http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924070596865
THE
PLANNED
BY the late LORD ACTON
REGIUS
PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY
EDITED
BY
A.
W. WARD Litt.D.
G.
W. PROTHERO Litt.D. STANLEY
LEATHES M.A.
VOLUME
XI
THE quarter
of a century which, roughly speaking, is covered by this volume is remarkable
as being an epoch of violent international and civic disturbance, interposed
between two generations of almost unbroken peace—the period 1815-45, and that
from 1871 to the present day. It is also, from the point of view of Universal
History, the most important period since the Congress of Vienna. Indeed, the
changes made in the map of Europe between 1859 and 1871 were in some respects
greater and more permanent than the final results of the warfare which ended in
that great pacification. The effects produced by the French Revolution and the
reign of the first Napoleon in the domain of political ideas—especially in
regard to notions of selfgovernment and the spirit of nationality—were indeed
immense and enduring. But the alterations which the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars made in the distribution of power and in international
relations were too sweeping to last. They called forth a hostile reaction as
overwhelming as the impulse which produced them; and the balance of power which
resulted from the Congress of Vienna differed in no essential respects from
that which existed before 1789.
The following
generation saw some notable changes in political conditions—the overthrow of
Legitimism in France; the separation of Holland and Belgium; the liberation of
Greece from the Turk, and other reductions of Ottoman power. But, thirty years
after the Congress, its work still remained almost intact. The revolutionary
and nationalist efforts in Poland and Italy had failed ; the unitary movement
in Germany had made little progress except in the Zollverein, the political
effect of which was as yet hardly perceived; reform and reaction were still at
grips in the Iberian peninsula; the obstinate conservatism of Mettemich
continued to dominate Europe.
But with the
Revolution of February a new stage in European development begins. The next
four years (1848-52) were a period of
violent
oscillation—not so much in international relations as in the domestic affairs
of France, Italy, and central Europe. Already, for some years previously, the
mutterings of the coming storm could be perceived by those who had ears to
hear; but there was no apparent reason to suppose that the new efforts of
political reformers and ardent nationalists would be more successful than those
which had preceded them. Nor indeed were they, so far as superficial
appearances went. The outbreak of 1848 was far more violent and more widespread
than the movements of 1820 and 1830; but, though for some time the
revolutionary element seemed to be gaining the upper hand, the tide ultimately
turned and the reaction everywhere prevailed. The Austrian monarchy, after a
severe struggle, not only reestablished itself in its own dominions but
recovered its hold upon northern Italy. In Bohemia the rising spirit of Slav
nationality led to a futile revolt; elsewhere in the Austrian dominions it
served as a set-off against the Magyar; and, with the aid of Russia, the
insurrection in Hungary was put down. Thus strengthened aiid encouraged,
Francis Joseph had little difficulty in regaining the hegemony of Germany, and
reducing Prussia at Olmiitz to her former secondary position. In France the
Republic collapsed, more from its inherent weakness and the mistakes of its
leaders, than from any active opposition; -and another Napoleon advanced, by
rapid stages, from Presidency to Empire. This was the most notable change
produced by the Revolution.of February; but two others had consequences
ultimately as important. In Germany Prussia, in Italy Piedmont, had stood forth
as the champions of national unity; and each had adopted a constitutional form
of government. In their nationalist efforts both countries failed—Piedmont
heroically, Prussia not without humiliation ; but each remained the centre of
nationalist hopes. These events, combined with the aims and character of
Napoleon III, the circumstances of his accession, and the appearance, in Italy
and Prussia, of two of the greatest statesmen of modem times, determined the
course of European development during the next eighteen years (1852-70).
This period
(that of the Second Empire) falls into two divisions, marked respectively by
the rise and dominance, the decay and fall, of Napoleon’s power. Anxious to
allay the fears excited by his name, he began by proclaiming the pacific
intentions of the Empire. But he could not forget that military distinction was
expected from a Napoleon, or disregard the conviction of Frenchmen that France
ought to be the
arbiter of
Europe. He therefore grasped the opportunity of selfassertion afforded by the
state of Turkey and the question of the Holy Places, and, departing from the
policy of Louis-Philippe, made war, in conjunction with Great Britain, on
Russia in defence of the Turk. The internal dissensions and the vacillating
policy of the British Ministry had left the initiative in the preliminary
negotiations to Napoleon; and he retained it throughout the armed conflict
which ended, to the dearly- bought advantage of the Allies, in the Treaty of
Paris. That the Peace of 1856 was not more unfavourable to Russia was due to
Napoleon’s desire to leave the way open for a complete reconciliation with the
defeated Power.
With a
reputation considerably enhanced both at home and abroad by this success, his
throne apparently established, and the succession secured by the birth of a
son, Napoleon now set about carrying into effect a policy which he conceived to
be a heritage from his uncle and at the same time worthy of France—namely, the
championship of oppressed nationalities. The most flagrant example of a
nationality oppressed, and that which most nearly concerned France, was to be
found in Italy. Hence the understanding with Sardinia, foreshadowed at the
Conference of Paris,1 which led to the war of 1859. The Peace of
Villafranca left the work of emancipation incomplete and Napoleon’s promises
only half fulfilled. When the Emperor retired, the work of liberating Italy was
taken up by a stronger and more determined spirit, that of Cavour, whose vigorous
and astute policy had, ever since the dark days of Novara, prepared his country
for the coming struggle. The union of Italy was brought about by a skilful
mixture of audacity and caution, of war and diplomacy, of action and reserve;
and Cavour lived to see his work accomplished, save that at his death the
Austrians were still in Venice, and a French garrison in Rome. Napoleon’s
scheme of liberating an oppressed nationality had prospered far beyond his
original intention or desire; and the annexation of Savoy and Nice hardly
compensated for the closing of the door to French ambitions in the peninsula.
Cavour had
used Napoleon in order to carry out his schemes for the union of Italy.
Meanwhile, in the north, another great statesman was watching events and
forming his plans for still more momentous action. In the year after Cavour’s
death, Bismarck was called to power in Prussia. His first task was to forge the
military weapon without which his policy of “ blood and iron ” could not hope
to succeed. Abroad he recognised
the
supreme importance to Prussia of a good understanding with her eastern
neighbour; and the Polish insurrection of 1863 gave him the opportunity of
cementing the friendship with Russia for which Prussia’s ■attitude in the
Crimean War had paved the way. But Bismarck’s originality showed itself most
momentously in the policy which he adopted towards Austria. In the debate
between the parties of “Great” and “Little” Germany, Bismarck ruled the former
decisively out of court. No longer obsequious to the traditions of the Holy
Roman Empire, Prussia was to revive those of Frederick the Great and to strike
boldly for the headship of Germany. .
The revival
in 1863 of the Schleswig-Holstein question, which had played an important part
in the German movement of 1848, gave Bismarck the opportunity of putting this
policy into execution, and of testing the capacities of his new army in the
field. The duchies once taken from Denmark, it was not difficult to pick a
quarrel with Austria over their tenure. Austria, attacked on two sides, was
victorious at Custozza, but her crushing defeat at Koniggratz decided the
German question against her; and Prussia, strengthened by annexations in
northern Germany, became the unquestioned head of a new confederation. As for
Italy, though defeated, she had her reward in Venetia.
It was
France—it has been well said—rather than Austria, that was beaten at
Koniggratz; and Napoleon was not slow in perceiving that the result was one
which menaced the power and even the security of France. He had vainly
intervened in regard to Poland in 1863—an action which only served to alienate
Russia. His refusal to interfere in the question of the duchies in the
following year offended England without conciliating Germany. Meanwhile difficulties,
at home and abroad, gathered round the Second Empire. In the Legislative Body
an opposition, hardly perceptible at first, was gradually growing in numbers
and influence. The ill-advised and unfortunate expedition to Mexico was
draining his resources and undermining his influence. To the Emperor, then, it
seemed increasingly necessary that France should obtain some compensation for
the growth of her neighbours in territory and power. The compensation which he
specially coveted lay on the left bank of the Rhine, or in Belgium. When the
Seven Weeks’ War broke out, Napoleon looked to a prolonged struggle which would
enable him to intervene between the exhausted combatants at his own price. But
he was not prepared for action, and his hopes were dashed by the
rapid
conclusion of peace. Subsequently he opened secret negotiations with Prussia,
but Bismarck bluntly repelled the suggestions to which he had formerly appeared
to listen, and made use of them to bring the States of southern Germany into a
close military alliance with Prussia.
From this
moment a conflict between France and Germany became practically inevitable. To
the majority of Napoleon’s advisers it appeared essential that the consummation
of German unity should at all costs be prevented. Bismarck looked to a war with
France as the only way to its accomplishment. The conflict appeared likely to
break out over the question of Luxemburg (1867); but Bismarck was not ready,
nor did he regard the matter as one likely to enlist the ardent sympathy of the
whole German nation. He accordingly accepted a compromise and awaited a better
occasion. Meanwhile in France, the system of government was rapidly passing,
under the increasing pressure of the parliamentary opposition, from an
autocracy into a constitutional monarchy, without, however, any gain of
popularity for the Emperor, whose concessions appeared due rather to weakness
than generosity. The disastrous failure of his plans in Mexico diminished his
resources, and dealt a heavy blow to his reputation.
Dreading a
single-handed collision with Prussia, he sought to strengthen himself by
alliances. His natural allies were Austria and Italy. With the object of
winning over Victor Emmanuel, Napoleon made the Convention of September, and
removed his troops from Rome. But Garibaldi was not to be restrained; and
Mentana forged anew the fatal link which bound Napoleon to the Vatican. So long
as French troops held the gates of Rome, there could be no alliance between
France and Italy. Austria lent a more willing ear; and overtures made with the
utmost secrecy at Vienna seemed to promise a hopeful result. Time however was
needed for Austria to prepare; and time was not to be allowed.
Secret as the
negotiations were, Bismarck was awake to the fact that a league against him was
in contemplation, and he resolved to anticipate it. The Revolution in Spain and
the difficulty of finding anyone to fill the vacant but precarious Spanish
throne,’ gave him the opportunity of fastening a quarrel on France, which would
appear to put that country in the wrong, and would give him that whole-hearted
support in Germany which was requisite for a successful war. The last phase in
the
c.
M. H. XI. ®
episode of
the Hohenzollem candidature was so managed as to produce this twofold result;
and the war for which Bismarck had so long been preparing burst on an
astonished Europe. A series of overwhelming victories hurled the Empire to the
ground; the heroic resistance of France was, with more difficulty, overcome;
and Paris itself fell into the invaders’ hands. Already German unity—the great
result at which Bismarck had aimed—had sprung from the triumph of combined
Germanic effort; and the new Empire was proclaimed amid the painted victories
of the Roi Soleil. In Paris the horrors of the Commune followed, like the fire
after the earthquake, on the disasters of the war; and, when the Commune fell,
royalist intrigues threatened and embarrassed the French Government. It was
only slowly and with difficulty that the Third Republic established itself, and
the maimed and shattered State recovered domestic repose. But the hegemony of
Europe—if indeed Napoleon III had ever really possessed it—had definitively
passed across the Rhine.
Directly
connected with that nationalistic policy which is so striking a feature of the
central story of this volume are the awakenings and developments of national
spirit or enthusiasm in the life and literature of Italy, Germany, and Hungary,
and also among the Slavonic races— fiechs, Poles, and Russians—to which
attention is drawn in the following narrative. Much else of interest and
importance—notably the Mutiny in India, the steady advance of British colonies
towards self-government, the rapid progress of British trade, the awakening of
Japan and the revolution in that country which substituted a highly organised
modem State for a loose congeries of feudal principalities—is also to be told.
The great contemporary events in America, the Civil War and the victory of the
Northern States over slavery and the forces of disruption, have already been
narrated in another volume.
It remains
only for the Editors to acknowledge their debts to the distinguished scholars
who have aided them in this portion of their enterprise. Sir Alfred Lyall,
acting as the literary executor of the late Sir Spencer Walpole, gave final
revision to Chapters XI and XII. The Bibliographies to these chapters were
compiled by Professor J. H. Clapham (now Assistant Tutor of King’s College) to
whom we are also indebted for valuable suggestions and criticisms with regard
to these and other chapters in the present volume. In connexion with the same
two chapters valuable information was given as to the Income Tax and Succession
Duty by Mr T.
A. Prest, of Somerset House. To Mr R. W. Seton- Watson, who kindly read through
Chapter XV, 1 and Chapter XXII, 4, we owe some valuable suggestions upon these
sections. The latter section had the additional benefit of revision by
Professor Askenazy, of Lemberg University. We are much indebted to Mr Ignatius
Knaster for his services in connexion with this section. Dr Zsolt Beothy,,
Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Budapest, gave valuable-
assistance in Chapter XV, 3, and allowed some quotations from his own works to
appear therein. Dr Eugen Horvdth, Professor in the Gyongyos: Gymnasium,
Hungary, rendered assistance, especially in the Bibliographies to Chapters
III, VI, VII, XV. To Professors H. Delbriick, of Berlin, and F. Meinecke, of
Freiburg, the Editors owe special thanks for their counsel as to several of the
chapters on recent German history.
In Chapter
XXVII, 1, Mr E. A. Benians, Fellow of St John’s College, Cambridge, offered
valuable suggestions. The Right Honourable Sir Charles Tupper revised the whole
of Chapter XXVII, 2, and inserted in it some new information derived from his
own vast experience in Canadian politics. Chapter XXVII, 3 was carefully
revised by Mr F. H. Keeling, Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge; and the
accompanying Bibliography was in large part composed by him and by Mr T. A.
Boose, Librarian of the Colonial Institute. It may be well to state that,
though the lamented death of Professor Masi occurred before this volume was
published, Chapters IV, XIV, and XIX had received the benefit of his final
revision. The Index to this volume has been compiled by Mr H. G. Aldis, of
Peterhouse and the University Library, who has also given other assistance.
Finally, we
desire to state that, in consequence of the illness of one of our number, his
editorial duties with regard to the present volume were, from an early stage in
the progress of its chapters through the Press, undertaken by Mr H. W. V.
Temperley, Fellow of Peterhouse. He has discharged the task which thus devolved
upon him with conspicuous ability and devotion, and we desire to assure him of
our cordial gratitude.
A. W. W.
G. W. P.
S. L.
November,
1908.
b
2
CHAPTER I.
GREAT BRITAIN
AND FREE TRADE.
(1841-52.)
By J. H. Clapham, M.A., Fellow and Assistant
Tutor in History of King’s College.
PAGE
State
of the country ..... ... 1
Peel’s
Cabinet ... 2
Financial
Reform. The Com Laws 3
Revival
of the Income Tax ib.
Laissez Faire. The Railways • . . 4
Factory
and Bank Acts ib.
The
Tractarian crisis 5
Its
Disruption ' . 6
Irish
affairs ........... 7
O’Connell
and Young Ireland ib.
Peel’s
Irish policy 8
The
Com Laws 9
and
the Potato Famine 10
Repeal
of the Corn Laws ii.-ll
Irish
Coercion Act 11
Peel’s
fall....... ib.
Political
unrest 13
Russell’s
Cabinet 14
Commercial
distress
ib.
Sugar and Timber Duties. Navigation
Laws ....
15
Repeal of the Navigation Laws.
Colonial policy . . . 16
Foreign policies of Aberdeen and
Palmerston ....
16-7
The
Churches .......... 18
The
Ecclesiastical Titles Bill 19
Chartism....... ib.
Social legislation and conditions.
Emigration ....
20
Confusion and rearrangement of
parties 21
CHAPTER II.
THE FALL OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN FRANCE. (1840-8.)
By IiImile Bourgeois, Professor of History
in the University of Paris.
PAOB
Results
of the crisis of 1840 ....... 22
Attitude of the bourgeoisie towards
religion............................ 23
Evolution of the two chief
parliamentary parties ... 26
Parliamentary
reform. The entente cordiaie with England . 28
Foreign
policy and party disputes. The schism between the centres 29
Opposition between Thiers and Guizot 30
Right of Search Convention. Railway
scheme .... 31
The
Regency Act 32
Temporary retirement of Thiers . .
.... 33
Guizot and the Congregations 34
Renewal
of struggle between Guizot and Thiers . . . ib.
French policy in Tahiti and Morocco
......
35
Thiers seeks aid from Palmerston and
Barrot . , . . . 36
Guizot, Thiers and Louis-Philippe 36-7
Dissolution
of the Chambers 37
The situation
in Europe and in France as affected by the Spanish
Marriages.. 38-9
Lamartine
and the banquets 40
Political
indecision of the French people ib.
Guizot’s
internal and foreign policy 41
4>i,esage&
of storm ......... 42
CHAPTER III.
LIBERALISM
AND NATIONALITY IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.
(1840-8.)
By F. Meinecke, Professor of History in the
University of Freiburg i. B.
Opposing
tendencies in Germany 43
Austrian government at the centra 44
Liberal and National movements in
Austria ....
45
Bohemian
demands ib.
Revolt
of peasants in Galicia 46
Austria
annexes Cracow. Nationality struggles in Hungary . 47
Situation
of Prussia ib.
Character
and ideas of Frederick William IV ... .
48
PAGE
His
first measures 49
National movement in Prussia 50
Religious
policy of Frederick William IV 51
The
King’s friends ib.
Connexion between religious and
political movements . . 52
Political
movements and leaders in Silesia and East Prussia, . ib.
And
in the Rhine Province 53
The Zollverein. List and national
economy ....
54
Frederick
William’s constitutional ideas 55
Committees
of the Provincial Diets ib.
Frederick William summons the
Combined Diets ... 56
His
constitutional scheme 57
The
Prussian Liberal Opposition 58
Liberal
opinion in Germany 59
State
of Saxony ib.
Of
Hanover and Baden 60
Of Wurtemberg. Disturbance in Bavaria
....
61
Foreshadowings of revolution 62
Demand for a German National
Parliament’ ....
63
The
King and Radowitz ........ ib.
Plan of Federal Reform and National
Union . ’ . . .
64
CHAPTER IV.
ITALY IN
REVOLUTION.
(1846-9.)
By the late
E. Masi, Professor of History in the University of Florence.
Revolution
and Moderate Reform . . •
D’Azeglio’s I
Oasi di Romagna ....
Gioberti’s Prolegomeni al Primato....
Pellegrino Rossi. Oongressi degli Scienxiati. .
Tuscany.
Naples. Smaller States , . .
Piedmont
Death
of Gregory XVI
The new
situation. Election of Pius IX . .
Character and
education of Mastai . . •
His
friendship with Pasolini. Liberal ideas .
Pius IX’s
Amnesty; its effects in Italy . .
The
Scientific and Agricultural Congresses . .
Further
reforms of Pius IX. His popularity .
Roman
plot
Austrian
occupation of Ferrara . . • •
Increased
hostility to Austria. Piedmont . .
The Two
Sicilies. Rome and Pius IX . .
Rising at
Palermo. Constitutional edict at Naples Constitution granted at Rome. Outburst
at Milan Retreat of Radetzky. Revolution at Venice .
Negotiations
between Milan and Piedmont . .
66
67
68
69
70 ib.
71
72
73
74
75
76 ib.
77
78
79
80 81 82 ib.
PAGE
Republic
of St Mark. Tuscany joins Piedmont .... 83
Situation
in Rome. Manin’s reservation 84
Charles
Albert moves on the Quadrilateral ....
85
March
and counter-march. Battle of Goito ....
86
Radetzky
overruns Venetia. Reaction at Naples ... 87
Austrian
negotiations. Charles Albert attacks Mantua . . 88
He
is defeated. The Salasco armistice 89
Rossi and the
Democratic party . . . . . . ■ 89-90
Murder
of Rossi. Flight of the Pope 91
Tuscany.
Sicily *&•
End
of Sicilian Revolution. Piedmont and Austria ... 92
Battle
of Novara 93
The
catastrophe of the Revolutionary period . ■ . . . ib.
Mazzini
and Garibaldi at Rome ... ... 94
Tuscany
crushed. Fall of Venice ...... 95
CHAPTER V.
THE FRENCH
REPUBLIC.
(1848-52.)
By Professor ]±!mile Bourgeois.
The
prohibited banquet 96
Effects
of the riot of February 22 97
Guizot’s
resignation and its results 98
February
23 and 24 ... 99
February
24... 100
Louis-Philippe abdicates . . , 101
The
deputies at the Corps Ligislatif ib.
Lamartine
and the Hotel de Ville ...... 102
Formation
of a Provisional Government 102-3
First
steps of the Provisional Government............................ 103-4
Paris
and the provinces ib.
Demonstration
of March 16. . . . . . . . 105
Foreign
policy of Lamartine 106
Election of a
Constituent Assembly. Ledru-Rollin and the
departments
107
The Provisional Government resigns 108
Moderates
and Reformers. Effect of the Polish uprising . . 109
Attitude
of the provinces 110
Attitude
of Paris and change of opinion among workmen . . Ill
Struggle
between people and Government............................ 112
Conflict
of June 24 and 25 . ib.
Slaughter
in the suburbs 113
Murder
of the Archbishop of Paris ib.
Suppression
of the insurrection by Cavaignac -■ . . . 114
The
Republican Constitution . . .... 115
Debates
on the Constitution 116
Movement
in favour of Louis Bonaparte 117
Louis
Bonaparte elected President 118
PAOE
Relatione
of Ministry and Assembly ...... 119
Parties in the Assembly ........ 120
The
new Government and Rome ....... 121
Oudinot
sent to Italy ......... 122
Louis Napoleon and the Conservatives 123
Results
of the new elections 124
Dissolution
of the Constituent Assembly 125
The
“Roman campaign at home” 126
Attacks
on the Democratic party 127
Louis
Napoleon and the Holy See 128
The
Prince President’s new Ministry 129
Falloux’
Education Act 130
Bye-elections in Paris and the
departments ....
131
Campaign
against the Republicans 132
The
new Ministers. Parties in the Chamber ....
133
Constitutional
revision rejected by Assembly ....
134
Attitude
of Louis Napoleon. The plot. Morny . . .
135
The
Coup d’etat 136
Events of December 3—8 ,. . 137
Effects
of the Coup d'ttat 138
Victory of the Prince President 139
Measures for the “public safety” 140
Restoration
of hereditary Empire 141
THE
REVOLUTION AND THE REACTION IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA. I.
(1848-9.)
By
A. W. Ward, Litt.D., F.B.A.,
Master of Peterhouse.
Impending
combination of national and radical ideas . . . 142
Early insurrectionary disturbances in
Germany .... 143
National
Parliament demanded. The Vorparlament . . . 144
The
movement in Baden, Mainz and Hesse-Darmstadt . . 145
In
Bavaria and Hesse-Cassel I46
In
Frankfort and Nassau ........ 147
In
Wiirtemberg, Hanover and Saxony 148
In
Saxony. Robert Blum ....... ib.
In Thuringia.... *49
In
Oldenburg and the Hanse Towns ..... 151
The
Austrian Empire before the outbreak ..... 151-2
Beginning
of the Vienna insurrection 163
Resignation and flight of Metternich
......
154
Imperial
manifesto of March 15 *&•
The
new Ministry. Hungary. The Batthyany Ministry . . 155
Croatia
_........
Movement
in Prussia *"•
■ PAGE
Agitation
at Berlin. The “March Days” 157-8
The
King’s ride and proclamation. “Prussia merged in Germany” 159
The
new Prussian Ministry 160
The
Schleswig-Holstein rising 161
Prussian intervention. “Dahlmann’s
Constitution" . . . 162
Sittings
of the Vorparlament 163
Baden.
Posen. Opening of the Frankfort Parliament . . 164
Archduke John elected. Reichsverweser
......
165
Ministers
and parties at Frankfort. The Grundreahte . . 166
The
Schleswig-Holstein War 167
The
Malmoe Truce and the Frankfort Parliament . . . 168
Murder of Lichnowsky and Auerswald 169
Agitated condition of Vienna 170
Weakness
of the Austrian Government. Pillersdorff . . . 171
The
Hungarian Ministry and its legislation ....
172
The
Magyars ,and the Slavs. Attitude of Kossuth . . . 173
The
Government Constitution 174
Central
Political Committee. The Emperor’s departure . . 175 Committee of- Safety. Regency of Archduke John. Doblhoff’s
Ministry..... 176
Jellacid.. The Slav Congress at
Prague 177
Windischgratz
subdues the Prague insurrection .... 178
The
Reichstag at Vienna . . . . . . . . 179
The
Croatian Diet ......... ib.
The
Hungarian Diet. Jellacid 180
Kossuth’s
financial measures 181
Imminence
of the Austro-Hungarian conflict ....
182
Batthyany.
Jellagic invades Hungary 183
Hungarian preparations. Murder Ojf
Lamberg .... 184
Austria declares war. Riots at Vienna 185
Insurrection at Vienna. Murder of
Latour ....
186
The
Emperor at Olmutz ........ ib.
Investment
of Vienna 187
Windischgratz before Vienna 188
Battle
of Schwechat. Capture of Vienna. Arrests and executions 189
Schwarzenberg’s
Ministry. Reichstag at Kremsier . . . 190
The
new Constitution ......... ib.
The
Prussian Government 191
The
Prussian “National Assembly” and the King . . . 192
The Brandenburg-Manteuffel Ministry 193
The
National Assembly moved to Brandenburg .... ib.
The new Prussian .Constitution. The
“Central Power" . . 194
Austria
and Germany
Conflicting schemes of reorganisation 19g
The
Prussian Circular Despatch ....... 197
Constitutional
reform and the Confederation ....
198
Frederick
William IV declines the Imperial Crown . . . lflg
The
National Assembly and the Reichsverweser .... 200
The
Frankfort Constitution 201
THE
REVOLUTION AND THE REACTION IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA. II.
PAGE
Hungarian
prospects at the end of 1848 .............................. 202
Gorgei.
Hungarian Government at Debreczen .... 203
Advance of Schlick. Kossuth and
Gorgei 204
Demhinski
and Bern . . 205
Slavonia
and the Banat. Windischgratz’ failure . . . 206
Declaration
of a Republic ........ 207
Hungarian
capture of Budapest. Russian intervention . . 208
Holy
War proclaimed ... 209
Advance
of Paskievich, and -of Haynau .....
210
Battles of Szoreg, Segesvar and
Temesvar............................ 211
Abdication and flight of Kossuth
...... 212
The
surrender of Vilagos 213
The
retribution 214
The
fugitives in Turkey 215
The
Reaction in the Austrian Empire. Bach ....
216
Transylvania
and Croatia. The Austrian Constitution abolished j!17
Prussian
attempts at German constitutional reform . . . 218
Insurrections
in Baden and Saxony 219
The
DreikBnigabundniaa and the Union............................ 220
The
Gotha meeting. The Baden insurrection ....
221
Breakdown of the Dreikonigsbiindniss
......
222
Resignation
of Beichsverweser. The Vierkdnigsbiindniss. Erfurt
Parliament
. . . ., 223
The
Schleswig-Holstein War and negotiations .... 224
Peace
of Berlin. End of Schleswig-Holstein War . . . 225
The Danish and Schleswig-Holstein Succession. The London
Protocol
.......... 226
The
Austro-Prussian dispute 227
The
Hesse-Cassel question 228
The
Hesse-Cassel crisis. Radowitz 229
The
Prussian Government gives way 230
The Olmutz Punctation. Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel . . 231
The
Dresden Conferences 232
The
Austro-Prussian secret alliance 233
CHAPTER VIII.
THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF SWISS FEDERAL UNITY.
By W. Oechsli, Professor of History in the
University of Zurich.
Contrasts
in Swiss history and life 234
Establishment of the Helvetian
Republic . . . . .
235
Results
of the Act of Mediation (1803) .....
236
The
Federal Pact 236-7
. PAGE
Reaction. The Act of Neutralisation 238
Period
of peace and recuperation 239
Effects
of the July Revolution at Paris 240
Democratic reforms. Disturbances in
Basel ....
241
Schwyz-Neuchatel troubles. Contending
Leagues . . . 242
Proposal to amend the Pact of 1816
...... 243
Threatened intervention of Great
Powers............................ 244
Dissolution
of the League of Sarnen ............................ 245
Disturbances concerning religion 246
The
Aargau monasteries 247
Origin
of the Sonderbund 248
Strife between Sonderbund and Federal
Diet .... 249
Fears
of European intervention 260
Dufour
defeats the Sonderbund 261
Proposed coercive measures against
Switzerland .... 252
Constitutional
reforms 253
Reform
of the Federal Constitution 254
Difficulty with Prussia as to
Neuchatel 265
Mediation of Napoleon. Reforms 256
Agitation for “Referendum” and
“Initiative” ....
257
Reform
of the Federal Constitution 258
Industrial and commercial progress
...... 259
Railway development. Education.
Science . . . .
260
History.
Literature. Arts 261
CHAPTER IX.
RUSSIA AND
THE LEVANT.
(1) Russia
under Nicholas I.
By Geoffrey Deage, M.A., Christ Church,
Oxford.
General
character of the reign 262
Personality
and policy of Nicholas 263
Legal reforms. Compilation of the
Svod 264
Reforms of the administration. The
army............................ 265
Reforms
in finance. The Church ...... 266
Education.
The Censorship 267
Attempts to ameliorate the lot of the
serfs ....
268
Industrial
progress 269
Industrial
policy of the Government 270
Increase in industries and
manufactures............................ 271
Cotton industry. Advance in Asia 272
Siberia.
Central Asia. Caucasus 273
Results
of the reign of Nicholas 274
(2) The Levant.
By E. C. Bi*ech, British Consul at Jerusalem.
The
reforms of Abd-ul-Mejid ....... 275
Organic
Statute for Lebanon 276
Improvements
in Turkish Law. Turco-Peraian frontier . .' ib.
PAGE
Turkey
and the Hungarian refugees. Moutenegro. Greece . 277
King
Otho’s accession 278
Misgovemment
of King Otho. Constitution granted . . . 279
The
Greek “idea.” Turkish and British troubles . . . 280
British claims against Greece ....... 281
Condition
of Moldo-Wallachia . 282
Russian
influence in Moldo-Wallachia, effect of 1848 . . . 28S
Convention
of Balta Liman. Servia ...... 284
Unrest
in Servia 285
NAPOLEON III
AND THE PERIOD OF PERSONAL GOVERNMENT.
(1852-9.)
By
Albert Thomas, Agrege of the
University of Paris.
The
hereditary Empire, character of Napoleon Les Idies NapoUomiennes ....
The
Constitution ......
Central
Government. The Ministries . .
Local
Government. Prefects . . .
Organisation
of the Army. The Press .
Police and
Press. Imperial Court . .
The imperial
family. Napoleon’s marriage .
Parliamentary
elections. The Chamber .
Powers of the
Council of State and the Senate Relations with the Church ....
The Church
obtains control of education .
Government
attitude towards finance . .
Railways and
agriculture ....
Government
policy towards industry . .
Industrial
developments : their effects . .
Social policy
and legislation. . . .
Great public
works. Paris ....
Paris and
public opinion. The Republican party The Emperor’s foreign policy . . .
Causes and
results of the Crimean War .
Piedmont and
the conference at Plombieres Relations of Napoleon with England . .
286
287
288
289
290
291
292 29S
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.
(1852-6.)
By the late Sir Spencer
Walpole, K.C.B., Hon. D.C.L. Oxon.; LL.D. Edinburgh.
Lord
Aberdeen’s new Ministry Gladstone’s first Budget . Financial policy of
Gladstone
309
310
311
Origin
of disputes between France and Russia .... 312
Policy
of Nicholas towards Turkey ...... 313
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and
Turkey .....
314
Effect
of the "massacre” of Sinope 315
Divisions
in the British Cabinet over the Eastern Question . 316
France and England declare war
against Russia .... 317
Blockade
of Sevastopol . 318
Actions before Sevastopol. Inkerman ............................ 319
Sufferings of
the British army. Fall of Aberdeen and accession
of
Palmerston ......... 320
Progress
of the War. Negotiations for peace ....
321
Failure of Buol’s proposals."
Fall of Sevastopol .... 322
End
of the War. Congress of Paris 323
Treaty
of Paris. Results of the Crimean War ....
324
GREAT BRITAIN,
LAST YEARS OF WHIGGISM, PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.
(1856-68.)
By the late
Sir Spenceb Walpole.
Palmerston’s
Chinese policy 325
Divorce
Act... 326
Effects
of the Orsini Plot in England 327
Defeat of Palmerston. Derby Premier 328
Government
of India Bill 329
Jewish
disabilities 330
Italian policy of Russell and Palmerston 332
The
“ Panic of 1859.” The Volunteer movement . . . 333
Cobden’s
Commercial Treaty with France............................ 334
Financial
achievements of Gladstone. America .... 335
The Trent crisis. Death of the Prince
Consort .... 336
The
Alabama question. Schleswig-Holstein ....
337
English
policy in the Schleswig-Holstein question . . . 338
Movements
for Reform. Gladstone’s Bill of 1866 . . . 339
The
Adullamites, Russell’s resignation ib.
Parliamentary Reform. Attitude of the
people .... 340
Disraeli’s first Parliamentary Reform
Bill............................ 341
Disraeli’s Reform Bill. Disraeli and
Gladstone .... 342
Ireland
since 1845, genesis of Fenianism............................ 343
Fenian outrages. Gladstone and
Disestablishment . . . 344
Abolition
of Church Rate. General election of 1868. . . 345
Material
progress of the period 346
CHAPTER XIII.
ENGLISH
LITERATURE.
. (1840-70.)
By H. Walkeb,
M.A., Balliol College, Oxford; LL.D. Glasgow; Professor of English Literature,
St David’s College, Lampeter.
PAGE
Foreign
literary influences during the period ....
347
Carlyle.
The Oxford Movement. . . . . . • 348
Landor.
Tennyson 350-1
Nationalism..... 351
Hood.
Elizabeth Barrett Browning ...... 363
Women poets: Christina Rossetti.
Clough ....
354
Matthew Arnold. Romantic influences 365
Romanticism in architecture and pair
ting: Ruskin . . . 366
Pre-Raphaelite influences in
literature and art . . . . 367
Prose of the period: Balwer and
Disraeli . . ...
358
Contrasted influence of Dickens and
Thackeray .... 359
Anthony Trollope. George Meredith 361
Historians:
Macaulay. Froude . . ., . . . . 363
Napier.
Kiriglake. Carlyle 364
Revival of French literary influence.
The idea of evolution . 365
CHAPTER XIV.
CAVOUR AND
THE KINGDOM OF ITALY. (1849-61.)
By the late
Professor E. Masi.
Victor
Emmanuel II’s accession . . • •
Terms of
peace after Novara . . . ■
The Siccardi
Laws. Cavour ....
Death of
Santarosa. Cavour head of the Cabinet Napoleon’s Coup d’ttat. Rattazzi’s
attitude . .
Cavour
Premier. Economic reforms . . .
Union of the
Moderate Right and Left Centre parties Battle on the Chernaya. Piedmontese
alliance with France and England . . • • _• • • • ■ Cavour at the Paris
Congress. Francis . seph in Lombardy The Mazzinians at Genoa. The Orsini Plot .
. . Conference of Plombieres. Lombardo-Venetia . . •
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
PAGE
The
“Mantuan Trials.” Reaction in Tuscany. Guerrazzi . 377
Reaction
at Rome 378
Political
trials at Naples. Gladstone’s letters ....
379
Naples
and Sicily 380
The
Duchies. Napoleon III and Austria 381
Different policies of Cavour and
Napoleon............................. 382
War declared.
Piedmontese and French victories. Magenta
and
Solferino . . . . i 383
Napoleon
proposes peace at Villafranca .....
384
Preliminaries
of Villafranca. Treaty of Zurich . . . . 385
Duchies and Florence declare for
union with Piedmont . . 386
The
Pope and the Congress. Cavour resumes office . . . 387
Piedmont and central Italy. Garihaldi
in Sicily. . . . 388
Garibaldi
at Naples. M erode at Rome 389
Victor Emmanuel and Garihaldi meet.
Fall of Gaeta . . 390
“A free Church in a free State”
...... 391
Cavour’s
negotiations with Rome. His death ....
392
CHAPTER XV.
AUSTRIA,
PRUSSIA, AND THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION.
(1) Reaction
and Reorganisation.
(1852-62.)
By H. Friedjung, Ph.D., Professor of History
in the University of Vienna.
Ascendancy
of Schwarzenberg ....... 393
Struggle over the German Zollverein ib.
Bruck’s
commercial policy . • • • ■ • • •
394
Policy
of Manteuffel in Prussia. The Junkers ....
395
Stahl
and Prussian Conservatism 396
The Kreuzzeitung and the Preussische Wochenblatt ... ib.
Reaction in Prussia and other German
States .... 397
Reaction
in Austria ......... ib.
The
Bach system fn Austria and Hungary............................ 398-9
Austrian
rule in Hungary 400
Magyar resistance to Bach’s policy 401
Financial
disorder ......... ib.
Austria
and Russia 402
Isolation
of Austria. Fall of Bach 403
Changes
consequent on Bach’s fall. “October Charter" . . 404
Schmerling’s
Ministry. Deak and his scheme ....
405
The
new era in Prussia 406
William
I and Austria 407
Prussian
and Austrian projects and diplomacy .... 408
Reorganisation
of the Prussian army 409
Struggle
between King and Parliament in Prussia. The
Fortschritt 410
Bismarck ........... ib.
(2) German Literature.
(1840-70.)
By K. Beeul, Litt.D., King’s College; Ph.D.;
University Reader in German.
Period of
calm and sustained effort . Political songs and ballads . . . . Political
satire: Heine. Geibel. Herwegh
Ballads
and songs
The drama:
Hebbel.
Tragedy and
comedy:
Prose
fiction: Tieck.
Prose
fiction: Keller.
Ludwig ....
Grillparzer . . . Historical romance: Alexis Storm. Freytag . . Heyse. Ludwig. Riehl. Raabe. Spielhagen
Novelists: Scheffel. Reuter. General survey .
PAGE
411
412
413
ib.
414r-6
416
417
418
419
420
(3) The
National Spirit in Hungarian Literature. (1686-1900.)
By A. B. Yolland, M.A., Ph.D., Scholar of Sidney
Sussex College; Professor Extraordinary of English Literature in the University
of Budapest,
The new era
of Hungarian literature . .
“French,”
"Classical/’ and “Magyar” Schools. Karman. Csokonai. Kisfaludy. Kazinczy .
Hungarian criticism. The drama: Charles Kisfaludy Vorosmarty. New Hungary:
Szechenyi Novelists: J<5sika. Eotvos . . .
The drama.
Szigligeti. Er.delyi. .
The lyric.
Tompa and Petfifi . .
Arany and the
Hungarian epic . .
Kalman T6th.
Jdkai . • • •
General
summary of development .
421
422
423
424
425
426-7
427
428
429
430
431
CHAPTER XVI.
BISMARCK AND
GERMAN UNITY.
By G. Roloff, Ph.D., Privatdocent in the
University of Berlin.
The keynote
of Bismarck’s policy . .
Prussia’s
position in Germany . . •
Bismarck and
the Polish Revolution . •
Austria and
the Frankfort assembly flf Prinfies Napoleon’s proposal for a congress rejected
New Constitution for Schleswig-Holstein prpcla and enforced 0. M. H. XI.
oed
433
434
435
436
437
438
PAGE
Prussia
resolves to act. withont the Confederation . . . 439
Austro-Prussian
intervention in the duchies ....
440
Truce.
Conference of London 441
Prussia
rejects the Aiigustenburg candidature .... 442
Austro-Prussian
joint administration of duchies .... 443
Zollverein renewed. Fall of Rechberg 444
Convention
of Gastein 445
Its
reception... 446
Napoleon
and Bismarck at Biarritz ....... 447
Preparations
for war ......... 448
The
war breaks ont 449
Action
of the Confederation and withdrawal of Prussia . . 450
Bismarck’s
risk 451
Langensalza. Movements of Benedek
.....
452
Battle
of Koniggratz 453
The political situation after
Koniggratz 454
Bismarck
prevails in the negotiations ......
455
Preliminaries
of Nikolsburg . 456
The south German States. French
demands waived . . . 457
The
North German Confederation ....... 458-9
North
German Federal Constitution adopted .... 460
The
southern States. The Zollverein ..... 461
Renewed French demands. Luxemburg 462
The Hohenzollern candidature. France
declares war . . 463
Effects
of the French declaration of war in Germany’ . . 464
Union
of north and south ....... 465
King
William of Prussia proclaimed German Emperor . . 466
THE LIBERAL
EMPIRE.
(1859-70.)
The
beginnings of trouble. The Emperor and Italy . , . 467
Religious
policy of Napoleon III ........................ 468
The
clerical opposition. 469
The
Cohden Treaty 470
Liberal decrees of November 24 471
Result
of the November decrees 472
Financial
crisis. Clerical opposition ...... 473
Concessions
to the Catholics 474
Polish
affairs. General election 475
Affairs
in Mexico 475!
Danish question. The “ indispensable
liberties ” ... 477
Renewal of the religious quarrel.
Pius IX ....
478
Schleswig-Holstein.
Bismarck at Biarritz............................ 479
Effect
of the “Six Weeks’ War” 480
Struggle
between Ollivier and Rouher 481
Triumph
of Rouher 482
PAGE
The
Luxemburg question . . - 483
The Mexican disaster. Continental
complications . . . 484
Mentana
and its results ........ 485
Labour
opposition 486
Military.
reorganisation 487
Influence of the Press : Rochefort.
Tenot 488
Progress
of the Opposition 489
Constitutional
reforms 490
Ollivier’s
Ministry 491
Result
of the Plebiscite 493
Prussian
policy towards France 494
Declaration
of war 496
Battle
of Sedan 497
Fall
of the empire ib.
Gambetta
and his task 498
The
Government of National Defence 499
Meeting
of the National Assembly at Bordeaux .... 500
Condition
of Paris 601
The
new Government at Paris ....... 502
The
Paris and other Communes 503
The
struggle in the provinces 504
The
struggle in Paris 505
Results
of the conflict 606
THE REACTION
AGAINST ROMANTICISM IN FRENCH LITERATURE.
(1840-71.)
By Professor ]£mile
Bourgeois.
Romanticism
and the Oinacle .
Definition
and types of Romanticism The evolution of Romanticism .
Early work of
Victor Hugo .
The'ophile Gautier . . .
Alfred de Vigny ....
Alfred de Musset. Baudelaire .
Leconte de Lisle ....
The
Romanticist drama: Scribe .
Augier
Dumas fils
....
Labiche.
Sardou . . •
Influence of
the novel: George Sand Stendhal. Merime'e . . .
Balzac
Feuillet.
Flaubert . . •
History:
Thierry. Michelet .
c 2
608
609
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520 621
522
523
PAGE
Guizot.
Tocqueville. Thiers. Lamartine ....
624
Fustel de Coulanges . . . '. . . . • • 625
Criticism: Sajnte-Beuve .
. ib.
Journalism.
Philosophy: Victor Cousin 626
Renan.
Taine 627
Art................ 628
General
summary *b.
CHAPTER XIX.
THE
COMPLETION OF ITALIAN UNITY.
(1) The
Successors of Cavour.
(1861-70.)
By the late
Professor E. Masi.
English
opinion of Cavour 629
The
kingdom of Italy obtains recognition............................ 630
Ricasoli’s policy in Church and State 631
Fall
of Ricasoli. Premiership of Rattazzi 632
Relations
between Garibaldi and Rattazzi............................ 633
Garibaldi
wounded at Aspromonte . . . ., . .
534
The
Gonsorteria Ministry. Naples ...... 635
The
problem of brigandage in Naples ......
636
The
Pica Law .......... 537
Foreign
politics . . . . . . . ib.
Improvement in finances. Industrial
development . . . 538
Ministry
of La Marmora . . . 539
Papal
Syllabus .......... ib.
ltalo-Prussian
alliance against Austria. Custozza . . . 540
Acquisition
of Venetia . . 641
Rattazzi carries the confiscation of
church property , . . 542
Garibaldi
repulsed at Mentana ....... 543
Vatican
Council ib.
Rome the capital of the Italian
kingdom 544
(2) The Literature of the Risqrqimentq and after. (1846-70.)
By C. Segb£, Professor in the University of
Rome.
The
poetry of the Bisorgimento 544
Various
writers: Niccolini 545
Giusti............ 546
Prose:
Gioberti. D’Azeglio ib.
Prati.
Aleardi . . 547
Political
writings. Memoirs <6.
Drama: Ferrari 548
Criticism: De Sanctis if,,
Carducci’s
early writings and influence 549
CHAPTER XX.
THE COURSE OF
REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.
(1845-71.)
By J. Fetzmaurice-Kelly, F.B.A., Corresponding
Member of the Royal Spanish Academy.
PAGE
Ministries
of Oldzaga and Gonzalez Bravo............................. 550-1
The
Constitution of 1845 . 552
The
Queen’s marriage and foreign diplomacy .... 553
Fall
of Narvaez 554
Isabel’s
marriage and its effect ......................... 554-5
Diplomatic
dispute with England 556
Bulwer
sent home. Triumph of Narvaez 557
Concordat.
Proposed revision of the Constitution . . . 558
Ministerial difficulties and changes.
San Luis .... 559
Conspiracy
of Canovas. Ministry of Espartero .... 560
Departure
of Queen Cristina 561
Religious
agitation . . . . . . . . • *6-
O’Donnell’s
new Ministry. His resignation ....
562
New
policy of O’Donnell 563
The “ Liberal Union.” Moroccan
campaign ....
564
Intervention
in Mexico . . . . . . . . 565
O’Donnell
and Prim. Dissolution of Liberal Union . . . 566
Madrid riots. Recall and resignation
of O’Donnell . . . 567
Narvaez’ autocratic rule. Prim and
the dynasty . . . 568
Gonzalez Bravo. Unpopularity of Queen
Isabel .... 569
Dethronement
of Isabel. Provisional Government . . . 570
Prim
in search of a king 571
Assassination
of Prim *&•
Reign
of Amadeo I. Changes in Portugal 572
The Acto Additional. Pedro V. Fall of
Saldanha . . . 573
Napoleon
III humiliates Portugal. Luiz I . . . . .
574
Republicanism
and colonial expansion 575
CHAPTER XXI.
THE
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.
(1870-1.)
By Major F. Maurice, General Staff Officer.
The European
situation in 1870 . . The question of the Spanish Succession
The
Prussian military system -
Moltke’s
plan of campaign . . • The French military system •. • Its defects
576-7
578
579
580
581
582
PAGE
The
affair of Saarbriicken 583
Advance of the 3rd German army.
Battle of Worth . . 584
Results
of the battle of Worth 585
Advance
of the 1st and 2nd German armies ....
586
Battle
of Spicheren . . . 587
The
French fall back behind the Moselle 588
Battle
of Colombey . . . . . . . . 589
The
French retreat intercepted at Vionville . . . .
590
The battles at Vionville and
Mars-la-Tour............................ 591
Bazaine falls back on Metz ........ 592
Battle
of Gravelotte ......... 593
Its
effects....... 594
Formation
of the army of Chalons . 595
Macmahon’s
march to the Meuse 596
The
Germans close in 597
Battle
of Sedan 698
Bazaine driven back at Noisseville
...... 599
Revolution
in Paris. Investment of the capital .... 600
The
situation after the investment of Paris ....
601
Organisation
of resistance in the provinces ....
602
The
Germans lose Orleans . . ' 603
Effect
of the capture of Metz 604
Battle of Beaune la Rolande. Germans
recapture Orleans . 605
Sortie
from Paris 606
Situation
in the provinces ib.
Chanzy at Le Mans. Faidherbe’s
advance on Amiens . . 607
Bombardment
of Paris. Efforts of Gamhetta . . .
608
Bourbaki’s
troops disarmed in Switzerland . . . . .
609
Defeat
of Chanzy at Le Mans ....... 610
Failure
of the last sortie from Paris ............................ 611
Formal
Treaty of Peace signed ........................ 612
RUSSIA AND
THE LEVANT AFTER THE CRIMEAN WAR.
(1) Russia and
the Period of Reform.
By Geoffbey Deage, M.A,
Antecedents
of Alexander II . 613
Emancipation
of the serfs. Committee of enquiry . . . 614
Emancipation
achieved 615
Effects
of the Emancipation on the serfs 616
on
the nobles.. 617
on
industry.... 618
Railways
and financial policy ....... 619
Introduction
of local self-government 620
Its
results . . . 621
Reform
of the law Courts 622
Working
of the legal reforms 623
PAGE
Reforms
in the military and educational systems . . . 624
Growth of journalism and power of the
Press .... 625
Influence
of Press Censorship 626
General
results of the era of Reform 627
Discontent
in Russia and Poland 628
Origin
and effects of the Polish Revolution ....
629
Growth
of Nihilism 630
Foreign
policy ib.
Russian
conquest of Bokhara . ; 631
Reduction
of Khiva and Khokand 632
Alaska........... ib.
Persia
........... 633
The
Danubian Principalities ib.
Russian
foreign policy in Europe 634
(2) The
Balkan Lands.
By E. C. Blech.
Fanatical
outbreaks against Christians Settlement of Syria. Montenegro .
Turkish
relations with Greece and Egypt Origin of the Suez Canal The Church in Bulgaria
Russia and the Black Sea Greek raid on Thessaly Misgovernment in Greece
Deposition of King Otho Accession of King George Ionian Islands ceded .
The new Greek
Constitution The Danubian Principalities,
Meeting of
the Divans. Union of Moldo-Wallachia Roumania. Fall of Couza. Accession of
Prince Charles Crisis in Roumania ....
Servia.
Withdrawal of Turkish garrisons
635
636
637
638 ib.
639
640 ib.
641 ib.
642 ib.
643
644
645
646
647
(3) Russian
Literature. (1800-1900.)
By Geoffrey Drage, M.A.
Romanticism
and Realism in Russian literature The Romanticists: Pushkin . . .
Lermontoff
The Realists:
Bielinski. Gogol . . Influence of Turgenieff and Dostoievski Tolstoi . . :
■ ■ • ■ Influence and character of his work
648 ib.
649 ib.
650
651
652
(4) National Influences in Bohemian and Polish
Literature.
By R. Nisbet Bain, Assistant Librarian,
British Museum.
PAGE!
The
Cech nationality. The origin of Panslavism . . . 653
Josef
Dobrowsky .......... 654
The
discovery of the Griineberg ms ib.
Josef Jungmann ......... ib.
Frantisek Palacky 655
Kollar
, .................. ib.
Cech
political literature 656
Polish
historical traditions ib.
Polish
parties: the “Reds,” Lelewel 65?
Dzieduszycki.. ib.
Alexander
Vielopolski and the new Russian policy . . . 658
The Grand Duke Constabtine and Poland
.....
659
Szujski
and the Przeglgd Polski . 660
CHAPTER
XXIII.
HOLLAND AND
BELGIUM.
(1839-70.)
By the Rev. George Edmundson, M.A., formerly Fellow
and Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford.
(1) Holland,
Holland
in 1839 and 1840
Abdication of
William I. Accession of William II Effects of 1848. Revision of the fundamental
Law William III. Thorbecke and the new Constitution Religious difficulties ....
The “April
Movement” and its results . .
Death of
Thorbecke ......
Progress of
the Dutch colonies . . . .'
The new
native policy ....
(2) Belgium.
State of
affairs in Belgium in 1839 . . . Industrial and financial crisis . , .
The Rogier
Ministry and the Revolution of 1848
Education
Liberation of
the Scheldt ....
First years
of Leopold II. Advanced Liberalism The Flemish National Movement . .
669
670
671
672 ib.
673
674
663
664
665 665-6
667 ib.
668
(3) The Luxemburg Question.
PAGE
Luxemburg, 1815-50 674
Luxemburg
under Prince Henfy (1850-79)............................
676
(4) Literature
in the Netherlands.
(1800-70.)
Dutch
and Flemish literature of the period .
. ■ 675-6
CHAPTER XXIV.
(l)
SCANDINAVIA.
(1816-70.)
Sweden and Nobway.
By W. F. Redda^ay, M.A., FelloW of King’s
College, and , Censor of Fitzwilliam HaU.
Character and
influence of Bernadotte Internal difficulties of Sweden . . Relations of Sweden
and Norway1 . Norwegian policy of Charles XIV .
His foreign
policy .... Swedish policy towards Russia and Denmark Domestic policy of Sweden
. . , Growth of a Liberal Opposition . . Attack on the Crown in the Diet .
National progress ....
Oscar I.
Foreign and domestic policy Industrial progress . . • •
Charles
XV
Parliamentary
reform in Sweden . . Suedo-Norwegian difficulties • •
677-8
679
680 681 682683
684
685
686 ib.
687
688 ib.
689
690
(2) Denmark.
By W. F. Reddaway, M.A.
Denmark
under Frederick VI < . . . Growing difficulties in Schleswig-Holstein . .
Enlightened policy of Christian VIII . . • The Schleswig-Holstein question.
Frederick VII The Constitution of 1849 . . • • ■ Loss of
Schleswig-Holstein...
691
692
693
694
695
(3) Dano-Norwegian
Literature.
(1815-65.)
By E. Gosse,
M.A., LL.D., Librarian to the House of Lords.
PAGE
Germanising
tendencies in Danish literature • . •
697
Danish Poetry:
Oehlenschlager. Grundtvig ....
698
Beginnings
of Norwegian national literature ....
700
Welhaven.
Munch 701
Norwegian
Prose *6.
The youth of Ibsen and Bjdmson 702
ROME AND THE
VATICAN COUNCIL.
(1846-70.)
By G. A. Fawkes,
M.A., Balliol College, Oxford.
Character
of Pius IX
703
The
Papal States at his accession ...... 704
Pius
IX and Reaction. Antonelli ........................ 705
Progress
of Reaction in Tuscany and Rome ....
706
Growth of French Ultramontanism. De
Maistre . . . 707
Political
relations of the Papacy ....... 708
Spanish
Concordat . . . . . . . . . 709
Victor
Emmanuel King of Italy ....... ib.
The
Oxford Movement: Newman 710
Russia... 711
Papal
dogmas. Syllabus of 1864 . . : . . 712
History of dogma of Immaculate
Conception ....
713
Religious
journalism. Development of Ultramontanism . . 714
Significance
of Quanta Cura and the Syllabus .... 715
Effects
of the Syllabus. . . 716
Opposition
to the dogma of Infallibility . ' ' . . . .
717
Origin
and summoning of a General Council ....
718
Controversial literature at the
Council . . . . .
719
Procedure
at the Council 720
The
Opposition grows weaker . . ■ . . . , .
721
Dogma of Infallibility voted 722
Results
of the Vatican Council 723
CHAPTER XXVI.
INDIA AND
AFGHANISTAN.
(1815-69.)
By Sir W. Lee-Warner, K.C.S.I., Jate Scholar of St
John’s College, Member of the Council of India.
t PAGE
The
importance of the year 1816 724
League formed against the Pindaris 725
Gwalior
and Indore States . 726
First
Burmese War 727
Treaty
with the King of Ava 728
Capture
of Bhartpur 729
Bentinck’s
reforms ......... 73®
Auckland’s
appointment 731
Afghanistan
and Persia 732
Course
of the Afghan War 733
British
retreat 734
Reoccupation
of Kabul 735
War
with Sind 736
Annexation
of Sind 737
Gwalior
and Lahore 738
First
Sikh War . . 739
Peace with Lahore. Kashmir. The
Multan rebellion . . 740
Second
Sikh War 741
The Punjab annexed. Second Burmese
War ....
742
“Rule
of lapse.” Oudh annexed 743
Dalhousie’s
administrative reforms. Canning Governor-General. 744
Persian
War. The Sepoys 745
Outbreak
of the Mutiny 746
Capture
of Delhi. Cawnpore massacre ............................ 747
Siege,
and two reliefs, of Lucknow . . . . . .
748
The
Mutiny quelled. The Queen’s Proclamation . . . 749
The
Queen’s clause. Sanadg of adoption ....
750
Transfer
of the government of India to the Crown . . . 751
Viceroyalties of Elgin and Lawrence.
Bhutan . . . .
752
\byssinian
War - . . 753
Retrospect.....
CHAPTER
XXVII.
GREAT BRITAIN
AND HER COLONIES.
(1) The New
Colonial Policy.
(1840-70.)
By H. W. V. Temperley, M.A., Fellow and Assistant
Tutor of Peterhouse.
The
British Empire in 1840 and 1870 . . . . .
754
Introductory.
Lord Durham and Canada............................. 755
Origin
of Durham’s colonial policy . • . • • •
756
Durham’s
Report on Canada ....
“Responsible
Government”: Durham; Russell . Metcalfe’s difficulties in Canada. Earl Grey .
Elgin in Canada. Australia. New Zealand . Extension of colonial self-government
. . . Colonial trade policy. Repeal of Navigation Laws Relaxation of economic
control . . ■ • Military defence. Imperial policy as a whole . General
influences of the period . . . • Idealism of colonial policy . . . . i •
PAGE
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
(2) The
Federation of Canada.
By Stuart J.
Reid, Litt.D., Durham.
Influence
of Durham 766
Policy
of Elgin 767
Achievements of Elgin. His successors
. . . . •
768
The
Quebec Conference 769
Coalition
Government *&•
Conferences
on Confederation ....... 770
Confederation
achieved 771
Provisions
of the new Constitution ...... 772
Results
of Confederation ........ 773
The
“Fathers of the Confederation” 774
Cartier. Macdonald. Growth of the
Dominion . . . . 775
Newfoundland.
Reciprocity Treaty 776
Red
River rebellion. Canadian fiscal policy . • •
777
Canadian
education 778
(3) The English
and Dutch in South Afbica.
By A. R.
CoLauHouN, F.R.G.S.
Introductory.
Missionary movement at the Cape . . . 778
The
affair of Schlachter’s Nek 779
Modifications
in the Constitution. Native policy . . . 780
The
Great Trek and its effects .... 781
“
Dingan’s Day.” Boers and British in Natal ....
782
Battle of Boomplatz. Orange River
Sovereignty . . . 783
Sand
River Convention. Cape Colony Parliament . . . 784
The
Transvaal and the Dutch Reformed Church . . . 785
The
“Dopper” Church. Destruction of the Kosas . . . 786
Basutoland.
The diamond fields ........................ 787
Natal............. 788
General
results of the period ib.
Commercial
Treaty between Portugal and the Transvaal . . 789
(4) The Development
op Australasia.
(1815-70.)
By J. D. Rogers, Barrister-at-Law, M.A., formerly
Stowell Fellow of University College, Oxford.
The
development of Australasia .....
Period of
autocratic Governors. Exploration . .
Nominee
Councils. Origin of Western Australia .
Origin of
South Australia* Victoria, New Zealand .
Development
of New Zealand
Convicts and
squatters in Australia ....
Exploration.
Advance in prosperity ....
New Zealand
Constitution ......
Australian
Constitutions. Land Acts ....
Victoria.
Queensland. South and Western Australia Progress of New Zealand. Troubles with
natives .
New Zealand
native war .......
Movements for
Australian Federation ....
CHAPTER
XXVIII.
THE FAR EAST.
(1816-71.)
(1) China and her Intercourse with Western Powers.
By the Right
Hon. Sir E. M. Satow, G.C.M.G.,
Hon. LL.D., late British Minister at Peking.
Divisions
in the history of the period .....
802
Chinese
attitude towards foreigners 803
Difficulties in the way of
establishing relations .... 804
The
mission of Napier 805
Elliot’s
difficulties 806
The
question of the opium trade 806-7
Decision
of the English Cabinet ....... 808
Attack on Canton. Mission of
Pottinger 809
United
States diplomacy in China 810
Cushing’s
Treaty 811
French
diplomacy tb.
Foreign protection of religious
missions 812
Chinese
alarmed at the growth of missions ....
813
The
Tientsin massacre. Troubles at Canton ....
814
Incident
of the lorcha u Arrow ” ....... 815
Blockade
and occupation of Canton 816
The
Tientsin Treaties 817
Second
expedition to northern China ......
818
Establishment
of legations at Peking 819
The
“Taiping” rebellion ........ 820
PAGE
. 789
. 790
. 791
. 792
. 793
. 704
. 795
. 796
. 797
. 798
. 799
. 800
. 801
PAGE
Suppression
of the rebellion 821
Views of Burlingame on China ....... 822
General
summary 823
(2) Japan.
By Sir E. M. Satow.
Introductory
retrospective . . . 823
Perry’s
mission. Social conditions in Japan ....
824
Political
institutions. Tycoon and daimiBs............................ 825
Mikado
and Court nobles . . . . . . . ■ 826
The
powers of the Council of State ...... 827
Nariaki
of Mito. Russian mission 828
Opinions of daimiBs. Perry’s Treaty
......
829
British Admiral’s Treaty, i Russian
Treaty............................ 830
Harris at Shimoda. He is invited to
Yedo ....
831
His
negotiations 832
Harris' Treaty: ports to be opened ........................ 833
Nariaki’s
opposition 834
The Mikado refuses to sanction the
Treaty ....
835
Adoption
of an heir to the Tycoon 836
Political
situation at Kioto . ' . 837
Manabe’s
mission to Kioto 838
Difficulties
of the Tycoon . . 839
The
Treaties come into operation 840
Murder
of Ii Kamon no Kami. Prussian Treaty . . . 841
Night
attack on the British legation 842
The
Russians at Tsushima 843
Political
amnesty 844
Shimadzu Saburo’s mission to Yedo.
Richardson killed . . 845
Kagoshima
bombarded 846
"Hie
Tycoon visits the Mikado at Kioto ........... 847
Choshiu
fires on foreign ships. Expedition against him . . 848
The
Tycoon and the Mikado ....... 849
Choshiu clan expelled from Kioto.
Murder of Camus . . 850
The Tycoon again at Kioto. Choshiu
clan attack the palace . 851
The
Tycoon’s expeditions against Choshiu............................ 852
The
powers of the Tycoon and the Mikado ....
853
The Treaties sanctioned by the Mikado 854
Deaths
of the Tycoon and the Mikado 855
Opening,
of Hidgo 856
The Tycoon resigns; the Mikado
resumes government . . 857
The Tycoon’s, attack on Kioto
defeated 858
Progress
of the civil war . . 859
Imperialist triumph. Organisation of
new government . . 860
Treatment of foreigners and Christian
converts .... 861
A second capital established at Yedo 862
Further
changes. Parliamentary assembly .....
863
Abolition
of the feudal .system 864
General
summary 865
CHAPS. I,
XI, XII. Great Britain (1841-68) .... |
PAGES 867—73 |
|
II,
V. |
France,
from 1840 to 1852 .... |
874—8 |
HI,
VI, |
VII,
XV. (1) Germany and the Austrian |
|
|
Monarchy
(1840-62) .... |
879—903 |
|
(2)
German Literature (1840-70) . . |
903—6 |
|
(3)
Hungarian Literature . . . . |
906—7 |
IV,
XIV, XIX, 1, 2. Italy (1846-70) .... |
908—13 |
|
VIII. |
The
Swiss Confederation (1815-74) . . |
914—8 |
IX,
1, XXII, 1, 3, 4. Russia and the Slavonic National |
|
|
|
Movements
. . , . . . . |
919—26 |
X,
XVII |
Napoleon
III. The Liberal Empire . . |
927—33 |
XIII. |
English
Literature (1840-70) . . . |
934—6 |
XVI. |
Bismarck
and German Unity . . . |
937—42 |
XVIII. |
French
Literature (1840-70) . . . |
943—4 |
XX. |
Spain
and Portugal (1845-71) . . . |
945—50 |
XXI. |
The
Franco-German War .... |
951—5 |
XXIII. |
Holland
and Belgium (1840-70) . . . |
956—8 |
XXIV. |
Scandinavia
(1815-70) ..... |
959—62 |
XXV. |
Rome
and the Vatican Council . . . |
963—4 |
XXVI. |
India
and Afghanistan (1815-69) . . |
965—7 |
XXVII. |
Great
Britain and her Colonies (1815-70) . |
968—80 |
XXVIII. |
(1)
China |
981 |
|
(2)
Japan |
982 |
Chronological
Table of Leading Events . . . |
983—94 |
|
Index . |
|
995 |
p. 27, 1. 4.
For Vicomte read Comte.
p. 35, 1. 8.
For the Pomare, read Pomare, the.
p. 41, 1. 20
from bottom. For Glivre read Givrd.
p. 50, 1. 2.
For Grolman read Grolmann.
p. 75, 1. 15
from bottom. For Montara read Mortara.
p. 80, 1. 15
from top. For Ruggero read Ruggiero.
p. 86, 1. 7
from bottom and p. 94, 1. 12 from bottom. For Montanara read Montanaro. p. 115,
1. 4 from top. For Freslou read Freslon. ib. 1. 17 from bottom. For Courmenin
read Cormenin. p. 118, 11. 3 and 11 from bottom.
p.
127, 1. 14 from top. • For MaUeviUe
read MaleviUe.
p.
133, 1. 20 ,, ,, ,
p. 150, 1. 6.
For son read brother.
p. 247, 1. 5
and p. 248, 1. 7. For Siegwart read Siegwan. p. 264, 1. 5. For Count read
Prince.
p. 444, 1. 14
from bottom and p. 448, 1. 1. For Mensdorf read MensdorfF. p. 634, 1. 14. For
Milan re(td Michael.
GREAT BRITAIN
AND FREE TRADE.
(1841-52.)
John Wilson
Croker said that in July, 1841, for “the first time in our history that he
remembered the people had chosen the first minister for the Sovereign.” His
testimony is not a proof; but without douht the majority of over eighty with
which Peel came to power was in a special sense his own. The nation that had
learnt to distrust the Whigs trusted him. In boroughs and counties, in the City
and in Yorkshire, at Dublin and in Northumberland, strong candidates went down
before his supporters. There was hard work for him to do, and his fitness for
the trust was to be severely tested.
It was the
census year. The returns showed no appreciable slackening in the growth of the
population. The full truth about the “state of England question” was being
steadily told to the rulers of England through their own commissioners and
committees, by the Press and in fiction, by the voice of agitation and the
noise of riot. Of the textile factories something had long been known. In
February, 1841, Nassau Senior and his colleagues signed the report describing
the long-drawn tragedy of the hand-loom weavers. Next year appeared the record
of the darker tragedy of the women and children in the coal and iron mines,
followed in 1843 by the longer, less notorious, but equally pitiful story of
child-labour in all branches of manufacture. That same year a commissioner
sent down to South Staffordshire to find out why there had been tumultuous
strikes at the collieries reported, among other things, that fifty-seven per
cent, of deaths among the miners were due to accidents in the pits. Special
Poor Law Commissioners brought to light the presence of children of all ages
and hoth sexes in the nomadic agricultural gangs that facilitated the quick and
economic working of the great farms of East Anglia and the fen country. Edwin
Chadwick wrote unspeakable things about urban burials. In 1844 and 1845 reports
on the state and health of the populous districts told how the many mill-dams
on the Aire acted “ as a series of catch-pits for the sewage of 120,000
persons,” and how “in one part of Manchester the wants of upwards of 7000
people ” were “ supplied by thirty-three necessaries only.”
2
State of the country.—Peels Cabinet.
[i84i-
From the
harvest of 1838 to that of 1842 the price of wheat was higher than it had been
for any equally long period since 1820. Owing to a combination of causes,
foreign trade was absolutely stagnant. In most industries work was
intermittent, and in hardly any were wages rising; while in such declining
crafts as hand-loom weaving and framework knitting their fall was conspicuous.
The Whig beginnings of factory legislation were but little less unpopular among
those whom they were meant to help than the Whig poor law. Gaunt, new,
workhouses —Bastilles they called them in the north—were full. In 1842 a heap
of 150,000 tons of stone broken by paupers was to be seen at Leeds; at Paisley
—not a large town—for many months 8—9000 souls were supported by charity.
Chartists had preached a general strike for the Charter, and rioting seemed
endemic. A single letter from the Home Secretary to the Queen (1842) reports “
vigorous measures ” at Preston; “ no lives lost ” at Blackburn; “ peace
preserved” at Manchester; house-bumings in the Potteries; an attack by the mob
on Huddersfield, and “some disturbance” at Warwick. No wonder the experience of
his first year of office was burnt into Peel’s widened and liberalised mind, or
that, even with his working-day of fifteen or sixteen hours, what he did in the
way of domestic legislation was so small compared with what he had to leave
undone.
The Cabinet
was strong in experience and promise, in administrative capacity and in debate.
Peel chose it almost without assistance. Wellington offered to lead the Lords
without office, thus giving Peel, as he said, “a ready answer to all else who
could not receive” places. Graham, Peel’s most trusted adviser and
administrator and closest personal friend within the Cabinet, took the post of
danger at the Home Office. The Admiralty and the Under-Secretaryship of the
Board of Trade went to young men, Sidney Herbert and Gladstone. Stanley’s
eminent but erratic talent and brilliant powers of debate were in a sense
wasted as War and Colonial Secretary, at a time when, as Peel told Gladstone, “
the chief importance would attach to questions of finance.” Goulburn, at the
Exchequer, was only Peel’s occasional mouthpiece. In the Lords, High Toryism
was represented, among others, by Lyndhurst and Buckingham, Conservatism of
Peel’s stamp by the Foreign Secretary, Aherdeen. Aberdeen had no
Under-Secretary in the Commons, a fact which a rejected candidate for that post
traced to Peel’s desire to face Palmerston himself. Perhaps he was right; for
Sir Robert habitually kept his hand on the reins of all the offices.
A readjustment
of the Corn Laws was only one aspect of the work of economical reform to which
Peel rightly believed himself called; but the deathbed conversion of the Whigs,
the state of the nation, the fears of the landowners, the activity and
popularity of the Anti-Corn Law League, and the presence of Cobden in
Parliament gave the corn question the first place in public interest. Nearly a
hundred members of the Commons were ready to vote for repeal, and there was
bitter
complaint at
Westminster and in the country that no policy was indicated in the autumn of
1841. But a policy was maturing. Peel and Graham agreed with the League so far
as to be resolved to quicken the purchasing power of the masses by lightening
the taxes on their food. They sympathised with commercial freedom, but were not
as yet prepared to throw the corn trade entirely open—for reasons both of
principle and of party. Peel was convinced that Britain could never again
dispense with foreign grain, save perhaps in years of exceptionally abundant harvest.
The not ignoble dream of a self-sufficing land was for him finally dissolved.
But knowing his followers, his “ inferior animals ” as Cobden called them, he
would not suggest so drastic a change as he might himself have welcomed. He
proposed merely a not very serious modification of those sliding duties on
corn that he had helped to establish in 1828. Even this offended many of hisi
party, the more so as it did not stand alone. Buck igham left the Cabinet ; and
the League denounced Peel savagely for insulting a starving people with a
paltry concession.
The Com Bill
was not the chief financial event of 1842. Whig finance had produced a series
of deficits and lowered the national credit. Before taking office, Peel had
decided that he must employ the sound method of reducing duties to irirease
revenue—Pitt’s method and Huskisson’s—and that, to meet any resulting
deficiency and prevent more deficits, the unpopular Income Tax must be
temporarily revived. It was not a novel scheme. Peel was no inventor. A revived
property tax had been approved in the Cabinet during Goderich’s short ministry;
it had been favoured but feared by Althorp; its combination with a revised
tariff had been explained by Sir Henry Parnell in 1830; and a belated attempt
to raise revenue by lowering duties had been made by Baring in
1841, in consequence of the great report of
Hume’s Import Duties Committee in 1840. To Peel belongs the credit of the thing
done—done amid the gloomy doubts of friends and the angry criticism of
adversaries. With the tariff he only made a beginning in 1842. Most of the
export duties were abolished. Moderate import duties replaced prohibitions,
notably in the cases of cattle, meat, and other foodstuffs. The duties on raw
materials were reduced, and so were most of the duties on partly manufactured
or finished articles. Incidentally, this curtailed protection of manufactures
was meant to justify the reduction of the food taxes.
In 1843 and
1844 the tariff policy of 1842 was pushed somewhat further. Canadian wheat was
admitted at Is. instead of 5s. a quarter; and the last restrictions on the
export of machinery were abolished in 1843. The great advance however was in
1845. By that time home and foreign trade had revived; there had been three
satisfactory harvests; deficits had ceased; and Peel could act boldly. Hundreds
of petty unremunerative duties disappeared; so did the export duties (except
that on coal), and nearly all the raw material duties. To render these
reductions safe, the Income Tax was renewed for three more years.
4
[1841-
Meanwhile,
the exceptional treatment of com became more conspicuously anomalous, to the
Minister as well as to the nation. Already in 1842 he was discussing the next
move with Graham. Graham held that it must be the last—the move to “an open
trade.” He thought it might safely be taken after two or three more sessions.
1
In 1844, i?250,000,000 of consols were reduced from 3£ to 3J per cents. In 1845
the lucrative excise on glass was abandoned; and there were some other
financial reforms in these three decisive years. Wholesale lowering of import
duties involved a reduction in the amount of the preferences given to colonial
produce; but the preferential principle was retained—in the case of Canadian
com it was extended.
As events
demonstrated the soundness of his financial policy, Peel’s sympathy with the
economic doctrines of his Manchester critics increased. But he was not the man
to put all measures of government to the test of general principles, and he
never made laissez faire his watchword. No continuous thread of principle can
be traced through the internal economic legislation of 1842-5. One watches the
able, concrete, unimaginative minds of the Prime Minister and the Home
Secretary dealing with a series of separate problems, leaning no doubt towards
laissez faire, but with no prejudice against state control; while around them
the Convictions and passions of landowners and millowners and merchants
influence their decisions on railway bills, factory bills, and bank bills.
When Peel had
last been in office, during 1835, there was only one railway line that
regularly carried passengers, the Liverpool and Manchester. In the late
thirties and early forties successive sections of railway were opened along the
great trunk routes of communication. By the end of 1843 nearly 2000 miles of
line were available; and five years later the open mileage was 5007. Peel’s
Ministry did not deal very successfully with this new and powerful social
force. A small party in the country favoured state ownership; others wished the
State to decide authoritatively where, when, and how lines should be built.
Some control over existing lines was secured by the Act of 1844, that created
the parliamentary train and gave the State the eventual right to purchase all
the lines in the country. But, during the “railway mania” of 1845, an attempt
made by Dalhousie, Gladstone’s successor at the Board of Trade, to introduce
some order and method into the reckless iminess of railway projection was frustrated
by Peel’s resolve to leave the final decision entirely to the Private Bill
Committees of the House of Commons, which pursued no sort of consistent policy.
Yet, in spite of injudicious and dishonest enterprises and vast waste of
capital, the rapid construction of the railway network put new life into
commerce and manufactures, gave much well-paid employment, and so helped to
keep food prices higher than they had been ten years earlier.
Graham’s
Factory Act of 1844 for the first time regulated the working hours of women and
created the half-time system for children.
-1845] Factory and Bank Acts.—The Church.
5
It was
bitterly attacked, on one side by the ten hours1 party, on the other
by the Manchester men. Next year print-works were brought under the factory
law, the first non-textile works to be so treated. In 1842-3 Ashley had
succeeded in passing the more revolutionary Act, which forbade child or female
labour underground and laid the foundation of mine inspection, thanks to
general disgust at the facts revealed in 1842. An attempt to associate
important educational provisions with Graham’s Bill failed because the
Nonconformists resented the privileged position assigned to the Church. In all
these measures the Government was pushed forward, somewhat against its will, by
the philanthropists of both parties and by those Tories who were glad to attack
the interests and deride the humanitarian professions of the free-traders.
The Bank Acts
of 1844-5, Peel’s handiwork, also raised bitter passions and controversies.
They established the existing system of note issue for the United Kingdom, the
regulation of the English notes being arranged so as to concentrate issue at
the Bank of England. In Threadneedle Street issuing and general banking were to
be kept apart. The Issue Department was to work automatically; it might issue
£14,000,000 of notes against securities; beyond that point it must keep gold
against every note created. Peel refused to make issue a government function,
alleging that, in times of political stress, government notes are more likely
to be distrusted and discredited than those of a strong private corporation.
Besides regulating the Bank of England, he limited the issues of all other
establishments, and stopped the creation of fresh issuing banks; for in every
commercial crisis since 1760 the failure of innumerable small banks and the
discredit of their notes had done untold harm.
Two of the
great events in the religious history of the nineteenth century fell within the
first four years of Peel’s ministry—the Tractarian crisis and the disruption of
the Scottish Church. The former, at this time, was a movement on the religious
plane, the latter, a movement about the line where the planes of religion and
politics intersect. Though travelling in very different orbits, Tractarian and
Free Churchman had this in common—each demanded great zeal of his Church and
claimed for it high spiritual prerogatives. For many years the party that
called itself Catholic, that the world called Tractarian or Puseyite, had been
forming opinion in Oxford. Now, its members were beginning, though half
consciously at first, to draw discordant conclusions from common premisses. But
already in 1841, when Newman s tract on the Articles roused the academic rulers
of Oxford and the episcopal Bench, their premisses—as the Times said—had “sunk
deep into the heart pf the Church of England”; and, although the attacks of
their enemies, the mismanagement of their ecclesiastical superiors, and the
nature of their own principles drove some of the leaders from that Church in
the years
OH. I.
6
[1833-
that
followed, those who remained continued to influence it profoundly, and by their
zeal and devotion increased its vitality, extended its influence, emphasised
those aspects of doctrine and ritual that it shares with episcopal communions,
ancient and modem, and strengthened the barriers that separate it from the
non-episcopal Churches. Once, in these years, the Oxford leaders had to face
directly the eternal problem of the bounds of spiritual and temporal power,
when their anger was roused by the cooperation of the Primate and the Crown
with the royal head of the non-episcopal Prussian Church in establishing a Protestant
Bishopric at Jerusalem; but the problem was not so forced upon them as it was
upon Scottish churchmen in 1843.
In Scotland,
as in England, the apathy and latitudinarianism of the eighteenth century had
long been declining. By 1833—Newman’s date for the beginning of the Oxford
movement—the party of orthodoxy, action and reform, led by Chalmers, had
secured a majority in the General Assembly. Between 1835 and 1841 over 200
churches were built for the growing population; sects that had seceded in the days
of apathy and Deism were received back into communion; discipline was more
strictly enforced, candidates for ordination more severely tested. The
ministers of the new churches and of all chapels of ease, as well as the
Secession ministers, were given a full share in the work of the presbyteries
and the Assembly. In 1834 the Assembly passed the so-called Veto Act, which led
directly to the Disruption. It declared that a majority of communicant heads of
households could veto the appointment of a minister by a lay patron. Behind
this notable decision stood nearly three centuries of theological and political
controversy. The Scottish Church had regarded its first alliance with the
State as a union of equals; and this view, it was held, the Revolution Settlement
(1690) had sanctioned. Since 1711, when the British Parliament had revived the
rights of patrons, the Assembly had repeatedly protested against this alleged
breach of the Act of Union. Not that patrons had absolute rights; they could
only require the presbytery of the district in which the vacant parish lay to
take a duly qualified candidate “ on his trials.” The presbytery might
subsequently reject him without appeal as morally or doctrinally unfit. Under
the Veto Act a candidate distasteful to the majority of the congregation became
ipso facto unfit. The object was to make the old practice of a “call” from the
people a necessary step in every appointment. The formal document known as a
call had always been in use; now it was to become a living reality!
