entrenchments, with which, the
moment arms were stacked, they covered every change of line, bivouac, or camp
against surprise or attack. The second peculiarity, displayed for the first
time by the Army of the Potomac, was that a single battle did not necessarily
end the campaign. Though in the two days there had been hard fighting, heavy
losses, and considerable captures of prisoners on both sides, the Army of the
Potomac held the field; and the enemy did not reappear on the 7th. Moreover
when, on the evening of that day, the troops and trains were ordered southward,
and after dark Generals Grant and Meade and their headquarters’ staffs were
seen riding in advance with their horses’ heads turned towards Richmond, the
soldiers knew what it meant, and greeted their chief with such an ovation of
cheers, salutations, and bonfires that their enthusiasm had to be checked lest
the unusual noise should give notice to the enemy that the Army of the Potomac
had begun a new flank movement, not in retreat as formerly, but forward, past
Lee’s army to Spotsylvania Court House.
Grant made
for Spotsylvania Court House in order to push forward toward Richmond. Lee made
for the same place with the idea of getting between Grant and Fredericksburg,
assuming that Grant was falling back. It was only a march of eight or ten
miles, but the Confederates arrived first, and were thus enabled to post
themselves on highly advantageous ground, in an irregular semicircle, having a
radius of about a mile and a half, from which there jutted out toward the north
a triangular salient nearly a mile long, and more than half a mile wide. The
country was both more open and more hilly than in the Wilderness, and by rapid
entrenchments Lee’s army turned the position during the next two days into a
great fortified camp of extraordinary strength. Grant’s army drew itself round
this position, with the feeling on his part that it was an obstacle in his path
which he must remove. Accordingly he took the aggressive, and on May 10 hurled
a heavy assault against Lee’s centre. Fortune varied at different points, but
the net result amounted to a repulse. The defeat, however, shook neither
Grant’s faith nor his purpose. While his report to Washington next morning
could only state that, after six days of very hard fighting and heavy losses, “
the result up to this time is much in our favour,” his dispatch contained the
resolute and characteristic phrase, “ I purpose to fight it out on this line,
if it takes
518
Sheridan in command of
the cavalry.
[l864
all summer.”
He immediately ordered another assault, and throughout the long, rainy,
lowering, dismal May 12, from dawn till dark, there raged at short intervals a
terrible and bloody, often hand to hand, struggle for the possession of the
salient, known thereafter to fame as the “Bloody Angle.” At night the Federals
had captured 3000 prisoners and 20 guns and held the salient; only however to
find at its base new and more formidable entrenchments that still barred their
way to the rear of Lee’s lines.
Unable to
drive the Confederates from their stronghold, Grant gave orders to continue his
southward movement by the left; but a week of rain followed, with a further
detention to await reinforcements, while reconnoitring and skirmishing varied
the slow and laborious movements of both armies. Though Grant continued to
advance, Lee, having the shorter lines, was always a little before him in
seizing advantageous positions for defence, and blocking his pathway. The
vigilance of Lee never failed, the confidence and aggressiveness of Grant never
wavered or halted, while the pluck and endurance of both armies in marching,
entrenching and fighting, responded to every thought and command of the
leaders. It was war in its sternest form. The estimated Union losses in the
Wilderness and at Spotsylvania were over 37,000, and those of the Confederates
are supposed to have been nearly as great.
In saying
that cavalry could not be used in the Wilderness, it must not be inferred that
that arm of the service was superfluous. The phrase was only intended to mean
that cavalry could not be employed in the manner usual in European battles. The
campaign of Grant against Lee, as has been seen, was from first to last in the
nature of a moving siege, assault upon and defence behind extemporised
breastworks. The use of cavalry in these operations, in addition to mere
reconnoitring, was twofold; first, in short and sudden advance expeditions to
clear the way and hold approaches for a march, to discharge which duty, in a
country of thickets and woods, the troopers often temporarily dismounted,
entrenched, and fought as infantry; secondly, to make long incursions and raids
into the enemy’s country to destroy military stores and property, break up
railroads, bum bridges, and obstruct lines of communication. Grant had a
cavalry force of 10,000 under the command of Sheridan. It had preceded the
march of the army, and fought three engagements in the Wilderness and one at
Spotsylvania. From that point the whole corps was despatched on May 8 on a raid
toward Richmond, working great havoc on Confederate railroads, trains and
depots, fighting three other engagements, penetrating the outer line of the
defences of Richmond, recapturing 400 Union prisoners, and joining Butler’s
army on the James river on May 14, whence, after a three days’ rest, it again
started and successfully rejoined Grant’s army on May 25. The Confederate
cavalry was almost equal to the Federal in numbers, and fully its match in
efficiency and daring. It followed
1864] Cold Harbour. Grant's change of plan. 619
Sheridan with
energy and fought him with courage. The casualties were severe and probably
equal—the Confederates suffering the heaviest loss, however, in their
commander, General Stuart, who was mortally wounded six miles from Richmond on
the 10th.
Lee, having
entrenched himself behind the North Anna on May 20, completely checkmated
Grant’s endeavour to dislodge him when the Federals crossed on the 23rd. Grant,
however, skilfully drew back to the north side, and again moving by the left
marched down thirty-two miles to Hanovertown, where his advance-guard crossed
the Pamunkey on May 27. Thus far, the mere fighting and losses of the two
armies gave no indications of decisive results, but other considerations
pointed to the approaching end. Since Grant had double the numbers of his
antagonist, Lee’s loss was relatively much the more damaging. Besides, Lee had
been compelled constantly to retreat. But the greatest difference lay in the
augury which Grant drew from the spirit of the opposing forces. In his report
of May 26 to Washington, announcing his intention to cross the Pamunkey at
Hanovertown, he wrote: “Lee’s army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take
show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakeably. A battle with them
outside of entrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the
moral over the enemy, and attack with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel
that our success over Lee’s army is already ensured.”
This success
was not destined to come as soon as Grant evidently hoped. With almost
continual fighting from the 27th, when he began crossing the Pamunkey, he
pushed his army forward to Cold Harbour, which Sheridan’s cavalry had seized on
the 31st, and successfully held until reinforcements came up. Heavy assaults on
June 1 and 2 carried some of the advanced Confederate entrenchments, and
encouraged Grant to believe that he could break Lee’s army by another frontal
attack. It turned out to be an ill-advised and costly experiment. The assault
was made at half past four o’clock on the morning of June 3, and though the
heroic soldiers gained the first rifle pits, in a single hour 4000 veterans lay
dead or wounded under the direct and cross fire of the well-prepared
Confederate works, raising the total casualties for the first twelve days of
June to near 10,000. Grant’s official report frankly acknowledges the serious
nature of the reverse. “It was the only general attack,” he writes, “ made from
the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to
compensate for our own losses.” From this point dates an entire change in
Grant’s plan of campaign. “I now find,” he wrote to Washington on June 5, “after
more than thirty days of trial, that the enemy deems it of the first importance
to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the
defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front
of them, and where, in case of repulse, they can instantly retire behind them.
Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am
520 Lee's
withdrawal.—Sherman at Chattanooga. [1864
willing to
make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city
(Richmond).” He still kept up a threatening front toward Lee’s army, pushing
reconnaissances, throwing up breastworks, and making preparations to cross the
Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp, all to create the belief that he intended to
advance by the left toward Richmond. These were, however, only the operations
preliminary to transporting his army safely over the fifty miles of distance
that lay between Cold Harbour and City Point, near Butler’s camp on the James
river. Difficult as was the nature of the ground, the design was successfully
accomplished during the following week. On the evening of June 12, the army
began withdrawing from Cold Harbour. Between the afternoon and midnight of the
14th, a bridge 3580 feet long was laid across the James river, and by midnight of
the 16th the whole army was on the south side of the stream, in immediate
junction with that of Butler, the two forming a total aggregate of about
150,000, while Lee with his army, numbering about 70,000, withdrew into the
defences of Richmond. Before the Unionist troops had yet begun to cross the
river, Grant was already with General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, directing the
movements which were to begin the combined siege of Petersburg and Richmond.
(2) The
Capture of Atlanta.
In the West
the main military operation during the year 1864 was preceded by two minor
campaigns, the Red River expedition under General Banks, and Sherman’s
expedition against Meridian, Mississippi. The former proved not only a complete
failure, but a considerable disaster, which however, apart from the mere loss
of men and material, was devoid of any serious consequences to the Unionist
cause. The latter succeeded in accomplishing its main object, the destruction
of about one hundred miles of the several railroads which centre at Meridian,
thus making the whole railroad system of the State of Mississippi practically
useless to the Confederates. This left but a single great north and south
railroad system in operation between the Alleghany Mountains and the seaboard;
and along that route, from Chattanooga to Savannah, followed the principal and
decisive western campaign of 1864.
Pursuant to
the plan agreed upon between Grant and Sherman, the latter had by the beginning
of May assembled at Chattanooga the three principal western armies, that of the
Cumberland under Thomas, that of the Tennessee under McPherson, that of the
Ohio under Schofield, embracing altogether nearly 100,000 men with 254 guns.
They were the flower of the western soldiers, seasoned men commanded by
officers of sound judgment and tried courage. Appreciating the magnitude of his
task, Sherman had prepared them for their perilous march with
1864] Shermans march on Atlanta.
521
every
precaution of equipment and supply, and rigidly reduced to a minimum their
baggage and impedimenta. His memoirs explain his purpose to convert all parts
of his army “into a mobile machine willing and able to start at a minute’s
notice, and to subsist on the scantiest food.”
To reach the
city of Atlanta, his first objective, he had both to protect the single line of
railroad behind him that brought his daily supply of food from Nashville to
Chattanooga, and to seize the line before him through the forty-mile belt of
the Alleghany Mountains, in which, immediately in front of him at Dalton, lay the
Confederate army, now commanded by General Johnston, 50,000 strong. The march
was promptly begun on May 5, the day following that on which Grant started from
the Wilderness toward Richmond. Sherman had the advantage of double numbers;
Johnston the advantage of a defensive campaign, in which however he could only
execute a highly skilful retreat from impregnable mountain defences, prepared
with great foresight and carried out by the almost unlimited supply of slave
labour with which military authority and enthusiastic local sentiment furnished
him. Sherman’s progress, therefore, was a succession of strong frontal demonstrations
combined with flank movements to threaten the Confederate rear. Under this
continued pressure Johnston retreated from Dalton to Resaca, from Resaca to
Marietta, from Marietta to the Chattahoochee river, and thence to the defences
of Atlanta. Continued reconnaissances and heavy skirmishes attended the
Confederate retirement and Unionist advance, and frequently grew into serious
battles. Sherman says that dining the month of May, across nearly 100 miles of
as difficult country as was ever fought over by civilised armies, the fighting
was continuous, almost daily, among trees and bushes, on ground where one could
rarely see a hundred yards ahead. Once only he tried the costly experiment of a
direct attack. On June 27 occurred the assault on Kenesaw Mountain, north of
Marietta, in which Sherman’s attempt to break through the Confederate front was
repulsed with a loss of 2500.
While Johnston’s
defensive retreat excited the professional admiration of his antagonist, it
gave rise to deep disappointment and severe displeasure on the part of the
Confederate government. On July 18, as Sherman was approaching Atlanta, the
command of the Confederate army was taken from Johnston and given to one of his
corps-commanders, J. B. Hood, who had severely criticised his superior’s
strategy. Resolved on an immediate change of policy, Hood at once took the
offensive, and by vigorous attacks on the 20th and the 22nd, attempted to break
through Sherman’s lines. The effort however resulted in a complete repulse; and
the new Confederate commander suffered another serious disaster in a sortie
planned and ordered by him on July 28. For several weeks more the besieged and
besieging armies watched and felt each other with unrelaxing vigilance. On
August 12 Sherman
522
Capture of Atlanta; its
results.
[l864
and his army
were cheered by the inspiriting news of the capture of Mobile Bay by the Union
fleet under Farragut. Toward the end of the month the general, becoming
impatient, once more moved by the right flank and seized the Macon railroad at
Jonesborough, twenty-five miles directly south of Atlanta, defeating a
Confederate detachment sent by Hood to oppose the movement. This success
rendered the Confederate position so insecure that Sherman began to hear
rumours of their retreat; and on September 3 he was able to telegraph to
Washington, “Atlanta is ours, and fairly won.” Hood had evacuated the city on
the 1st and taken a new position at Lovejoy’s Station, south of Jonesborough.
The four months of mingled siege and battle had caused a Federal loss of
31,000, the Confederate loss being estimated at 35,000.
The capture
of Atlanta by Sherman was a severe disaster to the Confederates. The city was
one of their great military depots, full of foundries and workshops for the
manufacture and repair of arms and material of war; and its fall was a
convincing proof to the people of Georgia that the strength of the Secessionist
movement was on the wane. By the opening of the Mississippi in the previous
year, the immense resources at first drawn from the great region west of that
stream, in cattle, provisions, and recruits were cut off1. This new
Unionist line, which was being drawn through the centre of Georgia, threatened
to sever from Richmond the supplies and military help of the two States of
Alabama and Mississippi. What was more serious still, this severance might
completely alienate the already shaken public sentiment of that State from its
adherence to the Confederate government and cause. The conduct of Governor
Brown in criticising and disobeying the orders of his superiors was approaching
open contumacy. His official order a few days later withdrew from the Confederate
service the Georgia State militia which he had organised for the defence of
Atlanta. Several prominent citizens came in to Sherman’s camp, and in
conversation acknowledged the madness of further resistance, and reported that
the Confederate Vice-President, Stephens, entertained similar feelings.
Jefferson Davis came on a tour of speech-making into South Carolina and
Georgia, in which he severely censured both Governor Brown and General Johnston
for their alleged shortcomings in bringing about the defeat of the South.
General Sherman sent kindly messages to both Stephens and Brown, but did not
succeed in his effort to draw them into a confidential interview. In the North,
the fall of Atlanta had a powerful political effect. It ensured to the
Republican party a great success in the October elections, and changed the
candidature of President Lincoln from apprehensive uncertainty to a magnificent
triumph.
1864] Sherman’s
plan.—Thomas in Tennessee.
523
(3) The
Defence of Tennessee.
With the view
of making Atlanta a strong and purely military post, capable of being defended
by a small garrison, Sherman ordered the removal of all its inhabitants,
sending them north or south as they chose, and arranging a temporary truce for
the purpose. Contracting his lines, and making his fortification impregnable,
he remained here a month, collecting supplies for his army, and preparing for
the next stage of the campaign, the course of which was for a time undecided.
Sherman’s doubts were however solved by the Confederates. Jefferson Davis
personally visited Hood in his camp toward the end of September; and it was
agreed between them that, in order to relieve the situation in Georgia, Hood
should make an aggressive movement into Tennessee. For a month or more the two
armies played a somewhat blind game, the Confederates endeavouring to attack
and destroy, the Federals to defend and reconstruct the railroad and support
their garrisons at various points between Nashville and Atlanta. Eventually
Sherman formed the conclusion that, instead of losing a thousand men a month in
merely defending the road and gaining no further result, the wiser course would
be to divide his army, to send back part of it for the defence of Tennessee, to
abandon the whole line of railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and, taking
the offensive, to march with the remainder to the sea, and “ make the interior
of Georgia feel the weight of war.’7 He sent a number of tentative
suggestions of this kind to Washington, but not until November 2 did he receive
from General Grant the distinct permission to go on as he proposed.
It is agreed
that, after Grant and Sherman, the ablest commander who had won his spurs in
the west was George H. Thomas. This officer held important commands in the Army
of the Cumberland with signal success, from the first battle at Mill Spring,
Kentucky, in January, 1862, to the battle of Chickamauga, where his resolute
heroism saved the day; and he had distinguished himself throughout the stubborn
campaign which led to the capture of Atlanta. With full confidence in the
courage and sagacity here displayed under his own eyes, Sherman, as soon as
Atlanta had been made safe, sent Thomas back to Chattanooga to supervise
military operations in Tennessee, instructing him, after his own army had been
formed, to collect a force at Nashville, made up partly from his own troops and
partly from recruits and reinforcements from the North, in order to meet and
defeat the projected Confederate invasion under Hood.
That
commander’s movement unfolded itself toward the end of September, when he
abandoned his position at Lovejoy’s Station on the Macon railroad, in order to
take up another to the west, on the
Montgomery
railroad. For a time he pertinaciously carried on detached operations against
the stations and garrisons between Atlanta and Chattanooga; and it required
constant watchfulness on the part of Sherman to fend them off. But, finding
after a month of experiment that he could not permanently break Sherman’s
communications, Hood moved to Gunters- ville on the Tennessee river, and, still
proceeding westward, on October 31 reached Tuscumbia, situate on that stream.
Here, in conference with General Beauregard he matured his design; and
Beauregard, who had been given superior command over both Hood and Taylor in
the adjoining Department, ordered him to assume the offensive. Hood’s force at
this time had been increased to about 35,000, and he had in addition the
co-operation of 10,000 cavalry under Forrest, then in northern Alabama. General
Thomas was now in Nashville awaiting reinforcements, but had an advanced post
of two army corps at Pulaski under Schofield. Putting his army in motion on
November 21, Hood endeavoured by a swift march to reach Columbia, Tennessee,
and cut off the retreat of this detachment. Though very near gaining his
object, he did not quite succeed; and, as he still pushed northward, a severe
fight took place at Spring Hill, which foiled and somewhat checked the
Confederate pursuit.
By all
accounts General Hood possessed great courage and energy, and an ambition to
emulate the flanking exploits of Stonewall Jackson; but the critics equally
agree that serious defects of judgment rendered this ambition futile. Hood’s
reverse at Spring Hill only sharpened his appetite for a victory, which was,
indeed, all but within his reach. He once more pushed on the pursuit,
addressing to his subordinate commanders not only lively entreaties, but also
injudicious reproaches for alleged shortcomings at Spring Hill. In the mood of
mingled discontent and anger induced by this fault-finding they ordered a
furious attack, at four o’clock on the afternoon of November 30, upon
Schofield’s army, which had barely arrived and entrenched itself at the village
of Franklin on the Harpeth river. The assault came so suddenly that the first
rush of the Confederates found an opening of about a thousand yards in the
Federal line; and the struggle on this side to close it, and on the Confederate
side to break through it at all cost, brought on a hand to hand conflict that proved
one of the most sanguinary of the war. The intensity and ardour of combat at
this point communicated itself to other parts of the field, and excited General
Hood to order attack after attack, prolonging the battle until nine o’clock at
night, with occasional volleys even for an hour after. Instead of his hoped for
victory, Hood suffered a crushing defeat. Six of his generals were killed, six
wounded, and one captured, while his total losses reached 6252, of whom only
700 were prisoners.
General
Thomas at Nashville, now ready to meet Hood’s invasion, was informed by
telegraph of the result at Franklin, and promptly ordered Schofield to retire
on Nashville—a movement which was effected after
1864]
Battle of Nashville.
Tennessee freed. 525
midnight of
the battle. General Hood’s abnormal confidence was not shaken even by his
terrible loss in the battle of Franklin. Again ordering a pursuit, he advanced
on Nashville, and on December 2 formed an entrenched line of battle before that
city. His later explanations indicate that he did not intend an attack, but
only wished to present a bold defensive front, collect supplies, and await
reinforcements, under the delusion then current among Confederate generals that
Tennessee was Southern in sentiment, and that, once liberated from the yoke of
the oppressor, it would eagerly rush to his support with recruits and rations.
Hood had a total force of about 44,000 men, and trusted they could not be
overwhelmed. On the contrary he believed that a defensive victory would give him
control of the State, or even open an easy entrance into Kentucky.
It was,
however, with a feeling of perfect security that General Thomas allowed his
antagonist to approach. He had by this time accumulated a total Federal force
of about 55,000; and by good fortune the last of his expected reinforcements
and nearly all retiring detachments had joined him at Nashville a day or two
before Hood’s arrival. The Administration at Washington, and General Grant near
Richmond, knowing that Sherman had started on his march to the sea, were watching
the Tennessee campaign with intense anxiety. Grant, seeing the disadvantage in
which Hood had placed himself, sent impatient orders to Thomas to attack him,
and went even so far as to send Logan with contingent and discretionary orders
to supersede him, if he did not act. A week passed away while Thomas was
deliberately completing his preparations, and then a storm of rain and sleet,
which covered the miry roads with a thin coat of ice, caused another six days’
delay.
On the
morning of December 15, when a warm rain had melted the ice, but without
waiting for the roads to dry, the Federal army advanced to the attack, its
first movements being masked by a heavy fog. Though the ground was hilly and
broken and the roads still heavy and difficult from the recent storm, the whole
plan of battle seems to have been executed with unusual regularity and success,
so that by nightfall at the close of the first day the entire Confederate line
had been driven back a distance of two miles, and had lost 16 guns and 1200
prisoners. Roused to eager enthusiasm by this initial success, the Federal
officers and soldiers resumed the battle on the next day, December 16, under
the same well-planned orders, and with the same steady courage. Though driven
back on the first day, Hood seems to have maintained hope and confidence on the
second, until in the afternoon, in the language of the commander of a division
on the Federal side, “the whole Confederate left was crushed in like an
eggshell”; and in Hood’s own words, his line “ broke at all points,” and he “
beheld for the first and only time a Confederate army abandon the field in
confusion.” The full result of the two days’ battle was the capture of 4500
prisoners, including
526
Sherman's march through
Georgia. [i864
four
generals, with 53 guns, and the disastrous rout of the Confederate army, which,
pursued to the Tennessee river in its flight, soon after disappeared as an
organised body. The Federal losses were about 3000, of whom less than 400 were
killed. The judgment of Sherman, in dividing his army and trusting the defence
of Tennessee to Thomas, was handsomely vindicated; and the President and
General Grant were greatly relieved of anxiety and encouraged in hope about the
march to the sea.
(4) The March
to the Sea.
Before Hood’s
advance had suffered its first reverses, Sherman was already on his second
march. As soon as Atlanta fell, his dispatches began strongly to recommend the
project; and the design grew to conviction in his mind when Hood left him a
clear path by abandoning Lovejoy’s Station on October 21, 1864, to undertake
the northward campaign. Receiving the coveted permission from Grant on November
2, Sherman hurried on his preparations with his usual impetuous energy. The
railroad was taxed to its utmost service in carrying back to Chattanooga the
sick, wounded, and non-combatants and surplus stores; garrisons were withdrawn,
the railroad broken up, bridges burned, mills destroyed, and the depots,
foundries, shops, and public buildings in Atlanta turned into smouldering
ruins. Sixty thousand of his best soldiers, under his best officers, with 65
guns, were welded into as perfect a fighting machine as was ever organised. It
was divided into two wings, led respectively by Generals Howard and Slocum.
With twenty days’ supply of provisions, five days’ supply of forage, and 200
rounds of ammunition, forty of which were carried by each soldier, the army
started on its march of 300 miles on November 15. The day was fine, men and
officers in high spirits, the regiments singing the inspiring melody of “John
Brown’s Body” with a fervour and confidence that made the “Glory Hallelujah” of
the chorus ring out more like a religious anthem than a military march. The
orders directed the army to march as nearly as possible in four parallel
columns, and to forage liberally on the country, but forbade soldiers to enter
the dwellings of the inhabitants or to use abusive or threatening language. To
corps-commanders alone was entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses and
cotton-gins.
In that
latitude the weather was good and comparatively mild. Excellent crops had
recently been harvested, and organised foraging parties found no difficulty in
keeping up a ten days’ supply of meat, com, sweet potatoes, and miscellaneous
provisions. Fifteen miles was an average day’s march; forage was abundant, and
more horses and mules were collected than could be used or taken along.
Wherever an army- corps followed a railroad, the track was systematically
destroyed by
piling
together and burning the ties, heating the rails red-hot in the middle, and
twisting them round trees. The advance of the left wing was directed to
threaten Augusta, that of the right to threaten Macon, diverging again however
to pass between them and unite at Milledgeville, the capital of the State, from
which the Confederate State officials and legislature precipitately fled. Two
brigades of cavalry under General Kilpatrick, operating as occasion required
with either wing, easily kept off the slight demonstrations of the enemy.
The audacity
of Sherman’s advance at first created great consternation; and the authorities
printed proclamations and orders in excited language, exhorting the people to
rise en masse to “assail the invader in front, flank, and rear by night and by
day.” But the appeal was vain. No effective force gathered to oppose Sherman’s
triumphant march. It was not even molested by guerrillas. While the troops were
sullenly received by the whites, they were everywhere greeted by the negroes
with demonstrations of satisfaction and welcome. Often their coming was hailed
as a providential deliverance; and it was with difficulty that Sherman could
prevent the blacks following in such numbers as seriously to embarrass his
march. Moving eastward from Milledgeville on November 24, Sherman crossed the
Ogeechee, and on the high land between that and the Savannah river pursued a
south-easterly course directly toward the city of Savannah, the outer defences
of which he reached on December 10, easily driving before him a Confederate
division and some irregular forces, about 10,000 in all. Hardee, an educated
and accomplished soldier, held Savannah, a site by nature difficult of
approach, well fortified, and defended by a garrison of 15,000. But Sherman promptly
stormed Fort McAllister on December 13; this gave him command of Ossabaw Sound,
through which he communicated with the Federal fleet, and sent to Washington a
dispatch that his march had been most agreeable, that he had not lost a waggon
on the trip, that he had utterly destroyed over 200 miles of rails, and
consumed stores and provisions that were essential to Lee’s and Hood’s armies.
“ The army is in splendid order,” he added with pardonable pride, “ and equal
to anything.”
The
investment and preparations for the capture of Savannah were immediately begun,
Admiral Dahlgren, in command of the Federal fleet, heartily co-operating.
Hardee’s position was soon rendered untenable, and on December 22, 1864,
Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln, “ I beg to present you as a Christmas
gift the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of
ammunition, also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton.”
At Savannah
Sherman received a dispatch from Grant, written twelve days earlier, in which
he was directed to establish and fortify a strong base on the coast, leaving
his artillery and cavalry, with enough infantry to hold the place and make
local incursions, and to move by sea and join Grant before Richmond, with the
remainder of his army. This
528
[1864-5
plant was
distasteful to Sherman; but, greatly to his delight, a few days later he
received a change of orders, or rather of suggestions. Since Grant had heard of
Thomas’ victory at Nashville, and the success of several Federal cavalry raids,
the military problem seemed to be changing; and he frankly wrote to Sherman on
the day of the latter’s arrival at Savannah, “I want to get your views
about.what ought to be done, and what can be done.” :By that time Sherman’s
views were “as clear as daylight.’’ He laid before Grant in considerable detail
his own plan of a march northward from Savannah by way of Columbia, South
Carolina, to Raleigh, North Carolina. “The game is then up with Lee,” he
confidently added, “unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you, and fights me,
in which case I should reckon on your being on his heels. If you feel confident
that you can whip Lee outside of his entrenchments, I feel equally confident
that I can handle him in the open country.”
Grant
promptly accepted Sherman’s suggestion, and directed him on December 27, 1864,
to make his preparations without delay, to “ break up the railroads in South
and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond” as soon as
he could. To facilitate this campaign a number of co-operative movements were
directed by Grant. The interior of Alabama was threatened, both by operations
from the Gulf Coast, and by a powerful cavalry expedition from Thomas’ army in
Tennessee. The 23rd corps of the Army of the Cumberland, under General
Schofield, was brought to the East and sent by sea to the North Carolina coast,
with orders to advance on Goldsborough—a movement rendered possible by the fall
of Fort Fisher at the mouth of Cape Fear river, which occurred on January 15,
1865. By agreement with Admiral Dahlgren the Federal fleet was held in
readiness to establish a new base and afford communication and support if
Sherman should desire or be forced to approach the coast during his northward
march.
The month of
January, 1865, was occupied, partly in preparation, partly by delays due to
rains which swelled the rivers and flooded the swamps. On February 1 Sherman
started from Savannah on his third march, with an army of 60,000 men,
provisions for twenty days, forage for seven, and ample ammunition for a great
battle. While he did not anticipate an unobstructed advance, he rightly judged
that the severest work of the expedition would be to conquer the natural
obstacles in his path. The general course of the rivers was at right angles to
the direction he had to follow, and, flowing through a low and sandy country,
they were divided into many branches and bordered by broad and difficult
swamps. To an ordinary army the route would have been, as the Confederate
general officially reported it, impassable. As in the march to the sea,
Sherman’s army was stripped of all but the barest necessaries; but these
included 2500 waggons, 600 ambulances, a pontoon train with each of the four
columns, and 68 guns.
This however
was not an ordinary army. It was made up of the
sons of that
sturdy race which in two generations had changed the West from a wilderness to
civilisation. Many of its soldiers were veterans serving a second term of
enlistment, expert axe-men and river-men, who in the campaigns of Vicksburg,
Chattanooga, Atlanta, and the march to the sea, had acquired a degree of
practical experience, organisation and confidence, that made light of
privations and reduced difficulty to commonplace. Compared with the new task,
the march to the sea had been a pleasant autumn excursion. Here were swamps to
be waded through waist-deep, bridges to be improvised over numberless headwater
channels, hundreds of miles of corduroy roads to be laid, railroad tracks to be
tom up and destroyed, and a daily and co-ordinate progress of ten or twelve
miles to be maintained throughout. Sherman’s memoirs dwell with pardonable
pride on this midwinter journey of 425 miles in fifty days, in which the army
crossed five navigable rivers, occupied three important cities, and ruined the
whole railroad system of South Carolina.
Repeating the
strategy of his earlier march, Sherman threatened Augusta to the left and
Charleston to the right, and passing between them united his army at Columbia,
South Carolina, on February 16. The Mayor formally surrendered the place; but
the Confederates, before leaving it, had piled a large quantity of cotton into
a narrow line in the street, and set it on fire. Loose flakes of cotton, blown
by the strong wind, set fire to neighbouring houses. For a while the Federal
troops and the citizens laboured hopefully to prevent a spread of the flames;
but the wind rose to a gale which continued the greater part of the night; and,
spreading beyond control, the conflagration burned out the heart of the city.
The charge that this was a deliberate act of vengeance has been distinctly
disproved in a careful judicial investigation, by the mixed commission on
American and British claims under the Treaty of Washington, as also by the
orders of Sherman, and by his leaving a generous supply of provisions to feed
the unfortunate sufferers.
When Hardee
evacuated Savannah, he had retreated to Charleston; and that city, whose
defences had for four years withstood every bombardment, assault and engineering
device of a powerful Federal fleet, had now in turn to be given up as a direct
result of Sherman’s occupation of Columbia. Here again the retreating
Confederates burned the cotton warehouses; and a considerable part of
Charleston went up in flames as a consequence. Still threatening right and
left, Sherman reached Cheraw on March 3, and Fayetteville on March 12. Here he
was able to open communication with General Terry, who had advanced from Fort
Fisher to Wilmington. Here also he was able to free his army from the
encumbrance of about 30,000 negroes who followed his march, sending them to
Federal camps on the coast. Up to this time there had been practically no
fighting; but Sherman now learned that General Johnston was once more in
command of the Confederate forces, and was
collecting an
army near Raleigh, North Carolina, made up of the retreating Confederate
garrisons, several slender divisions of cavalry which had followed along the
left flank of his army, and some scattered fragments of the army of Hood, which
Thomas had routed at Nashville. Sherman estimated that they might perhaps
number about 40,000, and, knowing his antagonist’s ability, advanced toward
Goldsborough with greater caution. In reality Johnston had only gathered a
force of about 25,000, but with 14,000 of these he courageously attacked the
flank of Slocum’s wing at Averysborough and Bentonville, on March 16 and 19,
bringing on sharp battles in which the Federals lost about 2100 men, and the
Confederates about 2900. The Confederates were compelled to retreat; Sherman
resumed his march on the 22nd, and on the 23rd rode into Goldsborough,
effecting a complete junction with the army of Schofield, which had arrived:
two days before, thus raising the total Federal force to 90,000 men. The third
giant stride of Sherman’s army was finished; the entire Southern system of
communications was broken up; the Confederate arsenal, depots, and military
factories were in ruins; four months’ supplies, on which Lee’s army was dependent,
were consumed or destroyed; and the whole Southern Confederacy proved to be a
mere shell, destined in a few weeks to sudden and complete collapse.
(5) The Fall
of Richmond.
Throughout
the whole war, the Shenandoah Valley, or, as it is also called, the Valley of
Virginia, exercised, from the nature of its topographical situation, an
important influence upon the military campaigns in Virginia. From the southern
end of the valley the James river runs by a winding easterly course to Richmond
and Hampton Roads; while the headwaters of the James interlock with those of
the Shenandoah river, which, running in a north-easterly direction, falls into
the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and gives the valley its name. The single
mountain line of the Blue Ridge affords the valley a continuous eastern wall,
and makes it a covered highway leading from the rear of Richmond to the rear of
Washington. The valley has a fine turnpike running its entire length; and the
well-kept farms that border it yield abundant harvests. It followed therefore
that, because of the protection, the road, and the supplies, every campaign or
movement of the contending armies east of the Blue Ridge necessitated some
auxiliary or detached operation in the Shenandoah Valley. : -
Accordingly,
when Grant set out on his- march from the Wilderness to Richmond, he directed
that a co-operating force, coming from the Kanawha and Shenandoah Valleys,
should move against Staunton and Lynchburg, But so early as the middle of May,
1864, Confederate,
1864] Early threatens Washington, but retires.
581
detachments
had met and foiled this movement. A new expedition was thereupon organised,
with a larger force, under General Hunter, with directions to destroy, if
possible, the railroad between Charlottesville and Lynchburg. Hunter moved actively
southward, won an important engagement at Piedmont on June 5, wrought
considerable destruction to the railroads and miscellaneous military property,
and pushed his advance up to the very fortifications of Lynchburg. But finding
that Lee had detached Early with a large force against him, having exhausted
his ammunition, and being 200 miles from his base, he was forced to retreat,
and he committed the error of withdrawing toward the Ohio river by way of the
Kanawha Valley. It was about this time when Grant, having driven Lee’s main
army before him from the Wilderness to Richmond, had reached and crossed the
James river, and was beginning his long siege of Petersburg and the Confederate
capital.
To relieve
the pressure on his own front, Lee now gave permission to Early with 17,000 men
to move northward through the Shenandoah Valley, which Hunter’s westward
retreat had left open towards the Potomac, in order to threaten and possibly
capture Washington City. Starting from Staunton on June 27, he reached Winchester
on July 2. Unable to occupy Harper’s Ferry because Unionist troops held Maryland
Heights, he crossed the Potomac at Shepardstown and made a short circuit into
Pennsylvania and Maryland, levying contributions in money and supplies on
several towns through which he passed. Marching swiftly by way of Frederick he
drove back Lew Wallace, who had hastened from Baltimore with a force of from
5000 to 6000 men to oppose him at the Monocacy river; and thence he moved
rapidly upon Washington. On the morning of July 11 he was before Fort Stevens,
immediately north of the Soldier’s Home, with the dome of the Capitol plainly
in sight.
It was not
until Early had reached Maryland that the serious nature of the raid was
understood; and troops were hurriedly dispatched from Grant’s army at
Petersburg to insure the safety of Washington. While Early was carefully
reconnoitring these strong defences on the afternoon of July 11, two divisions
under command of General Wright landed from steamers at the Potomac wharf and marched
up Seventh Street to Fort Stevens and the adjacent works which had been hastily
manned. The help, though coming late, arrived in time to save the Federal
capital. The skirmishing which followed on the next day, July 12, was a mere
blind to conceal Early’s withdrawal, but was Sufficiently serious to cause a
loss of 280 of the city’s defenders. Intense anxiety brought President Lincoln
to the parapet of Fort Stevens; and only when a sharpshooter’s bullet killed an
officer standing within a few feet of him did he yield to those who begged him
to retire from so dangerous a position.
532
Sheridan in the
Shenandoah Valley.
[l864
Having failed
to surprise Washington, Early retreated to the Shenandoah Valley, pursued by
Wright. During the next two or three weeks, the somewhat confused orders of
Grant at Richmond, Halleck at Washington, and Wright in the field, led to
little result; but the Confederates made another raid into Pennsylvania, where,
in default of a ransom of $500,000, McCausland, under Early’s orders, burned
the town of Chambersburg. Order came out of chaos when on August 7, General
Sheridan was placed in command of the newly-formed Middle Military Division, an
army of between 30,000 and 40,000 men, with instructions to drive the enemy
south, and to consume or destroy all the provisions, forage and
stock—everything except buildings—in the Shenandoah Valley, so that “ nothing
should be left to invite the enemy to return,” and the Valley should become “ a
barren waste.”
For .a month
longer Sheridan was occupied in bringing his detachments together, meeting
Early’s somewhat eccentric manoeuvres, and watching for the opportune moment
when Lee, pressed by Grant’s operations should recall part of the Valley force
to Richmond. The chance came about the middle of the month; and on September
19,
1864, Sheridan, advancing to the attack, fought
the battle of Opequon, capturing 2000 prisoners and five guns, and driving
Early’s army from Winchester to Fisher’s Hill. Here on the afternoon of
September 22 he achieved a second victory, routing the whole Confederate line,
and again capturing 60 guns and 1000 prisoners. Early retreated rapidly to Port
Republic, where he met reinforcements coming to his assistance; Sheridan
pursued as far as Harrisonburg; and for two weeks the opposing armies thus
faced each other. Sheridan employed this interlude to devastate thoroughly the
southern end of the Shenandoah Valley, reporting that he had consumed or
destroyed four herds of stock, 3000 sheep, 70 mills filled with flour and
wheat, and over 2000 bams filled with grain and forage, making the whole
country from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain entirely untenable for the
enemy.
Finding, as
all previous commanders, both Federal and Confederate, ha,d found, that, while
the; Valley offered great advantages for marching and fighting, so long as
supplies were abundant, it was nevertheless a most difficult region to hold and
defend, Sheridan retired northward during the first week of October, taking
position behind Cedar Creek, a short distance north of Fisher’s, Hill and
Strasburg. Early, having been reinforced, immediately followed, and again took
position at Fisher’s Hill. Here he devised an ingenious plan for a secret
;march past the left flank of the Federal army on the night of October 18. .
Effecting a complete surprise, and attacking the Federal left and rear a,t dawn
of October 19, the Confederates had the )attie nearly their own way until noon,
fprcing back the Federal lines a distance of four miles. Sheridan hgd been absent
at Washington, and was returning, when; at about nine o’clock, shortly after
leaving Winchester, he heard the
cannonade of
the battle, and met fugitives and trains in confusion and flight. Galloping
forward with an escort of twenty men, his presence and contagious enthusiasm
succeeded in arresting the flight, rallying the disorganised regiments and
brigades, and turning the tide of battle. Thereupon the retreating Federal army
took the aggressive, not only repulsing further attack, but changing the defeat
of the forenoon into a brilliant Federal victory. At nightfall it was the
Confederate army which in its turn was overwhelmed and beaten, having lost over
1000 prisoners, and 24 Confederate guns, together with the 24 Federal guns it
had taken in the morning. This victory at Cedar Creek, added to the previous
destruction of provisions and forage, practically eliminated the Shenandoah
Valley as a serious factor in the war. Detached Confederate raiding and further
devastation by Federal troops went on for awhile, but there were no more
invasions or important battles in that region.
While Sherman
was making his great march from the West through Georgia and the Carolinas
toward Virginia, and while Sigel, Hunter, and Sheridan, after many fluctuations
between defeat and victory, were gaining control , of the Shenandoah Valley and
rendering it untenable by the enemy’s forces, Grant, with the Army of the
Potomac, was steadily and patiently pushing forward the siege of Petersburg,
twenty-two miles south of Richmond, upon which depended the fate of the
Confederate capital and government. During the previous three years of the war
two strong circles of fortifications had been built to defend Richmond on the
Washington side. Since Grant brought the Army of the Potomac across the James
river, the defences of Petersburg had been pushed forward by the Confederates,
little by little, until, during the nine months of the siege which followed,
the combined fortifications of Richmond and Petersburg stretched for a distance
Of about forty miles, extending in a circle from five miles north-west of
Richmond to seven miles south-west of Petersburg. Grant, having failed to
destroy: Lee’s army by hard marching and desperate fighting, now endeavoured,
by cutting off its supplies, to force it either to capitulate or to abandon the
two strongholds. Lee’s supplies reached him partly from the north-west, but
principally from the south and south-west of Richmond. The main task of the
Federal army therefore was to seize the three railroads and two plank-roads
centring at Petersburg. Grant pursued the policy, which his greatly superior
numbers rendered possible, of threatening or attacking with his right wing
north of the James, in order to compel Lee to withdraw forces from other
points, and, by thus weakening his line, to enable Grant to push his investment
westward. As a consequence there was kept up, throughout the remainder of the
year, a double system of engineering and fighting, moves and counter-moves,
assaults and repulses, both north and south of the James. This work went on
somewhat languidly at times. Both armies had been greatly
weakened
by the long and bloody struggle from the Wilderness to Cold Harbour, and needed
a period of rest. The new recruits, that came to make up the losses* had to be
drilled and seasoned; at times operations were delayed by detachments being
sent to the Shenandoah Valley, or on cavalry raids. The same inflexibility of
purpose, however, with which Grant had pursued his march, characterised the
siege. Foiled and driven back from time to time, his left wing gradually
extended itself* reaching the Jerusalem plank-road on June SI,'and the Weldon
railroad two months later, which he stubbornly held thereafter against repeated
attempts to dislodge him. : ..
A further extension
to the point where the Boydton plank-road crosses Hatcher’s Run was effected
toward the end of October, but Grant’s effort to reach the South Side railroad
was as yet unavailing. Many noteworthy incidents, such as that of the
Petersburg mine, the capture of Fort Harrison, and the capture and recapture of
Fort Stedman, occurred during this long siege. While they will always be
recalled with intense interest by military students, as illustrations of the
high military skill they called forth, and the uncertainties of war they
demonstrated, and though as minor occurrences they sometimes assumed serious
proportions, their general results remained so evenly balanced in the long
account of loss and gain, as to have little effect in either hastening or retarding
the final consequences of the gigantic struggle. Far more comprehensive causes
than the occasional capture of a few redoubts or a few dozen guns, or the
losses of a few thousand combatants in killed, wounded or prisoners, were
bringing on the inevitable termination of the great contest. The strength and
spirit of the South were gradually sinking under material and moral exhaustion.
Sherman’s victorious march from Tennessee to North Carolina had completely cut
off the waning resources of Georgia and South Carolina, and brought final ruin
to their worn-out railroads. The capture of Savannah, Charleston, Fort Fisher,
and Wilmington closed the last avenues of help through blockade-runners. The
relentless Confederate conscription, which declared all Southern white men
between the ages of 17 and 50 liable to military service, and, in the vigorous
language of General Butler, robbed both the cradle and the grave, had for about
a year practically ceased to furnish any fresh material for the Southern
armies. Lee’s army was not only in want of every material of war, but actually
suffering through lack of clothing, meat, and bread. Confederate credit and
money had fallen to so low a value that the soldiers’ pay ceased to have any
significance; it required a thousand paper dollars to buy a barrel of flour.
Confederate taxation had been strained until it became confiscation,
imperiously demanding, in addition to other burdens, twenty- five per
cent.—one-fourth—of all coin held by individuals or banks in excess of two hundred
dollars. The Acts of the Confederate Congress were futile, the dictatorial
administration of Jefferson Davis could no longer
replenish the
Confederate armies. Every man whom Lee lost by battle, sickness or desertion
(and the last became a serious daily drain), weakened his force beyond hope of
remedy; while the armies commanded by Grant rose in the spring of 1865 to the
highest number they had reached during the war, with practically inexhaustible
resources for the future.
The certainty
of this impending doom of the cause that they had so valiantly championed and
defended became clear to many Confederate leaders during the winter of 1864-5;
but pride and constancy^ and the despotic rigour of Southern public opinion,
long restrained any admission of the belief. Military law and regulations grew
in stringency till they became virtual dictatorship; and, when at last the
Confederate President proposed and the Confederate Congress authorised the employment
of negro soldiers and their emancipation for military service, it was an
admission of the fallacy not alone of State Rights, but of slavery as an
institution of government. Under that admission the vital spirit of the
Southern cause—the preservation and perpetuation of slavery— expired; while the
accusations of stirring up servile war and the bans of outlawry officially
proclaimed by the Confederate President against commanders of the Federal army,
recoiled upon his own head. Secession had been illogical from the first; its
own consequences had now rendered it ridiculous.
In this
situation of affairs, it occurred to an eminent citizen of Washington, Francis
P. Blair, senior, to begin an unofficial negotiation for peace. More than a
generation before he had been the trusted political lieutenant of President Jackson.
Since that time he had maintained close intimacy and strong influence with
Democratic leaders. Though, after the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, he
abandoned the Democratic and joined the Republican party, Jefferson Davis had
long been and yet remained his warm personal friend. President Lincoln refused
to listen to his plans, but gave him a simple permit to pass the military
lines; and with this Blair sought and on January 12, 1865, obtained audience
with the Confederate President, before whom he laid an interesting but utterly
impracticable scheme. The North and South, he proposed, should cease and
postpone their conflict, and unite to drive Maximilian and French power out of
Mexico. It was, in another form, what Seward proposed to Lincoln on April 1,
1861—to substitute the Monroe Doctrine for the slavery question; and it was as
irrational and visionary now as then.
This wild
project of invading Mexico,: never authorised or entertained by
Lincoln, was used by Jefferson Davis as an excuse for sending a commission,
headed by the Confederate Vice-President, “for informal conference upon the
issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to
the two countries "; but they found their entrance into the Union lines
barred by the instruction of President Lincoln that they could only be received
on the condition that they
536 Failure of the negotiations.—Lee's overtures.
[i865
came “ with a
view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.” The
Commissioners finally transcended their instructions and yielded the point;
and, under these explicit terms, President Lincoln and Secretary Seward held a
four hours’ informal conference with them in the cabin of a steamer lying in
Hampton Roads, on the morning of February 3, 1865. The discussion was long and
earnest, and brought out a great variety of, suggestions and propositions; but
we have the concurring reports of the Commissioners that, throughout the whole,
President Lincoln, with that clearness and logic of which he was a master,
adhered politely but inflexibly to the three conditions upon which alone he
would consent to temporary armistice or permanent peace—first, the
complete;restoration of the Union; second, the maintenance of the emancipation
proclamation and other government action on slavery; third, no cessation of
hostilities short of an end of the war and the disbanding of all forces hostile
to the government. On, other points he was ready to be liberal in the exercise
of any executive authority confided to him by the Constitution.
Blair’s visit
and the departure of the Comin.asioners had excited feverish hopes in Richmond.
Their return, and the official announcement of their failure strongly
accentuated the prevailing despondency. The Confederate President made an
extraordinarily defiant and bellicose public address, to re-inspirit his
partisans; but the leaders never rallied from their discouragement, and
Vice-President Stephens gave up hope and went home to Georgia to await the
catastrophe and endure his fate.
A serious
conference between Lee and Davis had taken place early in March at Richmond, in
which the desperate straits of the Confederacy were frankly discussed. Although
the Confederate Congress had virtually given Lee a dictatorship by jmaking him
General-in-Chief, he had assumed the command, on February 9, in loyal
subordination to the civil authority represented by Davis. The details of their
consultation never became known. The necessity of abandoning Richmond and
forming a junction with Johnston’s army to the south and west was squarely
looked in the face; and the friends of each claim that he advised, while the
other opposed, its immediate execution. As, it was easier to suggest than to
perform such a task, nothing was done till Grant forced the beginning.
It may have
been due to this or some such consultation that General Lee, seizing upon a
phrase of a Confederate officer’s conversation with General Ord under a flag of
truce, wrote a letter on March 2 to General Grant, proposing that the two
commanders should meet “ with the hope that upon an interchange of views it may
be found practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the
belligerents” to a military convention. When the telegram containing this
proposal was handed to President Lincoln at Washington, he immediately and
without a word took up a pen and wrote this reply to be sent by the Secretary
of War:
1865]
Lincoln with Grant at
City Point.
537
“The
President directs me to say that he wishes you to have no conference with
General Lee, unless it be for capitulation of General Lee’s army, or on some
minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that , you are not to
decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the
President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military
conferences or conventions. Meanwhile you are to press to the utmost your
military advantages.”
On March 20,
1865, General Grant invited President Lincoln to pay him a visit at City Point.
The President accepted, and had an agreeable fortnight’s sojourn at the
General’s headquarters. Lincoln was a fine horseman; and the reviews, the
rides, the evenings by the camp-fire, above all the confidence and moral of
officers and soldiers, which he witnessed, afforded him perhaps the most
refreshing recreation he enjoyed during his whole official term. For several
weeks Grant had been anxious, with good cause, lest Lee and his army should
escape from the toils he was gradually winding about them. On the veiy day of
the President’s arrival at City Point, Grant wrote a comprehensive order to
his leading commanders, Meade before Petersburg, Ord before Richmond, and
Sheridan at the head of the cavalry, to prepare for a movement to the left on
March 29, to turn the enemy “out of his present position around Petersburg.”
Sheridan was not yet with him, but was daily expected to come in, after a
cavalry raid, in which, leaving Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley on February
27, he had swept south-westward to Staunton, thence south-east to Columbia on
the James river, forty miles to the rear of Richmond, and thence by an
eccentric northward circle round Richmond to join Grant’s army at City Point,
where, according to expectation, he arrived on March 26. On his way he had
defeated Early, capturing the remnant of his force, in all 1600 officers and
men, and wrought great destruction to the James river canal and the railroad
from Charlottesville to Lynchburg.
As if to fill
Grant’s hand of winning cards to overflowing, General Sherman also arrived at
City Point from North Carolina the day after Sheridan; and there occurred one
or two meetings at which President Lincoln, General Grant, General Sherman, and
Admiral Porter, who had taken part in January in the capture of Fort Fisher,
and was then at City Point with his fleet, were present. The record of the
conversations at these meetings is very meagre. The generals related their
experiences, and expressed full confidence in their ability to prevent the
junction of Lee and Johnston. The President wished the war might come to an end
without another bloody battle, and intimated his hope that Jefferson Davis and
other Confederate leaders might personally escape, and his willingness to deal
liberally in restoring the subverted authority of the Union in the Southern
States. When Sherman departed to rejoin his command in North Carolina, it was
with the understanding that he would be ready by April 10 to resume his
northward march to join Grant
538 Grant's advancet Capture of Petersburg. [i865
in the final campaign.
It does not appear that Grant informed him of his preparatory order, or his
expectation of capturing Petersburg during the President’s visit. His plan in
detail was not yet formed. That came as an inspiration of the first day’s-
movement. The grand total of all arms under Grant, at this time was 124,700;
that of the forces under Lee 57,000.
In
preparation for the- final campaign that was about to begin, an army corps
under Ord was brought from the north to the south side of the James river; and
the commands in the trenches were so thinned and shifted as to leave the two
army corps under Warren and Humphreys disposable for a mobile column to support
Sheridan. These three commanders, moving by the left, were to turn Lee’s
extreme right near Five Forks; and, as soon as Lee depleted his lines anywhere
to defend his threatened right, the Federal commanders along the whole line,
alert to discover the weak point, were to assault, break through it, and
vigorously follow up their success. -
The march was
begun promptly as ordered, on the morning of March 29, 1865, with' a prospect
of improving weather. By five o’clock in the afternoon Sheridan was at
Dinwiddie Court House, where after some unimportant skirmishing he went into
camp. Another storm set in, and, as was anticipated, Lee sent a considerable
force to dispute the advance. During the next two days there was much confused
fighting and blind marching on both sides, through flat miry woods, aggravated
by wretched weather. On April 1, however, the situation was cleared up.
Sheridan gradually drove the enemy before him into their field works at Five
Forks, and, having by five o’clock found and brought up his infantry supports,
forced an engagement in which he utterly routed the Confederates, capturing
4500 prisoners, 13 colours, and 6 guns.
This
brilliant success was only a prelude. When on the night of April 1 General
Grant received news that Sheridan had won his battle at Five Forks, he
immediately sent orders to his corps-commanders to assault Lee’s entrenchments.
They were not only prepared for the order but confident of success. On the
morning of Sunday, April 2, Parke at the Jerusalem plank-road, Wright west of
the Weldon railroad, and Humphreys at the Boydton plank-road, gained complete
possession of the Confederate works. The same forenoon, while Jefferson Davis
at Richmond sat in his pew in St Paul’s Church listening to the sermon, a
telegram from General Lee, dated Petersburg at half-past ten, was handed him,
which read, “My lines are broken in three places. Richmond must be evacuated
this evening.”
The several
Unionist detachments that had broken through Lee’s entrenchments were no sooner
well inside the Confederate lines than they turned toward Petersburg, and,
taking the works in reverse, made rapid progress, except where they came upon
completely enclosed redoubts or forts. These presented a harder task, and
caused great loss
1865] Richmond evacuated. Lee's retreat.
539
before they
were captured. By evening, however, of April % the Unionist forces had
possession of all except the inner line of defences immediately enclosing the
city from the Appomattox river on the east to the same stream on the west. When
night compelled a cessation of the attack, General Grant ordered that the
assault should be resumed as early as possible on the morning of April 3. But
with the dawn of that day, it was discovered that the remaining works were all
empty. At three o’clock on the afternoon of April 2 General Lee had issued his
order for the evacuation of both Petersburg and Richmond; and by dawn of the
3rd his remaining forces were marching rapidly toward Amelia Court House, in
the effort to escape to Danville or Lynchburg.
Grant himself
entered Petersburg early on the 3rd, and, sending for Mr Lincoln, then at City
Point, had the pleasure of welcoming the President to the captured city later
in the day. General Weitzel, who had been left in command before Richmond, also
soon learned of the flight of the Confederates; and the Southern capital was
formally surrendered to him at a quarter past eight on the same morning.
(6) The
Surrender.
When the
Federal troops entered Richmond they found that the retreating Confederates had
by official order set fire to the bridges, the steamers at the wharves, and
several buildings containing various depots of supplies; and that from these
the fire had broadened into a great conflagration, which by nightfall burned
out the heart of the city. It was the Federal troops who organised resistance
to the flames, put a stop to general pillage, restored public order, and for a
considerable period afterwards supplied rations to the inhabitants, who, by
order of their own government, were left in a houseless and starving condition.
In his flight
from his entrenchments, Lee’s first hope was, by following the Richmond and
Danville railroad toward the south-west, to reach Danville and form a junction
with General Johnston; and to this end he directed supplies to meet him at
Amelia Court House and at Burke’s Station, the latter being the point where the
Petersburg and Lynchburg railroad, running west, crosses the Danville road. But
when his hungry troops reached Amelia Court House they found no food. This
compelled a halt of twenty-four hours to gather what they could from the neighbourhood,
already stripped bare. The delay gave Grant’s pursuing columns such advantage
that, while Lee was still at Amelia on April 4, half of Sheridan’s horse and
the 5th corps of infantry had already reached Jetersville on the Danville road,
exactly in Lee’s path toward Burke’s Station, where they were joined on April 5
by two other infantry detachments. Lee’s report admits that “ this deprived us
of the use of the railroad, and rendered it impracticable to procure from
Danville the supplies ordered to meet us at points of our march.’’
540
Lee reaches Appomattox
Court House.
[l865
Compelled
thus to change his plan and route, Lee’s next endeavour was to reach Lynchburg,
from which he might hope to gain a refuge in the Virginia mountains. Neither
plan offered anything but a brief prolongation of a hopeless struggle; and the \ second, like the first, found a
quick termination. For three days longer it was almost an even race on parallel
lines westward, with Sheridan’s ubiquitous cavalry hanging on the flanks of the
enemy’s march, skirmishing, fighting, capturing prisoners, burning Confederate
waggon-trains, and gathering up their abandoned artillery. Both sides exhibited
heroic valour and endurance, under conditions which severely tried the skill
and fortitude of even such veteran soldiers as they had become—miiy roads,
swollen streams, intense fatigue, want of food, and marching at a pace which
only the wild excitement of flight and pursuit could have sustained. As a mere
military spectacle it was a fitting climax to the great clash of arms that for
four years had extended over a thousand miles of American territory. In that
running fight along the fifty miles from Petersburg to Appomattox, the Federal
army lost 10,0Q0 men in killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing, and the Confederate
army more than twice as many, without counting the final surrender.
But the very
fierceness of the combat brought it to a speedy ending. On April 6 the bulk of
Sheridan’s cavalxy and portions of several infantry columns managed to isolate
the greater part of Lee’s rearguard at Sailor’s Creek, routing and capturing
the whole of Ewell’s command, from 6000 to 8000 men, including among the
prisoners six leading Confederate generals. Such a disaster, added to the
wholesale desertions and disorganisation that attend every march of this
character, brought conviction to the remaining Confederate leaders. On the
evening of April 7 several of the commanders lformed General Lee that in their
opinion the time had come to end the contest. It was perhaps hardly to be
expected that he would yield at once to an intimation of this kind; but the
advice was reinforced by a note which Grant sent him on the same day, demanding
the surrender; of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee prolonged the
correspondence through the 8th, first by asking terms, and then by saying that,
while not ready to surrender, he would confer about the restoration of peace.
This offer Grant promptly and properly declined.
During the
whole retreat the Federal commanders, by intuition rather than express orders,
had constantly forced the Confederates away from the railroads. While the
interchange of notes went on, Sheridan’s cavalry once more got ahead of Lee’s
army, capturing four trains full of Confederate provisions at Appomattox
Station, where also at daylight on the 9th Sheridan was joined by portions of
the 5th and 24th corps of infantry. On the evening of the 8th, Lee’s army,
reduced to two corps, those of Gordon and Longstreet, had reached Appomattox
Court House, six miles north of Appomattox Station. Believing that only
Sheridan’s
1865] Lee's surrender.—Flight of Jefferson Davis. 541
cavalry
confronted him, Lee ordered Gordon’s corps to clear the way for a continuation
of their retreat. But when Gordon, advancing on the morning of the 9th, saw the
cavalry gradually retire, opening to his view the solid lines of Federal
infantry directly in his way, he halted and hurriedly Sent two messages, one
with a white flag to Sheridan, asking a suspension of hostilities pending
negotiations for surrender, the other to General Lee, on receipt of which the
Confederate commander at once announced his intention to hold a conference with
General Grant.
That
afternoon the village of Appomattox was made historic by a meeting of the
military chiefs. Lee, a tall, handsome man, fifty-nine years old,, over six
feet in height, with silver-grey hair, erect in carriage, and wearing a full
new Confederate uniform with handsome sword and sash, arrived first and was
conducted to the parlour of a comfortable two-storey brick house. Grant arrived
soon after, dad in the ordinary fatigue dress he habitually wore, “the uniform
of a private soldier, with the shoulder-straps of a Lieutenant-General,” as he
himself describes it in his memoirs, without sword or sash, and with his trousers
tucked into his top-boots which were splashed by his hurried ride. He was then
forty-three years of age, five feet eight inches in stature, with shoulders
slightly stooping, and dark brown hair and beard without a trace of grey. The
interview was courteous; the terms of surrender granted and accepted were
simple. Officers and men were to be paroled not to take up arms against the
United States until properly exchanged, and to return home, “not to be
disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their
paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.” Lee expressed his special
gratification that the officers were permitted to retain their side arms,
private horses, and baggage;r and that every soldier who claimed a
horse or mule might ride him home to do the summer’s ploughing. When Lee
mentioned that his army was out of provisions and had been subsisting on
parched com, Grant promptly agreed. to, supply rations. It was found that the
surrendered army numbered 28,000 men.
The warning
which Jefferson Davis received in St Paul’s Church on the morning of April 2,
that Richmond must be immediatdy evacuated, came with a painful suddenness,
notwithstanding the fact that such a probability had been discussed, and that
he had previously sent away his family and the furniture of his house. That
evening the Confederate President and Cabinet, with such archives as they could
hastily pack, departed for Danville, on the only available railroad train.
Arriving there on the 5th, Davis issued a proclamation,in order once more to
“fire the Southern heart,” stating that they had “now entered upon a new phase
of the struggle,” and that Virginia should be held and defended, “ and no peace
ever be made with the infamous invaders of her territory.”
Hearing,
however, on the same day that Lee had surrendered to Grant, the fugitive
Confederate government again hastily packed its
542 Surrender of Johnston and Beauregard. . [i865
archives, and
moved to Greensborough, North Carolina. Here, on April 12, Davis called
Generals Johnston and Beauregard into council with himself and three members of
his Cabinet; and in an amazing mood of optimism informed the party that in two
or three weeks he expected to have a large army in the field in response to new
proclamations. “ I think we can whip the enemy yet,” he said, “if our people
will turn out.” The two generals entertained no such absurd illusion. They
replied that men whom the Conscript Bureau had been unable to force into the
ranks would hardly come upon mere invitation. That afternoon Breckinridge, the
Secretary of War, also arrived, bringing definite news and details of Lee’s
surrender. When the council met again next morning, the situation was awkward.
Davis was still unconvinced and stubborn; the members of the Cabinet had not
the courage to tell him the plain truth, and the generals had no authority to
suggest the obvious duty of the hour. The spell was broken when at length Davis
invited General Johnston to give his views. “My views are, sir,” he replied
bluntly, “that our people are tired of the War, feel themselves whipped, and
will not fight.” He then tersely compared the strength of the opposing forces,
about eighteen to one; represented that, in such circumstances, it would be the
greatest of human crimes to continue the struggle; and urged Davis to exercise
at once the only function of government still remaining to him, namely, to open
negotiations for peace. These opinions being supported by three of the members
of the Cabinet present, Davis reluctantly consented; and the remainder of the
interview was devoted to drafting a letter to be sent by Johnston to Sherman
asking a suspension of hostilities to permit the civil authorities to negotiate
for peace.
Receiving
this letter on April 14, Sherman promptly replied the same day, agreeing to a
conference, and suggesting as a basis of discussion the terms and conditions
made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox. The meeting was duly held on
April 17; but, instead of adhering to his first suggestion, Sherman allowed
himself to be persuaded on the following day to sign a provisional convention
for the surrender of all the Confederate armies, including such important
political conditions, that when they were brought to the notice of the
Washington authorities, the convention was promptly rejected, and a cessation
of the armistice and a resumption of hostilities peremptorily ordered. Within a
few days, however, General Johnston requested another conference and proposed a
modification of the former terms; and on April 26 the two Generals signed a new
convention, surrendering all the forces under Johnston’s command, a total of
89,360 in North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, upon the simple military
conditions which Grant had given to Lee.
Davis and his
party meantime had continued their southward flight without awaiting Sherman’s
answer. Their railroad accommodation
1865]
Capture of Davis.—Final
surrenders.
543
extended no
further than Greensborough, whence they continued their journey with the aid of
such vehicles and horses as they could scrape together. For a while their
escort was swelled by little detachments that had broken away when Johnston
surrendered his army; and, when Davis joined his family at Abbeville, South
Carolina, they were provided with a comfortable waggon-train. From this time,
however, under rumours of swift pursuit, the disintegration of the escort was
rapid; and when finally the presidential party was arrested at daylight on May
10, in their camp near Irwinville in southern Georgia, by a detachment of
Federal cavalry under command of Colonel Pritchard, there remained together
only Jefferson Davis, six members of his family, Postmaster- General Reagan,
seven staff officers, several servants, and twelve private soldiers.
The
government had offered a large reward for the capture of Davis, under the
supposition that the Southern president had been an accomplice in the
assassination of President Lincoln; but the allegation was eventually proved
false. After an imprisonment of about two years in Fortress Monroe, he was
indicted and arraigned for the crime of treason, and liberated on bail. Pending
a motion to quash the indictment, President Johnson, on December 25, 1868,
issued a general proclamation of amnesty which included Davis; and he
thereafter remained at liberty-at his home in Mississippi until his death,
which occurred at New Orleans, while he was visiting that city, on December 6,
1889.
Two days
before the capture of Jefferson Davis, General Richard Taylor surrendered to
General Canby the Confederate forces in the States of Alabama and Mississippi,
42,293 in number; and on May 26 General E. Kirby Smith surrendered to General
Canby the final remnant of all the Confederate armies, some 17,686 men, under
his command in the trans-Mississippi department.
If the
warlike strength of the government of the United States had been fully tested
during four years by the valour and patriotism of an average of a million armed
men, the power of its civil authority was now demonstrated in an equally
shining example, by their devotion to law and their love of peace. Two days
after the surrender of Johnston to Sherman, the Secretary of War ordered eveiy
chief of bureau in his department to begin immediately , the reduction of
expenses to a peace footing. A few days before General E. Kirby Smith made a
formal surrender of the last fragments, of Confederate military organisation
still under arms in the immense department west of the Mississippi river, the
two great armies of Grant and Sherman were assembled at Washington on their
homeward march, where on May 23 and 24 they passed in a last grand review along
Pennsylvania Avenue, and before President Johnson, surrounded by the various
state dignitaries in a temporary pavilion erected in front of the White House.
From this magnificent pageant of two days’ duration, they returned to their
644
[1865
own States;
and in one year from that date a million volunteers had been mustered out of
service, and had again taken up their ordinary vocations, without an ambition
on the part of a single American soldier, except to continue to deserve in
civil life whatever distinction he had won on the field. In contrast with the
war-appropriations of over $500,000,000 for the fiscal year of 1865, the
estimates for 1866 had been cut down to $33,000,000. On June 13, 1865, the
President proclaimed the insurrection at an end in the State of Tennessee; and
on August 20, 1866, his final proclamation announced that “peace, order,
tranquillity and civil authority now exist in and throughout the whole of the
United States of America.”
(7) The Death
of Lincoln.
Prom his
parting visit to General Grant at Petersburg on April 3,
1865, President Lincoln returned to City Point,
where he learned that Richmond had fallen and had been Occupied by Unionist
troops; and on the following day, April 4, Admiral Porter arranged a visit to
the Confederate capital for the President, the Admiral and several army
officers. Proceeding by boat up the James river, the party started with ample
conveniences for the trip. But when, on nearing Richmond, they came to a row of
piles which had been placed across the river as a military obstruction, they
found the opening through it so far closed by a disabled vessel that their
steamer could not pass. With more zeal than prudence, the Admiral urged that
they should leave behind their steamer, with the carriage and cavalry escort,
and proceed in the twelve-oared barge he had brought along; and, seated in
this, they were towed by a small tug-boat the remaining distance to one of the
Richmond wharves. Procuring a guide from the coloured men loitering near their
landing-place, and without knowing how far they had yet to go, Admiral Porter
formed the party into a little procession of six sailors armed with carbines in
front, and four in rear; and between these, without other 'escort,'' President
Lincoln and his four companions walked a distance of perhaps a mile and a half
to the centre of Richmond. In that southern latitude it was already hot, and
the march was tedious and fatiguing, over rough roads and through dusty
streets. Probably never before, in the whole course of history, did the ruler
of a great nation make so simple and unpretending an entry into a conquered
capital. The party at length reached the headquarters of General Weitzel, the
new Federal commander, in the house which Jefferson Davis had occupied as his
official residence only 36 hours before. After this, of course, every comfort
was provided for President Lincoln during the remainder of his stay, and in
his visits to the scene of the conflagration which followed the
evacuation of
the city, and to various points which the war had rendered historic. From
Richmond the President returned to City Point, whence he took steamer for
Washington, called back by a severe accident that had happened to Secretary
Seward.
For a week
after his return, Lincoln and his Cabinet were fully occupied with important
details of administration, particularly with the serious question of
reconstruction, which the recent military successes so suddenly forced upon
them. On the evening of April 11, in response to a serenade, after thankfully
expressing the national joy at the prospect of speedy peace, the President
dwelt at some length upon the difficult problems by which the question was
environed. Neither he nor his listeners had any premonition that this was to be
the last public address he would ever make.
The subject
of reconstruction was again discussed in the Cabinet meeting held on Friday,
April 14. Lincoln spoke hopefully of being able to restore the machinery of
civil government in the Southern States without encountering too much objection
from extreme radicals on the one hand or obstinate conservatives on the other,
and without excessive friction between the conquering and the conquered
authorities; and an unusual feeling of gratitude and generosity pervaded his
words. The Cabinet meeting was made doubly interesting by the presence of
General Grant, who had arrived that morning from the field, bringing with him
Captain Robert Lincoln, the President’s son. The day itself had a historic
significance. It was the anniversary of the fall of Fort Sumter; and a great
celebration was then in progress inside the battered walls of that fortress, in
which General Robert Anderson again raised the identical flag which his own
hands had hauled down four years before.
In Washington
on that evening, the President and Mrs Lincoln, accompanied by two young
friends, went to Ford’s Theatre to see the comedy of Our American Cousin. At
about ten o’clock, while the President, seated in an arm-chair in the upper
right-hand stage-box, was deeply absorbed in the progress of the play, a young
actor named John Wilkes Booth, a fanatical Secessionist, having gained entrance
to the little corridor, noiselessly opened the box-door immediately behind
Lincoln, and, holding a pistol in one hand, and a knife in the other, put the
pistol to the President’s head and fired. Major Rathbone, who was in the same
box, sprang to seize the murderer, but the latter dealt him a savage cut on the
arm with his knife, and, advancing through the box, placed his left hand on the
railing and leaped from its front to the stage below. A spur that he wore
caught in the folds of the American flag which draped the front of the box, causing
him to break the small bone of one leg in the fall. Nevertheless, he raised
himself to his fall height and, brandishing his knife as he turned to the
audience, shouted the State motto of Virginia,
546 Funeral of Lincoln,—Attack on Secretary
Seward. [1865
“ Sic semper
tyramnis,” and, hastening through the familiar passages to the rear door of the
theatre, mounted a saddle-horse waiting there and galloped away.
The ball
fired by the assassin had entered the back of the President’s head on the left
side, and, passing through the brain, lodged just behind the left eye. For an
instant the audience was stupefied by the pistol- shot and the assassin’s
dramatic exit; then followed clamour arid confusion in the effort to render
assistance and in the eagerness of pursuit. The wounded President, breathing
but unconscious, was borne to a house across the street. Before such a hurt the
skill of the surgeons was unavailing; yet his strong vitality was slow to
surrender life. The family and State dignitaries watched by his bedside through
the night, and at twenty-two minutes past seven the next morning Abraham
Lincoln breathed his last.
Vice-President
Andrew Johnson was in Washington at the time, and at eleven o’clock Chief
Justice Chase, in the presence of a few witnesses, administered to him the oath
of the presidential office. This formal ceremony passed almost unnoticed amid
the profound grief and gloom that President Lincoln’s death spread through the
nation. On the 19th, after a brief funeral service in the East Boom, the body
was borne with solemn official and military pomp to the rotunda of the Capitol,
where it lay in state until the evening of the next day, and where thousands
took a last look upon his face. Then began a great mourning pageant, in which
the remains were borne amid impressive and reverent popular demonstrations
through the great cities of the States of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
Indiana, back to his home at Springfield, Illinois, over almost the same route
by which he had come to the seat of government as President-elect in February,
1861. On May 4, 1865, the body was laid to rest
in the ceir etery of Oak Bidge, where an imposing monument has been erected
over the grave.
The elaborate
preparations to assassinate the President were the result of a conspiracy which
Booth had arranged and had been carrying on for some weeks, though the final
devices of the plot were contrived the same day. Nine persons were active in
the conspiracy, with a number of others, some consciously, some unconsciously,
playing minor parts. The plot contemplated the assassination of several other
high government officials, upon only one of whom, however, an attack was made.
Secretary of State Seward was confined to his bed by a fracture of the arm and
jaw received in a fall from his carriage. Simultaneously with the tragedy at
the theatre, one of the conspirators named Payne, a stalwart but brutal and
simple-minded youth of twenty years, pretending to bring medicine for the
Secretary, forced his way into Mr Seward’s bedroom, in the second storey of his
house, and despite the efforts of Seward’s son, whom he beat down with the butt
of a
pistol which
had missed fire, and of a soldier-nurse whom he brushed aside, fell upon the
Secretary, inflicting three terrible wounds in his cheek and neck with a huge
knife. With desperate energy the Secretary rolled himself to the floor between
the bed and the wall, and, baffled in his attempt, the would-be murderer again
forced his way downstairs to the street.
Notwithstanding
the weakness and pain of his broken leg, the assassin Booth, favoured by
accidents, managed to escape first into Maryland and then into Virginia, where,
after almost intolerable exposure and suffering, he was, on April 25, traced
to his hiding-place in a bam and shot, while it was being burned to drive him
out. Payne was arrested on his return to the city, after having for two days
hidden himself in the woods east of Washington. The other conspirators were
soon ferreted out and taken into custody. After a long and searching trial by a
military commission, during the months of May and June, four of the accessories
were sentenced and hanged, three imprisoned for life at the Tortugas, another
was sentenced to six years in jail, and the ninth, after two years of wandering
about Europe, was finally freed by a disagreement of the jury.
The
assassination of Abraham Lincoln caused a profound sensation throughout the
civilised world. The deliberate malice of the murderer as shown in his
preparations, the savage boldness of his deed in the midst of a great
assemblage, the contrast of the black crime with the surrounding scene of
brightness and pleasure, shocked every human soul not distorted by fanatical
hatred. The sincere condolences and tributes of respect to the memory of the
dead President that were sent by rulers and cabinets, by cities and
associations, by individuals eminent in state and church, in science and art,
came from all nations, in almost every language. These messages of sympathy
were inspired more by affection than horror, for in the loss of this
lowliest-born of men, whose genius had lifted him to the highest powers and
prerogatives, who had shared the labours of the humblest and worn the honours
of the proudest, all mankind felt a common bereavement.
He was beloved
by his countrymen because he was the full embodiment of American life,
American genius, American aspiration. No American statesman has equalled him in
comprehending and interpreting the thought and will of the common people. He
had realised the republican ideal that every American boy is a possible
American President; and he gave the national birthright a new lustre, when,
from the steps of the White House, he said to a regiment of volunteers: “I am a
living witness that any one of your children may look to come here as my
father’s child has.” It was by no means an idle forecast. Without even waiting
for a generation to grow up, five American volunteer soldiers, who were under
fire in the Civil War, have since then worthily filled the Executive Chair of
the Republic.
But it was
not merely a romantic influence which Lincoln had on American life. He lifted
the Declaration of Independence from a political theory to a national fact. He
enforced the Constitution as the supreme law. It was under him that for the
first time the American government attained full perfection in its twin ideals
of union and liberty.
While
foreigners could not so correctly understand or value his typical American
characteristics, they were able to estimate his greatness and achievements for
more universal reasons. At the beginning of the Civil War, observers and
critics in other lands, judging from superficial indications, generally assumed
that a permanent dissolution of the Union was a foregone conclusion.
Conservatives looked with a degree of satisfaction upon what they deemed a
certain failure of the experiment of republican government. Liberals scarcely
dared hope that the Union would emerge from the struggle in undiminished
strength and territorial integrity. Both classes very naturally doubted whether
a rail-splitter candidate, even though he had the shrewdness to carry a popular
election, possessed the wisdom and the strength of will to conquer a formidable
rebellion. This question was now solved by the test of experiment. Lincoln had
reconciled, harmonised and rewarded his rivals, crystallised the strength of
the loyal States, inspired financial confidence, dominated the jealousy of his
generals, baffled the intrigues of faction, and led the public opinion of his
nation from indefinite tolerance to the abrupt and total destruction of the
institution of slavery. All this he had accomplished with a sagacity, a tact, a
patience, a moderation, and yet with an unyielding firmness that made his
re-election to a second term at once a popular demand and a party necessity. He
had ruled with an intelligent purpose, a consistent determination, an abiding
faith. He had administered a steady uniform justice, and tempered it with mercy
and forgiveness so ready and broad that he was often censured for leniency and
never for sternness. He made liberal offers and grants of amnesty. Striking
slavery its deathblow with the hand of war, he tendered the South compensation
with the hand of friendship and peace. Commanding a million armed men, his sole
ambition was to vindicate the doctrine that the majority must rule, that there
can be no appeal from the ballot to the bullet.
To the
admiration of foreigners for the art and magnanimity of the ruler was joined
their appreciation of his unselfish personal rectitude, and his world-wide
humanitarian wishes of freedom for the enslaved, and hope for the oppressed in
all lands. Above all, it was his great act of Emancipation that raised his
administration to the plane of a grand historical landmark, and crowned his
title of President with that of Liberator.
THE NAVAL
OPERATIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR.
The outbreak of war between the Northern States and
the Confederacy found the Federal Navy ill prepared and ill organised for a
great struggle. The material was insufficient in quantity and inferior in
quality. Though armoured ships were then under construction both in England and
France, the American fleet included no vessels of this type. The total of
steam- vessels was only forty; and of these eight were for various reasons
useless. Twenty-four vessels were in commission, scattered over the world, and
eight more were in reserve in the dockyards, without crews. At the outset of
the war only three steamers were ready for sea, manned, and in Northern ports.
The other ships in the navy were sailing vessels, and were of but insignificant
value for warfare in an age of steam. Nor was the organisation superior to the
material. The direction of the fleet was entrusted to several independent
bureaux under a civilian head, with no general staff and no intelligence
department. The organisation was devised for peace, not for war; but,
fortunately for the North, a capable Chief of the Staff appeared in the person
of Captain G. V. Fox, a retired naval officer, who became Assistant-Secretary
of the Navy. On him devolved the strategical direction of the naval operations;
and to his efforts the final success of the United States in the conflict was
in no small measure due. The personnel of the navy was on the whole good,
though the officers of higher rank were much too old and, with a few brilliant
exceptions, unenterprising and afraid of responsibility, owing to the long
peace, in which the duty of being always prepared for war had been overlooked.
The total number of officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, of all
departments was 1563, of whom 321 resigned and threw in their lot with the
South, while 350 more, although of Southern birth, remained true to their flag.
The total of officers and men was 7600.
As the country
possessed a large merchant marine and great shipbuilding facilities, the
necessary expansion of the navy was only a matter of time. Every serviceable
steamer in the merchant marine was purchased for the fleet; and a large number
of sloops, gun-boats, and small paddle-steamers were ordered to be constructed.
In August, 1861, it
550
[i86i
was
determined to build a number of ironclads; and among the types selected was the
famous turret-ship Monitor, designed by Ericsson, but not accepted by the navy
department without great resistance on the part of conservative naval officers,
who distrusted this revolutionary departure from preconceived ideas. So rapid
was the expansion of the navy that, in the last year of the war, the United
States possessed 671 ships, most of them steamers, and many of them
armour-plated, manned by 51,500 men. Had half this force existed at the outset,
every Southern port must have fallen into Northern hands in the first few weeks
of war, and the Secession movement would have been crushed at its birth.
But weak as
was the position of the United States navy at the outset, the naval position of
the Confederacy was weaker still. The Confederate States had no organised navy;
they had no ships intended for war, and but small facilities for building.
Their poverty and their dearth of engineering resources placed them at the
gravest disadvantage. The iron essential for armour-plating could only be
obtained with difficulty; if we can believe the Southern journalist, Pollard,
an appeal was actually issued for broken pots and pans to melt down for this
purpose. Everything had to be improvised—hulls, machinery, ordnance, armour,
ammunition, and projectiles; and the energy with which, notwithstanding all
these obstacles, effective fighting ships were constructed, reflects the
highest credit upon the officers of the Confederate navy. The want of sulphur
and saltpetre in the Confederacy compelled the commanders of ships, when in
action, to be extremely sparing of their ammunition, and reacted in a marked
degree upon the conduct of the operations. The more vigilant and effective the
blockade of the coast became, the greater grew the difficulty of meeting the
demands for war material; and there came a time when, despite the military
importance of the railroads, rails had to be tom up to make armour for the
ships. For officers, the Confederacy could rely upon the services of the many
able and devoted men who had resigned commissions in the United States’ navy;
but seamen were harder to obtain, and the crews of the Confederate vessels were
generally made up of landsmen.
Since the
South had no seagoing war-ships of any value, the maritime struggle was
necessarily fought out on the coasts, the Northern fleets assailing in succession
the fortified positions of the South on the seaboard and the Mississippi, often
but not always in co-operation with the Northern army. The twofold dependence
of the South upon the external world, as the source of supply from which it
drew military and engineering material, iron, clothing, and a hundred other
necessaries of war, and as the market for its cotton, the sale of which could
alone provide the sinews of war, naturally suggested to the Northern
strategists a close blockade of the Southern coast-line—a gigantic task,
inasmuch as that coast stretched at the beginning of the war from Chesapeake
Bay to the Mexican frontier, a distance of 3500 miles. The occupation
of the
Mississippi valley and the control of the waters of that river and its tributaries
by a naval flotilla were the logical extension of the blockade principle, since
such action would sunder the eastern States of the Confederacy from the western
States and from the only land frontier which touched a neutral power, Mexico.
It would also close these rivers to the movements of Southern troops, at the
same time opening them to the passage of the Northern armies for the purpose of
land operations. Nor was this all. At the date of the outbreak of war, direct
communication between the centres of population in the Confederacy was still
effected in large measure by water. The carriage roads were very rough; and the
railway system was imperfect, the lines being poorly laid and ill-equipped
with rolling-stock. There was railway communication between Richmond,
Wilmington, and Charleston; but between the Atlantic coast and the Mississippi
valley there were only two lines—that from Richmond through Chattanooga to
Memphis, and that from Charleston through Atlanta to Vicksburg. These lines
were linked up at three points by lateral branches; they were only laid with a
single pair of rails, and possessed no facilities for working much more than
two or three freight trains a day. One of these lines, moreover, was broken
early in the war. Thus, though at first the South enjoyed the advantage of
interior lines, it lost this advantage with the loss of its rivers, the steady
deterioration of its railroads, and the close blockade of its coast.
At the same
time every single State in the Confederacy was exposed to the attack of
combined expeditions; and the government was in consequence compelled by
popular clamour to distribute its military force. Any point on the Southern
coast or on the navigable rivers might be seized by the North with the help of
its overpowering fleet, and made a base for a Northern advance into the
interior. Yet this very facility of invasion operated in some degree to the
disadvantage of the United States, as it led their government also to scatter
its forces in a number of disconnected fields, with no unity of purpose. This
mistaken system continued till General Grant attained high command, and brought
to bear on the military problem his strategic insight and tenacious will. He
found the Union troops scattered and “ acting against different and unimportant
points, spread out so as to cover a wide and disconnected territory, and...in
reality doing nothing to accomplish the main objects of the war.” He at once
directed concentration on the vital points, and by so doing paved the way to
final victory.
The blockade
of the whole Southern coast, with the exception of the littoral of North
Carolina and Virginia, was proclaimed on April 19,1861; and those two States
were included a week later. This was an ironical comment upon the contention of
the United States in 1812, since, to render the blockade effective, there were
at the moment of the proclamation, as we have already seen, only three steam
war-ships in Northern
552 Seizure
or capture of Southern ports. [1861-5
ports. It may
also be noted in this connexion that, as the war proceeded, the American
government was driven by the trend of events to maintain a virtual blockade of
the British ports of Bermuda and Nassau, which were the chief centres of the
blockade-running trade from 1862 to 1864, just as in 1808 England had been
driven to blockade New York. It was not until July, 1861, that the chief
Southern ports were watched by Northern cruisers; and for a year longer fast
neutral vessels found little difficulty in running the blockade. The acquisition
by the North of bases on the Southern coast followed speedily upon the
enforcement of the blockade. From the outset Key West had been in Northern
hands; in August, 1861, Hatteras Inlet, on the North Carolina coast, was
seized; and in the following November, Port Royal. In January,
1862, the entrance to Savannah was blocked with
hulks laden with stone, but these in the course of a few weeks were washed away
by the tides. In February, 1862, Roanoke Island, at the entrance to Albemarle
Sound, was captured; in March, Femandina and St Augustine, in Florida; in
April, Beaufort, North Carolina, Fort Pulaski at the mouth of the Savannah
river, and the great seaport of New Orleans; while in May the two United States
dockyards, Norfolk and Pensacola, which had fallen into the hands of the
Confederates, were recaptured. After this there came a lull in the operations
on the coast; but in November, 1863, Brazos Island near the mouth of the Rio
Grande, important as intercepting the trade between the South and Mexico, was
secured; in August, 1864, Mobile was sealed; and in December of the same year
Savannah taken. At the opening of 1865 only two ports— Wilmington and
Charleston—were left in the hands of the Confederates. Wilmington was of great
strategic importance, as it was through this port that Lee’s army before
Richmond was supplied with food and ammunition, after the failure of the
railroads and the loss of the west and centre of the Confederacy. Fort Fisher,
commanding the seaward approach to it, was captured in January, 1865; and the
town itself was occupied in February of that year. In the same month the
Confederate flag was lowered in the last port of the Confederacy, Charleston.
The
establishment of a ring-fence round the Confederate States thus proceeded steadily
from the opening of the war; and, with each port that fell, the task of
blockading the remaining ports became simpler, as larger and ever larger forces
were set free to do the work. Yet these results were not accomplished without
severe fighting and some repulses. One of the most important naval actions in
the war was the attack on New Orleans, conducted by Flag-Officer Farragut in
April, 1862. He had clearly grasped the fact that it was perfectly feasible for
ships to run past forts, even when these were situated on each side of a
comparatively narrow river; and he argued that, when the forts were passed and
the war-ships placed in their rear, they could be taken in reverse, or isolated
and compelled to surrender. Upon this tactical idea his coast and river
operations
were usually based. New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi were defended
by two works—Fort St Philip, an old-fashioned structure, armed with 52 guns,
situated on the east bank of the river, below New Orleans, at a bend, so that
it enfiladed the channel; and Fort Jackson, a stone work, on the west bank,
armed with 74 guns. Afloat on the river, to support the forts, were the
roughly-constructed, lightly- armoured ram, the Manassas, two ironclads in an
incomplete condition, and several small gun-boats, hastily armed, and manned
with improvised crews. The Confederates were short of stores and ammunition;
only four of the guns in the forts were rifled; and most of the others were of
small calibre. The passage of the river was blocked, in part by booms, in part
by schooners anchored in the stream and secured to each other with strong
chains.
On April 18
Farragut began to bombard the forts with mortar schooners, and continued the
bombardment for some days, at the same time effecting with his small ships an
opening in the obstructions which blocked the fairway. In the dark hours of the
morning of the 24th he moved up to pass the forts, with five steam sloops,
three corvettes, and nine gun-boats. The formation adopted was “line ahead,”
Farragut’s flagship, the Hartford, taking station in the centre of the line.
The leading ships received a heavy fire from the forts, but sustained no vital
injury; most of them, indeed, were little the worse for their pounding. The ram
Manassas and some fire-rafts which were let loose by the Confederates were on
the whole more troublesome than the forts. During the engagement, the want of
initiative in the older officers of the United States’ squadron was curiously
illustrated by the action of one captain, who hailed ship after ship, in order
to obtain Farragut’s permission to run down the Manassas, instead of acting on
his own judgment. Farragut himself was for some minutes in great danger. A
fire-raft came down on the Hartford and set her on fire; while at the same
moment she grounded under the guns of Fort St Philip. But her crew extinguished
the flames; the ship came off the shoal; and Farragut went ahead with a loss of
only ten killed and wounded. Three of the ships in the rear failed to make the
passage, mainly because the day was breaking when they reached the forts. The
ships which had passed set to work at once to destroy the hostile flotilla, and
then pushed on and took possession of New Orleans. The two forts, thus left
isolated, surrendered, as Farragut had anticipated, on April 28. The blow was
politically a most serious one. If New Orleans had not fallen, wrote the
Southern envoy in Paris a few weeks later, the recognition of the Confederacy
by France could not have been much longer delayed. This great feat was
accomplished with a loss to the fleet of only 37 killed and 147 wounded, and
one small ship rammed and sunk.
In April,
1863, the Federal navy attacked the Charleston forts; but on this occasion the
conditions were less favourable, and the attempt
failed.
Admiral Dupont, who was in command, was unwilling to attack, but was overruled
by the naval authorities at Washington, owing to their excessive confidence in
his armoured vessels, of which he had nine, all but two being of the Monitor
pattern. It was impossible to adopt Farragut’s tactics, and to steam past the
forts, in order to take them in reverse, as the entrance to the harbour was
closed by obstructions and torpedoes. The forts to which the squadron was
opposed mounted only 77 guns, of which 17 were rifled; but an hour’s heavy
firing made no impression whatever on the forts, while all the vessels engaged
were repeatedly struck. Though the loss of life was insignificant, the turrets
were jammed, the conning-towers much damaged, and one of the armourclads was so
riddled that she sank next day. This unfortunate experiment showed the grave
risks run even by armoured vessels in attacking forts; but it had no influence
on the course of the war, and is of interest mainly from the technical
standpoint. The blockade of Charleston continued to be maintained, and the
ships engaged were speedily repaired.
Far more
important in its results was Farragut’s capture of the forts defending the
entrance to Mobile Bay, in August, 1864. There were two forts to be passed, one
of which was two miles distant from the deep-water channel, and therefore
played but an insignificant part in the action. The other, Fort Morgan, mounted
35 heavy guns, and stood close to the channel, on its eastern side. Under the
guns of the fort a double line of torpedoes had been carried across the
channel, with a clear passage, 300 feet wide, for blockade runners, close to
the fort. In the bay was a considerable flotilla, the most formidable vessel in
which was the Tennessee, a steamer plated with armour from five to six inches
thick, but fitted with engines so feeble that she could only make six knots,
while her steering gear was exposed and unprotected. She carried six heavy
guns, and flew the flag of the Confederate admiral, Buchanan. The three
gunboats which supported her were of little account; but the presence of a
hostile ironclad, imperfect though she was, rendered the passage of the forts
an extremely dangerous operation.
Farragut,
however, was a leader of great capacity and daring; and his repeated successes
had given the navy complete confidence in him. He had at his disposal a
powerful fleet. Four of his vessels were ironclads, of the Monitor type, two
of them very formidable craft. Besides these he had fourteen wooden steamers.
The ships mounted a total of 159 guns, the majority being of large calibre. By
Farragut’s orders, the monitors were to lead in single line, and the wooden
ships were to follow in pairs lashed together, a small vessel being firmly
attached to each large ship, on the side away from Fort Morgan. Thus two sets
of engines would have to be disabled before any ship would be left helpless,
while the weaker vessels would be screened from the fire of the fort. As a
measure of protection heavy chains were fastened to the exposed side
1864] Sinking of the Tecumseh; Farragut's
exploit. 555
of the larger
ships; and sandbags were in some cases used to defend the decks and sides
against shell-fire. At dawn on August 5 the signal was given for the fleet to
make the perilous attempt, and open the last and fiercest naval encounter of
the war. The monitor Tecumseh, captained by Commander Craven, led the way; and
as she came on the Tennessee moved into position to support the fort. Straight
at the gap in the chain of torpedoes went the Tecumseh; then, as her captain
saw the Tennessee on the further side of the fateful line, he turned
deliberately and headed across the field of danger, probably because he thought
it impossible to take his badly-steering vessel through the narrow gap in the
torpedo line. As his ship passed over the torpedoes a dull muffled roar was
heard. The sea heaved; the Tecumseh rolled violently from side to side; then
she lurched forward and her bows plunged, showing to her comrades astern her
whirling screw. She sank with incredible swiftness; and, as she went down,
Craven, who was with the pilot in the conning- tower, made an instinctive
movement towards the narrow man-hole, in order to escape. But even as he moved,
his chivalry asserted itself. “ After you, pilot,” he exclaimed, and drew back
to make room for his comrade, who passed through the man-hole and escaped,
while the gallant Craven went down with his ship.
While this
scene was being enacted, the other monitors were passing safely under the fort
and up the channel. The wooden ships had now overhauled the monitors and were
bunched up to the lee of them. The Brooklyn, first in the line of wooden ships,
stopped and signalled that she could not go ahead owing to the monitors in her
way. The Hartford, with Farragut’s flag, had also to stop, under the guns of
the fort. The fire on the ships was heavy; ahead was the line of torpedoes; and
the fate of the Tecumseh showed that the danger from them was real and
terrible. But Farragut was equal to the emergency; as his line curled up and
fell into disorder he defied the torpedoes, and went ahead full speed across
the mines. The snapping of the torpedo primers was plainly heard in the
terrible seconds during which the Hartford was forging across the mine-field;
there was dead silence on board amid the roar of the fight, while men held
their breath and waited in expectation for the explosion to follow; but the
ship passed in safety and steamed on to meet the Tennessee. The line behind
straightened out; and the other ships ran by the fort without the loss of a
single vessel.
After a short
but fierce encounter with the wooden ships and four unsuccessful attempts to
ram, the Tennessee was attacked by the Winnebago, without much effect, though
the Southern ship was compelled to retire under Fort Morgan, to give her
gunners rest. Two of the Confederate gunboats were sunk before she returned to
the fray; the third, like the Tennessee, was driven to the shelter of the fort.
After a brief rest the Tennessee once more moved out to the attack, though
556 Victory of Mobile
Bay.—Importance of Wilmington. [i864
owing to
injuries received she could now steam only five knots. The second stage of the
fight lasted an hour. The wooden ships in Farragut’s fleet made repeated but
unsuccessful attempts to ram their opponent; the issue was only decided when
the monitors brought their heavy guns to bear. Under their continued pounding,
her armour-plates started, her steering-gear was shot away, her funnel broken,
and three of her port-shutters jammed. The ironclad was thus reduced to
helplessness; and, Buchanan having been wounded, the white flag was raised. The
Tennessee had made a gallant resistance to great odds. The loss of life on
board her was not heavy; only two men were killed and ten wounded— a fact which
illustrates the efficacy of the protection afforded by armour, for she had been
exposed for hours to a continuous and concentrated fire from the heaviest guns
then known. In the Northern fleet the loss from the enemy’s fire was 52 killed
and 170 wounded; in the Tecumseh all but 21, out of a total of 100 officers and
men, were drowned. The forts at the entrance of the bay held out for some
little time after the battle; but Fort Gaines, to the west of the entrance,
surrendered on August 7, after a bombardment; while Fort Morgan, attacked from
land and sea, protracted its resistance until the 23rd. The town of Mobile
itself was not at once occupied, as all the troops available were required for
the fierce struggle then proceeding in northern Georgia and before Richmond;
but the port was thenceforth closed to blockade-runners. The political effect
of the victory was extremely important. The news of it arrived at a moment of
profound discouragement in the North, when Sherman was still groping his way
round Atlanta, when Grant had been repeatedly repulsed with terrible slaughter
before Richmond, and when the ciy for peace was growing ominously in vehemence.
A few weeks more, and the tide set decisively in favour of the North; the
action in Mobile Bay enabled the Administration to bridge the period of
suspense.
Of great
importance, in the final agony of Lee’s army before Richmond, was the capture
of Fort Fisher, defending the approach to Wilmington, from which port that army
was now drawing its supplies. Ammunition, cannon, clothing, and food were
imported by blockade- runners, and moved up by rail to Richmond; and this in
spite of the presence of a large squadron off the coast. The supply of flour in
Virginia was exhausted in 1864; and the Confederate Congress reported that
there was not enough meat and bread for the armies, and that meat would have to
be obtained from abroad through a seaport. The armies were on short rations; by
the testimony of a Southern private, rats, musk-rats, squirrels, and all kinds
of vermin were eaten; and bread was three dollars a loaf in Richmond. Lee
himself informed Colonel Lamb, the Confederate commander at Fort Fisher, that,
if Wilmington were lost, the army would be compelled to fall back from before
the Confederate capital. A report of the Secretary of the Confederate
Treasury
shows the magnitude of the trade which went on through Wilmington. Between
October 26, 1864, and January, 1865, 8,632,000 lbs. of meat, 1,507,000 lbs. of
lead, 1,933,000 lbs. of saltpetre, 546,000 pairs of shoes, 316,000 pairs of
blankets, half-a-million pounds of coffee, 69,000 rifles, and 43 cannon were
obtained through this port from the outer world, while cotton sufficient to pay
for these purchases was exported. The problem of defending the place was
complicated by the shortness of ammunition for the guns mounted in Fort Fisher.
There were but 3600 rounds for the 44 guns, or less than 90 rounds per gun; and
no more was to be obtained.
In December,
1864, a large fleet, including six ironclads, arrived off the fort, accompanied
by 6500 Northern troops under General Butler. Rear-Admiral Porter commanded the
fleet. On the night of the 23rd a ship laden with powder was exploded close to
the fort. It had been anticipated that the explosion would destroy the fort;
but so little damage was done that the garrison believed a Northern war-ship to
have been blown up by the fire of their guns. After this unpromising beginning,
the fort was heavily bombarded on December 24; and the bombardment was resumed
next day. In the afternoon of the 25th the troops landed, and advanced to carry
the work by assault. Their generals, however, convinced themselves that the
place was still too strong to be stormed; and, to the great dissatisfaction of
Porter and Grant, the troops re-embarked. In view of this ignominious failure,
Butler was replaced by General Terry, an officer of great decision; and on
January 13, 1865, the attack was renewed, the fleet bombarding while the troops
landed. The fort had now only 2300 rounds of ammunition left, so that it could
not waste a shot. All day the bombardment continued; it was repeated on the
14th and again on the 15th. Then at a given signal the ships concentrated their
entire fire on the landward face of the fort, while, to the sound of a
prolonged blast upon the whistle of every ship, the troops and a party of
seamen ashore moved forward to the assault in two columns. The fort was carried
after a desperate and bloody struggle, in which the casualties of the Northern
army were 691 killed, wounded, and missing. The loss of the fleet was 74
killed, 213 wounded, and 22 missing. With the fall of the fort the value of
Wilmington vanished; and the place itself was occupied some weeks later. In
April Lee’s half-starved army was forced away from before Richmond to the
surrender of Appomattox. In the words of the historian of the Confederate navy,
“ the fall of Wilmington was the severest blow to the Confederate cause which
it could receive from the loss of any port. It was far more injurious than the
capture of Charleston, and, but for the moral effect, even more hurtful than
the evacuation of Richmond. With Wilmington open, the supplies that reached the
Confederate armies would have enabled them to have maintained an unequal
contest for years; but with the fall of Fort
558 Military importance of the blockade. [1861-4
Fisher the
constant stream of supplies was effectually cut off.” Thus did the Northern
navy give the most valuable assistance in the final overthrow of the
Confederacy.
It will have
been observed that from first to last the blockade was an agency of the utmost
military importance, apart from its economic influence on the South. The want
of good boots, which could not be made in the South, affected the marching
power of the Southern troops. General Johnston, commanding the western army,
reported in January, 1864, that two out of four brigades in his force could not
march for want of shoes, while blankets were also not to be obtained. The
miserable condition to which the Southern troops were thus reduced led to a
large amount of straggling, which weakened them in every battle. This has
usually been ascribed to defective discipline; but obviously it is impossible
for any commander to punish severely barefooted and half naked men for inability
to keep up with their better equipped comrades. Soldiers who, in the words of
an eye-witness, “ were crazed with hunger,” must either straggle or die.
Second only
to the blockade, in political and strategical importance, was the clearing of
the Mississippi from Cairo to the sea, though in this undertaking, unlike the
blockade, the services of the army were as efficacious as those of the navy.
Both sides began the building of warships on the Mississippi in 1861, the
Northern vessels being of the gunboat type, lightly armoured. In September of
that year the Northern flotilla got to work, supporting the army and
skirmishing with the Confederate “bushwhackers” or guerrillas. Throughout the
early months of 1862 the flotilla rendered invaluable service to Grant. It
co-operated in the attack upon Fort Henry on the Tennessee river, where the
Northern gun-boats were severely handled. Immediately after the fall of the
fort, three of the gun-boats pushed on up the river to the Alabama frontier,
destroyed the Memphis and Ohio railway bridge, and burned a great quantity of
Confederate stores, at the same time threatening the important line of railroad
which linked Charleston to Memphis. In the attack on Fort Donelson, which
commanded the upper Cumberland, the gun-boats were directed by Grant to run
past the fort and take it in reverse, at the same time cutting it off from the
Confederate forces. This work they accomplished, though they suffered severely
from the guns of the fort; and their presence on the river above the fort was
the strategical cause of the sally of the garrison, which resulted in Grant’s
first complete victory. That general had worked admirably with the navy; and it
was one of his many merits that he understood the power which the possession of
this superior flotilla conferred upon him. He was for moving at once up the
Tennessee south- westward to Corinth, where the railroad system centred; but he
was overruled by an incapable superior, though such action would have had a
decisive effect. As the result of his victory at Donelson—a victory
I862-3] Naval operations on
the Mississippi.
559
splendidly
earned—Bowling Green and Columbus, the enemy’s two advanced positions in
Kentucky, were evacuated; but the advantage was not followed up. When the
advance was made to Pittsburg Landing the flotilla supported the army, and by
the confession of Southern authorities did some damage to the Confederates in
the battle of Shiloh.
In April,
1862, the Northern gunboats passed Island No. 10 on the Mississippi, compelling
its surrender; in the following June Fort Pillow was reduced, after an
engagement with the enemy’s flotilla off Memphis ; and Vicksburg was reached in
the same month. Farragut, moving up with his ships from New Orleans, had lately
reached a point below the town; and only the stretch of water commanded by the
guns of the Vicksburg forts now severed the deep-sea fleet of the North from
its victorious flotilla on the upper waters of the great river. With little
trouble and but small loss Farragut ran past the batteries up-stream, only to
find that no army was available for the attack on what was at that time the
last Confederate fortress on the Mississippi. He was therefore forced to
return, as his coal was running low and the level of the river was falling; but
his excursion had shown others the way. Early in 1863 the stretch of water
below Vicksburg, which had for some months been left untroubled by Northern
vessels, was the scene of the exploits of the steamer Queen of the West, which
ran past the Vicksburg works and destroyed a great quantity of supplies,
causing the South heavy loss before she was destroyed.
In the spring
and summer of 1863 the navy rendered Grant invaluable assistance against
Vicksburg—assistance which he, with his usual generosity of disposition, was
the first to acknowledge. Farragut had now received instructions once more to
move up the river from New Orleans; but the task was more difficult than it had
been on the previous occasion, owing to the construction of formidable works at
Port Hudson and Grand Gulf. Between these two points the Red River flowed into
the Mississippi; and down that river came great quantities of supplies for the
Confederate army. Late in the night of March 14 Farragut’s small squadron
advanced, the ships lashed in pairs, intending to pass the batteries at Port
Hudson and attack them from above, with the help of a military force. On this
occasion, however, Farragut met with a check. Of his seven vessels only two
passed the works; one was destroyed by the enemy’s fire, and the others were
compelled by various accidents to fall back. But with the two which had passed,
joined by a vessel from the flotilla above Vicksburg, he was able to stop the
passage of supplies from the Red River, and thus to render sterling service to
his cause. A few days later the flotilla above Vicksburg gallantly ran the
gauntlet of the fire of that fortress and anchored below. Farragut now received
orders to rejoin his fleet at New Orleans, but to do this he had to travel by
the bayous, the way
560
[1861-2
down the
river being too dangerous to be attempted with his small force. The operations
against Grand Gulf and Vicksburg are narrated elsewhere. It is enough to say
that with the fall of Vicksburg on July 4,
1863, the Mississippi was lost to the
Confederacy. With its loss began that shortage of food throughout the Southern
States which, even without the great military catastrophe culminating in
Appomattox, must have brought down the Secession movement when the blockade cut
off the South from all foreign sources of supply. There was continual fighting
between the flotilla on the river and Confederate guerrillas upon the banks,
down to the close of the war; but these operations possess little interest. So
firmly was the river held that, in General Early’s words, it became impossible
to move foodstuffs across it. At the same time the States of Texas and Arkansas
were left isolated and exposed to attack.
One or two
serious attempts were made by Confederate vessels to interfere with this
process of isolating the South from the rest of the world. In July, 1861, the
Confederates had begun the building of an iron-plated superstructure on the
hull of the frigate Merrimac, which had been burnt and sunk at Norfolk
navy-yard; and about the same time the Federals began to construct the
turret-ship Monitor. The Merrimac was completed in March, 1862. She was plated
above the water with two layers of iron armour, rolled from rails, with a
combined thickness of four inches, superposed upon a massive structure of
timber. A ram of cast-iron was fitted to the bow; and inside the armoured
pent-house, which had sloping sides and ends, were mounted four rifled and six
smooth-bore guns of heavy calibre. No solid shot for piercing armour was
supplied for the guns, but this was not thought to be a defect, as the only
vessels off the port of Norfolk, in which the Merrimac was building, were
wooden ships of the old type, vulnerable to shell-fire. The Northern ships were
five in number and mounted between them 222 guns; but, as against an armoured
ship, they might as well have been armed with toy-pistols. The rapid completion
of the Southern ironclad was known to the North, and led to every nerve being
strained to get the Monitor to sea.
The Monitor
differed greatly in design from the Merrimac. She was described by the Southern
officers as resembling a “ tin can on a raft ”; and the comparison was
accurate. When in fighting trim she showed nothing above water but a low hull,
well protected by armour, a circular turret plated with iron and mounting
inside it two heavy smooth-bore guns, and a low conning-tower, placed in the
fore-part of the ship and strongly armoured. The funnels, two in number, were
removed in battle. There was no unarmoured target for an enemy’s guns; and even
the armoured target was small. But against this advantage was to be set the
sacrifice of seaworthiness and comfort; the vessel was essentially one for
coast-service only, and a voyage in even a moderate
1862]
The Merrimac assails
the wooden ships.
561
sea was
extremely trying to her crew. She was ill-ventilated even in the best
circumstances; her speed was very low; the steam-engine which made the turret
revolve was not easily controlled, and was apt to carry the guns past the point
of aim. The ship was therefore imperfect— an improvisation to meet a great
emergency—but, had her designer had more time, there is no doubt that her
defects might have been remedied. On March 6,1862, this vessel left New York
for Hampton Roads, in command of Lieutenant Worden, convoyed by two unseaworthy
steamers. The voyage tasked her crew severely; water poured in through the
openings in her deck, which was awash in the ground- swell of the Atlantic.
There were moments when it seemed as though she must be abandoned; but Worden
was an excellent officer, a man of extreme tenacity and resolution, and he
finally succeeded in bringing his charge safe into Hampton Roads late in the
evening of March 8. As she drew near the roads the thunder of heavy firing
could be heard far off, towards Norfolk. The crew went to general quarters, and
put the ship in fighting trim. They were lighted to their berth in the roads by
the glare of a burning vessel, which told eloquently that the Merrimac had
already got to work.
On that same
morning the Merrimac had come down to try her guns upon the Northern fleet. She
engaged two of the wooden ships, the Congress and Cumberland, and received
their fire with impunity, the shot glancing off her armoured side like so many
peas. Far different was it when her own heavy guns gave tongue against her
adversaries. Her shells wrought horrible slaughter in the Congress; she then
charged the Cumberland with the ram and struck her at her moorings, in the
fore-channels, a blow which proved deadly. A huge gap was left in the side of
the Cumberland, and she at once began to settle in the water; but the crew
refused to surrender, and fought their ship to the last. While this was
happening, the Congress made sail, and strove to reach the shoal water under
the Northern batteries at Newport News. Here she ran aground and was assailed
by the Merrimac. The Southern ironclad was able to take up a position where her
guns would bear, while the Congress could only use two of her thirty pieces,
and those two were powerless against the Merrimac1 s armour. The combat was a hopeless one for the wooden vessel from the
first, but it was bravely protracted for an hour, when, with the ship on fire
in several places, the white flag was raised. This resistance, however, had
served some purpose. The tide in the roads was beginning to ebb, and the water
was shoaling fast, so that the Merrimac could not now get near the Northern
vessels which still survived, and would otherwise have fallen to her guns.
Leaving till next day the completion of the work of destruction, she steamed
back to Norfolk, with no more serious injuries than the loss of her ram, the
disablement of two guns, the springing of a slight leak, and some trivial
damage to her armour. The
news of her
victory and of the loss of two ships with 257 officers and men fell upon the
North with the suddenness of a thunderbolt. At Washington it caused not
unreasonable alarm, as it seemed likely that the Merrimac would attack the
capital, though, as a matter of fact, her draught of water made it impossible
for her to ascend the Potomac.
At daybreak
on March 9 she started from Norfolk to renew the attack on the Northern fleet,
and headed straight for the wooden Minnesota, which lay fast aground. The
Monitor was moored beside the big ship, as her light draught enabled her to bid
defiance to the shallows in the estuary. Worden’s hour had come; he moved out
instantly to the fight and interposed his little craft, one-fourth of the
Merrimac's size, between her and the Minnesota. The Merrimac opened fire on her
new antagonist, but this time the shells had no effect. The Monitor made no
reply; she steamed up to the Merrimac till she was close to the Southern
ironclad, and then discharged the two guns in her turret point-blank at the
iron pent-house. The shots glanced off, yet they dealt a heavy blow. For some
minutes the ships fought at close quarters, wreathed in smoke, pounding each
other with no visible effect, though many small injuries were inflicted on both
vessels. Then, eager to disable his enemy, and finding his guns of no avail,
Worden determined to use the ram. He ran at the Merrimac's propeller but missed
it by two feet and dealt his blow in the air. The ships grazed and, at this
moment, the Monitor fired her guns once more, almost in contact with the enemy,
crushing in the iron, but failing to penetrate. On this the Merrimac drew off
and manoeuvred to attack the Minnesota, which at least was vulnerable to shell.
But in the attempt to approach the unarmoured ship the Merrimac ran aground and
there remained some minutes. The Monitor failed to make use of this opportunity
to disable her enemy; and the Merrimac, getting afloat once more, abandoned her
attack on the wooden vessel, as the range was too great for effective fire, and
turned on the little turret-ship.
In this last
stage of the fight she attempted to run down the Monitor, and struck her a
heavy blow, but did no serious damage. The Monitor's turret now ran short of
ammunition, and Worden had to haul off to the shallows, where he was out of the
reach of the Merrimac, to get up fresh powder and projectiles. This done, he
closed once more; but the final bout was indecisive, though the Monitor's
conning- tower was shattered by concentrated fire and Worden very severely
wounded. The Monitor was now left without direction for some minutes; she
withdrew to the shelter of the shallows, and, not without considerable delay,
after the second officer had taken command, steamed back towards her foe. But
the fight was already over; the Merrimac's captain was under the not unnatural
impression that his enemy had retired from action, and not caring to venture in
shoal water near the wooden ships, he withdrew to Norfolk. The combat was
indecisive;
1862]
563
but the
Merrimac had been prevented from achieving her purpose of destroying the wooden
ships. It was on the whole judicious of the Northern officers not to risk
unnecessarily the only ironclad which the North then possessed; and the
Merrimac was not pursued. A month later she came out again, but this time the
Monitor did not show any anxiety to fight, though a number of barges were
carried off from her neighbourhood by the Confederate gun-boats accompanying
the Southern ironclad. This sally was the more dangerous in that it threatened
the maritime communications of McClellan’s army, which was then assembling at
Fort Monroe. Perhaps it was the greatness of this danger that kept the Monitor
back; and, as the commander of the Merrimac also had orders to run no risks,
the two ships only watched each other. In May the Confederates were compelled
to destroy their ironclad, as the army of McClellan was threatening Norfolk;
and the Monitor did not survive her antagonist for many months. In December,
1862, she foundered off Hatteras, taking down
with her part of her crew. But her work was done; and it is scarcely an
exaggeration to say that she saved the Union by preventing the South from
achieving a naval victory which would have resounded through the two hemispheres,
would have effectually broken the blockade, if only for a time, and, perhaps,
would even have secured intervention. The action is of historic importance as
the first battle fought between armoured vessels, though seven years before, at
Kinbum in the course of the Crimean War, armoured ships had been pitted against
forts with striking success.
On January
31,1863, an attempt was made by two small Confederate ironclads to break the
blockade off Charleston, but no decisive success was gained, though two of the
blockaders were much damaged. Armoured vessels were sent by the Northern
government to co-operate in the blockade, with the result that the Southerners
were not able thenceforth to do more than deliver torpedo attacks on the
vessels watching the port. At Savannah, however, they built a really formidable
armourclad, the Atlanta; and two monitors had to be detached from Charleston to
destroy her. The crew of the Atlanta was made up of untrained men, which may
account for her indifferent performance. On June 17, 1863, she steamed out and
was instantly attacked by the monitor Weehawken. This vessel fired but five
rounds in fifteen minutes, and at the fifth the Atlanta hauled down her flag,
having been struck by four shots, all of which had done great damage.
In April,
1864, the Albemarle, another ironclad of similar pattern to the Atlanta, was
completed for service on the North Carolina Sounds, with the object of driving
the Union gun-boats from these waters, where they interfered with trade and
penetrated to the very heart of the State. The town of Plymouth had been
occupied by a Northern force; and it was one of the first objects of the
Albemarle, when ready, to aid in a joint attack upon the garrison of this
place. On April 19, with men
still at work
upon her, she assailed the Northern gun-boats off Plymouth, sank one, and drove
the others off, when she was able to take the defences of the town in the rear,
with the result that the place was recaptured. So dangerous did her presence in
these waters become that it was decided to attempt her destruction with
torpedoes, as no ironclads could be spared to attack her. Lieutenant Cushing
was selected for the difficult and dangerous enterprise, and was placed in
command of a small steam-launch, the precursor of the modem torpedo-boat. The
torpedo carried was of the spar pattern, and was exploded by the primitive
contrivance of pulling a lanyard. One unsuccessful attempt was made on the
night of October 26, on which occasion the launch ran aground and so lost the
cover of darkness. The following night Cushing ran up to Plymouth once more,
and was so fortunate as to be able to approach close to the ironclad without
being detected. She was lying moored to the shore; and it was Cushing’s design
not to use his torpedo unless compelled to do so, but if possible to rush her
and carry her out to sea in the confusion of a surprise attack. This part of
his plan was only defeated by the barking of a dog; he then drove his launch at
the enemy, and, just as she opened fire, exploded his torpedo under her hull,
blowing a large hole in her and sinking her. His own launch was disabled by the
explosion, but he leapt into the water and swam down stream, regaining safety
without a scratch. His loss was two killed and 19 men captured. This was one of
the most brilliant and dashing exploits of the war.
The precursor
of the modern submarine and the successor of Fulton’s Nautilus is to be found
in the peculiar variety of craft constructed by the Confederates during the
war, and known as Davids. These were double-ended vessels, driven by steam,
which lay flush with the surface of the water, showing only their funnel and
hatches when in fighting trim. They carried a torpedo fixed upon a long spar.
Their defect was that they were liable to be sunk by a heavy wave when their
hatches were open; and to close the hatches meant dooming the crew to asphyxia.
One of these vessels was built at New Orleans, but, so far as is known, was not
employed in the defence of that place. Another was constructed at Charleston,
and on October 5, 1868, attacked the Northern ironclad New Ironsides, exploding
her torpedo against that ship’s side, but without any result beyond shaking
the ironclad severely. A subsequent attack delivered by the same boat on the
Wabash was not more successful. Another and a different type of submarine was a
small vessel constructed of boiler plates at Mobile. She was propelled with
hand-power by eight men, revolving a screw, which gave her a speed of four
knots. She had arrangements which enabled her to go below the surface for a few
minutes. She was a most dangerous craft to those on board her, not only because
of her tendency to dive unexpectedly, but also because, when below the surface,
the men in charge of her could see
nothing. She
sank suddenly when she was first tried at Mobile and drowned eight men. In 1864
she was recovered and moved to Charleston, and on her first trip there sank
again, only one officer escaping from her. She was raised to sink once more,
this time causing the death of six men. On her next trip she dived suddenly,
and stuck in the mud of the bottom, when nine men perished on board her. But
the Confederates still persevered; they raised her a fourth time and lost her
a fifth time, on this occasion through the fouling of a cable. After so many
disastrous experiences, General Beauregard, who was in command at Charleston,
refused to allow her to be used further as a submarine, and insisted that she
should only be employed on the surface. Running flush with the surface, she
attacked the Northern steamer Housatonic, off Charleston, on the night of
February 17, 1864, and succeeded in exploding a torpedo under that vessel. The
war-ship sank in four minutes; but the torpedo craft perished with her
adversary, whether as the result of the explosion or from becoming entangled in
the wreckage of the Housatonic must remain uncertain, as she carried down her
crew with her. When the war was over, divers found the boat lying on the
bottom, with nine dead men in their places on board her. For heroism and
devotion to their cause, it would be difficult in the long annals of war to
find superiors to the successive crews who maimed this fated vessel.
At the
opening of the war the Confederate authorities recognised that the North was
specially vulnerable in its commerce, and determined to attack in this quarter,
with the object of diverting as large a part of the Northern navy as possible
from the military operations on the Confederate coast. The vessels fit for this
purpose were not to be had in the Confederacy, but they were obtained by
purchase or construction in England, as at that date there was no clear ruling
of international law on the question of supplying a combatant with ships, not
actually armed but capable of bring employed for military purposes. The United
States, in the wars between England and France at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, had rendered similar assistance to the French. Only one
steam cruiser was procured in America, and she was purchased from a Southern
firm of ship-owners at New Orleans. She ran the blockade and got to sea in
June, 1861, and cruising under Commander Semmes made several prizes on the
South American coast; but she was finally driven into Gibraltar early in 1862,
where she was watched by three Northern ships. Eventually she was sold, as no
further use could be made of her because of her defects and because of this
vigilant blockade. The commerce-destroyers bought in England were the famous
Alabama, and the less well-known Florida, Georgia, Shenandoah, and
Rappahannock, of which the last never got to sea. The Florida cruised between
1862 and 1864, but was only moderately successful, taking 37 vessels, though
her tenders accounted for 23. She was seized by a Northern war-ship,
in defiance
of international law, while lying in the neutral port of Bahia; and, though
orders were issued that she was to be returned to Brazil, she was sunk by her
captors, it would appear deliberately, while at Hampton Roads.
The Alabama,
under Captain Semmes, was the most successful of the commerce-destroyers,
cruising for two years and making no less than 69 prizes. She visited in
succession the Atlantic, north and south, the Indian Ocean, and the China Sea.
Semmes’ plan was to take up a position on one of the main trade-routes, and
there remain two months, which time it took for the news of his exploits to
reach the United States and for the vessels sent to capture him to draw near
the spot. Then he moved on to a fresh cruising ground. Nearly all his prizes
were made between the Azores and the easternmost point of South America. The
Alabama coaled repeatedly in neutral ports; but it must be remembered that in
1863-4 there were no precedents to regulate this practice. Finally she entered
the port of Cherbourg on June 11, 1864, standing in need of repairs and a
refit. Within three days the Northern sloop of war Kearsarge appeared off the
port, and was immediately challenged by Captain Semmes to fight. On June 19 the
Alabama came out, steamed outside neutral waters, and engaged her antagonist.
The issue was quickly decided. The Alabama's crew, owing to the difficulty of
obtaining ammunition, had been compelled to husband their supply and had had
but little target practice. The Kearsarge had had constant practice, and was
besides slightly superior in weight of metal. The following is a comparison of
the two ships :
Guns
Broadside Crew Casualties Kearsarge 7 366 lbs. 163 3
Alabama 8 305 „ 150 40
In seventy
minutes from the opening of fire, the Alabama lay a sinking wreck upon the surface
of the water, and hoisted the white flag. A few minutes later she went down,
carrying with her ten of her crew.
The career of
the Georgia was unsuccessful, as in a year’s cruising she only took nine
prizes. Except under steam she was useless; and this militated against her
success, for coal was not always easily procured by the cruisers. She was sold
in 1864. The Shenandoah, towards the close of the war, proceeded to the whaling
ground in the Northern Pacific, there made 36 prizes, and, returning to Europe
after the Confederacy had fallen, was handed over to the British government. In
all, the commerce-destroyers accounted for 261 Northern vessels, two being
steamers. The consequences of these depredations upon the shipping of the North
were marked. Many Northern vessels were sold by their owners to neutrals; and
the terror inspired by the Confederate cruisers is shown by the fact that these
sales, which in 1860, before the war, had amounted to 17,418 tons, rose in 1861
to 26,649 tons; in
I861-5] The noar against commerce.—Its results.
567
1862 to
117,756 tons; in 1863 to 222,199 tons; in 1864 to 300,865 tons; and in the
first half of 1865 to 133,832 tons. The tonnage of the American deep-sea
merchant fleet diminished from 2,496,894! tons in 1861 to 1,387,756 in 1866.
The pressure of heavy insurance rates, and the impossibility of obtaining cargo
when its delivery was a matter of complete uncertainty, led to this decline. Of
the ships which remained on the American register the greater number were laid up
in home or neutral ports. Moreover, this trade, once lost, was not recovered;
the destruction of the American shipping industry was one of the most permanent
effects of the war. For her remissness in permitting the sailing or coaling of
the commerce-destroyers Great Britain subsequently paid the sum of ,£3,100,000
to the United States; and, though this amount much more than covered the direct
losses, it gave no compensation for the enormous indirect loss which the
warfare against commerce had inflicted.
The
Confederate cruisers were vessels of a type now obsolete, relying mainly upon
sails, but with auxiliary steam-power, and had, as we have seen, to deal mainly
with sailing ships. They proved extremely difficult to catch, and were almost
always able to elude the Northern war-ships. But with no Confederate ports and
coaling stations abroad the Confederate cruisers were bound to be driven,
sooner or later, into neutral harbours for want of coal; and then they could
only depend on the good-will of neutrals, which was wanting so soon as fortune
tinned against the Confederacy on land. The measures taken by the Northern
government to deal with the commerce-destroyers were defective; yet, as the
North was in no sense dependent upon foreign commerce, the government was
probably right in refusing to weaken the blockade of the Southern coast by
detaching war-ships to prevent the destruction of commerce.
The main
lesson of the war is the importance of preparation and organisation. This was
not, it has been justly said, a naval war, as the South did not possess a navy.
“There were three or four cruisers at sea, some of which were captured or
destroyed after having obliterated Northern commerce, and one of which at least
was never captured. There was an extemporised fleet here and there, made up of
anything that came to hand.” There was a want of skilled direction and unity of
control in the actual operations on the part of the North; and, though a fleet
was at last created by the Federal government, it was only after great delay
and enormous and unnecessary waste of money. For their want of forethought the
Northern people had to pay a terrible price both in blood and money; and, if
they had had to deal with an adversary better equipped with engineering
resources, or if that adversary had been able to obtain the help of a European
navy, the Confederacy would probably have survived the conflict.
THE NORTH
DURING THE WAR.
(1) Finance.
While following the development of the Civil War
through the fluctuations of military campaigns, the reader should also note
some of the more important events of civil administration. It was an anomalous
state of affairs that, prior to the beginning of President Lincoln’s term of
office, while the public debt was less than $70,000,000, with the business of
the country in normal activity, and money abundant in private banks, the
national treasury was absolutely empty; and that small government six per cent,
loans were with difficulty negotiated at from ten to twelve per cent, discount.
The Secessionist movement was of course largely responsible for this
depreciation, for upon Lincoln’s announcement that he would maintain the Union,
Salmon P. Chase, the new Secretary of the Treasury, borrowed his first three
millions at 94, and a few days later five millions at par. But the actual
outbreak of hostilities and the Act of the special session of 1861, authorising
a loan of $250,000,000, revolutionised the whole financial position. The
contrast with what had hitherto existed was almost bewildering. Fortunately the
patriotism of the country was by this time fully roused, and the people of the
loyal States had reached a determination to make whatever sacrifices were
necessary in men and in money to maintain the government and put down
rebellion. Congress cheerfully imposed heavy additional taxes, and made ample
appropriations for the military service; and Secretary Chase exhibited both
great ability and courage in his financial management. For a while, public
opinion was sustained by the hope that the war would be short; and before this
hope was destroyed by the heavy reverses in McClellan’s campaign against Richmond,
the people of the North, quick both in perception and intuition, had already
begun to take an enlarged view of the great crisis and its needs, and steeled
their nerves to the acceptance of financial burdens which a year earlier they
would have looked upon as irretrievable ruin.
At the
beginning of December, 1861, Secretary Chase had by various forms of loan
borrowed $197,000,000, and felt obliged to report that the public debt had
reached three hundred millions, and would at the end of the next fiscal year
exceed five hundred millions, as the government was then spending about two
millions each day. The banks had exhausted their resources ; $150,000,000 of
gold had passed from them to the government, and from the government in
disbursements to the people. In such a contingency, heroic measures were
necessary, and a resort to paper-money became imperative. On December 27, 1861,
both the banks and the government by agreement suspended specie payments; and
on February 25,1862, the President signed an Act passed by Congress making
non-interest-bearing Treasury notes a legal tender for all debts except duties
on imports, and in satisfaction of all claims against the government except for
interest upon the public debt, both these exceptions remaining payable in coin.
Both Congress
and the Administration adopted the system with the greatest reluctance as a war
measure; and only $150,000,000 in paper were at first issued. But as the needs
of the Treasury increased day by day, and as fluctuations occurred in other
forms of loans, the legal tender quality was, during the war, authorised to be
applied to various other issues to an aggregate of $1,250,000,000, two-thirds
of which was in Treasury notes, bearing interest at six and at seven and
three-tenths per cent. This authority was, however, used with such discretion
that the highest issue of non-interest-bearing legal tenders at any one time
never exceeded $500,000,000. The same Act which authorised the issue of these “
green-backs,” as they were popularly called on account of their colour, also
provided for funding them by the issue of United States six per cent, bonds,
payable in coin, and redeemable at the pleasure of the government after five
and payable twenty years from date, which received the general designation of “
five-twenties.” These bonds became very popular, because they replaced
non-interest-bearing green-backs with coin-interest-bearing six per cents. The
favour with which they had been received led Secretary Chase into the
experiment of issuing “ ten-forty ” bonds at five per cent, interest, which
signally failed; but the failure was ascribed by him to other causes than the
reduction of interest.
The Treasury
Department also availed itself of various other forms of loans. When in
December, 1861, specie payment was suspended, the needs of local daily traffic
became such that in addition to a general use of postage stamps, the country
was in a few weeks covered with a flood of paper small change issued by
corporations, banks, merchants, and trades-people of all sorts, down to
butchers’ and milk-vendors’ tickets. To drive out these “ shin-plasters,”
Congress authorised the issue of a fractional currency ranging in denominations
of from five to fifty cents, which went immediately into general circulation.
Under the varying
570
Fluctuations in the
price of gold.
[1862-4
needs of the
Treasury, Congress also authorised the use of the public credit in the form of
temporary loan deposits, at five per cent, interest, payable after ten days’
notice; certificates of indebtedness at six per cent, interest to public
creditors; several kinds of Treasury notes with interest at from five to seven
and three-tenths per cent.; coin certificates for deposits of gold and bullion;
and compound interest notes. On January 1, 1866, in which year the end of the
insurrection was officially proclaimed, the public debt of the United States
had risen to $2,773,000,000.
This seemingly
unlimited borrowing, the competition created by the endless government
purchases, and especially the substitution of legal tender paper for coin, was
succeeded by a great inflation of prices; and gold became a favourite commodity
for speculation. The fluctuations of premium in legal tender paper on that
metal ran from par to 5 during January, 1862; from 34 to 60f during January,
1863; from 51£ to 60 during January, 1864; from 97£ to 134£ during January,
1865; and closed at from 44 to 60 during April of that year, which month
brought the war practically to an end. Meanwhile, between these dates it
underwent all sorts of eccentric ups and downs, sometimes under the influence
of military, commercial, or political news, and sometimes for no apparent reason
of any kind.
Two direct
efforts were made by the government to control this gambling in gold, which had
an injurious effect upon both business and finance. Under authority given him
by Congress in March, 1864, Secretary Chase went to New York in person on April
13, and during five successive days sold about $11,000,000 of surplus gold on
hand in the Treasury, bringing down the premium from 89 on the 14th to 65 J on
the 19th. But the remedy proved very transient. Within a week after the sales
were stopped the premium was again almost as high as at their beginning. A new
expedient was tried by the passage, on June 17, of an Act of Congress
prohibiting gold contracts of various kinds under a penalty of fine and
imprisonment. This device proved not only ineffectual but disastrous. The Act
was authoritatively notified to the Stock Exchange on June 21; and gold,
opening that day at 100 premium, had risen by the 30th to 150, in defiance of
the threatened penalties. The announcement that Secretary Chase had finally
resigned sent the premium spasmodically up to 180.
News that
Senator William P. Fessenden was on July 1 appointed his successor quickly
brought down the premium to 155, and on July 2 it closed at 139. By that time
Congress had become convinced of the evil results of the law, and hastily
passed a repealing Act, which was approved by the President on the same day;
but the public fever could not be instantly stilled. Spasmodic fluctuations
again set in, and on July 11 the premium had risen to 185, which was the
highest figure reached during the war. From the end of the war onward, though
1862-5] Change in the banking system.
571
fluctuations
continued, there ensued a gradual diminution of such premium; but it did not
entirely disappear until the resumption of specie payment by the government on
January 1, 1879.
Among other
financial expedients adopted by the government, one of by no means the least
importance was an entire change in the banking system of the United States. In
the year 1862 there were in the loyal States about 1400 banks of issue,
generally organised under the laws of the different States. They were without
any national supervision; there was no authoritative source of information as
to their soundness; there was no general security for their circulation. The
system was subject to the grave evil of almost limitless counterfeiting, the
7000 various kinds of genuine bills being accompanied by about 5000 kinds of
altered, imitated, or spurious notes. Secretary Chase, in his first annual
report of December, 1861, proposed to replace these by a system of national
banks, having for their principal features (1) a circulation of notes bearing a
common impression and authenticated by a common authority; (2) the redemption
of these notes by the associations and institutions to which they might be
delivered; and (3) the security of that redemption by the pledge of United
States stocks and an adequate provision of specie.
The scheme
found little favour when first proposed. It was generally opposed by the State
banks, and only two prominent financiers at first gave it their hearty
approval. But little by little the plan made converts. In his second annual
report of Decemher, 1862, Secretary Chase again urged it upon Congress, and
after exhaustive debates it was embodied in a carefully drawn law, approved by
the President, February 25, 1863. Under its provisions, banks depositing United
States interest-bearing bonds in the Treasury might receive circulating notes,
printed, registered, and countersigned by the Treasury Department, equal to 90
per cent, of the current value of the bonds deposited, which notes were made
receivable in payment of all dues to the United States except duties on
imports, and payable in satisfaction of all demands against the United States
except interest on the public debt. A new office was created, that of
Comptroller of the Currency, one of whose duties was to examine and regulate
the condition of national banks, and enforce the redemption of their
circulation through the sale of their deposited bonds. The details of the
system were greatly elaborated by an amendment to the Act approved June 3,
1864. A still more important and, it may be said, decisive amendment was
approved on March 3, 1865, which, under the constitutional power of Congress to
regulate commerce and the value of coin, laid a tax of 10 per cent, on the
amount of the notes of any State bank, or State banking association paid out by
them after the first day of July, 1866. This tax compelled the retirement oi
all State bank circulation; and State institutions generally transformed
themselves into National Banks. In
1866 the Comptroller was able to report that the
national bank system had superseded all the State systems, and that the entire
control of the currency of the country was in the hands of the Federal
government. Secretary Chase’s original idea of establishing “one sound uniform
circulation of equal value throughout the countiy, upon the foundation of
national credit, combined with private capital,” was thus completely realised.
Put in operation and perfected very gradually, it had but little direct effect
upon the finances of the war; but the change of systems was thereby rendered
much more easy, and created no appreciable derangement of the currency.
(2) Recruiting.
Such had been
the patriotic resolve of the loyal States to put down the rebellion, that
within one year after the opening of hostilities considerably over half a
million volunteers for three years’ service were enlisted in the Unionist
armies. Under this initial impulse, volunteering was still in active progress
throughout the North, when on April 3, 1862, Secretary of War Stanton, becoming
impressed with the belief that the armies were large enough to end the war,
issued a sweeping order to stop recruiting in all the States. There had been
during a few preceding weeks a brilliant succession of Unionist victories, and
still more important ones occurred during the few weeks that followed. But in
May the tide of success began to turn, and the unwisdom of Stanton’s order
quickly became apparent. A resumption of enlistments was ordered early in June;
but, as the recruiting offices had been closed for two months, the efforts of
popular leaders had ceased, and patriotic enthusiasm had been damped to such a
degree that, for a while, it only feebly responded to the renewed efforts of
the authorities. The total failure of McClellan’s Richmond campaign and the
second battle of Bull Run greatly deepened public despondency.
Under this
accumulation of discouragements, the need of speedy reinforcements became so
great that resort to a more temporary expedient seemed necessary; and an order
of the President called upon the governors of the loyal States for a draft of
300,000 men from their State militia to serve for a term of nine months. This
system of drafting proved, however, totally ineffective; and, while the drain
on the army during the summer was substantially made up through the greatly
increased efforts of the governors to fill the quota of 300,000 three-years’
volunteers, which they had tendered the President on July 1, it became evident
that a more regular and general system of recruiting must be adopted.
Accordingly, on March 3, 1863, Congress passed a general conscription law,
requiring all citizens between the ages of 20 and 45 to be enrolled in military
service and called out by draft, as the exigencies
1863] The Conscription Law; violent opposition.
573
of the war
might require. Instead of relying upon the governors and State authorities, as
had been the case under the volunteer system, and the temporary militia draft,
the law provided that it should be enforced by the direct agency of the general
government through a provost- marshal-general and a local provost-marshal in
each Congressional district, aided also by a local board of enrolment.
The passage
of this law through Congress was attended by hot and acrimonious discussion,
the Republicans supporting and the Democrats opposing the measure. Since the
Democratic members denounced the law in Congressional debates as being
unconstitutional and despotic, the Democratic voters in the loyal States,
following the lead of their representatives, generally placed themselves in an
attitude of hostility towards enforcement. This opposition subsequently gave
the government officials not only great annoyance but serious trouble, and
caused a three days’ riot in the city of New York, beginning on July 11, 1863,
in which $2,000,000 worth of property was destroyed and from 600 to 1000
persons, it was estimated, were killed and wounded. Slight disturbances
occurred in several other cities; and in a very few instances provost- marshals
or their deputies were assassinated in country districts. On the whole however
the law was firmly and justly enforced, though frequently mitigated in its
stringency by the fact that active volunteering was carried on concurrently and
greatly promoted by high bounties paid to volunteer recruits, through which
local districts furnishing their required quota of men were enabled to avoid
the draft.
Out of this
opposition to the draft-law grew an incident of national interest. Clement L.
Vallandigham, a Democratic member of Congress from Ohio, carried his
denunciation of the measure to such an extreme in speeches before his
constituents, that General Burnside, at that time in command of the military
department in which the State was included, had him arrested on May 1. Placed
on trial before a military commission, Vallandigham was convicted of having
violated Order No. 38 by “declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the
object and purpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to
suppress an unlawful rebellion,” and was sentenced to military confinement
during the continuance of the war. An application for a writ of habeas carpus was
denied by Judge Leavitt of the United States Circuit Court, on the ground that
the President, under whose military authority, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy, General Bumside acted, is his own sole judge of the power with
which the Constitution invests him, and is amenable for an abuse of his
authority by impeachment only.
President
Lincoln’s judgment was always against arbitrary military measures ; but he felt
that it would be imprudent to annul the action of the general and the military tribunal.
Conformably, however, to a paragraph in Burnside’s Order No. 38, he modified
the sentence by ending the prisoner south beyond the Federal military lines, on
May 25.
Assuming the
attitude of a Confederate prisoner of war, Vallandigham went to Richmond, where
he held a conference with the Confederate authorities, and about a month
afterwards made his way from Wilmington to Bermuda on a blockade-runner, and
from there to Canada, whence he issued an address to the people of Ohio.
Meanwhile the Democratic Convention of that State had met at Columbus on June
11, and, by way of party protest, unanimously nominated Vallandigham as their
candidate for the governorship of Ohio.
The arrest,
trial, banishment, and nomination created a profound sensation throughout the
country, and became a subject of legal and political discussion that for the
time being almost excluded other topics. The resolutions of the Ohio Democratic
State Convention were presented to the President by a large committee of
Vallandigham’s supporters, together with an address arguing the questions
involved, with all the heat and earnestness the incident engendered. A similar
address and resolutions had already been brought to the President by an
influential committee of New York Democrats representing a meeting held at
Albany. Lincoln made written replies to both committees setting forth with
clearness and logic the differing views that animated the two parties to the
controversy. Only so much of his replies need be quoted here as gives the substance
of his interpretation of the Constitution on the power of the President to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, “ when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it.”
“ You ask in
substance, whether I really claim that I may override all the guaranteed rights
of individuals on the plea of conserving the public safety—when I may choose to
say the public safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology
calculated to represent me as struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative,
is either simply a question who shall decide, or an affirmation that nobody
shall decide, what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or
invasion. The Constitution contemplates the question as likely to occur for
decision, but it does not expressly declare who is to decide it. By necessary
implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is to be made, from
time to time; and I think the man whom, for the time, the people have, under
the Constitution, made the Commander-in-Chief of their army and navy is the man
who holds the power, and bears the responsibility of making it. If he uses the
power justly, the same people will probably justify him; if he abuses it, he is
in their hands to be dealt with by all the modes they have reserved to
themselves in the Constitution.”
Of far
greater popular effect, however, than this convincing legal analysis, was the
sympathetic question which the President asked in his reply to the Albany
committee, “Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier-boy who deserts, while I must
not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert ? ” That pointed
query touched the heart of
every parent
who had. a son in the Federal army, while it also described with precision the
character of Vallandigham, who had rendered himself conspicuous as a “ wily
agitator ” in behalf of the South and its action ever since, and even before,
the Presidential election which furnished the pretext for secession. The people
of the State of Ohio returned an emphatic answer at the October election of
1863, in which Vallandigham was defeated for the governorship by a majority of
101,000 votes, 39,000 of which were cast by Ohio soldiers in the field.
In sustaining
General Burnside’s arrest of Vallandigham, President Lincoln had acted not only
within his constitutional, but also strictly within his statutory authority.
The question of his right to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
came up immediately at the beginning of the Secession, at which time he
authorised General Scott and other military officers to order the suspension
within specified limits when it might become necessary. Chief Justice Taney of
the Supreme Court of the United States questioned his right, and, in the case
of ex parte Merryman, filed an opinion denying it. By a law passed on March 3,
1863, after considerable discussion, Congress legalised all orders of this
character made by the President at any time during the present rebellion, and
accorded him full indemnity for all searches, seizures, arrests, or
imprisonments made under his orders. The Act further provided “ that during the
present rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment
the public safety may require it, is authorised to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or any part
thereof.” Under authority of this Act, the President, by proclamation of
September 15, 1863, formally suspended the writ throughout the United States in
cases relating to prisoners of war, spies, aiders or abettors of the enemy, and
deserters, and other cases relating to the military service. Though the terms
of the proclamation were general and comprehensive, the chief object for which
it was issued was to prevent continued appeals to the civil courts for process
to be utilised in hindering or delaying the prompt execution of the Draft Law.
While much public clamour occurred from warm Southern sympathisers and
over-zealous Democratic partisans, the arbitrary power of the President was used
so seldom and with such circumspection both before and after the formal
suspension that neither oppression nor noteworthy public protest arose under
it.
(3) Negotiation
and Intrigue.
Under date of
December 15, 1862, Secretary of State Seward wrote in one of his dispatches: “
the political atmosphere begins to exhibit phenomena indicative of a weariness
of the war, and a desire for peace on both sides.” It was a period of
uncertainty and inaction; to each of
576 Lincoln's dealing with peace overtures. [1862-4
the
contending parties the prospect of decisive victory seemed distant, and the
final issue of the war involved in great doubt. For the moment, public opinion
permitted a freer expression of the hope always latent in many minds that the
burdens and sacrifices of war might be removed; and the expression manifested
itself in the speeches of individuals, the editorials of newspapers, and the
resolutions of meetings, and occasionally even in the debates and proceedings
of both the Federal and Confederate Congresses. As yet, however, such
manifestations were feeble and sporadic in comparison with the great mass of
public sentiment both North and South; and it is worthy of mention here only to
show the manner in which it was dealt with by President Lincoln. A prominent
but somewhat eccentric member of the Democratic party, Fernando Wood, a
representative in Congress, wrote to the President that he had “reliable and
truthful authority” to say that the Southern States would send representatives
to the next Congress, provided that a full and general amnesty should permit
them to do so. He asked further that he might be allowed to hold unofficial
correspondence with Southern leaders on the subject, such correspondence to be
submitted to. the President. Lincoln replied to him under date of December 12,
that he strongly suspected that his information would prove groundless, but
that, if “the people of the Southern States would cease resistance, and would
re-inaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national authority within the limits
of such States under the Constitution of the United States, the war would
cease; and that, if within a reasonable time ‘a full and general amnesty’ were
necessary to such end, it would not be withheld. I do not think it would be
proper now for me to communicate this formally or informally to the people of
the Southern States...nor do I think it proper now to suspend military
operations to try any experiment of negotiation.” Nothing more was heard from
Wood’s “reliable and truthful authority.”
In June,
1863, Alexander H. Stephens, the Confederate VicePresident, became impressed
with the belief that existing military and political conditions might enable
him as a former intimate personal friend of Lincoln to accomplish something in
the way of opening peace negotiations; and Jefferson Davis authorised him to
propose a conference about an exchange of prisoners. Stephens applied to
Admiral Lee at Fortress Monroe for permission to proceed to Washington in his
own steamer in order to deliver a written communication to the President. When
Lincoln received the dispatch in which Admiral Lee forwarded the request, he
himself drafted an answer to be sent by the Secretary of the Navy refusing the
permission, and explaining that military communications would be readily
received through the well understood military channels; adding also, “ of
course nothing else will be received by the President, when offered as in this
case in terms assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate States;
1864]
577
and anything
will be received and carefully considered by him when offered by any
influential person or persons in terms not assuming the independence of the
so-called Confederate States.”
Several other
incidents of this nature occurred in the summer of 1864. In July of that year
an adventurer named Jewett so worked upon the confidence of Horace Greeley,
editor of the New York Tribune, as to induce him to believe that there were
certain Confederate agents in Canada “with full and complete powers for a
peace”; and Greeley in a credulous and pleading letter urged the President to
invite “those now at Niagara to exhibit their credentials and submit their
ultimatum.” While Lincoln utterly disbelieved the good faith or authority of
the pretended emissaries, he felt it necessary to convince Greeley, and
immediately answered him on July 9: “If you can find any person, anywhere,
professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace,
embracing the restoration of the Union, and abandonment of slavery, whatever
else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you, and that if he really
brings such proposition he shall at least have safe-conduct with the paper (and
without publicity, if he chooses) to the point where you shall have met him.
The same if there be two or more persons.”
Greeley
interposed certain trivial objections to taking part himself; but the
President again telegraphed and wrote to him emphatically: “ I was not
expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man, or men....I not only
intend a sincere effort for peace, but I intend that you shall be a personal
witness that it is made.” Finally to leave no room for equivocation or delay,
he sent Major John Hay with the following paper in his own handwriting, which
Major Hay delivered into the hand of one of the Confederate emissaries on the
Canada side of Niagara Falls.
“
Executive Mansion,
Washington,
July 18, 1864.
To whom it
may concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity
of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and <vhich comes by and
with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United
States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the
United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and
collateral points; and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe- conduct
both ways.
ABRAHAM
LINCOLN.”
If the
Confederate agents did not devise, they at least countenanced the imposture by
which the adventurer Jewett drew Greeley, and sought to draw the President,
into a negotiation which on their part was all pretence. They were compelled to
admit that they possessed no powers, and could only allege that they were
acquainted with the views of their government. With this avowal of course all
negotiation was summarily ended. Mr Greeley left Niagara abruptly; and the
President’s
memorandum effectively counteracted the advantage they had hoped to gain
through the influence of their intrigue upon politics and diplomacy.
The
particulars of this Niagara intrigue were fully published in the newspapers,
and acquainted the public with the exact terms on which Lincoln would consent
to peace with the insurrectionary States. Even while it was in progress,
another unauthorised embassy obtained from Jefferson Davis the equally precise
terms upon which alone he as the head of the Confederate government was willing
to agree to the cessation of war. Colonel Jaquess, formerly a Methodist
preacher, now •ommand'-ig an Dlinois regiment in the West, was a man of
somewhat morbid religious enthusiasm, who believed that through his
affiliations with the Methodist Church in the South he could gain the ear, and
work upon the patriotic sympathies, of his fellow-Methodists in the Confederacy,
and persuade them of the hopelessness of their enterprise. In the summer of
1863, General Rosecrans recommended him to President Lincoln as a sincere, if
infatuated apostle, who was at least willing to risk his life in his
self-appointed mission. The President directed that General Rosecrans might
give him an indefinite furlough, but upon the clear and imperative condition
that he should go without any government authority whatever. A brief excursion
into the Confederate lines in 1863 was without result; but, nothing daunted,
Jaquess renewed his experiment in 1864, in company with a literary friend of
his named Gilmore. Proceeding from Fortress Monroe by the route over which the
exchanges of prisoners were carried on, the two amateur envoys were so
fortunate as to make their way with comparatively little difficulty to
Richmond, where they passed the night of July l6, 1864, under close
surveillance at the Spotswood Hotel. Next morning, Sunday, July 17, they asked
for an interview with President Davis, as private citizens having no official
character or authority. After they had been thoroughly cross-questioned by the
Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin, he arranged the desired interview for
them; and, on the same evening they were admitted to a two-hours’ conference
with the Confederate President and Secretary of State. To the entirely unauthorised
as well as utterly impracticable suggestions which they advanced as a method of
adjustment, they received the distinct reply from President Davis “that the
separation of the States was an accomplished fact; that he had no authority to
receive proposals for negotiations except by virtue of his office as President
of an independent Confederacy; and on this basis alone must proposals be made
to him.”
While the
clamour for peace exercised of itself but little political influence, it
counted for something as an addition to the stock of accusations against the
administration of President Lincoln, of which the Democratic party made
unceasing use in its attempt to retrieve its fallen fortunes at the approaching
presidential election. Their
orators and
newspapers declared that, by the terms of the memorandum which he sent to
Niagara, the President was rejecting offers of peace in order to force the
abolition of slavery through a continuation of the war. This allegation, joined
to criticism of the conduct of the war, opposition to the emancipation policy,
denunciations of the Draft Law, outcry against the arrest of Vallandigham, and
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, constituted a somewhat formidable
array of campaign arguments that were employed with an unusual bitterness of
tone and violence of speech. The earnest championship with which the Democrats
of Ohio had devoted themselves to the cause of Vallandigham was, however,
repaid by that inveterate partisan with a most serious injury to the prospects
and chances of his political friends. In June, 1864, he returned from Canada to
the United States in defiance of th6 order of banishment against him, and once
more began to make speeches full of ill-concealed treason against the
government. The authorities took no measures against him, except to direct that
he should be closely watched, rightly judging that his intemperate zeal would
do the Administration more good than harm. When, at the end of August, 1864,
the National Convention of the Democratic party met at Chicago, the prominence
which the Ohio leaders had given Vallandigham secured him the position of
chairman of the Committee on Resolutions. Against the protest of the cooler
heads in the committee he succeeded in embodying in the platform a resolution,
“ That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American
people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment
of war...justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that
immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an
ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at
the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the
Federal Union of the States.”
In view of
the inflexible demand for independence, constantly maintained and so recently
reiterated with emphasis by Jefferson Davis, this resolution meant nothing less
than a surrender of the contest, and an acceptance of disunion. The convention
immediately thereafter nominated General McClellan as the Democratic candidate
for President. The general saw clearly enough that the platform upon which he
was called to stand was fatal to his chances, and he framed his letter of
acceptance in language substantially repudiating the Vallandigham declaration.
His disavowal however had little effect. From that time, aided by Sherman’s
capture of Atlanta, the Republican party was able to maintain a vigorous
aggressive; and the Democratic platform and candidate met signal defeat at the
election of November 8, 1864. The resentment of soldiers in the field,
communicated in letters to their homes, and the actual ballots cast by them,
under the laws of various States, against the ignominious surrender proposed by
the
580
Lincoln on the
conditions of peace.
[1864
Vallandigham
resolution, formed an important and striking feature of the presidential
contest.
Since the
general question of peace and reunion had received so much public discussion
and comment during the summer, and especially during the political campaign of
the autumn months, at the end of which Lincoln was re-elected President, he
restated the problem and its conditions with his usual masterly brevity, and
clearness in his annual message addressed to Congress on December 6, 1864. “The
public purpose to re-establish and maintain the national authority is
unchanged, and, as we believe, unchangeable. The manner of continuing the effort
remains to choose. On careful consideration of , all the evidence accessible,
it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could
result in any good. He would accept nothing short of severance of the
Union—precisely what we will not, and cannot give. His declarations to this
effect are explicit and oft-repeated. He does not attempt to deceive us. He
affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. He cannot voluntarily re-accept the
Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it. Between him and us the issue is
distinct, simple and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war,
and decided by victory. If we yield, we are beaten; if the Southern people fail
him, he is beaten. Either way, it would be the victory and defeat, following war.
What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause is not necessarily
true of those who follow. Although he cannot re-accept the Union, they can.
Some of them, we know, already desire peace and reunion. The, number of such
may increase. They , can, at any moment, have peace simply by laying down their
arms, and submitting to the national authority under the Constitution.”
(4) Abolition
and Compensation.
Secession and
rebellion, devised and begun by the Southern leaders to extend and perpetuate slavery,
proved the most powerful agency for its swift destruction. When Abraham Lincoln
first took the presidential oath, he had no thought that he was destined to
give “the institution" its death-blow. His Inaugural repeated his many
previous declarations that he “had no purpose directly or indirectly to
interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists”; and,
in addition, he expressed his willingness to accept an amendment to the
Constitution which Congress had passed, to the effect that the Federal
government should never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States,
including that of persons held to service. When, however, the States by
secession renounced all constitutional obligations, and when by rebellion
slavery invited battle and reprisal, the “ institution ” naturally became
exposed to all the chances and accidents of war; and from the beginning every
military measure and movement demonstrated its fatal vulnerability.
i86i] The question of slavery forced on by the war.
581
Jefferson
Davis, in his book, “The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” has
asserted that the South did not fight for slavery but for equality. The whole
mass of Secessionist literature, speeches, proclamations, legislative
resolutions and Acts, show this statement to be an error, which is also
demonstrated by the famous speech of Alexander H. Stephens, the Confederate
Vice-President, in which he declared slavery to be the corner-stone of the new
government. 1
Public
opinion in the Free States, realising that slavery had caused the war, readily
indulged the hope that the war might destroy it. In the border Slave States
however, where loyalty predominated, it was a difficult choice that the loyal
slave-owner had to make between the duty of supporting the Constitution, and
the danger of sacrificing his property, alienating his friends, and uprooting
the prejudices of a lifetime. It was this grave alternative which caused the
long political struggle in the interior Slave States, among which Virginia,
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas joined the Confederacy, while Maryland,
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri adhered to the Union.
The question,
.however, did not take this extreme form at the beginning. At the special
session of Congress which met on July 4,
1861, the Republican members, being left by the
war in a majority in both branches, passed, with only four dissenting votes in
each House, the Crittenden resolution, which declared that the war was not
waged to overthrow or interfere with rights or established institutions of
Southern States. While this declaration satisfied political theory, it was
quickly found to be incapable of solving questions of practical military
administration. No sooner were camps established and 'movements begun, than
the Unionist commanders, without pausing to consider slavery as an institution,
found it necessary to deal with two classes of slaves as individuals—slaves
whom Secessionist masters left behind in their flight, and slaves of either
Secessionist or loyal masters who sought refuge as fugitives, and whom Federal
soldiers and officers willingly received to serve them in Federal camps.
In regard to
the first class of cases, General Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe, found
a ready and acceptable course of action. Application was made to him to give
up, under the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law, three negroes who had taken
refuge in his camp. General Butler responded that since Virginia claimed to be
a foreign country, the Fugitive Slave Law could not possibly be in operation
there. He therefore declined to give them up, unless their master would come to
the fort and take the oath of allegiance; which, as a Secessionist, the owner
did not venture to do. A still more pertinent reply is credited to the general
in the same interview. Everywhere in the South, Confederate commanders made
sweeping impressments of negro slaves to dig trenches and build earthworks;
and, citing this practice, Butler declared them to be properly contraband of
war. The judicial equity
of
the decision and the pertinency of the retort were highly appreciated by public
opinion; and, from that time till the end of the war, the term “contraband”
became the popular designation of every negro in military lines. • r
The question
was early brought to the official attention of the government. The Virginia
Peninsula was strongly Secessionist; and a speedy abandonment of neighbouring
plantations followed the gathering of Federal troops at Fortress Monroe. In the
confusion of flight many slaves, dreading to be sold to the extreme South,
managed to escape to the fort, not alone as individuals, but often coming by
whole families; and, a month later, General Butler had under his care 900
negroes, 300 of whom were able-bodied men, the rest being old men, women, and
children. In his report to the Secretary of War the general set forth the
complications involved in the novel problem. What should be done with these
slaves, and what was their legal status? Were they property or men, women, and children?
Were they flotsam and jetsam? Could the United States own slave property ? Was
a slave whose master ran away a fugitive? Might troops harbour negro children,
or must they leave them to starve when they had destroyed all means of
subsistence, or driven off the rebel masters ? Should commandcrs of regiments
or battalions decide whether a black man fled from his master or the master
from him ? How were the free-born to be distinguished ?
Before the
War Department answered these inquiries, a law of Congress, passed at the
special session, confiscated the proprietary rights of slave-owners in such of
their slaves as they permitted or required to be employed in aid of rebellion
or in hostile service; and thereupon the Secretary of War laid down the following
general rules. 1. In States wholly or partly in insurrection, rights to slave
property and service must be subject to military necessity. 2. Military
authorities must obey the Confiscation Act. 8. Claims to such service cannot
saifely be decided by military authority. The general was therefore directed to
employ fugitive slaves in necessary labour, trusting that, on the return of
peace, Congress would compensate loyal masters.
As the war
continued, many larger aggregations of fugitive slaves came under the care and
protection of the Union armies. When the navy captured Port Royal harbour, and
an adjoining sea front thirty miles in extent, comprising the famous Sea Island
Cotton region of South Carolina, nearly ten thousand slaves, whom the flight of
the great cotton planters left destitute, came into the Federal lines. Military
and official organisation provided them with food, shelter, and government
through the whole of the war, employing those capable of labour in gathering
the old and raising new cotton crops, while private charity and volunteer
teachers from Northern cities supplied an element of social control, religious
leadership, and free primary instruction.
The rules for
dealing with masses of fugitive slaves in disloyal districts
i86i] Fugitive slaves.—Frdmont’s
proclamation. 583
could not,
however, be applied to the individual cases of runaways from loyal masters in
the loyal border States; and these instances also became quite common. The
negroes had an irrepressible longing for the freedom, the variety, the
adventure of camp life, while soldiers and officers appreciated not only the
personal service they were able to render as servants, cooks, and teamsters,
but more especially the useful information about local topography and
sentiment, loyal or disloyal, which they were able to impart or obtain. From
first to last there was and remained between the Federal soldier and the
“contraband” a bond of mutual sympathy and help; and, as a rule, the protection
which the former gave the escaping slave in his camp was amply repaid by the
information, concealment, and guidance which the latter afforded the escaping
Unionist prisoner, or the Federal commander in march and battle. When the loyal
Marylander, Kentuckian, or Missourian, who was supporting the government, asked
that his slave should be returned to him, it was impossible to deny his
equitable right. The rule laid down by the War Department therefore was that,
in loyal States, claims to fugitives must be prosecuted through ordinary
judicial proceedings, and be respected alike by military and civil authorities.
Here again, however, the law of military necessity generally baffled the
claimant. The Fugitive Slave Law was difficult of execution under the most
favourable conditions of peace. Under even preliminary conditions of war it
soon became practically obsolete. The treatment of each case had necessarily to
be left to the judgment of each military commander. While Butler therefore, at
Fortress Monroe, was virtually freeing coloured fugitives, Dix at Baltimore was
declaring that “ we have nothing to do with slaves. We are neither
negro-stealers nor negro-catchers.” Sherman and Buell in Kentucky issued
substantially the same orders as Dix, and Halleck in Missouri employed nearly
the same language; while subordinate commanders at the multitude of small posts
and camps found all sorts of pretexts to evade general orders according to
their individual sentiments or wishes. At the very beginning of the war,
President Lincoln was much perplexed by the numerous complaints on this score,
brought to his notice by members of Congress from the loyal Slave States. These
however came to a sudden end after the first defeat at Bull Run. In the
excitement and consternation which that seemingly overwhelming disaster created,
small annoyances were lost sight of. The escape of a Maryland negro from his
master became too trifling a circumstance to be noted in comparison with the
possible danger to the capital or fate of the government; and military
emergency and necessity were accepted by public opinion as the dominating rule
with a better grace than before.
It was not
long before President Lincoln was called upon to deal with the question of
slavery in its larger aspects and relations. Greatly to his surprise and
dissatisfaction, General Fremont, commanding the Department of the West, issued
a proclamation on August 30, 1861,
establishing
martial law throughout the State of Missouri, and containing the radical
provision that the property, real and personal, of Missouri rebels was
“confiscated to the public use...and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby
declared free men.” He also organised a military commission to hear evidence
and issue personal deeds of manumission to such slaves. The language of the
proclamation and the general’s subsequent explanations assigned rather confused
reasons for the step, and gave it the character of merely a local police
regulation. Indeed the circumstances and manner of its promulgation indicated
very clearly that it was a political manoeuvre on the part of the general to
regain the prestige lost by the weakness of his military administration.
The President
decided at once that the measure was not only dangerous on the score of
policy, but that no emergency existed in Missouri to justify it as a military
necessity. He instantly wrote Fremont a private letter, asking him to modify
the order so as to make it conform to the Confiscation Act which Congress had
passed. Fremont, however, refused to make the retractation as of his own
accord, and asked the President to order it publicly, which he accordingly did.
As Fremont
had doubtless expected and hoped, the question of emancipation by military
decree quickly grew into a political issue, in which many radical anti-slaveiy
newspapers and politicians took sides with the general. He became leader of a
Republican faction which loudly criticised the President, though on account of
Fremont’s conspicuous failure as a soldier it did not attain any numerical
importance. Yet, in regard to the final results of the great national drama,
the incident proved a double benefit. Lincoln’s revocation of Fremont’s
proclamation finally decided the hesitating Kentucky conservatives to range
themselves on the side of the Union, and heartily to lend the substantial military
power of their State to the suppression of the rebellion; while the adherents
of Fremont, weak in numbers but active in propagandism, aided materially in the
creation of public opinion which demanded that slavery should be utterly
destroyed.
The inevitable
processes of war soon moved the slavery question forward another step. If the
army undertook to employ negroes in military work at exposed points, must it
not protect them ? and, as a necessary consequence, must it not permit them to
protect themselves, and furnish them with weapons for defence? When an
instruction of the War Department affirming this duty was submitted to the
President, he saw that it was liable to misconstruction by unfriendly critics,
and interlined with his own hand the explanation, “this however not to mean a
general arming of them for military service.” When also, at the beginning of
December, 1861, the President found that Secretary of War Cameron had, without
his knowledge, printed in his annual report an unqualified recommendation to
arm slaves, the President instructed
Cameron to
have the report reprinted, and the radical proposition omitted from it.
Lincoln with
wise forethought was already measuring the hot political conflict of views as
to slavery entertained by men who were equally sincere and equally loyal in
support of the Administration and the war, and was determined not to be led by
either extreme, but to maintain a position from which he might control both.
Giving the subject a very limited and prudent discussion in his annual message
sent to Congress on December 8, 1861, he carefully laid down the following
proposition—one to which the most stubborn conservative could not object, while
at the same time it left a free field for the most radical action to which the
exigences of war might compel him to resort—“The Union must be preserved; and
hence all indispensable means must be employed. We should not be in haste to
determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well
as the disloyal, are indispensable.”
He had
already in his own mind framed a moderate but effectual policy upon which he
hoped to reconcile and unite the opposing views of sincere and honest men. This
was to initiate a system of gradual emancipation, with compensation to the owners
of slaves. In the State of Delaware, where the total population was small, and
slave labour unprofitable, there remained less than 1800 bondmen. The election
of a Republican member of Congress from that State seemed also to indicate a
condition of public opinion favourable to such a reform; Lincoln therefore
drafted a bill providing for the payment of $400 for each slave, in
consideration of which all slaves in Delaware should become free in graduated
classes within 31 years. The President entrusted his scheme to the
representative of that State in Congress; and the latter undertook to commend
it to his political friends, and secure that the bill should be passed by the
Delaware legislature. If such a measure could be passed, the President next
hoped to interest the State of Maryland in a similar project, since there also
the number of slaves had fallen to about 87,000, or the ratio of 1 in 8 of
population. The District of Columbia, with about 3000 slaves, could be freed by
action of Congress; and Missouri and Kentucky might next be appealed to with
good prospect, if so much progress were once made.
But the
President had counted upon too much wisdom and patriotism in the local
statesmen of Delaware. Her parliament of 9 senators and 21 representatives contained
a majority whose zeal for slavery was in inverse proportion to the material
interest of the State in the institution. They scornfully repelled what they
stigmatised as a bribe, and declared * haughtily that Delaware would not
consent by accepting government bonds to guarantee the credit of the United
States.
The
prejudiced opposition of the legislature of Delaware doubtless discouraged
Lincoln from making any appeal to the law-makers of
586
[1862
Maryland,
but did not cause him to abandon his efforts. Turning with more hope to
Congress, on March 6, 1862, he sent to the Senate and House a special message
recommending the adoption of the following joint resolution: “That the United
States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment
of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its
discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced
by such change of system.” “The point is,” he explained, “not that all the
States tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate emancipation,
but that while the offer is equally made to all, the more Northern shall, by
such initiation, make it certain to the more Southern that in no event will the
former ever join the latter in their proposed Confederacy.” With his generous
proposal to compensate slave-owners he joined a prophetic warning.. He repeated
the declaration of his annual message that all indispensable means must be
employed to preserve the Union, adding that it was impossible to foresee all
the incidents and ruin which might attend a continuation of the war. “ Such as
may seem indispensable, or may obviously proirise great efficiency towards
ending the struggle, must and will come.” And replying to certain criticisms of
the expensiveness of his scheme, he showed in letters that less than one half
day’s cost of the war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware, at $400 per
head, and at the same rate, 87 days’ cost of the war would pay for all in Delaware,
Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri. ,
But
Lincoln'did not limit his efforts to mere written messages to Congress. More
perhaps than any previous President, he kept up personal communication with the
members of that body, whose frequent, sometimes daily, visits to the Executive
Mansion were rendered necessary by the various incidents of the war. On two
occasions he invited the members and senators from the border Slave States to
visit him in a body, and in lengthy interviews pressed upon their favourable
consideration his scheme of compensated abolition. The first of these
interviews occurred on March 10, 1862; and the conversation which took place
was substantially reported by one of those present. Repeating the arguments of
his special message, Lincoln further reminded them that the offer was not only
made in good faith, but that it contemplated a thoroughly voluntary action on
both sides. It recognised that emancipation was a subject exclusively under
control of the States, and that his plan left it to their own initiative and
management; that he did not ask an immediate answer from them, but wished them
to take the subject into serious consideration. On the same day the joint
resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives, and promptly passed
by about a two-thirds majority. In the Senate it was debated for some weeks,
but that body also passed it by about the same majority; and it was signed by
the President on April 10.
While the
joint resolution merely pledged the government to a policy, not only the
two-thirds vote, by which it was passed, but further manifestations also showed
the willingness of Congress to carry out that policy in practical legislation.
A joint resolution was introduced in the Senate to grant aid to the States of
Maryland and Delaware; and in the House a select committee on emancipation was
appointed, which reported a comprehensive bill authorising the President to
give compensation at the rate of $300 for each slave, to any one of the States
of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, that might
adopt immediate or gradual emancipation. This was as far as the House could go
until a response came from the States; and no such response followed. In the
next session indeed, a bill appropriating $15,000,000 to aid emancipation in
the State of Missouri was agreed upon, and carried well-nigh through all the
stages of legislative enactment in both houses. But it finally failed, partly
through the press of business in the last days of the session, and partly
through the unyielding opposition of three strongly pro-slavery Missouri
representatives, aided by the obstructive parliamentary tactics of the
Democratic minority. While the loss of property value in slaves in the
Confederate States was a just punishment for their rebellion, the final loss of
property value in slaves in the loyal Slave States is fairly chargeable to the
stubborn conservatism of their people and their statesmen, which refused to
accept the compensation so generously and sincerely offered them by President
Lincoln and Congress.
One practical
measure of relief, however, resulted from the President’s plan. In the District
of Columbia, though the domestic slave-trade had been abolished, slavery still
existed. The subject had formed a bone of contention throughout nearly the
whole history of the government. While liberal men urged the removal of this
stain from the Federal capital, pro-slavery partisans had clung to its
retention with stubborn tenacity, more as an argument than as a practical
advantage. The changes wrought by the war, however, left it neither excuse nor
defender, Congress passed, and on April 16, 1862, the President signed an Act
for the immediate emancipation of slaves in the District of Columbia, with compensation
to owners at the rate of $300 per slave. Mr Lincoln thus had the satisfaction
of assisting in the consummation of a reform for which he had introduced a bill
in the House of Representatives when a member of that body in 1849,
While
President Lincoln was thus energetically pushing his policy of compensated
abolition, the subject of military emancipation was once more brought sharply
into official and popular discussion. On May 9, 1862, Major-General Hunter
issued an order reciting that the Department of the South, which he commanded,
was under martial law, adding: “Slavery and martial law in a free country are
altogether incompatible. The persons in these three States, Georgia, Florida,
and
588
Democratic opposition
to Lincoln.
[l862
South
Carolina, heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared for ever free.” No
political intrigue, but merely a deep sense of moral duty seems to have moved
him to issue the order.
Acrimonious
comments immediately followed its publication, and the President promptly
condemned it. “ No commanding general shall do such a thing upon my
responsibility without consulting me,” he wrote. On May 19, 1862, he published
a proclamation reciting that the government had no knowledge or part in the
issuing of Hunter’s order of emancipation; that neither Hunter nor any other
person had been authorised to emancipate the slaves of any State; and that
Hunter’s order in that respect was altogether void. The President continued: “I
further make it known that whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free,
and whether at any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity
indispensable to the maintenance of the Government to exercise such supposed
power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and
which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the
field. These are totally different questions from those of police regulations
in armies and camps.”
In the same
proclamation he also pointedly called the attention of the loyal Slave States
to his offer of compensated abolition. “ I do not argue,” he said, “ I beseech
you to make the arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to
the signs of the times.” To all sagacious and liberal-minded men the signs were
indeed significant. Everywhere the march of Federal armies was disturbing,
relaxing, abrading the institution. In Congress the most determined resistance
which the Democratic minority and pro-slaveiy conservatives could make had
constantly to give way before the onslaughts of anti-slavery enthusiasts in
debate, and the steady votes of the Republican majority on resolutions and
bills. The subject of slavery touched almost every measure of legislation at
some point. A single year of war had advanced public and parliamentary opinion
more than a whole decade of party politics. The reactionary claims of the
Charleston Convention were consigned to oblivion. The vital Republican issue of
the Fremont and Lincoln presidential campaigns—prohibition of slavery in the
territories—was placed in the statute books as a merely pro forma and
sentimental enactment. The various military laws contained provisions which in
the aggregate amounted to a sweeping confiscation of slave property for almost
all forms of participation in rebellion, and included a virtual repeal of the
Fugitive Slave Law. One section, framed in guarded language, was made
sufficiently elastic to permit even the formation of coloured regiments.
The
conservatives of the border Slave States and the Democratic leaders in the Free
States seemed, however, incapable of comprehending, and unwilling to
acknowledge, this profound transformation of the public thought and will. Too
weak in numbers to resist, they yielded under the
continual
protest that the war ought to be fought without damage to slavery, a theory as
impossible as that snow should not melt under a July sun. Indirectly their
opposition served one useful purpose. It enabled the President to stand midway
between them and the antislavery extremists, and to keep legislation and
administration within prudent and constitutional limits.
Meanwhile
the chances of war were carrying the issue towards an acute and dangerous
crisis. The inspiring victories gained by the Federal arms during the early
months of the year 1862 suddenly ceased; and defeat and disaster seemed to
culminate in McClellan’s despairing dispatch from the peninsula, expressing the
fear that, instead of conquering Richmond, he was about to lose his army. The
President’s call for 300,000 volunteers gave momentary relief to the army and
hope to the country, but, facing the political as well as the military
emergency, he also considered and decided how he would deal with the subject of
slavery. .
On
July 12, 1862, Lincoln for the second time called together the representatives
and senators from the border Slave States, and read to them a carefully
prepared written appeal to accept compensation for slaves in their respective
States. “ Let the States,” said he, “ which are in rebellion see definitely and
certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their
proposed Confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the contest. But you
cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them, so long as
you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States The
incidents of
the war cannot be avoided; if the war continues long, as it must if the object
be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by
mere friction and abrasion—by the' mere incidents of war. It will be gone, and
you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it.” But this appeal, like the former
one, proved substantially barren of result. Twenty members signed a written
address in reply two days after, reiterating their loyalty, but urging a
general plea of nonaction to the President’s request. Nine others promised to
lay the matter before the people of their States. Both the refusal of the
majority, and the non-committal attitude of the others indicated clearly enough
that the plan had no hope of success.
President
Lincoln had doubtless foreseen the failure, for on the following day, July 13,
1862, he confided to two members of the Cabinet his determination to issue a
decree of military emancipation. During a drive with Secretaries Seward and
Welles he introduced the subject, and “dwelt earnestly on the gravity,
importance and delicacy of the movement; said he had given it much thought, and
had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity, absolutely
essential for the salvation of the nation, that we must free the slaves, or be
ourselves subdued.”
Two weeks
later, when Congress had adjourned, and it became necessary to prepare certain
orders under the Confiscation Act, Lincoln read to his Cabinet (July 22, 1862)
his first draft of the preliminary emancipation proclamation. It came as a
surprise to all the members except the two with whom he had conversed about it.
In the impressive tone of a father addressing his children, he told them he
heid not called them together to ask their advice as to issuing it, which he
had resolved upon, but to lay the proclamation before them for their
suggestions. Only two members expressed their unhesitating approval. The others
received it with varying doubt and hesitation. It was Seward, the Secretary of
State, who finally made the decisive suggestion, that it had better be
postponed until it could be issued with the support of military success, instead
of appearing, as would be the case now, under the depressing influence of grave
disasters. “The wisdom of the view,” said Lincoln afterwards, “struck me with
very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the
subject, I had entirely overlooked.” Accordingly the President laid the draft
aside, and waited for victory.
There
followed a dreary period of suspense; for, in that time of intense feeling and
deep anxiety, days counted as weeks. The disastrous campaign of McClellan was
succeeded by the disastrous campaign of Pope, ending in the second defeat at
Bull Run. Popular complaint grew loud, and factious recrimination bitter.
Radicals and Conservatives laid upon each other the burden of all public
calamities; and each party importuned the President to correct the misdeeds of
its opponents. It required all Lincoln’s patience to curb the imprudent zeal of
both. To a citizen of Louisiana, who complained of the enforcement of the
Confiscation Act, he wrote: “ What is done and omitted about slaves,
is
done and omitted on the same military necessity_________ The
rebellion
will never be
suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there will neither help to
do it, nor permit the government to do it without their help....It is for them
to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the government to save them
from losing all. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can to
save the government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination.
I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious
dealing.”
With equal
firmness he restrained the impatience of anti-slavery zeal. Horace Greeley,
editor of the New York Tribune, then perhaps the most influential newspaper in
the United States, printed an open letter to the President, accusing him of
failure to execute the Confiscation Act. In reply, Lincoln also printed an
open letter in the newspapers, under date of August 22, 1862, which in its
skill of dealing with factious fault-finding has probably never been excelled.
“ As to the policy I ‘ seem to be pursuing,’ as you say, I have not meant to
leave anyone in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it in
1862]
Lincoln's emancipation
policy.
591
the shortest
way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored,
the nearer the Union will be to ‘the Union as it was.’ If there be those who
would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do
not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount
object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to
destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I Would do
it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I
could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that.
What I do about slavery and the coloured race, I do because I believe it helps
to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it
would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I
am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing
more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be
errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true
views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and
I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere
could be free.”
(5) Emancipation.
The President
was not only beset by clamours on the score of public policy and constitutional
law, but was also importuned by sincere enthusiasts to decree military
emancipation as a religious duty. His reply to a deputation of Chicago
clergymen, that he did not want to issue a document as inoperative as the
Pope’s Bull against the comet, was merely a figurative protest against their
inopportune urgency; for he had long since decided that such a document would
be inefficacious. He immediately added: “ Understand I raise no objections
against it on legal or constitutional grounds, for, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure
which may best subdue the enemy.”
Four days
afterwards occurred the battle of Antietam, the result of which was for several
days uncertain. As soon as it could be definitely claimed as a victory, the
President called together his Cabinet on Monday, September 22, 1862, and laid
before it the proclamation he had drafted, informing them that the question was
finally decided, that he had formed his own conclusions, and that he only asked
their criticisms to assist in making the document as correct in terms as
possible. Referring to the former Cabinet council upon the same topic, and its
postponement, the President continued: “Ever since then my mind has been much
occupied with this subject, and I have thought, all along, that the time for
acting on it might probably come. I think the
592
time has come
now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition.
The action of the army against the rebels has not been, quite .what I should
have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is
no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I
determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a
proclamation of emanci-* pation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I
said nothing to anyone, but I made the promise to myself, and (hesitating a
little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out and I am going to fulfil
that promise.”
In the
discussion which followed, the Postmaster-General, Blair, while agreeing to
both the principle and policy, urged that the time was still inopportune. The
Secretary of State, Mr Seward, suggested the principal verbal amendment; that
the document should promise to “maintain” as well as “recognise” the freedom of
the enfranchised persons. The President accepted the modification, which gave
the essence of the decree the following form:
“That on the
first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of
a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United
States, shall be then, thenceforward, and for ever free; and the Executive
Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities
thereof, will recognise and maintain the freedom of such persons, or any of
them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.”
In addition
the document contained three other leading proposals and promises: 1. A renewal
of the plan of compensated abolition; 2. A continuance of the effort at
voluntary colonisation; 3. The recommendation of ultimate compensation to loyal
owners. It also contained an express order enjoining upon the military and
naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce the provisions
of the Confiscation and other Acts relating to slaves. The leading newspapers
of the country printed the proclamation in full on the morning of September 23;
and that evening, in reply to a serenade, Mr Lincoln said: “What I did, I did
after a very full deliberation, and under a verv heavy and solemn sense of
responsibility. I can only trust in God I have made no mistake. I shall make no
attempt on this occasion to sustain what I have done or said by any comment. It
is now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, may be, take action
upon it.”
The probable
action of the country and the world had been thought out by the President with
accurate judgment. He had reached, not a highly sanguine, but a thoroughly
hopeful • mental forecast of its effect upon the border Slave States, the army,
the emancipated slaves and general public opinion. A convocation of the
governors of the loyal
States was at
the time in session at Altoona, Pennsylvania, deliberating upon co-operative
measures relating to the war. A few days later they waited upon him in a body
to present a written address, signed by sixteen governors of Free States, and
the governor of West Virginia, which contained among other things a hearty
endorsement of the new emancipation policy; while the governors of New Jersey
and four border Slave States, though declining to endorse the proclamation,
nevertheless heartily concurred in the military and patriotic sentiments of the
address. The only official sign in the army of discontent with the proclamation
was of so negative a character as to produce no impression. General McClellan,
after the final failure of his Richmond campaign, had had the bad taste to
write the President a long letter, tendering advice upon the civil and military
policy of the Administration, and strongly opposing Radical views and action
upon slavery. In the flush of that general’s newspaper popularity a coterie of
Democratic politicians was industriously nursing him as a prospective candidate
for President; and this Harrison’s Landing letter was doubtless intended to
serve as his platform. Had he captured Richmond, the letter might have been
effective; but, writing * after defeat and failure, his desire to place himself
in antagonism to the Administration was so evident, that Lincoln was able to
treat it with the silence it deserved.
Placed again
in command by the President’s generosity, McClellan found himself in an awkward
predicament when the proclamation appeared. Its military character required
official notice. To condemn or approve it would be equally embarrassing, though
his inclinations were decidedly for the former. In a private letter of
September 25,
1862, he wrote, “The President’s late
proclamation, and the continuation of Stanton and Halleck in office, render it
almost impossible for me to retain my commission and self-respect at the same
time." After receiving the advice of his political friends in New York, he
issued on October 7 an order calling attention to the proclamation, deprecating
intemperate discussion of public measures determined upon and declared by the
government, and significantly adding, “ the remedy for political errors, if any
are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls.”
That the
proclamation should add considerable heat to party discussion in the autumn
elections was inevitable. It was roundly denounced by the Democratic leaders
and party, and of course, found little favour in the border Slave States. On
the other hand, the Republicans of the Free States supported it with steady
unanimity. Other exciting topics, the want of military success, and the
anti-slavery legislation of Congress, added to the loud outcry that the
Administration had changed the war for union to a war for abolition, gave the
Democrats the advantage of an aggressive campaign, which increased the
representatives of that party in the House from 44 to 75. They
594 Emancipation adopted in West Virginia. [1862
also
succeeded in electing a governor in the great State of New York, whose stubborn
partisanship gave the administration much annoyance when enforcing the Draft
Law in the following year. Nevertheless, the elections once over, moderate men
who had opposed military emancipation began gradually to accept it as one of
the inevitable events of war, to be submitted to along with its other
calami'iies. In the House of Representatives the Republicans promptly took
measures to defeat a resolution declaring the proclamation to be an
unconstitutional and dangerous war-measure, and, by a test vote of 78 to 51, passed
a resolution sustaining it in strong affirmative terms.
In his annual
message of December 1, 1862, the President once more elaborately discussed and
urgently recommended his policy of compensated emancipation, proposing a
constitutional amendment containing provisions that all slaves who should have
enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war at any time before the end of the
rebellion should remain for ever free; but that all loyal owners, and all
States which should abolish the institution before 1900, should receive
compensation from the United States. While this recommendation did not take
effect in legislation, the strong logic of the President’s argument and the
fervency of his exhortation in favour of shortening the war, and dividing its
necessary sacrifices between the people of both sections, made a powerful
impression upon the public mind, preparing the country for the final military
decree of which the September proclamation was the preliminary announcement.
Meanwhile as
a joint result of war, congressional legislation, and executive action, the
first step in actual emancipation took place. Loyal West Virginia, having by
the spontaneous movement of her people repudiated secession, formed a new State
and adopted a constitution, and applied for admission to the Union. Congress
accepted all the provisions of the new constitution which she presented, except
that relating to slaves, which was a simple prohibition against their being
brought into the State for permanent residence. By way of insisting on a more
radical reform, Congress embodied in its Act to admit the new State a condition
precedent requiring it to adopt a system of gradual emancipation to begin on
July 4, 1863; slave children bom thereafter to be free, slaves under ten years
of age to become free at twenty-one, and slaves under twenty-one to become free
at twenty-five. The Senate passed the Act on July 14, 1862, and the House at
the next session, on December 10, 1862. The constitutionality of this Act of
Admission was thoroughly discussed by President Lincoln’s Cabinet in written
opinions, during the last week of December; and the President signed it on the
31st. In due time West Virginia accepted the system of gradual emancipation
imposed by Congress; and the State was admitted on June 20, 1863. Finally,
under the impulse of the growing spirit of progress, the system of
gradual
emancipation prescribed by Congress was terminated by the immediate abolition
of “the institution” under an Act of the West Virginia legislature passed three
days after the adoption of the XIHth Amendment by Congress.
The year 1862
had drawn to its dose; the period fixed by the President’s September
proclamation, warning the country that an emancipation decree would follow
unless rebellion ceased, had expired; but the Confederate States gave no sign
of repentance, and offered no diminution of hostility; nor was there any
indication of willingness to give up slavery and receive the money equivalent
tendered. President Lincoln was not, however, the man to recede from his public
announcement, and on January 1, 1863, he signed the final Edict of Freedom,
the details of which he had carefully discussed with his Cabinet on the
preceding day. The essential paragraphs of the proclamation read as follows.
“ Now,
therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the
power in me vested as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government
of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war-measure for suppressing
said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to
do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of 100 days from the day first
above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein
the people thereof, respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United
States, the following, to wit:
“Arkansas,
Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St
John, St Charles, St James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, La Fourche, St
Mary, St Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except
the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of
Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and
Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted
parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not
issued.
“ And by
virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that
all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States
are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the executive government of the
United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will
recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.”
The
proclamation also contained pne other feature of immense importance not before
publicly announced. It was contained in the following paragraph: “And I further
declare and make known that
596
Negro soldiers in the
Northern armies. [1862-3
such persons
of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United
States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man
vessels of all sorts in said service.”
While Lincoln
had hitherto discouraged the formation of negro regiments for use in active
campaigns, and while two or three tentative experiments to put arms into their
hands to strengthen the local defence of the Port Royal cotton fields and the
sugar plantations adjacent to New Orleans had proved unsuccessful, the purpose
of eventually making the negroes a military resource had long been entertained
by him, and was indeed one of the principal reasons for adopting the policy of
military emancipation. So far back as July, 1862, when the collapse of
McClellan’s Richmond campaign had forced the President to make an anxious
forecast of the future military struggle, he had indicated in a conversation
his determination to use the great and decisive element of military strength
which lay as yet untouched and unappropriated in the slave population of the
South. The reasons which then existed against it—prejudice on the part of the
whites, and the want of a motive on the part of the blacks—were removed, the
first by the stress of war, the second by the two proclamations of freedom.
Thereafter the government urgently pushed the formation of negro regiments
among the Southern blacks; and before the end of the war 150,000 of their
number carried bayonets in the Unionist armies, and worthily vindicated their
right to freedom by bravery in battle.
The fondness
of Southern politicians and statesmen for redundant and florid rhetoric was
aggravated by the passions of the Civil War into a hot and vindictive
intemperance of language with which, in their official correspondence and State
papers, they ascribed the meanest motives and most shocking excesses to. their
antagonists. The Confederate President, followed by some of the leading
generals, could hardly find phrases sufficiently strong to express their
feelings. They accused the North of conducting the war in a “cruel,”
“barbarous,” “merciless,” “ inhuman ” manner. This violence of language came
to a climax whenever it touched the subject of negro soldiers. Forgetting their
own wholesale use of slaves in various military labours, they affected to feel
surprise and horror when Unionist commanders began to organise them for local
defence. “The best authenticated newspapers received from the United States,”
wrote General Lee, “ announce as a fact that Major-General Hunter has armed
slaves for the murder of their masters, and has thus done all in his power to
inaugurate a servile war, which is worse than that of the savage, inasmuch as
it superadds other horrors to the indiscriminate slaughter of ages, sexes, and
conditions.” The Confederate War Department issued a general order that
officers organising negro soldiers should be subject, if captured, to execution
as felons. General Butler’s earliest effort to repeat what the Confederates
themselves had done in New Orleans to organise a regiment, not of slaves,
but of free
mulattos, was thus set forth in a proclamation of outlawry by the Confederate
President: “African slaves have not only been incited to insurrection by every
licence and encouragement, but numbers of them have actually been armed for a
servile war—a war in its nature far exceeding the horrors and most merciless
atrocities of savages.” In a similar temper Jefferson Davis, in his annual
message, commented upon President Lincoln’s final proclamation of emancipation.
“ Our own detestation of those who have attempted the most execrable measure
recorded in the history of guilty man is tempered by profound contempt for the
impotent rage which it discloses ”; and he threatened with dire punishment
officers executing the decree.
It is worthy
of historical record that in the tremendous change which transferred four
millions of Africans from bondage to freedom, none of these dreadful
consequences happened. The Southern people had for half a century groaned and
trembled under the nightmare of a general slave insurrection; and it was not
unnatural that the Civil War should double this dread. But the suffering and
destruction inseparable from war were not aggravated by any inhuman excesses on
the part of the freed people, armed or unarmed. The only serious violation of
the laws of war was committed by white Confederate soldiers at the massacre of
Fort Pillow. This caused President Lincoln to issue an order of retaliation,
but his humane and forgiving spirit permitted it to lapse.
The action of
Lincoln in freeing the United States from the institution of African slavery
falls naturally into two periods. The first extends from the re-affirmation, in
his inaugural address, of the doctrines of the Chicago platform to the final
emancipation proclamation; the second from that military decree, which annulled
the proprietary rights of rebellious masters, to the XIHth Amendment
obliterating slavery from the national jurisdiction. The edict of freedom left
the “institution” untouched in a few territorial fragments of Louisiana and
Virginia, and in the loyal States of Delaware, West Virginia, Maryland,
Kentucky, and Missouri. But an aggressive public spirit of reform had been
generated during the first period, which now added its impulse to the stem
decree of the final proclamation. The war had everywhere rudely disturbed the
relation of master and slave, wakening the nation from the old life to fresher
aspirations. The advantages of the Free States in intellectual energy and
material prosperity were strongly brought into light by the trying struggle.