All this was
done with the advice of the highest legal opinion in Scotland; and for four
years it worked welL Then came a series of decisions in the Scotch Courts and
the House of Lords adverse to the legality of the veto, coupled with general
assertions by the judges of the supremacy of the civil over the ecclesiastical
power in all such matters which set Scotland on fire. Aberdeen tried to make
peace by Act of
Parliament;
but his Bill was condemned by the Church and abandoned. By the end of 1841, the
Courts had given damages against a presbytery for refusing to obey the law; and
the Assembly had suspended a presbytery for obeying the Courts. Soon the Courts
were to declare the pi nleges granted by the Assembly to Chapel and Secession
ministers illegal; and the mere question of patronage was merged in the greater
question of the spiritual rights of the Church. There were many schemes of
conciliation; but on two points Peel and Graham stood fast. The Church Courts
must cease to defy the law: in no case would they consent —as Graham put it—to
transfer the right of patronage to “ a variable and irresponsible multitude,”
for they feared ecclesiastical as much as political democracy. Rather than
share the privileges of establishment on these terms, half the clergy of
Scotland, after recording in the Claim of Right of 1842 their conviction that
the Courts and not the Church had violated the Constitution, left the Assembly,
their churches, and their manses in May, 1843, to found the Free Church. In the
first year 500 churches were built; and the extent and vitality of the
secession amazed statesmen who hardly understood the sources of its strength.
When the
Tories carried Dublin in 1841, the defeated candidate was O’Connell. At that
moment his fortunes and those of Repeal seemed gloomy. Until 1840 his alliance
with the Whigs had checked his agitation, though in 1839 he founded a society
significantly named the Precursors. Anticipating the return of the Tories to
power, he called the Repeal Association into life in April, 1840; but at first
its life was feeble. He had founded so many associations; he had so often used
threats of Repeal to extort concessions from Government; he had so long
cooperated with the Whigs and had made terms with them about the tithe; relations
of his bad taken office under the Crown—these and other circumstances prevented
rapid success. Only twelve Repealers went to Westminster in 1841, instead of
the forty of 1832. But in November O’Connell was chosen Lord Mayor of Dublin,
under the Whig Municipal Reform Act; and forty-seven of his sixty colleagues
were Repealers. No Roman Catholic had ever sat on the City Council before.
During his year of office active agitation was suspended; but his position and
conduct revived his popularity, and preparations were made for a great movement
in 1843.
A new force
had arisen to aid, and later to thwart, O’Connell. On October 15,1842, appeared
the first number of the Nation, the organ of a band of young men of both
religions who were filled with a spirit of nationalism which was more literary,
and therefore deeper and better founded, more fervid and more intemperate than
that of O’Connell’s personal following. Led by Thomas Davis, John Blake Dillon
and Charles Gavan Duffy, “ Young Ireland” laboured to weld together Catholic
and Protestant and to revive among the people knowledge of its literature,
its heroes,
and its wrongs. Their dream was first to waken the imagination of Ireland and
then to win her independence—if all other means failed, with the sword. Their
passion, their praise of rebellion, their impatience of the calculated methods
of political agitation, their criticisms of O’Connell’s absolute control of the
funds of the Repeal Association, their faith in things to which he was hostile
or indifferent—Hsuch as the revival of the Irish language—made them from the
first rather unwelcome allies; but for a time outward signs of dissension were
few.
The old
Liberator—he was now sixty-seven—proclaimed in January, 1843, that the new year
was to be the year of Repeal. Next month his campaign opened with a great
debate on Repeal in the Dublin Corporation. Forthwith important recruits
joined the Association; the people’s contribution to the cause, the Repeal
Rent, rose from <£150 to <£700 a week; and the O’Connell Tribute,
collected twice yearly at all the chapels in the land, that year exceeded
<£20,000. The Association was admirably organised. Every parish had its
Repeal Wardens, who directed operations and collected the Rent; in Repeal
reading-rooms men read the Nation and the Freeman’s Journal; for a time Repeal
Arbitration Courts settled quarrels and checked agrarian crime. In March began
the great open-air meetings. O’Connell and his organisers were tireless; and
the wonderful, but too short-lived, success of Father Mathew’s temperance
movement enabled them, all through the summer, to collect and disperse hundreds
of thousands of hearers in perfect order and peace.
Until May the
Government remained passive. Then Peel proposed to revive in a modified form an
Arms Act of 1835. He was, however, pressing conciliatory measures on De Grey,
the Viceroy, and he disapproved of the high-handed action of the Irish
executive in removing from the Commission of the Peace O’Connell and
thirty-three other Repealers. This step and the subsequent despatch of troops
to Ireland drove the Repeal Rent up to £2200, made avowed Repealers of O’Hagan
(the future Chancellor) and Smith O’Brien, and brought a note of violence into
O’Connell’s speeches, which hitherto had been studiously constitutional.
Remembering 1829, he tried to frighten Peel into concessions. He knew that it
was hopeless to think of force; and when Peel, with both parties behind him in
defence of the Union, stood firm, and when a great meeting at Clontarf was
prohibited the day before it was to have been held, he submitted. Young Ireland
wanted him to face the 60th Rifles, with ball in their pouches, and the guns of
the warships that lay off shore at Clontarf. Possibly that was what the
Government also wanted. This was in October. Within a few days O’Connell and an
odd selection of his supporters were arrested. Early next year he was convicted
of seditious conspiracy, before a well-packed jury, and was wildly cheered by
the Whigs when he came to Parliament between the conviction and the sentence.
In September, 1844, the
-1845]
Peels Irish policy.—The Corn Laws.
9
decision was
reversed in the Lords by Denman’s vote, and' O’Connell left his easy
confinement on a triumphal car. But his health was failing. In his absence Smith
O’Brien had led the Association with success. On his return, his growing
weakness, his dallyings with federalism in the shape of a subordinate
Legislature at Dublin, and his steadfast resolve to avoid bloodshed at all
costs, further shook the allegiance of his supporters. The Repeal Rent, the
barometer of the cause, fell to a few hundreds a week.
Meanwhile
Peel looked for measures of conciliation. The Union and the Established Church
he would not touch. The land he hardly dared to touch. He sent over the Devon
Commission to study the land law—its report is a monument to the defects of
that law—and commissioned Stanley to introduce in the Lords a modest measure
for increasing security of tenure and giving some compensation to improving
tenants in the future; but he let the Bill be strangled in committee by Irish
landlords whom, in his private letters, he called “ shabby fellows.” A measure
for extending the county franchise was also abandoned. But he legalised the
endowment of the Roman Church with land; he increased the grant to Maynooth,
which lost him Gladstone; and he established the Queen’s Colleges, the “godless
colleges,” for the joint education of Catholic and Protestant. Graham wanted to
see Dublin University thrown open to the Catholics, though he would have left
Trinity College untouched. All these measures were honestly welcomed by Young
Ireland. The last two were bitterly denounced by nearly every religious party
in Britain, and by O’Connell and most of the Roman Catholic Bishops in Ireland.
In June,
1845, Villiers introduced his annual motion for the immediate repeal of the
Com Laws. The inevitable criticisms of Peel and Graham were based mainly on one
word—“forthwith.” Everyone realised the direction in which they were moving;
and the loyalty of the country party was strained to breaking point. Two months
later came rumours of a widespread failure of the potato crop; but until late
in September official reports from Ireland were favourable. The Ministers had
often been told that one bad harvest would overturn their law of
1842. Peel had at last learnt that wages do not
vary with the price of com; and he believed that an attempt to maintain the
laws in face of some imminent danger would harm the landowners more than any
other class. He intended to confess his changed opinions to his party and to
discuss with them a fresh com policy in 1846. But, by the end of October, 1845,
a short harvest and a failure of the potato crop throughout Europe were
certain; how great a failure, was not yet known. So Peel told his Cabinet that
grants to buy food for Ireland would probably be necessary, and that, if made,
they must in his opinion be accompanied by the suspension or modification of
the Corn Laws. He reminded them that Russia, Belgium, and Holland had suspended
their corn duties, and
that several
countries had prohibited the export of foodstuffs. They calked, disagreed, and
separated. On November 6 he suggested tentatively that the ports should be
opened by Order in Council; that Parliament should be summoned to grant an
indemnity; and that the Com Law should be revised after Christmas—a nominal
duty being laid on maize and colonial com, and some sort of sliding scale being
retained for other grains. The existing scale was working badly, owing to a
defective method of calculating the a rerage prices which regulated the duties.
Only Aberdeen, Graham and Herbert supported him. As a precautionary measure, he
ordered the house of Baring to buy secretly £100,000 worth of maize in America;
but he rejected a proposal, pressed on him from Ireland, for stopping the
export of the fine Irish oat-crop of
1845. On November 15 Professors Lindley and
Lyon Playfair, who had been sent to Ireland to make enquiries, reported that
half the potato crop was lost or rotten, and thaJt a quarter of what remained
was wanted for seed. Now more than half the population of Ireland lived on
potatoes. The Anti-Corn Law League had seized its chance and was working harder
than ever. On the 22nd Lord John Russell in an open letter from Edinburgh
declared himself on its side, and the crisis came.
Peel, though
delayed by the divisions in his Cabinet, was determined to act. He was at this
time disposed to suspend the laws himself and leave to the Whigt the “review of
the whole question of agricultural protection ” which must follow suspension.
But he held that the Government which suspended the laws bught also to put
before Parliament some policy to be adopted after suspension, and to carry it
out, if Parliament approved. For this purpose he suggested, on December 2, a
system of annually dwindling duties, based on a sliding scale, to lead to
perfect freedom. His colleagues, except Stanley and Buccleuch, agreed; but many
agreed reluctantly, some urging him to resign. He did resign, and the Queen sent
for Russell. Russell and his party were by no means eager for office. Many
leading Whigs were not converts to repeal; they were in a minority in
Parliament; and some could not bring themselves to trust Peel’s promises of
support. Lord John himself trusted Peel, but did not trust Peel’s control of
his followers’ votes. Eventually (December 18) he agreed to form a ministry,
but threw up the task next day because Grey objected to Palmerston’s taking the
Foreign Office.
Peel
therefore came back, with the full support of the Queen, with all his Cabinet
but Stanley, with Gladstone also and Ellenborough. Wellington preferred even
repeal to a ministry of “Cobden and Co.,” and undertook to discipline the
Lords. Peel felt stronger than ever, and decided to propose a measure involving
ultimate repeal forthwith. Suspension, pending the decision of Parliament, was
abandoned; why, is not quite clear. Possibly Peel hoped to carry his Bill so
rapidly as to render it superfluous. He proposed that all corn duties, except a
(hilling, should disappear in 1849. When wheat was under 48s., there
-i84e] Repeal of the Corn
Lcwos.—Peel's fall.
11
was to be a
10j. duty; when it was 53$. of upwards, a 4?. duty. These rates were to fall
annually. At existing prices this meant a 4s. duty. The budget, which followed
this announcement, abolished the duties on all live animals and nearly every
kind of meat, and reduced those on cheese, butter, and other foods. And, in
order to demonstrate that Com Law repeal was only part of a general policy,
many duties on manufactures were abolished and others greatly reduced.
Parliament
met in January, 1846, and Peel soon perceived that the hope that he had
entertained of carrying his party with him was false. For years he had been
accumulating unpopularity. He could not charm and manage the ordinary party
man. At times, believing that people “liked being governed,” he had stubbornly
forced his followers to register his own opinions. His leadership was not based
on affection, but on the belief that he was the ablest embodiment of
Conservative principles. Those principles he had now, men said, betrayed—for
the second time. The five months from January to June, 1846, were filled with a
long series of bitter personal attacks on the Minister by the landed gentry,
led by Lord George Bentinck, inspired by Disraeli, who, having sought office
under Peel, had since begged favours at Peel’s hands and whose faith in
Protection was at least doubtful. In the Lords Stanley conducted the attack
with more moderation.
To the last,
Ireland was Peel’s undoing. As the darkness of the coming famine deepened and
food was seen leaving the ports, as there was little hope in the now disunited
Repeal Association and the land igrievances remained untouched, agfarian crime
broke out once more. Com Law repeal, introduced apparently as a palliative of
Irish distress, was discussed for the most part from an English standpoint and
at interminable length. Smith O’Brien said in the House that it was actually
opposed to Ireland’s permanent interests, seeing that she ordinarily sent grain
to the protected English market. Meanwhile she waited—the existing law not
suspended—with ^100,000 worth of maize to be sold at cost price to guardians of
the poor and relief associations. This was followed by a grant for
extraordinary public works. The maize flour, which proved an incalculable boon,
began to be utilised in the south-west in March; though at first the unfamiliar
stuff, “ Peel’s brimstone,” pleased no one. By that time its purveyor was
asking Parliament for a new, and stem, coercion act. It passed the Lords; but
in the Commons a combination of Whigs and Protectionists threw it out, some for
love of Ireland, more for hatred of Peel. That was on June 26, the night that
the Com and Customs Bills passed the Lords. Three days later Peel resigned, and
Lord John Russell reigned in his stead.
Famine was
tightening its grip on Ireland. July and August, the “ meal months,” when the
old potatoes were exhausted and the new were not available, were always a time
of Semi-starvation. The potatoes of 1845 lasted longer than had been expected;
for the crop was heavy, the
CH. L.
12
[1846-61
disease
sporadic, and an early frost checked it. But by the beginning of June some
districts had been without potatoes for weeks. Only the government meal depots
kept down prices. Money to buy food came from employment on the public
works—roads, for the most part, and harbours. In August 97,000 men were
employed on them. Already it was known that the potato blight would be far more
destructive than that of 1845; the oat and barley crops were deficient, the
wheat crop a bare average. Famine was also beginning among the potato-fed
crofters of the Highlands and the Isles; but the activity of most of the Scotch
landlords, the experience that Government had gained in Ireland, and the
well-organised charity of the rich and unstricken southern and eastern counties
limited its evil consequences.
Charity gave
generous aid for Ireland also; and Government had hoped to abstain from again
coming into the food-markets as a buyer, for fear of discouraging private
trade. But such abstinence proved impossible. The winter of 1846-7 saw the
climax of the tragedy. Government was now giving money freely. All who
could—there were but too many impotent—thronged the works to get “ the Queen’s
pay.” Over 700,000 received it in March, 1847; and effectual control over the
numbers or the work done had been lost. Ordinary agricultural operations had
nearly ceased. The new workhouses were overcrowded, though the people hated
them. Father Mathew wrote bitterly of how women “ were forcibly deprived of
their hair and clothed in the garb of guilty convicts.” In March and April the
deaths in the workhouses alone exceeded 2500 a week; Starving Irish poured into
England and died in thousands of famine fever. They crowded into emigrant
ships, many dying on board or on arriving at their destinations. As one of
these ships left Dublin, in June, 1847, it met the vessel that carried
O’Connell’s body; and there rose from its deck the wail of the peasants for
their dead leader and their lost home.
In January,
1847, Peel’s Com Law and the Navigation Laws were suspended, and the policy of
relief works was condemned. Relief was henceforward to take the form of cooked
rations and to be administered mainly through the Poor Law organisation.
Hitherto outdoor relief had been prohibited in Ireland. From March to June the
people were successfully drafted from the works. By August more than 8,000,000
were receiving the rations, and the workhouse mortality had been reduced by
one-half. The com harvests of 1847 were satisfactory; food prices fell, and the
potato disease was nearly exhausted. But so few potatoes had been planted that
the winter of 1847-8 was again a time of great, though lessened, distress. So
was the year 1849. While the wreckage of famine was being cleared away and
relief for bankrupt landlords and bankrupt Poor Law Unions was being arranged,
the peasants emigrated steadily. The next census showed that the population had
fallen from about 8,300,000 to less than 6,600,000 between 1845 and 1851.
1846-8]
IS
Political
troubles and the continued failure of Parliament to deal satisfactorily with
the land question had contributed to the emigration. The Whigs gave some
Irishmen places and got some support from O’Connell while he lived; but there
was no effective revival of the discriminating administration of 1835-9. The
support given by the O’Connellites merely embittered the relations between that
party and Young Ireland. In July, 1846, the final disruption came; the young
men left the Association because they refused to pledge themselves never to use
force to secure Repeal, Davis was dead; but more impatient and violent men carried
on his work—Mitchel, a dreamy, passionate lawyer of thirty, and Meagher, a
stormy orator of twenty-two. Smith O’Brien, disgusted with the irresolution of
the O’Connellite rump, also sided with the seceders. Soon there were
O’Connellite and O’Brienite faction fights. All this was in the height of the
famine, when passions were easily roused. Moreover an untimely revival of an
old agrarian trouble disposed hungry men to welcome violent counsels. Since
about 1820, “ clearances ” had been in progress. As the old leases to middlemen
fell in, many landowners, finding their estates overcrowded with cotters,
cleared them and consolidated the holdings. The thing in itself was good; the
manner of doing it could not have been worse. And this procedure was renewed, sometimes
most wantonly, when famine distress gave legal warrant for evicting tenants who
could not pay their rent. There were also evictions to relieve landlords of
liability under the Poor Law. The year 1847 was filled, in certain counties,
with the worst type of agrarian outrage. Under the advice of Lord Clarendon,
their Viceroy, the Government passed a Coercion Act in the autumn. Russell
sincerely desired to approach the land question; but he was not strong enough,
nor were the times favourable. A compensation for improvements Bill and a
suggested Bill to control evictions went into limbo in 1848.
The political
ferment of 1848 filled the overwrought minds of the Irish leaders with dreams
of a republic baptised in blood. Mitchel’s paper, the United Irishmcm, talked
incessantly of pikes, barricades, bullet-making and vitriol. Revolutionary
clubs sprang into life. Mpaghpr and O’Brien went to Paris to establish
connexions with the successful republicans of France; but they were judiciously
discouraged by Lamartine. The Government was at work, creating the crime of
treason-felony and clearing for action. O’Brien and Meagher were tried for
sedition, but escaped because each jury contained one Roman Catholic. A more
judiciously constituted jury sent Mitchel to penal servitude for
treason-felony. Later in the year Habeas Corpus was suspended; over a hundred
nationalists were imprisoned by warrant; O’Brien, Dillon, and Meagher, foolish
enough to surround themselves with a useless little body of armed men, were taken
and transported.
All that
Russell passed in the way of reforming legislation for Ireland was an extension
of the franchise and Peel s favourite scheme for
14
Bussells Cabinet.—Commercial
distress. [1846-52
facilitating
the sale of, encumbered estates. This wa? ;n.tended to introduce
the British practices of land tenure. What, it- did was to complicate further
the specifically Irish problems which its sponsors, even with the reports of
the Devon Commission before them, persistently ignored.
The Russell
ministry was lacking in constructive statesmanship and unsuccessfully, though
ably, led. None of Peel’s friends, the Ministers of
1846, would join, though they usually
supported, the Government. The men who had done most to destroy the Corn Law
were not even asked to join. There was a strong—a headstrong—man for the
Foreign Office, for Grey withdrew his objection to Palmerston. Lord Grey
himself did well at the Colonial Office. Others filled their posts creditably.
But there was no one fit to continue Peel’s special work. At the Exchequer,
Lord John’s attempt to play Peel to Sir Charles Wood’s Goulburn was decidedly
unsuccessful. Lord John once admitted that he had no head for figures, and
unfortunately the times required skilful finance. The worst of the railway
speculation was over in June, 1846; but the steady, and for a time
unremunerative, absorption of capital in rail way-building produced serious
difficulties. Harvest failure in 1846 disorgarisec the produce markets, and
caused an abnormal drain of gold from the United Kingdom to pay for the
imported food. The slackening of purchasing power among the masses that comes
with dear food depressed many branches of manufacture. Cotton, as well as
grain, ran short. While the prices of food and cotton rose, those of most other
staples fell. All through.the spring of 1847, the money-market was disturbed;
and in May wheat fetched 115s. a quarter. An unexpectedly good harvest proved
ruinous to dealers who had strained their credit to buy at such famine prices.
In August, when wheat was at 64s., corn firms began to fail, then East India
'merchants, joint-stock banks, iron firms, cotton firms, and of course
stock-brokers. Every weak spot in the trade of the country was probed. In
October the new Bank Act had to be suspended, the Bank being empowered to
exceed its legal note issue against securities, in order to ease the panic
demand for money; and political troubles in 1848 prolonged the slow
convalescence of trade.
National
expenu'tu-e was meanwhile driven up by an alarm of war with France in 1847.
Hence deficits and financial expedients. In 1848 Peel’s Income Tax was to
expire. But, instead of abandoning, Wood and Russell proposed to raise it.
There was vigorous opposition to this, and eventually they gave way. In 1851 and
1852 the Commons renewed it for one year only. But nevertheless the tax got
established, as it were by accident. Some other sides of Whig finance showed
more foresight. The obnoxious Brick Tax was abolished; the Stamp Duties were
consolidated and reduced; an Inhabited House Duty took the place of
the
insanitary Window Tax; the last export duty.—that on coal________
disappeared;
the duty on coffee came down to 3d. a pound; and the huge differential duties
on foreign timber and foreign sugar were lowered.
1838-49] Sugar and Timber Duties,—Navigation
Laws. 15
These last
were old occasions of controversy, much involved with party manoeuvres and the
fates of Governments. Until 1842 the duties had been almost prohibitive and
even those on colonial timber and sugar had been high. An attempt to reduce the
tax on foreign sugar was the immediate cause of Melbourne’s fall. In 1844, Peel
had forced on Parliament a reduction on non-slave-grown foreign sugars ; but
the supply of these proved inadequate. So in 1846, after Peel’s fall, the “
free labour ” principle, which was half philanthropic half a concession to the
West Indies, was dropped, and a scheme for the gradual equalisation of all the
duties substituted for it. Depression in the sugar colonies and the stubborn
will of Bentinck, fighting each step towards free trade, wrung from the
Government in 1848 an extension of the preferential period until 1854. In the
case of timber, Wood endorsed a policy traced out by Peel. Peel had found the
duties on foreign timber at 55s., and on colonial at 10s. 6d. a load; Wood left
them at Is. 6d. and Is. respectively. These partial abandonments of the
preierei itial principle were simply the outcome of a desire to relieve
consumers. In the American colonie^ they were most unpopular.
Closely
connected with them was the fall of the old Navigation Code. A long series of
reciprocity treaties had stretched it greatly since Huskisson’s time. Direct
trade with the treaty countries was practically open. In 1838 a very important
concession affecting indirect trade had been made to Austria, by which her
ships might carry freely between England and Danubian ports not on Austrian
territory. Similar privileges had since been granted to the States of the
Prussian Zollverem and to other countries. The Colonies were by this time
allowed to trade direct with most foreign countries, the East Indies with any
friendly Power. By special agreement, United States ships might even trade
between the United Kingdom and India. But no foreign ship could carry between
England and the Colonies, or from colony to colony. Goods could not even be
sent from the Colonies in an “illegal” ship to be warehoused although not
consumed here; yet they could be so sent from foreign countries. No Asian,
African, or American produce could, as a general rule, be brought from any
European port—Javan sugar or coffee from Rotterdam or cotton from Havre. Two
years of controversy and committee reports preceded the final repealing Act of
1849. Opinions were very evenly balanced. The mercantile and manufacturing
interests wanted complete freedom. Statesmen felt that the Code was in opposition
to the general trend of commercial legislation, and were much influenced by the
facts that most of our commercial treaties were running out, and that foreign
Powers were disinclined to renew them on the old terms. Some colonists who were
losing fiscal preferences wished to be left free to ship their goods in what
bottoms they pleased. The seaboard Colonies of North America, on the other
hand, bitterly resented the proposal to allow the Yankees to share their
profitable carrying
16 Repeal of the Navigation Laws-Colonial policy.
[1846-52
trade with
Britain and the West Indies. In England the shipping interest was almost
unanimous against repeal; so was the old school of naval officers. But it was
carried nevertheless; though proxies and the Bishops’ votes were needed to pass
it in the Lords.
Besides
opening the colonial trade, the Whigs greatly extended colonial
self-government. They did so, to some extent, under pressure; they borrowed
ideas and received abundant criticism from such veteran colonial reformers as
Gibbon Wakefield and Molesworth; and they often offended the Colonies by the
manner of their gifts. Yet, when all is said, theirs was a great achievement.
New South Wales had been granted a measure of home rule in 1842. Under Russell
and Grey, Victoria was created, and Constitutions given to all the Australian
Colonies. These were short lived, just because of their most important
feature—they were alterable on the initiative of the Colonies themselves. Grey
also drafted a Constitution for New Zealand. Shortly after he left office, it
was revised and applied with Wakefield’s assistance. In 1846 colonial legislatures
had for the first time been authorised to remove differential duties favouring
British goods. This permission, coupled with selfgovernment, was to give them
a control of tariffs and trade such as Lord Durham had never contemplated. In
England there was much indifference to all these things. Very many observers
thought that self-government would develop into independence. But, as a class,
the leading statesmen of the forties neither desired, nor even habitually
anticipated, the dissolution of the imperial bond.
Between
Aberdeen’s tenure of the Foreign Office and Palmerston’s the contrast is
complete—Aberdeen reticent, not popular, pacific, considerate, in full sympathy
with the Crown and trusted by his chief; Palmerston always in the public eye,
reckless, masterful, distrusted by the Court—by all Courts—and enjoying a
popularity that encouraged him to disregard the . leader whom he half expected
in time to oust. Aberdeen’s chief works were the establishment of a good
understanding with France and the settlement of accumulated difficulties with
the. United States. Thiers and Palmerston had hrought France and England to the
very brink of war in 1840. Press writers and professional diplomatists on both
sides were full of suspicions and jealousies. Aberdeen and Guizot, who were
personal friends, laboured incessantly to remove causes of offence. But the
work was heavy, and many Englishmen besides Palmerston thought that concessions
were too habitually on Aberdeen’s side. With all their labour war came near in
1844, through once famous squabbles over Tahiti: and Morocco, which are
elsewhere described. Though immediate danger was over, Peel was preparing to
revive the militia ballot and strengthen the navy in 1845. Aberdeen, who
disagreed with these warlike preparations, had spoken of resignation just
before, in September, Irish affairs pushed all else aside.
1841-9] Foreign policies of Aberdeen arid
Palmerston. 17
At that
moment the western horizon also was dark, for the second time since 1841, Old
disputes about the Canadian boundaries, the abuse of the right of search by our
slaver-hunting cruisers, and other matters, were settled by the Ashburton
Treaty of 1842, both sides making concessions. But the Oregon boundary dispute
remained and produced a dangerous inflammation in 1845. Once more Aberdeen acted
with pacific dignity; and Peel was able to announce that his proposals had been
accepted intact, on the very day on which the Government was dissolved.
Then came
Palmerston, full of contempt for his predecessor; and the foreign offices
abroad grew uneasy. “ Palmerston,” said Rothschild of Paris in December, 1845,
“has this drawback—he makes the funds fall all over Europe without giving us
notice.” He did so now, though part of the blame lay with Guizot.
Louis-Philippe had long been anxious to marry the young Queen Isabella of Spain
to some Bourbon prince and her sister to his son the Due de Montpensier.
Aberdeen had acquiesced in principle; and the French Government had promised
both him and Queen Victoria not to press the Montpensier match until Isabella
was married and a mother, stipulating however to Aberdeen that, if a marriage
for either princess outside the House of Bourbon became imminent, they should
be free of their pledge. Immediately on entering office, Palmerston, advised by
Bulwer, our ambassador at Madrid, set himself definitely against Montpensier,
and privately pressed the claims of another candidate to the hand of the
Queen’s sister. Bresson, the French ambassador, had been intriguing in the
opposite sense. Learn; g of Palmerston’s intentions, Guizot took up Bresson’s
plan and arranged the two marriages to suit his master in August, 1846. In
England the Court, the public, and the Press were furious; and, until the fall
of Louis-Philippe in 1848, the Government was busy with plans for expenditure
on the services and the revival of the militia.
While Europe
was labouring in revolution, Palmerston’s self-confident activity was
incessant, generous, and indiscreet. It won him the good opinion of the nation,
and finally lost him his office. Wherever absolutism grew arrogant, there
Palmerston’s agents took the side of freedom; in and out of season he
instructed Governments in their constitutional duties. When Mettemich tried to
unite the Powers against the nationalist movement that he foresaw in Italy,
Palmerston resisted him and sent Lord Minto to Italy to proclaim England’s
sympathy with reform. When the storm broke, he consistently supported the anti-
Austrian party, telling Minto that “Italy ought to unite in a confederacy,”
and that “now was the time to strike.” He rejoiced in Austria’s temporary
downfall, and, when Radetzky turned the tide, he worked hard in the Italian
cause. He gave Spain lessons in the art of government, which led the Spaniards
to give Bulwer his passports. In 1849 he tried vainly to avert Russian
intervention in Hungary, and
18
Palmerston.—The
Churches. [i846-52
ordered our
Minister at Vienna to express disgust at Austrian atrocities “openly and
decidedly.” He supported the Sultan when the two Courts tried to force him to
give up Kossuth and other political refugees. He allowed English arms to be
sent to the rebel Sicilians. And, in extorting compensation from Greece over
the notorious Don Pacifico incident, he was at least as anxious to school King
Otho, who had absolutist leanings, as to win a diplomatic triumph for England
and himself.
This Pacifico
affair led to a formal parliamentary attack on Palmerston in June, 1850. He
had already irritated Lord John and the Court by his habit of acting entirely
on his own responsibility and his indifference to foreign susceptibilities.
The Queen had censured him severely; the Prime Minister had made him apologise
to the King of the Two Sicilies, and meant to remove him from the Foreign
Office at the end of 1850. But he beat off the parliamentary attack with
distinction, and Russell could hardly dismiss the man whose peroration, with
its demand that no British subject should ever in vain say Civis Romanus mm,
had stirred the whole people. Yet soon afterwards the Queen sent him a memorandum
with definite rules for his relations with the Crown. Finally Russell removed
him from office ir December, 1851, because of fresh indiscretion and
insubordination—not this time in a popular cause. He had expressed approval of
Louis Napoleon’s coup d'etat of December 2, and had repeated his expressions,
after the Queen and Russell had censured them, in a despatch that he submitted
to neither.
The relations
of the State with the Churches raised as great storms under Russell’s
Government as under Peel’s. But the storm centre had moved south. Scotland was
recovering from the shock of the Disruption. The Free Church grew strong and
efficient. The Established Church also prospered, and the State conceded to it
some of the privileges, though not the principles, for which the Disruption
leaders had fought. In England Russell’s hatred of the “ Puseyites ” was a
beginning of trouble. They disliked his episcopal nominations; and one of
these—that of the latitudinarian Dr Hampden—raised a tumult of protest. Indignation
rose higher when the Privy Council overrode the refusal of Phillpotts, Bishop
of Exeter, to institute to a crown living a clergyman named Gorham, who held
Calvinistic views on baptism. This was an intrusion into the spiritual sphere
by a lay tribunal far more decisive than those which had broken up the Scottish
Church. But, as the F.nglkTi Church had no corporate voice, repudiation of the
Establishment was impossible, even had it been widely advocated—which it was
not; for the English and Scottish views of the bounds of temporal authority
differed. Many clergymen who held high views of Church prerogative seceded to
Rome; but these were individual acts. The revival of Convocation in November,
1852, was the outward sign of the desire that corporate action should
henceforth be possible. Two years earlier,
1842-52] The Ecclesiastical Titles
Bill.—Chartism.
19
Pius IX’s
creation of Roman bishoprics in England produced a widespread and fanatical
outcry against Romanism and “Puseyism,” in which Russell joined. It led him to
place on the statute book that monument of intolerance and bad statesmanship,
the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which in its final form forbade Roman Catholic
Bishops to make use of those territorial titles which they have ever since employed.
Some
contemporaries believed that Peel’s decision in 1845 saved his country from
revolution three years later. This at least is certain—it helped to convince
the labouring classes that Parliament was not altogether indifferent to their
needs, and strengthened the hands of all who were working for peaceful reform.
After 1842 militant Chartism steadily lost its hold on the best of the
working-men. The Chartist leaders were always quarrelling. Feargus O’Connor’s
Chartist Cooperative Land Society of 1845, which spent some £100,000 in an
ill-considered attempt to bring the people back to the land, strained the
resources and the loyalty of his followers. For some, faith in the political
and even in the economic principles of the Anti-Corn Law Leaguers supplanted
faith in the Charter. They learnt to cooperate with middle class Radicals for
attainable political ends. Others threw themselves into the new cooperative
store movement, with its tangible advantages, or into bolder and less
successful essays in cooperative production. The Trade Unions drew apart from
organised Chartism as the years passed. They were becoming businesslike and
opportunist, more interested in the improvement of their own organisation than
in the bolder schemes of the Chartists, such as Bronterre O’Brien’s proposals
for land nationalisation. Some of the great existing Unions date from these
years, as for example, the Amalgamated Engineers. Only the high prices and
slack work of 1847 and the revolutionary contagion of 1848 gave the party of
violence among the Chartists a momentary ascendancy. Even then their power was
more apparent than real, and they proved miserably inefficient revolutionaries.
The great demonstration of April 10, 1848, which was to have overawed
Parliament, was an utter failure; and the subsequent riots in the north were
unimportant. Next year O’Connor, who was responsible for the fiasco, found just
fifteen members of Parliament willing to vote with him for the Charter. As a
distinct movement, Chartism was dead; most of its principles, but not its
exaggerated class-feeling, found a home in the left wing of the new Liberal
party.
The repeal of
the Com Laws by no means stood alone. There were many signs of a drawing
together of “the two nations,” and some signs of an increasing faith in
legislation as an engine of economic reform. In 1847 and 1850 the Ten Hours
Acts met one of the chief grievances of the factory population, a grievance
upon which Chartist orators had laid great stress. Private enterprise was
making a humble beginning of housing reform. The first Act dealing with it—the
Lodging House
20 Social legislation and conditions.—Emigration.
[1840-52
Act—was
passed in 1851. From 1847 to 1850 urban sanitation and burial abuses were at
last seriously taken in hand, though too late to prevent a recurrence of
cholera in 1849. The State added a little to its small contribution towards the
cost of national education; and the connexion between the absence of universal
schooling and the existence of child labour was rendered clear by the factory
inspectors. The Mechanics’ Institutes had made some partial provision for adult
education. In 1845 this was supplemented by the permission given to town
councils to create museums; in 1850 the permission was extended to free
libraries.
By that time
urban wages were showing an upward movement in all but the dying crafts; though
rural wages still continued at, or even below, the level of 1841. But the cost
of living had declined, and, on the land, better cottages and more allotments
were to be found. Railways and steam navigation and free trade had stimulated
every branch of industry; and, although the glorification of Britain’s
industrial strength in the Great Exhibition of 1851 did not mark the beginning
of an age of contentment and peace, it coincided with a marked increase not
only in wealth but in well-bning. Moreover the immense emigration of the past
decade, from Britain as well as Ireland, had checked the gloomy fears of
Malthusians and eased the labour market. Some 337,000 emigrants had left the
United Kingdom in the three bad years 1840-2; 221,000 in 1842-5; and 130,000 in
1846. From 1847 to 1852 the number was never in any one year less than 248,000;
and in 1852—after the great gold discoveries—it rose to 368,000. Many of the emigrants,
British as well as Irish, carried bitter memories with them. The more capable
and daring went; the more listless and timid remained. Thus the movement had
its drawbacks, yet on the whole it was good.
Throughout
the Russell Administration all the lines of party division were blurred. Peel
had broken up the Tories and helped to break up the Whigs. Russell had not
converted the whole Whig party to free trade. Many influential men would have
preferred a protectionist to a Peelite alliance. Melbourne was a protectionist
to the last. The manufacturing free-traders preferred Peel to the Whigs; and
Cobden once begged him to lead a new middle class free trade party. Cobden and
his friends owned no Whig allegiance and voted as they pleased; so did the
Peelites. After Bentinck’s death in 1848, the protectionist Tories came under
the control of Disraeli, who took in hand the task of weaning them from their
extreme opinions, and more than once tried to secure the cooperation of some of
Peel’s friends. For neither he nor Stanley ever thought mere dogmatic
Protection an adequate foundation for a great political party.
Peel died
suddenly and prematurely in July, 1850. He had been the greatest political
power in the country, and had often saved the Government when in difficulties.
But, in losing him, Russell also lost a possiple
1846-52] Confusion and rearrangement of parties.
21
rival. Had
Palmerston fallen a year earlier, some at least of the Peelites might have
joined Russell. As it was, they held aloof. The revival of the question of
parliamentary reform and the “Papal aggression” of September, 1850, further
complicated matters. Reform was popular among Russell’s more liberal adherents;
and, after various parliamentary mishaps, he was beaten, in a nearly empty House,
on a motion for extending the county franchise in February, 1851. During the
debates he made a declaration in favour of some extension.
Russell
resigned. Stanley was sent for, but refused office. Russell then tried, as so
often before, to secure some Peelite assistance; but the Peelites unanimously
condemned his anti-papal policy. Aberdeen was sent for and declined. Then
Stanley tried to enlist Gladstone and others. He too failed. So Russell came
back, no stronger than before. Towards the end of the year, when he was
discussing Reform with his Cabinet, the rise of Louis Napoleon lost him
Palmerston and threw the country into a war fever. On February 16, 1852,
Palmerston cheerfully defeated the Government on an amendment to the little
Militia Bill, with which they had hoped—and failed—to satisfy the public.
Stanley, now
Lord Derby, the inevitable successor, held office until the general election in
July by the courtesy of the Peelites. There was little legislation except a
Militia Bill and a provisional budget, in introducing which Disraeli—now
Chancellor of the Exchequer—praised Peel’s finance and did not mention corn.
Derby’s short ministry is chiefly interesting through its influence on the
rearrangement of parties. Had he repudiated Protection and been cautious
abroad, he might have rallied Aberdeen, Gladstone, and Herbert. But there was
no repudiation; and Malmesbury, his Foreign Secretary, seemed to them
over-friendly with Napoleon. He had some hope of enlisting Palmerston; but
Palmerston was thinking of the leadership. Graham was returning to his old Whig
allegiance, with some able men at his back. Gladstone and the rest still dreamt
of a purged Conservative party. That someone must join Derby, if he was not to
fall, was clear; but no one joined.
There was a
simple issue at the election—did the nation approve the commercial policy that
Peel had begun and Russell had continued? Ministers had made it clear that they
would stand by the decision of the electorate; but they were less clear as to
what they wished that decision to be. Disraeli, like Peel before him, was
preparing for a change of front and, in private, “had no great fear” of the
Protectionists. The elections were numerically indecisive, against Protection
decisive enough. When Palmerston proposed in place of a triumphant free trade
motion of Villiers’ a gentler amendment, so drafted (by Graham) as to save the
face of the Protectionists, it was carried by 468 to 63. But acceptance of the
free trade principle could not save the Government. It fell on December 17, on
a budget amendment—when through the night Gladstone struggled with Disraeli.
THE FALL OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN FRANCE.
(1840-8.)
The crisis of 1840 had nearly laid in ruins the July
Monarchy, yet it was destined to live for another eight years, with such
apparent stability, that it seemed unshakeable on the very eve of its downfall.
The ability of Guizot who, during this period, bore the burden of power, is
manifestly insufficient to explain so striking a phenomenon. It will be as
well, therefore, to attempt a survey of the underlying causes which were
sapping the regime of July in 1840, and also of those, possibly no less
interesting, which kept it standing until the day when a shock, slight in
itself, caused it first to tremble, and ultimately to collapse. Such an
examination, moreover, will prepare the way for a clearer understanding of the
different phases of the Republic of 1848 in its final metamorphosis into a
Napoleonic Empire.
The crisis of
1840 produced certain elements which endangered the Government of
Louis-Philippe, none of which, singly, was capable of seriously imperilling it,
but of which the cumulative effect was great. An apparently trifling accident
revealed the hidden weakness of the whole body politic; in a moment the
movement assumed alarming proportions; and after three days, it proved fatal to
the existing regime on February 24, 1848.
The least
grave of these dangers would seem to have been the complete change in mental
attitude of a large portion of the middle class at finding, or, at any rate,
believing that the regime of 18S0 had proved false to all its promises. The
upholders of this r&gvme had allowed the nation to believe, had indeed
themselves believed, that the semi-revolution which had replaced Charles X by
Louis-Philippe would provide safeguards alike for vested interests and for the
national honour. Instead of this, the new regime appeared to the bourgeoisie to
have done nothing of the kind. Even if property were safe, the national honour
seemed compromised; and the supporters of the rigime were thus divided into two
parties. On the one hand was a body of middle class
1840-8] Attitude of the bourgeoisie towards
religion. 23
citizens,
hitherto probably as much saturated with scepticism and Voltaireanism as the
rest of their class, but whose behaviour now clearly showed a revival of
religious belief. They sent their children to the Congregationist Schools,
which subsisted side by side with the State University—then dominated by the
philosophy of Victor Cousin—they devoured eagerly the violent pamphlets by
which the clergy were attempting to destroy this particular philosophy as well
as the University monopoly. They cheered Lacordaire on his public assumption
of the Dominican habit; they encouraged the Jesuits to reappear with heads held
high despite the law; and, finally, they fostered the growth of innumerable
congregations all over the country. In these and similar ways this section of
the bourgeoisie showed its detachment from & regime which recognised in
religion (since it preached resignation) a necessity for the populace, but
which aimed at binding its ministers within the limits of the Concordat. But
even in the remaining portion of the middle class, among whom still
predominated a personal indifference towards religion, or at any rate a hatred
of the Jesuits and of Ultra- montanism, there came about a peculiar
transformation, which, following upon an almost feverish interest in things
political, and especially in foreign affairs, showed itself in a kind of
apathy, an indifference as profound as it was incredible, amounting even to an
openly expressed contempt for all such questions. Though still greatly attached
to the regime in whose stability they were personally interested, this section
of the bourgeoisie seemed to think that, with a Government of such approved
caution in face of a Europe indulgent so long as it was not provoked, there was
nothing for them to do but to take advantage of the situation to increase their
individual wealth and to make up, by the enjoyment of material pleasures, for
the loss of the luxury of national pride. All desire for “glory” was henceforth
incompatible with the maintenance of their own particular privilege. Hence
questions relating to lucrative enterprises, Stock Exchange speculation, and
the like, formed practically their sole preoccupation after 1840. The
opportunities for personal enrichment were naturally numerous, owing to the
introduction of novel inventions, new industrial processes, steam engines,
railways, and the like. It was a misfortune that, speaking generally, the
national morality was but little regarded, and that scandals soon broke out in
connexion with concessions and bribery whereby the reputations of two
ex-Ministers were dragged in the mire. Even Guizot and Thiers, the leaders of
the two rival political parties, though their personal integrity was above
reproach, were splashed with the same mud.
How strange
an effect must all this have had upon those to whom the regime had brought
nothing but misfortune—those who not only possessed no direct voice in the
government of affairs but, by the very conditions of their social existence,
saw themselves condemned to a life of complete inaction in perpetuity 1 What
had become of those theoretic rights
24
[1840-3
which had
been reserved to them—equality with regard to employment, with regard to
honours—of that Marshal’s baton which the Revolution or, according to the
popular notion, Napoleon had placed in their knapsacks? With a Government so
pacific in intention, would actual opportunities ever offer themselves? Seeking
consolation through the imagination, they were forced to fall back upon
reminiscences of their grandfathers, distorted by the action of time and
centring round the Napoleonic legend. The contrast afforded by the
commonplaceness of their own time, by the work of authors and artists such as
Victor Hugo, Seranger the song-writer, the painters Charlet and Raffet (whose
works were extensively reproduced by lithography)—and even by the views of the
political leaders themselves, such as Thiers, who at the Chateau of Versailles
took first rank among the “ Napoleonisers ”—all helped to .^produce this legend
in letters of fire. Not only Napoleon himself was deified, but those humble
grenadiers, those “grognards”—whom his eagle eye had singled out from the
crowd—were raised with him to the very pinnacle of greatness.
In very truth
this Napoleonic cult, to which the Government sacrificed—as if in the hope of
winning pardon for its own timidities abroad — seemed harmless enough for the
moment. No imperial claimant assumed a menacing character—not even Louis
Napoleon, whose somewhat foolish attempts in 1836-40 were almost unknown to the
nation at large. Moreover, since the cult found its most ardent worshippers in
the provinces, which—being inaccessible to the influence of the Press—seemed
politically unimportant, the Government was perhaps justified in its attitude
of reassurance. But Ministers should have paid greater attention to the
disillusions and disappointments of the working-classes, whose political
discontent was beginning to be intensified by an added social discontent. It
is, in fact, from this period that we may date the first infiltrations of
Socialism among the workers. True, this Socialism presented at first no very
dangerous appearance, consisting as it did of schemes for the radical
reorganisation of society, which were either too "heoretit al or too
purely doctrinaire to appeal readily to the great mass of the people. Moreover,
there was too much contradiction among its exponents themselves. Proudhon
preached Individualism, Cabet and Pierre Leroux Communism, Louis Blanc a
mitigated and temporary system of socialistic workshops. Of all this the people
in general grasped very little, inclining rather more to Louis Blanc’s theory
of the “ right to work ”—which was to receive its first practical application
in 1848—than to Proudhon’s maxim “ property is theft.” Socialism was in fact
only making itself known through the medium of vague, general articles in a
certain section of the Republican Press which, after 1840, devoted itself in
particular to the “ amelioration of the working-man’s lot.” For example, such a
paper as Le Journal du Peuple was remodelled in 1841, and, becoming La Reform
in 1843, underwent a transformation
1840-8]
25
still more
profound under the editorship of Flocon and Ribeyrolles, who were assisted by
Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc.
Nevertheless
the Socialist propaganda was still too limited in extent, too vague, and, in
certain directions, even too lacking in seriousness, to appear anything but an
exceedingly remote danger. Far more serious in reality was the attitude of the
middle classes after 1840, for upon them depended the whole stability of the “
system.” We know how it was established—this system which claimed to have
raised up the Sovereignty of Reason upon the ruins of two chimeras: upon
“Divine Right” and the “Sovereignty of the People,” which were embodied in the
legitimate Monarchy and the Republic respectively. It was done by making
tax-payers (who paid 500 francs in taxes) eligible for election as
Parliamentary Deputies, by making those who paid 200 francs eligible as voters,
and by allowing the rest no political rights whatever. To the lower middle
classes, however, who appeared to be deprived of political importance by the
smallness of their pecuniary resources, the Government had conceded both a
favour and a right. After the Revolution of 1830, which they had themselves brought
about, they were held worthy to fulfil the functions of police, in the
interests of Liberalism and for the maintenance of order, as well as to assist
the army in the work of national defence. The National Guard had thus become a
fundamental institution of the Monarchy—an institution whose practical
importance was all the greater from the fact that they could use their muskets
against whom they pleased. The National Guard was perfectly aware of its
position and of the importance of its role. As a matter of fact, its opinions
were divided like its functions— half military and half police—or its
recruitment—half from the populace and half from the middle classes—or its.
interests—half conservative and half revolutionary. It possessed, in fact, but
empty honours, and the burdens, without the joys, of power. It may be that it
urged the Government less insistently to stir up warlike passions than to avoid
all possibilities of diplomatic humiliations; it may even be that it found less
fault with the grounds of a pacific policy than with the manner in which that
policy displayed itself to the world. But this did not in its eyes diminish the
guilt of the Government, responsible as it was, alike for its outward behaviour
and its underlying intentions.
Middle class
discontent proceeded promptly to show itself in the acquittal of persons
accused of political offences, and in hostile cries uttered by the National
Guard during reviews held by the King, a circumstance which eventually obliged
him to suspend these inspections and parades. Yet these facts were not regarded
by the Government as of any special significance, and rightly so. For the
middle classes, while judging the Government severely, might be trusted not to
imagine or desire its overthrow. So great was their horror, both of the
excesses of 1793 and of those of the ujicwji
regime} that, even at
26 Evolution of the two chief parliamentary
parties. [i84o
the beginning
of the “February Days,” the National Guard had no thought of this kind. Its
purely passive role was then to paralyse the army, a role which was however
equivalent to leaving the field clear to the enemies of the regime both secret
and avowed.
But from the
year 1840, to be precise, the suspicions aroused in the breasts of these former
partisans of reaction and revolution showed a tendency to disappear. The two
parties, influenced by the same crisis which so profoundly modified the whole
spirit of France, simultaneously underwent an evolution which rendered both
practically unrecognisable. The class which continued openly to attack the
Government was so far changed that it no longer endeavoured to spread its
propaganda beyond a clearly defined portion of the nation, whose necessities
became practically its sole preoccupation. This was the case with the
Legitimists, who were condemned henceforward to restrict their
recruiting-fields to the nobility and their dependents. It was also the case
with those Republicans who, struck by the importance which social'questions
were assuming among the working-classes, subordinated to them all other
problems. But the other faction of each of the two main parties adopted a
wholly different line of conduct. While pretending to accept the existing form
of government or perhaps in despair of changing it, the middle class Republicans,
on the one hand, and the Catholic Legitimists, on the other, adopted tactics
quite different from those which the Red Republicans and ultra-reactionaries
had hitherto employed. The Republican organ-in-chief, Le National, formerly in
the hands of Armand Carrel, allowed Marrast, who had returned from exile in
1840, to bring1 over its supporters—Gamier-Pages junior, Arago,
Carnot, Pagnerre, Goudchaux, Marie, and others—to an entirely new standpoint.
This new departure consisted in transferring their opposition to legal ground,
and in making electoral reform the first point in their programme. It was not
that ultimate hopes were to be abandoned: they were to be postponed to a more
propitious moment—or rather, the country was gradually to be led in the
direction in which at present it declined to go. The Catholics, on their side,
both Bishops and laity, henceforward appear to have exclusively occupied
themselves with the cause of religion; and, feeling that they had gained
nothing by the association of their cause with that of the Legitimists, they
came to an important decision. They, too, were willing to accept the existing
form of government, only demanding in return one thing, liberty with regard to
secondary education—a reform to which the Government had pledged itself on its
accession to power but which it had only partially fulfilled. This question had
been left unsettled after primary education had been arranged upon lines
allowing both freedom and reform to various denominations. If only the University
monopoly were destroyed, the clergy and the congregations could, by securing
control over the education of the sons of that middle class which held the
reins of power, eventually
1840-8]
27
dominate the
Government. The Bishops were gradually won over to this plan—their conversion
being, curiously enough, due to a layman, a former friend of Lamennais and a
staunch friend of Lacordaire, the Comte de Montalembert, who became proprietor
of the great Catholic newspaper, L'Univers, in 1840, with the object of
achieving this end. The suspicions harboured by one section of the upper, as
well as of the lower, middle class towards a party hitherto deeply pledged to
reaction gradually diminished and showed signs of disappearing altogether. At
the same time, the distrust felt by the remaining section of those same classes
in regard to the Liberal doctrines of progress began to subside, or at any rate
gradually to lose its intensity, when they saw these same doctrines expounded
with the literary and political moderation shown by Le National—so decisively
contrasted with the habitual violence and crudity of La Riforme, in its daily
accusations of treason against the “ Gentleman’s Newspaper.” As a matter of
fact the two Republican organs both aimed at the downfall of the
Monarchy—though they differed with regard to means and opportunities. These
underground workings, these tactics which the future was to make clear, the men
of the Left Centre, including even Thiers himself, failed to comprehend, still
thinking that they could ally themselves with the one section while repudiating
the other. Guizot, also, was deceived as to the Catholic designs, to the extent
of making compromising promises to Montalembert and his friends without paying
sufficient attention to their strange collaborators, such as Louis Veuillot,
whom Montalembert made editor of L'Univers in 1843—a man fillpfl to overflowing
with poisonous hatred towards the Monarchy of July.
Yet not even
here must we look for the actual cause of that Monarchy’s fall. There had been
no time for the propaganda of the middle class Republicans, nor for that of the
Catholic laity, to produce their full effect before 1848. It was in fact to
another and more internal malady that the regime was destined to succumb. Its
fatal weakness, after 1840, lay in the fact that it was condemned to go on
existing, or rather acting without any real incentive to action; and thus, by
the medium of barren debates, of numberless internal dissensions, of rancorous
and irreconcilable disputes between its leaders, all the contradictions and
weaknesses inherent in the system were exposed to the public gaze. The regime
had in fact no further raison d'etre—there was no longer anything to compel
France to preserve either the Monarchy or the Monarch, useful as both had
undoubtedly been to her in ridding her of the horrors of a foreign invasion. On
the sole condition that France respected the treaties of 1815, it was easy to
see that Europe would leave her free to repress her unruly elements as she
pleased; yet it was at this precise juncture that the Government laid itself
open to the charge of refusing all demands for reform, and, what was perhaps
still more unexpected, declined to make any change in her foreign policy.
28 Parliamentary reform.—Entente cordiale.
[1830-42
This
surprising policy was due neither to the senility of Louis-Philippe nor to the
inexplicable obstinacv of Guizot, but to the exigencies arising from the nature
and origin of the system itself.
The nature of
the tyranny exercised by circumstance over the rulers of France was well
illustrated in the questions of electoral reform and the lowering of the
franchise. By the confession that one of its lines of policy might conceivably
be changed, a regime proclaiming itself as one of “ pure reason ” admitted that
this particular line of policy had a purely arbitrary foundation, and could be
altered without serious consequences. Directly the possibility of the arbitrary
principle having a place in the system of government was allowed, that system
was doomed. If, for instance, it was held sufficient to-day to lower the
property qualification to 100 francs, to-morrow, under the pretext that in a
country like France the title of “proprietor” was of extraordinarily wide application,
it would be possible to demand universal suffrage, with its inevitable
corollary in the sovereignty of numbers. Even economic reforms became
impossible, as was clearly seen when, in 1842, the Government was obliged to
abandon the idea of a Franco-Belgian Zollverem—an abandonment due as much to
the protests of the great manufacturers, the actual pillars of the regime, as
to those of Europe.
Ultimately,
the same compulsion of circumstance also manifested itself in foreign policy.
Ever since 1830 France had had it dinned into her that in her capacity of a
parvenue among the nations—a parvenue, it is true, who in no way blushed at her
title, but who, at the same time, did not care to run the risks involved in the
overthrow of “Society”—she must absolutely find someone to act as sponsor for
her in the European drawing-room. And was not this sponsor ready to. her hand
in the shape of England who, according to a fallacious analogy common at the
time, had passed through her own “Revolution of 1830” in 1688? Thus, even after
the practically complete agreement reached with regard to the settlement of
the. Belgian Kingdom (1833), which is described elsewhere, the entente cordiale
still remained the Government’s main preoccupation and support. At the same time,,
in the face of a hostile Europe, England had become the model to imitate and
not to surpass. No< one took the trouble to observe that this presumably
unchanging model was herself passing through a profound process of evolution,
until the fact that she refused to play the part allotted to her in 1840 had
forced itself upon the public attention. Moreover, the crisis revealed Europe
as something quite different from the entity with which, until then, France had
supposed herself to have been dealing. French policy,, both home and foreign,
was seen to have been based on a miscalculation. Not only was it clearly impost
.Hjle to count any longer upon England as sponsor to the Liberal Monarchy of
France in the “society” of Europe, but the Government of July could no longer
put itself forward as a happy mean,
1840-3]
Foreign policy and party disputes.
29
as a
reasonable compromise between the just aspirations of the French people and the
hostile passions of Europe. In external as in internal policy the bourgeois Monarchy
had, in fact, lost its raison d'etre.
But no one
renounces existence of his own free will; therefore, the problem presenting
itself after the crisis of 1840 was how to create anew by mere force of
affirmation, or even of sincere conviction, the same European surroundings in
which France had dwelt from 1815 to 1840,—the same bogey of a Grand Alliance,
the same danger from another Waterloo. On this head all the overt partisans of
the regime were in close accord; but it was impossible for them not to diverge
as to the possibility of ignoring the crisis itself, and particularly the
diplomatic insult inflicted upon France by England in 1840. The same fact was
interpreted in different ways. The fall of the Whigs—so-called Liberals—and the
triumph of the Tories—so-called Conservatives—in 1841, justified in Guizot’s
eyes the rehabilitation of the entente cordiale; in those of Thiers, it
condemned it. How greatly England herself was misunderstood it is unnecessary
to state. But what is worth noting is that it was on this very question of the
entente cordiale, and not upon questions of internal policy (in regard to which
Thiers and Guizot were to remain in agreement for five years longer), that a
double evolution took place in Government circles. To begin with, the coalition
formed in 1839 between the two Centres and the Dynastic Left against the
proceedings of the King and especially against his foreign policy, was broken
up. While, on the one side, the alliance between Guizot’s Left Centre and the
Dynastic Left became closer and more complete, on the other the Right Centre
and Louis-Philippe were making mutual concessions, and concluding a bargain
whereby each gained an equal advantage. The King obtained approval of his
foreign policy from Thiers and the Right Centre by convincing them that it
alone could save the rigime from a return to the levee en masse and from
democratic reforms, if not from something worse. In return the King accepted
the Right Centre’s parliamentary doctrines and respect for forms—a respect,
however, more apparent than real, as the corruptions practised by Guizot were
soon to demonstrate.
It should be
noted that this schism between the two Centres was fraught with the gravest
consequences for the fate of the Monarchy. It is true that at the present day
one can hardly help smiling at the spectacle of two parties and two
leaders—both equally devoted to the juste milieu—browbeating one another with
accusations of “Revolution” and “Counter-Revolution.” But this impression
tends to disappear when one realises that between these two men and these two
parties there lay not only bitter grudges and conflicting ambitions, but also,
under the mask of common interests, two opposite philosophic and social
conceptions of life. Starting from twe different points of view, the one
envisaging the rights of the individual rather in his relation to sci”ety and
the other occupying just the contrary standpoint, they had no clear
30
Opposition between Thiers and Guizot.
[i83i-48
perception of
their initial divergence, so long as it was merely a question of building up
and consolidating the existing system of government. But, directly it became a
question of defending it, this divergence became manifest, each turned his arms
against the other, and in their mutual destructive antagonism they threatened
to overthrow the two essential pillars upon which the Monarchy rested. Neither
could do anything singly; each party was unable, either to maintain itself in
power, or to conduct an effective opposition. Their forces were practically
equal, their fate depended upon a party other than their own—a party more
genuinely central than themselves—which combined all the contradictions
inherent in them both and united them in the oddest wedlock. This was that
ventre Ugislatif which aimed at reconciling the two antagonists, which rejected
Thiers on account of his bellicose policy, but imposed that same policy upon
Guizot; which accepted the entente cordOale in defiance of the one, but
compelled the other to use it as an instrument for annoying England. This was
that middle party which, dominated by motives in themselves irreconcilable,
desired peace because it suited its material interests, but designed for such
peace an aspect of victory, in order not to put the finishing touch to popular
exasperation. It was because this Centre was, for both Guizot and Thiers, a
source of support as vital as it was intangible that both turned elsewhere for
reinforcements. The one looked more and more to the Right, almost to the camp
of the Legitimists, the other more and more to the Left, almost to that of the
Republicans, each hoping to retain control of the middle class, and the whole
resulting, in 1848, in the spectacle of a discontented National Guard
surrendering to the enemies of the rigime.
The history
of the eight years after 1840 may be divided, under this aspect, into four
periods: the first ending with the death of the Duke of Orleans and the passing
of the Regency Act; the second with the conclusion of the entente cordiah', the
third with its rupture; the fourth with the Revolution of February.
During the
first period we find Thiers declaring, a propos of the Straits Convention, that
Guizot had brought the regime into being solely for the purpose of diminishing
French territory; Guizot retorted that Thiers had laid France open to the
possibility of humiliation. But, while these mutual recriminations did au
injury to the Monarchy of which neither antagonist dreamed, each had as yet
only coquetted with those false friends, those new men, who were to be their
undoing. While Guizot turned a blind eye upon the reestablishment of the
Dominicans at Nancy, Thiers supported—half-heartedly it is true—a timid
proposal of Odilon Barrot’s for electoral reform, by which those who served on
juries were to be added to the electoral roll.
But the issue
was not joined, as might have been at first supposed, on the. right of
searching vessels suspected of carrying slaves. In 1831 and 1833 England and
France had granted each other the reciprocal
I841-2] Right of Search
Convention.—Railway scheme. 31
right of
search, stipulating that the number of cruisers employed by one Power for the
purpose should not be more than half as much again as the number employed by
the other. A limit was thus placed on the right of search which the more
numerous British vessels might exercise. This arrangement was to lapse, when
the right of search was extended to the flags of other nations. In 1842 Guizot
presented to Parliament a new Convention, signed on December 20, 1841, by Lord
Aberdeen, following upon long antecedent pourparlers—a convention now not
restricted to France and England, but including Austria, Prussia and Russia. As
at least one of these was not properly a maritime Power, the clause limiting
the number of cruisers exercising the right of search had to be abolished. Thus
disappeared a precaution which France had thought it her duty to take, to
prevent an unlimited exercise of the right of search by the British Fleet. In
Parliament the Centre itself, or rather the public opinion of French ports—such
as it was—pointed out how prejudicial such a convention might be both to French
commerce and to the independence of the fleet, and it was by the mouth of a
deputy, who passed for a Ministerialist, that this view found most vigorous
expression. Surprised and not less disappointed at the attitude of the
majority—that majority which only a few days before had approved his desire to
revise the policy of a good understanding with Europe, while at the same time
condemning Thiers’ attitude in the Straits question—Guizot promised not to
ratify this convention without further consideration, though, at his own
request and even supplication, other continental Powers had acceded to it. From
these concessions, however, Thiers gained no triumph, since the Chamber showed
no signs of a withdrawal of its confidence from the Ministry, though compelling
it to alter its policy in the face of the whole of Europe. Before the end of
the session Guizot had been forced by the majority in Parliament to give way
completely, and to promise absolutely that he would not ratify the right of
search—a necessity which he had hoped to be able to avoid.
Nevertheless,
it was to satisfy the greed, the money-grubbing spirit, of this irremoveable
Centre, as well as in the hope of distracting public attention that Guizot, on
February 7, 1842, held out as a bait his vast railway scheme, conceived—as even
the Journal des Debats admitted— “ to give free play to the Genius of Peace in
its conflict with the Genius of War.” In very truth it ended by linking up
Paris with such outlying points as Lille, Strassburg, Lyons, Marseilles,
Bordeaux, Nantes and Cherbourg, and not only called forth all the sources of
wealth contained in the soil, but concentrated them in the capital, and thus
gave a giant impetus to the march of social and political reforms. Paying
wholly insufficient attention to the disappointments and the scandals attendant
on the handing over to private enterprise of such railways as were already
constructed, Guizot contented himself with putting at the disposal of the State
the land acquired, and left the construction of the
permanent way
and the actual working of the railways in the hands of the great companies. If,
by so doing, he thought to snatch from his rival an unique opportunity for
winning over the majority, and at the same time to silence popular discontent,
all the world now knows the depth of his miscalculation.
Neither
Thiers nor Guizot had in fact so far any cause for selfcongratulation, and the
elections of 1842—owing to the apathy of the electorate—produced no radical
change in the composition of the Chamber. Then came catastrophe, in the shape
of the accident which cost the Duke of Orleans his life (July 13,1842), and in
a moment eyes were opened to the essential weakness of the “system.” All had
been foreseen in this “Reign of Reason ”—all but one thing: the Crown falling
into the hands of a child. This event would not perhaps have been a serious
matter before the crisis of 1840—the real catastrophe of the regime—but it
became so after this. The whole problem of the July Monarchy was centred in a
coffin. Either the Chamber alone ought to proclaim itself the constituent power
and recognise its own right to elect the Regent where it liked—even to
designate the young prince’s mother, if it chose to abrogate the Salic law; or
this same Chamber ought merely to regard itself as called upon to settle a
disputed point of law as a judicial tribunal. By its decision—either that the
Salic law had been swept away, or that it had been preserved by the Revolution
of 1830, together with the other laws of the anden regime—a fundamental point
which had remained in doubt for the last twelve years would find solution. And
thereby, too, would be cleared away the uncertainty lying at the very
foundation of the regime—the question as to whether the charter, and with it
the constitutional system, dated from 1814 or from 1830. Was it a compromise
between the rights of the King and the equal rights of the people? Was it
imposed upon the former by the latter; and, in that case, was it capable of
revocation and revision? Men’s minds were so shaken by the recent catastrophe
that the problem seemed neither so simple, nor so complex, as in our statement
of it. Alphonse de Lamartine, already moving on towards the Republic,
pronounced in favour of the principles of 1830, on the pretext that those of
1814 would involve a return to the most obnoxious traditions of the ancien
regime: a decision which sufficed to bring Odilon Barrot back to his earlier
convictions. Thiers and Guizot, much against their own wishes, were compelled
to unite by the necessity of defending this particular uncertainty—to which
indeed the regime owed its birth. Happily for them personal factors decided the
matter for the Deputies of the Centre or Ventre. The Due de Nemours—not much of
a Liberal and rather unpopular—seemed to them a safeguard against any leanings
to the “ Left ” on the part of the regime; and they preferred him to the
Duchess of Orleans, who was too popular, and therefore too much inclined
towards those Liberal concessions, which were obnoxious in the
1842-3]
Temporary retirement of Thiers.
SB
eyes of these
middle class property owners. Thus the Regency Bill of 1842 became law. The Act
tacitly maintained the Salic and other laws of the ancien rigime, and, by its
ambiguity, gave equal satisfaction to both Thiers and Guizot.
Nevertheless,
this law which should have brought them together did not long contribute to
that end. Thiers, who had been forced to do violence to his own opinions in
order to move in unity with his rival, and seeing him thereby firmly anchored
to the buoy of power, grew weary of the struggle and, following the now
stereotyped course of action, retired to his “ beloved studies.” He set to work
upon his History of the Consulate, so as to contrast that period so fertile in
its reforms and glorious in its victories with one of emptiness, selfishness
and shame, during which, to use Lamartine’s phrase, “ la France s'ennuyait.”
This retirement of Thiers was naturally not without its effect upon Guizot, who
was in no wise disturbed by the insignificant opposition of Mole, and was
satisfied at having disarmed his most redoubtable adversary. In his somewhat
precipitate elation he forgot all the humiliation inflicted upon him by the
Centre, when he tried to enter into closer relations with England. He
undoubtedly undertook to denounce diplomatically the treaties of 1831 and
1833; but he promised himself the accomplishment of something much better, i.e.
the revival of the entente cordiale. Ever since 1842, despite contrary winds
and tides, he had been working with this end in view, and had made to England
an offer which she had coldly rejected—of concluding with her a bargain on the
question of the Spanish marriages; a subject more fully discussed in the
chapter on Spain. England, it was suggested, should abandon the candidature of
Leopold Prince of Coburg to the hand of Isabella, and France that of the son of
Louis-Philippe. There was no conceivable chance of England’s accepting such a
proposal so long as Espartero, who was all too much under English influence,
continued to support the Regency in Madrid. But in April, 1843, he was
overthrown, and in September Queen Victoria landed at Eu, with Aberdeen and the
Prince Consort, and, as described elsewhere, accepted Guizot’s proposals. This
is not the place for us to ask what advantage England derived from this arrangement.
To Guizot the matter was simple. He reestablished the entente vrdiale, wiping
out, at the same stroke, all remaining traces of the affront of 1840; at the
same time, he achieved a success of personal vanity and a particular
satisfaction for his major ty in the preservation, as a possibility, of the
eventual marriage of the Due de Montpensier to the Queen’s sister. In what he
was later to call his “ archaic simplicity ” he conceived it to be of supreme
importance to France, that no Prince of nominally English blood (as a matter of
fact Prince Leopold was nearly related to the family of Lou>>:-Philippe)
should reign, or even parade upon the steps of a throne, on the far side of the
Pyrenees. He did not perceive the inherent contradiction between seeking an
alliance with
34
[l843
“perfidious
Albion,” and offering her as its basis a measure of precaution against her
odious designs. However this may be, the landing at Eu, and the announcement of
the new entente cordiale resounded suddenly through France like a flourish of
trumpets.
If Guizot had
paid more attention to the national temper, he could hardly have failed to note
that, at this precise juncture, the enemies of the regime were completing their
metamorphosis, and finally adopting those weapons to which his downfall was to
be largely due. On the one hand, Montalembert was busy winning over the bishops
to his tactics, and collaborating with Veuillot; on the other, Le National—more
occupied with the question of national defence than of riots or revolution—was
as eager to congratulate the Government on having fortified Paris, as to scold
the Republicans of La Reforme for neglecting their most vital duties to their
country.
Meanwhile an
occasion, afforded by an outburst of public opinion which the actions of the
Ministry had provoked, brought into almost savage relief the lack of internal
harmony between the Right Centre and the Left, and the fundamental antagonism
between their social philosophies. Guizot had not only offended one large
portion of the nation by his foreign policy; he had estranged a further portion
by his toleration of the unauthorised Congregations, and by the appeals and
offers made to the Catholics. He had begged this suspected party to assist him
in fighting the anarchical elements which were everywhere revealing themselves,
as much in the political lassitude of the electors as in the outward quiet of
the people—quiet which, considering the national temperament, was ominous.
This was undoubtedly another imprudence, but a wellnigh unavoidable one, which
had its immediate consequence in concentrating popular attention upon those
religious passions whose existence the populace, if left to itself, might have
forgotten. Even men sincerely attached to the Ministry—colleagues of Guizot
such as Villemain, and the editors of the Journal des Debats, the leading ministerial
organ—began declaring that they saw everywhere the finger of the Jesuits.
Liberals, or rather Republicans, such as Quinet and Michelet in their lectures
at the College de France, caught the alarm and spread it broadcast. In truth
the dissensions, both in the Chamber and in the Press, revealed a great
confusion of ideas. In each party men’s minds were so divided on the subject of
the Jesuits, or rather on that of educational liberty, which was so closely
linked with it, that nothing of immediate gravity to the Government could for
the moment arise; its seriousness was only to become manifest with time and
when men’s ideas had grown clearer.
Thus the
struggle between the two enemies began afresh, more ardently than before, and
without any greater promise of victory to the one than to the other. Thiers had
nothing but sarcasm for the entente cordiale-, but he could not induce the
Centre to repudiate it. All he could persuade that
1842-5]
French policy in Tahiti and Morocco.
35
body to do
was to restrict the range of the entente, to force Guizot into making a kind of
amende honorable, and soon afterwards to try to compel him to extract from
England measures unpalatable alike to that country and its Queen. Yet Guizot
could hardly have paid less for the entente than by his refusal to annex
Tahiti, and by insisting on the literal carrying out of the orders given to
Admiral Dupetit-Thouars. The Admiral—instructed to occupy the Marquesas
Isles—had taken upon himself to sign a treaty (September 9, 1842) with Pomare,
Queen of Tahiti. This treaty, concluded in the absence of the Queen’s English
adviser, the missionary Consul Pritchard, placed Tahiti in the position of a
protected State. In November, 1843, Dupetit-Thouars returned to find that
Pritchard had inspired the Queen with sentiments adverse to France. Accordingly
he annexed the island and eventually expelled Pritchard (March, 1844). The news
of his action had produced violent excitement in both England and France, and
each nation demanded satisfaction for the insults offered to her national
pride. But the “ Tahiti stupidities,” as Louis-Philippe called them, were not
worth a war with England, and Guizot was therefore reluctantly induced by the
English Government to disavow the Admiral and his annexation projects, and to
make a sort of reparation for the injury to Pritchard.
And,
as to French relations with Morocco, the Ministry was surely right a thousand
times over, in resting content with a victory on the Isly, and a bombardment of
Tangier and Mogador, and in not wishing to add the immense difficulties of a
struggle with Moroccan fanaticism to those France was already encountering in
the resistance of the Algerians. The arrest of French progress in Morocco
pleased England, and induced her to concede an official recognition of French
definite establishment at Algiers. No doubt the future was to show the mistake
France made in dealing with Morocco as if it were a duly constituted Empire;
but this error was not apparent at the time or to the Opposition. On the
contrary, all these arrangements were attacked by Thiers and his friends as
involving injury to the national honour; and, unfortunately for the rigime,
Guizot could not defend himself by revealing the secret aim of his policy, the
crowning success he looked for as the result of his alliance with England. He
therefore tried to strengthen his majority by certain concessions to the Right,
more apparent than real. He authorised Villemain, in February, 1844, to bring
in a Bill which was headed by the words “ Liberty of Education,” but which,
since it proceeded to do away with that same “ liberty ” in practice, evoked a
fresh outcry from bishops and laity alike. Even the Centre would not allow him
to profit by this cleverly engineered move in the direction of the Right, but
retorted by handing over to Thiers the report drawn up in defence of the
University monopoly—not as justifiable in itself, but as taking into account “
the period and the country.” _
Thus in the
struggle at the beginning of 1845 neither Thiers nor
36 Thiers seeks aid from Palmerston and Barrot.
[1844-5
Guizot had
gained the upper hand. By this time both had grown weary of the narrow and
obstinate dictation of the Centre, and each in his own fashion began to seek
for some means of escape therefrom. The Treaty of May 29,1845, between England
and France suppressed the unlimited right of search and replaced it by
organising a joint Franco-English squadron for the purpose in question. Thus
Guizot finally got rid of that question to which, as to a kind of clog, the
Centre had bound him, and proceeded to make advances to the party of reaction,
which, if not more sincere, were at least more marked than before. Comte de
Salvandy was appointed Minister of Public Instruction in the place of
Villemain, and reprimands were addressed to Michelet and Quinet for their
lectures on the Jesuits. Thiers, on his side, used similar tactics, and
violently interpellated the Government on its illegal and culpable toleration
towards those religious Orders (i.e. the Jesuits) which the old Monarchy had
expelled. Finding that the Centre did not really oppose it, and that the secret
necessities of the regime demanded it, he even proceeded to attack his rival on
the subject of the entente cordiale, and to seek allies in England itself.
Since Guizot had come to an understanding with the English Tories, Thiers must
needs cultivate relations with the Whigs; and with this view he entered,
towards the end of 1844, into a correspondence with Palmerston, and went over
to England in 1845, in order to get into closer touch with him.
At this
juncture, while the veiled enemies of the July Monarchy— both Republicans and
Catholics—were growing impatient, underground movements were making themselves
felt in Europe, most of all in Germany and in Italy. In England the return of
the Whigs to power seemed certain; and, since the fall of the Aberdeen Cabinet
seemed imminent, Thiers followed up his foreign alliance with Palmerston with
an alliance at home. On December 25,1845, he signed a formal treaty with Odilon
Barrot, and through Barrot with the moderate Republicans, now called
Parliamentary Radicals. In the event of Guizot’s fall, Thiers undertook to make
room for Barrot and his friends in the Ministry, and also to support a proposal
of electoral reform backed by Le National, which lowered the franchise to 100
francs, while at the same time giving voting rights to certain professions, in
such a way as to double the electoral strength of the nation. At the same
time—and this was a matter of graver import, and only explicable by his anger
with Louis- Philippe—Thiers undertook not only to tackle the subject of parliamentary
corruption, but also to discuss the question of the “personal power” of a King,
who had “ betrayed the parliamentary system.1’
In face of
these combined attacks Guizot did not remain inactive. He countered Thiers’
alliance with the Radicals by his own alliance with the Catholics, to whom this
time he was forced to offer a genuine quid pro quo. He allowed Salvandy to
supersede the Royal Council of Public Instruction (wherein Cousin reigned
supreme) in favour of a Council drawn
1845-e] Guizot, Thiers and Louis-PMUppe.
37
from
different classes of the population, two-thirds of the members of which were to
be renewed annually. To the Catholics and to the Pope, who had assisted in
ridding him more or less effectually of the troublesome Jesuit problem, he
made what was tantamount to a solemn promise to grant liberty of education.
Finally, he took his own precautions with regard to foreign affairs, that is to
say, he planned a certain diplomatic victory over England. In order not to lose
the unique advantage which he had counted upon deriving from the entente
cordiale before Palmerston’s return to power, he hurried on the project of the
marriage of the Due de Montpensier with the Infanta Louisa-Fernanda, and
endeavoured to make it simultaneous with that of Queen Isabella with Don
Francis of Asis, the Duke of Cadiz. This project was well under way at the end
of 1845, though, in a second meeting between Queen Victoria and Louis-Philippe
at Eu in 1845, renewed disclaimers had been made by Guizot. All his plans, as
well as those of Thiers, were suspended in consequence of the somewhat
unexpected patching-up of the English Tory Ministry for a further six months
(December, 1845— June, 1846), during which period it was clearly necessary for
Guizot, as the Minister in power, and Thiers as his rival in Opposition, to set
about postponing the performance of the promises made to their allies at home.
Thiers obtained a respite from Odilon Barrot, and delayed the introduction of
his proposed electoral reform. Guizot felt himself justified in not immediately
bringing the question of educational liberty before the Chamber. The Ministers
were “ forced to await the result of the new elections and their effect upon
parliamentary majorities both in England and France,” and so forth.
Nevertheless, the parliamentary session held on its way, unaffected by any such
reasoning; and the only subjects of discussion were “corruption” and the “
personal power.” Thus Thiers and Guizot, with one eye on the future and the
other upon those home allies likely to be useful in the coming electoral
campaign, carried their inconsistency to the point of stripping the customary
veil from the personality and practice of the King. The former accused him, in
so many words, of reviving the spirit and methods of Charles X, and, in order
to frighten him, pointed to the possibility of new barricades—thus reawakening
in the country a memory which it would have been far better to let sleep.
Guizot, on the other hand, supported the King in his refusal to surrender any
of the royal prerogatives, asserting that he regarded them as “ sheet- anchors
in the storms which the country might yet be called upon to face.” Such
language, though apparently a defence of the monarch, really justified all
hostile criticism, and invited France to lay the responsibility for every
misfortune upon the Sovereign alone.
In July,
1846, the dissolution of the Chamber was announced. Beneath the activity of the
parties in opposition and especially of their most hostile portion, a change
was perceptible, too slight to
38 The situation in Europe and in France. [i846
bring about
an alteration in the parliamentary balance, but enough to prove that there was
something wrong with the frail mechanism which for sixteen years had triturated
the fortunes both of the nation and the throne. The personnel of two sections
of the Centre had suffered change, and one of them finally consented to follow
Guizot on the question of educational liberty, while still stipulating that it
should be denied to the interdicted religious Orders. The other accepted the
principle of the advisability of reform—even of electoral reform, provided that
it was carried out under the auspices, not of Thiers, but of Guizot. But this
was by no means the most threatening storm-signal of this new time. At this
precise moment everything outside Prance was undergoing a process of
transformation. It was not only manifest in England, which had just seen the
triumphant return to power of Palmerston and the Whigs (June, 1846)—a return so
desired by Thiers, so dreaded by Guizot. In Switzerland the capture of the
Federal Council by the Radicals was complete, and official Europe was much
alarmed by this ominous demonstration of the power of democracy. Germany also
was profoundly agitated when the Schleswig-Holstein question entered upon an
acute phase; while a similar wave of nationalist sentiment was sweeping over
Italy, shaken to its foundations by the election of Pio Nono. All
nationalities, especially those suffering or believing themselves to be
suffering from oppression, stirred simultaneously as at a preconcerted
signal—the people of Austria, the Danes, even the Poles whose national heart
had seemed almost to have ceased beating. Everything in Europe, as in France,
was in a state of ferment and restlessness.