The discussion of emancipation merged gradually into an acceptance of the idea,
and a hope of its fulfilment. Considerable portions of the Secessionist States
of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee came and remained under control of the
Unionist armies; and the loyal element of the population, repressed under the
terrorism of Secession, saw its best hope for ascendancy and domination, and
the firm adherence of
598
Reconstruction and
Emancipation.
[1863-4
the State to
the Union, in the complete local destruction of the old order of things. To
foster this political regeneration, President Lincoln, acting through his
military governors and local commanders appointed to restore and supplement the
civil administration subverted by secession, suggested, aided, and promoted
the movements to reorganise loyal State governments and adopt new State
constitutions by which slavery should be prohibited.
Since these
three States differed greatly in respect to existing military conditions and
local political sentiment, the President, on December 8, 1863, issued a general
proclamation of amnesty and reconstruction, granting to all except certain
specified classes, on taking a prescribed oath of allegiance, pardon and
restoration of rights of property, except as to slaves, and authorising one-tenth
of the legal voters of any seceding State to re-establish a loyal State
government, which would be recognised by the executive. In his accompanying
annual message, he remarked further that “By the proclamation the plan is
presented which may be accepted by them as a rallying point, and which they are
assured in advance will not be rejected
here Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if
presented in
a specified
way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way.” Under the
terms of this proclamation, Arkansas and Louisiana organised State governments
and adopted new constitutions prohibiting slavery, mainly during the year 1864;
Tennessee, where more serious military obstacles prevailed, reached the same
result early in 1865; while in the loyal border Slave States of Maryland and
Missouri the regular political action of their people worked out the same
constitutional reform at about the same dates. Congress, however, displayed
considerable reluctance to recognise these “ ten per cent. States ” reorganised
under the plan of the President, and to approve the admission of their senators
and representatives to seats. Discussion of various theories engendered some
factional heat among Republican senators and representatives; but the President
carefully avoided the formation of any practical legislative issue on the
subject. It was only in the succeeding administration of President Johnson that
the divergence developed into bitter antagonism and led to a long constitutional
struggle between the executive powers of the Administration and the legislative
powers of Congress.
Meanwhile,
however, a yet more radical and far-reaching movement for the complete
extinction of slavery was in progress. With the year 1864 came again the
quadrennial election of a President of the United States. While the failures of
campaigns, the rivalries of generals, and the fierce criticisms of the
opposition minority in Congress had created a certain disaffection among a few
Republican politicians towards Lincoln’s administration, the people at large
recognised and appreciated the unselfish devotion, sagacity and tact which he
had displayed in
1864]
The Thirteenth
Amendment proposed. 599
the conduct
of the war, and turned to him with great confidence as the fittest man to
nominate for the next presidential term, both on account of his remarkable
qualities of statesmanship and because the experience he had gained would
enable him better than any other to carry the struggle for national life and
freedom to a successful issue. The feeble intrigues of Secretary Chase and
General Fremont to supplant him in his own party suffered an early blight. In
the national convention of the Republican party, held at Baltimore on June 7,
1864, the roll-call on nomination showed an undivided vote for Abraham Lincoln
in every State delegation except that of Missouri, which, under instructions,
gave its first ballot to Grant, but immediately changed and made Lincoln’s
nomination unanimous.
While
Lincoln’s prudent but tactful management of the slavery question in the past
had been perhaps the most influential cause of this unanimity, his counsel and
influence were already shaping the final solution of this most perplexing
problem of national destiny. In the preceding session of Congress a joint
resolution had been introduced, perfected, and passed in the Senate, proposing
the Xlllth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, viz.: “ Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.” In the House of Representatives,
however, the party attitude of members was such that the necessary two-thirds
vote could not then be obtained for it, and it went over as unfinished
business.
But
Congressional and legislative discussion had advanced public opinion to a point
which found emphatic expression in the Republican National Convention. The
preliminary speeches foreshadowed the declaration embodied in the third
resolution of the platform, which approved all the Acts hitherto directed
against the “institution,” and declared in favour of an amendment to the
Constitution terminating and for ever prohibiting the existence of slavery in
the United States. To the Committee that notified him of his nomination,
Lincoln gave a special and hearty approval of this resolution of the platform.
“Such an amendment,” said he, “to the Constitution, as is now proposed, became
a fitting and necessary conclusion to the final success of the Union cause.
Such alone can meet and cover all cavils. Now the unconditional Union men,
north and south, perceive its importance and embrace it. In the joint names of
Liberty and Union let us labour to give it legal form and practical effect.”
And to a friend in confidential conversation he remarked that it was he who
had suggested to Senator Morgan to put the subject into his opening speech when
he called the Convention to order.
In his annual
message of December 6, 1864, President Lincoln argued with emphasis in favour
of completing the enactment of the
XHIth
Amendment. “Although the present is the same Congress,” said he, “and nearly
the same members, and without questioning the wisdom or patriotism of those who
stood in opposition, I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage of
the measure at the present session. Of course the abstract question is not
changed, but an intervening election shows almost certainly that the next
Congress will pass the measure if this does not....It is the voice of the
people, now for the first time heard upon the question.”
The people
had indeed spoken with marked emphasis. The singular misconceptions of correct
national policy, in which the Democratic party had so long allied itself with
the pro-slavery interests of the South, carried the mass of its adherents into
equally grave blunders of party action during the war. A few sagacious leaders,
such as Douglas, Holt, Dix, Butler, Logan, and many of the rank and file, were
inspired by a freer and fresher patriotism, and gave hearty assistance to Union
and freedom. But the Democratic party as an organisation stubbornly nursed its
engrained prejudices, and remained in criticising, obstructing opposition;
while a few misguided members of the party attained unenviable notoriety by
straining that opposition to an almost open partisanship with Secession. Having
opposed both emancipation and the Draft Law, their National Convention could
do no better than nominate General McClellan as their candidate for President
against Lincoln, and then overweight his faded popularity and blighted military
laurels with a platform resolution declaring the war a failure. This compelled
McClellan while accepting the nomination to repudiate the platform ; and in
this awkward predicament the Democratic ticket went to disastrous defeat at
the November polls. Lincoln was triumphantly chosen by 212 electoral votes
against 21 for McClellan; while the House of Representatives was reinforced
with a strong Republican majority.
This decisive
voice of the people had been largely stimulated by the decisive work of the
army. Grant, in a series of sternly contested but successful battles, had moved
from the Wilderness through Virginia with an irresistible steadiness, and now
held Richmond and Petersburg in an iron grip. Sherman had swept in a victorious
march from Chattanooga through Georgia, and had Savannah practically in his
grasp. Early’s raid on Washington had been repulsed; and Sheridan had cleared
the Shenandoah Valley. All the omens indicated the early collapse of the
Confederate government.
It was under
these brightening prospects, which gave the President’s words of recommendation
an overpowering weight, that, in the second session of the thirty-eighth
Congress, the House of Representatives returned to the unfinished XHIth
Amendment passed by the Senate in the previous session. The question was taken
up about the middle of December, and debated at intervals for six weeks with
unusual seriousness,
1865]
Compensation
proposed but rejected. 601
the
Republicans favouring, the Democrats opposing, the proposal. Gradually the
latter yielded to the logic of events; and in the final vote, taken on January
31, 1865, a sufficient number of liberal men, among both the Democratic members
and those representing the border Slave States, united with the Republicans in
passing the Joint Resolution by the two-thirds majority required by the
Constitution. The formal ratification of the amendment by three-fourths of the
States was begun by Illinois on the following day, February 1, and completed
within the year; and on December 18, 1865, official proclamation was made that
it had become valid as a part of the Constitution of the United States.
On February
3, 1865, three days after the House of Representatives had passed the Xlllth
Amendment, President Lincoln and Secretary Seward, as elsewhere related, met
the Confederate Commissioners at the Hampton Roads conference, in which the
subject of emancipation was earnestly reviewed. The President repeated with
emphasis that while he would never change or modify his proclamation, he had
issued it only as a necessary war-measure to maintain the Union. He believed,
however, that the people of the North were as responsible for slavery as the
people of the South, and if the war should then cease with the voluntary
abolition of slavery by the States, he individually should be in favour of the
government paying the owners a fair indemnity for their loss; and he added
further that he believed this feeling was widely prevalent in the North.
Immediately
upon his return from the Hampton Roads conference to Washington, at a Cabinet
Meeting held on February 5, the President submitted to his constitutional
advisers a message addressed to Congress, recommending that that body should
pass a joint resolution offering the Slave States a compensation of
$400,000,000, upon condition that all rebellion should cease, before April 1,
half the sum to be paid at that date, and the other half as soon as the Xlllth
Amendment should become valid constitutional law, by the ratification of the
requisite number of States. The proposition was, however, disapproved by the
whole Cabinet; and the President, in evident surprise and sorrow at the want of
statesmanlike liberality shown by his executive council, folded and laid away
the draft of his message. Notwithstanding the radical disagreement, his mind
strongly retained the generous impulse. “How long will the war last?” he asked,
and when no one replied he answered himself, “A hundred days. We are spending
now in carrying on the war $3,000,000 a day, which will amount to all this
money, besides all the lives.” With a deep sigh he added, “But you are all
opposed to me, and I will not send the message.”
It is fair to
infer that, even after this, he still clung to the hope that an opportunity
would arise when he might make some such goodwill offering to the South. In
his last public address, on the evening
602 Lincoln on slavery as the cause of the war.
[1862
of April 11,
after a discussion of questions of reconstruction, he used these significant
words: “ In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to
make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and
shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will be proper.”
With what
earnest solicitude President Lincoln had, during four years, traced out the
causes and consequences of the great national transformation from slavery to
freedom—with what high purpose and under what solemn sense of responsibility he
had wrought and guided the grand act of liberation to success and fulfilment
can, after all, be best understood from the words of his second Inaugural
Address, in which he applied the eternal law of compensation to the sin and the
atonement of American slaveiy. Premising that “the institution” was the origin
of the civil conflict, he concluded: “ Neither party expected for the war the
magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated
that the cause of the conflict might cease with or even before the conflict
should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental
and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each
invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare
to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other
men’s faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both
could not be answered: that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has
His own purposes. ‘ Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs
be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh.’ If we
shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offences which, in the
providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His
appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and
South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence came,
shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the
believers in a living God always ascribe to Him ? Fondly do we hope—fervently
do we pray—that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God
wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondman’s two hundred
and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until eveiy drop of blood
drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn by the sword, as was said
three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, ‘ The judgments of the Lord
are true and righteous altogether.’
“With malice
toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us
to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the
nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his
widow, and his orphan— to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and
lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.”
THE SOUTH
DURING THE WAR.
(1861—1865.)
The secession of the Southern States and the
formation of the Confederacy were events for which the previous political
history of the United States had laid the foundation. When the movement
culminated in the winter of 1860-1 the Southerners acted promptly, with
decision, and with increasing unanimity of feeling. South Carolina seceded from
the Union on December 20, 1860; Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana
followed suit during January; Virginia, Arkansas, and North Carolina delayed
till May, Tennessee till June, 1861. The decided action taken by President
Lincoln as a result of the attack on Fort Sumter on April 11 turned the scale
in the doubtful States. The Montgomery Convention met on February 4, 1861, and
included delegates from all the above States except from Virginia, Arkansas,
and Tennessee. In four days a provisional constitution was drawn up and
adopted. On February 9 the Convention elected Jefferson Davis President and
Alexander H. Stephens Vice-President of the new Confederacy. They assumed
office on the 18th. Before adjourning, the Congress, beside passing the necessary
revenue measures, adopted on March 11, 1861, a permanent constitution, which
was formally ratified by the legislatures of the eleven States concerned, and
in all cases by large majorities.
The prominent
candidates for the Presidency had been Jefferson Davis, Alexander H. Stephens,
and Robert Toombs. Of these, Davis and Toombs had been, at Washington and in
their respective States, Mississippi and Georgia, outspoken and extreme
advocates of States rights, and strongly favoured secession. Davis, after
graduating at West Point in 1828, and holding a commission in the United States
army for seven years, and again during the Mexican war, settled in Mississippi
as a cotton-planter. From 1845 to 1846 and from 1847 to the outbreak of the war
he was at Washington, first in the House of Representatives, then, from 1847 to
1851, and again from 1857 to 1861, in the Senate; while from 1852 to 1857 he
was Secretary of War. While President of the Confederacy he did not excel as a
statesman or
financier, though he devoted himself with energy and self-effacement to the
hopeless task of winning independence for the South. Elected to his office in
order to carry out the views of the extreme secessionists, he lacked the hearty
support of the more moderate advocates of Southern rights, such as his own
Vice-President, and aroused the bitter opposition of a small party in the
Congress, a prominent spokesman of which was Henry S. Foote, representative
from Tennessee, formerly, like Davis, a United States senator from Mississippi,
and in 1852 the successful opponent to Davis in his candidacy for the
governorship of that State. As head of a government that had necessarily to
become a military despotism, despite the theory of State sovereignty upon which
it was avowedly based, Davis aroused the active hostility of various State
governments in the person of their governors. After the war he was indicted for
treason, but the case was “nolled” in 1868. He died in 1889.
Alexander H.
Stephens, like Davis, brought to his office an intimate acquaintance with the
Federal government, having represented Georgia in Congress at Washington from
1843 to 1859. Before and after his election to the Vice-Presidency he differed
with Davis on the fundamental question of States rights. In the Confederate
government he played an unimportant part, except for the sanction, if not encouragement,
that he gave to the Georgia peace party, which became prominent in 1864, and
demanded a speedy termination of the war, even at the cost of Southern
autonomy. After the war Stephens again appeared in the political field, first
in the United States Congress, then as Governor of Georgia.
In Davis’
Cabinet, Judah P. Benjamin and Bobert Toombs were men of distinction. Both had
been members of the United States Congress, and were uncompromising champions
of the Southern cause. Benjamin held various Confederate Cabinet positions, and
was Secretary of State during three years. Toombs was the President’s choice
for the Treasury portfolio; but Davis yielded to South Carolina’s claims for
recognition, and offered Toombs the Secretaryship of State, which he held till
his appointment to a military command. The Secretary of the Treasury, C. G.
Memminger, was quite unknown in national politics. He had had some experience
in public matters as a member of the South Carolina legislature, but brought to
his important office a very slight acquaintance with financial questions, and
small ability to diagnose the difficulties which confronted the Confederate
Treasury, and to suggest proper remedies. Memminger’s successor, George A.
Trenholm of Charleston, to whom he yielded his office in July, 1864, was of a
different stamp, a keen and active cotton-merchant, who had been on intimate
terms with the Treasury Department owing to his interest and success in
blockade-running. Among other members of the Cabinet may be mentioned the two
leading Secretaries of War,
G. W.
Randolph and James E. Seddon of Virginia; the Secretary of the Navy, S. R.
Mallory of Florida; and the Postmaster-General, John R. Regan of Texas, the
last survivor of the Confederate Cabinet.
The three
Congresses of the Confederacy—the Provisional Congress sitting from February 4,
1861, to February 18, 1862; the first Permanent Congress, from February 22,
1862, to February 18, 1863, and the second Permanent Congress, from May 2,
1864, to March 18, 1865—were made up to a considerable extent of former members
of the United States Congress. Of these Howell Cobb was perhaps the most
distinguished. He had been the Speaker of the House during the thirty-first
Congress, then Governor of Georgia, later in the Federal Congress again, and
then in President Buchanan’s Cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury till the
culmination of the Secession movement. He served as Speaker of the Provisional Congress
of the Confederacy, and afterwards in the field, though he saw little service.
Other men of mark in the Confederate Congresses were: Robert W. Barnwell, an
extreme secessionist; J. L. M. Curry of Alabama, a former member of his State
legislature and of the United States Congress; he subsequently served in the
Southern army, after the war became prominent in educational matters, and,
under President Cleveland, was minister to Spain; William L. Yancey, another
extremist, till his death in 1863 senator from Alabama; Benjamin H. Hill and
Augustus H. Keenan of Georgia, representing the moderates; senator James L. Orr
of South Carolina, also representing the moderate champions of the South; John
A. Campbell, before the war an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, and later an Assistant Secretary of War under the Confederacy, and a
member of the ineffective Peace Convention of February, 1865; and Duncan F.
Kenner of Louisiana, a prominent member of the Ways and Means Committee.
Outside the Congress a few names are worthy of mention: those of Judge Andrew
G. Magrath of the Confederate Court in South Carolina, which dealt with many
important constitutional questions; of Governor Zebulon B. Vance of North
Carolina, and Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, both of whom were prominent in the
conflict between the State and central authorities; of William W. Holden, an
unsuccessful candidate for the governorship of North Carolina in 1864, when he
headed the peace party; and of E. A. Pollard, journalist and historian,
principal editor of the Richmond Examiner, and a bitter critic of the Davis
Administration.
In their
provisional and permanent Constitutions—the latter of which came into effect on
February 22, 1862—the Southerners took the opportunity to emphasise their
position in the great political controversies of previous years, and also to
correct certain supposed defects of the United States Constitution, which
document they otherwise faithfully copied. The Southern view of the rights of
the individual States was embodied in the preamble and in various other
sections of both
Constitutions
; and great stress was laid upon the delegation of powers to the central
government by the “ Sovereign and Independent States ” composing the
Confederation. For instance, a Confederate official acting within a State could
be impeached by a two-thirds majority of the particular State legislature—a
provision quite unknown to the United States Constitution. Moreover, in the
provisional Constitution the State officials were not bound by oath to support
the Confederate Constitution.
The framers
of the Confederate Constitutions, unlike the men of 1787, felt no scruples
about the use of the word “slave,” and, in addition to recognising distinctly
the legitimate existence of slavery, they explicitly forbade the Confederate,
State, and Territorial legislatures to enact laws impairing or denying the
right of property in negro slaves. The Constitutions took similar ground
against protective tariff legislation, under which the South had in previous
years been an unwilling sufferer. It was provided that no bounties should be
paid, and no taxes levied, for the benefit of any branch of industry. In
compliance with this principle the Congress drew up a tariff on the lines of
those of 1846 and 1857, which had been framed by Democratic Congresses, and in
marked contrast with the Morrill Tariff of 1861, framed by and in the interest
of the North. The rates of duty were avowedly devoid of any protective motive,
though in the case of sugar, a product of the South, the comparatively high
duty of 20 per cent, suggests some leaning in that direction. Indeed, the
constitutional prohibition of protective legislation did not prevent the South
from developing a strong protectionist sentiment—a result common to most wars.
The blockade came to be looked upon by some as a blessing in disguise, in that
it roused the South to the necessity of fostering its own industrial resources.
In fact, just as happened in New England during the war of 1812, manufacturing concerns
of various kinds were established in the South during the Civil War; and
resentment of the South’s industrial rather than of its political dependence
upon the North was very general.
Memminger
planned to raise 25 millions of dollars during the first fiscal year from
import duties averaging 12| per cent. No such revenue was obtained; in fact,
during the four years of the war only about one million in specie was collected
in this way. This source of revenue was cut off by the efficiency of the Federal
blockading fleet. Owing to the same cause export duties yielded a quite
insignificant sum. The Constitutions allowed the imposition of such a tax; and
great things were expected from the cotton export duty of one eighth of a cent
per lb. But so little cotton escaped the vigilance of the blockading fleet that
during the period 1861-5 not much more than $6000 in specie were collected by
means of this tax.
With a view
to preventing legislation favourable to one section at the expense of another,
the Constitutions forbade the appropriation
of public
money for internal improvements except for aids to navigation, such as the
maintenance of lighthouses and the removal of obstructions; and even in these
cases corresponding taxes upon the navigation facilitated were called for.
Similarly, the expenditure of public money for the benefit of a part of the
people was forbidden by the constitutional requirement that after March 1,
1863, the Post-Office should be selfsupporting. A surplus revenue in that
department was actually secured by adopting high postal rates, while the volume
of business it transacted was relatively small.
The
provisions regarding the issue of paper-money as legal tender were the same in
the Constitutions of the North and the South, except that in the permanent
Confederate Constitution the States were not prohibited from issuing bills of
credit, though the prohibition against making anything but gold and silver a
tender in payment of debts was left unchanged. Both belligerents had therefore
to deal with a similar question touching the constitutionality of legal tender
paper-money. In the North the Act of February, 1862, authorising an issue of
legal tender paper-money, was sustained by the Supreme Court in later years; in
the South the generally accepted theory of constitutional interpretation
prevented the passing of any similar measure. Pressure was frequently brought
to bear on the Congress to pass a legal tender law; the same arguments were
used that proved effective in Federal legislation , it was called a war
measure, and a proper check upon the disloyal noteholders who were discrediting
the government by circulating its notes at a discount. E. A. Pollard in
particular urged the adoption of the measure; but the majority in the Congress,
and among them the leading members, as well as the leading executive officers,
opposed it. President Davis would doubtless have vetoed such a bill; and
Memminger clearly defined his views on the constitutionality and the expediency
of the measure, in marked contrast with the equivocal position taken by the
Secretary of the Federal Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, under similar
circumstances. The State legislatures did not feel the same scruples about the
constitutionality of legal tender laws, and passed many such measures, as well
as other Acts intended to compel the unwilling creditors to accept Confederate
or State notes.
The
Confederate Constitutions made some noticeable changes in the direction of
increasing the powers of the President, and diminishing those of the Congress,
but, strangely, not with a view to the impending war. The increase in the
President’s powers had solely in view his position in time of peace. To prevent
the long-established practice of legislative “log-rolling” he was empowered to
veto particular appropriations and approve others in the same bill—a'
constitutional change still favoured by many, and frequently adopted in recent
State constitutions. The term of office for both President and Vice-President
was lengthened from four to seven years; and they were declared ineligible for
a second
term—a change
also generally approved as tending to promote administrative stability and the
development of a pronounced policy, and reducing the number of occasions for
political excitement and consequent derangement of business due to presidential
elections.
The members
of the Cabinet were also given nominally greater power. They were allowed a
seat in either House with the right to discuss measures pertaining to their
several Departments. This was a radical change from the old order, and aimed at
copying the British system of a responsible ministry, which Stephens was
anxious to adopt without qualification. The necessary legislation to carry out
this provision of the Confederate Constitution was never passed; and apparently
neither the Congress nor the Cabinet was anxious to venture on the experiment.
In another direction the powers of heads of Departments were greatly increased
and those of the Congress correspondingly diminished, namely, by the provision
that an appropriation could be voted only by a two-thirds majority, unless
asked for by the head of a Department. Such a provision, if in force in time of
peace, would radically change the character of Congressional government in the
United States, possibly in the direction of economy and better fiscal good
order. In time of war it had little if any effect, as the appropriations were
voted on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Treasury without much
scrutiny, and no rival districts or sections were concerned in securing a share
of them. Another constitutional provision, which aimed at improving the
character of legislation, required every law to relate to but one subject, and
that subject to be expressed in the title of the law—a favourite device for
blocking ill-advised and confused legislation, but one which was never applied
in the history of the Confederate States, as all important laws covered a large
variety of subjects, few of which could be expressed in their titles.
The war
powers of the executive as well as of the legislative branches of the
government, namely, the right to declare martial law, to conscribe, to call out
the State militia, and to impress goods for the use of the army, were all left
unchanged by the Confederate Constitutions and as indefinite as they had been
previous to the war. The rather vague provisions of the United States
Constitution regarding the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were copied
verbatim. In the spring of
1862, after the disastrous fall of Forts Donelson
and Henry and of New Orleans, martial law was declared in various districts. In
the summer of 1864, and again toward the close of the war, the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended. In each case this policy aroused bitter opposition,
especially in North Carolina and Georgia, Vice-President Stephens even lending
his influence toward making the opposition effective. In the above-mentioned
States the local Courts put great difficulties in the way of carrying out the
Confederate policy. However, in suspending the functions of civil government,
the central authorities
-1864]
Increase in the central
power.
609
did not
employ the extreme measures put in force by the Washington government during
the same years.
In the policy
of confiscating the property of Northerners the Confederate States went much
further. By a series of Acts such property was made payable to the Confederate
government in exchange for bonds. The commercial debts due to Northern
creditors were especially aimed at. The results of the policy were meagre, for
few Southern debtors sought to rid themselves of the claims upon them; and,
owing to the invisible and intangible character of the property concerned, the
government found little to confiscate. Less than $400,000 (specie value) was
paid into the public treasury. This questionable practice of confiscating debts
due to an enemy was declared constitutional by the Courts, though strongly
opposed by some who, adhering to the traditional strict interpretation of the
Constitution, held that no such power was given by that instrument to the
Congress. The State legislatures, as usual, followed the example set by the
central government, and passed Confiscation Acts that were equally ineffective
from a fiscal point of view.
As the war
progressed and grew in dimensions, the necessary powers of the central
authorities became more and more pronounced; and an inevitable conflict arose
between the notion of a confederation of sovereign States and that of a
powerful centralised government in Richmond. The development of a strong
military power could not be reconciled with a loose federation of independent
States. In interpreting the Confederate Constitution in favour of the former
principle, the Attorney- General did violence to the treasured doctrine of
States rights which the exigencies of the war dissipated. In the spring of 1862
the first Conscription Act was passed, enrolling in the army all white
residents within certain age limits. In February, 1864, another similar but
more stringent measure was adopted. This policy aroused much particularist
opposition and outspoken disaffection in the States, especially in Georgia and
North Carolina, where Stephens and Governors Brown and Vance put great
difficulties in the way of the Confederate authorities carrying out the
conscription. The relations between the State militias and the Confederate War
Department were a constant cause of irritation. In North Carolina the feeling
for States rights was most pronounced. In the summer of 1863 disaffection
became general, and was crystallised in the so-called Peace Party, of which W.
W. Holden became the head. Numerous public meetings were held to denounce the
military despotism of the Richmond authorities and their encroachments upon the
proper sphere of the State governments. The movement culminated in the
political campaign of 1864, when Governor Vance was re-elected, defeating
Holden. The former had abandoned his particularist attitude, and championed the
cause of the central government. In North Carolina, as elsewhere, there were
threats of seceding from the Confederacy; and it is an open question whether
the South would have held together
politically
had the war lasted much longer, or even if the result had been different. The
war accentuated the natural antagonism between those districts of the South
where slaveholding predominated and those where slaves, for industrial reasons,
did not exist in large numbers. It was claimed that the war was being carried
on for the benefit of the slave-owners, primarily the cotton-growers, but at
the expense of the other sections of the population. That the raisers of
foodfproduce bore the largest part of the burden of the war is clear from a
study of the Confederate finances.
From the
outset the Confederate Treasuiy relied mainly upon loans. The first issue of
bonds was authorised in February, 1861, and was known as the Fifteen-million
Loan. Interest at 8 per cent, was secured on the export duty on cotton. The
government obtained the desired $15,000,000 in specie, principally through the
generous help of the New Orleans and Charleston banks ; the proceeds were sent
abroad for the purchase of war supplies. The amount, in addition to the funds
seized in the United States’ mints and custom-houses, constituted practically
the only supply of specie that the government ever secured. The loan was the
only successful one of a long series attempted during the war.
In May, 1861,
a further loan of $100,000,000 was invited. Owing to the banks having suspended
specie payments, and to the absence of an investing class, subscriptions to at
least a part of the loan were made payable in agricultural produce. This was
the first of a series of produce loans, through which the government
accumulated both food material for the army and also large quantities of cotton.
Before the end of 1861, 400,000 bales of cotton were subscribed. The policy met
the wishes of the impoverished cotton-planters, who were shut out of their
customary market and welcomed the appearance of the government as a buyer of
their produce, even if payment were made in bonds whose value was rapidly
declining. These planters were loud in their demands for relief by the banks or
by the government. The latter met their wishes by extending the produce loan
system in 1862 and 1863, and by allowing them to retain the hypothecated cotton
on their plantations. The State governments too were drawn into the practice of
borrowing cotton by the issue of bonds.
The central
and State governments thereby accumulated a stock of cotton, which they
attempted to hypothecate abroad, by using it as a basis for foreign loans. The
authorities had from the outset been urged to buy the entire cotton crop; the
notion prevailed that thereby they would acquire a valuable asset, on the
security of which they could effect advantageous loans abroad. The hope of
political recognition by the great European Powers had been dissipated by the
skilful diplomacy of the representatives of the United States government in
foreign capitals, notably by that of Charles Francis Adams in London. The
desire for financial recognition abroad was equally strong, and more was
accomplished
in that direction. Early in the war Confederate foreign agents, among whom
Caleb Huse, J. D. Bullock, C. J. McRae, and James Spence were conspicuous, were
despatched to purchase supplies abroad.
As the
growing scarcity of cotton drove up its price in the Liverpool market, from Id.
a lb. at the outbreak of the war to nearly twice that amount in the early
months of 1862, and to 2*. 1 d. before the end of that year, the desire of the
Confederate government to realise upon its accumulated stock of cotton led it
to approach some foreign bankers who might be willing to enter into the
speculation involved. The banking firm of Erlanger agreed in January, 1863, to
guarantee a loan of i?3,000,000 at 77. Interest at 8 per cent., as well as an
annual amortisation of of the principal, was payable in gold and in Europe. The
bonds were payable in cotton at 6d. a lb.; delivery to be made within the
Confederacy. Six months after the declaration of peace this exchange was to
cease; and the bonds were thereafter payable at their face value in gold. The
bonds were favourably received and subscribed for at 90, but they soon began to
decline, and continued to fall till the end of the war. The news of Federal
victories drove them down, the rumours of repulses of the blockading fleet
temporarily drove them up. The bonds were quoted at a much higher figure than
were other Confederate issues, owing to the mistaken notion of the security
offered by the large amount of cotton held by the Confederate government.
After the war they continued to be quoted, and there was talk of urging the
United States government to assume the debt. So late as 1876 and even 1884-5
the hopes of the unlucky bondholders were revived; but of course neither the
Federal government nor those of the States felt bound to assume the obligations
of the defunct Confederacy. The loss to the bondholders was not balanced by a
corresponding gain to the Confederate government. The commission charged by
Erlanger for floating the loan and paying the interest charges was large;
moreover, $6,000,000 were wasted by the Confederate agents in a futile effort
to “bull” the bonds in the foreign market. The loan netted for the government
about $6,000,000, which were spent in buying ships and war supplies, a large
part of which never reached their destination.
The issue of
bonds by the Confederate government was difficult, owing to the insignificant
revenue at its command, and the consequent derangement of its finances. The
government met with little success in obtaining voluntary loans from the
lending public, and was driven to adopting forced loans, primarily by means of
the issue of paper money. During the first five months of its existence the Confederate
government borrowed eight times as much by issuing bonds as by issuing notes ;
thereafter the relative importance of bond issues declined rapidly. During the
four months ending November, 1861, $4*47 in notes were issued to every $1 in
bonds; during the following three months the
figure rose
to $4'84; and during the following months ending August 1,
1863, to $31436. Issues -of notes in
increasing amounts followed each other in rapid succession. The first batch,
issued in March, 1861, bore a low interest; the smallest denomination was $50;
and the amount authorised was only two millions. They were intended as a
temporary expedient, and fell due in one year. In the following issues the
amounts authorised were increased, till in September, 1862, no limit was set.
The date of redemption was also deferred further and further, first to two
years, then to six months after a prospective treaty of peace with the United
States, and subsequently to two years after such peace. The denominations of
the notes were also successively lowered; and in 1863 fractional dollar notes
were issued. On. the basis of these laws the amounts of outstanding notes
increased prodigiously. About $1,000,000 in treasury notes were in circulation
in the summer of 1861; by the end of that year the amount had increased to
above $30,000,000. It rose to above $100,000,000 by March, 1862; to
$200,000,000 by August, 1862; and reached perhaps $450,000,000 by the end of
that year. A year later twice that amount was in circulation; and before the
end of the war a further increase had been made, though after the autumn of
1864 the figures are purely conjectural.
During these
years the government made constant but futile efforts to reduce the amount of
notes in circulation by encouraging or compelling the noteholders to treat the
notes as an investment and hold them instead of passing them on in their
purchases. With this end in view some of the notes bore interest, for instance
the large issue of 7'30 per cent, notes of 1862. Such interest-bearing notes
were, nevertheless, not locked up, but inevitably passed into circulation, and
contributed to the inflation of the currency. With the notes falling in value
owing to the declining credit of the government, the noteholders naturally felt
impelled to pass them on by converting them into some commodity by purchase, in
preference to retaining them and bearing the inevitable loss from their
shrinking value. ■
In all the
early note-issues a provision making the notes exchangeable at par for interest-bearing
bonds was introduced, with the hope of thereby correcting the tendency toward
redundancy in the currency. It was supposed that if the notes declined in
value, that is, were quoted at a discount in gold, the holders would at once
exchange them for bonds, thereby reducing the amount of paper-money in
circulation. In this hope the government was disappointed; for the value of the
bonds fell with that of the notes, and the noteholders found no advantage in
making the exchange, but continued to hold and circulate their notes. The
government gradually introduced provisions to compel them to make the exchange.
The first Act of the kind was passed in March, 1863, by which the notes issued
before the previous December were no longer fundable in bonds after August 1,
1863; notes issued later than
December 1,
1862, were made fundable in a low interest-bearing bond after the following
August. As a result of this measure some 100 millions of notes, perhaps a sixth
of the amount outstanding, were actually funded in bonds before the latter
date; but a further provision authorising a monthly issue of 50 millions of new
notes prevented an actual reduction of the amount outstanding, which continued
to increase. This first Funding Act was a virtual breach of faith, however
favourably its provisions were interpreted, and paved the way to a similar but
more drastic Act' of the following year, to which the Congress was driven by
the desperate condition of the Confederate finances during the winter of
1863-4.
The Funding
Act of February, 1864, carried further this policy of compelling the unwilling
noteholders to withdraw their notes from circulation and exchange them for
bonds, by taxing the outstanding notes one-third of their face value. Notes in
denominations of $5 and less were to be thus taxed on July 1, 1864; notes in
denominations larger than $5, that is, the bulk of those in circulation, on
April 1; while notes for $100 and larger amounts were to bear an additional
monthly tax of 10 per cent. This radical measure was hotly debated, and met
with much opposition. It passed, but, as was foreseen by many, it failed to
diminish the amount of notes in circulation. Comparatively few notes were
funded, either at par or at two-thirds of their face value; and the heavy tax
could of course only be collected from noteholders when offering them for
bonds. This the public did not do, but preferred to retain the discredited
notes and use them in purchasing or speculating in the market. They continued
to fall in value more rapidly than ever before. In fact, the Funding Act was a
declaration of bankruptcy, and wrecked the Confederate finances. It nominally
forbade further issues of notes, but could not prevent the government from
meeting its obligations thenceforward with a variety of interest-bearing
certificates and bonds, and with a huge mass of floating debt, the dimensions
of which at the end of the war are largely a matter of conjecture. The Funding
Act had been urged upon the Congress by Memminger; and its failure to accomplish
the hoped-for results led to his resignation in June, 1864. He was succeeded by
George A. Trenholm, a man better fitted by previous experience for the position
of head of the Confederate Treasury. It was too late, however, to establish an
effective financial policy, though Trenholm made heroic efforts to secure a
revenue for the government during the months of its decline.
The dread of
heavy taxation prevented the Confederate government from adopting a policy
which would have brought in a revenue and sustained its credit. As at the time
of the Revolutionary war, popular feeling was strongly opposed to assuming the
burden involved in a stringent tax system in addition to the other burdens of
the war. At the outset of the Civil War Memminger’s recommendation of a direct
tax of
f15,000,000
led to no effective legislation. The Congress merely pledged the government to
provide a revenue sufficient to cancel the bonds. It furthermore deferred
action by calling upon Memminger to collect information regarding the tax
systems of the various States. This information was presented in July ; and
finally in August, 1861, an Act was passed laying a tax of ^ per cent, on all
property, in addition to the customary general property tax of the local
governments. The tax was apportioned to each State, which was at liberty to
assume its quota by paying the amount with a rebate of 10 per cent, to the
central government. Nine-tenths of the tax were thus assumed by the States,
which borrowed the necessary sum by the issue of bonds or notes, and thereby
avoided the necessity of taxing. One-tenth, at most, of the tax was actually
raised by taxation. In all, the Confederate government secured some
$18,000,000; but delays in collection had been encouraged by the rebate
provision and by other laws postponing or even suspending the enforcement of
the tax. The assessment, as made by the government officials, placed the
valuation of all taxable property at 4,221 millions; one-third of this amount
represented slaves, another third real estate, and less than one-eighth money
at interest. The difficulty of levying taxes upon slaves and land was very
great; and the government in levying any taxes payable in money was obliged to
accept its own depreciating notes in payment, and then to enter the market and
purchase supplies for the army, the price of which was constantly rising. In
order to remedy this difficulty the next Tax Act provided for a tax in kind
similar in character to the produce loans alluded to above.
The Act of
April, 1863, levied a general tax of 10 per cent, on agricultural produce,
payable in that produce in March, 1864, direct to the army for its use, the
similar tax on cotton being paid to Treasury officials. The same Act also taxed
agricultural produce, manufactures, and money 8 per cent., and profits of the
wholesale trader in food-products, 10 per cent. It also levied an income-tax,
and provided for an elaborate license system. This was in reality the first
effective tax measure of the Confederacy; but its operation was delayed, and
during the year following its enactment only $3,000,000 (specie value) had
been collected. The constitutionality of this tax, it being a direct tax and
not apportioned among the States as the Constitution required, was seriously
questioned; but the question could not be authoritatively determined except by
a Supreme Court of the Confederacy. The establishment of such a Court was never
undertaken by the Confederate Congress, owing largely to a desire not to wound
the particularist sentiment for States rights; since the existence of a Court
with appellate jurisdiction over the highest State Courts would inevitably have
brought on a conflict between the local and the central, governments.
The farmers
of the South felt the great burden of the tax in kind,
and in many
districts were bitterly opposed to it. During the six months following April 1,
1864, an amount of food-products was collected from them sufficient to feed
1,000,000 soldiers for one month on the basis of the legally established army
ration. The demand for relaxation was answered by the Congress, and the tax
amended accordingly. In particular, the payment of the tax in money instead of
in produce was allowed in exceptional cases; whereby the burden of the tax was
generally lightened, and the farmer enabled to keep his produce and sell it on
the rising market. Additional Tax Acts increased the rates in the spring of
1864, and again towards the end of the war. But it is clear that taxation did
not weigh very heavily on the Southerners, except upon the producers of food.
These bore the chief burden of the war under the financial policy of the
Confederacy, fed the armies, and were impoverished thereby.
The finances
of the individual States and local governments reflected the financial policy
of the Confederacy. The collection of taxes was often postponed or even
suspended; and, even where extraordinary war- taxes were levied, the results
were meagre. Taxes in kind were attempted in some States. But, in general, the
States, counties, and cities followed the example of the central government,
and adopted a loan policy early in the war, issuing large amounts of bonds and
notes. The latter contributed to the redundancy of the currency, but met a
popular demand for more currency in view of the rising scale of prices. Private
corporations and individuals, especially railways, manufacturers and large
dealers, also met this demand with large issues of notes that circulated
widely. Futile efforts were made to prevent their circulation, and also to
check the prevalence of counterfeits, the circulation of which was favoured by
the poor workmanship of the government notes.
The financial
history of the Confederate States hinges on the wholesale issue of paper-money
and the consequent derangement of prices, which destroyed legitimate business,
encouraged wild speculation, and, by undermining the industrial structure of
the South, contributed in no small degree to the final downfall. As note issue
followed note issue, the paper-money fell rapidly in value. Gold was first
quoted at a premium in paper in May, 1861; it rose to 20 per cent, by the end
of the year. By the end of 1862 a gold dollar was exchanged for three in paper;
a year later, for 20; in December, 1864, for nearly 40; and during the closing
months of the war, for an ever-increasing amount, the final quotation being
perhaps 1000. This gold premium in its upward movement followed in general the
increased issues of government notes. Its fluctuations from month to month,
however, reflected more accurately the popular feeling in the South as to the
probability of a successful issue to the war. The complementary movements of
the gold premium in the North offer a similar means of estimating popular
sentiment in that quarter.
The gold
premium in the South rose most rapidly in the spring of
1862, in the midsummer of 1863, in the first
months of 1864, and in the first months of 1865, namely at the times when the
affairs of the Confederacy were approaching a crisis. The spring of 1862
brought the first decisive Northern victories after the long period of inaction
following the battle of Bull Run; in the interior Forts Henry and Donelson
fell; the hopes of the Confederate navy were dashed by the Monitor. Above all,
the Mississippi valley was opened by Farragut; New Orleans was lost; and the
trans-Mississippi States were cut off from the rest of the Confederacy. These
desperate straits led to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the
proclamation of martial law, and to the passage of the first conscription law.
These
brilliant successes of the North were not, however, successfully followed up.
Vicksburg continued to resist; the Peninsular campaign •was a disastrous
failure; the second battle of Bull Run, General Bragg’s operations in Kentucky,
and General Lee’s first advance into Maryland followed. These events depressed
the feelings of the North, and correspondingly raised those of the South. The
gold premium in the Confederacy rose less rapidly. A change occurred in the
summer of 1863, and the gold premium rose more rapidly, when the capture of
Vicksburg by General Grant and General Lee’s withdrawal from Pennsylvania after
the battle of Gettysburg depressed the hopes of the South. They were raised,
however, during the autumn of 1863, and the hopes of the North ;o,’respoi)dingly
depressed,1 by the successes >f General Bragg near Chattanooga
and General Lee in Virginia; but after the Republican victories at the polls in
the North in November, and after the decisive Federal victory of Chattanooga,
the gold premium in the South rose more rapidly than before. During this crisis
in the affairs of the Confederacy a second Conscription Act, an Act for heavy
taxation, and the notorious Funding Act were passed—all'on the same day,
February 17, 1864. During the following months the Federal army made little
progress, and the hopes of the South rose again, till Sherman’s advance and
General Grant’s successes outside Richmond raised the gold premium to
unheard-of heights.
The inflation
of the currency raised the prices of all commodities. In the case of those
whose supply was wholly or largely derived from abroad in times of peace, the
relative scarcity during the war added a further upward impetus. For instance,
coffee rose to four times its usual price before the end of 1861; a year later
to 25 times; in December,
1863, to 80 times; and in December, 1864, it
was selling for 125 times the price that it commanded in time of peace. Cut off
by the blockade from their customary supply of salt, the Southerners tried to
obtain that article by the evaporation of sea-water and by working the few
inferior natural salt springs in the interior. The quantity thus obtained was
meagre, and did not prevent the price of salt from rising nearly as high
as that of
coffee. The price of sugar and molasses, the usual supply of which was only
partly met by the product of Southern plantations, also rose to great heights,
as did that of all manufactured articles usually obtained from the North or
from Europe. The price of all the abovementioned articles in paper-money rose
above their normal value in gold; or, in other words, owing to their scarcity,
their price, reduced to a specie basis, rose above the general level of 1860.
Consequently a great incentive was given to the discovery of substitutes for
these general articles of consumption, roasted berries and seeds being used for
coffee, some strong textile for leather, persimmon seeds for buttons, leaves
for tea, and so on in great variety. 1 '
The rise in
the cost of living led to many attempts to fix by law a maximum price for each
article. Where martial law existed schedules of prices were established; or
else the State legislatures penalised the demand of extortionate prices. Such
legislation had the inevitable effect of enhancing the scarcity of commodities
in the markets of the South; for producers withheld their goods from the
markets when they were obliged to accept prices which left them no profit. The
familiar device of price conventions was tried with the same result. When
entered into by the body of buyers these conventions were simply organised
efforts to browbeat the sellers by calling them opprobrious names, questioning
their loyalty to the Southern cause, and threatening them with vengeance if
they did not reduce their prices. Similar practices were common during the
American Revolution and during the French Revolution. All such attempts to
reduce the inflated prices of a paper-money regime create scarcity in the
market and raise prices instead of lowering them.
The same
results followed the practice, adopted by the Confederate government, of
impressing goods for the use of the army instead of buying them in the open
market. At first no compulsion was used; and the farmers of the South were
induced to sell their produce Voluntarily to the army. As the inflated
currency drove prices up, Congress was persuaded that the government could
avoid paying the high prices demanded, and passed an Act in March, 1863,
providing for official boards of assessors to determine arbitrarily the value
of impressed goods, if the owner and the military authorities could not agree
on a price. It proved to be very difficult to coerce the producers of
food-stuffs to sell at unremunerative prices. Farmers withheld their produce
and hid it from the officials in preference to accepting a mass of depreciating
paper-money. Moreover, they naturally reduced1 their crops of
cereals when they feared a forced sale to the government at unremunerative
prices; they correspondingly increased their crops of cotton and tobacco, which
were less liable to government seizure. Here again legislation and popular
agitation interfered; and attempts were made to restrict the cotton and tobacco
crops. A limit was set to the number of acres
to
be planted per hand employed; and heavy penalties were enacted for exceeding
it, though none were ever inflicted. •
The
paper-money policy and its natural concomitant, the arbitrary interference with
prices, exaggerated the existing scarcity of provisions. The crops of Indian
com and wheat were abundant during the years of the war. Meats and cereals,
though commanding increasing prices in currency, did not rise much above the
1860 level as expressed in gold. This was especially true in the agricultural
districts remote from the cities and the seat of war—for instance, in North
Carolina. The scarcity of food in the cities and in the army was certainly not
as much due to deficient harvests or the inroads of the Federal armies as to
the difficulty of attracting produce to the markets under the currency and impressment
regime. Moreover, the latter policy led to a great accumulation of food
material at points where, not being needed, it went to waste, while at other
points the armies were suffering from want. Politically, the impressment policy
aroused the bitterest opposition to the military authorities and the despotic
powers that they exerted.
The enormous
issues of irredeemable paper-money engendered notions about the currency such
as usually characterise a period of inflation. As prices rose with the prodigious
issues of treasury-notes and with the general increase of bank-notes, the
currency, it was claimed, was not sufficient for the business needs of the
South, and demands were made for an increase. It was seldom understood that a
further redundancy of notes would create greater relative scarcity by driving
prices still higher. A parallel to this movement is found in every period of
paper-money inflation in the United States, as well as in the history of the
assignats in France.
The history
of Southern banks during the war illustrates the same demand for an increased
currency. At the beginning of the war all banks in the South had suspended
specie payments except those at Mobile and New Orleans. The latter held out
till September, 1861, when they too fell into line with the others. As the tide
of paper-money rose, the banks were authorised and encouraged to enlarge their
note issues, and did so. They were also drawn into the prevailing speculation
in government securities and cotton. New banks and similar concerns were
founded for the special purpose of speculating in the fluctuating value of
commodities, and of meeting the clamour for paper currency.
This popular
clamour for more currency tends to pass, in all cases of a deranged money
system, into the “ fiat money ” doctrine. The notion that paper-money is the
ideal money, and creates wealth without the intervention of the banks, and
without reference to a specie commodity, was prevalent in the South. We find
there in embryo the philosophy of “ greenbackism,” which played such an
important part in the later political history of the United States. The various
notes in circulation in the South became so debased and discredited that in
many districts
the
paper-money of the North gained a foothold. Legislation and popular appeals
were helpless against the invasion of the enemies’ currency, which circulated
freely and became more and more acceptable as the Confederate currency declined
in value. Even the government found it advantageous to handle it, and was not above
speculating in it, though the law strictly forbade individuals from dealing in
United States currency. The utter collapse of the Confederate currency is
further evidenced by the general return to barter, with a view to escaping the
hopeless confusion due to the paper medium of exchange, just as the produce
loans and taxes in kind had similarly aimed at avoiding the difficulty. Towards
the end of the war people generally cut themselves loose from the paper-money
system, and bought and sold in kind, just as they had been paying their taxes
and subscribing to government loans in produce.
The
deficiencies of transport and communication produced local differences in the
prices of Southern commodities. Moreover, the varying fortunes of the
Confederacy and the sinking of its credit produced great fluctuations in those
prices as expressed in the paper currency, with a general and rapid upward
tendency. On the basis of these violent price movements was developed a form of
wild speculation, as uncharacteristic of the non-commercial traditions of the
South as it was typical of all periods of deranged currency, such as the years
previous to 1873 in the United States, or the period of the French Revolution,
or the later experience of Austria and Italy. As a result of the constantly
rising prices of goods, it was greatly to the disadvantage of the noteholder to
keep his notes. He was forced to buy goods with them in order to avoid loss.
Everybody became a speculator. It seemed impossible to lose on the rising
market. The rising scale of prices made speculation inevitable; it was not
primarily the speculators who made prices rise. However, they were constantly
reproached for enhancing prices. It was claimed that they were depressing the
value of the currency by their operations, that they were draining specie from
the country, and that they were spreading disaffection and discrediting the
government. Legislation, especially in the individual States, was aimed at
curbing speculation, but with no results. Speculation in specie was
particularly odious to the legislatures; and futile attempts were made in the
South, as in the North, to prevent what was a necessary outcome of the deranged
currency. In fact, the government itself was irresistibly driven to speculating
in gold. Army and Treasury officers who held public funds in paper-money were
easily tempted to take advantage of the fluctuating gold premium and try to
enlarge their holdings. ,
The prices of
cotton and tobacco were least affected by the redundancy of the currency.
After the middle of 1861 the price of cotton, reduced to specie value, never
rose above the 1860 level, but fell far below it. At the same time the price of
cotton in the North and in
Europe
doubled before the end of 1861, quadrupled by the end of 1862, and during the
last two years of the war reached five and six times the figure at which it had
stood in 1860. This divergence between North and South in respect of the price
of cotton and tobacco put a great premium upon attempts to export these two articles,
produced in large amounts in the South and urgently demanded in the North and
in Europe. On the other hand, large profits rewarded the efforts of the
venturesome merchant who exchanged these exports for foreign goods, such as
coffee, bacon, and war materials, imported these, and sold them in the South
where, as we have seen, the prices were driven up to exorbitant heights. The
efficiency of the Federal blockade prevented such trade from reaching any large
dimensions. The blockade of the Southern ports was declared in April, 1861, and
was at once carried out by the United States navy. Exports and imports were
soon cut down to an insignificant figure; but, small as was the quantity- of
goods imported and exported, the profits of the trade that eluded the watchful
blockading fleet were enormous, aiid enriched a considerable number of
merchants. Fast vessels of light draught were equipped to carry cotton,
especially from Charleston and Wilmington, to some port in the West Indies, for
instance to Nassau or Havana, where the cargoes were transshipped to larger
vessels, reached England, and were exchanged for so-called blockade goods which
returned to ■ the Southern ports. The frequent captures by the Federal
fleet did not wipe out the large profits of such transactions. The Confederate
government itself was drawn into these ventures. During the first two years of
the war it shipped 31,000 bales of cotton to Liverpool. It engaged steamships
for the purpose, and joined with individual speculators in trading ventures
exactly as the Continental Congress had done nearly a century before. The
individual States, too, engaged in blockade-running, especially North and South
Carolina, Georgia, and Texas. This practice led to inevitable conflicts between
the central and State governments, and between the governments and the
individual traders. :
The
profitable nature of this contraband trade acted also as a stimulus to
extensive commercial relations with the North. Along the borders of the
Confederate States, in Virginia and Louisiana, and on the Mississippi, such an
exchange of cotton and tobacco for salt, coffee, and similar articles from the
North was at times quite brisk, and had to be winked at by the military
authorities, although in law it constituted a treasonable act. In fact, there
was a constant conflict of motives throughout the war, one favouring free
commercial intercourse with other countries, another leaning to restrictions on
it. At the outset a free-trade policy was pursued, on the theory that the South
had everything to gain and nothing to lose by attempting to get its supplies
from abroad. Subsequently the government polity played into the hands of the
Federal blockaders by restricting the exportation of cotton and the
importation
of foreign articles. So with the fairly brisk trade carried on over the Mexican
border. At first it was encouraged as a means of securing a foreign supply of
war materials; but when it grew more hazardous and therefore more profitable,
in consequence of the Federal troops establishing themselves in that
neighbourhood, a policy of restriction was adopted. The government was anxious
to share in the profits or to monopolise the trade. Just as was the case during
the Revolutionary war, laws were passed to forbid the exportation of cotton and
the importation of foreign supplies; but the government was allowed to make
exceptions in cases where it was admitted by the individual trader to a share
in the profits. Another motive that entered into this restrictive policy was
the hope of forcing the European governments to recognise the Confederacy, by
creating a scarcity of the much-needed cotton. The embargo, however, proved
ineffective for this purpose, and merely helped the Federal blockade.
The
operations of the Federal fleet contributed as effectively, though not as
obviously, as did those of the army to the overthrow of the Confederacy.- The
blockade forced an economic isolation upon the South which weakened her power
of resistance. Her resources were much inferior to those of the North, and,
owing to the blockade, they could not be effectively employed. The paper-money
policy undoubtedly also contributed to that end, and sapped the industrial
strength of the Confederacy. The Civil War represented for the South a conflict
with overwhelming odds. The South contained a population only about half as
large as that of the North. It had no large trade centres, except New Orleans
and Charleston; and the more important of these two cities came into the
possession of the Federal authorities a year after the opening of hostilities.
The South had no manufactures comparable with the enormous industrial resources
of the North; and its railway system was inferior. That the war lasted as long
as it did was due to the brilliant generalship of the Southern military
leaders, pre-eminently of General Lee, and to the heroic efforts made by a
devoted people to avoid the inevitable result. It may be doubted whether any
other people has ever made such sacrifices for any cause. The destruction of
wealth by friend and foe was unparalleled; and the South was left in a state of
impoverishment from which it is still but slowly recovering.
POLITICAL
RECONSTRUCTION.
(1865—1885.)
The war of secession altered profoundly the
governmental ideals and methods, the economic life, and the whole social
structure of the United States. Long before Lee’s surrender it had become
evident to all intelligent men that a return to the old conditions was
impossible; and upon the final collapse of the Confederacy the question at once
became pressing as to what should be done to reconstruct the government and
establish it upon enduring foundations. The problem was threefold. In the
forefront stood the questions presented by the conquered Southern States, whose
condition in 1865 seemed appalling. Four years of desperate exertions to raise
and equip armies, the ravages of campaigns and raids, the effect of a merciless
blockade, and the emancipation of slaves by the Federal armies, had reduced the
Southern people to bankruptcy. Mills, railways, and bridges were destroyed;
banks were empty; capital had vanished. The temper of the defeated people, in
such circumstances, could not be other than bitter and despairing. Open
resistance was at an end; but a deep-seated hatred of the North, whether
recklessly avowed or veiled by a sullen submission, animated most of the
Southern leaders. They had staked all and lost. Here and there men of a
different cast of mind advocated making the best of a bad plight, and turned
from public affairs to the task of restoring their ruined plantations; but,
whether resigned or resentful, all alike retained a fervent faith in the
justice of their lost cause. How these communities of ex-Confederates were to
be restored to a participation in the Federal government without severely
straining its operation was the first question confronting the North.
A still more
perplexing part of the Southern difficulty was presented by the four millions
of negroes. The greater number of these had gained their freedom through the
Emancipation Proclamation and the
Confiscation
Acts ; but the thirteenth amendment, abolishing slavery, had not yet been
ratified, and apparently could not be so without the votes of some of the
seceded States. The freedmen in 1865 were an element in the South utterly unlike
anything previously dealt with by the country. Entirely ignorant, untrained, as
a rule, except for servile occupations, lacking any civilised customs of
domestic or public morality, and devoid of economic instincts, the former
slaves formed an alien race fitted in no single respect for citizenship.
Childlike in mind and habits, they interpreted their new liberty to mean simply
release from restraint; and they began in 1865 to wander away from their
home-plantations, to enjoy the delights of idleness, to indulge any thievish or
immoral propensities to the full, and to work no more and no longer than they
found agreeable. What should be done for these unfortunate people ? Should the
task of controlling them and attempting to improve their lot be left to their
former masters, or should it be assumed by the Federal government? For the time
being, at the close of hostilities, military supervision answered these
questions. Federal armies kept order, and Federal generals exercised an
unlimited authority over the Southern people; while a Freedman’s Bureau, also
under military direction, devoted endless time and patience and large sums of
money to protecting, helping, and even feeding the negroes. But this system was
obviously temporary : what was to follow it as a permanent policy on the part
of the North ?
A further
complication in the problem of Southern reconstruction was the uncertainty as
to the legal basis for any action proposed. The Federal Constitution made no
provision for secession or restoration; and the powers of the central
government over the conquered communities, which from the necessities of the
case ought to be as wide as possible, were left to be inferred from a few
meagre clauses open to various interpretations. Military control for an unlimited
period, which would have been the obvious policy for a European government, was
impossible under such a constitution as that of the United States. Moreover the
habit of legal action and constitutional procedure was ingrained in the
American mind; and the moment the clash of arms ceased this tendency asserted
itself. The only possible way of attacking the Southern problem, in the opinion
of most American leaders, was by some legal, constitutional, federal process.
Scarcely less
difficult than the Southern question appeared the financial problem. It
involved the reduction of heavy war taxes, the readjustment of the revenue, the
refunding of an enormous debt, and the restoration of an inflated and
depreciated paper currency to a specie basis. During the war the country had
become used to extravagant expenditure by the Federal and State governments,
and to reckless speculation; now, on the arrival of peace, it was at the height
of an era of industrial and agricultural expansion. Could the return to
normal conditions
be successfully carried out in the midst of such an economic situation ?
Less
burdensome but still threatening were foreign relations. The war left the
United States with scores to settle against both Great Britain and France on
account of what the people of the North considered the favours shown by both
these nations to Confederate privateers. France, moreover, was involved in an
enterprise Sn Mexico which was regarded with suspicion and disapproval. It
remained to be seen whether the North, flushed with its success, could settle
these and other foreign questions peaceably and satisfactorily. .
The gravity
of these problems was not lessened by the composition of the party in power in
the North in 1865. Since the outbreak of the war, the control of public affairs
had been in the hands of “Union men,” who, during the crisis, had eschewed the
name Republican or Democrat, and appealed for support on the single issue of
union against .disunion. The political leaders,. accordingly, represented all
shades of former opinion; for, while the majority termed themselves
Bepublicans, many had been, until 1861, Democrats, Know-Nothings, or Whigs.
Upon questions of foreign or internal policy, upon the Constitution, upon the
finances, the tariff, or the currency, and upon the proper treatment of
ex-Confederates or of negroes, there was no semblance of unanimity. Between
ideal philanthropists, like Sumner of Massac! jsetts, at one extreme, and
purely practical statesmen, like Morton of Indiana, at the other, there was but
one common bond—a strong love of the Union, coupled with an intense feeling of
resentment towards the South. Naturally these men were, one and all, bitter
partisans, masterful in temper, intolerant of opposition, and hampered by no
fine-drawn scruples. For four years men like Stanton in executive office,
Stevens, Wade, and Sumner in Congress, Morton and Johnson as governors of
States, had been doing their utmost to maintain the Union against Confederates
in the South and a steady opposition in the North; and it was their pugnacity
and energy which had brought them to the front. Now that peace had come, these
new problems were certain to evoke every possible difference of personal
opinion among them. Opposed to the Union men stood the Democratic party, drilled
by the habit of generations into so steady a discipline that, even when its
leaders, blinded by passion, had gone to the verge of treason in their
opposition to Lincoln’s Administration, the mass of voters had still followed
them. Always sympathetic toward the South, ready to oppose anything advocated
by the war leaders, this Democratic minority stood waiting its opportunity.
It was not
until six years after the close of the war that Reconstruction was definitely
accomplished, and that the financial and foreign questions were settled. The
principal cause of this delay was a difference of
opinion
between the successive Presidents, Lincoln and Johnson, on one side and the
majority of the Northern political leaders on the other, as to the objects to
be aimed at in the reconstruction of the South, and the proper means for
carrying it out.
When the war
closed, three lines of policy were advocated, each, as was inevitable, claiming
to be based on the only true interpretation of the Constitution. Those who, like
Lincoln and Johnson, held the extreme view on the side of leniency, maintained
that secession had no legal effect beyond incapacitating those persons
participating in it from performing their constitutional duties; that this
incapacity could be removed by executive pardon ; and that, so soon as this was
accomplished, State governments could be re-established, and could resume the
normal functions of States in a Federation. The extreme view, urged on the
other side by Sumner and Stevens, was that secession had had the effect of
destroying the Southern States, so that Congress could do whatever it pleased
with the territory formerly occupied by them. A third and intermediate view was
adopted by the majority of Republican leaders. Those who held it maintained
that secession had not destroyed the statehood of the Southern commonwealths,
but had caused them to forfeit their rights as States under the Constitution;
and that it appertained to Congress in its discretion to restore these rights
under the clause of the Constitution guaranteeing to the States a republican
form of government. Constitutional theory was framed, as usual, in accordance
with the temperament and desires of the persons who proclaimed it.
Lincoln, a
man of magnanimous character, believed that a policy of amnesty, with a prompt
return to civil government, would be far more likely to secure co-operation
from the defeated insurgents than a continuance of war methods. Accordingly,
in his proclamation of December,
1863, he offered amnesty, on condition of
taking an oath to support the Constitution and all laws or proclamations
concerning Emancipation, to all persons except those who had held high office
under the Confederacy or who by leaving the Federal service to join the South
had already violated an oath to support the Constitution. As soon as the oath
should have been taken by a number of persons in any State equal to one-tenth
of the voters of 1860, a new government might be formed; and, in accordance
with Lincoln’s plans, new governments were set up in Virginia, Tennessee,
Louisiana, and Arkansas. After the assassination of Lincoln, his policy was
continued by his successor, Andrew Johnson, an honest, self-educated Union
Democrat of Tennessee, with much crude ability, but without tact or refinement,
and cursed by an ungovernable temper. Having begun his term with a violent
denunciation of “rebels” as traitors who ought to be hanged, he surprised all
parties by adhering closely to Lincoln’s plans. On May 29, 1865, he issued a
new proclamation, resembling Lincoln’s in all essentials, but excluding a
larger
number of
classes from the privilege of taking the oath, the most significant being that
comprising all persons own ng property worth over $20,000. By this provision
Johnson undoubtedly meant to shut out the great planters and former
slaveholders from sharing in the work of reconstruction.
It was
contrary to the political system of the United States that a Congress elected
in the autumn of 1864 should, unless specially summoned by the President, meet
until December, 1865. Johnson therefore had a free hand in the process which he
now put in operation. For each of the conquered States, except those already
reconstructed by Lincoln, he appointed in the early summer of 1865 a
provisional governor, with instructions to aid in the formation of a new State
government, and to insist on the performance of certain acts which would, in
Johnson’s opinion, safeguard the results of the war. The new State governments
must abolish slavery, repudiate debt incurred in aid of the rebellion, and
ratify the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This done, they were to be
regarded as restored to their place in the Union. The Southern people, or such
of them as were not excluded by Johnson’s proclamation, were thus given the
opportunity to resume civil government; and it rested with them to use it
wisely or unwisely. On the whole, the President’s offer met with a favourable
response; the oaths were willingly taken; and an intention was manifested to
make the best of things. Here and there excluded leaders hung back sullenly, or
reckless young men defied Johnson’s governors; but in every State there were
found enough conservative men, former Whigs or Unionists, to carry through the
programme urged by the eager President. Every State amended its Constitution so
as to abolish slavery; most of them repudiated the Confederate debt; and all
but two, Mississippi and Texas, ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. All but
Texas had elected State officials by December, 1865; and, when Texas finally
took action, Johnson felt warranted in proclaiming officially the end of the
Rebellion. The proclamation was dated April 6, 1866.
The- burden
laid on the new governments was a heavy one; but they faced the situation with
characteristic energy. Every State created Courts and imposed taxes. Every
State passed laws relieving bankrupts and executors; all but two stayed
executions for debt; and all but four provided relief for maimed and indigent
Confederate soldiers. But most striking of all was the manner in which the new
governments attempted to deal with the negro problem, now staring them in the
face. Without going into detail, it may be said that their clear purpose was to
keep the freedmen as a subordinate class, personally free but subject to strict
legal control, special limitations, and peculiar penalties. Their status was
defined in such a way as to enable them to sue and be sued, and to bear
testimony in suits where a negro was a party; but intermarriage
with whites
was forbidden, and a long series of crimes and minor offences were made
punishable with special penalties. The most drastic laws bore evidence of an
intention to force the negroes into semi-servile work. Vagrancy was made
punishable by fine or forced service, old masters being preferred as lessees;
labour contracts entered into by negroes were rendered inviolable under
penalties of forced service; and apprentice laws provided for the binding out
of negro children, former masters again being preferred. Finally, a variety of laws
in certain States endeavoured to restrict the negroes, by a system of licenses
or by other devices, to the career of agricultural labourers. It need hardly be
said that the new State governments failed to pacify immediately the distressed
districts. Poverty and destitution prevailed; acts of violence and lawlessness
continued; and the negroes, actively supported by the Federal military
authorities, showed no tendency to submit to the new codes. Still, in spite of
all drawbacks, the whites of the South had begun the task of reconstruction;
and hope had returned to a devastated region. Moreover by the votes of these
States the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified, and it was proclaimed as
part of the Constitution in December, 1865. So much, then, had been
accomplished, for good or for ill, by the presidential policy.
But meanwhile
an ominous spirit had been rising in the North. The majority of Unionists,
lacking entirely the magnanimity of Lincoln or Johnson, regarded Confederates
with a distrust and dislike too intense to permit them to see any distinction
between Whigs and Democrats in the South, or to contemplate without alarm the
restoration of the former slaveholders to their place in the Union. The
Northern leaders felt that Reconstruction could not be regarded as a mere
incident of the President’s pardoning power, but should be dealt with by the
representatives of the States and the people. This feeling they had already
shown by the passing, in 1864, of a Reconstruction Act which Lincoln had refused
to sign. When Johnson began his rapid process of reconstituting State
governments, the people of the North looked on with distrust and soon with
increasing anger. It seemed to them that their defeated enemies were being
brought back into power, and the results of the war placed in jeopardy. The
most sinister impressions were made by the reports of lawlessness and violence
between whites and blacks, and above all by the negro codes, vagrancy laws, and
apprentice regulations, all of which convinced the Union men that the lives
and liberty of the freedmen could not safely be left at the mercy of their
former masters. By the end of the year 1865 the feeling was widely spread and
freely expressed that it would not do to accept the results of Johnson’s action
without additional precautions against Southern disaffection and safeguards
for the negro. As to what form these should take, opinions varied widely,
ranging from the radical utterances of former Abolitionists, who demanded negro
suffrage as a panacea, to the
628 Rupture between President and Congress. [1866
threats of
partisans, who desired mainly some form of punishment for the Southern whites.
From the
party point of view, Johnson’s action was full of danger to the Unionists,
since with the abolition of slavery the constitutional three-fifths
representation of the negroes became full representation, adding several
members to the Southern States in the House of Representatives. Should these,
as was almost inevitable, join forces with the Northern Democrats the Unionist
party might well be outnumbered, both in Congress and in the electoral
colleges. Such a prospect called into activity every instinct of political
self-preservation on the part of Unionist leaders. Some steps, all agreed, must
certainly be taken to prevent such a calamity as the overthrow of the Unionist
party.
When Congress
assembled in December, 1865, the progress of reconstruction came to a sudden
halt. Disregarding Johnson’s message inviting recognition of the new State
governments, the majority showed its temper by promptly excluding all senators
and representatives from the South, and by appointing a joint committee to
investigate the condition of the insurrectionary States; while leaders like
Simmer, Trumbull, Stevens, and Shellabargar began an open attack upon the
President’s plan as inadequate and unconstitutional. It appeared, from the
start, that only the small Democratic minority, with a very few Unionists,
supported Johnson; and, within a short time, the hot-headed President and the
determined Republican leaders came to an open rupture. Intent on furnishing
some defence for the negroes against the black codes, Congress passed a law
extending the functions of the Freedmen’s Bureau. This Johnson promptly vetoed,
taking occasion a few days later to denounce the leading Congressmen by name as
traitors. His violence damaged his cause to such an extent that, when after an
interval he vetoed a Civil Rights bill, also intended to destroy the effect of
the Vagrancy laws, a two-thirds majority in each House immediately passed the
bill over his veto. The breach was now irreparable.
By June,
1866, the issue was clear. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction had finished
its work and had come before the country with a constitutional amendment and a
report. The report expounded the theory of forfeited rights above referred to.
It declared that Congress alone had the power to reconstruct the “ rebel
communities ”; that the Johnson governments were illegal; and that the South
was in anarchy, controlled by “ unrepentant and unpardoned rebels, glorying in
the crime that they had committed.” Nevertheless these illegal State
governments were held competent to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment; and another
amendment was now submitted to them, which aimed at remedying the situation by
disfranchising ex-Confederate officials, forbidding payment of Confederate
debt, prohibiting any denial of equal rights to negroes, and providing for the
reduction of the representation in Congress of any State excluding the negroes
from
the ballot. A
bill introduced simultaneously provided that any State ratifying the amendment
should be restored to representation.
This
amendment now became the issue in the Congressional elections in the fall of
1866. No more important campaign ever took place in the country; for the fate
of the South hung in the balance. The rupture in the Union party was complete;
and the Radicals fought with desperation to retain a two-thirds majority in
Congress, since anything less would permit Johnson’s veto to block all action.
Each side made great efforts to rally popular support by holding Union
conventions and soldiers’ and sailors’ conventions; and Johnson himself “took
the stump” in the Western States with a series of passionate speeches whose
vulgarity and extravagance did infinite damage to his cause. But, in any case,
the unwise tactics of the Johnson Unionists in demanding immediate recognition
for the Southern States as a constitutional right decided the contest. The
feeling of the North, still bitter and unforgiving, supported the Congressional
party, and returned an increased Radical majority in both Houses, thereby
deciding the history of the country for the next generation. Had the Southern
States been wise enough to read their fate in this vote and ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment, they might have escaped years of bitterness; but the
events of 1865 had restored their political hopes; and now, in the face of the
repudiation of Johnson’s plan by the North, all of them, except Tennessee,
refused the offer of Congress by rejecting the Fourteenth Amendment with
overwhelming majorities. When Congress assembled in December, 1866, the
triumphant majority found their proposal thrown back at them by a defiant
South. Clearly nothing was to be expected from the President and his followers.
Matters appeared to be at a deadlock.
Then the
leaders of the Radicals took control of affairs with relentless energy. They
had come to the conclusion that the South must be reconstructed a second time;
that Secessionists must be excluded from political life; and that negroes must
receive votes, partly in order to defend themselves, and partly to guarantee a
large body of “ loyal,” that is Republican, voters in the South. That their
party, as a whole, did not favour negro suffrage in itself is shown by the fact
that propositions to confer it in Northern States were defeated at the polls in
Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Minnesota in 1865, and in Ohio, Kansas, and
Minnesota in 1867, all these being strong Republican States. But its
introduction in the South was urged by philanthropists as an act of justice to
an oppressed race, by vindictive Northerners as a punishment for secession, and
by partisan politicians as a party manoeuvre. So the majority, contemptuously
overriding Johnson’s veto, forced through Congress, in March and July, 1867, a
series of Reconstruction Acts, by which the “Rebel States,” so-called, were
placed under military government in five districts, and a registration of
voters was decreed, from which a rigid oath was to exclude all classes meant to
be disfranchised by the
Fourteenth
Amendment, while negroes were to be included. By this electorate a
constitutional convention was to be chosen in each State, which should draft a
constitution containing the same suffrage qualifications ; and, when this had
been adopted by a majority of the registered voters in the State, and the State
had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress, if it found nothing
“unrepublican” in the process, could admit the State to representation.
At the same
time Congress tied the hands of the executive. It provided that the first
session of the Congress elected in 1866 should follow immediately upon the
expiration of its predecessor, thus leaving no such interval of time as that
used by Johnson in 1865. It made all military orders issuable only through the
commanding General, known to be in favour of the Congressional policy. It
passed a Tenure of Office Act, limiting the power of the President to dismiss
officials by making the consent of the Senate necessary, thus blocking a
proscription threatened by Johnson. Fearing unfriendly action by the Federal
judiciary in a test case involving the validity of the Reconstruction Acts, it
abolished the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in such cases. Objections on
constitutional grounds were lightly regarded by the relentless majority; they
had a task to perform, and refused to be hindered by legal quibbles.
Furious
debate, it is needless to say, raged in Congress from its meeting in December,
1865, increasing in acrimony during the next three years; but these were times
when debate counted for little. The old days of elevated constitutional
discussion were gone for ever; and, although both sides regularly invoked the
sacred document, this became scarcely more than a matter of form, the result of
ingrained habit. In fact, party considerations were absolutely dominant, the
majority riding roughshod and regardless of mere words over President and
minority. This party vindictiveness reached its height in an attempt to impeach
the President, who regarded the Tenure of Office Act as unconstitutional, and
tried to remove Secretary Stanton, his bitter enemy, in apparent defiance of
its terms. In an explosion of rage the House voted impeachment, and brought
Johnson to trial before the Senate in March, 1868. Public excitement was at
fever heat, the President being subjected to a tempest of execration, and
accused not merely of violating the law but of planning to get control of the
War Department in order to carry out a coup d'etat. The Senate, however,
although strongly Republican, on technical grounds failed to convict him by the
narrow margin of one vote. Sevei. Republican senators, who separated from their
party in this vote, were ruined politically; but the decision is universally
regarded at the present day as fortunate for the country and the stability of
the Constitution.
Meanwhile the
process of reconstruction laid down in the Acts of
1867 was being vigorously carried through; but it
became clear that
before its
entire completion the presidential election of 1868 would place the whole
subject before the voters. And into this election another issue beside that of
Reconstruction necessarily entered, namely, the question of the government
credit. McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury m 1865, set out to restore the
finances to a peace footing as soon as possible; and in this he was at first
aided vigorously by Congress. From the year 1866 onward war taxes were rapidly
reduced, being withdrawn mainly from manufactures and internal trades, until,
by the summer of 1868, the revenue had been reduced by $140,000,000. The
enormous debt, attaining in 1865 a maximum of $2,800,000,000, was dealt with in
a similar spirit. McCulloch, acting under authorisation of April, 1866, had
exchanged, by the year 1868, nearly all temporary obligations for long-term
bonds, and managed at the same time to reduce the debt by over $200,000,000.
Finally, as to the legal tender notes, McCulloch urged a policy of contraction,
and was authorised by Congress in April, 1866, to retire the “greenbacks” at a
rate not exceeding $10,000,000 in six months, and subsequently at a rate not
exceeding $4,000,000 in a month. In this way, by 1868, he had reduced the legal
tender circulation by $66,000,000; but during this process there suddenly
appeared in the Western States signs of unmistakable inflationist sentiment.
Such an outcry began against the retirement policy that in February, 1868,
Congress, alarmed by an apparent shrinkage in prices, abruptly forbade further
contraction. At the same time proposals to pay the principal of United States
bonds in paper, and to tax the bondholders, were freely made in Congress and
in the newspapers; and a Refunding Act, providing for coin bonds, was
successfully vetoed by Johnson in July, 1868. This vital question, it was
evident, as well as that of Reconstruction, would have to be decided by the
presidential election.
At the outset
the prospect for the Radicals seemed doubtful. In 1867 a revulsion of feeling
in the North had thrown New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and California
into Democratic hands, and had caused an alarming shrinkage in Republican
majorities. Clearly the “War Democrats” were returning to their old ranks on
the negro- suflrage issue. The days for a Unionist party were past. When the
Republican National Convention met in June, 1868, the doubts of the party
leaders were reflected in their platform, which, while pledging the party to
the fulfilment of the Reconstruction measures in the South, added that “the
question of suffrage in all the loyal States properly belongs to the people of
those States.” On the financial issue the platform, less timid, demanded the
payment of the public debt “in the uttermost good faith.” General Ulysses S.
Grant, the hero of the war, who had taken an active part in reconstruction, was
unanimously chosen as Republican nominee for the Presidency. On the other side
the Democratic party, much infected with inflationist feeling, settled its
internal
dissensions in characteristic fashion. Governor Seymour of New York, a
“hard-money” man, was nominated in July after a dramatic “stampede” in the
convention, upon a platform which demanded taxation of the government bonds
and their payment in “ lawful money,” that is, greenbacks, and also demanded
immediate restoration of all the States, and “ regulation of the elective
franchise in the States by their citizens.” Thus the two issues were fairly
joined.
But, while
the contest appeared not unequal on the surface, a new, and, as it proved,
decisive element was brought into the field in the shape of a powerful
Republican party in every Southern State. The beginnings of this new
organisation are to be found in the process of reconstruction under the Acts of
March, 1867. The plan then laid down had been carried out in every State.
Begistration had been followed by votes calling Conventions, and these by the
election of Conventions, the drafting of Constitutions, and their submission
to popular suffrage. But those who participated in this procedure were limited
to the negroes, guided by army officers, miscellaneous Northern residents, and
a very few native whites. The registration of the new electorate was
accompanied in 1867 by the active effort to organise a Bepublican party through
“ Union Leagues,” with such success that the State Constitutional Conventions
not uncommonly acted also as Bepublican nominating Conventions. The new party
and the new State were one. From this second reconstruction, with its return to
military rule, its disfranchisement of Confederates and enfranchisement of the
negroes, all Southern whites shrank with loathing and despair; but in 1868,
with thousands disqualified and with the negroes held well in hand by the
Bepublican leaders, they were overmatched. Only in Mississippi did they succeed
in rejecting the new Constitution; elsewhere their efforts, whether they
abstained from voting or offered open opposition, were fruitless; and by the
summer of 1868 all the States but three—Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas—had
been reconstructed and were under the control of the new Bepublicans. Congress
immediately by an “ Omnibus Act ” restored seven of them to representation,
having already restored Alabama.
This
accession decided the election. Grant was easily successful, carrying all
except four Northern and three Southern States, and receiving 214 electoral
votes to Seymour’s 80. But without the disfranchisement of thousands of
Confederates, and the addition of the negroes, the result might have been
exactly what the Republicans feared in 1865. Seymour would have carried all the
South, and, with four Northern States in his favour, would have come very close
to being elected. It was alleged by Democrats, and not denied by Republicans,
that Congress had admitted the eight States in 1868 for the purpose of securing
their electoral votes. There can be no doubt that the formation of a Southern
Bepublican party out of the negroes was one of the principal objects of the
Congressional
Reconstruction policy. This was avowed by Sumner, Stevens, Wade, and many
others.
The election
of Grant as President, with a Congress still largely Republican in both
branches, and the successful ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
guaranteed the completion of both political and financial reconstruction. The
triumphant party now fulfilled its task. In the first place, in order to render
the negroes secure in their right of suffrage, the Republicans, abandoning the
ground taken in their platform, immediately proposed a Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting
any denial of the suffrage on account of race, colour, or previous condition of
servitude, and submitted it in 1869 to the States. In order to aid in securing
its ratification, its acceptance was added as a further condition of readmission
in the case of the three States as yet unreconstructed, and also in that of
Georgia, which now underwent a third reconstruction. In the case of
Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas the difficulties as to the acceptance of new
constitutions were solved by legislation submitting the drafts to popular vote,
the objectionable clauses concerning disfranchisement being submitted
separately in the first two States. These clauses were rejected; and all three
States then adopted the Constitutions, ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, and
were restored by Congress in 1870. The case of Georgia was peculiar, in that
the whites, getting control of the legislature elected in 1868, had declared
negroes ineligible and their seats vacant. Congress now retorted by passing an
Act whose effect was to place Georgia once more under military government and
subject its legislature to a thorough purging by the so-called “ iron-clad ”
oath, which turned out ex-Confederates and admitted Republicans. Then after
the much-reconstructed State had ratified the pending amendment it was finally
restored to its privileges in the Union. The Fifteenth Amendment, having with
some difficulty gained the requisite number of States, was declared in force on
March 30,1870. The process of reconstruction was now complete so far as
legislation and constitutional amendment could make it.
During this
period Reconstruction was virtually sanctioned by the judicial department of
the government, whose position had been regarded with distrust by Republicans,
and with hope by the Southerners. The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Chase,
held at first an attitude distinctly ominous. In 1866, in the case ex parte
Milligan, it declared military tribunals in a State not in insurrection to be
unconstitutional; and in two other suits, ex parte Garland and Cummings v.
Missouri, it had pronounced test oaths, framed to punish ex-Confederates, to be
invalid. But when two Southern States, in a desperate effort to prevent
Congressional Reconstruction,applied for injunctions against the President and
the Secretary of War, to prohibit their executing the Acts of 1867, the Court,
in the cases of Mississippi v. Johnson and Georgia v. Stanton, declined to
interfere in matters political with another department of the Federal
government. And a little later, in successive suits involving the
legal status
of the Southern States during the Reconstruction period, Chief Justice Chase
committed the Court squarely to the Congressional theory of the situation. A
State—so the Court held in Texas v. White, 1869—is an indestructible part of an
indestructible Union. Secession does not destroy the State, but suspends its
legal rights; and to restore these is the duty of Congress under the clause
guaranteeing a Republican form of government. Although in this case, and in
White v. Hart, three years later, the Court carefully refrained from any
decision as to the Reconstruction Acts themselves, these opinions substantially
ratified the Republican policy. Legally as well as practically Southern Reconstruction
was an accomplished fact.
In the same
years the financial situation was placed on a definite basis. In the existing
state of public opinion immediate retirement of the “ greenbacks ” was out of
the question; but the Republicans in Congress passed a bill in the winter of
1869 pledging the faith of the United States to redeem its notes “at the
earliest practicable period” in coin. Resumption was thus promised.
Simultaneously the constitutional validity of the legal tender notes was
established by the Supreme Court in a peculiar way. During Johnson’s
administration the Court showed in successive decisions a strongly antagonistic
attitude toward the “greenbacks,” culminating, early in Grant’s term, in the
famous case of Hepburn v, Griswold, in which Chase as Chief Justice delivered
an opinion declaring unconstitutional the notes he had himself issued as
Secretary of the Treasury eight years before. Almost immediately afterwards
the membership of the Court was altered by resignations and the appointment of
two new judges; and within a year, in the Legal Tender Cases, the Court, by a
majority of one, reversed its previous decision, and re-established the
constitutionality of the “greenbacks.” It was loudly asserted that Grant had
packed the Court; but this was true only in so far that Grant appointed strong
partisan Republicans as judges—a policy perfectly inevitable in 1870. The
prestige of the Court suffered with impartial persons; but the number of such
persons was few at the time, and the country at large felt relieved by the
decision.
The rest of
the financial programme was carried out, on the whole, with success. Internal
taxation was steadily reduced, until by 1872 little remained beyond a few
excises. The debt, the repudiation of which was threatened by Democrats and
advocated by Johnson, was placed beyond danger of payment in depreciated1
paper, first by an “ Act to strengthen the Public Credit,” vetoed by Johnson,
but repassed by Congress and signed by Grant on March 18, 1869, which pledged
the faith of the country to the payment of its bonds in coin; and secondly by
the Refunding Act of July, 1870. By this the Secretary was empowered to refund
the “ five-twenties,” which all became redeemable about 1870, in bonds at 5,4£,
and 4 per cent., running from ten to thirty years respect-
I866-71] Protection. Civil Service reform.
635
ively, and
payable, principal and interest, in coin. The Republican party was not
unanimous in support of these measures; but, since the Democrats were very
nearly unanimous against them, the Republican majority fairly deserves the
credit for them. While the government credit was by no means placed beyond the
reach of attack, it had certainly been established on a safe basis. The
financial future seemed assured.
An important
result of the process of financial reconstruction was the fact that the country
was committed to a policy of high protection. The industries taxed during the
war had been granted ample duties on imports designed to compensate for their
internal taxes. When the war ended, Congress, as has been said, rapidly wiped
out these internal taxes, but, owing to pressure on the part of the
manufacturing interests, refrained from altering the tariff rates. Bills to
reduce duties were almost uniformly unsuccessful; and in 1867, 1869, and 1870
the rates were actually raised on wool and woollens, steel rails, copper, and a
few other articles. By the middle of Grant’s term the war tariff, imposed
mainly for revenue, had, by remaining unaltered, become a highly protective
one; and the manufacturing interests of the country had come to identify their
prosperity with its retention.
Finally, to
complete its record, the Republican party in 1871 took steps toward a much
needed reform in the Federal Civil Service. The evils of partisan appointments
and removals, although attracting slight popular interest during the crisis of
Reconstruction, had become so flagrant that certain members of Congress had
begun a campaign for reform. Bills for a competitive examination system,
introduced in each Congress by Jenckes of Rhode Island, failed of success; but
in Grant’s first term the desired reform was at length attained, almost by
chance, being incorporated as a “ rider ” to an Appropriation Bill on March 3,
1871. In this way the Republican Administration took a step apparently destined
to be of incalculable benefit.
These same
years saw the settlement of pending foreign questions by the Administrations of
Johnson and Grant, after a period in which brisk diplomatic activity, exhibited
by Seward and Fish, successively Secretaries, gradually came to a standstill in
the face of a strong popular disinclination for anything aggressive in foreign
policy. Seward undoubtedly did his best to retrieve his popularity, damaged
through his adherence to Johnson’s plan of reconstruction, by an energy in
treaty-making and negotiation scarcely equalled in the history of the United
States. A score of commercial and extradition treaties were made with Powers
large and small, the two most important being those with China and Germany in
1868; and many similar treaties were concluded under his successor. Seward’s
principal efforts, however, were directed toward the settlement of the serious
questions pending with France and Great Britain. As regards the French intervention
in Mexico, although General Grant was quite ready to use force, Seward
wisely
refrained from threats, and confined himself to a steady diplomatic pressure,
confident that his end was more likely to be peacefully attained if he avoided
affronting a government resting mainly on military prestige. Napoleon III acted
as Seward had foreseen, and, harassed by European complications, withdrew his
forces in 1867.
As regards
relations with Great Britain, the situation was still more threatening. The
country, while not anxious for war, cherished feelings of bitter resentment on
account of the ravages committed by Confederate cruisers equipped in England,
and the unsympathetic attitude of the English governing classes during the war.
There were, moreover, unsettled boundary and fisheries controversies, and
differences about naturalisation arising from the trial of certain Irish
“Fenian” conspirators claiming American citizenship. At first Earl Russell, in
1865, absolutely denied the possibility of arbitrating on any American claims;
but a year later English opinion altered, and Lord Stanley, Russell’s
successor, intimated a willingness to discuss the question. Prolonged
negotiations as to the extent to which the Alabama claims should be considered
led eventually to the drawing up by Lord Clarendon and Reverdy Johnson, United
States minister to England, of two protocols and a treaty for arbitration. One
of the protocols, regarding naturalisation, was developed into the treaty of
1870; but the other results of Johnson’s mission proved fruitless. The
disfavour in which the Senate held Seward, together with the popular feeling
that something more than a mere claims treaty was necessary, led to the
rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon draft as inadequate and defective.
There
followed a period of renewed negotiation between Lord Clarendon and Secretary
Fish, much hampered by a speech of Sumner in the Senate, announcing that the
United States would accept nothing less than a national apology, together with
reparation for indirect damages suffered by the United States through England’s
recognition of Confederate belligerency. President Grant in his message of 1870
suggested that the United States should pay the claims, and thus assume them
against Great Britain; but the necessity for any such radical action was
avoided by an agreement reached through the skilful dealing of Sir John Rose
and Fish in 1871. Both governments joined in appointing a High Commission,
which met in Washington, and by a treaty in May, 1871, practically settled all
outstanding questions. An expression of courteous regret on the part of the
British Commissioners disposed of the claim for an apology; minor matters were
dealt with; and three arbitrations were provided, for the fisheries, the
North-western boundaries, and the Alabama claims. In the course of the
following year the principal issue was laid at rest by the award of the
arbitration tribunal, which, after a hearing at Geneva, dismissed the extreme
American claims, but held Great Britain guilty of negligence in several cases,
and assigned damages of $15,500,000. In this way the skill and persistence
of the
American secretaries finally disposed of the most threatening diplomatic
questions arising from the war. No other achievement of the Reconstruction Administrations
showed greater wisdom or ability, or was of greater benefit to the country and
the world at large.
The popular
feeling was, however, far less positive in foreign affairs chan were the
aspirations of Seward and his successors. The pressure of debt, the excitements
of the Reconstruction struggle, and the absorbing interests of domestic
industrial development, rendered public opinion apathetic and peaceable. When a
Cuban insurrection broke out, some sympathy was manifested in the United States
for the insurgents; but Grant’s Administration had no difficulty in maintaining
a peaceful attitude, and in 1871 agreed to a treaty for settling all claims
arising from Spanish acts against American citizens. Even when, in 1873, the
Virginim, an American steamer suspected of filibustering, was seized, and fifty
of its crew were shot, Grant took no belligerent steps and accepted an
indemnity from Spain. The lack of popular interest in an expansive foreign
policy was also shown by the failure of a movement begun by Seward towards the
control of an Isthmian canal. A treaty with Nicaragua in 1868 for a right of
way across the Isthmus was successful; but a treaty with Colombia for sole
control of a Panama canal was rejected by the Senate in 1869; and another treaty
for joint control failed similarly in 1870. The utmost accomplished was a
government survey in the latter year.
But perhaps
the most striking illustration of the popular temper was the practical failure
of a movement toward territorial expansion begun by Seward and continued by
Grant, but repudiated by the country. Russia having offered in 1867 to sell
Alaska, Seward instantly agreed, made a treaty for the purchase, sent it to the
Senate, and through Sumner’s influence secured its ratification before the
public was at all aware of what was taking place. So averse was the general
feeling, however, that a serious effort was made in the House in 1868 to defeat
the appropriation of the purchase-money; and only a feeling of friendship for
Russia saved the day. At about the same time a treaty with Denmark for the
annexation of the Danish West Indies, although favoured by naval authorities,
met with obstinate popular opposition and was suppressed by the Senate. Seward
also began and Grant took up a project to annex San Domingo by treaty or by
joint resolution; but this was rejected by both the Senate and the House,
partly owing to a flavour of corruption attaching to it, but mainly because of
popular disapproval. Grant took the utmost interest in the affair, going so far
as to establish a sort of naval protectorate over San Domingo while the treaty
was pending; and his personal efforts with senators to secure ratification were
such as to involve him in a savage quarrel with Sumner; but not even his
prestige nor the desire for party harmony could coerce the reluctant Senate.
The failure of the San Domingo project in 1871
marked the
cessation for another decade of any aggressiveness in external affairs. The
country had settled all outstanding questions, and was committed to a
thoroughly conservative course.
The year 1871
marks the culmination of Republican policy. The three problems which confronted
the country in 1865 had been dealt with; and it now remained for time to test
the permanence of the settlement. All the South was once more a part of the
Federal union, wonderfully changed by an experiment in political democrat^ more
radical than any previously attempted. The debt had been partly refunded and
placed on a firm basis; the currency was pledged for redemption; the war taxes
were abolished. The country, at peace with its neighbours, had settled all
dangerous external questions successfully. But, in the process of attaining
these results, the political conditions of society had been subjected to a
terrible strain. The Union party of all loyal men, which controlled the North
in 1865, had vanished; many of its leaders were dead or had retired, or had in
disgust joined the Opposition; while its place and power had passed to a
Bepublican party, led by intense partisans, rigidly controlling every
governmental act on a party basis. This Republican party showed in the years
1865 to 1871 a forcefulness and a relentlessness of purpose not displayed by
any other group of men in the country’s history. What they wished, they did. If
pledges or conditions previously announced proved inconvenient, they were
broken without hesitation. Constitutional objections of the utmost weight
brought against their measures were absolutely disregarded, if the end to be
attained seemed necessary. Scruples, in short, were as conspicuously lacking as
indomitable purpose was visibly present. The result of their policy was that
they controlled the country, North and South, with an unyielding grip. It now
remained to be seen whether, after the solution of the great war problems, this
party domination could continue; and whether, if it should fall, its work might
not fall with it.
The six years
of Republican domination were followed by a somewhat longer period of reaction
against the measures of political and financial reconstruction, and against the
party responsible for them. To understand this a brief reference is necessary
to the economic conditions of the country and their effect upon society. The
two decades from 1865 to 1885 were marked in the United States, as elsewhere,
by an enormous development along industrial lines, aided by invention and
discovery. Railway building became at first a profitable speculation, then a
mania, lines being recklessly constructed until competition developed in extravagant
forms. Manufactures also were extremely profitable during and after the war,
and underwent great expansion. Land crazes in connexion with new railways were
frequent; and not only private but public credit was copiously lent to aid new
enterprises. Add to all this
the effects
of a redundant paper currency, a fluctuating gold premium, and continued issues
of government bonds, and it is clear that all the conditions were present for
popular recklessness and eventual disaster. During the Reconstruction struggle
social excitability found a political outlet in following the congressional
contests; but, as soon as the task of the Republican party seemed finished, the
tension relaxed, and popular restlessness showed itself in a tendency to divide
on new issues, to revolt against too rigid party dictation, and to hold the
controlling Republicans responsible for any public ills which society now had
leisure to contemplate. Accordingly reaction appeared sooner or later in every
quarter, directed against every feature of the Republican party and its policy;
and from this the Opposition, without regard to its own merits or defects, was
sure to profit.