As is
inevitable at such times, dissension was everywhere. French Republicans and
French Catholics were as hopelessly divided as to the end to be attained, as in
regard to the means to be employed. Foreign nations, even the great mass of the
French people themselves, hardly knew what they wanted, and only a little more
clearly what they did not want. To Thiers and Guizot, seeking inspiration from
events in England (which they were really as incapable of interpreting as of
understanding Europe, or even France itself, at this moment of transition), the
time seemed to have come when, in the interests of the Monarchy of the juste
milieu, their trump-card must be played. Guizot, for his part, did not hesitate
to break up the foreign entente to which he had hitherto devoted his efforts,
in order to conceal from Thiers and Palmerston its main object, viz. the
marriage of Isabella to Francis of Asis and the simultaneous union (since Maria
Christina insisted upon it) of the Infanta to the Due de Montpensier. On
October 10,1846, it was announced to the world that, in direct defiance of
previous French pledges, these marriages would immediately take place. England,
and Palmerston were furious, since, as it was believed that Isabella would
never have a child by her husband, the Due de Montpensier might
1846-7]
Effect of the Spanish Marriages.
39
one day sit
on the throne of Spain. But for this remote prospect England cared less than
for the immediate insult to her national pride involved in Guizot’s breach of
faith. The immediate effect was the severing of the entente cor diale, and the
isolation of France in Europe.
Henceforward events
followed one another so quickly that, at home as well as abroad, all was
confusion. Palmerston, enraged at being tricked by Guizot in the affair of the
Spanish marriages, tried to persuade Metternich that the presence of the Due de
Montpensier in Madrid would reestablish that union between France and Spain
which had existed under Louis XIV and Philip V. When this hope flickered out,
he busied himself, regardless of the cost, in setting France against Austria,
or Austria against France a propos of events in Switzerland and Italy. In every
conceivable way, and by every conceivable means, he tried to wreck the France
of Guizot and Louis-Philippe, even that of Thiers, by supplying weapons to
their opponents. Metternich, who had taken advantage of the sudden coldness
between France and England to annex Cracow, and, having just drawn upon himself
an academic though indignant protest from Guizot, was not ashamed to disavow
his whole past policy. He was now ready to seek the help of that very France
whose susceptibilities he had trampled under foot, so that, aided by France’s
King and by Guizot, he might the better fight revolution—and this time it was
revolution indeed.
Finally, in
France itself, there was a most interesting change of front on the part of both
Republicans and Catholics. The Catholics, disgusted at seeing the Chamber
reject once more the proposal for liberty of education (May, 1847), in spite of
Guizot’s efforts, seemed disposed to listen to the overtures of the
Republicans. For they not unnaturally thought that it could scarcely be more
difficult to induce an electorate, based upon universal suffrage, to give them
what they wanted, than it had proved to persuade one composed of small
property-owners. The moderate Republicans, such as Marrast, Marie, Carnot,
willing but a short while before to submit to Thiers’ evasions, now decided, in
proportion as they realised his “hypocrisy” and his imperious need of their
assistance, to impose harder conditions upon him. Suddenly, in the midst of all
this the whole reputation for probity upon which this French middle class
Government prided itself, which reputation Guizot’s morgue had largely helped
to preserve, collapsed completely beneath the crushing weight of a number of
notorious scandals. Teste, a former colleague of Guizot, was convicted of
having sold to Cubieres, a former colleague of Thiers, a salt-mine concession
for a considerable amount of hard cash. At the same time by way of violent
contrast, men bankrupt in reputation were being whitewashed, thanks to the
talents of enthusiastic advocates. These bankrupts were the men of the Terror
and their advocates, men like Louis Blanc, Jules Michelet and Alphonse de
Lamartine. The impassioned albeit
ch. u.
inaccurate
Histoire des Girondins by Lamartine brought his publishers a success which was
celebrated at Ma^on in July, 1847, by a colossal banquet to 6000 guests. In the
face of such calamities to the regime it was inevitable that Thiers and Guizot
should yield some ground to their allies, in the hope of recapturing it later
on if they could.
Guizot was
now forced to hasten the reconquest of Montalembert by proclaiming aloud from
the tribune that “ for all the moral diseases of society religious faith and
liberty are the sovereign remedies.” He asked from the Catholics only “a little
patience” and he would give them their educational liberty. Thiers, for his
part, half of his own free will and half from necessity, allowed his friends to
sit side by side with Odilon Barrot and the Republicans at a whole campaign of
banquets, designed to bring pressure to bear first upon public opinion and
subsequently on the Government, with the view of precipitating electoral
reform. Thiers, who hoped, though the expectation was a vain one, to conciliate
Louis-Philippe, took no personal part in these banquets, the object of which,
in his view, was to strengthen and steady the institutions of July.
Unfortunately .for Thiers, Barrot was from the outset in a position to dictate
his own terms to him. Barrot himself was soon forced to yield to the moderate
Republicans, who in their turn were soon to give way before those of the
advanced section. Starting with the omission of the royal toast, and then with
that of the bald toast to the July Institutions, these banquets, originated in
Paris with a view to the enlargement of a too restricted suffrage, were
destined to pass by imperceptible degrees, as at Lille and Rouen, to the
glorification of manhood suffrage by Ledru-Rollin. Nor was Guizot more
fortunate in his alliances, though the theatre of his mortifications lay
outside France. What advantage was it to him to be hand and glove with the
Catholics, and to have risked checkmate against Palmerston in Switzerland, if
the Church of Rome, which he had served so well there, was to elude him in
Italy? Pope Pius IX paid no attention to him, and, at the very moment when the
banquets were producing their greatest effect in France, gave rein in the
Italian Peninsula to an immense movement towards freedom and unity, which was
destined to shake all the monarchies of Europe to their foundations.
Everything
should have warned Thiers and Guizot of their imprudence ; but their
positions, and the element of infatuation in their characters, ill-fitted them
to understand what was going on in the hearts of nations. Their excuse must be
sought in the confusion of ideas then prevalent everywhere, alike among the
masses and among those who aspired to lead then—whether they were Catholics and
Republicans as in France, or national patriots as in Germany and Italy. So
great, for example, was the political indecision of the French people,
powerless, for lack of a man to reestablish the one form of government which
seemed at the moment to be suited to it, viz. the Empire, that neither
Catholics nor
Republicans could' look forward to a lasting or even a possible victory. And
this explains how it was that Thiers and Guizot, in spite of all their
compromises with the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right, failed to take alarm,
but continued to devote themselves unremittingly to their favourite idea—the
taming of a rebellious majority.
At the
beginning of 1848, Guizot, still believing in the possibility of isolating his
rival from the Monarchical Centre for good and all, proposed to the Chamber
that his Government should denounce those “ blind or hostile passions11
which did not even recoil before the criminal idea of altering, in some degree,
those institutions which had governed France so long without shock and without
disturbance. Thiers had already defined his attitude at the end of 1847 in a
discourse which was indeed a masterpiece of contradictions (not all of them
intended). Extremely bold in parts, so as to make a powerful impression on the
Centre, it was also extremely timid in others, since he still had to maintain
his character of a possible Minister, acceptable alike to the King and to
Mettemich. If he spoke, now of the painful necessity of respecting the treaties
of 1815, now of the opposite necessity of recognising the movements towards
unity of the Italian peoples, it was with the deliberate design of inviting the
Centre to choose between him, Thiers, who prided himself upon his leanings
towards Revolution, and Guizot, whom he accused of reverting to the ancien
regime. Vain efforts on the part of both! The Centre repulsed Thiers and, for
the moment, condescended to approve of Guizot’s foreign policy, and even to
censure those “blind or hostile passions” which desired reforms. Yet
immediately afterwards, by its mouthpiece, Desmousseaux de Givre, it was
reproaching the Minister with having accomplished “ nothing! nothing! nothing!”
And then these same deputies, as though afflicted with arnnesie, proceeded to
demand the belated introduction of “ wise and moderate reforms.” What was this
but incoherence in excelsis—absurdity reigning fatally supreme in a kingdom
which prided itself upon being the Realm of Reason?
Moreover in
January-February, 1848, while nothing in the state of things abroad justified
Louis-Philippe and Guizot in arguing the existence of a dangerous social
upheaval, neither was there anything to justify them in their threats of a
counter-revolution. Austria and Metternich, bowing before accomplished facts,
had seen constitutional governments erected at Naples, Florence and Turin, and
a Liberal in the Chair of Saint Peter. The hour was approaching when the
Monarchy of the juste milieu would have once and for all to reveal its true
policy to a nation whose sentiments had profoundly changed since 1830.
Should the
Monarchy fail thus to declare itself, it remained to be seen what incident
would cause, and what would be the manner of, its downfall. A doubtful point of
law had presided over its origin, and was now to preside over its end. The
Opposition Dynastic as well as Republican—decided to hold a great banquet in
Paris, to answer
42
[1848
the censure
passed by Guizot upon its “blind or hostile passions.” But Hebert, the Minister
of Justice, interpreting a legal enactment in heroic fashion, claimed the right
to prohibit this banquet—a gage of defiance which the Opposition took up by
simply asserting that the banquet would take place. Both sides proceeded to
take up their positions. On the one side should have been the troops and
also—it was thought— the National Guard; on the other the insurrectionary
forces. But then* all of a sudden, both parties took fright. The Government had
only a limited confidence in the National Guard and preferred not to put its
loyalty to the test; the deputies ranged round Thiers did not feel sure enough
of their Republican allies; Barrot himself had not sufficient confidence in the
support of the populace.
A sort of
tacit understanding was arranged between the Ministry and the Opposition, an
incongruous compromise which threatened to reduce the conflict to the proportions
of a farce. The banquet was to be announced for February 22, and the
demonstrators were to be present, but without any display of military force and
in obedience to a simple police order; they were then to disperse; after which
the legal aspect of the question could be thrashed out in the Courts.
Everything was admirably foreseen—except the numbers and the organisation of
the demonstrating procession. Le National proceeded on its own responsibility
to draw up the plan of a grandiose procession, wherein the various
corporations, societies, groups, even the National Guard itself, should march
in their appointed order. Could it be that the possibility of such a procession
exceeding the limits, allowed by the Government, was also not wholly unforeseen
? The Ministry threatened to rescind its pledge, and to mobilise both the
troops and the National Guard. The Opposition, becoming alarmed, decided during
the night of February 21-22, 1848, that Le National and La Reforrrie should
countermand the procession in their issues of the next morning, and peace
seemed to reign once more. Accordingly, the morning of the 22nd duly arrived
without any military precautions having been decided upon by the Government,
just as no programme of action had been drawn up by the leaders of the heterogeneous
Opposition—Left Centre, Left Dynastic, middle class Republicans, Socialist
Republicans. But, on that same morning, the mass of the people of Paris, who
did not read the newspapers and were unwarned of the change of programme—urged
on simply by curiosity and without any instigation from recognised
leaders—took a decisive step. Hardly knowing what they wanted, but desiring to
express their invincible dislike towards Guizot, the King and even Thiers
himself—in fact towards all the beneficiaries of that regime which had
exploited the credulity of the masses for eighteen years—the citizens thronged
into the streets in unexpected numbers.
LIBERALISM
AND NATIONALITY IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.
(1840-8.)
In
Germany and Austria the years 1840-7 are of special interest as the period in
which the revolutionary storms of 1848-9 were preparing. An antiquated
political condition was evidently hastening towards dissolution. It was obvious
that an absolutist and bureaucratic system of government could not quench the
fire of Liberal and national ideas, which continued to blaze forth with ever
growing strength and intensity; nor could it help towards that minimum of
agreement between rulers and ruled which is essential for the maintenance of
stability in our complicated modem States. To attain to its full vigour, a
State needs the support and approval of those national influences which
contribute the most to its economic, social, and intellectual life. At that
time these were to be found in the middle classes, among men of education and
the more progressive citizens. But in this very class the opposition was
strongly represented; and it was now spreading downward to the lower grades of
the population, whose traditional devotion had hitherto been the main support
of the ruling Houses in Germany and Austria.
Still the
strength and significance of these opposing tendencies must not be gauged only
by the elemental power with which they forced a way in 1848; we must estimate
them from a more comprehensive standpoint. Though they overthrew the old
Government regime, they did not destroy all the foundations on which it rested.
It was no such easy matter to set aside the institutions built up by centuries
of labour. The bureaucracy and the military system in particular, the two main
supports of absolute monarchy, were so securely constituted that they survived
the shock of the Revolution. Moreover the antagonistic tendencies of the middle
and lower classes were still very far from undermining the remnant of loyalty
to the dynasty. When, therefore, the national and Liberal demands at last
compelled recognition from the Governments, important remnants of the old
political regime were able, not only to survive, but also to attain to fresh
and vigorous life. These facts must be kept in mind in noting the symptoms
which characterise the overthrow of the old forces and the rise of the new
ideas.
44
Austrian government at the centre.
[1815-48
We may begin
with Austria, that Power which still held the actual hegemony in Germany. The
system of government which prevailed after 1815 and is elsewhere described
underwent no essential change during this period. But it could be maintained
only in a form which hastened its internal decay. The Emperor Ferdinand, who succeeded
to the throne in 1835, was good-natured and inoffensive, but mentally and
physically insignificant. The real task of government was therefore undertaken,
not by a regularly constituted regency, but through the further development of
an existing organ of central government, composed of a small number of
dignitaries, and known as the State Conference (Staatskonferenz). As
representative of the Emperor, the Archduke Louis became President of this body
in 1836, and in his absence Prince Mettemich took his place; the other regular
members were the Archduke Francis Charles, and Count Kolowrat, who had charge
of the finance department. Other members who could be summoned, when required,
were the heads of the separate sections of the State Council (Staatsrat), and
the Presidents of the so-called HofsteUen (Court offices), who were really the
highest adn”' listrative authorities of the State. Even under the Emperor
Francis I there had been a marked want of cooperation between these three
bodies—the State Conference, the State Council, and the Court offices; and it
now proved impossible to establish the missing connexion. The heads of sections
of the State Council and the Presidents of the Court offices, who were only
summoned now and then and for a special purpose to the meetings of the State
Conference, remained in their former isolation.
On the other
hand of the two officials permanently attached to the State Conference,
Mettemich was already so overburdened with foreign affairs, and Kolowrat with
the finances, that they had but little leisure for other state matters. Nor was
it long before a bitter personal rivalry broke out between the two. As in
adfition to this, Archduke Louis, partly from indolence partly from fear,
opposed every innovation, it is not surprising that in the heart of the State a
somnolent condition set in, and that mere routine and listless habit prevailed
even more generally than before. In the forties the State Conference met less
and less often. Mettemich was not unaware of the weakness of the administrative
organisation; but he contented himself with his own peculiar domain, that of
German and foreign policy, and with promulgating those maxims which helped even
beyond the borders of Austria to maintain the condition of stagnation, so indispensable
to the preservation of the existing Government.
Thus the
system of political separation and the suppression of all political desires and
tendencies of a Liberal character, remained in force; but the power necessary
to maintain its full severity gradually declined. Though newspapers and
pamphlets published in the country were still subject to strict censorship,
there was no difficulty in introducing into
1840-8] Liberal and National movements in
Austria. 45
Austria the
Liberal literature of foreign countries, so long as care was taken to avoid any
aggressive provocation of the police. All this literature was eagerly consumed
by the educated classes: while the young scholars and students steeped
themselves in Radical ideas. Even the teachers in the universities, though
nominally subject to the severest restrictions in regard to their teaching,
could allow themselves considerable latitude, so long as they avoided touching
on the dogmas of the Catholic Church. Under the shadow of a patriarchal police
regime new life was sprouting upward in almost all directions; and even these
tentative movements showed how serious were the problems that a modernised
Austria would have to face, and what a disintegrating effect the idea of
nationality must exercise upon its polity.
It is
important to distinguish carefully two political movements: first, that which
aimed mainly at Liberal and constitutional measures without affecting the
essential character of the Austrian institutions; and, next, that which combined
the Liberal demand for weakening the central State with the National claim for
the emancipation of the individual nationality. The movement in the German
lauds took, as might be expected, the former course in different parts, but it
differed much in intensity. In the Alpine districts it was least developed; in
Lower Austria and the capital Vienna the greatest activity was shown. It was
indeed a noteworthy circumstance that the Assembly of Estates in Lower Austria
began to evince some political zeal. During the last century the separate
national assemblies, with the except'on of the Hungarian Parliament which is
treated elsewhere, had entirely lost their pol ical significance. They might
have their say in the revision of tariffs, and might even bring forward modest
requests and representations, but in all other respects they were mere harmless
shadows of their former selves. And practically they only represented the
nobility. But now the Assembly of Estates in Lower Austria was beginning to
seek support from the well-to-do and cultivated citizens of Vienna, in the hope
of thus increasing its importance. Its representations to the Government grew
in boldness, and though it expressed the one-sided interests of the landed
gentry with a certain naivete, it also sent in complaints about general abuses,
pressing for a more effectual parliamentary representation of the cities, and
for various modem reforms in legislation and taxation. In this way the old
Estates acquired a new significance.
The same
thing happened in Bohemia. Here, too, the Diet was essentially representative
of the land-owning nobility; but the memory of the old days, when the Estates
had taken their share in the Government, was being awakened. They recalled the
“ renovated Constitution ” established by the Emperor Ferdinand II in 1627,
which had originally aimed at diminishing the power of the Assembly and
increasing that of the King. Now that absolutism had made such advances, this
Constitution had come to be regarded as a source of rights and as a
46 Bohemian demands-Revolt in Galicia and Cracow.
[1815-47
documentary
proof of their existence, and as such was once more brought to light. As a
matter of form the Diet still voted the taxes, though this procedure was always
treated by the Government as an empty formality. But since the beginning of the
forties the Bohemian Diet had claimed the right to consider and, if need be, to
refuse the proposals of the Government with regard to taxation. This claim
resulted in animated discussions and disputes with the Government, notably
during 1847. A very slight increase of taxation was required for the maintenance
of the municipal criminal courts (Stadtlcriminalgerichte), in Bohemia. The
Government proposed to raise this by an increased land tax, to be levied in
Bohemia alone; but the Parliament insisted that the expenses should be included
in the general budget of the State, and vetoed the increased taxation. At that
time the Government was still strong enough to disregard the protest of the
Parliament and levy the tax in the form it preferred. The Bohemian Estates too
must have felt that the basis of their old Constitution no longer sufficed to
bring the fight with the Government and the bureaucracy to a successful issue.
They too, like the corresponding class in Lower Austria, were trying to get
into touch with the interests of the middle class. But they could draw upon an
even stronger force by invoking the spirit of Cech nationality. At that time
the Cechs were devoting energy and enthusiasm to the study of their language,
literature, and history, and were zealously cultivating the Pan-Slavonic idea
of the interconnexion of all Slav peoples. Partly under the influence of
romanticism, but still more with a view to establishing the independence and
originality of Cech civilisation, zealous students like Palacky and Schafarik
studied the ancient history of the Cechs and Slavs.
Events
in Galicia at that time proved that the interconnexion between the Slav peoples
had not attained to that ideal intimacy which the Cechs desired. The Polish
revolutionary party, completely defeated in Russian Poland, had set its hopes
on fresh risings in Galicia and the Prussian province of Posen; and the little
State of Cracow, established as a neutralised free republic in 1815 and as the
last survival of Polish autonomy, now became a centre of agitation and
conspiracy. The neighbouring Powers, the original accomplices in the partition
of Poland_________________
Russia,
Austria and Prussia—had already, in the secret agreement of 1835, resolved to
abolish the troublesome little republic and to incorporate it with Austria. In
fact they had actually sent troops into the territory of Cracow, to suppress
the agitation there in 1836. Ten years later the flames of revolution were
rekindled at Cracow with greater force. Under the leadership of Mieroslawski,
the Poles determined to declare their independence on February 14,1846, in
Posen and Galicia simultaneously. The conspiracy in Posen was discovered before
it broke out and was easily suppressed; but in Cracow and Galicia there was
fighting in real earnest. Cracow itself was subdued early in March by the
Austrian Colonel Benedek—the unfortunate commander-in-chief of 1866—who rallied
to
1840-6] Austria annexes Cracow.—Situation of
Prussia. 47
his side a
number of peasants from Poland, especially from the Ruthenian district of
Galicia, by allowing them to give full rein to their fierce hatred of their
Polish landlords, whose country estates fell a prey to fire and plunder. Thus,
with the silent connivance of the Austrian authorities, who felt themselves
powerless to check the movement, one revolution was quelled by means of
another. But the days of the free- state of Cracow were numbered. The European
compact of 1815 was arbitrarily set aside, and in November, 1846, the two other
Eastern Powers looked quietly on while Austria absorbed Cracow.
The struggle
between the Ruthenian and Polish nationalities in Galicia was a prelude to that
which Austria was to witness on a far larger scale in 1848, when the race
hatred of the different nationalities broke out in full fury. Still in Galicia
the political situation was comparatively simple, for the Polish magnates were
struggling for emancipation, while the Ruthenian nationality naturally sought
for support by attaching itself to the Austrian Government.' In Hungary matters
were far more complicated and difficult. Here the Magyars were trying to extend
their dominion over the Croats, who, for their part, desired to bring the
Slovenes and Serbs in Hungary and Dalmatia under their banner. In deciding
which to favour of the two nationalities, the Government found itself between
Scylla and Charybdis. The Magyars were a very important political factor, on
account of their greater autonomy, which they exercised in Parliament by a
right of taxation by no means merely formal. Moreover they formed the only
nationality within the Austrian borders destitute of any kindred branch beyond
those borders with which to combine. Their policy and fortunes are treated in
another chapter.
Prussia, the
second of the great German Powers, unlike Austria, had no such subversive
tendencies to contend against. The Polish troubles of 1846 affected only the
outer circle of the Prussian kingdom, and were easily suppressed. Still,
Prussia too had to be prepared for the contingencies of a general revolution,
which would certainly bring with it' a fresh outbreak in Poland, and might
endanger the Rhine provinces, her most westerly possession, which was as yet
but imperfectly incorporated in the common State. Far more comprehensive and
deep-seated were the difficulties involved in Prussia’s internal condition and
in the general character of her relation to the Germanic Body, even in the
years that preceded the outbreak of the Revolution. The accession of Frederick
William IV on June 7,1840, is one of the most important landmarks in the
Prussian and German history of the nineteenth century. It brought Prussia back
again into the German movement, and restored her to the position of a living
and active member of the whole German National life. The Zollverein had already
woven close bonds round Prussia and the rest of Germany; and the feeling of
unity promoted by the Wars of Liberation had nowhere quite died out. But
complaints were general about the weakening of this sentiment in Prussia, for
she
48 Character of Frederick William IF'.—His ideas.
[i840
was returning
to her former unyielding self-sufficiency, and, except with regard to the
Zollverein, she had made herself unpleasantly conspicuous as an ally of Mettemich.
Political life too manifested itself far more quietly and peaceably in Prussia,
particularly in her old provinces, than in the turbulent south and west of
Germany. This was in large measure due to the loyalty and veneration with which
in his later years King Frederick William III had been regarded,
notwithstanding his narrowminded and even oppressive rigime A shadow had
seemed to rest on Prussia; but everything was changed with the accession of a
new ruler. The monarch, the Government, and the people of Prussia once more
step out into the clear daylight of German national history.
This change
was due to the peculiar character of the new King, to the vigorous internal
life of the people and the State, and to the impetus given by Prussia’s
political position in Germany and by the movements in other parts of Europe.
The King’s peculiarity consisted less in recognising and utilising the
strongest and most fruitful tendencies of his time, than in setting the whole
in stronger motion. He had enough sympathy with the new movement to feel drawn
towards many of its demands, and to give the impression of a man who might play
the part of leader to his age and his people. It was an impression, and nothing
more; for it soon became evident that an impassable gulf lay between his
desires and those of the majority of his contemporaries. Still the King, who in
contrast with his taciturn father, was a brilliant and eloquent speaker, ' was
inspired in his utterances by so much enthusiasm, such deep personal feeling,
and so peculiar an insight into life and politics, that he actually stirred up
and roused the very persons opposed to him in principle.
Greater
political freedom and stronger national unity were the chief desires both of
his contemporaries and of himself, but his meaning was different from theirs.
The only thing he had in common with them was his opposition to bureaucratic
absolutism on the one hand, and on the other to the treaties of 1815 and the
subsequent settlement of Germany, which did not suffice to satisfy the national
wishes. The substitute he proposed for the former was, however, not the
Constitutional State, which his contemporaries desired, but the rule of the
Estates, which would revive the rights and prestige of the nobles and
corporations, and reflect the mystic glories of a divinely consecrated and
patriarchal monarchy. In place of the sober and grudging Act of Confederation,
he dreamed of a revived Holy Roman Empire, in which he, the heir of Frederick
the Great, would voluntarily submit himself to Austria, as the wearer of the
crown of Charlemagne. This idea, which he confided in 1840 to his intimate
friend Colonel Joseph von Radowitz, proves in itself that his policy was not
primarily concerned with the domain of reality. Though he was proud of his Prussian
Crown and wished to see Prussia occupy a distinguished and prominent place in
Europe, and himself play the part of a leader, a “ duke ” of the German forces,
he was at least as much attracted
by the poetic
splendour as by the actual power of the position. He was in fact a true
romanticist, in the matter as well as the mode of his thought, and many of his
ideas may be found in the pages of Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and Gorres. His
romantic feeling shows itself in his passionate love for the German nation, but
also in his readiness to subordinate the individual interests of the separate
States and nations to the idea of a universal community of European
Christianity. It was shown in his desire to revive the Holy Roman Empire, which
was to form the nucleus of a European league of peace, and in his growing
enthusiasm for the idea of a new “ Holy Alliance,” and of a mutual combination
against breach of the peace, revolution and violent change.
But, in spite
of his fierce hatred of the French Revolution and all its consequences, he was
too clever and large-minded to take pleasure in the detestable policy of
repression and the persecution of popular leaders which had prevailed during
the last decades. His reign began with a breath of freedom, by the restoration
to his professorship at Bonn of the cruelly persecuted Ernst Moritz Arndt and
the grant of an amnesty to the imprisoned demagogues; while of the seven
Gottingen professors, who (as related in a previous volume) had been recently
subjected to unfair treatment, the brothers Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm received
appointments at the Berlin Academy, and Dahlmann was called to a chair at Bonn
(1842). In the beginning of 1841 he even reinstated Boyen as War Minister,
which office he had been compelled to resign at the time of the Carlsbad
decrees in 1819 on account of his Liberal tendencies. This did not mean that
the King shared Boyen’s Liberal views, but that he honoured in him the faithful
patriot, who had fought side by side with Schamhorst during the War of
Liberation. Of course Boyen with his Liberal tendencies found himself in a
position of much isolation in the King’s Council (1847), and, even in his own
domain of army administration, found it difficult to defend the popular and
Liberal side of the military organisation, the Landwehr, against the
aristocratic military spirit of the Prussian officers.
At any rate,
Frederick William IV contrived to connect all these measures with the period
which appealed most strongly to his own ideals, that of the War of Liberation.
And the actual moment of his accession recalled these traditions and coincided
with a striking development of national consciousness, aroused by the position
of the various Powers and the fear lest France, checked in her other ambitions,
should seek to compensate herself by conquering the left bank of the Rhine. It was at this time that Niklas Becker’s famous song of
the Rhine, Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhevn, and Max
Schnecken- burger’s song, Die Wacht am Rhein, were written. The
King himself was full of great schemes in case of war resulting in the victory
of the German arms; such as the reconquest of Elsass and Lothringen, the
establishment of a Burgundian kingdom under an Austrian Archduke,
50
[1840-2
the inclusion
of Holland and Switzerland in the German Union. In November, 1840, he sent
Radowitz and General von Grolman, one of the ablest leaders of 1813, to Vienna,
to draw up plans of campaign and to discuss the reform of the wretched military
constitution of the German Confederation. But neither Austria nor the secondary
States were disposed to undertake an effectual reform of the military
organisation, which must inevitably increase Prussian influence. Consequently,
when the fear of war had passed by, the result achieved was but small. An
inspection of the contingents of the Union was introduced, and it was agreed to
take in hand the long postponed erection of fortifications in southern Germany
at Ulm and Rastatt.
Still, the
national hopes, once reawakened in the German peoples, were never again
completely lost. From this time forward till the Revolution of 1848 they
swelled into an ever rising stream. Few persons had any consistent and clear
conception of the form which a national united Germany should take, but the
desire to achieve it was a very vivid reality. In this period of transition
literary and philosophic were giving way to political and social interests, and
even poetry and philosophy were transformed into weapons of attack. Bold young
poets came forward with startling new songs touching on the events of the
hour—Herwegh, Dingelstedt, Freiligrath, Prutz; and the Hegelian philosophy,
which had formed the highest point of idealistic thought in Germany, had now to
furnish the roads leading down again to reality. Thus the young Hegelians, with
Arnold Ruge at their head, founded on Hegelian formulae the demands for
universal, political, social, and intellectual advance in accordance with
Liberal and Radical ideas. There was constant and varied activity in the
literature of the day, and a young generation was growing up with great
demands, ready to criticise without mercy all existing institutions and full of
optimistic illusions.
Its first and
chief demand was “ space in which a free spirit might find room to soar,” i.e.
abolition of the censorial restrictions on poetry and literature, which had
been established both by the Confederation and by the separate States.
Frederick William for his part was quite ready to modify the system of the
censorship. In 1841-2 he made it much less stringent, exempting works of more
than twenty sheets in length; and in 1842 he established a chief Court of
censorship, in order to maintain a regular legal safeguard in this domain. But
when he found that the writers were abusing the new freedom, the mild censorial
regime soon came to an end; and the only result was mutual anger and recrimination
between the Government and public opinion.
In religious
matters the King pacified the quarrels with the Curia and the Prussian
Catholics by considerable concessions. Though Archbishop Droste was not
allowed to return to Cologne, Archbishop Dunin was reinstated in Posen (1840);
and the dispute about mixed marriages was decided according to the views of the
Church, while the “ Catholic
Section,”
established in 1841 in the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship and composed of
Catholic councillors, provided an effective organ within the Government for
ultramontane ambitions. The King was blind to this danger, because his romantic
views inspired him with deep respect for the ancient glory of the Roman Church,
and drew him, despite his earnest Protestantism, towards the idea of the
universal connexion between all faithful Christians. This made him tolerant
towards all Christian denominations whose piety rested on firm dogma; but it
also rendered him opposed and even intolerant towards all freer tendencies
which sought to escape from dogmatic bondage. He suspected in them some
revolutionary element; and, at that time, the camps in Germany were so divided
that war was waged at the same time against political and ecclesiastical
authorities. Indeed, the King’s circle of friends included the men who found in
the aristocratic and patriarchal polity that which God had appointed and
consecrated, the really “Christian Germanic” State, and the complement of their
political ideals in a pietistic orthodoxy.
This group
included, besides the Catholic Radowitz, General Leopold von Gerlach, his
brother the eminent lawyer Ludwig von Gerlach, the Cabinet Minister General von
Thile, Count Anton Stolberg, Baron Senfft von Pilsach and others. These “ Bible
hussars,” some of whom even regarded dancing as a sinful pursuit, were all men
of high character and refinement, but were regarded by public opinion with
contemptuous dislike; and the King’s own rule soon confirmed the fears that had
been felt as to this combination of politics and religion, and the aggressive
encouragement of pietism. It was evident that an appearance of formal piety was
now required of candidates for high state positions. Particular annoyance was
caused in 1842 by the draft scheme for a new divorce law laid before the State
Council by Ludwig von Gerlach, which aimed at modifying in a Puritanic sense
the laxer customs of the national law. Public feeling ran so high that it
became necessary to withdraw the essential clauses of this proposal, and the
general feeling of mistrust was further strengthened by the administration of
Eichhom, the Minister of Public Worship. He had rendered important services to
his country in connexion with the establishment of the Zollverein, and was
thoroughly sincere and personally disinclined to the narrow form of orthodoxy;
but his bureaucratic prejudices and the pressure exercised by the pietistic
entourage of the King led him to interfere unduly in Church and School matters,
and to subject to discipline teachers and clerics with any tendency to Liberal
views. His measures were especially directed against the “Friends of Light”
party in the Church led by Uhlich, Rupp, and Urslivenus, which had been trying
ever since 1841 to free the clergy from the necessity of subscribing to the
dogmatic articles of faith. The King agreed with Eichhom that these undogmatic
rationalists were entitled to toleration, but not to a place within the
Protestant national Church. The majority were compelled to leave it, and form
“Free
62 Connexion between religious and political
movements. [1840-6
Congregations”
which also helped to foster political radicalism. The civil power was used—so
contemporaries could not but think—in order to suppress free intellectual
movement within the Church.
And yet it
was the King’s ideal to restore liberty to the Protestant Church, and to hand
over the power, which he exercised as summits episcopus, “ into the right hands
”; or, in other words, to create a revived apostolic ecclesiastical
constitution, consisting of metropolitans, bishops, presbyters, pastors, laymen
and eleemosynary deacons—a scheme which the King himself designated as a
Midsummer Night’s Dream. His real inner purpose was the weakening of the lay
and bureaucratic influence in the Church. Eichhom did in fact make an attempt
at establishing the synods, and a Prussian general synod was actually convened
at Berlin in 1846; but the King’s fantastic views combined with the split
between parties and tendencies in the Church to render any permanent settlement
on the new basis impossible. Thus the King’s ecclesiastical policy failed in its
positive aims, though it secured the dominance of the orthodox and pietistic
elements in the Prussian State. Nevertheless, it intensified ecclesiastical
differences among the Protestants, embittered the minds of all broader
thinkers, and helped in no slight degree to fan political discontent in the
country.
The King’s
opponents, the “ Friends of Light,” also suffered from a certain
ineffectiveness, for, like contemporaneous Catholic Reformers, they lacked
positive religious force and creative leaders. When in 1844 Bishop Amoldi of
Trier exhibited the pretended seamless coat of Christ and encouraged
pilgrimages to the sacred object, this caused so much annoyance even in
Catholic circles, that “German Catholic” communities were founded under the
leadership of a Silesian priest, Johannes Ronge. These however, after some
faint flickerings of agitation, soon showed their inability to make any lasting
impression on the masses of the Catholic people, and in 1859 they became
incorporated with the “ free communities ” of the Protestant “ friends of
light.”
The
sympathetic excitement which all these religious and ecclesiastical struggles
aroused among the lower as well as the more educated classes was really a
symptom of political dissatisfaction, the desire to abolish the absolutistic
bureaucratic tutelage and feudal aristocratic influence, as well as to secure
real liberty and a free Constitution. At this time three Prussian provinces
were hotbeds of political and social unrest—Silesia, East Prussia, and the
Rhinelands. In 1844 Silesia experienced a local revolution in the disturbances
caused by the distressed weavers, which had to be put down by force of arms;
and Heinrich Simon, a lawyer of Breslau, at the same time won a wide acceptance
for his severe attack on the new laws regulating the discipline of officials.
In East Prussia the movement was more theoretical and doctrinal, for here the
freer conditions of the age of Kant and reform had remained alive even among
the aristocracy and led to a distinctly Liberal royalism.
1840-4] Political movements and leaders inthe
Rhine Province. 53
Here Theodor
von Schon, Stein’s old colleague, had filled the post of Chief President till
1842 amid general satisfaction. In 1840 he had published, at first anonymously,
his pamphlet Woher und Wohin? a pathetic plaint against the bureaucratic
tutelage and an appeal for general Assembly of Estates of the Realm. He was
seconded with even greater violence by Dr Johann Jacoby, whose pamphlet Vier
Fragen beantwortet von einem Ostpreussen (Four questions answered by an East
Prussian) involved him in a legal prosecution. Jacoby was a member of a group
of young, for the most part Jewish, literary men and freethinkers, whose
agitation originated at Konigsberg, where it found support even among the
peaceable merchant class.
In the
Prussian Rhine Province the movement was even more closely connected with
economic and social questions. Here were combined the strongest contrasts, in a
historic stratification, whose oldest and lowest stratum originated in the time
when the Rhine was the “Priest’s lane of the Holy Roman Empire” and formed the
Catholic element, which was already being transformed into modern
Ultramontanism. Next came the democratic and levelling traditions and
institutions of the French period. The Code NapoUon, the jury courts, the
abolition of the economic and social contrasts between town and country, helped
the mobile Rhinelander to feel himself superior to the inhabitants of the old
provinces, and to grumble at the stiff Prussian officials, who administered
his country according to antiquated principles. And it was just here, where the
Russian State found its severest critics, that a group of merchants with
Liberal tendencies and a wide political outlook was formed, who knew how to value
the blessing of a great and strong State, and desired a closer union and
agreement between the Rhinelands and old Prussia, and a liberalising of the
Prussian State as a whole. The leaders of this party were David Hansemann, a
merchant of Aachen, Ludwig Camphausen of Cologne, Hermann von Beckerath of
Krefeld, and the young Gustav Mevissen. And here, as in Konigsberg, there was a
light skirmishing corps of young Radical writers. The common organ of these
various Liberal tendencies was the Rheinische Zeitung, which had but a short
life (1842-3) and was soon suppressed on account of its daring language; but it
has an historic interest because its editor, the young Karl Marx, at that time
still occupied an intermediary position between the bourgeoisie, Hegelian
philosophy, and Socialism.
At that time
German socialism was still in the ideal and theoretical stage; but the
conditions which were to cause its spread among the masses were even then
preparing, for the capitalistic industries were expanding in the large and
united economic domain created by the Zollverein. The Zollverein itself
increased a little in extent by the accession of Luxemburg in 1842 and
Brunswick in 1844; but the North Sea lands (Hanover, Oldenburg, and the Hanse
towns) were unwilling to give up their free trade by sea, and preferred to
remain outside it.
54 The Zollverdn.—List and national economy.
[i84i-6
Even within
the League there was often a violent clash of interests. The protectionists
desired, especially in southern Germany and Saxony, to protect the home
factories against English competition in wool, cotton, linen goods, and iron.
They were opposed by the free-traders, who found support in Prussia both among
the bureaucracy and those landowners who had not as yet been threatened by foreign
competition. But these contests, in which the party in favour of protective
tariffs achieved some victories in 1844 and 1846, were in themselves a token
and proof of the increasing economic movement in Germany generally. During
these years the first steamers went from Bremen to North America, aided by
subsidies from Prussia, Bremen, and the United States. In 1841 Friedrich List
developed views on a “ national system of political economy,” which went far
beyond the ordinary arguments of the protectionists. In List’s view the future
of German nationality was connected with the claims of the national economic
life, and the aim of his teaching was to establish the connexion between
national and political power and economic prosperity. It was at this time that
the first proposals, immature enough, were made in favour of German
colonisation, suggested in part by the increase in emigration during these
years. But, above all, the new means of locomotion provided by the railway were
eagerly exploited by the enterprise of private capital. Joint-stock companies
for railway construction sprang up everywhere; but the speculation fever, to
which they gave rise, aroused the alarm and provoked the interference of the
bureaucracy, and all manner of hindrances and restrictions were put in their
way (especially by the Companies Law of 1844). Everyone who attempted any bold
enterprise must be prepared to have his steps hampered by off "laldora,
which, no doubt with the very best intentions, and the desire to advance national
prosperity as a whole, lacked the elasticity and understanding necessary to
adapt itself to the requirements of a capitalistic system.
Thus the days
of the purely bureaucratic system in Germany were numbered. Its last great
achievement was the establishment of the Zollverein; but the effects of this
very creation reached far beyond their original intention. The desire for
parliamentary institutions in Prussia was reinforced by a fresh argument in the
cumbrous economic methods of the bureaucracy. And now the State itself was
compelled by the new economic requirements to satisfy the demand for a
Constitution. The Government recognised the great advantage which the State
would derive from constructing the railways itself, instead of leaving the
+g«]r to private enterprise. One of the most necessary lines, partly required
for military and strategic reasons, was a railway eastward from Berlin to
Konigsberg; and private enterprise, alarmed by the Companies Act of 1844, did
not venture to undertake its construction. If the State were to undertake the
task, it could not accomplish it without borrowing. But, according to the Order
of January 17, 1820, a loan could not be
issued
without the consent and guarantee of the Prussian Parliament; which,
accordingly, gave the King a new and strong impulse for summoning it.
His ideals of
government by Parliament were of a great and glorious assembly of the
empire—something very different from a modem parliament on the French model,
which was what the Liberals demanded. According to his Christian-Germanic
doctrincs there was a marked distinction between government by the Estates and
government by representation. The latter in his view led down to the slippery
path of popular sovereignty, which regarded the people as a single unity. He
for his part believed in a system of historically developed separate Estates,
whose representatives must only guard and represent their own rights and those
of their fellow Estates. He was resolved never to grant to any assembly a
formal control over the government, which was to be exercised by the will of
majorities. Of course it was impossible to limit the powers of an assembly of
Estates, so that its members should represent only their own rights and not
deal also with the interests of the whole people. Still he made the attempt.
His plan, at
any rate after 1830, was to unite in one great assembly all the members of the
separate Diets, which had been established in each province since 1823, on a
basis of class representation. But directly after his accession he was shown a
testamentary draft of his father’s, which enjoined on his successors not to
make any change in the Constitution without consulting the chief members of the
royal House, and, should the levy of a fresh loan become necessary, to fulfil
the promise of 1820 by summoning a small Committee partly from the
representatives of the Provincial Diets and partly from members of the State
Council, who were appointed by Crown nomination. Although this draft was not
legally binding, it hampered his action, and there were loud demands among the
Liberals for the fulfilment of the promise to grant a Constitution, made on May
22, 1815. This demand had already been made by the East Prussian Diet, when it
assembled to offer him allegiance in 1840, and had aroused in him a conflict of
feelings. He determined to go forward slowly, one step at a time, always
animated by the one resolve not to grant too many concessions to the exacting
Liberals. In 1841 some additional rights were very sparingly doled out to the
Provincial Diets. Their chief right was to be the privilege of electing
Committees, which were to meet in Berlin and help to discuss legislation for
the whole kingdom. This was almost the same as a central representation of the
Prussian people ; but at their first meeting in 1842 the long made it very
clear that they were not to regard themselves as a mere popular assembly, “
representing the varying wind of opinion and the teaching of the moment.”
Annoyed at this as well as at the ambiguous nature of their position, the
Committees separated after achieving little of any importance.
56 Frederick William summons the Combined Diets.
[i845-7
Among the
King’s counsellors Boyen was at first the only one who worked for the
Constitution with real and decisive conviction; afterwards, the same may be
said of Bodelschwingh, especially after his appointment in 1845 to the Ministry
of the Interior. The rest, no doubt, were also of opinion that something should
be done to pacify the increasing discontent of the people; but they lacked real
affection for the cause. A very dangerous opponent of constitutional rights was
the Prince of Prussia, the King’s brother, afterwards Emperor William I, who
regarded his father’s testamentary draft as the very last word to be spoken on
this subject. In this view he was inspired not so much by obstinate absolutism
as by anxiety lest the position of Prussia should be weakened by the effect
that the institution of an assembly of this character might have upon Europe.
On behalf of Austria Metternich also tried to stay the King’s arm, and warned
him against experiments with the Estates. But all this resistance, though it
served to hinder him for a time, did not avail to turn him from his romantic
scheme; and, as we have seen, he was also actuated by a very practical
motive—the necessity laid on the Prussian State of establishing some sort of
popular representation in order to obtain a freer hand in financial matters.
The King therefore resumed the deliberations about this question in 1845, and
would not rest satisfied until his favourite plans were realised. At last even
the Prince of Prussia felt constrained, from motives of loyalty, to yield to
his brother’s wishes; but he declared solemnly: “A new Prussia will arise. The
old Prussia goes to the grave with the publication of this law. May the new be
as great and glorious in honour and fame, as the old has been.”
On February
3,1847, the Order summoning the Combined Diets was published. It was the King’s
own political action, an attempt conceived on a large scale but poorly
executed, meant to achieve something different and better than the model
Constitutions of ordinary Liberalism, something original sprung from Prussian
soil and suited to her special needs. The King hoped that Liberalism would be
put to shame and conquered by a deeper political insight. In reality it was a
mongrel creation, in which absolutist ideas were mingled with the old theories
of the representation of classes and privileges, and in which modern constitutional
principles received very inadequate recognition. The result was a most
inharmonious medley. Even the external arrangement was incomplete, though an
attempt at creating Upper Chambers was made, by choosing out 72 of the most
aristocratic members of the combined Provincial Diets to form a special House
of Lords. But this plan was not even carried through consistently, as it was
arranged that this special committee was to deliberate sometimes apart and at
others together with the rest of the House. In accordance with the Constitution
of 1820, these combined bodies were to have the decision as to the raising of
new state loans; they were to possess the right of petition for
internal
matters, and a deliberative voice with regard to projects of law, though it was
left to the discretion of the Government whether or not these should be laid
before the Prussian Parliament. The most important of its rights was therefore
the voting of fresh taxes, while existing ones could not take place without
their consent.
Even this concession
was more than the orders and decrees of Har- denberg’s time had undertaken to
give to the future Prussian Parliament. But in one respect it obtained less
than had been promised. The decree of 1820 had declared that the Parliament
should receive an annual statement of the amount of the nation’s debt, thus
involving an annual meeting of the Estates. But this was just what the King,
who feared the claims of the Parliament, did not mean to grant. He specially
reserved the right in future to summon the Combined Diets only when any special
occasion made it desirable, and devised an artificial means of satisfying the
requirements of the 1820 order. A small standing deputation of eight members
was to meet every year and examine the balance sheet relating to the state
debts. Even state loans for military purposes were to be voted by this
deputation and not by the Combined Parliament, though this arrangement cast an
undeserved slur on the larger body. A still more artificial development of this
parliamentary scheme was the retention of the Committees from the Provincial
Diets created in 1842. These were to meet at regular intervals (once in four
years) for the discussion of draft laws, though it rested with the Government
to refer these at pleasure to the Combined Parliament, or, as before, to the
separate Provincial Diets.
Such was the
complicated scheme that the King now laid before his country. Yet, strangely
enough, his aim had been to avoid the formalism and minuteness which he
considered characteristic of Liberal Constitutions, and to substitute for it a
living and personal understanding between the Prince and his people. There was
a deep meaning in his words, when at the formal opening of Parliament in the
White Hall of the castle of Berlin, on April 11, 1847, he addressed its members
in a speech of fiery eloquence. “ Never,” said he, “ will I allow a written
document to come between God in Heaven and this land in the character of a
second Providence, to govern us with its formalities and take the place of
ancient loyalty.” But the fantastic artist in him was misled by an illusion,
which prevented him from realising that Constitutions, statutes, and settled
rights are an absolute necessity of actual political life; and even he was
obliged to limit his ideal picture by so many written agreements that, in the
end, it was more artificial than the despised Constitutions of Western Europe.
This scheme,
which was not meant to be a real Constitution, met with a decided opposition in
the Combined Parliament, led by the Rhinelanders and East Prussians, who
demanded full and absolute fulfilment of former promises, and above all regular
sessions of the assembly.
They insisted
that this could not be properly represented by the little standing committee of
eight appointed to deal with the state debts. The King replied that he did not
consider himself pledged to more than he tiad promised in his Charter of
February 3, and would promise nothing except that the Combined Parliament
should be summoned again in four years’ time. Two financial Bills were now
introduced in the assembly, of which one guaranteed the land-rent banks, to
relieve the peasants of the burdens on their land, while a second, and even
more important, measure guaranteed a state loan for the construction of the
Eastern railway. But the East Prussian deputies, in spite of their special
provincial interest in this particular measure, thought that even this Bill
must be postponed until the political demand for the fulfilment of the promises
of 1820 had been granted. Both proposals were accordingly rejected by a large
majority. At the end of the session on June 25, 1847, Parliament was required
by the King’s word and the Charter of February 3 to elect the standing
committees and financial deputation, the very bodies in fact which were to
exercise the functions which the majority of the Parliament claimed the right
to exercise themselves. The Opposition therefore regarded these elections as a
step by which they would dispossess themselves of their rights. Of 499 members
present only 284 took part in the elections without reservation, 157 with
reservation, and 58 did not vote at all. Thus, though the committees were
elected, the general result of the session was discontent and annoyance on all
sides.
The whole Prussian
people, as well as all non-Prussian Germany, was watching with the deepest
interest this first attempt at combined and— in spite of the King’s dislike to
the term—parliamentary government in Prussia. Some may have doubted whether the
Opposition had acted with political wisdom; but no one could doubt the great
intellectual gifts of its leaders, or the honest political enthusiasm of their
following. Throughout the land the names of the Opposition speakers, George von
Vincke, the stiff-necked Westphalian, the Pomeranian Count von Schwerin,
Beckerath the Rhinelander, Hansemann, and many others, were held in honour. In
face of such ability Bodelschwingh, the King’s Minister, had no easy task. But
the hopes of the small and strictly Conservative minority were raised by the
young Otto von Bismarck-Schonhausen, remarkable already for his firm and proud
bearing, the originality and condensed force of his speeches, and his dauntless
courage. He represented the severest spirit of royalism and aristocracy, in
face of a majority which though unquestionably loyal to the monarchy, and
though in fact containing a large aristocratic element, was yet penetrated by
the necessity for great constitutional concessions. But even the Rhinelanders,
who formed the Extreme Left, were far removed from the conception of government
by the people, and hoped to settle the Constitutional question by an “
agreement ” between Crown and Parliament.
Taken as a
whole, the effect of the Combined Parliament on public opinion in Germany was to
encourage all Liberal elements and also of
1845-7] Liberal opinion in
Germany.—Saxony.
59
course the
Radical parties, who regarded every moral victory achieved by Liberalism as a
step towards their own future success. It happened that the years 1846 and 1847
brought bad harvests, high prices and great material distress throughout
Germany. In the eastern provinces of Prussia the agrarian legislation of
Hardenberg’s time had relieved the more well-to-do peasant class of some of its
former burdens by transforming them into proprietors, but had degraded the
smaller peasants into day-labourers, and put their land into the possession of
the landlords. In other German States too many of the burdens of the old
landlord system still existed in greater or lesser degree. In the south-west,
where the ownership of the land had long been undergoing subdivision, the small
owners were great sufferers during this time of famine. Still it would be a
mistake to seek in these material troubles, which did not check the economic
development of Germany as a whole, the main causes of the Revolution of 1848.
These are to be found in the growing desire among all classes of the nation for
a freer political and social activity, and in the growth of the idea of
nationality and of the longing for a powerful united Germany among the better
educated classes. As the representatives of culture aud intellectual ideals,
they wished to rise above the bondage of absolutism and police government,
above the particularism of fractional existence, into the higher and freer
realms of German national life.
The
increasing unrest of men’s minds may also be traced in the political conditions
of the secondary and small States. In the kingdom of Saxony, under Frederick
Augustus II (1836-54) agriculture and industry had been greatly developed by
the Zollverein, though the occurrence of some industrial crises had disposed
the working classes to give ear to democratic, and sometimes even socialistic,
doctrines. At the same time we may observe, especially in Saxony, where the
“German Catholic” congregations were so numerous, the great influence exercised
by intellectual tendencies. Leipzig especially, where Robert Blum, at that time
box-ofKce-keeper at a theatre, led the agitation, was a hotbed of freethought and
democracy. The mistrust felt of a member of the Catholic dynasty, Prince John,
who was unjustly suspected of Jesuit tendencies, gave rise to a street riot in
Leipzig in August, 1845, which had to be put down by force of arms. Some
symptoms of movement might even be observed m the most stagnant of the States
bordering on Prussia, such as the grand duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and
Strelitz, which were linked together by a common aristocratic constitution.
Though members of the burgher class could acquire manorial estates, which
conferred on them a seat in the Diet, the essential rights of their position
were kept from them by the nobility. A desire to obtain these was making itself
strongly manifest; and this agitation, though springing originally from the old
class system, was tinged in the years before 1848 with modem Liberal ideas and
demands.
60 Liberal movements in Hanover and Baden.
[1831-47
In Hanover
the coup d'Hat of King Ernest Augustus in 1837 (mentioned in a previous
volume) had aroused only passive annoyance in the calm and stolid population;
but in the Diet, for all its reactionary transformation, occasional demands
made themselves heard for a greater measure of political rights. Electoral
Hesse was governed at that time by William II and his son Frederick William,
who since 1831 had been joined with him as co-regent, both men of despotic
views and repellent personality, whose private quarrels were a source of
constant annoyance. When the Elector died in 1847, his successor would have
arbitrarily repudiated the Constitution of 1831, had he not been restrained by
the warnings of Prussia and Austria, who were anxious to avoid any new cause
for provocation. The grand duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt (where Louis II reigned
from 1830 to 1848) was spared these attacks on its Constitution of 1820. But
here the greater political activity of the peoples in the south-west manifested
itself, when in 1846 Heinrich von Gagem, the leader of the Hesse-Darmstadt
Liberals, a man penetrated with German national ideals, returned to the Diet
after ten years’ abstinence from political activity.
Far more
violent was the political movement in the grand duchy of Baden. Radowitz, then
Prussian ambassador at Carlsruhe, aptly remarked that the German secondary
States of the older type, such as Hanover, Saxony and Bavaria, were sharply
distinguished in their political aspirations from those of the newer type, like
Baden and Wurtemberg. In the former the internal constitutional struggle retarded
the development of the national German ideas; in the latter the national and
the abstract Liberal ideas held an equal balance. The dangerous proximity of France
helped to foster the national German idea in these south-western districts,
where, up to 1806, the remains of an old-fashioned patriotism had still
lingered. At the same time democratic ideas, brought over by political
fugitives from France and Switzerland, penetrated to Baden; and, in 1844,
Radowitz expressed his opinion that the whole subversive party in Germany
regarded Baden as the region where the chief blows were being struck. The Grand
Duke Leopold (1830-52) at one time resorted to Liberal policy, at another to
police repression; and this confusion caused distraction and disturbance in the
minds of the people. Here, as in the Rhinelands, the purely political contrasts
were complicated by the presence of a strong Ultramontane element, especially in
southern Baden. A proposal brought before the Diet towards the end of 1845 by
the deputy Zittel for equal toleration of all Christian denominations (framed
for the benefit of the “ German Catholics”) aroused a violent counter-agitation
on the part of the Roman Catholics. The Government hoped to draw its own
advantage out of these disputes, and, in the expectation of breaking up the
Liberal Opposition, dissolved the Diet in February, 1846. But the Liberals won
a brilliant electoral victory, and at the end of 1846 the Grand Duke consented
to appoint
1846-8]
Wiirtemberg.—Disturbance in Bavaria.
61
a moderate
Liberal Ministry under Bekk. This striking victory for the constitutional and
parliamentary idea had another important effect; it marked the first separation
in Germany between the Liberal and the Radical democratic parties, the former
being led by Karl Mathy, Karl Theodor Welcker and Bassermann, the latter by
Hecker, Struve and Itzstein. The former were prepared to abandon pure
opposition and support the Government, the latter sought and found matter for
fresh agitation among the lower classes of the town population in socialistic
ideas and fanning the general hatred of the monarchy. We shall presently see
that this parting of the ways in Baden prepared the events which marked the eve
of the German Revolution.
In
Wiirtemberg, the able and energetic King William I grasped the reins more
tightly in his hands, and consistently kept down the Liberal demands for
freedom, which he had himself favoured early in the twenties, in the hope of
thus strengthening the influence and popularity of the south-German States. But
even here the Liberal Opposition in the Diet grew more active after 1845; and
the famine years 1846-7 led in May, 1847, to street disturbances in the
capital, Stuttgart.
In Bavaria,
King Louis, with his idealistic tendencies and his love for art and
architecture, had, ever since the close of the thirties, been entirely under
the influence of the Ultramontane party, and had, after 1837, governed through
the clerical Ministry of Abel. A painful impression was created by the sight of
the Protestant soldiers of the Bavarian army, kneeling before the host at
Catholic processions. But the annoyance of the Protestant population at this
religious compulsion strengthened the Liberal Opposition, and the lust of power
displayed by the Ultra- montanes presently caused them to lose favour with the
King. The actual circumstance which brought about the breach between the King
and the Ultramontanes was an unfortunate one. In the autumn of 1846 he was
drawn into an entanglement with the beautiful and fascinating Spanish dancer,
Lola Montez, who played the part of a patroness of literature. The
Ultramontanes were thus able to exclaim at the same time against the moral perversion
of the old King and against the moral and political poison of Liberalism. The
Abel Ministry protested against the King’s proposal to create Lola Montez a
countess, and their consequent resignation (February, 1847) inflicted a severe
blow on his prestige. As the new Ministers also refused to be at the beck and
call of the arrogant dancer, the so-called Lola Ministry had to be appointed in
1847 under Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein. Fighting went on in the streets of
Munich between the Ultramontane and the “ Lolamontane ” students, while the
common people threw mud and stones at the actress when she appeared in public.
Thereupon the King closed the University (February 9, 1848), but the people of
Munich were so unanimous in their attitude that he was at last forced to give
way and send the objectionable Lola out of the country (February 11, 1848).
These
62
Foreshadowings
of Revolution. [i847-8
scandalous
proceedings, occurring in the midst of a fanatically Ultramontane though
essentially loyal population, may have had no immediate revolutionary effect,
but they certainly helped to weaken respect for the dynasties elsewhere in
Germany and to prepare the ground in Munich for the events of March.
We may thus
trace almost everywhere in Germany in the years before 1848, an increasing
political unrest. At any rate in south-west Germany the scent of battle was in
the air, and in the autumn of 1847 the various parties closed their ranks. On
September 12, the Radicals of Baden assembled at Offenburg, under the leadership
of Hecker and Struve, and the programme which they accepted may serve as a
summary of the demands made by the advanced Left throughout Germany. These
included the abolition of the reactionary federal laws (Bundesgesctze) of 1819
and 1832, which checked the utterance of political opinions, absolute
religious toleration, Liberal laws regulating the right of assembly, and an
oath of allegiance taken by the army to the constitution, for this, they hoped,
would undermine the main support of the monarchy. They even proposed to
substitute for the standing army a popular levy resembling a militia. The
demand for popular representation in the Federal Diet (Bundestag) was to
satisfy the democratic as well as the national tendency which even the Radicals
shared. Other demands betray the influence of the socialist movement—a
progressive income-tax, attempts to promote better relations between capital
and labour, trial by jury, abolition of all privileges and finally substitution
of government by the people for the rule of officials. The word Republic had
not yet been uttered, but it was in the minds of the leaders, as was
subsequently proved.
The National
and moderate Liberal elements of Baden and western Germany generally founded an
important organ in the summer of 1847, the Deutsche Zeitung, edited by the
historian Gervinus at Heidelberg. It became the organ of that national and
idealistic academic policy, which culminated in the hereditary empire party of
1848. They gave full recognition to the monarchical form of government and the
separate German States, and they welcomed Prussia’s Combined Parliament with
hopeful sympathy, as the first step towards constitutional principles. They
showed a general interest in the political future of Prussia, based on the hope
of winning a national reform of the German Confederation with the help of a
Liberal Prussia. What aspect this reformed State would bear, and what place
Prussia and Austria would occupy in it, were questions that were either set
aside or but vaguely discussed.
The Assembly
of this party had its first experiences of the difficulties they would have to
encounter, when they met at Heppenheim on October 10, 1847. Here were present
among others Mathy, Basser- mann, Heinrich von Gagem, Romer, the leader of the
Wurtemberg Liberals, and Hansemann from Rhenish Prussia. Some, like Bassermann,
1847-8] Demand for a German National
Parliament. 63
thought the
course of events would lead to a popular assembly representing the German
people sitting side by side with a Federal Parliament consisting of
representatives of the Governments. This was what the Radicals had demanded at
Offenburg, and Welcker had been asking for ever since 1831. But where was the
use of a national Parliament side by side with a Congress of Government
representatives, if there was no unifying national Central Power beside and
above them ? Hansemann and Mathy therefore confined their efforts to the more
modest and attainable plan of extending the Zollverein, and furnishing it with
a Parliament of delegates from the Estates of the various States in the
Confederation. This plan might have resulted in the foundation of a federal
State under Prussian hegemony, within the frame of the old federal
constitution. At the moment, however, the demand for a mere Zollverein
Parliament did not attract the mass of the people, especially as Zollverein
politics were just then complicated by the opposition bet veen Free Trade and
Protection. Eventually Hansemann and Mathy also recognised this fact, and
during the next few months all the Liberals of southern and western Germany
adopted the common watchword which the Radicals had already made their own—the
demand for a national German Parliament to sit side by side, and legislate
concurrently, with the Federal Diet already established as the organ of the
German Confederation. On February 12, 1848, Bassermann brought forward a
proposal in the Baden Chamber to work for this end; and the echo which his
words found throughout Germany is another proof that the country was ready for
the events of 1848.
Prussia
itself had already entered on a path which led towards the views of the
national party in southern and western Germany. Frederick William IV, as we
know, had long been occupied with national dreams and fantasies, and desired at
any rate to recall to life the German Federal Constitution, though on a
conservative basis and with due regard to Austria’s historic position and
importance in Germany. He met with a check, however, in the backwardness of
Austria, for her traditional system shrank from every radical change in
Germany, especially from utilising the national idea. In. the autumn of 1847
the King, by the advice of Radowitz, entered on a new policy. The failure of
the Combined Parliament, and the rising flood of Nationalism and Liberalism
suggested to him the idea of recovering his moral and political prestige by
satisfying the national demand in a conservative and legitimate fashion. “ The
most powerful force of the present time, that of Nationality, has become the
most dangerous weapon in the hands of the enemies of rightful order.” Thus
wrote Radowitz on November 20,1847, in a memorial which the King adopted as his
programme. According to this plan the enemy was to be hoist with his own
petard, and the needs of the German nation as a whole, and of the Prussian
State in particular, were to be satisfied at the same time. The King and
Radowitz therefore proposed that the
ca. in.
64 Plan of Federal Reform and National Union.
[1846-8
Federal Diet
of the Confederation, which had hitherto been so unfruitful of results, should
take up new tasks in regard to the military organisation, legal protection, and
material interests of the Confederation, and thereby inaugurate a comprehensive
national legislation. But what was to be done if Austria, the natural opponent
of an effective federal reform, should refuse her consent?
The actual
consequence of an intensive federal reform must sooner or later transform the
loose federation of States into a federal State. In the existing Confederation two
great Powers, Austria and Prussia, had been able, though not harmoniously, to
exist side by side; in a federal State this equality would become impossible.
But Frederick William IV and Radowitz failed to realise this, though they were
both inspired with ambition for Prussia, and hoped that a reform of the
Confederation would raise her position in Germany and Europe. This desire to
combine the incompatible, because it seemed such a beautiful dream, was
characteristic of their romantic policy. “ May God in Heaven save me from any
attempt to drive Austria out of the Confederation,” said the King in November,
1847; “ Germany without Trieste, Tyrol, and that glorious Archduchy would be
worse than a face without a nose.” His friend Radowitz however was prepared, in
case Austria and the Diet of the Confederation opposed the idea of reform, to
go forward without her, and summon special associations of the States which
desired reform, on the model of the Zollverein. But this was only to be a
transition stage, and the restoration of the old community with Austria and all
the German States was the final goal.
At the end of
1847 Radowitz went to Vienna to win Austria to the cause of federal reform. But
events in Switzerland, as is elsewhere told, intervened, and took up, for the
time being, the whole attention of the Prussian and Austrian Governments, and
set the question of reform again in the background. The King however took it up
again even before the outbreak of the February revolution in Paris (1848). Two
events occurred to give it an impetus: the news of the proposal introduced by
Bassermann on February 12, into the Baden Diet, and the death of Christian VIII
of Denmark on January 20, 1„848. Radowitz, when consulted by the King, at once
advised him to press forward German interests in the Schleswig-Holstein
question, the origin and development of which is elsewhere described.
The Federal
Parliament had already replied to the “ open letter ” of Christian VIII of
Denmark, by a general reservation of rights (September 17, 1846). Now, they
were called on to defend these rights, and with them the German nationality in
Schleswig, at the very moment when the whole German Confederation was feeling
the inspiration of fresh national life. While undertaking these great and difficult
tasks, they were drawn into the current of a revolutionary movement, which
might either carry them along to their goal or involve them in destruction.
(1846-9.)
The main revolutionary influences working
in Italy just before the period 1846-9, were two: the one, the frankly
Revolutionary doctrine of Mazzini; the other, that of Moderate Reform. Nothing
is more indicative of the opposition between these policies, and at the same
time of the fact that they had not then severed all connexion, than the
agitation at Rimini in 1845, headed by Pietro Renzi. There we see an armed
insurrection by the people, and side by side with it a Reform manifesto, issued
by Luigi Carlo Farini of the Romagna and Giuseppe Montanelli of Tuscany, which
renewed the demands for reforms first formulated by the Great Powers in their
Memorandum of 1831. The authors hoped no doubt to gain the good-will of the
Powers, or at least to involve them in some sort of moral complicity with the
insurgents of the Romagna—a naive idea enough, as the event proved. The attempt
indicates, however, a sense of the uselessness of previous efforts and
sacrifices (as notably shown in the elsewhere described “ Bandiera ” incident,
in 1844, the memory of which still burned in the hearts of all) and produced a
consequent reaction of thought. A new policy was coming to the front, even
among the most blinded of conspirators, which at last recognised that salvation
must be looked for outside the narrowing influences of the Sette (Secret
Societies): and Mazzini significantly repudiated any connexion with the
agitation at Rimini in 1845.
The first and
strongest impulse to political thought in the direction of Moderate Reform as
against armed Revolution, was given by Vincenzo Gioberti’s Primaio morale e
civile degli Italiani (1843); and following thereon came the works of Balbo,
Torelli, Durando, Capponi, Galeotti, and d’Azeglio, which have been noticed
elsewhere. In his Primaio Gioberti said nothing at all about the Austrians, and
very
little and that little with reserve—about the Jesuits,
lest his book
should be
stopped in Lombardo-Venetia. To this the Liberals took no exception, seeing
that hatred of the foreigner could be detected in every page, and that
Gioberti’s conclusions were a clear call to arms which was intended to stir,
and did in fact stir, Italy to its very depths. But, if he thought to mollify
either the Austrians or the Jesuits, he was soon
66
D'Azeglio's I Casi di Romagna.
[1845-6
undeceived.
Not only Austria, but even other Italian Governments, did their best to stop
the circulation of the book, by seizing it and forbidding its sale; while the
Jesuits were especially alarmed by the striking and unexpected impression it
produced among the clergy. Thus it became a forbidden fruit which all wished to
taste, even if they could not appreciate half of its metaphysical subtleties.
So clearly was it understood that Italian independence was the principal thesis
of Gioberti’s book, in spite of its astute omissions and skilful silences, that
the writers who continued the discussion, with Balbo at their head, all
addressed themselves explicitly to that point.
The man who
took the principal part in exposing the flagrant contradiction between the
proposals of the Moderate Reformers and the reckless and disconnected attempts
of armed Revolution, was Massimo dAzeglio, then a student of painting in Rome.
Travelling from that city by easy journeys through Umbria, the Marches, and
Romagna, he collected a fund of observations, the substance of which, with his
remarks thereon, he published in his celebrated work I Casi di Romagna (The
Fortunes of Romagna). The literature of Reform stood to political events in the
double relation of cause and effect; of those immediately following it was
undoubtedly the direct cause, inasmuch as they were (in their earlier period,
at least) mainly the work of the Moderate Reform party, to the formation of
which literature had contributed so much. And in that literature there is
probably no more widely known or popular work than I Casi di Romagna, with its
friendly warnings to the party of conspiracy, and its terrible indictment of
the methods of Papal government. Of course it went full in the teeth of the
traditions of Italian literature; it was Federalist, and Neo-Guelf; it aimed at
making an ally, instead of an enemy, of that very Temporal Power of the Popes,
which from Machiavelli to Victor Alfieri had been considered the principal bar
to the reconstruction of the Italian nation. The literature of political reform
culminates in I Casi di Romagna. Before publishing it, dAzeglio had
communicated to King Charles Albert of Piedmont and Sardinia his impressions of
the Romagna, and had informed him of the advice he had given to his Liberal
friends, namely, to trust in Charles Albert as the only leader who possessed an
Italian army strong enough to attempt anything useful and decisive. This secret
conversation with Charles Albert is recorded by dAzeglio in his Ricordi
(Recollections). The King replied to him calmly but firmly: “ Tell these
gentlemen to keep still; there is nothing to be done at present; but they may
rest assured that, when the opportunity occurs, my life, my sons’ lives, my
arms, treasure, and all, will be expended for the cause of Italy.” Then he
embraced and dismissed him. DAzeglio had not expected any such positive
declaration from a Prince of so uncertain and secretive a temperament, and left
his presence with emotion. Shortly afterwards I Casi di Romagna was published
(January, 1846).
1845-6] Gioberti's Prolegomeni al Primato.
67
But for a
short time, and by a sort of happy accident, its leading ideas appeared to be
practically accepted; though they never really succeeded in becoming popular,
in spite of d’Azeglio’s assertions to the contrary. Mazzinianism, on the other
hand, the deadly enemy of the Moderate Reform programme, looking to the
unification of Italy as its end and to open insurrection as its means, never
ceased to justify its own existence to the popular mind. Nor did it cease to combat
the exaggerations of the Federalists and Neo-Guelfs, and to deny their claim to
be the completest and most logical exponents of a united Italy. But whatever
may be said of the extraordinary variety of views which characterised the
political literature of Italy at the end of 1846, there can be no doubt as to
the effect that it produced, in forcing the question from the gloom and mystery
of the conspirator’s cellar into the open fields of publicity. Here Mazzini had
set the example by his publication of Giovme Italia (Young Italy).
This series
of publications, their profound effect on public opinion, the calibre of their
authors, and the moderation of the opinions put forth in them, were a
sufficient proof to Europe in general—and to Austria in particular (to whom all
this ferment of ideas was an abiding menace)— that the Italian question had now
permeated every class in society. It was now impossible to put this new form of
militant patriotism on the same level as Mazzinian conspiracies, or to throw it
contemptuously aside with the ordinary formula of the pundits of reaction, that
it was an affair of madmen, or of scoundrels. It would have been absurd thus to
describe men like Gioberti, Balbo, d’Azeglio, or Capponi.
In 1845
Gioberti had published his Prolegomeni al Primato, which, though intended as a
preface to the second edition of the Primato, is in fact a separate work;
impulsive and impressionable, Gioberti not only practically renounced his idea
of making the Papacy the pivot of Italian regeneration, but went further. He
broke his armistice with the Jesuits, and roundly denounced them as the moths
fretting the garment of Catholicism; and, though he had previously favoured an
agreement between all Italian rulers, he now laid the Neapolitan Bourbons under
the ban of the civilised world. What was it that had produced in him this
change, involving a suggestion of inconsistency ?
It was caused
by two facts: the one, the already mentioned execution of the brothers Bandiera
in 1844; the other, the demeanour of the Jesuits in Switzerland, where, as is
elsewhere described, they had shown themselves ready and willing to go even so
far as civil war. And not in Switzerland only had they behaved thus, but also
in Belgium, Italy, and France. In France, indeed, the struggle between the
University of Paris and the Society of Jesus, between Liberals and Jesuits,
reached such a pitch of bitterness and created so much popular excitement, that
even the Conservative Minister, Guizot, had found it necessary to send a special
envoy to Pope Gregory XVI to invite him to recall the Jesuits.
68 Pellegrino Rossi,—Congressi degli Scienziati. [1839-47
This envoy
was Pellegrino Rossi, of Carrara, an Italian political exile naturalised in
France, who had acquired a European reputation in science, literature, and
statesmanship, and had risen by sheer genius to the highest offices, first in
Switzerland, and later in France. By singular ability and tenacity Rossi
succeeded in his difficult mission; he actually induced the General of the Jesuits,
by his own act, to dissolve the French branch of the Society. As Minister of
France, Pellegrino Rossi was present at the death of Gregory XVI and at the
enthronement of the new Pope; and, while he never failed in his duty as the
loyal interpreter of French policy, his heart was none the less that of a
patriot and an Italian. On seeing Italy once more, after some thirty years of
exile, “I cried,” he says, “like a child”; and he subsequently sent forth his
son with his blessing to Lombardy as a volunteer against the Austrians. The
like spirit appears in his public and private correspondence with Guizot, and
in private letters written by him from Rome, after the revolution which
dethroned Louis-Philippe.
Thus, on the
eve of 1846, the positions of the Italian Liberals and their adversaries had
gradually come to be determined by the following facts: the victory of Rossi
over the Jesuits (although this directly concerned France alone); the
unexpected attack on the Jesuits in Gioberti’s Prolegomeni, to which they had
made haughty and unsparing replies; the indignation excited in Tuscany, even
among Liberals, by certain Neo-Guelfic and pro-Papal tendencies of Gioberti and
Balbo, to which Giusti had given expression; and, finally, the absolute irreconcilability
between the Moderate- Reformers and the Revolutionary Mazzinists. Owing to
these facts, the field of controversy was widened, and the air of Italy became
so charged with electricity that at any moment a spark might cause a
conflagration. The most practical idea of the Moderate Reformers was that the
petty tyrants of Italy, together with the Pope, and Austria, could be far more
effectively combated by constantly stirring public opinion, and by insisting on
wide and open public discussion of the state of Italy, than by secret
conspiracies and mere local revolts. Next to the Press and to the vigorous
controversy carried on in print, their best allies were the Congressi degli
Scienziati (Scientific Congresses), which had met regularly from 1839 to 1847,
and which united as into one family through community of thought and study all
cultivated Italians, who had been hitherto isolated in their various cities. At
first the Italian Princes (including even Ferdinand II of Naples) not only
permitted these Congresses, but took some pride in patronising them; but, as
the Congresses became more and more an opportunity for political propaganda and
for the development of Liberalism, they took fright. Austria, ever watchful,
was specially alarmed; the Austrian Minister in Tuscany, in reporting on the
Congress held in Florence in 1841, flatly called the Grand Duke a traitor; and
Marshal Radetzky, who had commanded the Austrian troops in Lombardo-Venetia
since 1833,
1824-47]
69
could
see nothing but the cloven hoof of the devil of revolution in this Arcadia of
Congresses.
.
But even in
Tuscany that period of “pacific beatitude,” which is held to have lasted from
1824 to 1847, was no longer quite undisturbed. Pietro Renzi, the leader of the
revolt at Rimini in 1845, had been allowed to slip into France, whence he had
returned to Tuscany; the Papal Government demanded his extradition, which the
Tuscan authorities granted after some hesitation. Just at this moment Massimo
d’Azeglio was passing his I Casi di Romagna through the press; and thus it
happens that, while in the text he praises the Grand Duke for his humanity to
the refugees of Romagna, he inveighs against him in a note for the surrender of
Renzi. Another trouble befel the Grand Duke at Pisa, when the Sisters of the
Sacred Heart, an off-shoot of the Jesuit system, asked permission to open homes
and schools. This was contrary to the traditional policy of the grand duchy;
moreover, a petition against the establishment of such an outpost of the Jesuits
in Pisa had been drawn up by Giuseppe Montanelli, and signed by hundreds of
people of mark. The authorities did in fact refuse their sanction, but they
expelled d’Azeglio from Florence as a sort of compensation for the striking
success of his book; a piece of gratuitous discourtesy, which made a greater
scandal than the extradition of Renzi.
In 1845,
Ferdinand II of Naples, who, with all his proverbial indifference, was
somewhat uneasy under the general storm of execration raised by the Bandiera
executions, tried to figure as an enlightened ruler by graciously welcoming the
Congresso degU Scienziati. The 1400 names on the list of that Congress show
that the amateurs outnumbered the professionals, and that many attended for
reasons very different from the mere love of science. The King had no objection
to flattery from the Congress; but was none the less ready, on hearing of the
agitation at Rimini, to lock up some of its leading political members; and it
was only on a secret warning from the Minister, del Carretto, that these men
secured safety by speedy flight. The Neapolitan Liberals on the whole favoured
Mazzini’s old methods of conspiracy and partial and local rebellion, although
his Giovine Italia had no great circulation among them; the famous Protesta del
popolo delle due Sicilie (Protest of the People of the Two Sicilies) by
Settembrini, in 1847, was their first utterance in favour of Reform on the
lines of the Rimini manifesto. It should be remembered that, bad as the
condition of the Neapolitan provinces was, that of Sicily was even worse. The
consequent jealousy between the two peoples was fostered by the incompetence
of the authorities, and was afterwards productive of much evil to the cause of
Italy as a whole.
The same
condition of things existed in the smaller States; in Lucca, whose ruler was a
madman; in Modena, under a petty tyrant; in Parma under the widow of Napoleon,
dominated by a succession of
70 Piedmont.—Death
of Gregory XVI. [1835-46
lovers and
husbands who could at the best but rank as mere Austrian agents. Of course
these rulers did not distinguish between Mazzinians and Reformers, between
Revolution and Moderate Liberalism. Like Austria, they felt themselves equally
threatened by both; and they trusted to Austrian aid against both, if
necessary—with good reason, for Austria was the true sovereign of all Italy,
outside the kingdom of Sardinia.
In Piedmont
the case was different. On Charles Albert the writings on Reform, of Gioberti,
Balbo, d’Azeglio and others, had produced a profound effect. He had always
disliked Austria, and cherished the idea of expelling her from Italy by force
of arms. The discovery of this secret by his new Foreign Secretary, Clemente
Solaro della Margarita, in 1835, had caused him considerable annoyance. But others
had discovered it also: Gioberti evidently refers to it in his Primato; Balbo,
more explicitly, in his Speranze cT Italia; and even Niccolini, the tragic poet
of Tuscany, openly called on Charles Albert to draw the sword. The revival of
public confidence in the King, notwithstanding his conduct in the rebellion of
1821, and his indefensible severities in 1833, was marked; and the hopes of the
Liberals once more centred in him. He did not at once lay aside the reserve and
mystery he had adopted since his accession; but the effect was none the less
visible, reviving the memories of his youth, and eliciting many expressions,
spasmodic perhaps but none the less clear, which revealed his “ secret,” the
fixed, deep-rooted purpose to which the rest of his life was to be devoted.