The first
sign of a turning tide appeared while prosperity was at its height, in the
shape of a revolt against the party despotism which stood out plainly the
moment the crisis of the Reconstruction struggle had passed. The Republican
party under Grant’s administration began to show signs of moral relaxation.
Habits of disregarding legal and technical difficulties, the neglect of merely
negative virtues while the problem of saving the country was still unsolved,
and the use of unchecked power, produced their inevitable effects. The
Republican politicians regarded public offices as their own perquisites, and
exercised their control, as senators and representatives, for partisan and
personal considerations. Consequently, the period was marked by frequent cases
of corruption and much open cynicism. Of course these tendencies affected the
two parties equally; the Democratic Tammany Hall and the Republican
customs-house plundered New York city with equal impudence; but the political
domination of the Republicans made their shortcomings more prominent. Grant
professed himself heartily in favour of the new Civil Service law of 1871; but
his conduct as President unfortunately showed little comprehension of the real
purpose of public service. Grant was personally honest, but he was a poor judge
of men, susceptible to certain kinds of flattery, and extremely dependent for
advice in civil matters upon his personal friends. By the end of his term it
was common talk that he had fallen completely under the influence of a group of
Republican senators of the less elevated type; and this, with his appointments,
his amazing behaviour in the San Domingo affair, and his intolerance of
opposition, led a great many of the more moderate Republican leaders to dread
his re-election as a danger to good government.
On this issue
began the first reaction. As usual a faction quarrel gave the impetus. The
revolt first appeared in Missouri in 1870, where the Republican party divided,
and the anti-Administration wing, by a coalition with the Democrats, carried
the State. In 1871 active agitation began against Grant’s re-election, which
resulted in the calling by the
Missourians
of a Liberal National Convention, to meet at Cincinnati in May, 1872. At first
the movement seemed extremely promising, owing to the character of the leaders,
men like Trumbull of Illinois, Brown of Missouri, Julian of Indiana, Sumner and
C. F. Adams of Massachusetts; but, owing to a series of blunders, the
Convention nominated Horace Greeley, the eccentric, impulsive editor of the New
York Tribune. The candidate and the platform, which demanded acquiescence in
the results of Reconstruction while throwing its principal emphasis upon the
cry of reform, were both adopted by the Democrats on July 9,1872; but the
coalition was hopeless from the start. The country was at the height of
prosperity; Grant’s popularity with the masses was unshaken; and Greeley’s
personal peculiarities rendered him almost absurd as a rival for the war hero.
He not only could not draw more than a handful from the Bepublicans, but could
not even command full Democratic support; and the election resulted in an overwhelming
Bepublican victory, Grant carrying all the States but six, and receiving 286
electoral votes out of 360. The only result of the Liberal secession seemed to
be the political ruin of a dozen of the ablest Bepublicans, and the firmer
rivetting of the hold of a particular party upon the country.
But meanwhile
the Republican power was being undermined in a more effective way in the
Southern States, the Reconstruction policy being now subjected to a decisive
trial in all of these except Virginia, which in its first election was carried
by the whites. It is not easy to say precisely what result was expected by the
Republicans who bestowed the suffrage upon the negro. The extreme Radicals like
Sumner maintained that the mere possession of the vote would raise the negro in
all respects to the level of his late master; many others, who agreed with
Sumner that the ballot belonged to the freedman by right, were less optimistic,
and hoped at the most for a process of gradual political education; but the
majority, while willing for party reasons as well as for justice’s sake to
create a negro electorate, recognised that it was a hazardous experiment, and
entertained grave doubts as to its success. None, it may safely be said,
foresaw the actual results.
Judging from
the experience of the twelve States where the experiment was tried, it is not
too much to say that the Southern Republican party showed neither the ability
nor the will to govern well. The negroes formed the voting body, and the more
intelligent among their number commonly held office; but the real control was
in the hands of white residents of Northern origin, the “ carpet-baggers,” and
of a few Southern whites or “ scalawags.” Some of these were men of character
and honest intentions, but few were of a high order of ability, and very many
were adventurers pure and simple. One and all were imbued with an intense
partisanship which shrank from nothing that would advance the cause of the
Republican or Radical organisation. It was impossible for such a party to
provide competent officials; there were not enough educated
1868—vi] “ Carpet-baggers ” and
“ Ku Kluoc Klan."
641
men among
them to fill the positions; and the result was in very many localities to place
civil, judicial, and local offices in the hands of corrupt whites or illiterate
negroes.
The
characteristic of this regime, stated briefly, was misgovemment of every
degree, from simple inefficiency and extravagance to appalling corruption and
tyranny. Offices were multiplied, and salaries doubled and trebled; government
printing was lavishly granted for building up a party press in every county;
bonds were issued in aid of railroads which were never built, or in behalf of
other schemes resting on thin air. Embezzlement by corrupt whites and blacks
was wide-spread; and in South Carolina, where public morals reached their
lowest depth of degradation, the members of the legislature and the executive
officials helped themselves freely from the public treasury. Bribery in legislation
was common; and the administration of justice was frequently a scandal. Courts
were partisan, and governors facile. It was hard to convict a Republican
offender; and, if convicted, he was almost certain to be pardoned. Taxation
mounted enormously; for, since it fell, of course, not on the former slaves but
on the whites, property was absolutely divorced from government. It cost “
carpet-baggers” nothing to squander money which was furnished by their
political opponents. To crown all, the personal character of very many negro
and white Republican officials was notoriously immoral.
This
condition of things, it is needless to say, was regarded by Southern whites as
the destruction of human civilisation. Original Secessionists and Unionists
alike were immediately welded into a party with one absorbing purpose—to put an
end to “carpet-bag” rule. Overmatched at first in point of numbers, they were
driven by their anger and disgust at negro supremacy into expedients which
their knowledge of negro weaknesses suggested; and the years 1866 to 1871 saw
the rise of the “ Ku Khix Klan,” a secret society of disguised night- riders,
who terrified, whipped, and finally began to murder negro leaders and
“carpet-baggers.” Open race-conflicts, too, were frequent; and after every
brawl or shooting affray the report of negroes killed and wounded showed the
deadly purpose of the former slaveholders. The State governments in vain
retorted by passing severe laws, and arming a “ loyal,” that is negro, militia.
Every election became a fight for life, the Democrats trying to intimidate the
negroes, the “ carpet-baggers ” using every means in their power to retain
control, throwing out votes, cancelling returns, and ejecting Democratic
claimants. In the years after 1868 the whole South seemed to be in anarchy, the
lower elements on both sides exhibiting the worst passions of humanity. Murder,
violence, and a consuming race-hatred seemed pitted against utterly
unscrupulous misgovemment and tyranny.
In such
circumstances the Republicans controlling Congress and the executive could not
fail to intervene. Congressional investigating
642 Breakdown of “
Carpet-bag ” governments. [1870-7
committees
held inquests and collected testimony of such a character as to lead the
majority to pass, in May, 1870, an “ Enforcement Act,” whereby any conspiracy
to deprive the negroes of rights guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment was made
punishable by Federal process. This not proving successful, a second Act, known
as the “ Ku Klnx Act,” still more drastic in its effect, was passed in April,
1871; and in 1875 a Supplementary Civil Rights Act was added, which aimed at
enforcing full social equality for negroes in theatres, hotels, and public
conveyances. At the same time, by Acts of 1871 and 1872, all Federal elections
were placed under the control of Federal authorities; and under these Acts
hundreds of arrests were made and convictions secured. The President, on his
part, used troops freely to aid the struggling “carpet-bag” governments; and
scenes repellent to all but extreme partisans frequently took place, when
Federal troops, at the word of a Republican governor, broke up legislatures
claiming to be legally constituted, or ejected State officials. In Louisiana,
especially, these interventions became habitual; but Grant grew weary of the
“annual autumnal outbreaks,” and occasionally in his second term refused aid.
Under the “ Ku Klnx Act ” Grant also proclaimed martial law for a while in part
of South Carolina.
But, though
these measures succeeded in curbing the open outrages, they failed in effecting
their main purpose. In spite of troops, Federal election laws, and the
unscrupulous defence of the “ carpet-baggers,” the negro governments broke down
one after another. The weaker race could not hold its own in such a contest;
faction quarrels weakened the Republican organisations; and in the end the
whites triumphed. Tennessee turned Democratic in 1869; West Virginia, Missouri,
and North Carolina in 1870; Georgia in 1871; Alabama, Texas, and Arkansas,
after a hard struggle, in 1874; Mississippi, after a desperate campaign, in
1875; and only Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina remained Republican in
the election of 1876. These three played a decisive part in the presidential
struggle of that year, as will be shown later; but, upon the withdrawal of
troops from them in 1877, the Republican governments collapsed, and all three
passed into the hands of the whites. In each State the overthrow of the
“carpet-baggers” was followed by reforms in administration, reduction of
expenses and taxation, and, in many cases, by new State constitutions and the
repudiation of fraudulent debt. During the same period, in spite of Federal
election laws, the number of Republicans in Congress from the reconstructed
States ran rapidly down from 20 senators and 40 representatives in 1869 to two
senators and four representatives in 1877. The ruin of Republican
Reconstruction as a party policy was complete within ten years, after its
establishment.
Meanwhile
financial reconstruction had been endangered by a sudden industrial crisis,
which, with its subsequent years of hard times, wrecked at a blow the
Republican financial prestige. The panic of 1873 came as
the
inevitable result of an abnormal, industrial expansion; banks and speculative
railways fell together; and prices dropped until, for a time, all industry
seemed to be at a standstill. For some years there were no signs of reviving
prosperity; and a great cry for relief went up, which took the form of a demand
for currency inflation, both parties being affected; The result was an epoch of
exceedingly confused financial legislation, during which the Republican policy
barely escaped destruction. In 1874, Secretary Richardson, on his own motion,
reissued “greenr backs ”; and Congress, in a panic, passed the so-called “
Inflation Act,” increasing the circulation of legal tenders and national
bank-notes. This Grant fortunately vetoed; and a year later the same Congress,
in a saner mood, passed an Act for the resumption of specie payments in 1879
which tended to restore the party’s credit. But immediately a new danger
appeared in a movement for free silver coinage* also inspired by inflationist
sentiment; since the silver dollar, demonetised in 1873 as overvalued and
obsolete, had suddenly fallen in value, owing partly to the demonetisation of
silver by Germany in 1873, but still more to the enormous silver production
following the opening of the rich Nevada mines. Repeated attempts were made in
the Congresses of 1875 and 1877 to repeal the Resumption Act and enact free-coinage
bills; and, although the Senate blocked the first of these, it did not succeed
in preventing the second. In 1878 the Bland-Allison Act was passed, by which
the coinage of from two to four million dollars of silver per month was made
obligatory. Congress at the same moment by resolution declared all bonds to be
payable in silver.
In spite of
this action, Secretary Sherman managed with great skill, during the years 1877
and 1878, to pave the way for resumption, and, in spite of the outcries of silver
men and inflationists, succeeded in selling bonds and accumulating a reserve.
On January 1, 1879, he actually resumed specie payment. He was doubtless much
aided by a combination of good crops and heavy agricultural exports; but the
credit none the less belonged to him and his party, although at the moment of
resumption they had helped to damage the measure by the injection of silver
into the government currency. The years 1872-9 were financially perilous; but,
largely oving to fortune, the reaction failed to carry the day. Specie
resumption marks its end.
The reaction
against Republican official errors, which failed so completely in the Greeley
campaign, returned again with redoubled force in Grant’s second term. It was a
time of absorption in things material and domestic. In foreign affairs the
years 1872-8 were marked by stagnation, a few commercial, extradition, and
naturalisation treaties beirg the only evidences of diplomatic activity.
Cabinet ministers and Congressmen alike were swept along in the current of the
new industrial materialism to such an extent that an epidemic of scandals broke
out between 1872 and 1876. The “Credit Mobilier,” a
644
Governmental
demoralisation. [1872-6
corporation
which received the contract to construct the Union Pacific Railway, was proved
on investigation to have distributed large blocks of shares among members of
Congress^ whose reputations were ruined. A little later, extensive corruption
in the collection of the internal revenue, connected with the so-called Whiskey
Ring, was discovered by Secretary Bristow, and traced close to one of Grant’s
confidential friends; and, while this was being aired, Grant’s Secretary of War
was discovered to have accepted a bribe, and only escaped impeachment by prompt
resignation. Last of all, Blaine, the Republican Speaker and leader of the
House, was accused of having sold his official influence in return for railway
stock, and was unable to clear himself satisfactorily. These were years, also,
of flagrant use of offices for spoils, especially after Congress in 1874 had
refused to continue any appropriation for the Civil Service • Commission. The
disgust of all thinking men with this state of things reached its culmination
when Congress, in 1873, raised the salaries of its own members, voting money
into its own pockets with the effrontery of a “carpet-bag” legislature. In all
this both parties were on the same level; but the Democrats had the advantage
of being in opposition and hence escaping responsibility* At the same time
popular regard for the negro governments, at first strong in the North, had
been seriously shaken by their glaring defects. Times were ripe for a political
revulsion.
Party lines
were not, however, easily disturbed, as the Greeley episode showed. The bitter
struggles, of the years 1865-70 had created two organisations whose antagonisms
seemed irreconcilable, and whose members were bound together by ties unrelated
to reason. Nothing but some sharp shock could unsettle this tenacity, as was
shown by the unvarying succession of party votes in the North. The panic of
1873 supplied the shock required, and for the moment rendered Republicans and
Democrats conscious of the evils of the situation. The excesses of the spoils
system, the Congressional and executive scandals, and the immorality of the
“carpet-bag” governments, joined with economic distress to cause a sudden
Democratic “ land-slide.” In 1873 the Democrats gained six Northern States; in
1874 they swept the Congressional elections by a two-thirds majority; and in
1875 they continued to hold their own. The Republicans, feeling the solid earth
crumbling under them, began to set their house in order, correct abuses, and
advocate reform; but thei hard times continued; and, before they could regain
popular favour, the election of 1876 was upon them.
It was a
critical moment. The choice of a Democratic President would mean the immediate
undoing of Reconstruction; and the Republicans used every means in their power
to retain the control of affairs. In the crisis many of the Administration
leaders urged the nomination of Grant for a third term; and Grant himself
professed willingness to accept. Against this proposal, which not only ran
counter to a precedent
obeyed since
the time of Washington, but also seemed to threaten a continuation of all the
worst features of Republican supremacy, every conservative and reforming
element in the country protested; and the House of Representatives, by an
almost unanimous vote, stigmatised the plan as “ unwise, unpatriotic, and
fraught with peril to our free institutions.” This killed the third term
movement, and encouraged all the better elements of the Republican party at the
Convention, which met in June, 1876, at Cincinnati, to unite in nominating
Governor Hayes of Ohio, whose record showed him to be sound on financial
matters and favourable to governmental reform, over Blaine, whose popularity
was clouded by a charge of corruption. The platform promised reform, sound
finance, and the maintenance of the reconstruction measures. The Democrats, on
their part, presented Governor Tilden of New York, a candidate representing the
conservative wing of the party, and prominent as a reformer through his recent
share in overthrowing the Tammany ring in New York city. Their platform
condemned Republican corruption in the Federal and “carpet-bag” governments,
and denounced the Specie Resumption Act as a hindrance to resumption.
The election
which followed proved to be one of the most exciting in the history of the
country, since an alarming dilemma arose from the fact that in the three
remaining “ carpet-bag” States the returns, as usual, were in doubt, and these
held the balance between the candidates. Since the Senate was Republican and
the House Democratic, a partisan insistence by either might prevent any
counting of the electoral vote, and might thus leave the country with no legal
executive after March 4, 1877. To avoid this danger, the Houses agreed upon a
compromise, by which the question of the vote in these three States and in
Oregon was submitted to an Electoral Commission composed of five members of
each House and five judges of the Supreme Court; the decision of the Commission
to stand unless overruled by both Houses. As it turned out, the Commission,
intended to be impartial, proved to consist of eight Republicans and seven
Democrats; and it decided every question in favour of the Republicans by a vote
of eight to seven. Since the Senate declined to overrule these decisions, they
remained valid; and in this way Hayes was declared elected by 185 votes to 184.
The anger of the Democrats over this last triumph of the “carpet-bag” system
was extreme; but ‘the nation acquiesced, and Hayes was inaugurated. The whole
affair was permeated with blind partisanship and tainted by rumours of corruption,
and stands as a discreditable episode for nearly everyone engaged in it with
the exception of Hayes .himself.
The election
of Hayes maintained Republican control of the executive ; but although the new
President appointed a liberal Cabinet, made admirable reforms in
administration, and withdrew Federal troops from the South, the tide kept on
running against the party. Hard times continued, intensified in 1877 by a
severe railway strike in the Central
States
productive of violence and rioting; and the Democrats continued to control
important States like Ohio and New York, beside carrying both Houses of
Congress in 1878. At the same time a new party sprang up and rapidly grew into
importance upon a platform calling for the repeal of the Specie Resumption Act
and the issue of a currency of government paper. In the years after 1872 there
had appeared a non-partisan farmers’ movement in the West, in the form of
societies known as “ Granges,” agitating against railway monopolies and
discriminations. When the panic occurred, these led to the National or
“Greenback” party, which made its first campaign in 1876, nominating Peter
Cooper, a well-known New York philanthropist, and casting a small vote mainly
in the Grange States; but in 1877 and 1878 its numbers swelled fivefold, and
the organisation spread all over the North, drawing mainly from the Democrats.
It carried one State, Maine, in coalition with the Democrats, and elected
sixteen members to the House.
During their
period of Congressional control, the Democratic party made an attempt to break
down the Federal election laws by forbidding the use of troops and refusing
appropriations for marshals and deputies. At first the struggle was between a
Democratic House and a Republican Senate, later between Hayes and a united
Democratic Congress; but, although the Democrats were persistent, Hayes
unflinchingly vetoed every provision of this character, even when attached as a
“ rider ” to a general appropriation bill. This wrangling struggle lasted
during the greater part of Hayes’s administration, and led to no less than
seven vetoes and the occasional failure of army and judicial appropriations;
but the President triumphed, for the Democrats lacked the two-thirds majorities
necessary to override him. The utmost gained was the passage of an Act
forbidding the use of Federal troops as a posse comitatus. This Democratic
policy did not help their party, for it seemed more factious than
statesmanlike; and when, in 1879, the agricultural discontent was suddenly
ended by a crop failure in Europe, with a great rise in the price of wheat, and
at the same time the resumption of specie payment was accomplished, it became
evident that the reaction was at an end. In the elections of 1879 great
Republican gains appeared; the large States of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York
were easily carried; and the “ greenback ” vote fell off.
The period
thus terminated may be regarded as resulting in a drawn battle. The Republican
party of 1868, With its reconstructed South, its financial pledges, and its
complete mastery over the country, had undergone a series of defeats; but by
good fortune the party had not been crushed, nor had all its measures been
reversed. The Reconstruction policy, it is true, had by 1879 become an almost
hopeless failure. The negroes had abundantly shown their incapacity for decent
government; the Southern States had all been regained by “ rebels ”; and all
that remained of the programme so relentlessly forced through in 1867-721 was
the judicial
protection which the negroes might derive from the three constitutional
amendments and a number of almost useless statutes. The financial policy
proclaimed in 1869 and 1870 had fared better, specie payment having been
finally resumed, and the worst inflationist schemes defeated. By 1879 the two
parties had settled into an equilibrium ; and, while the organisations
remained firm and party feeling high, people in the North were beginning to
tire of the dismal Southern question, and to show a willingness to divide on
the new issues. The war problems were ready to be shelved so soon as parties
and leaders could readjust themselves to altered political sentiment.
After the
period of reaction came a series of peculiarly barren years, during which many
observers, both European and American, agreed that political life in the
Bepublic was in a fatally diseased condition, the reason being that the parties
created in the Reconstruction period and based on practically dead issues
continued to struggle for office and to command support, without regard to the
actual questions of the day. In reality, however, these years saw not only the
end of the old issues but the beginning of new ones, and prepared the way for a
return in the near future to healthier political activity.
As in the
preceding decade, economic interests dominated private and public life. These
years began with a recovery from the long depression after 1873; railroad
building again became almost a craze; immigration poured into the West; and the
grain crop and grain exports became the gauge of prosperity over a large part
of the country. Manufactures also continued their expansion. After several
years of abnormal profits from large grain crops in America and short harvests
in Europe, the tide turned; and the price of wheat sank rapidly, so that by
1884 the agricultural States were again depressed. Simultaneously the growth of
speculation resulted in a brisk panic on the New York Stock Exchange in the
spring of 1884, which did not, however, produce results comparable to those of 1873.
On the whole these were years of prosperity; and throughout them financial and
industrial questions occupied the public mind to the exclusion of old issues.
Under such
conditions the Southern whites continued undisturbed their task of destroying
the traces of Beconstruction. The political life of the South centred in one
feature—a burning hatred of the Bepub- lican party, and the determination to
prevent any recurrence of “ carpetbag ” government. In fact, social as well as
political life became based on the one idea of white supremacy. When once the
negro governments were overthrown, violence was laid aside for systematic
trickery and fraud. “ Gerrymandering ” was reduced to a science, as in the
famous “Shoe-string” district of Mississippi or the “Dumb-bell” of South
Carolina, where negro counties were grouped together for representative
purposes. “Ballot-stuffing” and eveiy variety of imposture upon an
ignorant and
credulous race were habitual at elections; and the upshot was the entire
impotence and virtual disappearance of the Southern Republican party except at
congressional and presidential elections. In some States even the pretence of
running a ticket was abandoned. The “solid South” feared by Stevens and Sumner
in 1865 was henceforward a reality.
Simultaneously
a series of decisions by the Supreme Court nullified to a considerable extent
the powers assumed by the Federal government under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. It was in the Slaughter House Cases (1873), that the Court first proclaimed
the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment, in guaranteeing the rights of
citizens of the United States against infringement by the States, was not meant
to interfere with the “police power” exercised by the States in legislating for
the public health, safety, or convenience. The decisions in later cases along
this line—such as Bartemeyer v. Iowa (1875), permitting a State law prohibiting
the manufacture of liquor; and Murni v. Illinois (1877), allowing a State to
fix rates for grain-elevators—carried the doctrine further, until by 1885 it
had become perfectly evident that the Court’s purpose was rather to restrict
than to extend Federal power under that Amendment. But still more significant
were decisions which gradually undermined the Reconstruction laws passed to
enforce these Amendments. In 1875, in United States v. Reeve, and in 1882, in
United States v. Harris, so much of the Force Act of 1870 and the Ku Klux Act
of 1871 as purported to punish individuals for conspiring to deprive negroes of
their rights under the last two Amendments was declared unconstitutional, the
Court holding that the Amendments applied only to State action. For the same
reason the Court in 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, declared the Supplementary
Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional. With these decisions the enforcement
legislation was practically disposed of. Reconstruction was not only dead, but
buried beyond hope of resurrection.
As
the Reconstruction issue vanished from the stage, so the financial issue ceased
in these years to be of any great significance, industrial and agricultural
prosperity turning the farmer’s mind away from inflationist dreams, and
allowing the silver question to rest undisturbed. With prosperity the
“Greenback” party rapidly declined; and it was the irony of fate that in 1884,
when they ran their last presidential ticket, the Supreme Court, in the case of
Juillard v. Greenman, reaffirmed the doctrine that the issue of government
legal tender notes in time of peace was constitutional. ,
In the place
of the two great issues growing out of the Civil War, but now practically
abandoned, the country began to turn once more to problems of external policy
and internal government. This was marked, in the field of diplomacy, by the
reappearance of a vigorous foreign policy, lacking since the days of Seward and
Fish. Commercial treaties
1878-85]
649
continued to
be concluded, the most important being that made with China in 1880, by which
the treaty of 1868 was considerably modified, at the demand of the Pacific
Coast States, so as to limit immigration. Treaties indicating a new tendency
were those of 1878 with Samoa and of 1884 with Hawaii for coaling-stations—a
provision not thought necessary in Seward’s time. The United States also showed
a willingness to act in international affairs, ratifying conventions for an
International Bureau of Weights and Measures in 1878, the Geneva Convention of
1864 with amendments in 1882, and conventions for the protection of industrial
property and international cables in 1883 and 1884. A still more significant
innovation was a tendency shown by Congress and by Secretary Blaine to assume
an aggressive policy with regard to the interests of the United States in
Central and South America. Blaine endeavoured to interpose between Chili and
her defeated enemies, Bolivia and Peru, with an offer of arbitration; but Chili
resented the attitude of the United States; and the proposal was dropped by
Blaine’s successor. At the same time Congress took a lively interest in the
Panama projects of De Lesseps and his company, and revived the scheme of a
purely American Nicaragua Canal by requesting the President, in 1880, to secure
the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Blaine undertook the task, and entered
upon a correspondence with the British government. He also called a
pan-American Congress for 1882. But neither of these efforts succeeded, the
British government showing no willingness to consent to an abrogation, and the
pan- American Congress being abandoned as impracticable. A treaty, however, was
actually concluded with Nicaragua in 1884, acquiring for the United States the
right of a protectorate over a canal. These movements, although unproductive at
the time, were evidently forerunners of a new departure in foreign policy. The
time was foreshadowed when the quiescence of the years after 1865 would be
abandoned for greater activity in foreign affairs.
The matters
of domestic interest confronting Congress were revivals of questions
temporarily settled a decade earlier. The reform of the Civil Service had been
an issue in 1874 and 1876; but, although Hayes had by executive order subjected
to examination candidates for appointment to certain offices, the Democratic
Congresses of 1875 to 1881 took no action. With the accession of President
Garfield, the pressure for partisan removals and appointments became severe.
Before the new Administration was three months old a public quarrel about
patronage broke out between the President and the New York Senators, Conkling
and Platt, who wished to dictate all appointments in their State. Both senators
resigned, seeking re-election from their State legislature as a personal
vindication; but they miscalculated their strength and failed to be returned.
Almost immediately afterwards the disgust of the country over the affair was
tinned to horror, when
650
The Civil Service and
the Tariff.
[1882-5
a half-crazy
adherent of Conkling, a disappointed office-seeker, shot the President in July,
1881. Driven by a popular outcry, Congress sldwly jnd rather reluctantly passed
an Act establishing a Civil Service Commission, and empowering the President to
extend to the departments the rules of appointment after competitive
examination. The number of offices included was small, but the reform was
fairly established ; and, on this occasion, Congress did not, as ten years
before, immediately undo its own work.
The other
question now revived was that of the tariff. This matter had been fairly
prominent in 1872, but had dropped out of sight during the years of depression,
until, in the years 1879 to 1885, a great surplus revenue brought • it again to
the front. It soon appeared that the Western States were desirous of a
reduction, while the Eastern States, the seat of the country’s manufacturing
industries, were extremely averse from any diminution of the protection enjoyed
by them for twenty years under the war tariff. At the recommendation of
President Arthur, Congress in 1882 established a Tariff Commission, which took
evidence, and in the next session reported a bill making some reductions. After
much debate and some very sharp parliamentary management, a Tariff Bill of a
strongly protective character was passed, lowering duties on a few articles
where the rates still remained prohibitory, but actually increasing them upon
many others. The tariff question was not, of course, laid at rest by any such
measure; and in the next Congress an attempt was made to lower all rates by 10
per cent. This failed by a narrow majority, and left the tariff question still
pending in 1884, the surplus revenue continuing in spite of the panic of that
year. The tariff, then, apart from the Civil Service, was the principal subject
of debate between 1880 and 1884; and this leads to the consideration of parties
in this period, and the manner in which the tariff question came gradually to
affect them.
Both parties
from 1879 to 1884 showed marks of fossilisation. The questions which had caused
their division were practically laid at rest; and yet never were organisations
more active, partisanship more rigid, or campaigns more vigorous. The members
of each party were held together by a tradition and a loyalty akin to religious
faith, which led to a fixity in party votes that made the results of State
elections, except in years of unusual excitement, perfectly easy to predict.
This fixity had however no relation to legislative action, and did not prevent
influential members of the parties from holding opposite opinions on public
questions. In elections neither party dared to commit itself, since the taking
of any decisive ground for or against anything beyond the traditional issues
risked the defection of a number of adherents, small in any one region but
large enough, in the East or the West as a whole, to cause the loss of
Congressmen or electors. The result was that each party in Congress, from 1874
onward, divided freely on every
1874-84]
Political tendencies
and methods.
651
issue but
that of Reconstruction. The Tariff Acts of 1872 and 1875, the Inflation Act of
1874, the bills to restore specie payment and to repeal the restoration, and
the Bland Silver Act, had shown Republicans and Democrats voting on both sides.
It was almost impossible to draw from the platforms of the two parties any
clear distinctions between them on most public questions; and it was this fact
which observers in this period found alarming.
When,
however, the tariff question came up again in the years after 1880, it became
evident that, with favourable circumstances, the question of revenue reform
might become an issue between parties. The Republicans were unquestionably
committed to protection. They had framed the tariffs, had adjusted them to suit
the demands of particular industries, and drew their chief support from the
manufacturing and industrial States. Beside the tradition of past services, the
party was indispensable to protectionists, as being their defence against a
free-trade agricultural West and South. There were individual free-traders, or
tariff reformers, among the Republicans; but the party vote on the measures of
1883 and 1884 was practically unanimous. With the Democrats the situation was
less clear. While the majority favoured tariff reduction, there was a
considerable minority from the Eastern States, led by Randall of Pennsylvania,
who were as fully devoted to high protection as their Republican neighbours.
This was shown in the votes of 1883 and 1884, when 16 Democrats out of 138, and
41 out of 198, respectively, voted for protection. Nevertheless the situation
was such as to foreshadow a direct conflict between the two parties on this
issue ; for the Democrats were easily capable of being led whither their
leaders wished; and these, with the exception of Randall, were all for tariff
reform in 1884. The time had not yet come, but it was near at hand.
In default of
issues, the parties of these years relied upon organisation and machinery.
Perfection in the manipulation of “ caucus ” and convention was attained by
many men at this time, who in their respective cities or States stood forward
as “ bosses,” or dictators of nominations and party programmes. This evil—for
as such it was regarded by many— was more prominent in the Republican party
than the Democratic, since the former controlled more States in the North; but there
is no reason for holding one party more guilty than the other. The hordes of
foreign immigrants settling in the great cities, the rise of a labour class
with the spread of factories, and the necessity of finding some way of holding
parties together in default of issues, made such a development inevitable. But
the years 1878-84 were also rendered noteworthy by the rise of a group of
Independents in politics, mostly of Republican antecedents, who censured the
abuses of party machinery, and declared their intention to vote without regard
to party lines. Such utterances, it is true, impressed the average voter of
1880 as akin to blasphemy; but the rise of independence in politics was
destined to have important results.
The political
struggles of these years were accordingly of a peculiarly barren and mechanical
character; and yet their outcome was of considerable significance. In 1879, as
has already been said, an agricultural revival - turned popular favour to the
Republicans,, who regained lost ground, and in 1880 came with confidence to the
presidential election. At the National Convention a prolonged struggle between
the adherents of Grant, who urged the election of the war hero for a third
term, and Blaine, who had come near success in 1876, was ended by a dramatic “
stampede ” to Garfield, one of the more liberal Reconstruction leaders, with
Arthur (representing the “machine” element) for Vice-President. Against them
the Democrats nominated a military candidate, General Hancock, but without much
hope of success. The chief element in the platforms of the two parties was
eulogy of themselves and abuse of their opponents; but there was an apparent
issue on the tariff, the Republicans demanding a tariff for protection, the
Democrats one for revenue only. The campaign proved listless, the Democrats
seeming more anxious to avoid debating the tariff than to meet the Republicans;
and the country, elated by the wave of prosperity, gave Garfield a safe
majority of 214 electors against 155, while the “Greenbackers” cast about
300,000 votes and carried no States. The vote was almost purely sectional,
Hancock carrying all the Southern States, but, outside these, only California,
Nevada, and New Jersey; nevertheless the Southern question was not a serious
issue in the campaign. The Republicans had no intention of renewing the
“carpet-bag” regime, nor did they carry Congress by a sufficiently large
majority to permit them to override the Opposition.
The
victorious party was mainly interested in attempting to reduce the surplus by
extravagant appropriations, passing a River and Harbour Bill of unheard-of
dimensions over the veto of President Arthur in 1882. This action, the quarrels
of the Republicans over spoils, and their failure promptly to reduce the tariff
or pass a Civil Service Act, combined with a decline in agricultural prices to
cause another Democratic “ land-slide ” in 1882; after which, in its second
session, the chastened Congress passed. both the Tariff and the Civil Service
Commission Acts. The House elected in 1882 was Democratic by a majority of 198
to 124; but the Senate was Republican; and no decisive results followed this
victory. In 1883 a number of States, which the Democrats had carried in 1882,
swung back to Republican control; and in the election of 1884 each party felt
that it had an even chance. The partisan struggles of these years had brought
no apparent change.
Bat the
election of 1884 showed by its result that the time for change was at hand. The
real issues before the country were good government and the tariff; and it was
these that mainly decided the contest. The Republicans failed to appreciate the
situation, and, instead of selecting a candidate identified with new issues,
nominated the twice-defeated
aspirant,
Blaine. He was one of the few great Reconstruction leaders left in politics,
and in spite of his ability and personal popularity he was tainted, whether
justly or not, by the suspicion of unscrupulousness which attached to so many
of the Bepublican leaders of Grant’s time. The Democrats, with greater wisdom,
imitated their procedure of 1876 by nominating Grover Cleveland, Governor of
New York, who had a reputation as a practical, business-like reformer; and they
were at once joined by a great number of prominent and influential Independents
who declined to trust Blaine’s integrity or good judgment. Many of these
“Mugwumps” were free-traders, whose discontent in Bepublican ranks made them
the more ready to use this method of escape. The personality of the candidates
was the main issue in the campaign, since the platform, verbose beyond all
precedent, contained little of significance or of difference, except a demand
for Protection on the part of the Bepublicans and a laboured and hopelessly
obscure advocacy of tariff reform on that of the Democrats. The contest
involved the tariff to some extent, but soon centred in the candidates’
respective merits, and finally sank into personal defamation and vulgarity
beyond all bounds of decency. In an extremely close election, the “Mugwump”
defection and the financial stringency of the year turned the tide; and
Cleveland succeeded by 219 to 182. The party vote in general remained unaltered
from the preceding two elections, showing that party rigidity still continued;
hut the slight change of a few Independents in a few States decided the result.
The election
of Grover Cleveland and his inauguration in 1885 mark the end of an epoch in
the history of the United States. The long Republican control, lasting since
Lincoln, was broken; and the accession of a Democratic President elected by the
votes of the “solid South,” with the aid of a comparatively few Northerners,
over one of the leaders of the Reconstruction period, presents the very result
which the Radicals of 1867 meant to render impossible. The North, in fact, had
accepted the failure of Reconstruction as it had accepted the other positive
results of the war, and showed its readiness to dismiss the whole subject by
electing a Democrat upon the single issue of good government, with the tariff
in the background.
By this time
the old issues were shelved by the action of the Supreme Court, the failure of
the “ Greenback ” party, and the success of specie resumption, and still more
by the disappearance of the Reconstruction leaders of an earlier generation.
The earlier statesmen on both sides— Stevens, Wade, Chase, Seward, Stanton,
Sumner, Greeley—all died while the contest was raging, and by 1885 nearly all
of the others were out of politics. Johnson, Chandler, Colfax, and Garfield
were dead; Grant, Conkling, Thurman, and Schurz were in retirement. Edmunds,
Sherman, Bayard, and a few other older senators were still active, but were outnumbered
by younger colleagues; and Blaine, most prominent of all,
had just been
beaten by a comparatively unknown man. In the place of these a new race of
leaders had come up, in whom the passions of the Civil War did not burn as in
those who had fought the fight through —a cooler tempered race, less masterful,
and inclined to rely on business methods rather than on the iron hand. Among
the voters, too, the veterans were now outnumbered by hundreds of thousands who
did n®t come to manhood until after 1871, and by masses of foreign-born
immigrants. This new electorate had settled into the mechanism of the old
parties, but it was held together by no such ties as those that bound the older
Democrats and Republicans. In the South, of course, the case was different.
There the Reconstruction period had left ineffaceable traces in the permanent
incorporation of the race question in society and politics; but outside the
South the times were ripe for a change; and the new tendencies of the years
1879 to 1885 marked the path which the new developments were to follow.
In looking at
the Reconstruction period as a whole we find a prolonged and involved
struggle, dramatic at times, but seldom heroic. It lacks the moral intensity of
the earlier slavery controversy, or of the war which followed, and takes its
tone from a partisan and rather reckless society. We find the unrelenting use
of strength without accompanying coolness of judgment, contests of more
bitterness than dignity, and, above all, the marks of an attempt to reverse the
order of nature. The years 1865-85 display in the United States a parallel to
the simultaneous efforts of liberal reform in Europe. In each continent the
solution of problems of national sovereignty, first attempted by the sword,
was continued by masterful legislation, the result of the mingled influence of
the fading doctrinaire liberalism and of a new materialistic political thought.
On both continents the attempt to subvert the rooted habits and beliefs of
generations failed; in Europe when in the Culturkanrvpf the Catholic Church
emerged victorious; in America when the effort to place the negro on an equality
with his former master broke down. With these defeats the last victory of
abstract liberalism crumbled; and the way was cleared for new questions of
national growth and international politics, and for new political creeds.
THE UNITED
STATES AS A WORLD-POWER.
(1885—1902.)
Although the inauguration on March 4,1885, of
Grover Cleveland, the nominee of the Democratic party, as President, marked the
end of twenty-four years of continuous Republican administration, the
transition was not attended by symptoms of radical change. An eminent orator,
who afterwards declined to support Blaine for the Presidency, had, in a speech
at the Republican National Convention of 1884, described the Democratic party
as “very hungry and very thirsty.” The implication that the Federal offices
were then held almost exclusively by Republicans was quite true. It had been
the practice of the great political parties, when in power, to fill vacancies
in office with their own adherents, there being no marked difference of opinion
except as to the extent to which vacancies should be created by removals on
political grounds. But the Act of January 16, 1883, “ to regulate and improve
the civil service of the United States,” laid the foundation of a system
designed to place the bulk of Federal posts beyond the reach of political
contests; and with this system the new President was known to be entirely in
accord. His declaration that “ public office is a public trust” was one of the
watchwords of the campaign; and his practical application of the principle,
first as mayor of Buffalo, and then as governor of the State of New York, had
helped to win for him as a national candidate the support of many leading men
who were devoted to the cause of Civil Service Reform. While, therefore, the
political transition was necessarily accompanied by many changes in office, it
was distinguished by an obvious effort to observe the provisions of the law in
spirit as well as in letter.
Nor was there
any sudden and violent rupture in matters of policy. In his first annual
message to Congress (December 8, 1885), President Cleveland stated that there
were “no questions of difficulty pending with any foreign government.” In his
review of foreign affairs, the
656
The Nicaraguan
Canal.—The Tariff.
[1885
largest place
was given to the question of an interoceanic canal. Under the previous
Administration a treaty had been concluded with Nicaragua for the construction
by the United States and at its sole cost of a canal through Nicaraguan
territory, to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This treaty had been
submitted to the Senate; but no definitive action upon it had been taken. In
some quarters the objection was made that it committed the United States to a
scheme of joint action and political alliance with Nicaragua, while in others
the stipulations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were urged as an obstacle to
ratification. President Cleveland, soon after his inauguration, withdrew the
treaty from the Senate; and in his annual message to Congress he declared his
intention not to submit it again. Adhering, as he said, “to the tenets of a
line of precedents from Washington’s day, which proscribe entangling alliances
with foreign States,” he was “unable to recommend propositions involving
paramount privileges of ownership or right outside of our own territory, when
coupled with absolute and unlimited engagements to defend the territorial
integrity of the State where such interests lie.” He moreover affirmed that any
highway that might be constructed across the isthmus “must be for the world’s
benefit, a trust for mankind, to be removed from the chance of domination by
any single Power, nor become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize
for warlike ambition ”; and he quoted with approval the words of Cass, while
Secretary of State in 1858, that “What the United States Want in Central
America, next to the happiness of its people, is the security and neutrality of
the interoceanic routes which lead through it.”
With regard
to the question of the tariff, which was so soon to overshadow all other
issues, the President said little. The fact that the revenue for the preceding
fiscal year had exceeded the expenditure led him to recommend a reduction of
taxes; but he added that “justice and fairness ” dictated that, in any modification
of existing laws, “ the industries and interests which have been encouraged by
such laws, and in which our citizens have large investments, should not be
ruthlessly injured or destroyed ”; that the subject should be dealt with “ in
such manner as to protect the interests of American labour,” whose remuneration
furnished “ the most justifiable pretext for a protective policy ”; and that, “
within these limitations, a certain reduction should be made in our customs
revenue,” particularly in respect of taxes “upon the imported necessaries of
life.” In these phrases, the advocates of a protective tariff scented no
special danger.
But there was
another subject which President Cleveland, besides devoting to it the largest
place in his message, discussed with a directness and precision that none
could mistake. This was the subject of currency reform, a cause with which, by
reason of the high and inflexible resolution with which he maintained and
advanced it, against opposition
in both
parties and at the sacrifice of personal popularity, his fame will be
peculiarly identified. In presenting it to Congress, he stated that under the
law of February, 1878, by which the government was required to purchase and
coin silver bullion at the rate of more than $2,000,000 a month, more than
215,000,000 silver dollars, which were each worth only eighty cents as compared
with gold, had been coined, while only 50,000,000 had actually found. their way
into circulation, leaving more than 165,000,000 in the possession of the
government, against which there were outstanding $93,000,300 in silver
certificates. As the silver thus coined was made legal tender for all debts and
dues, a large proport’on of what was issued found its way back into the
Treasury. The hoar' mg of gold had, so the President declared, already begun;
and the country had been saved from disaster only by careful management and
unusual expedients, by a combins v,ion of fortunate conditions, and
by a confident expectation that the course of the government would be speedily
changed. “ Prosperity,” said the President, “ hesitates upon our threshold
because of the dangers and uncertainties surrounding this question. .. .No
interest appeals to us so strongly for a safe and stable currency as the vast
army of the unemployed. I recommend the suspension of the compulsory coinage of
silver dollars, directed by the law passed in February, 1878.” This
recommendation was not adopted.
The lack of “
questions of difficulty” with foreign governments was supplied early in 1886 by
the revival of the controversy with Great Britain touching the fisheries
adjacent to the eastern coasts of British North America. Under the treaty of
peace of 1783, not only were American fishermen acknowledged to have the right
to take fish on the banks of Newfoundland, n the Gulf of St Lawrence, and at
all other places in the sea, but they also enjoyed the liberty of taking fish
on the coasts of British America generally, and of drying and curing fish in
any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks, of Nova Scotia, Magdalen
Islands, and Labrador. After the war of 1812 the British government held that
the liberty of inshore fishing had been terminated by the rupture, while the
United States maintained that the treaty was permanent in its nature and was
not affected by the war. This difference was adjusted by the compromise
embodied in the convention of October 20, 1818, by which the United States
renounced, except as to parts of the coasts of Newfoundland, the Magdalen
Islands, and Labrador, the liberty to take fish inshore, and, except as to
parts of Newfoundland and the coast of Labrador, the liberty to dry and cure
fish. With these exceptions the United States renounced any liberty previously
enjoyed “ to take, dry, or cure fish on or within three marine miles of any of
the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbours” of the British dominions in America;
with the proviso, however, that American fishermen should be admitted “to enter
such bays or harbours for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein,
of purchasing wood,
and of
obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever,” subject to such
restrictions as might be “ necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing
fish therein, or in any other manner whatever' abusing' the privileges hereby
reserved to them.”
In the years
that followed the conclusion of this convention various questions arose as to
its proper interpretation. What were the “ bays ” intended by the convention ?
Did they include only bodies of water not more than six marine miles wide at
the mouth, or all bodies of water bearing the name of bays, such even as the
Bay of Fundy or the Bay of Chaleurs? Were the three marine miles to be measured
from a line following the sinuosities of the coast, or from a line drawn from
headland to headland, even where there might be no body of water bearing the
name of a bay? Did the stipulations of the convention prohibit American fishing
vessels from trafficking or obtaining supplies in the British colonial ports,
even when they had entered for one of the four specified purposes? Might the
colonial^authorities prohibit such vessels from navigating the Strait of Cahso,
which was at least a way of convenience if not of necessity between the
Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of St Lawrence ? All these questions, and
particularly the first three, were discussed with more or less acrimony,
especially after 1836, when the authorities of Nova Scotia adopted measures for
the more stringent enforcement of the convention. They were temporarily put to
rest by the reciprocity treaty of 1854, under which mutual privileges as to
inshore fishing in the waters of both countries were coupled with certain
privileges in trade and navigation. They were revived by the termination of
that treaty in 1866, but were again suspended by the fishery clauses of the
Treaty of Washington of May 8,1871, under which the United States, in return
for the privilege of inshore fishing, gave to the products of the Canadian
fisheries a free market, and agreed to submit to arbitration the question
whether further compensation should be paid. The award made at Halifax in 1877
of $5,500,000, or nearly half a million dollars1 for each of the
twelve; years during which the treaty was certainly to continue in force,
produced in the United States a feeling of dissatisfaction, not only because
the rate of compensation thus sanctioned was believed to be excessive, but also
because the choice of the third arbitrator, by whose vote the award Was
determined, was attended with unusual incidents.
These circumstance^
combined to ensure the denunciation of the fishery articles at the earliest
possible moment; and in due time, on notice given by the United States, July 1,
1885, was fixed as the date of their termination. In the preceding spring,
however, it was agreed, as the result of overtures made by the British
Legation, that American fishermen should continue to enjoy their treaty
privileges during the pending season, in consideration of the President
undertaking to recommend to Congress at its next session the creation of a
joint
commission,
to which should; be referred not only the question of the fisheries,
but also the more general question of trade relations. To this recommendation
the Senate in February, 1886, declined to accede; and soon afterwards an
American fishing vessel was seized at Annapolis Basin, in Nova Scotia* for
purchasing bait. Other seizures for various causes followed in quick
succession, till the list of complaints was swollen to formidable proportions.
By an Act of Congress of March 3, 1887, the President was invested with power
to enforce in his discretion measures of retaliation. But, after the failure of
his recommendation for a joint commission, although the idea of a trade
agreement was abandoned, negotiations were entered upon for an amicable
arrangement. To that end plenipotentiaries bearing commissions from the
executive authority of each country met in Washington in November, 1887. Their
conferences resulted in what was known as the Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty,
February 15, 1'888. The object of the treaty was to provide for the proper
interpretation and enforcement of the Convention of 1818. It looked to the
removal of the duty on the products of Canadian fisheries only in a certain
contingency. The treaty was rejected by the Senate in the following August.
President Cleveland, interpreting this as a disapproval of his policy of
negotiation, then proposed to Congress a plan of retaliation, involving the
interruption of the bonded transit system. This recommendation Congress did not
adopt; and, as the Act of February, 1887, remained unexecuted, no measure of
retaliation was put into force. The Canadian government, however, had
undertaken, pending the consideration of the treaty, to sell to American
fishing vessels licenses for the enjoyment of port privileges; and this system
continued in operation after the treaty was rejected.
The question
tif the fisheries had in reality been swept, together with various other
questions, into the vortex of a great struggle over the protective tariff".
This contest was precipitated by President Cleveland’s annual message of
December 6, 1887. The brief reference to the, tariff in his first annual
message, has already been noticed; but his subsequent reflections, enforced by
a steadily increasing excess of revenue, had aroused his apprehensions, and he
proceeded to discuss the subject with characteristic zeal and directness. The
exaction from the people of an amount of taxes greater than was necessary for
the “ careful and economical maintenance ” of government he pronounced an “
indefensible extortion and a culpable betrayal of American fairness and
justice,” which crippled the national energies, suspended the country’s development,
hindered investment in productive enterprise, threatened financial disturbance,
and invited schemes of public plunder; and, afte^ discussing various suggested
modes of relief, he attacked the existing laws as “ the vicious, inequitable,
and illogical source of unnecessary taxation.” So stubbornly, he affirmed^ had
all efforts to reform the tariff been resisted by its beneficiaries, that they
could hardly complain of the suspicion
660
Tariff reform.—The
Sackville incident. [1888
that .there
existed “an organised combination all .along the line to maintain their
advantages.” With regard to the question of wages, he argued that any advantage
gained by the labourer on that score was destroyed by the artificial
enhancement of the cost of living. He disclaimed, however, any desire to dwell
upon the theories of Protection and Free Trade. It was, he declared, “ a
condition which confronts us— not a theory.”.
To the
subject of tariff reform President Cleveland devoted his whole message, the
usual review of foreign affairs and of the general domestic situation being
altogether omitted. The Republican leaders were not slow to take up the
gauntlet. As representatives of the party identified with the policy of
Protection, they knew when the system was assailed, -and they accepted the
challenge. Blaine, who was then in Europe, answered the President’s argument in
a public statement, which was afterwards known as the “ Paris message.” A
measure to give effect to the President’s views was prepared in the House of
Representatives, and bore the name of Mills, the chairman of the Committee on Ways
and Means. It passed the House July 21, 1888, The national campaign was then in
progress. President Cleveland had been renominated by the Democrats, while the
Republicans, when Blaine declined to be a candidate, had nominated Benjamin
Harrison; The great issue was the tariff. The Democratic platform expressly
endorsed the views enunciated in President Cleveland^ message, while a separate
resolution, unanimously adopted by the convention, approved the Mills Bill. The
answer of the Republican National Convention was unmistakable. It declared
that the Republican party was “ uncompromisingly in favour of the American
system of Protection,” and denounced the Mills Bill as destructive to general
business, and to the labour and farming interests of the country. The
President’s proposal to place wool on the free list was condemned. It was
declared to be the policy of the Republican party to effect all .needed,
reduction of revenue by repealing internal taxes, and by such revision of the
tariff as would “tend to check imports ” of articles .produced in the United
States. Should a surplus of revenue still remain, a preference was declared for
the “ entire repeal of internal taxes, rather than the surrender of any part of
our protective system.”
The campaign,
though conducted with great energy, was not attended with any unusual incident
till near the close, when a sensation was created by the publication of a
letter written by Lord Sackville, the British minister, to a stranger in
California, who, falsely representing himself as a naturalised American citizen
of English origin, had sought his advice as to how he should vote at the
approaching election. While expressing gratification that President Cleveland
had, by his advocacy of “ free trade,” preferred the interests of the “
mother-country ” to those of the United States, the writer anxiously solicited
Lord Sackville’s opinion
as to whether
the President was sincere in his retaliatory message on the fisheries
question.- In his reply Lord Sackville said: “ You are probably aware that any
political party which openly favoured the mother-country at the present moment
would lose popularity, and that the party in power is fully aware of this fact.
The party, however, is, I believe, still desirous of maintaining friendly relations
with Great Britain.... All allowances must, therefore, be made for the
political situation as regards the Presidential election thus created.” The
reply was marked “private,” but this circumstance did not lessen the commotion
produced by its publication. It was regarded by the government of the United
States as an unwarrantable interference in political affairs; and the situation
was aggravated by reports in the press of alleged statements made by Lord
Sackville, the authenticity of at least some of which the ambassador afterwards
denied. His recall was asked for on the ground that he had become persona non
grata; and, when Lord Salisbury refused to grant it, without opportunity for
farther investigation, the government of the United States declined to hold
further intercourse with Lord Sackville and sent him his passports. The post of
minister was permitted by Lord Salisbury to remain vacant till the incoming of
the new Administration.
It is
obviously impossible to say what effect, if any, the Sackville incident had
upon the results of the campaign. Whatever effect it may have had was probably
adverse to President Cleveland. He was unlikely to gain any votes either by
taking action in the matter, or by abstaining from it; while either course was
sure to result in the alienation of a certain number. The Republicans, although
their popular vote was somewhat less than that of the Democrats, won the
Presidency and gained a small majority in both houses of Congress. But, in the
House of Bepresentatives, their majority was soon increased by members from
four new States—Washington, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota—all of
which, in the first election after their admission, were carried by the
Bepublicans.
■
President Harrison was duly inaugurated March 4,1889; and one of the first
subjects upon which he was required to act was a question of foreign affairs
which had seriously disturbed the usual good understanding between the United
States and Germany, producing unfavourable impressions which were rot easi] y
effaced. Indeed, Prince Bismarck in his Memmrs couples the Samoan incident with
those of Schnabele, Hoiilanger, and the Caroline Islands, as examples of his
adherence to the policy of being “ easily reconciled in case of friction or
untoward events,” even in spite of “ some personal reluc lance.” The United
States was the first Power to make a treaty with Samoa. The treaties of Germany
and Great Britain with Samoa were concluded in the following year; but the
Germans outstripped the other Powers in trade and in planting. The increase of
their commercial interests led to friction with the natives and on December 31,
1885, the German Consul
at Apia, as
an act of reprisal, attached the sovereign rights of the Samoan King in the
municipality of , Apia, while an armed force- from a German manrof-war hauled
down the Samoan flag from the Government House. Prior to this, the government
of the United States had taken no decided stand with regard to the fate of the
islands. In January, 1886, however, Bayard, as Secretary of State, instructed
the American minister at Berlin to express the expectation that nothing would
be done to .impair the rights of the United States under the existing treaty.
The German government made a friendly response; and it was afterwards agreed
that the British and German ministers at Washington should confer with the
Secretary of State with a view to the re-establishment of order, existing
arrangements in the islands to be meanwhile preserved. The conference was
opened in June, 1887; but in the following month, which happened to be
-excessively hot, it was adjourned till the autumn, in the hope that a basis
would be found for reconciling certain differences of view which the
discussions had disclosed.
Immediately
after the adjournment, the German government, without previous notice to the
other Powers, instructed its representatives in Samoa to demand from the Samoan
King, Malietoa, reparation for certain alleged wrongs, all of which were prior
to che assembling of the conference ; and, if he should be unwilling or unable
to afford satisfaction, to declare war against him “ personally.” War was
declared; Malietoa was dethroned and deported; and Tamasese, who had lately
been in arms against the government, was installed as King, with a German named
Brandeis, who had long been connected with German commercial interests in
Samoa, as adviser. In September, 1888, many of the natives revolted against
Tamasese, and chose Mataafa as King. Hostilities ensued; and a party of German
marines, who had been sent ashore to protect German property, were ambushed by
Mataafa’s forces and many of them killed and wounded. A state of war with Samoa
was then announced by Prince Bismarck; and the German minister at Washington
complained that the force by which the German marines were attacked was commanded
by an American named Klein. This allegation has often been repeated by writers,
who have inferred from it that the attack was due to American inspiration. It
was shown, however, by subsequent investigation that Klein, who was in no way
connected with the public service, was a correspondent of the American press,
who had visited Samoa merely in the pursuit of his profession. He swore that he
advised the natives not to fire, and hailed the German boats to warn them of
their danger; that the German marines fired first, and that he did not advise
the Samoans to return the fire. Three of the natives gave evidence to the same
effect; while two others, although they admitted that Klein hailed the German
boata, stated that he took command of the Samoans in the ensuing fight. On
neither supposition was the government or the people of the United States in
any degree responsible for the unfortunate incident.
But when the
correspondence in relation to Samoan affairs was published, and the facts
concerning the adjournment of the conference and the subsequent seizure and
deportation of Malietoa became known, there was produced in the United States a
widespread feeling of resentment, not untinged with suspicion. The naval forces
of the United States in the islands were increased; and a considerable sum was
appropriated by Congress for the protection of American interests.
In this
situation, which was such as to cause grave apprehension, Prince Bismarck
proposed a resumption of the conference, with Berlin as the place of meeting.
This proposal was accepted on certain conditions, which were duly arranged. The
representatives of the three Powers met in Berlin on April 29,1889. At the
first session Prince Bismarck stated that, as Malietoa had expressed his
earnest wish to be reconciled with the German government, he had been released
and was at liberty to go wherever he pleased. This statement forestalled the
raising of a preliminary question, the discussion of which could hardly have promoted
good feeling; and on June 4, 1889, there was signed a general act, under which
a condominium of the three Powers was established in Samoa. The results of this
arrangement proved to be altogether unsatisfactory; and ten years later, by a
treaty concluded on December 2, 1899, the group was divided, the United States
receiving the island of Tutuila and its dependencies, while Germany took the
rest. Great Britain, by a separate arrangement with Germany, obtained
compensation in other directions. The predominance of German commercial and
landed interests in Samoa was thus finally recognised. But the chief
historical significance of the Samoan incident lies less in the disposition
ultimately made of the islands, than in the assertion by the United States not
merely of a willingness but even of a right to take pari in determining the
fate of a remote and semi-barbarous people whose possessions lay far outside
the traditional sphere of American political interests. The tendency thus
exhibited, though to a certain extent novel, was by no means inexplicable. The
intense absorption of the people of the United States in domestic affairs,
which resulted from the Civil War and the struggle over Reconstruction, had
ceased. A last effort to extend political support to the negro, by means of a
federal law for the control of national elections, was about to end in failure.
The effort nowhere excited enthusiasm. The old issues were no longer
interesting: the national energy and sense of power sought employment in other
fields. The desire for a vigorous foreign policy, though it jarred with
traditions, had spread and become popular. The reconstruction of the navy had
also begun.
The first
session of the fifty-first Congress, which met in December,
1889, was rendered notable by changes in the
procedure of the House of Representatives, under the direction of Reed, the new
Speaker. By counting for the purposes of a quorum members present but not
voting,
664
Protection: the
McKinley Tariff. [1890-1
he struck at
the power of the minority to employ obstructive tactics. A new code of rules,
designed to facilitate the control and dispatch of business by the majority,
was addpted by a strict party vote. The limitations placed on what had been
regarded as proper freedom of debate created an intense bitterness of feeling,
which characterised the whole session; but the old system has not been
restored. The Republican leaders also proceeded to frame a tariff bill, in the
spirit of their national platform. A measure of this kind, bearing the name of
McKinley, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, passed the House ill May
and the Senate in September, and, after an adjustment of differences by a
conference committee, was signed by the President on October 1,
1890. It largely increased the rates of duty on
competitive articles of importation. It removed the duty on sugar, which was
highly productive of revenue, and gave the American sugar-planters a bounty.
The effect on
the popular mind was somewhat startling. The great increase made in duties
during the Civil War had generally been regarded as a temporary expedient. From
time to time during succeeding years the question of a general reduction was
agitated; and many influential Republican statesmen, like President Garfield,
gave their support to the principle. The theory of Protection for its own sake,
without regard to the effect on revenue, though it had found some advocates,
especially among publicists, had not found its way into the popular mind. Its
enunciation in the Republican national platform of 1888 was perhaps not clearly
apprehended, certainly in its full import. Its application in the McKinley Bill
therefore attracted universal attention, and, doubtless to some extent because
of its novelty, excited widespread opposition. It aroused antagonism even among
the leaders of the Republican party. Blaine publicly attacked the bill as a
measure that would not open a market for another bushel of wheat or another
barrel of pork. His sensitiveness to this subject was doubtless enhai:ced by
his connexion with the International American Conference, which had just closed
its sessions in Washington. He had been its president; and by the Act of
Congress of May 24, 1888, under which the conference assembled, one of the
declared objects of its convocation was the adoption of a measure “ under which
the trade of the American nations with each other should, so far as possible
and profitable, be promoted.” It was due chiefly to Blaine’s efforts that the
bill was so amended as to author oe the making of limited reciprocity
arrangements.
The McKinley
Act had barely gone into effect when the Congressional elections were held. The
Democrats carried the House of Representatives by almost a three-fourths
majority. The Republicans had not only increased the tariff, but they had made
liberal appropriations, besides adopting legislation that necessitated larger
expenditure in future. To a certain extent an increase in national expenditure
was incidental to the nation’s growth; but the present increase was criticised
as excessive; and
the
fifty-first Congress was popularly referred to as the “ billion dollars
Congress,” that sum representing a rough estimate of the total amount
appropriated during the two sessions.
In 1892
President Harrison was renominated by the Republicans; while Cleveland, in
spite of the faet that during the preceding year he had publicly proclaimed his
hostility to the free coinage of silver, was again put forward by the
Democrats. In each case the renomination was attended with a certain dramatic
interest. The Republican National Convention met at Minneapolis on June 7. Pour
days earlier Blaine, who had previously declared that he was not a candidate
for the nomination, suddenly resigned the office of Secretary of State; and his
name was presented to the Convention. Prepident Harrison was renominated on the
first ballot; but 369 votes were cast for other persons. In the Democratic
Convention, the nomination of Cleveland was strenuously opposed by the
delegates from his own State, that of New York; but the effect of their
opposition was broken by the belief that, by reason of the manner in which they
were chosen, they failed to represent the will of the Democratic voters of the
commonwealth. Ex-President Cleveland therefore was nominated on the first
ballot by a majority larger than that which President Harrison had received in
the Republican Convention. The elections resulted in an overwhelming Republican
defeat. Even States such as Illinois and Wisconsin, which had usually given
large Republican majorities, were found in the Democratic column, so that the
vote in the electoral college stood 277 to 145 in favour of Cleveland..
Another
striking feature of the result was the casting of 22 electoral votes for
General Weaver, the candidate of what was commonly called the Populist party.
This party, originating in the Farmers’ Alliance movement, was officially known
as the People’s party. It declared in its platform that the nation was on “the
verge of moral, political, and material ruin.” The burden of its complaint was
the oppression of society by the money-power. Of this a signal proof was found
in the demonetisation of silver through the machinations of “a vast
conspiracy,” which was declared to have been “ organised on the two
continents,” and to be “ rapidly taking possession of the world.” The contest
over the tariff was pronounced a “sham battle.” The Populist platform therefore
demanded the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, the
speedy increase of circulating money to not less than $50 per head of the
population, a graduated income-tax, a reduction of revenues, the establishment
of postal savings-banks, government ownership and management of railways and
telegraphs, and the distribution of money by loans directly to the people
without the intervention of banking corporations. So considerable was the
strength exhibited by this party that fusions were made with it in various
States by one or the other of the regular political parties. Owing to this
fact, it is impossible to say precisely what was the Populist strength; but the
vote nominally cast
for the
Populist candidate for the Presidency was upwards of a million, or a fifth of
the votes cast for either of the regular candidates.
Several
incidents in foreign affairs attracted wide attention during President
Harrison’s administration. One of these was the lynching of certain Italians in
the parish prison at New Orleans, on the ground that, as members of the Mafia,
they had been concerned in the assassination of the chief of police of the
city, and in other crimes. This affair caused for a time almost a suspension of
diplomatic relations with Italy, but it was closed by the payment of an
indemnity, after the local authorities had failed to indict the leaders of the
mob. Another incident was the controversy with Chili, growing out of the
killing and wounding of a number of sailors of the U.S.S. Baltimore, at
Valparaiso* in October, 1891. On the assembling of Congress in December, 1891,
the incident was discussed by the President and the Secretary of the Navy, both
of whom complained of the attitude of the Chilian authorities. Senor Matta,
who was then Chilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued in reply a circular in
which he imputed to the government at Washington “inexactness” and insincerity.
The Chilian Cabinet was soon afterwards reorganised; and when in January, 1892,
the United States presented an ultimatum, the Chilian government apologised for
Matta’s action, offered a suitable expression of regret for the attack on the
American sailors, and proposed to refer the question of further reparation to
the Supreme Court of the United States. A settlement, comprising the payment of
an indemnity, was effected through the usual diplomatic channels.
The
discussion as to the fur-seals in Behring Sea began in the first administration
of President Cleveland, but did not assume a controversial form till 1889. The
first seizures of Canadian sealers outside territorial waters took place in •
1886; but the vessels were ordered to be released, and the maritime Powers were
invited to co-operate in the protection of the seals by joint action. This
proposal seemed to excite no opposition; and an arrangement with Great Britain
seemed to be assured, when the negotiations were arrested owing to an objection
raised by Canada, apparently occasioned by the adverse report of the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Senate on the treaty touching the north-eastern
fisheries. The advent of the new Administration was followed by fresh seizures;
and Blaine, who had then become Secretary of State, abandoning the principle of
co-operation, sought to establish a right of protection on moral and legal
grounds. To this end he argued that pelagic sealing, since it was destructive
of the species, was to be considered as an act contra bonos mores, and that,
moreover, it constituted a violation of immemorial rights which the United
States had acquired from Bussia on the cession of Alaska. The latter argument
assumed various forms, one of which has been popularly and even judicially
interpreted as a claim of mare clausum. In December, 1890, however, Blaine
declared that the United States had never desired to make such a claim, and he
expressly
disavowed it. In the arbitration at Paris, under the treaty of February 29,
1892, counsel for the United States relied chiefly upon a theory of property in
seals; but as this theory had not found expression in positive law, even in the
United States, it was not accepted by the tribunal. The claim of right having
thus been disallowed, the arbitrators, in conformity with the treaty, drew up a
plan of joint regulations, which was put into force. Under a subsequent
convention, British subjects, whose vessels had been seized, were duly
compensated (1898).
The tendency
towards a more active foreign policy, clearly exhibited during President
Harrison’s administration, was illustrated by the Act of Congress authorising
the appointment of ambassadors to foreign countries, wherever such countries
gave that rank to their representatives in Washington; but it was much more
strikingly exemplified by the conclusion, almost at the close of his term of
office, of a treaty for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. From an early
day the United States had asserted a predominant interest in this group. The
events of 1854, when a treaty for annexation was agreed on, were followed by
other warnings that the question of forming closer ties waited upon crises in
native affairs; and the exceptional stipulations of the reciprocity treaty of
1875 merely accentuated the protective relation which the United States had
maintained towards these islands. In 1887 the native King, Kalakaua, who had,
by seeking to intervene in the affairs of Samoa, and by other unwise courses,
shown a want of stability, was induced, under pressure of the white element, to
accept a new constitution. Under this constitution the native Hawaiians were
restive, since it established responsible government and in other ways
curtailed their political power.
On January
14, 1892, Queen Liliuokalani, who had succeeded Kalakaua in the royal office,
sought by a coup cTetat to restore the old constitution. A counter-revolution
took place; and on January 16 a body of marines was landed from the U.S.S.
Boston. The next day a republic was proclaimed, to last until terms of union
with the United States were agreed on. The new government was recognised by the
American minister. The Queen abdicated, declaring that she did so under
compulsion, and that she would appeal to the government at Washington for
reinstatement. The Provisional Government immediately dispatched commissioners
to the United States. They were received at the Department of State on February
4; and on the 15th a treaty of annexation, which was signed the day before, was
sent to the Senate. Action upon it had not been taken, when President
Cleveland, succeeding to the Presidency, withdrew it, and sent a commissioner
to Hawaii to make an investigation. The commissioner reported that the
revolution was brought about with the connivance of the American minister, and
that the presence of the American marines, who were landed at the minister’s
instance, influenced the Queen in abdicating.
A new
minister to Hawaii was appointed, with instructions to endeavour to bring about
the Queen’s restoration. This plan, when it became known, was violently
attacked in the United States and met with much popular opposition; and any
possibility of carrying it into effect was destroyed by the action of the
Queen* who, when the American minister, in conformity with his instructions,
requested an amnesty for those who were concerned in, her overthrow, replied
that the. law must take its course. The penalty of their offence was death and
the forfeiture of their estates. A constitutional republic was afterwards duly
established, and was formally recognised by President Cleveland. It lasted till
the islands were annexed to the United States in 1898.
In domestic
affairs, the first question on which President Cleveland, after his second
inauguration, was required to act, was that of the currency. On June 4, 1893,
he announced his purpose to convene Congress in special session in the
following September, in order to consider that question. The subsequent
development of signs of panic caused him to issue a proclamation designating
August 7 as the day of meeting. The countiy, in fact, was in the midst of a
serious financial crisis. The hoarding of gold had assumed alarming
proportions. It was impossible, even upon the best security, to obtain money
for the needs of current business. Shares in the soundest companies had in many
instances fallen to prices representing less than half their usual market
value. When Congress assembled, President Cleveland immediately laid before it
a measure of relief. The existing disorders he ascribed chiefly to the statute
of July 14, 1890, commonly called the Sherman Act, by which the Secretary of
the Treasury was commanded each month to purchase, if so much should be
offered, 4,500,000 ounces of silver, issuing therefor Treasury notes which were
redeemable on demand in gold or silver coin, at the discretion of the
Secretary, but which were on redemption to be reissued. This Act did not
represent the financial views of its putative author, who was an advocate of
sound money, but was a measure of compromise, desdgned to prevent the defec-.
tion of “silver” Republicans, as well as the passage, with the support of
members of both parties, of a bill for the free coinage of silver at the ratio
of 16 to 1. The Act, however, declared it to be the established policy of the
United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other, at
whatever ratio might be fixed by law. To this end the Secretary of the Treasury
was required constantly to submit to demands for gold, since any refusal of them
would at once have discredited silver obligations and destroyed the parity
between the two metals. In three years the gold coin and bullion in the
Treasury had decreased by more than $132,000,000, while the silver coin and
bullion had increased by more than $147,000,000; and the excess of exports over
imports of gold was rapidly increasing. The President therefore recommended the
repeal of the purchasing clause of the Act of 1890, and the adoption of
1893—4] New Tariff
Bill.—Labour disturbances.
669
such other
legislation as would assure the maintenance of the gold standard. On November 1
the clause was repealed, but no other legislation was adopted. The gold reserve
had then fallen to about $80,000,000.
Meanwhile,
the Democratic members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives had begun the preparation of a tariff bill. The result of their
labours was the Wilson Bill, which derived its name from that of the chairman
of the committee. Its basal principles were the adoption, wherever practicable,
of ad valorem instead of specific duties, and the freeing from taxation of “
those great materials of industry that lie at the basis of production.” The
free list was largely extended, and rates of duty were generally lowered. The
loss of revenue was expected to be made good by an internal revenue bill. A
clause was inserted repealing the reciprocity provision of the McKinley Act.
The principal feature of the Internal Revenue Bill was a tax of two per cent,
on the incomes of individuals and of corporations; but, in the case of
individuals, only income in excess of $4,000 was to be issessed. Strong
opposition to this measure was manifested in the East, but it was popular in
the South and West; and a Democratic caucus, against the wish of Wilson,
decided to attach it to the Tariff Bill. The bill, as thus amended, was adopted
by the House of Representatives ; but in the Senate it was thoroughly revised.
Sugar, iron ore, and coal were restored to the dutiable list; and, when the
bill came to be discussed, it was evident that, by reason of its bearing on the
industries of various States, it could not command undivided party support.
When it passed the Senate, early in July, 1894, it was essentially altered; and
it was not until August 13 that an agreement was reached between the two
Houses. In the meantime the questions at issue had produced a serious breach in
the Democratic ranks; and President Cleveland had openly espoused the cause of
the House of Representatives, especially with reference to the sugar schedule.
A compromise measure, which was known as the Wilson-Gorman Bill, became law on
August 28, without the President’s signature. The income-tax was retained, but
it was subsequently declared by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. In the
elections held in the autumn of 1894 the Republicans swept the country,
securing a majority of 140 in the House of Representatives, in which many
leading Democrats, including Wilson, lost their places. The Democrats also lost
their hold on the Senate.
While the
struggle over the tariff was in progress at Washington, a serious labour
disturbance occurred at Chicago. The workmen employed in the shops of the
Pullman’s Palace Car Company near that city having struck iga tist a reduction
of wages, and the company having refused to refer the matter to arbitration,
the president of the American Railway Union, an organisation of railway
workers, ordered a sympathetic “boycott” of Pullman cars. The execution of this
order was accom-
670 Currency.—Civil
Service reform.—Venezuela. [i894-6
panied
by widespread disorders and the stopping of traffic by violent and unlawful
means. Injunctions against the rioters were issued by the Federal courts; and
among those who were arrested was the leader of the Railway Union. On July 1
President Cleveland gave orders for the protection of the mails and of
inter-State'commerce by regular troops; and, a few days later, when rioting had
become general at Chicago and many cars were burned and damaged, he issued a
proclamation calli’ g on the mobs to disperse on pain of , being dealt with as
public enemies. The rioting at Chicago was immediately brought to an end;
and-order was gradually restored along the railroad lines in other places. The
President’s action in sending troops to the scene of disturbance, without
awaiting a requisition of the State authorities, was the subject of much heated
discussion; but it was at the time approved with little opposition by both
Houses of Congress.
, . :
,
The question of the currency, however, continued to be a disturbing factor; and
the task of the government in dealing with it was rendered more difficult by
the falling off in revenue. In November, 1894, February, 1895, and January,
1896, the President, in order to avoid a suspension of gold payments, was
obliged to resort to the sale of bonds. Two of these issues were made to
bankers’ syndicates, who placed themselves under special obligations to
maintain the gold reserve. The! third issue was offered to the public. The
amount was $100,000,000; the subscriptions exceeded $680,000,000; but it was
found in some instances that bids were speculative, the subscribers drawing,
gold from the Treasury in order to make their payments. The banks of the
country subsequently lent their aid by depositing part of their gold reserves
in the Treasury. .
In May, 1895,
President Cleveland issued an Order bringing , 30,000 places within the Civil
Service Law. With this addition the classified service embraced more than
85,000 places, or substantially all between the grade of labourer and those
subject to confirmation by the Senate. This was the last of a series of Orders
by which he had, since his first inauguration, steadily extended the
application of the Civil Service Law. He also continued to oppose what he conceived
to be irregularities and extravagances in the pension system, the cost of
which, during the fiscal year ending June 30,1894, was $158,000,000.
In foreign
affairs President Cleveland’s second administration was marked by two events
which have exerted, and must continue to exert, profound effect on the future
of the United States. These were the Venezuelan incident and the insurrection
in Cuba.. The Venezuelan incident, as is well known, grew out of a longstanding
dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, the continuation of a dispute two
centuries old between the Netherlands and Spain as to the limits of the Dutch
and Spanish settlements in Guiana. As a mere question of disputed boundary,
however complicated, it would ordinarily have
1844-95]
671
attracted
little attention. But it came in time to assume a form in which it seemed to
involve a traditional principle of American policy. In 1844 Lord. Aberdeen
proposed to Venezuela a conventional line, beginning at the river Moroco. This
proposal was declined; and, chiefly in consequence of civil commotions in
Venezuela, negotiations were practically suspended till 1876. Venezuela then
offered to accept the Aberdeen line; but Lord Granville in return suggested a
boundary further west. In subsequent negotiations the boundary of the district
claimed by Great Britain was moved still further westward, and the exercise of
jurisdiction followed the advance. Venezuela, representing that this apparent
enlargement of British dominion constituted a pure aggression on her
territorial rights, invoked the aid of the United States, on the ground of the
Monroe Doctrine. This doctrine has been variously interpreted by statesmen and
scholars; but in its popular form, with which all governments, including that
of the United States, must reckon, it involves the principle that no European
Power shall be permitted to acquire new possessions or to extend its dominions
in the Western hemisphere. This meaning is conveyed in the phrase, “ America
for the Americans.” Venezuela asked for arbitration, and in so doing included
in her claim a large portion of British Guiana; Great Britain at length
declined to arbitrate unless Venezuela would first yield all territory within a
line to the westward of that offered by Lord Aberdeen. It must be confessed
that demands for the unrestricted submission of territorial claims have by no
means been invariably conceded-; but the reservation made by Great Britain
embraced much territory to which, in the light of the negotiations, and in the
absence of authentic information as to the merits of the British case, seemed
to be questionable.
In these
circumstances Olney, as Secretary of State, With the approval of the President,
in July, 1895, categorically inquired whether the British government would
submit the whole controversy to arbitration. In making this inquiry, he
reviewed the history of the dispute and the various efforts of the United
States to bring about a settlement, and maintained that, as Venezuela was
unable to establish her claims by any but peaceful methods, Great Britain’s
assertion of title, coupled with her refusal to allow its investigation,
constituted in substance a forcible appropriation of the territory. Lord
Salisbury’s answer, refusing unrestricted arbitration, was made in two notes.
In one of these he questioned the authority of the Monroe Doctrine, and also
denied its applicability to the boundary question. In the other he maintained
that the failure to agree was due to the baselessness of Venezuela’s claims and
her lack of stable government; and explained that Great Britain had adopted an
irreducible boundary because Venezuela insisted on including in the arbitration
a large tract of country which had long been settled by British subjects, and
to which no effectual Spanish claim had ever been made.
When the
British answer was received in December, 1895, President Cleveland laid the
correspondence before the Congress. Affirming that the matter was one that
involved, on the principles, of the Monroe Doctrine, the vital interests and
safety of the United States, he recommended the appointment by the United
States of a commission to investigate the merits of the controversy. He
declared at the same time, that, in case of the title being found to belong to
Venezuela, it would be the duty of the United States “ to resist by every means
in its power, as a wilful aggrese'on upon its rights and interests, the appropriation
by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of govemmeutal jurisdiction over
any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to
Venezuela.” The publication of this message, which was generally construed as
suggesting the possibility of a collision, was followed by an outbreak of great
popular excitement. Congress with unanimity adopted the President’s
recommendation as to a commission of investigation; but the commission,
immediately after its appointment, addressed to Secretary Olney a letter,
setting forth its peaceful and non-partisan character and che desirability of securing
the co-operation of Great Britain and Venezuela,in obtaii>ing evidence. Both
governments responded to the appeal; but the labours of the commission were
brought to a close by the conclusion of a Treaty of Arbitration. The
signatories of this treaty were Great Britain and Venezuela; but its essential
provisions were the result of direct negotiations between the former Power and
the United States. Its predominant feature was the application of the principle
of. prescription, under the definite rule that fifty years’ adverse holding of
a district, either by exclusive political control or by actual settlement,
should suffice to constitute a national title. The adoption of this principle;,
which in the circumstances of the case furnished the only practicable basis for
a judicial decision, at once removed the foundation of a large part of the
Venezuelan claim. The results of the arbitration were decidedly favourable to
Great Britain.
A general
Arbitration Treaty between the United States and Great Britain was signed by
Secretary Olney and Sir Julian Pauncefote, at Washington, on January 11, 1897.
It failed, however, to pass the Senate, the vote in its favour, on May 5, 1897,
standing 43 to 26, or less than the requisite two-thirds majority of the
senators present.
The chief
issue of the presidential campaign of 1896 was the currency question. The
Republicans, in their National Convention at St Louis, in June, declared : “ We
are opposed to the free coinage of silver except by international agreement
with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to
promote; and, until such agreement can be obtained, the existing gold standard
must be preserved.” When this resolution was adopted, thirty-four delegates,
comprising all or a part of the members of the several delegations from the
States of
Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, Utah, South Dakota, and Nevada, withdrew from the Convention.
The platform further declared that Protection and reciprocity were “ twin
measures of Republican policy ”; and that the United States ought to control
Hawaii, own the Nicaragua Canal, buy the Danish West Indies, prevent European
encroachments in America, and use its “ influence and good offices ” for the
peace and independence of Cuba. In his letter of acceptance dated August 26,
McKinley, the presidential nominee of the party, gave the chief place to the
free coinage issue.
The
Democratic National Convention, which met in Chicago early in July, fell
completely into the grasp of the radical silver element. President Cleveland’s
administration not only failed to secure approval, but was obviously condemned.
The platform denounced the issue of bonds in time of peace and the “trafficking
with banking syndicates,” demanded that paper-money should be issued only by
the government, criticised the income-tax decision of the Supreme Court, and
condemned “ government by injunction ” and the “ arbitrary interference by
Federal authorities in local affairs.” Its spirit and purpose were summed up in
the demand for the “free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver, at the
present legal ratio of 16 to 1, without waiting for the aid or consent of any
other nation.” The delegates opposed to this resolution took no active part
after its adoption in the proceedings of the Convention. William J. Bryan, of
Nebraska, was nominated for the Presidency. The Populists afterwards nominated
him for the same office, but absolved him from endorsing their platform as a
whole. It was not, however, essentially unlike the platform promulgated at Chicago.
Bryan’s letter of acceptance was devoted chiefly to the advocacy of the free
coinage of silver. The Chicago Convention was followed by the defection of
prominent Democrats all over the country; and early in August a conference at
Indianapolis, representing thirty-five States, issued a call for a convention
of the “ National Democratic Party ” to be held in that city on September 2. In
this Convention all the States, except Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada, were
represented. This Convention declared for the gold standard and endorsed the
administration of President Cleveland. It nominated candidates for the
Presidency and Vice-Presidency. Its proceedings were publicly approved by
President Cleveland and all the members of his Cabinet, with the exception of
Smith, Secretary of the Interior, who had resigned his place in August.
The
Republicans carried every State north of the Potomac and the Ohio and east of
the Mississippi. They made great gains in the West and even in some of the
States in the South. Their plurality in New York was nearly 270,000. In the
electoral college McKinley received 271 votes, while Bryan received 176.
President McKinley was inaugurated on March 4,1897. In his inaugural address he
praised arbitration and declared that peace was “ preferable to war in almost
every
contingency.” He also announced that an extra session of Congress would be
called to deal with the tariff, the revenue being, as he maintained,
inadequate to the expenses of the government. When Congress met on March 15, a
tariff measure was introduced by Dingley. It was expected to produce an
increase in revenue of from seventy to one hundred millions. Wood, lumber, and
many other articles were transferred from the free to the dutiable list; and a
general increase was made in existing rates of duty, exceeding, in some instances,
the rates of 1890. In the House there were 206 Republicans, 122 Democrats, and
29 of other parties; and Reed was re-elected as Speaker. The bill passed the
House on March 31, 1897, by a vote of 205 to 121. It was amended in the Senate,
where the Silver Republicans and Populists still held the balance of power;
and, after passing through a conference committee, it became law by the
President’s signature on July 24, 1897. As soon as the tariff was disposed of,
the President presented the subject of the currency; but the special session
adjourned without definitive action upon it. In his annual message of December
6, 1897, President McKinley gave the first place to the currency question. At
the first session of the fifty-sixth Congress, which began December 4, 1899, an
Act was passed for the preservation of the gold standard. The gold dollar was
adopted as the unit of value, all other forms of money to be maintained at
parity with it. A gold reserve of $150,000,000 was established, with power if
necessary to issue bonds to maintain it. Provision was made for refunding the
national debt in two per cent, bonds running thirty years. The national banking
law was so amended as to allow national banks to be organised with a minimum
capital of $25,000, with authority to issue notes to the par value of their
United States bonds deposited in the Treasury.
Meanwhile the
country had entered, as the result of the war with Spain, on the course which
has been distinctively called Expansion. In reality the history of the United
States presents an almost continuous record of territorial extension; but this
extension had for the most part been confined to the North American continent.
The decision to assume responsibilities beyond the seas was unpremeditated. The
train of events, of which it was the result, began with the outbreak of the
insurrection in Cuba, in February, 1895. With reference to this conflict the
United States assumed an attitude of neutrality and non-intervention; but, as
time wore on, it became more and more difficult to maintain that position.
During the previous insurrection, from 1868 to 1878, the government of the
United States, in pursuing, even in the face of “untoward events,”a neutral
course, was aided by the admonitions which the people were daily receiving at
home of the difficulties that might attend the re-establishment of order in a
large and populous island where the process of emancipation was still going on.
In 1895 the
situation had
changed in the United States as well as in Cuba. American interests in the
island had also increased, in planting, in mining, and in other enterprises;
even in the past five years the volume of trade had almost doubled. The second
insurrection was, besides, more active than the first, and spread itself over a
wider area. At the end of two years it seemed, by reason of the failure of
Spain’s extraordinary efforts to suppress it, to admit of indefinite
prolongation. If the conflict were left to take its course, the ruin of the
island was apparently assured. The United States tendered its good offices; but
the offer was not productive of any tangible result. In his annual message of
December 7,1896, President Cleveland declared that it could not be reasonably assumed
that the United States, though anxious to accord all due respect to the
sovereignty of Spain, would indefinitely maintain an expectant attitude; and he
added that when Spain’s inability to suppress the insurrection had become
manifest, and the struggle had degenerated into a hopeless strife involving
useless sacrifice of life and the destruction of the very subject-matter of the
conflict, a situation would be presented in which the obligation to recognise
the sovereignty of Spain would be superseded by higher obligations.
Conditions in
the island continued to grow worse. General Martinez Campos, as Captain-general
during the earlier stages of the conflict, declared it to be his policy to
encourage and protect productive industry. His successor, General Weyler, while
requiring the owners of plantations to maintain forces for self-defence,
prohibited production. His policy was embodied in his measures of
“concentration,” the object of which was to reduce the island to a condition in
which the insurgents must either surrender or starve. The distress produced by
these measures excited strong feeling in the United States, and led President
McKinley to request Spain to put an end to existing conditions and restore
order. When this request was presented, Senor Canovas had fallen by the hand of
an assassin, and had been succeeded as head of the Spanish Administration by
Senor Sagasta. The reply of the Sagasta government was of a friendly character.
It announced that an autonomous regime would be instituted, and that the mode
of conducting hostilities would be modified. President McKinley therefore, in
his annual message of December 6,1897, expressed the opinion that the time had
not come for the recognition either of belligerency or of independence, or for
intervention. Steps were taken, however, to ameliorate the condition of the
recon- centrados; and a Central Cuban Relief Committee was appointed, with
headquarters at New York. In Cuba General Weyler was succeeded by General
Blanco, who represented the new Spanish policy. But neither the offer of
autonomy, nor the actual institution of an autonomous government, produced
peace. The insurgents, embittered by three years’ conflict, in which the rights
of war were denied them, rejected the programme of autonomy with substantial
unanimity, while the distinctively
Spanish
element of the population viewed it with disapprobation and withdrew from
politics.
In this
delicate situation the intervention of the United States was precipitated by
certain startling incidents. On February 8,1898, there was published in New
York a private letter which Senor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister at
Washington, had written to Senor Canalejas, a Spanish journalist, who, after
visiting the United States, had gone to Cuba. This letter, as it appears, was
abstracted from the mails at Havana by a Cuban sympathiser. From internal
evidence it appeared to have been written about the middle of December, 1897.
It described President McKinley as a weak and shifty politician, a bidder for
the admiration of the crowd, who tried to leave a door open behind him while
keeping on good terms with the “jingoes” of his party; and intimated that it
would be advantageous for Spain to take up, “ even if only for effect,” the
question of commercial relations. When the letter was published, this
suggestion had actually been adopted. Senor Dupuy de Lome frankly acknowledged
his authors].. p of the letter, and, with a view to save his government from
embarrassment, cabled his resignation to Madrid. The Spanish government not
only accepted his resignation, but disclaimed any participation in his
sentiments, and on February 14 the incident was declared to be closed.
On the
evening of the next day the U. S. S. Maine was blown up at Havana, and 266 of
her crew pensned. She had been sent to Havana on January 24, in consequence of
representations that Americans there were in danger from anti-autonomy rioters.
Her visit was declared to be entirely friendly. When she sank Spanish officials
assisted in the rescue and relief of the survivors of her crew, and they
afterward0 paid funeral honours to the doad. The United States,
however, appointed a naval board to investigate the cause of the disaster; and
Spain, after the United States had rejected a proposal for a joint investigation,
entered upon an independent inquiry. Feeling in the United States was deeply
stirred; and a request from the Spanish government for the recall of the
Consul-general at Havana was promptly refused. A profound effect on public
opinion was also produced by a speech made in the Senate by Proctor, of
Vermont, who, by a calm narration of his personal observations in Cuba,
confirmed the growing conviction that independence was the only solution of the
difficulty. Early in March Congress unanimously placed at the President’s
disposal $50,000,000 for national defence. The report of the naval board of
inquiry on the case of the Maine was made public on March 28. It found that the
destruction of the ship was caused by the explosion of a submarine mine, which in
turn produced an explosion in the ship’s forward magazines; but no evidence was
obtained to fix the responsibility. The President transmitted the report to
Congress, and communicated the substance of it to the Spanish government. At
the same time the Spanish government informed the
United States
that the Spanish commission had reported that the explosion was due solely to
some interior cause.
Meanwhile,
President McKinley had proposed to Spain the conclusion of an armistice to last
till October 1, 1898, the entire revocation of the decrees of concentration,
the restoration of all the reconcentrados to their homes, and the distribution
of provisions and supplies from the United States to the needy in co-operation
with the Spanish authorities. In reply Spain offered to leave the question of
peace to the autonomous parliament, which was to meet on May 4. She was
prepared to suspend hostilities if the insurgents should request it. She
declared that the concentration orders had been revoked, and accepted the offer
with regard to relief of the suffering. The case of the Maine she proposed to
submit to arbitration. On April 1 it was announced that the President
considered this reply unsatisfactory, and that he would submit the matter to
Congress in a message. War then seemed to be inevitable. The presentation at
Washington by the representatives of the six great Powers of Europe of a note,
in which the hope was expressed that further negotiations might result in
peace, called forth from President McKinley the reply that the conditions
existing in Cuba could no longer be endured. On April 10 Spain proclaimed an
armistice in Cuba. On the preceding day, however, the Consul-general of the
United States at Havana, with the last of the American residents, had embarked for
the United States; and on Monday, April 11, the President communicated to
Congress his promised message. It recommended intervention, which it justified
on grounds of humanity; of the protection due to American citizens in Cuba and
to their trade and industry; and of the fact that the existing condition of
things constituted a constant menace to peace; Of this condition the case of
the Maine was cited as an illustration. Declaring that “ the war in Cuba must
stop,” the President asked Congress to give him power to terminate it and
secure in Cuba a stable government capable of maintaining order and of
preserving international obligations, and to this end to employ the army and
navy. In conclusion he mentioned the armistice just proclaimed by Spam, and asked
that it should have due consideration.
The response
of Congress was embodied in a joint resolution, which was approved by the
President on April 20,1898. It declared that the people of Cuba “ are and of
right ought to be free and independent”; demanded that Spain should at once
relinquish her authority and government there; “ directed and empowered ” the
President to use the army and navy to enforce the demand ; and disclaimed for
the United States any intention to “exercise sovereignty,jurisdiction, or control”
over the island “except for the pacification thereof.” The resolution was
communicated as an ultimatum to the Spanish minister at Washington, and was
cabled to General Woodford, the minister of the United States at Madrid. The
Spanish
minister immediately requested his passports, and left Washington; and General
Woodford, before he had had an opportunity to carry out his instructions, was
notified by the Spanish government that the approval of the resolution by the
President was considered as a declaration of war, and that diplomatic relations
between the two countries had ceased. He at once withdrew. Next day, April 22,
1898, President McKinley proclaimed a blockade of the north coast of Cuba from
Cardenas to Bahia Honda, and of the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast; iand
on April 25 Congress adopted a formal declaration that war had existed since
the 21st. Though neither government had adhered to the Declaration of Paris,
the United States declared that it would be its policy not to resort to
privateering. Spain reserved the right to issue letters of marque, but issued
none. Both governments exercised the right of employing auxiliary cruisers,
under naval control. The second, third, and fourth rules of the Declaration of
Paris were proclaimed by both belligerents as principles of international law.
American ships lying in Spanish ports on the outbreak of the war were allowed
five days in which to depart. Spanish ships in American ports were allowed to
load their cargoes and depart within thirty days; a similar concession was made
to neutral vessels lying in Spanish ports which the United States blockaded;
and Spanish ships that had sailed for the United States prior to April 21 were
permitted to enter, discharge, and depart with the assurance of an unmolested
voyage to' any port not blockaded.
In spite of
these liberal measures, it must be admitted that popular sentiment in foreign
countries, as exhibited by the press, was strongly adverse to the American
intervention. To this rule, however, Great Britain, and perhaps even more so
her colonies, formed an exception so agreeable to the United States that the
sentiment of fraternity became unusually prevalent and popular in that country.
But the disposition to censoriousness, in whatever quarters it existed, was
soon modified by the course of the conflict.
Some weeks
before the outbreak of the war active preparations had been in progress,
especially on the part of the United States, for the conflict that seemed to be
inevitable. Early in March authority was given by Congress for the raising of
two additional regiments of artillery, and on April 16 the regular army was put
in motion toward points of concentration from which it would be available for
active service, particularly in Cuba. On the rejection by Spain of the American
ultimatum the President was empowered by Congress to prohibit the exportation
by sea of coal and other materials used in war; and provision was made for the
creation of a volunteer army. The President issued a call for 125,000 volunteers
for two years. The regular army was reorganised and placed on a war footing,
and its numbers were raised from 27,000 to 61,000. American officers were
authorised to furnish subsistence to inhabitants of Cuba who were destitute and
in
1898] The naval war.
Dewey captures Manila. 679
danger of
perishing, and to supply the “ Cuban people ” with arms and ammunition.