The state of
affairs in Italy in 1846 may be thus summarised— Naples motionless under the
tutelage of Austria (which, however, the King personally resented), and
disturbed by a Liberal agitation, which he ferociously repressed; Lombardy and
Venice, to all appearance submissive and contented, but with a Liberal ferment
gradually alienating the higher classes from the Government and extending among
the lower. In the Papal States deep-seated evils were openly denounced: in the
duchies of Lucca, Parma, and Modena, there was an ever growing divergence
between rulers and ruled. In Tuscany an administration was slowly losing its
old repute owing to its new reactionary tendencies; it was menaced by a Liberal
agitation, and by the intervention of a secret Press, which not only demanded
Reform but threatened the person of the Grand Duke himself. Piedmont alone was
sound; the people were devoted to the dynasty; and the King, who had at last
taken up a position of decided resistance to the overbearing policy of Austria,
was slowly but surely carrying out his internal reforms.
Such was the
condition of Italy at the death of Gregory XVI, June 1,1846. The least that
could happen, it was said, was that the Papal State generally and the turbulent
Romagna in particular would be turned upside down; that Austria would then
intervene; and that she would be opposed by France, according to her already
declared intention. In fact, the conflagration might extend to all Europe.
1846] The new situation. Election of Pius IX. 71
In view of
possibilities, Mettemich had ordered Radetzky, the Austrian Commander-in-chief
in Italy, to be ready to reinforce the garrisons of Ferrara and to invade the
Legations. France, on her side, warned Austria that her intervention would be
followed by a French occupation of Civita Vecchia and Ancona. Mettemich, thus
aware of the possibility of Revolution in the Papal State, was ready to meet
it; but he was not prepared for a Pope of the type desired by Gioberti in his
Primato. He had directed Count Liitzow, the Austrian Minister in Rome, who was
an expert in Papal diplomacy, to manipulate the election of the new Pope in the
Austrian interest. In short, he wanted a Pope with no appetite for novelties,
and as devoted to Austria as had been Gregory XVI, who had never during his
pontificate been guilty of any apostolic energy, except indeed against Russia;
for the severity of his language to the Emperor Nicholas on his visit to Rome
in 1845, on the subject of Catholic persecution in Poland, was long remembered.
Just at this
time della Margarita, in the name of his Government, offered the Papal State
the aid of Piedmontese troops, in case of disorder occurring on the death of
the Pope and the election of his successor, thus anticipating the proposal,
which some declared to be so novel and bold when Gioberti made it in 1849.
Nothing could cause so much suspicion and irritation to Austria as the
knowledge that the rulers of Italy were solving her internal problems on their
own account, especially if this action took the shape of an intervention by
Piedmont in the Papal States, at the request of the College of Cardinals. The
offer of della Margarita had no result, and a serious darger was averted; for
Piedmont might thus have found herself fighting on the same side as Austria, in
the very probable event of a similar intervention by the latter. This might
possibly have been agreeable to the personal opinions of della Margarita, but
it would certainly have been repugnant to Charles Albert and his followers, and
not less fatal to the future of an Italy which was to unite under the hegemony
of Piedmont.
The fears of
Mettemich and of della Margarita were groundless. Upon the death of Gregory
XVI, amid the indifference or execrations of all, including even his intimates,
no serious disorder ensued. The party of Moderate Reform was then in the
ascendant, and the idea of provoking Austrian intervention by unconsidered
agitation was abominated by all. Action was confined to the presentation of
petitions for Reform si<med by great numbers of citizens of the highest
repute, the most noteworthy of which was that from Bologna, drawn up by Marco
Minghetti. A lengthy Conclave had been expected; but a new Pope was in fact
elected in forty-eight hours.
Cardinal
Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti, the new Pope, who assumed the name of Pius IX,
belonged to a respected family of provincial nobility residing at Sinigaglia,
in the Marches. Bom in 1792, he received his early education at the College of
the Scolopi at
72
Character and education of Mastai.
[1792-1845
Volterra, but
left the College owing to epileptic fits. Some traces of this terrible
infirmity always remained in a nervous excitability and unreasoning
impetuosity, which explain many incidents of his later life. The stories of the
extraordinary promise, as of the romantic love affairs of his youth, are merely
the fables of admirers, or the slanders of enemies. He returned to Sinigaglia
in 1809, where he remained till the restoration of Pius VII in 1814. This was
the period to which are assigned his supposed irregularity of life and
relations with the Freemasons and the Carbonari. There is no proof that he was
in any actual political connexion with the Revolutionary party, or that he
even diverged to any great extent from his family traditions, which were purely
clerical.
The future
Pope left Sinigaglia (1814) for Rome to seek his fortunes under the wing of an
uncle, Monsignor Paolino Mastai; for a short time he mingled in the mob of
worldly ecclesiastics of that capital; but the influence of his mother’s
sincere piety, and of his own excessive tendency to emotion, soon entirely
changed the current of his life. After being refused admission to the Pope’s “
Noble Guard ” on the score of his weak health, he obtained a small post in the
Orphanage known as that of Tata Giovanni (1816); and, accepting this success as
a sign from Heaven, he took Holy Orders. In 1817 he went on a half-religious,
half-diplomatic mission to Chili; from which he did not return till 1825, when
Leo XII nominated him to the Presidency of the Hospital of St Michael,
promoting him two years later to the Archbishopric of Spoleto. There in 1831 he
first came into contact with the Italian Revolution. General Sercognani, the
leader of the revolutionary forces (in which the future Emperor of the French
was serving) had retired to Spoleto, after having pushed forward as far as
Otricoli; there he was persuaded by Mastai to throw down his arms and disband
his troops.
In 1832
Mastai was translated to the see of Imola; and in 1840 was created a Cardinal,
retaining his see. At Imola he witnessed a constant round of conspiracy,
revolt, repression, Austrian intervention, imprisonments, banishments,
sentences, and executions. He was unable to conceal his disgust, arid, in consequence
of his open protests, he had the honour of being classed at the Court of Rome
with Abbe Gregoire, of Revolutionary fame. Mastai resented this, and hence
perhaps a remark of his in a letter to his friend Monsignor Polidori, on the
occasion of the meeting of the three Cardinal Legates of Bologna, Ferrara, and
Ravenna, at a political congress in November, 1845: “God help us! for the
meeting of the three Eminences certainly will not! ” In these words there is a
certain flavour of protest, as of an honest man in the midst of rogues, who
seems to be losing heart and spirit at his own isolation and impotence for good
in such an atmosphere of suspicion, distrust, and espionage.
At this
period Mastai lived in close intimacy with Count Giuseppe Pasolini, an educated
and thoughtful young Liberal, and his amiable wife, Antonietta Bassi, who
resided near Imola. In this genial and sunny
1845-6] Masted's friendship with Pasolini.
Liberal ideas. 73
environment
Mastai’s cultivated temperament and aristocratic instincts found attraction and
sympathy, while in the loyalty of the pair and the honesty of their intentions
he felt a hitherto unknown confidence. They frequently discussed the logical
and practical possibility of an agreement between religion and progress, between
the Catholic faith and Liberal principles, and the incompatibility of the
Italian aspirations with the methods practised by the Pope and by Austria. Thus
Mastai was led to adopt, more or less, the ideas and principles of Moderate
Reform, in opposition to retrograde absolutism, or Revolutionary Mazzinianism.
Probably
Mastai had not given any special attention to these matters, or to the
development of those ideas of conciliation which had formed part of the Liberal
romanticism of 1830, and the revival of which was then unconsciously drawing
the younger clergy into opposition to the >bscurantists and the Jesuits. But
at the bottom of his heart he certainly then sympathised with the movement,
whose scope had been widened by the literature of Reform until it dealt with
all the problems of Italian politics. It was on this idea of conciliation that
Gioberti, Balbo, and the other writers on Reform had based all their schemes
for the redemption of Italy. Thus the Pasolini easily led on Cardinal Mastai to
political questions, and brought him at last to regret bitterly the conditions
of the time and to look forward to a happier future, for which nothing, as he
thought, was needed but a little leniency and a little Christianity on the part
of the rulers. His friends introduced him to Gioberti’s Primaio and Balbo’s
Speranze d' Italia; d’Azeglio’s I Casi di Romagna he had already obtained from
another friend of the house. Thus by the study of the Liberal Reform doctrines,
combined with the sight of the horrors perpetrated under his eyes in Romagna,
the Pope of 1846 grew out of the Bishop of Imola.
On Mastai’s
departure to attend the Conclave in 1846, Count Pasolini expressed his hopes
that he might have the opportunity, as Pope, of practising all the theories so
often discussed; and the populace, seeing a dove flying round his carriage,
affirmed that it was the Holy Ghost. Thus the foundation was being laid for the
extraordinary legend of the liberty-loving Pope, which was destined later to
mystify the world and to influence the mind of the Pope himself. The exact
moment of his election was unpropitious to the ideas of Liberal Reform; there
was a breath of reaction over all Europe, which would increase a thousandfold
the difficulties of a Pope who wished to prove his good-will by actions. The
entente cordiale between Louis-Philippe and England had been broken by the
Spanish marriages, and the rupture had forced Louis-Philippe into the arms of
Austria, whose policy was everywhere and always anti-Liberal.
The first
actions of Pius IX were, under these circumstances, those of a man who did not
know exactly where to begin. Luckily for him, he had the support and assistance
of two excellent men: Canon Graziosi,
74 Pirn IX's Amnesty; its effects in Italy. [i846
a learned and
enlightened ecclesiastic, and Monsignor Corboli Bussi, a man described by
Minghetti as of so ardent a disposition that he would nowadays be called a
Catholic Socialist. They and Pellegrino Rossi were the inspirers of that great
political act, the Amnesty of July 16, 1846. It proclaimed the pardon of all
political offenders and suspects, and made Pius IX, historically speaking, the
father of the political resurrection of Italy. The enthusiasm caused by the
Amnesty in Rome, in the provinces, in Italy generally, indeed in the world at
large, was indescribable. • It was a spark falling upon a mass of inflammable
stuff— a consideration which had not occurred to the Pope, when he yielded to
the spontaneous dictates of his kindly nature. Among the people a yearning for
change, for political and social reforms, had been growing since 1815, and had
become irresistible since 1830. In Italy, where the need was greatest, Austria
had been the mainstay of the reaction in its struggles with Liberal
aspirations; and it was against Austria that any innovation, however small and
insignificant, would naturally be held to be directed. But the Amnesty of Pius
IX. was neither small nor insignificant; in spite of the safeguards surrounding
it, it was in substance a rehabilitation of patriotism. It made a virtue of
what had before been a crime, at a moment when through all Europe Reaction and
Liberalism were in a state of opposition, and even of open conflict. A main
clue to subsequent Italian history is to be found in the feet that Pius IX,
unlike Mettemich, did not see that his Amnesty meant war with Austria, and the
independence of Italy. The act was equivocal, and admitted of two
constructions: and all that followed is, under ultimate analysis, only an
exposure of this ambiguity, and of its elimination by the logic of facts. In
this sense the Amnesty of Pius IX began the Italian Revolution.
The reforms
of Pius IX after the Amnesty were slow to come, few, inadequate, and often
inconsistent: the secularisation of the Government, the most urgent and the
most desired of them, never got beyond the stage of a pious wish. The
enthusiasm for the Pope however did not diminish; since a certain liberty
existed for all except Jews. It lay indeed de facto, if not de jure, at the
mercy of the rulers, but it was something which relieved the old wretched
conditions, without creating new difficulties. Rossi judged the reforms of Pius
IX very rightly, when he wrote to Guizot: “ This is not an ideal
administration, but one that is still only an idea.” The Pope never acted
except under the pressure of a popular demonstration; and so well did the
people, and their tribune, Angelo Brunetti (dubbed Ciceruacchio), know this,
that their demonstrations had become a permanent institution. Thus the
Government was on a dangerous incline, which might lead to disaster on the
first disagreement between people and sovereign. And yet, in the councils of
reaction, Pius IX was already denounced as a Freemason and a Carbonaro, and the
legitimacy of his election was denied—portents indicative of the
1846] The Scientific and Agricultural Congresses. 75
dislike and
alarm which his attitude inspired. Commenting on these events, Mettemich said
to the Marquis Sauli, Sardinian Minister in Vienna: “We were prepared for
everything except for a Liberal Pope; now we have got one, there is no
answering for anything.”
Towards the
close of 1846 the forecast of the great arbiter of European politics was
beginning to be justified, and the ambiguity as to the meaning and purport of
the Amnesty began to be apparent. Its effect was already assuming a more
pronounced shape beyond the boundaries of the Papal State. Genoa was
celebrating the centenary of the expulsion of the Austrians in 1746: in Milan
there was solemn mourning over the death of Federigo Confalonieri, one of the
martyrs of the Spielberg, who had expired in a village at the foot of St
Gothard, on his return to Italy, whither he too had been attracted by the
glimmer of the day-dawn on the dome of St Peter’s. The Scientific Congress in
1846 assumed so political an aspect that it was actually called a National
Convention. It was there that the proposal was made for the above-mentioned
centenary fete at Genoa, in which the whole of Italy was invited to take part;
beacon-fires were to illuminate the whole range of the Apennines. Emphasis was
thus laid on the point to which Home was still endeavouring to shut her eyes,
the direct relation between Liberal Reform and the yearning for national independence;
and della Margarita was not mistaken when, after a visit of enquiry to Rome, he
wrote to King Charles Albert: “ The Revolution wants no making; it is made
already! ”
In
other Italian States, such as Tuscany, Lucca, Modena, and Parma this attitude
had engendered an ever growing popular enthusiasm, which was rather of a
frankly national and anti-Austrian, than of a merely reforming, temper; it had
deeply stirred Naples and Sicily, while in Piedmont every opportunity was taken
for patriotic demonstrations, ODe of the most important of these being the
Agricultural Congress at Montara, which served the same purpose for Piedmont as
the Scientific Congresses had served for Italy. King Charles Albert, foreseeing
that Austria would put every obstacle in the way of a reforming Pope, looked
forward with pleasure to war on his behalf, as the prospect harmonised with his
own political and religious principles. Meanwhile he continued to cany out
reforms within his own kingdom ; he dismissed della Margarita; he showed less
severity towards the political exiles, who were now returning home, and towards
the Press; he gave the portfolio of Education to Marquis Cesare Alfieri di
Sostegno, a man of reputed progressive tendencies; whom some even declared to
be in secret communication with Liberals from Lombardy. _ _ For, even in
Lombardy and Venetia,the districts under direct Austrian rule, the period of
comparative contentment, or at least of resignation, was closing. The rural
population was perhaps indifferent, but the urban middle class was thoroughly
hostile to Austria, and the nobility and
76
[1846-7
clergy were
gradually following their lead. The Liberal party was divided into Mazzinians,
supporters of Charles Albert, and anti- Austrians pure and simple. The popular
feeling was significantly shown in Milan on the occasion of the funeral of
Federigo Confalonieri, and in Venetia by the protest against the official plans
for the Venice- Milan railway. Among the signatories of this vigorous protest
were Daniele Manin, Pietro Paleocapa, and Valentino Pasini, three of the
leaders in the coming revolution. Meanwhile, the large circulation of the works
of Gioberti and of other Reformers was giving the Government great uneasiness,
as the question in Lombardo-Venetia was one not merely of Reform, but of
Nationality. The popularity of these works could only mean the assertion of
Nationality, and the expulsion of Austria. Every demonstration in favour of
Pius IX, or of the system he was held to represent, meant further estrangement
from Austria. These movements continued without interruption down to the
meeting of the ninth and last Scientific Congress, held in Venice in 1847;
when, in consequence of the inflammatory addresses then made, the two most
prominent speakers, Daniele Manin and Nicolo Tommaseo, were arrested.
In Rome the
slowness and inadequacy of the reforms were attributed to the secret influence
of the Jesuits and the retrograde party, and prompted the cry first raised on
March 10, 1847: “ Long live Pius IX —alone!” On April 21, the Pope sanctioned
the formation of an Advisory Council (Consulta di Stato). The idea of an
autocracy, tempered by the advice of a Council, had been favoured by Gioberti
in his Primato, but only as a step towards Constitutional government;
unfortunately, to Pius IX it meant the furthest limit of his reform. But the
tide was rising from day to day; and it had now become difficult to stem it. In
spite of the opposition of the Secretary of State, Cardinal Gizzi, arms were
placed in the hands of the citizens by the formation of a Civic Guard,
whereupon he resigned. The first anniversary of the Amnesty was now at hand,
and the people were preparing to give it due honour. Suddenly, the word was
passed round that Austria was in secret accord with the Cardinals of the
Opposition, the Jesuits, and some of the worst cut-throats of Gregory XVI’s old
police (who had been seen skulking about Rome), to foment disorders in Central
Italy. Thus were to be created pretexts for intervention, and for giving a
final blow to the whole Reform agitation, which Austria regarded as pure
Revolution. On the rumour reaching Brunetti (Ciceruacchio), the popular tribune
promptly stopped all preparations for the festival, summoned his most faithful
adherents, arrested the best known of the Opposition, made shift in some way to
arm the Civic Guard, and insisted on the resignation and banishment of
Monsignor Grassellini, Governor of Rome, and the institution of a judicial
enquiry. In fact, as Gioberti said in his pamphlet on the subject, “if ancient
Rome could boast of its Cicero, modern Rome might be equally proud of its
Ciceruacchio!”
1847] Roman plot. Austrian occupation of Ferrara. 77
Had he then
really saved Rome from another Catilinarian conspiracy P Clerical historians
deny it absolutely, some asserting that the pretended plot was a popular
delusion and exaggeration; others that it was a mere excuse for attacking the
reactionaries. Two facts, however, support the allegation: the reactionary
movements that took place in no less than ten Italian towns at the same date,
and the sudden occupation of a part of Ferrara by Austrian troops on July 17,
1847. This had been preceded by an offer of armed intervention, first made by
Metternich to Monsignor Viale-Prela, papal Nuncio in Vienna, and later by the
Austrian Minister, Count Liitzow, to Cardinal Gizzi in Rome. Evidence of this
offer exists in the correspondence of the two British representatives in Vienna
and Florence with Lord Palmerston, and in that of Count Revel, Sardinian
ambassador in London, with his own Government. After this offer was declined,
Metternich tried to force intervention by provoking agitation in Central
Italy. If the Pope asked for intervention, an end could be probably made of the
whole movement on the pretext of restoring order; and, if the Pope could not be
induced to summon the Austrians, then the invasion of Ferrara would so provoke
the feelings of the nation as to make war inevitable. The “great” Roman plot
therefore probably had a genuine existence, though it never got beyond the
embryonic stage. At any rate, Metternich succeeded entirely in attaining his
second object; for the Austrian occupation of Ferrara (July 17, 1847) hurried
Italy prematurely into action. Together with the subsequent insurrection at
Palermo, on January 12, 1848, which closes the period in which Reforms, and
opens that in which Constitutions, were granted, the Ferrara occupation marks
the beginning of actual warfare—in fact the opening of the Italian Revolution
of 1848.
According to
Radical and Republican historians, Pius IX was at this time in covert accord
with Metternich; of this there is no proof, and the probabilities are against
it. Metternich was obliged to admit the Pope’s protests against the occupation
of Ferrara; and, if the Pope had been privy to the occupation, Metternich would
surely have blurted out the secret. Instead of doing so, he repeated his
arbitrary action; for a second armed demonstration of the Austrians against
Ferrara took place on August 17. Pius IX thereupon repeated his protests; and
Austria, while reserving all questions of law, was forced to give up the town
and confine herself to the occupation of the fortress of Ferrara, according to
the terms of the treaties of 1815. So far indeed was Metternich from being in secret
league with the Pope, that, in a private letter written at this time, he
charges Pius with being a Freemason and a Carbonaro, who had succeeded, Heaven
knew how, in becoming Pope.
Metternich’s
plans were thus ripening. Revolution and war were imminent; and he was ready to
face both, for he possessed the superiority in force, and knew that the
political situation in Europe would leave him a free hand. For France had
broken with Great
Britain, and
attached herself to Austria, through fear of isolation; she could not therefore
carry her counsels of Reform in Italy so far as to offend her new ally. Great
Britain, it is true, favoured Reform; for the rupture with France had in a
measure forced her to accept the office of Defender of the Liberal faith, which
France had inherited from the first Revolution. England had therefore
encouraged the Pope and the other Italian Princes on the path of Reform, and
had opened communications with the Papal Government, which were called semiofficial
to meet the religious scruples of Pius IX. Lord Minto had been sent on this
mission; but he had given the Pope clearly to understand that, should the
Reform movement degenerate into a provocation of Austria, England would not put
out a finger to help. Prussia and Russia were naturally on the side of Austria,
and delighted to see her preparing to put down the Revolution imminent in
Italy. Mettemich had a free hand, and every reason to act with all speed, and
hence the Roman plot, and the surprise of Ferrara.
- These two
events, while increasing the popularity of Pius IX, accentuated the hostility
felt towards Austria. On September 8,1847, Mazzini wrote a singular appeal to
the Pope recalling his letter to Charles Albert in 1831, in which he exhorted
him to bring about not only the unity of Italy, but also a reform in the
Church. In Florence a demand was made for the formation of a Civic Guard, which
the Grand Duke refused under orders from Vienna; later, a disturbance at
Leghorn, in which the tempestuous romance-writer Guerrazzi was involved, forced
him to grant it. At Leghorn a further demand had been made for a Constitution;
in fact, the first Liberal Ministry in Tuscany was then formed, under the
Marquis Ridolfi. In Piedmont the impulse to more resolute action was again
given in the Agricultural Congress. At the meeting at Casale in Montferrat
Count Castagnetto, the King’s private secretary, read a letter from his Majesty
on the subject of the occupation of Ferrara, which was in fact a call to arms,
and was welcomed as such with patriotic enthusiasm in Turin, Genoa, and
throughout Piedmont. King Charles Albert indeed again fell back into the usual
and characteristic state of indecision, which earned him at the time the name
of King Tentenna (hesitating). He had undoubtedly determined on war; but he
knew that the summoning of a Constitutional Assembly must be the prelude to it,
and he feared this step would produce weakness and disorder. Hence with every
disposition for war he still leaned for a moment towards peace. But henceforth
the die was cast. Nothing could have better contributed to exasperate the
popular feeling than the excesses recently committed by Austria in
Lombardo-Venetia. Senseless as they were, Austria seemed unable to avoid them,
any more than the Italian States could avoid being dragged, in spite of
themselves, into the vortex of Liberal Reform, with its certain result of
revolution and war.
1847-8] y The Two Sicilies.—Rome and Pius IX.
79
The movement
initiated by Pius IX had made itself felt throughout all Italy, and sometimes
with singular results; nowhere more so than in the Two Sicilies, where the
political disturbances of the past, notably those of 1820, had left their
record of continual plots and insurrections in the habits and history of the
people. In July, 1847, the miseries and corruptions of the Bourbon regime were
laid bare to the world in Settembrini’s terrible Protesta del popolo delle due
Sicilie, by which Naples and Sicily seemed to signify their common intention of
working in accord with the general movement of Italy. Indeed, in August, 1847,
Messina and Reggio di Calabria did actually choose the same moment for rising;
the combination promised well, but it was short-lived; and a repetition of the
experiment by the Revolutionary committee of Naples, after the rising had been
suppressed, was unsuccessful. A continuous series of popular demonstrations was
then organised, on the model of those in Rome under Pius IX and in Florence
under Leopold II, by which King Ferdinand II was to be frightened into Reform.
The King appeared to be shaken; he was particularly affected by the protests of
the Tuscan and Roman Press, and by an address from the Liberals of Rome and
Piedmont, signed by Camillo di Cavour, Silvio Pellico, Carlo Alfieri di
Sostegno and Michelangelo Caetani di Sermoneta, which called upon him to follow
the example of the other Italian rulers by granting Reform. All that came of
it, however, was the dismissal of the worst of his Ministers in favour of some
of rather better repute. The Sicilians at this time broke off entirely from the
Revolutionists of Naples, and determined to act on their own account; oddly
enough, they began by giving public notice that an insurrection would take
place on January 12, 1848. “ It would fall due,” they said, “ with the certainty
of a promissory note.”-
Pius IX in
the meantime protested vehemently, that he desired no war with Austria, and
that the formation of an Advisory Council marked the limit of his internal
reforms. It was in vain, for everyone believed that he would yield to
persuasion, or to the compulsion of facts. Before the close of the year the
Council was inaugurated with extravagant ceremony, in order to mark that, in
the opinion of the public, it, and it only, was the Government; and publicity
was demanded for its proceedings as if it had been a real Parliament. The new
municipality of Rome, constituted on a wide electoral basis, was already
demanding a Constitution; a great popular demonstration was held; and a new
administrative programme was put forth, which included the expulsion of the
Jesuits, against whom the feeling of execration was strong. The Pope was torn
this way and that between the demands of the people, and the warnings of the
retrograde party as to the possible danger to religion. On January 2 and 3,
1848, the Austrians crushed the disturbances in Milan and other Lombard towns
by the slaughter of defenceless citizens. The indignation excited
throughout
Italy was eloquently expressed by d’Azeglio’s well-known pamphlet, Lutti di
Lombardia; in Rome the obsequies of the victims were celebrated amid intense
and universal emotion.
The rising in
Palermo on January 12,1848, closed the era of Reform, and ushered in that of
Revolution. Beginning in Palermo on the 12th, it was completely successful by
the 27th, after a desperate and singularly ferocious struggle; a practically
unarmed populace not only routed the garrison, but drove a relieving force from
Naples into ignominious flight. In twenty-four days the whole island was free,
except the fortress of Messina, which the Sicilians, with strange weakness,
never succeeded in mastering during the Revolution. The King then consented to
treat, and offered some concessions through the mediation of the English and
French Ministers. The Sicilians haughtily declined every concession; they
proclaimed without further ado the Constituzione del 1812 (Constitution of
1812), and appointed a provisional Government under Ruggero Settimo. On April
18 their two Houses of Parliament considered a resolution for the deposition of
the Bourbon dynasty in Sicily.
The
concessions, which the King of Naples was now offering to Sicily, he had
already granted with a liberal hand to his mainland kingdom, under the stress
of his disasters in Sicily and of the continuous demonstrations in Naples. On
January 29 he issued an edict formulating the basis of a Constitution. He was
the first of Italian rulers to make this concession, and appears to have
intended to precipitate by this means the purely Reform movement, and above all
to punish Pius IX for causing confusion by his schemes of Reform. The Pope
would now be forced to follow suit, together with the other Italian Princes,
even those most dependent on Austria. The result was curious. The concessions
granted in Naples were so extravagantly large, that the country, passing
suddenly from the most rigid restriction to the wildest licence, fell headlong
into a state of continuous anarchy, with which the three Liberal ministries,
which succeeded one another in the hundred days or so of the new Constitution,
were never able to cope.
The King of
Naples was right in supposing that his action would force the hands of Leopold
of Tuscany and the Pope. But Charles Albert, after long hesitation, came to an
independent decision. Feeling certain that the Austrian war now imminent could
not be safely undertaken unless he could gain over the Liberal opinion so
powerful in Piedmont, he published a manifesto announcing the bases of the Constitution
(Statuto), and formed a new Ministry under Cesare Balbo. The Manifesto was
dated February 8, but was not formally promulgated till March 5. On February
17, a Statuto was also published in Tuscany.
Pius IX, on
the other hand, tried to resist the torrent, but in vain. He had on February 10
published the allocution, containing the celebrated words, “God bless Italy”;
which he repeated next
day, in
addressing the people from the balcony of the Quirinal, amid the wildest
enthusiasm. On both occasions he also made it perfectly clear that he would
have nothing to do with a Constitution, with the expulsion of the Jesuits, or
with war against Austria. Unfortunately, nobody listened to anything but his “
God bless Italy.” The Pope was tom different ways* now carried away by the
tempest of events, now again intoxicated by the popular enthusiasm. At last, on
March 10, he sanctioned the formation of a Ministry composed almost entirely of
laymen, among whom were Marco Minghetti, Count Giuseppe Pasolini, and Giuseppe
Galletti; on March 14,1848, he published a Constitution. The scheme had been
concocted in great secrecy by a committee of clerics; and the Ministry, whose
duty it would be to put it into force, knew nothing about it. The moment
Pellegrino Rossi set eyes on this formless abortion, this confused network of
powers and jurisdictions, all neutralising one another, he told the Pope,
rather brutally, that it was simply “war between sovereign and people under
legal forms.” The criticism was profound and worthy of its author, but it
passed unnoticed amid the torrent of applause which greeted the Constitution.
The
Revolution which hurled Louis-Philippe from his throne in France (February
24,1848) was received with no little exultation in Italy. Nobody drew an
ominous lesson, for no one had observed that all four Italian Constitutions,
including that granted by the Pope, were, after all, only more or less accurate
copies of the French Constitution of 1830, which had just broken down under the
shock of Revolution. The socialistic side of the French Revolution of 1848 had
little or no counterpart in Italy; but its political influence powerfully
encouraged the hopes and increased the audacity of the ultra-Radicals. Its
effects were more immediately felt in Germany and in Austria; and,' on March
13, 1848, Vienna itself, the “faithful city,” rose. To Milan and Venice came
one upon another, in quick succession, the announcements of the Revolution in
Sicily, of the grant of a Constitution to four Italian States, of a Revolution
and Republic in Paris, and finally, on March 17, 1848, of the Revolution in
Vienna and the fall and flight of Metternich.
Upon this
news the tempest burst; the people, who had been so long preparing for it, rose
with a unanimity of patriotic feeling which surprised, not only Austria, but
even the most sanguine of the revolutionists. In the face of imminent ruin, the
Government of Lombardo-Venetia practically went to pieces. The Revolution of
Milan began on the morning of March 18; and on the night of the 22nd Radetzky
abandoned the city; There were five days of furious battle in the streets, in
which numberless barricades were erected; against these were pitted from 18,000
to 20,000 troops, who, deafened by the constant clang of the bells, and
prostrated by fatigue and hunger, finally lost all heart against the indomitable
tenacity of their opponents. During the five glorious days (the Cinque
Giornate) of conflict in Milan the Austrian army was faced, not merely
by the
people, but by an entire nation. All classes were there, united in one single
desire to free their country or die ; and this resolve carried them to victory.
Fearing an extension of the movement into the rural districts, uncertain as to
what was happening in Vienna, and dreading that the Piedmontese might hasten to
the assistance of Milan, Radetzky retreated to his strategic base, the
Quadrilateral, a district between the mountains and the sea, bounded by the
Adige with its fortresses of Verona and Legnago on one side, and by the Mincio
with those of Mantua and Peschiera on the other.
On March 22
Venice rose. The news of the Revolution in Vienna, which had reached the city
on the evening of the 17th, had produced no immediate explosion. The first use
that the Venetians made of the excitement produced by the news from Vienna and
the consequent panic-stricken paralysis of the civil and military authorities,
was to rush to the prisons and set free Manin and Tommaseo, who dissuaded them
from extreme measures. But, on March 18, public feeling had reached such a
pitch that the Governor, intending merely to trim his sails to the new breeze
of Liberalism and Revolution that was blowing from Vienna, allowed the
enrolment of a body of citizens not exceeding 200 or so, as a sort of Civic
Guard for the protection of order. On the 20th and 21st the numbers enlisted
were far beyond this limit; and the more cautious sought to profit by the
opportunity to put the country in some sort of order, on the lines of the
concessions made at Vienna, the corrected report of which had been welcomed, on
the evening of the 19th, with satisfaction and even by some demonstrations.
This was enough to confirm the civil and military authorities in their mistaken
idea that conciliation was still possible. Conciliation was exactly what Manin
and others would not hear of. Their plan was simply to get possession of the
Arsenal, and proclaim the Republic of Saint Mark. On the 22nd Manin, at the
head of the populace and the Civic Guard, captured the Arsenal, the Commandant
of which had been killed in a mutiny. Having but few troops that they could
trust, Palffy, Hie Governor, and Zichy, the Military Commandant, were forced to
treat with Manin, the real leader of the Revolution, who persuaded them to
capitulate, and to evacuate the town and the surrounding forts. Once more was
heard—and this time without a dissentient voice—the old historic shout, “ Viva
San Marco! ” and the Republic was proclaimed!
Although the
envoys of the Provisional Government of Milan, which had been formed during the
Cmque Giornate, insistently urged on Charles Albert the need for his prompt
intervention in Lombardy, it was not till March 22 that, on the advice of his
Ministers, he finally decided on war. On the 25th 5000 men crossed the Ticino
in the direction of Milan; but the King did not reach Pavia before the 29th,
six days after Radetzky’s retreat from Milan. The Marshal had thus time and
leisure to reorganise his forces. The King had only 23,000 men under
his command;
so that his inaction may be attributed, in some measure, to lack of preparation
as well as to delay. But the main factors were his own temperament,
self-sacrificing to the utmost, but incapable of taking swift decisions; the
unforeseen suddenness of events; and, lastly, the fact that he was facing
Austria alone, while she, though crippled by her internal conditions, was
anything but isolated in Europe.
For Charles
Albert the abstention or neutrality, counselled by England and France, was now
impossible. All Piedmont was stirring. Volunteers were starting everywhere in
small parties for the front. Camillo di Cavour, who was one day to be the
statesman of the union of Italy, published in the Risorgimento his well-known
article beginning “The hour of fate has struck for the Sardinian monarchy. One
road only is open, that of immediate war.” If Charles Albert had but so resolved!
Even the few days’ delay was both a military, and a political, blunder. The
King’s failure to intervene, until the triumph of the Milanese in the Cinque
Giornate was complete, cast an uncertainty upon his and their respective rights
and obligations, which was increased by the general but very erroneous
impression among the insurgents that, henceforth, they no longer stood in need
of armed help. The existing divisions between parties in Milan, from the
Moderate to the ultra-Radical, grew wider; the higher and wealthier classes
still clung to the idea of union with Piedmont, while many others, and these
the noisiest, inclined to a Republic. The two parties were about equal in
strength ; and both were represented in the Provisional Government. It was determined,
as a compromise, to leave the question of the new form of government to be
decided at the close of the struggle. This was the worst possible solution, as
it created a weak and confused condition at a very critical moment; and withal
it was of absolutely no practical use, inasmuch as defeat would involve the
return of Lombardy into the Austrian Empire, while success would mean the
victory of monarchy under Charles Albert, who was after all the chief Power in
Upper Italy. But the question was further complicated through the proclamation
of the Republic of Saint Mark in Venice, which added one more to the existing
subdivisions. There were Mazzinian Republicans in Milan ; Manin and Tommaseo
were pure Republicans of the federalist type in Venice; and both struggled to
realise their own special programmes ; while the King, who was risking his all
for Italy, alone had a force competent to fight against Austria. However much
he might favour a war for national independence, it would be too much to expect
of him that he should fight, without any regard for the interests of his own
dynasty, simply to create one Republic in Milan and another in Venice.
All this made
but a gloomy prelude to the war; and the union of Parma and Modena with
Piedmont, which took place at once and almost without opposition, was not an
equivalent compensation. The war thus begun put the Grand Duke Leopold II in a
grave difficulty. Tuscany
was burning
to take part in it; and the Grand Duke found it impossible either to resist or
to divert the popular enthusiasm. On April 5, 1848, he accordingly declared
war, alid despatched into Lombardy 3000 regulars and the same number of
volunteers. On April 17 they crossed the Po under the command of General Cesare
de Laugier.
'\The
political situation in Rome at this time was most singular. The people and the
Administration breathed war, and war only; the Sovereign opposed it. In
defiance of him, however, troops and volunteers'left Rome in large numbers
between March 23 and 30, and traversed the whole length of the Papal States on
their way to the Po, being as they passed joined by others amid general
enthusiasm. War was not indeed yet formally declared, though operations had
commenced; the Austrian ambassador was still at his post in Rome; and the Pope
had forbidden the troops to cross the frontier. In his allocution of March 30,
1848, the Pope appeared still to look forward to some pacific solution,
trusting to his favourite scheme of a Lega degli Stati Italiani (League of
Italian States). His main dread was that of a schism in Germany, a spectre with
which diplomatists, Cardinals, and Jesuits were always trying to terrify him;
and he wished therefore to throw off all responsibility for the war. But
General Giovanni Durando, who commanded the Papal troops, forced his hand by a
proclamation of April 5, 1848, written by d’Azeglio, which solemnly declared a
crusade against the foreigner. The Pope was furious, and his Ministers would
gladly have disowned Durando; but they were reluctantly obliged to direct him
to put himself at the disposal of Charles Albert. Volunteers were already
crossing the frontier on their own account. Finally, on April 25, Durando
crossed the Po, and took up a position between Ostiglia and Govemolo, thus
forming, with the Tuscan forces, the right wing of the army investing Mantua.
Durando did
not stay there long; Austria, with her usual tenacity^ though torn by intestine
revolution, had sent a new army under Nugent, by way of the Camic Alps, to the
aid of Radetzky, who was shut up in the Quadrilateral. This move obliged Manin
to call for the help of Charles Albert, who thereupon, on April 30, 1848,
ordered the Papal forces to prevent Nugent’s junction with Radetzky.
Unfortunately Nugent had already reached Udine on the 22nd. The provinces of
Venetia, threatened by this move, all favoured union with Piedmont; but Manin,
when calling upon Charles Albert for assistance, had, like M ilan, proposed to
reserve the question of the form of government till the close of the war. This
proposal simply created a new cause of disagreement in Venetia; as a compromise
it had been abandoned even in Lombardy; it ran counter to the general opinion
in the duchies of Parma, Lucca, and Modena, where the popular vote had been for
union with Piedmont, and in Tuscany and the Papal State; counter, lastly, to
the essentially monarchical instincts of the Neapolitans, who were now
quarrelling
with the Sicilians on this very question of separation. The net result of this
dispute in any event was only so much loss of strength to the party of national
independence in this hour of supreme need.
In the ever
increasing anarchy of Naples, three Liberal ministries had followed one
another: the third, presided over by Carlo Troia, favoured cooperation in the
War of Independence. On March 29 200 volunteers had already been sent to the
front, raised and commanded by the Princess Christina Belgioioso, a Milanese
lady and a characteristic specimen of the age both in her faults and in her
virtues. In April a fleet was despatched to the Adriatic, and was fired on by
the Sicilians as it passed Messina—a shameful deed, but in connexion with which
may perhaps be noted the fact that barely one hundred of the Italian
volunteers, who fought in the War of Independence, came from Sicily. The 40,000
Neapolitan troops told off for service in Upper Italy dwindled down to barely
14,000, commanded by the old insurgent, General Guglielmo Pepe; and so slow
were their movements (designedly, no doubt) that the heads of their columns did
not reach Bologna before May 14.
Charles
Albert now moved on the Quadrilateral, where Radetzky had taken refuge, passed
through Pavia and Cremona, but avoided Milan, which he did not propose to enter
unless victorious. Overcoming the feeble Austrian resistance offered on the
Mincio, he took post on its left bank, so as to cover Lombardy in case of
defeat, and to keep in touch with the Papal and Neapolitan forces, which were
to march on the Lower Po. He thus stood between the fortresses of Mantua and •
Peschiera; and the subsequent affairs were little more than reconnaissances
against one or other of these fortresses. At last Radetzky, with a view to the
reestablishment of his communications with Peschiera, attacked the heights of
Pastrengo on April 20; he was beaten, but retired without molestation. On his
side, Charles Albert, deceived by a false assurance that Verona would
immediately rise on the advance of the Piedmontese troops, moved on May 6 to
Santa Lucia, within sight of Verona. Being repulsed with serious loss, he was
obliged to concentrate his attention on the siege of Peschiera.
No better
fortune attended the volunteers of Lombardy. Few in number, without discipline,
and badly led, they had first been directed to act on the Mincio on the left of
the Piedmontese; they were then sent into Tyrol, to hinder the advance of
reinforcements for Radetzky in Verona; thence they were recalled to Brescia
partly for reorganisation, and partly from a fear that their presence in Tyrol
might provoke the intervention of the Germanic Confederation. That the aid
given by Lombardy was lacking both in quantity and quality was mainly owing to
the unfortunate view held in Milan that the war had closed with the Cinque
Giomate, and also by the paralysing uncertainty as to the eventual form of
government, the decision on which had been suspended
chiefly by
Mazzinian and Republican influence. The Provisional Government decided to
remove this last obstacle at any cost, and at an Assembly of the People held on
May 12 brought forward a resolution for union with Piedmont, which was
ultimately carried in June. Venice subsequently followed this example, although
the effect of Manin’s greatest blunder produced more delay and greater
difficulty. She had given little material aid to the war, believing that
Durando’s Papal troops, with the Neapolitan forces, were sufficient for their
task; unfortunately, the latter had not yet crossed the Po. Meanwhile Nugent
advanced towards the Tagliamento, annoyed but not seriously hindered by the
attacks of the inhabitants and of the Venetian volunteers; on May 3 he reached
Conegliano, on May 5 he occupied Belluno.
At this
juncture Durando was at Treviso, having been ordered thither by Charles Albert
on April 29; where he was joined on May 6 by General Ferrari, with the Papal
volunteers. In the uncertainty as to Nugent’s movements, the two generals
should have remained in dose touch; but they scattered their forces on useless
lines of defence. Ferrari found Nugent on May 9 at Comuda, and was driven back
in complete disorder, thus leaving open the line of the Lower Piave. While
Durando was hesitating whether to cover Treviso, or to defend the fords of the
Brenta against the enemy, General Thum, who had succeeded Nugent, advanced with
all speed and attacked Vicenza; though repulsed by the inhabitants with the aid
of Durando, who had now come up, he was able to make good his junction with
Radetzky at San Bonifazio, near Verona, on May 22.
Notwithstanding
the success of the Austrians in thus effecting their main purpose, the
continued resistance of Vicenza had restored heart to Durando’s mixed force of
regulars and volunteers; and, if the Neapolitans, who had now reached a point
between Bologna and Ferrara, had crossed the Po, joined Durando, and come into
touch with the Piedmontese army, the result of the war might have been
different. Radetzky would have thus been shut in between Mantua and Verona,
with Peschiera on the verge of surrender, and his communications would have
been threatened on the lines of Tyrol and of the Piave, where the revolt
appeared to be extending. But Radetzky knew that the Neapolitans were not
moving, and that he was faced by an army extended over more than thirty miles.
He therefore decided to force the Piedmontese right, composed of the Tuscans,
cross the Mincio, and take the Piedmontese in the rear. Accordingly, on May 29,
he drove in the Tuscans as far as Curtatone and Montanara. But their fierce
resistance delayed him long enough to enable the Piedmontese to cross to the
right bank of the Mincio, and win the battle of Goito on May 30. On the same
day came the news that Peschiera had fallen. This was the most glorious day of
the war. But Radetzky made better use of his defeat than Charles Albert of his
victory. The King halted, while Radetzky hurried on and captured Vicenza, in
spite of a vigorous defence, on June 10.
1848]
Radetzky overruns
Venetia.—Naples. 87
On the 14th
Treviso fell; on the 15th Padua, Rovigo a little later. Of all Venetia, Venice
amid her lagoons alone remained free.
The want of
discipline among the Papal volunteers and their dispersal after Comuda were not
due only to bad organisation, want of military spirit, and discord among their
chiefs. A more powerful solvent existed in the Encyclical of April 29,1848, in
which Pius IX, in answer to a specific request for his views from his lay
ministry, solemnly denounced the war, and alike, as man and as Pope, disclaimed
from thenceforth all part in the cause of Italy. Its effect in Rome, in Italy
and in Europe generally, was calamitous, and certainly went beyond the
intentions of its author. A report immediately spread among the Papal regulars
and volunteers who had fought at Cornuda, that the Pope’s public repudiation of
the war had deprived them of the benefit of the ordinary laws of warfare, and
justified Austria in treating them as mere brigands, to whom no quarter was
due; hence a general discouragement and disorganisation. The temporary success
at Vicenza and the incorporation of what had been the Papal forces into the
army of Charles Albert, at the instance of the Roman Ministry, somewhat revived
their spirits; but the final capitulation of Vicenza in June precluded the
majority of them from taking further part in the war, and the remainder took
refuge in Venice, now the only place in Venetia where Austrian authority had
not been restored.
The fifteenth
of May—the day of the meeting of the Chambers in Naples—saw the beginning and
the close of her Constitutional regime, and the end of her . share in the War
of Independence. On this fatal day folly spread from the Council Chamber to the
street; and barricades were everywhere erected, because the King had vetoed a
proposal which Settembrini himself described as worthy of a tap-room, viz. that
Parliament should be opened without the tender of any oath of allegiance, and
that the National Guard should garrison the forts of Naples. The Swiss
regiments, ordered to patrol the streets in case of disorder, collided with the
insurgents, and a conflict, beginning no one knew exactly how, resulted in a
massacre. The populace then gave themselves up to the wildest excesses; the
Chambers were prorogued, and then dissolved; on May 22 General Pepe, then at
Bologna, was ordered to return to Naples with his troops; and Admiral de Cosa,
who had already joined the Sardinian squadron before Trieste, was ordered to
leave the Adriatic. Pepe and a few others declined to obey orders, crossed the
Po, and entered Venice on June 13. The King did not immediately revoke the
Constitution; but he made no further attempt to put it in force—which came to
much the same thing. A curious legend treats this affair of May 15 as a mere
act of provocation, concocted by the King and the Court camarilla in order to
drown the new-born Constitution in blood, and to provide a pretext for the
recall of the military forces ordered to the front against their own wishes.
But in truth,
May 15 was only the outcome of the faults of all concerned; King, people,
Liberals, Absolutists, secret societies, regular ■;roops, National Guard,
Court, and Deputies were all to blame, especially the last-named, whose
reckless chatter, unreasonable suspicions, and pedantic disputes, together with
their general violence, gave the King all the pretext he wanted; if, indeed,
the inability to put down the rebellion in Sicily were not sufficient pretext
in itself.
After the
defection of Pius IX, the loss of Vicenza, the retreat: of the Neapolitans, and
the defeat of the Tuscans, Charles Albert found himself once more alone against
Austria. Thus the idea of Federation, which had never taken any formal shape,
became impossible. The revolution in Vienua, which had stimulated those of
Milan and Venice, had no practical effect upon the issue., The negotiations,
that took place in the course of the war, never so much as promised a hope of a
favourable result. On June IS Wessenberg, the Foreign Minister in Vienna, made
a proposal to the Provisional Government in Milan which practically amounted to
an offer to repurchase Lombardy, apart from Venetia, at a price; but, as the
Union with Piedmont had then been formally declared, this proposal came to
nothing. Later Baron Hum- melauer went to London to obtain the mediation of
England in a project for the creation of a large kingdom comprising
Lombardo-Venetia, and the duchies of Parma, Lucca, and Modena, and united to
Austria solely by the personal link of the Crown. England did not refuse her
good offices, and indeed put forward a still larger proposal, which was
provisionally accepted by Hummelauer; but, as it was not discussed at Vienna
till the moment when Radetzky was preparing his second attack on Charles
Albert, it had no result. The military party had, as usual, the last word in
Vienna; and the kindly Emperor Ferdinand, who appeared to be in the way, was
forced to abdicate (December 2, 1848) in favour of the present Emperor, Francis
Joseph, who had gained his first military and political experience in the
Italian campaign.
It is
possible, indeed, that all these attempts at negotiation had no purpose but
that of gaining time for the reinforcement of Radetzky. France took a languid
part in the discussion; her object was to prevent the formation of a strong
monarchy in Upper Italy, or in that event to obtain compensation by the cession
of Nice and Savoy. Charles Albert at last determined to attack Mantua, with the
view of forcing Radetzky out of Verona, whither he had returned with all speed
immediately upon the capture of Vicenza. He marched on July IS; on the 18th, he
occupied Govemolo after a successful action; but his line, stretching from
Govemolo to Rivoli, now became too much extended, and was consequently weak at
many points. Radetzky, who could now (July 22) dispose of 80,000 men, repeated
the manoeuvre of Goito; he thrust back the Piedmontese left towards Peschiera,
and then turned upon their centre. On July 24 the Piedmontese troops, brought
up from the trenches before Mantua, marlt.
a flank
attack ; but they were completely defeated at Custozza on the 25th, and driven
across the Mincio. Charles Albert, instead of retreating by the line of the
Po, tried to cover Milan, before which he was again defeated (August 4). On his
entrance into the city the populace rose, incited by noisy demagogues, and
besieged him in the Greppi Palace (August 5), whence he was rescued with some
difficulty. On August 6 the remnant of the Piedmontese army repassed the
Ticino, and Radetzky reentered Milan. On August 9, at Vigevano, an armistice
was concluded, generally known as the Salasco armistice, from the name of the
gallant soldier who had the ill-luck to sign it. Its conditions were most
rigorous, restoring everything to the status quo ante bellurn, with the
exception of the city of Venice, which still maintained its resistance. After
this disaster Charles Albert withdrew to Piedmont, and the whole situation
throughout Italy was evidently changed.
The Austrians
immediately marched on the Duchies; part of their forces, under Welden, entered
the Papal States, advancing on Bologna. On May 4 the lay or Minghetti Ministry
had resigned, in consequence of the Encyclical of April 29. The weak and
ephemeral Ministry of Mamiani (May 4—Aug. 6) was succeeded by one under Count
Edoardo Fabbri, under whom the disintegration of the State proceeded yet
faster. On September 16,1848, Fabbri was succeeded by Count Pellegrino Rossi,
the man whose illustrious life was to be the price of the last desperate effort
to maintain the union between Pius IX and his people, between a Catholic Papacy
and the cause of a free and independent Italy. With marvellous judgment and
knowledge Rossi flung himself into the task of curbing the all-pervading
anarchy, and of infusing fresh life into an administration which was already in
dissolution. He met the hatred both of Clericals and demagogues in the open,
concealed none of his proposals, never retreated, put his hand to everything,
and promised reform everywhere; and all this without in any way threatening
liberty, while allowing a scurrilous Press to go unmuzzled, and even taking
part publicly in their controversies. His appointment took place on September
16; and he at once summoned the Chambers for November 15.
The foreign
policy of Rossi is summed up in his attitude towards the eternal question of
Italian Federation. Of this Pius IX was the most consistent supporter; next to
him was the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who saw therein a means of reconciling his
duties as an Austrian prince and as an Italian ruler; then came Naples, to whom
it meant the possible submission of Sicily and a counterpoise to the dreaded
ambition of Piedmont. Piedmont, on the other hand, had opposed Federation.
Where views were so diverse, the idea of Federation was not practicable; that
of union, which was then the monopoly of the Republicans, was not yet ripe.
When Rossi took the question up, the war seemed almost decided. The great
philosopher Antonio Rosmini had been sent to Rome on August 15, 1848, by the
Piedmontese Ministry to discuss
Federazione
(Federation). But the Ministry of Casati and Gioberti had given way, after the
Salasco armistice, to that of Alfieri di Sostegno. Sostegno was unfavourable to
Bosmini’s project, which involved a complete federative organisation of Italy;
and all that he asked was assistance in the war, which, it was supposed, might
soon be resumed. To this resumption of war Rossi was hostile, as involving a
Federation without Naples, which, from a military point of view, was the
strongest of the States; especially as any assistance from the Papal State was,
at the moment, impossible. Rossi now put forward a vague counter-proposal for a
“ League of Princes,” with which Rosmini’s scheme would not have been
necessarily incompatible. But Rossi was too late; if the projected kingdom of
Upper Italy, the dream of Charles Albert, was dead, any federal organisation
was equally out of the question. Considering the events in Venice on August 11,
1848, and remembering that the union of Piedmont with the Duchies, Lombardy,
and Venice was only legally completed on July 27,1848, we may reckon that the
life of the Kingdom of Upper Italy lasted only a fortnight. With its
disappearance, the idea of Federation under any form vanished beyond hope of
realisation.
On July 27
the Statutory Union of Venetia and Piedmont was declared, Venice at last
consenting: on August 6 the Commissioners of Charles Albert formally took over
Venice. But on the 11th, when the news of the Salasco armistice arrived, they
were expelled from the city, and Manin, who had retired into private life after
the vote in favour of the Union, was restored to the dictatorship by acclamation.
The defeat of King Charles Albert and the Salasco armistice closed the career
of the Moderate Monarchist party. Henceforward the idea of a United Democratic
Italy everywhere held the field. In Tuscany the Ridolfi Ministry was forced on
August 18 to retire in favour of one headed by Gino Capponi, which appears to
have resembled the Carlo Troia Ministry in Naples in many points; especially as
both Ministers were e: .posed on one side to sovereigns of doubtful faith, and
to the street-demagogues on the other. Leghorn now rose in insurrection.
Montanelli was sent thither to exercise his influence, which was great on
account of his service in the war, and his imprisonment; he there proclaimed an
Assembled Costituente (Constituent Assembly) for Italy, a name which thence-
forwards was the badge and rallying cry of the Revolution, signifying an
Assembly with absolute power, much on the lines of the French Convention. On
October 27 the Capponi Ministry was succeeded by the so-called Democratic
Ministry under Montanelli and Guerrazzi.
To the
torrent of demagogy, which had triumphed so easily in Tuscany, Rossi offered a
firm resistance in Rome. The day of the opening of the Chambers was drawing
near, and there were signs that the Democratic party were preparing on that day
to strike a great blow. On what did Rossi rely for victory? The answer must be
that he relied solely on himself. We may admire his courage; but it is clear
that he
had
misconceived the situation, and was suffering under an illusion, which, grand
and even heroic as it was, could not but be fatal alike to him and to his
cause. On the morning of November 15, 1848, he drove to the Palace of the
Cancelleria for the purpose of opening Parliament; after leaving his carriage
and ascending the first few steps of the staircase, he met his death at the
hand of an assassin. On the day after the death of Rossi, a popular
insurrection forced the Pope to call a Democratic Ministry under Monsignor
Carlo Muzzarelli, of which Pietro Sterbini, one of the instigators of the
murder, was a member. On November 25 the Pope fled from Rome and took refuge at
Gaeta, whence he issued a Commission of Regency; but his Commissioners were
unable to act, or even to meet. The Chambers replied by the appointment of a
“Supreme Committee of State,” which decided to proceed to the election of a
Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage. This Assembly met on February 5,
1849, and on the 9th proclaimed a Republic.
That matters
did not proceed to so great a length in Tuscany was due to the resistance of
Guerrazzi, a man who belonged to a class of his own, both in politics and
literature. Montanelli and he were at first to all appearance in favour with
the Grand Duke, who had not expressed any objection even to a Constituent
Assembly. But on January 30 the Grand Duke withdrew to Siena; and retired on
February 7 to Porto San Stefano. On the following day Mazzini appeared in
Florence, but did not find the conditions propitious. A Triumvirate, consisting
of Guerrazzi, Montanelli, and Mazzoni, had proclaimed a Constituent Assembly
for Tuscany, and the Grand Duke on February 21 followed the example of the Pope
by taking refuge at Gaeta. A Republic was not actually proclaimed in Florence;
but Guerrazzi had all the power in his hands, and was ultimately, on March 28,
1849, appointed Dictator.
The
Neapolitan King required no urging towards reaction; at any rate he had ample
excuse for it in the disorders of his capital, in the refusal of the Sicilians
to negotiate, and in the insurrections on the mainland after May 15, 1848. Had
the Sicilians given any material aid to these insurrections, the face of things
might have been changed; but they failed to do so. The Neapolitan Parliament,
after a precarious existence, was finally dissolved on March 13,1849. The hour
was now at hand for the Sicilians in their turn to pay the penalty of their
many mistakes and of the insular selfishness which had led them to trust
entirely to the protection of the English fleet in their waters, instead of
arming in their own defence. On July 10, 1849, after reforming the Constitution
of 1812 to such an extent that the monarchical power was well-nigh extinguished
under safeguards and provisos, they offered the Crown to the Duke of Genoa,
second son of Charles Albert; he, however, declined it.
After the
Piedmontese defeats and the Salasco armistice, the Bourbon King deemed the
moment ripe for resolute action in Sicily; and, late in August, he launched an
army under General Carlo Filangieri against
the
rebellious island. Messina was captured amid horrors sufficient to awaken the
conscience of Europe; from pure humanity, the French and British admirals in
Sicilian waters intervened with proposals for a pacific solution. On September
11 the Bourbon, alarmed by this action, accepted the armistice; but the only
result was to encourage the Sicilians to further resistance and defiance. The
last scheme of settlement, known as the Ultimatum of Gaeta, dated February
26,1849, was rejected like the rest by the Sicilian Parliament on March 24. For
all their brave words, the Sicilians made no serious provision for the war;
their troops were few, badly armed, and ill-disciplined, and commanded by adventurers,
such as the Pole Mieroslawski. Having declared the armistice at an end,
Filangieri captured Taormina on April 2 and Catania on the 7th ; other towns
surrendered without fighting, and he entered Palermo on May 15. Such was the
evil end of the Sicilian Revolution, which had hampered instead of aiding the
war of national independence, and had had no small share in bringing about the
final disasters.
From these
disasters Piedmont was labouring hard to recover; the Ministry of Marquis
Cesare Alfieri di Sostegno, who had unselfishly taken office on August 19,
1848, tried to stay the torrent of catastrophe by accepting the mediation of
France and England. The two Powers suggested the renewal of negotiations on the
basis of the old Hartig and Hummelauer proposals; but these had never been put
forward quite seriously by Austria, and it was not likely that she would now
accept them, when her arms were completely victorious, when Lombardy had been
reoccupied, and when the only remaining resistance Was that of Venice. Austria
fenced over the point at first, and tried to make mischief between the mediating
Powers and Piedmont; but at last she refused to consider the old bases of
negotiation, suggesting for a new basis the grant of Liberal institutions in
Lombardo-Venetia, similar to those already granted in the rest of the Austrian
empire. A Congress at Brussels was proposed, but Austria found plenty of
excuses for not taking part in it: and finally, after Wessenberg had been
succeeded at the Foreign Office in Vienna by the more unyielding Prince
Schwarzenberg, she declared her intention of taking her stand purely and simply
on the treaties of 1815. The part taken by France in all these negotiations had
been neither frank nor creditable; that of Great Britain, though fruitless, was
at any rate more honourable. Palmerston in particular, in his despatch of November
11, 1848, to Vienna, went fully into the errors and iniquities of Austria in
her Italian policy; he looked into the future with sureness of vision, even
prophesying that the return of a Bonaparte to power in France might result in
the enfranchisement of Italy from the Austrian yoke by French assistance.
'Hie
ill-success of the Anglo-French mediation increased the enmity and opposition
to the Piedmontese Ministry, in spite of their efforts to reorganise and
reinforce the army. Vienna had again risen in insur
rection on
October 6,1848, thus giving renewed vigour to the Hevolution in Hungary, which
had now been in progress for some months. The Opposition in Piedmont naturally
thought this an excellent opportunity for repudiating the Salasco armistice and
renewing the war. Vincenzo Gioberti, whose support they had obtained, and who
believed himself to be leading the Democratic party, though he was in fact only
following their lead, publicly charged the Sostegno Ministry with having a
concealed programme of peace at any price. AJfieri had now retired through
ill-health, and had been succeeded by General Ettore Peirone, a man of the
highest character, who afterwards died fighting heroically at Novara; that
Ministry also resigned, on December 3, 1848. It was followed by Gioberti’s
Democratic Ministry (to give it the title then in fashion), which soon
discovered that to make war at that moment would be equally difficult and
absurd; it therefore tried to revive the idea of a Federal Union of States, and
to that end proposed that Piedmont should intervene for the restoration of the
Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. It was late in the day for such a policy;
the reaction had already begun, and there was every risk that Piedmont also
would be involved. Gioberti was repudiated by his own colleagues, and resigned.
The Anglo-French mediation having likewise failed, the only issue from the
impossible situation seemed to be to take the chances of war; and, on March 12,
1849, notice was given of the termination of the armistice. The Piedmontese
army took the field under the Polish General Chrzanowsky; on March 23 they were
defeated at Novara. Radetzky’s triumph was complete, the only powerful army now
opposed to Austria was decisively beaten, and the war was at an end for
Piedmont. Charles Albert, after in vain seeking death on the battle-field,
abdicated in favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel II, thus removing any obstacle
to peace that might attach to his own person. He then went into voluntary exile
at Oporto in Portugal, where he died on July 28, 1849, a martyr to the cause of
Italian independence.
Thus the
final catastrophe of the Revolutionary period was on all sides rapidly
approaching. In Rome Terenzio Mamiani tried to stem the advance of the tide,
which was daily more threatening since the murder of Rossi and the flight of
Pius IX. His efforts bear some tesemblances to those of Gioberti in Piedmont,
but here also circumstances were too strong. There were two unacknowledged
dictatorships, the one that of the demagogues, exercised through Sterbini, once
a party to the assassination of Rossi, now a Minister; the other that of the
Reaction wielded by Cardinal Antonelli, ruling for Pius IX, who was at Gaeta.
On February 7, 1849, the Pope and Cardinals formally applied for the
intervention of all the Catholic Powers, though, by excepting the TTing of
Sardinia, they incidentally negatived Gioberti’s plans for his intervention. On
the other side, Giuseppe Mazzini, the Revolutionists, and the flower of the
Italian volunteers all flocked to Rome; together
with Giuseppe
Garibaldi, already famous for great deeds in America, and during the recent war
in Upper Italy. On receiving the news of the disaster at Novara, the Republic
had established a Triumvirate, consisting nominally of Mazzini, Saffi, and
Armellini, but with the whole power in the hands of Mazzini, who wielded it
with honesty and moderation.
France,
Republican France, in whom Mazzini trusted so confidently, offered the Pope her
intervention in Rome, on condition that she should act alone; and on April 25,
1849, a French force under Oudinot landed at Civita Vecchia on its way to Rome.
The French, who had not expected any serious resistance in Rome, were soon
undeceived. On April 30, 1849, Garibaldi repulsed them by sheer hard fighting;
and he similarly drove back the Neapolitans on May 19. Oudinot concealed the
extent of his defeat, and sent home for reinforcements. Thus between France and
the Roman Republic there suddenly arose a question of military amour propre
obscuring the political issues ; and this just at the moment when the President
of the French Republic, for the confirmation of his own power and for the
eventual restoration of the Empire, needed the whole support both of the army
and the Church. In order to g in time, the French sent Ferdinand de Lesseps to
Rome to treat for peace with Mazzini and the Assembly; and on May 17 an
armistice was concluded. Lesseps no doubt acted in good faith, as did Mazzini;
and they came to terms. But, as soon as the reactionary intrigues between Gaeta
and the French headquarters were ripe, and the reinforcements had arrived, the
terms were repudiated. Without even giving notice of the close of the
armistice, the French suddenly assaulted Rome. Garibaldi and his forces made a
heroic stand; but, on June 30, they were obliged to abandon the defence, and a
number retreated with Garibaldi before the French entered the city. The life of
the ill-starred Roman Republic under Mazzini had been precarious and,
politically speaking, it earned small praise; but, as the death-struggle of
Italians against foreign perfidy and violence, its record is glorious and its
memory is still green.
At the date
of the fall of Rome the Austrians had already invaded Tuscany. Guerrazzi the
Dictator had already charged Cesare de Laugier (who had fought at Curtatone and
Montanara) with treason, because, as an officer of the Grand Duke, he had tried
to aid in his restoration. Now, however, Guerrazzi himself followed that
example; for, while trying to keep the anarchical demagogy in bounds, he was
also meditating the possible restoration of the Lorraine dynasty, with himself
in the part of Monck. But the Moderates, who bore him no good will, and who
still nursed some vain hopes of averting Austrian intervention, gave him no
time to get the credit of such overtures. On April 11, 1849, in a burst of
reaction, the Grand Duke was restored by a general vote, in which the
municipality, the upper classes, and the peasants combined; and Guerrazzi was
arrested, on the pretext of protecting him from the excited populace. The
punishment of the city was bitter. On May 25,
after
overcoming a slight resistance at Leghorn, the Austrians entered Florence. The
Grand Duke gave it to be understood that the Austrian intervention was against
his wishes; but General dAspre tore off the mask, by his proclamation dated
Empoli, May 24, in which he declared that the Austrians had come at the
specific request of the Grand Duke. Ten days of glorious struggle now took
place at Brescia, the only one of the Lombard cities that had risen in support
of Piedmont’s desperate renewal of the war in March, 1849. The attempt was put
down with extraordinary ferocity by the Austrian General Haynau, who earned the
nickname of “ General Hyena ”; and Brescia’s struggle may be looked upon as the
epilogue of Charles Albert’s War of Italian Independence.
Thus Venice
alone was left. After the defeat of Novara the Venetian Assembly resolved on
resistance to the last, on the motion of Daniele Manin, whose grandeur and truthfulness
of character is unsurpassed among Italian patriots. He proposed by keeping a
strong hand upon demagogy to win the respect of all Europe, and by the
moderation of his rule to throw into stronger light the lawlessness of
Austria’s appeals to force; with a lofty faith in international equity, he
hoped ultimately to force England and France, as the Liberal Powers, to accord
to Venice their moral and material support, and thus to compel Austria to
accede to her demands. His right-hand-man was Valentino Pasini, a diplomatist
who recalled the best type of the ambassadors of the Serene Republic; and whose
admission to personal negotiation with Prince Schwarzenberg is sufficient proof
of his diplomatic skill.
Venice did in
fact resist to the last. On May 26,1849, the Austrians captured the fort of
Malghera. From July 30 the city endured a ceaseless direct bombardment. On
August 4 starvation and cholera stared them in the face. Unwilling to abuse the
unlimited confidence of his people, Daniele Manin called an Assembly: on August
6 he was given full power to deal with the situation. After he had received a
final and unfavourable answer from Pasini, who was negotiating at Vienna, and
had learnt the news of the Russian intervention for the suppression of the Revolution
in Hungary, his last hope disappeared. On August 11 he began to treat for the
surrender of the city. On the 14th, the first reply was received from the
Austrian commander, offering only the hardest conditions. The cholera was
making havoc in town and fleet; only a section of the city still remained
uninjured by the ceaseless bombardment, and the rush of the population into
that section was aggravating the epidemic. In a short time starvation cut short
all discussion, and unconditional surrender became inevitable. On August 24
Manin resigned all power into the hands of the municipal authorities, who
negotiated the surrender; and on August 27 he departed into exile. With the
fall of Venice all was at an end. The Pope and the Italian Princes were restored;
France occupied Rome; the Austrians were dominant throughout the north; on all
sides reaction triumphed.
THE FRENCH
REPUBLIC.
(1848-52.)
On January 27,1848, Alexis de Tocqueville, speaking
in Parliament, questioned the Ministers of Louis-Philippe: “ Can you,” he
asked, “ at this very moment count upon to-morrow ? Have you the smallest idea
of what a year, a month, even a day may bring forth?” Guizot and his colleagues
with their majority behind them smiled at the wan ing, for, although a heated
debate followed on Tocqueville’s speech, there was nothing to show that it
pointed to the fall of the Monarchy of July. For three years the Opposition
under Thiers and Odilon Barrot had attacked, without weakening, the majority;
and the Ministiy resolved to deal once for all with their opponents by putting
down the existing system of appealing to the nation outside Parliament, both in
Paris and in the provinces, through the medium of meetings and banquets. Early
in 1848 Count Duchatel, the Minister of the Interior, with the approval of the
King, “ and to put an end to a dangerous and reckless agitation,” prohibited a
banquet, which was to have been given in the 12th arron- dissement of Paris,
and held troops in readiness to enforce the prohibition if necessary. His
action, which became known to the Deputies at a moment when the Opposition was
once more Urging their grievances in the customary shape of an address to the
Crown, stirred the anger of Guizot’s opponents, but there was nothing to show
that the outburst heralded a revolution. A disturbance there might be, but in
the absence of organisation it could be of no consequence; it might even afford
Ministers a favourable opportunity for reducing the Opposition to impotence
and silence.
Events showed
however how false were the calculations of Guizot and his friends and how true
were Tocqueville’s words. On February 22,
1848, the day fixed for the prohibited banquet,
a considerable crowd of ; students, workmen, and
shopkeepers—lookers-on and malcontents rather than rebels—assembled on the
Place de la Madeleine in obedience to the summons of the Republican journals,
Le National and La Riforme, for the purpose of protesting against the policy of
Guizot. The gathering
had neither
watchword nor leaders. Even the Opposition members had decided at the last
moment to hold aloof; and the Republicans themselves —Louis Blanc and
Ledru-Rollin—after issuing their appeal to the people began to dread the
consequences. The result, however, of that one day was that an unarmed and
excited mob compelled King Louis-Philippe, in spite of the 30,000 soldiers at
his disposal, to dismiss the Guizot Ministry on February 23.
To all
appearance nothing of much importance had happened on February 22; one or two
scuffles on the boulevards and on the Place de la Concorde, a few barricades no
sooner erected than pulled down, some customs barriers burnt in the suburbs—the
disturbances seemed to be of far less moment than had been the case on previous
occasions when the royal cause had triumphed. In point of fact, certain events,
conclusive as evidence of what was going on, had, to the furtherance of the
people’s cause, created sudden confusion in the Councils of the monarchy. The
dragoons who should have cleared the approaches to the Corps Legislatif had on
receiving their orders made it plain that they sympathised with the
demonstrators, and the infantry on guard in the Avenue Marigny fell back as the
demonstrators approached. From the very first the regular army under the
half-hearted leadership of Sebastiani and Jacqueminot had declined to
interfere; and, when—to supply its place— the Government, on the morning of
February 23, appealed to the National Guard, the appeal was met by unmistakable
signs not only of friendly neutrality but of active sympathy with the mob. The
people, the army, and the National Guard, had as if by instinct come to a
sudden understanding. The force upon which Guizot had counted for crushing the
disturbance had disappeared, and the disturbance assumed the proportions of a
revolution.
All this was
the outcome of a gradual and obscure growth of ideas and sentiments which had
for eight years been taking place in every class of the nation, and which had
escaped the notice of statesmen too much engrossed in parliamentary struggles
to watch the aspirations of the people. The subjects of debate in the Chambers
at this juncture seemed to be mere questions of electoral reform: the lowering
of the property qualification of deputies and electors, and certain measures
framed to prevent the Ministry from creating a majority of paid functionaries.
When however the people clamoured for “Reform” and for the dismissal of Guizot
who was opposed to it, as fiercely as they had once denounced the “ Ordinances
” and Polignac, their passionate aspirations went far beyond the bounds of the
wrangle between the Ministers and the Opposition. They called for the overthrow
of a Government legally constituted perhaps, but unjust and dishonourable, set
up for the benefit of a minority who, devoid of conscience and forgetful of
their responsibilities, were enjoying the spoils of office and filling their
pockets at the expense of the working classes at home and of the good name of
the country
abroad.
Frenchmen, whose minds had been stirred, in the Press, the pamphlets, the
fiction, and the drama of the time, by the lessons drawn from the social evils
around them, were angered at the combined resistance to their dream of
internal progress and national greatness offered by the King, his Ministers,
and Europe. From 1840 onwards, they looked upon the whole Government as one
long conspiracy—the permanent betrayal of the country. The events of February
22 showed that there were many Frenchmen of this way of thinking among both the
soldiers and the officers in the regular army, and that they were still more
numerous in the National Guard.
The King at
this juncture committed the grave blunder of imagining that, if he dismissed
Guizot, he could with the help of his other Ministers ensure the continuance of
the peaceful foreign policy which had been for eight years his chief aim and
for which he held himself responsible as between France and Europe. Guizot
bowed to the King’s decision, and, pale and calm, announced it to the Chambers
at three o’clock on February 23. The Deputies, less disposed to submit to a
disgrace which they felt to be inevitable and imminent, expressed their indignation,
and Mole made an attempt to rescue the doomed majority by a coalition with the
Right Centre and Dufaure and Passy. Meanwhile, there happened one of those
accidents which might have been foreseen— a collision on the Boulevard des
Capucines between the mob who were emboldened by the fall of the Ministers and
some troops under the orders of a loyalist officer. This incident was the
signal for a general rising in the city; and, on the same evening, Mole
abandoned the attempt to form a Ministry with the men who, during eight years,
had shared the Government with Guizot. Thiers, for whom the King sent during
the night, agreed to accept a position already so gravely compromised only on
condition that the Chamber should be forthwith dismissed, and an Assembly
called together resting on a wider franchise and more closely representative of
the nation.
We should
wonder at the repugnance of Louis-Philippe to comply with requirements so amply
justified, if we did not call to mind the events of 1840, the dismissal by the
King of his Minister because of the attempt of the latter to gratify the nation
by an ambitious foreign policy, and, subsequently, that Minister’s strenuous
and successful struggle with Guizot, and his active participation in the
revival of the Napoleonic legend. When, at the nation’s bidding, the hour of
revenge struck for Thiers, the old sovereign saw his system and his work swept
away together with the Ministers and the Assembly that had helped him, no
matter how, to maintain peace for eight years. The members of the royal family
and the Court who were with the King on the night of February 23 noticed his
dejection and his hesitation, the fatal inconsistency between his decisions and
his acts. He stood almost alone, confronted by the whole of France; he was
convinced that he was in the right and that the country
was in the
wrong, and he saw that the only possibility of saving the Crown for himself and
his children lay in the douhtful chances of a Civil War; his convictions urged
him to employ force. The memories of the Revolution and the idea of a struggle
with the nation at large held him back; he felt douhts as to his duty and his
prospects of success; he was wearied out yet incapable of yielding. When he
agreed to the demands of Thiers, he forced General Bugeaud upon him as Minister
of War and thus coupled his concession with a defiance—surrendering and
threatening simultaneously.
During the
night which decided the fate of the monarchy, the revolutionaries had on their
side found an organisation and leaders. The journalists and members of the
democratic clubs * Louis Blanc, Felix Pyat, Goudchaux, Flocon, Bastide, Martin
of Strassburg, Arago, Caussidiere, who had previously shown much hesitation,
were unable, after the conflict on the Boulevard des Capucines, to resist the
appeal of the excited populace. At the offices of La Reforme and Le National,
in the committees and at the meetings of the secret societies, they had
decided, relying on the complicity of the army and the National Guard, to seize
the opportunity which presented itself. More than 1500 barricades were
forthwith thrown up, and at some of them in the redoubtable centre quarter was
displayed the red flag, the symbol of the social revolution. The insurgents
provided themselves with firearms by plundering the gunsmiths’ shops and by
seizing on the barracks and guard-rooms, while the manufacture of cartridges
and bullets went on without intermission. Proclamations drawn up in haste and
printed hy Proudhon conveyed to the combatants the order for a general attack;
and by sunrise on the following day, February 24, all the central districts of
the capital, from the Bastille to the Rue St Honore and from the Porte St Denis
to the Pantheon, were in the possession of the insurgents. The proletariate of
Paris, armed and already victorious, demanded, in the flush of combat,
something more than a mere change in the political system: they demanded the
inauguration of the promised era of justice, prosperity and glory. They were
ready and resolved to force on a social revolution, throughout Europe if need
were.
The
appointment of General Bugeaud, moreover, and his military dispositions destroyed
the effect which might have heen produced by entrusting Thiers and Odilon
Barrot with the formation of a Ministry of the Left and by the dismissal of the
Assembly. The members of the secret societies by whom the orders of the day
were now issued called to mind the massacres of the Rue Transnonain and the
pitiless nature of the repressive measures taken against them by the Due
d’Isly. It was in vain that Odilon Barrot boldly traversed the boulevards arid
the streets, in the hope of inspiring confidence and so reestablishing order.
To his appeals and his speeches the defenders of the barricades answered with
cries of “Down with Bugeaud,” “Down with Thiers,” “Down with
Louis-Philippe.”
When Barrot returned to the Ministry he found there the Republican deputies,
Pagnerre and Gamier-Pages, who demanded the abdication of the King. Guizot and
the Chamber had fallen, and now the monarchy of July was itself in jeopardy.
The monarchy
had now nothing left to rely on but military force; and this resource was suddenly
to fail. When he took over the command, Marshal Bugeaud had been startled by
the state of the regular army; he found it demoralised and ill-supplied with
provisions and military stores. He had however ordered General Bedeau with a
force of 2000 men to clear the boulevards, General Sebastiani with a like force
to make his way to and occupy the Hotel de Ville, General Duhot to hold his
ground at the Bastille and Colonel Brunet to join forces at the Pantheon with
General Renault. In spite of the formal orders of the Commander-in-chief to act
and act quickly, all his lieutenants, apprehensive of the disaffection of the
National Guard and of a possible conflict with it, shrank from the task. Duhot
evacuated the Place de la Bastille and retired to Vincennes; Sebastiani retired
with unnecessary haste from the Hotel de Ville, and Bedeau, after parleying on
the boulevard with the chiefs of the citizen soldiery, halted his troops and
advised the Marshal to hand over the city to the National Guard.
From the very
beginning the action of Bugeaud was paralysed by the hesitation of his
colleagues and the advice of courtiers and Ministers. He wasted the decisive
morning of February 24 in attempts at conciliation. At 10 o’clock he ordered
all regular troops to retreat to the Carrousel and entrusted the maintenance of
order to the citizen forces. The retreat amounted to a capitulation, and the
army accepted it in that sense.
When the
forces of General Bedeau withdrew from the boulevards as far as the Rue de la
Paix, they abandoned their guns and ammunition waggons to the insurgents who
surrounded them; and they looked on while the rebels helped themselves to
ammunition and delivered a series of successful attacks on police stations and
guard-rooms. By 10 o’clock the only building in Paris outside the Carrousel and
the Tuileries which was left to the Government was the Palais Royal; it was hPlrl
by the Municipal Guard, but its position became more critical every hour. The
supreme moment had arrived. If he was to regain the ground he had so rapidly
lost, could the King in default of the army, whose inaction he had encouraged,
count on the aid of that National Guard which in 1830 and since that time had
helped him to stave off the republic ? In order to satisfy himself as to this,
Louis-Philippe reviewed the guard in the Court of the Tuileries; and he
reentered his palace with the sad conviction that his citizen-soldiers would
leave him to struggle unaided with the mob.
These three
victories gained by the people in swift succession over the Ministers, the
Assembly, and the King himself drove him to a
1848]
101
resolution
which as he believed would save the monarchy and his dynasty from destruction;
at 1 o’clock on February 24 Louis-Philippe abdicated in favour of his grandson,
the Comte de Paris. This solution which, without doubt, he submitted to rather
than approved, had been suggested an hour before by politicians who had hoped
that by sacrificing the King they would escape a republic, and it was supported
by the princes (by Montpensier especially, who with his brothers had for a long
time objected to the pacific policy of their father). The plan had however
been opposed by certain of his adherents more far-seeing than the others and by
the Queen herself, who had shown great courage when the storm of the Revolution
thundered at the gates of the Tuileries. It was in fact to the democracy of
Paris that Louis-Philippe, deserted by his army and the National Guard,
abandoned his Ministers, his family, and himself, on February 24, 1848.
For some
hours two parliaments were sitting at Paris, two Assemblies debating the fate
of France and discussing a future which three days before, they had not dreamed
of and for which they were in no sense prepared. One of these Assemblies which
sat in the Salle St Jacques at the Hotel de Ville met spontaneously on the
abdication of the King for the purpose of setting up a government in his place.
The insurgents crowded thither during the afternoon and held a noisy sitting under
the unacknowledged leadership of the advanced Republicans of La Reforme, Louis
Blanc, the workman Albert, Martin of Strassburg and Flocon. The Assembly
appointed as mayor of Paris Gamier-Pages and, following the tradition of 1792,
took steps to subject all France to the authority of the revolutionary commune
in the shape of a provisional government—a Committee of Public Safety, which
had been created with the view of imposing the Republic and social reforms upon
the whole of Europe. The other was the legal Assembly of representatives, the
only lawful authority left standing indeed, but derelict after the storm; the
Conservative majority was bewildered by the ruin of the Ministry which had
created it; lie Liberal and Royalist minority was discouraged by the abdication
of the King.
Louis-Philippe
having abandoned the Tuileries, which were forthwith occupied by the
insurgents, the deputies met at the Corps Legislatif. Without a Ministry at
their head to prescribe a definite programme, they had neither the belief in
their cause nor the community of aim which were necessary to enable them to
frame for themselves a policy capable of resuscitating the monarchy; they were
without any guarantee that their deliberations or their persons would be
protected against the attacks of the victorious revolutionaries. At this
juncture the President Sauzet might have played a decisive part; he had neither
the necessary qualities nor the inclination to do so.
On the one
side were the Duchesse d’Orleans, her son the heir of Louis-Philippe, and her
brother-in-law the Due de Nemours, who had made
their way
through the disturbed streets to invite the aid and authority of the Chamber,
in bringing about the devolution of the Crown upon a minor and the creation of
a Regency monarchical in form. On the other side were the Paris mob, which had
surged from the street into the tribunes and the very precincts of the Chamber,
with demands exactly contrary; it was between these opponents that the deputies
were called upon to legislate—and, as they formed a collection of individuals
rather than an organised body, they allowed their hands to be forced.
Lamartine, in
secret agreement with the journalists of Le National, Marie, Marrast, and
Cremieux, was preparing the way for the Republic by the creation of a
Provisional Government on a plan devised in the office of that newspaper, and
he was unwilling as yet to proclaim the fall of the House of Orleans or to
propose the Republic prematurely. Dupin and Odilon Barrot, Royalists to the
end, defended but feebly the cause of the Comte de Paris and of the Regency
promised to the fallen King in exchange for his abdication. It was the
conquerors of the Tuileries, students, Republican citizens, and Socialist
workmen who in spite of the orders of General Gourgaud invaded the defenceless
Assembly, swept away the President, the Royalist deputies, the Regent and the
boy King, and gave monarchy its death-blow. Dupont de l’Eiire was chosen
President on the spot; and the deputies who were exponents of the rights bf the
people declared the final deposition of the Orleans family and placed the
Provisional Government in the hands of Lamartine, Arago, Ledru-Rollin, Dupont
de l’Eure, Gamier-Pages, Cr&nieux and Marie. They refrained from
proclaiming the Republic,
There was a
wide difference of origin, composition and aims between the gathering of the
men of Paris who sat at the Hotel de Ville and the Assembly of French deputies
who at the Corps Legislatif had voted fora Provisional Government. The one was
actually the people in arms who had overturned the monarchy, swept away all
other authority and sat in the direct exercise of their sovereign will; they
were, however, the people of Paris and nothing more, working men and artisans
eager to achieve social reforms and to revolutionise Europe. The other was a
body of representatives chosen in part by the provinces, whose functions had
been placed in suspense by the downfall of the parliamentary monarchy,
politicians who were chiefly concerned in legalising their own position with
the consent and by the help of the nation—more inclined to follow the opinion
of the country than to move forward without its approbation, “de cimenter urn
gouvemement solidemore desirous, finally, of order than of reform, of peace at
home and abroad than of social changes or the advancement of theories.
If these two
bodies with their divergent aims had continued to oppose each other as the
people, the Ministers, and the Court had oppose I. each other for the last
three days, the Revolution would not have come to an end on the evening of
February 24. Lamartine,
however, and
his colleagues in the Assembly had the courage and the sagacity, like
Louis-Philippe in 1830, to demand the confirmation of their powers by the
sovereign people at the Hotel de Ville. On their arrival there the
representatives of the people who mistrusted them hesitated to comply. The
Ministers finally gained their object by proclaiming the Republic forthwith
(subject to ratification by the people), and especially by admitting to power
three Republicans, two of whom were socialists, as secretaries of the
Provisional Government; the names of these men were added by the popular
assembly to those of its friends Alarrast, Louis Blanc, and Albert, the working
man. “ We have been appointed to the Chamber but not by the Chamber” was the
phrase employed by Cremieux to describe this singular Constitution. It was the
result of a bargain, •of a compromise between the deputies and the people of
Paris, brought about and concluded by mutual concessions; on the one side was
the establishment of a democratic republic and the promise of a movement of
social reform ; on the other was the surrender of the sovereignty of the people
following upon the surrender of the sovereignty of the King, into the hands of
the Provisional Government.
Promises and
mutual confidence formed the basis of that compromise which on a certain
evening of 1848 for the second time founded the Republic at Paris. This fact
explains the preponderating part in the settlement played by sentiments which
found their highest expression in the eloquence of a poet—Lamartine. All
classes of the nation, the provinces as well as the capital, shared during the
first days of the new regime in one common dream of justice and benevolence. The
rich, like the Rothschilds, subscribed for the wounded, and duchesses organised
societies for the relief of the destitute. The poorer classes, although they
had gained the upper hand, made no attempt to abuse their victory, abstaining
from vengeance and plunder. Never was a revolution less blood-stained. The army
which had avoided a conflict was invited to swear friendship with the
triumphant mob; the clergy proclaimed the doctrine of Christian equality and
fraternised with young and old beneath trees of liberty. The provinces made no
complaint of changes about which they had not been consulted; they trusted
Paris as Paris had trusted the Provisional Government. The political parties
who migbt have cherished regrets or hopes became suddenly conscious of their
own impotence, as they were swept away by a flood of enthusiasm.
These were
the characteristics of a Revolution, the shortest and least violent that has
ever taken place in France, but which carried with it a conviction of its
irresistible force. These same qualities accounted too for the transitory
nature of its results.
Once clothed
with authority and made responsible for order, the Provisional Government
hastened to organise the one with a view of ensuring the other. Since Guizot
fell there had been no Ministry, and Lamartine at this juncture undertook
Foreign Affairs, Ledru-Rollin the
Interior,
Arago the Admiralty and provisionally the Ministry of War, it being necessary
to recall General Cavaignac from Africa. Cremieux became Minister of Justice,
and Marie of Public Works ; Finance, Public Instruction and Trade were
respectively entrusted to Michel Goudchaux, Carnot, and Bethmont. Their first
care was for Paris; measures were necessary to provide for the removal of the
barricades and for the subsistence of the populace, who had been plunged into
poverty by the events of February and the enforced idleness which followed. The
officers in command of the army agreed to serve under General Bedeau, who had
been placed at their head; General Duvivier, who had assisted at the capture of
the Tuileries, reorganised the National Guard, and functionaries of all sorts,
when invited to transfer their services to the Republic, accepted the
situation. The new Ministry then, without further delay, turned its attention to
the provinces and appointed Commissioners who were to carry its orders into
each department and report on the position of affairs. In many cases the men,
thus hastily chosen, injured rather than benefited the cause of the Republic.
It was not however the country districts which first gave the Government cause
for anxiety; danger threatened from close at hand, from the people of Paris
whom it had already been necessary to reckon with, who mistrusted the
Government and even their own representatives, associated with it in an
incongruous task. ,
It was to no
purpose that on the very evening of February 24, the Government with a view to
satisfying the popular eagerness for social reform had declared that the royal
palace of the Tuileries should be turned into a national home for incapacitated
working men, and that the civil list of Louis-Philippe should be employed in
redeeming for destitute persons the goods which they had been compelled to
pawn. On February 25 the revolutionaries, who had grown used to mob victories,
marched to the Hotel de Ville with arms in their hands and bearing the red
flag, the emblem of their claims and the terror of the propertied classes.
Lamartine calmed them by dint of fair words and concessions, and persuaded them
to retain as the National Flag the tricolour with a red rosette on the staff.
Next, under pressure from his colleagues, particularly Louis Blanc, he pledged
the future by a decree which proclaimed the right of all citizens to
employment, cost what it might, under the inspection of the State or of
associations authorised by it. It was only by this concession, extorted by the
menace of a dangerous conflict, that he succeeded on this particular day in
persuading the mob to disperse and in procuring for his Ministry a further extension
of credit. “We have three months of misery in the service of the Republic
before us,” said one of the popular orators to Lamartine on taking his leave;
the promise implied was full of meaning, but it was never carried out. The
Republic had restored to liberty the revolutionaries Blanqui, Barb&s,
Huber, and Martin Bernard, imprisoned under the Monarchy of
July. The
return of these men to Paris, their presence there in the midst of their
adherents, and the tale of the sufferings they had endured, created so much
excitement in the clubs of the Friends of the Revolutionaries (Amis du peuple
de la Rivolution), which had just then been formed, that a fresh armed rising
took place on February 28. The working men of Paris and their Socialist leaders
demanded that as a practical sequel to the decree of February 25, a Ministry of
Progress and Labour (Ministere du progres et du travail) should be created,
whose duty it should be, in conjunction with one of their own number, to create
and equip a centre for the organisation of labour. The Ministers parried this
new attack by consenting to the appointment of a commission of enquiry—one more
promise—which was to sit at the Luxembourg under the presidency of two of their
members, Louis Blanc and Albert. The Government had already on February 27 made
a show of fulfilling its previous promises by opening yards for the engagement
of the unemployed as navvies—the first beginning of national workshops. It had
moreover in the place of the Municipal Guard, which had become odious to the
Parisians, enrolled, as a paid body of police, men who had been driven by want
to volunteer for the service. These measures, condemned as acts of weakness by
the propertied classes, by no means satisfied the Socialist artisans. In vain
the mutual assurances of confidence and good will exchanged in a moment of
enthusiasm between the Provisional Government and the people were renewed again
and again. No sooner were they given than fresh claims were advanced.
On March 16
there was a demonstration organised by the bonnets a poil, the grenadiers of
the National Guard, belonging to the well-to-do quarters who were indignant at
the recent disbandment of their smartest battalions; and this sufficed to rouse
once more the poorer inhabitants of the faubourgs who were dissatisfied and
restless. A hundred thousand men marched past the Hotel de Ville and extorted a
promise from the Government that the regular army should always be kept as far
from Paris as possible. If on this occasion the Socialist leaders could have
agreed amongst themselves to let loose the mob upon the Ministry, the social
revolution so much desired by Blanqui and Barbes would have broken out and
swept away Lamartine and his colleagues. Instead of this, there were divisions
among the leaders of the working men; and Cabet, Raspail, and above all, Louis
Blanc, managed to turn a dangerous riot into a peaceful demonstration, and so
gained for a few days a greater hold than ever upon the Ministry. The
Government survived this fresh crisis only through the intervention—the treason
as it was called in the clubs—of Louis Blanc; but the important point was that
it did survive the danger; and every week added, no matter with what
difficulty, to its existence strengthened its position. Louis Blanc soon
perceived this. He had hoped to have dominated the Ministry, which in the first
instance had accepted his dictation with ill grace, but at the beginning of
April, 1848,
Lamartine had
managed to secure the all-important support of Ledru- Rollin, and within the
Ministry, at all events, retained his supremacy. It was, however, only with the
greatest difficulty that he had succeeded in securing for the country during
these two months complete political liberty, liberty of the Press, the right of
meeting—liberty in fact under every aspect, and in resisting at the same time
the pressure of the social revolution.
His efforts
had been equally great to maintain peaceful relations between the newly bom
Republic and the European Powers. With Europe on the one side already ripe for
revolution at the moment of the outbreak in Paris, and on the other the
Parisian democrats who were inclined to follow the traditions of the Convention
and make war on kings on behalf of their subjects, the Government had a
difficult part to play; a dread of the revival of the Terror inclined them to
peace, while they were anxious after the fall of Guizot to emphasise their
sympathies with liberty. A number of foreigners who had taken refuge at Paris—
Belgians, Poles, Germans, Italians, and Irish—found advocates and champions in
the victors of the Tuileries, and also in certain of the Ministers whose
enthusiasm they had aroused. The circular despatch addressed by Lamartine on
March 7 to the Powers was necessarily, like the Government itself, a
compromise, an undertaking not to intervene in the affairs of Europe coupled
with a veiled threat of intervention aimed at those sovereigns who should check
the natural growth of liberty within their own dominions: “the maintenance of
the treaties of 1815 is irreconcilable with natural rights.” “ The circular is
evidently a piece of patch-work put together by opposite parties in the
Government. The one warlike and disturbing, the other peaceful and
conciliatory. I should say that if you were to put the whole of it into a
crucible and evaporate the gaseous parts and scum off the dross, you would find
the rule to be peace and good fellowship with other Governments ” (Palmerston
to Clarendon, March 9,1848). As a matter of fact, while the Revolution broke loose
in Germany and Italy, the French Republic, which seemed to have prompted them,
abstained under the guidance of Lamartine from any participation in the
troubles at Berlin and Vienna. It even went so far as to discover and put a
stop to the plottings of certain Frenchmen such as Delescluze with the “Risk
Alls” (Risquons Tout) in Belgium and the Lyonnais in Savoy. This was hardly the
Republic dreamed of by the revolutionaries of Paris, when on the evening of
February 24 they proclaimed, as the consequence of their victory, a new era of
liberty, and the brotherhood of all Europe. A dream, however, could be no safe
guide for statesmen burdened with the destinies of France; and between them and
the people of Paris there arose a fundamental antagonism—
the
conflict of the ideal with the practical, of enthusiasm with reason___
which had its
origin in the events at the Hotel de Ville on February 24, and which day by day
grew more acute.
In these
circumstances, France was called upon to elect a Constituent Assembly. Such a
national council had been demanded, and promised from the first by the
Provisional Government. On February 26, accordingly, it gave notice that a
plebiscite for the Republic would be held immediately; while, on March 5, it
summoned the constituencies to prepare for the elections on April 9. By the
provisions of a decree drafted in conformity with a pledge given by
Ledru-Rollin, “the suffrage was to be direct and universal; all Frenchmen over
twenty-one years of age were to have a vote; and all Frenchmen over twenty-five
were to be eligible for election. Voting was to be secret, by scrutin de liste
according to departments.” This decree afterwards took its place as a law among
the legal institutions of the country, and by it the French democracy, which,
already in 1789, had acquired equality before the law, now obtained complete
political equality also. The adoption of such a measure was a great event in
the history of France, and in that of modem democracy; but, after fifty years
of monarchical government and several centuries of political inexpe ience on
the part of the nation, it was also a measure of which it was impossible to
foretell the consequences. The results of such a step were specially mistrusted
by the revolutionary leaders in Paris, Louis Blanc, Blanqui, and Albert, who
would have preferred delaying the elections as their forerunners had done in
1793. They were perfectly at home in a revolutionary movement in Paris under
their immediate control ; but an appeal to the country would be a leap in the
dark, a leap too, whatever the result, backed with all the sanction of the law.
They protested therefore against the elections, and with redoubled vigour on
March 17, when it became known that the Ministers, who were equally uneasy
about the result of an appeal to the people, had decided to take roundabout
steps to influence the choice of the electors. On March 8, Ledru-Rollin
addressed a circular to his agents in the departments, in which he desired them
to warn all under their rule against letting candidates spring surprises on
them and to mistrust those republicams du lendemain who, while pretending to be
the friends of the new regime, were trying to make the electors forget the
really sincere Republicans of former days. Although Ledru-Rollin was one of the
most advanced members of the Government, this advice caused him to be accused
of exerting undue official pressure, and at the same time aroused the
indignation of the club orators, who demanded that the elections should be put
off For the purpose of calming the agitators they were accordingly postponed
till April 23, 1848.
The results
of the contest, which were published on April 28 and 29, fully justified the
forebodings of the Socialists, and, to a certain extent, those of the
Ministers. Judged only in the light of the speeches of those elected, the
returns, it is true, represented an almost unanimous devotion on the part of
the country to the Republic and to social reform; but a glance at the personal
character of the deputies produced a very
108
The Provisional Government resigns.
[l848
different
impression. In Paris itself, the Socialist leaders, Barbes, Leroux, and
Raspail, together with all the Labour candidates, and the communists nominated
by the commission at the Luxembourg, hardly obtained a fourth of the votes
given to members of the Provisional Government; and the elections in the
capital therefore supplied Lamartine and his colleagues with precisely that
legal support of which they had hitherto felt the want in their campaign against
violence and impatience. In the provinces, on the other hand, the election
returns showed a very different state of affairs. Lamartine himself, it is
true, was elected in ten. departments ; but out of the eight-hundred and forty
deputies who composed the new Assembly, a dangerous minority of a hundred and
thirty were declared Legitimists, and at least a hundred, who had sat as
Royalists in the Assemblies of the preceding reign, could be counted side by
side with the members of Lamartine’s own party. Should these Royalists forget
the crisis which had disunited them in 1830, and combine together against the
Republic, their presence in the Assembly might easily become a peril to the new
regime.
This double
peril, consisting on the one hand of the discontent among the Socialist
leaders, who were now deprived of their authority in Paris by the legalised
power of the Assembly, and who on April 15, before the elections, had even
attempted to excite another insurrection, and on the other hand of the large
number of Royalists in the Assembly, who, though nominally Republicans, had by
no means abandoned their former opinions, ought to have induced the Republican
majority to form itself into a closely united party. That such a course was
absolutely essential, if the party was to be successful in its endeavours to
establish peace, and in its task of compelling the refractory and hot-headed
sections of society to submit to the laws of a strong and organised Republic,
was quite evident; but it was soon made clear that no such union would be
attempted.
On May 8, in
compliance with the law, the Provisional Government laid down its powers, and
rendered its final account to the Constituent Assembly. As that body was
incapable of exercising the executive power itself, it decided to establish an
Executive Commission of five members, until after the Constitution had been
voted. Lamartine advised the Moderate Republicans to permit some of the
Democrats to hold office in this Commission, as they had formerly done in the
Provisional Government; but all in vain. Moderates, such as Buchez, Marie,
Pagnerre, Gamier-Pages, and the men belonging to the committee at the Palais
National—Marrast and Marie—strained every nerve to exclude Ledru- Rollin, whose
propagandist tendencies and leanings towards Socialism had alarmed them. It
would indeed have taken little to induce them to form an alliance with
Orleanists like Odilon Barrot. On May 9, when the vote on the Commission was
taken, Ledru-Rollin’s exclusion, which would have provoked an immediate
conflict, was only prevented by the most
strenuous
exertions on the part of Lamartine, whose eloquent refusal to abandon his
colleague cost him fifty votes and some of his popularity. On the following
day, on the other hand, Louis Blanc called upon the Assembly and the Government
to remember the people, and to nominate a Minister of Labour and Progress, thus
further alarming the country at the projects of the revolutionary party.
From the very
first, the Executive Government was caught between these tendencies to excess
and reaction, and reduced to impotence. The two principal sections of the
Republican party in the Assembly formed themselves into separate parties that
were disunited and almost hostile to one another. Dupont de l’Eure presided
over the Moderate Republicans at the Palais National; Ledru-Rollin and Flocon
headed the Reform party, which went by the name of “ the committee of the Rue
des Pyramides”; and Berryer, a celebrated Legitimist lawyer, led the Royalists,
who affected the name of “ honest Republicans,” and met in the Rue de Poitiers.
The whole Assembly also, by the five great committees into which it at once
organised itself, was conspiring to curtail still further the power of the
Commissioners entrusted with the government of France.
The
consequences of such conduct soon became visible. By May 11, the popular
agitators believed that circumstances were ripe for an enterprise that would
secure them the command of the streets. Their pretext was the foreign policy of
the Government; for according to the Parisian democrats the business of a
Republic was to make war on kings, and organise crusades for the assistance of
enslaved or martyred nations. Their ideas, however, did not coincide with those
of Lamartine, who insisted on maintaining a peaceful policy, and on observing
strict neutrality in European quarrels. On May 13, accordingly, when the news
of a Polish revolt, brutally suppressed by Prussian troops (May 5), became
known in Paris, a long procession of workmen and students assembled in the
Place de la Concorde, with shouts of “Vive la Pohgne.” On May 15, this
procession met again outside the doors of the Corps Legislatif, in order that
it might support a motion made by the deputy Wolowski in behalf of unhappy
Poland. The Assembly itself was next invaded, and in a few moments became the
prisoner of the people, who, by the mouths of Blanqui, Barbes, and Huber,
proceeded to decree its dissolution, to establish a tax on the rich, and to
declare war against the kings of Europe. Fortunately, the National Guards from
the bourgeois quarters of the city and from the suburbs, who appeared upon the
scene at the call and under the command of General Clement Thomas, arrived in
time to set the deputies at liberty, to restore the independence of the Assembly,
and to reestablish peace and order in the capital. The revolutionary leaders,
Barbes and Blanqui, were now in their turn obliged to submit to the fate which
they had designed for the members of the Assembly: the Provisional Government,
for a moment master of the
Hotel de
Ville, was driven out, the revolt was brought to an end, and the conspirators
were imprisoned at Vincennes.
This episode,
however, had further consequences. Not only did it accentuate the split in the
Republican majority, but the more advanced members of that party were now held
responsible for an act of violence which they had never encouraged. An
accusation was brought against Louis Blanc, who was roughly handled by the
National Guards, and narrowly escaped being arrested; Caussidiere, the chief
commissioner of police, a friend of Ledru-Rollin’s, was obliged to send in his
resignation; while Ledru-Rollin himself was looked upon as the accomplice of
the rioters. The members of the committee at the Palais National, Marrast,
Senart, Martin of Strassburg, and Pascal Duprat, who were delighted to have
this opportunity of compromising their more advanced colleagues and of
identifying them with the insurgents, intrigued busily against the Executive
Commission, and even against Lamartine, in the hope of either obliging them to
resign, or to give way before the reactionary campaign which was being
meditated. To the detriment of the Republic they were unconsciously repeating
the mistakes made by the Royalist majority of the two Centres when it overturned
the throne of Louis-Philippe. By setting the two sections of their majority one
against the other they were crippling their power, which could only become
really strong through the union of their whole party.
This fact was
clearly proved by the bye-elections on June 5, 1848. Almost all the candidates
elected in Paris, and in some of the provinces, belonged to the parties hostile
to the Executive Commission and to Lamartine’s Republic. The Parisian
Socialists who had suffered in the April elections now obtained their revenge
through the success of Pierre Leroux, Proudhon, Charles Lagrange, and
Caussidiere. In four constituencies Royalists rejoiced over the election of
Thiers, who had till now been excluded from the Constituent Assembly, but who
now, in company with Changarnier, returned in triumph to public life. The
event, however, charged with the most serious consequences for the future was
the election of Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte in Paris and in three
departments; for his success proved that a coalition had been effected between
the discontented and the hopeful sections of society, and bore witness to an
alliance among all those workmen, Conservatives, Liberals and patriots who were
mutually disappointed with the home and foreign policy of the Republic. It
showed that the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right, however mutually opposed,
were ready to unite under a name recalling the glories of the past; while the
other Republicans, under the guidance of Lamartine, were growing more and more divided.
On June 10,
when the Government moved that a decree of banishment should be pronounced
against Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the icy manner in which the Assembly received
this proposal at once convinced Lamartine that his own power was at an end.
Two-thirds of the
Assembly,
consisting of the Socialists, the Royalists, and a large number of the
Republicans, who were well pleased to do anything that damaged the Executive
Commission, which they accused of weakness and of favouring the Revolutionists,
voted that Louis Napoleon should be allowed to take his seat.
From this
moment the Republic was without a Government, though it had never needed one
more. Trade and business, which had already been injured by the February
insurrection, were declining. The five per cent. Rente, which had been at par
under the preceding regimes, now stood at only sixty-nine. Strikes and want of
work had affected both workmen and employers. The collection of a supplementary
tax of forty-five centimes, voted by the Assembly to supply the deficit, was
earning trouble, and giving rise to riots in all parts of the country, at some
of which cries of “ Vive FEmpereur'" were already to be heard. In the
month of May also, those workmen in Paris whom the Republic had placed in the
Ateliers nationalise, in order to secure the peace of society during a time of
crisis, and in order to testify the new regime's sympathy for the labouring
classes whom they hoped thus to preserve from the contagion of revolutionary
doctrines, began to show an inclination to escape from Conservative influences,
and to go over to Louis Blanc and the Socialists. More than 100,000 men whom
the Government believed it had enrolled in the party of order now showed signs
of preparing for a revolt; while their leader, ^mile Thomas, allowing himself
to be influenced by the mob and by its doctrines, proposed a plan for the
organisation of labour according to the methods of Louis Blanc, which he had
till now rejected.
When first
this change of opinion among the workmen became noticeable, the Government
resolved to meet it by prompt action. On May 26 it dismissed Simile Thomas, the
head of the Ateliers nationaux, and forced him to leave Paris; while, in
concert with Trelat, the Minister of Public Works, it endeavoured to find some means
of putting an end to the workshops themselves, of sending the younger workmen
into the army, and of either discharging the others, or obliging them to work
again for private employers. But it suddenly appeared to have thought better of
this design, and instead of discharging all the workmen simultaneously, began
to talk of getting rid of them by slow degrees. The Government had realised
that it was face to face with a serious insurrection.
This new
insurrection was too good an opportunity for weakening and disuniting the
Republicans to be missed by their adversaries. In the Assembly, on May 28,
during a sitting of the Labour Committee, presided over by Corbon, a Socialist
workman, the Democrats combined with economists like Wolowski, and with the Royalists,
in an attempt to force the Government to consent to a decree for the
reorganisation or disbanding of the national workshops. The speeches made by
some of
the deputies
on this occasion, even more than the actual words of the decree, were of a kind
certain to provoke hostility between the bourgeoisie and the labouring
classes. Both Socialists and Conservatives wished to excite a disturbance; “
either organise labour or maintain order ” was the general cry. Under their
orders the Assembly required the Government, now in a dilemma between the
extreme parties, to dismiss the provincial workmen who had crowded into the
workshops, and to pay any men whom they continued to employ by the piece
instead of by the day. In vain Trelat and the Commission tried to postpone the
passing of this decree. On May 30, June 11 and June 19 the Right repeated their
demands. In Paris, ever since May 30, the people had been preparing for
resistance. George Sand pointed out to Tocqueville the state of affairs among
the workmen, and told him of their organisation, numbers, arms, and bitter
feeling. “Do not,” she said, “ drive the people into the street by irritating
them.” The Commission, with its usual prudence, endeavoured to repurchase the
railways and to start the construction of lines on a large scale, for this
measure would have at once enabled the State to provide work for the national
workshops and to send the unemployed away from Paris. But the Assembly refused
its consent to this project, and on June 21 the Government was obliged to
publish a decree abolishing the Ateliers nationaux. The younger workmen were to
be compelled to enter the army, the rest to be sent into the provinces to make
embankments. On the same evening, however, the workmen, with cries of “Vive
Barbes” and “Vive NapoUon,” decided to make a demonstration in the Pantheon on
the following day; and on June 23, barricades were erected in all the
working-class districts. On that evening Lamartine, now resigned to a struggle
which he saw was inevitable, and with which he perceived the Commission would
be unable to cope, persuaded his colleagues to place unrestricted powers in the
hands of the Minister for War, General Cavaignac. On June 24, accordingly, the
Assembly, satisfied with having rendered powerless the Government which it had
itself created on May 5, established a military dictatorship in the person of
General Cavaignac for the purpose of putting down the insurrection; and at the
same time requested the Executive Commission to resign.
This measure,
which was proposed by Pascal Duprat with the consent of the Moderate
Republicans and the men of the Committee at the Palais National, was apparently
justified by the gravity of the approaching conflict. Indeed, the struggle
which now broke out between the people and the Conservative Republicans, on
June 23, 24, 25, and 26, was much longer and more sanguinary than the conflict
with the monarchy in the preceding February. Both sides were ready to take the
offensive; and General Cavaignac was much better prepared for resistance than
Louis- Philippe had been. The populace had had both time and means to provide
arms and ammunition; while the Minister for War, with the
assistance of
Colonel Charras, had made all necessary preparations for overcoming the
insurgents ; and had arranged a plan of campaign which was now successfully
carried into operation by the concerted action of Generals Lamoriciere, Bedeau,
Damesme and Duvivier. The compromise that had existed in Paris between the
Republic and the labouring classes was now at an end. On the day when the
Assembly denounced that precarious understanding the people rose era masse,
without any incitement from conspirators, in the working-class districts round
the Hotel de Ville, in the Bastille quarter, in the Faubourg St Antoine, and in
the neighbourhood of the Pantheon and the Place d’ltalie. Veritable fortresses
were set up by the insurgents, “with the regularity and skill of engineers,”
for the purpose of regaining the Hotel de Ville from the bourgeouu The generals
entrusted with the task of contending with the workmen for the possession of
Paris, Cavaignac and especially Lamoriciere, also resolved to concentrate their
forces in the districts which they already controlled, and to secure from
thence first the Hotel de Ville and subsequently, one after another, the
various strongholds of the insurrection. In the midst of this pitched battle,
only a few deputies still endeavoured to carry messages of peace and
conciliation to the barricades or the Assembly; but the people answered these
well-meant efforts by firing at Lamartine, wounding Bixio, and killing Domes.
From the tribune, meanwhile, some of the deputies reviled Victor Considerant
and Duclerc.
A terrible
battle ensued. On June 24 the troops, assisted by the National Guard and the
Garde mobile, succeeded in occupying the Hotel de Ville and the central
districts, while at the same time they drove the insurgents back into the
faubourgs. On the 25th General Brea was killed while trying to surprise the
great barricade set up by the people near the Banrriere de Vltalie, which was
taken the same afternoon. On the same day all the northern districts were
recovered from the insurgents. Finally, in the evening, after terrible
bloodshed, the troops, which had now been reinforced by National Guards from
all parts of France, succeeded in taking the Place de la Bastille, where the
rebels had concentrated their forces. The Faubourg' St Antoine was now the only
quarter unsubdued; but the conquest of this working-class district was a veiy
difficult enterprise, for its lofty houses and narrow streets were ill suited
to military operations, while almost its entire population was fighting on the
side of the workmen. The Archbishop of Paris (Mgr. Affre) bravely undertook a
mission of pacification for the purpose of saving the army and people from
another engagement that would inevitably lead to still worse bloodshed. He was
struck down by a bullet, which was not, however, fired by an insurgent nor
aimed at him, and it looked, at first, as if his life had not been sacrificed
in vain, for the combatants now showed some inclination to lay down their arms.
During the night conferences took place between Recurt, the Minister of the
Interior, Adam, a Parisian official, and delegates from the Faubourg. The
people required
a guarantee
that a “ social Republic would be established” as the price of their
submission. Cavaignac, however, demanded unconditional surrender. At ten
o’clock on June 26 he ordered an attack, which resulted in a complete victory.
The Parisian workmen and army left 10,000 killed and wounded on the field of
battle in this cruel struggle; while the number of officers, who fell during
the insurrection, exceeded the number killed in any of the glorious victories
of the First Empire.
This conflict
left behind it a feeling of hatred between the Republic" and the people
that nothing could efface. For a long time, the bourgeoisie dreaded a
repetition of the insurrection which it had found so much difficulty in
suppressing at Marseilles, Rouen and Bordeaux. No mercy was shown to the
vanquished; special commissions were instituted for the purpose of securing
culprits, who might otherwise have escaped punishment; Courts martial were set
up; and on June 27, a large number of prisoners was sentenced to transportation
from France. The people were forced to Submit to the will of their conquerors,
but their hearts were filled with hatred. During the insurrection, which had
thus extinguished the hopes of the populace, traces of an active Bonapartist
propaganda were already noticeable, and that party now prepared to profit out
of the misunderstandings produced by the civil strife—for the outbreak of which
it was probably, in some degree, responsible.
The
conclusipn of the social insurrection was a personal triumph for General
Cavaignac, who had been responsible for its suppression. But, by August, 1848,
the Republicans were entirely and hopelessly divided. After his last attempt to
compose the differences among his party, Ledru-Rollin determined, with Flocon
and Felix Pyat, to form an alliance with the defeated Socialists. On September
12, he pleaded, as Louis Blanc had done, for the right, to work; while on
September 22, he celebrated the anniversary of the Revolution by a great
banquet. Meanwhile Delescluze, the editor of the Republique democratiqite et
sociale attempted to renew the alliance between the associations of the workmen
and the Democrats. But, as Proudhon had just asked the Assembly to confiscate a
third of all private property, such a proceeding was exactly the one most
calculated to drive the Conservative Republicans into further reaction. This
section of the party now permitted its allies of the Right, de Falloux, Thiers
and Montalembert, to take measures completely at variance with Republican
principles; such as the abolition, after July 11, of the right to elect the
mayors in Paris and the other large towns, decrees restricting the liberties of
clubs and political associations, and a succession of repressive measures
against the Press, which was obliged “in the intei'ests of property and the
family,” to provide heavy securities and to submit to a tyrannical
surveillance, while its spoliation and ruin were made a source of public
profit. On July 15 the Manuel republicain, written by the philosopher
Renouvier, was prohibited; and Carnot was obliged to retire from the Ministry
because
he had
defended a scheme for popular elementary education. Prom fear and necessity the
Republicans agreed to these measures to the great joy of the Conservatives,
partisans of Church and monarchy; who, on October 1,1848, in the persons of
Dufaure, Vivien, and Freslou, began to make their way into the Ministry itself.
Under these
conditions the Republican Constitution was passed by the Assembly during
September and October, 1848. Though its object was to put the coping stone on a
rigime for the advancement of justice, fraternity and peace, and, so to say, to
inaugurate a new era, it was published all in a hurry, as the last act of a
dream, that had been condemned before realisation by the dissensions among the
Republicans. Armand Marrast introduced the report of the Committee in the
Assembly; and, in explaining the new law, he remembered rather his studies and
his philosophy than the role of statesman that he had played in the Republican
party since February, 1848. He offered the Assembly a theoretical scheme of
Republicanism and social policy, the vagueness of which was little in harmony
with the real state of parties. Revolutions, according to him, were justified
by an inevitable law of progress; and he defined a regime resting on universal
suffrage as a reign of equality explained by fraternity, as the condition most
favourable to all liberty, whether of speech, of the Press, or of association,
and as a pledge and binding promise to the disinherited and the poor.
On September
3, 1848, the Assembly, after a few amendments, decided almost unanimously to
prefix a preamble to the Constitution conceived in a similar spirit, thus
showing that it intended to proceed on the lines of Marrast and his committee.
Tocqueville, who was a member of that committee, has left an account in his
memoirs of his colleague’s deliberation and aims. The actual text of the
Constitution was mainly drafted by a lawyer, Courmenin, but the other members
of the committee containing journalists from all parties like Marrast,
Vaulabelle, and Lamennais, Royalist statesmen like Dufaure and Barrot, and
Moderate Republicans, differed so greatly in their opinions that they were only
able to work together at all by evading real facts and fundamental questions.
As Tocqueville observed, “ the Committee thought it best to preserve a
semblance of harmony by keeping to superficial matters; it applied broad
principles to small details; and it organised the whole machinery of the
Government without due consideration, because it was desirous of avoiding any
enquiry into the relative force of the various wheels.”
The Chamber,
which was even more divided than its Committee, acted in the same manner. In
the preamble to the Constitution it declared that by means of the Republic “ it
would walk with greater freedom in the paths of progress and civilisation;
would assure a more equal distribution of social burdens and advantages...and
would enable all citizens to attain a higher standard of morality, prosperity,
and
enlightenment
by the help of laws and institutions.” It recognised that there were “ rights
and duties prior to, and superior to, actual laws ”; but it did not enquire
whether the actual laws which it was then passing were consistent with this
vague and ill-defined code. It undertook “to respect foreign nationalities,” at
the very moment when it was preparing to send a French expedition against the
Roman people. It talked about “free popular education” while dismissing Carnot,
and abandoning his projects. It announced, after closing the national
workshops, that “ the State and the departments would establish public
workshops for the benefit of the unemployed.” The unanimous issue of a written
programme that for the present was quite unpractical, made the Assembly appear
anxious to offer some amends for the real refusal of all its parties to grant
any social and democratic reforms.
The clauses
of the Constitution gave rise to much more debate. The lengthiest discussion
was occupied with the question whether the legislative power should be vested
in one or two Chambers. On September 27, Lamartine and Dupin, who were in
favour of a single Chamber, only obtained a majority of 40 over Duvergier de
Hauranne and Odilon Barret. Republicans, indeed, were beginning to fear that a
dictator might possibly establish his supremacy by sowing dissensions between
two Chambers; and they would therefore only consent to the institution of a
Council of State, to be elected by the Assembly for the purpose of elaborating
and discussing bills. If the whole Republican party had logically followed up
this policy, it could have rejected the Committee’s proposal to place the
executive power in the hands of a President to be elected directly by the
people by universal suffrage. The Committee’s proposal would lead to the
establishment of two rival powers, each with a similar origin, but neither with
any means of legally controlling the other; and as any conflict between two
such powers must inevitably result in a victory for the one commanding the
army, the end could only be a dictatorship. A few Democrats like Jules Grevy
and Flocon opposed the project; but Lamartine’s fears of a dictatorship were
not strong enough to keep him from adopting it and upholding it in a vigorous
debate. Eventually, by a majority of 500, the Assembly agreed to the
institution of a President, to be nominated by the people, independently of
the Char,.her, like the President of the United States. There was this difference,
however, that the French President’s Ministers, though chosen and appointed by
himself, were to be responsible to the Assembly, and answerable with their
chief to a high court of justice, whose members were to be selected each year
from the Court of Cassation (October 7,1848). With the exception of some
debates on administrative decentralisation, which occupied October 18 and 19,
without arriving at any conclusion, there was no part of this Constitution, as
it finally became law on October 23, which engaged the attention of the
Assembly so earnestly as this question concerning the election of the
President.
Meanwhile, on
September 17,1848, the people had already declared for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte
in five departments. Of these elections the most characteristic had been those
in Paris, where two parties, the Moderate Republicans and the Social Democrats,
had found themselves face to face. Fould and Raspail, the favourite candidates
of these two parties, out of a total poll of 247,000, had hardly obtained
together a greater number of votes than had been cast for the great Emperor’s
nephew alone. As the months passed away, the heir of Napoleon continued to
improve his position with the electors. In former clays he had not seemed
destined to such good fortune, when his unsuccessful conspiracies against the
July Monarchy had resulted in his imprisonment and exile. Since then, however,
he had very prudently remained in England, allowing his friends to act for him;
and their zeal and activity, noticeable alike in the Assembly, in the Press,
and at popular centres and demonstrations, had advanced his cause, and
gradually gained over the malcontents of all parties. The Socialists, enraged
at the way they had been crushed after the June insurrection, now remembered
how Louis Napoleon had written in their behalf at the end of the preceding
reign. Others among the Democrats expected a vigorous foreign policy from a
Napoleon, accompanied by a glorious Liberal propaganda, such as Monarchy and
Republic had alike refused them. Finally, not a few Royalists underrated the
influence of a man whom they believed to be of mediocre ability and unequal to
the task of securing a triumph for his political and religious aspirations. The
elections which took place on September 17 were an omen which Louis Napoleon
perfectly understood. He at once came to take his seat in the Constituent
Assembly, where he was unanimously received as the defender of order and the
champion of democracy. While the Republicans were divided among themselves, and
were becoming more and more undecided between the desires of the people on the
one hand, and the reproaches of a Conservative bourgeoisie on the other, a
union of extremists was being formed against them under the leadership of Louis
Napoleon.
During the
last month in which his Provisional Government held office, Cavaignac tried in
vain to give some more definite pledges to the party of order. To this end he
separated himself from the more moderate section of the Republican party, and
made Dufaure, a Moderate Monarchist, Minister of the Interior, with the result
that he was accused of being a traitor by the Republicans on November 29; but
all to no purpose. In the last days of November, in order to please and
reassure the Catholics, who were alarmed by the Roman insurrection, which had
brought about the assassination of the Minister Rossi, and was on the point of
driving the Pope from Rome, Cavaignac took the step of appointing a special
ambassador, Corcelles, and also organised an armed expedition at Toulon for the
purpose of assisting the Pope. But neither these tardy concessions, nor the
Minister’s efforts to win the
favour of the
masses, who were summoned on December 10, 1848, to elect a President by
universal suffrage, were able to prevent Frenchmen from declaring themselves
for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte by an enormous majority. He was elected to hold
office for four years, by more than five million votes, against one million and
a half given to General Cavaignac. On December 20, the President of the
Constituent Assembly administered the oath to the Prince President, as he was
to be called for the future; an oath by which he undertook to remain faithful
to the democratic Republic, and to perform all the duties required of him by
the Constitution. “ Memories of the Napoleonic legend, dreams of a glorious
future, the fear of communism and of a clerical propaganda, had deceived the
mind of the people, and in consequence the Republic obtained a master.” The
rule of the men of 1848 was over; and now the Moderates also had had their day,
like the Montagnards, Radicals and Socialists who had been dismissed in the
months of June and July.
A proof that
this was the case was furnished without delay by the Government, which the new
chief of the executive power selected on December 29. Constitutionally he
should have chosen his Ministers from the groups possessing a majority in the
Assembly; partly, that is to say, from the Moderate Republicans of the Left,
and partly from the Conservatives or Republicans of the Right, the sometime
Monarchists. He, however, did nothing of the kind. The Assembly indeed retained
its Republican President, Armand Marrast, but every other Republican, however
able, was driven from office. The names of Arago, Marie, Gamier-Pages, and Recurt
were hardly even considered; and still less notice was taken of Senart,
Bastide, Pagnerre, and Barthelemy St Hilaire, although they controlled four
hundred out of the seven hundred votes in the Assembly. The Premiership was
given to Odilon Barrot, a man never at heart a Republican, though he had
overthrown the monarchy, as it were accidentally, while striving to overthrow
Guizot, and who now consented to serve under the new regime, solely in order to
gain power. Drouyn de Lhuys, a diplomatist who had made his fortune under
Thiers, and had won a name for himself while opposing Guizot, was made Minister
of Foreign Affairs; Tracy undertook the Navy; Hyppolite Passy became Minister
of Finance, and Malleville, Minister of the Interior. All these men had been in
the Government of Louis- Philippe. There were indeed only two blots on this
Orleanist Cabinet: namely, Bixio, a Republican, who accepted office, in the
hope of inducing the Government to help suffering Italy, and de Falloux, a
Legitimist, who had been persuaded by his friends, and by the Abbe Dupanloup,
to accept the portfolio of Education, in order that the supremacy of the Church
might be established in that department. It was not long, however, before the
resignation of Bixio and Malleville made way for Leon Faucher, an old opponent
of Guizot’s, who had worked for liberty with much ability under the July
Monarchy, but who was now, at the risk of
sacrificing
liberty, to devote all his former energy and talent to the defence of order
against Socialism. Under these Ministers the Republicans were all ejected from
office. Berger, a friend of Odilon Barrot, who had formerly been a member of
the Dynastic Left, was made Prefect of the Seine; General Changamier became
Commander-in-chief in Paris, and was also given the command of the National
Guard,' although it was illegal for the same officer to hold both appointments.
The Legion of Honour was placed in the hands of Marshal Molitor, a general of
the Empire; and finally a rich pension, as it were, was found for Jerome
Bonaparte, a brother of the great Napoleon, by his being solemnly installed at
the Hotel des Invalides (January, 1849).
What control,
however, could an Assembly representing a mere fraction of the electorate, and
frequently holding diverse opinions, hope to exercise henceforth over a man
supported by five million electors ? The powers wielded by the Constituent
Assembly—never anything but provisional— were necessarily obsolete, now that
the Constitution had become law; while the President’s power had acquired an
additional strength since it rested on a definite form of government founded
upon the Constitution. Ministers, indeed, still humoured the Assembly at times,
but they often made it feel the superior strength of the master whom they
represented. Now and then the Republicans offered a feeble resistance, and
tried to come to an understanding with the Democrats whom they had formerly
opposed. But a common fate awaited both parties. The life of the Republican
Assembly had been prolonged, in spite of its last endeavours to avert the
threatened dictatorship, in spite of a reaction among the Royalist party, and
in spite of its ill-founded claim to remain sitting until all laws
fundamentally necessary to the Constitution had been passed. But now, on January
29,1849, under the coercion of the troops quartered in Paris, mobilised for the
purpose by Changamier, the Assembly was compelled to vote its own dissolution
and agreed, by a majority of five, to retire so soon as it had passed laws for
regulating the Council of State arid the responsibility of the Executive, an
electoral law, and finally a Budget. The Republic did not, however, disappear
abruptly, but still lingered on for several months after this decree.
Its
adversaries, in the meantime, took care not to neglect the lesson to be drawn
from the Republican dissensions which had been so helpful to their own
manoeuvres. Perceiving that the days of the Constituent Asseihbly were
numbered, they took measures for securing the control of the Assembly that would
succeed it. Their first care was to form a united party; for their ranks
included Orleanists who dreamt, like Thiers, of restoring the deposed monarchy;
men who, like Faucher, Barrot and Dufaure, had visions of a bourgeois regime
with a strong Government; declared Bonapartists, like Lucien Murat and Lucien
Bonaparte; Legitimists, like Falloux; and even a very few Republicans. Though
the past of these men differed as widely as their views, whether
120
[l849
avowed or
otherwise, a union was none the less swiftly effected between them by means of
a Committee (Union electorate) which met in the Rue de Poitiers. The common
ground on which all were ready to agree was undoubtedly a policy of “saving
society” by supporting the Church of Rome, which was so admirably qualified, if
only it was strong arid independent, to teach resignation and respect for
authority to a turbulent people. In order to further this polity, subscriptions
were collected in Paris and in the provinces; newspapers were subsidised and
circulated; while pamphlets advocating the cause of religion and hostile to communism
were distributed in town and county. “Woe to church towers if the Socialists
win,” became the common watchword; and Montalembert, the eloquent leader of the
Catholic parly, placing himself at the head of the association, called upon
Liberty to unite with the Church for the purpose of, securing the safety of
society.
It was
Falloux, Montalembert’s friend and accomplice in the Prmce President’s
Government, who now, under the pretence of giving freedom of conscience, became
responsible for a law which handed over the training of the mind to the Church
and the religious Orders. He had barely established himself as Minister of
Education, for the purpose of carrying out this dieme, before he hastened to
summon a special Parliamentary Commission on Education, whose appointed task
was “to secure the freedom of the schools set up by the Republican
Constitution” (January 4, 1849). Very few University men were appointed by the
Minister to this Commission, which was mainly composed of Catholics, such as
Dupanloup, de Melun, and de Riancey, under the presidency of fh’ers. Its first
duty, in the opinion of Falloux, was to shelve the democratic scheme for a
system of elementary education given and controlled by the State, in opposition
to the private schools, which Carnot iiad proposed six months earlier in the
Constituent Assembly. Secondly, though Thiers and Cousin opposed this, it was
to withdraw from the State the monopoly of secondary schools in which the bourgeoisie
were educated, and to sanction the establishment of Catholic schools, and of
education by the religious Orders. At the very outset of these proceedings,
however, the Catholics encountered a difficulty which had not been foreseen.
Certain members of the Constituent Assembly, who had scruples about the work on
which they were engaged^ endeavoured to oppose Falloux by b • aging forward an
alternative scheme for popular instruction. On January 9, Jules Simon, in the
name of the Education Commission, gave the Assembly an opportunity of frustrating
the plan formed by Falloux, the friend of Dupanloup and Lacordaire. This move
was, however defeated, for although the Commission had been nominated by the
Assembly, the Minister was strong enough to delay any examination of its
proposals until the end of the session; and at the coming elections he expected
to obtain a majority which would promote the influence of the Church with
greater docility.
It was not
only the position of the Church in France, however, but also her situation
abroad, which is elsewhere described, that was arousing the attention and zeal
of the Conservatives. Though Cavaignac had offered the Pope assistance, after
his defeat in Rome by the Revolutionists, Pius IX had preferred to take refuge
at Gaeta, under the protection of the King of Naples and of Austria; and thence
he appealed for help to Europe, and the despotic Catholic Powers, rather than
to France, where sympathy with schemes for a free Italy was believed to be
current. In France, the Catholics desired to show their sympathy with the Holy
See by restoring it unconditionally to its former position; while their chief
Falloux had accepted office for the double purpose of establishing “religious liberty,”
and of ensuring “the safety of the Pope in Italy.” Louis Veuillot, a man well
qualified to give evidence on Catholic party history, relates how, previous to
the election of Lapis Napoleon, Montalembert had made Falloux promise to
intervene in Rome on behalf of the Pope.
But in
January, 1849, the Prince President and his Ministers, Odilon Barrot and Drouyn
de Lhuys, found it no easy matter to fulfil this promise. By the terms of the
Constitution, which they had sworn to uphold, they were forbidden to interfere
in quarrels between a sovereign and his people, and they had therefore no right
to intervene between Pius IX and his rebellious subjects. It was hardly
possible for Louis Napoleon to forget, or to make others forget, that, in 1831,
he had himself intrigued and fought in Rome for those liberties which Pius IX
would not grant even now, when defeated and a fugitive. With the President’s
consent, Drouyn de Lhuys suggested that a Congress should be summoned for the
purpose of supporting the Pope; only making the condition that it should not be
held in the King of Naples’ dominions, but in those of the King of Sardinia,
who was at once a Catholic and a Liberal. But a fresh outbreak of hostilities,
and the crushing defeat of Charles Albert at Novara, in March, 1849, soon
obliged Louis Napoleon and his Ministers to abandon their temporising policy.
The revolution in Rome grew more acute after the nomination of a Triumvirate,
of which Mazzini was the violent and despotic leader. By the end of March, 1849,
the Pope’s exile seemed likely to prove a lengthy and serious matter. Meanwhile
Falloux, in the name of the Catholics, who were growing impatient, continually
pressed for some definite action on the part of France. At length Drouyn de
Lhuys took the first step forward, and decided to send de Rayneval and
d’Harcourt to the conference of Catholic States at Gaeta. Afterwards, however,
when .he saw that this conference seemed inclined to give Austria a mandate to
intervene in Rome, he advised Louis Napoleon to take more decisive measures,
and to despatch an army corps to Italy, capable at once of checking the
Austrians on the Roman frontiers, and of striking a wholesome fear into the
hearts of the rebel Republicans.
The
traditional hatred of French Liberals for the Austria of Mettemich and
Schwarzenberg, and their desire to dispute the possession of Italy with that
nation, made Drouyn de Lhuys hope that he would be able to justify this
enterprise in the eyes of the Constituent Assembly, in spite of its being apparently
directed against the Romans; and, on April 16, he did in fact succeed in
carrying his measure. On the other hand, he believed that this seeming attack
upon the rebels would give the President a good opportunity of satisfying and
reassuring the minds of the Catholics. The execution of this very delicate
enterprise was entrusted to General Oudinot; who, though he was to refrain from
attacking the rebels, received instructions “ to bring about the reestablishment
of order,” on a basis in conformity with the legitimate rights of the people,
while at the same time- forcing Rome into submission; and the Pope to accept a
constitution. On August 29,1849, the French troops disembarked at Civita
Vecchia. They encountered no resistance on first landing, for the Romans were
uncertain whether the new arrivals came to defend them against Austria and the
Neapolitans or to restore the Papacy to power. At first, the Pope rejoiced at
the coming of these troops; but his satisfaction was mitigated when the French
Envoys tried to force him to promise that he would grant indulgences and
liberty to his subjects. It soon became evident that the French Government had
been mistaken in believing that the mere presence of its troops would
intimidate Mazzini or induce the Pope to give way. The arrival of General
Oudinot in Italy only served to excite hostilities between the rival parties by
making both contend for the assistance of France.
A choice
between these parties soon became inevitable, nor could the decision of the
French Commander be much in doubt. In the situation in which he found himself—a
situation without a practicable solution—his only advisers were the
diplomatists, d’Harcourt, de Rayneval and Forbin Janson; men who, both from
inclination and from the position which they occupied, would naturally give Way
to the influence of the Roman Catholic party, Forbin Janson indeed, on the word
of a priest, Father Ventura, assured Oudinot that Mazzini’s faction in Rome was
in a minority, and that the majority of the people there were hoping for his
intervention. On April 30, accordingly, on the strength of this information, he
risked an attack upon the city, and was defeated outside the gates of Rome.
Without any actual orders, in defiance indeed of the decrees and instructions
of the Constituent Assembly, he had declared war against the Roman Republic and
his attempt had been a failure.
On May
7,1849, when this news became known in Paris, the indignation among the
Republican party fully equalled the joy experienced by the circle in the Rue de
Poitiers. A stormy sitting in the Assembly showed, for an instant, how strong
the Republicans might have been if they had only been united. The Moderates
too—irritated at being
1849]
123
dragged into
a war against liherty—(although they had refused to fight for it), and
indignant at the open violation of the Constitution, united their reproaches
and their votes with those of the Radicals In a motion proposed by Senart, and
carried by a majority of a hundred, Jules Favre and Ledru-Rollin both condemned
the conduct of the Government. To appease this violent opposition, Drouyn de
Lhuys offered to suspend hostilities against the Roman Republic; while on May
9, he hurriedly despatched Ferdinand de Lesseps to Italy, in the hope that the
negotiations of a diplomatist of strong will and well-known Liberalism would be
ahle to repair the mischief caused by Oudinot’s unfortunate attack. But
whatever chance of success such a mission might have in Rome itself, it was
condemned in France before it started;
But what did
the wishes of a dying Assembly matter to the Catholics or the Conservatives ?
Oudinot’s abrupt attack upon the Pope’s enemies was exactly what they wanted,
and they were therefore certain to find excuses for it and to turn it to some
good account. In the first place it was an excellent pledge to offer to the
Catholic electors at the opening of the electoral campaign. The honour of the
Church and of the French army required to he avenged; and Falloux had no
difficulty in making the Prince President understand and acquiesce in the
wishes of the Catholic party. The occurrence, indeed, supplied Louis Napoleon
with an admirable opportunity of strengthening his own majority in the next
Assembly. He now formed a closer alliance with the Conservatives for the
purpose of ousting the Republicans; forbade his Minister to send reinforcements
to General Oudinot; and caused Lesseps to convey the following message, which,
on May 9, he also had published in the Presidential paper La Patrie, to that
officer: “ Our military honour is at stake, I will not suffer it to receive any
injury.” Copies of the letter containing these words were also distributed to
every regiment “ for the purpose of attaching the army more closely to the
chief of the State.” As the elections were imminent there can be no doubt that
Louis Napoleon desired to increase his prestige by a show of zeal against the
Roman insurgents. The furious indignation of the Republicans, who, on May 11,
1849, endeavoured to overthrow the Ministry, did not prevent Leon Faucher from
sending to the Prifets (May 12) a list containing the names of those deputies
who disapproved of the Roman expedition, in order that the electors might be
urged not to vote for them. At the same time, emboldened by the knowledge that
its desire to involve France in the defence of the Holy See was connived at by
the Presidency, the Union Libirale, the organ of the association i l the Rue de
Poitiers, did not scruple to apply such terms as “Socialist” and “Insurgent”
to even the most moderate Republicans, who were only desirous of maintaining
French neutrality in the quarrel between the Pope and his subjects. “The honour
of the country and of the army” was cleverly turned to account, and used for
the advantage of the reactionary parties
by Louis
Napoleon; and on May 18,1849, this fortunate phrase secured a victory at the
elections.
At these
elections the Conservatives won eighteen seats out of twenty-eight in Paris,
while five hundred out of the seven hundred candidates recommended by the
association in the Rue de Poitiers were successful in the provinces. The
unanimity among the Republican party, which the Roman question had seemed for a
moment to promote in the Assembly, had not been extended to the country. Moderate
men like Arago, Bastide, Lamartine, Marrast, Carnot, and Jules Favre, had
refiised to stand at the elections as members of the coalition that Ledru-
Rollin, Madier de Montjau, and Greppo had endeavoured to form with the
Socialists for the purpose of defending the Republic. In consequence, the
Moderate Republicans were utterly crushed; and even the most popular man among
them, Dupont de l’Eure, only obtained 40,000 votes out of 274,000. Their role
was indeed over; and henceforth they disappeared among the Royalists who had
succeeded in uniting themselves with the Church and Louis Napoleon, or among
those Democrats whose alliance they had formerly refused. An event of
particular significance was the defeat of such a man as Lamartine, whose name
and prestige had secured a majority for his party in 1848.
Though the
defeat of these men was highly agreeable to General Cavaignac’s fortunate
rival, and to the Conservative party, it did not, after all, mean the final
extinction of the democratic Republic which they had desired to establish in
France. In Paris, the Social Democrats had secured only 30,000 votes less than
the Conservatives; while in the provinces, two hundred deputies, entirely
devoted to Republican principles, had been returned to oppose the Conservatives
in the new Assembly. When the Revolution had broken out in February, very few
people had dreamed of realising Republican ideas; and the democratic regime
which had then been established, as if by chance, had not been supported by any
definitely constituted party. But a year later, in 1849, in spite of the
sanguinary conflicts which were agitating France and Europe, such a party was
being insensibly formed by a rapprochement between statesmen who recognised the
power and the rights of the people, and a people who began to perceive the
uselessness of rioting and violence. This new force had been organised by
Ledru-Rollin by means of banquets and popular committees. The communistic
theories also, whose advocacy of confiscation had formerly caused so much
alarm, had now been replaced by a Socialistic propaganda encouraging the
formation of friendly societies among the lower classes, and urging them to
engage in solid undertakings for the advancement of the general prosperity. The
May elections were a real triumph for Ledru-Rollin, who was elected in five
departments by two million votes. The departments of the Est, Alsace, the
Haute Saone, the Jura, the Saone et Loire, the Ain, the Rhone, the Isere, the
Ardeche, and also several departments
of the Centre,
such as the Loir et Cher, the Cher, the Nievre, and the Creuse, all pronounced
themselves in favour of a Social Democratic Republic. Even in the army, as its
generals themselves admitted, the party which was still strong in the Assembly
and in certain districts, could reckon upon a considerable number of adherents;
while Tocqueville observes that the Democrats, who had believed their cause
utterly lost, were as much intoxicated with joy when their successes became
known as if they had gained a majority at the elections.
During the
last days of the Constituent Assembly, these Democrats had already made furious
attacks upon the Government and the Conservatives, who had leagued together
for their destruction. On May 19, they had managed to reject a Bill brought
forward by the Government for the purpose of legalising the position of General
Changamier. On May 22, Ledru-Rollin and Sarrans had demanded vigorous action in
defence of the liberties of the people, that is to say, a complete reversal of
the policy of the Roman expedition. Had not General Changamier kept the troops
then in Paris shut up in their barracks, they might even have succeeded in
persuading the Assembly to declare itself en permanence, and in giving the
signal for an armed resistance. The pretext, or motive, for such a proceeding
on their part would have been the blow aimed by the President and his Ministers
at the Constitution by their conduct in the Roman question. But on May 27,
1849, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly had parted the combatants.
At Rome,
meanwhile, all through this crisis Lesseps was ceaselessly trying to make the
Romans submit to the Pope by promises of liberty and a Constitution. But,
between General Oudinot on the one hand, who would not abandon his intention of
entering the city by force, and Mazzini and Garibaldi on the other, who were
firmly resolved to prevent him, his task was by no means easy. On May 16,
nevertheless, he succeeded in obtaining an armistice from the French General;
and on May 18, he persuaded the Roman Assembly to appoint some plenipotentiaries
with views more moderate than Mazzini’s. But, on the following day, Mazzini and
the violent party once more obtained the upper hand in Rome; while Oudinot
insisted upon a renewal of hostilities, and became even more warlike after the
arrival of General Vaillant from Paris, with orders to supersede him if he
should give way. On May 24, however, after threatening the Romans with a
definite rupture, a menace which was confirmed by an ultimatum delivered on May
29, Lesseps at length succeeded in signing a treaty with the Roman Republic, by
which the city gates were to be opened to the French army, if it would promise
to respect the rights of the nation.
On the very
day on which Lesseps issued his ultimatum, he was curtly recalled by a telegram
from Drouyn de Lhuys, as if he had ill- acquitted himself of his mission or
failed in obedience. On June 1 an order was telegraphed to General Oudinot from
Pans, contrary to his
;xpectations,
to break off negotiations, to attack Rome, and to take it by storm. It was the
effect of the pressure brought to bear at headquarters by d’Harcourt and de
Rayneval, who advocated the immediate and unconditional' restoration of the
Pope, and by the German Jesuits, who were financially supporting this French
crusade. It was the consequence of the wishes which they had conveyed to Paris
through a determined Catholic, Prince de La Tour, d’Auvergne. Lastly it was the
welcome extended by the Ministry to the Catholic majority in the Legislative
Assembly. The first sitting had been held on May 28; and already the Catholics
were growing uneasy to find Odilon Barrot hesitating between them and the more
moderate deputies of the Centre, such as Dufaure, Tocqueville, and Lanjuinais.
It was to reassure them and quiet their apprehensions that the Prince President
had sacrificed Rome and the convention signed by Lesseps. That diplomat
returned in amazement to France, to be rewarded for his efforts by disavowal
and censure for having failed to carry out his instructions; while General
Oudinot began the siege of Rome on June 3, and on the 30th entered through the
breach. A fortnight later, the Catholics saw the close of their cherished
crusade: a solemn Te Deum was sung at St Peter’s celebrating the victory of,
France over the Roman Republic, and the unconditional restoration of pontifical
authority.
At the same
time Falloux had hastened to lay on the table of the Legislative Assembly his
Bill for liberty of instruction claimed by Catholics and religious communities
for nearly twelve years (June 18). A week later a commission had already been
appointed to investigate it; and, on July 3,1849, the Catholic majority,
rejoicing just then in the return of the Pope to Rome, asserted their
determination to carry through with the utmost speed “this Roman campaign at
home,” as Montalembert called it. The Constitution, however, prescribed a preliminary
enquiry by the Council of State, in the case of a law of such importance. But
when it came to obtaining control of education in France and achieving their
purposes, Falloux and the Catholic majority did not trouble themselves about
constitutional forms, any more than they had done in their defence of the Pope.
The Catholic
party had the power, and they meant to use or even abuse it. The fruitless
attempt of Ledru-Rollin and Martin Bernard, on June 13, to stir the people of
Paris to revolt furnished an excellent pretext to decimate the Democratic party
by means of severe measures •^-arrests in Paris and in the provinces,
prosecutions and a state of siege.. Banquets were forbidden, mutual benefit
societies dissolved, and Republican school-teachers suspended or arbitrarily
dismissed. These excessive measures of repression were as ill-judged as the
abortive rising of June 13; besides, they overshot the mark. It became evident
that this so-called vindication of order was to culminate1 in the
subjection of the nation to the Catholic party. This stimulated the
Republican
propaganda: the prosecutions secured readers for such newspapers as Le
National—whose editors, Duras and Jules Simon, were now disposed for an
understanding with the Democrats—Le SiZcle, La Republique, UEvenement, prime
mover in which last was Victor Hugo, and especially La Presse, which Iilmile de
Girardin suddenly brought round again to the party of liberty, as public
opinion shifted. In the country districts La Feuille du Village disseminated
information among the peasants. The municipal and departmental elections more
than anything else indicated the progress of this propaganda. None were more
characteristic than the ballots of July 14: nineteen Socialist and Democratic
deputies had been shut out from the Assembly by the High Court entrusted with
the trial of the culprits of June 13. To supply their places the Union
Lib&rale of the Rue de Poitiers had produced a list, mainly of Royalists
like Malleville, Delessert, Ferdinand Barrot and Ducos, and of Moderates such
as Lanjuinais and Boinvilliers, who always rallied round a Bonaparte. This list
passed by only a very small majority over the Republican list, which mustered
nearly 100,000 votes. So the strength of the Republican Opposition was growing.
The
contending parties then were the Catholic Conservatives and the Republican
Democrats, two vast bodies each disputing as to the power or tenets of the
other; and, between the two, the Prince President at that time began by degrees
to make his weight felt and to sketch out his own independent policy. His
election and his fate, prior to the development tending to divide Catholics and
Republicans into oppc. i ue camps, had been determined by the
movement which, on the strength of his name, had at the close of 1848 brought
together the numerous adherents of Communism, and also the people who since the
days of June bore a grudge against the Republican bourgeoisie. Louis Napoleon
had no intention of being completely drawn over to the Right, nor of losing his
influence with the masses, the peasantry, and the army by adopting a Catholic
reactionary policy. Though he might propose to remain the guardian of order in
the face of clubs, democratic Press, and mob, he did not wish to be the tool
either of the Monarchy or of the Church. On the contrary the mode of operation
best calculated to develop and assure his power in the country seemed to him
that of striking the political mean. Between the rival parties, on various
grounds so distracting for France, an intermediate party must be interposed
for which preparations had long since been made, and which was destined when
the time should be ripe to supersede both in his interests. The history of the
Legislative Assembly thus became to all appearances that of a , , , Catholic
Republic contending with Liberal and popular Oppositions; in reality events
were simply paving the way for a personal government.
From the
outset, Louis Napoleon had clearly shown that he had no intention of joining
the Monarchist and Catholic majority, since he had selected more Liberal
Ministers such as Tocqueville, Lanjuinais,,and
128
Louis Napoleon and the Holy See.
[l849
Dufaure, to
the last of whom, on the model of Cavaignac, he had entrusted the Ministry of
the Interior (June 2). After the capture of Rome the Ministry prorogued the
Assembly from August 13 to September 30. People openly talked of a coup d'etat,
which was precisely what took place—save that the President’s action was less
serious than had been feared, though sufficiently so to furnish a lesson for
the Catholics and a pledge for the Liberals. The opportunity was provided for
him by the Roman question—the pivot on which the internal affairs of France
just then turned. Louis Napoleon had restored the Pope by force: he wished it
to be known that—as a former champion of the liberties of Rome—he would not
suffer Pius IX and Antonelli to set up an absolutist regime once more, although
a sort of white terror (terreur blanche) had already begun on July 15 in Rome.
He sent his aide-de-camp, Edgar Ney, to remonstrate with the Pope; and finally,
on August 18, he published Ney’s instructions, in the form of a letter
compounded of expostulations and demands, which scandalised the Holy See.
France, or rather her leader, dared to present a sort of ultimatum to the Holy
See, embodying a total amnesty, lay administration, and Liberal institutions.
Pius IX, who could not dispense with the French troops, dared not show his
anger by a refusal. In a brief of September 12, motu proprio, he promised
reforms, but without really granting them. Instead of discharging his debt he
signed a bill for payment at a remote date. Napoleon was not baffled by this
dilatory reply: he insisted on his Ministers demanding from the Holy See an
amendment to the pontifical brief, namely the voting of supplies by an elective
assembly; but he had reckoned on a Ministry more amenable to his orders than to
the will of the majority in the Assembly which controlled the Ministers.
When the
Legislative met on October 1,1849, the Catholics did not seem inclined to
approve or support the conditions imposed on the Holy See by the Prince
President. “It would be an odious piece of inconsistency to force the will of a
sovereign whose independence we were but now vindicating,” exclaimed
Montalembert with enthusiastic applause from the majority. Odilon Barrot and
his colleagues, yielding to Falloux’ influence and to fear, did not venture to
question this. They declared, in agreement with Thiers, reporter to the
commission, that after all the Pope’s brief was satisfactory and in compliance
with the President’s letter. The Assembly approved by a large majority of the
expeditionary corps remaining in Rome in the Pope’s service unconditionally
and even for the purpose of supporting a reactionary policy5; and
thus they virtually pronounced against Louis Napoleon.
The President
resolved on a decisive step, namely, the dismissal of a Ministry which had not
upheld his policy of opposing the pretensions of the Catholic party. As early
as May 30, 1849, he had commissioned Odilon Barrot “to secure Ministers who
would be devoted to his own
1849-50] Louis Napoleon's new Ministry.
129
person.”
Barrot had shirked this task, preferring to retain his influence in the
Parliament. Without consulting the Assembly, the; President sent for General
d’Hautpoul on October 31 and put him in office, giving him for coadjutors new
men who were to be simply exponents of his own opinions and policy. These new
Ministers were: Rouher for Justice, de Rayneval and then Ducos de La Hitte for
Foreign Affairs, Ferdinand Barrot for the Interior, de Parieu for Public
Instruction, Fould for Finance. The message which he bade them read contained
one passage which was a programme in itself: “No sooner were the dangers of the
mob safely past than the parties were seen to raise their standards afresh,
renew their rivalry, and alarm the country by sowing seeds of unrest broadcast.
In the midst of this confusion France looks to the guiding hand, the will, and
the standard of him whom she elected on December 10. That victory of December
10 involved a whole system, for the name of Napoleon is a programme in itself
alone. Let us then exalt authority without detriment to true liberty.”
It was in
point of fact a dictatorship, which began from October 81,
1849, under pretext of “ exalting authority.”
The most vigorous participator in the undertaking, whose talent and zeal were
absolutely Jevoted to the President, was the Auvergne lawyer Rouher, who sought
to find means for the satisfaction of his ambition in the establishment of a
regime of authority. As Keeper of the Seals he did not scruple, for the undoing
of the Republicans, to make “red, rabid, anarchist” criminals of them. For this
piece of policy he made use of the administration of justice. The
procureurs-generaux were bidden to give information every month against the
organisation of the Democratic party, its newspapers, its associations, its
dealings both open and secret, and even against those holders of office in the
other departments who were suspected of halfheartedness or complicity. The
Minister of War was equally zealous in his use of the gendarmerie, circulating
orders for them to watch “itinerant demagogues,” and to give notice of all
persons in authority and even school-teaehers favourable to subversive
doctrines. On December 13,1849, the Minister of Public Instruction, Parieu,
asked the Assembly while waiting for the voting of a law on education, that the
school-teachers iii each department might be set under the control and at the
disposal of the prefects. It was clear that, by the prosecution of the
Republicans as anarchists, the presidential authority further aimed at setting
up for itself in the country an army of officials, who should be perfectly amenable
to its designs and ready to fall in with them, whatever they might be.
On January 2,
1850, the Royalist and Catholic majority attempted an almost successful
opposition to this plan. It was only by a majority of one vote that the Bill,
putting the school-teachers under the control of the prefect1;, was
passed. Royalists and Catholics retaliated by opposing the Education Bill,
which the Government had been adroit enough to delay and refer to the Council
of State on November 7, 1849. The
President
perceived the threat; the Assembly itself was dismayed by its audacity. On the
advice of Dupin and Mole they agreed to a compromise, and voted for Parieu’s
Bill, on condition that the Government pledged themselves to support at no
distant date that Bill dear to the Catholics, the Education Bill drawn up by
Falloux. This Bill, which in the history of French education has retained the
name of “Falloux’ Act,” was finally passed on March 15, 1850.
The
fundamental yet evident principle of this enactment was to confirm in the
primary schools and extend to secondary education the right of all citizens to
give instruction, and further to charge the State with the burden of providing
national education—transferred to it by Napoleon I* when he created the
University and the lycees, and by Guizot in his Act dealing with the schools in
1833. But for the Catholics, who thus secured the right of competing with the state
schools, the law meant something very different. Primary, communal and departmental
schools, the lycees, and the masters in these schools, were placed under the
influence of the Church. Four archbishops, elected by their colleagues, were
put by the Church on the governing body of the University to inspect the
programmes of lectures, to examine books, and to enquire into abuses. On the
provincial academic Councils she placed two priests, one of them a bishop, to
supervise the masters; and, lastly, she obtained for rural cures the right of
inspection of schools themselves. At the same time the Act gave special
facilities to those schools which the Catholic party proposed to found,
availing itself of the liberty of competition for the religious communities,
whose existence was not then, however, recognised in France. If it was a
question of a primary school, the certificate of competency required from state
masters or from independent professors was not required from members of the
Church: if of a secondary school, where only state masters with degrees
attesting considerable attainments were allowed to teach, no proof of learning
was asked from the teachers in the case of Catholic schools. On granting their
premises to free (i.e. Catholic) schools, the communes and departments were
exempted from obedience to the law obliging them to provide education at their
own expense. By means of such immnniti'ga Falloux’ Act, which proclaimed
liberty as a natural right, was destined, above all else, to subject that very
liberty to the influence and advancement of the Catholic clergy.
Louis
Napoleon’s Government would have been satisfied with Parieu’s Act, passed on
January 9,1850, which, under pretext of protecting the school-teachers from
Socialistic doctrines, placed them at the Government’s discretion. It
acquiesced in Falloux’ Act because it had been committed to it from the outset
and, by going back on its word, it would have provoked a conflict with the
Catholics in the Assembly, to the advantage of the Democratic party. The
passing of these two Acts in succession produced a temporary compromise between
the Prince
i85o] Bye-elections in Paris and the departments.
131
President and
the Legislative, a provisional entente directed against their mutual
enemies—Republicans, Liberals, Democrats, and Socialists. On March 15 this
ill-assorted but useful compact seemed to them still more necessary, because
the system of repression practised during the past year produced an effect on
these enemies contrary to calculation* On March 10, five days before the
passing of Falloux’ Act, the people of Paris and of the departments were
summoned to a ballot, in order to fill the thirty-one vacancies in the
Assembly. The Republican list, with men like Carnot, Vidal and de Flotte, was carried
by a majority of a tVinnsanH votes over the list from the Rue de Poitiers
supported by Louis Napoleon. In the provinces, eighteen Republicans were
elected out of twenty-eight. This popular revulsion to Republicanism was due to
the final completion and cementing of the union between Moderates, Radicals,
and Socialists which was effected once a dictatorship seemed imminent and a
clerical reaction to be feared. Henceforth the time could be foreseen when, by
an inverse process to that which came about in 1848, Republicans of all shades
of opinion would unite and regain the ground which their divisions had cost
them, while the Union Liberate dissolved into partisans and opponents of Louis
Napoleon.
This was the
second decisive move in the policy of the Prince President. As he had imposed
his will on the Catholic majority on October 81, 1849, so, on March 16, 1850,
he opposed it to the progress of the Republican minority, which threatened to
become a majority just as formidable to his ambition. Under pretext of
protecting society, which he declared to be in danger, he made Pierre Jules
Baroche Minister of the Interior. Baroche had attracted attention as magistrate
by the zeal with which he had successively opposed Guizot and, after December
10, 1848, the Republicans. The personnel of the Second Empire was made up of
Rouher, Fould and shortly afterwards Morny. Moreover it was amusing to see
Baroche, one of those who had organised Radical banquets for the extension of
the property qualification for the franchise, making ready with the same zeal
to “rectify universal suffrage. Baroche threw himself heart and soul into this
task, prosecuting newspapers and clubs; but just then a fresh election became
necessary in Paris as Vidal, one of the candidates of March 10, chose to sit
for his constituency in Alsace. Things went in favour of Eugene Sue, the
popular writer, on April 28, 1850, thus contributing to the superiority of the
Republican party. Baroche at once took in hand a scheme for “ rectifying
universal suffrage,” suggested to the Conservatives by their defeat in Paris on
March 10, which he introduced in the Assembly on May 8,1850. A committee, of
which Leon Faucher was chosen reporter, decided in favour of this scheme on May
18. On May 31 the Ligislative did likewise, after stormy debates, in which
Montalembert was accused by Victor Hugo of having abjured his whole past as a
Liberal, and Thiers brought about his own recall to the people’s confidence.
There
was an end of
the matter. Nearly three million citizens found that they were deprived of
their political rights on the pretext that they had not resided three years in
one place, and were consequently “vagabonds,” or “anarchists” and “criminals,”
if they had taken part in a club or secret society, or if they had been
convicted before a political tribunal. Shortly afterwards clubs and public
meetings even for election purposes were forbidden, for the future, by the Act
of June 9, 1850.
Following on
these enactments a regular reign of terror and persecution was deliberately
inaugurated against the Republican party throughout France. The Administration
of Justice under Rouher cooperated with the Executive under Baroche. House to
house distribution of books or pamphlets, meetings and banquets, in any form,
were forbidden. The Republican representatives of the nation were reduced to
receiving their constituents one at a time in caf&s watched by the police.
Any gathering of people who might talk politics was eyed with suspicion by
gendarmes, magistrates, and prefects. The houses of Republicans were searched
daily. The smallest societies where Republicans met were signalised and broken
up as secret societies. The Republican newspapers were hunted down and
overwhelmed with lawsuits and fines. Officials, postmen, surveyors of roads,
and school-teachers were dismissed on the slightest suspicion. Mayors, officers
of the National Guard, and municipal councillors suffered a like fate so soon
as information had been given against them. The cry of “ Vive la
Republique" became an act of sedition, that of “Vive Napoleon" was
commended and rewarded. Absurd as it may seem even the wearing of red in belts,
ties, or caps became actionable.
These
reactionary measures paralysed the Republican propaganda just when it was
deprived of means of action in the Assembly. There was at that time some
thought of a rising among many Democrats like Michel de Bourges and his friends
the London exiles, Ledru-Rollin and others; but the more politic among
them—Bernard, Lavergne, Grevy and Cavaignac—contented themselves with
exercising the right of speaking in the Assembly. They denounced, at every
opportunity, these glaring infringements of justice, hoping that an appeal to
the country would before long give the nation a voice once more, and that
justice would then be avenged. Patience being a virtue of the strong, the
Democrats proved their strength by the practice of it. They desired their party
to abstain from voting till 1852, in order to signify their intention and fixed
determination to have no part in political institutions, which—for the time
being—had no more than a superficial claim to legality. By their policy the
Republicans gained this point, that, in face of their opponents who were taking
advantage of power for their own ends, they remained the party of justice, of
liberty as against absolutism, of established order as against the abettors of
civil strife. Thus, despite persecution, they were nourished on something
better than hopes. Soon the Royalists, in their turn, were struck in the person
of Changamier, who was deprived
of the
command of the army of Paris. On January 9, 1851, Louis Napoleon formed a
Ministry of action, in which were included Rouher, Baroche, Fould, and
Saint-Amaud, and Thiers was able to say to the Assembly: “The Empire is already
in existence.’’