Measures also were adopted for the increase of the revenues of the United
States; and an issue of 3 per cent, bonds was authorised to an amount not to
exceed $500,000,000.
When
hostilities began, the naval forces of Spain were divided into three parts:
one, under Admiral Camara, remained at home; another, under Admiral Cervera,
had its rendezvous at the Cape de Verde Islands; while the third, under Admiral
Montojo, lay in Philippine waters. The American naval forces were similarly
divided; but, of the three squadrons, two lay in home ports: one at Key West,
under Captain Sampson, who was assigned to the command of the North Atlantic
station with the rank of rear-admiral; the other, called the flying squadron,
at Hampton Roads, under Commodore Schley. The third, under Commodore Dewey, was
at Hong Kong. The United States also organised a numerous force, popularly
called the “Mosquito fleet,” composed of steamships, yachts, and tugs, which
were purchased or chartered for service as auxiliary cruisers, torpedo boats,
and dispatch boats.
On April 24
Commodore Dewey was ordered to proceed to the Philippines, and to capture or
destroy the Spanish fleet there. Finding the enemy in Manila Bay, he began his
attack early in the morning of May 1. By noon the Spanish ships, though
supported by land batteries, were all burnt or sunk, except some small tugs and
launches which were captured. The Spanish admiral, Montojo, reported that the
Americans “fired most rapidly,” covering his ships with “a rain of rapid-fire
projectiles”; on the other hand, he complained of the inefficiency of his own
vessels, some of which he ordered to be sunk during the battle in order to
prevent their destruction by fire. The Spanish loss was 381 killed and wounded,
including casualties at Cavite arsenal. Though several of the American vessels
were struck and even penetrated, the damage done to them was trifling. Seven
men in the squadron were slightly wounded; none was killed. Commodore Dewey
took possession of Cavite arsenal, and established a blockade of Manila; while
Filipino forces, under Aguinaldo, invested Manila on the north and east. Thereupon
an expeditionary force, consisting of 641 officers and 15,058 enlisted men,
under the command of Major-General Merritt, was fitted out by the United
States; and on August 13 the city of Manila, for whose surrender a joint demand
had been made by General Merritt and Admiral Dewey, capitulated with 13,000
men, before the combined attack of the American military and naval forces.
Toward the end of June the Spanish home squadron under Admiral Camara had
started for the Philippines; but, after passing through the Suez Canal, it was
recalled.
In the
Atlantic the operations of the war were more complex. Expeditions were planned
for the invasion of Cuba and Porto Rico; and naval demonstrations were made at
exposed points in those islands. Blockades were maintained on the southern as
well as the northern
680 Invasion of Cuba.
Capture of Santiago. [i898
;oast of
Cuba, and at San Juan, Porto Rico. On May 14 the fleet of Admiral Cervera, for
which the squadrons of Sampson and Schley had both been searching, was reported
at Curasao. Five days later it entered the harbour of Santiago de Cuba, where
its presence was discovered only at the end of the month. A blockade was then
instituted to prevent its escape; and a concentration of the American squadrons
was promptly effected. On June 22, the advance of the invading army, composed
of 14,000 regulars and 2,500 volunteers, under General Shafter, landed at
Daiquiri, fifteen miles east of Santiago; and the movement against Santiago
began. On June 23 the Spanish outposts at Las Guasimas were driven in; on July
1 the outworks of Santiago were gained; and next day the heights of El Caney
and San Juan were, after an obstinate resistance, carried by assault, the
Americans losing more than 103 officers and 1492 men, killed and wounded. On
July 3 occurred the decisive event of the campaign* The Spanish fleet, in
attempting to leave the harbour of Santiago, was met by the American ships and
destroyed. Admiral Cervera and more than 1300 of his men were taken prisoners,
while about 600 perished. The American ships were repeatedly struck, but none
was seriously injured; while but one man was killed, and one severely wounded.
On July 17 Santiago capitulated to General Shafter. The capitulation covered
the entire eastern end of Cuba, and included 22,000 Spanish soldiers, all of
whom the United States agreed to return to Spain. Arrangements to that end were
at once begun; but, before they were completed, the United States was obliged
to undertake the removal of its own troops, who, weakened by the hardsl. ips of
the campaign, were prostrated in large numbers by climatic diseases. The malady
most prevalent was malarial t'ever; but dysentery and yellow fever had also
appeared. At this time loud complaints were heard of inefficiency in army
management, especially in the commissary and quartermaster’s departments, not
only among the troops in Cuba, but also among those who were collected in camps
in the United States. Without entering into the merits of the controversies to
which these complaints gave rise, it is not improper to remark that there is no
business in which preparation and training are more requisite than in war; and
that the attempt, by means of an organisation designed to maintain 25,000
regular soldiers in time of peace, to create and move an army of 200,000 men,
mostly volunteers, in time of war, must inevitably be attended with some
confusion and disorder.
On the fall
of Santiago, an expedition set out for the invasion of Porto Rico. This
expedition, which sailed from Guantanamo, Cuba, on July 21, was under the
command of General Miles, and consisted of upwards of 3,500 men whom he had
just led to Santiago for the reinforcement of General Shafter. Miles landed at
Guanica on July 25, with little opposition, and was soon reinforced by troops
under Generals Schwan, Wilson, and Brooke, till his army numbered 16,973
officers and
men. On July
27 he entered Ponce, from which point he directed operations, and in the course
of two weeks had obtained possession of a large part of the island, when
hostilities were suddenly arrested.
The rapid
progress of the American arms and particularly the destruction of the Spanish
fleets at Manila and Santiago, induced the government of Spain on July 22,
1898, to make formal overtures for peace. It was intimated that Spain was
prepared to relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba, and a wish was expressed to
learn from the President the basis on which a “ political status ” might be
established there and an end be put to a conflict “ which would continue
without reason should both governments agree upon the means of pacifying the
island.” The President replied on July 30. The suggestion that the war might be
brought to a close on the basis of an agreement as to the future status of Cuba
was not accepted. On the contrary, it was declared that the “ local question ”
as to the peace and good government of Cuba, out of which the war had grown,
had by the course of events been “ transformed and enlarged into a general
conflict of arms between two great peoples.” The terms which the President
offered were expressed in these words:
“ The United States will require :
“First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of
sovereignty over and title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the island.
“Second. The
President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forward
any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he cannot be insensible to
the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to the
claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late
insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United
States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Rico and
other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also
the cession of an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.
“ Third. On
similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city,
bay, and harbour of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which
shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.
“If the terms
hereby offered are accepted in their entirety, commissioners will be named by
the United States to meet similarly authorised commissioners on the part of
Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and
signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated.”
In regard to
Cuba, Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and the island
in the Ladrones, the answer of Spain, which was dated August 7, in substance
accepted, without qualification or reserve, the President’s terms. In respect
of the Philippines, it was less specific. Though it declared in conclusion that
the government of the Queen
682 Peace protocol. Negotiations at Paris. [i898
ftegent “accepts
the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Dortes of the kingdom, as
required by their constitutional duties,” some of the expressions used in
relation to the Philippines were not free from ambiguity. This circumstance
induced the President to pronounce the note unsatisfactory, and to propose, as
the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding, to embody in a
protocol the precise terms on which negotiations should be undertaken. This
course was adopted; and on August 12 the protocol was signed at Washington by
Judge Day, Secretaiy of State, duly empowered by the President for the purpose,
and by the French ambassador, Cambon, acting under a special full power from
the Queen Regent of Spain.
This protocol
embodied, without qualification or reserve, the precise terms offered by the
President to Spain on July 30. It consisted of six articles. By the first,
Spain agreed to “relinquish all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.”
By the second, she engaged to cede Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the
West Indies, and an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United
States. The third was in these words : “ The United States will occupy and hold
the city, bay, and harbour of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace
which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the
Philippines.” The fourth provided for the appointment of two commissions, to
meet respectively at Havana, in Cuba, and San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the
purpose of carrying out the immediate evacuation by Spain of Cuba, Porto Rico,
and other Spanish islands in the West Indies. By the fifth, the United States
and Spain agreed each to appoint not more than five commissioners, who should
meet in Paris not later than October 1, 1898, to treat of peace. By the sixth
and last article, provision was made for the immediate suspension of
hostilities.
In the
negotiations at Paris, the two great subjects of controversy were the so-called
Cuban debt and the disposition of the Philippines. For the payment of the Cuban
debt the revenues of the island were pledged; but its payment was also
expressly guaranteed by the Spanish nation. The debt itself was contracted by
the Spanish government and its authorities in Cuba for the most part after
1868. In that year the so-called debt of Cuba amounted to only $18,000,000. In
1880, two years after the close of the ten years’ war, it amounted to upwards
of $170,000,000. Between February, 1895, when the last insurrection broke out,
and January 1,1898, new bonds were issued to the amount of 858,550,000 pesetas,
or $171,000,000. There were also other debts, uncertain in amount, which were
understood to be considered in Spain as properly chargeable to Cuba.
To Spain the
question of the disposition of these financial burdens was evidently more
important, from the pecuniary point of view, than that of the relinquishment of
territory, the attempt to retain which had given rise to them. The Spanish
commissioners therefore bent all their
efforts to
the establishment of the position that the debts in question must follow the
sovereignty of the island, and must be assumed by whatever nation possessed
that sovereignty. The American commissioners, on the other hand, maintained
that from no point of view could the debts in question be considered as local
debts of Cuba or as obligations chargeable to the island; that they were
created by the government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own
agents; and that the precedents which had been cited of the assumption or apportionment
of debts, where a State was absorbed or divided, were inapplicable to the
so-called Cuban debt, the burden of which, imposed upon the people of Cuba
without their consent and by force of arms, was one of the principal wrongs for
the termination of which the struggles for Cuban independence were undertaken.
The American commissioners moreover contended that Spain, by her unconditional
agreement to relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba, had waived the question of
the debt. On these grounds the American commissioners repeatedly declined to
assume the so-called Cuban debt, either for the United States or for Cuba. The
discussion continued, however, till the eighth conference, on October 24, when
it was brought to a head by the pointed inquiry whether the Spanish
commissioners “would refuse to consider any articles as to Cuba and Porto Rico
which contained no provision for the assumption of indebtedness by the United
States, or Cuba, or both?” The Spanish commissioners two days later replied
that they would not refuse to consider such articles, since their “final
approval ” must depend on an agreement upon a complete treaty; and they invited
the American commissioners to enter upon the discussion of other points, and at
the outset to submit a proposal with regard to the Philippine Archipelago.
The joint
commission was thus brought face to face with the question of the Philippines.
By the protocol of Aiigust 12 this question was left entirely open. The avowed
object of the United States in so leaving it was to gain time for further
consideration. The problem was both novel and perplexing. It may be confidently
affirmed that before the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila the
acquisition of the Philippines by the United States had not been suggested even
as a possible contingency ; but, although Dewey’s victory attracted universal
attention to the islands, it was not followed by any general and definite
expression of desire for their annexation. An accident of war was destined to
exert an important influence on the direction of public sentiment. Soon after
the destruction of the Spanish fleet telegraphic communication with the islands
was severed. For this reason the orders that were sent out from Washington on
August 12, immediately on the signing of the protocol for the suspension of
hostilities, were a week old when they reached the Philippines. Meanwhile, on
August 13 Manila was captured by the American forces; and on the following day
a capitulation was signed.
684
The Philippines
demanded by America.
[l898
A peaceful
occupation of' the city, under the provisions of the protocol, would have
excited little feeling., The report of its capture by force of arms, with some
casualties, was received in the United States eight days after the signing of
the protocol. The effect was visible and pronounced. It gave a decided impulse
to annexationist sentiment. The question began to he popularly discussed as
one, not of taking the slands, but of abandoning them ; and the tendency to
retain them was powerfully reinforced by the growth of a missionary spirit,
which discerned in the course of events a providential opportunity to promote
the welfare of the natives, an opportunity the neglect of which, because of
preconceived notions of national interest, would constitute a selfish and
censurable violation of duty. Nevertheless, President McKinley, in his
instructions to the American Peace Commission, of September 16, 1898, went no
further than to say that, the United States could not accept “less than” the
island of Luzon. During the following weeks, however, much consideration was
given to the subject both at Washington and at Paris; and on October 28 the
American commissioners were instructed that the President could see “ but one
plain path of duty—the acceptance of the archipelago.”
The American
commissioners therefore presented, on October 31, a proposal for the cession of
the whole group, but stated that they were prepared to insert in the treaty a
stipulation for the assumption by the United States of any existing debt
incurred by Spain for public works and improvements of a pacific character in
the islands. At the next conference the Spanish commissioners submitted a
counter-proposal, in the form of an argumentative memorandum. In this document
they contended that the protocol of August 12 did not justify a demand for the
cession of the whole group; and that the capture of Manila by the American
forces, after the signature of that instrument, though in fact before news of
its signature was received in the islands, was, in view of the agreement for a
suspension of hostilities^, unlawful. On this ground they maintained that the
treaty of peace orught to provide for the immediate delivery of Manila to the
Spanish government, the immediate release of the Spanish garrison, the return
to the Spanish government of all funds and public property taken by the
American army since the occupation of the place, as well as of all taxes
collected prior to its restoration; and they even demanded an indemnity for the
damage occasioned by the detention of the Spanish troops as prisoners, to which
they ascribed the spread of the Tagal insurrection in Luzon and its extension
to the Visayas, and the ill- treatmeht of Spanish prisoners, civil and
military, by the natives. They concluded by inviting the American commissioners
to present a proposition concerning “the control, disposition, and government”
of the Philippines which should conform to “ the stipulations of Article III ”
of the protocol. To this counter-proposal the American commissioners made a
detailed reply. Obviously the principal point at issue was the
proposal for
the cession of the group. The American commissioners did not controvert the
general principle that acts of war, committed after a general suspension of
hostilities, afford no basis for a claim of title by conquest, even though such
acts be committed prior to the receipt of notice of the suspension; but they
pointed out that by the third article of the protocol the United States was to
“ occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbour of Manila pending the conclusion
of a treaty of peace”; and they maintained that this meant a military
occupation, with all the rights and powers of government legally incident to
such occupation. The great subject of controversy, however, was the effect to
be given to the words “ control, disposition, and government.” Did the
stipulation that the treaty of peace should “ determine the control,
disposition, and government of the Philippines” warrant a demand for the
cession of territory ? Did it authorise a demand for the transfer of
sovereignty over the group or any part of it ?
We have seen
that the words in question were first used in the note of July 30, which
defined the terms on which the United States would enter upon negotiations for
peace; and that the reply of the Spanish government with regard to the third
condition, relating to the Philippines, was unsatisfactory. The purport of that
reply was that, as Manila, though blockaded, had not been captured by the
American forces, the proposed occupation of the city should be considered not
as an act of conquest, but as a “guarantee”; and that, since the intentions of
the United States were not disclosed in the stipulation that the treaty of
peace should determine the control, disposition, and government of the
Philippines, “the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the
third condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over
the archipelago, leaving it to the negut'itors to agree as to such reforms as
the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives
may render desirable.” It may fairly be argued that the statement that the
Spanish government did not “a priori ” renounce “the sovereignty of Spain over
the archipelago” clearly implied that the renunciation of sovereignty might
become the subject of negotiation, and constituted an acceptance of the
condition that the question of the Philippines should be left in its entirety
for future determination by the treaty of peace. Nevertheless, the President
declined so to treat it; and this decision was made known to the French
ambassador, first in oral conference, and afterwards by a formal note, with
which there was enclosed a draft of the protocol in the exact words in which it
was signed two days later. The attempt to reach an agreement by correspondence
was abandoned, and the terms on which the negotiations were to be undertaken
were embodied in a single document.
On November
21 the American commissioners, in order to bring the discussions to a close,
presented a final proposition, on the acceptance or
rejection of
which the continuance of the negotiations was to depend. This proposition
embraced the cession of the entire archipelago of the Philippines and the
payment by the United States of the sum of $20,000,000; and, in connexion with
this offer, the American commissioners stated that, “it being the policy of
the United States to maintain in the Philippines an open door to the world’s
commerce,” they were prepared to insert in the treaty a stipulation to the
effect that, for a term of years, Spanish ships and merchandise should be
admitted into the ports of the islands on the same terms as American ships and
merchandise. The proposition also embraced a mutual relinquishment of claims that
had arisen since the beginning of the insurrection in Cuba in 1895.
The Spanish
commissioners made by letter various alternative proposals, as possible
substitutes for the American demands. These proposals were, however, declined;
and on November 28 the Spanish commissioners presented in conference a formal
written acceptance of the ultimatum. The treaty of peace was signed on December
10, 1898.
The
publication of the terms of the treaty was followed in the United States by an
active discussion as to whether the article for the cession of the Philippines
should not be amended by a declaration in favour of ultimate independence,
somewhat after the example of Cuba. The contest was carried into the Senate,
and the prospects of unqualified ratification seemed to become more and more
doubtful. The vote was to be taken on Monday, February 6, 1899. On Sunday, the
5th, came the unexpected and startling news of a collision between the American
and “Filipino” forces. Next day, by a vote of 57 to 27—one more than the requisite
two-thirds—the treaty was ratified, without amendment. The Philippine Islands
became unconditionally a colony of the United States. In May, 1902, the
American occupation ceasing, the Republic of Cuba, under an independent
government, became a reality.
THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES.
The economic history of the United States differs
from that of any European country, in the fact that it begins with the
transplantation of a civilised race to a vast territory endowed with
extraordinary resources. It can hardly be said that a new nation begins its
development at the point that has been reached by the older nation from which
it springs; for there is an inevitable return to a more primitive economic life
in the adjustment to a primitive environment. Furthermore, the process of
transplanting removes many of the shackles of custom and tradition which retard
the progress of older countries. In' a new country things cannot be done in the
old way, and therefore they are probably done in the best way. There is no
force to oppose the quick adoption of the methods which make most directly for
the end in view. It is true that this progress of economic adjustment may have
important effects on national character and on legal and political conceptions;
but the period of transition is temporary, and the social changes are
conditioned by the racial inheritance. The nation begins its new life with the
period of appreuticeship already past; and the century-long process of
accumulating knowledge, of building character, of shaping economic and
political institutions, in short, of rearing stone by stone the structure of
civilisation, does not require to be repeated. For these reasons, an account of
the economic growth of the United States is rather a chronicle of material
achievement than a history of economic institutions.
It should be
remembered, however, that an intelligent race and natural resources are not in
themselves sufficient to bring about with speed a condition of economic
stability. To secure this result, the new nation must not only draw its
inherited ability from the old stock, but also the successive supplies of
capital which it needs for the exploitation of its resources; while the channel
of commerce must be kept open if the energy of the country is to follow the
lines of its greatest economic advantage. The new country must be able to
discount its
future wealth before production takes place. And for this purpose, if it be a
country of great extent, it must first grow up to its task of exploitation. For
many years the chief economic characteristic of the United States was the
possession of an excess of natural resources with an inadequate supply of
labour and capital. It resembled a great ship undermanned and poorly equipped.
Consequently economic progress, instead of being rapid in the early years, was,
viewed from our present knowledge of the possibilities of the country,
surprisingly slow. The very immensity of the undertaking required a period of
preparation before that strong and complex economic organisation could be
developed which was necessary to the successful utilisation of American
resources.
The economic
conditions prevalent in the first half of the nineteenth century have already
been described, and may be very briefly summarised here. At the beginning of
that century nine-tenths of the population of the country lived along the
narrow strip of territory between the sea-coast and the Alleghanies. As yet the
dominant section, politically and socially, was the group of Southern States with
Virginia at their head. Here the economic system was patriarchal in form.
Slavery was firmly established, and the land was held in large estates. The
plantation system had been the natural outcome of the characters of the ruling
class and the enslaved negroes, and of the nature of the soil, which was
especially adapted to the production of tobacco, indigo, and cotton. Little
attempt was made at diversity of agriculture; and, even at this period, the
South was largely dependent on other districts for its food supplies as well as
its manufactures. Tobacco had been the chief crop in the colonial period, and
was just beginning to give way before that extension of cotton culture which
was destined to play so great a part in the social and political as well as the
economic history of the country. The invention of the cotton-gin by Eli Whitney
had occurred a few years before; and this remarkable improvement, coming at a
time when the new processes of manufacture were just making themselves felt in
England, determined the course of Southern development for sixty years to
come, and gave a firm economic foundation to the slave system—a remarkable
instance of a beneficent invention of the human mind affording the chief reason
for the maintenance of an inhuman institution.
The Northern
States were agricultural and commercial. Here the conditions of agriculture
were exactly the reverse of those in the South. Small holdings, with
considerable diversity of products, were the rule. Food-products were grown,
both for the home market and for export. The flourishing condition of West
Indian commerce at this time furnished the chief foreign market for American
provisions, and also for the products of the New England fisheries. The
greatest commercial activity was found in the shipping business, which had been
greatly
stimulated by
the opportunities of the neutral trade during the period of the European wars.
Domestic manufactures were in a fairly flourishing condition, and helped to
supply both the home and the Southern market. Little advance, however, had been
made in the introduction of mechanical processes, while the factory system was
nearly unknown. In the main, all luxuries and many of the necessities which
could be easily transported were imported from England. There was little to
encourage capital to compete with the powerful industries of England,
especially in view of the fact that the opportunities for its employment in
agriculture and shipping were in any case more attractive.
In the
meantime that movement toward the settlement of the West, which for a century
was to be the controlling factor in economic development, but whose effects at
this early period were scarcely felt, had already begun. Ever since the
Revolution, the migration of the pioneers beyond the mountains had been going
on; and by 1800 about one-tenth of the population, roughly 500,000 in number,
had moved into the western territory. Settlers had penetrated the wilderness of
western New York and of western Virginia; but the chief stream of migration had
gone from Virginia into Kentucky and Tennessee till it had reached the Ohio
river and its tributaries. This population, for the time being, consisted of
hardy pioneers practically shut off from dose commercial connexion because of
the great difficulties of conducting trade across the mountains, and the
necessity on their own part of devoting all their energies to
self-preservation. Nevertheless they increased rapidly year by year.
The course of
economic development at this time was but a continuation of the colonial
period. There was a considerable degree of widespread comfort, leading to a
rapid increase in population, about 35 per cent, to the decade; but there were
no important changes in the nature of the economic life or in the relations of
its various groups. More people were simply making more things in the same way.
Before long, however, a marked change began; and the second war against England
may be taken as a convenient line of demarcation between the two periods. The
transition may be described as that from the period of homogeneous expansion to
the period of organic growth; and the chief factors to which the change was due
were the rise of manufactures, the improvements in transport, and the extension
of cotton culture into the South-west, on the one hand; and, on the other, the
adoption of a national economic policy which included protection to
manufactures, government aid to internal improvements, and a land policy which
favoured rapid settlement.
The cessation
of foreign trade in the years 1808-9, and again in 1812-14, had forced the
nation into an industrial development, which not only was more rapid than
before, but also involved a change
690 Industrial changes. Communications. [i807-
from the
domestic system of industry to the factory system, and the consequent
investment of capital on a larger scale. It is not necessary to describe the
growth in detail. The single example of the cotton industry, in which the
number of spindles in factories increased from
8,000 to 130,000 between 1807 and 1815, will
suffice to show that a new period in American industry had begun. The cessation
of the war in 1814 brought the new manufactures into direct competition with
the older industries of Great Britain; and the natural result was that some
degree of protection was considered necessary to their maintenance. A tariff
with some protective features had been adopted in the first year of the
Constitution; but, since there had been few manufactures to protect in the
early period, the real beginning of the protective policy of the United States
may be said to date from the tariff of 1816. This Act provided for a moderate
measure of Protection, which was subsequently increased by the Acts of 1824 and
1828.
This rise of
manufactures was accompanied by a growing activity on the part of eastern
merchants in the western territory, and would have provided an increasingly
important market for western produce but for the grave difficulties of
transport. There was practically no route for commerce except the mountain
trail, which could not be utilised for the bulky products of the West. At the
same time the roads in the sea-coast States were in a desperate condition. Many
proposals had been made for turnpike and canal improvements; and Gallatin’s
famous report (1807), providing for an elaborate system connecting all sections
of the country, was an expression of the popular feeling of the time. It was
not till after the war of 1812 that any serious beginnings were made; but,
dining the next twenty years, the progress of improvements in internal
communications was an important factor both in politics and commerce. The
problem of the moment was to secure facilities of transport which should bring
the farming sections of the East into connexion with their own rivers, unite
the traffic of the eastern river districts, connect eastern rivers with those
west of the mountains, and develop a system of western waterways by connecting
the Lakes with the Ohio and the Mississippi, while branch canals led to the
interior farms. Such enterprises required a far larger capital than was
available in the home money markets; and extensive borrowing from England
became necessary. The credit of the home companies, however, was insufficient
for such purposes; and the only solution was the issue of State bonds or grants
from the Federal government in support of the necessary improvements.
Government aid was therefore resorted to in support of nearly every enterprise
of the kind; and the contributions of the State governments were, in view of
the resources of the time, enormous.
The demand
for such improvements was especially strong in the West; and the reason of this
can be easily understood. Soon after
-1828] The needs of the West. The cotton
industry. 691
the close of
the war the population west of the mountains had reached a total of 2,000,000.
The settled area included, besides Kentucky and Tennessee, a large part of
Ohio, southern Indiana, and Illinois. Between these districts and the great
Lakes lay a vast region, still unpenetrated save by the Indian trader, while to
the South the region between central Georgia and Louisiana was still
wilderness; but a great wedge of settlement had been thrown out, which,
stretching from Lake Erie to the Tennessee on the east, and following the great
valley of the Ohio westward, had split the wilderness in halves. The
Mississippi had been crossed, and a settlement already existed at St Louis,
near its junction with its great western tributary, the Missouri. At the mouth
of the river lay New Orleans. Despite the surrounding stretches of wilderness,
the strategic points for the exploitation of the West had now been occupied.
And yet the prospect before the western people was not entirely encouraging.
Their chief need was a market for their increasing products; and their only
outlet was by export from New Orleans. Notable as this trade was, in view of
the conditions of the time, it involved, besides a sea-voyage after the Gulf
was reached, a long river-voyage in flat-boats with no possibility of a return
cargo upstream. For the time being their natural waterways did not connect them
with a home market, while the natural market of the Eastern States behind them
was shut off by the mountains. That the problem of transport should seem to
them all-important is not surprising.
This problem,
however, was not to be adequately solved by the system of internal improvements
which now began to be carried out. The great Erie Canal was opened in 1825. It
connected the lake region with the Atlantic by way of the Hudson river, and at
once opened the eastern markets to northern Ohio; but the great body of
settlers were too far south to make connexion with this route practicable.
Before the Ohio river could be successfully connected with the seaboard, the
Alleghanies themselves had to be crossed; and no canal enterprise proved equal
to the problem. In the meantime, however, new factors entered into the
situation, which made the question of the eastern market less important. The
rivers flowed west to the Mississippi; and there was needed only a market at
the river’s mouth to give the necessary stimulus to western agriculture. This
market now began to appear through the rapid settlement of the South-west.
It seems
to-day a strange fact that, though England had imported cotton from the East
before Jamestown was founded, yet Virginia had been an English colony for a
century and a half and, with the other colonies, had achieved independence
before cotton was exported to the mother-country. The total production of
cotton in the United States in 1790 was only 1,500,000 lbs.; but in 1810 this
had increased to
85,000,000
lbs. Down to this time the production had been confined
692
Cotton. Steam
navigation. Land. [1809-
to the
Atlantic States; but in the next decade the continued foreign demand led to
that great increase in production which was to afford an unique instance in
history of a great region entirely dependent on a single crop, and the world
dependent on that region for its supply; it also led to that rapid settlement
of the South-west which was to increase so greatly the area of slave labour and
the power of the slave- holding class. By 1820 the river valleys of Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi were already well settled; and the population of the
three States had risen to over 350,000.
This extension
of cotton culture was of immense importance to the West, since it built up the
much-needed market at the end of river navigation. And that navigation was
itself immensely facilitated at the same time by the successful introduction of
the steamboat on the Ohio. Only two years after the Clermont made her famous
voyage from New York to Albany in 1809, a steamboat started on the long voyage
from Pittsburgh to New Orleans. It was not, however, till some years later that
the steam navigation of the western rivers became commercially important. Under
these new conditions the real development of the West began. The towns along
the Ohio and Mississippi flourished as never before. Pittsburgh became the
distributing centre for merchandise to the West, and New Orleans the great
receiving port for western com and provisions, since more than ever the Cotton
States devoted their whole energies to the one great staple.
About the
same time the land policy of the United States began to adopt the character
which it has subsequently maintained, and which has been of great importance to
the country’s progress. The course of this policy and the growth of the public
doma;" have been described elsewhere in this volume; and it is
only necessary here to point out the manner in which the new tendencies
co-operated for the stimulation of national development. The early theory
regarding the public domain was that it should be used as a vast government
property for fiscal purposes. The idea of some European historians, that the policy
of Hamilton was adopted under the conscious influence of capitalistic
interests, in order to prevent the labourers from acquiring farms and thus keep
the price of labour high, is simply a fanciful interpretation of the facts, due
to the effort to reduce all history to some arbitrary theory of class struggle.
There was doubtless a feeling in some quarters that the development of the
country might be retarded by encouraging a continuous decentralisation of the
population; but the land policy that was actually carried out was dictated by
purely fiscal motives. The change to a more liberal policy was due to the
popular demand for land, and showed the growing influence of the West. By 1820
the minimum unit of purchase had been reduced to eighty acres; and the price
was in that year reduced to $1'25 per acre. In the following years the
preemption idea was becoming practically operative; and the
temporary Act
of 1830 and the permanent Preemption Act of 1841 were merely legal declarations
of a right that had been generally granted. Though there was some justification
of the fiscal policy at the time of its adoption, a more far-sighted
statesmanship would have perceived that ultimately even the financial position
of the government would be more strengthened through the permanent settlement
of the domain by tax-paying farmers than through its sale to speculative
companies.
Such were the
natural conditions and the lines of public policy determining the course of
national development in the quarter of a century following the war of 1812.
Much criticism has been directed against some features of the policy adopted;
but it must be judged as a whole. When we recognise the nature of the
problem—the difficulties which obstructed the development of an economic system
capable of exploiting the resources of a vast territoiy, and the fact that the
veiy vastness of the country, combined with insufficient transport, was a
temporary source of weakness, as tending to produce an isolated development of
separate sections—we must admit that, however futile or extravagant the support
of internal improvements may in some cases have been, however unreasonable and
one-sided some of the Tariff Acts, the general line of national policy was
broadly and wisely conceived.
Despite the
growing prosperity, there were nevertheless elements of weakness which made the
development of a strong national life still doubtful. The country was now
divided into three sections. The New England and Middle States east of the
Alleghany mountains, rapidly developing on industrial and commercial lines,
were far removed in character and sympathy from the Cotton States, with their
expanding plantation and slave system, and were not yet commercially joined
with the new West. Even the extension of canals to the West, although it
brought the products of western New York and the shores of Lake Erie to the
Hudson, did not overcome the dependence of the great valley of the Ohio on the
southern market by way of the Mississippi and New Orleans. The East sold to the
West but did not buy from it; and, though there was a natural division of
labour among the three sections, there was not such a system of mutual exchange
as would most closely bind them together. The West, which should naturally have
been in the closest interdependence with the East, was being bound more and
more closely by commercial interest to the South; and the continuance of this
process would have been inevitable had conditions remained the same while Iowa
and the Missouri valley were being colonised. Had the great struggle of the
Civil War arisen in such circumstances, the Middle-west might possibly have
sided with the South.
The great
event which was to change this geographical situation and determine entirely
anew the lines of economic development was the introduction of the railroad. It
is not necessary to enlarge upon the
commercial
revolution brought about everywhere in the world by this invention, following
rapidly on the application of steam to ocean navigation. Three distinctively
important results for the United States may, however, be noted. In the first
place, the very size of the country made railroads far more important here than
in the countries of Europe. The resources of the United States are separated by
distances so great that anything approximating their full development would
have been impossible under the old methods of transport. The great rivers of
the West, as already shown, were important arteries of commerce; but there were
vast districts separated by enormous distances, and either totally disconnected
from these waterways, or connected with them only by streams incapable of
conveying more than a very limited trade. Nor could canals be constructed to
complete the system of waterways in any adequate degree. Consequently, had any
observer in 1830 been able to appreciate the great possibilities of production
on the American continent, he must have resigned himself to the conviction
that, in the face of the small advance mankind had yet been able to make in
respect of transport, these possibilities could never be realised. In the
second place, the railroads solved the geographical problem, and profoundly
modified the course of economic development. They united the East and West.
Neither mountains nor rivers could stop them. If any commodity could be
produced in one district and sold in another, these districts could now be
connected. Even down to the middle of the century the chief routes of commerce
ran north and south: since that time they have run east and west. The economic
unity of the country was at last made possible. The third feature of American
railroads lies in the fact that to a great extent they have preceded commerce
rather than followed it. They have been built not to connect producing
districts but to create production. In the Far West the rails have been laid
through the wilderness; and the settlers have followed the rails, as formerly
they followed the river courses. It is this fact which has made the development
of the trans-Mississippi region possible.
The first
railroad to be opened was the Baltimore and Ohio, in 1831. As the name implies,
the idea of the road was to unite the sea-coast with the Ohio river; but it was
not until 1853 that the Ohio was reached. During the first twenty years of
railroad development, lines were built rapidly in the Eastern States, both
North and South, while after 1840 considerable advance was made in the States
west of the mountains. Little, however, was accomplished towards overcoming
that barrier between them which had played so important a part in the early
history of the country. In 1842 a line was completed between Boston and Albany;
and in the same year New York was connected by rail with Buffalo at the lake
end of the Erie Canal, the level character of the country, which had made the
canal possible, causing also the first through rail connexion here. The people
soon perceived the importance
of railroads
to their commercial progress; and demands for State aid received an all-too
ready response. Almost every State in the Union made grants for the support of
railroad companies, while Pennsylvania and Georgia built some State roads
outright. The former State built at an early date the so-called Portage
railroad over the Alleghany mountains, which, connecting with its system of
canals and railroads, made a direct communication with the Ohio; but, though it
was justly considered a great feat of engineering, the actual portage of canal
boats over the mountains never proved commercially practicable. Large as were
the sums somewhat recklessly advanced for the development of railroads, they
did not reach the amount which had been expended on canals, nor were the
financial consequences by any means so disastrous.
The
speculation connected with the great investments of capital on internal
improvements, combined with the reckless banking and currency inflation of the
period, led to the severe panic of 1837, from which industry did not recover
for some years. The panic did not however greatly affect railroad expansion;
and the railroads became the most important factors in the period of prosperity
that followed. The years from 1840 to 1860 were years of rapid growth, with no
serious reverses till the panic of 1857. The westward movement continued with
increasing rapidity. As we have seen, the period 1800-20 was marked by the
settlement of the Ohio valley, while the period 1820-40 saw the settlement of
the south-western Cotton States, and the continuous increase in the States
tributary to the Ohio, such as Illinois and Indiana. The period from 1840 to
1860 is that of the settlement of the Mississippi valley above the cotton-belt.
East of the Mississippi the population of Michigan and Wisconsin increased from
233,000, of whom only 31,000 were in Wisconsin, to over 1,500,000, of whom
Wisconsin claimed the larger share. At the same time, Illinois and Indiana
increased from less than
1.200.000 to over 3,000,000. The west bank of the
Mississippi was settled from north to south. While the movement had only just
begun in Minnesota, Iowa increased from 43,000 to 675,000; Missouri from
383.000 to 1,182,000, and Arkansas from 97,000 to
435,000.
The area of
improved farm-land increased by fifty per cent, between 1850 and 1860, and the
value of farm property by one hundred per cent. An important factor in this
rapid growth of the West was the application of new agricultural implements to
the production of grain. Improvements of various kinds were made during these
years; but the revolutionary change was the introduction throughout the new
territory of the reapers invented by McCormick and Hussey in the early
thirties. The “ complete harvester ” of to-day represents a great advance on
these earlier machines; but all the main inventions were made before 1860, and
the reaper had come into general use. It is hardly too much to say that this
application of machinery to harvesting was as important in the development of
western agriculture as the extent and fertility of
696
Growth of exports, and
of population. [1845-60
the soil
itself. There was now practically no limit to production from lack of ability
to harvest the crop; and production increased enormously. The increase of an
industrial population in the Eastern States afforded an expanding market for
these products, while at the same time the markets of the Old World were thrown
open owing to frequent failures of European crops, and to the repeal of the
English Com Laws. Down to 184)5, exports of wheat or provisions to Great
Britain on any considerable scale had been only sporadic. The beginning of a
steady market appeared at this period, but only the beginning, for Europe was
not yet dependent on the United States for its regular supplies; and even down
to the Civil War the exports were important only in years of unusual scarcity
abroad. The exports of cotton still formed the bulk of the foreign trade; and,
exclusive of cotton and tobacco, Europe in normal years took a smaller quantity
of American products than the non-European countries.
The increased
demand for cotton had given a great stimulus to the extension of the
cotton-belt, which by 1860 had spread so far west that Texas already had a
population of 600,000. The production of cotton had increased from 800,000,000
lbs. in the early forties to 2,200,000,000 in 1860; and seventy-five per cent,
of the crop still continued to be exported. In the meantime, while that
expansion of the Slave States was progressing which bade fair to split the
country in halves when the final rupture came, a movement in the Far West had
begun which was to be of great moment in binding the West and the East
together. The discovery of gold in California in 1849 had led to a rush of
settlers amounting to over 350,000 in a single decade. The search for gold
could not be restrained by the mountain barriers that seemed to set a limit to
further expansion for agricultural purposes. And yet the soil of the California
valley was even more valuable than her mines. By 1860 the Mississippi had
become an interior river, and the Missouri formed a frontier line that in other
circumstances might have seemed permanent; but, a great State once formed on
the Pacific slope, the wilderness and the mountains could no longer keep the
two oceans apart.
Among the
many striking features of the Civil War there is none more extraordinary than
the fact that throughout the whole struggle the Northern States continued to
increase in population and industrial power. Despite the fact that out of a
population of about 22,000,000 the total of enlistments and re-enlistments was
over 2,500,000, and that at the dose of the war 1,000,000 men were enrolled in
the Union armies, the population increased by at least 3,000,000 between 1860
and 1865, while over 4,500,000 acres of the public domain were taken up by
settlers. Despite the fact that the grain States sent hundreds of thousands of
men to the front, the annual production of cereals increased. For example,
Indiana, which had produced about 15,000,000
bushels of
wheat in 1859, produced 20,000,000 in 1863, although 124,000 of her sons
(one-tenth of the total population of 1860) were in the Union ranks. Despite
the great demand for food-products to supply the army, the exports of wheat and
provisions increased even more than their production. The average export of
wheat for 1863 and 1864 was
33,000,000
bushels compared with a maximum export of 27,000,000 in any year before the
war. The demands for products were such, that despite the burdens of taxation
and the disorganisation of the finances, many new industries were established
on a firm basis. Notwithstanding the fact that prices were high and domestic
consumption greatly curtailed, the period was not one of real suffering in the
North.
The quickness
with which industry recovered after the war is equally remarkable. Few now
recall what grave dangers lurked in the problem of disbanding 1,000,000 soldiers,
and turning them at once into paths of peaceful industry; and yet the
enthusiasm with which the country took up arms for the defence of union is not
more inspiring than the dignity with which she laid down her arms, and sent “
all her handmaid armies back to spin.” That such a sudden addition to the ranks
of labour could be made at the very time when the government stopped its own
extraordinary purchases, without a serious disorganisation of business, seems
indeed surprising; and yet the exhaustion of supplies was such that even a lack
of capital and a crippled purchasing power, were not serious obstacles to
profitable employment. The large disbursements by the government in the way of
arrears added a temporary spur to the demand, while what had been the weakness
of the South—its dependence on a single crop— now proved its chief strength in
the moment of need. Stricken to a point of desperate poverty by the war, its
salvation lay in the fact that at once an eager market was clamouring for its
cotton. In the twelve months following the close of the war the exports of
cotton, though less than half the quantity of the years immediately preceding
the war, reached the unprecedented money value of over f 200,000,000. High
prices continued for seven or eight years, and counterbalanced the lower
production, which did not reach the ante helium level till 1871. The South had
money to buy the goods it so sorely needed, and the North had a ready market
for its surplus.
These
conditions were sufficient to tide over the few years of economic readjustment
which ushered in the new era. For the Civil War marks a turning-point in the
economic life of the country as in its political life, The question of national
unity was settled once for all as a political theory, and it was to be settled
even more effectively by a national economic development on a vaster scale than
had yet been conceived. The removal of all barriers to inter-State commerce
through the rapid extension of the railroad system, culminating in the great
transcontinental lines; the opening up of the grain States west of the
Mississippi to the limits of the arable land; the utilisation of the
grazing
facilities, and the exploitation of the mineral resources, of the Rocky
Mountains and the arid plains; the transformation of the Pacific slope from a
series of mining camps to an important source of agricultural and forest
supplies; the expansion of eastern industry in response to the discovery of the
new resources, to a continuous series of inventions, and to the increasing
market; the recovery of prosperity in the South, and the adoption of a more
diversified industry under a system of free labour— these were the causes which
operated during the thirty years after the Civil War to bind all sections of
the country together with the bonds of mutual commercial interest.
On the other
hand, the new era was to be marked by the appearance of problems from which
hitherto the young democracy had been comparatively free, and the freedom from
which had formed a favourite theme for patriotic oratory. The same material
causes which were to obliterate the lines of geographical cleavage contained
the elements which were to increase the cleavage of social classes. The growth
of industry meant the establishment of a wage-earning class, whose members were
to lose more and more the possibility of escape from a dependent position
through the freedom of the soil, which had been the strength of the earlier
artisan. The aggregation of capital necessary to the new methods of exploiting
the national resources necessitated the concentration of power in fewer hands.
The time had come when the unorganised activities of an industrious people had
found their limit; and the capacity to forecast the future had become more
important than the mere industry of the present. No matter how important the
energy and intelligence of the masses, no matter how rapidly their own comforts
increased, they seemed to themselves to have lost the independent initiative of
their fathers, as the organised march of progress was more and more directed by
the great captains of industry. These feelings, however, were not of a kind to
lessen the intenser feelings of nationality which accompanied the change to the
larger scale of economic life. The country bulked bigger to all sections and
classes; enterprises hitherto considered magnificent now became ordinary; and
the confidence in the future, which encouraged the spirit of daring speculative
enterprise, was at the same time the common possession and the common pride of
a whole people.
The change of
scale in popular conceptions was quickly seen in the financial transactions of
the government. The strict economy and cautious tariff policy of the ante
bellum period were no longer to be enforced by a public sensitive, through inherited
prejudice, to every increase of taxation. Accustomed to the vast system of
excise and customs taxes of the war period, the people were not likely to prove
too exacting provided that the most burdensome internal taxes were quickly
removed, while there was easy tolerance of a scale of public expenditure which
offered every inducement to the looting of the public treasury, and the
consequent demoralisation of politics. In some measure this spirit
accounts for
the continuance of the excessive features of the war tariff in time of peace.
There was, to be sure, a reaction from the low tariff policy even before the
war, and many of the rates of the war tariff were avowedly protective; but no
such customs system could have been built up except under the pressing
necessity of enormous revenue; and, on the easy assumption that high duties
meant high revenue, the most extreme demands of the manufacturers were readily
granted. It is equally true that there was a strong feeling for Protection at
the close of the war; but it would he absurd to say that the extreme emergency
measures adopted in a great conflict represented the deliberate commercial
policy of any party for the time of peace. It was fully expected that the rates
would be rapidly reduced as soon as the proper adjustment could be made; but
the manufacturers had tasted the fruits of monopoly; and with each year’s delay
the problem became more difficult. Without entering into an account of the
different Acts, and the occasional attempts at tariff reform, it may be said in
general that the duties repealed or lowered were revenue duties, and that,
wherever the pressure of competition was still felt, the duties were maintained
and even raised. At no time since the war has the average rate on dutiable
goods been less than 40 or more than 50 per cent. In the case of many of the
most important articles, however, the duties have been much higher.
For many
years the idea still prevailed, even among Republican leaders, that the need of
Protection would pass with the full establishment of home manufactures; but by
1890 the doctrine that Protection was a permanent necessity had made its
appearance. The infant-industry argument could hardly be advanced in support of
protecting industries which had been long established; and the argument as to
the social advantages of a diversified industry, which Hamilton had expressed
so sanely and persuasively, and which formed the basis of a whole social
philosophy in the hands of Carey, was not applicable to a nation which had
already become one of the greatest industrial powers of the world. This
argument, to be sure, was extended to the point of insisting that nothing
should be purchased abroad that could be made at home; but the chief argument
of the later period has been the necessity of permanently maintaining tariffs
sufficient to balance the higher wages paid by American employers. A strong
appeal was thus made to the wage- earning class, who were convinced that a
reduction of duties would be followed by a reduction of wages. This argument
was equally applicable to all lines of industry, and was carried out logically
in the tariff. Duties were put on farm and dairy products to protect the
residents on the Canadian border; and those on raw materials gave a convenient
pretext for giving additional protection to manufactures by excessive “compensating
duties.”
It would be
an error to attribute even the extreme features of the American tariff entirely
to the sinister influence of private interests on
legislation.
In the first place many industries, partially if not wholly dependent on the
tariff, had been established before the occasion for readjustment came; and,
these being once established, even the most conscientious members of the
dominant party shrank from the responsibility of causing their downfall.
Furthermore, the fact of rapid industrial expansion was patent to both the
people and their legislators; and, convinced as they were of the soundness of
the principle of Protection, it seemed wiser to leave well alone, than to run
the risk of experimental changes. That the tariff was an influential factor in
this development is beyond question. In some cases entirely new industries were
established under its shelter, for example, the manufacture of silk, and the
tin-plate industry, the most recent illustration of a new industry created
outright by conscious effort. The initial costs necessary to the production of
iron and steel on a large scale would have delayed the wonderful development in
these lines, had it not been for the protected prices of the early period. On
the other side, however, must be placed the increased costs to other
manufactures, and the diminished purchasing power of the farmer. These are
problems which need not be discussed here; but it may be asserted with confidence
that the power of the tariff, whether for good or evil, has been vastly
overrated. It has not been that oppressive burden on the public that some
critics maintain; for many of its rates have been nominal and the home market
has, ultimately and in the main, been adequately supplied with the home
product. On the other hand, the main causes of industrial growth lie deeper
than the regulations of commercial policy. These causes may now be briefly
considered.
The primary
causes of industrial growth in the United States are to be found in the
character of the people and the natural advantages of the country. It is not
necessary to enlarge upon those general qualities of nervous energy, alert
intelligence, directness in method, independent initiative, and daring
enterprise, combined with an eager absorption in the pursuit of material
success, which, partly inherited but largely acquired during a century’s
command of unlimited resources, have marked the people of the United States
perhaps above all others. A special characteristic, however, of the American,
which has had an important influence on the industrial advance of the country,
is his ingenuity in invention, combined with a peculiar aptitude in the use of
machinery. He possesses neither the laborious patience of the hand- labourer
nor the aesthetic sense of the true artisan; but his practical sense finds full
scope in the production of large quantities of uniform commodities by quick
machine methods. A further characteristic of the aptness of the race in these
respects is the promptness with which the inventions of others have been
adopted and brought to greater perfection. The history of many typical American
industries is the history of inventions first made by Europeans, which remained
without
—i89o] Inventions and
patents.—Immigration. 701
economic
result till perfected and made financially successful in the United States. The
practical sense of the American has been quick to turn ideas into dollars.
Sewing machines and typewriters, for example, though first experimented with
abroad, are practically the products of American ingenuity. Further, Americans
have shown a peculiar capacity, not only for improving old processes, but also
for inventing new instruments with purposes never before known, and for
applying machine methods to industries into which they had not previously
entered, as, for example, in the manufacture of watches, shoes, and silk-goods,
in which hand-labour has been entirely displaced. To enumerate the inventions
in the greater industries is impossible. In the manufacture of iron and steel,
railroad supplies, electrical machinery, and the like, they have been
countless, although frequently following an example first set by foreign
investigators. In the manufacture of hardware and tools, frequently of a
complicated nature, the Americans have easily led all other peoples. It is
here, perhaps, that American ingenuity has found its most fertile field.
No small
share of the credit for this constant succession of inventions belongs to the
system of patent right, which, despite occasional abuses in the undue
maintenance of monopolies, has been a powerful incentive to constant
improvement. The patent law is based on the Act of 1836, its chief
characteristics being a careful investigation of the claim to novelty and
priority, and the grant of monopoly right for a considerable period, at present
seventeen years. Whether we maintain that a patent should protect the
discoverer of the invention or the capitalist who risks his money in putting
the invention on the market, the system has been justified by its results.
Endowed with
such qualities for industrial success, the people were rapidly increasing
through natural causes while receiving enormous additions to their labour force
through immigration. The influence of immigration on the economic conditions of
the country has been a subject of much discussion ; but that it has materially
hastened industrial expansion can scarcely be disputed. The first great wave of
immigration came in the nine years following 1845, and was largely Irish and
German, due to the conditions of distress in those countries. This movement
continued, but at a reduced rate, down to the Civil War. As soon as hostilities
closed, immigrants again came in large numbers down to the depression following
1873, when the numbers again decreased, only to rise again in a still greater
wave in the years from 1880 to 1884. In 1882 the enormous total of 789,000 was
reached. Down to this time nearly 90 per cent, of European immigrants were from
the good stock of western Europe. They were chiefly unskilled labourers, but
vigorous, quick to learn, and easily assimilated; and a large percentage were
in the ages of greatest productivity. The quick rise of the capitalistic system
of production is not easy where a vigorous and independent
702
[1860-
population
have the opportunity of taking up free land of great fertility; but this influx
of labour made possible an extension of industry on a great scale, at the
periods of particular speculative activity, which might otherwise have been
checked. The vast extension of railroads and the accompanying growth of coal
and iron mining required large quantities of both skilled and unskilled labour;
and, in the main, during the early period the filling-up of the lower branches
with foreign labour still left ample opportunity in the higher branches for the
native population^ The almost automatic machine processes made the employment
of immigrants in factories possible; and in the manufacture of textiles, for
instance, it was not long before the immigrants employed numbered one-half of
the total.
Nor were
these the only economic effects of immigration during this period. The
settlement of the West was hastened by the influx of immigrants, but in a less
degree than has sometimes been supposed. The colonising movement has been
carried out primarily by native stock. Even of the German immigrants hardly
more than 25 per cent, have become agricultural settlers or farm-labourers, and
of the Irish not more than 12 per cent. The Scandinavians, constituting a
smaller absolute number, are relatively more inclined to agriculture, nearly 40
per cent, of that race choosing that occupation. This, however, is less than
the percentage of the native population. Special sections of the country,
however, have been largely colonised by special nationalities, notably such
States as Wisconsin by the Germans, and Minnesota by the Germans and Swedes. In
the main, however, the tendency of the foreign population has been towards
city life, and mechanical and mining occupations, or personal service,
hand-trades, and shopkeeping. An important reason for this is the necessity on
the part of the newcomer to seek paid employment at once; and it should be
noted that this tendency, while hastening the expansion of industry, has also
hastened the establishment of a more permanent and dependent wage-earning
class than had formerly existed. It would, however, be a one-sided picture
which showed only the effect of relatively unskilled labour on the growth of
manufactures. Although the proportion of skilled labourers to other immigrants
has been small, their actual numbers have been considerable, especially from
Great Britain; and their skill has been an important factor in many industries,
notably in iron and steel manufactures and in shipbuilding. Furthermore, the
contribution of individuals of high talent has been immeasurable; and
Americans, attributing too much to the native character, are frequently
inclined to forget that many of the most striking cases of success in the
industrial and commercial world have been those of poor immigrants who have
distanced the dominant nationality in the race for wealth.
The effect of
this movement on the growth of population presents yet another problem. The
population of 1870 was 38,558,371,
showing an
increase of 7,000,000, or 22'6 per cent., during the decade of the war. Of this
population nearly 5,000,000 were negroes, about
5,500,000 foreign-born, and about 5,000,000 native-born
of foreign parents. The latter two classes together formed over 28 per cent, of
the population. By 1880 the total population had increased to over 50,155,183
(or 30 per cent.), among whom the foreign-born and native- born of foreign
parents numbered nearly 15,000,000, or 29 8 per cent. The percentage of
foreign-born, however, diminished, the total number increasing to 6,679,543,
being now less than the descendants of foreign- born in the first generation.
The decade from 1880 to 1890 brought a relative increase in the population of
both classes. Out of a total population of over 62,000,000 (an increase of 24-9
per cent.) the number of foreign-born was 9,250,000, and of foreign-born plus
native- born of foreign parents over 20,000,000, being 14'8 per cent, and 33 per
cent, respectively of the total population. In other words, while the total
population increased about 25 per cent., the foreign element increased about 38
per cent., whether the foreign-born alone, or all those bom of foreign parents,
are considered. Immigration fell off again in the nineties; and the proportion
of foreign-bom fell by 1900 to 13'7 per cent, of the total population (actual
numbers 10,460,085), while the percentage of all those of foreign parentage
increased to 34'3 per cent, of the total, in actual numbers about 26,000,000.
This shows an increase over the numbers of 1890 of about 30 per cent, compared
with an increase of 20'7 per cent, for the whole population.
Despite these
figures, however, it may be doubted whether, in the long run, immigration into
the United States has added so largely to the population as is commonly
believed. Speculations of this nature are not very fruitful; but it is certain
that if the rate of increase between 1790 and 1840 had been continued to the
present time, without any immigration whatsoever, the present population would
be far greater than it is. The causes which lessen the rate of increase are the
economic limits of production; and, in view of these facts, it was the opinion
of the most eminent of American statisticians, General Francis Walker, that
immigration in the long run had not reinforced the population, but had merely “
replaced native by foreign stock.” This theory, however, even if accepted in
modified form, would not alter the fact that the great waves of immigration in
the periods 1867-72 and 1880-4 were of material assistance in supplying the
immediate demand for labour at the beginning of two periods of great industrial
activity.
The second
great factor in the industrial growth of the country has been its unparalleled
command of natural resources. The area of the United States at the close of the
Civil War was the same as its present area, exclusive of Alaska and the island
possessions, namely, 3,025,600 square miles. A mere glance at the map shows the
wonderful geographical advantages which this country enjoys. Stretching across
a continent, it
commands
access^ as no other country does, to the two great oceans. Its eastern
coast-line, indented with splendid harbours, stretches south till it meets the
great southern gulf, which itself extends beyond the mouth of the Mississippi
to the cotton-fields of Texas. To the north, the great Lakes, connected with
the Atlantic seaboard by the St Lawrence and the Erie Canal, reach the
wheat-flelds and iron supplies of the West, and afford direct
water-communication to the seaboard for cities more than a thousand miles
inland in the centre of a great productive area. A third of the way across the
continent and in the very middle of its most fertile region, the great
Mississippi flows from the Canadian border to the Gulf. Into this river flow
its vast tributaries, the Ohio, with the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from
the east, the Missouri and Arkansas and Bed rivers from the west, forming a
single valley, which extends for 1800 miles at its widest part and includes
over 1,000,000 square miles, within which lies more than half the arable land
of: the ■ country. More than half the States drain into this one river.
From the Alleghanies on the east a large number of rivers flow to the Atlantic
and the Gulf. All told, it is estimated that there are 18,000 miles of
navigable rivers in the whole United States.
Within the
area thus situated is to be found a greater variety of climate, soil, and
mineral resources than in any equal area of the world. The arid plains which
lie west of the 100th meridian are separated from the Atlantic by three great
belts of arable land, broken only by the Alleghany mountains, producing a vast
variety of products, and roughly distinguished by their chief crops, the spring
wheat-belt in the north, the central belt of winter wheat and Indian corn, and
the southern cotton-belt. West of this fertile territory lie the plains which,
though called the Great Desert, are the seat of vast cattle and sheep ranches;
and beyond the great basin formed by the Rockies and the Sierras lie the
Pacific States with their lumber and wheat and fruits. The mountain States are
rich in valuable ores, gold, silver, and copper; while coal and iron, minerals
even more important for industry, are widely distributed within the great belts
of arable territory already described, throughout the Alleghany region, and
even farther east. The supply of anthracite coal comes exclusively from a small
area in north-eastern Pennsylvania; and most of the bituminous coal still comes
from the great Alleghany deposit which stretches from western Pennsylvania to
Alabama; but there are coal-beds of vast extent in Illinois and Indiana, in the
prairie States beyond the Mississippi, and in the Pacific States of the
North-west. Iron ore is also widely distributed, the chief deposits being found
in the Alleghany region and on the southern shore of Lake Superior. The full
extent of the mineral resources of the country is even yet not known. To the
men who began to develop them at the beginning of the new era they may well
have seemed inexhaustible, as ever new discoveries were made, not only of new
deposits of known
materials,
but of such unexpected resources as the supplies of natural oil and gas.
Within this
area there existed no artificial barriers to the growth of commerce. Free trade
between the States had been established by the Constitution; and the extension
of a territorial division of labour was possible on a larger scale than had
ever before been known. The next step was to overcome the natural barriers of
mountain and wilderness. At the end of the war the railroad mileage of the
country was
35,000 miles; and an era of great expansion at
once began. It had become apparent early in the war that a transcontinental
line, mr. ing California with the East, had become a necessity; and an Act
incorporating the Union Pacific Company was passed in 1862. The tremendous
difficulties of constructing a line across the desert and the Rockies called for
government aid; and it was given in generous measure—a bond subsidy of
$27,000,000 in all and 12,000,000 acres of land. The Central Pacific received
over $27,000,000 and 11,000,000 acres. The bonds were secured by a first
mortgage on the road, changed later to a second lien to enable the road to
raise further loans. Finally, in 1869, the last spike was driven, the two roads
were united at Ogden, and the first line to join the Atlantic and Pacific was
complete. In the meantime rapid building continued in all sections of the
country, especially in the Middle Atlantic States, and in the Middle West. The
progress, or its effects on particular sections, cannot be traced in detail. By
1870 the mileage had increased to 52,000 miles, by 1880 to 93,000, and by 1890
to 166,000. This continuous expansion of transport facilities brought new areas
into cultivation, opened up new supplies of raw materials, and built up a
market in the West for the products of the East.
This rapid
growth was attended, however, with considerable evils. In the first place,
there occurred serious instances of corruption. Though the charges of political
bribery in the matter of the aid given to the transcontinental lines were not
substantiated, there is no doubt that fortunes were made by the manipulation of
construction companies for the benefit of railroad directors rather than
stockholders. In the next place, the rate of building was not only rapid, but
excessive. An era of speculation began which led to the construction of
parallel lines, fierce competition, destructive rate wars, and bankruptcy. The
new enterprises were on so gigantic a scale, and the demoralisation due to
excessive competition was so destructive of values, that the openings for stock
speculation were greatly increased; and, as vultures flock unerringly to
carrion, a new group of financiers appeared who made fortunes by wrecking
enterprises instead of by making them prosper. The scandals of that period will
always remain a blot on the commercial history of the country, and they sowed
evil seed in the mind of the public, who were frequently unable to distinguish
between the beneficial
labours of
the great entrepreneurs whom the situation brought forth, and the machinations
of the audacious plunderers who were mixed up with them in the market.
Furthermore,
it was through the railroads that the people were for the first time brought
face to face with the problem of the new capitalism and the power of monopoly.
When a railroad entered a new i-egion, it seemed by some magic “sesame” to
create wealth in its course; but the very fact that that wealth was the
creation of the road involved a serious danger. For the first time the people
of a large area found their welfare dependent on the action of a single
corporation. Wherever competition appeared,. discrimination followed; and in
the scramble for business the stronger shippers were favoured at the expense of
the weaker. Where there was no competition, the public felt that they were
being oppressed by a monopoly, to make up for sacrifice rates elsewhere—a
feeling which was intensified by the absentee ownership of the western roads.
The “ Granger movement ” against the railroads, which in some of the Western
States was the result of these conditions, was unreasoning in its prejudice,
misguided in its efforts at legislative reform, and injurious in its immediate
results; but it was the natural protest of a democratic community against the
domination of corporate capital. The actual offences of the roads were less
important than they were made out to be at the time; but the masterful men who
controlled them, conscious of the great development they were advancing, and
eager for their rewards, were little tolerant of public feeling. To them the
interference with their property seemed an insolent invasion of private rights.
Although the lesson has often been disregarded, it was nevertheless made clear
that, if it comes to a struggle between capital and the people, the people can
dominate when they will.
With such a
combination of advantages as has now been briefly described, the progress of
industry was inevitably rapid. Some figures for the recent development in
special industries will be given in the next section, and it will suffice for
the present to point out that almost every industry that had been in existence
at the time of the war continued to grow, while a large number of entirely new
industries sprang into prominence as the result of new discoveries and
inventions. While the population was, roughly speaking, doubled between 1860 and
1890, the capital invested in manufactures increased sixfold, from
$1,000,000,000 to over $6,000,000,000, the value of the products above
fivefold, the number of persons employed threefold, and their wages nearly
fivefold.
Such a growth
of the factory system as this could not fail to introduce all the problems of
organised labour. Trade unions and strikes had been known at an early date; and
the literature of the fifty years before the war shows that our conceptions of
the idyllic conditions of the labourer of that period as a democratic artisan
are somewhat exaggerated.
Still it is
true that the system of production- on a large scale was not widely prevalent
till after the war; and in the later period the problem of labour assumed a new
phase. The first warning the country had of the new power Was the series of
railroad strikes in 1877, which were accompanied by serious outbreaks of
disorder, necessitating a resort to Federal troops. Then followed, the
appearance of the “ Knights of Labour,” and the first exhibition of their power
in the serious strike on the Missouri Pacific line in 1886. By this time the
movement toward labour organisation was rapidly progressing; and strikes became
frequent. Occasionally there occurred great conflicts such as those already mentioned,
followed by the Homestead and Chicago strikes (1892 and 1894), when the public
again stood aghast before the spectre of an industrial war which amounted to
armed insurrection. Such excesses were perhaps inseparable from the rise of a
powerful new organisation in economic life, carried away by its first
consciousness of strength; but the educated public, which was still marvelling
at the material triumphs of the capitalistic system, was little prepared for
the sudden problem which followed \logically in its train. Gradually better
leaders have arisen; and the harder; lessons have been at least partially
learned by the unions. If they have been slow in appreciating the necessary
limits within which alone they can hope for success, the employing class on the
other hand has been equally slow in recognising the utter futility of the
attempt to crush the new organisation; and the public have as much to forgive
on the one side as on the other. The problem is the same in America as in every
industrial nation to-day. Combination has arisen to meet combination ; and only
as the rights of each are recognised will the bitterness of the conflict cease.
There are special reasons why this is to be hoped for in the United States,
before a sense of social cleavage becomes more acute. For though the masses are
easily- roused by a sense of injustice and incited by that spirit of
independence, which has been their chief pride, to resist promptly even at the
expense of law and order, class divisions are not yet permanently fixed, and
the consciousness of class is still subordinate to the sense of national
unity.
Little,
space, has been left for the consideration of the agricultural development of
the country during this period, although that development has been the true
basis of its prosperity. Even all the advantages for industrial growth which
have been enumerated would have been insufficient for the establishment of a
great system of manufactures, had not the home market been constantly
expanding. The period from 1860 to 1890 is indeed as notable for the way in
which the United States became the chief source of supply for food-products and
raw material to Europe as for the extent to which, the country achieved its
independence of European industry.
Between 1860
and 1870 the population of the grain States (the “North Central” division)
increased by more than 42 per,cent., and in the next
708
[1860-
decade by
nearly 34 per cent.—a total addition in twenty years of over
8,000,000
inhabitants. Even in the older States of Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri, the
growth was more rapid' than the general rate of increase, while in the newer
States of the North, the population of Michigan more than doubled, and that of
Minnesota increased more than fourfold. Over 130,000 settlers took up farms in
the unknown Dakotas, while, farther south, the population of Kansas increased
more than ninefold, and that of Nebraska! rosr from 28,841 in 1860 to 452,402
in 1880. At the same time the Gulf States were rapidly growing with the
constant extension of cotton culture. The greatest proportional advances were
made in the “ Western division,” where the new mines were opened up by the
transcontinental lines. This division, which includes roughly the States west
of the Kansas boundary, was, with the exception of California and Oregon,
practically unsettled in 1860. Exclusive of these two States, a popula an of
less than 200,000 was scattered over a territory covering one-third of the
whole area of the country. By 1880 half a million settlers had come into these
States, while the population of California had increased by almost as many
more. During the next decade this movement continued, till in 1890 California
had 1,200,000 inhabitants and the rest of the Western division nearly
2,000,000. Flourishing cities had grown up; and the extension of mining and
cattle-raising had now gone so far that the census of 1890 announced that there
was no longer a line of frontier. In the same decade the increase in the new
grain States continued as before. The population of Minnesota, the Dakotas,
Nebraska, and Kansas increased by nearly *2,000,000, or over 80 per cent.
This growth
of population in the grain States was made possible by the extension of the
railroad system, which opened new areas for cultivation and, combined with
improvements in ocean navigation, brought the prairie farms into direct
connexion with the factories of Europe. The westward movement was also
stimulated by the further extension of the land policy of the government as
expressed in the Homestead Act of 1862, which permitted the acquisition of
title to lands actually settled, by the payment of a nominal fee-—the ■
last step in the policy of free homes. In the meantime great improvements were
made in the methods of production and in handling the crops. Agricultural
machinery, which had begun to work its transformation before the war, was
applied on a still larger scale; a great extension of terminal and railroad
elevators facilitated storage; and a system of grading and classification was
established under the influence of the speculative market, which made it
possible to handle grain in the most economical manner. This was especially
important in view of the great distances in transport and the many reshipments
necessary. Grain could now be handled in bulk without regard to small specific
lots; and, in the case of wheat, owing to its fluid quality, the application of
machinery in its handling has
made the
methods of the .American grain trade unique in the world of commerce. Prom the
moment when the grain is brought by the farmer to his local elevator to the
moment when it cachet the docks of Liverpool, the only hand labour necessary to
its movement is the pulling of the right lever to set the machinery going. The
new process of handling and marketing the wheat was hardly less important than
the new methods of harvesting.
Under these
conditions the production of cereals and the accompanying production 6f
provisions increased enormously. The wheat crop, which in 1870 had amounted to
235,000,000 bushels, averaged
310,000 000 from 1870 to 1879, and 450,000,000 from
1880 to 1889. Since then it has twice exceeded 600,000,000, and once
700,000,000. In the case of Indian com, the average for the decade ending 1889
was
500.000.000 bushels greater than for the previous
decade, and in recent years has averaged 2,000,000,000. The value of the
products of the slaughtering and meat-packing industries increased from
$75,000,000 in 1870 to $303,000,000 in 1880, and $561,000,000 in 1890. Meanwhile
the amount of wool, produced primarily in the Western States, increased from an
annual average of 177,000,000 lbs. in the seventies to about
275.000.000 between 1880 and 1889. Exports increased in
even greater proportion than production. The average annual export of wheat
(including flour) from 1867 to 1872 was 35,500,000 bushels; from 1873 to 1878
it was 73,400,000, and from 1879 to 1883 it was 157,600,000. The proportion of
the total crop exported in these three periods was 16'53, 24'59, and 34'91 per
cent, respectively. Such a phenomenal increase could manifestly not be long
continued, and the average for the next ten ' years showed some falling-off.
From 1884 to 1888 it was
122.400.000, and for the next five years 144,400,000
bushels. During the last decade it has again increased to a higher figure than
ever. The export of Indian com has never been so important in relation to production
as that of wheat. It is primarily a feed-crop for the home market; and in fact
80 per cent, of the total crop, which in bushels is three or four times that of
wheat, is consumed in the county where it is grown. Nevertheless a foreign
demand has been stimulated; and the average annual exports increased from
14,200,000 bushels in 1867-72 to 73,400,000 in 1879-83. After a period of
comparative uniformity the exports have begun to increase enormously in recent
years, having risen, in one year, to over 200,000,000 bushels. The increase in
the production of Indian com made the growing export of provisions possible,
while the improvements in refrigeration enabled the packing houses to ship
immense quantities of fresh beef. The export in this line alone increased from
20,000,000 lbs. in the early seventies to 200,000,000 lbs. by 1890. The value
of bacon and hams exported increased from $6,000,000 to $60,000,000 in the same
period, and that of lard from $6,000,000 to $42,000 000.
The thirty
years after the war also witnessed a great economic revolution in the Southern
States. The abolition of slavery destroyed once for all the large-pl'antation
system which had been the foundation of a patriarchal society; and the
financial ruin of the large planters made its partial re-establishment under a
wage system impossible. During the stormy days of reconstruction the growth of
a new economic system was retarded; but the subsequent years saw an adaptation
of Southern agriculture to the new conditions of free labour on lines which are
likely to be permanent. While the large planters and their descendants were
left helpless before the new problem, the small planters, the “poor whites,”
rose rapidly in importance, took over the land relinquished to them, and began
the process of regeneration. The black population was for the time being not
improved by emancipation; and its incompetence has been a serious check on the
growth of the South. Strenuous efforts are being made to educate them on lines
of industrial efficiency; and the better blacks are gradually learning that
economic independence is their real need. It must be admitted, however, that
the amount of skilled labour among the blacks at the present time is less than
before their emancipation. The same difficulties have proved how chimerical
were the early hopes that a body' of independent farmers would grow up among
the freedmen. Despite notable exceptions, they have not shown sufficient
economic strength for the rdle of landowners. At first they were employed as
wage-eamers, but very soon the lack of capital on the part of the planters and
of industry on the part of the black labourers led to the substitution of the
system of share-tenancy, which is now the most prevalent method of tenure among
the agricultural blacks. To these difficulties should be added the pressure of
indebtedness due to deficient capital and falling prices, which has kept even
the white planters from establishing that independent position which on the
whole characterises the farmers of the North. Still the substitution of the
small-farm system for the large plantations opens up to Southern agriculture
the prospect of gradually attaining independent conditions.
Despite all
these drawbacks the cultivation of cotton has grown enormously, eiiabling the
Southern States to advance rapidly in population and 'wealth. The production
of cotton increased from less than
2,000,000,000
lbs. in the early seventies to more than 4,000,000,000 in the early nineties,
keeping pace with the world’s demand, of which it supplies 80 pet cent. Exports
increased from about 1,000,000,000 lbs. to over 3,000,000,000 lbs. Furthermore,
the Southern States have at last begun to Utilise their other resources.
Coal-mines and iron-works are being opened, while the growth of cotton
manufacture in the old Slave States has been more rapid than in any other part
of the country.
The last few
years have witnessed in the United States an expansion of industry and a growth
of material prosperity which have not been
equalled in
any period of equal length in its history; and this has been accompanied by
notable changes which demand special consideration. The long period of
depression which followed the panic of 1893 came to an end in 1897. The
enforced economy of that period had reduced production till the surplus stocks
were exhausted. The country had grown up to its surplus silver currency, which
had resulted from the dangerous experiments of 1878 and 1890; and, more
important still, the election of 1896 had settled once for all the question of
sound currency and insured the legal maintenance of the gold standard. The
prices of agricultural products began to rise in the autumn of 1896; and good
crops, with a growing foreign demand, initiated that agricultural prosperity
which has been the basis of the whole movement. Before considering the more
striking developments in industrial production and organisation and in foreign
commerce, a word may be said of the condition of the West.
A glance at
the census map of 1900, showing the various centres of the country’s economic
activity, gives a vivid impression of the dominant position of the Mississippi
valley. The centre of population has moved west during the last decade at a
slower rate than in preceding years, and now lies near the southern boundary of
Indiana at longitude about 85° 49'. The centre of manufactures had crossed the
Ohio before 1890, and now lies fifty-nine miles south-west of Cleveland, Ohio.
The centre of agricultural production lies along the Mississippi. The centre
of the “six cereals ” is exactly on the river about half-way between Hannibal
and Burlington; and the three points representing the centres of improved
acreage, farm income, and com-production fall almost together just above the
junction of the Illinois and Mississippi. The centre of total farm-area has
moved west to the ninety-third meridian; and the centre of wheat-production
north-west across the Mississippi to a point seventy miles west of Des Moines,
Iowa. This is the most noticeable change of all, and marks the increasing
preeminence of the north-western wheat-fields. The population of North Dakota
and Minnesota made large advances in the last decade, while the more southern
States of Kansas and Nebraska did not increase at all, owing to the reaction
from the abnormal settlement of the previous decades which had been followed by
the agricultural depression. For the first time, the “ North Central ”
division, including the chief wheat States, showed, as a whole, a smaller
proportional increase in population than the North Atlantic division. On the
other hand, a notable increase took place in the South. Central division,
especially in Arkansas and Texas, and above all in Oklahoma, to which district
a wild rush took place on the opening of the new lands. The largest
proportional increase has been in the Western division, including the three
Pacific States and the growing districts of Montana and Colorado.
It will be
seen, then, that the westward movement continues,
712 Migration and agricultural expansion. [i890-
although at a
diminished rate; and the movement is continuing in the same way as formerly,
that is, by steady pressure pushing the whole moving population. The same men
who settled the earlier frontiers still advance, selling their farms at a
profit to those who come behind. The pioneer element is constantly drawn
forward, and the less adventurous enter into their heritage. This also explains
the nature of the emigration across the border into north-western Canada, which
has called forth gloomy comment. The virgin soils of the Canadian wheat-belt
afford greater opportunities; and the same class of men who left Iowa for
Minnesota or Dakota now move on to the north once more; but their places are
continually filled. It is but a normal continuation of the general migratory
movement.
The number of
farms has increased more rapidly than the population, and the total acreage of
improved land somewhat less. On the other hand, the total farm-area has
increased more rapidly than in any decade since 1860—a fact, however, less
significant than it might appear, since there has been an addition to the
nominal farm-area of 130,000,000 acres of unimproved land in the South-central
and Western divisions. In this connexion reference may be made to the problem
of farm tenure. The public was surprised to hear, after the census of 1890,
that the ratio of farms worked by owners to farms worked by tenants was decreasing.
The independent farmer had been so long lauded as the main prop of a democratic
society that the revelation was startling. An even more marked change in the
same direction has taken place in the last decade, the number of owning
operators having fallen from 71'6 per cent, in 1890 to 64<*7 per cent, in
1900, while tenancy increased correspondingly from 28'4 per cent, to 35'3 per
cent. Nevertheless, the gloomy forecasts to which the fact that over one-third
of American farms were in tenants’ hands has given rise, do not seem to be
warranted. We have already noted the reasons for farm tenancy in the
cotton-belt, where it causes less alarm. In the North-west there have doubtless
been some cases of men losing their farms by foreclosure and becoming tenants,
while some farms have been bought up for investment; but in the main the causes
are different. In the first place, the break-up of the “ bonanza ” farms has
come largely through division into tenant- holdings, which simply means the
extension of the small-farm system. In the next place, the facts show that the
number of operating owners compared with the total farm population has not
diminished since 1880, while the comparative number of farm-labourers has
diminished in a marked degree. This would seem to establish the inference that
the increase in tenants is due to the rise of labourers rather than the fall of
owners. This conclusion is further strengthened by a study of the relative ages
of operating owners, tenants, and labourers. The striking fact appears that 90
per cent, of all the farm-labourers are under 35 years of age, over two-thirds
of the tenants are under 45, while about
60 per cent,
of operating owners are over 45 years of age. In other words, there is a steady
progress from the ranks of labourers up through tenancy to ownership. This
certainly does not represent a dangerous reaction.
Despite wide
variations in individual crops, the last five years have been years of large
yields and good prices. Even the serious failure in the Indian corn crop in
1901 did not materially affect the situation, for this reverse was balanced by
heavy crops in the other cereals, while it kept corn prices high for the corn
crop of 1902. Only four times prior to 1897 did the wheat crop reach
500,000,000 bushels. In the last six years the crop has exceeded that amount
each year, and in 1901 reached the unprecedented total of 750,000,000 bushels;
while the range of prices has been higher than under the smaller crops of the
three previous years. In the matter of cotton the conditions have been much the
same. The average crop for the last five years has been over 10,500,000 bales,
and in two years the crop was over 11,000,000, compared with crops ranging in
the ten years previous from 6,500,000 to a maximum of less than 10,000,000
bales. Such statistics, however, give a less vivid idea of the recent change in
western conditions than facts for which no accurate figures can be given. The
great change has been the raising of the farmers from a condition of burdensome
debt to economic independence. In the decade from 1880 to 1890 millions of
acres were taken up by settlers, who burdened themselves with mortgages both
for the purchase price and the working capital, and found themselves, before
they became firmly established, facing an agricultural depression of almost
unprecedented proportions. The pressure of interest payments at a time when
crops could hardly be sold at a profit accounts largely for the great hold of
the free-silver movement in the campaign of 1896. In the last few years,
however, mortgages have been paid off rapidly, while the enforced economy of
the preceding years made saving out of increased income easy. The wheat-grower
is no longer obliged to sell his crop at once or to mortgage it before harvest.
He is in a position of economic solvency, with money laid by. It is this fact
that gives more than a passing significance to the prosperity of the West. Mere
fluctuation from time to time in farming incomes would hardly warrant extended
comment; but the use made of the increased income, namely, the payment of
debts, is sure to prove of permanent importance. The surplus may be dissipated,
new settlers may incur new debts, but hundreds of thousands of the settlers of
the earlier decade are now for the first time in a position to bear reverses.
At last they are really in possession of free homes.
We may now
consider the industrial expansion. The census of 1900 attempts to determine the
relation of manufactured to agricultural products in money value, and to
establish the excess of the former, even after making proper deductions for the
value of the raw materials.
714
[l890—
It is unsafe,
however, to place much dependence on such calculations, while the comparison of
different periods according to the value of products may give results very
different from those reached by a comparison of quantities. A few figures,
however, may be given to indicate the surprising growth of the last half
decade.
The
production of coal, which had already surpassed the amount of British
production in 1899, increased by 1902 to 293,000,000 (short) tons, an increase
of 75,000,000 tons in four years, and of 140,000,000 in ten years. The
production of pig-iron increased 90 per cent, between 1897 and 1902, and reached
a total of over 17,000,000 tons in the latter year, while steel production
increased to about 15,000,000 tons; the product in both cases being greater
than the combined output of the United Kingdom and Germany. In the textile
industries the progress has been continuous, but by no means so striking as in
iron and steel. The United States now consumes a larger quantity of cotton than
the United Kingdom, although this is far from indicating that British supremacy
in the cotton industry has been threatened, since the large consumption in the
United States is due to the great amount of coarse spinning. The number of
spindles at work in the United States in 1900 was only 40 per cent, of those in
Great Britain, though more than twice the number used in any other country.
Among the textiles the most rapid advance has been made in the manufacture of
silk, the product of which is now worth more than $100,000,000, and gives the
United States the second place in that industry, but a little behind France.
It is not
possible to describe the growth of different industries in detail, but a few
general statements may be given. The census reports establish fifteen groups of
industries, of which the four most important in order are food and kindred
products, iron and steel, textiles, and lumber and its manufactures, in each of
which the product is valued at over $1,000,000,000. Among these the greatest
increase during the decade has been in iron and steel. Among the other groups,
that of metals and metal products other than iron and steel shows an increase
of over 100 per cent., and a total value of $748,000,000. A special group
consists of vehicles for land transport, and shows an increase of 50 per cent,
over 1890, and of 396 per cent, since 1880. Other marked increases are in iron
and steel shipbuilding, which has risen from about $40,000,000 to over
$85,000,000; and wood-pulp and paper, with an increase of 61 per cent, over
1890, and a total value of over $127,000,000.
Other general
marks of progress may be noted. The estimated horse-power used in production
rose 90 per cent, between 1890 and 1900, from less than 6,000,000 to over
11,000,000. The railroad mileage increased in the decade ending 1902, from
171,563 to over
200,000 miles, and constitutes more than 40 per
cent, of the total mileage of the world; while traffic increased from
88,000,000,000 to
147,000,000,000
ton-miles, and gross receipts from $1,171,000,000 to $1,711,000,000. Deposits
in all banks reached in 1902 $9,315,193,912, an increase of $4,000,000,000 in
five years. Bank clearings were $116,000,000,000, showing a gain of 100 per
cent, over 1897.
Apart from
the extraordinary outburst of business activity as proved by these figures, the
period following the depression years 1893-6 is notable for two reasons, viz.
the great strides made by the United States in the foreign market, and the
rapid growth of industrial consolidations. An analysis of the statistics of
foreign trade brings out many interesting points. The total exports of domestic
merchandise, exclusive of specie, for the six years ending June 30, 1902, were
annually in excess of $1,000,000,000. Until 1897 that total had been reached in
only one year, viz. 1892. The culmination, so far as money values are
concerned, came in 1901, when the exports reached $1,460,462,806. In 1902 they
fell off slightly, the total being $1,355,481,861. For the six years ending in
1902 the average annual exports were about $1,322,000,000, compared with an
average of $878,000,000 in the six years previous, showing a gain of over 50
per cent. The gain in the period from 1891 to 1896 was less than 20 per cent,
over the six years, 1885-90; while the period 1885-90 showed an actual loss
compared with the years 1879-85.
Much comment
has been occasioned by the relative increase of manufactured exports. According
to the classification of the Treasury Department, the ratio of exports of
agricultural products and manufactures respectively to total exports was 83'25
per cent, and 12'48 per cent, in 1880; 74'51 per cent, and 17'87 per cent, in
1890; 60 98 per cent, and 31 ’65 per cent, in 1900; and in 1902, marking a
slight reaction, 62'81 per cent, and 29'80 per cent. The same tendency appears
even more strikingly from the fact that, whereas total exports in the last six
years have increased by about 50 per cent., the exports of manufactures have
more than doubled. Comparing the three years 1900-2 with the years 1890-2 the
increase has been nearly threefold, from an average of $470,000,000 in the
first period to $1,250,000,000 in the second. By far the most important of the
manufactured exports are iron and steel products, with a total of $98,000,000
in 1902, to which should be added $16,000,000 of agricultural machinery. The
highest figure reached for iron and steel goods was $122,000,000 in 1901,
compared with less than $27,000,000 in 1892. Technically the proportion of
manufactured exports to total exports is much greater, since the above
classification includes flour and provisions, which are indisputably
manufactures, under the head of agricultural products. But the classification
shows the distinction of chief interest, namely, the proportion of exports
which are primarily due to agricultural resources rather than to manufacturing
skill. If the export of refined petroleum (about $70,000,000) were taken from
the list of manufactures,
716 Imports, raw
materials and manufactures. [is90-
the
comparative importance of the natural resources of the country would appear
even greater. It appears then that the United States is still able to hold its
place as the chief seller among nations of food- products and raw materials.
Despite the increasing consumption of cotton at home, the greater production
makes it possible to export the same proportion of the crop, about two-thirds,
furnishing 80 per cent, of the total world’s supply. The exports of cotton in
1901 were more than 3,500,000,000 lbs. Out of a crop of 748,000,000 bushels of
wheat
290.000.000 were exported, including flour, with a
value of $200,000,000. The exports of Indian com, which formerly found no
market abroad, have increased to over 200,000,000 bushels, while the exports of
provisions have doubled within a decade. In 1901 the value of the export.? of
provisions was $207,000,000, of breadstuff’s $276,000,000, and of cotton
$300,000,000, a total of $783,000,000 for these three items alone.
The
statistics of imports bring out more clearly still the increase of
manufacturing industry. The amount of manufactures imported ready for
consumption tends to become less and less important in comparison with the
materials, raw or partially manufactured, for further use in manufacturing. .
Scarcely more than 25 per cent, of the total imports are of the first class. Of
the chief manufactured imports of the earlier period, cotton goods- alone have
held their own even in actual quantities. The importation of woollen goods,
especially affected by the tariff, has fallen to less than $15,000,000, of silk
*oods to about $25,000,000, while iron and steel imports have averaged less
than $20,000,000 in the last five years, compared with average exports of more
than $100,000,000. Other manufactures of minor importance, especially luxuries,
have increased ; but on the whole, despite the greatly increased home demand,
the quantity of manufactured imports ready for consumption has diminished. On
the other hand, the imports of food-products and materials for manufacture have
greatly increased, though in the case of food-products the fall in prices has
concealed the real facts. The chief single items of import are coffee to the
amount of more than a
1.000.000.000 lbs. in 1902 with a value of $71,000,000, and
sugar, to the amount of 3,000,000,000 lbs. with a value of $55,000,000. The
imports of raw material have increased even more rapidly; for india-rubber and
gutta-percha the increase in the decade was 100 per cent., for hides and skins
150 per cent., for silks nearly 100 per cent., for tin more than 100 per cent.
Notable imports of half-manufactured goods are leather, chemicals and dye
stuffs, wood, and tin plates. The actual proportions in 1901 were as follows:
food-products and animals 27'02 per cent.; raw materials 32'79 per cent.;
partially manufactured 9'61 per cent.; ready for consumption 30 58 per cent.
A further
significant indication of the growth of industrial independence is to be found
in the relation of total exports to imports. From 1790 to 1874, the imports
exceeded the exports in all but six
years; since
1874 the exports have been in excess except in four years. The early period,
then, was one of extensive borrowing in Europe. The excess of exports from 1874
to 1896 was probably not more than sufficient for the payment of interest,
freights, remittances by immigrants, and the like. But in the five years from
1898 to 1902 the total excess of exports has been over $2,650,000,000. This
would seem to indicate a rapid payment of the foreign indebtedness, a
conclusion supported by the facts known regarding the sale of foreign-held
securities in the New York market. Furthermore, despite the large amount of
foreign capital still invested in America, the United States is already
becoming in some degree a creditor nation. The investment of American capital
in foreign enterprises and the bonds of foreign governments has already begun
to arouse comment.
This long array
of figures shows briefly the extent to which the United States has approached
the goal of self-sufficiency so ardently desired by the protectionist
statesman. In the matter of raw material the country has. ample supplies of the
chief food-products for its own needs: of coal, iron, copper, and lumber for
building and manufactures; of cotton, and (in less measure) of wool, for its
clothing. In the matter of manufactures it still imports large quantities, but
these are chiefly of the finer and more luxurious kinds. It imports less than 5
per cent, of its consumption of iron and steel, less than 10 per cent, of its
cottons and woollens, and less than 20 per cent, of its silk goods. Its chief
dependence on foreign countries for single important commodities is on the
non-European countries for its coffee, tea, and sugar, its hides and furs, its
silk, fibres, and rubber, its tin, and to some extent its wool. On the other
hand, it has a market at home for its own manufactures, which absorb 90 per
cent, of the total production. Its farmers are still dependent on the foreign
market for the disposal of their surplus wheat and cotton, of which one-third
and two-thirds of the crops respectively are exported, and for which the
foreign demand fixes the price. In the case of Indian com, however, less than
10 per cent, is exported; and, taking the country as a whole, the prosperity of
the farmer depends more on the feed-crops, Indian com, oats, and hay, than on
wheat. The influence of the foreign market in fixing prices through its
absorption of certain surplus products of agriculture and manufacture easily
obscures the importance of the home market, and even the real factors of
wealth. A vast amount of the commodities produced annually does not enter into
commerce at all, but is consumed at the place of production. The money value of
the dairy products annually produced in: this country is greater than that of
the total wheat crop; and the value of the poultry and eggs is greater than
that of the production of gold, silver,* and copper combined. It may be said in
general, that the foreign trade of the United States, great as it is, is less
important compared with the internal business of the country
718 Internal trade.
Organisation of capital. [i890-
than that of
any other country of a similar degree of civilisation. This fact is also seen
by reference to the statistics of traffic: The amount of grain consumed where
it is grown is so great that the grain1 tonnage hauled, even by some
of the so-called “ Granger ” railroads, is less than the tonnage of
manufactures. There are more tons of manufactured goods hauled to the West than
there are tons of grain hauled back. Of the total traffic of the railroads of the
country the products of agriculture (exclusive of animal products) contributed
in 1901 only 10'76 per cent., while manufactures contributed 13’75 per cent. A
further illustration of the immensity of the home trade is seen in the fact
that the tonnage of vessels passing through the Sault St Marie, between Lake
Superior and Lake Michigan, in 1901, was as great as the total tonnage entered
at United States ports from all foreign countries. The navigation of the great
Lakes has increased with marvellous rapidity in the last few years; and they
now constitute the greatest inland waterway of the world. ■■ The
industrial expansion which has been described above has been accompanied, by,
and is in some degree the result of, a widespread reorganisation of business
control, which, has brought to the fore the entirely new problem of
capitalistic centralisation. The development in its present form has been so
recent that the most careful investigators find themselves unprepared to speak
with any confidence regarding its results. The movement seems to have had its
inception during the reaction which followed the period of . excessive
speculative investment after the Civil War; and the first of the new
combinations, the Standard Oil Company, still remains the greatest in its power
and solidity. Other combinations were formed at a comparatively early date,
notably in the sugar and whiskey industries; but the earlier “Trusts,” though
important, were few in number. With the upward movement of industry, however,
which followed the depression of 1893-6, the movement toward combination went
on with such startling rapidity that the public seemed likely to find every one
of its articles of consumption under the control of a single organisation. In
the financial centres there seemed to be an absolute mania for the
reorganisation of competing companies on the new lines. In the single year 1899
the nominal capital of newly formed combinations reached a total of
$3,500,000,000,000, of which, however, more than three-quarters represented the
capital of the reorganised companies. In the following year the United States
Steel Company was organised with a capital of $1,100,000,000, besides a bonded
indebtedness of $300,000,000. If a single corporation to control the vast iron
and steel business of the country could be successfully established, there
seemed indeed no limit to the process of consolidation.
The fact that
consolidation has followed periods of depression suggests the cause frequently
assigned for it, namely, the necessity of escaping from a cut-throat
competition which results from speculative and unguided investment. This was
unquestionably an important
motive in the
earlier period; and its results are best seen in the case of railroads. The
disorganisation resulting from over-building and the uncontrolled competition
of bankrupt roads, which had to meet no fixed charges, led to “pools” and
traffic agreements which aimed at establishing some degree of harmony in rates
and policy. These, however, seldom endured; and the legislation prohibiting
“pools" hastened the movement of consolidation, till at the present time a
large proportion of the mileage of the country is consolidated in a few vast
systems. Furthermore, under the dominating influence of a small group of
financiers, a new policy has been enforced among the different systems which
has been termed the policy of “harmony of interest”; and, for the time being,
the rate wars of the trunk lines have nearly ceased. This is evidently in one
sense a tendency to monopoly; but it cannot be denied that even under the new
system competition among the trunk lines is vigorously pursued, while a
stability of railroad business has been secured that is of great benefit to
commercial interests. ■ ■ •
If all
industrial combinations had been formed under the same conditions, they would
represent an important step toward the reform of that system of disorganised
and speculative production which has been a primary cause of modern commercial
crises, and has justified one of the chief charges of socialistic critics
against capitalistic industry. It is not denied that to a certain degree many
of the industrial combinations have this character; but it is only in a
certain degree. On the whole, other causes have been more potent in the
formation of so-called “Trusts” than the necessity of escaping from ruinous
competition. The first is the desire to escape from any competition at all,
that is, the desire for monopoly. No mere effort to maintain normal trade conditions
could explain the brutal and sometimes unlawful methods which have not
infrequently been adopted to crush out every incipient effort at rivalry after
the organisation has been firmly established. To cut down prices within the
special market reached by the rival while raising them elsewhere, to institute
“boycotts,” and to secure discriminating rates from public carriers,— these are
not steps in the direction of industrial reform. The primary aim of the most
conspicuous Trusts has been to secure command of the market through the power
which great capital affords to outlast the individual competitor in the unequal
struggle.
Another cause
of Trust-building, especially at the beginning of the more recent movement, has
been the desire to make speculative profits out of securities. The promoters of
these organisations have frequently been outsiders, who persuaded a certain
number of companies to combine in order to secure a large block of stock for
their services in financing the new organisation. The practice of organising
companies to manufacture certificates of stock rather than commodities was
known long before the trust problem arose; but the new tendency afforded a fine
opportunity to carry this out on a large scale. In some cases the owners
720 Causes and results
of capital combination. [i890-
of the
original properties have received only bonds and preferred stock, the total
issue of common stock being distributed between promoters and underwriters. The
dangers of over-cap realisation for stock-jobbing purposes, to any class except
the more foolish speculators, have been exaggerated; but the practice explains
in no small degree the rush to effect combinations of an unstable nature at a
time of speculative activity. So far as this has been the chief factor, the
movement is necessarily of a temporary nature; and one of the most encouraging
signs in the whole situation has been the comparative conservatism, after the
first outburst, of both the banks and the public in the matter of taking up
securities of so uncertain a nature. The extravagant lopes that have been
capitalised in the form of “ watered ” stock have been largely discounted by
the investors.