From 1851
onwards the whole question was not whether the Empire would come into being,
but how, by legitimate means or by force. If it was to be accomplished
legitimately, the Constitution would have to be modified, in particular Article
45 forbidding the reelection of the President after four years’ tenure of
office. At the instigation of the Prefects the Conseils-generaux had since
August, 1850, expressed themselves in favour of the removal by the Assembly of
this limit in the case of Louis Napoleon; some had even advocated a consulship
for life. The President was, first of all, in favour of effecting this act of
usurpation without violence, preferring to have the supreme power accorded to
him rather than to seize it. After governing by an emergency Ministry, which he
appointed on January 17, 1851, in place of his Ministry whose fall had been
effected by the vote of the Assembly—after proving to the Assembly that he
could dispense with it and was even then doing so—he offered the Royalists an
opportunity of coming to an understanding with him. Those approached by him
were, first of all, Odilon Barrot, Malleville and Tocqueville, subsequently
Faucher and Buffet, all men who could never be expected to countenance violent
measures. On April 10, 1851, they accepted his promise of loyal support from
the presidency if they would faithfully endeavour to extort from the Assembly a
vote approving the prolongation of his tenure of office. Such were Louis
Napoleon’s efforts to secure a peaceful revision of the Constitution.
The new
Ministers, among whom were Rouher, Baroche and Magne, left no stone unturned in
their attempts to reconcile public opinion and even to utilise it in breaking
down parliamentary opposition. Up till May 28, 1851, the time when the
proposals desired by the Assembly were to be brought forward, the opinion of
the country appeared favourable, especially in those departments in which the
Bonapartist party had first been built up. The intentions of parties in the
Chamber continued uncertain: the Republican party took their stand from the
first. They could not pronounce in favour of preparing the way for a
dictatorship, were it never so legal a one. The Monarchist party, who formed a
majority, were disposed towards this solution, since they shared Berryer’s
illusion that an entire revision would fully vindicate justice, and tend to
bring about a restoration previously approved by such Orleanists as Mole.
Uncompromising Orleanists like Thiers, who desired to overthrow Louis Napoleon
and set aside the Comte de Chambord, allied with the Republicans to defeat
absolutely the programme of the President and his Ministers. The partisans of
Bonapartist power, already numerous in the Chamber, who constituted the party
of the Elysee, were bestirring themselves on the other side and
to their joy
discovered many politicians in the ranks of Legitimists and Orleanists, who
were resigned to a prolongation of Louis Napoleon’s authority in order to avoid
a coup d'etat and delay the irreparable. De Broglie came to terms with Leon
Faucher on this point, and his influence was still great in Orleanist circles.
Persigny, a friend of the Prince and a former Legitimist, tried to win
Changamier’s concurrence on these grounds and by means of promises likely to
appease his rancour.
In short,
there was certainly a majority in favour of the legal solution, which the
Prince President laid before the House. But, according to constitutional law, a
majority for the revision was not sufflcient. The votes in favour had to be
three-quarters of the total number of voters, and out of about 710 entitled to
register their opinion over 180 (more than a quarter) were obdurate
Republicans. Perhaps it was in order to win adherents in the group thus
entitled to decide between dictatorship and monarchy that Louis Napoleon went
away to Lyons, and made a speech there on June 1, 1851, which was calculated to
conciliate the Democrats. This produced no effect whatever: when on July 8
Tocqueville opened the debate on the revision with a favourable statement,
Michel de Bourges and Victor Hugo declared that not a single Republican would
vote for it. On July 19 the project of revision was thrown out by nearly 100
votes: “The Constitution will not be revised,” said a deputy, “ it can almost
be said to have ceased to be.” After voting, the Assembly decided to rise as
usual on August 10 for a recess of two months and a half—an interval which, in
1849 and 1850, the President had turned to such good account for the
furtherance of his fortunes.
And did Louis
Napoleon use it, as has been said, for the preparation this time of those
violent measures, which seemed the sole expedient for maintaining his power,
now that the attempt at a legal solution had been foiled? It was observed that
Saint-Amaud, General Magnan, and Colonel Fleury were summoned to Paris. They
were young officers from Africa, who were supposed to possess the energy and
decision of youth needful for carrying out a coup de main. Maupas, Prefect of
Haute Garonne and the Prince’s confidant, and Count Momy, who was a member of
the family, and devoid of all scruple, were now more frequent visitors at the
Elysee; and between August 11 and September 9, in the retirement of
Saint-Cloud, they considered with Carlier, Prefect of Police, the question of
the right moment and conduct of a coup d’etat. It seems for a time that the
President demurred at making the final decision.
Tocqueville,
who was his Minister, has said: “ Louis Napoleon was very vacillating in his
plans. He was often seen to alter his course, advance, pause and then retire,
greatly to his own loss: for the nation had chosen him to dare all things, and
what it expected of him was valour and not discretion. He had always been much
addicted to pleasure. His passion for common amusements and his taste for
comfort had increased with the facilities of power. He let his energy thus
become
daily
enfeebled and his ambition abate and die away.” Up to the moment for attempting
the final stroke the President hesitated between the desire to establish
himself firmly in power without risking anything and the fear of losing that
power if he risked nothing.
After
contemplating the coup d'Hat for October, 1851, when he saw the Assembly on the
point of resuming its sittings, he thought that he would make one last attempt
on legal lines. He knew that it was only the stubborn opposition of the
Republicans, which had in July baffled his desire to protract his authority,
and he suddenly conceived of a device for appeasing them. He announced his
intention of restoring the people to all their rights and of abrogating the
electoral law of May 81, 1850j and he gave the grounds for his action in his
message of November 4. “This restoration of universal suffrage affords one more
chance of securing the revision.” But from October 12 the opposition of the
Ministry, which resigned in a body rather than accept this challenge to the
Conservative Assembly, and the certain opposition of that Assembly, induced the
President to anticipate it. On October 27 he summoned de Maupas to the
Prefecture of Police for Paris in these terms: “ Here I am on the edge of a
ditch full of water; on the other side I see safety for the country. I need
some men to help me across this ditch. Will you be one of them?” Maupas had
accepted, and so above all had Saint-Amaud, who was to replace General Randon
in the War Department. Lamoriciere had said of him: “ When you see Saint-Amaud
a Minister, say: Here is the coup d'itat.'" The other Ministers, except
Giraud and Fortoul, were men of no weight and behind them lurked Momy awaiting
the critical moment, when he would assume the management of the conspiracy at
the Ministry of the Interior. The plot was carried on in perfect secrecy during
November, 1851, whilst the Assembly, which was reduced to the defensive,
attempted at the instigation of its Quaestors to guarantee its own
inviolability and existence by a law, empowering the Assembly’s President to
claim the armed force and all authority. The Republicans had defeated this
Quaestors’ Bill by a majority of one hundred. The Royalists had set aside the
Electoral Bill approved by the Republicans. Members seemed incapable of
combining for decisive effort Maupas, Persigny, Saint- Amaud, Momy and
Mocquard, bringing Louis Napoleon’s final hesitations to an abrupt conclusion,
laid their plans in profound secrecy during the last days of November.
First of all
a decree was drawn up by Momy and mysteriously printed during the night of
December 1-2, embodying a proclamation informing and advising the people of the
dissolution of the Assembly and the restoration of universal suffrage, and
convening the electors from December 14 to 21 for a plibiscite to decide about
the revision of the Constitution. When the Parisians read these notices, they
were confronted by the whole army of Paris called out in readiness to uphold
136
[1851
them. The
people’s representatives found the Palais Ugislatif occupied since dawn by two
regiments of the line. They soon heard too that at sunrise the most prominent
men among them, Royalist as well as Republican generals, had been taken to the
prison of Mazas under the pretext of their having conspired against the State:
those so treated were Bedeau, Changamier, Lamoriciere, Cavaignac, Leflo,
Colonel Charras; Thiers and Roger du Nord of the Orleanist leaders; and of the
Republicans Cholat, Valentin, Greppo, Nadaud, Miot, Baune and Lagrange.
Warrants had at the same time been issued against seventy Republicans,
journalists or members of Democratic societies, who were to be arrested “in
order to make the Republic more sure,” as Louis Napoleon put it. In short, all
the men, and the parties, who in July had opposed the revision of the
Constitution, were rendered powerless under pretext of conspiracy, whether in
the interests of crown or people. The manoeuvre had been rapidly executed and
promised to be successful.
Such
representatives of the people, however, as were still at large, tried under
Berryer’s leadership to organise some form of legal opposition at the Mairie of
the Tenth Arrondissement, in the quartier St Germain, where the Legitimist
party reckoned its strongest adherents. Two hundred deputies of all parties met
for a last sitting and proclaimed the fall of Louis Napoleon and the
continuance of the Assembly, although they possessed no means of enforcing
their decisions or the law of the land. At the orders of Maupas, General Forey
cleared the hall and had these last supporters of legality conveyed between
lines of soldiers to prison in some neighbouring barracks.
The
Republican representatives had tried another expedient for resisting the
establishment of a dictatorship. Camot, de Flotte, Jules Favre, Victor Hugo,
Michel de Bourges, Madier de Montjau, and Schoelcher formed themselves into a
committee of opposition and decided on a popular rising for December 3 in the
Faubourg St Antoine. A few barricades were raised there and also near the
Hailes. But the whole day passed off without any events of consequence. It was
not till the evening, from seven o’clock till midnight, that a serious
disturbance ensued on news arriving that Baudin had met his death on a
barricade. Saint-Arnaud left things to take their course until the afternoon of
the next day; then, when he had given his troops the needful time to rest and recuperate,
he hurled his cavalry brigades on the boulevards against the artisan districts
in the centre, drove the mob back, and overwhelmed it, so that in a few hours
he was master of the situation. Blows had been dealt thick and fast, and no
qftarter given; without warning an unarmed crowd of pedestrians and onlookers
had been fired on with grape-shot on the Boulevard Poissoniere, and then the
company had passed on at once to complete its work of brutal repression.
Morny had
installed himself too, in hot haste, as Minister of the Interior. Louis
Napoleon Bonaparte might be master of the Assembly and of Paris, but France was
not yet at his feet. Momy, who was
185l]
137
devoid of
scruples and full of energy and devotion for his cause, was the very man for
this hazardous post. It was vital that everything should be prepared so that,
when the people were summoned in a fortnight’s time to vote for the
restoration of the Empire, they might not be overruled by the influence of
Republican leaders, committees, and newspapers of which the progress, even in
the rural districts, had been daily apparent during the past two years. Morny
kindled the enthusiasm of his prefects and sub-prefects by despatches. In order
to make ready for the great national plebiscite, he authorised them after
December 4, 1851, to replace justices of the peace, mayors, and schoolteachers,
whose concurrence was not vouched for by an oath in writing. He ordered them to
arrest instantly any person attempting to disturb the peace, and to suspend any
newspaper that might damage their side by its polemics. On December 5 he
requested the prefects to give information against sub-prefects not showing
sufficient zeal in the performance of this task. On December 6 he forbade them
for the future to let a single newspaper appear unless they had seen the
proofs. “The Administration,” he said, “needed all its moral force to
accomplish its work of regeneration and salvation.” On the 7th the Ministry had
a list of the authors of disorder, and the leaders of the Socialist party drawn
up in every part of France, and a decree of December 8 treated as convicts and
criminals at common law “ all these rascally members of secret societies and
unrecognised political associations.”
There was a
twofold purpose in these terrorist measures: the framework and heads of the
Republican organisation prepared in the departments, in view of the elections
of 1852, must be speedily demolished before the ballot to which France was
summoned; and, on the other hand, the friends of law and order, both
Conservatives and Royalists, must be persuaded by reason of impending anarchy
to rally on the day of the voting to the policy of the Elysde. The risings
which took place in Democratic centres in the provinces at the news of the Coup
d'etat contributed towards this twofold object. The north made no move, and the
east scarcely any beyond a few demonstrations rapidly quelled at Nancy and
Strassburg. In the west it was the same thing. But at Montargis and at
Bonny-sur-Loire there was fighting. In Allier the Democrats of Donjon seized
the town of La Palisse. There was a riot at Poligny in the Jura, a bloody
revolt in Nievre where the Democrats got possession of Clamecy and summoned
their friends from Yonne to help them. The troops got the better of them on
December 8. In the south the Republicans of Lavardac and Villeneuve advanced
under arms against Agen, and those of Gers against Auch, while those of
Herault, mustering hastily from the country, blockaded Beziers for three days.
At Toulon there was quite a little army commanded by Duteil, which would
perhaps have roused Provence to revolt if Marseilles had risen. For six days a
provisional Government consisting of peasants actually
sat at Digne
and governed the Basses-Alpes, formerly a Conservative district. These revolts,
speedily quelled by the exertions of the prefects, generals and gendarmes
incited by Momy, afforded evidence to the country of the grave danger—from
which it had been preserved by the Coup d'etat—and some justification for the
brutal repression of this “abominable vandalism of this jacquerie,” and for the
declaration of a state of siege in thirty-two departments, one-third of France.
From •that time it was a simple matter to implicate in proceedings against
insurgents all Republicans whom it was desirable to banish immediately.
In Paris from
December 4 the number of arrests amounted to 2100; and they continued during
the following days. In Meurthe, between December 3 and 20, nearly 5000 of the “
reds ” were arrested. And of course the departments which had risen were most
affected.
■ The
time had now come when Momy, in view of the approaching verdict of France,
could give his prefects the necessary instructions “ for ensuring the free and
sincere expression of the will of the nation." Since they were delivered
for the future from Republicans and party ai nosity (which would have perverted
the real significance of the ballot) the Administration must not remain
inactive and unmoved. It received orders to turn “ its energies to winning the
day for the political opinion which had prompted the Coup d'etat, to
circulating the President’s proclamations even in the remotest villages, to
forming electoral committees composed of honest men, who would undertake to
enlighten the minds of the public, from the chief towns to the smallest
hamlets, to fortify their spirit, and to convey the wishes of the prefects to
the electors,” This circular of December 10, 1851, after the terrorist measures
leading up to it, was the essential preliminary to a ballot manipulated by an
energetic and unscrupulous Ministry. It contained a sentence which was at once
a programme and an avowal. “ Liberty of conscience, but the resolute and
consistent use of every allowable means of influence and persuasion, that is
what I expect from you.”
Momy was not
deceived in his expectation, and Louis Napoleon could congratulate himself on
having called him in at the critical moment, when on December 21, 1851, France
decided, by 7,500,000 votes against 640,000, to delegate to the Prince
President the right of drawing up the Constitution. The nation abdicated its
sovereignty, vesting all its rights in the person of the great Emperor’s
nephew, remembering at the same time the fame which his House had won for France,
and hoping for a strong and equally glorious Government. The people were weary
of parliamentary struggles and the impotence of parties; they dreaded popular
risings and longed for quiet and security. They were discouraged and helpless
too, beneath a regime of administrative pressure and terrorism, which stifled
every attempt at discussion and opposition. Louis Napoleon and his adherents
celebrated this their first victory at Notre Dame on January 1, 1852, and by Te
Deums in all the churches of France. And, while the President duly installed
1851-2]
Victory of the Prince President.
139
himself at
the Tuileries, there to revive the memories of Napoleon’s Consulate, the
eagles, symbolical of glory and power, appeared once more on the standards of
France. There was very little room for doubt as to the form of Constitution
which the Dictator was commissioned to draw up.
In order
however to leave nothing to chance, he carried on with renewed severity that
policy, of which the efficacy had been proved by the plebiscite of December 20.
After December 31, 1851, Momy had the list sent in to him of persons arrested
since the Coup d'etat, so that he might deal them a final blow and complete the
sentence in good earnest. These measures for the “public safety” attacked the
representatives of the people first of all: by the decree of January 9
eighteen deputies, of whom six were Republicans, were exiled for a period, and
sixty-six for life, all of whom belonged to the Montagne; the five most
dangerous of these were to be transported to Guiana; but, through the influence
of George Sand, three of the sentences were commuted to banishment, namely,
those of Greppo, Marc Dufraisse and Richardet. Mathe made his escape. Miot was
sent to Lambessa. The Conservative deputies had almost all been released: there
was nothing to fear from them after the voting of December 20. After the
Democratic leaders, it was the turn of their constituents in the provinces,
“the revolutionary ringleaders”—as they were termed in the circular of January
11,1852— the insurgents ill the recent risings and all opponents of the
Government who threatened the peace. Regular lists of suspects were drawn up by
Commissaries of the War Department, procureurs-generaux and prefects. All
compromising information was welcomed; and arrests immediately began and were
continued throughout the month of January, 1852, to the number, it is
estimated, of nearly one hundred thousand.
Then, when
all Democrats possessed of any energy, conviction or influence had been
securely caught in the net which the authorities had spread so widely and so
rapidly, a special Court of Justice was constituted to deal finally with the
victims. “ The number of guilty persons and the fear of public strife,” Morny
confessed in his circular, “did not allow of acting otherwise.” From January
18, 1852, it was decided that Commissions mioctes, consisting of prefects,
procmreurs-generaux and officers, should try the prisoners in districts
declared to be in a state of siege—if trial it could be called when the
sentence was pronounced on information from the Government, in private, and
without witnesses or counsel. These commissions determined on penalties, in
accordance with a special code compiled for their use, namely, trial before a
Court martial; transportation to Cayenne or Algeria, temporary or for life;
relegation to some place in the interior; trial before a Court for the trial of
misdemeanours (tribunal correctionnel); subjection to supervision. Under these
conditions sentence was given summarily and rapidly. The records of the
proceedings, as also the grounds of conviction, have been preserved and suffice
to prove how many people innocent even
140
Measures for the “public safety”
[1852
from a
political point of view—were arrested, condemned and actually transported on
the orders of officials anxious to show their zeal or even as a consequence of
private animosities or unfounded suspicions. The official documents of the time
give the number of persons sentenced as little short of 20,000—nearly 3000 to
relegation to the interior, 10,000 to transportation to Algeria, and 6000 to
supervision. But this total is incomplete: the numerous Republicans must not be
forgotten who, to escape these stringent proceedings, underwent voluntary exile
in Switzerland, Belgium, England, and even the New World, or who remained in
France because they were unable to flee, but had to leave their homes and
conceal themselves at the sacrifice of their occupations and of other
interests. By February, 1852, this piece of work was completed to the
satisfaction of its instigators—a work which we can only regard as cruel and
fatal to justice and liberty. George Sand’s words bear a melancholy testimony
to the state of things: “ When you go into the provinces and see how crushed is
the spirit, you must bear in mind that all the force lay in a few men now in
prison, dead, or banished.”
In
conclusion, the dictator could henceforth without risk give some semblance of
legality to his power. On January 14, 1852, he promulgated the Constitution on
his own authority, having entrusted the task of drawing it up to his faithful
Ministers Troplong, Persigny, Flahaut and Rouher chiefly. He offered it to the
French nation as the fortunate and rightful heritage of the First Consul, a
return too long delayed, “the only Constitution adapted to the social and
administrative institutions of modem France, and calculated to secure the
requisite liberties and the maintenance of Napoleonic principles.” He justified
the institution of an untrammelled power, on the grounds of the pretended
responsibility of the head of the State towards a people no longer possessed
of newspapers, political liberty, or personal security. The fact is that he had
grasped all the nation’s powers; the Ministers no longer constituted a
parliamentary cabinet, but were appointed by him and removable at his pleasure
alone; they had become mere instruments under his direction. The Council of
State, chosen by him, formulated laws, but in private. The Senate, whose duty
it was to revise the laws and propose fresh ones, and to interpret the
Constitution, seemed to have some legislative authority; but the selection of
every one of its members rested with the President and their salary was left to
his discretion. Since their sittings were not public, and as their sessions
only lasted so long as their master chose, beginning and terminating at his
orders, what independence or initiative was there actually left to the Senate ?
The Senators were appointed on January 26,1852, the Councillors of State,
Admirals and Marshals on the 25th. Every precaution, legal and otherwise, was
taken so that the sovereign, having the law in his own interests and without
any other check, need not apprehend that one and only check, the Corps
legislatif, which he had allowed to stand as a sort of last tribute to
legality.
And such a
Corps Ugislaiifl An assembly of two hundred and fifty members who had to swear
themselves in before him in order to take their seats, who were elected by a
ballot of the arrondissements to pass laws and arrange taxation, but who were
obliged to refuse the public any account of their deliberations. They had to
pass the Government’s Bills without possessing the right to modify them, and
might not even bring forward a Bill themselves. They were not entitled to
nominate their President, nor might they call in the Ministers to debate with
them, nor ask questions. By the suppression of the right of address they were
deprived of every expedient for obtaining a hearing with either the sovereign or
the nation. In short, the annual voting of the budget was the sole power
remaining to the representatives of the country. Louis Napoleon had however
taken his precautions against this inadequate means of opposition: by the
electoral decree of February 2, 1852, all categories of electors suspected of
Republicanism were carefully debarred from the ballot (which, according to
principle, was to be universal) and the right of determining the electoral
divisions was conferred on the executive power. “ You must understand,” Momy
wrote to the prefects on January 18, “how great an effect a more or less
skilful adjustment of divisions will have on the election results.” “It is a
serious business,” he added on January 20; “ the Government will not hesitate
to recommend candidates directly to the choice of the electors.” And, while
biding his time for absolutely forcing the vote of the electorate, the
President on February 17 issued a decree relating to the Press, which entirely
deprived the voters of political liberty, subjecting them to authorisation pure
and simple, and to the suspension of the Government at his caprice, and even
compelling them to insert officially communications of reports of the Ministers
and their agents.
On March 29,
1852, the President, desirous of putting the Constitution into force,
installed the bodies, thus elected at his will and according to his orders. On
that occasion he solemnly declared: “ The dictatorship, entrusted to me by the
people, terminates to-day.” But what had he done but force that dictatorship on
the people, and continue it under the semblance of a Constitution ? His
Minister and coadjutor, de Maupas, described this rigime more accurately when
he termed it an absolute Government, which possessed no more than the name of Republic
and of liberty. Even the name was soon lost. A fresh plibiscite was organised
in a similar manner to those preceding it. The same measures of repression and
intimidation were in the first instance adopted ; there were appeals from the
head of the State to Conservatives and to Catholics in the provinces, which the
President visited in September of that year; there was proscription of
Democrats, and suppression of the Press. On November 21 and 22, 1852, came the
final restoration of the hereditary Empire in the person of Napoleon III.
THE
REVOLUTION AND THE REACTION IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA. I.
(1848-9.)
It has been seen in an earlier chapter, how
widespread had been the political unrest which in Germany preceded the outbreak
of the Revolution of 1848. The leaders of the party of national reform had
definitively adopted as an integral element of their programme of action the
transformation of the decrepit Confederation into a federal State. The more
radical political ideas, which during the last generation had found abundant
utterance in the south-west, seemed about to coalesce with the desire for
representative institutions that in 1847 had led to the summons of the Combined
Prussian Diet. Were such & coalition to be actually brought about, it must
overwhelm all attempts at resistance or evasion. It must stultify the wish of
King Frederick William IV to force the growing national movement into the
tortuous channel of his own semi-mystic designs; but it must also overwhelm the
traditional attachment to territorial independence still strong in many of the
minor States of the north. Its effect on Austria and the Austrian monarchy
could not yet be definitively gauged; but the discontent which had accumulated
here was partly due to racial and to economic causes of very long standing.
Still, the
impulse to which the outbreak of both the German and the Austrian Revolution of
1848 was due, came, after all, from without and not from within; and Count
Beust, who was generally aware from what quarter the wind blew, very properly
scouts the notion that the earlier and more homogeneous of these two associated
movements, unprecedented in the suddenness of its outbreak and unparalleled in
the swiftness of its spread, was of purely native origin^- The impotence of the
chief continental Governments had for some time become manifest to the party of
agitation spread over Europe. In 1846, the Polish Revolution had indeed been
overthrown; but its fugitive germs had been scattered into many a region of
future activity besides the hotbed of Paris. In 1847 had followed the overthrow
of the Swiss Sonderbund, and the successful assertion of the principle of a
direct appeal to a national numerical
1847-8] Early insurrectionary
disturbances in Germany. 143
majority. In
October, 1847, Mettemich diagnosed the condition of Austria by the remark that
a mortal disease was upon the State which he had served for very nearly half a
century; and the Italian troubles of the December and January ensuing went some
way towards confirming his fears. When on February 22-4,1848, the crash came at
Paris, the tremendous significance of these events was at once recognised by
German political opinion among all sorts and conditions of men. In his London
exile Ferdinand Freiligrath, whose dreams were haunted by the figure of the
Holy Republic of the German nation, exulted in “this proud epoch of the world’s
history.” And, a few days later, King Frederick William IV of Prussia, mindful,
perhaps, of Neuchatel, appealed to Queen Victoria to join in a new quadruple
alliance on behalf of the peace of the world.
The earliest
actua? insurrectionary disturbances in Germany which followed on the February
outbreak of the Revolution in France were on a siflall scale. But the rapidity
of their succession and the ubiquity of their recurrence were amazing; and, in
the words of Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, “ most astonishing of all was
the total absence of any power of resistance on the part of the various
Government authorities, and the helplessness with which one and all, high and
low, allowed themselves to fall a prey, some to the most inept notions, and
others to a paralysis of terror.” The movement, starting in the south-* west in
the last day or two of February, was everywhere welcomed by a virtual consensus
of the middle and more especially the professional classes, as well as by a
large proportion of the Government officials of the several States. Addresses
poured in from all quarters—the most notable being that to the Prussian
Government drafted by the master- hand of Dahlmann and signed by nearly the
whole professoriate of his University of Bonn; while the population of nearly
every important town or princely “ Residenz ” assembled in more or less
imposing numbers, to give voice to its demands. With the almost universal
claims for freedom of the Press and the right of free assembly and petition was
usually associated the demand for a national Parliament, through which the
people at large should share in the government of a united Germany. Trial by
jury, the arming of the people, the grant of a Constitution where it did not
already exist, and the imposition on the State army of an oath of fidelity to
it where it did, were other frequent demands; often the establishment of
equality of rights between the several religious confessions was added, for the
most part on behalf of the Jews; and before long the social grievances of the
lower classes, whose political interests proper were few, made themselves
heard. The workmen in the towns claimed a share in the profits of the
manufacturers; and the peasants raised their perennial cry for the removal of
feudal servitudes, and the abolition of the game laws. In the large majority of
instances the fruit fell from the trembling tree at the first shock. The
procedure was nearly everywhere the same—^roass-meetings, with “storm-petitions
ta the
sovereign when forthcoming or to a Diet when at hand. But, though there was a
great deal of clamour, there was little actual violence and hardly any
bloodshed. The Governments readily changed the chiefs of their most prominent
ministerial departments and made profuse promises of reforms; and they were
equally prompt in undertaking to use their best endeavours for a fundamental
change in the system of the existing Germanic Confederation.
The
Heppenheim meeting of October 10,1847—the first of the kind whose proceedings
were made public—had led to the concentration of Liberal effort, in the
south-west at all events, upon the question of a German National Parliament. On
the first news of the Paris disturbances, a motion on this subject was
proposed in the Darmstadt Chamber on February 27, 1848, by Heinrich von Gagem.
This ardent champion of parliamentary freedom and singularly high-minded man
had from the first aimed at carrying a plan of constitutional reform by the
support of a national representative body, elected by the people at large; and
he now urged the Hesse-Darmstadt Government to take steps towards obtaining for
Germany in the first instance a provisional head with a responsible Ministry
for foreign and military affairs, and a National Parliament. A few days later,
on March 5, a more or less self-constituted committee of fifty-three leading
Liberals, chiefly though not entirely from this part of Germany, met at
Heidelberg, and agreed to the appointment of a Committee of seven members, to
arrange for the summoning of a preliminary Parliament ( Vorparlament). On his
return from this meeting, Heinrich von Gagem, who had in the interval been
himself called to the head of the Hesse-Darmstadt Ministry, brought about an
understanding with the Baden and Nassau Governments, by which his younger
brother Max was commissioned to ask the cooperation of other German Governments
in establishing a German Central Power, which should assume authority in
conjunction with the proposed National Parliament (March). The success of the
scheme was practically conditional on the readiness of the King of Prussia to
assume the responsibility of a provisional German headship. Frederick William
IV, however, had conceived a rival plan of a Congress of German Princes at
Dresden. The gifted and high-minded Joseph Maria von Radowitz, who had long
been deep in the King’s counsels, and of whose veracity there is no doubt, was
afterwards anxious to prove that his master had been ready to place himself at
the head of the German movement. But both Radowitz and the King, whatever the
strength of their intentions, had to submit to the superior force of events. As
for the old Diet at Frankfort, though, even to itself, its days were known to
be numbered, it rose after a fashion to the situation by a vague appeal to the
German nation (March 1) and by allowing each Government to deal as it chose
with its Press. Meanwhile, the Vorparlament scheme was steadily carried on; and
on March 81 this assembly actually met at Frankfort.
The grand
duchy of Baden was the natural starting-point for the revolutionary movement
which, once set on foot, seemed to progress almost automatically from State to
State, and town to town. The Grand Duke Leopold had, as far back as 1846,
introduced a strong Liberal element into his Administration, which was thus in
substantial agreement with the constitutional views cherished by the
parliamentary majority. But before long a potent ■ influence was exercised
on the Opposition side by Friedrich Hecker, a talented advocate with a powerful
demagogic vein, who soon shared the Radical leadership with Gustav Struve.
Thus, while the Liberal majority followed the lead of those whose national
aspirations had found expression in Bassermann’s motion in the Chamber noticed
above, Hecker’s socialistic harangues on the one hand and the remnants of Baron
von BlittersdorfTs anti-Liberal influence upon the administration on the other,
made the political state of Baden extremely inflammable; in addition to which
the grand duchy was in this veiy winter of 1847-8 threatened by material
distress consequent upon an industrial crisis. Thus, when on February 27 the
Paris news reached Mannheim (the centre of radical feeling in the State) a popular
meeting was at once held; and an attempt made on March 1 to terrorise the Diet
at Carlsruhe was only defeated by the presence of mind of Karl Mathy. By his
advice the Government met the popular demands half-way, conceding liberty of
the Press and the formation of a National Guard. But, while in the chief towns
of the grand duchy the movement was still under some control, in the rural
districts the peasantry began to rise against the landowners, and in the
neighbourhood of the Lake of Constance a Republic was proclaimed. Mathy’s
courageous behaviour among his electors at Constance helped to steady men’s
heads; on March 23 the Second Chamber rallied to the Constitution; and, pending
the meeting of the National Parliament, the revolutionary movement was arrested.
On the same
day as that on which the French news reached Mannheim, it had filled Mainz. The
famous metropolis, connected by recent traditions with the memories of the
First French Revolution, had since those turbulent days had to submit to the reactionary
sway of the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, besides as a territorial fortress
admitting a joint garrison of Austrians and Prussians—the latter much detested.
In default of the immediate concession of the demands of a popular meeting held
on March 4, a descent en masse upon Darmstadt had been intended, when on the
following day it was announced that Grand Duke Ludwig II had adopted his son
and namesake as his co-regent (a few months later, Ludwig III became Grand Duke
by his father’s death) and called to the conduct of his-Gevemment Heinrich von
Gagem, who learnt his appointment on his return from Heidelberg (March 5). It
failed however to put an end to the Mainz unrest; and in May a deplorable
disturbance took place, accompanied by some loss of life.
In the
Bavarian capital the scandals of the Lola Montez regime might
have been
expected to have ended with the departure of their heroine and the reopening of
the University, the centre of opposition to her sway (February 11). But her
creature, Berks, was still acting Minister of the Interior; and after, to quell
popular agitation, Prince Wrede had been on the point of ordering the troops to
fire on the crowd, a serious conflict seemed inevitable (March 6). A royal
proclamation, however, now appeared, promising the assembling of the Estates on
March 16, for the discussion of the popular demands, including a National
Parliament; “Bavaria’s King,” it was announced in his inimitable style, “takes
pride in his Germanic manhood.” On the same day the Munich garrison, headed by
the King’s younger son, Prince Luitpold, swore fidelity to the Bavarian
Constitution. But Lola still hovered about the capital; and various ministerial
changes ensued before on the 18th, rioting having recommenced, she was declared
an alien and her most powerful agent, the head of the police, was dismissed.
The Estates were awaiting the opening of their sittings and the capital was
distracted between hopes and fears, when, late on March 20, two royal
proclamations were affixed to the walls. In one of these, King Ludwig, while
recording his faithful adherence to the Constitution and his conscientious
stewardship of the public resources—“ as though I had been the servant of a
free commonwealth,” announced his abdication; the other was signed by his son
and successor Maximilian II, who declared his resolution to uphold lawful
liberty in both Church and State. Some Liberal politicians were admitted into
the Ministry ; and the new era began.
Bavaria was
almost the only German State where the Revolution of 1848 was accompanied by a
change of sovereign. In Hesse-Cassel, where a law-abiding population had to
suffer from the arbitrary will of a succession of Electors, the Revolution
found Frederick William I in a conflict with his subjects which he had long
carried on as co-regent with his father William II, and had recommenced with
fresh vigour since he had himself succeeded as Elector in November, 1847.
Foiled in his attempt to prevent the officers of his army from taking the oath
to the Constitution, which with the aid of his Minister Scheffer he was
persistently striving to undermine, he had at the dose of the year appointed a
Commission of revision, under whose care it would probably have bled to death,
but for the effect of the news from France, which reached Cassel on February
29. After some hesitation, due to Scheffer’s illness, the Elector gave way
under the pressure of a number of deputations from Hanau and other places
(March 6), and agreed to the dismissal of Scheffer, the appointment of some
Liberal Ministers, and the convocation of the Estates. Further deputations
resulted in a proclamation of freedom of the Press and other concessions,
including that of full right of private religious worship to the
Deutschkatholiken— seceders from the Church of Rome whose importance (with that
of their apostle Ronge) was overrated at the time, but has since been perhaps
unduly
disparaged. These concessions were not considered sufficient at Hanau, where on
March 9 a popular meeting, swelled by many outsiders, determined upon a three
days’ ultimatum to the Elector. On March 11 the Elector, greatly perturbed,
more especially in view of the relative popularity of the rival Hesse-Darmstadt
line, gave way once more and proclaimed his acceptance of a purely constitutional
system of government. His Ministry was now thoroughly transformed; but as it
neither enjoyed the Elector’s confidence nor satisfied the populace (a riot on
April 9 led to the disbandment of the Elector’s lifeguards), more troubles were
certain to follow.
At Frankfort,
under a still essentially oligarchical system of government, the Jews within
the city, and outside it the inhabitants of the rural districts, desired a
removal of the restrictions resting upon them. In accordance with the permission
given by the Diet on March 3, the Senate at once proclaimed the liberty of the
Press; and, when further demands were made, they were for the most part
granted. But some, including the removal of Jewish disabilities, were refused;
and democratic excesses led to conservative counter-demonstrations. Meanwhile,
the Diet hoisted the national black-red-and-gold standard in front of its
palace, as though determined to put a patriotic face on its collapse.
From Mannheim
and Carlsruhe the revolutionary movement quickly passed on into Nassau, where
it took a new turn. On March 2 a popular meeting was held at Wiesbaden into
which had poured an enormous number of peasants—it was said 30,000—well
provisioned as if for a campaign. The one demand near to their hearts was that
the private domains of the Duke—one of the wealthiest of German Princes—should
be declared the property of the State. When, after some delay, Duke Adolf
appeared among his subjects and promised to grant all their demands, he became
for the nonce almost as popular as the 'able leader of the movement, a lawyer
named Hergenhahn. But it was not to be expected that the peasants’ rising—for
such it really was—would stop here. Not only did the peasants, when an amnesty
had been proclaimed for all offences against the game and forest laws,
interpret this as licensing a general destruction of game and a free
appropriation of all forest timber; but they possessed themselves of all
communal offices, and carried on the work of local government, except that the payment
of rates and taxes, and of rent payable to public receivers, had come to an
end. While the Ministry under Baron von Dungem passively looked on, and the old
Chambers had been dissolved, the real authority everywhere belonged to the
Committees of Safety newly formed round the Central Committee at Wiesbaden.
When at last a Second Chamber, elected on a new basis, assembled, it consisted
half of peasants, half of officials. Hergenhahn, now chief of the Ministry, was
left without enduring support, and in June, 1849, his resignation was accepted
by the Duke. Notwithst mding the violent resistance of the Radicals, the days
of
148 The movement in Wurtemberg,Hanover Saxony.
[i848-9
reform were
now ended, and by March, 1852, the revolutionary changes had been effectually “
revised.”
It has been
noticed in an earlier chapter, how in Wurtemberg the intelligent system of
government carried out for many years under King William, more especially
through his very capable Minister Johannes von Schleyer, a strict constitutionalist,
had ceased to satisfy the popular demands. The material prosperity of the
kingdom had at last begun to diminish; and the economic distress had been
increased by the dearth of 1847. Thus the malcontent element in the population
had been further increased; though the Government, at the opening of the
Wurtemberg Diet early in 1848, sought to ascribe this condition of things to
the malign influence of immigrant revolutionary agitators. The arrival of the
news from Paris accordingly led to disturbances, which were forcibly put down,
and to the admission into the Ministry of Friedrich Romer, the actual
originator of the-Heidelberg meeting of March 5, and a thoroughly independent
politician of high~cEaracter. To the Ministry which included him and some other
men of insight must be attributed the fact that Wurtemberg, though its action
in regard to national German affairs was much hampered by the determined
particularism of its King, weathered the storm in the two critical years 1848
and 1849.
Passing from
the south-west to the north, one would hardly have expected that the kingdom of
Hanover should have been involved to any serious extent in the revolutionary
movement. For here the despotic rule of King Ernest Augustus—personally, in
spite of everything, not an unpopular sovereign—had been able to repress the
resTstarrce which it provoked in every quarter; and no Press deserving the name
existed to be “freed.” Yet a public demonstration on March 17 induced the King,
three days later, to consent to the appointment of a new Ministry, presided
over by Count Alexander Levin von Bennigsen, and including, as its most
important member, the eminent historian and publicist Johann Karl Bertram
Stiive, burgomaster of Osnabriick. The Hanoverian legislature hereupon settled
down to a revision of the Constitution of the kingdom on the more Liberal lines
of that approjted in 1833; and the task was accomplished by September, 1849. On
the other hand, the Government of Ernest Augustus, even more pertinaciously
than that of William of Wurtemberg, opposed all attempts to bring about a
constitutional unity for Germany at large.
In Saxony,
since the Leipzig tumults of August, 1845, and the consequent adoption of a
repressive policy by the Government, disquiet and discontent had continued to
pervade the population. At a time when in Prussia the Combined Diet was at last
presenting the spectacle of a representative assembly worthy of the name, in
the little neighbour kingdom the Radicals had every pretext for declaring its
existing Diet “incompetent.” Nowhere was the impotence of particularism more
teenly felt than in Saxony, through which so much of the German
nation’s
activity and intelligence circulated. Immediately on the arrival of the news of
the Paris Revolution an address, in which all the sections of Liberalism
concurred, was sent to King Frederick Augustus from Leipzig (March 2); and,
this having been unfavourably received, a second, demanding the dismissal of
the Ministry, was despatched amidst great agitation. Falkenstein, the unpopular
Minister of the Interior, hereupon resigned; and, after the abolition of the
censorship had been announced and the summoning of a new Diet promised, the
whole of the Konneritz Ministry followed his example (March 13). Three days
later, by which time the success of the Revolution at Vienna was unmistakable,
the new Saxon Ministry took office—with Braun, the leader of the Opposition in
the Second Chamber of the Diet, as its President, and von der Pfordten
(formerly professor at Leipzig) and Oberlander (a town councillor of Zwickau)
as Ministers for Foreign and Home Affairs respectively. Under Oberlander’s
auspices a network of clubs, destined to exercise a notable influence upon the
progress of the revolutionary movement in Germany, speedily overspread the
kingdom. The most active and influential among these were the
Vaterlandsvereine, which were, consciously or not, moving forward in the
direction of a Republic. Their exemplar was the Leipzig club, where Robert Blum
was long the protagonist—a copious orator and a master of both rapture and
pathos, but often indefinite like the movement of which he assumed the
direction, and self-consistent only in his abhorrence of government and
Governments. In Saxony the progress of this kind of radicalism was surprisingly
rapid, and took the new Liberal Government itself by surprise, so that the new
electoral law promulgated by it resulted in Diets which altogether outstripped
its policy. Thus, in February, 1849, the Braun Ministry finally resigned, and
was reconstituted under Held; Baron von Beust, to oblige the King, taking the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With this Ministry, too, the Chamber was speedily
at issue on the subject of the publication of the German Constitution, and in
April it was dissolved by the King, who though a moderate and reasonably minded
Prince, was strongly attached to his sovereign rights. Thus affairs moved on to
the final conflict between King and people in May, 1849, to which it will be
necessary to refer below.
In Ernestine
Saxony, and in the small Thuringian States in general, where for the most part
much good-will existed between the potentates and their “ peoples,” the news of
the February Revolution produced a flood of petitions and addresses as
elsewhere. Little hesitation was anywhere shown before conceding the popular
demands; indeed, at Greiz, Prince Henry XX of Reuss granted them before they
were made. In the capital of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, whose public debt
exceeded half a million of dollars and which could not boast a single railway,
Prince Gunther affably declared that, even if fate were to force him to
abdicate, he would still arrange so as to finish his days at home. In
150
other
Thuringian towns the citizens joined with the military in putting down
insurrectionary demonstrations, or performed this task themselves. The rising
at Weimar was mainly inspired from the neighbouring University of Jena, a
time-honoured centre of academical agitation; more violent was that at
Altenburg, where, after Hanoverian and Prussian troops had restored order, Duke
Joseph abdicated in favour of his son George. In general, the more or less
vague agitation for liberty ran its course in this part of Germany before the
schemes for unity had taken definite shape. Nothing came of proposals for a
union with the kingdom of Saxony, or for the establishment of a kingdom of
Thuringia; and it may be noticed that, when at Frankfort (in November, 1848) a
scheme of mediatisation was debated, nine of the Thuringian deputies voted against
it, and only four in its favour. The spirit of Karl August of Weimar survived
among many of the Thuringian Princes, and the Coburgers were by no means
isolated in their political breadth of view. Thus these petty sovereigns were
popular among their subjects; and in the days of the Reaction they showed
little desire to undo the reforms accomplished in 1848 and 1849.
In
Lippe-Detmold and Waldeck, as well as in the southern principality of
Hohenzollem-Hechingen, the petitions of the inhabitants were granted by the
several Princes (March 9-10). The course of events in the Anhalt
principalities, at that time still under three Governments, and more especially
the history of the Bemburg revolution, are typical of an obstinate
Kleinstaaterei by no means on the Thuringian pattern. The population of this
petty State had long been misgoverned under an imbecile Duke by an extravagant
camarilla, without a single non-official newspaper to open the eyes of the
public; but now a responsible Ministry and constituent Diet were established.
These soon quarrelled with one another; whereupon the Court left the country,
and Duke Leopold IV of Dessau assumed his kinsman’s responsibilities by
granting the Bemburgers a Constitution and summoning a fresh Diet for its
revision. During an election riot (February 18, 1849), some thirteen persons
were shot down by the military, which was hereupon superseded by Prussian
troops; and soon afterwards the reaction began. In Dessau and Kothen, where a
joint Diet sat and a common Constitution was confirmed by the Duke of Dessau,
Prussian influence and Prussian military interference, to the satisfaction of
King Frederick William IV who as the cousin of the Duchess took a great
interest in Anhalt affairs, in the course of 1849 and 1850 undid most of the
progress effected.
In the
Mecklenburg grand duchies, long regarded as the impregnable fastness of feudal
institutions and ideas, the movement of the spring of 1848 seized upon both
burghers and peasantry as rapidly as elsewhere. At Schwerin the Grand Duke
Frederick Francis II was moved to promise liberty of the Press, and to summon
(for April 26) an extraordinaiy Diet, which, for the first time in Mecklenburg
history, secured the same measure
i848-5i] Oldenburg.—The Hanse Towns.
151
of electoral
rights to all classes of the population. Towards the close of the year deputies
from both the g^and duchies met to draw up a common Constitution on a broadly
democratic basis. But the combined efforts of the nobility of both duchies and
of the Grand Duke George of Strelitz (Queen Louisa’s brother) prevailed over
the willingness of his Schwerin kinsman to recognise this Constitution; and,
both duchies having concluded military conventions with Prussia, the old
character of the Mecklenburg rigvme was to a large extent restored by 1851.
In Oldenburg,
in answer to the usual popular demands and disturbances, Minister Beaulieu
quietly withdrew (his subordinate Hannibal Fischer being driven out of
Birkenfeld by main force); and Grand Duke Paul Frederick Augustus was found
ready to lay before a Diet summoned for the purpose (September) a draft
Constitution, which assigned half the income from the domains to the State.
Disturbances broke out in the free city of Bremen at the same time as in
Oldenburg; and after a protracted deliberation a Constitution was adopted in
March, 1849, in which the civic body was reformed on a broadly popular basis,
without the oligarchical Senate being, however, ousted from its possession of
the real power. In Hamburg, the question of constitutional reform had to be
committed to an assembly elected by a general vote. But its conclusions failed
to satisfy either side, and serious disturbances ensued which necessitated the
calling in of Prussian troops (August, 1849), and at a later date of Austrian;
so that more than a decade passed before (in 1860) a constitutional settlement
was effected. In the third of the Hanse Towns, Liibeck, a proposal to revise
the existing Constitution by providing for a wider popular representation, was
withstood by the Senate, and ultimately led to an occupation of the city by
Mecklenburg troops (October, 1848); but the revised Constitution came into
force (December) and was not again altered in a reactionary sense till 1851.
The movements
in the minor German States noted above, whatever their special antecedents,
were actually brought about by the outbreak of the Paris February Revolution;
but none of them could have gone so far as it did but for the success of the
risings which shook the foundations of the two great German Powers, Austria
and Prussia. And of these, again, the Berlin insurrection beyond all doubt
derived a powerful immediate impulse from the upheaval which had preceded it,
though only by a few days, at Vienna.
“—Tire
general political condition of the Austrian monarchy has been briefly described
in a previous chapter. A long period of peace had weakened instead of
strengthened the authority of a Government whose purpose it had been to
maintain the existing system of the State without any actual change. The spirit
of constitutional freedom could not fail to penetrate into an empire of whose
population something like half had for centuries enjoyed the right of a share
in their own legislation and taxation, though this right was not exercised
under modem
constitutional
forms, and though even in Hungary the executive was reserved to the Crown. It
was impossible but that a desire for an effective system of representative
Government and for the reforms which its establishment must bring with it
should be cherished throughout the empire, though no opportunity was allowed
for any expression of opinion on public affairs either by the Press or by
public meetings. The Government was organised in Departments, often conducted
with ability, and by officials of enlightened and even Liberal views, but out
of touch with one another and subject to little control except in the last
instance by the supreme authority of the State. This supreme authority was in
the hands of an imbecile Emperor, guided by a State Conference consisting of
four—Archduke Francis Charles, the heir to the throne, mentally little above
the level of the reigning Emperor; Archduke Ludwig, the Emperor’s youngest
brother, a conservative of the narrowest type, in favour of whose claims those
of his liberal-minded elders Archdukes Charles and John had been accordingly
passed over by their father; and the two Chancellors Metternich and Kolowrat,
who were hardly on speaking terms with each other. Count Franz
Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, who was responsible for the control of home affairs, was
wont to pose as a reformer in order to annoy his colleague. Metternich, in his
turn, while quite awake to the expediency of internal changes, had long
abandoned any effort to bring them gradually about, and confined his attention
to maintaining the existing political system of Europe against all attempts to
interfere with it. Thus he had at last settled down to the belief that the
success which had so long attended his endeavours was destined to continue
unbroken.
The year 1848
opened with no direct signs of troubles; though anxiety was caused by movements
of troops and volunteers towards the Lombardo-Venetian frontier. Early in
February there were disturbances at Padua; and, anti-Austrian demonstrations
having followed at both Milan and Venice, martial law was proclaimed in
Lombardo-Venetia (February 22). In Hungary and Transylvania the Conservative
influence of the two Court Chancellors, Count George Apponyi and Baron Samuel
Josika, seemed for the time at least to have arrested the progress of Kossuth’s
agitation, to which the Moderate leaders of the Opposition gave only a
half-hearted support. Galicia was quiet. In the German provinces of the
monarchy there seemed nothing to cause alarm, except that the bad harvests of
the last two years and the stagnation of business had led to disturbances among
the unemployed, more especially in and about Vienna.
The news of
the Paris Revolution, soon after it had reached Vienna, was followed by that of
the popular movements in Baden and Wiirtem- berg, and of the rising at
Neuchatel, which resulted in the expulsion of the Prussian officials and the
establishment of a Provisional Government (March 1). The first symptoms of
public excitement at Vienna
manifested
themselves among the select body of political thinkers who met in the
Politico-Juridical Club, and of whom Alexander Bach, a Vienna lawyer of great
ability and courage, as well as of an ambition which soared above personal
inconsistencies, was soon to come to the front; among the students of the
University, who were to play so extremely prominent a part in the coming
Revolution; and more especially on ’Change. During the whole of this period of
Austrian history, financial interests came to the front with surprising
rapidity; and it was, as we shall see, the doubts felt in the stability of the
National Bank of Austria which as early as March 3 furnished Kossuth with the
opportunity for insisting on the establishment of a separate Hungarian
Ministry.
Metternich
was by this time quite aware of the gravity of the general situation of the
Empire. On March 4 Radowitz arrived at Vienna, where Metternich agreed to the
King of Prussia’s proposal of a conference of Princes on German affairs at
Dresden, and endeavoured to gain over his visitor to the idea of a common
action on the part of the Eastern Powers in view of the approaching European
crisis. He was full of anxiety; but though rumours of his and Archduke Ludwig’s
resignation were already on foot, no question of any popular concessions seems
to have been as yet entertained. On March 9 an address, upholding the
principles of a self-dependent and centralised Austria, was drafted for
presentation by the Lower Austrian Estates who were shortly to meet; and two
days later another was passed in a popular meeting at Prague, on similar lines,
but emphasising the fraternity and equality of rights existing between the
German and 6ech nationalities.
Thus
prefaced, the Vienna insurrection proper began characteristically by a
demonstration in the University on Sunday, March 12, in which a petition of the
well-known type was carried by acclamation and entrusted to the care of two
popular professors. Though it was graciously received by the Emperor, through
the mediation of Kolowrat, a feverish agitation had now seized upon the
capital; and the State Conference, following Mettemich’s advice, resolved to
summon a meeting of delegates from the lawful Estates of the several provinces
of the Empire to confer with a special Committee nominated by the Government. But
such measures came too late. On the 13th the insurrection took more definite
shape. Led by Adolf Fischhof, a young doctor of medicine, a popular deputation
amidst great tumult gained admission to the Landhaus, where the Lower Austrian
Estates were assembling, and whence they with difficulty made their way to the
Hofburg. Before the heads of the State assembled there in council could arrive
at any conclusion, a conflict had taken place in the Herrengasse between the
troops and a densely packed crowd, and five lives had been lost. So great was
the popular fury that Archduke Albrecht, the commander of the garrison, was
persuaded to allow the civic guard to enter the Inner Town, where
154 Resignation and flight of Mettemich. [i848
it at once
fraternised with the insurgents. Then, while in the suburbs fire was set to
some manufactories, the mass of the population of the city surrounded the
imperial residence, where the members of the State Conference and others were
assembled under Archduke Ludwig, and whither University and civic deputations
passed in, the populace itself in the evening invading parts of the palace. It
was in circumstances so anarchical, in the midst of a hurly-burly of Archdukes,
officials, and demos, that Mettemich, whose resignation had been demanded by
the civic deputation, was apprised of the expediency of bowing to the storm.
After a personal appeal, to which Archduke Ludwig made no adequate response,
the Chancellor declared his readiness to resign, and at once drew up and
despatched to the Emperor a dignified letter. On the following day (March 14)
he and his faithful Princess escaped with some difficulty to Feldsberg in the
Marchfeld, and thence to Olmiitz and Prague; nor were the later stages of his
flight—to Dresden, and finally to London (which he did not reach till April
21)—devoid of danger or of suffering. His semi-official farewells to the Tsar
and the King of Prussia were in keeping with the rest of his conduct: he had
given way to a catastrophe which, though never, as he writes, a docteur a
symptomes, he had long foreseen and which during nearly forty years he had done
his best to avert. His constructive task was long over; and even at Court, in
the circle of Archduchess Sophia, the consort of the heir to the throne, his
persistence in the old methods had begun to arouse some impatience. The
extraordinary coldness experienced by the fallen statesman was due partly to
fear, partly to a mass of obloquy which to this day obscures his great services
to the Peace of Europe.
While
Kolowrat remained in place, and Mettemich’s own office was temporarily filled,
the imperial manifesto issued on March 15 was put together, without ministerial
advice, in a wrangle of Archdukes and other advisers round the sovereign. It
promised a Constitution, abolished the censorship of the Press, established a
National Guard, and announced a joint meeting of Estates, which would now have
a new significance, for the coming July 3. It was rapturously received as the
visible sign of the popular victory; and on the same day the Emperor was made
to drive as if in token of his contentment through the capital, where all was
exultation and confusion. On the 16th, though Prince Windischgratz, to whom on
the 14th Archduke Albrecht had made over his powers, had proclaimed martial
law, and carried it out in some of the suburbs, he left the city to its own
devices; and the mob used its liberty to enter the house of the unpopular
burgomaster, Ritter von Czapka, who fled for his life. A Committee of 24
citizens was appointed to conduct the business of the city. Inasmuch as the
obnoxious head of the police, Count Sedlnitzky, had been dismissed and the
force itself been reduced to inaction, such order as was preserved depended
upon the exertions of this Committee, and more especially upon those of the new
National Guard and the
armed
students of the University. On March 19 the Emperor’s advisers at last summoned
courage to issue an imperial edict directing all public authorities to maintain
the existing laws and ordinances in so far as they had not been legally
revoked; and on the following day the new Ministry, which had been several days
in the making, was actually called into “ power.” Bach and Schmerling were
astute enough to keep out of it; and its ultimate head was Baron von Pillersdorff,
hitherto Kolowrat’s second-in-command, whose brief memoir of his Ministry shows
him to have been well-intentioned and honest almost to simplicity. “Six men,”
he writes, “ were now united in a single cabinet, who had never before
exchanged opinions or concerted a political system”; and five of them speedily
resigned. Among these were Count Kolowrat, who remained President of the
Ministry for little more than a fortnight, when he retired into private life;
Count Ficquelmont, who at an advanced age had taken the direction of foreign
affairs, for which he had long been designed in the event of Mettemich leaving
it vacant; and Baron von Kiibeck, whose experience of Austrian finance was
probably unsurpassed, but who withdrew even sooner than Kolowrat.
The movement,
which had first broken out at Vienna, had communicated itself with the utmost
speed to Linz, the chief town of Upper Austria; to Graz, the capital of Styria
(where public feeling in the first instance directed itself against the
Jesuits), though the demands of the Styrian Diet rapidly extended; to Salzburg,
and to other important places in German Austria. Thence it passed with no less
rapidity into the other parts of the monarchy; and from first to last the
action of the new Government was complicated by a most varied series of
deputations.
The address
of the two Tables of the Hungarian Diet was brought to Vienna on the day on
which the triumph of the Revolution had been formally acknowledged there (March
15) by the Palatine of Hungary, Archduke Stephen. The guidance of popular
opinion, and the consequent control of the Diet, where the Magnates could not
in the end hold out against the Lower Table, was rapidly passing out of the
hands of the Moderate Constitutionalists, even out of those of Szechenyi, whose
influence had been unrivalled, into those of Count Batthy&ny and Kossuth.
The youthful Palatine, who had only in the previous year succeeded to his
father’s dignity, had allowed himself to be gained over by these leaders, the
drift of whose action he hardly perceived, and had consented to support the
demand for a responsible Hungarian Ministry appointed by the Palatine, which
the Diet had adopted on March 14. He was followed to Vienna by a large
deputation of members (including Kossuth), and on the 17th was informed that
the King agreed to the demand of the Hungarian Diet. No sooner had Archduke
Stephen returned to Pressburg, than he announced the nomination of
Batthy&ny as President of the Ministry. Meanwhile, on March 15, an
enthusiastic popular gathering at Budapest had forced the Council of the absent
Palatine to
grant the demands of the “People’s Charter,” embodying the “Twelve Points”
recently drawn up by Joseph Iranyi, and including liberty of the Press and the
establishment of a National Guard. At Vienna, the critical character of the
concessions which the vehemence of the Hungarian nationalists and the
impetuosity of the Palatine had brought to pass, was fully recognised; and it
was sought to minimise them by attempting to reserve to the imperial Government
the supreme military command and certain financial resources for the maintenance
of army and diplomacy, as well as to pledge Hungary to the taking over of part
of the public debt. But it was not a moment in which the Government was able to
press anything, and the law which practically pronounced the autonomy of
Hungary was finally approved at Vienna (April). A brief period followed in
which, as will be seen, much was done in the way of legislative reform to
justify the measure which Kossuth and Batthy&ny had carried over the heads
of Crown and nobility, and of all the Conservative and Moderate elements in the
political life of the kingdom.
At Agram
also, May 15 was a day of popular excitement, and in a great public meeting an
address, approved on the morrow by the magistrature of the city, was voted,
which called upon the Emperor to restore the ancient rights of “constitutional
Croatia.” At Prague, a National Guard was . formed, and, pending the
reorganisation of both Diet and City Council, a general “ Committee of St
Wenceslas ” took it upon itself to prepare a national address for presentation
to the Crown. Finally, in Galicia, whither of course the Vienna views
penetrated latest, a deputation of nobles and citizens obtained from the imperial
Commissioner at Cracow, and from the Governor Count Francis Stadion at
Lemberg, the release of political prisoners. But this most capable and
courageous official and statesman refused to allow the arming of the
population, and called out the entire garrison of the capital, in order to show
that here at least the Government stood firm.
The cycle of
these early revolutionary movements is completed by the course of events in
Berlin. The Prussian like the Austrian Government had at first remained apparently
passive spectators of the series of disturbances in the minor States; though at
the beginning of March Frederick William IV is said to have had the intention
of sending two army corps into the south-west. When, however, by March 15 the
outbreak of the Revolution at Vienna and the flight of Mettemich became known
at Berlin, there was great joy in popular and some satisfaction even in
official spheres; but the Government seemed wholly at a loss how to act, and
the King, who cherished a romantic veneration for the historical greatness of
the House of Austria, was in the depths of despair. Everything seemed giving
way around him. In the Prussian monarchy, there were signs of strong popular
sympathy with the
Revolution.
In the west—both in Westphalia and in the Rhine Province, where there was so
much inflammable material to receive the sparks blowing across the
frontier—savage assaults were made upon the country- houses of wealthy
noblemen; and a great deputation was on its way from Cologne to assure the King
that immediate reforms were indispensable. In the east, there was a disturbance
at Breslau on March 5; and at Konigsberg in East Prussia a meeting was held on
the following day, which commissioned Johann Jacoby, a Radical physician of
great ability, and others to draft a petition demanding liberty of the Press
and a National German Parliament. A riot followed on March 18, and wild rumours
immediately arose that the Government intended to bring Russian troops across
the frontier.
In Berlin
itself March had opened with a succession of public meetings, and from the 13th
onwards there was increasing friction with the military and the police. A
considerable alien element— believed to have consisted chiefly of Rhinelanders
and Poles—had found its way into the capital, where barricades were
experimentally erected as early as March 15. On the following day the military
had for the first time to give fire in order to clear the streets. March 17
seemed to pass quietly; but unfortunately the King’s Ministry was at this very
time awaiting its dismissal. The high-minded and able Minister of the Interior,
Ernst von Bodelschwingh, who had advised the summoning of the Combined Diet in
1847, had been unable to persuade the King to go further; and, distrusting his
own influence as a public man, he had on March 15 again asked leave to resign.
As a last service, he drafted a patent accelerating, in view of the great
events at Vienna, the meeting of the Combined Diet, and insisting on the
necessity of a Constitution, with a representative assembly, for Germany at
large. On the fatal morning of March 18, Frederick William IV signed this
patent, and at the same time an ordinance abolishing the censorship in Prussia.
At noon the Ministers gave in their resignation. Count Albert von Alvensleben-Erxleben,
a wealthy Conservative nobleman who had rendered excellent service to the
State, and who long held an almost unique position at Court as adviser in cases
of extreme difficulty, had been sent for; but, moved by a rooted distrust of the
King’s methods of rule, he declined to serve, and suggested Count Adolf
Heinrich von Amim-Boitzenburg. He was sent for in his turn and granted a day’s
delay in which to make up his mind.
In the course
of the morning the royal concessions became known through Berlin; and the
Schlossplatz filled with all sorts of people —more especially proletariate and
“immigrants.” Within the Palace the King was discussing ministerial
arrangements, .and, in the midst of a motley crowd, receiving first the Rhenish
deputation, to which he poured out promises for both Prussia and Germany, and
then a less vehement deputation from the Berlin magistracy, towards which he
158
adopted a
regal tone. Outside, in the meantime, the aspect of the crowd grew dangerous,
and part of it bore down in a menacing fashion upon the Palace. In the absence
of General von Pfuel, who had just arrived in Berlin to take charge of the
Guards, the command was by Alvensleben’s advice assigned to General von
Prittwitz, an officer of high courage but uncertain temper. He at once—it was
now about 2 p.m.—proceeded to clear the Schlossplatz by slowly advancing a
squadron of dragoons, with their sabres sheathed, and a company of infantry on
each flank. Some friction inevitably followed, and a few sabres were drawn ;
then a couple of muskets accidentally went off. No one was hurt; but in a
moment the crowd dispersed, crying “ Murder! Treason! ” With extraordinary
speed, barricades rose up in several streets, and in a few hours Berlin was in
a state of general insurrection.
Prittwitz,
who had not more than 12,000 troops at his disposal, now began to carry out his
plan of gradually securing the control of a limited area round the Palace; but
he was terribly hampered by the indecision of the King, who could not be
induced till nine o’clock to give an order for the troops to advance, and who
by midnight was in a condition bordering upon dementia. The shock of finding
his trust in his people vain, and his own visions of action rudely dissipated,
had completely unhinged him; and when the Liberal leader, Georg von Vincke,
pressed the King hard to “yield,” his last power of resistance seemed to have
vanished. It was in this state of mind that he composed his ill-starred
proclamation “ An meine lieben Berliner,” in which he requested the people to
quit the barricades, after which the troops should be withdrawn. This he sent
for approval or correction to the ex-Minister Bodelschwingh, who at once
conveyed it to the printers. Next morning (Sunday, March 19) the confusion in
the King’s apartments was renewed; in the midst of it he knelt down to prayers
with the royal family, when he was further softened by an inopportune
admonition to humility from the Court preacher. Deputation on deputation
arrived urging the unhappy monarch to withdraw the troops, although, except
very partially in one of the suburbs, the barricades had not yet been
evacuated. At ten o’clock, the King was at last persuaded by Amim, in spite of
the opposition of Bodelschwingh and of vehement protestations from the Prince
of Prussia, to issue an order that the troops facing the barricades should
quietly x’emove from them. The order was communicated to some of the officers
on duty with the troops, who during the last four-and-twenty hours had
undergone much fatigue and worry, and were half-starved; and it had already
been partially acted upon before it reached Prittwitz, who, after some
hesitation, with an oath, gave the word for the withdrawal of the troops into
their barracks. Before long, to the horror of the inmates of the Palace, its
surroundings were left unprotected. Soon afterwards the King granted the
popular demand for arms, which were supplied from the Zeughaus; and the triumph
of the insurrection was complete.
1848]
The King's ride and
proclamation. 159
Further
humiliations, however, followed on this unforgotten day of shame. In the course
of the day a long procession escorting a van laden with corpses of defenders of
the barricades—it was afterwards reckoned that 216 insurgents had fallen in the
fray as against 18 soldiers—passed thejh^ade of the Palace; the few military
still remaining to guard it were quickly hidden away, and the King and Queen
appeared on the balcony to salute the procession. In the evening the capital
was brilliantly illuminated; for it was known that a new Ministry had been
appointed—all of them avowed Liberals, though of no extreme type. With
Amim-Boitzenburg, Count Schwerin, Alfred von Auerswald, Ludolf Camphausen (the
leader of the Rhenish Opposition), Hansemann, Bomemann, and, as Foreign
Minister, Heinrich von Arnim (late Minister at Paris) had taken office. During
the night and on the following morning Prittwitz ordered the troops to quit all
the barracks in Berlin, lest they should be surrounded there. For a moment the
King thought of leaving Berlin with his departing troops, but is said to have
been kept back by the (incorrect) observation of his new Chief Minister that no
sovereign who had left his capital in such circumstances Kad ever returned thither.
He remained, and it is said that a watch was kept over the threshold of his
bedchamber by one or two faithful officers. But the fury of the populace turned
against the Prince of Prussia, who was set down as a sworn reactionary—“
unhappily,” wrote Ludwig von Gerlach, “quite a mistake." On the evening of
the 22nd he and the Princess escaped to Potsdam, where the officers of the
troops sent out of Berlin were consuming their wrath; and thence they continued
their flight to England.
Meanwhile, on
the 21st, the dregs of the cup had been drunk by the unhappy King, who was in a
sense the martyr of his own illusions. On that day appeared a second
Proclamation, drafted by Amim-Boitzenburg, and addressed “ To my people and the
German nation.” In this document occurred the celebrated phrase that Prussia
was henceforth merged in Germany (Preussen geht in Deutschland cmf\ More than
this, escorted by his Minister-in-Chief and a police officer, King Frederick
William IV, with the black-red-and-gold flag which he had declared himself to
have adopted floating round his head, rode through the streets of his capital,
addressing the students of the University on the way and otherwise spending
himself in promises. He had not consented to this grotesque solemnity without
reluctance, and afterwards spoke to the Queen of this day as the most terrible
of his life. The part which he had played on this occasion, there can be no
doubt, filled all factions and interests in the State with shame and disgust.
Among the Liberals, whom it had quite failed to conciliate, the idea was mooted
of bringing about his abdication, and of working for the accession of the
Prince of Prussia’s son, Prince Frederick, under the regency of his mother, who
leaned to Liberalism. For a time, the King, remaining at Sanssouci, followed
Radowitz’
advice of “effacing” himself as much as possible—not only for constitutional
reasons, but because his spirit was utterly broken.
Yet, after
all, the significance of Frederick William IV’s semi-mystic proclamation was
more enduring than that of his unlucky ride. Amim’s phrase of Prussia being
merged in Germany implied that desire for the expansion of Prussia and her
Constitution into Germany and a German Constitution which underlay the
political aspirations of the brothers Gagern, of the historian Droysen, and of
Baron Stockmar, one of the most practical politicians of his day. This idea was
in essence that of the National State, to this day imperfectly realised, as
preferable to the Federal State which, though destined to be reconstituted and
reorganised, was already becoming a thing of the past. But neither was
Frederick William IV the man to secure to Prussia the hegemony in Germany at
the price of the sacrifice of her own individuality as a State, nor was an
effort in this direction to remain within the power of his successors.
On March 22
the solemn funeral of the martyrs of the insurrection was held at Berlin,
attended by nearly all the clergy of the capital, the King doffing his cap as
the coffins passed the Palace, whereas he took no part in the military honours
at the burial of the fallen soldiers two days later. On the 25th he paid a
visit to Potsdam, where he enraged the officers, some of whom, it is said, had
entered into a plot for his “ liberation,” by dwelling on his perfectly
comfortable condition at Berlin. Abroad, as well as at home, his Government was
treated with undisguised disrespect. In the latter half of March the proposed
conference of Governments on German affairs was to have been held at Potsdam
instead of Dresden; Austria, then in the throes of her Revolution, had
assented; and Ministers had actually arrived from Saxony and from the
south-west. But, on March 24, the new Austrian Government declared that without
its assent no change could take place in the Constitution of the Confederation.
Eager to conciliate national feeling and Liberal good-will, the Prussian
Ministry, as we shall see, despatched troops to support the newly established
Provisional Government of Schleswig- Holstein, and promised to satisfy the
Poles by a division of the grand duchy of Posen. On the 29th the Ministry was
reconstituted with a view to satisfying the more advanced Liberalism of the
western provinces, Camphausen taking Amim-Boitzenburg’s place at its head, and
Hansemann being transferred to the Financial Department; and on April 2 the
Combined Diet met. So far there had been no serious attempt to interfere with
the results achieved by the March Revolution; but it was about this time that
efforts towards bringing about a reaction began on the part of the extreme
Conservatives, among whom Ludwig von Gerlach was the leading spirit, and Hans
von Kleist-Retzow and Otto von Bismarck soon became known as his most
redoubtable followers.
The hope was
now widespread, that a United Germany would at last be called into life, with a
common Constitution based upon a
national
representation. Yet it may be doubted whether even this long- cherished
aspiration^ and the impulse derived from the wonderful success of the French
Revolution, would have sufficed to fill all Germany with a sense of the
necessity of common national action, but for the direct appeal coming at this
very time from a quarter to which the national sympathy could go out whole and
undivided. The significance of the Schleswig- Holstein question and its history
cannot be understood except in connexion with the long struggle for national
unity, and with its successive phases of hopefulness and failure.
The draft
Constitution fpr the Danish monarchy, which it was attempted to introduce
immediately after the accession of King Frederick in January, 1848, and by
which it was intended to unite with the Danish kingdom the duchies of Schleswig
and Holstein, hitherto only tied to it by a personal union, was never carried
into execution. It was to have been submitted to an assembly of notables—26
from Denmark and 26 from the Duchies; but the project had to be given up within
two months. Its chief consequence was the formation at Kiel of a Provisional
Government for the Duchies under the Hereditary Prince Frederick of
Schleswig-Holstein-Noer, which included, together with Count von
Reventlow-Preetz and Wilhelm Beseler of Schleswig, both prominent as political
leaders, two local citizens, of repute. This representative Government took
possession of the fortress of Rendsburg—the key to the command of both
Duchies*—and organised the insurrection against the Danish rule. At Copenhagen
no exertion was spared, and by the beginning of April 14,000 men were in the
field. On April 9, before Prince Frederick had joined his army, it was defeated
at Bau near Flensburg by the Danes, who two days later occupied Schleswig.
Beyond a doubt, if left to theinselves, being in possession of the whole of
Schleswig, as well as in command of the sea and the island of Alsen, they would
have made short work of the ill-organised insurrection. But already the quarrel
had become one of European significance; and Prussia could not avoid taking
part in the conflict.
The instincts
of both the Russian and the British Government were against helping Germany to
become once more what a league of German towns had been in the distant past, a
great Baltic Power. France had no such interest, but she was traditionally
hostile to Germany and friendly to Denmark. Austria was at present incapable of
intervening; but if Prussia intervened, she could not permanently hold aloof.
This fact, and the eagerness with which the Schleswig-Holstein rising had been
welcomed by the patriotic feeling common to all German Liberals, were patent to
all parties in Prussia. To the extreme Conservatives any Prussian interference
in the struggle seemed self-seeking and dishonest; the Liberal Government knew
that nevertheless it must be ventured, unless all thought of a Prussian
hegemony in Germany was to be postponed sine die.
162 Prussian intervention.-" Dahlmann's
Constitution.” [i848
';
Thus, already on March 24 the Prussian Government had recognised the autonomy
of the Duchieg, their indissoluble connexion with each other, and the diescent
of the sovereignty over them in the nearest male (i.e. Augusteiiburg) line.
Soon afterwards two regiments of Guards were sent to Rendsburg, as if Prussia
had been charged with the Federal execution. On April 4 the Diet at Frankfort,
moved by several of the north-German Governments, resolved to invite the
Prussian to charge itself with the task of negotiating a cessation of
hostilities with Denmark on the basis of the restitution of the state of things
before the issue of the obnoxious Constitution; and an agent, Major von Wildenbruch,
was immediately sent from Berlin to Copenhagen. His instructions were carried
out by him in so unskilful a fashion as to inspire the Danish Government with
the conviction that it might play1 its own game. It rapidly broke
off the negotiations; and, after the defeat of the Schleswig^ Holsteiners
(April 9) and their retreat upon the Eider, the Prussian troops crossed that
river (April 30). They were soon followed by other Prussian and Hanoverian
soldiery. The die had been cast; and the German people at last had its wish. On
April 12 the Federal Diet acknowledged the Schleswig-Holstein Provisional
Government; and a few days later General von Wrangel, a veteran cavalry officer
whose reputation for dash dated from the days of Napoleon and whose manners were
thought like Blucher’s, took the command of the army, commissioned by the
Germanic Confederation as well as by the King of Prussia.
Before this
enterprise came to an inglorious end, the National Parliament at Frankfort'had
at last been called into life. A Committee of Seven, including Heinrich von
Gagem, had, it will be remembered, been appointed at Heidelberg on March 5,
1848, to take the requisite steps forj the meeting of a National
Parliament, and to provide in the first instance for the convocation of a
preliminary assembly (Vorparla- ment). The Diet of the old Confederation,
having as early as March 8 come to the conclusion that a German Parliament was
a necessity, in its turn appointed an advisory Committee of Seventeen to
discuss the best method of reorganising the existing Confederation. Among the
Seventeen, for the most part men of Liberal views, Dahlmann represented
Prussia, and Schmerlirig Austria. They constituted themselves early in April
under the presidency of Max von Gagem; and within a week, Dahlmann, with the
aid of the eminent jurist Albrecht, drafted a German Constitution which was
signed by all the Seventeen but the Bavarian, and on April 25 laid before the
Diet. “ Dahlmann’s Constitution,” a historical document of the highest significance,
accepted the principle of a hereditary sovereign head of the Empire; it
further proposed a two Chamber system, giving seats in the Upper Chamber, by
the side of the reigning Princes, to 161 notables, to be chosen in part by the
Governments, and in part by the Diets, of the several States. Foi* the rest,
while army, diplomacy and customs were to be Imperial concerns, there was left
to
the
particular States a measure of independence sufficient to satisfy the demands
of historical tradition. As to the extent of the Empire, both East and West
Prussia were to be included in it, together with part of Posen, but only the
Cisleithanian dominions of the House of Austria.
This scheme
was generally approved by the Prince of Prussia and by Baron von Usedom, the
Prussian plenipotentiary at the Diet, as well as by Bunsen. It agreed in some
respects with a draft Constitution sketched about this time by Prince Albert
(Queen Victoria’s consort), but differed from it in others. Frederick William
IV, however, would have none of it—in correspondence with Dahlmann he had put
forward a rival scheme of his own, with the Emperor of Austria as hereditary
Roman Emperor, and the King of Prussia as German King, together with other
half-historical, half-fantastic variations. Thus Dahlmann’s first draft, though
in many respects long subsequent labours of the Frankfort National Assembly
failed to better it, fell stillborn.
On March 12
the Committee of Seven had begun to issue their invitations to the
Vorparlament, addressing them in the first instance to the several Estates; but
the outbreak of the Revolution in Vienna and Berlin accelerated their action,
and already on March 31 the assembly met at Frankfort. Out of a total of 576
members, 141 came from Prussia, 72 from Baden, 84 from Hesse-Darmstadt, but
only 2 from Austria. The Vorparlament was not particularly fortunate in its
actual President, the eminent Heidelberg jurist Mittermaier, who, though
possessed of political experience as well as insight, lacked those physical
qualities which among the Vice-Presidents Robert Blum had in perfection. The
“Wild Parliament,” as this assembly was dubbed, revealed its hopeless
commixture of heterogeneous ingredients at its first meeting, held in the midst
of tumultuous excitement and rumours of imminent armed intervention. The
Republican minority, led by the Badeners Hecker and Struve, brought forward
their plan of a federal Constitution on the model of that of the United States;
but, on the motion of the Badener Alexander von Soiron, it was resolved to
leave the settlement of the future German Constitution “solely and wholly” to
the National Assembly, as directly representing the nation. In accordance with
a federal law promulgated by the Diet as early as March 30, the Vorparlament
ordered the holding of direct elections for a single Chamber, without a check
upon it; but the numerical basis was altered so as to apportion one deputy to a
population of 50,000, instead of 70,000, souls. A Committee of Fifty (in which
not a single Republican member was included) was appointed to watch the course
of events till the actual meeting .of the National Assembly. It should be added
that the Vorparlament, while declaring in favour of the immediate admission of
a united Schleswig-Holstein into the Germanic Confederation, acknowledged it
as a sacred duty of the nation to cooperate in the restoration of Poland.
Before the
first sitting of the National Assembly was held (May 18), the Republican party,
vexed by their failure in lie Vorparlament and infuriated by the courageous
arrest of Fielder, one of the champions of Radicalism in Baden, by the Moderate
Liberal leader Mathy, had organised an insurrectionary outbreak near the Lake
of Constance; but some troops sent by the Diet quelled the attempt (April); nor
was another, made by Struve in September, more successful. More serious for the
time was the rising, also in April, which followed on the. arrival at Posen of
General Baron von Willisen, an officer of Liberal views, as commissary to
superintend the partition of that province. But he could not satisfy either
side; and, though 20,000 insurgents were here confronted by more than 30,000
Prussian troops, it was not till after the latter had suffered a reverse at
Miloslav (April 30) that the insurgents were forced to conclude a convention at
Bardo (May 5) and lay down their arms. Hereupon General von Pfuel, who had
succeeded Willisen, without difficulty suppressed the insurrection. Two years
later the detachment of Polish from German Posen was without resistance revoked.
Republican
opposition, and the unwillingness of some of the Governments to obey the
behest of the Diet, had delayed the elections to the National Assembly.
Nevertheless, by May 13 the deputies had gathered at Frankfort in sufficient
numbers for the Assembly to be opened with adequate solemnity in the
Paulskirche. The elections had mot been carried on everywhere at the same time
or with the same ardour; while, for instance, in Austria proper there had been
much enthusiasm, in Bohemia a large number of districts had flatly refused to
have anything to do with a German Parliament. The number of its members, which
at the opening had nearly reached 400, seems afterwards to have risen to about
550. The National Assembly, whatever its shortcomings, presented a fair
reflexion of German middle class society, except that the landowners, and still
more distinctly the merchants and manufacturers, were quite inadequately
represented in it. On the other hand, the “ professors,” the men of solid
academical learning, including many of the foremost historical and legal
scholars of the age, formed a very important element in the Assembly, and took
a leading part in its debates. In one sense at least no nation could be
“unready” which was counselled by such men as Dahlmann, Droysen, Duncker,
Gervinus, Waitz, Mohl, Welcker, Mittermaier, with Jakob Grimm, Ernst Moritz
Arndt, Ludwig Uhland, and many other bearers of honoured names. Yet even these
were outnumbered by about two to one by the judicial and administrative officials,
and nearly equalled in numbers by the practising advocates. At the second
meeting of the NationaHverscmmlung it chose as its President by 305 votes out
of 396 Heinrich von Gagern, who was unmistakably marked out for the post not
only by the part he had taken in the national movement, but by his commanding
personality, loftiness of purpose and moral courage. His chief competitors for
the
1848]
Archduke John elected Reichsverweser.
165
Chair had
been Alexander von Soiron and the democratic orator Robert Blum.