A more
serious question, however, arises in the case of the combinations which s.tand
on a solid foundation. Their advantages have been frequently explained—the
reduction of cost by production on a large scale, the saving effected by the
utilisation of by-products, and by the production of many articles formerly
purchased in the market, the possibility of obts ining the highest skill in management,
the elimination of the expenses incurred in competing for the market, the
employment of the best experts, the ability to withstand temporary reverses,
and many others. There is a limit to the size of an industrial undertaking
necessary to secure the maximum economy and efficiency; and it is possible that
some of the present organisations have reached a point at which the
difficulties of management outweigh the above-mentioned advantages. In the
main, however, the facts seem to bear out . the claim of the large combinations
to superiority in production; and probably a jonuiderable share of the total
increase in the export of manufactures is due to the reduction in cost which
they effect, and to the energy which they have shown in seeking foreign markets.
In view of these facts, a certain section of the public feels perfectly
satisfied with what they consider a trust-made prosperity.
But, even if
it be granted that the Trusts have been able to cheapen the cost of production,
their advantage to the public depends on the use made of this power. A
reduction in prices is not, as a rule, the fruit of monopoly. As a matter of
fact, many so-called Trusts are merely combinations of a certain number of
companies, which mark a tendency to consolidation, but do not in any sense
control the market for their products. For that reason any list of Trusts is
misleading when given as showing the extent of monopoly. They frequently have
to meet the fiercest form of competition, that of a rival combination. In
certain cases, however, a sufficient control of the supply, say from 75 to 90
per cent., has been secured to make possible the dictation of prices within
limits. The limits are set by potential competitipn and the diminution in
demand as the price rises. There are doubtless cases
-1902] Ominous growth
of Trusts—Other problems. 721
where prices
have been maintained at a rate higher than would have been possible under
normal competition, but there are also instances, no doubt rarer, in which the
Trusts have restrained a speculative increase in prices with a view to the
maintenance of stable business conditions, which their defenders claim to be
their chief function. As yet it is impossible to say with certainty what is the
effect of Trusts on prices; but if the great combinations do not as yet abuse
their power over prices, they have the power to do so; and that fact in itself
constitutes a national problem.
Unquestionably
the control of the supply of any important commodity by a single company is
contrary to the spirit of American law and to the traditions of American
business. And it is as much the market question of price as the social question
of industrial power that excites alarm, even among Ihe least radical. The
tendency towards consolidation has not been confined to a single industry, but
huge surplus profits have sought investment in neighbouring fields; and the
same directive influence is seen in many diverse lines. Railroads are coming to
be more and more controlled by the same powers; while in the field of banking,
which until recently has been completely decentralised in the United States,
institutions of great size have been established to finance the operations of
these great enterprises, and are rapidly extending their control over other
banks in the leading financial centres. It would be out of place here to
enlarge on this situation; but there can be no doubt that the financial power
of the country is to-day centralised in fewer hands than before, and that this
power is more far-reaching in its influence than seems consistent with the
democratic traditions of the past.
Other
problems of economic policy are presenting themselves at the same time. The
protective system, which has never been successfully attacked on the ground of
the consumer’s interest, is being criticised from two new points of view. In
the first place, the question of the effect of the tariff' in supporting
industrial combinations has put the protectionists on their defence; while the
influence of the increasing effort to extend the foreign market is more
important still. The fact that the home manufacturers are able to compete in
the neutral markets cannot fail to raise a doubt in the public mind as to the
further necessity of such high protective duties; and those manufacturers who
are striving to increase their exports are likely to prove less enthusiastic
than formerly about a system of almost prohibitive duties which restricts- the
whole development of foreign trade. The strongest demand for a reduction of
duties comes from the West, where the desire to extend the markets for their
agricultural products, and the wide-spread hostility to the Trust movement,
combine to form that opinion. It cannot be said that the abstract doctrine of
Free Trade has ever taken great hold in the United States; and the present
agitation follows rather the line of
722 Protective duties.
Immigration. Land. [1890-1902
President
McKinley’s significant utterance delivered the very day before his
assassination. Although himself the most conspicuous defender of the protective
system, he declared in his last speech his conviction that the time had come
when the restrictive policy should be modified to meet the new conditions of
international competition in the neutral markets. The policy of reciprocity,
supported by his great authority and accepted by his successor in office,
though as yet checked by the extreme protectionist element, has unquestionably
a strong hold upon the masses, even in the ranks of the Republican party
itself.
The freedom
with which immigration has hitherto been permitted was partly the result of
political idealism—the sentiment that America has “room about her hearth for
all mankind11—but even to a larger extent the result of an economic
demand for more labour. At the present time, however, population has increased
sufficiently to supply this demand; and already the rate of increase has fallen
from 33 per cent, in the decade to 20 per cent. Moreover, the character of the
immigrants has changed. Whereas formerly the larger proportion of them were of the
best races of western Europe, at the present time that kind of immigration has
practically ceased; and the country is receiving annually hundreds of thousands
of the lower classes of south-eastern Europe, a more ignorant and turbulent
element, which is not easily assimilated and which threatens to form a
permanent proletariat inconsistent with the theory, at least, of a democratic
society.
New problems
of direct government activity have also arisen. The political importance of a
trans-isthmian canal was clearly seen at the time of the Spanish war, but, if
it is built, it will be primarily for commercial reasons. The gradual
disappearance of free land has raised the problem of irrigation, at government
expense, of the Great Desert, vast areas of which would be of unsurpassed
fertility if only they had sufficient moisture. A cautious move in this
direction was made in the Act of 1902, which provided for a self-supporting
plan under which the sales of the first lands should provide for the irrigation
of the next. The possibility of successful irrigation over large sections of
the arid territory has been established; and every increase in population is
likely to strengthen the demand for a vigorous policy along this line.
THE AMERICAN
INTELLECT.
The American Revolution revealed to Europe that there
was such a thing as American nationality. As the nation which then came into
being has developed into the world-power now so conspicuous, this nationality
has become a matter of general interest. Like any other of those impalpable,
indefinable facts, the nationality of old Rome, of Renaissance Italy, of
Prance, of England, of modem Germany, this American nationality has traits
peculiarly its own. Nothing could be more natural than the general assumption
of those who have tried to define it than that it is a new thing. Europeans of
various races, it is generally supposed, have mingled their blood in a new
race; and this race, under the new conditions of a continent which almost
within human memory was principally untamed wilderness, has developed national
characteristics absolutely its own.
“America,” it
has been said, “is the grave-yard of Europe”; and the remark seems true. No one
who has had occasion to deal much with American-born children of immigrants,
whatever their social class, can fail to be struck by the swiftness with which
their ancestral characteristics are absorbed by those of their environment. In
the depths of native American life and temper, the traits which widely
differing races bring from their European homes are soon buried from sight. Few
inquirers, however, have troubled themselves to ask when this power of
universal assimilation first declared itself. Such a question, indeed, is not
one to which any precise answer can be given; yet without some conjectural
answer to it no clear impression can be formed of how the typical American has
come to differ from the typical Englishman or even from the typical European.
The evidence on which such a conjectural answer may be based must be drawn
from the records which Americans have left, during the three centuries which
have elapsed since the foundation of those colonies in Virginia and
Massachusetts, from which the principal national traditions of America have
sprang.
Any
consideration of American expression must result in one conclusion. Since the
Revolution the type of national character has changed
very little.
The country which to-day absorbs and buries the divers nationalities of Europe
is essentially the same which, in the reign of King George III, declared its
independence of England. The typical American of 1900 is, on the whole, more
like his ancestor of 1775 than is the typical Englishman. For this an adequate
reason may easily be found. On the whole, the conditions of American life have
altered less, in the last century and a quarter, than the conditions of English
life; and it is as true of nations as it is of human beings or any other
organisms that, if the conditions surrounding them remain stable, their chief
characteristics will not be prone to radical change. Accordingly, we find
ourselves, in our search for the origin of American nationality, carried back
to a point before that nationality declared itself politically independent. The
new race, which, despite itself, has at last attained imperial power, is the
same English-speaking race which, four or five generations ago, broke the bonds
that held it to the mother-country.
In 1775, no
doubt, the American colonies were already of somewhat mixed blood; yet the
great stream of immigration, which has been assumed to be the chief source of
the difference between Americans and Englishmen, did not begin to flow till
more than two generations after that date. It is hardly excessive to say that
the Americans of 1775 were, in the main, as English in their traditions and
their temper as they were in their language. It follows that, to this day, the
nationality of America, for all its various foreign infusion, may be regarded
as a variety of the English. Our question accordingly grows more definite,
reducing itself to an inquiry concerning the difference which existed at the
time of the Revolution, between native Englishmen and their fellow-subjects
across the Atlantic.
The most
familiar analysis of American character at the time of the Revolution is that
given by Burke, in his speech on conciliation with America. Without attempting
to summarise it, we may agree that it depicts a kind of Englishman
specifically, though not generically, different from the kind which had
remained at home. A little later, Francis Hopkinson, an accomplished lawyer of
Philadelphia, set forth, in a paper familiar to all students of American
history, the view of English character which was most obvious to the kind of
American whom Burke so vividly sketched. In brief, Hopkinson found Englishmen
densely conservative, just as Burke found Americans passionately devoted to the
spirit of liberty. The two peoples were of common stock; but their tempers had
come to differ, and each was growing aware of it. Our question becomes more
definite still. When and how did this difference begin ?
A few lines
from Hopkinson may suggest the answer, or at least the direction in which the
answer is to be sought. “ A manufacturer,” he writes, in discussing English
character, “has been brought up a maker of pin-heads; he has been at this
business forty years and, of course, makes pin-heads with great dexterity; but
he cannot make a whole pin for his
life. He
thinks it the perfection of human nature to make pin-heads. He leaves other
matters to inferior abilities. It is enough for him that he believes in the
Athanasian Creed, reverences the splendour of the Court, and makes pin-heads.”
The style is certainly that of the full eighteenth century; but the matter, on
inspection, seems not quite so. It lacks the individualisation which from the
time of the Tatler distinguished the English Essay from the Character-writing
of earlier days. One needs little reflection to remember that this more vague
and general kind of literary temper was at its height in England not during the
eighteenth century but during the seventeenth. Its masters—Hall and Overbury
and Earle and Fuller—flourished before the Commonwealth. Taken by itself, such
an indication would be trivial. Taken in conjunction with innumerable other
symptoms, of which it may fairly serve for an example, it suggests that one
chief difference between Englishmen in 1775 and the rebellious colonists may
have been that the latter, far more than the former, preserved traits which had
ceased to be fully characteristic of England a hundred years before. In other
words, there is fair ground for belief that between 1650 and 1775 there was far
more change in the temper of England than in that of America.
The same we
found true during the century of American independence, which has ensued. And
in 1650 the settlements, both of Virginia and of New England, were within
living memory. The obvious conclusion is that the national character of the
United States preserves, far more than that of England, the traits which the
founders of the colonies shared with their fellow-countrymen in the first half
of the seventeenth century. In other words, the origin of the characteristics
of modem America is to be sought in Elizabethan England: for the first settlers
of Jamestown, of Plymouth, and of Massachusetts alike, so far as they were of
mature years, were Englishmen bom in the reign of Queen Elizabeth.
This does not
mean, of course, that modern America is an isolated survival of that elder
England which vanished in the Civil Wars of the seventeenth century. It does
mean, however, that to understand modem America, it is desirable to remember
that its ways parted from those of England in the days when men born under the
Virgin Queen were in their prime. And the surprising power of assimilation
which that vigorous race has shown from the beginning has combined with comparative
stability of internal circumstances to preserve in America more traces of
Elizabethan England than have survived in the mother-country. Virginia is a
name which still suggests an element of lasting truth. New "F.nglanrl
would be better named if, in the course of generations, it had come to be
called Old. And the deep mutual misunderstanding which resulted in the American
Revolution arose more from changes in the national temper of England than from
changes in America itself. In some important respects the New World has not
speeded ahead of the Old; it has rather lingered behind it.
Granting (this,
and putting aside the question of what changes have occurred in England since
1625, our question now becomes more definite still. It concerns only the ways
in which native Americans have developed, in their own country, since the reign
of King Charles I. So far as records go, in literature or in any other form of
literary expression, this question may conveniently be considered century by
century. Clearly, the nineteenth centuly—that in which American nationality
became conscious and generally recognised—has been by far the most noteworthy.
But the two preceding centuries have left abundant records of certain kinds,
chiefly religious and political. The religious records are on the whole
characteristic of the seventeenth century; the political of the eighteenth. And
the former issued in such preponderance from New England that, for the present
purpose, New England may fairly be held to comprehend seventeenth century
America, so far as America was intellectually active.
Seventeenth
century New England was founded by Elizabethan Puritans, whose motive for
immigration is well stated in the words of Cotton Mather, “’Tis possible that
our Lord Jesus Christ carried some Thousands of Beformers into the Retirements
of an American Desart, on purpose that, with an opportunity granted unto many
of His Faithful Servants to enjoy the precious Liberty of their Ministry,.. .He
might there .. .give a Specimen of many good things, which He would have His
Churches elsewhere aspire and arise unto.” In other words, the founders of New
England fervently desired to establish a society, free from those distracting
complexities which in the Old World had prevented them from leading a life in
accordance with what they believed positive right. No purpose could have been
more nobly ideal, nor any much less tolerant. Their effort was on the whole
successful. They made short work of dissent from their principles; and for two
or three generations they preserved, with little alteration, the religious and
political systems which they had planted at the time of the settlement. In
religion they were rigid Calvinists. The somewhat grotesque austerity of their
consequent aspect and manners has combined with the rather lifeless formalism
of Yankee Puritanism in its decline to obscure the truth that early Calvinism
was an intensely ideal, imaginative faith. Convinced that mau was fallen, that
salvation could be the lot only of the elect, and that the test of election was
miraculous ability to use the human will in accordance with the will of God,
the founders of New England exhausted the resources of human passion and aspiration
in unceasing effort to image Divinity and to assure themselves, if so might be,
that they would merge their own being in that of God. Without some
understanding of this intense pristine idealism of New England it is hard to
understand the subsequent development of American character. Keeping this
idealism in mind, one finds the development of America natural and simple. For
even before the seventeenth century ended the Pilgrim Fathers were
—1*700] Idealism, in
New England. Cotton Mather. 727
dead; and the
religion of New England, as well as its political and moral convictions, had
already acquired, in its isolated home, the strength of immemorial tradition.
In other words, the general principle that life should be governed by ideal
aspirations—a principle which in the older world must have proved at odds with
established custom, and therefore a breach of historical continuity—became, in
New England, itself customary.
On the whole,
the social system of New England was hierarchical, rhe chief power, social and
political, was in the hands of the clergy. The Church government was
congregational; each Church was independent; but there was little dissent from
established principle. And from this state of affairs, quite as much as from
any political circumstance, arose that kind of republican democracy which has
remained so characteristic of all the regions affected by New England
tradition. The minister was called to his office by the vote of the
congregation over which he was to preside; but, once elected, he enjoyed an
authority, spiritual and intellectual, of extraordinary range and strength.
With his fellow-ministers he was one of a chosen company, generally acting in
harmony, whose position on Yankee earth faintly figured that of the elect in a
Yankee heaven. And, though the orthodox clergy of New England fell from their
earthly estate a full century ago, the tradition they implanted still gives to
ministers, in most parts of the United States, a kind of factitious dignity
greater than that enjoyed by most clergymen of a fully established Church.
As New England grew, there appeared, in various
directions, a tendency to diverge from the rigid principles of the early days.
To this we owe the single work of the seventeenth century in America which has
any claim to literary permanence. This is the Magnolia Christi Americana, or
Church History of New England, written between 1690 and 1700 by Cotton Mather,
at that time the most conspicuous Conservative minister of Boston. Hastily
written and far from trustworthy in detail, this book is in spirit a document
of historical importance. Cotton Mather honestly believed that the founders of
New England wrought the will of God; if so, he reasoned, God would indicate His
pleasure by choosing from New England a remarkable proportion of His elect.
Accordingly, if a truthful record of what had transpired in New England during
its seventy years of national life should reveal an unusual amount of
godliness, the record would virtually demonstrate that the Fathers were
immortally right. Nothing else could so certainly stem the tide of liberalism,
of progress, of whatever we choose to call the departure from the principles
and the practices of the elder days; nothing else could so certainly maintain
the work which the Fathers had accomplished. So this big, confused folio was
flung together; historical records, biographies of saintly ministers and
magistrates, the story of Harvard College, the creeds and disciplines of the
Churches, and awful warnings for those who fall away. The book is written in
the manner of
the
mid-seventeenth century, or earlier. Published after Dryden died, its style and
literary temper are, at the very latest, those of Fuller. But it is clear; it
is rarely dull; it has occasional beauties; and, above all, it sums up
virtually the whole of New England experience during the first century of New
England. Examples of all the kinds of writing, in verse or in prose, which had
proceeded from that earlier time—the publications were mostly Puritan sermons,
to be sure—maybe found most conveniently in its pages. What is more, the
Magnalia went far to prove its main point. The doings of New England which it
records for seventy years were doubtless human, and therefore often weak and
sinful. Nevertheless, the amount of simple human virtue, and of honestly
aspiring godliness, which those years could show, was something to prove that
the new world was specially favoured by the God whom it was founded to serve.
Though the
Magnalia thus sustained Cotton Mather’s position, it in no wise served his
purpose. He had hoped that it might prove an efficient exhortation to the
present and the future. Instead, it has proved only a comprehensive record of
the past. Despite the Puritan traditions which have so deeply affected American
life, that national life was already started on the course which it has
followed. And this course has been considerably affected by precisely the moral
fact which Mather attributed to the miracles of God in a region specially
dedicated to His service. For this moral fact—a somewhat exceptional purity of
personal character, general freedom from excess of sensual vice, and persistent
effort to govern life, political and domestic as well as religious, by earnest
principle—we can discern nowadays a reason far from miraculous. Though the
material and economic conditions of early New England were hard and narrow,
they were remarkably simple, and free from every kind of social complexity. The
very sparseness of population made the struggle for life chiefly a contest with
the forces of nature. Acute wickedness, obviously deformed distortion of human
character, is apt to develop chiefly in regions where population is congested.
The transplantation of an essentially idealistic and earnest race to an empty
continent would involve less change of temper than would occur in a crowded
world; it would rather promote the unchecked growth of a simpler type of
character than would be frequent in any old and densely settled parts of the
earth. Incidentally, top, the growth of this simpler character would tend in
time to general views signally different from those of the Calvinists anywhere.
The social phenomena of Europe have usually been such as to warrant
unfavourable conclusions about human nature, which have become crystallised in
theological doctrines of human depravity. But, if in any district God’s elect,
as Mather would have put it, are to be found in considerable numbers, the happy
dwellers in such a region find themselves surrounded by a kind of human beings
who do not seem bound hell-ward. Their experience tends to prove human nature
on the whole well-disposed. Calvinism no longer
ivoo-76] The eighteenth century. Jonathan
Edwards. 729
fits the
case. It may be said, of course, that God is uncommonly kind to a particular
neighbourhood; but it is simpler to say that Calvin was mistaken about the
extreme depravity of men. And this is the view which Americans, on the whole,
have been disposed to take.
Cotton Mather
was by no means wholly a man of the past. Though his principles in religion and
in politics were what he believed those of the New England Fathers to be, he
found time, in his wonderfully busy life, for much scientific and other
observation. His letters on various phases of natural history in America won
him recognition from the Royal Society; and he supposed himself fully entitled
to the dignity of F.R.S. Towards the end of his life he introduced at Boston
the practice of inoculation for the small-pox, which is said not to have been
attempted previously in the British dominions. A conventional seventeenth
century scholar, he felt, nevertheless, the impulse of the newer learning which
was to distinguish later centuries. To this he contributed certain unimportant
facts. He never approached, however, a scientific generalisation; and his chief
scientific achievement was that medical one in which he applied to practical
use the result of his omnivorous reading. In this aspect he foreshadowed the
America which was to follow him. Americans have, observed well; they have made
a great many useful and practical inventions; but to this day pure science
would be little poorer without them.
So far as
seventeenth century America expressed itself, its intellectual energy was
concentrated in New England, and was chiefly devoted to Calvinistic theology.
In the following century the state of things was different. New England, to be
sure, still remained the centre of theological activity. It produced, in
Jonathan Edwards, the man who may still be held the most eminent of American
theologians. As one considers the unfl inching logic of his Calvinism, however,
there is an aspect of it more noteworthy than its courage and its technical
excellence. This is its remoteness from actual experience. The earlier Puritans
had accepted with all their hearts a creed which explained to their
satisfaction the confusion and the wickedness of human life. Edwards, turning
his eyes from all things of this world, and seeking, like the true Yankee that
he was, for the truths which lie beyond the limits of human experience, devoted
all his energy to reasoning out extreme conclusions involved in the faith which
he had accepted from the Fathers. Unlike the eminent ministers of earlier days,
he concerned himself hardly at all with public affairs. His career, accordingly,
marks at once the tendency of American theology to depart from experience in
its search for ideal truth, and the tendency of American life to separate the
things of this world from those of the next. The elder divines were practical
and often skilful politicians; the diplomatic achievement of Increase Mather,
in securing the Provincial Charter of Massachusetts, was almost as remarkable
as the later diplomatic career of Franklin. Edwards, on
730 Eighteenth century Politics: the Revolution.
[1700-
the other hand,
the most eminent American divine of his time, , had nothing to do with any form
of politics. No life could exemplify more clearly than his a complete
separation of Church and State.
It was
chiefly in affairs of State that eighteenth century ‘ America was noteworthy.
Just at the end of the third quarter of the century came the most critical
event in American history—the Revolution which resulted in national
independence. The more one considers thip stupendous imperial disruption, the
more puzzling it appears. There was no tyranny on the part of Great Britain so
galling as to account for the passionate revolt of America or to justify the
blatant traditions of Fourth of July oratory. Yet, beyond question, the revolt
of America was hot only passionate but deeply sincere. To understand it, we
must recall the facts that the national life of America parted from that of
England not in the time of George III but early in the reign of Charles I; that
the traditions of America had their origin in Elizabethan England; and that,
apart from other considerations,the British Parliament attained to predominance
in the State only at a time when the American colonies had already developed
working constitutions of their own. Of this traditional system in America no
feature was more marked than that which established the custom that a
representative to any legislative assembly should not only be elected by the
constituency he represented, but should actually be resident among them. No
single fact could more clearly typify the divergence of constitutional practice
in America from that of England, sixty years before the Reform Bill. Each
country, in brief, had' its own political traditions; and those of each were
consecrated by customs which extended far beyond the range of human memory.
Furthermore, the mutual misunderstandings bound to arise from such divergences
were emphasised by the growing differences of national temper due to the fact
that, in general character, America had changed so little, while England had
changed so much, since the early days of colonial settlement.
Though the
first important conflicts of the Revolution occurred in Massachusetts, the
revolutionary sentiment pervaded all the colonies, and was most memorably
expressed in those further south. The Adamses were Massachusetts men ; but
Franklin, though bom in Boston, was an almost lifelong resident of
Pennsylvania; Hamilton was of New York ; and Washington, Jefferson, and Madison
were of Virginia. From Virginia, most of all, came the utterances on which the
political temper of America has subsequently been based. The Declaration of
Independence was written by Jefferson’s hand. To understand this newly evident
phase of American temper, we must glance for an instant at the development of
other regions than New England. In brief, these had been colonised not for
religious but for secular purposes ; and the energies of their inhabitants had
been chiefly devoted to success in things of this world. Such an object
requires a fairly settled state of
Legal training and its
results.
731
law. In early
colonial days there were few lawyers ; and, at the outset, no locally
established customs. Before long, customs began to assert themselves; in a
generation or two, these had become established. The Courts, which gave them
the sanction of formal law, were then composed not of trained jurists but of
men resembling in general rather the justices of the peace than the judges of
England. As a class they were persons of vigorous sense and upright character;
they were confronted with the nominal duty of administering the law of England,
and accordingly informed themselves concerning it as well as they could by
means of treatises and books of legal forms; but, in reality, their duty was to
establish in their own remote country a legal system which should secure them
the rights of life, of property, and, so far as might be, of liberty. Thus
there grew up among them a habit of assuming that the practical customs of
their country were really based on abstract legal principles, concerning which,
now and again, they discoursed and disputed with far more freedom than would
have been the case in a country where lawyers and legislators had been
specially trained for their careers. From the nature of affairs, any man of
position and of intelligence was apt to find himself charged with duties which
compelled him, in some degree, to assume the character of a jurist and of a
legal thinker; he might at any moment be called to a position in which he would
be expected to assert not only the actual state of the law, but the reasons for
it.
When we
remember that these conditions originated in the reign of Charles I; when we
recall the tendency of England at that time to the assertion of general
political principles—a tendency never so evident there after the collapse of
the Commonwealth ; and when, furthermore, we remind ourselves of the
comparative stability of American social conditions, we shall feel less wonder
than sometimes arises when we are confronted with the political philosophers of
the American Revolution. They were in truth the: successors of
generations who had been compelled to administer a new system of customary law,
and to defend and support it by reference to principles and authorities which
had developed under conditions widely different from their own. They had grown
so accustomed to the assertion of abstract legal and political principles,
derived from their occasional reading and study, that they instinctively
welcomed the delusively simple and alluring generalisations of fashionable French
philosophy. Yet, all the while, they never dreamed of letting general
principles, however fascinating, interfere with the state of legal custom on
which the stability of their society depended. They had learned, to a degree
which has not been understood, the practical lesson that life cannot be
conducted on abstract principles. In practical matters their good sense was
remarkable. Yet they never quite understood the actual divergence between their
preaching and their practice. At heart, they had an instinctive, uncritical
faith in their
own
integrity. They held certain beliefs; they conducted themsdves in certain ways;
and they were certainly themselves. It seemed indisputably to follow that
their beliefs and their conduct must be consistent. Emerson was more American
than he knew when he proclaimed that “ a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin
of little minds.”
Among the
Americans of the eighteenth century, the most eminent was probably Franklin;
and in many ways his character was typical both of his country and of his time.
As the isolation of Edwards had indicated, theology was no longer a dominant
force in the American colonies. The growth of the colonies inevitably forced
questions of this world on the attention of the people. This was true not only
in matters of politics and law, but still more in the conduct of private
affairs and the business of daily life. Of the various proofs of IVanklin’s
common- sense which are furnished by the reading of his letters and other
works, none makes a more deep and lasting impression than the cool decision
with which he recognised this state of affairs! He was far removed from atheism
; on the other hand, he could see no reason for troubling himself about the
problems of theology. He found himself placed in a world where he was free to
win his honest way from obscurity to a distinction which gives colour to the
contention that on the whole he was the most successful man of his century; the
affairs of this world, the questions which inevitably arose concerning the relations
of men with one another and with physical nature, seemed to him enough for any
human being. If a man did his best, intellectually and morally, he need have no
fear of God; for the angels can do no more. And Franklin did his best—as
printer, as shopkeeper, as practical moralist, as scientific observer, as
inventor, citizen, diplomatist, statesman. It was his study of dectricity which
won him most recognition as a man of science. Yet, on the whole, what seems
chiefly to have interested him in this respect was his invention of the
lightning-rod, so long believed to be a protection against the fiercest danger
which can fall from the skies. His other scientific studies were apt, in the
same way, to result in practical inventions, made rather for the benefit of
humanity than from any consideration of mere personal advantage. The Franklin
stove—an iron fireplace advanced a few inches in front of the old gaping
chimneys—added more to the comfort of American life than words can tell; for
more than half the heat which had escaped up the wide chimney-throat was saved
to do service.
In science,
as in public life, this Franklin, calmly facing whatever question presented
itself, tried to solve it or to measure it in the most broadly sensible way.
Philosopher as he was, he troubled himself so little about ideals and
abstractions that, paradoxically enough, his Americanism seems a little short
of that which should most broadly have characterised his country. On the
practical side he left nothing to be desired ; he was constantly willing and
eager to adapt himself, and to urge that others should adapt themsdves, to the
conditions of life by
which they
were surrounded. As a reasoner, whether dealing with others or communing with
himself, he was vigorous, honest, and so shrewd that the expanse of his
common-sense extended to the verge of genius. In versatile rationality he never
had a superior. But, on the whole he never quite completed his typical
nationality by such sympathetic understanding of ideal philosophy as underlay
both the theological abstractions of Edwards and the political generalisations
of the statesmen of the Revolution. In that eighteenth century America, in
which the independent life of the United States had its origin, the older
fusion of ideals and of practical conduct had evidently begun to give way.
The aspects
of American character on which we have now touched may be taken, on the whole,
as comprehensive. Edwards typifies the older theology, divorced from life as
Church and State began to trend apart, but still vigorous in that intensity of
idealism which had been from the beginning what it remains to-day—the true
spiritual force of America. The statesmen of the Revolution show how a modified
form of that same idealism could underlie schemes of legal and political
conduct, which on the surface seem at odds with the ideals they are supposed to
express and to justify. And finally, the consummate rationality of Franklin
typifies, more admirably still, that phase of American character which, while
not insensitive to the influence of pure ideals, can adapt itself and devote
its energies to the advancement not of abstract science but of the practical
conduct of life. The question now before us is how these national
characteristics, of which we have tried to trace the origin and the
development, have displayed themselves since the Revolution. This question we
may conveniently consider under the separate headings of law, philosophy,
literature, art, science, and education.
As we have
already seen, the state of law in America, when the Revolution occurred, was
peculiar. Nominally the law of England prevailed from New Hampshire to Georgia.
Each of the colonies meanwhile had a legislature of its own; each had its own
Courts, and had long ago begun to establish an unwritten law of its own. This
unwritten law, however, was everywhere stated in terms which assumed it to be
the law of England itself. Accordingly, hardly anyone, on either side of the
Atlantic, understood how, under the new conditions of colonial life, a number
of customs unknown in England had acquired in America the full force of
constitutional sanction. This peculiar condition of affairs, which has not yet
been much studied in detail, lay at the bottom of the deep mutual
misunderstandings which resulted in the independence of America.
Something
similar has persisted in the United States to this day. The settlement of the
West, which began well before the nineteenth century, and which is hardly yet
complete, has been accompanied every
where by the
practical jurisdiction of Courts which believed themselves to be administering
either the common law or—in the case of regions originally colonies of France
or of Spain—some other recognised branch of the law of Europe. In fact,
however, these Courts have constantly been called on to sanction or to
establish new customs such as were demanded by the frequently unprecedented
conditions of the societies which they attempted to organise. In seventeenth
centuiy New England, for example, there arose an unwritten and almost
unrecorded law concerning meeting-houses, the proprietors of which were
sometimes a body distinct from either the Churches which assembled therein or
the parishes which the church-meetings governed. In the mining regions of the
Pacific slope, within the past fifty years, the staking of claims—originally
almost a matter of brute force—gave rise to a department of law, now, like the
staking itself, mostly obsolete, which was almost as fixed as that which
governs English rights of way. And the same development may be traced
elsewhere. It is a happy legal notion, honestly believed by most Americans from
the beginning to this day, that no question can arise which the law does not
cover. Accordingly, when new questions have arisen, the law has presently been so
stretched as to cover them, or at least as to maintain the semblance of justice
and of order.
The legal
development that we have traced is familiar enough to students of English
Constitutional History. So, in its fundamental nature, is the practice, which
has eveiywhere accompanied it, of correcting the errors and supplying the
deficiencies of customary law by legislation. In various ways, however, the
legislative system of America has differed more than is usually perceived from
the parliamentary practices on which it was based.
In the first
place, every State in the Union, like the Union itself, has had, from the
beginning, a written constitution; and this has theoretically limited, to a
degree unknown in England, the powers of all branches of the government—legislative,
executive, and judicial alike. Constitutions, however, no matter how carefully
written, require interpretation. Speaking generally, the interpretation of
American constitutions has been confided to the Courts established under them;
and, on the whole, these Courts have disch irged their interpretative duties in
the same spirit which has animated their administration of unwritten law. They
have found themselves confronted with questions which had to be solved
practically; their business has been to declare how to apply the rules of a
system, whose general efficiency has been assumed in the terms of the problems
presented to them. Their prime duty, from the beginning, has been to establish
and to maintain social order, and to avert anarchy. From this they have rarely
shrunk. The natural consequence has been that no American constitution exists
in so pristine a condition as to warrant the assumption that any clause in it
is comprehensible, until one has painfully ascertained exactly how that clause
has been interpreted.
At best, a
written constitution has proved only a tolerably articulated skeleton; the
living flesh of law with which it must be clothed, in order to possess vital
force, has sprung, like the common law itself, from the judiciary. Therefore,
paradoxically enough, the written constitutions of the United States have
actually tended rather to strengthen than to weaken the force which throughout
the constitutional history of England and her descendants has resided in unwritten
law.
In the second
place, the complexity of legislation in the United States has been hitherto
unprecedented. Under the British system Parliament has tended to become more
and more a sovereign power; and, ait least in the British Isles, subordinate
legislative bodies—city corporations, town councils, and the like—have been
analogous rather to bodies assembled for the transaction of private business
than to so august a body as the House of Commons. In the United States there
is, to begin with, the Federal Congress; next, each State—and there are now
some fifty of them—has a legislature, virtually a separate parliament, of its
own ; and finally, almost every town which has reached the dignity of a city
charter has been subject to a legislative body—usually in two separate
assemblies—which has generally tended toward parliamentary, rather than civic,
views of its functions. This state of affairs has combined with the somewhat
superstitious confidence of Americans in legal forms, to cover the face of the
continent with an intricate network of often conflicting statute law, varying
in force from Acts of Congress to resolutions of aldermanic Boards. If a hasty
glance at the superficial simplicity of American constitutions might lead a
stranger to undue confidence in the virtues of constitutional codification, a
hasty glance at the incredible confusion of American legislation might equally
mislead him into a belief that any country thus fettered must be virtually
paralysed. The actual solution of the difficulty has hitherto been found, just
as has been the case with constitutions, in the system under which the
interpretation of statutes is confided to the Courts. Whatever the shortcomings
of these bodies, they have usually been animated by a conviction, that their duty
is to keep the machinery of society in working order. If the wording of
carelessly drawn, preposterous, or conflicting statutes can be stretched into
practical consistency, the Courts may usually be trusted so to stretch it. If
statutes prove utterly unpracticable, the Courts will commonly make this fact
so clear as to induce repeal or amendment. In brief, what has saved America
from the benumbing result of excessive legislation has again been the swift and
luxuriant overgrowth of unwritten law.
Begarded from
the philosophical, or scientific, or even from the technical point of view,
this rapidly developed law of America is often far from sound. There have,
indeed, been remarkable exceptions to this generalisation. Lemuel Shaw, for
example, who was Chief Justice of Massachusetts towards the middle of the
nineteenth century, has been
736
The spirit of legal
interpretation. [1776-1900
said to have
done more than almost any other magistrate in the world towards adapting the
old English law of partnerships to the rapid development of joint-stock
companies, and the old law of common carriers to the new facts of railway
transport. In general, however, such legal genius has been rare. The impression
which results from wide reading of American law reports is, on the whole, that
substantial justice and practical good sense are more frequent than one would
have expected, but that the principles by which decisions are justified and the
dicta in which they are often swathed are apt to be bewildering. Despite frequent
lack of training, the American judiciary has generally been more than
respectable in its devotion to duty, no less than in its sagacity. It has
instinctively accepted its real office, which has been to establish and to
preserve such order as should enable the community to manage its affairs
prosperously. It has always remembered that, in so doing, it must pretend to
base its decisions on principles presumed to be established. But, so long as a
decision referred to these principles has proved momentarily efficient, it has
rarely troubled itself much about their historic truth or their technical
validity.
The state of
law thus rapidly sketched persists. It is a natural development of the
inevitable legal makeshifts to which America has been habituated from colonial
times; and it has resulted in a general faith, almost amounting to superstition
on the part of Americans in general, that the law may be trusted. Legislation,
on the whole, is apt to be blindly radical; the Courts, on the other hand, are
apt to be instinctively conservative. If this conservatism goes too far,
legislation may temper it. If legislation in its turn goes too far, it may
either be amended or—like some preposterous Acts, for example, concerning the
sale of intoxicating drink—it may, without practical inconvenience, be suffered
to fall into neglect. Like the Elizabethan English, from whom they can trace
their national descent, the Americans are fond of lofty principles ; like them
again, they are eminently practical in their conduct of daily affairs;
and—another point of resemblance—they are apt to trouble themselves very little
concerning the logical harmony of edifying precept and efficient practice. The
justification of their inconsistencies must be found, as is the case with that
older England, in the thoughtless honesty with which they youthfully ignore
them.
How natural
such a temper must be in America will become more evident when we turn to the
consideration of American philosophy. In its origin, as we have seen already,
the philosophical thought of America was dogmatically religious. The colonists
of Virginia, and even the more tolerant Quakers of Pennsylvania, were apt to be
primarily men of affairs. The dominant class in early New England, on the other
hand, was the Puritan clergy; and although, for almost two hundred years, they
retained at least traces of the political energy which once came
1620—1776] Religion and philosophy; principle and
practice. 737
near making
the government of New England a legalised hierarchy, their deepest influence
proves to have been theological. They not only preached orthodox Calvinism;
they reasoned it out to logical extremes hitherto unsuspected. They accepted
its implications as unreservedly as they accepted its dogmas ; and they never
admitted, even to themselves, that while the dogmas were originally based on
observation of human life in corrupt old Europe, the conclusions which those
dogmas involved bore little relation to the facts of human life in the
comparatively simple and innocent society of provincial America. Medicean
Europe, which Calvin contemplated, like the decadent Roman Empire of Saint
Augustine’s day, justified the conviction that human nature is totally
depraved. The colonies which bred Franklin, with all his honestly admitted
errors, revealed human nature in a far less deplorable aspect. All this the
Puritan preachers ignored. Their wits, to the days of Edwards and beyond, were
busy with the assumed realities which transcend phenomena. They lived their
spiritual lives in regions beyond human ken. For them, more than for most men
known to history, faith was truly the substance of things hoped for, the
evidence of things unseen.
How
susceptible Americans remained to the influence of ideal philosophy was evident
in what is called “ the Great Awakening ”—the religious revival, associated
with the name of Whitefield, which swept over the colonies about the year 1740.
English Methodism never blazed so fiercely. A generation later came the newer
influence of the full Revolutionary spirit. There can be no question that
beneath this spirit, which has declared itself throughout the European world,
there rests a dogma concerning human nature precisely contradictory to that on
which orthodox Christianity has been based. The Church has everywhere assumed
that human beings are fallen into a state so perilous that they can be saved
only through the miraculous intercession of Christ. The Revolution, in France
and everywhere, proclaimed that human nature is essentially good; and that its
errors and deformities have resulted only from the distorting presence of
artificial institutions— Church and State. The logical conclusion from such a
premise would be anarchy; just as that which should logically follow from
ecclesiastical dogma is despotism. What has averted anarchy in the America
which eagerly accepted Revolutionary doctrine, is the ancestral habit of the
nation to trouble itself far less than it supposes about the harmony between
honestly accepted precept and assuredly prudent practice.
At the same time,
such divergence cannot extend endlessly. And as the American mind began to
accustom itself to the new conception of human nature which alone could justify
its tendency toward republican institutions, many good men, saturated with the
ideal habit of ancestral Calvinism, became aware that human nature, as
observable in their comparatively simple country, was not so evil as their
fully developed dogmas would have made them believe. The moment this perception
738
becomes
distinct to any man, or to any body of men, a revision of creed becomes
necessary, as a matter of honesty. From some such necessities have arisen the
multiplicity of sects and the tendency to devout free thought which have been
characteristic of America during the nineteenth century.
Sectarianism
has pervaded the country. As each older faith has grown rigid, tending toward
dogma and formalism, it has given rise to new heresies. The varieties of
American Methodism, for example, are innumerable; and a debased form of it has
even given rise to the remarkable phenomena of Mormonism. In most cases this
kind of sectarianism has hardly attained such intellectual dignity as to make
it conspicuous in the history of philosophic thought. As was the case with the
earlier theology, the most pregnant expression of the more cheerful philosophy
which replaced it found voice in New England. The precise forms of philosophy
and religion which flourished there have not, it is true, been generally
accepted; but the utterances which accompanied them have had far more influence
than some of those who have most deeply felt it have been willing to admit.
During the
eighteenth century the intellectual history of New England was comparatively
insignificant; it was, in the main, a story of stiffening tradition. With the
nineteenth there came to that region a general reawakening which has been
justly called a Renaissance. The bias of New England towards theology naturally
gave this, in the beginning, a religious aspect. The first conspicuous evidence
of it was the rapid conquest of Yankee pulpits by the buoyant heresies of the
Unitarians. Of these the most memorable was William Ellery Channing. Of
Calvinism he wrote, so early as 1809, in these terms: “ Whoever will consult
the famous Assembly’s Catechisms and Confession will see the peculiarities of
the system in all their length and breadth of deformity. A man of plain sense,
whose spirit has not been broken to this creed by education or terror, will
think that it is not necessary for us to travel to heathen countries to learn
how mournfully the human mind may misrepresent the Deity.” The means by which
he believed that this misrepresentation could be corrected he subsequently
summarised as follows. “ We must start in religion from our own souls. In these
is the fountain of all divine truth.... Here is our primitive teacher and
light.... The soul is the spring of our knowledge of God.” What Channing
supposed the soul to be is not quite clear; but there can be no doubt that he
found its manifestation in something analogous to the voice of conscience and
to the inner light of the Quakers. Nor can there be any doubt that the result
of his teachings, or rather of the religious movement to which those teachings
gave rise, was to substitute, in the chief minds of his time, the habit of
seeking the truth for oneself, regardless of outward authority, in place of the
older habit, which required submission to the arbitrary will of dogmatic
divinity. In other words, the Yankee
-1900]
Emerson and the Transcendentalists.
739
Unitarians
were disposed to be as logical in their inferences from the assumption that man
is made in the image of God as their Calvinistic forefathers had been in their
inferences from the dogma of total depravity.
The strength
of the formal hierarchy in New England prevented this new individualism from
revealing its disintegrating force for about a generation. It was not until
1832 that Ralph Waldo Emerson, who had succeeded to the pulpit which, a century
before, had been held by the Mathers, resigned his office on the ground that
the sacrament, which the Church expected him to administer, no longer
interested him. The pitilessly individualistic idealism with which, for the
rest of his long and admirable life, he prophetically replaced the teachings of
orthodoxy, provoked, on the one hand, enthusiasm and, on the other, alarm. The
enthusiasts, almost without exception believers in ideal philosophy, were apt
at first to accept the name of Transcendentalists; freed from all restraint of
dogma they sought truth, each for himself, in those refreshing regions of the
mind where the range of speculation can never be limited by the troublesome
intervention of observation or experiment. Their different vagaries are
recorded in the Dial, in the history of the unsuccessful socialistic experiment
at Brook Farm, in the absurdities of Bronson Alcott, in the fantasies of Henry
David Thoreau, and in numberless utterances which are less generally
remembered. Their tendency to idealism was the natural consequence of that
intense ancestral idealism which had characterised Puritan theology; their
remarkable innocence of life was the natural consequence of the simplicity
which had characterised Puritan society; and their general optimism was widely
acceptable to the temper of a continent which, throughout their time, was
swiftly submitting to the theoretical authority of the self-satisfied
generalisations of republican commonplace.
The very
names of Emerson, Alcott, and Thoreau suggest what soon followed. Ideal individualism,
unfettered like theirs, could not but express itself in practical efforts to
reform the world. The rather comical aspect of these efforts, in their earlier
manifestations, is admirably set forth in the opening pages of Lowell’s essay
on Thoreau. A little later they began to concentrate in the growing reform
movement for the abolition of slaveiy, which ultimately so far harmonised with
the inevitable progress of political history that the Abolitionists are now
held, by a new and pious tradition generally accepted throughout the North, to
have been almost inspired prophets.
The matters
on which we touch here carry us beyond our range. They belong to the history
not of American character but of American conduct. It is enough for the present
to point out that a movement so deep and so complex as that which resulted in
the Civil War was bound to involve great numbers of people by no means disposed
to accept the philosophical freedom of thought amid which the chief utterances
of practical reform had their origin. Such freedom, as we
740
Early
literary efforts. [1620-1776
observed in
regard to Emerson, was bound to provoke reaction in any minds predisposed to
conservatism. To this somewhat alarmed reaction may be traced a tendency, still
strong among Americans of a religious turn, toward the willing acceptance of
ecclesiastical systems generally foreign to the freedom of their earlier
traditions. For example, in New England and indeed throughout the country, the
strength of the Protestant Episcopal Church has tended, for half a century,
steadily to increase; and so has that of the Church of Rome.
Independent
America, of which we have now attempted to ascertain the legal and the
philosophic temper, has displayed from the beginning of the Revolution a
somewhat sensitive consciousness of nationality. This was nowhere more evident,
at first, than in the efforts made by Americans, almost as soon as their
national existence was assured, to enrich their country with a literature of
its own. During colonial times there had been a good deal of publication in
America; but little of this had been literary in character. The American
writings of the seventeenth century, mostly produced in New England, had been
chiefly theological; those of the eighteenth century, before the Revolution,
had been chiefly political or historical. Such American work as had taken
literary form had been frank and rather amateurish imitations of more or less
fashionable English models. That America, as such, possessed anything
resembling a native literature had never occurred to anybody.
Accordingly,
when certain patriotic Americans set themselves to the task of creating such a
literature, their efforts might have been expected to be vigorously uncouth.
The voice of a newly-born republic, established in a continent still mostly
wilderness, might naturally have possessed a wild melody of its own; but no one
would have predicted for it any special grace of modulation. A certain
consciousness of this presumption probably combined with the conservative
instinct so characteristic of Americans to make the beginning of their
literature rather deliberately formal. Literature, those who then wrote were
apt to feel, was essentially an expression of high civilisation; whoever would
aspire to literary distinction must therefore prove himself, to begin with,
highly civilised; and the prime evidence of high civilisation is an impressive
manner. Accordingly, the chief characteristic of literature in America for many
years was punctilious care for form; and indeed this kind of care has persisted
in America to this day. It is instantly evident when we remember that the
species of literature in which Americans have proved most successful is the
short story, the merit of which depends so manifestly on formal precision. The
tendency which bore its first fruit in the short stories of Irving subsequently
made itself felt in other ways; as a tendency, however, it has been evident all
along.
Even before
the Revolution some clever young men in Connecticut had begun to publish
essays, fashioned after the Spectator and its
1776-1860] The
“Hartford Wits.” Brown. Irving. 741
successors,
and poems modelled on the verse which had been fashionable in England from
Butler’s time to that of Pope and Churchill. During the Revolution and the
years which followed this little group, commonly remembered as the “ Hartford
Wits,” burst into the first literary efflorescence which foretold the coming
literature of their country. They were all graduates of Yale College; all men
of character, wit, ability, and accomplishment; and all eagerly enthusiastic.
But none of them had much originality; and, although their poems and satires
were creditably imitative, they revealed, in the end, nothing more than that
Americans could imitate skilfully. Except as matter of literary history, they
have long been neglected and forgotten.
The writer
who is now commonly regarded as the earliest professional man of letters in
America flourished a very little later. Wielamd, the first novel of Charles
Brockden Brown, was published in 1798. Before his premature death in 1810,
Brown had produced several more works of darkly romantic fiction. His general
model was Godwin’s Caleb Williams. In his effort to preserve a definite point
of view by means of autobiographic narration, he was apt to make his plots so
intricate that they became bewildering. But his writings, even after a century,
possess two or three vital merits; he had a deep sense of the horrors which lie
in the mysterious regions beyond human ken—a sense naturally involved in the
speculative idealism so characteristic of his country; he was able, at the same
time, to write vivid descriptions of actual nature and of certain grim aspects
of fact, particularly of the terrors of pestilence; and his style, despite its crude
grandiloquence, possessed a remarkably felicitous accuracy of rhythm.
Brown, like
the “Hartford Wits,” has hardly survived except historically. Washington
Irving, whose first books appeared before Brown’s death, is read to-day. His
early work was broadly humorous, foreshadowing the later humour of America,
which inextricably intermingles plain statements of fact with extravagant
nonsense. Two years later he began to produce another kind of work, and one
more deeply characteristic, in the essays and the short stories of the Sketch
Book and the similar works which followed. They express, with admirable
amenity, that delight in romance, whether the romance be of mystery or of an
illimitable past, which has been so frequent in the superficially prosaic and
new America of the nineteenth century. His later work, which persisted until
his death in 1859, was apt to be professedly historical; but whether he was
dealing with Columbus, or with Goldsmith, or with Washington, he wrote history
rather in the temper of a romantic man of letters than in that of a scientific
scholar. What keeps him alive is not so much what he said as the manner in
which he said it. With all the romantic enthusiasm of his own time he combined
a formal grace of style hardly equalled in England after his model Goldsmith
had laid down his pen.
Fenimore
Cooper, Irving’s still more popular contemporary, began writing some ten years
later than he, and enjoys to this day the distinction of being the only
American novelist whose works, taken as a whole, have an assured place in the
literature of the world. The general similarity of his method to that of Scott,
so often remarked, has somewhat obscured his positive merit. He never
approached Scott either in mastery of character or in careless command of
style. Among eminent American writers, indeed, Cooper remains the one whose
style, taken by itself, is the most cumbrous and faulty. His admirable
knowledge of nature, on the other hand, in those two different aspects which
are most universal—forest and sea—has combined with his manly purity of temper
to make his better work at once permanently memorable and deeply expressive of
the youthful and vigorous age during which he flourished.
Cooper lived
until 1851; Irving until 1859; and their chief poetical contemporary, William
Cullen Bryant, survived until 1878. But Bryant’s work, like that of the others,
was so far complete by 1832—the year of Scott’s death—that we may fairly
consider him, with them, as representative of the state of literature in America
during the first third of the nineteenth century. His later verse sustained the
reputation which his earlier verse had won him, but added no new feature to his
poetic individuality. He was calmly romantic, sentimentally melancholy, and
punctiliously polished. He was free from all extravagance, and innocently
unconscious that his gentle self-restraint often kept him within the bounds of
commonplace. Poetry, he maintained, should be “always simple and always
luminous.” Whatever his defects in respect of sensuousness and passion, he was
never intricate or obscure; nor was he wanting in a certain deliberate grace
which has stood the test of time.
It has seemed
desirable thus to define the chief earlier writers of the Middle States because
their work comprises the whole achievement of American letters during the
period which began in England with the publication of the Lyrical Ballads and
closed with the death of Scott. Naturally they were not solitary. Even such
comparatively unimportant achievements as theirs must always involve
considerable literary activity. The New York in which they lived produced many
less eminent makers of prose and of verse, and many magazines in which these
ephemeral authors found fleeting vehicles of expression. In 1833 the Knickerbocker
Magazine, on the whole the most important of them, was founded. It lived for
about thirty years, to be succeeded by other magazines, more highly developed,
several of which are still in existence. Throughout its career, it published
the best work of America; but, on looking back, we may fairly say either that
this work was a gently decadent form of such literature as reached its height
in the hands of Irving, Cooper, and Bryant, or else that, with the single
exception of Edgar Allan Poe, it proceeded from New England.
i8oo-oo]
The Knickerbocker Magazine. Poe.
743
Poe was an
erratic, sporadic man of genius, whose restless life was never closely
associated with any particular part of the country. He has been claimed by New
England because he happened to be bom in Boston, and by the South because he
was adopted by a gentleman of Richmond. On the whole, so far as one may
classify him anywhere, he seems most in place among the writers of the Middle
States. His genius was of the kind which involves meretricious individuality;
he was essentially histrionic; he could not be honestly himself without a touch
of conscious affectation. But he had at once a deep sense of rather
melodramatic horror, which makes his tales extraordinarily stirring, and an intuitive
sense of form peculiarly his own. This gives admirable precision both to the
outline of his tales and to the rhythm and cadence of his haunting style. In
his poems, meanwhile, there is a kind of lyric quality different from any to be
found elsewhere, a fantastic melody which has made many who love art for art’s
sake rate him among the truly great. But if it is asked what he really had to
say, the answer must be the same as that to any similar question concerning
Bryant, or Cooper, or Irving, or Brockden Brown; namely, not much. For the more
serious literature of America we must turn to the New England which was
contemporary with Poe.
We have
already seen how the general awakening of national consciousness which
followed the Revolution had aroused eastern New England to the assertion of a
new theology. During the years when Irving and Cooper and Bryant were making
literature in New York, the Unitarian movement was taking possession of the old
Boston pulpits. It is a striking coincidence that the year in which Emerson
resigned his ministry, for want of sympathy with the sacrament—an act which
marks the date when religious philosophy attained unfettered freedom in New
England—was that very year 1832 in which Scott died, and in which Bryant
published at New York the first important collection of his poems. At that time
the pure literature of New England was hardly in existence; but there were
already other tendencies, besides the philosophical, which indicated what it
was soon to be.
Of these the
earliest to declare itself was the school of oratory which developed itself in
Boston. Throughout America, to be sure, the popular appetite for public
speaking has been unusually large; but in New England the ancestral habit of
listening to sermons was more deeply rooted than elsewhere. Accordingly the lay
sermons with which the orators of revolutionary times and of the succeeding
century replaced the theological discourses of earlier days were received in
New England with special eagerness ; and the masters of rhetoric who discoursed
there seem, on the whole, not only the most accomplished of all, but also the
most broadly typical of what American oratory has been. The chief of these
orators was Daniel Webster, equally eminent as an advocate, as a parliamentary
debater, and as a maker of elaborate occasional orations.
744 Boston orators:
Webster; Choate; Everett. [i830-
The simplest
feature of his complex character was a patriotic devotion to the Constitution
of the United States, so fervent as to resemble the religious enthusiasm of
Puritan days; and his chief utterance of this was perhaps his famous Reply to
Hayne, published in 1830, only two years before Emerson’s withdrawal from the
pulpit of the Second Church of Boston. With all Webster’s patriotic fervour,
his utterances now seem rather innocently artificial; they are clearly modelled
on the masterpieces of Parliamentary oratory in the eighteenth century, which
in turn were modelled on the oratorical masterpieces of Cicero and Demosthenes.
They have, at the same time, a passionate yet controlled sincerity which marks
them as his own. Similarly individual are the more coolly elaborate orations
which laid a firm rhetorical basis for the widely useful public career of
Webster’s most eminent Boston contemporary, Edward Everett. The school of
oratory which these two masters exemplify was numerous, and persisted long. Its
later formal master was Rufus Choate, whose achievements at the bar are still
fresh in the public memory, though he has been dead for more than forty years.
The somewhat demagogic speakers who stirred anti-slavery sentiment, with what
seemed to conservative minds a reckless disregard of truth, sprang from the
same rhetorical stock. The species of oratory which reached its height in the
patriotic eloquence of Webster was the same which declined in the virulent
diatribes of Theodore Parker, Charles Sumner, and Wendell Phillips.
Meanwhile,
almost from the time of the Revolution, another kind of activity had also
declared itself in Massachusetts. Harvard College, the oldest of American
universities, had been founded there as early as 1636; but for rather more than
two centuries it did little more than preserve, with admirable fidelity, the
tradition of classical and mathematical scholarship. When the awakening of
national consciousness began to stir Harvard men, it excited them towards
fresher kinds of learning. They began to found learned societies, libraries,
and periodicals, some of which still exist. For more than a century the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Massachusetts Historical Society
have maintained, each in its own way, a standard of learning which will bear
comparison with the best. The Boston Athenaeum, founded about 1815, is now a
library of positive and growing importance, from which has indirectly sprung
the still richer and more widely-known Public Library of Boston, the model on
which have been formed the numerous public libraries now so general in the
United States. The North American Review, until it passed into commercial hands
and was transferred to New York, maintained for many years in Boston a standard
analogous to that of the Edinburgh and the Quarterly Reviews in England.
From the
influences thus concentrated sprang, by the middle of the nineteenth century, a
school of historical writing which has won more than local recognition. Its
first eminent master was William Hickling
—i89i] Prescott. Motley. Parkman. Ticknor. Thoreau. 745
Prescott,
whose work dealt with the Spanish conquests of America, and subsequently with
the later history of Spain. Its next leader was John Lothrop Motley, whose
chief subject was the assertion of liberty by the Dutch, in their conflicts
with the Spaniards. But the most accomplished member of this school was Francis
Parkman, whose work, persisted in for fifty years despite incredible physical
obstacles, records, perhaps definitively, the struggle in America between the
constitutional system of England and the more arbitrary system of continental
Europe, as embodied in the Canadian colonies of France.
Among the
earlier writers of history in New England none had more permanent influence
than George Ticknor; but this influence was not primarily due to his writings.
His principal work is a History of Spanish Literature, never very widely read.
His principal activity, so far as popular memory goes, was the generous part
which he took in the foundation of the Boston Public Library. But what seems
now his most important contribution to the intellectual life of his country was
the work which he conscientiously did for many years as Smith Professor at
Harvard College. The chair, of which he was the first tenant, was founded to
promote a study at that time almost unknown in America— the study of modem
literature. He began his teaching in 1819; by 1835, when he resigned his
professorship, the facts of modem literature were generally familiar to New
England. A year later he was succeeded, at his own suggestion, by Longfellow,
who held the chair until 1854; by that time New England not only knew what
modem literature was, but eagerly enjoyed it. Longfellow was succeeded by
Lowell, who, at least nominally, remained Smith Professor until his death in
1891. In his time New England learned not only to enjoy modem literature but
critically to appreciate it. Since 1891 the chair has remained vacant.
The names of
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and of James Russell Lowell are among the most
eminent in the roll of literary men who flourished in New England during this
epoch; and the fact that both these men were professors of belles lettres in
the oldest of American universities throws light on the nature of the
literature which they made and which was in making about them. It was
essentially an expression of the effect produced on the native American mind,
when, deeply imbued with the ideal traditions of its country, it awakened at
once to national consciousness and to sympathetic knowledge of what
world-literature had achieved elsewhere. Hardly in existence before 1832, this
Renaissance of New England was virtually complete when Nathaniel Hawthorne died
in 1864. Though many of his contemporaries long survived him, none added any
new feature to the characters which had been adequately expressed during his
lifetime. We have already touched on the buoyant and vagrant iiiealis’n of
Emerson and on the less inspiring individualism of Thoreau. Thoreau, even more
memorably,
746 Whittier.
Longfellow. LoweU. Holmes. Hawthorne. [i830-
expressed the
consolation and the sedate pleasure which may be found in the contemplation of
nature even in rugged New England. John Greenleaf Whittier, so well known as
the impassioned and sincere poet of antislavery enthusiasm, was more
noteworthy still as another exponent of the peculiar charm which lurks beneath
the rude face of the Yankee country. Mrs Stowe’s Uncle Torres Cabin, which had
flashed the horrors of slavery into the upper consciousness of the
philanthropic world, had been succeeded by tales which, with the same careless
admixture of genius and commonplace, had recorded the traditional society of
earlier New England. Longfellow, with gentle amenity, had revealed to America
the innocent charm which hides the murky depths of old-world literature; beyond
anyone else he had translated the beauties of other languages into the simple
tunes of his country, leaving his native air the sweeter for his song. Lowell,
sympathetic at once with humanity and with the humanities, had proved himself
the chief humanist of the Renaissance in New England; and meanwhile had made
those quaint political satires which raise a doubt whether he was more
remarkable as a satirist or as interpretative critic. Oliver Wendell Holmes
had written excellent occasional poems and some of those uniquely garrulous
essays, which beyond anything else express the humour and the kindly rationalism
of his time; they have their grimmer side as well, when one comes to understand
the bravery of his lifelong struggle against the haunting horrors of
Calvinistic dogma. And Hawthorne, the most deeply artistic of all, had
beautifully recorded, in his own exquisite and tender style, the native temper
of the country which, during his time, was finally emerging from the benumbing
self-consciousness of ancestral Puritanism.
These names,
perhaps the most memorable in the record of New England letters, probably imply
most of the tendencies which found expression there. But many more people were
writing at the same time. Much of the work in question may be found in the
earlier volumes of the Atlantic Monthly, which was founded in 1857. It remains
to this day the chief vehicle of literature in New England; and it has never
swerved from its standard intention to publish nothing but what has been
honestly meant and excellently phrased. In the earlier days, its most eminent
editors were Lowell and Fields, men of widely different characters, but both of
them native Yankees, full of instinctive sympathy with what was most deeply
characteristic of their country. It is significant of what ensued in New
England that their two most eminent successors in the control of the Atlantic
Monthly have been neither New England men, nor, for all their admirable
devotion to literature, completely at ease in New England surroundings. And it
is hardly excessive to say that, so far as pure letters go, New England has not
subsequently produced any writers of much more than local importance.
In brief, the
literature of New England may be regarded, for the moment, as complete. For
nearly two hundred years the region had
-1900] Changes in New
England. Whitman. Harte. 747
been defining
its native character under the rigid influence of Puritan theology. When the
Revolution awakened it to its final sense of nationality, the strength of
formal Puritanism was broken. A certain disintegration ensued. So long as the
generations were alive which had grown to consciousness under the conservative
influences of the older time, the expression of New England retained at once
the idealism and the aspiration toward ideal excellence, of every kind, which
had been the saving grace of the Fathers. Then, in course of time, Unitarianism
lapsed into uncontrolled freedom of devout thought, and so into such vagaries
that, as we have seen, prudent folk have been apt to recoil into the arms of
Churches more rigidly ecclesiastical than those of their forefathers. So,
while the literature of New England once seemed a prophecy of some
newly-enfranchised future, it is beginning to reveal itself rather as the
record of an ideal and innocent past. And, all the while, the disintegrated
region from which it sprang has been tending to lapse more and more into
provincial isolation.
The
subsequent literature of America is contemporary. Its chief centre is
undoubtedly New York, where the principal publishers of the country are now
settled, and where the most widely circulated magazines are established. It is
hardly excessive, however, to say that the only writer, no longer living, who
has achieved in that region a reputation comparable with that achieved by the
eminent writers of New England is Walt Whitman. To many, particularly abroad,
he appears deeply and prophetically American. To most Americans his rude
eccentricities of thought and phrase appear so far from characteristic of their
country, that, while admitting him to possess some touch of genius, they are
apt to think of him as a sporadic anarchist. To name the writers and to discuss
the literary tendencies of the present day would be out of place here. Of the
numberless writers of local short stories who have sprung up throughout the
country, none has yet surpassed the first to declare himself—Bret Harte, who so
vividly set forth certain picturesque aspects of the American conquest of the
Pacific slope. Like him, the most popular living American writers have
generally emerged from the ranks of popular journalism.
It is hard to
summarise the modem American temper; and it is harder still to summarise the
literary history at whose course we have so hastily glanced. Yet, on the whole,
this seems analogous to the legal and the philosophical history on which we
touched before. The country whose thoughts and aspirations it has expressed is
a country animated by more than common devotion to ideals—the conceptions which
are matters not of knowledge, but of fervent faith. It is a country, at the
same time, which has been brought by historical necessity face to face with
innumerable practical questions, which have had to be settled swiftly. Its
precept has consequently, soared above its practice, until to strangers it may
well seem hypocritical. Its saving grace has been
748
The modern age. The
fine arts. [1850-1900
that it
retains a spiritual honesty, like that of Elizabethan Englishmen, which has
kept unbroken its perhaps mistaken confidence in its own essential integrity.
In earlier days the ideals were perhaps more frequently asserted than now; for,
at least since the great national convulsion of the Civil War, Americans have
been forced, by circumstances beyond human control, to devote their chief
energies to the practical solution, in the simplest attainable way, of
questions which, if they had paused to master their complexity, might have
proved almost paralytically appalling. So meanwhile, very naturally, their
literary expression has tended, on the whole, to rather journalistically
precise and vivid statements of something resembling fact.
In fine arts
other than that of literature America has not yet found very characteristic
expression. Its sculpture and its painting have been so far modelled on the
contemporary work of Europe that the only American sculptors or painters who
have attained high excellence have generally been resident abroad.
Something
similar is true of music in America. Of late years, particularly in Boston,
New York, and Chicago, America has had orchestras of admirable quality. It has
also many respectable schools of music; and the standard of musical art, in
general, has become more than respectable. But American musical life and
expression have not yet assumed any tangibly national character, such as one
feels, for example, in the music of Italy, of Germany, of France, or of Bussia.
Neither performers nor composers differ much from well-trained performers and
composers elsewhere. When America desired a national march for the Centennial
Celebration of the Declaration of Independence, Bichard Wagner was invited to
write it; and the performance of it was intrusted to musicians who were mostly
of German birth. What was true twenty-seven years ago remains on the whole
equally true to-day.
With
architecture the case is different. In later colonial times, American
buildings, though generally constructed of wood, and always lighter in material
than the monumental buildings of Europe, had often exhibited a certain delicacy
of proportion which renders such of them as still exist agreeable examples of
the pseudo-classic style general throughout the eighteenth century. The
earlier buildings of the independent Bepublic, such as the State House in
Boston, and the White House and the original Capitol at Washington, preserve,
on a somewhat more pretentious scale, much of this charm. In the United
States, as in England, there succeeded a period of architecture from which all
trace of fine art seemed to have departed; and when, about the time of the
Civil War, some signs of an artistic revival appeared, its first efforts, particularly
in public buildings, were singularly unfortunate. Within the last thirty years,
on the other hand, something resembling a true architectural renaissance has
declared itself in America. The great increase of wealth
in the
country has combined with various new conditions of life to demand from trained
architects something like actual novelties—things for which there is no precise
precedent elsewhere; and American architects, though generally trained in
European schools, have shown, in adapting themselves to these conditions, great
and increasingly flexible intelligence.
In accordance
with the new demands of their country, they have developed various types of
building which are, at this moment, at least so far successful, that to an
American who visits Europe contemporary architecture in the old world is apt to
appear comparatively lifeless. Recent private houses in America display an
opulent spaciousness, and at the same time an intelligent adaptation to the
conditions of the life that they are designed to serve, which are seldom
apparent in modern private houses in Europe. American churches are
comparatively unimportant, conventional, and inconspicuous; for the moment,
the most earnest enthusiasm of American ideals is somewhat distracted from
religion. On the other hand, the schools, the libraries, and the hospitals of
America, together with the civic buildings which are rising everywhere, show
increasing dignity, beauty, and impressiveness. At the same time, the
commercial conditions of the country, which require, in the larger cities,
light and strong structures of great height, have encouraged new methods of
construction, in which steel frames are masked by a screen of ornamental
masonry, which promise ultimately to achieve a peculiar grandeur of architectural
effect. It seems more than possible that, before long, the decorative arts of
painting and of sculpture may adapt themselves to these new architectural
conditions.
The same
tendency towards flexible adaptation of effort to practical necessity which has
displayed itself in American architecture may be said, on the whole, to
characterise American science. It is a commonplace that Americans are apt
inventors; and it appears to be an acknowledged fact that the economic success
of the Unites States has been most pronounced in the industries which can be
most readily advanced by labour-saving mechanical devices. American machinery
is far more remarkable than American handiwork. The temper of the country still
recoils from that kind of patient self-effacement without which the highest
personal skill is out of the question.
Accordingly,
though Americans have been by no means neglectful of pure science, the ablest
minds in the United States have always been, and still are, for the most part,
directed rather towards the needs of applied science, and the consequent
rewards which they offer. From Franklin’s time to our own, there have been in
America plenty of applications of scientific knowledge, and more than a few
extensions of such knowledge in directions where this extension may prove of
practical or of humanitarian use. But America has still to wait for a thinker
who shall
take his
place, in the realm of scientific thought, with the deathless masters of the
Old World.
The practical
character of American science has given rise, throughout the country, to a
number of schools specially devoted to the higher scientific training. Schools
of law and medicine and scientific laboratories abound; hardly any of the
numerous universities which, with widely varying standards, maintain everywhere
at least the form of the higher learning, is without these adjuncts. But
perhaps the most significant fact concerning American education to-day is that
which must instantly impress the eye of any traveller from the Atlantic to the
Pacific. In Europe, the architectural structures which attract attention are
usually churches, castles, or buildings connected with some phase of
government. In America the most conspicuous structures are, as a rule, the
schools and the public libraries.
This
difference implies a deep contrast between the instinctive faith which,
throughout the centuries, has animated the Old World and that which, for the
moment, is most blindly cherished in America. Erom the days of Rome itself, the
more serious imagination of Europe has been most deeply stirred by religious
influences, which found architectural expression in the churches dominating
almost every town. This predominance may, no doubt, be passing away; but the
traces of it remain everywhere. In America, a faith in the saving grace of
education seems more deeply rooted than even religion itself And this faith
finds expression, not only in the architectural facts so apparent to any eye,
but in the vast sums which throughout the country are frequently given for the
foundation or the support of schools and universities and libraries.
Such
enthusiasm as this has naturally given rise to a state of affairs perhaps
unprecedented in educational history. Elsewhere education has generally been a
matter either of tradition or else of alertly intelligent reform. In America it
tends—as religion has sometimes tended in the Old World—to become a matter of
unintelligent formalism. A typical incident occurred at San Francisco during
the summer of 1901, when the Philippine Islands had just come, for better or
worse, under American control. At that moment hundreds of half-trained public
school-teachers, men and women alike, crowded into the transports which were to
carry them to Manila, with a spirit as devoted, and a belief in their calling
as absolute, as that which animated the crusaders of Peter the Hermit.
In short, the
nation that we are trying to understand is a nation whose most prominent
characteristic at this moment is its superstitious devotion to education. What
is necessary is that this devotion shall be enlightened and directed. Those
leaders are probably right who maintain that the chief service which can be
rendered to the country
in the years
immediately to come will be rendered by those who shall correct educational
errors and wisely guide educational progress.
Our main
reason for this hasty glance at American education is its significance in the
question of American character. As we have seen, the native character of the
Americans may be traced to that phase of English character which was most
potent in the days when the American colonies were founded. The original
divergence between the English character and the American occurred in days when
mature men were still of Elizabethan birth. And throughout the course of their
national history, Americans have never quite lost the wonderful old Elizabethan
fusion of firm faith in ideals with versatile and swiftly sensible management
of practical affairs. In ideal philosophy, they still seek the simple
essentials of truth; in practical life, they still show a tendency to do,
simply and instinctively, the essential thing; and in the simplicity of heart
which is still theirs, they never quite understand how far from consistent
their lofty phrases and their work-a-day deeds may seem to unsympathetic
observers. Thus, in their own way, the educational leaders of America may be
taken, at this moment, as among the most characteristic figures whom the
country has as yet produced. For, however they may differ concerning all manner
of detail, they are agreed in faith that education should be a fearless search
for truth; that the truth, honestly proclaimed, will make life on earth better
and better; and that the best way to discover and to proclaim truth is to open
to all who can use them the fullest resources of learning. In which buoyant
faith, though often obscured by the superstitious errors of the moment, there
glows a deep belief in the ultimate excellence of human nature, which,
throughout the continent, has paled, for a while, the blaze of Calvinistic
fire, as the sunlight pales the flames that flicker, in darkness, above burning
coals.
In order to
avoid needless repetitions, and for the sake of rapid reference, » short List
of Works bearing on the whole or on considerable portions of the history of the
United States, or giving general views of various departments of national
activity, is here prefixed to the Special Bibliographies bearing on particular
chapters.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Adams, C. K.
Manual of Historical Literature. 3rd ed. New York. 1889. Channing, E. and Hart,
A. B. Guide to the Study of American History. Boston. 1896.
Lamed, J. N.
(editor). The Literature of American History. A Bibliographical Guide. Boston.
1902. Supplement (for 1900-1). Ed. by P. P. Wells. Boston. 1902. (A very full
and useful bibliography, dealing with Canada, Spanish and Portuguese America,
and the West Indies, as well as the United States; and giving notes of the
contents, and estimates of the value, of the books mentioned.)
II. GENERAL WORKS.
(i) Chronicles,
etc.
American
Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events, 1861-74: (continued as)
Appleton’s Annual Cyclopaedia, 1875, etc. New York. 1862, etc. Annual Register
(from 1758). London. 1759, etc.
Jameson, J.
F. Dictionary of United States History, 1492-1894. Philadelphia.
1901.
Lalor, J. J.
(editor). Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the
Political History of the United States. 3 vols. Chicago and New York. 1881-4.
Macdonald, W.
Select Charters and other Documents illustrative of American History,
1606-1861. 2 vols. New York. 1898.
Poore, B. P.
Descriptive Catalogue of Government Publications, 1774-1881. Washington. 1885.
(ii) Histories.
Adams, H.
History of the United States of America. 9 vols. New York. 1889-91. Bancroft,
G. History of the United States (to 1789). Author’s last revision.
6 vols. New
York. 1883-5.
Bryant, W.
C., and Gay, S. H. Popular History of the United States. 5 vols. New York.
1896.
Fiske, J. The
Discovery of America. 2 vols. Boston. 1892. The Beginnings of New England.
Boston. 1889. Old Virginia and her neighbours. 2 vols. New York. 1897. Dutch
and Quaker Colonies in America. 2 vols. Boston.
1899. The American Revolution. 2 vols. Boston.
1891. Critical Period of American History (1783-89). Boston. 1888.
Hart, A. B.
(editor). American History told by Contemporaries. 4 vols. New York. 1897-1902.
(editor). Epochs of American History.
(With useful maps.) 3 vols. London
and New York.
1891-3.
Hildreth, R.
History of the United States of America (to 1821). Revised ed.
6 vols. New
York. 1882.
McMaster, J.
B. History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil
War. 5 vols. (to be completed in 7 vols.). New York. 1883, etc. Rhodes, J. F.
History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850. 4 vols.
(In course of
publication.) New York. 1893, etc.
Schouler, J.
History of the United States under the Constitution. Revised ed.
6 vols. New
York. 1899.
Wilson, W.
History of the American People. 5 vols. New York. 1902.
Winsor, J.
(editor). The Narrative and Critical History of America. 8 vols. Boston.
1886-9. (The Appendix to Vol. vm contains a disquisition on the MS. sources,
and a select bibliography of the printed authorities for the history of the United
States.)
The American
Commonwealths Series gives short histories of the different States in separate
volumes. Boston. 1884, etc.
III. SPECIAL WORKS.
(i) Political.
American
State Papers: documents legislative and executive. 38 vols. Washington. 1832-61.
Benton, T. H.
Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, 1789-1856. 16 vols.
New York.
1857-61.
Bryce, J. The
American Commonwealth. 3 vols. London. 1888. 3rd ed.
revised, with
additional chapters. 1893-5.
Foster, W. E.
References to the History of Presidential Administrations, 17891885. New York.
1885. (Contains a bibliography.)
Johnston, A.
History of American Politics. 4th ed. revised. New York. 1898.
Representative American Orations. Re-edited by
J. A. Woodburn. 4 vols.
New York.
1896-7.
Moore, J. W.
The American Congress, 1774-1895. New York. 1895. Richardson, J. D. Compilation
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897. 10 vols. Washington.
1896-9.
Smith,
Goldwin. The United States: an outline of political history, 1492-1871.
London and
New York. 1893.
Stanwood, E.
History of the Presidency. (Revised edition of the History of Presidential
Elections.) Boston. 1898.
Tocqueville, A. de. De la Democratic en Amerique. Paris. 1835.
Democracy in America. (Translation by H. Reeve.) London. 1835. New ed., revised
and annotated by F. Bowen, with introduction hy D. C. Gilman. 2 vols. New York.
1898.
Wilson, W.
Congressional Government. Boston. 1885.
(ii) Constitutional.
Cooley, T.
Mcl. General principles of Constitutional Law in the United States. 3rd ed.,
revised by A. C. McLaughlin. Boston. 1898.
Treatise on the constitutional limitations
which rest upon the legislative power
of the States
of the American Union. 6th ed.; with additions by A. C. Angell. Boston. 1890.
Curtis, G. T.
Constitutional History of the United States. 2 vols. New York. 1889-96.
Federalist,
The. A commentary on the Constitution of the United States: reprinted from the
original text (1788) of Alex. Hamilton, John Jay, and Jas. Madison. Edited by
H. C. Lodge. New York. 1888. The same; edited by P. L. Ford. New York. 1898.
Ford, H. J.
Rise and Growth of American Politics: a sketch of constitutional development.
New York. 1898.
Foster, W. E.
References to the Constitution of the United States. New York.
1890.
(Contains a bibliography.)
Hare, J. I.
C. American Constitutional Law. 2 vols. Boston.
1889.
Holst, H. E. von. The Constitutional and Political
History of the United States.
Transl. by J.
J. Lalor, etc. New ed. Chicago. 1899.
Howard, G. E.
Introduction to the local Constitutional History of the United States. (Johns
Hopkins Univ. Studies, extra vol. iv.) Baltimore. 1889. Jameson, J. A. Treatise
on the Constitutional Convention. 4th ed. Chicago. 1887.
Poore, B. P.
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other organic laws of
the United States. 2 vols. Washington. 1877.
Story, J.
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. 6th ed. (by M. M.
Bigelow). 2 vols. Boston. 1891.
Thorpe, F. N.
The Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850.
2 vols. Chicago. 1898.
(See
also under section III (vi).)
(iii) Financial
and Economical.
Bishop, J. L.
History of American Manufactures, 1603-1860. 3rd (revised) ed.
3 vols. Philadelphia. 1867.
Bolles, A. S.
Financial History of the United States. 3 vols. New York. 1879-85.
Depew, C. M.
One Hundred Years of American Commerce. 2 vols. New York. 1896.
Dewey, D. R.
Financial History of the United States (American Citizen Series).
New York.
1902.
Sumner, W. G.
History of American Currency. New York. 1876.
Taussig, F.
W. Tariff History of the United States. 4th (revised) ed. New York.
1898.
(iv) Foreign Affairs.
Moore, J. B.
History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States
has been a party. 6 vols. Washington. 1898.
Treaties and
Conventions concluded between the United States and other Powers since July 4,
1776. With notes by J. C. B. Davis. Washington. 1889.
(v) Ecclesiastical.
Hurst, J. F.
Literature of Theology. (Contains a full bibl:ography of American
Church History.) New York. 1896.
Jackson, S.
M. Bibliography of American Church History, 1820-93. New York.
• 1894.
(vi) Law.
Carson, H. L.
The Supreme Court of the United States. Its History. Philadelphia. 1891.
Kent, J.
Commentaries on American Law. 14th ed., by J. M. Gould. 4 vols. Boston. 1896.
Wharton, F.
Digest of the International Law of the United States, taken from documents
issued by Presidents and Secretaries. 3 vols. Washington. 1886.
(vii) National
Defence.
Maclay, E. S.
History of the United States Navy, 1775-1901. Revised ed.
3 vols. New York. 1898-1901.
Walton, W.
(editor). Army and Navy of the United States. 25 parts. Philadelphia.
1889-1900.
(viii) Literature.
Richardson,
C. F. American Literature, 1607-1885. 2 vols. New York. 1893-4. Tyler, M. C.
History of American Literature, 1607-1765. Revised ed. 2 vols. New York. 1897.
(Continued in) Literary History of the American Revolution, 1763-83. 2 vols.
New York. 1897.
Wendell, B.
Literary History of America. (Contains a bibliography.) New York. 1900.
(ix) Education.
Boone, R. G.
Education in the United States: its History. New York. 1889.
(x) Aborigines.
Brinton, D.
G. The American Race: a linguistic classification and ethnographic description
of the native tribes of North and South America. New York. 1891. Catlin, G.
Illustrations of the manners, customs, and condition of the North American
Indians. Letters and notes on the same. 6 vols. London. 1841. Drake, S. G.
Aboriginal Races of North America. Revised ed. New York. 1880.
IV. BIOGRAPHY.
American
Statesmen Series. Edited by J. T. Morse. New ed. 32 vols. Boston. 1898-1900.
Sparks,
Jared. Library of American Biography. 25 vols. Boston. 1834-48. Wilson, J. G.
and Fiske, J. (editors). Appleton’s Cyclopedia of American Biography. Edited by
J. G. Wilson and J. Fiske. Revised ed. 7 vols. New York. 1898-1900.
V. HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY.
Hart, A. B.
Epoch Maps illustrating American History. New York. 1893. MacCoun, T.
Historical Charts of the United States: territorial growth. (Contains 28 large
maps.) New York. 1889.
Historical Geography of the United States. New
York. 1902.
Phillips, P.
L. A List of Maps of America in the Library of Congress. Washington. 1901.
CHAPTER I THE FIRST
CENTURY OF ENGLISH COLONISATION
AND
THE ENGLISH COLONIES (1700—1763).
I. GENERAL.
Doouments.
Archa»ologia
Americana. 9 vols. Worcester, Mass. 1843-1901.
Calendars of
Colonial State Papers in the English Record Office, 1574-1680. Ed.
by W. Noel
Sainsbury and J. W. Fortescue. 5 vols. London. 1860-96. Force, P. Tracts
relating to the American Colonies. 4 vols. W ashington. 1836-46.
Hazard, E.
Historical Collections. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1792-94.
Histories.
Account of
European Settlements in America. 2 vols. London. 1760. (Attributed to Edmnnd
Burke.)
Chalmers, G.
Political Annals of the Present United Colonies. London. 1780. Douglas, W.
Summary of the British Settlements in North America. 2 vols. London. 1755.
Doyle, J. A.
The English in America. 3 vols. London. 1882-7.
Egerton, H.
E. Short History of British Colonial Policy. New York. 1898. Greene, E. V. The
Governor in the English Colonies in America. (Harvard Historical Studies.) New
York. 1898.
II. SPECIAL.
(i) Period
of Discovery.
Original
Authorities.
Eden, R.
Decades of the New World. London. 1566.
Hakluyt, R.
Discourse on Western Planting (written in 1554). Cambridge,
U. S. 1877.
Divers Voyages. London. 1862.
Hakluyt, R.
Principal navigations, voiages, and discoveries of the English nation.
London. 1589.
New edition, 5 vols. London. 1809.
Hariot, T.
Narrative of Firlt; English Plantation of Virginia. London. 1588. Pinkerton, J.
Collection of Voyages and Travels. Vols. xii,
an, xiv. London.
1808-14.
Purchas, S.,
his Pilgrimes. 5 vols. London. 1625-6.
Later
Writers.
Beazley, R.
John and Sebastian Cabot. New York. 1898.
Biddle, R.
Memoir of Sebastian Cabot. London. 1831.
Edwards, E.
Life of Sir Walter Raleigh. London. 1868.
Harrisse, H.
Discovery of North America by John Cabot. London. 1897.
John Cabot, the Discoverer of North America,
and Sebastian his Son. London.
1896.
Hume, M. A.
S. Life of Sir Walter Raleigh. London. 1897.
Payne, E. J.
Voyages of Elizabethan Seamen to America. (Selections from Hakluyt, etc.) 2
vols. London. 1893.
Tarbox, T. N.
Sir Walter Raleigh and his Colony in America. (Prince Society.) Boston. 1884.
(ii) Maine.
Documents.
Publications
of Maine Historical Society. 28 vols. Portland, Maine. 1822-1901.
Later
Writers.
Baxter, J. P.
Sir Ferdinando Gorges. (Prince Society.) 3 vols. Boston. 1890. Folsom, G.
History of Saco and Biddeford. Saco. 1830.
Williamson,
W. D. History of Maine. 2 vols. Hallowell. 1832.
(iii) New
Hampshire.
Documents.
Dean, J. W.
Capt. John Mason. (Prince Society.) Boston. 1897.
Farmer, J.
and Moore, J. B. Collections relating to New Hampshire. 2 vols. Concord. 1822.
New Hampshire
Historical Society Collections. 10 vols. Proceedings. 3 vols.
Concord, N.
H. 1824-97.
New Hampshire
Provincial Papers. 27 vols. Concord. 1867-96.
Later
Writers.
Belknap, J. History
of New Hampshire. 3 vols. Boston. 1784-92.
M°Clintock,
J. N. History of New Hampshire. Boston. 1889.
(iv) Massachusetts.
Documents.
Boston
Commissioners, Report of. Boston. 1876.
Hutchinson,
T. Collections of Papers. 2 vols. (Prince Society.) Albany. 1865. Massachusetts
Historical Society Collections. 61 vols. Proceedings 36 vols., to 1900.
(The most
important contents are specified under their respective heads.)
Prince
Society, Publications of the. Boston, 1858. 20 vols. (Mostly specified elsewhere.)
Shurtleffj N.
B. Records of Massachusetts Bay, 1628-86. 5 vols. Boston. 1853-4. Young,
Alexander. Chronicles of Massachusetts, 1623-36. Boston. 1846.
Original
Authorities.
Church, B.
History of King Philipp’s War. 2 vols. Boston. 1865-7.
Gorges, Sir
Ferdinando. Brief Narration. London. 1658.
Johnson, E.
History of New England, 1628-52. 2 vols. London. 1654. Re-ed. in Mass. Hist.
Coll. 1814-19.
Josselyn, J.
Two Voyages to New England, 1638-53. London. 1674. (Re-ed. in Mass. Hist. Coll.
1833.)
Moreton,
Thos. New English Canaan. London. 1632.
Penhallow, S.
History of the Wars of New England with the Indians. Boston.
1726. ,
Winthrop,
John. History of New England. 1630-49. Boston. 1853.
Later
Writers.
Adams, C. F.
Three Episodes of Massachusetts History. Boston. 1892.
Barry, J. S.
History of Massachusetts. 8 vols. Boston. 1855.
Drake, S. A.
Border Wars of New England. New York. 1897.
Drake, S. G.
History and Antiquities of Boston, 1630-1770. Boston. 1856.
History of the War, 1744-49. Albany. 1870.
Fiske, J.
Beginnings of New England. Boston. 1889.
Hubhard, W.
History of New England. Boston. 1815.
Hutchinson,
T. History of Massachusetts. 2 vols. Boston. 1764.
Lodge, H. C.
Boston. (Historic Town Series.) New York. 1891.
Mather, C.
Magnalia Christi Americana, 1620-98. London. 1702.
Morton,
Nathaniel. New England’s Memorial. Cambridge, Mass. 1669.
Neal, D.
History of New England. 2 vols. London. 1747.
Oliver, P.
Puritan Commonwealth. Boston. 1856.
Palfrey, J.
G. History of New England. 4 vols. Boston. 1865-73.
History of New England from the Revolution to
the 17th Century. 2 vols.
Boston.
1875-90.
Prince, T.
Chronological History of New England. Boston. 1736.
Winsor, J.
Memorial History of Boston, 1630-80. 4 vols. Boston. 1880-82.
Biography,
etc.
Jones, A.
Life and work of Thomas Dudley. Boston. 1899.
Wheelwright,
J. Writings and Memoir. (Prince Society.) Boston. 1876. Whitmore, W. H. Andros
Tracts. 3 vols. (Prince Society.) Boston. 1868-74. Winthrop, R. C. Life and
Letters of John Winthrop. Boston. 1864-7.
(v) Plymouth.
Documents.
Shurtleff, N.
B. Records of Plymouth. 12 vols. Boston. 1885-7.
Original
Authorities.
Arher, E. The
Story of the Pilgrim Fathers told hy themselves. Boston. 1897. Bradford, W.
History of Plymouth Plantation. (Published in Mass. Hist. Coll.) Boston. 1856.
Mourt, G.
Journal of the Plantation of Plymouth. Boston. 1865.
Young, A.
Chronicles of The Pilgrim Fathers, 1602-25. Boston. 1841.
Later
Writers.
Brown, J. The
Pilgrim Fathers of New England. New York. 1895.
Goodwin, J.
A. The Pilgrim Republic. Boston. 1888.
(vi) Rhode
Island.
Bibliography.
Bartlett, J.
R. Bibliography of Rhode Island. Providence. 1864.
Documents.
Bartlett, J.
R. Records of Rhode Island. Providence. 1856-65.
Original
Authorities.
Callender, J.
Historical Discourse on the colony of R. I. (In Rhode Island Historical Society
Collections.)
Narraganset
Club Publications. 6 vols. Providence. 1865, etc.
Rhode
Island Historical Society Collections. 9 vols. Providence. 1827-97,, ,, ,,
Proceedings. 21 nos. Providence. 1872-92.
,, ,, „
Publications. 8 vols. Providence. 1893-1901.
Rhode Island
Historical Tracts. 21 nos. Providence. 1877-89.
Later
Writers.
Arnold, S. G.
History of Rhode Island. 2 vols. New York. 1859-60.
Foster, W. L.
Stephen Hopkins, a Rhode Island Statesman. Providence. 1884.
(vii) Connecticut and New Haven.
Documents.
Hoadly, C. J.
Records of the Colony of New Haven, 1638-63. 2 vols. Hartford.
1857-8.
Trumbull, J.
H. and Hoadly, C. J. Colonial Records of Connecticut. 15 vols. Hartford.
1850-90.
Histories.
Johnston, A.
Connecticut. (American Commonwealth Series.) Boston. 1887.
Genesis of a New England State. (Johns Hopkins
Series.) Baltimore. 1883.
Levermore, C.
H. The Republic of New Haven. (Johns Hopkins Series.) Baltimore. 1886.
Trumbull, B.
Complete History of Connecticut to 1764. 2 vols. New Haven. 1818.
(viii) New York.
Bibliography.
Asher, G. M.
Essay on the Dutch books and pamphlets relating to New Netherlands.
Documents.
New York
Historical Society’s Collections. 26 vols. 1804, etc. New York. O’Callaghan, E.
B. and Femow, B. Documents relating to the Colonial History of New York,
collected by J. R. Brodhead. 15 vols. Albany. 1853-83. O’Callaghan, E. B.
Documentary History of New York. 4 vols. Albany. 1849-51. Pearson, J. Early
Records of Albany. Albany. 1889.
• Histories.
Brodhead, J.
R. History of New York, 1609-91. 2 vols. New York. 1853-71. Fiske, J. Dutch and
Quaker Colonies in America. 2 vols. Boston. 1899.
Lamb, W. J.
History of the City of New York. 2 vols. New York. 1877-81. Roberts, C. H.
History of New York. (American Commonwealth Series.) 2 vols. Boston. 1887.
Roosevelt, T.
New York. (Historic Towns Series.) New York. 1891.
Smith, W.
History of New York. London. 1776.
(ix) New
Jersey.
Bibliography.
Index to
Colonial Documents of New Jersey, containing a catalogue of books on New Jersey
during the Colonial Period.
Documents.
Proceedings
of the New Jersey Historical Society. 24 vols. 1845-99.
Whitehead, W.
A. Documents relating to the Colonial History of the State of New Jersey. 21
vols. Newark. 1880-99. (Published by the New Jersey Historical Society.)
Histories.
Smith, S.
History of New Jersey to 1721. Burlington. 1765.
(x) Pennsylvania
and Delaware.
Documents.
Delaware
Historical Society, Publications of the. 22 nos. Wilmington. 1879-98. Hazard,
E. Register of Pennsylvania. 16 vols. Philadelphia. 1828-36.
Penn,
William. Select Works. 3 vols. London. 1771.
Pennsylvania
Archives. 25 vols. Philadelphia and Harrisburgh. 1852-95. Pennsylvania
Historical Society Bulletin. 13 nos. 1845-7.
Collections. 1
vol. 1853.
Memoirs. 14 vols.
1826-95.
Pennsylvania
Magazine of History (quarterly). 24 vols. 1877-1901. (This includes the letters
of William Penn and the History of New Sweden by Isaac Aerelius, originally
published in 1759.)
Thomas G.
Historical Account of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. London. 1698.
Histories,
etc.
Clarkson, T.
Memoirs of William Penn. 2 vols. London. 1813.
Egle, W. H.
History of Pennsylvania. New York. 1828.
Proud, R.
History of Pennsylvania. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1797-8.
(xi) Maryland.
Documents.
Archives of
Maryland. (Published by Maryland Historical Society.)
Maryland
Historical Society Collections. Baltimore.
Morris, J. G.
Historical Magazine.
Bistories.
Bozman, J. L.
History of Maryland, 1633-60. 2 vols. Baltimore. 1837. Browne, W. H. History of
Maryland. (American Commonwealth Series.) Boston. 1884.
Doyle, J. A.
Euglish in America, Virginia, Maryland and the Carolinas. London.
1882.
Mereness, N.
D. Maryland as a Proprietary Province. New York. 1901.
Neill, E. D. Terra Marias. Philadelphia. 1867.
Biographies.
Browne, W. H.
George and Cecilius Calvert. New York. 1890.
Scull, G. D.
The Evelyns in America. Oxford. 1881.
(xii) Virginia.
Documents.
Browne, A.
Genesis of the United States. Boston. 1890.
Calendar of
Virginia State Papers. 11 vols. Richmond. 1875.
Hen mg, W.
Statutes of Virginia. 13 vols. 1819-23.
Records of
Virginia Company. Virginia Historical Society. 2 vols. Richmond. 1888-9.
Virginia
Magazine of History. 6 vols. Richmond. 1893.
Original
Authorities.
Jones, H.
Present state of Virginia. London. 1724.
Smith, Capt.
John. Works, 1608-31. 2 vols. Edited by E. Arber. Birmingham.
1884.
Strachey, W.
Historic of Travaile into Virginia Britannia. (Hakluyt Society.) Wingfield, E.
M. Discourse of America. (Archaeologia Americana.)
Later
Writers.
Beverley, R.
History of Virginia. London. 1722.
Burke, J. D.
History of Virginia. 3 vols. Petersburgh, Virginia. 1804. Campbell, C. History
of Virginia. Philadelphia. 1859.
Cooke, J. E.
Virginia. (American Commonwealth Series.) Boston. 1883.
Fiske, J. E.
Old Virginia and Her Neighbours. 2 vols. New York. 1897.
Neill, E. D.
History of the Virginia Company of London. Albany. 1869.
Virginia Carolorum : Virginia under Charles I
and II. Albany. 1886.
Virginia Vetusta, during the reign of James I.
Albany. 1885.
Stith, W.
History of the first discovery and settlement of Virginia. Williamsburg. 1747.
(xiii) North
Carolina.
Bibliography. ■
Weeks, S. B.
Libraries and Literature of North Carolina in the 18th Century.
Washington.
1896.
Historical Literature of North Carolina.
Cambridge, U. S. 1895.
Documents.
Colonial
Records of North Carolina, with Introductions by W. L. Sanders. 16 vols.
Raleigh. 1886.
Histories.
Byrd, W.
History of the Dividing: Line. 2 vols. Richmond. 1866.
Hawks, F. L.
History of North Carolina. 3 vols. Fayetteville. 1857-8. Williamson, H. History
of North Carolina. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1812.
(xiv) South
Carolina.
Bibliography.
Whitney, E.
L. Bibliography of South Carolina. (In American Historical Association Report
for 1894.)
Original
Authorities.
Carroll, B.
R. Historical Collections of South Carolina. 2 vols. New York. 1836. South
Carolina Historical Society. Collections. 5 vols. 1857-97.
Statutes of
South Carolina from 1682. 10 vols. Columbia. 1836-73.
Later
Writers.
Hewatt, A.
Historical Account of South Carolina and Georgia. 2 vols. London. 1779.
M'Crady, E.
History of South Carolina. 1670-1780. 3 vols. New York. 1897
1901.
Rivers, W. J.
Sketch of the History of South Carolina. Charleston. 1856.
(xv) Georgia.
Documents.
Acts of the
Assembly, 1755-74.
Journal of
Proceedings in Georgia by W. Stephens (Secretary to the Trustees). London.
1742.
MS. Records
of the Trustees for Georgia. (Now the property of that State.)
Original
Authorities.
Cadogan, G.
Impartial Account of the Expedition against St Augustine. London. 1743.
The Spanish Hireling Detected. London. 1743.
De Brahm, J.
G. History of Province of Georgia. Privately printed, Savannah, 1849, from a
contemporary manuscript.
Georgia
Historical Society. Collections. 4 vols. Savannah. 1840-78.
Martyn, B.
Reasons for establishing the Colony of Georgia. London. 1733. Moore, F. Voyage
to Georgia. London. 1744.
New and
accurate Account of the Provinces of South Carolina and Georgia. London.
1732. (Said
to have been prepared by Oglethorpe.)
Wesley, J.
Journal for Georgia. Bristol, n. d.
Later
Writers.
Bruce, H.
Life of Oglethorpe. (Makers of America Series.) New York. 1890. Jones, C. C.
History of Georgia. 2 vols. Boston. 1883.
McCall, Major
H. History of Georgia. 2 vols. Savannah. 1811-16.
Wright, R.
Memoir of James Oglethorpe. London. 1867.
(xvi) Newfoundland.
Hatton, J.
and Harvey, M. Newfoundland: History, Conditions, Prospects. Boston. 1883.
Prowse, D. W.
History of Newfoundland. London. 1895.
Reeves, J.
Governors of Newfoundland. London. 1793.
III.
ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY.
Adams, C. F.
Antinomianism in Massachusetts. (Prince Society.)
Anderson, J.
S. M. History of the Church of England in the Colonies. London. 1845-55.
Backus, J.
History of New England with particular reference to the Baptists.
2 vols.
Newton, Mass. 1871.
Baird, R.
Religion in America. New York. 1856. .
Beardsley, E.
E. History of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut. 2 vols. Boston.
1883.
Besse, J. Collections
of the Sufferings of the Quakers. 1650-89. 2 vols. London. 1753.
Blaikie, A.
History of Presbyterianism in New England. Boston. 1881.
Bowden, J.
History of the Society of Friends in America. 2 vols. London. 1861. Cobb, S. H.
The Rise of Religious Liberty in America. New York and London. 1902.
Cross, A. L.
The Angl’can Episcopate and the American Colonies. New York. 1892. Felt, J. B.
Ecclesiastical History of New England. 2 vols. Boston. 1855-62. Hallowell, R.
P. Quaker Invasion of Massachusetts. Boston. 1887.
The Pioneer Quakers. Boston. 1887.
Hawks, F. L.
Contributions to the Ecclesiastical History of the United States.
2 vols. New
York. 1836-9.
Higginson, T.
W. Life of Francis Higginson. (Makers of America Series.) New York. 1891.
Hodge, C. Constitutional
History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.
2 vols.
Philadelphia. 1839-40.
Jacobs, H. E.
History of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States.
(American
Church History Series.) New York. 1893.
Meade, W. Old
Churches of Virginia. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1861.
Newman, A. H.
History of the Baptist Churches in the United States. 2 vols.
(American
Church History Series.) New York. 1894.
Periy, W. S.
History of the American Episcopal Church (1587-1883). 2 vols. Boston. 1885.
Historical Collections relating to the
American Colonial Church. 5 vols.
Hartford.
1870-8.
Walker, G. L.
Thomas Hooker. (Makers of America Series.) New York. 1891. White, W. Memoirs of
the American Episcopal Church in the United States. Philadelphia. 1820.
Whitefield,
G. Journal of a Voyage from London to Savannah, 1737-8. London. 1739.
Wilberforce,
S. History of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America. London. 1856.
IV. LITERATURE AND EDUCATION.
Adams, H. B.
The College of William and Mary. Washington. 1887.
Quincy, J.
History of Harvard University. 2 vols. Boston. 1860.
Steiner, B.
C. History of Education in Connecticut. Washington. 1893.
. History of Education in Maryland.
Washington. 1894.
Thomas, J.
History of Printing in America. (Archaeologia Americana.) 2 vols. Albany. 1874.
Tyler, M. C.
History of American Literature, 1607-1765. 2 vols. New York. 1897.
V. SOCIAL AND ECONOMICAL HISTORY.
Beer, G. L.
Commercial Policy of England towards the American Colonies. New York. 1893.
Bishop, J. L.
History of American Manufactures. 3 vols. Philadelphia. 1867. Bruce, P. A.
Economic History of Virginia in 17th Century. 2 vols. New York. 1896.
Channing, E.
Navigation Laws. (American Antiquarian Society.)
Dankers, J.
and Sluyter, P. Journal of a Voyage to New York, 1679-80. (Long Island
Historical Society.) Brooklyn. 1867.
Denton, D.
Brief Description of New York. (Gowan’s Bibliotheca Americana.) New York. 1845.
Dunton, J.
Letters from New England, 1686. (Prince Society.) Boston. 1867. Felt, J. B.
Customs of New England. Boston. 1853.
Grant, Mrs A.
(of Laggan). Memoirs of an American Lady. Albany. 1876. Johnson, J. Old
Maryland Manors. (Johns Hopkins Studies.) Baltimore. 1883. Jones, H. Present
State of Virginia. New York. 1865.
Kalm, P.
Travels into North America. London. 1772.
Lawson, J.
History of Carolina. Raleigh. 1860.
Miller, J.
Description of New York in 1695. (Gowan’s Bibliotheca Americana.) New York.
1862.
Sewel, S. E.
Diary, 1674^1729. (Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll.) Boston. 1878-82. Upham, C. W. Salem
Witchcraft. 2 vols. Boston. 1867.
Weeden, W. B.
Economic and Social History of New England. 2 vols. Boston. 1890.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Faribault, 6. B. Catalogue d’ouvrages sur l’histoire de 1’Amerique et en
particulier sur celle du Canada, de la Louisiane, de l’Acadie, et autres lieux,
ci-devant connus sous le nom de Nouvelle-France, etc. Quebec. 1837.
Harrisse, H. Notes pour servir a l’histoire, a la bibliographie, et a la
cartographie de la Nouvelle France, etc. 1545-1700. Paris. 1872.
A list of
maps is given by Gabriel Marcel in the Revue de Geographie, vols.
16, 17.
See also
Winsor’s Narrative and Critical History, above, p. 754.
II. ARCHIVES.
The chief
collections of archives are at the Archives Nationales, Ministere des Affaires
Etrangeres, Ministere de la Guerre, and Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris; in the
Parliamentary Library, Ottawa; and in Parkman’s Collection at the Harvard
College Library. Lorin praises Le Pers’s manuscript history of St Domingo,
Bibl. Nationale, No. 8992. Moreau de Saint Mery’s manuscript collections at the
Ministere de la Marine are of principal importance for the history of the West
Indies.
III. COLONISATION IN GENERAL.
Account of
European Settlements in America. 2 vols. London. 1760. (Attributed to Edmund
Burke.)
Bordier, A. La colonisation scientifique et les colonies franijaises.
Paris. 1884. Deschamps, L. La question coloniale. 1891.
Duval, J. Les colonies et la politique coloniale de la France. Paris.
1864. Leroy-Beaulieu, P. De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes. Paris.
1898. Merivale, H. Lectures on colonization and colonies. London. 1841, 1861.
Pauliat, L. La politique coloniale sous l’ancien regime. Leipzig. 1887.
Rameau de Saint-Pere, E. La France aux colonies. Paris. 1859.
Roscher, W. Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung. 3rd ed. Leipzig.
1885.
Auxiliary Information.
Bonnassieux, P. Les grandes compagnies de commerce. Paris. 1892. .
Breard, Ch. and P. Documents relatifs a la Marine normande. Rouen. 1889.
Clement, P. Histoire du systeme protecteur en France. Paris. 1854.
Dictionnaire du commerce de l’Encyclop£die Methodique. 3 vols. Paris.
1783.
Dufresne de Francheville, J. Histoire generale et particuliere des
finances. 3 vols. Paris. 1738-46.
Guerin, L. Histoire maritime de France. 6 vols. Paris. 1859-63.
Oldmixon, J.
Account of the British Empire in America. 3rd edition. London. 1741.
Pownall, T.
Administration of the North American colonies. 4th
ed. London. 1768.
V^ron de Forbonnais, F. Recherches et considerations sur les finances de
France. Paris.
1758.
Winsor, J.
Critical History of America. (Contains useful bibliographies, information
about maps, etc.) Vols. hi, iv, v,
vm. London. 1886-9.
Wisdom and
policy of the French in the construction of their great offices so as best to
answer the purposes of trade. Paris. 1755.
IV. THE SEPARATE COLONIES.
(A) Canada.
Documents. ’
[Blanchet, J.] Collection de manuscrits relatifs a la Nouvelle France,
1492-1769.
4 vols. Paris. 1883-5.
Boucher, P. Histoire veritable et naturelle des moeurs et productions du
pays de la Nouvelle France. Paris. 1664.
Brodhead, J.
R. and O’Callaghan, E. B. Documents relative to the colonial history of the
State of New York. Vols. hi, ix,
x. Albany, N. Y. 1856-77.
Brymner, D.
Reports on Canadian Archives, 1881 etc., including J. Marmette’s reports on the
documents in the office of Foreign Affairs, 1883, p. 116, with a synopsis of
the documents from 1592 to 1765, and of other collections in the French
Archives. See also report for 1885. Ottawa. 1884, etc.
Carayon, A. Premiere Mission des Jesuites au Canada. Paris. 1864.
Cartier, J. Discours du voyage fait par...J. Quartier en la terre de
Canada. Literary
and Historical Society. Quebec. 1843.
Champlain, S.
de. GEuvres. Ed. by C. H. Laverdiere. 6 vols.
Quebec. 1870.
Clement, P. Lettres, Instructions et Memoires de Colbert, in (2). Paris.
1865.
De Bacqueville de la Potherie. Histoire de l’Amerique septentrionale, i.
Paris. 1722.
Dn Creux, Fr. Historia Canadensis. Paris. 1664.
£dits, Ordonnances royaux, declarations et arrets du conseil d’etat du
Roi, concemant le Canada. [1627-1756.] Ordonnances des intendants et arrets
portant reglements du conseil superieur de Quebec, avec les commissions des
Gouvemeurs (1540—1758). 3 vols. Quebec. 1854-56.
La Hontan, J. de. Nouveaux Voyages...dans l’Amerique septentrionale. 2
vols. The Hague. 1703.
Laverdiere, C. H. Journal des Jesuites. Quebec. 1871.
Laverdiere, C. H. Relations des Je'suites. 4 vols. Quebec. 1858.
Le Clercq, C. Premier etabliasement de la foy dans la Nouvelle-France. 2
vols. Paris. 1691.
Lescarbot, M. Histoire de la Nouvelle France. Paris. 1609, etc.
Le Tac, S. Histoire chronologique de la Nouvelle France. Edited
by E. Re- veillaud. Paris. 1888.
Margry, P. Relations et memoires inedits pour servir a l’histoire de la
France dans les pays d’outre-mer tires des archives du ministere de la marine
et des colonies. Paris. 1867.
Margry, P. Decouvertes et etablissements des fran^ais dans l’Ouest. 6
vols. Paris. 1875-81.
Richard, Ed.
Supplement to Dr Brymner’s Report on Canadian Archives. (Paris Archives, 1663-1720.) 1900.
Sagard Theodat, G. Histoire du Canada. Paris. 1636.
Thevet, A. Les singularitez de la France Antarctique. Paris.
1558. ,
Thwaites, R.
Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents. 69 vols. Cleveland. 18961902.
Publications
of Societies.
Collection de Memoires et de relations sur l’histoire ancienne du
Canada. 8
parts.
Quebec
Literary and Historical Society. Quebec. 1840.
Maine
Historical Society. Collections. Portland (Maine).
Manuscripts
relating to the early history of Canada, ed. J. M. Le Moine. Quebec Literary
and Historical Society. Quebec. 1866-8.
Massachusetts Historical Society. Collections. Boston. (See above, p.
758.) Memoires et documents relatifs a l’histoire du Canada. Societe Historique
de Montreal. 1859,
etc.
Prince
Society, Publications of the. Boston. (See above, p. 758.)
Principal Histories.
Bibaud, Max. Les institutions de l'histoire du Canada, on Annales
Canadiennes. Montreal. 1855.
Bibaud, Michel. Histoire du Canada sous la domination franfaise. 2
vols. Montreal. 1843-44.
Biggar, H. P.
The early trading companies of New France. (In University of Toronto Studies in
History.) Toronto. 1901.
Bourinot, J. G. Canada. London. 1897.
Charlevoix, P. F. X. de. Histoire et description de la Nouvelle France. 6
vols. Paris. 1744. English edition, transl. by J. Gilmary Shea. 6 vols. London.
1902.
Dussieux, L. E. Le Canada sous la domination fran9aise d’apres les
archives de la marine et de la guerre. Paris. 1855.
[Faillon, l’Abbe.] Histoire de la colonie franijaise en Canada. 3 vols.
Montreal.
1865-6.
Ferland, J. B. A. Cours d’histoire du Canada. 2 pts. Quebec. 1861-5.
Gameau, F. X. Histoire du Canada, r, n. Montreal. 1845, 1882.
Guenin, E. La Nouvelle France. Paris. 1898.
Kingsford, W.
History of Canada, i, ii, in, iv.
London. 1889-90.
Parkman, F.
Pioneers of France in the New World. 23rd edition. 1885.
The Jesuits in North America. 20th edition.
1885.
La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West.
12th edition. 1885.
The Old Regime in Canada. 14th edition. 1885.
Count Frontenac and New France. 14th edition.
1885.
Montcalm and Wolfe. 2 vols. 6th edition. 1885.
The Pontiac Conspiracy. 2 vols. 10th edition.
1885.
Collected Works. New ed., by W. Kingsford. London. 1900-1.
Rameau, E. de Saint Pere. La France aux colonies. Les Fran^ais en
Amerique: Acadiens et Canadiens. Paris. 1859.
Reveillaud, E. Histoire du Canada et des Canadiens franyais de la decouverte
jusqu’a nos jours. Paris. 1884.
Suite, B. Histoire des Canadiens franyais. i, n. Montreal. 1882-4.
Topography and Travel.
Bossu, —. Nouveaux Voyages dans l’Amerique septentrionale. Amsterdam.
1777. Bouchette, J. Topographical description of Lower Canada. London. 1816.
Topographical dictionary of the province of
Lower Canada. London. 1832.
Cusick, D. History of the Six Nations. Lockport. 1848.
De Bacqueville de la Potherie. Histoire de l’Amerique septentrionale. ii, m, iv. Paris. 1722.
Kalm, P. Travels
into North America, in Pinkerton’s Voyages, xm. London. 1808, etc.
Morgan, L. H.
The League of the Iroquois. Rochester, N. Y. 1851.
Relations
with Natives.
Bannister, S.
British colonization and the coloured tribes. London. 1838. Colden, C. History
of the five nations of Canada. London. 1747.
Ellis, G. E.
The Red man and the White in North America. Boston. 1882. Hubbard, W. A
narrative of the troubles with the Indians in New England.
2 pts. Boston. 1677, etc.
Lafitau, J. F. Moeurs des sauvages ameriquains. 2 vols. Paris. 1724.
Le Clercq, C. Nouvelle relation de la Gaspesie. Paris. 1691.
Rochemonteix, C. de. Les Jesuites et la Nouvelle France. 3
vols. Boston. 1895. Trumbull, J. H. Origin and Early Progress of Indian
missions. Worcester (Mass.). 1874.
Miscellaneous.
Bibaud, Max. Dictionnaire historique des hommes illustres du Canada et
de l’Amerique. Montreal. 1867.
Casgrain, H. R. CEuvres. Worcester (Mass.). 1884.
Cugnet, F. J. Loi des fiefs. Paris. 1775.
Abstract of royal edicts that were in force in
the Province of Quebec in
the time of
the French government. London. 1772.
Dard, Henri. Le Droit Public canadien sous la dominion fran9aise. Paris.
1898. Doutre, G. et Lareau, E. Le Droit Civile canadien suivant 1’ordre etabli
par les codes.
Precede d’une histoire generale du Droit canadien. i. Montreal. 1872.
Dugas, G. L’Ouest Canadien. Worcester (Mass.). 1896.
Gamault, E. Les Rochellais et le Canada. Worcester (Mass.). 1893.
Le Commerce rochellais au 18® siecle.
Worcester (Mass.). 1888-98.
Jourdain, A. J. L., F. A. Isambert, etc. Recueil general des anciennes
lois franijaises. Paris. 1822.
Lemieux, R. Les origines du Droit franco-canadien. Montreal. 1902.
Lorin, H. Le Comte de Frontenac. Montreal.
1896.
Thomas, I.
History of Printing in America. Worcester
(Mass.). 1810.
Tricoche, G. Les milices fran9aises et anglaises au Canada, 1627-1900.
Paris
1902.
(B) Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, C. Breton, Pr. Erw.
Island. Documents.
Akins, T. B. Nova Scotia Archives, 1714-55. Halifax (N. S.). 1869.
Du Boscq de Beaumont, G. Les demiers jours de l’Acadie. London.
1899. Memorials of the English and French Commissaries concerning the limits of
Nova Scotia and Acadie. London. 1755.
Principal
Histories.
Bourinot, J.
G. Historical and descriptive account of Cape Breton. Toronto. 1895. Brown, R.
History of the island of Cape Breton. London. 1869.
Campbell, D.
History of Prince Edward’s Island. Charlottetown. 1875.
Hannay, J.
History of Acadia. London, 1880.
Murdoch, B.
History of Nova Scotia. 3 vols. Halifax. 1865-7.
Rameau de Saint Pere, E. Une colonie feodale en Amerique: 1’Acadie, 16041710.
Paris.
1877. L’Acadie. 2 vols. Paris. 1889.
Stewart, J.
Account of Prince Edward’s Island. London. 1806.
Auxiliary
Information.
Belknap, J.
History of New Hampshire. 3 vols. Philadelphia.
1813.
Denys, N. Description geographique et historique des costes de
1’Amerique septen- trionale. 2 vols. Paris. 1672.
Ganong, W. F.
Boundaries of the Province of New Brunswick. Roy. Soc. Can.
Trans. 2nd
Series, vii, 2. 1901.
Lafargue, E. de. Histoire geographique de la Nouvelle Illcosse. London.
176[5]. Prowse, D. W. History of Newfoundland. Philadelphia. 1896.
Winthrop, J.
Journal of the transactions in the settlement of Massachusetts. Hartford
(Conn.). 1790.
(C) Louisiana.
Documents.
French, B. F.
Historical collections of Louisiana. 5 parts. New York. 1846-53. Margry, P.
(See under Canada.)
Principal Histories.
Barbe-Marbois, F. Histoire de la Louisiane et de la cession de cette
colonie par la France aux Illtats Unis. Paris. 1829.
Gayarrd, C. Histoire de la Louisiane. New Orleans. 1846.
Le Page du Pratz. Histoire de la Louisiane. 3 vols. Paris.
1758.
Martin, F. X.
History of Louisiana from the earliest period. 2 vols. New Orleans. 1827.
Wallace,
Joseph. History of Illinois and Louisiana under the French rule. 1899.
Auxiliary Information.
bossu. Nouveaux Voyages dans l’Amerique Septentrionale. Amsterdam. 1777.
Carayon, A. Bannissement des Jesuites de la Louisiane. Paris. 1865.
Coxe, D.
Description of the English Province of Carolana. London.
1722. Memoire historique et politique sur la Louisiane. (Attributed
to C. Gravier, Comte de Vergennes.) 1802.
(D) French
Antilles and Guiana.
Documents.
Calendar of
State Papers. Colonial. West Indies and America, 1574-1685. London. 1860-98.
Malouet, P. V. de. Collection de Memoires et correspondances officielles
sur 1’administration des colonies, et notamment sur la Guiane franchise et hol-
landaise. 5 vols. Paris. 1802.
Moreau de Saint Mdry, M. L. E. Loix et constitutions des colonies
fran^oises de 1’Amerique sous le Vent. 5 vols. Paris. 1784^5.
Principal Histories.
Ardouin, B. Etudes sur Hayti. 3 vols. Paris. 1853.
Boyer-Peyreloau, E. E. Les Antilles fran^aises, particulierement la Guadaloupe.
3 vols. Paris. 1823.
Charlevoix, P. F. X. Histoire d’Isle Espagnole ou de S. Domingue. 2
vols. Paris. 1730.
Dessalles, A. et P. R. Histoire generale des Antilles. 5 vols. Paris.
1847-8.
Du Tertre, J. B. Histoire generale des Isles de S. Christophe, de la
Guadaloupe, de la Martinique et autres dans l’Ame'rique. Paris. 1654.
Histoire generale des Antilles habites par les
Francais. 4 vols. Paris.
1667-71.
Edwards, B.
Historical survey of the French colony in the island of St Domingo. London. 1797.
Labat, J. B. Nouveaux voyages aux iles de l’Amerique. 6 vols. Paris.
1722. Lorin, H. De praedonibus S. Dominici. 1894.
Moreau de Saint Mery, M. L. E. Description topographique et historique
de la partie fran^oise de l’lsle Sainfr-Domingue. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1797-8.
Raynal, G. T. F. Histoire philosophique et politique des Etablissemens et du
Commerce des Europeens dans les deux Indes. Paris. 1774,
1780, 1781, etc.
Philosophical and political history of the
settlements and trade of the
Europeans in
the East and West Indies. Trans. J. Justamond.
London. 1776, etc.
Rochefort, C. de. Histoire naturelle et morale des iles Antilles.
Rotterdam. 1665, 1681.
Temaux-Compans, H. Notice historique sur la Guyane fran^aise. Paris.
1843.
Auxiliary
Information.
Archenholz,
J. W. von. History of the Pirates, freebooters and buccaneers of America. Trans, by G. Mason. London. 1807.
Bossu. Nouveaux Voyages aux Indes Occidentales. Paris. 1768.
Burney, J.
Chronological history of discoveries in the South Seas. iv. (Buccaneers.) London. 1803-17.
Dufresne de Francheville, J. Histoire de la Compagnie des Indes. 3
vols. Paris.
1746. .
Edwards, B.
History, civil and commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies. 3
vols. London. 1793-1801, etc.
Exquemelin,
A. O. Bucaniers of America. 2 vols. Londou.
1684-85, etc.
Petit, E. Droit publique ou Gouvernement des colonies fran9oises. Paris.
1771. Schomburgk, Sir R. H. History of Barbados. London. 1848.
I. ARCHIVES AND MSS.
America and
West Indies, Papers on. Vols. lxvii-lxxvii,
lxxix-lxxxiii, lxxxv- xcvi, xcix, c. Public Record Office, London.
Bouquet, H.,
Brigadier-General in the British Army in America. Letters and documents
relating to military events in America, 1757-1765. British Museum. Add. MSS.
21631—21660. (For synopsis of these volumes see Brymner’s Report on Canadian
Archives for 1899.)
Canada.
Verreau, l’Abbe. Report on Canadian Archives. Ottawa. 1875.
Brymner, D. Reports on Canadian Archives,
1883-95. Ottawa. 1884-95.
(The vols.
for 1885, 1886 and 1887 contain supplementary reports by J. Marinette, and
that for 1900 by E. Richard, on the documents concerning Canada contained in
the “Archives Coloniales” of the Ministere de la Marine at Paris.)
Haldimand,
Sir F., Commander-in-chief in North America and Governor of Quebec. Official
correspondence and papers during his various commands. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.
21661—21666, 21670, 21682, 21686, 21687. (For synopsis of these volumes see
Brymner’s reports on Canadian Archives for 1883-4^5.) Massachusetts original
papers (Board of Trade). Vols. lxxiv-lxxvih.
P. R. O., London.
New Hampshire
original papers (Board of Trade). Vols. vii-ix.
P. R. O., London. New Jersey original papers (Board of Trade). Vols. vii-ix. P. R. O., London. New Jersey
Archives. First Series. Vols. viii, ix.
Newark, N. J. 1885.
New York
original papers (Board of Trade). Vols. xxxn-xxxvi. P. R. O., London. Nova
Scotia original papers'(Board of Trade). Vols. xv-xviu. P. R. O., London.
Brymner, D. Report on Canadian Archives, 1894.
Ottawa. 1895.
Prince Edward
Island, New Brunswick, Cape Breton, Hudson’s Bay. Brymner, D.
Report on
Canad. Arch. 1895. Ottawa, 1896.
Virginia
original papers (Board of Trade). Vols. xxv-xxvii.
P. R. O., London. War Office. Original correspondence. Vols. xi, xiv,
xv. P. R. O., London.
II. COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS.
(i) Provincial.
Canada. Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, memoires, et autres
documents historiques relatifs a la Nouvelle France, 1492-1789. 4 vols. Quebec.
1883-5.
Extraits des Archives des Ministeres de la
Marine et de la Guerre a Paris.
Canada ; Correspondance generale, 1755-60. Ed. Casgrain. Quebec. 1890. Voyages
et memoires sur le Canada. Ed. Franquet. Quebec. 1889.
New
Hampshire. Provincial Papers. Vol. vi. (1749-63.) Compiled and edited by N.
Bouton, D.D. Manchester, N. H. 1872.
Nova Scotia.
Papers relating to the Acadian French. (N. S. Hist. Society.) Vol. n. Halifax,
N. S. 1881.
Selections from the Public Documents of the
Province of Nova Scotia,
compiled by
T. B. Akins. Halifax, N. S. 1869.
Pennsylvania
Archives, selected and arranged from original documents in the office of the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, conformably to Acts of the General Assembly,
commencing 1644. Philadelphia. 1874.
Second Series. Published under the direction
of M. S. Quay. Ed. by
J. B. linn
and W. H. Egle. Harrisburg. 1874.
Pennsylvania
Register. Edited by S. Hazard. Philadelphia. 1828.
(ii) Personal.
Dinwiddie
Papers. Vols. I, n. Virginia Hist. Collections. New series. Vols. in, iv.
Richmond, Va. 1883-4.
General
Orders in Wolfe’s Army during the Expedition up the River St Lawrence,
1759. Quebec. 1875.
Grenville
papers (Grenville, R. T., Earl Temple). Edited, with notes, by W. J. Smith. London. 1852-3.
Levis, F. G. de, Duke, Marshal of France. Recueil des pieces relatives a
la publication des manuscrits du Marechal de Levis sur la guerre du Canada,
1755 a
1760, etc. Rennes. 1888.
Collection des Manuscrits du Marechal de
Levis. Edited
by H. R. Casgrain.
12 vols. Montreal and Quehec. 1889-95. This valuable collection contains
(vol. i) Journal des Campagnes du Chevalier de Levis en Canada, 1756-60; (n)
Lettres du Chev. de L6vis concemant la Guerre du Canada, 1756-60; (m) Lettres
de la Cour de Versailles au Baron de Dieskau, au Marq. de Montcalm, et au Chev.
de Levis; (iv) Lettres et Pieces Militaires; (v) Lettres de M- de Bourlamaque
au Chev. de Levis; (vi) Lettres du Marq. de Montcalm au Chev. de Levis; (vn)
Journal du Marq. de Montcalm durant ses Campagnes en Canada, 175659; (vrn)
Lettres du Marq. de Vaudreuil au Chev. de Levis; (ix) Lettres de l'lntendant
Bigot au Chev. de Levis; (x) Lettres de divers particuliers au Chev. de Levis;
(xi) Relations et Journaux de differentes Expeditions, 1755-60; (xn) Table analytique.
The French War Papers of the Marechal
de Le'vis, described by the Abbe
Casgrain.
With comments by F. Parkman and J. Winsor. (Privately printed.) Cambridge,
Mass. 1888.
L’Isle Dieu,
l’Abbe de. Various Letters and Papers in the Archives de la Marine, Paris. See
Synopsis of MS. documents relating to Canada, in Marmette’s report on Canadian
Archives, 1887.
Margry, Pierre. Relations et Memoires inedits pour servir a l’histoire
de la France dans les pays d’outre-mer, tires des Archives du Ministere de la
Marine et des Colonies. Paris. 1867.
Sackville
(Stopford) MSS. Hist. MSS. Commission, Ninth Report, App. ni. Sect. xi. London.
1884.
Townshend
Papers. Hist. MSS. Comm. Eleventh Report. App. iv. London. 1887.
III. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Acadia. Relation de ce qui s’est passe en Acadie au sujet de neuf mille
Francois neutres, qui ont mieux aime perdre leur fortune et leur liberte que de
prendre les armes contre la France. (Paris? 1775.)
Bonnecamp, le Pere. Relation d’un voyage dans la Belle Riviere sous les
ordres de M. de Celoron, en 1748. Archives de la Marine, Paris. N. A. Canada.
Vol. xin. C. 11, fbl. 198.
Bougainville, Louis Antoine, Count de. Memoire sur l’etat de la Nouvelle
France a l’epoque de la guerre de sept ans. Relations et
memoires inedits. 1867.
Bradstreet,
Col. Impartial account of Lt. Col. Bradstreet’s expedition. By a volunteer in
the expedition. London. 1759.
Canada, the
importance of, considered in two letters to a Noble Lord. London. 1761.
Memoires sur le, depuis 1749 jusqu’a 1760, en
trois parties: avec cartes et
plans
lithographie's. Quebec. 1838. (Also under the title: Memoires du
S de C .)
Relation de ce qui s’est passe cette annee en
Canada, avec le Journal du Siege
des forts de Choueguen ou Oswego, etc. (Extrait du Mercure de France du
mois de Decembre, 1756.) Paris(?). 1756 (?).
The Campaign of 1760 [by the Chevalier
Johnstone ?]. Quebec. 1866.
A
Parallel of Military Errors, of which the French and English Armies were
guilty,
during the campaign of 1759, in Canada [by the Chevalier Johnstone?]. Quebec.
1866.
Manuscript relating to the early history of
(ascribed to the Chevalier Johnstone). Edited by J.
M. Le Moine. Quebec. 1867.
Memoires des Commissaires de Sa Majeste Tres
Chretienne et de ceux de Sa
Majeste Brittanique. Paris. 1756.
Celoron, Journal de M. de, captain of infantry, etc. Archives de la
Marine. Paris.
Contest, the,
in America between Great Britain and France, giving an account of the views and
designs of the French. By an impartial hand [J. Michel]. London. 1757.
Entick, J.
The general history of the late war, containing its rise, progress and events
in Europe, Asia, Africa and America. 5 vols. London. 1763-4.
Fort du
Quesne, .The History of the Expedition against, in 1755. Ed. by W. Sargent.
Hist. Soc. of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia. 1826.
Franklin, B.,
the autobiography of. Published verbatim from the original manuscript. Edited
by J. Sparks. London. 1850.
Fraser, Col.
M. Extract from a manuscript journal relating to the siege of Quebec in 1759.
Quebec Literary and Historical Society. Quebec. 1867.
Gentleman’s
Magazine, for 1755. Journal of the War in America, July to December,
1755. London. 1755.
for 1756-60. Various accounts of American affairs.
for 1759. Canada to be retained; reasons
offered in mockery for its restitution (pp. 549, 590-620).
for 1759. Fort du Quesne (pp. 39, 41, 145, 171, 223).
for 1759. General Wolfe (pp. 440,
466, 471-2, 495-6, 528, 549).
for 1759. Letter addressed to two Great Men,
on the Prospect of Peace, and
on the Terms
necessary to be insisted upon in the Negociation (pp. 585-92).
for 1760. Some Account of Remarks on the
Letter Addressed to two Great
Men (p. 24).
—— for 1760.
Indians (pp. 33, 101, 442).
Gist, C.,
Journal of. Mass. Hist. Coll. 3rd Series. Vol. v. Boston. 1836.
Gordon’s
Journal of the Second Siege of Louisbourg, 1758. Nova Scotia Hist. Society.
Vol. v. Halifax, N. S. 1887.
Hutchinson,
T. History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, 1628-1750. Boston, New
England. l764r-7.
History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay
from 1749 to 1774. Edited by
J.
Hutchinson. London. 1828.
Jefferys, T.
The natural and civil history of the French dominions in North and South
America. Illustrated by maps and plans of the principal places, collected from
the best authorities and engraved by T. J. 2 parts. London. 1760.
Knox, Captain
J. An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the years
1757-60. 2 vols. London. 1769.
Legardeur de Saint Pierre (Jacques Repentigny), Memoire ou Journal
sommaire du voyage de. Printed in Brymner’s report on
Canadian Archives for 1886. Ottawa.
1887.
Livingston,
W. A Review of the Military Operations in North America ; from the commencement
of the French Hostilities on the Frontiers of Virginia in 1753, to the
Surrender of Oswego, on the 14th of August, 1756. London. 1757. New York. 1770.
Do. do. To which are added, Colonel
Washington’s Journal of his Expedition to the Ohio in 1754, and several
Letters and other Papers of consequence, found in the Cabinet of Major General
Braddock after his Defeat near Fort du Quesne; and since published by the
French Court. (None of these papers is contained in the English edition.)
Dublin. 1757.
Loudoun, Earl
of (John Campbell). The conduct of a Noble Commander in America [Lord Loudoun]
impartially reviewed. London. 1758.
An answer to the letter to two great
men...vindicating the character of a
Noble Lord
[Loudoun] from inactivity. London. 1760.
Louisbourg,
Two Journals of the siege of. Anonymous, 1758. Archives
de la Marine, Paris. (lie Royale, North America.)
The Campaign of, 1750-8 [by the Chevalier
Johnstone ?]. Quebec. 1866.
A
Letter to a Great M r [Minister] on the
prospect of a peace; wherein
the
demolition of the fortifications of Louisbourg is shown to be absurd, the
importance of Canada refuted, the proper barrier pointed out in North America. By an unprejudiced observer. London. 1761.
Malartic, Le Comte Gabriel de Maures de, and P. Gefferat. Journal des
cam- pagnes au Canada de 1755 a 1760. Dijon. 1890.
Mante, T.
History of the late war in North America. London. 1772.
Micmacs. An
account of the customs and manners of the Micmakis and Maricheets, savage
nations now dependent on the Government of Cape Breton. From an original French
manuscript letter never published, written by a French missionary amongst them:
to which are annexed several pieces, relative to the savages, to Nova Scotia,
etc. London. 1758.
Montcalm, Journal du Marquis de, 1756-9. Ed. Casgrain. Quebec. 1895.
Montresor. Journals of Col. James Montresor (1757-9) and
Capt. John Montresor (1757-78). New York Hist. Soc. 1881.
Murray, J.
Journal of the Siege of Quebec, 1760. Lit. and Hist. Soc. of Quebec. 1871.
Norton, J.
Teyoninhokarawen (Iroquois Indians).
Orme, Captain
R. Journal [of an Expedition against Fort du Quesne]. Hist. Soc. of
Pennsylvania. Vol. v. 1826.
Panet, J. C. Journal du siege de Quebec en 1759. Montreal.
1866.
Pennsylvania,
A brief state of the Province of. To which is annexed an easy plan
for...defeating the ambitious views of the French... [By Wm. Smith.] London.
1753. '
A
brief view of the conduct of, for the year 1753, so far as it affected the
general
service of the British colonies, particularly the expedition under...
General
Braddock Being a sequel to a
late...pamphlet intitled, A brief state
of
Pennsylvania; In a second letter to a friend in London. London. 1756.
A
true and impartial state of the Province of;...being a full answer to the
pamphlets
intitled, A brief state and A brief view, etc. of the conduct of Pennsylvania.
Philadelphia. 1759.
Pensilvanie,
fitat present de la; ou Ton trouve le detail de ce qui s’y est passe depuis la
defaite du General Braddock jusqu’a la prise d’Oswego (extracted and translated
from a letter entitled A brief view of the conduct of Pennsylvania, etc.). Avec une carte. 1756.
Pichon, T. Lettres et memoires pour servir a l’histoire naturelle du Cap
Breton, depuis son etablissement jusqu’a la reprise de cette ile par les
Anglois en 1758. La Haye. 1760.
Post, C. F.
Causes of the alienation of the Delaware and Shawanase Indians from the British
interest (contains the Journal of C. F. Post in his journey from Philadelphia
to the Ohio, 1759). Philadelphia, 1867.
Pouchot.
Memoir upon the late war in North America, between the French and English,
1755-60; followed by observations upon the theatre of actual war,... with
topographical maps. Translated (from the French) and edited by F. B. Hough. 2 vols. Roxbury, Mass. 1866.
Poullin de Lumina. Histoire de la Guerre contre les Anglois. 2 vols.
Geneva. 1759-60.
Quebec. Journal du Siege de Quebec depose 4 la bibliotheque de Hartwell,
en Angleterre. Printed at Quebec, 1836.
Relation du Siege de Quebec en 1759 (e'crite
en 1765 par une religieuse de
l’hopital general de Quebec). In Collection de Memoires et de Relations
sur 1’Histoire ancienne du Canada, d’apres des manuscrits recemment obtenus des
Archives et Bureaux Publics en France. Societe
Litteraire et Historique de Quebec. Quebec. 1840.
Journal of the Expedition up the River St
Lawrence...from...their embarkation at Louisbourg ’til after the surrender of
Quebec. (Republished from the New York Mercury, Dec. 31,
1759.) Quebec. 1866.
Ramezay, Memoire du Sieur de, Commandant a Quebec, au sujet de la
reddition de cette ville, le 18 Septembre, 1759. Quebec. 1861.
Rogers, R.
Journals of Major R. Rogers, containing an account of the several excursions he
made under the Generals who commanded upon the continent of North America
during the late war, etc. London. 1765. The same, edited, with introduction and
notes, by F. B. Hough. Albany. 1883.
A
concise account of North America. To which is subjoined an account of
the several
nations and tribes of Indians residing in those parts, etc. London. 1765.
Reminiscences of the French war, containing
Rogers’ expeditions with the
New England
Rangers under his command as published in London in 1765; with notes and
illustrations. To which is added an account of the life and military services
of Major General J. Stark, with notices and anecdotes of the officers
distinguished in the French and revolutionary war. Concord, N. H. 1831.
Saxe, le Marechal de, Dialogue avec le Baron de Dieskau aux Champs
llllysees. Archives de la Guerre. Paris. Transl. in New York Col. Docs, x, 340.
Shirley, W.
(Governor of the Province of Massachusetts Bay) and Mildmay, W. The memorials
of the English and French commissaries concerning the limits of Nova Scotia.
1755.
A
fair Representation of His Majesty’s right to Nova Scotia or Acadie; briefly
stated from
the Memorials of the English Commissaries (W. Shirley and W. Mildmay), with an
answer to the objections contained in the French Memorials [by R. M. Barrin,
Marquis de la Galissonniere, and G. de Silhouette] in a treatise entitled,
Discussion sommaire sur les anciennes limites de 1’Acadie. London.
1756. '
The conduct of Major General Shirley, late
General and Commander-in-Chief
of His
Majesty’s Forces in North America, briefly stated. London. 1758.
Smith, W.,
Chief Justice of New York. The History of the Province of New York from the
first discovery to the year mdccxxxii. London.
1757. Another ed., with a continuation from 1732 to 1814. Albany. 1814.
Stark
(General John). Memoir and official correspondence of, with notices of several
other officers of the Revolution. Also, a biography of Capt. P. Stevens, and of
Col. R. Rogers, with an account of his services in America during the Seven
Years’ War. Ed. by C. Stark. Concord. 1860.
Stobo, R.
Memoirs of Major R. Stobo of the Virginia Regt. London. 1800. Another edition
with his plan of Fort du Quesne; edited, with an introduction, by N. B. C.
Pittsburgh. 1854.
Thomas, J.
Diary of (surgeon with Winslow’s Expedition of 1755, against the Acadians). Nova Scotia Hist. Soc. Vol. i. Halifax, N. S. 1879.
Tourville, Chevalier de (commanding the “Sauvage”), Journal of, 1756-8.
Archives de la Marine. Paris. (North America, lie Royale. Vol. x.)
Vaudreuil, le Comte de. Voyage to Cauada. New York Col. Doc.
x, 297.
Walpole, H.,
Earl of Orford. Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Second. Edited by Lord
Holland. 3 vols. London. 1847.
The Letters of. Edited by P. Cunningham. 9
vols. London. 1857-9.
Washington,
G. Diary of, from 1789 to 1791, together with his Journal of a Tour to the Ohio
in 1753. Edited by B. J. Lossing. New York. 1860.
Journal of Col. G. Washington, commanding a
detachment of Virginia troops,
sent by R.
Dinwiddie across the Alleghany Mts in 1754, to build forts at the head of the
Ohio. Edited with notes by J. M. Toner. Albany. 1893.
The writings of G. Washington; being his
correspondence, addresses, messages and other papers, official and private,
selected and published from the original MSS, with a life of the author, notes
and illustrations, by J. Sparks. 12 vols. Boston. 1837.
Weiser, C.
Journal of. Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, vi, 150.
Winslow, J.
Journal of the Provincial Troops; or Winslow’s Journal of the Expulsion of the
Acadians in 1755. Nova Scotia Hist. Soc. Vol. hi.
Halifax, N. S. 1883.
Journal of Col. J. Winslow while engaged in
the siege of Fort Beausejour
1755. Nova
Scotia Hist. Soc. Vol. iv. Halifax, N. S. 1885.
Witherspoon,
J., prisoner at Quebec. Journal of. Nova Scotia Hist. Soc. Vol. n. Halifax,
N.S. 1881.
Wolfe. A dialogue
betwixt General Wolfe and the Marquis Montcalm in the Ely- sian Fields. London,
1759.
IV. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.
Archibald,
Sir A. G. The Expulsion of the Acadians. Nova Scotia Hist. Soc.
Vol. v.
Halifax, N.S. 1887.
Bancroft, G.
History of the United States of America, from the discovery of the continent. Author’s last revision. 6 vols. New York. 1885.
Baudoncourt, J. de. Histoire populaire du Canada. Paris. 1888.
Bonnechose, C. de. Montcalm et le Canada fra^ais. Paris.
1881.
Bourinot, Sir
J. G. Canada. (Story of the Nations Series.) London. 1885.
Historical and descriptive account of the
Island of Cape Breton, and of its
memorials of
the French regime, etc. Trans. Roy. Soc. Can. Sect. ii, 1891. Montreal. 1892.
Canada under British Rule (with a chapter on
the French Regime). Cambridge Historical Series. Cambridge. 1900.
Bradley, A.
G. Wolfe. (English Men of Action.) London. 1889.
Bradley, A.
G. The Fight with France for North America. London. 1900.
Bryce, G.
Short History of the Canadian people. London. 1887.
Canada. Jugement impartial sur les operations militaires de la campagne
en, en 1759. Lit. and Hist. Soc. of Quebec. 1840.
Canivet, C. Les colonies perdues. Paris. 1884.
Casgrain, H. R. Guerre du Canada, 1756-1760. Montcalm et Le'vis. 2 vols.
Quebec. 1891.
Cauvain, Hi Demiere Campagne du Marquis de Montcalm. Paris. 1885.
Charlevoix, P. F. X. de. History and general description of
New France. Trarrlated (from the French) with notes by J. G. Shea. 6 vols. New
York. 1866-72.
Davis, A.
McF. Canada and Louisiana. Boston, Mass. 1887.
Delafield, M.
L. W. Smith, Judge of the Supreme Court of the province of New York. Reprinted
from “The Magazine of American History,” etc. New York. 1882.
Doughty, A.,
and Parmelee, G. W. The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of
Abraham. 6 vols. Quebec. 1901.
Dussieux, L. E. Le Canada sous la domination fran^aise, d’apres les
archives de la marine et de la guerre. Paris. 1866.
Edwards, J.
P. Louisbourg; an historical sketch. Nova Scotia Hist. Soc. Vol. ix. Halifax, N. S. 1896.
Faillon, l’Abbe. Histoire de la Colonie fran^aise en Canada. 3 vols.
Paris.
1866-6.
Feyrol, J. Les Fran^ais en Amerique. Paris and Poitiers. 1888.
Gabriel, C. N. Guerre du Canada, 1756-60. Verdun. 1887.
Garneau, F. X. Histoire du Canada depuis sa decouverte jusqu’a nos
jours. 4th ed. 4 vols. Montreal. 1882-3.
Gourmont, R. de. Les Fran^ais au Canada et en Acadie. Paris.
1888.
Grant, Mrs A.
(of Laggan). Memoirs of an American lady, with sketches of manners and scenery
in America as they existed previous to the Revolution. 2 vols. New York and
Philadelphia. 1846.
Hart, G. E.
The Fall of New France, 1755-60. Montreal. 1888.
Hoyt, E.
Antiquarian Researches, comprising a History of the Indian Wars in the Country
bordering Connecticut River and parts adjacent, and other interesting Events,
from the First Landing of the Pilgrims, to the conquest of Canada by the
English, in 1760. Greenfield, Mass. 1824.
Johnson, R.
Minor Wars of the United States. A history of the French War, ending in the
conquest of Canada, etc. New York. 1882.
Kerallain, R. de. Les Fran^ais au Canada. La jeunesse de Bougainville et
la guerre de sept ans. Paris. 1896.
Kingsford,
W., LL.D. The History of Canada. Vols. hi,
iv. London. 1888.
Parkman,
F. Montcalm and Wolfe. 2 vols. Toronto. 1901. #
Quebec, Les Ursulines de, depuis leur etablissement jusqu’a nos jours. 4
vols. Quebec. 1863-66.
Rameau de Saint-Pere, E. La France aux Colonies; etudes sur le
developpe- ment de la race franfaise hors de l’Europe. Les Fran^ais en
Amerique, Acadiens et Canadiens. Paris. 1869.
Roberts, C. G. D. History of Canada. London. 1898.
Shippen, Dr
E. Memoir of Henry Bouquet, 1719-66, Brigadier-General in America and Colonel
of the Royal American Regt. in the French and Indian war. Philadelphia. 1900.
Smollett, T.
G. History of England from the Revolution to the end of the American War and
Peace of Versailles in 1783. Vols. vn. and vm. (Supplement to an edition of
Smollett’s history in 6 vols.) Edinburgh. 1791.
Stanhope,
Earl (Viscount Mahon). History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the
Peace of Versailles. 7 vols. London. 1836-54.
Stark, C.
Memoir and official correspondence of General John Stark, with notices of
several other officers of the revolution. Also, a biography of Capt. P.
Stevens, and of Col. R. Rogers, with an account of his services in America
during the Seven Years’ War. Concord. 1860.
Stone, W. L.,
the younger. Life and times of Sir W. Johnson, Bart. 2 vols. Albany. 1865.
Townshend, C.
V. P. Military life of Field-Marshal George, first Marquess Townshend,
1724-1807. 2 vols. London. 1901.
Trumbull, H.
History of the discovery of America. By a Citizen of Connecticut [H. T. ].
Norwich, Conn. 1810. The same, with alterations and additions by J. Steward,
D.D. Boston, Mass. 1822.
Waddington, R. La Guerre de Sept Ans. Histoire diplomatique et
militaire. Paris. 1899, etc.
Walton, J. S.
Conrad Weiser and the Indian Policy of Colonial Pennsylvania. Philadelphia.
1900.
Warburton, G.
D. The conquest of Canada. London. 1849.
Winsor, J.
Narrative and Critical History of America. 8 vols. London. 1889.
Note on the spurious letters of Montcalm,
1759. Mass. Hist Soc. Cambridge. 1887.
Rival claimants for N. America, 1497-1755.
Worcester, Mass. 1895.
The struggle in America between England and
France, 1697-1763. With
full
cartographical illustrations, etc. London. 1895.
Wright, R.
Life of Major-General J. Wolfe. London. 1864.
V. MAPS AND PLANS.
Bell, P. Map
of the British Dominions according to the treaty in 1763. 1772. (British
Museum.)
Huske. New
Map of [part of] North America. 1775. (British Museum.)
Mackellar,
P., Engineer. Sketch of the Field of Battle of the 9th of July [1755], upon the
Monongahela.. .shewing the Disposition of the Troops when the Action be^an.
American and W. Ind. papers. Vol. lxxxii.
(P. R. O., London.)
Sketch of the Field of Battle, etc., shewing
the Disposition of the Troops
about 2
o’clock.... American and W. Ind. papers. Vol. lxxxii.
(P. R. O., London.)
Mitchell, J.
Map of the British and French Dominions in North America, with the roads,
distances, limits and extent of the Settlements. London. 1755. (British
Museum.)
Quebec, Plan
of, with the positions of the British and French Armys on the Heights of
Abraham, 13 Sept. 1759. (British Museum. King’s, oxix, 27.)
Winsor’s Struggle
in America (see above) contains many contemporary maps.
THE QUARREL WITH GREAT BRITAIN
AND
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Baker, W. S.
Bibliotheca Washingtoniana. Philadelphia. 1889.
Tyler, M. C.
Literary History of the American Revolution, 1763-83. 2 vols. New York. 1897.
Winsor, J.
Reader's Handbook of the American Revolution. Boston. 1880.
II. DOCUMENTS.
Almon, J.
Collection of interesting, authentic Papers. London. 1777.
Parliamentary Register. 35 vols. London.
1766-74.
Adams, John.
Works. 10 vols. Boston. 1850-6.
Adams, John
and Abigail. Familiar letters during the Revolution. Boston. 1785. Andre,
Papers concerning the capture of Major. Edited by H. B. Dawson.
Yonkers, N.
Y. 1866.
Andreana.
(Memorials touching Andr&) Edited by H. W. Smith. Philadelphia.
1865.
Burgoyne, J.
State of Expedition from Canada as laid before the House of Commons. London.
1780.
Calendar of
State Papers: Home Office, 1760-75. 4 vols.
Carroll, C. Journal
during visit to Canada in 1776. Baltimore. 1845.
Cavendish,
Sir H. Debates of the House of Commons (1768-74). 3 vols. London. 1839-43.
Chatham
Correspondence. 4 vols. London. 1838-40.
Colden
Papers. (Publications of New York Historical Society.)
Congress,
Journals of, 1774-83. Printed at Philadelphia.
Conover, G.
S. Journals of Sullivan’s Expedition against the Six Nations. Auburn.
New York.
1887.
Curwen, S.
Journal and Letters. New York. 1842.
Dartmouth
Papers. (Historical MSS. Comm. Reports, xi, App. Part v; xiv, App.
Part x; and
xv, App. Part i.)
Deane, S.
Correspondence of, 1774-6. (Connecticut Historical Society, 1870.)
Deane Papers.
(New York Historical Society.)
Donne, W. B.
Correspondence of George III with Lord North. 2 vols. London. 1867. Finlay, H.
(Postmaster in America). Journal during 1773-4. Brooklyn. 1867. Franklin,
Benjamin. Complete Works. 10 vols. New York.- 1887-9.
Autobiography and Letters. Edited by J.
Bigelow. 3 vols. Philadelphia.
1888.
Grenville
Papers. 4 vols. London. 1852-3.
Heath Papers.
(Mass. Hist. Coll., 1st series, Vol. iv.)
Hutchinson,
Thomas. Diary and Letters. Edited by P. O. Hutchinson. 2 vols. London. 1883.
Lafayette, Marquis de. Memoirs and Correspondence. 3 vols. London. 1837.
Laurens, J. (Colonel). Army Correspondence, 1777-8. (Bradford Club Series.) New
York. 1867.
Shelburne
Papers. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Reports, No. 5.) London. 1876.
Sparks, J.
Correspondence of the American Revolution. 4 vols. Boston. 1853.
Diplomatic Correspondence of the American
Revolution. 12 vols. Boston.
1829-30.
Stark, John
(General). Official correspondence of. (See above, p. 779.)
Stevens, D.
F. Facsimiles of MSS. in European archives relating to America, 1773-83. 25
vols. London. 1889-98.
Thomson, C.
(Secretary of the Continental Congress). Papers of. (New York Hist. Soc.) 1879.
Washington,
G. Writings, collected (with Life) by J. Sparks. 12 vols. Boston. 1837.
Writings, collected by V. C. Ford. 14 vols.
New York. 1889-93.
III. POLITICAL HISTORY.
(A) Contemporary
Authorities.
Almon, J. The
Remembrancer. 17 vols. London. 1775-84.
Collection of Tracts. 8 vols. London. 1773-88.
Andrews, J.
History of the War. 4 vols. London. 1785-6.
Boudinot, E.
Journal; or Historical recollections of American events during the
Revolutionary War. Trenton. 1899.
Dickinson, J.
Writings, edited by P. L. Ford. (Hist. Soc. of Pennsylvania.) 1895. Drayton, J.
Memoirs of the American Revolution as relating to S. Carolina.
2 vols. Charleston. 1821.
Graydon, A.
Memoirs. Ed. by J. S. Uttett. Philadelphia. 1846.
Hutchinson,
T. History of Massachusetts, 1749-74. London. 1828.
Jefferson, T.
Writings, ed. by P. L. Ford. 10 vols. New York. London. 1892-9. Jones, T.
History of New York during the Revolutionary War. (New York Hist.
Soc.) 2 vols.
1879.
Marshall, C.
Extracts from Diary, 1774-81, edited by W. Duane. Albany. 1877. Paine, Thomas.
Writings, collected and edited by M. D. Conway. 4 vols. New York. 1894-6.
Price, R.
Observations on the War with America. London. 1776.
Stedman, C.
History of the American War. 2 vols. London. 1794.
(B) Later
Writers.
Botta, C.
History of the War. 2 vols. Translated from the Italian by G. A. Otis.
New Haven.
1840.
Fiske, J. The
American Revolution. 2 vols. Boston. 1891.
Fiske, J. The
War of Independence. Boston. 1889.
Gordon, W.
History of the rise, etc. of the Independence of the United States.
4 vols. London. 1788.
Lodge, H. C.
Story-of the Revolutisn. 2 vols. New York. 1898.
Ryerson, E.
Loyalists of America. 2 vols. Toronto. 1880.
Sabine, L.
Biographical Sketches of Loyalists. 2 vols. Boston. 1864.
Trevelyan, G.
O. The American Revolution, Part i (1766-76). London. 1899. Van Tyne, C. H. The
Loyalists in the American Revolution. New York. 1902.
IV. MILITARY HISTORY.
(A) Contemporary
Authorities.
Heath, W.
Memoirs. Boston. 1798.
Lamb, R.
Original and authentic Journal of occurrences during the late war. Dublin.
1809.
Lee, Henry.
(“ Light Horse Harry.”) Memoirs of the War in the South.
Washington.
1827.
Lee, Henry.
Memoir of his own life. Dublin. 1811.
Riedesel,
Baron von. Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of. Translated by W. L.
Stone. 2
vols. Albany. 1868.
Riedesel,
Baroness von. Letters and Journals relating to the War of the American
Revolution. Translated by W. L. Stone. Albany. 1867.
Rogers, R.
(Major). Journals. Albany. 1883.
Simcoe, J. G.
(Colonel). Journals of the Operations of the Queen’s Rangers.
Exeter. 1787.
New York. 1844.
Military Journal. New York. 1844.
Stone, W. L.
Letters of Brunswick and Hessian Officers during the American Revolution.
Albany. 1871.
Tarleton, B. (Colonel).
History of the Campaigns, 1780-1. London. 1787. Thacher, J. Military Journal
during the American War. Boston. 1827.
(B) Later
Writers.
Balch, T. The
French in America during the War of Independence. 2 vols.
Philadelphia.
1891-5.
Carrington,
H. B. (General). Battles of the American Revolution. 2 vols. New York. 1876.
Washington the Soldier. New York. 1899.
Codman.
Arnold’s Expedition to Quebec. New York. 1902.
Draper, L. C.
King’s Mountain and its Heroes. Cincinnati. 1881.
Frothingham,
R. History of the Siege of Boston, etc. Boston. 1873.
Hough, F. B.
Northern Invasion of October, 1780. (Bradford Club Series.)
New York.
1866.
Johnston, H.
P. Battle of Harlem Heights. New York. 1897.
Campaign of 1776, around New York and
Brooklyn. (Long Island Historical
Society’s
Memoirs, Vol. m.) Brooklyn. 1878.
Observations on Jones’s Loyalist’s History.
New York. 1880.
The Yorktown Campaign. New York. 1881.
Jones, C. H.
History of the Campaign for the Conquest of Canada, 1776. Philadelphia. 1882.
Lossing, B.
J. Field Book of the Revolution. 2 vols. New York. 1855.
Lowell, E. J.
The Hessians and other German Auxiliaries. New York. 1884. Mahan, A. T.
Influence of Sea Power upon History. London. 1889.
Moore, G. H.
Treason of Charles Lee. New York. 1860.
Roosevelt, T.
The Winning of the West. 2 vols. New York. 1889-96.
Schenck, D.
North Carolina, 1780-1. Raleigh, North Carolina. 1889.
Stone, E. M.
Invasion of Canada in 1775. (Rhode Island Historical Society’s Collections.)
Providence. 1867.
Stryker, W.
S. Battles of Trenton and Princeton. Boston. 1898.
Y. DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY.
(A) Contemporary
Authorities.
Affaires d’Angleterre et de l’Amerique. 15 vols.
Antwerp. 1776.
Durand, J.
New Materials for the History of the American Revolution, translated from
French Archives. New York. 1889.
Lee, W.
Letters, 1766-83. 3 vols. Brooklyn. 1892.
Sparks, J.
Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution. 12 vols. Boston. 1829.
(B) Later Writers.
Doniol, H. Histoire de la Participation de la France a l’etablissement
des l£tats- Unis d’Amerique. Paris. 1886-1900.
Lomenie, L.
L. de. Life of Beaumarchais, translated by F. Lister. New York. 1895.
Wharton, F.
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States.
6 vols. Washington. 1889.
VI. BIOGRAPHIES, ETC.
Abbatt,
W. Crisis of the Revolution, being the story of Arnold and Andre. New York.
1899.
„
Adams, C. F.
Life of John Adams. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1871.
Albemarle,
Earl of. Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham. 2 vols. London. 1852.
Alben, Ethan.
His Captivity. Boston. 1845.
Arnold, J. N.
Life of Benedict Arnold. Chicago. 1880.
Baker, W. S.
Itinerary of Washington. Philadelphia. 1892.
Butterfield,
C. W. History of the Girtys. Cincinnati. 1890.
Conway, M. B.
Life of Tom Paine. 2 vols. New York. 1862.
Drake, F. S.
Life of General Knox. Boston. 1873.
Duer, W. A.
Life of the Earl of Stirling. (New York Historical Collections, Vol. ii.)
New York.
1847.
Field, E.
Life of Admiral Hopkins. Providence. 1898.
Fonblanque,
E. B. Life and Correspondence of Burgoyne. London. 1876. Frothingham, R. Life
of J. Warren. Boston. 1865.
Greene, F. V.
Life of General Greene. (Great Commanders Series.) New York. 1893.
Greene, G. W.
Life of Nathanael Greene. 3 vols. Boston. 1867-71.
Hale, E. Franklin in France. 2 vols. Boston. 1887-8.
Hamilton, J.
C. Life of Alexander Hamilton. 2 vols. New York. 1834-40. Henry, W. W. Life of
Patrick Henry. 3 vols. New York. 1891.
Hosmer, J. K.
Life of Samuel Adams. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston. 1885. Humphreys, J.
(General). Essay on the Life of Putnam. Boston. 1818.
Irving, W.
Life of Washington. 5 vols. New York. 1855-9.
Johnson, W.
Life of Nathanael Greene. 3 vols. Boston. 1867-71.
Kapp, F. Life
of General Kalb. New York. 1884.
Langworthy,
E. Memoirs of Charles Lee. New York. 1793.
Lee, C. H.
Vindication of Arthur Lee. New York. 1894.
Lee, R. H.
Life of Arthur Lee. 2 vols. Boston. 1829.
Lodge, H. C.
Life of Alexander Hamilton. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston.
1882.
Life of Washington. ' (American Statesmen
Series.) 2 vols. Boston. 1889.
Lossing, B.
J. Life of Philip Schuyler. 2 vols. New York. 1884.
Mackenzie, A.
S. Life of Paul Jones. 2 vols. Boston. 1841.
Marshall, J.
Life of Washington. 5 vols. Philadelphia. 1804r-7.
Morse, J. T.
Life of Alexander Hamilton. 2 vols. Boston. 1876.
Life of Jefferson. (American Statesmen
Series.) Boston. 1883.
Life of Franklin. (American Statesmen Series.)
Boston. 1889.
Parton, J.
Life of Jefferson. Boston. 1874.
Life and Times of Franklin. 2 vols. Boston.
1864.
Quincy, J.,
Life of. Boston. 1874.
Randall, H.
S. Life of Jefferson. 3 vols. New York. 1858.
Reed, W. B.
Life and Correspondence of J. Reed. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1847.
Life of Esther Reed. (Privately printed.)
Philadelphia. 1853.
Rowland, K.
M. Life of Charles Carroll. 2 vols. New York. 1898.
Sargent, W.
Life and Career of Major John Andre. New York. 1871.
Schouler, J.
Life of Jefferson. (Makers of America Series.) New York. 1893. Sedgwick, E.
Thomas Paine. (Beacon Biographies.) Boston. 1899.
Sedgwick, T.
Memoirs of William Livingstone. New York. 1833.
Stille, C. J.
Life and Times of John Dickinson. Philadelphia. 1891.
Major-General Anthony Wayne. Philadelphia.
1893.
Stuart, J. W.
Life of Jonathan Trumbell. Boston. 1859.
Tarbor, I. N.
Life of Putna/n. Boston. 1884.
Towers, C.
Lafayette in the American Revolution. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1895. Tucker,, G.
Life of Jefferson. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1837.
Tuckerman, B.
Life of Lafayette. New York. 1899.
Tudor, W.
Life of James Otis. Boston. 1828.
Tyler, M. C.
Life of Patrick Henry. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston. 1887.
VII. MAPS AND PLANS.
Stedman (see
above) gives plans of the principal engagements.
Tarleton’s
History of the Campaigns (see above) contains maps.
The American
Atlas (Philadelphia 1822) shews the position of battle-fields with fair
accuracy.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Fiske, J. The
Critical Period of American History. Boston. 1898.
Greene, E. B.
The Provincial Governments of the English Colonies of North America. New York.
1898.
Tyler, M. C.
The Literary History of the American Revolution, 1763-83. New York. 1897.
Much of the
bibliography consists of pamphlet literature; most of that relating to
constitutional history will be found below, under Contemporary Authorities.
II. ARCHIVES.
Government
records of the several colonies and States, in large part unprinted, and
without title except on the back of bound volumes, such as “Court Records” of
the Province of Massachusetts Bay. Records of this kind have been or are being
printed in many of the States, but much will still be left in manuscript. Town
records, of which the same may be said, are sometimes important.
III. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Adams, J. The
Works of. Edited by C. F. Adams. 10 vols. Boston. 1856. Adams, S. The True
Sentiments of America : contained in a Collection of Letters sent from the
House of Representatives of the Province of Massachusetts Bay to Several
Persons of high Rank in this kingdom. London. 1788.
Almon, J. A
Collection of Interesting Authentic Papers, relative to the Dispute between
Great Britain and America, shewing the Causes and Progress of that
Misunderstanding, from 1764 to 1775. London. 1777. '
Bouchier, J.
A View of the Causes and Consequences of the American Revolution; in Thirteen
Discourses, preached in North America between the years 1763 and 1775, with an
Historical Preface. London. 1797.
Dickinson, J.
The Writings of. Edited by P. L. Ford. 3 vols. Vol. i. Philadelphia. 1895.
Dulaney, D.
Considerations on the Propriety of imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, for
the Purpose of raising a Revenue hy Act of Parliament. 2nd ed. London. 1766.
Elliot, J.
The Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution, as recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, ■
in 1787- Together with the Journal of the Federal Convention. 6 vols. 2nded.
Philadelphia. 1836. (Reprint, 1896.)
Fitch, T.
Reasons why the British Colonies in America should not be charged with Internal
Taxes by Authority of Parliament, Humbly Offered for Consideration, In Behalf
of the Colony of Connecticut. New Haven. 1764.
Force, P.
American Archives: Fourth Series. Containing a Documentary History of the
English Colonies in North America, from the King’s Message to Parliament, of
March 7, 1774, to the Declaration of Independence by the United States. Edited
by P. Force. 6 vols. Washington. 1837-46.
American Archives: Fifth Series. Containing a
Documentary History of the
United States
of America, from the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, to the
Definitive Treaty with Great Britain, September 3, 1783. By P. Force.
3 vols. Washington. 1848-63.
Franklin,
B. The Complete Works of. Edited by J. Bigelow. 10 vols. New York. 1887-8. '
Galloway, J.
A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain and the Colonies.
With a Plan of Accommodation on Constitutional Principles. New York. 1776.
A
Reply to an Address to the Author of a Pamphlet entitled A Candid
Examination,
etc., by the Author of the Candid Examination. New York. 1775. .
The Examination of J. Galloway, Esq., late
Speaker of the House of Assembly
of
Pennsylvania, before the House of Commons, in a Committee on the American
Papers. With explanatory notes. London. 1779.
Cool Thoughts on the Consequences to Great
Britain of American Independence; on the Expense of Great Britain in the
Settlement and Defence of the American Colonies; on the Value and Importance of
the American Colonies and the West Indies to the British Empire. London. 1780.
Hamilton, A.
A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress, from the Calumnies of their
Enemies; in Answer to a Letter under the signature of A. W. Farmer. Whereby his
Sophistry is exposed, his Cavils confuted, and his Wit ridiculed. New York.
1774.
The Farmer refuted: or, A more impartial and
comprehensive View of the
Dispute
between Great Britain and the Colonies: intended as a further Vindication of
the Congress, in Answer to a Letter from A. W. Farmer, entitled a View of the
Controversy, etc. New York. 1776.
The Works of. Edited by H. C. Lodge. 9 vols.
New York. 1885-6.
Hopkins, S.
The Rights of the Colonies examined. iPublished by Authority. Providence. 1765.
Howard, M. A
Letter from a Gentleman at Halifax to His Friend in Rhode Island, containing
Remarks upon a Pamphlet entitled The Rights of Colonies examined. Newport.
1765.
A
Defense of the Letter from a Gentleman at Halifax, to His Friend in
Rhode Island.
Newport. 1765.
Jefferson, T.
The Writings of. Edited by P. L. Ford. 11 vols. New York. 1892-1900.
Journals of
the American Congress: from 1774 to 1788. 4 vols. Washington. 1823.
Leonard, D.
Massachusatensis: or, a Series of Letters, containing a faithful Statement of
many important and striking Facts which laid the Foundation of the Present
Troubles in the Province of Massachusetts-Bay; interspersed with Animadversions
and Reflections, originally addressed to the People of that Province, and
worthy the Consideration of the true Patriots of this Country. By a Person of
Honour upon the Spot. London. 1776.
Madison, J.
The Writings of, comprising his Public Papers and his Private Correspondence,
including numerous Letters and Documents now for the first time printed. Edited
by G. Hunt. 2 vols. New York and London. 1900-1.
Otis, J. The
Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved. London. [1764.]
A
Vindication of the British Colonies, against the Aspersions of the Halifax
Gentleman, in
his Letter to a Rhode Island Friend. Boston. 1765. London. 1769.
Paine, T. The
Political Writings of. 2 vols. Boston. 1870.
Poore, B. P.
The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and other Organic Laws
of the United States. Compiled under an Order of the United States Senate hy B.
P. Poore, Clerk of Printing Records. 2nd ed. 2 Parts. Washington. 1878.
Quincy, J.,
Jr. Reports of Cases argued and adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of
the Province of Massachusetts Bay. Between 1761 and 1772. Edited by S. M.
Quincy. With an Appendix upon the Writs of Assistance. Boston. 1865.
The Appendix
is an elaborate history of the writs of assistance, by H. Gray, late Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, as a ncite to Paxton’s Case, p. 51 of
the Reports.
Seabury, S.
Free Thoughts on the Proceedings of the Continental Congress, held at
Philadelphia, September 5, 1774: wherein their Errors are exhibited, their
Reasonings confuted, and the fatal Tendency of their Non-Importation, NonExportation,
and Non-Consumption Measures are laid open to the plainest Understandings; and
the only means pointed out for preserving and securing our present happy
Constitution. By a Farmer. [New York.] 1774.
A
View of the Controversy between Great Britain and her Colonies: Including
a mode of
determining their present Disputes, finally and effectually, and of preventing
all future Contentions. In a Letter to the Author of A Full Vindication of the
Measures of the Congress from the Calumnies of their Enemies. By A. W. Farmer.
New York. 1774.
Secret
Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress, from the First Meeting
thereof to the Dissolution of the Confederation, by the adoption of the Constitution
of the United States. 4 vols. Boston. 1821. fbacher, O. The Sentiments of a
British American. Boston. 1764.
Washington,
G. The Writings of. Edited by W. C. Ford. 14 vols. New York and London.
1889-93.
Wilson, J.,
The Works of, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and
Professor of Law in the College of Philadelphia; being his Public Discourses
upon Jurisprudence and the Political Science; including Lectures as Professor
of Law. Edited by J. de W. Andrews. 2 vols. Chicago. 1896.
To the
foregoing list the English Statutes at Large and the statute books and printed
records of the several colonial and State governments of the time should of
course be added.
IV. SECONDARY WORKS.
General Histories.
Bancroft, G.
History of the United States of America. 6 vols. New York. 1891. Bryce, J. The
American Commonwealth. 2 vols. New York. 3rd ed. 1893-5. Doyle, J. A. The
English in America. 3 vols. London. 1882-7.
Hutchinson,
T. History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, from the year 1750 until June
1774. Vol. m. London. 1828.
Lecky, W. E.
H. History of England in the Eighteenth Century. New ed.
7 vols. London. 1892.
Trevelyan, G.
O. The American Revolution. Part I. New York and London.
1899.
Special Works.
Curtis, G. T.
Constitutional History of the United States from the Declaration of
Independence to the Close of the Civil War. 2 vols. New York. 1889-96. Holst,
H. von. The Constitutional and Political History of the United States.
(E. Tr.) Vol.
i. New York. 1880.
Story, J.
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. 2 vols. 5th ed. Boston.
1891.
Thorpe, F. N.
Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850. Chicago. 1902.
Tucker, J. R.
The Constitution of the United States. A Critical Discussion of its Genesis,
Development and Interpretation. 2 vols. Edited by H. St G. Tucker. 2 vols.
Chicago. 1899.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Ford, P. L.
Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States. Published during its
Discussion by the People. 1787-88. Brooklyn. 1888.
II. MANUSCRIPTS.
Government
records of the several colonies and States, in large part unprinted, and
without title except on the back of bound volumes, such as “Court Records” of
Massachusetts. Records of this kind have been or are being printed in many of
the States, but much will still be left in manuscript. Town records, of which
the same may be said, are sometimes important.
III. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Elliot, J.
The Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution, as recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in
1787. Together with the Journal of the Federal Convention, L. Martin’s Letter,
Yates’s Minutes, Congressional Opinions, Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
of’98-99, and other Illustrations of the Constitution....2nd ed., with
considerable Additions. Published under the Sanction of Congress.
5 vols. Philadelphia. 1836. (Reprint 1896.)
The title
page of vol. v is, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in the
Convention held at Philadelphia in 1787; with a diary of the Debates of the
Congress of the Confederation; as reported by J. Madison, a Member and Deputy
from Virginia. Revised and Newly arranged....
This vol. v
is the source of the debates set forth in the present chapter.
Federalist,
The. Edited by P. L. Ford. New York. 1898.
Gerry, E.
Letter containing Reasons for not signing the Federal Constitution.
Elliot’s
Debates, i, 492. See Elliot, J.
Hamilton, A.
The Works of. Edited by H. C. Lodge. 9 vols. New York. 1885-6. Jay, J. Address
to the People of the State of New York, on the Subject of the proposed Federal
Constitution. Elliot’s Debates, i, 496. See Elliot, J.
Jefferson, T.
The Writings of. Collected and edited by P. L. Ford. 11 vols.
New York.
1892-1900.
Journal of
the Federal Convention. See Elliot, J.
Journals of
the American Congress: from 1774 to 1788. 4 vols. Washington. 1823.
Madison, J.
The Writings of, comprising his Public Papers and his Private Correspondence,
including numerous Letters and Documents now for the first time printed. Edited
by G. Hunt. 2 vols. New York and London. 1900-1.
Martin, L.
Letter on the Federal Convention of 1787 (and his address to the Legislature of
Maryland on that subject). Elliot’s Debates, i, 344. See Elliot, J., above.
Mason, G.
Objections to the proposed Federal Constitution. Extracts. Elliot’s Debates, i,
494. See Elliot, J.
Poore, B. P.
The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and other Organic Laws
of the United States. Compiled under an Order of the United States Senate by B.
P. Poore, Clerk of Printing Records. 2nd ed. 2 Parts. Washington. 1878.
Randolph, E.
A Letter on the Federal Convention. Elliot’s Debates, i, 482. See Elliot, J.
Secret
Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress, from the first meeting
thereof to the dissolution of the Confederation by the adoption of the Constitution
of the United States. 4 vols. Boston. 1821.
Washington,
G. The Writings of. Edited by W. C. Ford. 14 vols. New York and London.
1889-93.
Wilson, J.,
The Works of, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and
Professor of Law in the College of Philadelphia; being his Public Discourses
upon Jurisprudence and the Political Science; including Lectures as Professor
of Law. Edited by J. de W. Andrews. 2 vols. Chicago. 1896.
Yates’s
Minutes. See Elliot, J.
To the
foregoing list the statute books and printed records of the various colonial
and state
governments of the time should of course be added.
IV. SECONDARY WORKS.
Bancroft, G.
History of the United States of America. 6 vols. New York. 1891. Chamberlain,
D. H. The Historical Conception of the United States Constitution and Union.
Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, May, 1902. (To appear in
vol. xvi of the Second Series of the Proceedings.)
Curtis, G. T.
Constitutional History of the United States from their Declaration of
Independence to the Close of their Civil War. 2 vols. New York. 1889-96. Holst,
H. von. The Constitutional and Political History of the United States.
(E. Tr.) Vol.
l. New York. 1880.
Meigs, W. M.
Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787. An Effort to
trace the Origin and Developement of each separate Clause from its First
Suggestion in that Body to the Form finally adopted....Philadelphia. 1900. (A
very valuable work, based, like Chapter vm of the present work, on the
proceedings of the Convention, but not published, or known to be in progress,
until after this Chapter was sent to the press.)
Schouler, J.
History of the United States under the Constitution. 6 vols. Revised ed. New
York. 1894-99.
Story, J.
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. 2 vols. 5th ed. Boston.
1891.
Thayer, J. B.
Cases on Constitutional Law. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass. 1895. Thorpe, F. N. A
Constitutional History of the American People (1776-1850). Chicago. 1901.
Tucker, J. R.
The Constitution of the United States. A Critical Discussion of its Genesis,
Development and Interpretation. Edited by H. St G. Tucker. 2 vols. Chicago.
1899.
THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMERCIAL INDEPENDENCE.
Papers of the
Continental Congress preserved in the Department of State, Washington, D.C. .
Papers
preserved in the State Departments (War, Navy, Post Office) and in the
Libraries of Congress and the Supreme Court, Washington, D.C.
II. DOCUMENTS.
American
State Papers. Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the
United States from the first session of the 1st to the third session of the
13th Congress inclusive. Commencing March 3, 1789, and ending March 3, 1815. 38
vols. Washington. 1832-61.
Ames, H. V.
State Documents on Federal Relations. University of Pennsylvania; Department of
History. Parts i—in.
Benton, T.
Abridgement of the Debates of Congress from 1789-1856. New York.
1860.
Carey, M. The
American Remembrancer, or an impartial collection of Essays, Resolves,
Speeches, etc. relating, or having affinity, to the treaty with Great Britain.
3 vols. Philadelphia. 1798.
Debates and
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, with an Appendix containing
important State Papers and Public Documents, and all the laws of a public
nature, 1789-1824. Washington. 1834r-6. (Commonly called Annals of Congress.)
Journal
of the Senate of the United States. 1789-1812. (One volume for each annual
session.) -
Journals of
Congress, containing their Proceedings. 13 vols. Published contemporaneously
at Philadelphia. Reprinted, 1800.
MacDonald, W.
Select Documents illustrative of the History of the United States, 1776-1861.
New York. 1898.
Preston, H.
W. Documents Illustrative of American History, 1606-1863. New York. 1886.
Secret
Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress, from the first meeting
thereof to the dissolution of the Confederation by the adoption of the Constitution
of the United States. 4 vols. Boston. 1821.
The Public
Statutes at Large of the United States of America from the organization of the government
in 1789 to March 3, 1845. Boston. 1845-56.
III. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Adams, C. F.
The Works of John Adams, second President of the United States; with a life of
the author. 10 vols. Boston. 1856.
Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, comprising parts
of his diary from 1795
1815. 12 vols. Philadelphia. 1874.
Adams, H. The
Writings of Albert Gallatin. 3 vols. Philadelphia. 1879.
Ford, P. L.
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 10 vols. New York. 1894.
Ford, W. C.
The Writings of George Washington. 14 vols. New York. 1889.
Hamilton, S.
M. The Writings of James Monroe, including a collection of his Public and
Private Papers and Correspondence. 6 vols. New York. 1898.
Hunt, G. The
Writings of James Madison, comprising his Public Papers and his Private
Correspondence. 6 vols. New York. 1898.
Johnston, H.
F. Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay. 4 vols. New York. 1891.
King, C. R.
Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, comprising his Letters, Public Documents,
and Speeches. 6 vols. New York. 1894.
Lodge, H. C.
The Works of Alexander Hamilton. 4 vols. New York. 1885.
Miles, H.
Weekly Register, containing political, historical, geographical, scientific,
statistical, economical, and biographical Documents, Essays, and Facts,
together with notices of the Arts and Manufactures, and a record of the events
of the time. 76 vols. Baltimore. 1811—49.
Smith, W. H.
The St Clair Papers: Life and Public Services of Arthur St Clair, with his
correspondence and papers. 2 vols. Cincinnati. 1882.
IV. SECONDARY WORKS.
(A) General
Histories.
Bradford, A.
History of the Federal Government for fifty years from March, 1789, to March,
1839. Boston. 1840.
McMaster, J.
B. History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil
War. 5 vols. New York. 1883-98.
Pitkin, T.
Political and Civil History of the United States of America from the year 1763
to the close of the Administration of President Washington in March, 1797,
including a summary view of the political and civil state of the North American
colonies prior to that period. 2 vols. New Haven. 1828.
Schouler, J.
History of the United States of America under the Constitution.
6 vols. New York. 1880-9.
Tucker, G.
History of the United States from their Colonization to the end of the
Twenty-Sixth Congress in 1841. 4 vols. Philadelphia. 1856-7.
Walker, F. A.
The Making of the Nation, 1783-1817. (American History Series.) New York. 1895.
(B) Speoial
Works.
(i) Political.
Adams, H.
Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 1800-17. Boston. 1877.
Adams, H. B.
Maryland’s Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States, with minor papers
on George Washington’s interest in Western lands, the Potomac Company, and a
National University. (Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political
Science. Vol. m. No. 1.) Baltimore. 1885.
Anderson, F.
M. Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. American
Historical Review. Vol. v. Nos. 1 and 2. October, 1899; January, 1900.
Andrews, I.
W. The Northwest Territory; Its Ordinance and its Government. Papers of the
American Historical Association. Vol. ii.
New York and London. 1887.
Barrett, J.
A. Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, with an account of the earlier plans for
the Government of the Northwest Territory. University of Nebraska Seminary
Papers. 1891.
Brackenridge,
H. M. History of the Western Insurrection in Western Pennsylvania, commonly
called the Whisky Insurrection. Pittsburg. 1859.
Chambers, H.
E. West Florida and its relation to the Historical Cartography of the United
States. (Johns Hopkins University Studies Series, xvi. No. 5.) Baltimore. 1898.
Cutler, W. P.
The Ordinance of July 13,1787, for the government of the Territory northwest of
the River Ohio.
DuBois, W. E.
B. Suppression of the Slave Trade in the United States of America, 1638-1870.
(Harvard Historical Series.) New York. 1896.
Findley, W.
History of the Insurrection in the four Western Counties of Pennsylvania in the
year 1794. Philadelphia. 1796.
Fiske, J. The
Critical Period of American History, 1783-9. Boston. 1888.
Gannett, H.
Boundaries of the United States and of the several States and territories.
Bulletin of the United States Geographical Survey. No. 13. Washington. 1885.
Gibbs, G.
Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams. New York. 1820.
Goodell, W.
Slavery and Anti-Slavery. History of the great struggle in both hemispheres,
with a view of the slavery question in the United States. New York. 1852.
Hamilton, J.
C. History of the Republic of the United States of America as traced in the
writings of Alexander Hamilton and his Contemporaries. New York. 1858.
Hinsdale, B.
A. The old Northwest, with a view of the thirteen colonies as constituted by
the Royal Charters. New York. 1888.
Jay, J. The
Peace Negotiations of 1782-3, as illustrated by the Secret Correspondence of
France and England. Papers of the American Historical Association. Vol. in. New
York and London. 1889.
Johnston, A.
American Orations. Studies in American Political History. Edited with an
Introduction by Alexander Johnston. Re-edited with historical and textual notes
by James A. Woodburn. 4 vols. New York. 1896-7.
Maclay, E. S.
Journal of William Maclay, United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-91.
New York. 1890.
Mathews, A.
Ohio and her Western Reserve..., its Indian Wars and Massacres. New York. 1902.
McDougall, W.
G. Fugitive Slaves. Boston. 1891.
Minot, G. R.
The History of the Insurrections in Massachusetts in the year 1786, and the
Rebellion consequent thereon. Worcester. 1789.
Monroe, J.
View of the Conduct of the Executive in the foreign affairs of the United
States (l794r-6). Philadelphia. 1797.
Moore, G. H.
Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts. New York.
1866.
Rives, G. L.
Spain and the United States in 1795. American Historical Review. Vol. iv. No.
1. October, 1898.
Roosevelt, T.
The Winning of the West. New York. 1889-96.
Salmon, L. M.
History of the Appointing Power of the President. (Papers of the American
Historical Association. Vol. i. No. S.) New York and London. 1885.
Sato,
Shosuke. History of the Land Question in the United States. (Johns Hopkins
University Studies. Fourth Series, Nos. 8, 9.) Baltimore. 1886.
Shaler, N. S.
Kentucky. A Pioneer Commonwealth. Boston. 1886.
Stone, F. S.
The Ordinance of 1787. Philadelphia. 1889.
Stroud, G. M.
A Sketch of the Laws relating to Slavery in the several States of the United
States of America. Philadelphia. 1866.
Van Tyne, C.
H. The Loyalists in the American Revolution. New York. 1902.
Warfield, E.
D. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. An historical study. New York.
1894.
Wharton, F.
State Trials of the United States during the Administrations of Washington and
Adams. Philadelphia. 1849.
Williams, G.
History of the Negro Race in America from 1619 to 1880. 2 vols. New York. 1883.
Wilson, H.
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. 3 vols. Boston.
1872-7.
(ii) Constitutional.
Ames, H. V.
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States during the first
century of its history. Annual Report of the American Historical Association
for the year 1896. Vol. n. Washington. 1897.
Blunt, J. A
Historical Sketch of the formation of the Confederacy, particularly with
reference to the Provincial Limits and the Jurisdiction of the General
Government over Indian Tribes and the Public Territory. New York. 1826.
Curtis, G. T.
Constitutional History of the United States from their Independence to the
close of the Civil War. 2 vols. New York. 1889.
Fisher, S. G.
The Evolution of the Constitution of the United States. Philadelphia. 1898.
Hitchcock, H.
American State Constitutions: an analysis of the influences that have affected
their History and Modifications. (Questions of the Day Series, No. 37.) New
York. 1887.
Jameson, J.
A. A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions; their History, Powers, and Modes
of Proceeding. Chicago. 1887.
Jameson, J.
F. Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States of the formative
period, 1776-1789. Boston. 1889.
Johnston, A.
The First Century of the Constitution. New Princeton Review, Septemher, 1887.
New Series. Vol. iv. No. 2.
McMaster, J.
B. A Century of Constitutional Interpretation. Studies in the History of the
United States. New York. 1899.
Porter, H. L.
Outlines of the Constitutional History of the United States. New York. 1887.
Robinson, J.
H. Original and derived features of the Constitution. (American Academy of
Political and Social Science. Annals. Vol. i.) 1890-91.
Small, A. W.
The Beginnings of American Nationality. The constitutional relations hetween
the Continental Congress and the Colonies and States from 1776 to 1789. (Johns
Hopkins University. Studies in History and Political Science. Eighth Series,
Nos. 1, 2.) Baltimore. 1890.
Stevens, C.
E. Sources of the Constitution of the United States considered in relation to
Colonial and English History. New York. 1894.
(iii) Foreign Affairs.
Ames, H. V.
The X, Y, Z Letters. Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of
European History. Department of History, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia.
Cooley, T. M.
Acquisition of Louisiana. Indiana Historical Society pamphlets. 1887. Curtis,
W. E. The United States and Foreign Powers. Meadville, Pa. 1892. Davis, S. M.
Some of the Consequences of the Louisiana Purchase. Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for the year 1897. Washington. 1898.
Hosmer, J. K.
History of the Louisiana Purchase. New York. 1902.
Lyman, T. The
Diplomacy of the United States. 2 vols. Boston. 1828. Robertson, C. F. The
Louisiana Purchase and its influence on the American System. American
Historical Association Papers. Vol. i. 1885.
Schuyler, E.
American Diplomacy and the furtherance of Commerce. New York.
1886.
Trescott, W.
H. Diplomatic History of the Administration of Washington and Adams, 1789-1801.
Boston. 1857.
Wharton, F.
Digest of the International Law of the United States, taken from documents
issued by Presidents and Secretaries. 3 vols. Washington. 1886.
(iv)
Financial and Economic.
Adams, H. C.
Taxation in the United States 1789-1816. (Johns Hopkins University Studies,
Vol. n.) Baltimore.
American
State Papers : Finance.
Birch, S.
Historical Sketch of the Continental Paper Money. Philadelphia. 1843. Bishop,
J. L. A History of American Manufactures from 1608 to 1860. 2 vols.
Philadelphia.
1861-64.
Bolles, A. S.
The Financial History of the United States. 3 vols. New York. 1879-86.
Bullock, C.
J. Essay on the Monetary History of the United States. New York.
1900.
Clarke, M.
and Hall, D. A. Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the United
States. Washington. 1832.
Donaldson, T.
The Public Domain: its History, with Statistics. House Miscellaneous
Documents. Second Session, 47th Congress. Vol. xix. Washington.
1884.
Fisher, W. C.
American Trade Regulations before 1789. Annual Report of the American Historical
Association for the year 1889. Washington. 1890. Gouge, W. M. A Short History
of Paper Money and Banking in the United States. New York. 1835.
Gross, J. D.
History of Tariff Administration in the United States. (Columbia College
Publications.)
Hill, W.
First Stages of the Tariff Policy of the United States. (American Economic
Association Publications, vm. No. 6.) 1893.
Scribner.
Statistical Atlas of the United States. New York. 1885.
Statistics of
the Population of the United States at the Tenth Census. (Vol. i. of the Tenth
Census.)
Sumner, W. G.
The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution.
2 vols. New York. 1891.
Weeden, W. B.
Economic and Social History of New England. 2 vols. Boston.
1890. _
Wright, C. D.
The Industrial Evolution of the United States. (Chautauqua Reading Circle
Literature.) Meadville, Pa. 1895.
V. BIOGRAPHIES.
Adams, H.
Life of Albert Gallatin. Philadelphia. 1879.
Bigelow, J.
The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin, including his private as well as his
official and scientific correspondence,... and a correct version of his
Autobiography. 10 vols. New York. 1888.
Cone, M. Life
of Rufus Putnam. Cleveland. 1886.
Conway, M. D.
Life of Thomas Paine. 2 vols. New York. 1892.
Cutler, W. P.
and J. P. Life, Journals and Correspondence of Rev. Manasseh Cutler. 2 vols.
Cincinnati. 1888.
Drake, F. S.
Life and Correspondence of Henry Knox. Boston. 1873.
Hamilton, J.
C. Life of Alexander Hamilton. 2 vols. New York. 1834. Marshall, J. Life of
George Washington. 5 vols. Philadelphia. 1804-7.
Parton, J.
Life of Thomas Jefferson. Boston. 1874.
Life and Times of Aaron Burr. Boston. 1872.
Randall, H.
S. Life of Thomas Jefferson. 3 vols. New York. 1888.
Rives, W. C.
History of the Life and Times of James Madison. Boston. 1866.
3 vols.
I. ARCHIVES.
The Public
Record Office, London, contains a mass of manuscript documents, of which the
following axe important:
Admirals’
Despatches. North America Station. Vols. 500-609.
Newfoundland Station. Vols. 477-8.
Colonial
Office State Papers, Lower Canada; Upper Canada. 1812-5.
Navy List
Books. 1812-3. (List Books 1814r-5 missing, and must be supplied from Steel’s
Navy List of those years.)
Reports of
Courts-Martial. Vols. 5430-5454. (State of Discipline of the Navy: Trials of Defeated
Officers.)
War Office,
Original Correspondence. Vols. 38-40.
The Navy
Department, Washington, contains “Captains’ Letters,” “Commander^ Letters,” and
“Letters sent.”
II. DOCUMENTS.
American
State Papers. Foreign Affairs, vol. in; Military Affairs, vols. i and vi;
Naval
Affairs, vol. i. Washington.
Annual
Register. London. 1812-5.
Bowen, A. The
Naval Monument. (Letters, logs, official reports and cuttings.) Boston. 1816.
Brannan, J.
Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States during
the War. Washington. 1823.
Brymner, D.
Reports on Canadian Archives. 1887-97. (Annual.) Ottowa, v.d. Castlereagh,
Viscount. Correspondence, Despatches, and other Papers of. Ed. by C. W. Vane.
Vols. vm-x. London. 1851-3.
Cobbett’s
Parliamentary Debates. 1810-5. London.
Fay, Capt. H.