At an early
sitting of the Assembly (on May 24) a Committee of Thirty (in which of the
Diet’s advisory committee only Dahlmann and Max von Gagem were included) was
appointed to draft a national Constitution for report to the House; but, as it
had been recognised from the first that the most pressing question was the
establishment of a supreme executive authority—a Central Power—another
Committee, of fifteen, was named to consider it. This second Committee had come
to the conclusion that the bolder plan of the hegemony of a single Government—which
could only have been the Prussian—must be postponed, and that the best
temporary expedient was a tripartite Directory consisting of representatives
of Austi. a, Prussia and the smaller States respectively, when opinion began to
veer round towards the provisional establishment of a single Head, in the
time-honoured form of a Reichsverweser (Vicar of the Empire). Somewhat
impulsively, Gagem identified himself with this idea, and with the suggestion
that Archduke John of Austria should be selected for the office. The Archduke’s
personal popularity, due in part to his open dislike of Mettemich’s system of
government, in part to his bonhomie of manner and speech, and in part to his
marriage with a daughter of the people, had been skilfully fostered in the
Austrian interest. The proposal of entrusting to him the control of the
executive power of the new-born Empire chimed in with the medieval notions of
the King of Prussia—but would it commend itself to the susceptibilities of the
Prussian people, and to the sympathies of the other, especially the northern,
German States ? For the debate which was to settle the question of the Central
Power not less than 160 speakers had put down their names; and, after it had
lasted from June 19-24, it was only a bold stroke on the part of Gagem which
decided the issue. Amidst tremendous applause he proposed that the Assembly
itself should proceed to create the Central Power by the election of a
Reichsverweser. This resolution which, while vindicating the sovereignty of the
nation as directly represented by the Assembly, completely ignored the
particular Governments, having been supported by both Radowitz and Vincke,
<vas, notwithstanding Dahlmann’s protest, carried without a division on June
27; and on the following day the Central Government in the person of an
irresponsible Reichsverweser acting through a responsible Ministry was
established. On the 29th Archduke John was elected to the office by 436 out of
548 votes. The unwillingness of the Couservatives to ignore the Governments,
and the Radical prejudice against the election of a Prince, had alike proved
unavailing; and the Prussian plenipotentiary Usedom had not ventured to make
known the protest sent by his Government. An act of more than doubtful legality
had been combined with a great political blunder.
At first all
seemed to promise well. The recognition of the Reichs-
166
Ministers and parties
at Frankfort. [1848
verweser
by the Governments met with no difficulty; the new Prussian Ministry
(Auerswald’s) passed over the laches of Usedom, and King Ernest of Hanover
swallowed his ire. It was, however, noticed that the recognition of the new
authority by the Prussian army was indefinitely delayed. On July 11 the
Archduke held his joyous entry into Frankfort; and the Diet of the
Confederation, by transferring its powers to the Reichsver- weser, at the same
time, as had been skilfully arranged by Schmerling, asserted and for the
present put a stop to its functions. The Archduke now proceeded to the
appointment of a Rekhsmmisterium, and of ambassador^ to the Great Powers,
Schmerling took Home affairs, and Heckscher Justice, with the Prussian General
von Peucker as Minister of War; early in August Prince Charles of Leiningen
accepted the Presidency of the Ministry^ but resigned it within a few weeks on
account of the vote on the Malmoe Truce to be mentioned below; while Heckscher
was transferred to Foreign Affairs, and three deputies of great ability,
Duckwitz of Bremen, Beckerath (for whom Mathy had generously made way), and
Robert von Mohl, became Ministers of Commerce, Finance and Justice
respectively. The appointment of Stockmar (who sat for Coburg) as Minister of
Foreign Affairs had been contemplated; but he declined, though declaring
himself ready to accept the Presidency of the Ministry if Bunsen would take the
Foreign portfolio. Within the National Assembly, the system of parties slowly
proceeded to define itself more or less distinctly. They took their names in
French fashion from the sections of the arena in the Paulskirche in which their
members sat, and also from the hostelries and other places of public resort
which they frequented. Thus the Extreme Right (the Party Milani) consisted of
the Conservative ultras, who denied to the National Assembly any right of
participation in the executive, and demanded for the Governments a share in the
settlement of the Constitution of the Empire. The Right (the Casino) did not
ignore the Governments, though acknowledging the unity of Germany as the
paramount purpose of the Assembly; while the Right Centre (the Landsberg party)
though likewise respecting the independence of the Governments, desired the
control of the military forces to be in the hands of the Central Power. It was
to this fraction that the majority of the Ministers belonged. Similarly, the
Left shaded off from the Extreme Left (the Dormersberg) who hoisted the flag of
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, to the Left proper (the Teutsche Hof) whose
chief aim was popular sovereignty as represented by a permanent national
parliament elected by universal adult suffrage, and to the more moderate
politicians in the Left Centre (Wurtemberger Hof), with the intermediate
fractions of the Augsburger Hof and the Westend Hall.
The National Assembly
now felt itself free to enter upon its proper task. It began its constitutional
discussions with the protracted process of formulating the Grundrechte, or
fundamental rights of German citizenship. The interpretation given to the term
was so
1848] The Grundrechte.—The Schleswig-Holstein
War. 167
wide1,
and the determination to exhaust the subject before passing on to a discussion
of the constitutional superstructure so profound, that the Grundrechte must in
any case have occupied the House for a considerable time; but before the
Assembly brought its labours upon them to a dose, towards the end of 1848, much
had happened to interrupt these labours and to impair the authority of the
Assembly itself. Thus, though the Grundrechte were, on December 27, 1848,
proclaimed as law by the Reichsverweser, and though on March 28,1849, they were
incorporated in the Constitution of the Empire, the larger States (Austria,
Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover) neither proclaimed them as law, nor treated them as
having the force of law without proclamation.
A most
humiliating rebuff was in the first instance administered to the national
aspirations by the stoppage of the Schleswig-Holstein War. Prussia, though she
had intervened in this War in the name of the Germanic Confederation, lacked
the will, as the Central Government lacked the means, to carry the conflict to
a successful issue in the face of the ill-will of the non-German Great Powers,
while Austria required every soldier she could spare for the struggle in Italy.
Wrangel, after assuming the command, had by a couple of successful engagements
soon made himself master of the whole of Schleswig, and entered Jutland, taking
Fridericia (May 2). Jutland, however, he soon received orders to evacuate, in
consequence no doubt of Russian warnings. Very soon, too, the Danes drove back
the Prussians from their position at Duppel opposite Alsen; but they were in
their turn pushed back by Wrangel across the Jutland boundary upon Hadersleben
(June 28). Practically the War was now at a standstill: the Danish blockade of
the German coasts pressed heavily upon German trade, and was felt as a national
humiliation which gave rise to a widespread wish for a German fleet. Neither
the King of Prussia nor the Conservative camarilla which from time to time
influenced his action sympathised with the War. Thus negotiations had been
opened in the previous month, countenanced by Russia, Great Britain (where
Bunsen’s appeal to public opinion had been counteracted by the visit to London
of the Danish politician Orla Lehmann) and Sweden; and on August 26 a truce was
concluded for a term of seven
1
This will appear from the following brief summary of the Grundrechte as
actually passed: “Every German is a citizen of the Empire. No German State
shall in the administration of civil or penal law make any difference between
its own subjects and those of any other State. Before the law there exists no
distinction of classes. The rights of all citizens are equal; the duties of all
are the same: every man is bound to serve the Empire in arms. Personal freedom
is inviolable; and no man may be arrested except on a judicial warrant which
gives the cause of his detention and is communicated to him within twenty-four
hours after his arrest. All Germans have the right of freely expressing their
opinions by word of mouth, in writing or in print; the right of free petition;
the right of public meeting. Every German State is to possess a Constitution
with a popular representation, and to this representative body the Ministers are
to be responsible."
months
between Denmark and Prussia at Malmoe. Prussia had no authority to conclude
this truce; but the Danish Government, in refusing to deal directly with the
agents of the Central Power, was able to plead that it had remained “uninformed”
of the establishment of that authority.
The Malmoe
Truce stipulated that the Provisional Government should ceiase, and that its
authority should be transferred to a so-called “ Conji .it Government,” named
partly by Prussia and partly by Denmark, with Count Karl Moltke, whose leanings
were Danish, at its head. When, on September 4, Heckscher communicated the
Truce to the National Assembly for confirmation by the Central Power, it was
clear that an approval of the compact would involve an approval of the action
of Prussia in concluding it. The Prussian Government was at once impeached by
the eminent politician at the head of the Right Centre, who, more completely
than any man in his party, was identified with the idea of the hegemony of
Prussia in Germany. Dahlmann, a Schleswig-Holsteiner every inch of him (he sat
for a Holstein division), had resolved at any cost to oppose the Truce. After a
first failure he renewed his onslaught; and, when after the ratification of the
Truce by Prussia (September 2) the Assembly had to choose between the humiliation
of approval and civil war, his motion for the rejection of the agreement was
carried by a majority of 17 votes (September 5). The nascent Organisation of
parties seemed suddenly broken up; the Ministers resigned; if there was to be a
new Government, Dahlmann, it was said, must take office with Robert Blum. The
former was actually sent for by the Archduke; but he soon saw that he was in an
impasse—even old Arndt had gone over to the Moderates. The diplomacy of Franke
(long the trusted agent of the House of Ailgustenburg) had to be called in; and
by a majority of 21 the vote of the Assembly was reversed, and the Truce of
Malmoe approved (September 16). The most far-sighted and the most single-minded
of the politicians of the Frankfort Parliament had been under a delusion.
Prussia’s prestige had fallen low; but her hand could not be forced by appeals
to public morality and national patriotism. Though the Prussian Government now
took steps, if the Danish War should be renewed, to meet it well prepared, the
Prussian intervention in the Duchies was after a second campaign to come to a
still more ignominious close.
Meanwhile,
the breakdown of the National Assembly in this matter had led to the most
lamentable incident in its history. The Free Town of Frankfort had in this very
month of September set up a Constituent Assembly of 120, to be freely elected
by the whole body of the subjects of the State. The citizens had been largely
stimulated in the direction of advanced democratic ideas by the deputies of the
Left, who fraternised with them in their clubs, and enjoyed their applause from
the galleries of the Paulskirche. The acceptance of the Malmoe Truce by the
Assembly had failen like sparks upon fuel. The members were mobbed
1848] Murder of Lichnowsky and Auerswald. 169
indiscriminately
as they came forth after voting; the Westend Hall, as the club-house of a more
Moderate portion of the Left, was devastated; and an attempt was made to seize
the person of Heckscher, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Here, as in other
risings of the sort, an unknown alien element poured in by train to take part
in the conduct of the insurrection. The next day passed in wild rioting; but on
the 18th some 2400 Austrian and Prussian soldiers arrived in the city. Unskilfully
handled, they failed to prevent something like an irruption into the Assembly’s
place of meeting, where however the authority of Gagem kept the peace. Round
the Paulskirche, however, a network of small barricades was raised, and it was
not till two in the afternoon that the troops (which had behaved with admirable
self-control, several Prussian soldiers having been shot down where they stood)
received orders to demolish these. Three hours later the troops were called off
again, as it was hoped that the arrival of artillery from Darmstadt would soon
put an end to the revolt. It was about this time that two deputies, Prince
Felix Lichnowsky, a nobleman of popular sympathies well-known in the Palace at
Berlin, and the Prussian General von Auerswald—as a politician conspicuous by
his moderation—who had ridden forth to survey the state of affairs, were
recognised by a suburban mob, dragged forth from a house into which they had
retreated, and murdered with the most revolting brutality. By six o’clock the
artillery had arrived, and there were now some 12,000 troops in the town; but
some hours passed before the revolt was mastered. Next morning a state of siege
was proclaimed, which was vigorously enforced; and the talk of removing the
National Assembly to Niimberg came to nothing. But the effect of the episode,
enacted almost under the eyes of the National Parliament, was very notable; and
though the murder of Auerswald and Lichnowsky was not to stand alone as a deed
of popular frenzy (probably in this instance instigated by diabolical design),
its effect upon public feeling beyond all doubt contributed to hasten the
approach of the Reaction.
While, during
the summer and autumn of 1848, the authority of the National Assembly was seriously
impaired, the relations between the Governments of the two German Great Powers
and the National Assembly also underwent important changes. At Vienna, the
transformation of the old political system into a constitutional regime more
or less corresponding to popular Liberal ideas and aspirations, had been
accomplished without much trouble and with hardly any bloodshed. The
light-hearted Viennese were immensely elated to find that citizens and students
together had managed a great revolution so cleverly, and were ready to believe
that capital and monarchy might without difficulty be tided over into a new
stage of their political life, while the Constitution of the Empire was in the
making. The influence allowed to the students of the University was a specially
significant illustration of the childlike hopefulness of the times. These
spoilt children of the community, left
170
[l848
to their own
devices by their professors (except when one or the other of these served as a
popular figure-head on his own account), were treated by the population at
large not only as directors and organisers of the political movement in
progress, but as a kind of Court of Appeal on all the grievances and troubles
of private as well as public life. Perhaps this peculiar feature of the Vienna
insurrection may explain the idealistic character which it throughout retained,
and which it certainly did not owe to the scurrilities which flowed from the
emancipated Press. The troubled condition of Vienna was, at the same time, due
in part to the privations suffered by its working classes; for, though the
Government had done their best to bring these sufferings to public notice, they
had not earned much gratitude for their pains; and, in the end, the workmen
came to care for little beyond the satisfaction of their own claims in the way
of employment, freedom from taxation, and the general improvement of their
condition. ' In addition to this material for future disturbance, there was the
proletariate proper, with the Polish and other alien agitators. The full tide
of a Polish immigration from France and Belgium poured into Germany towards the
end of March, 1848; and the resolute pursuit by the Poles of their own aim,
while many others who took part in the Revolution had but a vague notion of
what aim they were pursuing, no doubt contributed to their disproportionately
large share in the actual conduct of the insurrection now near at hand.
With
Lombardo-Venetia turned into a camping-ground; with Hungary demanding a
measure of independence which it was impossible to deny to her; with Croatia
and Slavonia asking for protection against the Magyars, of which it was
impossible at present to hold out more than the vaguest promise; with Bohemia
striving after an autonomy of which her later history had failed to obscure the
proud traditions; and with the German provinces of the monarchy largely
entering into the desires of the rest of Germany for a real national executive
as well as a national legislature—the new Austrian Government had decided not
to postpone till the meeting of the great Combined Diet the attempt to frame
the new Constitution which was to cure all ills. Pillersdorff and his
colleagues in the meantime allowed the free use —and none could well have been
more free-—of the civic rights of petition and public meeting. Prince
Windischgratz had, as early as March 18, proclaimed that order and tranquillity
had been restored at Vienna; moreover, when the news came of the evacuation of
Milan and Venice, a large number of volunteers were enlisted for Radetzky’s
army. But this patriotic phase proved quite transitory.
The unspent
force of the Revolutionary current, and the impotence' of Pillersdorff and his
colleagues, were shown on the occasion of the publication of the new Press law
(April 1). Though it offered a liberal instalment of concessions, the law
aroused the most vehement opposition, and Pillersdorff consented to the
appointment of a joint
committee of
students and journalists to advise on amendment^ In the German question the
Government were more successful in keeping in touch with public feeling both in
Vienna and in the German provinces generally—which was in general sympathy with
the national movement, but desirous of maintaining the Austrian ascendancy in
federal affairs. Schmerling, whom the Government had appointed its
representative on the confidential Committee of Seventeen, completely fell in
with the guarded policy of Count Ficquelmont, who as Minister of Foreign
Affairs kept a cool head, and who in the beginning of April, on the resignation
of Kolowrat, assumed the Presidency of the Ministry. The fear of a Prussian
hegemony influenced the policy of Austria even in this period of stress; as
early as April 21, the Ministry officially declined, though in courteous
phrase, to submit unconditionally to any decree of the “ Federal Assembly ”;
and at Frankfort, down to the end of Archduke John’s tenure of office, Austrian
statesmanship continued to hold back.
Yet in
Austria itself the progress of Liberalism seemed unbroken. The Ministerial
changes early in April were accompanied by the abolition of the State
Conference, so long the supreme authority in the Austrian system of government;
and immediately afterwards Archduke Ludwig withdrew from public affairs. The
Emperor Ferdinand found it easier to govern through his responsible Ministers,
now that no more intimate adviser was left to him; the Archduchess Sophia had
not yet become a convert to the cause of the reaction, and as yet all talk of a
Court camarilla was illusory. But worthy men though Pillersdorff and his
fellow-Ministers undoubtedly were, the times in Austria were not such as to
suit a monarchy without a monarch. The symptoms of trouble continued in
Vienna; and after Windischgratz had on April 30 been transferred to his old
post of Commander-in-chief at Prague, there was now in the imperial capital no
effective military authority, and no police authority at all.
Meanwhile,
the Ministers continued their work of framing a Constitution, and already
early in April submitted to a gathering of some thirty notables from the
several parts of the monarchy a draft, based, as Pillersdorff afterwards
frankly declared, on the Belgian Constitution, as having been drawn up “ in
circumstances similar to those exist' lg in Austria.” In these deliberations
Alexander Bach’s voice is said to have been generally decisive. Simultaneously
discussions on the proposed Constitution took place in the several provincial
Diets. In Bohemia, however, the national party insisted by petition on the
establishment of a separate administration for this kingdom, with Moravia and
Silesia; and from Galicia, where Count Francis Stadion and his lieutenants had
with difficulty maintained the public peace, a petition came up for the resettlement
of the province on a national basis. The Bohemians were referred to the coming
general Reichstag, whose assembling was to crown the constitutional work, for
the satisfaction of their main demand;
the Galicians
were assured that the Emperor was ready to preserve their nationality. But the
cardinal difficulty with which the Austrian Government haft to deal was the
condition of Hungary, and its relations to the adjoining lands. The Hungarian
Ministry had, after a violent storm of popular indignation had broken down some
recalcitrance at Vienna, more especially against the inclusion of Kossuth, been
finally constituted under Count Lewis Batthy&ny. Among its members were the
Conservative Prince Paul EsterMzy, long known as Austrian ambassador in London
(Foreign Affairs); Francis De&k and Baron Joseph Eotvos, both Constitutionalists
of high character and consistent moderation (Justice and Public Instruction);
Count Stephen Szechenyi, formerly the adored leader of the national party
(Public Works), and Kossuth (Finance). The Administration was thus composed of
members of all the national parties, including men who kept in view the
historic traditions of Hungarian politics; and in the elaboration of the
Constitution at Pressburg, the provisions as to the Palatine, the maintenance
of the bicameral system, and the imposition of a property qualification on
electors, reveal a moderating hand, although the far-sighted prudence of
De&k was unable altogether to prevail against the driving power of Kossuth.
Thus the all- important provision which transferred the control of army and
fortresses from the Crown to the Hungarian Ministry was strongly disapproved by
De&k. On the other hand, his moderating wisdom cordially cooperated with
the enthusiasm of Kossuth, who had long insisted upon their necessity, in
carrying through the Diet those March and April Laws, which completely—and, it
must be asserted, beneficently—changed the very foundations of the social as
well as the political system of the Hungarian nation. In the first place, the
feudal servitudes and the tithes payable by the peasantry were abolished. In
the second, taxation was extended to all classes. In the third, the right of
electing to the Diet, which had hitherto belonged only to the nobility, who
exercised it in the several counties of the kingdom (Comitats), was now
extended to every Hungarian owning property worth the equivalent of £30. These
were henceforth the Grundrechte of the Hungarian people; and the fact that the
nobility had voluntarily relinquished their privileges bound the middle class
as well as the peasantry to the national cause during the conflicts now at
hand; while a class of small landowners had been created who were passionately
attached to the new regitne. The Diets, it may be added, were to be henceforth
annual; and their future seat, with that of the Government, was to be at Pest.
Provision was also made in these laws for establishment of liberty of the
Press, and for the formation of a National Guard.
But the
Hungarian question was by no means solved by a change in the relations between
the Austrian monarchy and the Hungarian nation. Notwithstanding the breadth of
their legislative enactments, Kossuth and his fellow-leaders of the national
movement had long regarded as an
axiom the
ascendancy of the Magyars, including that of the Magyar tongue. Before the Diet
separated, it requested the King to take immediate steps for the convocation
of the Transylvanian Diet, so as to effect without further delay a union
between the two countries. The feeling of Magyar Klausenburg was entirely in
favour of such a union; but the Saxons at Hermanstadt showed an anxious desire
to secure guarantees for their rights. Still more doubtful seemed the future of
Slavonia and Croatia. On April 8 a Serb deputation, which had arrived at
Pressburg to congratulate the Diet, though well received in public, were told
by Kossuth in his private house that, before there could be any question of an
equal treatment of the Slavonian with the Magyar tongue, appeal would have to
be made to the decision of the sword. His imprudent words left five millions
of Slavs and two and a half millions of Roumans (Walachs)—not to speak of
nearly a million and a half of Germans—assured that five millions of Magyars
were resolved to uphold the ascendancy of their tongue systematically extended
since 1839. Thus a strong impulse was added to the agitation which had for some
time been carried on for the speedy holding of a Diet of the “South Slavonic
nations”; by which they should secure to themselves an autonomy analogous to
the Hungarians. At Vienna this agitation was tacitly approved; but prosent ills
had to be reckoned with in the first instance, and on April 11 the Emperor-King
Ferdinand closed, with a speech in Hungarian, the Diet which had gone far
towards achieving the disruption of his monarchy.
A.s a matter
of course, in this of all monarchies in the world, neither loyalty towards the
throne nor the desire for a strong pe-sonal rule was extinct or confined to
self-centred regions like Tyrol. Even where these feelings did not operate, but
where historic traditions of autonomy or the feelings of race were strong,
there was in most instances a desire to uphold the Austrian empire as such,
while transforming it into a union of more or less independent political
communities, under the personal headship of the Emperor. Except among the
German democrats—and even with these it was not always strong—there was nowhere
a desire that the Austrian monarchy should merge, either in whole or in part,
in a united Germany. Among the six Austrian members of the watching committee
of Fifty named by the Frankfort Vorparlament, the five who put in an attendance
(they included Count Anton Auersperg, no less sincere as a politician than as a
poet) showed themselves anxious above all to secure attention to the demands of
the Slav nationality; the sixth, the eminent historian Palacky, the
acknowledged leader of the old Cech party in Bohemia, refused to attend, on the
plea that Bohemia properly formed no part of Germany, and that for Austria,
including Bohemia, to “ merge ” in Germany would be political suicide. The
effect of Palacky’s very open letter was considerable in various parts of the
monarchy; among the Slovenes in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola
associations were
formed in favour of adhesion to Austria and against incorporation in the
Germanic body—the real object being the formation of a kingdom of Slovenia as
an independent part of the Austrian monarchy. With all these views and
interests the makers of the new Austrian Constitution had to reckon, as well as
with the desire to merge Austria in Germany, cherished by the Vienna students
and advocated by one Doctor Schiitte—till he was removed by government orders.
Yet, after
submitting the Constitution to the notables assembled at Vienna for the
purpose, under the presidency of Archduke Francis Charles, it was resolved,
instead of discussing the new Constitution in a general Diet (ar had been
promised in the imperial manifesto of March 15), to promulgate it ready-made
(octroyer)1 on the authority of the sovereign. The
Constitution was actually published amidst great rejoicing on April 25, to
which day the celebration of the Emperor’s birthday had been postponed, and
communicated by Ficquelmont to the foreign Powers. It declared the union as a
single indissoluble constitutional monarchy of the lands forming part of the
imperial Austrian State, exclusive of Hungary and the other Transleithanian
lands, and the Italian possessions. To all the citizens of the State thus
defined it granted full rights of civil and religious liberty. A General Diet
(Reichstag) was instituted, to consist of an Upper House of princes of the
dynasty, and nominees of the landowners, and a Lower of 383 members, the system
of election to be definitively determined by the Reichstag. The provincial
Estates were to continue by its side, but without constituent powers. The
Ministers were to be responsible to it; and a National Guard was to be formed,
which, like all the officials of the Empire, was to swear fidelity to the
Constitution as well as to the sovereign.
The
Constitution had avowedly left the Hungarian difficulty unsolved ; and just
exception was taken to some of its provisions as well as its omissions. Bach,
who perceived that it was regarded as unsatisfactory, lost no time in moving
away from the Administration. Its most unpopular member was at this time its
head, Ficquelmont, widely charged with having jobbed into the Ministry of War
his relative, Count Baillet von Latour, who was a general of reputation as well
as a zealous servant of the Crown. The aged President of the Ministry was
shamefully mobbed in his own house, with the cooperation of the National Guard
and the Students’ Legion, and practically forced to resign (May 3). The populace
was more and more coming to demean itself as master of the city, with the aid
of an increasing influx of Poles. In Galicia a rising on April 25 had been
completely suppressed by the following day, and the sittings of the popular
council at Lemberg were closed by Stadion. At the same time he granted the
peasantry the abolition of the robot (a servitude of labour which varied in
different parts of the monarchy, but
1 “
Concession et octroi” were the terms used in Louis XVIII’s grant of the Oharte
of 1814.
1848]
CentralPoliticalCommittee.-TheEmperor’sdeparture. 175
usually
extended over rather more than a hundred days), and encouraged the Ruthenes to
assert their racial counter-grievances at Vienna. The Polish movement, being
thus at an end in Galicia, proceeded to make itself felt, after another
fashion, in the Austrian capital. Yet it was not the Poles to whom the second
and most dangerous outbreak of the Revolution at Vienna was directly due.
For the
control of the populace the Government, which dared not make use of such troops
as remained in Vienna, had chiefly to depend on the National Guard, which
transacted business with the Ministers through an executive Committee. Out of
this Committee and the University students was then formed a Central Political
Committee, which had begun to interfere in government business when it was
dissolved by Count Hoyos, who had quite recently resumed the governorship of
the city (May 13). The result was vehement popular indignation; and on the
evening of the 15th, a concourse of workmen and students moved upon the
Hofburg, following the National Guard, which did not interfere with their
proceedings. Here a self-commissioned deputation invaded a meeting of the
Cabinet, and obtained from it the reinstatement of the Central Political
Committee, and the promise of a revision in a democratic sense of the
Constitution and the electoral law. Late at night the Emperor signed these
concessions, which were made public on the following day, with an undertaking
that the military should not be called out except on the demand of the National
Guard. Pillersdorff and his colleagues now chivalrously offered either to go or
to stay; but without eliciting any public response. On the 17th the unexpected—
which is often the obvious—happened. The Emperor, with the whole imperial
family, starting from Schonbrunn as if for a carriage drive, continued it to
Innsbruck. Fear, pure and simple, had dictated this step. On the following
morning the news of the flight spread through Vienna, and produced a state of
feeling made up of popular exasperation against the Camarilla (now forming
round the Archduchess Sophia), loyal regrets, and among the well-to-do apprehensions
of a complete downfall of the public credit. The Ministry floundered into a
decree—which afterwards had to be modified in order to avoid a national
bankruptcy pure and simple—ordering that all payments in specified coins or in
public bank-notes should be accepted at their nominal value.
Public
feeling was beginning to recover from the effects of the departure of the
Emperor, when the Ministry attempted a repressive measure which they were
impotent to carry out. One of the chronic incentives to disturbance would, they
thought, be removed by the dissolution of the Academic Legion, for which the
closing of the University for the annual vacation on May 26 would furnish an
admirable opportunity. The students resisted in spite of a display of National
Guards and regulars; and a large body of unemployed workmen (who had been kept
together by government orders to facilitate measures
for their
maintenance) came to the aid of their University comrades. The end was theit
the Government withdrew part of the troops, and, when the erection of
barricades immediately ensued, revoked the obnoxious order itself. They had
thus practically abdicated their authority; and on the evening of the 26th a
fresh Committee of one hundred members, consisting of citizens, students, and
National Guards, was set up to preserve public order and to safeguard popular
rights. This Committee of Safety, with Dr Fischhof as its ruling spirit,
exercised what little public authority remained in the strange interregnum
which followed. While the eyes of the Viennese were turned towards Prague,
whence an army under Wipdischgratz was quite prematurely rumoured to be
approaching, the barricades were left standing in the streets, “defended” by
workmen, and affording much pleasure—especially one decorated with a portrait
of the Emperor—to the population. The Press had never been more shameless.
Vienna was given up to the officials and the lower classes; according to one
account, the aristocracy had taken its departure on the 18th, and after the
26th the bourgeoisie followed.
A more
extraordinary condition of things has probably never existed in a State in
which the regular machinery of government was still at work. Addresses and
deputations were pouring in every day to the Emperor’s Court at Innsbruck, where
Wessenberg, who had courageously taken office as Minister for Foreign Affairs
at the age of 74, was in attendance, and where the Vienna corps diplomatique
gradually assembled. In Vienna the rest of the Minv try jogged on as best it
could, the War Minister Latour taking no part in any business but that of his
own department. The chief difficulty of the Ministry was, after all, the
situation of the public finances. Every month the deficit increased, and by the
end of June it was reckoned at 35 million florins. The credit of the State
could not much longer be maintained, when the reserve of coin in the Bank stood
to the amount of government paper in circulation in the ratio of 1 to 8. On
June 25 Archduke John, at Pillersdorff’s request and with the Emperor’s
consent, came to the rescue by assuming the regency; but this could only be a
temporary expedient, since his election as Reichsverweser, narrated above,
followed within four days. Thus, when the Committee of Safety indicated the
expediency of a change of administration, and Archduke John did not say nay,
the long-suffering Pillersdorff actually resigned, together with one or two of
his colleagues (July 8). Baron Anton von Doblhoff-Dier hereupon undertook the
formation of a Ministry which was to be unmistakably Liberal in colour, with
Wessenberg as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Bach of Justice, Latour,
however, retaining the Ministry of War.
The abnormal
condition of things at Vienna necessarily reacted upon the other great centres
of population in the monarchy. At Prague the Cech party determined to attempt
another advance towards Bohemian independence. Windisohgratz, who was in
command of the troops, and
1848] JellaUi.— The Slav Congress at Prague. 177
several
members of the nobility, openly renounced all obedience to the Vienna Ministry;
and Count Leo Thun, now at the head of the Bohemian Administration, declared
himself obliged to establish a responsible provisional Government, in which
the Cechs were duly represented. The Vienna Government hereupon called upon him
to resign his office. On the other hand, the negotiations in progress at the
instigation of Eotvos between Frankfort and Pest, aimed at allowing Austria to
be absorbed into the German Empire with her Slav as well as her German
provinces, provided that Croatia and Slavonia were left to be incorporated in
the Magyar kingdom. But this solution they dreaded more than anything, and were
resolved upon averting, more especially since the Austrian Government had
appointed' Count Joseph Jellacic von Buzim Banus of Croatia. Jellacic, the son
of a Croatian nobleman and landowner who had seen much service in the
Napoleonic days, had himself as yet only risen to the rank of colonel in the
Austrian army; but he had gained distinction in the fighting against the Turks
on the Military Frontier, of which he continued to hold the command, so that he
always had a supply of soldiery at his disposal, and he had acquired the
confidence of the national party in Croatia. Under his government Croatian
jealousy of Magyar ascendancy soon found means of making itself audible; wherer
upon the Austrian Government cautiously prohibited the proposed meeting of a
Croatian Diet and called upon the Banus to give an account of his proceedings.
But, interpreting the situation for himself, he warmly approved the suggested
convocation of a general Slav Congress with a view to the formation of a great
Slav confederation.
The
Slav Congress actually opened at Prague in June, after the issue of two
manifestos, the one appealing to the whole brotherhood of Slavs, the other
protesting loyalty to the House of Austria. But its sole fruit was a third
manifesto drawn up by Palacky, which in its final sentence demanded a general
congress of nations. The Congress had thus soared into the sphere of dreams;
but, though the denunciation of a great Slav conspiracy seems to have been pure
invention, the gathering undoubtedly helped to excite the democratic
aspirations of the masses. The ill-will excited among the younger Cech
partisans by the return of Windischgratz was heightened hy his refusal to
supply the Prague students, emulous of their Vienna brethren, with cannon and
ammunition. On Whitsunday, June 13, an assault was made upon his palace by the
excited populace, and, this having been dispersed by the soldiery, barricades
were erected, and the revolt began in earnest. Though on the first day the
insurgents were overpowered by the troops, Windischgratz, whose methods were
always slow, entered into negotiations; even after his wife had been shot dead
at a window of his palace, he showed no vindictiveness in the terms offered by
him; and on June 15, after an exchange of prisoners had been effected, he
withdrew his troops from the city to the surrounding heights, and agreed to an
armistice. But, on the 16th, some shots fired across o. M. H. XI. ch. vi. 12
the Moldau
furnished him with an excuse for renewing hostilities; and, after demanding an
unconditional surrender, he began the bombardment of the city and continued it
during the night. In the morning the insurgents gave way, and Windischgratz was
absolute master of Prague.
The Reaction
had achieved its first victory and found a champion in whom it could put its
trust; and, though the Austrian Revolution was by no means at an end, the
turning-point in its course had been reached. As for the Cechs, they had missed
their opportunity, and had no longer to be taken into account in the ultimate
settlement. The Bohemian Diet summoned by Count Leo Thun never met, and his
Slavophil hopes were at an end. On the other hand, the Croatians and Southern
Slavs (ii general, having to abandon the hope of Cech cooperation, became in
the hands of the Austrian Government an interest to play off against the
Hungarians, and indeed an instrument to employ against them. For the present,
the service rendered by Windischgratz to the cause of order and to the prestige
of the army overshadowed all others; and he felt strong enough to raise the
state of siege at Prague, while declaring his determination to maintain the
tranquillity which he had reestablished.
The Reaction,
which had thus triumphed at Prague and was looking forward to a speedy triumph
at Vienna, hereupon sprerd to other parts of the monarchy where the Revolution
had made a more or less rapid progress. The provincial Diets which met in the
summer of 1848 almost invariably took as a starting-point for their discussions
the burdens resting on the peasantry—the robot and the tithe—and were indeed
pinned down to this subject by the peasant deputies admitted into the reformed
assemblies. The results were neither uniform, nor everywhere satisfactory. In
Tyrol, where there were no peasant servitudes, the old Estates were maintained,
and a petition was voted against the liberty of religious worship allowed by
the new Constitution to dissident confessions.
The Genera]
Diet (iReichstag), which was finally to settle this Constitution, was formally
opened by Archduke John on July 22, by which time most of the members of the
heterogeneous and polyglot assembly had reached Vienna. Of the total of 383
nearly one-fourth were peasants ; on the other hand, the nobility were
conspicuous by their absence, though there were a few Polish nobles from
Galicia, where, curiously enough, Stadion had also found a seat. Thus, as at
Frankfort, the great body of the deputies belonged to the middle class; but it
was calculated that less than half of them spoke German as their mother-tongue.
The Right in the Assembly consisted mainly of Cechs, led by Ladislas Rieger,
and the incompetence of the President, Schmitt (a Viennese), left the conduct
of business chiefly in the hands of the Cech Vice-President Strobach; the
minority on the Left consisted of German democrats, and was largely controlled
by the Vienna democratic organisations.
Though the
Committee of Safety still remained in the exercise of its
1848]
179
abnormal
functions, a vote of the Reichstag, urging upon the Emperor the necessity of
his return, induced his advisers to bring him back to Schonbrunn on August 12.
Already on July 31 the Assembly appointed a Committee to deliberate on a
Constitution for the Empire, instead of merely revising the Pillersdorff
instrument, which was thus relegated to limbo. During August the discussions
turned chiefly on the removal of the burdens which had hitherto oppressed the
peasantry in their relations to the owners of the land. The mover of the
resolution for their removal, which was unanimously adopted in principle, Hans
Kudlich, was himself a peasant’s son. But on the question of compensation
protracted debates arose, the Left objecting to any payment of the sort, while
Bach roundly declared that by the grant of it the Government would stand or
fall. Thus the Reichstag determined in favour of compensation by a vote of 174
to 144, and by a further vote resolved on the formation of provincial funds for
defraying it. With some difficulty, Bach further persuaded the House (which as
he pointed out possessed no legislative, but only constituent powers) to ask
the imperial sanction for the new land law; although it would not concede to
the Emperor the title “ von Gottes Gnaden” (by the grace of God). Thus a great
and enduring piece of work was actually accomplished by this otherwise
ill-starred Reichstag (September 7).
Before its
remaining labours were overwhelmed by the last effort of the llevolution at
Vienna, the relations between Austria and Hungary, and those between both
Governments and the South-Slavonian movement, had entered into a further phase.
The new Banus of Croatia had at first seemed ready to adopt the entire “
Illyrian ” programme, according to which a Slav kingdom was to be included on
equal terms with Germany, Austruuand Hungary in a tripartite personal union.
But it is doubtful whether Jellacic was really enamoured of the ideal of a
South-Slavonic State. His chief wish appears to have been to preserve the
authority of the Habsburg dynasty which his family had faithfully served in
arms, while at the same time enabling Croatia to defy the Pest Government and
thus secure the gratitude of the Emperor. Without therefore intending to bind
his future action by its conclusions, he summoned the Croato-Slavonic Diet for
which both provinces had been agitating, and which met on June 5 at Agram. The
assembly was blessed by prelates of both the Greek and the Roman Church, and
attended by sympathetic or quasi-suppliant representatives from the Cechs of
Bohemia, the Slovaks of northern Hungary, the Slovenes of ,Styria. The
Dalmatians, however, would not come; and between the Croatians and the Serbs of
Slavonia, whose proper centre was at Carlowitz, no prospective system of common
administration, or of mutual consultation, could be settled. The only point as
to which unanimity existed was precisely the line of action which Jellacic
desired to ensure—the rejection of the authority of the Hungarian Ministry.
180 The Croatian and the Hungarian Diet. [1848
The
frightened imperial Court ordered him to dissolve the Agram assembly; but, by
way of reply, he betook himself to Innsbruck in person to explain his
proceedings, preceded by a couple of deputations.
The Hungarian
Diet in its turn had reassembled on July 2; but the Court at Innsbruck, where
Prince EsterMzy put in an appearance as the Foreign Minister of the King of
Hungary, could not hope that history would repeat itself, and that the Magyars
would once more come to the rescue of their distressed sovereign. He was
followed by the President of the Ministry, Batthydny, who had the satisfaction
of taking back with him to Pest three imperial manifestos (dated June 10),
rejecting the claim to independence in respect of the Hungarian Crown asserted
by the two main sections of the population of Transylvania, the Saxons and the
Roumans; charging the Hungarian Government with the defence of Dalmatia and the
Military Frontier—both of them Slav lands which it was desired at Agram to
include in the great South-Slavonian or “Illyrian” kingdom; and suspending the
Banus of Croatia from all his offices till he should have justified himself
before his sovereign. It required some courage—and some knowledge of the
dessous des cartes—to see through this attempt to pacify Hungary at any cost,
while waiting for better times. But this courage—and, there seems reason to
believe, this knowledge— Jell acid possessed; and when, after Batthydny’s
departure from Innsbruck, the Banus arrived there, a change in the Imperial
policy set in, which was promoted by the turn which events took in Hungary
under the continuously growing ascendancy of the Radical party and its
leader—it might be said, its dictator—Kossuth.
An
anti-militaiy tumult at Pest on May 10 had ended in the withdrawal of the
commanding general, Baron Lederer; and several of the officers and soldiers
involved in the affray had been subjected by the Government to the jurisdiction
of an ordinary tribunal. The apprehensions of the army quartered in Hungary
increased when the Ministry called out a National Guard of 10,000 men, with
higher pay than the regulars, obviously in order to tempt over as many as
possible of them into its ranks; and a vague hope arose that Jellacid was the
destined leader of a reaction at Pest as well as at Vienna in which the army
would again play the decisive part.
His astute
proceedings continued to excite quite extraordinary interest in both friends
and foes. Encouraged by a rising of the Serbs under George Stratimirovid at
Carlowitz, which the Hungarian General Hrabowsky had in vain endeavoured to
suppress, the Croatian Diet assembled at Agram for an extraordinary sitting,
and resolved to demand from the Emperor the restoration of the Banus, together
with other more far-reaching concessions. It then voted to confer upon the
Banus an unrestricted personal authority; whereupon he declared the Diet permanent,
and then prorogued it with a “ parental ” benediction (July 9). In other words,
he could now act as he thought best on his own
responsibility.
A negotiation into which he hereupon entered at Vienna with the Palatine and
Batthy&ny, broke down; but he proclaimed his failure at Agram as if it had
been a success (August 6).
Whether or
not Jellacic had intended this last negotiation to fail, it was predoomed to a
breakdown. The action of Kossuth, which they were unable to resist or restrain,
was beginning to create great alarm among his colleagues, of whom in truth
Batthydny alone was under his spell. Kossuth, whose moods were at times those
of a religious enthusiast rather than of a political reformer, had for a time,
in a sort of retreat, been meditating a systematic breaking away from the
Austrian rule. He began with a succession of financial measures culminating in
a refusal of the compulsory redemption of the notes of the Vienna National Bank
by the Hungarian exchequer, and in the emission of Hungarian paper-money to the
amount of 12J million florins, in lieu of a loan of its paper offered to the
Hungarian exchequer by the Vienna Bank, in accordance with its privileges
(May). Thus the interests of Austrian finance were united to those of the
Austrian army in the desire to see an end of the Hungarian Constitution and
Ministry. Kossuth, however, went forward undismayed, commending his proceedings
to the capital and the country at large by “his journal” (Kossuth Hirlapja)— for
he was not less fluent and effective as a writer than as a speaker. When, on
July 5, the Diet was reopened, it was seen how great a change had been brought
about in its relations to the country. The commanding influence had altogether
passed from the Magnates to the Deputies; indeed, the Upper House was
approaching extinction, as a large number of nobles were quitting the country.
The war against the Croatians was treated as a national necessity, and
Kossuth’s impassioned demand for 42,000 men and a credit of 2,000,000 florins
was granted without a dissentient voice (July 11). On the other hand, though it
was reluctantly agreed to defend Austrian interests in Italy, if reasonable
regard were paid to the just national demands of the Italians, there was obviously
a growing sympathy on the part of the Magyars with the Italian struggle for
independence. While (notwithstanding the misgivings of Eotvos and De&k)
the Hungarian democracy was thus under Kossuth’s leadership drifting away from
the maintenance of a foreign policy frankly in harmony with that of Austria, it
showed itself ready to enter into relations of intimacy with the Frankfort
Assembly and its Central Power; and Kossuth ruthlessly pointed out to his
countrymen that the completion of the unity of Germany meant the disintegration
of the Habsburg monarchy. The Austrian Government, on the other hand, still
kept up a policy of conciliation towards Hungary; though its leading members,
and more especially Bach, perceived the impossibility of maintaining a real
union on the basis of the Pasting Hungarian Constitution. But the solution of
the problem was soon taken out of the Government’s hands.
The outbreak
of the conflict between Austria and Hungary, which had no doubt been largely
provoked by the dealings of the Hungarian Diet with the questions of army and
finance, was decided by the change which came over the spirit of the Austrian
Court and Government with the triumph of the Austrian arms in Italy. In June
and July Magyar pride had suffered from the inability of the Hungarian
Government to cope with a series of disturbances on the part of the Serbs of
Slavonia, in the course of which General Bechtold, who had nearly 10,000 men at
his lisposal, was finally repulsed from the trenches of Szent Tomasch, commanding
the JFranzenskanal and the Lower Theiss. The Austrian Government, however,
though an understanding existed between the War Minister Latour and Jellacic,
could not yet make up its mind to take part openly with the latter and the Slav
movement. Kossuth’s budget, on which the debates of the Diet began on August
24, was conceived and constructed entirely as if framed for a perfectly
independent State, managing its own army and foreign affairs. Yet the
anticipated financial deficit was. nearly four times the anticipated revenue,
and could only be covered by a loan and the issue of paper-money (besides the
doubling of the tax on absentees). The Austrian Government having, in
accordance with the privilege of the National Bank of Vienna, prohibited the circulation
in Austria of Hungarian one-florin bank-notes, Kossuth retorted by the
prohibition of Austrian notes of the same value in Hungary; and other
retaliatory measures followed. The relations between the two Governments were
becoming strained to the breaking- point; and now a curious contest arose
between them for the possession of the person of the Emperor-King. When, on
July 24, a motion had been carried in the Hungarian Diet inviting the King to
Pest, Doblhoff brought matters to a crisis by inducing the Austrian General
Diet (July 29) to send a deputation to Innsbruck urging the Emperor’s return to
Vienna. The deputation had to listen to some indignant reproaches launched by
the Archduchess Sophia against the misbehaviour of the capital; but for the moment
the Ministry, and the wish to mark the Imperial displeasure with the
proceedings in Hungary, prevailed, and the Court returned to Schonbrunn (August
12). Both the Ministry and the Court had been encouraged to this defiance of
the Hungarian Government, to which they had hitherto seemed to yield step upon
step, by the good news from Italy, where on July 25 Radetzky had gained the
victory of Custozza and on August 6 triumphantly entered Milan.
On August 22
the first warning was given to the Hungarians by the withdrawal of the
extraordinary powers of the Palatine; whereupon Batthydny and Dedk immediately
hastened to Vienna to arrest further action. But the Camarilla, which now
determined the action of the Emperor—and of which the chief members were the Archduchess
Sophia and the Adjutant-General Prince Lobkowitz, the friend of Windischgratz,
to whom were subsequently added Baron Kiibeck, now out of office,
and Prince
Felix Schwarzenberg not yet Minister—had resolved to strike home; and on
September 4) an imperial rescript was issued, without previous consultation
with Wessenberg, reinstating JellaSic in all his offices. The Hungarian
Ministers, who knew that this meant war, were for the moment dumbfounded.
Batthy&ny shook off all responsibility for the imperial rescript by
resigning his post. The patriotic Szechenyi’s mind was unhinged, and he
attempted to take his own life. Kossuth alone, after a moment of
discouragement, rose to the height of the situation, which he had done so much
to bring about. Into his half-responsible, half-irresponsible, hands now fell
the direction of the proceedings of the Diet, which accepted the programme of
the Minister of the People— including the issue of an (apparently) unlit'’ted
number of Hungarian five-florin bank-notes, and the transfer of any officers
and soldiers from the army into the newly created National Militia—the Hmvoeds.
All this was to be “without prejudice to the sanction of the King”—which
sanction was immediately refused by an imperial rescript, dated September 15.
Three days earlier Batthydny had been induced by the Palatine to undertake the
formation of a new Ministry, to which Kossuth promised to give an independent
support. Batthy&ny’s self-sacrifice deserves recognition—for he well knew
that the condition which he had attached to his consent—namely, that the
Austrian Government should prevent Jellacid from an irruption into
Hungary—could never be fulfilled. On September 17 came the news that the Banus
had crossed the Drave; and the invasion of Hungary—an invasion countenanced by
the Austrian Government, and jubilantly welcomed by a large majority of the
Slavs, whether or not subjects of the Hungarian Crown—had begun. On the same
day the Reichstag at Vienna, to which the Hungarian Diet had made a last appeal
as from nation to nation, notwithstanding a notable demonstration of sympathy
on the part of the German democrats, was induced by Bach to refuse to receive
the Hungarian deputation. A few days later the Palatine, Archduke Stephen,
resigned his dignity; though he was much blamed by the Court, his intentions
had always been good, and he had no taste for Kossuth’s project of proclaiming
him King. The recognition of Batthydny’s Ministry was, however, not directly
refused at Vienna; and the relations between the two Governments remained for
a time undetermined even after hostilities had actually begun. In other words
Austria, as Bach had indicated, reserved to herself the right of supreme
arbitration between Slav and Magyar —and of finally siding with the successful
combatant. So late as September 22 the Imperial troops in Hungary were ordered
to avoid any collision with the national levies.
The patriotic
enthusiasm which in the hour of peril Kossuth had been able to infuse into Diet
and nation had, for the moment at least, justified itself. Capital and country
had been so far as possible plated in a state of defence. With a view to
ensuring the fidelity of the people,
184 Hungarian preparations.—-Murder of Lamberg.
[1848
it was
resolved to carry out in full the reforms decreed by the Diet in the preceding
spring, more especially the removal of the peasant servitudes, for which the
landowners were to be compensated by a state advance of 15 million florins. The
national military force had been provided with arms, munition and gunnery
instruction at the “national” expense. Most of the fortresses of the kingdom
had been given up to the Government; Temesvar and Arad alone, among the more
important places, remaining under imperial control. The key of the Danube fell
into the hands of the Hungarians, when on September 28 Field-Marshal von Mertz
left Komorn, of which the defences had been neglected, in the hands of his
second in command, who soon hoisted the Hungarian flag. But though Jellacid’
advance met with no support in Hungary, he continued to move forward, and the
critical moment of a collision drew nearer and nearer.
A last
attempt was now made by the Austrian Ministry, in consultation with some
Hungarian noblemen at Vienna, to avert the imminent catastrophe. It was agreed,
with the assent of Batthy&ny, who had been summoned to give advice, to form
a Conservative Ministry in Hungary under the presidency of Baron Vay. But, as
this would take time and Jellacid was gradually drawing nearer to Pest, it was
resolved, again with Batthydny’s approval, to send thither at once
Field-Marshal von Lamberg, who was himself a Hungarian Magnate, and
conciliatory in his sentiments, in the capacity of Commander-in-chief of all
the troops beyond the Leitha; so that Jellacid would have been subordinated to
him. Before Lamberg’s arrival at Pest Kossuth had induced the Diet to appoint a
parliamentary committee of six, of which he was himself one, to assist the
Ministry in the conduct of affairs (September 22)—a far-reaching step; for out
of this Committee grew that of the National Defence, which with Kossuth at its
head accomplished the Hungarian Revolution. At a sitting of the Diet on the
27th Kossuth carried a further motion, disapproving the assumption by Lamberg
of the command of the Hungarian army arid forbidding any part of it to
acknowledge him as its chief. On the 28th he arrived at Pest, and after a short
interview with Hrabowsky, the General in command, was crossing the bridge to
Buda in a hackney-coach, when he was fallen upon by an excited mob and brutally
done to death. His mutilated body, which had been borne on scythes to the
military hospital, was afterwards secretly interred by the Servite Fathers.
But for this
foul act Jellacid would have found himself in a position of great difficulty,
had he appeared at the head of his troops before Pest. But this was not to be.
On September 29 he came upon the Hungaran forces under General Moga near
Veldencze, and after an artillery engagement agreed to an armistice of three
days’ duration. The check thus imposed upon his advance, and his subsequent
withdrawal towards the Croatian frontier, and then into Styria, raised the
self-
1848]
Austria declares war.—Riots at
Vienna.
185
confidence of
the Hungarian people to a height which as a military event the engagement
hardly warranted; but, little more than a week later (October 7), his reserve,
which, 10,000 strong, had followed the retreat of his main army, was pressed so
hard by the Hungarians under Perczel and Gorgei that it was obliged to surrender.
On October 3
the Austrian Government at last issued an open declaration of war against the
holders of power in Hungary. The manifesto was signed among others by General
Recsey, an old Hungarian officer who had been named President of the Hungarian
Ministry by the Austrian Government. At the same time the Diet was dissolved,
and its last resolutions were declared invalid; a state of siege was proclaimed
over the whole kingdom; and Jellacic was declared Commander-in-chief of all
the troops in Hungary. But there could no longer be any question at Pest of
going back. On October 7 two Austrian generals surrendered with their force to
Gorgei at Ozora, and a great number of soldiers immediately passed over to the
national camp. At Vienna, Latour, though continuing in the Reichstag to deny
that actual assistance had been given to Jell acid, was pushing forward all
troops which could be spared to the Hungarian frontier; and it was his
intention of using for this purpose even part of the diminished Vienna garrison
of 8000 men, which gave rise to the final revolutionary outbreak in the
Austrian capital.
While the
Reichstag was, in half a dozen languages, debating the Constitution, and public
attention seemed to be riveted by the progress of the conflict between the
Magyars and Jellacid, the populace of the capital and its friends were still
haunted by the vision of an approaching sudden revolutionary change. Agitators
of all sorts were on the spot; and as the fear of a restoration of the old
order of things began to be associated with military designs and Court
influences, the sense of excitement and alarm continued, even after illness
had for a time silenced the Radical agitator-in-chief, a language teacher named
Tausenau. On August 21 and the four days following Vienna was terrified by a
prolonged riot occasioned by an attempt of the Ministiy to lower the state
allowance made to unemployed women and children; and the Committee of Safety,
unable to cope with the rioters, made an offer to dissolve itself. The offer
was promptly accepted by the Ministry, which, chiefly no doubt at the
instigation of Bach, was, in the words of a diplomatic observer, “ adopting a
more governmental attitude.” This again excited the displeasure of the
populace; and in a riot which began on September 11 and continued on the
following day a ministerial building was sacked. On the 13th the students were
astir; at the requisition of the National Guard the military were called out;
and the Reichstag declared itself permanent—a vote which Bach’s firmness
induced the House to rescind. More exasperated than ever, the malcontents now
formed a new Central Committee out of representatives of the chief
186 Insurrection in Vienna.—Murder of Latour.
[i848
democratic
clubs; and the sympathies of the masses were thus directly attracted both to
the Hungarian cause and to the scheme of absorbing Cisleithanian Austria into
the German Empire—or German Republic— of the future. Hungarian influence was of
course actively at work to foster this disposition.
Thus Latour’s
attempt to detach part of the Vienna garrson for service in Hungary proved a
calamitous experiment. On October 5 some difficulty was caused by the removal
of an Italian battalion; on the morning of the 6th a battalion of grenadiers,
chiefly composed of Viennese, was to have started for Pressburg, when a
disturbance took place at the railway- station, and part of the battalion
fraternised with the populace and students. Some Galician troops haying been
ordered by Major-General Bredy to intervene, he was shot dead; his guns were
seized; and the mutinous grenadiers and their friends marched back in triumph
into the city. Neither Ministry nor Reichstag knew how to act; the small £ar
xson, scattered through different parts of Vienna, were confused by contradictory
orders; and the mob increased hcurly, in spite of some efforts of the loyal
portion of the National Guard—a body which outnumbered the garr’sor* by
something like five to one—and with the connivance of its disloyal section and
the students. The bells were ringing, and cannon discharging—and the mob had
become a maddened monster, which needed its victim. This victim was sought and
found in the Minister of War, Count Latour, who was forced to sign some paper,
and then hunted out from an attic in which he had taken refuge, and
murdered—his body being hung up on a lantem-post. Meanwhile, barricades were
rising everywhere; and after a struggle of several hours the populace, early on
the 7th, stormed the Zeughaus. Wessenberg and Bach (now also an object of
popular hatred) made their escape; and the latter next day sought to ease
DoblhofFs way by resigning his office. In the night a fraction or rump of the
Reichstag, consisting mainly of members of the Left, held a sort of sitting in
which they declared the Reichstag permanent; appointed a Council of the Commune
(Gemeinderath) to provide for the public security in cooperation with the
Government; and despatched an address to the Emperor which recommended an
amnesty, to include the murderers of Latour, and demanded the withdrawal of the
imperial manifesto of October 3. Thus closely was the outbreak at Vienna,
though its immediate cause was to be sought in the agitation among the working
classes, interwoven with the movement, now essentially democratic, of the
Hungarian Revolution.
The Emperor
received this address, before the night of October 6-7 was out, with his usual
suavity, and gave a conciliatory answer in writing. On the morning of the 7th
he quitted Schonbrunn, this time guarded by a numerous escort. His destination
was unknown at Vienna; but on the 17th he took up his residence at Olmiitz.
Soon after his
departure
another manifesto reached the Ministry at Vienna for publication, in which an
appeal was made to all the peoples of the Empire for their support in the
struggle with revolutionary anarchy. The Ministry, represented by the Finance
Minister, Baron Philip von Krauss (whose conciliatory attitude towards the
Revolution was quite understood at Olmiitz), and the rump of the Reichstag,
instead of associating themselves with this manifesto, maintained a kind of
middle position. Meanwhile, the majority of the Reichstag—the Slav Right and
the leaders of the Centre—with the approval of both the Conservative and the
Moderate Liberal chiefs, Stadion, Wessenberg and Bach—declared its sittings
transferred to Brunn. The Vienna rump had now become a mere local authority, by
the side of the Gemeinderath and the perennial students’ committee, in the
midst of an anarchy which a contemporary could describe as gemiithlich—liable
though it was to outbreaks of fury. While the unemployed proletariate was being
armed with weapons from the Zeughaus, the remaining troops of the garrison were
withdrawn into a suburb, and finally led out to join Jellacic’ forces, which were
now approaching Vienna. By October 9 his army, numbering between
30.000 and 40,000 men, reached Bruck on the
Leitha, some four miles from Vienna; within a couple of days the heights round
the city were covered with troops; and on the 13th Jellacitf headquarters were
at Schonbrunn. Notwithstanding the rumours current in Vienna, no Hungarian army
of deliverance had appeared. The Reichstag had not dared to call in Magyar aid;
on the other hand the Hungarian Government—or in other words Kossuth, now
President of the Committee for the Defence of the Country—awaited an appeal
from the Reichstag before actually attempting the relief of Vienna. Twice—on
October 17 and 20 —Hungarian troops actually crossed the Leitha, and twice they
returned.
It was not,
however, Jellacid, to whom the chief honours of the recovery of the Imperial
capital were to fall. On October 11 a proclamation was posted in the streets
of Prague, announcing that Prince Windischgratz was starting with his army for
Vienna. It was issued on his own authority; but, unlike Jellacid in Hungary,
Windischgratz, who had for some time been in close communication with the
Court, had not long to wait for its confirmation. On October 16 an Imperial
manifesto invested him with the command of all troops in the service of the
Emperor, except the Italian army under Radetzky. Slowly, according to his wont,
Windischgratz advanced, proclaiming from Graz on the 20th a state of siege in
Vienna and its vicinity, and calling upon all authorities to submit to him within
four-and-twenty hours. The troops ultimately gathered round the city were
afterwards reckoned at
160.000 men—probably a much exaggerated total.
The
resistance offered by Vienna, as has been well pointed out by the most recent
historian of the Revolution in Austria, was far from contemptible, especially
if it is compared with the quiet submission of
188
[l848
Berlin to
Wrangel, and that of Pest to Haynau. Windischgratz refused to enter into any
negotiation with rebels; and the Reichstags protest against his proceedings was
futile. The moving power lay with the democratic clubs; and their nominee,
Wenzel Messenhauser, an exofficer and popular journalist and orator, had on
October 6 been chosen Commander of the National Guard. He was a man of courage;
but the actual organiser of the defence was Joseph Bern, who had served under
Napoleon in Russia, covered himself with glory at Ostrolerika, in the Polish
insurrection of 1830-1, and had taken part in the civil wars of Portugal. With
ruthless energy he conducted the resistance of Vienna till its close on October
29, when he fled to Pressburg and offered his services to Kossuth.
The struggle
now riveted the attention of Germany at large, as well as of the Austrian
Empire. Though an attempt in the National Assembly at Frankfort to obtain a
direct vote of sympathy with the Viennese broke down, and the two
Commissioners, who at Schmerling’s instigation were sent to make enquiries at
Vienna, speedily quitted that city for the camp of Windischgratz, the “ United
Left ” soon deputed to the Austrian capital four of its members, among whom by
far the most prominent was Robert Blum. His political position had of late been
somewhat weakened by his attempts to repress the wild extravagances of the
Extreme Left, while posing as the acknowledged leader of the entire democratic
party; and, by nature an Orator rather than a statesman, he may have gone to
Vienna with vague hopes. But, according to the testimony of one of his
companions (Julius Frobel), the deputation speedily perceived the discord
existing between the leaders of the insurrection, and on the day after their
arrival resolved to return to Frankfort. This proving impossible, Blum threw
himself with impetuous courage into the defensive action of the University
students.
On October 24
Windischgratz took up his quarters at Hetzendorf, near Schonbrunn. On the
previous day he had issued his second proclamation to the Viennese, giving
forty-eight hours’ grace to the city, and ordering the dissolution of all armed
bodies, inclusive of the Academic Legion, the closing of all clubs, and the
removal of all aliens unprovided with a passport, and further demanding the
surrender of certain hostages, as well as of Bern, the Hungarian Pulszky, and
the murderers of Latour. The desperate suggestion of the Gemeimderath that he
might at once take possession of the ill-defended city, Windischgratz.
judiciously declined; and he refused to negotiate with either Reichstag or
Ministry. On the 26th the bombardment of Vienna by the Emperor’s generalissimo
began; but it was not till the 28th that the main attack was opened, and that
after considerable resistance, directed by Bern, the walls of the Tnnpr Town
were occupied. Hereupon, there was much talk of surrender; but on the 30th the
revolutionary spirit flickered up once more. A proffer of intervention had now
been made by Kossuth, but curtly refused by
1848] Battle of Schwechat.—Capture of Vienna. 189
Windischgratz;
and on the 30th the Hungarian forces under Moga once more crossed the Leitha,
and came into collision at Schwechat with the greater part of the Imperial army
under Jellacie. When the result of the battle, which was visible from the spire
of St Stephen’s at Vienna— the rapid defeat of the Hungarians—was ascertained,
all further organised resistance on the part of the city was at an end. The
proletariate was in occupation of streets and walls; and, early on the 31st,
the Gemeinderath sued Windischgratz for protection. That night Vienna was,
after a short cannonade, entirely in the hands of the troops; and the black
flag on St Stephen’s gave way to the black-and-yellow colours.
On November 1
the arrests of persons concerned in the insurrection began; but no execution
took place for more than a week; and it was reckoned that altogether not more
than 104 cases of punishment occurred, and that in not more than twenty-four
death was inflicted. Among those executed was Robert Blum, as to whose active
participation in the rising there was no doubt, and who was shot on November 9.
The remembrance of his eloquence and enthusiasm invested his death with a
semblance of martyrdom, which long occupied the popular imagination. A protest
against his execution was almost unanimously voted by the Frankfort Assembly,
and even Schmerling had to show indignation. The pardon extended to Blum’s
associate, Julius Frobel, was attributed to the fact that this well-known
publicist had produced a pamphlet opposing the absorption of Austria in
Germany. Another sufferer was the gallant Messenhauser, by whose execution a
lesson was read to the Austrian Reichstag. For the rest, Vienna submitted to
the Reaction without further protest—herein wiser than the enthusiasts who died
without having abandoned hope; for the final overthrow of the Vienna Revolution
ended the design of permanently transforming the Austrian monarchy into a group
of national States, while merging German Austria in a united Germany.
The army had
now once more become, and was conscious of having become, the chief power in
the State. Radetzky tendered his congratulations to Windischgratz, and the
Tsar felicitated both commanders (November). The selection of a Government had
no longer to be accommodated to the demands of a democracy to which
Pillersdorff and his colleagues had been obliged to show deference. In place of
the old Ministry, treated with cool disregard by Windischgratz (whom Archduke
John, for him rather bitterly, about this time compared to Wallenstein), a new
Administration now took office, presided over by the Field- Marshal’s
brother-in-law, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg. He possessed considerable
experience as a diplomatist (he had recently rendered admirable service to
Radetzky in this capacity, after serving under him with credit in the field);
but he knew little, and cared less, for modern constitutional life, and was a
stranger to any theory of government, except that of a strong monarchy. His
self-possession was due, partly
190 Schwarzenberg s Ministry.-$Le\chst&g at
Kremsier. [i848
to
aristocratic haughtiness, partly to a cynical coldness of nature; and his will
was iron. With him were associated, as Home Minister, Count Francis Stadion,
who combined with conservative instincts a sincere desire for reform; as
Minister for Commerce, Bruck* the creator of the North German Lloyd; and, among
the late Ministers, Krpuss for Finance, and, after Windischgratz had overcome
his prejudice against hjm, the indispensable Bach for Justice. The really
distinctive feature in the new Ministers’ programme, and in their policy, was the
insistence on the unity of the Austrian monarchy, even as against what would at
a later date have been called Fangerman aspirations. The democratic party at
Vienna and in the German parts of the monarchy in general had never been able
entirely to shake off the desire for the preservation of this unity; and the
political instincts of Schwarzenberg and Stadion met in the desire to renew it
in a more enduring form.
On October 22
an imperial rescript summoned the Reichstag {many of whose members had already
betaken themselves to Moravia) to meet at Kremsier, a small town not far from
Olmutz, and formerly an archiepiscopal residence. Another opportunity seemed
thus to be offered to the Cech party to control the situation; but before long
a large portion of the Left of the Vienna Assembly put in an appearance; and on
November 27 Schwarzenberg, no doubt speaking the views of Stadion, announced
the intention of the Ministry to uphold unreservedly the “constitutional
monarchy.” As a matter of fact, the debates of the Kremsier Reichstag, mainly
concerned with a series of Grwidreckte, which, like those elaborated at
Frankfort, were to form the basis of the ultimate Constitution of the Empire,
attracted scant attention.
The utmost
excitement, on the other hand, was caused by an event, foreseen though it had
been, which the Ministry communicated to the Kremsier Reichstag on December 20.
The Emperor Ferdinand:—whose mental condition necessitated this
step—had on December 2 abdicated the throne, with a kindly word of welcome to
his successor.. Archduke Francis Charles having, not without difficulty, been
induced to forgo his rights, his and Archduchess Sophia’s son, Archduke
Francis, or as he was henceforth happily called, Francis Joseph, succeeded as
Emperor. Though only eighteen years old, he was at once declared of age. His
accession eased the situation; for he was unfettered by promises either
Austrian or Hungarian. His title as King of Hilngary was, indeed, disputed as
not having been confirmed by the Diet of that kingdom; but for this he could
afford to wait, if, as his first proclamation drafted by Alexander von Hubner,
like most Imperial manifestos of this period, announced, his trust was, “ with
the assent of all his peoples, to unite them into a single political whole.”
The aim of
the Schwarzenberg Government, thus announced and re- annouriced, was the
consolidation of a single centralised monarchy, whose Constitution would absorb
that of Hungary and the lands hitherto held
to be
dependent on the Orown of St Stephen. But was this aim compatible with the
continuance of the Kremsier Diet, which presumed the duality of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy only partly represented in it ? In the course of the
constitutional discussions which this Diet had taken over from Vienna something
like a fair compromise seemed to have been reached between the centralising and
the purely federalist principles. Palack^, whose draft had proposed to divide
the monarchy into eight distinct national groups, withdrew from the
Constitutional Committee; and provision seemed to have been made for a
reasonable distribution of functions between the central and the provincial
authorities, and of the electoral power between the towns and the peasantry.
But, though by March 2, 1849, the Committee had at last ended its labours (even
so far as proposing a new national white-red-and-gold flag), and was about to
submit them to the Diet, these hopes were doomed to disappointment. Though the
Frankfort Assembly had affirmed the provision of the German Constitution by
which no German land could be combined with a non- German in a single
State,*and though Hungary was fighting for the autonomy of which her own
Constitution was the symbol, the Schwarzen- berg Government on March 4
perpetrated its coup d'etat. On that day it published by imperial authority a
Constitution of the one and indivisible Austrian monarchy; the occupation of
the Kremsier Diet, after its many months of labour, was gone, and on March 7 it
was dissolved.
Far
different, except in its close, had been the course of Prussian politics in the
period ensuing on the Revolution of March, 1848. The dreary months of summer
and autumn brought little comfort to King or jeople. King Frederick William
IV’s sensitive nature could not bring itself to accept the new conditions of
rule. The Camphausen Ministry showed no lack of skill or earnestness in seeking
to perform the difficult task of restraining democratic endeavours while at the
same time recovering for Prussia the sympathies of German Liberalism; but they
could not conciliate the confidence of the King, to whom the idea of
ministerial responsibility was utterly repugnant. He was still worse pleased
when at the end of June the Ministry was once more shifted “further left” under
the presidency of Rudolf von Auerswald, Hansemann becoming the leading
Minister. Thus the King remained constantly accessible to the counsels of the
Conservative Camarilla by which he was surrounded (Leopold von Gerlach,
Adjutant-General von Rauch, Marshal of the Court von Massow, Edwin von
Manteuffel, and Marcus Niebuhr); while at the same time lending an ear to the
advice of those Liberal statesmen towards whom he cherished an unfailing
personal confidence—Bunsen, Stockmar, and above all Radowitz, who may be said
to have kept the King’s conscience in this period of depression, down to
November, 1850.
The chief
questions with which at this time the Prussian Government had to deal were the
settlement of the Prussian Constitution, and the
relations of
Prussia to Germany as reorganised under the Constitution in course of
elaboration by the National Assembly. To democratic opinion, and to those
far-sighted political thinkers who, though from no democratic point of view,
desired a fusion between the Prussian monarchy and the national German State of
the future, nothing could be more unwelcome than that a Prussian Constitution
should be called into life before the German; and beyond doubt a strong
specifically Prussian feeling existed even in Liberal quarters. The Prussian
Ministry could, however, hardly do otherwise than pursue its course; and after
the second and last Combined Prussian Diet (Veremigter Landtag) had closed
(April 10), the Constituent Assembly on which that Diet had resolved met at
Berlin on May 22, and sat till November. Between this Berlin “ National
Assembly ” and the King there was little love lost, although he followed
Stockmar’s advice by abstaining from dissolving it; but the Conservative party
took up no attitude of uncompromising resistance against its work—indeed, in one
of the earliest numbers of the Neue Preussische (Kreuz-) Zeitung, the important
organ of Conservative opinion in Church and State, of which Wagener was editor
and Ludwig von Gerlach the most important contributor, it was argued that
Prussia was dejure a hereditary constitutional monarchy, Before long, however,
the Assembly fell more and more under the control of the Radicals; and, when in
a riot on June 14 the mob plundered the Zeughaus, the Assembly, whose sittings
were held close by, declared itself in need of no protection but that of the
citizens of Berlin. On the other hand, in August a series of meetings was held
at Berlin, under the presidency of Kleist-Retzow, “for the protection of
property”—the so-called JunJcerparlament, in which Conservatives of various
shades of views, from Bismarck to Bethmann-Hollweg, took part. In September,
the Assembly proceeded to such a height of democratic extravagance as to pass,
against Ministers, a vote calling upon all officers in the army who refused to
abstain from reactionary efforts to resign their commissions. The consequence
was another ministerial crisis. The poor King was exposed to a series of
refusals from leading Liberal statesmen, and from Alvensleben, who made it
clear that his acceptance of office must be preceded by the King’s
abdication—an event which at this time seemed quite possible. Finally, a
Ministry was patched up under General von Pfuel, on his return from suppressing
disorder in Posen (September).
As the year
went on, the spirit of unrest was still astir in various parts of Germany—there
were tumults in Saxony; and in Baden Struve once more proclaimed the republic
(September 21), but soon found limself in prison, while in Vienna the
Revolution was still supreme. In Berlin the mob terrorised city and Assembly;
and the King vacillated between submission to the will of the democracy
(assenting for instance to the reform of the game laws, and thereby enraging
Bismarck) and spasmodic recalcitrance (absolutely refusing to accept the
abolition of
1848-9] The
Brandenburg-Manteuffel Ministry. 193
the formula “
By the grace of God ” as the preamble of his royal title). The Ministry could
bear the strain no longer, and resigned; and on November 1 the King took his
courage into his hands and appointed a new President of his Ministry who was
prepared to risk a conflict with the Assembly. Count Brandenburg, the son of
King Frederick William II and Countess Donhoff, and a patriotic Prussian and a
Hohenzollem every inch of him (he was a cavalry general and had recently
restored order at Breslau), was not the man to shrink from necessary measures.
But he lacked the official experience enabling him to avoid repressive
processes which, aristocrat though he was, were repugnant to him. He was
therefore soon provided with a colleague (and future successor) whose
qualifications supplemented his own, and who had been trained both to
pertinacity and to self-effacement in the school of the bureaucracy typified by
him. Otto von Manteuffel’s name is associated, more than that of any other man,
with a period of Prussian history full of humiliations, but marked at the same
time by a subconsciousness of the future for which the State was preparing
itself and of which the glory was to fall to others. He suited the King, who
liked those in his service to spare him the outspokenness which had hitherto
been a tradition of Prussian official life.
On November
9—the anniversary, as Ludwig von Gerlach was fain to remind the Court circle at
Sanssouci, of “ Brumaire ”—Count Brandenburg appeared in the Berlin National
Assembly, and announced its transfer to Brandenburg. The Assembly replied by
resolving to refuse the payment of the taxes already granted by it; but on the
following day Wrangel at the head of his troops occupied the capital without
encountering any resistance. So far the new composite Ministry (which still
included several Liberal or Liberalising members, such as von der Heydt) had
been successful; but they had formed a further design—that of introducing by
the authority of the Crown a ready-made Constitution, which differed by the
insertion of certain provisions for the maintenance of the royal authority from
the “Waldeck Constitution” (as that elaborated by the Assembly was popularly
called after the most extreme of the Radical leaders). The Government
Constitution even accepted the principle of universal suffrage; nor was it till
nearly six months later (May 30, 1849) that the three classes of electors,
graded according to rate of taxation, were introduced, and secrecy of voting
was abolished. It is not easy to understand the object of Brandenburg and his
colleagues in persisting in their intention to impose (octroyer) this
Constitution upon the country. The King at first refused to sign, and only gave
way when convinced that nothing could be expected from the Assembly at
Brandenburg, and encouraged by the example set by the Emperor of Austria on
November 27. The Assembly itself, whose trump card of refusing the taxes had
been played in vain, could not be induced to make up a quorum at Brandenburg.
Probably it was the desire to prove
194 The new Prussian Constitution-The"
Central Power." [i848
the Prussian
State capable of determining its own course of action which induced the
Ministry to undertake and carry through their experiment. On December 5 the
Assembly was dissolved, and on the following day the new Constitution was
promulgated.
The efforts
of the Frankfort National Assembly itself for the settlement of the German
Constitution and the permanent establishment of a Central Government could not
but be affected by the political changes in Austria and Prussia, and by the
bearing of their Governments and peoples towards the German problem. For—in
spite of many taunts as to the political incompetence of the Frankfort Parliament
and the nation whose aspirations it on the whole adequately represented—it was
not this Parliament or the German nation which is to be held accountable in the
last resort for the failure of the work of reorganisation. It has been seen
that, after much time and trouble devoted to the discussion of the
Grundrechte—the basis on which the edifice of the Constitution itself was to
rest—there ensued the interruptions caused by the Schleswig-Holstein crisis and
the September riots at Frankfort. It was well understood at Frankfort that,
after the purely provisional step of entrusting the vicarious administration of
the Central Power to Archduke John of Austria, it behoved the Assembly to lose
no time in establishing that Central Power on a firm foundation. But though
logic might in this instance have been sacrificed to necessity, and the
discussion of the Grwulrechie adjourned till their acceptance and that of the
Constitution of which they were the substructure could be enforced, the
relations of Austria and Prussia to the new Germany could in no case have been
settled with speed. When on October 19 the National Assembly entered on its
grand constitutional debates, beginning with a series of questions which
involved the relations with the two Great Powers, its authority had, as has
been seen, unfortunately been impaired both in the eyes of the nation at large,
and as towards these Powers in particular.
The relations
of Austria to a reorganised Germany had not admitted of other than speculative
treatment so long as the former had itself been in a state of revolutionary
unsettlement. The appointment of Archduke John as Reichsverweser had irritated
the Prussian nation without really benefiting its rival, and had merely tided
over the difficulty of securing a permanent Central Government to a united
Germany. But there was a question antecedent to that of the satisfaction of
such claims as Austria might still possess to the hegemony in Germany; and this
was that of the actual territorial relations between them. Practically, this
problem admitted of only three lines of solution. The first was to admit the
entire Austrian monarchy into the German polity of the future; this was of
course impossible, and more impossible than ever at a time when the conflict
between the nationalities within that Empire had developed into open war. The
second was to exclude (together with
Transleithanian)
Cisleithanian Austria from the German Empire or Federal State, and thus to do
away with the completeness of German union. This was the solution which seemed
to Frederick William IV, as it has to many patriotic minds before and after
him, an unpardonable sin against the national history and the national life.
Even those, therefore, who, like Dahlmann and Droysen, were prepared to consent
to this sacrifice, rather than renounce the design of creating a federal German
State under feasible conditions, shrank from a naked presentment of this
alternative; and in its place put forward what may be described as a third
course. This was, to insert in the proposed second paragraph of the German
Constitution the following declaration: “ No part of the German Empire may form
part of a State containing non-German territories.” These words implied that if
the German portion of the Austrian monarchy was to be included in the Germany
of the future, that monarchy must be divided into two halves, held together by
a personal union only. One of these halves must be organically united with the
German Empire, acknowledging its laws and yielding allegiance to its Central Power,
however that Power might be constituted. The other must stand aside. And to
this proposal the Austrian Government must answer by a categorical Aye or No.
It was,
however, clear that the Austrian Government was not at the time in a position
to give a decisive reply to a question affecting the whole future of the
monarchy; and, in any case, procrastination would have been in accordance with
its instincts. On the other hand, neither the National Assembly nor Prussia,
Austria’s only real rival, had any sufficient reason for delay. Not only,
however, would it have seemed abominable to Frederick William IV to allow any
advantage to be taken of the difficulties of the Austrian Government; but even
Prussian Liberalism of the old Opposition type, as represented by such a
politician as Georg von Vincke, could not reconcile itself to such a course. To
this feeling Gagem gave expression by moving an amendment tp the proposal of
Dahlmann and the Constitution Committee—to the effect that non-Austrian Germany
should be constituted a federal State with which Austria should enter into a
wider federation; so that there would be a Union within a Union. But the wider
union would nanifestly amount to little more than an international alliance;
and the eminent poet and patriot Ludwig Uhland admirably described it as “the
joining of fraternal hands stretched forth for a final farewell.” Ultimately, a
proposal to exclude all non-German lands from the Empire was adopted by a large
majority (October 27); but the majority failed to carry the nation with it. For
it was due to the support of the entire Left, which—the Vienna Revolution was
then at its height—still indulged in the hope that German Austria was destined
to form part of the German Republic. The declaration had, after all, to stand
over.