A. Collection of the Official Accounts in Detail of all the Battles fought by
Sea and Land...1812-5. New York. 1817.
Gales, J.,
and Seaton, W. W. Annals of Congress. 1810-5. Washington.
Naval
Chronicle, The. (Periodical.) London. 1812-5.
Niles’ Weekly
Register. (Periodical.) Baltimore. 1811-5.
Pilot, The.
(Periodical.) London. 1812-5.
Wellington,
Duke of. Supplementary Despatches. Vol. xx. London. 1862.
III. GENERAL WORKS.
(i) Contemporary
Authorities.
Armstrong, General
J. Notices of the War of 1812. 2 vols. New York. 1836-40. James, W. A Full and
Correct Account of the Chief Naval Occurrences of the late War. London. 1817.
An Inquiry into the Merits of the Principal
Naval Actions. Halifax, N.S.
1816.
A
Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences of the late War.
2 vols.
London. 1818.
Naval History of Great Britain. New ed. Vols. iv-vi. London. 1886.
Madison,
James. Letters and other writings (1769-1836). 4 vols. Philadelphia. 1865.
Papers of. Edited by H. D. Gilpin. 3 vols. New
York. 1841.
A new edition
of the Letters and Works, by E. Hunt, is in course of publication. New York.
1900- .
Russell, J.,
Jun. History of the War between the United States and Great Britain.
Compiled
chiefly from the Public Documents. Hartford. 1815.
Thomson, J.
L. Historical Sketches of the late War. Philadelphia. 1816. Wilkinson, General
J. Memoirs of My Own Times. Philadelphia. 1816.
(ii) Later
Writers.
Adams, H.
History of the United States. Vols. vi-ix.
New York. 1891.
Coffin, W. F.
1812. The War and its Moral. Montreal. 1864.
Cooper, J. F.
History of the Navy of the United States. 2nd ed. 2 vols.
Philadelphia.
1840.
Cullum,
General G. W. Campaigns of the War 1812-5. New York. 1879. Ingersoll, C. J.
Historical Sketch of the Second War between the United States and Great
Britain. 3 vols. Philadelphia. 1845-52.
Johnson, R.
History of the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain. New
York. 1882.
Lossing, B.
J. The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812. New York. 1869. Maclay, E. S.
History of the United States Navy from 1774 to 1894. 3 vols.
New York.
1897.
Roosevelt, T.
The Naval War of 1812. New York. 1882.
The War with the United States. In 'The Royal
Navy,’ edited by W. L.
Clowes. Vol.
vi, 1-180. London. 1901.
Soley, J. R.
The Wars of the United States. In J. Winsor’s Narrative and Critical History of
America. Vol. vn, 376 sqq. London. 1888.
IV. SPECIAL WORKS.
Adams, H.
Documents relating to New England Federation. Boston. 1876. Campbell, M., and Clarke,
J. F. Revolutionary Services...of Gen. Wm. Hull...
together with
the History of the Campaign of 1812. New York. 1848. Christie, R. Memoirs of
the Administration...of Lower Canada. Quebec. 1818. The Military and Naval
Operations in the Canadas during the late War. Quebec. 1818.
Coggleshall,
G. History of the American Privateers. 2nd ed. New York. 1856. Dwight, T.
History of the Hartford Convention. New York. 1833.
Edgar, M. Ten
Years of Upper Canada: in peace and war. (Letter of T. Ridout) London. 1891.
(With useful map.)
Forbes,
Lieut.-Col. Report of the Trial of Brig.-Gen. W. Hull by a Court-Martial. New
York. 1814.
Gleig, G. R.
Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans. London. 1821.
Hull, General
W. Defence offered before the General Court-Martial. Boston.
1814.
Ingraham, E.
D. Sketch of the Events which preceded the Capture of Washington. Philadelphia.
1849.
Latour, Major
A. La C. Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-5.
Translated by H. P. Nugent. With Atlas. Philadelphia.
1815.
Maclay, E. S.
History of American Privateers. London. 1900.
M’Afee, R. B.
History of the Late War in the Western Country. Lexington, Kentucky. 1816.
Porter, Capt.
D. Journal of a Cruise made to the Pacific Ocean. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1815.
Provost,
Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Some Account of the Public Life of. London. 1823. [Procter,
G.] Campaigns in the Canadas. Quarterly Review, xxvii.
405. London. 1822.
Soley, J. R.
Proceedings of the (U.S.) Naval Institute, vii.
3. (The Frigate Actions of the War.) Annapolis, Md.
Van
Rensselaer, Col. S. A Narrative of the Affair at Queenstown. New York. 1836.
Williams, G.
The Liverpool Privateers. Pp. 430-64. London. 1897.
V. BIOGRAPHIES.
Brighton,
Rev. J. G. Admiral Sir P. B. V. Broke; a Memoir. London. 1866. Drake, B. Life
of Tecumseh, and of his brother. Cincinnati. 1841.
Leech, S.
Thirty Years from Home, or a Voice from the Main-deck. 15th ed. 1847.
Marshall,
Lieut. J. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols. London. 1823-35. Parton, J. Life of
Andrew Jackson. 3 vols. Boston. 1883.
Tupper, F. B.
Life and Correspondence of Major-Gen. Sir Isaac Brock. London.
1847.
VI. MAPS AND TOPOGRAPHY.
Bouchette, J.
British Dominions in North America. 2 vols. London. 1831. Burr, D. H. The
American Atlas. Washington. 1839.
See also maps
in Adams’s History of the United States, Lossing’a Pictorial Field- Book, and
Latour’s Historical Memoir (above).
AND
COMMERCE, EXPANSION, AND SLAVERY.
I. DOCUMENTS.
(i) Congress.
Journal of
the Senate of the United States. (One volume for each annual session.)
Journal of
the House of Representatives of the United States. (One volume for each annual
session.)
Ordway, A.
General Index of the Journals of Congress from the First to the Tenth Congress
inclusive (1789-1809) in House Reports, 46th Congress, 2nd Session, No. 1776.
Washington. 1880. This is continued for the years
1809-21
(Eleventh to Sixteenth Congress) in House Reports, 47th Congress, 1st Session,
No. 1556. Washington. 1883.
Register of Debates
in Congress; comprising the leading debates and incidents. (Commonly known as
Congressional Debates.) 29 vols. Washington. 1825-37.
The Public
Statutes at Large of the United States, from the Organization of the Government
in 1789 to March 3, 1845, arranged in chronological order.
8 vols. Boston. 1845-56. (For this chapter
see vols. ii-iv. Vol. vi contains
Private Laws, 1789-1845; vol. vii, Indian
Treaties; and vol. vra, Foreign Treaties, 1789-1844.)
The
Congressional Globe: containing sketches of the Debates and Proceedings of the
Sessions of Congress. 108 vols. Washington. 1834-73.
(ii) State
Papers.
From 1801 to
1817, Congressional Documents are known by the binders’ titles as State Papers,
Documents, or Reports.
Senate
Documents (1817-49).
State Papers
and Public Documents of the United States. Edited by T. B. Waite. 12 vols.
Boston. (Covers 1789-1818.)
American
State Papers. 38 vols. Washington. 1832-61. (Finance, vol. v: Foreign
Relations, vols. v, vi: Military Affairs, vol. in: Naval Affairs, vols. ii, m:
Public Lands, vol. iv.)
(iii) Supreme
Court.
Reports of
Cases argued and adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States. Edited by
W. Cranch. 9 vols. Washington. 1804^-17. Continued by
H. Wheaton (12 vols. New York. 1816-27); R.
Peters (17 vols. Philar- delphia. 1828-43); and B. C. Howard (24 vols.
1843-60).
(iv) Works
op Statesmen.
Adams, J. Q.
Memoirs, comprising parts of his diary from 1795 to 1848. 12 vols.
Philadelphia.
1874-77.
Bancroft, H.
H. Works. San Francisco. 1886.
Binns, J.
Recollections of his Life, written by himself. Philadelphia. 1854. Calhoun, J.
C. Correspondence. Edited by J. F. Jameson. Fourth Annual Report of the
Historical Manuscripts Commission, in vol. h
of the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1899.
2 vols. Washington.
1900.
Works. Edited by R. K. Crall6. 6 vols. New
York. 1854.
Choate,
Rufus. Works : with a memoir by S. G. Brown. 2 vols. Boston. 1862. Clay, H.
Works. Edited by Calvin Colton. 6 vols. New York. 1863.
Gallatin, A.
Writings. Edited by H. Adams. 3 vols. Philadelphia. 1879. Kendall, Amos.
Autobiography. Edited hy W. Stickney. Boston. 1872.
Lowell, J. R.
The Biglow Papers. Cambridge, Mass. 1846-8. New ed. Boston. 1890.
Seward, W. H.
Autobiography, 1801-34 (with memoir by F. W. Seward). New York. 1877.
Sumner,
Charles. Works. 15 vols. Boston. 1870-83.
Webster,
Daniel. Letters. Edited by C. H. Van Tyne from documents secured principally by
the New Hampshire Historical Society. New York. 1902.
Great Speeches and Orations. Edited by E. P.
Whipple. Boston. 1879.
Works. 6 vols. Boston. 1851.
Weed,
Thurlow. Autobiography. Edited by H. A. Weed. Boston. 1884. Woodbury, Levi.
Writings, political, judicial, and literary. 3 vols. Boston. 1852.
II. GENERAL HISTORY.
Benton, T. H.
Thirty Years’ View. A History of the working of the American ' Government for
Thirty Years; from 1820 to 1850. 2 vols. New York. 1854-6. Bradford, A. History
of the Federal Government for Fifty Years; from March, 1789, to March, 1839.
Boston. 1840.
Burgess, J. W.
The Middle Period, 1817-58. New York. 1897.
Greeley, H.
The American Conflict. 2 vols. Hartford. 1864-7.
McMaster, J.
B. History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil
War. (Five volumes published. Vols. iv and v cover the period 1815-30.) New
York. 1883-98.
Miles, H.
Weekly Register. 76 vols. Baltimore. 1811-49.
Tucker, G.
History of the United States. 4 vols. Philadelphia. 1856-7.
Wilson, W.
Division and Reunion, 1829-89. New York. 1893.
III. SPECIAL WORKS.
(A) Government.
Follett, M.
P. The Speaker of the House of Representatives. New York. 1896.
Kerr, C. H.
The Origin and Development of the United States Senate. Ithaca.
1895.
Lawton, G. W.
The American Caucus: its Origin, Purpose, and System. New York. 1885.
McKnight, D.
A. The Electoral System of the United States. Philadelphia. 1878.
Mason, E. C.
The Veto Power: Its Origin, Development, and Function in the government of the
United States, 1789-1889. (Harvard Historical Monographs, No. 1.) Boston. 1890.
O’Neil, C. A.
The American Electoral System. New York. 1887.
(B) Political
Parties.
Brown, H.
Narrative of the Anti-Masonic Excitement in the Western part of the State of
New York during the years 1826, ’7, ’8 and a part of 1829. Batavia. 1829.
Narrative <o£ the facts and circumstances
relating to the Kidnapping and
presumed
Murder of William Morgan. Brookfield. 1827.
Byrdsall, F.
History of the Loco-Foco or Equal Rights Party. New York. 1842.
Gordy, J. P.
History of Political Parties in the United States. 4 vols. Athens, Ohio.
1895-1903. (Vol. ii covers
1809-28.)
Hammond, J.
D. History of Political Parties in the State of New York. 4th ed. 2 vols.
Cooperstown. 1846. (Vol. i for Anti-Masonic Party.)
McKee, J. H.
The National Platforms of all Political Parties, with the names of all
candidates at each Presidential Election from 1789-1900. Washington, n.d.
Ormsby, R.
McK. History of the Whig Party, or some of its main features...and the outlines
of the history of the principal Parties of the country to the present time.
Boston. 1859.
Lee, J. H.
Origin and Progress of the American Party in Politics. Philadelphia.
1855.
Smith, T. E.
The Free Soil Party in Wisconsin. (Histor. Society of Wisconsin.) Madison.
1895.
The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the
North-West. New York. 1897.
(C) The
Constitution and the Courts.
Coxe, B.
Essay on the Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation. Philadelphia.
1893.
Curtis, G. T.
History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the
United States. 2 vols. New York. 1860.
Elliott, C.
B. The Legislatures and the Courts. (Political Science Quarterly, vol. v.) New
York. 1890.
Landon, J. S.
Constitutional History and Government of the United States. Boston. 1889.
Rogers, H. W.
(editor). Constitutional History of the United States as seen in the
development of American Law. Political Science Lectures, 1889, University of
Michigan. New York. 1889.
Thorpe, F. N.
Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850. 2 vols. Chicago.
1898.
Tiedeman, C.
G. The Unwritten Constitution of the United States. A Philosophic Inquiry into
the fundamentals of American Constitutional Law. New York.
1890.
Willoughby,
W. W. The Supreme Court of the United States. (Johns Hopkins University
Studies. Extra vol. No. 7.) Baltimore. 1890.
(D) Nullification.
Ames, H. V.
State Documents on Federal relations. No. 4. The Tariff and Nullification,
1820-33. Univ. of Pennsylvania; Department of History. (Contains a
bihliography.) Philadelphia. 1902.
Houston, D.
F. Critical study of Nullification in S. Carolina. (Harvard Historical Studies,
No. 3.) New York. 1896.
Letters on
the Nullification movement in S. Carolina, 1830-4. Amer. Histor.
Review, vi,
4; vii, 1. New York. 1901.
Powell, E. V.
Nullification and Secession in the United States. New York. 1897.
(E) Foreion
Relations.
(i) The Fishery Dispute.
Elliott, C.
B. The United States and the North-eastern Fisheries. A History of the Fishery
Question. (Contains a good bibliography.) University of Minnesota.
Minneapolis. 1887.
Isham, C. The
Fishery Question. Its Origin, History, and present Situation; with a map of the
Anglo-American Fishing-Grounds and a short Bibliography. (Questions of the Day
Series, No. 41.) New York. 1887.
(ii) The Monroe Doctrine.
Beaumarchais, M. D. de. La Doctrine de Monroe. L’evolution de la
politique des Etats-Unis pendant le xixme siecle. Paris.
1898.
Hart, A. B.
and Channing, E. (Editors). Extracts from Official Declarations of the United
States emhodying the Monroe Doctrine, 1789-1891. (American History Leaflets,
No. 4.)
McMaster, J.
B. The Monroe Doctrine. (In “With the Fathers.”) New York.
1896.
Monroe, J.
Message to Congress, December, 1823, announcing the doctrine. (In Richardson’s “Messages and Papers of the Presidents,” vol. 2.)
Petin, H. Les fitats-Unis et la Doctrine de Monroe. Paris. 1900.
Reddaway, W.
F. The Monroe Doctrine. Cambridge, England. 1898.
Rush, R.
Memoranda of a residence at the Court of London. Philadelphia. 188-3. Tucker,
G. F. The Monroe Doctrine. A concise history of its origin and growth. Boston.
1885.
(iil) Spanish
Treaty, 1819; Florida Purchase.
American
State Papers. Foreign Relations: Vol. n. Land Claims: Vol. hi. Chambers, H. E. A short-lived
American State. Magazine of American History. January. 1892.
West Florida and its relations to the
Cartography of the United States.
(Contains a
bibliography.) Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political
Science. Series xv, No. 5. Baltimore. 1898.
Favrot, H. L.
Some of the Causes and Conditions that brought about the West Florida
Revolution of 1810.' (Louisiana Historical Society’s Publications.) Part n.
Gayarre, C. Histoire de la Louisiana. 2 vols. Nouvelle Orleans.
1846. (Translation) : History of Louisiana. Third edition. 4 vols. New
Orleans. 1885.
(iv) British Treaties (Oregon, etc.).
Adams, J. Q.
Message to Congress, December 28, 1827. Richardson’s Messages and Papers of the
Presidents. Vol. n.
American
State Papers, Foreign Relations. Vols. iv, v, vi.
Bancroft, H.
H. History of Oregon. 2 vols. San Francisco. 1856.
Barrows, W.
Oregon. The Struggle for Possession. (Contains a bibliography. Boston. 1884.
Chase, L. B.
History of the Polk Administration. New York. 1850.
Gallatin, A.
Right of the United States to the North-western Boundary claimed by them.
(Maps.) New York. 1840.
Gould and
Fowler. The Trial of Alex. McLeod. New York. 1841.
Gray, W. H.
History of Oregon from 1792-1849. Portland. 1870.
Greenhow, R.
The History of Oregon and California, and the other territories on the
North-west coast of North America. Boston. 1844.
House
Executive Documents ; 42nd Congress, 3rd Session, Vol. 5.
Nicolay, C.
G. Oregon Territory...with outlines of its history. (Gives British side of
Oregon dispute.) London. 1846.
Parliamentary
Blue-books (North American Boundary); 1837, xxxix; 1840, xxii;
1845, lii;
1846, lii; 1873, lxxiv.
Senate
Executive Documents; 35th Congress, 1st Session, No. 29.
Sturges, W.
The Oregon Question. Boston. 1845.
Webster, D.
Diplomatic and Official Papers. New York. 1848.
See also
Treaties and Conventions (General Bibliography, p. 755).
(F) Westward
Exploration and Expansion.
Allen, P.
History of the Expedition under the command of Captains Lewis and Clark to the
sources of the Missouri, thence across the Rocky Mountains and down the River
Columbia to the Pacific Ocean, performed during the years
1804-6. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1814.
Capron, E. S.
History of California. Boston. 1854.
Chittenden,
H. C. The American Fur Trade of the Far West. 3 vols.
Coues, E.
(editor). Expeditions of Zebulon M. Pike to the head waters of the Mississippi
River, the interior parts of Louisiana, Mexico and Texas, in the years
1805-6-7. 3 vols. Cleveland.
Foote, H. S.
Texas and the Texans ; or the advance of the Anglo-Americans to the south-west.
2 vols. Philadelphia. 1841.
Fremont, Gen.
J. C. Report of the exploring expedition to the Rocky Mountains (1842), and to
Oregon and N. California (1843-4). Washington. 1845. Helper, H. R. The Land of
Gold ; reality versus fiction. Baltimore. 1855. Hittel, T. H. History of
California. 4 vols. San Francisco. 1897.
Huntley, Sir
H. V. California; its gold and its inhabitants. 2 vols. London.
1856.
James, E.
Account of an Expedition from Pittsburg to the Rocky Mountains performed in the
years 1819 and 1820 under the command of Major Stephen H. Long. 2 vols.
Philadelphia. 1823.
Kennedy, W.
Rise, Progress, and Prospects of the Republic of Texas. 2 vols. London. 1841.
Larpenteur,
C. Forty years a fur-trader on the Upper Missouri. (Personal reminiscences,
1833-72.) Edited by E. Coues. 2 vols. New York. 1898. Newell, C. History of the
Revolution in Texas. New York. 1838.
Parkman, F.
The Oregon Trail. Revised ed. Boston. 1892.
Roosevelt, T.
The Winning of the West. 4 vols. New York. 1889-96.
Shinn, C. H.
Mining Camps. A study in American Frontier Government. (Contains a
bibliography.) New York. 1885.
Wooten, D. G.
Comprehensive History of Texas, 1686-1897. 2 vols. Dallas, Texas. 1898.
Wyeth, Capt.
N. J. Correspondence and Journals, 1831-36. Edited by F. G. Young. (Sources of
History of Oregon, vol. i.) Portland. 1899.
Yoakum, H.
History of Texas, 1685-1846. 2 vols. New York. 1866.
(G) Missouri
Compromise.
Carr, L.
Missouri. A Bone of Contention. (American Commonwealths Series.) Boston. 1888.
See Chapters vn and vm.
Greeley, H.
The American Conflict. 2 vols. Hartford. 1864-67. Vol. i, cap. vn.
Woodbum, J. A
The Historical Significance of the Missouri Compromise. Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for the year 1893. Washington. 1894.
(H) Industrial Development, eto.
Bromwell, W.
J. History of Immigration to the United States...from September 30, 1819, to
December 31, 1855. New York. 1866.
De Bow, J. D.
B. The Industrial Resources, Statistics, &c. of the United States, and more
particularly of the Southern and Western States. 3 vols. New York. 1854.
Dexter, F. B.
Estimates of Population in the American Colonies. Worcester. 1887.
Donaldson, T.
The Public Domain. Third Edition. Washington. 1884.
Ely, R. T.
The Labor Movement in America. New York. 1886. (Chapters i and in.)
First Century
of the Republic : a Review of American Progress. New York. 1876.
O’Neill, G.
E. (editor). The Labour Movement; The Problem of To-day. New York and Boston.
1887. (Chapter iv.)
Seybert, A.
Statistical Annals of the United States. Philadelphia. 1818.
Smith, R. M. Emigration
and Immigration. A Study in Social Science. (Contains a-good bibliography.) New
York. 1890.
Sparks, E. E.
The Expansion of the American People, social and territorial. Chicago. 1900.
Tenth Census
of the United States. 1880. Vol. i; Statistics of the Population of the United
States at the Tenth Census; June 1, 1880. Maps and Text, pp. xi— xviii.
Washington. 1883.
Wright, C. D.
The Industrial Evolution of the United States. (Chautauqua Reading Circle
Literature.) Meadville, Pa. 1895.
(I) The Tariff Controversy.
Elliott, C.
L. The Tariff Controversy in the United States, 1789-1833, with a Summary of
the period before the adoption of the Constitution. (Leland Stanford Junior
University-Monographs. History and Economics. No. 1.) Palo Alto, California. 1892.
Gross, J. D.
History of Tariff Administration in the United States from Colonial Times to
the McKinley Administration Bill. (Studies in History, Economics, and Public
Law. Columbia College, New York City. Vol. i, No. 2.) New York. 1891.
Taussig, F. W.
The Early Protective Movement and the Tariff of 1828. Papers of the American
Historical Association. New York and London. 1887.
(J) Finance.
Bourne, E. G.
History of the Surplus Revenue of 1837. New York. 1885. Dunbar, C. F. Laws of
the United States relating to Currency and Finance. Boston. 1891.
Gouge, W. M.
Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the United States. Philadelphia..
1833.
Kinlev, D.
History...of the Independent Treasury of the United States. New York. 1893.
Knox, J. J.
History of Banking in the United States. New York. 1900. (Chapters i—vi.)
Laughlin, J.
L. History of Bimetallism in the United States. New York. 1886.
(Part i.
1792-1873.)
Scott, W. S.
Repudiation of State Debts. New York. 1893.
White, H.
Money and Banking. New York. 1895.
(K) Slavery.
Anti-Slavery
Struggle. Old South Leaflets. 15th Series. Boston. 1897.
Cobb, T. R.
R. An Inquiry into the Law of American Slavery in the United States.
Philadelphia. 1858.
Goodell, W.
The African Slave Code in theory and practice. New York. 1852. Greeley, Horace.
History of the struggle for slavery extension or restriction in the United
States. New York. 1856.
Recollections of a busy life. New ed. with
memoir. New York. 1873.
Hurd, J. C.
Law of freedom and bondage in the United States. 2 vols. Boston.
1858-62.
Jay, W.
Miscellaneous writings on Slavery. Boston. 1853.
Liberator,
The. (Periodical.) Boston. 1831-65.
May, S. J.
Some Recollections of our Anti-Slavery Conflict. Boston. 1869. McDougall, M. G.
Fugitive slaves, 1619-1865. (Fay House monographs, No. 3.) Boston. 1891.
National
Anti-Slavery Standard. (Periodical.) New York. 1840-70.
Parker, J.
Personal Liberty Laws. Boston. 1861.
Siebert, W.
H. The Underground Railroad from Slavery to Freedom. With introduction by A. B.
Hart. New York. 1898.
Smith, W. H.
Political History of Slavery. 2 vols. New York. 1903.
Spears, J. R.
The American Slave Trade. Its origin, growth, and suppression. New York. 1900.
Still, W. The
Underground Railroad. A record of facts, etc. Philadelphia. 1872. Thayer, Eli.
History of the Kansas Crusade. New York. 1889.
Williams, G.
W. History of the Negro Race in America, 1619-1880. New York.
1883.
Wilson,
Henry. History of the rise and fall of the Slave Power in America. 3 vols.
Boston. 1872-7.
See also
biographies of Birney, Brown, Garrison, Jay, etc.
(L) The Mexican War.
Jay, W.
Review of the causes and consequences of the Mexican War. Boston. 1849.
Livermore, A.
A. The War with Mexico reviewed. Boston. 1850.
Mayer, B.
History of the War between Mexico and the United States. New York.
1848.
Polk,
President. Message to the two Houses of Congress. 30th Congress, 1st Session :
Gen. exec, documents, No. 1 (contains detailed military history of the war).
Washington. 1847.
Ramsey, A. C.
The Other Side; or Notes for the History of the War between Mexico and the
United States. New York. 1850.
Ripley, R. S.
The War with Mexico. 2 vols. New York. 1847.
See also
biographies of Generals Houston, Scott, Taylor; and works in Section
m (p) above.
IV. BIOGRAPHIES.
Adams, H.
Life of Albert Gallatin. Philadelphia. 1879.
American
Statesmen Series. Boston. 1882-91. John Quincy Adams. By J. T. Morse. 1883.
James Monroe. By D. C. Gilman. 1883. Andrew Jackson. By W. G. Sumner. 1882.
Martin Van Buren. By E. M. Shepard. 1888. Henry Clay. By C. Schurz. 2 vols.
1887. John C. Calhoun. By H. Von Holst. 1882. Thomas H. Benton. By T.
Roosevelt. 1887. Lewis Cass. By A. C. McLaughlin. 1891. Daniel Webster. By H.
C. Lodge. 1883.
Austin, G. L.
Life and Times of Wendell Phillips. Boston. 1888.
Bigelow, J. Memoir
of J. C. Fremont. New York. 1856.
Birney, W.
James G. Bimey and his Times. New York. 1890.
Bruce, H. Sam
Houston. (Makers of America Series.) New York. 1891. Colton, C. Life and Times
of Henry Clay. 3 vols. New York. 1846.
Crockett, D.
Colonel Crockett’s Exploits and Adventures in Texas. Philadelphia. 1836.
Curtis, G. T.
Life of Daniel Webster. 2 vols. New York. 1870.
Earle, T.
Life, Travels, and Opinions of Benj. Lundy. Philadelphia. 1847. Fremont, J. C.
Memoirs of my Life (to 1847). Cnicago. 1887.
Frothingham,
O. B. Life of Theodore Parker. Boston. 1874.
Garrison, W.
P. and F. J. William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-79 ; the story of his life told by
his children. New ed. 4 vols. Boston. 1894.
Hinton, R. J.
John Brown and his men. New York. 1894.
Howard, O. O.
Life of General Taylor. New York. 1892.
Jenkins, J.
S. Life of James K. Polk. Auburn. 1850.
Julian, G. W.
Life of Joshua R. Giddings. Chicago. 1892.
Political Recollections. Chicago. 1884.
Lester, C. E.
Houston and his Republic. New York. 1846.
Nicolay, J.
G., and Hay, J. Abraham Lincoln. 10 vols. New York. 1890. Parton, J. Life of
Andrew Jackson. 3 vols. New York. 1860.
Pierce, E. L.
Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner. 4 vols. Boston. 1877-93. Pollard, E. A.
Life of Jefferson Davis. Philadelphia. 1869.
Reid, W. A
Memorial of Horace Greeley. New York. 1873.
Sanborn, F.
B. Life and Letters of John Brown. Boston. 1885.
Sargent, N.
Public Men and Events, 1817-1853. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1875. Seward, F. W.
Seward [W. H.] at Washington, 1846-72. 2 vols. New York.
1891.
Seward, W. H.
Life and Public Services of John Quincy Adams. Auburn. 1849. Sheahan, J. W.
Life of Stephen A. Douglas. New York. 1860.
Tuckerman, B.
William Jay and the constitutional movement for the abolition of slavery. New
York. 1893.
Tyler, L. G.
Letters and Times of the Tylers. 2 vols. Richmond, Va. 1884-5. Williams, A. M.
Sam Houston and the War of Independence in Texas. Boston.
1893.
Wright, M. J.
Life of General Scott. New York. 1894.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Lalor, J. J. Cyclopaedia
of Political Science and of the Political History of the United States.
Chicago, 1881-8. See under special titles: Slavery, Whig Party, Democratic
Party, Republican Party, Annexations, Compromises, Wilmot Proviso, Fugitive
Slave Laws, Territories, Dred Scott Case.
Sparks, E. E.
Topical Reference Lists in American History. Columbus, Ohio. 1893.
II. DOCUMENTS.
Benton, T. H.
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856. Vol. xvi. 1857.
The
Congressional Globe gives the debates in full. The Congresses covered by this
chapter are the Thirty-first to the Thirty-sixth, inclusive.
Congressional
Documents, House and Senate.
Executive
Documents (official).
III. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Benton, T. H.
Thirty Years’ View [1820-50]. New York. 1834r-6.
Calhoun, J.
C. Works. 6 vols. Charleston, N. Y. 1851-5.
Clay, H.
Correspondence and Speeches. 3 vols. New York. 1855-7.
Curtis, G. W.
Orations and Addresses. Edited by C. E. Norton. New York. 1894. Davis, J. Rise
and Fall of the Confederate Government. 2 vols. London. 1881. Douglass, F. Life
and Times, from 1817 to 1882. London. 1882.
Grant, U. S.
Personal Memoirs. 2 vols. New York. 1895.
Johnston, A
(editor). Representative American Orations. Vol. n. New York.
1884.
Keyes, E. D.
Fifty Years’ Observation of Men and Events.
Lincoln, A.
Complete Works. Edited by Nicolay and Hay. 2 vols. New York.
1894.
McCulloch, H.
Men and Measures of half a Century. New York. 1888.
Motley, J. L.
Correspondence. Edited by G. T. Curtis.
Olmatead, F.
L. Journeys and Explorations in the Cotton Kingdom. 2 vols. London. 1861.
Pierce, E. L.
Memoir and Letters of C. Sumner. London. 1893.
Pike, J. S.
First Blows of the Civil War. New York. 1879.
Poore, B. P.
Perley’s Reminiscences of sixty years in the National Metropolis.
2 vols.
Philadelphia. 1886.
Sargent, N.
Public Men and Events, 1817-53. Philadelphia. 1875.
Seward, W. H.
Works. Ed. Baker. 5 vols. New York. 1853-84.
Sumner, C.
Orations and Speeches. 2 vols. Boston, Mass. 1850.
Works. 15 vols. Boston, Mass. 1875-83.
Taussig, F.
W. (editor). State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff.
Webster, D.
Works. With Memoir by E. Everett. 6 vols. Boston, Mass. 1851.
IV. SECONDARY WORKS.
General Histories.
Holst, H. von. Constitutional and Political History of the
United States. Transl.
by Lalor and
Mason. Vols. iv-vii. New York.
1880.
Johnston, A.
History of American Politics. New York. 1879.
Rhodes, J. F.
History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850. London.
1893, etc. Vols. i, n.
Schouler, J.
History of the United States of America under the Constitution, 1783
1861. 5 vols. New York. 1880-91. (Vol. v.)
Wilson, W.
Division and Reunion, 1829-89.
Special Works.
Blaine, J. G.
Twenty Years of Congress: from Lincoln to Garfield. Norwich, Conn. 1884.
Cobb, T. R.
R. Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States. Savannah. 1858.
Draper, J. W.
History of the American Civil War. 3 vols. London. 1871.
Vol. i deals
with events and influences preceding the war.
Goodell, W.
Slavery and Anti-Slavery. New York. 1852.
Greeley, H.
History of the Struggle for Slavery Extension or Restriction in the United
States, 1776-1856. New York. 1856.
The American Conflict. 2 vols. Hartford, Conn.
1864-6.
Hodgson, J.
The Cradle of the Confederacy. Mobile, Alabama. 1876.
Houston, D. F.
A Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina. (Harvard Histor.
Monographs, No. 3.) 1896.
Hurd, J. C.
Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States. New York. 1858. Lalor, J. J.
Cyclopaedia of Political Science and of the Political History of the United
States. Chicago. 1881-8. Articles: Whig Party, Republican Party, Democratic
Party, Annexations, Compromises, Wilmot Proviso, Fugitive Slave Law,
Territories, Dred Scott Case.
Lunt, G.
Origin of the Late War. New York. 1866.
McDougall. M.
G. Fugitive Slaves (1619-1865). Boston. 1891.
Parker, Joel.
Habeas Corpus and Martial Law. Philadelphia. 1862.
Pollard, E.
A. The Lost Cause. New York. 1866.
Sanborn, F.
B. Memoirs of John Brown. Concord, Mass. 1878.
Sherman, J.
Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate, and Cabinet.
2 vols. Chicago. 1895.
Siebert, W.
H. Tie Underground Railway from Slavery to Freedom. New York. 1898.
Smith, T. C.
The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the North West. (Harvard Histor. Studies.)
New York. 1897.
Spring, L. W.
Kansas. (American Commonwealth Series.) Boston. 1885. Stephens, A. H. A
constitutional view of the late War between the States (argumentative and
narrative dialogues).
Taussig, F.
W. Tariff History of the United States. 4th ed. New York. 1898. Wilson, H. History
of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. 3 vols. Boston. 1872-7.
Wise, B. H.
Life of H. A. Wise of Virginia, 1806-76. London. 1899.
H. A. Seven Decades of the Union.
Philadelphia. 1872.
J. S. The end of an Era. Boston, Mass. 1899.
Woodbury, L.
Writings, political, judicial, and literary. 3 vols. Boston. 1852.
Biographies.
Coleman, Mrs
C. Life of J. J. Crittenden. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1873.
Colton, C.
Life and Times of Henry Clay. 3 vols. New York. 1857.
Curtis, G. T.
Life of James Buchanan. 2 vols. New York. 1883.
Davis, Mrs V.
H. Jefferson Davis, Ex-President of the Confederate States. 2 vols. New York.
1890.
Garrison, W.
P. and F. J. W. L. Garrison, 1805-79. 4 vols. (Gives full details of the
abolitionist agitation.)
Hart, A. B. Salmon
P. Chase. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston. 1899. Herndon, W. H. Life of
Abraham Lincoln. 2 vols. London. 1893.
Johnston, R.
M. and Browne, W. H. Life of A. H. Stephens. Philadelphia. 1883. McLaughlinj A.
C. L. Cass. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston. 1891. Merriam, G. S. Life and
Times of S. Bowles (an influential northern editor).
2 vols. New York. 1865.
Morse, J. T.
A. Lincoln. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston. 1893.
Nicolay, J.
G. and Hay, J. A. Lincoln: a History. 10 vols. New York. 1890. Roosevelt, T. T.
H. Benton. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston. 1887. Schurz, C. A. Lincoln. An
Essay. London. 1891.
Seward, F. H.
Seward at Washington (1846-1872). 2 vols. New York. 1891.
H. W. Autobiography of, 1801-34; with a Memoir
of his life from 1831
to 1846, by
F. W. Seward. New York. 1877.
Storey, M. C.
Sumner. (American Statesmen Series.) Boston. 1900.
Stovall, P.
Life of R. Toombs (a remarkable southern agitator). New York. 1892. Tyler, L.
G. Letters and Times of the Tylers (the latter part refers to this period).
3 vols. Williamsburg, Va. 1884-96.
Weed, T.
Autobiography of; with Memoir by T. W. Barnes. 2 vols. Boston. 1883.
THE CIVIL
WAR;
AND
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Bartlett, J.
R. The Literature of the Rebellion. Providence. 1866.
Leypoldt, F.
The American Catalogue. New York. 1876- . [Subject Index, U.S. History, Civil
War.]
II. DOCUMENTS.
Alabama
Claims. Correspondence concerning Claims against Great Britain, transmitted to
the Senate of the United States. 5 vols. Washington. 1869-70. Committee Reports
of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Washington.
1860-5.
Confederate
Archives [MSS. etc.] in U.S. War Department, Washington.
Journals of
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Washington. 1860-5. Messages and
Documents. Washington. 1860-5.
Narrative of
Privations and Sufferings of United States Officers and Soldiers while
Prisoners of War. Philadelphia. 1864.
Preliminary
Report on the Eighth Census, 1860. Washington. 1862.
Report of the
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. 8 vols. Washington. 1863-5.
Report of the
Provost Marshal General. Washington. 1865-6.
Report of the
Secretary of the Navy in relation to Armoured Vessels. Washington. 1864.
Reports of
the Secretary of the Navy. 1861-6. Washington.
Statutes at
Large, U.S. Washington. 1861-5.
The Case of
the United States to be laid before the Tribunal of Arbitration to be convened
at Geneva. Washington. 1872.
The Trial of
Hon. C. L. Vallandigham by a Military Commission. Cincinnati. 1863. Files of
the Contemporary Press, especially The Daily Despatch, Richmond.
The New York
Herald.
The Tribune,
New York.
De Bow’s
Review, New Orleans.
The War of
the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
Washington. 1880-.
III. GENERAL WORKS.
Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. New York. 1887.
Bay ley, R.
A. National Loans Of the United States from July 4, 1776 to June 30, 1880.
Washington. 1882.
Blaine, J. G.
Twenty Years of Congress, from Lincoln to Garfield. 2 vols. Norwich, Conn.
1884.
Campaigns of
the Civil War. New York. 1881-3.
Davis, J. The
Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. 2 vols. London. 1881. Draper, J.
W. History of the American Civil War. 3 vols. London. 1871. Giddings, J. R.
History of the Rebellion, its authors and causes. New York. 1864. Greeley, H.
The American Conflict; a History of the Great Rebellion. 2 vols.
Hartford,
Conn. 1864-6.
Johnson, R.
History of the Secession War. Boston. 1887.
Johnston,
General J. E. Narrative of Military Operations. New York. 1874. Jones, J. B. A
Rebel War Clerk’s Diary at the Confederate States Capital.
2 vols.
Philadelphia. 1866.
Julian, G. W.
Political Recollections. Chicago. 1884.
Knox, J. J.
United States Notes. New York. 1884.
Lincoln, A.
Complete Works. Edited by J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay. 2 vols. New York. 1894.
Longstreet,
General J. From Manassas to Appomattox. Philadelphia. 1896. Lossing, B. J.
Pictorial Field-Book of the Civil War. 3 vols. Philadelphia, 1869. McPherson,
E. Political History of the United States...during the...Rebellion.
4th ed.
Washington. 1882.
Moore, F. W.
(editor). The Rebellion Record. 12 vols. New York. 1862-8.
Paris, le
Comte de. History of the Civil War in America. Translated by L. F.
Tasistro. 4
vols. Philadelphia. 1876.
Pollard, E.
A. The Lost Cause; a new Southern History of the War of the Confederates. New
York. 1866.
Rhodes, J. F.
History of the United States. Vols. m, rv. London. 1895-9. Ropes, J. C. The
Story of the Civil War. Vols. i, n (unfinished). New York.
1895-8.
Russell, W.
H. My Diary North and South. Boston. 1863.
Schouler, J.
History of the United States. Vol. vr. New York. 1899.
Southern
Historical Society Papers. Richmond. 1876-.
Thorndike, R.
S. The Sherman Letters. London. 1894.
Welles, G.
Lincoln and Seward. New York. 1874.
Wilson, H.
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. 3 vols. Boston,
Mass. 1872, etc.
IV. SPECIAL WORKS.
(A) Naval
Operations.
Bulloch, J.
D. The Secret Service of the Confederate States. 2 vols. London. 1883. Porter,
Admiral D. D. Naval History of the Civil War. London. 1887.
Roberts,
Captain (pseudonym of Hobart Pasha). Never Caught. London. 1867. Scharf, J. T.
History of the Confederate Navy. Albany, N.Y. 1894.
Semmes,
Admiral R. Memoirs of Service Afloat. Baltimore. 1869.
Taylor, T. E.
Running the Blockade. London. 1896.
The Navy in
the Civil War. New York. 1883:
1. The Blockade and the Cruisers. J. R. Soley.
2. The Atlantic Coast. D. Ammen.
3. The Gulf and Inland Waters. A. T. Mahan.
(B) Other
Works.
Boynton, H.
V. Sherman’s Historical Raid. Cincinnati. 1875.
Buchanan, J.
Mr Buchanan’s Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion. New York. 1866.
“Copperhead”
Catechism, The. New York. 1864.
“
Copperhead ” Minstrel. A choice collection of Democratic Poems. New York.
1863.
Early,
General J. A. A Memoir of the Last Year of the War. 2nd ed.
Lynchburg
(Virginia). 1867.
Eggleston, G.
C. Recollections of a Rebel. New York. 1874.
American War Ballads and Lyrics. 2 vols. New
York. 1889.
Fry, J. B.
The Army under Buell. Revised ed. New York. 1884.
Gilmore, J.
R. Personal Recollections of A. Lincoln. London. 1899.
Gordon,
General G. H. History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia. Boston. 1880.
Hague, P. A.
A Blockaded Family: Life in Southern Alabama during the Civil War. New York. 1888. dalle, E. von. Die Blockade der
Nordamerikanischen Sudstaaten. (Jahrbuch fur Deutschlands Seeinteressen. ii.) Berlin. 1900.
Harris, T. L. The Trent Affair. Indianapolis. 1896.
Harris, T. M.
The Assassination of Lincoln. Borton. 1892.
Haywood, P.
D. The Cruise of the Alabama. Boston. 1886.
Hood, General
J. B. Advance and Retreat. New Orleans. 1880.
Johnson, J.
The Defence of Charleston Harbour. Charleston. 1890.
[Jones, S.
L.J Life in the South from the Commencement of the War. By a Blockaded British
Subject. 2 vols. London. 1863.
MacCarthy, C.
Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life. Richmond. 1882.
McCarthy, C.
H. Lincoln’s Plan of Reconstruction. New York. 1901.
McClellan,
General G. B. Report on the organisation and campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.
New York. 1864.
Porter,
General H. Campaigning with Grant. New York. 1897.
Scheliha,
von. A Treatise on Coast Defence. London. 1868.
Schwab, J. C.
The Confederate States of America. New York. 1901.
Stephens, A.
A Constitutional View of the late War between the States. 2 vols. Philadelphia.
1868.
Taylor, R.
Destruction and Reconstruction. Edinburgh. 1879.
Van Home, T.
B. History of the Army of the Cumberland; written at the request of General G.
H. Thomas. 2 vols. Cincinnati. 1875.
Walker,
General F. A. History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac.
Boston. 1889.
Watson, W.
Life in the Confederate Army. New York. 1888.
Wilkeson, F.
The Soldier in Battle: or Life in the ranks of the Army of the Potomac. London.
1896.
V. BIOGRAPHIES, ETC.
Alfriend, F.
H. Life of J. Davis. Cincinnati. 1868.
Badeau, A.
Personal Memoirs and Military History of U. S. Grant. 3 vols. New York. 1881.
Butler,
General B. F. Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences. Boston. 1892. Church,
W. C. Life of J. Ericsson. 2 vols. London. 1890.
Cleveland, H.
A. H. Stephens in Public and Private; with Letters and Speeches, etc.
Philadelphia. 1867.
Curtis, G. T.
Life of J. Buchanan. 2 vols. New York. 1883.
Dabney, R. L.
Life of Lieut—Gen. T. J. Jackson. 2 vols. London. 1864.
Davis, Mrs.
Jefferson Davis.... A Memoir by his Wife. 2 vols. New York. 1890. Dix, M.
Memoirs of J. A. Dix. 2 vols. New York. 1883.
Grant,
General U. S. Personal Memoirs. 2 vols. New York. 1885.
Henderson, G.
F. R. Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. 2 vols.
London. 1900.
Johnson,
President A. Speeches of. Boston. 1865.
Johnston, R.
M. and Browne, W. H. Life of A. H. Stephens. Philadelphia. 1878. Johnston, W.
P. Life of General A. S. Johnston. New York. 1879.
Lamon, W. H.
Recollections of Abraham Lincoln. Chicago. 1895.
Lee, F.
General Lee. New York. 1894.
Long, A. L.
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee. London. 1886.
Mahan, A. T.
Life of Admiral Farragut New York. 1884.
Morse, J. T.
Abraham Lincoln. 2 vols. London. 1893.
Nicolay, J.
G. and Hay, J. Abraham Lincoln: a History. 10 vols. New York. 1890.
Piatt, D. and
Boynton, H. V. General G. H. Thomas. A critical Biography. Cincinnati. 1893.
Polk, W. M.
Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General. 2 vols. London. 1893. Pollard, E. A. Life of
Jefferson Davis; with a secret history of the Southern Confederacy.
Philadelphia. 1869.
Prime, W. C.
McClellan’s own Story. London. 1887.
Rom an j A.
The Military Operations of General Beauregard. 2 vols. New York. 1884.
Schuckers, J.
W. The Life and Public Service of S. P. Chase. New York. 1874. Seward, F.W.
Seward at Washington; etc. A Memoir. 2 vols. New York. 1891. Seward, W. H.,
Autobiography of; with Memoir by F. W. Seward. New York.
Sheridan,
General P. H. Personal Memoirs. 2 vols. London. 1888.
Sherman,
General W. T. Memoirs. 2 vols. London. 1876.
Vallandigham,
C. L. Y. The Record of Hon. C. L. Vallandigham. Columbus. 1863. Vallandigham,
J. L. Life of Hon. C. Vallandigham. By his brother. 4th ed Baltimore. 1872.
Van Home, T.
B. Life of Maj.-Gen. G. H. Thomas. New York. 1882.
Warden, R. B.
An Account of the Private Life and Public Services of S. P. Chase. Cincinnati.
1874.
White, H. A.
R. E. Lee and the Southern Confederacy. London. 1897.
VI. MAPS.
Atlas to
accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington,
n. d.
See also
Nicolay and Hay, Badeau, Ropes, and “ Battles and Leaders.”
I. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
The
Confederate States of America, 1863-5, by J. C. Schwab, gives a full
bibliography.
See also,
Materials for the History of the Government of the Southern Confederacy, by J.
C. Sumner (American Historical Association Papers, rv, part 4, p. 5: October,
1890).
II. DOCUMENTS.
Attomey-Generals
of the Confederate States, Copies of Opinions of. (In the New York Public
Library.) See New York Public Library, Publications, i, 341 (Nov., 1897); n,
196 (June, 1898); ii, 389 (Oct.,
1898); u, 407 (Nov., 1898). Confederate Archives (United States War Department,
Washington). Contains documents, letters, and newspaper clippings.
State Documents,
especially Statutes of the individual States. (New York Bar Association
Library; New York Law Institute.)
Statutes at
Large of the Confederate States of America, First and Second Congress.
Richmond. 1862-4.
Statutes at
Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America.
Richmond. 1864.
Thian, R. P.
Illustrated Catalogue of Confederate Treasury Notes, with Descriptive
Letterpress. (Yale University Library.)
III. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Banker’s
Magazine and Statistical Register. New York. 1859-65.
De Bow’s
Review. New Orleans. 1860-2.
Economist,
the. London. 1869-65.
Jones, J. B.
A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary at the Confederate States Capital.
2 vols.
Philadelphia. 1866.
Merchant’s
Magazine (Hunt’s). New York. 1859-66.
Newspapers,
1860-5, especially of Richmond, Charleston, and New Orleans. (Yale University
Library; Congressional Library, Washington.)
Official
Records. A Compilation of the War of the Rebellion. Series i-iv.
130 vols.
Washington. 1880-1901.
Rebellion
Record, the. Edited hy F. Moore. 11 vols., and supplement. New York. 1862-8.
Russell, W.
H. My Diary North and South. Boston. 1863.
Townsend
Library of National, State, and Individual Civil War Records (newspaper
clippings). Columbia University Library.
IV. SECONDARY WORKS.
Adams, C. F.
Charles Francis Adams. By his Son. Boston. 1900.
Alfriend, F.
H. Life of Jefferson Davis. Cincinnati and Chicago. 1868.
Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. New York. 1887.
Bigelow, J.
France and the Confederate Navy, 1862-8. New York. 1888. Borcke, Heros von.
Memoirs of the Confederate War for Independence. 2 vols. London. 1866.
Bulloch, J.
D. The Secret Service of the Confederate States, in Europe. 2 vols.
London. 1883.
New York. 1884.
Callahan, J.
M. The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy. Baltimore.
1901.
Campbell, J.
A. Reminiscences and Documents. Civil War, 1865. Baltimore. 1887. Capers, H. D.
The Life and Times of C. G. Memminger. Richmond. 1893. Cleveland, H. Alexander
H. Stephens in public and private. Philadelphia. 1866. Coffin, C. C. Four Years
of Fighting; Personal Observations. 5th ed. Boston. 1866. Curry, J. L. M. Civil
History of the Government of the Confederate States, with some Personal
Reminiscences. Richmond. 1901.
Davis,
Jefferson. The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. 2 vols. New York.
1881.
Davis, Mrs V.
H. Jefferson Davis a memoir. 2 vols. New York. 1890.
Day, S. P.
Down South, or an Englishman’s Experience at the Seat of the American War. 2
vols. London. 1862.
De Leon, T.
C. Four Years in Rebel Camps. Mobile. 1890.
Du Bose, J.
W. The Life and Times of William Lowndes Yancey. Birmingham. 1892. Echoes from
the South. New York. 1866.
Eggleston, G.
C. The Recollections of a Rebel. New York. 1874. 2nd ed. 1878. Fielder,H.
LifeandTimesandSpeechesof JosephE.Brown. Springfield,Mass. 1883. Fremantle,
Lieut.-Col. Three Months in the Southern States. New York. 1864. Gay, Mary A.
H. Life in Dixie during the War, 1863-5. Atlanta. 1892.
Hague, P. A.
A Blockaded Family: Life in Southern Alabama during the Civil War. Boston and
New York. 1888.
Johnston,
General Joseph E. Narrative of Military Operations during the late War. New
York. 1874.
Jones, Sarah
L. Life in the South from the Commencement of the War. By a Blockaded British
Subject. 2 vols. London. 1863.
McCarthy, C.
Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia,
1861-5.
Richmond. 1882. 4th ed. 1884.
McPherson, E.
Political History of America during the Great Rebellion. 4th ed. Washington.
1882.
Pollard, E.
A. The First, Second, and Third Years of the War. 3 vols. New York. 1863-5.
The War in America, 1863-4. London. 1865.
The Lost Cause. New York. 1867.
Pollard, E.
A. Life of Jefferson Davis. Philadelphia. 1869.
Putnam, Mrs
Sarah. Richmond during the War. By a Richmond Lady. New York. 1867.
Rhodes, J. F.
History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850.
Vols. in and
xv. New York. 1898-9.
Schwab, J. C.
The Confederate States of America, 1861-5: a Financial and Industrial History
of the South during the Civil War. New York. 1901.
Prices in the Confederate States. (Yale
Review, ii, 288. March, 1892.)
Stephens, A.
H. A Constitutional View of the late War between the States.
2 vols.
Philadelphia. 1870.
Taylor, T. E.
Running the Blockade. London. 2nd ed. 1896.
Two
Months in the Confederate States. By an English Merchant. London. 1863. c. M.
H. VII.
62
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Foster, W. E.
References to the Constitution of the United States. New York. 1890.
References to the History of Presidential
Administrations. New York. 1885.
Hart, A. B.
Foundations of American Foreign Policy. New York. 1901.
Wilson, W.
History of the American People. Vol. v. New York. 1902.
II. DOCUMENTS.
Government
Publications of the thirty-eighth to the forty-seventh Congresses. Washington.
1865-85:
Congressional
Globe, 1865-73, and Congressional Record, 1873-85.
Documents
(Executive), House and Senate.
Documents
(Miscellaneous), House and Senate.
Journals,
House and Senate.
Reports,
House and Senate.
Ferrell, L.
G. Tables of, and Annotated Index to, the Congressional Series of United States
Public Documents. Washington. 1902.
Poore, B. P.
A Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Publications of the United States,
1774-1881. Washington. 1885.
Davis, J. C.
B. United States Reports. Vols. 108-110. 1882-4. New York 1884-86.
Otto, W. T.
United States Reports. Vols. 91-107. 1875-82. Boston. 1876-83. Public Statutes
at Large, Thirty-eighth to Forty-seventh Congresses. Boston.
1866-73. New York. 1873-85.
Wallace, J.
W. Supreme Court Reports. Vols. 4r-23. 1866-74. Washington.
1867-76.
Acts or
Session Laws of the several States, especially of the Southern States. 1865
-85. Journals of the Constitutional Conventions of the Southern States. 1865-80.
Reports of Investigating Committees of the Southern States. 1871-80.
III. COMPILATIONS CONTAINING DOCUMENTARY AND OTHER
SOURCES.
Cooper, T. V.
and Fenton, H. I. American Politics. Philadelphia. 1882.
Davis, J. C.
B. (editor). Treaties and Conventions concluded between the United States and
other Powers since July 4, 1776. Washington. 1889.
Documentary
History of the Constitution. Vol. n. Washington. 1894.
Dunbar, C. F.
Laws of the United States relating to Currency, Finance and Banking, from 1789
to 1891. Boston. 1891.
Hart, A. B.
American History told by Contemporaries. Vol. iv.
New York. 1901. McPherson, E. Political History of the United States of
America during the period of Reconstruction, 1865-70. Washington. 1875.
Handbooks of Politics, issued biennially.
Washington. 1872-86.
Moore, J. B.
History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States
has been a Party. 6 vols. Washington. 1898.
Richardson,
J. D. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents.
Vols. vi-viii. Washington. 1897.
Snow, F.
Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy. Boston. 1894.
Spofford, A.
R. (editor). American Almanac. New York. 1878-85.
Tribune
Almanac. New York. 1866-85.
IV. CONTEMPORARY PERIODICALS.
Newspapers,
from 1865 to 1885: New York Tribune. New York Times. New York Herald. The
Nation, New York. Harper’s Weekly, New York. Chicago Tribune. Cincinnati
Commercial Inquirer. Springfield Republican.
Magazines:
Atlantic Monthly. Boston. 1865-85. De Bow’s Review. New Orleans. 1866-70.
Brownson’s Quarterly Review. New York. 1865-75. International Review. New York.
1874-83. North American Review. Boston and New York. 1865-85.
Articles in
these and other magazines may be found mentioned in Poole’s Index to Periodical
Literature. 4 vols. Boston. 1882-97.
V. GENERAL WORKS.
Andrews, E.
B. History of the last Quarter-Century. 2 vols. New York. 1896. Blaine, J. G.
Twenty Years of Congress. 2 vols. Norwich, Conn. 1884-6.
Cox, S. S.
Three Decades of Federal Legislation. Providence. 1885.
Curtis, G. T.
Constitutional History of the United States. Vol. n. New York. 1896. Foster, J.
W. A Century of American Diplomacy. Boston. 1895.
Greg, P.
History of the United States. Vol. ii.
London. 1887.
Hart, A. B.
The Foundations of American Foreign Policy. New York. 1901. McClure, A. K. Our
Presidents. How we make them. New York. 1900. O’Neil, C. A. The American
Electoral System. New York. 1887.
Rogers, H. W.
(editor). Constitutional History as seen in American Law. New York. 1889.
Schuyler, E.
American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Commerce. New York. 1886.
Smith, E.
England and America after Independence. Westminster. 1900. Thorpe, F. N.
Constitutional History of the United States. Vol. hi. Chicago. 1901. Wilson, H. History of the Rise and Fall
of the Slave Power. Vol. m. Boston. 1877.
Wilson, W.
Congressional Government. Boston. 1885.
History of the American People. Vol. v. New
York. 1902.
VI. SPECIAL WORKS.
(A) Reconstruction.
Allen, W.
Governor Chamberlain’s Administration in South Carolina. A Chapter of
Reconstruction in the Southern States. New York. 1888.
Barnes, W. H.
History of the Thirty-ninth Congress. New York. 1868.
Burgess, J.
W. Reconstruction and the Constitution, 1866-76. New York. 1892. Chadsey, C. E.
The Struggle between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction. New York. 1896.
Doehn, Dr R. Die Administrationen der Prasidenten U. S. Grant und R. B.
Hayes.
2 vols.
Leipzig. 1881.
Dunning, W.
A. Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction. New York. 1898. Fertig, J. W.
The Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee. Chicago. 1898. Garner, J. W.
Reconstruction in Mississippi. New York. 1901.
Herbert, H.
A. and others. Why the Solid South ? Baltimore. 1890.
King, E. The
Great South. Hartford. 1875.
McCarthy, C.
H. Lincoln’s Plan of Reconstruction. New York. 1901.
Nordhoff, C.
The Cotton States in the Spring and Summer of 1875. New York.
1876.
Pike, J. S.
The Prostrate State. New York. 1874.
Pollard, E.
A. The Lost Cause Regained. New York. 1868.
Porcher, F.
A. Reconstruction in South Carolina. (Southern Historical Society Papers. Vol.
xn.) Richmond. 1884.
Scott, E. G.
Reconstruction during the Civil War. Boston. 1895.
Steams, C.
The Black Man of the South and the Rebels. New York. 1872. Wilson, W., Herbert,
H. A., Dubois, W. E. B. and others, articles on Reconstruction in Atlantic
Monthly, Jan. to Oct. 1901.
Woolley, E.
C. The Reconstruction of Georgia. New York. 1901.
(B) Financial
and Economical.
Bolles, A. S.
Financial History of the United States. Vol. hi. New York. 1886. Laughlin, A.
L. History of Bimetallism in the United States. New York. 1897. Noyes, A. D.
Thirty Years of American Finance. New York. 1898.
Scott, W. A.
The Repudiation of State Debts. New York. 1893.
Sumner, W. A.
History of American Currency. New York. 1874.
Taussig, F.
W. Tariff History of the United States. 4th ed. New York. 1898. Watson, D. K.
History of American Currency. New York. 1899.
Wells, D. A.
Recent Economic Changes. New York. 1889.
White, H.
Money and Banking illustrated by American History. Boston. 1896.
(C) Looal
History.
Avery, I. W.
The History of the State of Georgia. 1850-81. New York. 1881 Brown, J. H.
History of Texas. 2 vols. St Louis. 1893.
Brown, W. G
History of Alabama. New York. 1900.
Davis, W. B.
and Durrie, D. S. An Illustrated History of Missouri. St Louis. 1876 Hempsted,
F. Pictorial History of Arkansas. St Louis. 1890.
Lewis, V. A.
History of West Virginia. Philadelphia. 1889.
Lowry, R.,
and McCardle, W. H. A History of Mississippi. Jackson, Miss. 1891 Moore, J. W.
History of North Carolina. 2 vols. Raleigh. 1880.
Scharf, J. T.
History of Maryland. Vol. hi.
Baltimore. 1879.
Switzler,
Col. W. F. The Commonwealth of Missouri. Ed. C. R. Barnes. St Louis.
1877.
Wooten, D. G.
Comprehensive History of Texas. 2 vols. Dallas, Texas. 1898.
(D) Works
op Public Men.
Blaine, J. G.
Political Discussions, Legislative, Diplomatic and Popular, 1856-86.
Norwich,
Conn. 1887.
Curtis, G. W.
Orations and Addresses. Edited by C. E. Norton. 3 vols. New York. 1894.
Garfield, J.
A. Works of James A. Garfield. Edited by B. A. Hinsdale. 2 vols. Boston. 1882.
Johnston, A.
(editor). American Orations. Revised by J. A. Woodbum. 4 vols. New York.
1896-7.
Julian, G. W.
Later Speeches on Political Questions. Edited by G. J. Clarke. Indianapolis.
1889.
Lincoln, A.
Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln. Edited by J. G. Nicolay and John Hay. 2
vols. New York. 1894.
Lowell, J. R.
Political Essays. Boston. 1871.
Robinson, W.
S. Warrington Pen Portraits. Boston. 1877.
Seward, W. H.
Works of William H. Seward. Edited by G. E. Baker. 5 vols. Boston. 1884.
Sherman, J.
Selected Speeches and Reports. New York. 1879.
Sumner, C.
Works of Charles Sumner. Edited by E. L. Pierce. 15 vols. Boston. 1874-83.
Tilden, S. J.
Writings and Speeches. Edited by J. Bigelow. 2 vols. New York.
1882.
(E) Miscellaneous.
Civil Service
Commission. Fifteenth Report of the United States Civil Service Commission.
Part VI. Washington. 1899.
Cushing, C.
The Treaty of Washington. New York. 1873.
Guthrie, W.
D. The Fourteenth Amendment. New York. 1899.
Keasbey, L.
M. The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine. New York. 1896.
VII. BIOGRAPHIES, ETC.
Adams, C. F.
Charles Francis Adams. By his son. Boston. 1900.
Austin, G. L.
Life and Times of Wendell Phillips. Boston. 1888.
Badeau, A. Grant
in Peace. Hartford. 1887.
Balestier, C.
W. James G. Blaine, a Sketch of his Life. New York. 1884. Bancroft, F. Life of
W. H. Seward. 2 vols. New York. 1800.
Barnes, T. W.
Memoir of Thurlow Weed. Boston. 1884.
Bigelow, J.
Life of Samuel J. Tilden. 2 vols. New York. 1895.
Boutwell, G.
S. Reminiscences of Sixty Years. 2 vols. New York. 1902. Butler, B. F.
Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences. Butler’s Book. Boston.
1892.
Callender, E.
B. Thaddeus Stevens, Commoner. Boston. 1882.
Cary, E.
George William Curtis. Boston. 1899.
Conkling, A.
R. Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling. New York. 1884. Cornell, W. M. Life and
Public Career of Horace Greeley. Boston. 1882.
Dix, M.
Memoirs of John Adams Dix. 2 vols. New York. 1883.
Douglass, F.
The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass. Written by himself. Boston. 1893.
Forney, J. W.
Anecdotes of Public Men. 2 vols. New York. 1873, 1881. Foulke, W. P. Oliver P.
Morton. 2 vols. Indianapolis. 1899.
Garland, H.
Ulysses S. Grant, his Life and Character. New York. 1898.
Gorham, G. C.
Edwin M. Stanton. 2 vols. Boston. 1899.
Hamilton,
Gail (Dodge, M. A.). Biography of James G. Blaine. Norwich, Ver. 1895.
Hamlin, C. E.
Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin, 1809-91. Boston. 1899. Hart, A. B. Salmon P.
Chase. Boston. 1899.
Hayes, E. L.
Q. C. Lamar, his Life, Times and Speeches, 1825-93. Nashville, Term. 1896.
Hollister, O.
J. Life of Schuyler Colfax. New York. 1887.
Johnston, R.
M. and Brown, W. H. Life of Alexander H. Stephens. Philadelphia. 1878.
Jones, Rev.
J. S. Life of Andrew Johnson. Greeneville, Tenn. 1901.
Julian, G. W.
Political Recollections. Chicago. 1884.
Lang, A.
Life, Letters and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1890.
McCall, S. W.
Hiaddeus Stevens. Boston. 1899.
McCulloch,
H. Men and Measures of Half a Century. New York. 1888. Merriam, G. S. Life and
Times of Samuel Bowles. 2 vols. New York. 1886. Morse, J. T. Abraham Lincoln. 2
vols. Boston. 1894. .
Nason, E. and
Russell, T. Life and Public Services of Henry Wilson. Boston. 1872. Nicolay, J.
G. and Hay, J. Abraham Lincoln, a History. 10 vols. New York. 1890. Pierce, E.
L. Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner. 4 vols. Boston. 1877-93. Poore, B. P.
Perley’s Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis.
2 vols.
Philadelphia. 1886.
Salter, W.
Life of J. W. Grimes. New York. 1876.
Schuckers, J.
W. Life and Public Services of Salmon P. Chase. New York. 1874. Selbome, Earl
of. Memorials, Personal and Political, 1865-95. Vol. hi. London. 1898.
Seward, F. W.
Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State. New York. 1891.
Sherman, J.
Recollections of Forty Years. Chicago. 1895.
Storey, M.
Charles Sumner. Boston. 1900.
Stovall, P.
A. Robert Toombs, Statesman, Speaker, Soldier, Sage. New York. 1892.
Vallandigham, J. L. Life of Clement L. Vallandigham. Baltimore. 1872. Warden,
R. B. Account of the Private Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase.
Cincinnati. 1874.
THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD-POWER.
I. DOCUMENTS.
Congressional
Documents. Documents published by authority of the United States Congress,
consisting of Executive Messages and Reports, Reports of Congressional
Committees, and Miscellaneous Documents. Washington, congressional Record,
containing the Proceedings and Debates in Congress.
Washington.
1873-.
Foreign
Relations of the United States. Washington. 1870-.
Johnston, A.
American Orations. 4 vols. New York. 1896-7.
Moore, J. B.
History and Digest of International Arbitrations. Washington. 1899. Naval
Operations of the War with Spain. Washington. 1898.
Richardson,
J. D. Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 10 vols. Washington.
1896-9.
II. GENERAL WORKS.
Andrews, E.
B. History of the Last Quarter-Century in the United States, 1870-95. 2 vols.
New York. 1895.
Colby, F. M.
and Peck, H. T. The International Year Book. New York. 1898, and subsequent
years.
Hart, A. B.
American History told by Contemporaries. Vol. iv. Welding of the. Nation,
1845-1900. New York. 1901.
Wilson, W.
History of the American People. 5 vols. New York. 1902.
III. SPECIAL WORKS.
(A) Government
and Constitutional Law.
Bryce, J. The
American Commonwealth. 2 vols. New York. 1893.
Burgess, J.
W. Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law. 2 vols. Boston.
1890-1.
Carson, H. L.
The Supreme Court of the United States. Philadelphia.
1891. Chambum, A. de. Droits et Libertes aux ^tats-Unis. Paris.
1891.
Cooley, T. M.
Constitutional Limitations upon the Legislative Power of the States.
6th ed.
Boston. 1890.
Coxe, B. An
Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation. Philadelphia.
1893. '
Follet, M. P.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives. New York. 1896. Goodnow, F. J.
Administrative Law : An Analysis of the Administrative Systems, National and
Local, of the United States, England, France, and Germany. New York. 1893.
Hare, J. I.
C. American Constitutional Law. Boston. 1889.
Magoon, C. E.
Reports on the Law of Civil Government in Territory subject to Military
Occupation by the Military Forces of the United States. Washington.
1902.
M°Conachie,
L. G. Congressional Committees : a Study of the Origin and Development of our
National and Local Legislative Methods. New York. 1898. Miller, S. F. Lectures
on the Constitution of the United States. New York. 1891. Moore, J. B.
Extradition and Interstate Rendition. Boston. 1891.
Wilcox, D.
The Study of City Government. New York. 1897.
Wilson, W.
Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. Boston. 1885.
(B) Descriptive
Works.
Foreman, J.
The Philippine Islands. New York. 1899.
Heilprin, A.
Alaska and the Klondike. New York. 1899.
Rowan, A. S.
and Ramsey, M. M. The Island of Cuba. New York. 1896.
Shaler, N. S.
The United States of America. 2 vols. New York. 1894. Worcester, T>. C. The
Philippine Islands and their People. New York. 1898.
(C) Miscellaneous.
Adams, C. F.
Lee at Appomattox, and other papers. Boston and New York. 1902. Callahan, J. M.
Cuba and International Relations. Baltimore. 1899. Chamberlain, J. L.
[American] Universities and their Sons. 5 vols. 1899.
Flint, G.
Marching with Gomez. New York and London. 1898.
Ford, W. C. John
Quincy Adams, his Connection with the Monroe Doctrine.
Cambridge,
Mass. 1902.
Foster, J. W.
A Century of American Diplomacy. Boston. 1900.
Godkin, E. L.
Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy. Boston. 1898.
Hart, A. B.
Foundations of American Foreign Policy. New York and London.
1901.
jatane, J. H.
The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America.
Baltimore.
1900.
Lodge, H. C.
The War with Spain. New York and London. 1899.
Maclay, E. S.
History of the United States Navy. Vol. hi.
New York. 1901. Mahan, A. T. The Interest of America in Sea-Power. Boston.
1897.
Lessons of the War with Spain. Boston. 1899.
Reddaway, W.
F. The Monroe Doctrine. Cambridge, Eng. 1898.
Schuyler, E.
American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Commerce. New York. 1886.
Titherington,
R. H. History of the Spanish-American War. New York. 1900. Tucker, G. F. The
Monroe Doctrine. Boston. 1885.
IV. BIOGRAPHIES, ETC.
Boutwell,
G. S. Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs. 2 vols. New York. 1902. '
Hamilton,
Gail (Dodge, M. A.). Biography of James G. Blaine. Norwich, Ver
1895.
Hayes, E.
Lucius Q. C. Lamar: his Life, Times, and Speeches, 1825-93.
Nashville,
Tenn. 1896.
Sherman, J.
Recollections of Forty Years in House, Senate, and Cabinet. 2 vols. New York. 1895.
Thompson, R.
W. Recollections of Sixteen Presidents. 2 vols. Indianapolis. 1894.
I.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Bowker, R. R.
and Iles. Reader’s Guide in Economic, Social, and Political Science. New York.
1891.
Dewey, D. R.
Financial History of the United States (New York, 1903) contains the best
bibliography on financial history.
II. GENERAL WORKS.
Bolles, A. S.
Industrial History of the United States. New York. ' 1878. (Covers agriculture
and trade as well as industry.)
Depew, C.
(editor). One Hundred Years of American Commerce. 2 vols. New York. 1896.
Gannett, H.
Building of a Nation: growth, present condition, and resources of the United
States. New York. 1895.
Lador, J. J.
Cyclopedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and Political History of
the United States. 3 vols. Chicago. 1881-4.
Peto, Sir S.
Morton. Resources and Prospects of America. London. 1866.
Report of the
Industrial Commission. 19 vols. Washington. 1900-2. A comprehensive and very
valuable report to Congress on economic conditions, including, besides the
printed evidence and the Commission’s report, important historical and
descriptive monographs.
Shaler, N. S.
(editor). The United States of America. 2 vols. New York. 1894.
United States
Census, taken each decade from 1790 to 1900. (In addition to the statistical
tables, these volumes contain many valuable historical and descriptive reports
on special subjects.)
Wells, D. A.
Recent Economic Changes. New York. 1889.
Whitney, J.
D. The United States. 1889. Supplement, 1894. Originally contributed to
Encyclopaedia Britannica and reprinted with corrections and supplement.
Woolsey, T.
D. (editor). First Century of the Republic. New York. 1876.
III. SPECIAL WORKS.
(A) Economic
Conditions before the Civil War.
Coxe, T. View
of the United States of America. Philadelphia. 1794. London. 1795.
De Bow, J. D.
B. Industrial Resources of the South and West. 3 vols. New Orleans. 1853.
(Articles alphabetically arranged.)
Eighty Years'
Progress in the United States. Hartford. 1867.
McGregor, J.
Commercial Statistics of America, printed separately from the renei ¥ork
entitled Progress of America. London. 1847.
Pitkin, T.
Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States. 2nd ed. New Haven. 1835
(1st ed. 1817).
Seybert, A.
Statistical Annals. Philadelphia. 1818.
Periodicals.
American
Almanac and Repository of Useful Knowledge. 33 vols. Boston. 1830 to 1863.
De Bow’s
Review. 40 vols. New Orleans. 1846-70.
Hunt’s
Merchant’s Magazine and Commercial Review. 63 vols. New York. 18401870. .
Nile’s Weekly
Register and Nile’s National Register. 73 vols. Baltimore. 1811-48.
(The general
histories should also be consulted, especially Henry Adams, History of the
United States, during the administrations of Jefferson and Madison (voL i, cap.
1 : and vol. ix, cap. 7). J. B. McMaster, History of the People of the United
States (caps. 7, 12, 16, 19, 22, 31, 33, 36, 37, 43-46), and J. F. Rhodes,
History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, vol. in, cap. 12.
(B) Movement
op Population and Public Land Policy.
Chittenden,
H. M. The American Fur Trade of the Far West. 3 vols. New York.
1902.
Donaldson, T.
The Public Domain. 46th Congress. 3rd Session, H. Doc. 47.
Pt. iv.
Washington. 1881.
Hart, A. B.
The Public Land Policy of the United States, in “ Practical Essays in American
Government.” New York. 1893.
Roosevelt,
Th. The Winning of the West. 4 vols. New York. 1889-96.
Sato, S.
History of the Land Question in the United States. Johns Hopkins Univ.
Studies; ser.
4, Nos. 7-9. Baltimore. 1886.
Turner, F. J.
The Significance of the Frontier in American History. Washington.
1894. (Annual Report of the American Historical
Association for 1893.)
United States
Census. Volumes on Population, each decade. See especially Maps in the Eleventh
Census (1890). Population. Vol. i, pp. xviii-xxvm.
(C) The
Tariff.
Adams, H. C.
Taxation in the United States, 1789-1816. Johns Hopkins University Studies;
ser. 2, Nos. 5 and 6. Baltimore. 1884.
Fisk, G. M. Die Handelspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten, 1890-1900. Leipzig.
1900. (Schriften des Vereins fur Social Politik, vol. lxxx.)
Mayo-Smith,
R. and Seligman, E. R. A. The Commercial Policy of the United States, 1860-90. Leipzig. 1892. (Schriften des Vereins fiir Social
Politik, vol. XLIX.)
Rabbeno, Ugo. II Protectionismo Americano. Milan. 1892.
Translation: American Commercial Policy. London. 1895.
Sumner, W. G.
Lectures on the History of Protection in the United States. New York. 1877.
Taussig, F.
W. Tariff History of the United States. New York. 1888. 4th ed. revised, 1898.
(editor). State Papers and Speeches on the
Tariff. Published by Harvard
University.
Cambridge, Mass. 1892.
Young, E.
Special Report on the Customs Tariff Legislation of the United States. Bureau
of Statistics, Treasury Department. Washington. 1873.
(D) Transport
and Internal Comsierce.
Adams, C. F.
Chapters of Erie and other Essays. Boston. 1871.
Andrews, I.
D. Report on Colonial and Lake Trade: 32nd Congress, 1st Sess.;
Sen. Ex. Doc.
No. 112. Washington. 1853.
Bourne, E. G.
History of the Surplus Revenue of 1837. New York. 1888. Callender, G. S. The
Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the
Growth of Corporations. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Boston. Nov. 1902.
Chevalier, M. Histoire et Description des Voies de Communication aux
Etats Unis. 3 vols. Paris. 1840-1.
Flagg, A. C.
Internal Improvements in New York. Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine.
Vols.
xxm-xxv. New York. 1850-1.
Hadley, A. T.
Railroad Transportation. New York. 1885.
Leyen, A. von der. Die Nordamerikanischen Eisenbahnen in ihren
wirtschaftlichen und politischen Beziehungen. Leipzig.
1885.
Ringwalt, J.
L. Development of Transportation Systems in the United States. Philadelphia.
1888.
Tanner, H. K.
A Description of the Canals and Railroads of the United States.
New York.
1840.
White, H. K.
History of the Union Pacific Railway. Chicago. 1895.
The Catalogue
of the Hopkins Railway Library (Publications of Leland Stanford Junior
University, Palo Alto, 1895) may also be consulted.
Government
Publications.
Report of the
Industrial Commission. Vols. rv, x, xix. Washington. 1901.
Reports of
the Interstate Commerce Commission on Statistics of Railroads; annual since
1888.
Reports of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington; annual since 1887.
Report of the
Select Committee on Transportation Routes to the Seaboard; 43rd Congress, 1st
Session, Senate Report, No. 307. Washington. 1874.
Reports on
Internal Commerce. Treasury Department, Bureau of Statistics; annual from 1876
to 1891. (Contain much historical material; see especially the report for 1887
on the Early Commerce of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers.)
(E) Agriculture.
Halle, E. von. Baumwollproduktion und Pflanzungswirtschaft in den Nordamerikanischen
Sudstaaten. Erster
Theil: Die Sklavenzeit (Schmoller’s Forschungen,
xv, 1.) Leipzig. 1897.
Hammond, M.
B. The Cotton Industry, Part I.; Cotton Culture and the Cotton Trade.
(Publications of the American Economic Association, N. S. No. 1.) New York.
1897. (Full bibliography.)
Levasseur, E. L’Agriculture aux Etats Unis. (Memoires de la Societe
Nationale de l’Agriculture de France.) Paris. 1894.
Lewis, J. D.
Agricultural Implements. (Twelfth Census, vol. x.) Washington. 1902.
Olmsted, F.
L. The Cotton Kingdom. 2 vols. London and New York. 1861.
Schumacher, H. Der Getreidehandel in den Vereinigten Staaten. (Jahrbiicher
fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik, vol. x, 1895.)
Bering, M. Die landwirtschaftliche Konkurrenz Nordamerika’s. Leipzig. 1887.
Government
Publications.
Annual
Beports and Year Books of the Department of Agriculture. (Prior to 1862,
agricultural reports were printed as part of the report of the Commissioner of
Patents; 1862-1888, as Reports of Commissioner of Agriculture; since 1889, as
Reports of Secretary of Agriculture.)
Monthly
Summary of Commerce and Finance, Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department:
Jan. 1900,
The Grain Trade of the United States.
March 1900,
The Cotton Trade of the United States.
Report of the
Industrial Commission. Washington. 1900-2. Vols. vi, x, xi.
United States
Census: the volumes on Agriculture contain valuable descriptive and historical
reports.
(F) Manufactures.
Bishop, J. L.
History of American Manufactures, from 1608 to I860. 2 vols. Philadelphia.
1864. 3rd edition. 3 vols. 1868.
Bolles, A. S.
Industrial History of the United States. New York. 1878.
Ladd, S. B.
Patents in Relation to Manufactures. Twelfth Census, vol. x.
Struthers, J.
(ed.). The Mineral Industry, its Statistics, Technology, and Trade, to the end
of 1901. New York. 2nd ed. 1903. (Vol. x of a series of Year-books published by
the Engineering and Mining Journal.)
Swank, D. M.
History of the manufacture of Iron in all Ages, and particularly in the United
States. Philadelphia. 1884. 2nd ed. 1892.
Taussig, F.
W. Tariff History of the United States. 4th ed. New York. 1898.
The Iron Industry in the United States.
Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. xiv.
Boston. Feb. and Aug. 1900.
The Great
Industries of the United States. Hartford. 1872. (Contributed by various
writers.)
Wright, C. D.
Industrial Evolution of the United States. New York. 1895. (Chautauqua Series.)
Government
Publications.
Department of
Labour; Hand and Machine Labour; Annual Report for 1898.
Monthly
Summary of Commerce and Finance, Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department :
Feb. 1900,
The Provision Trade of the United States.
Apr. 1900,
The Coal Trade of the United States.
Aug. 1900,
The Iron and Steel Trade of the United States.
Dec. 1900,
The Shipping Industry of the United States.
Report of the
Industrial Commission. Vols. vn, xiv, xix. Washington. 1900-2.
United States
Census: The volumes on manufactures include special reports on the history of
particular industries.
United States
Geological Survey; Mineral Resources of the United States; annual since 1878.
(G) Immigration.
Brownwell, W.
J. History of Immigration into the United States. New York. 1866.
Mayo-Smith,
R. Emigration and Immigration. (Bibliography.) New York. 1890.
Report of the
New York Bureau of Labour Statistics (pp. 963-1148). Albany. 1898.
Report of the
Industrial Commission. Vols. xv, xix. (Final Report.) Washington. 1900-2.
Walker, F. A.
Discussions in Economics and Statistics. Vol. u. New York. 1899.
(H) Conditions
of Labour.
Department of
Labor: Reports of. Washington. Annual since 1885.
„ Bulletin of. Washington. Bi-monthly since
1896.
Ely, R. T.
The Labor Movement in America. New York. 1886.
Levacseur,
E. L’Ouvrier Americain. Paris. 1898. (Translation) The American Workman.
Baltimore, 1901.
McNeil, G.
E., and others. The Labor Movement. Boston. 1886.
Report of the
Industrial Commission. Vols. vn, viii, xn,
xiv, xvii, xix. (Final
Report.) Washington. 1900-2.
(I) Recent Combinations of Capital.
Halle, E.
von. Trusts; or Industrial Combinations in the United States. (Contains a
bibliography.) New York. 1895.
Jenks, J. W.
The Trust Problem. 2nd ed. New York. 1903.
Report of the
Industrial Commission. Vols. i, ii,
xm. (Contains a bibliography.) xix. (Final Report.) Washington. 1900-2.
Rousiers, P. de. Les Industries Monopolisms aux Etats Unis. Paris.
1898.
(J) Recent Commercial Statistics.
Bradstreet’s
Journal of Trade, Finance, and Public Economy. New York (issued weekly).
Commerce and
Navigation, Treasury Department (annual).
Commercial
and Financial Chronicle. New York (issued weekly).
Commercial
Relations, State Department. Washington (annual).
Monthly
Summary of Commerce and Finance, Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department.
Statistical
Abstract, Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department (annual).
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Foley, P. K. American
Authors [1795-1895] ; a Bibliography of First and Notable Editions
chronologically arranged, with Notes. Boston. 1897.
Sabin, J.
Bibliotheca Americana; a Dictionary of Books relating to America. 20 vols. New
York. 1868-92.
The extensive
bibliographical materials in Justin Winsor’s Narrative and Critical History of
America (8 vols., Boston, 1889), and in the Guide to the Study of American
History, by Channing and Hart (Boston, 1897), are chiefly historical, but are
also of great service in the study of American literature.
The literary
histories of Professor Bronson and Professor Wendell contain classified
bibliographies of American literature.
II. COLLECTIONS.
Duyckinck, E.
A. and G. L. Cyclopaedia of American Literature. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1875.
Griswold, R.
W. The Poets and Poetry of America. Philadelphia. 1842.
Prose Writers of America. Philadelphia. 1847.
Stedman, E.
C. An American Anthology. Boston. 1900.
Stedman, E.
C. and Hutchinson, E. M. Library of American Literature. 11 vols. New York.
1888-90.
III. DOCUMENTS.
(A) Pre-Revolutionary
Era.
Edwards,
Jonathan. Works. 10 vols. New York. 1829-30.
Franklin,
Benjamin. Works. Edited by J. Bigelow. 10 vols. New York. 1887-8.
Autobiography. Edited by J. Bigelow. 3 vols.
Philadelphia. 1875.
Mather,
Cotton. Magnalia: first edition, London, 1702; reprinted in 2 vols., Hartford.
1820 and 1853.
(B) Post-Revolutionary Era.
(i) Religion and Philosophy.
Charming, W.
E. Works. Boston. 1886.
Dial, The : A
Magazine for Literature, Philosophy, and Religion. 4 vols. Boston. 1840-4.
Emerson, R.
W. Works. 14 vols. Boston. 1883-7.
Thoreau, H.
D. Works. 11 vols. Boston. 1899-1900.
(ii) Literature.
Atlantic
Monthly, The. Boston. 1857, etc.
Brown, C. B. Novels. 6 vols. Philadelphia. 1887.
Bryant, W. C.
Poetical Works. Edited by Parke Godwin. 2 vols. New York.
1883.
Prose Writings. Edited by Godwin. 2 vols. New
York. 1884.
Choate, R.
Works, with Memoir by S. G. Brown. 2 vols. Boston. 1862. Cooper, J. F. Novels.
32 vols. New York. 1896.
Everett, E. Orations
and Speeches on Various Occasions. 4 vols. Boston. 1853-68.
Hawthorne,
Nathaniel. Works. 15 vols. Boston. 1882-4.
Holmes, O. W.
Works. 15 vols. Boston. 1892-6.
Irving,
Washington. Works. 40 vols. New York. 1891-7.
Knickerbocker,
The, or New York Monthly Magazine. 60 vols. New York. 1833-62.
Knickerbocker
Gallery, The : A Testimonial to the Editor of the Knickerbocker Magazine from
its Contributors. New York. 1855.
Longfellow,
H. W. Works. 14 vols. Boston. 1886-91.
Lowell, J. R.
Works. 11 vols. Boston. 1892.
Letters. Edited by C. E. Norton. 2 vols. New
York. 1894.
Motley, J. L.
Works. 17 vols. New York. 1900.
Parker,
Theodore. Works. Edited by F. P. Cobbe. 12 vols. London. 1863-5. Parkman, F.
Works. 12 vols. Boston. 1900-1.
Phillips,
Wendell. Speeches, Lectures, and Letters. 2 vols. Boston. 1863, 1892. Poe, E.
A. Works. Edited by E. C. Stedman and G. E. Woodberry. 10 vols. Chicago.
1894-5.
Prescott, W.
H. Works. Edited by J. F. Kirk. 12 vols. Philadelphia. 1890-2. Stowe, H. B.
Works. 16 vols. Boston. 18HG-8.
Sumner, C.
Works. 15 vols. Boston. 1874-83.
Ticknor, G.
History of Spanish Literature. 3 vols. New York. 1849.
Trumbull, J.
Poetical Works. 2 vols. Hartford. 1820.
Webster,
Daniel. Works. 6 vols. Boston. 1851.
Whitman,
Walt. Complete Prose Works. Boston. 1898.
Leaves of Grass. Boston. 1898.
Whittier, J.
G. Works. 9 vols. Boston. 1892-4.
(iii) Education.
Barnard, H.
The American Journal of Education. 31 vols. Hartford. 1855-81.
Reports of the Commissioner of Education.
Vols. i and h. Washington.
1867, 1870.
Mann, H.
Reports as Secretary of the Board of Education of Massachusetts 12 vols.
Boston. 1838-49.
For other
works of Barnard and Mann, and for the names and works of less distinguished
American Educators, see Monroe, W. S. Bibliography of Education. New York.
1897.
IV. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.
A. General
Works.
Bronson, W.
C. A Short History of American Literature. Boston. 1902.
Nichol, J.
American Literature: an Historical Sketch, 1620-1880. Edinburgh.
1882.
Pancoast, H.
S. An Introduction to American Literature. New York. 1898. Richardson, C. F.
American Literature, 1607-1885. 2 vols. New York. 1893-4. Stedman, B. C. Poets
of America. Boston. 1885.
Tyler, M. C.
A History of American Literature during the Colonial Time [16071765]. 2 vols.
New York. 1897.
The Literary History of the American
Revolution. 2 vols. New York. 1897
Wendell,
Barrett. A Literary History of America. New York. 1900.
Whitcomb, S.
L. Chronological Outlines of American Literature. New York. 1894.
B. Special.
(1) Pre-Revolutionary
Era.
Allen, A. V.
G. Jouathan Edwards. Boston. 1889.
Holmes, O. W.
Jonathan Edwards. Works, vm, 361-401. (See above.)
Marvin, A. B.
P. The Life and Titnes. of Cottou Mather. Boston; 1892. McMaster, J. B.
Benjamin Franklin. Boston. 1887.
Morse, J. T.,
jr. Benjamin Franklin. Boston. 1889.
Stephen, Sir
L. Jonathan Edwards. Hours in a Library. 2nd series, cap. 2. London. 1876.
Wendell,
Barrett. Cotton Mather, the Puritan Priest. New York. 1891.
(2) Post-Revolutionary
Era.
(a)
Law.
Soule, C. C.
The Lawyer’s Reference Manual of Law Books and Citations. Boston.
1883. This contains: “ I. A List of American
Reports, Digests, and Statutes, with brief notes in regard to editions and
peculiarities. III. Au Index of Authors, etc. IV. An Index of Subjects,
covering...elementary works and periodicals.”
(b) Religion and Philosophy.
Cabot, J. E.
A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson. 2 vols. Boston. 1887.
Channing, W.
H. Memoirs of William Ellery Channing. 3 vols. Boston. 1848.
Cooke, G. W.
The Dial: an Historical and Biographical Introduction, with a List of the
Contributors, in Journal of Speculative Philosophy, xix, 225-265, 322, 323. New
York. 1885.
Unitariauism in America. Boston. 1902.
Dexter, H. M.
The Congregationalism of the Last Three Hundred Years, as seen in its
Literature. New York. 1880. Contains a bibliography of more than seven thousand
titles.
Emerson, R.
W. Thoreau. Works, x. 421-452.
Fiske, J. New
France and New England (Cap. vx). Boston. 1902.
Frothingham,
O. B. Transcendentalism in New England : A History. New York. 1876.
Holmes, O. W.
Ralph Waldo Emerson. Boston. 1885.
Lowell, J. R.
Emerson the Lecturer. Works, i. 349 ff. (See p. 831.)
Thoreau. Works, i. 361 ff.
Peabody, A.
P., in Winsor’s Memorial History of Boston. Vol. m. Chap. xi.
Boston.
1880-1.
Sanborn, F.
B. Henry David Thoreau. Boston. 1882.
Sanborn, F.
B., and Harris, W. T. Amos Bronson Alcott, His Life and Philosophy.
2 vols.
Boston. 1893.
Stevenson, R.
L. Essay on Thoreau. Works (Thistle Edition), xiv. 116-149.
Swift, L. Brook
Farm: Its Members, Scholars, and Visitors. New York. 1900.
(c) Literature.
Austin, G. L.
Life and Times of Wendell Phillips. Boston. 1888.
Bigelow, J.
William Cullen Bryant. Boston. 1890.
Brown, S. G.
Life of Rufus Choate. Boston. 1870.
Burroughs, J.
Whitman: A Study. Boston. 1896.
Chapman, J.
J. Emerson and other Essays. New York. 1898.
Clymer, W. B.
S. James Fenimore Cooper. Boston. 1900.
Curtis, G. T.
Life of Daniel Webster. 2 vols. New York. 1870.
Dunlop, W.
Life of Charles Brockden Brown. 2 vols. Philadelphia. 1815. Famham, C. H. Life
of Francis Parkman. Boston. 1900.
Fields, Mrs
J. T. Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe. Boston. 1897.
Frothingham,
O. B. Theodore Parker: A Biography. Boston. 1874.
Grates, L. E.
Studies and Appreciations. [Hawthorne, Poe, etc.] New York. 1900. Godwin,
Parke. Biography of William Cullen Bryant, with Extracts from his Private
Correspondence. 2 vols. New York. 1883.
Hawthorne,
Julian. Nathaniel Hawthorne and his Wife. 2 vols. Boston. 1885. Higginson, T.
W. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Boston. 1902.
John Greenleaf Whittier. New York. 1902.
Wendell Phillips. Boston. 1884.
Holmes, O. W.
John Lothrop Motley. A Jlemoir. Boston. 1879.
Irving, P. M.
Life and Letters of Washington Irving. 4 vols. New York.
1862-4.
James, H.
Hawthorne. London. 1879.
Lodge, H. C.
Daniel Webster. Boston. 1883.
Longfellow,
S. Life of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, with Extracts from his Journals and
Correspondence. 3 vols. Boston. 1891.
Lounshury, T.
R. James Fenimore Cooper. Boston. 1883.
Morse, J. T.,
jr. Life and Letters of Oliver Wendell Holmes. 2 vols. Boston.
1896.
Pickard, S.
T. Life and Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier. 2 vols. Boston. 1894. Pierce,
E. L. Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner. 4 vols. Boston. 1879-93. Prescott,
W. H. Memoir of Charles Brockden Brown; in Biographical and Critical
Miscellanies. New York. 1845, pp. 1-56.
Scudder, H.
E. James Russell Lowell: a Biography. 2 vols. Boston. 1901. Storey, M. Charles
Sumner. Boston. 1900.
Ticknor, G.
Life of William Hickling Prescott. Boston. 1864.
Ticknor,
Anna. The Life, Letters, and Journals of George Ticknor. 2 vols. Boston. 1876.
Traubel, H.
L. In Re Walt Whitman. Philadelphia. 1893.
Tyler, M. C.
Three Men of Letters (Berkeley, Dwight, Barlow). New York. 1895. Warner, C. D.
Washington Irving. Boston. 1881.
Weiss, J.
Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker. 2 vols. New York.
1864.
Wendell,
Barrett. Stelligeri, and other Essays concerning America (Lowell, Whittier,
etc.). New York. 1893.
Woodberry, G.
E. Edgar Allan Poe. Boston. 1885.
Nathaniel Hawthorne. Boston. 1902.
(d) Education.
Brown, E. E.
The Making of our Middle Schools. New York. 1903.
Butler, N. M.
Education in the United States. 2 vols. Albany. 1900.
Educational
Review. 24 vols. New York. 1891-.
Eliot, C. W.
Educational Reform. New York. 1898.
Hinsdale, B.
A. Horace Mann and the Common School Revival in the United States. New York.
1898.
Martin, G. H.
Evolution of the Massachusetts Public School System. New York.
1894.
National
Educational Association. Report of the Committee of Fifteen on Elementary
Education. New York. 1895.
National
Educational Association. Report of the Committee on College Entrance
Requirements. Chicago. 1899.
Sadler, M. E.
Special Reports on Educational Subjects. Vols. x, xi. London. 1902.
United States
Bureau of Education Report of the Committee on Secondary School Studies, etc.
Washington. 1893. (Usually known as the “Report of the Committee of Ten.”)
United States
Commissioner of Education. Reports. 45 vols. Washington. 1867, etc.