When, after
the removal of the Austrian Reichstag from Vienna,
196 Conflicting
schemes of reorganisation. [i848-9
Schwarzenberg
at last found time to reply to the Frankfort Assembly, he informed the deputies
who at Kremsier were labouring at the completion of the Austrian Constitution,
that the maintenance of the unity of the Austrian monarchy—that unity with
which the principle approved at Frankfort was at direct issue—was “a German as
well as a European necessity.” The relations between the new Austria and the
new Germany, he continued, could not be finally determined till each of them
should have firmly established itself; up to that time, however, Austria would
continue faithfully to meet her federal obligations. The answer of the Frankfort
Assembly was to relieve Schmerling of his position at the head of the
Reichsministerium by a vote of want of confidence; in other words, the Assembly
refused to be any longer a party to the temporising policy which he had so
skilfully carried on. His place was taken by Gagem (December 18), who in his
turn was succeeded as President of the National Assembly by Eduard Simson, a
Konigsberg Professor of remarkable political, and especially parliamentary,
ability. In answer to the enquiries of the Prussian Government Schwarzenberg
was quite explicit. He demanded the admission into the Germanic body of the
entire Austrian monarchy, centralised as a single State. The Frankfort
Constitution should be thrown over altogether, together with the Assembly which
had produced it; and the old Confederation should be restored, with a stronger
executive than it had hitherto possessed (December 13). The Prussian reply
favoured the conjoint consideration of the Frankfort draft Constitution by
Assembly and Governments; while, as to the future relations of the Austrian
monarchy with the Germanic body, it approved the plan of a wider federation
between the two (December 19). A further exchange of views then took place as
to a possible grouping of the smaller German States round the larger; the
Austrian Government propounding a scheme which would have successfully sapped
the principle of German unity as well as the design of Prussian ascendancy, and
was therefore warmly welcomed by the Governments of the minor Kings; and
Frederick William IV interposing with a memorandum (January 4, 1849) upholding
that conception of Austria as the first and Prussia as the second German Power,
from which he only swerved when his patience was too sorely tried by his ally.
Meanwhile
Gagem demonstrated, on behalf of the German Central Government, that a united
and centralised Austrian monarchy could not conceivably enter into the German
Federal State as at present constituted, while the question of a wider union
between them must be left to diplomatic negotiation (December 18). Thus the
political separation of Austria from Germany had to all intents and purposes
been officially proclaimed. Though not long afterwards (January 5, 1849) Gagem
was authorised by the Assembly to enter into negotiations with Austria as to
her relations with the German State, it was well- known that Schwarzenberg’s
diplomatic action entirely ignored the
German
Parliament. It therefore behoved Prussia to explain to the other German States
her own position and her desire that they as well as she should maintain a
satisfactory understanding with the German Parliament. This was done in a
circular despatch which further advocated a closer union between the
non-Austrian States of Germany, and a wider union between these and Austria. King
Frederick William IV was with great difficulty—mainly through Bunsen’s exertions—prevailed
upon to attach his signature to this missive; and with its despatch, on January
23, Prussia seemed to have at last entered into friendly, relations with the
National Parliament, and to have abandoned her preposterous attitude of
deference to Austria. Unfortunately, even now he vacillated; but between the
Austrian Government and the Frankfort Parliament the breach was no longer to be
filled. From Schwarzenberg came a bland demand that the Austrian Constitution
of March 4 should be recognised by the German Ministry, and the entire Austrian
monarchy admitted into the Germanic Confederation, reorganised by means of a
directory of seven members, presided over (this was the solitary concession)
alternately by Austria and Prussia, with an Upper or States House of 70
members, of whom 38 were to come from the Austrian monarchy, and 30 from
Austrian Germany. The resolute answer of the despised Frankfort Assembly to
this proposal was the completion of the Constitution at which it had so long
laboured and the choice of the King of Prussia as German Emperor (March 27 and
28).
On this last
issue the attitude of the Prussian Government towards the action of the German
National Assembly from first to last turned. The difficulties in the way of the
consistent advocates of a Prussian hegemony over Germany, to take if possible
the convincing form of a German Empire hereditary in the royal dynasty of
Prussia, were many and various. There was the conscientious conviction of the
King, that the Imperial dignity ought to be restored to the House of Austria,
he being made German King, or, as he would have preferred, hereditary commander
of the German armies; there was his still stronger conviction that, if the
headship of the Empire were accepted by him at all, it must come through the
choice of his fellow Prince; and there was, lastly, his private but passionate
determination not to accept a “crown of shame” ([Schandkrone) from the detested
revolutionary Assembly at Frankfort. A less immediate difficulty, but one which
seems to have impressed itself upon several eminent political thinkers of the
time, was the bearing of the question of the Prussian hegemony of Germany upon
the future of the Prussian State. Was it possible for Prussia either to secure
this hegemony or to merge her own political existence in that of Germany, if
she sought at the same time to develop her own constitutional life, with
representative institutions of its own? Least of all could such a combination
commend itself, if the Prussian Constitution, which was to coexist with the
German, was one imposed by the Crown,
and lacking
real guarantees of permanency. Such seem to have been the views of such men as
Bassermann, Simson, Hergenhahn and Heinrich von Gagem, all of whom in November,
1848, visited Berlin. The last- named in particular, as the mouthpiece of the
Frankfort Casino party, earnestly endeavoured to divert the King from the path
along which Brandenburg and Manteuffel were leading him. For a moment, the
King’s imagination was fired by the “tempter”; and Gagem believed that his
efforts had been successful. But it was not to be; Prussia was neither now nor
later to be wholly “ merged in Germany"; and, as has been seen, the
Prussian Constitution was promulgated on December 6.
Thus, the
Austrian Government, after repressing the Bohemian and Viennese insurrections,
and making some progress, as it seemed, towards overcoming the Hungarian
revolution, had announced as its German programme the reconstruction of the old
Confederation. From Prussia, on the other hand, the great opportunity of
establishing her hegemony over Germany seemed passing away for the reasons
indicated above, and because of the jealousy of the smaller German royal
Governments, and the unwillingness of the democrats at Frankfort, Berlin and
elsewhere to support a scheme based on hereditary monarchy. Between these
difficulties the German Constitution, which the National Assembly had laboured
so arduously to perfect, could not but fall to the ground, and the whole
national movement of which it was to have been the enduring symbol, collapse,
together with the National Assembly itself, in the face of a triumphant
Reaction. One more series of efforts was made before the end came; but when
these had been frustrated, the story closes, though its epilogue will have to
be briefly recounted in a subsequent chapter.
On March 12,
1849, Karl Welcker, an eminent member of the National Assembly who had hitherto
upheld the retention of Austria in the Empire proposed, without previous
consultation with his party, the adoption en bloc of the Constitution of the
Empire as now before the Assembly and the offer of the hereditary dignity of
Emperor to the King of Prussia. Had Welcker pressed his motion to an immediate
division, it would probably have been adopted by a large majority; but he
deprecated haste; and, when the motion came up from committee for decision, it
was rejected by a small majority, which included the entire Left as well as all
the opponents of the ascendancy of Prussia. Even patriotic Radicals, however,
could not look with equanimity upon the downfall of the entire constitutional
edifice which seemed imminent; and in the end the influence of Heinrich Simon
and others gained over a sufficient number of the Left by the twofold
concession of agreeing jto the Imperial veto being made suspensory only, and
voting in parliamentary elections secret. The bearing of this limitation of the
Emperor’s prerogative (which was subsequently even extended to his veto on
constitutional changes) upon King Frederick William’s
estimate of
the value of the Crown subsequently proffered to him should not be overlooked.
But the word had now been given that, quocumque modo, the Constitution and the
election of the King of Prussia as Emperor were to be put through. On March 27,
a majority of 27 resolved that the head of the German Government should be a
reigning German Prince; and the hereditary character of the dignity was
affirmed by the still more slender majority of 4. On the following day 290
votes were given in favour of the election of King Frederick William IV of
Prussia, 248 deputies, including 200 Austrian members, not voting; and a
deputation of 32 members, with President Simon at their head, was appointed to
offer the Imperial Crown to the King in person. Before leaving Frankfort, the
President, perhaps injudiciously, prevailed upon the Reichsverweser to retain
his office for the present.
Since signing
the important despatch of January 23, Frederick William IV had relapsed into
his usual habit of political castle- building. Early in February he perplexed
his Ministers by a four hours’ exposition of the system of German policy
favoured by him. On the one hand, he could not but be impressed by the fact
that many of those around him—not only his brother the Prince of Prussia and
Liberal Ministers and advisers, but even a member of the Camarilla such as
Rauch—inclined to the acceptance of the Imperial Crown. But his hatred of the
Revolution and all its works was ineradicable; and he told the veteran Arndt,
who ■vehemently pressed him not to refuse it, that it was no Crown, but a
necklet of slavery. Thus, in consultation with the Camarilla, an answer to the
imminent offer was drafted, and to this, improved by Alvensleben and accepted
by the Ministry, the King adhered, though not without moments of doubt. On
April 3 the celebrated audience took place in which the Imperial Crown was
actually offered and declined. Strictly speaking, the King neither accepted nor
rejected it. The purport of his words, which were lacking neither in dignity
nor in good sense, was that he could arrive at no decision without the free
assent (Einverstandniss) of the German Kings, Princes and Free Towns. Inasmuch
as there was little or no doubt as to the assent of the petty sovereigns, it
was the Kings only whose dissent was in question; but as this was equally
certain, Frederick William IV’s reply amounted to a postponement sine die of
the proposal made to him. Whether or not he afterwards regretted his decision,
in his comments to Bunsen and others he dwelt chiefly, and by no means without
reason, on the dangers to which his acceptance would have exposed Prussia. To
Beckerath, whom the Frankfort Ministry sent to Berlin to make one final attempt
at overcoming his scruples, he used, not for the first time, the expression
that “ Frederick the Great would have been the man for the occasion— as for
himself, he was not a great ruler.” At least he loved peace, and was full of real,
though probably exaggerated, fears for the security of the monarchy which he
had inherited.
Not one of
the four Kings—Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and Wiirtem- berg—ventured to affront
the majority of their subjects by declaring against the resolutions of the
National Parliament; and, on April 4, the plenipotentiaries of 28 German States
signified their assent to them. Moreover, the affairs of Austria were again
going badly in Hungary, and her resistance to any Prussian action could, for
the time at least, have been only what Schwarzenberg might have called “
symbolical.” But the risk which Prussia dared not run a year later existed in
1849; and the Tsar would no doubt have then raised as angry a protest against
any decisive step taken or threatened by Prussia as he actually;did
in 1850. In any case, Frederick William IV had made up his mind not to run this
risk, and to break with the Frankfort Parliament once and for ever. On April 11
the National Assembly had resolved by a vote of 276 against 159 to adhere
immutably to the Constitution which had been read for the second time and
approved by the House. A motion for its recognition was laid on the table of
the Prussian Second Chamber; and 011 the 21st the King authorised a ministerial
declaration that the Prussian Government refused its assent to the Frankfort
Constitution. Camphausen immediately resigned as plenipotentiary at Frankfort;
and at Berlin the Foreign Office was taken over by Count Henry von
Amim-Heinrichsdorf, from whom no opposition to the King’s vagaries was to be
expected.
The action of
the Frankfort Parliament was paralysed from this moment onwards. Austria had
recalled her deputies so early as April 5. On May 4 the Parliament gallantly
called upon the several German Governments to enforce the lawfully enacted
Constitution, and announced at the same time that the first duly constituted
German Reichstag would meet on August 15, up to which date a Regent of the
Empire (no longer a Vicar) was to hold office. But even this course was only
supported by a majority of two. On May 14 Prussia recalled her deputies,
declaring her intention of carrying on, in conjunction with the Governments of
the larger States, the constitutional work begun at Frankfort. On May 21 Saxony
followed suit; and on the same date 65 deputies, headed by Dahlmann—the very
core of the whole body—announced their withdrawal. Four days earlier, the
Reichsverweser, by way of keeping up appearances to the last, had appointed a
new Ministry—but it was an administration pour rire, including as Minister for
Foreign Affairs one Jochmus, previously a Hamburg merchant’s clerk and a
Turkish pasha. On May 25 the rump of the National Assembly determined by 71 to
64 votes to migrate to Stuttgart, where on June 6 it set up a Regency of the
Empire, consisting of Heinrich Simon, the ultra-Radical Karl Vogt, and four
other deputies, and on June 16 declared the Reichsverweser a usurper. On
September 30 Austria and Prussia finally took over the functions, such as they
were, still appertaining to the Central Power, and before the end of the year
Archduke John finally made over his authority into their hands, quitting
Frankfort on New Year’s Day, 1850.
So ended an
attempt which had long become hopeless, to give validity to a Constitution
nobly planned. This instrument, which would have realised for Germany the ideal
of national unity in a federal form, has passed into the limbo of great designs
frustrated by fate. The edifice had been constructed on the basis of personal
liberty to be guaranteed throughout the Empire by the Grundrechte described
above. Its several States were to retain their independence in so far as it was
not limited by the Imperial Constitution, and their Governments all the rights
of state sovereignty not expressly surrendered to the Imperial authority. There
was no longer any loose confusion of Federal with Government power as had been
the case with the old Confederation; the Imperial authority was to form the
sole international representation of the German nation; to it were to belong exclusively
the right of declaring war and of concluding peace; it was to have at its
command, not a congeries of state contingents, but the entire armed force of
Germany. The Empire was to constitute a single territory in all matters of
commerce and customs. The Emperor was to be its head and its international
representative. By his side was to stand the Reichstag—composed of two Houses:
the Upper or Staatenhaus, with 192 members (40 from Prussia and 38 from
Austria), half of them nominated by the several Governments, and half by the
representative bodies of the several States; and the Lower or Volkshaius,
composed of the deputies of the nation, directly elected by a simple majority
in areas of 100,000 inhabitants; every male citizen over twenty-four years of
age being entitled to a vote. To each of the two Houses was to belong the right
of initiating laws and impeaching members of the Government; but the Lower
House alone was to determine the Financial Budget, to be annually proposed to
it and granted for one year in whole or in part, or rejected, by the
representatives of the nation.
This was the
gift which the Frankfort Assembly proposed to bestow upon the German nation;
nor can the design be laughed to scorn, though its incomplete fulfilment was
reserved for a later generation.
THE
REVOLUTION AND THE REACTION IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA. II.
In November
and December, 1848, the prospects of the Hungarian Revolution had become very
dark. The national pride had suffered from the defeat of the Hungarian army at
Schwechat (October 30) and its consequent return into Hungarian territory; and
the dream of an alliance between the Hungarian and the Viennese democracy was
at an end with the fall of Vienna. Before long, the Hungarian Government would
have to defend itself and its cause against a ring of armed forces closing in
upon the turbulent Magyar capital to cooperate with the army that had subdued
Vienna—from Galicia and Moravia in the north, and from Styria in the west. The
anti-Magyar movement of the northern Slovaks had been quite recently put down;
but in Transylvania in the east all sections were united against the Magyars,
except their kinsmen the Szeklers, and a savage Rouman rising played into the
hands of the Austrian Government. All along the southern line, in Slavonia and
in Croatia, soldiery was being raised where it was not already under arms, and
the Hungarian Government were being taught too late their rashness in treating
the claims of these populations with contemptuous ill-will. To a total of not
far short of 150,000 armed men, of whom at least two-thirds were trained
regular troops, the Magyars could as yet only oppose a force of 100,000—still
to a large extent consisting of troops which had come over from the Austrian
colours; the national levies of the Honveds, however, admitted of considerable
further extension; the National Guards, on the other hand, could not be used in
the field. The great want of the Hungarians was officers of experience; for
though many officers had come over with their companies, they were for the
most part younger men.
Windischgratz,
habitually slow in his movements, was on the present occasion probably anxious
to wait till the change of Emperor should have been completed. The Hungarian
Diet of course declared Francis Joseph’s assumption of the succession in
Hungary illegal, as having taken place without its own assent, and on December
15 Jella&rf, with the advanced
guard of
Windischgratz’ army, crossed the Leitha. Of the two routes leading directly to
Pest the southern was covered by Moritz Perczel, a Hungarian political leader,
who had formerly been an officer of Engineers. The northern was in charge of
Arthur von Gorgei, who, on Moga’s withdrawal after Schwechat, had been
appointed his successor. This able strategist and in many respects mysterious
man (for, wherever the key to his character and conduct is to be found, it is
certainly not in his own wordy memoirs) sprang from a German Protestant family
in the Zips, and had, after some early military service, quitted the Austrian
army and devoted himself to chemical research at Prague. In 1848 he returned to
Hungary, where he at first took service in the National Guard and speedily came
to the front, sharing in the success of Veldencze, and doing his part towards embittering
the conflict by ordering the execution by military law of Count Zichy, for
engaging in “treasonable” correspondence with Jellacid. Gorgei, who had many
enemies, and between whom and Kossuth there existed an ineradicable antipathy,
was afterwards accused of having always remained a German and always a
soldier. Though Kossuth is known to have spoken of him as “ a very ambitious
man,” he was no politician; and, while certainly careful of his military
reputation, not even animated by any consuming desire for warlike laurels. On
critical occasions Gorgei made his choice coldly, as if distracted by no
thoughts either of himself or of the cause for which he had taken up arms.
At present he
judged resistance impossible. Perczel, who had attempted it, had been easily
driven off the field near Mdor (December 30), and Gorgei, notwithstanding the
insistence of Kossuth, declined to risk a battle before Pest on the right side
of the Danube. When on the morning of January 2, 1849, he reached the capital,
which he lacked the means of defending, he found that National Defence
Committee, Diet, and population were panic-struck, and that the members of the
Committee, including Kossuth, had already taken, or were taking, their
departure to Debreczen beyond the Theiss. With them they carried the most
potent of the instruments of government at their disposal—the press which
produced their bank-notes. By January 4 no Hungarian troops were left in the
capital, which on the following day was occupied by the Imperial army without
resistance. The confiscation of the property of all rebels in arms was at once
proclaimed; and a number of important arrests were made, including that of
Batthy&ny, who at the last, with De&k and others, had sought to
intervene so as to obtain terms from Windischgratz. All Austrian officers who
had not abandoned the Hungarian service by November 26 were declared liable to
be court-martialled, though many of them, being stationed in remote parts of
the country, had been unable to choose their side.
Windischgratz
might now have thrown himself upon Gorgei’s army with a greatly superior force,
still leaving enough troops at Pest to
204 Advance of Schlick.—Kossuth and Gorgei. [1849
mask the
all-important fortress of Komom in his rear. Moreover, Count Schlick, whose
family had for many generations honourably served the House of Habsburg on
Hungarian soil, and who was himself a cavalry general of renown, after crossing
the Carpathians from Galicia and putting Pulszky to flight on January 4,
completely routed the army of 17,000 men commanded by General Mesz&ros, the
Minister of War. Hereupon, no other Hungarian force being at the time left fit
for battle, Gorgei’s army at Waitzen (on the bend of the river north of Pest)
had on January 6, at the instigation of its commander, declared its adhesion to
the Constitution granted to Hungary by King Ferdinand, and at the same time its
resolution to oppose all Republican manoeuvres. Whether or not influenced by
this manifesto, Windischgratz made no serious attempt to prevent Gorgei from
withdrawing into the Bergstddte—the mountainous country in the upper valley of
the Gran—where he was for the time secure; and, after a demonstration against
Perczel, he returned to Budapest. Thus, as the early weeks of 1849 passed away,
the insurrection, instead of being crushed as had been announced at Vienna,
was beginning to gather strength out of weakness.
For, in the
interval, Kossuth and his colleagues had not despaired of their country, and
had perceived what Windischgratz had failed to realise in time, that in a
country with so many centres of action only a large military force could assume
the offensive with a fair prospect of success. To this end Kossuth instructed
Gorgei and the army of the Upper Danube to march from the north-west to the
Upper Theiss, there to effect a junction with George Klapka (a high-spirited
Magyar, who had also seen service in the Austrian army, and who had now
succeeded Mesz&ros in his command) and support him against Schlick. Gorgei,
who chose to regard this movement as a retreat, was at the beginning of his
march interviewed by an emissary from Windischgratz, who proposed to him—
prematurely—that he should bring over the “army of the Upper Danube.” Schlick’s
advance upon Debreczen was stopped by the junction of the two Hungarian armies,
and he had to evacuate Upper Hungary with all possible speed. But he effected
this with the loss of under a couple of hundred men (February 13); so that
Gorgei’s campaign with the “army of the Upper Danube ” was virtually a failure.
The discord
between the Hungarian leaders hereupon rose to a serious height. The
difficulties of the Committee of National Defence in choosing their generals
had from the first been excessive. No superior officer who had come over from
the Austrian service could make a stand against Gorgei; and his relations with
Kossuth and his colleagues had never been satisfactory. Thus the Committee
turned their eyes to the Polish refugees. Bern had offered his services after
the overthrow of the Vienna insurrection, but he was so much detested by the
democratic party among the Poles themselves that his life was actually in
danger and Kossuth sent him to form an army in Transylvania. Early
in January,
1849, another Polish veteran, who had served under Napoleon and had since
actively promoted the Polish cause, appeared on the scene, in the person of
Henry Dembinski, whom Count Teleki (the Hungarian agent at Paris) had assured
that the Hungarian Government would grant autonomy to all the Slav populations
under its control. This avowed Panslavist was now appointed Hungarian
Commander-in-chief over the heads of Perczel (who at once resigned), Klapka and
Gorgei. The appointment was a grave error; for Dembinski’s aims were, at all
events as yet, not those of the movement which he served.
When at last
(February 93) Dembinski assumed the offensive, he was just too late to
anticipate Schlick’s junction with Windischgratz. The latter had attacked the
Hungarian forces at Kapolna on the 26th; and, when on the following day the
fight had become general, Schlick arrived at the right moment, and the
Hungarians were driven back upon the Theiss. Though they had left 1200 dead on
the field (against only 300 Austrians), the defeat was not a rout; but
Dembinski proposed to carry his army to the eastern side of the Theiss in front
of Debreczen, and (with the exception of Komom) the whole of western Hungary
was now again in Austrian hands. Thus the first offensive operation on a large
scale had ended in failure, and pacific feeling began to increase in the
country as well as discontent with Dembinski. Szechenyi was out of his mind;
Batthyany in prison; and even in the rump Diet at Debreczen Kossuth had to face
an uncertain majority. But he did not lose courage, being aware that the army was
increasing in numbers and, thanks to Dembinski, improving in organisation.
Though very few of the Magnates had stood firm, the very numerous smaller
nobility, the lower middle classes, and the liberated peasantry had proved
staunch. The bank-note press was busily at work, producing at a marvellous rate
30 and 15 Kreuzer notes, which Windischgratz till the middle of March was
obtuse enough to allow to circulate in the reconquered districts. Kossuth
sought to terrorise his adversaries by appointing extraordinary tribunals for
trying political offenders; and, finally, he resolved to appease the further
growth of dissatisfaction in the army by the dismissal of Dembinski (March 5).
But he could not make up his mind to create Gorgei Commander-in-chief, till General
Vetter, who had been appointed to the post, had fallen ill. Thereupon
operations once more began on a large scale; and, to the amazement of Austria
and Europe, the tide of the Hungarian Revolution was seen to have once more set
in, and to be rising to its height.
Meanwhile,
the prospects of the Revolution had benefited by successful operations in the
dependent kingdoms. In Transylvania Bern, with only
10,000 ill-armed and ill-disciplined troops, had
been able to confound the incompetent Austrian generals and to take Klausenburg
(Koloszvar) on Christmas Day, 1848. In January and early in February he
suffered some reverses, but soon defiantly resumed his ubiquitous activity. And
now an
ominous incident occurred. The Saxon towns of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt,
trusting no longer to the protection of the Austrian arms, appealed for aid to
the Russian General Luders, who had recently suppressed a Boyar rising in
Wallachia. He was instructed by his Government to decline any intervention,
except in case of an explicit request from the Austrian military authorities.
When hereupon Puchner actually asked for aid, 3000 Russians occupied
Hermannstadt and 200 Kronstadt, nor were they driven out of the former by Bern
till March 11. Puchner was himself forced to fly across the Wallachian
frontier, being followed by all the remaining Austrian troops and the Russians
from Kronstadt; so that virtually the whole of Transylvania was now in Bern’s
hands.
In the
south-west, the Serbs and Croatians, deeply disappointed by Jellacic’ inability
to enforce their claims on the Imperial Government, and in Slavonia hampered by
quarrels among the native leaders, had finally come to place their chief
reliance, as against the Magyars, upon the Austrian army, which, during the
early months of 1849, asserted its domination as far as the Maros river. When,
on March 17, Perczel resumed his command, his advance led to a series of
atrocities on both sides—a conflict of racial hatreds, which must remain
shrouded in some obscurity. A great part of Slavonia and, with Bern’s aid, of
the Banat, was subdued. Croatia the Hungarians made no attempt to master.
These
successes were preliminary to that of the main army, now under the chief
command of Gorgei. Windischgratz made up his mind that the real object of
Gorgei’s advance was the relief of Komom, which a considerable division of the
main Austrian army had been besieging since March 19. But, when on April 5
Gorgei drew near to the Austrian position between Godollo and Isaszeg,
Windischgratz, at the head of not more than 25,000 men, little more than half
the Hungarian numbers, was, after an engagement on the 6th, obliged to retreat
upon the capital. Gorgei now marched upon Waitzen, and, after driving out Gotz
and defeating Wohlgemuth at Nagy Sarlo, on the 22nd entered Komom. Thus,
Windischgratz had failed to act up to his correct conclusion. Wohlgemuth had to
fall back in order to cover Vienna while Jellacic withdrew into his own special
sphere of influence in the south; and the Austrian main army’s evacuation of
Pest and retreat south of the Danube upon Vienna was only a matter of time.
However, an attempt made by Gorgei on the 26th to cut off Schlick at Szony
failed.
A few days
before the actual relief of Komom Windischgratz had been recalled. Though a man
of strong character (as well as of strong speech) he was not, in fact, a great
general, and no politician at all, as his blindness about the “ Kossuth notes ”
had shown. He had wholly underrated the strength of his adversaries, and proved
no match for the unexpected movements of Gorgei. His recall, on which his
brother-in- law Schwarzenberg had insisted, was softened by his retaining the
title
of
Commander-in-chief; but the command of the Hungarian army was transferred to
the Governor of Vienna, Feldzeugmeister von Welden.
The Hungarian
victories, thus recognised by the Austrian Government, seemed for the moment
likely to bring about an entire change in the political aspect of south-eastern
Europe, by means of a democratic fraternisation between Magyars, Slavs, and
Italians. At Debreczen Kossuth, never in prouder mood, unfolded to the Diet in
a secret sitting his design of a perpetual rupture with the Austrian dynasty;
and on April 14 both Houses confirmed his policy by declaring the regal rights
over Hungary appertaining to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine to be forfeited for
ever. The Commission appointed to draw up a Declaration of Independence issued
a manifesto (which was dated March 19) appointing Kossuth, until a definitive
form of government should have been established, “ responsible
Governor-President ” of the State. The majority of the deputies still at
Debreczen having signed a memorial in favour of the proclamation of a Republic,
this step was actually taken and announced in the official newspaper on April
13. The Magyars now represented the cause of the Revolution pure and simple.
Hungary and Italy—where the democratic party had also prevailed over the
Moderates —were now whole-hearted allies in their struggle against Austria; and
it was no doubt largely in consequence of the renewed vigour displayed by the
Magyars in the campaigns of the early spring of 1849 that Charles Albert’s last
offensive effort was made, which ended in the rout of Novara (March 23).
Towards the Slav nationalities Hungarian policy could now no longer remain
repellent; already Kossuth had made one abortive attempt at conciliating the
Roumans of western Transylvania; and a Hungarian army corps under Dembinski and
Wysocki was placed on the Galician frontier to encourage a Polish rising.
Kossuth now
appointed a Ministry of his own, by no means composed entirely, or even mainly,
of politicians of advanced opinions; though the President of the Ministry,
Szemere, by his declarations identified himself and his colleagues unconditionally
with the principle of popular sovereignty. Gorgei was appointed Minister of
War, it being however understood that, while he retained the command in the
field, General Damjanics, in whom he had the utmost confidence, would represent
him in the administration. Unluckily, however, Damjanics was at this time
incapacitated from further service by a dangerous accident; and Klapka, whom
Gorgei could ill spare in the field, represented him at Debreczen. In Klapka’s
opinion, the military resources of the country were insufficient to carry on
the war for another six months; and this patriot of the purest water seems
practically to have confirmed Gorgei in his opinion that the only salvation for
the cause lay in a military dictatorship. Thus Hungary entered into this new
and fiercer stage of the struggle, with her Governor and her Commander-in-chief
at odds as to the method of conducting it, if not as to its ultimate aim.
So matters
stood when, after Gorgei’s victorious relief of Komom, breathless expectation
waited upon his next military step. The general supposition was that he would
march upon Vienna. Such a course would no doubt have been consistent with the
spirit of Kossuth’s military policy, and would have been much applauded on both
sides of the Leitha. Moreover, the time had not yet come (nor did it seem near
at hand) when any considerable part of the Austrian forces in Italy could be
used for the Hungarian War. For the Italian policy of the Austrian Government
after Radetzky’s victories continued to be aggressive rather than conciliatory;
and the total numbers of the Austrian forces which could be used against the
Hungarian Revolution cannot have even now exceeded by more than about 20,000
the total of 170,000 or 180,000 men whom the Hungarians could put in the field.
But Gorgei’s prudence as a general (to say nothing of other reasons) opposed an
immediate advance on Vienna; and Kossuth gave the formal order that the army
should march, not on the Austrian capital, but on Budapest. On May 3, Gorgei
began to cannonade the fortress of Buda, still occupied by 5000 Austrians under
General Hentzi. For six weeks this gallant band held out, even after a breach
had been made in the walls, and, when on May 21 the place was at last taken by
assault, the commander heroically fell at the head of his men. On June 6,
Kossuth held his solemn entry into Pest, where he judiciously prorogued the
Diet.
But already
the conditions of the conflict, in which the recapture of Budapest marked the
high-tide of Hungarian success, had changed. The Austrian Government had by its
Italian policy left itself no choice but to call in foreign aid, if the
Hungarian insurrection was to be speedily' and completely overcome. If at
Berlin—even within the CamariUa—it was whispered that Austria might be willing
to pay for Prussian aid by the surrender of the hegemony in Germany, the suggestion
never came to anything, and would have suited neither Frederick William IVs nor
Schwarzenberg’s sense of honour. No alternative remained besides the acceptance
of the aid of the Tsar, though it was some time before the Austrian Minister’s
pride could reconcile itself to this course, on its being suggested to him by
Windischgratz. Apart from the fact that the Hungarian Government were desirous
of provoking troubles in Poland, Nicholas I sincerely believed himself to be
the appointed guardian of the cause of order, of the institution of monarchy,
and of the conservative interests of society in general; and specially as protector
of his young fellow-emperor on the Austrian throne. For the service which he
was prepared to render he expected no reward but gratitude.
The
circumstances of Russia’s proffer of aid to Austria have no doubt been
partially obscured by an intentional oblivion. Some indications of the Tsar’s
readiness to furnish assistance seem to have been given as early as May, 1848,
on the occasion of the Emperor Ferdinand’s first flight from Vienna. But it was
not till March, 1849, so far as we know,
1849] Russian intervention.—Holy War proclaimed.
209
that the
Austrian Government first requested the Russian to move troops to the frontier
in support of its operations; and it has been seen how in the course of that
month a Russian corps actually entered Transylvania, at the request of the
Austrian commander there, and was driven out again by Bern. After the recall of
Windischgratz, the Austrian Government had itself requested the despatch of a
Russian auxiliary force; but the Government of the Tsar made it clear that
Russian aid must take the form of an army under the independent control of its
own commander, and amounting to a force superior in numbers to any single
Austrian army in the field. On May 1 the Russian decision to grant aid was
officially announced at Vienna, and a few days later at St Petersburg. The
persistent rumours of an intervention in the Hungarian interest by either or
both of the Western Powers, came to nothing; and Palmerston’s remonstrances
against Austria’s acceptance of Russian aid were angrily rejected by
Schwarzenberg. From Sardinia nothing could be obtained but cooperation in the
organisation of an Italian legion, and from the Porte nothing but sympathy,
though that was genuine enough.
The net was
being drawn in. Jellacic was once more advancing from Croatia with not far
short of 40,000 troops; and, from the Austrian frontier on the right bank of
the Danube, the main Austrian army was approaching under the command of
Feldzeugmeister Baron von Haynau. The inherited ruthlessness of this able
officer (he was a son of the first Elector of Hesse) had been abundantly
experienced by the Lombard towns with the administration of which he had been
entrusted by Radetzky. The virtually absolute judicial and military powers,
conferred upon the new Austrian Commander-in-chief, as well as the character which
he bore and consistently exhibited with the utmost frankness, left no doubt
that, if ever conciliation had been part of the programme of his Government, it
was now so no longer.
Kossuth and
his colleagues had literally nothing on which to depend but the national
enthusiasm; and to this they resolved to make a final appeal. On May 18 the
Hungarian Government put forth its protest against the Russian intervention,
and at the same time announced a plan of national defence conceived in the
spirit of a Crusade or Holy War; and on the 27th followed a further
proclamation, with Bishop Horvath’s injunctions to the clergy to lead on the
people, crucifix in hand, against the foe. But the effort was futile. Of the
five million Magyars and two millions of German inhabitants, most of the
Magnates and wealthier citizens had quitted the country, while no reliance was
to be placed upon such Serbs or Roumans as had in one way or another found
their way into the ranks of the Honveds. The numerical disproportion between the
combatants was too great; arms were wanting, and could neither be imported from
abroad, nor manufactured at home in sufficient quantities; above all, the
supply of money dried up as the
depreciation
of the paper currency continued, and even the tradesmen at Pest began to refuse
the notes. Thus Kossuth’s appeal was only partially successful; and, while he
was straining every nerve to uphold the Republic, '3-orgei’s endeavours to form
a party favouring the restoration of the old monarchical Constitution obliged
him to prorogue the Diet, inasmuch as he did not dare to take away the control
of the army from his rival.
A respite was
afforded by the difficulty of adjusting the Russian and Austrian plans of
action. At an interview between the two Emperors, held at Warsaw on May 21, it
was resolved to abandon the plan of a joint Austro-Russian attack, to prevent
which Gorgei was operating upon the Waag, when he was defeated by Wohlgemuth at
Pered (June 20-1). While 80,000 Russians under Field-Marshal Paskievich were
now at last crossing the Carpathians, the operations in the west were, much to
Haynau’s satisfaction, left to him and his 60,000 Austrians. Advancing on Raab,
he drove back the Hungarians, and on June 27 the young Emperor, Francis Joseph,
entered the place at the head of his troops. By the middle of July, the
Russians, who had advanced without resistance and, after taking Eperies and
other places north of the Theiss, were moving towards the Danube, in order if
possible to take in the rear Gorgei, who stood near Komom, and was thus in
imminent danger of being caught between the two allied armies. It is impossible
to recount here the shifts and changes which had distracted the counsels of the
Hungarian military and civil authorities. Dembinski’s plan of a southern
concentration had been in turn approved, rejected, and again approved by
Gorgei, who in his turn had been deprived of the supreme command, and
reappointed commander of the army of the Danube, while the Ministry of War had
heen again conferred upon Meszdros.
Meanwhile,
Haynau was carrying on his advance with great spirit. He followed up the
capture of Raab by an attack upon the Hungarians’ fortified camp at Acs (July
3), in the course of which Gorgei was wounded, but which led to no result.
Gorgei had now finally resolved to abandon his position at Komom, and with it
any attempt at protecting Budapest, and move upon the Theiss. Kossuth, with
Szemere and the rest of the Government, hereupon took his departure from the
capital to Szegedin, which he reached on July 12. Distracted by doubts, he put
the best face possible upon the situation; assembled the Diet (in which the
House of Magnates had dwindled to a single member), and allowed it to carry on
the pretence of legislation, and vote inter alia the emancipation of the Jews.
Certain measures designed to meet the grievances of the non-Magyar
nationalities as to language and other matters were passed by a majority (July
28), just before the Diet was transferred to the fortress of Arad (which on
July 1 had capitulated to the Magyars after a siege of four months). But no
sittings were actually held here; for the end was already at hand. On July 18
the Austrians took possession of Buda, and on the following day the Emperor’s
colours
1849]
Battles of Szoreg and Segesvar.
211
were hoisted
at Pest, where, apart from special measures of oppression, the prohibition of
Kossuth notes as legal tender brought immediate ruin upon many households. In
the course of the month Jellaci<f soldiery at Hegyes with difficulty extricated
itself from the attack of a much larger Hungarian force (July 14), but he
contrived to effect his junction with Haynau’s army at Uj-Besce. On the 23rd a
Hungarian force suffered a reverse at Mossorin, at the hands chiefly of the
Serb levies under Knicanin; and even in Transylvania, notwithstanding the
diversion which Bern attempted to create by an incursion into Moldavia, the
gradual advance of the Austro-Russian forces continued.
Gorgei had
rightly foreseen how the dislocation of the Hungarian military power must end;
and the events of the early part of August made this clearer still. Haynau,
determined to strike hard to deprive the Russians of any ground for the
pretence of having saved the Austrian rule in Hungary, pushed forward in the
direction of Szegedin, where he hoped, at the junction of Theiss and Maros, and
in a position threatening Arad, to crush the Hungarian army of the south, to
the command of which, after the usual disputes, Dembinski had been appointed.
On August 5 Haynau fell upon it at Szoreg (on the left side of the Theiss) and
drove it back, though without obtaining a decisive victory. Thus a
concentration of the Hungarian forces still in the field had become more
indispensable than ever. For, after an extraordinarily successful guerilla
campaign of several months, Bern had been routed by Liiders on July 31 at
Segesvar (Schassburg), where the patriot poet Alexander Petfifi is believed to
have fallen; and the army which Bern had raised in Transylvania, though it
momentarily recovered itself, was completely broken up. Thus everything now
depended on a junction being effected by Gorgei with Dembinski’s army before
Haynau was able to accomplish its overthrow. But neither of the two Hungarian
commanders acted so as to further this purpose. Dembinski, after his reverse at
Szoreg, fell back as far south as Temesvar. Gorgei, for whatever reasons,
perpetrated, according to his own confession, an undesigned piece of
strategical nonsense by stopping his march far to the north of Arad, on the river
Hem£d. He had successfully avoided coming into contact with the forces of
Paskievich; but on the very day (August 9) when he at last arrived at Arad, the
Hungarian army of the south, with which his own was to unite, was hopelessly
routed by Haynau. The Austrian commander had, after a successful fight at
Szegedin, crossed the Theiss on August 5, and four days afterwards had the
satisfaction of delivering the long-desired main attack at Temesvar. Just
before the battle, the command had been transferred by Kossuth from Dembinski
to Bern, who arrived barely in time to assume it. He retreated with the remnant
of the army to Lugos, but he rccognised the defeat as decisive, and neither he
nor his troops, most of whom dispersed, thought of resuming the struggle.
212
Abdication and flight■ of Kossuth.
[1849
At Arad,
where Kossuth and the Ministry were assembled, and where Gorgei was, according
to his own account, preparing for immediate action, the relations between the
Governor and the general entered into their last and most extraordinary phase.
According to Gorgei, on August 10, the day before that on which the news of the
result of the battle of Temesvar reached Arad, he informed Kossuth that, in the
event of an Austrian victory, he would surrender; Kossuth replying that, in the
same event, he would take his own life. Before daybreak on the 11th Kossuth
sent Gorgei the news of the catastrophe; and Gorgei, with the full intention of
carrying out the surrender, asked Kossuth to abdicate, and thus to transfer the
responsibility of the surrender to the head of both army and Government. In
reply, Kossuth sent to Gorgei a document with the proper Ministerial countersignature,
conferring upon him the supreme command and full powers for concluding
peace—but with the Russians only. By Gorgei’s desire one of the Ministers,
Csdnyi, thereupon called on Kossuth to point out that without his abdication
this document was futile; and, in consequence, the act of abdication was
signed on the afternoon of the 11th by Kossuth and his Ministers. This account,
so far as the transactions on the 11th are concerned, is generally confirmed by
the statement of one of the Ministers who actually took part in the proceedings
(Sabbas Vucovics, the Minister of Justice). Two of the Ministers (Szemere and
Count Casimir Batthydny), who afterwards took exception to the proceedings,
were, however, absent from the meeting at which the resignations took place,
together with a third (Duschek), of whom more below. But Gorgei omits to say
that Kossuth, in his letter of resignation, prescribed to him the preservation
of the autonomy of Hungary as a separate nation—a condition not included in the
original document sent to him. From this it was afterwards argued—not very
forcibly— that, in consequence of Gorgei’s disregard of this condition, the
powers conferred on him reverted to Kossuth. In his proclamation to the nation
(of the same date) the ex-Govemor, while declaring it useless to continue the
war, certainly made Gorgei responsible for the preservation of the national
political life of Hungary. Gorgei’s own proclamation promised that he would do
his best—by the sword, or by pacific means; but he bade the citizens in no case
further resort to arms.
While Kossuth
fled towards the Turkish frontier—which he crossed on August 17, after burying
the crown of St Stephen and its jewels at Orsova—Gorgei quite openly set about
his remaining task. By the Austrian army, even more vehemently than by the
Austrian Government, it was afterwards imputed to him as an unpardonable
offence, that he surrendered to the Russians, and not to Haynau and the
Austrians, whose victorious operations had actually determined the result: for
it was the Austrian rule against which Hungary had risen, the House of Habsburg
whose perpetual exclusion from the Hungarian
throne had
been voted by the Diet, and the Austrian Emperor whose allegiance the officers
and soldiers, enlisted by the Committee of National Defence, had forsworn. On
the other hand, Gorgei, and with him Kossuth and the Hungarian Ministry, who
were at least equally responsible for the decision, had more reason for hope ;
from the Russians. The desperate design which seems at some time—possibly as
late as their council held at Arad on August 10—to have been entertained by
Kossuth and his Ministers, of offering the Hungarian crown to a Russian Grand
Duke, cannot be brought home to Gorgei. But Russian overtures of some sort had
reached him from a comparatively early date, whereas no communications of a
similar sort had come from Haynau or any other Austrian authority. In return to
intimations received late in July the Ministers Szemere and Count Casimir
Batthydny engaged in an active correspondence, and Gorgei sent General Baron
Poltenberg to the Russian General Count Rudiger; but, on the very day on which
Kossuth quitted Arad, a letter from Rudiger reached Gorgei informing him that
all offers of “ submission to his lawful sovereign ” must go through the
Austrian Commander-in-chief. Gorgei, whose mind was made up, hereupon, with the
approval of a council of war, sent a white flag to Rudiger, stating that, being
now in possession of the supreme authority, he was prepared for an absolute
surrender provided always that it was made in the presence of Russian troops
only; and he appealed to the generosity of the Tsar, more especially for the
former Austrian officers in his army, excepting himself. He then, in the night
of August 11, moved his whole army from Arad to Vil&gos, where on the 12th
he ordered the ex-Finance Minister, Duschek, to distribute all the coin and
notes in the National Treasury to the soldiers, but allowed this worthy to
carry over to the Austrians the uncoined gold. On the morning of the 13th, in
face of Rudiger’s corps, the Hungarian army, 23,000 men strong, with 11 generals
and 1400 officers, laid down their arms. The number of guns abandoned was 129.
A small
remnant of 5000 men, after a fight at Lugos (August 15), managed to cross the
Turkish frontier in the course of the five days following. Besides Kossuth,
some of his Ministers, with Generals Bern, Dembinski, Meszdros, Perczel and
others had also found a refuge. The remaining smaller bodies of Hungarian
troops in Hungary and Transylvania also surrendered to the Russians, together
with the garrisons of Arad, Munkd.cs and Peterwardein—probably more than 15,000
men in all. At Komom Klapka held out with heroic spirit till October 5, when he
capitulated under favourable conditions.
Nothing now
remained but the payment of the penalty. In the first place, by order of the
Tsar, “at whose feet,” according to Paskie- vich’s despatch to Francis Joseph,
“ Hungary lay,” Gorgei’s army, with the troops that followed its example, was
handed over to the Austrian Commander-in-chief, Haynau. But for the personal
intervention of
the Tsar and
Grand Duke Constantine there is no reason for supposing that Gorgei himself
would have met with exceptional treatment; most certainly, he had not sought
for it. After being taken to Paskievich’s headquarters at Grosswardein, he was
informed by Haynau that he was pardoned by the Emperor, and would for the
present be interned at Klagenfurt in Carinthia. Here he was, as he believed,
able, after some time had passed, to help in bringing about an act of grace for
some of his fellow-officers; for he had some fine qualities as a soldier,
though after Vilrigos no patriot could breathe his name without a shudder.
Haynau
rigorously carried out the orders received by him. In the first place, all
privates and non-commissioned officers, and all officers who had not previously
served under the Austrian colours, were allowed to go scatheless, though, as an
administrative measure, 40,000 Honveds (officers and men) were at once enrolled
in the imperial army, in which they were of course liable to serve. Next, the
officers of the late Hungarian army who had formerly held Austrian commissions
were brought up before the military tribunal at Arad, some 490 in number.
Thirteen generals were condemned to death; but the sentence was not executed
till the news of the fall of Komom had been received at Arad, when, on October
6, four of them (including Kiss) were shot, and the remainder (including
Aulich, Nagy Sandor, and Damjanics) hanged. No case among those of the “Arad
martyrs” was harder than that of Prince Charles of Leiningen, Queen Victoria’s
cousin. Of the other officers in prison at Arad 231 were sentenced to death,
but not executed; 386 underwent various terms of imprisonment. One of these was
Joseph Bayer, Gorgei’s chief of the staff, whom Haynau is said to have termed the
real leader of the insurrectionary army..
Besides those
who were taken arms in hand, many others suffered for their participation in
the Revolution. All Magnates and Deputies who had sat in the Diet since its
dissolution had been ordered on October 3,
1848, and all members of the Revolutionary
Government, or of the committees or tribunals set up by it, were proscribed
(September 1, 1849); and to the list were subsequently added other names,
including those of Prelates who had promoted the Holy War proclaimed by Kossuth
and Bishop Horv&th. The ex-Govemor himself, Pulszky, Julius Andr&ssy,
and seventy-three others, were hanged in effigy. Of those non-military
offenders who actually underwent punishment, Hungarian accounts state that 114
suffered death, and 1765 varying periods of imprisonment. Among the former was
Lewis Batthy&ny, whose object throughout had been a pacific solution. His
self-sacrifice was understood on neither side; but no execution was more
deeply resented in Hungary than his. A few days after his death the Minister
Csdnyi, Perenyi, who had presided over the Magnates at Debreczen, and other
prominent politicians, were brought to the gallows.
That the
tragic tale of these events repeatedly unfolded by Kossuth
before
British and American audiences should have stirred them deeply, was only in the
nature of things. On the other hand, we should not forget that, according to
the official enquiry, of which the results were published in August, 1850, a
total of 467 persons were put to death in Hungary proper by order of military
tribunals instituted by the Hungarian Revolutionary Government; and that, quite
apart from the soldiers who fell in battle, a much larger number of men, women
and children were, beyond all reasonable doubt, sacrificed in Transylvania
alone, to the racial hatred which the Magyar Government had helped to fan. At
the same time, the severity of the measures capriciously carried out by Haynau,
in some instances with a barbarity congenial to him, and the impunity, granted
to many of the inhuman barbarities perpetrated by the Roumans in Transylvania,
dishonoured the Austrian name; nor was the process altogether stopped after
Schwarzenberg had informed his colleagues that both Haynau in Hungary and Baron
Wohlgemuth in Transylvania had been ordered to put an end to it (October 26,
1849). Haynau, whose arbitrary method of rule gave offence at home, was
actually recalled in July, 1850.
It may
perhaps be added here that Kossuth, after entering the Turkish dominions, had
been recognised and interned at Widdin. In the same fortress Meszdros, Perczel,
Bern, Dembinski, and Guyon were lodged; Casimir Batthy&ny and others being
quartered outside, while the fugitive soldiers, including those belonging to
the late Polish and Italian legions, were encamped on the Danube near by. The
extradition of the exiles was demanded by the Russian Government; but the
Porte, in whose support both England and France made naval demonstrations,
stood firm, and only the Polish refugees were expelled. Three of the generals,
including Bern, thought it prudent to adopt the Mussulman faith. At a later
date about 2000 private soldiers returned to Hungary, trusting in the Austrian
assurance of pardon. Kossuth was himself transferred to Shumla, and finally, in
March, 1851, to Kiutayeh in Asiatic Turkey, which he was not allowed to quit
till the following August. His later career as an apostle of Revolution in
Great Britain and America cannot occupy us here, or his intervention in the
Italian War of 1859; he declined to take advantage of the General Amnesty
proclaimed in 1867; and died at Turin in 1895.
The course of
internal affairs in the Austrian monarchy on both sides of the Leitha up to the
date of Schwarzenberg’s death in April, 1852, will be noticed in a later
chapter; for the close of his career marked no real break in the system of home
government, of which the real direction gradually came into the hands of the
supple and flexible, but tenaciously ambitious, Alexander Bach. The Court had
returned to Vienna so early as May, 1849; and with it the old days seemed to
have come back, while the military spirit, with which Schwarzenberg himself
was in
thorough sympathy, was, owing to the self-consciousness of a doubly victorious
army, more in the ascendant than it had been before the Revolution. Next to the
army, the chief prop of the Reaction was the Church. The improvement in the
administration of the country which marked these years was largely due to the
reorganisation of its system by Bach, as were the revival and progress of
industry and commerce to the far-reaching policy of Brack. Nor should it be
forgotten that, as has been already pointed out, the removal of the servitudes
and other burdens by which the peasantry had for centuries been oppressed,
including the abolition of patrimonial jurisdiction and police, were a benefit
conferred by the Revolution upon the Austrian empire (with the exception of
Galicia), not again to be undone. Thus, in this so-called period of Reaction,
the social and economic advance made by Austria was, as will be shown
elsewhere, at least as notable as was the specious success attending her German
policy, of which immediately.
In the
meantime, the era of constitutional reform seemed to have closed for the
Austrian monarchy. The Constitution of March 4,1849, now appeared to those who
controlled the destinies of the State a piece of obsolete machinery. Perhaps
Stadion might have saved it; but, so early as May, 1849, this upright and
far-sighted statesman was forced into retirement by a mental collapse. The
opportunist influence of Bach, who now became Minister of the Interior, was
speedily signalised by negotiations with the Episcopate, of which the Concordat
of 1855 was the ultimate outcome. In place of what Schwarzenberg openly called
the “ abortive Constitution,” a vigorously centralised system of government now
became the avowed end and aim of the Ministry. In Bohemia, even before the year
1849 was out, the indefatigable Palacky was once more to the front with a newly
furbished-up plan for a federation of nationalities, and the enthusiasm for
this ideal was by no means extinct among the fiechs; but their own day had not
yet come, and the German element prevailed over the Cechish in the municipal
politics of Prague. In Hungary, after Haynau’s recall, Bach’s system of
centralisation and Germanisation was freely applied to all nationalities alike,
to the great tribulation of the Conservative Magyar Magnates, led by Baron
Jdsika, to whom the Reaction had restored but little of what the Revolution had
taken from them. When, in October, 1851, the government of the kingdom, now
divided into five administrative districts, was taken over from Baron von
Geringer by Archduke Albrecht, the reorganisation of the administrative system
of government seemed to announce itself as permanent; and it was coupled with a
commercial policy apparently to the advantage of manufacturing Austria rather
than agricultural and pastoral Hungary. Only very slowly and very quietly the
party of constitutional legality was building itself up under the guidance of
De£k, who, after remaining quietly on his estate during the Revolution, had
unostentatiously placed himself at his country’s service after it had been
“pacified.”
In
Transylvania, under Wohlgemuth, and afterwards (from April, 1851) under Prince
Charles Schwarzenberg, the hopes of the Roumans were doomed to disappointment;
no less complete was the disillusionment of the Slavonian Serbs; and hardly
less that of their neighbours, the Croatians, whose Banus was loaded with
rewards, while the country had gained nothing but a modest extension of
territory (including three Hungarian counties, and Fiume), in return for the
loss—during a decade -!—of its Diet, the visible symbol of its
desire for national autonomy.
When, as we
shall see, Schwarzenberg’s diplomacy had prevailed over Prussia at Olmiitz and
Dresden, and the Austrian hegemony in Germany might be regarded as definitively
restored, the time seemed to have arrived for putting an end to the Austrian
Constitution. Very possibly, this step was recommended to Francis Joseph by his
paternal friend the Tsar at Olmiitz in May; but the advice was superfluous.
Already in April, 1851, a preliminary step had been taken by instituting, under
the presidency of the experienced Kiibeck, a Reichsrath, or Council of State,
which, though without power of control over the Ministry, was to be entitled to
be consulted on all matters of legislation. Bach, who was already engaged in
executing his masterly retreat from constitutional principles, was acquainted
with the design by Schwarzenberg; together with only one other member of the
Cabinet, the Finance Minister Krauss; but the latter, though a faithful servant
of the Crown, dissented from the plan, and ultimately resigned his office. On
August 20 the final decision was taken; on the 22nd the National Guard was
dissolved; on September 19 the civil servants of the Crown were relieved (as
the army had been several months earlier) from the obligation of swearing
fidelity to the Constitution; and on December 81,1851, an imperial patent
abolishing it was issued. The Austrian coup d'etat was not bloodstained, like
that which had by a few weeks preceded it in France; but it openly attested the
Emperor’s and his advisers’ want of confidence in one and all of the peoples of
the Empire, whom by a stroke of the pen it deprived of their representative
rights. Yet it produced hardly a complaint; for the Constitution to which it
put an end had not had time to become part of the life of the peoples. It was
what lay behind the Constitution, but could be pressed forward more effectively
without it than with it—the centralising tendency, in a word—that in the
ensuing period provoked and heightened what power of self-assertion and
opposition the nationalities still retained. Thus, while the economic condition
of the several sections of the Austrian monarchy, with the aid of free
land-tenure and the development of industrial progress and commercial
intercourse, steadily advanced, neither could their political growth be again
repressed as it had been before "the Revolution; and, when they once more
addressed themselves to the task of settling their own affairs, the troublous
experiences of the Revolution age proved to have not been undergone in vain.
The collapse
of the German National Parliament and of the Central Power established by it
had left the settlement of the future conditions of Germany’s political life to
be determined by the two Great German Powers. Or rather, inasmuch as nobody*—
except now and again King Frederick William IV—any longer dreamt of a sincere
cooperation for the purpose between them, this settlement must be ultimately
determined by the stronger of the pair. How to shape their action in accordance
with this necessity now became the main task of German statesmen during a
period of some seventeen years. Until, however, in one way or another, the
Hungarian Revolution should have been mastered, Schwarzenberg, to whom the
national ideals of Germany were wholly antipathetic, could only maintain
towards Prussia’s belated schemes for the political reorganisation of Germany,
an attitude of cold dissent.
These
attempts on the part of Prussia were marked from the first by an uncertainty
due to the very imperfect mutual understanding which existed on the subject between
sovereign, ministry, and people. Moreover, each of these was hampered by the
difficulty of reconciling the historic self-consciousness of the Prussian
monarchy and its subjects with the German aspirations cherished both by the
King and by the large majority of his subjects. On April 21, 1849, the Prussian
Second Chamber, in spite of the uncompromising protest of the Prime Minister,
Count Brandenburg, adopted the motion of Johann Karl Rodbertus, the celebrated
economist, supported by the leader of the Liberal Opposition, Georg von Vincke,
in favour of the recognition of the Frankfort Constitution of the German
Empire—but by a majority of 16 votes only. A street disturbance followed at
Berlin; but the King had made up his mind, as a matter of conscience, that the
assent of the German Governments to the Constitution must be secured before it
was definitively formulated. Thus, on April 28, he invited all these
Governments to send plenipotentiaries to Berlin to discuss the terms of a
Constitution for the German Empire. But, inasmuch as the Frankfort Constitution
had been actually accepted by Wiirtemberg as well as by nearly all the petty
States, and rejected, though on different grounds respectively, by Bavaria,
Hanover and Saxony only (in which last instance it had been accepted by the
Chambers, but not by the King), it was practically the Governments of these
three kingdoms whom the Prussian desired to consult. Yet it was at this very
time that the revolutionary element, acting through the democratic clubs
overspreading the country like a network, once more sought to dominate the
situation.
A beginning
was made in the Rhenish Palatinate, whose population, far from loyally disposed
towards its Bavarian rulers, on May 2 set up a provisional Government, and for
several weeks maintained it in power. The movement, as a matter of course,
spread to Baden (although the grand ducal Government had recognised the
Frankfort Constitution), where it took the alarming form of a general military
mutiny, compelling
the Grand
Duke to fly into Elsass (May 13) and rapidly bringing the entire grand duchy,
including the Federal fortress of Rastatt, under the control of the
Republicans. A few days earlier, the Revolution had broken out in Saxony, where
the Chambers had been dissolved (April 30), and the Ministry reconstituted on a
more Conservative basis under Zschinsky and Beust. King Frederick Augustus II
persisted in his refusal to recognise the German Constitution; and, inasmuch as
the Chambers had also placed the whole of the Saxon troops at the disposal of
the Central Power, he might well think that his sovereignty was at stake. At
Leipzig a vote of “ want of confidence ” in the King was proposed; and, when
disturbances had broken out in Dresden, he sought with the royal family the
shelter of the fortress of the Konigstein, higher up the Elbe. A provisional
Government was hereupon formed by the popular leaders, and the “ defence ” of
the capital organised under the direction of Michael Bakunin, a Russian
fugitive. The few Saxon troops at hand were unable to suppress the
insurrection; nor was it till after four days that, on May 7, three battalions
of Prussian guards, by express orders of Frederick William IV, made their
appearance at Dresden and, followed by other Prussian troops, took possession
of the city. The violence of the Saxon “ May Insurrection,” occurring as it did
in the midst of a gentle though excitable population, was surprising; and there
was so much disagreement among the leaders that timely concession might have confined
the movement within a narrow channel, and left less room for alien agencies. As
a matter of fact, the rising was suppressed with a comparatively small loss of
life (probably about 200 insurgents, and half as many Prussian or Saxon
soldiers). Of the leaders some (including Tzschirner) escaped; but Bakunin was
caught and sentenced to death—he was, however, afterwards delivered up to
Austria, and by Austria to Russia. Several thousands of arrests took place; and
it was long before capital and kingdom recovered from the demoralising effects
of a few days’ disturbance.
In Prussia
itself, where the vote of the Chambers in support of the German Constitution
had been immediately followed by their dissolution, there was much disquiet.
Part of the Landwehr was called out; but in many districts, both east and west,
the levies resisted the call. Diisseldorf and Elberfeld were for several days
in the occupation of revolutionary bands; and at Breslau barricades were
erected and lives lost. But, this time, the Government stood firm; by the end
of May it had restored order at home, and was ready to furnish aid in answer to
fresh applications from other States. It was about this time that the
Government introduced a classification according to income into the Prussian electoral
system. The democratic party abstained for a time from taking part in
parliamentary elections; but the change was never
revoked. .
Meanwhile,
the summons to the three Kings had gone forth; and, in a
proclamation
to his people bearing date May 15, Frederick William IV had announced his
intention of perfecting a German Constitution in consultation with his allies,
and laying it before a parliament in which all the States whose Governments had
taken part in the work should be represented. Prussia seemed at last anxious to
satisfy the national claims and to assert her own right to the hegemony by
satisfying them. Radowitz, who was now, and remained during some eighteen
months further, the King’s chief adviser, was a man of profound veracity and
true highmindedness, besides being a true Liberal and a convinced supporter of
the Prussian hegemony and the policy of excluding the Austrian monarchy from
Germany proper. In spite, however, of the breadth of his statesmanship and the
force of his eloquence, he was not much liked by the Liberals—chiefly no doubt
because he was a devout Catholic, and in favour of a free Church in a free
State, and partly also because, as Ludwig von Gerlach put it, he had no happy
hand—being in fact better able to manage the King than to conciliate his own
political opponents.
With a view,
then, to carrying out the policy which Frederick William IV had accepted as far
back as January 23, 1849, of a closer “Union” between Prussia and the purely
German States, and a perpetual offensive and defensive alliance between this
Union and the Austrian monarchy—a policy which Schwarzenberg had to all intents
and purposes absolutely rejected—conferences were actually opened at Berlin on
May 17. These conferences were attended by the plenipotentiaries of Prussia
(Radowitz), Saxony (Beust and Behr), and Hanover (Stuve and Wangenheim). The
Austrian ambassador attended only the opening sitting, and the Bavarian was
left without instructions. On May 26, the three Governments accepted a draft of
the German Constitution which had been prepared by Radowitz, and which, while
maintaining the principles of a Prussian headship in the conduct of federal
affairs, of a common administrative council, and of a popular representation,
had been revised in a Conservative sense in several points, more especially as
to the system of election for the representative assembly. The principles of
the “ DreiJcdnigsbundniss” were therefore essentially those on which the North
German Confederation and the German Empire succeeding it, were afterwards
established by Bismarck, at the time one of Radowitz’ most violent opponents;
but, in seeking to carry out these principles, Radowitz was unable to master
the spirits of intrigue with which he had to deal. On the day after that on which
the Saxon and Hanoverian plenipotentiaries had signed the draft Constitution
and agreed to the publication of the terms of the Union, they signified that
the entrance of their Governments into it was conditional on its being accepted
by the other German Governments—apart from the Austrian—and by that of Bavaria
in particular. The Prussian Government, as appears from Radowitz’ own notes,
does not appear to have regarded this reservation
as
invalidating the Saxon and Hanoverian assent; and in the course of the summer
the Union was joined by the two Hesses and several other minor States, while a
meeting held at Gotha, on June 28, of nearly 150 members of the late Frankfort
Assembly, including Heinrich von Gagem, Dahlmann, Mathy, Bassermann, Soiron and
Beckerath, declared in its favour. But even the support of the Gothaers, as
they were called by an only half-sympathetic public, failed to embolden the
Prussian Government to rapid action. Nearly all the petty Governments had now
joined the Union; and about this very time the most important of them was being
laid under enduring obligations towards Prussia. By the middle of May the
insurrection had overspread the whole of the grand duchy of Baden, and had
swallowed up its entire military force, together with 3000 troops in the
Bavarian Palatinate and some Wurtem- bergers quartered in Freiburg. Some 22,000
or 23,000 regulars were now in the service of the insurrection, together with
14,000 or 15,000 National Guards; and, allowing for the spread of the
revolutionary spirit through the contiguous States, a force of 100,000 men or
more might have been very speedily on foot. Of course there was a want of
officers as well as organisation; and, though a Provisional Government was set
up on June 1, its head, Ludwig Brentano, whose actual moderation contrasted
with the inflammatory tone of his former speeches, could not assert his
authority over Sigel, a high-spirited young ex-officer, who commanded the
soldiery. In the course of the month, however, came the beginning of the end. A
Prussian force of about 20,000 men under General von Hirschfeld marched upon
the Bavarian Palatinate, and on the right bank of the Rhine another of about
15,000 under General von Groben, with a Reichsarmee under the former Minister
of War, the Prussian General von Peucker, rather smaller in numbers, overran
Baden—while Bavarian, Wiirtemberg, and Austrian troops stood in reserve. On
June 13 the Prince of Prussia was placed at the head of the whole expeditionary
force. Four days earlier the Polish General Mieroslawski had arrived at
Carlsruhe to assume the supreme command of the insurrectionary army. In the
circumstances, his plan of breaking up Hirschfeld’s army after drawing it
across the Rhine, could not end in success. Hirschfeld did not cross the Rhine
till he had completely subdued the Bavarian Palatinate; and, though
Mieroslawski gained a success at Waghausel over General Hannecken, the
Prussians, superior in numbers and discipline, routed the insurrectionary army
in a series of engagements (June 25-30), and, by means of a rapid march by
Peucker as far as Constance, effectively prevented any spread of the
insurrection into Wiirtemberg. After Mieroslawski had thrown up the command,
Sigel had only 6000 men under him, most of whom found their way into
Switzerland. ^ Rastatt alone held out till July 23, when the fortress
surrendered unconditionally, and many of the garrison were put to death. The
whole struggle—the most extensive military effort of the Revolution in
Germany—had cost
222 Breakdown of the Dreikonigsbtindniss.
[1849-50
the victors
about 1000 dead and wounded; the losses of the vanquished cannot have been
smaller. But the victory was complete, and helped considerably to raise the
prestige of the Prussian arms.
Yet, under
influences of which the chief was the King’s unwillingness to take advantage of
Austria’s troubles, there was still hesitation at Berlin. Indeed, when in
August, 1849, the Reichsverweser, Archduke John, had at last agreed to resign
his office on condition of the Central Power being provisionally (up to May 1,
1850) held by Austria and Prussia in common, the Prussian Government consented
to this temporary arrangement (September 30). But soon the situation became
clearer. On October 5 the Administrative Council of the new Union met to
discuss the proposal of Nassau that a day should be fixed for the meeting of
the new National Assembly. Prussia’s smaller confederates were ready to agree
to this proposal; but Hanover and Saxony now (relying on a provision of the
Federal Act of 1815) declared that the assent of Austria, Bavaria and
Wurtemberg was required to make such a measure legal. Unluckily Prussia herself
had on more than one recent occasion appealed to the Federal Act, instead of
treating it as extinct with the Confederation. But the vote for summoning the
National Assembly was passed on October 19; and, though Austria protested, the
elections actually took place on January 31, 1850, in the States which adhered
to the Union.
But these no
longer included Saxony and Hanover. On October 20, the day after that on which
the Union had passed its resolute vote, all doubt was removed as to their real
intentions, which to British diplomacy at all events had been no secret from
the first. The two Kings, both of whom were under obligations to the King of
Prussia— what the King of Saxony owed him has been seen—now announced their
withdrawal from the Council of the Union, though they stated that they still
remained members of the Union itself. In plain words, this meant their
secession; they took no part in the elections to the Erfurt Parliament; and on
February 23, 1850, Hanover openly seceded, and the Prussian envoy at the Court
of King Ernest Augustus was recalled.
The breakdown
of the “Three Kings’ Alliance,” in default of which the “Union” practically
shrank to a league between Prussia and the petty States, encouraged
Schwarzenberg, whose hands were now comparatively free, to press his own
notions of federal reconstruction. For, while treating the Germanic
Confederation as still in existence, he proposed changes in its scheme not less
drastic than those which Radowitz had in view. Boldly assuming that it would
include the whole of the Austrian monarchy, he proposed to substitute for the
old Federal Council a directory of seven States (Austria, Prussia, the four
lesser kingdoms, and the two Hesses counting as one). The scheme was commended
to certain of the Governments (Hanover in particular) by the suggestion of
pleasing, territorial readjustments; and, having before the
end of 1849
been taken up by Bavaria, it was elaborated so promptly, that by February 27,
1850, the Governments of Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Saxony and Hanover (though the
last did not actually sign) could lay it before those of Austria and Prussia.
The scheme of the “ Vierlconigs- biindniss ” differed from Schwarzenberg’s
chiefly by including a proposal for a “popular” assembly, to be elected by the
Chambers of the several States, and to consist of 100 representatives each of
Austria, Prussia, and the rest. Austria’s presidency over the new directory was
not mentioned either in Schwarzenberg’s proposals, or in the Four Kings’ Draft;
but it was understood to be as much a matter of course as the inclusion of the
whole Austrian monarchy in the reconstructed Confederation. The bearing of
these schemes on the future commercial development of Germany cannot be
discussed here; but it may be noted that at the Customs Conference held at
Cassel, July—November, 1850, Austria succeeded in preventing an understanding
between Prussia and the south-western States, and that in the following year
the first step in Bruck’s great plan of commercial policy was taken by the
establishment of a Customs Union, referred to above, between Austria and
Hungary.
Notwithstanding
the defection of the two Kings and the stimulus which it supplied to the
designs of Austria—notwithstanding, too, the renewed lukewarmness of King
Frederick William IV towards the “ Union ” scheme and the exceptions taken to
it by some of the Prussian Conservatives, such as their parliamentary
protagonist Stahl, and Bismarck—Radowitz persisted. On March 20,1850, the
Erfurt Parliament opened; and, in spite of a virulent attack on the Prussian
“Sonderbumd” delivered a few days earlier by King William I of Wiirtemberg in a
speech from the throne, the revised Constitution proposed in a very effective
speech by Radowitz was approved by the Assembly, which was soon afterwards
prorogued (April 29). But now Frederick William IV made it clear that he lacked
the courage, and had lost the desire, to pit himself against Austria and the
four royal Governments, with no support but that of the petty States. He
invited the Princes of the Union to a personal conference at Berlin, and,
having apprised his guests that he left them free to adhere to the Union, bade
farewell to them in terms amounting to a suspension of it till happier times.
Schwarzenberg,
with heightened self-confidence, now quite openly pursued his plan of
reestablishing the old Confederation and its Diet, though declaring himself
only desirous of gaining a starting-point for necessary reforms. On his
invitation the plenipotentiaries of Austria and the four kingdoms, together
with those of Electoral Hesse (to which Hesse-Darmstadt was added at the second
meeting), Homburg and Liechtenstein, and those of Holstein and Limburg (Denmark
and Holland), met at Frankfort on May 10, and on May 16 constituted themselves
the plenum of the Diet. It was not, however, till September 2 that after a long
and energetic diplomatic correspondence between
Radowitz and
the Governments concerned, the activity of the old Confederation was
practically revived by the reconstitution of its Select Council (Engerer Rath).
Though these
manoeuvres were resented by Frederick William IV, his desire to remain on
friendly terms with the Emperor of Austria induced him to arrange a personal
interview between them at Teplitz (September 8) and to receive acquiescently a
letter from the Tsar urging him to adhere to the Austrian alliance. Something
more was needed than even Schwarzenberg’s overbearing action to carry the King
so far as he actually proceeded on the lines of the policy of Radowitz. With
regard to the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty the action of the two German Great
Powers had come to be more or less in agreement. After the conclusion of the
Truce of Malmoe (August 26,1848) between Prussia and Denmark, bitterly resented
at Frankfort and in Germany at large, negotiations for a definitive peace began
in London, and were carried on during the remainder of the year. In October the
Danes formulated a proposal—probably suggested by Russia, who never lost the
possibilities of the succession out of view—that, without prejudice to its
connexion with the Danish Crown, Schleswig should form an autonomous State,
distinct alike from Denmark and from Holstein. Palmerston prevailed upon the
Prussian and then upon the German Government (January, 1849) to accept this
formula, omitting the clause italicised, though even so it was contradictory to
the historic principle of the indissolubility of the union between the duchies;
but Denmark declined to listen to the proposal so modified, and, confident in
the support of three at least among the Great Powers, declared the truce at an
end. On April 3,
1849, the War was reopened; and, though the Danish
Government might count itself master of the sea, it was on this very day that
at Eckernforde two Danish men-of-war, having all but run aground, were obliged
to strike their flags; one of them afterwards blew up in sight of the troops
commanded by Duke Ernest of Coburg-Gotha. On April 13 followed the capture of
the Diippel redoubts (opposite Alsen) by Saxon and Bavarian troops; but after
some further German successes the Danes worsted the Schleswig-Holsteiners under
General von Bonin in their attack upon Fridericia. The issue of the War was not
however to depend on the exertions of the contending military forces. On July
10,1849, a truce for six months was, again under British mediation, concluded
by the Prussian and Danish Governments at Berlin, which stipulated that
Schleswig, after being evacuated by the German troops, should be for the time
administered jointly by a Prussian, a Danish and a British Commissioner, the
military occupation of the duchy being distributed between Swedes and
Norwegians in the north, Germans in the south, and Danes on Alsen. At the same
time peace preliminaries were signed, in which Prussia accepted the clause safeguarding
the political union between Schleswig and the Danish Crown,
Denmark not
insisting upon this union being declared indissoluble. Palmerston’s diplomacy
had succeeded in bringing to pass a settlement which was no settlement at all;
as was shown even more distinctly by the terms of the “ definitive ” peace,
concluded at Berlin on July 2,
1850. This peace, most inglorious for Prussia,
was what is technically termed a “ simple peace,” i.e. it merely reserved to
both the contracting Powers all the rights which they had possessed before the
war; it made no mention whatever of Schleswig (except as to its evacuation);
and it left the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein to call upon the Germanic
Confederation to restore him to his rights in that duchy, or, in case of its
refusing to intervene, to take steps on his own account. All the long preceding
negotiations had been carried on under the eye of the Tsar, who resisted any
proposal tending to the separation of Schleswig from Denmark or to the
recognition of the Augustenburg succession in the duchies.
Thus the
duchies were left to themselves. At first they were determined to carry on the
struggle; for their army numbered 30,000 men— not far from the total of the
military forces at the disposal of the Danes —and before the struggle was over,
was increased by 12,000 or 13,000. In April it was placed under General von
Willisen, who was once more doomed to disappoint expectations. He was defeated
at Idstedt (July 25); and the loss of Friedrichstadt (September 7), which he in
vain attempted to recover (September 29—October 4), was followed by his
abandonment of the offensive, and then by his resignation of the command
(December 7). Before this the fate of the duchies had been decided in the
Olmiitz Conferences, and the restored Germanic Confederation had declared its
readiness to carry out the Peace of July 2, 1850. In these circumstances the
Estates of the duchies, assembled at Kiel for the last time on January 11,
1851, resolved to renounce any further attempt at resistance, and the
Provisional Government made over its authority to the Austro-Prussian
Commission of Pacification. On January 28, 1852, Frederick VII of Denmark took
possession of the duchies with a proclamation promising them special
Constitutions with separate representative bodies, included in a common
Constitution of the whole monarchy, to be submitted to the approval of their
Estates. This proclamation, so far as words went, carried out and even expanded
the undertakings into which the Danish Government had entered towards the
German Great Powers (December 6, 1851), and was followed (on May 10,1852) by an
amnesty containing, however, numerous exceptions. Denmark’s sincerity in
forming these engagements was to be tested during the twelve years of continual
grievances, political, financial and racial, which preceded the Dano-German War
of 1864. The Common Constitution for the monarchy, drawn by the Finance
Minister Sponneck and promulgated in 1854, was rejected by the Eider Dane
party; and in its place a revised Constitution, which left the
representation
of the duchies powerless in all matters common to the monarchy, was in 1855
forced upon them, and, so far as Holstein was concerned, upon the Germanic
Confederation.
Finally, the
question of the Danish Succession in 1852 likewise reached a settlement full of
danger for the future. Already before the Schleswig- Holstein War of 1848-9
there had been a strong wish in Denmark proper to regulate the Succession in
such a way as to preserve at all events the personal union between the kingdom
and the duchies, although in the former the Lex Regia (1665) allowed succession
in the female line, whereas in the latter only the male line of Christian I
could succeed. Matters had now been simplified; the Constitution of 1848 had
deprived the Lex Regia of its basis; the claims belonging to Prince Frederick
of Hesse-Cassel, the nephew and nearest relative of King Frederick VII, (should
his two sisters resign in the Prince’s favour), would therefore be dropped by
common consent; and of the agnati, the Augustenburgs and (with a single
exception) the Gliicksburgs were held to be out of court as having been in
active sympathy with the rising against the Danish Crown. This .view, which was
favoured by the King, was strongly supported by the Tsar Nicholas; and, as in
his capacity as head of all the three branches of the Gottorp line, which came
next among the agnati, he declared in favour of the one eligible candidate of
the Gliicksburg line, Prince Christian, it was hoped that the Powers might
agree upon the choice of this Prince, who was additionally acceptable as
married to a niece of King Christian VIII.
In his
interview with the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia at Warsaw in May,
1851, the Tsar obtained the assent of the former, and the conditional assent of
the latter, to his Danish Succession scheme. But after this initial success the
negotiation hung fire—partly owing to the dissatisfaction aroused in both the
German Great Powers by the Danish proceedings in the duchies, partly in
consequence of the negotiations with the head of the Augustenburgs, upon whose
assent Prussia had made her own conditional, and in whose claims Queen Victoria
took a strong interest. Moreover, both the Prussian Government and Queen
Victoria were desirous that the claims of the Germanic Confederation to a voice
in the matter should not be ignored. Thus it was not till Duke Christian of
Augustenburg had (towards the end of April) declared his acceptance of the
terms offered—he was to receive an annual payment in return for his
acquiescence and the renunciation of his Schleswig estates—that the Conference
of the Powers in London could settle its Protocol on the basis of an
acknowledgment of the integrity of the Danish monarchy as a European necessity,
and the consequent nomination of Prince Christian of Gliicksburg and his
descendants in the male line to the entire succession. The Protocol was
actually signed on May 8,1852, the final decision of Prussia in its favour
having been possibly expedited by the recognition on the part of the
Powers of the
King’s rights in Neuchatel. The ratifications were exchanged by each of the
Powers concerned with Denmark only, so that they entered into no obligation
with one another with regard to the settlement. It was promulgated as a law for
the entire Danish monarchy on July 81, though not less unwelcome to the Danish
nationalists than to the Germans in the duchies, and though the Holstein
Estates disputed its validity as not having received their concurrence. A
further flaw consisted in the fact that, though the Duke of Augustenburg had
promised, for himself and his family, in no way to oppose the succession of
Prince Christian of Gliicksburg, he had not actually renounced his claims, and
could not renounce those which would after his death or abdication accrue to
his sons, both of whom were of age in 1852. Finally, the Germanic Confederation
had not been consulted as to the Protocol; and, as Bunsen suggested at the
time, this left the question open so far as that body was concerned. Such was
the character of the instrument by which European diplomacy hoped successfully
to ward off whatever future storms might arise in sea-girt Schleswig-Holstein1.
Meanwhile,
another question had brought Austria and Prussia to the verge of an open
conflict. The Austrian suggestion of a provisional administration to be carried
on by both Governments, had after some hesitation been rejected at Berlin (May,
1850); and Prussia, with the remnant of the Union, stood opposed to her rival,
with the beginnings of the restored Confederation, including at present some
eleven out of thirty-five States. Schwarzenberg now changed his tone. He could
not protest against the Prussian annexation of the two Hohenzollem
principalities, which had been accomplished, with the consent of all concerned,
in April.
1
This may be the most convenient place for referring to an episode now half
forgotten, but at the time productive of great bitterness and a deep sense of
national humiliation. The course of the Schleswig-Holstein War in 1848 had
created in Germany a desire, as widespread as it was legitimate, for a navy
capable of protecting the northern coasts of the country. The subject, after
being discussed by the Committee of Fifty at Frankfort and by a naval congress
held at Hamburg in May, 1848, was in June taken up by the National Parliament
and the Reichsverweser’s Government. A small number of ships was equipped,
partly by means of a matricula imposed upon the several States, from some of
which the response was extremely slack, partly by voluntary contributions; but
the enterprise, as Minister Duckwitz reported in April, 1849, was in an
unpromising condition even before the National Government came to an end,
though a small flotilla supported the last efforts of the Schleswig-Holstein
army under Willisen. The restored Germanic Confederation, though acknowledging
the ships to be its property, did nothing to keep them up; and after Hanover
had made some attempt to that end, and Austria.had propos-ec1 that
they should be distributed in three divisions, the Diet in April, 1852,
resolved to make an end of the fleet. Hannibal Fischer, a retired Oldenburg
official of extremely reactionary antecedents, was appointed federal
commissioner for the purpose, and incurred so much obloquy in the process that
the completion of it had to be transferred to other hands. After dismissing the
crews he had disposed of six steam brigs at forty, the sailing frigate
Deutschland at fifteen, and twenty-seven gun-boats at four per cent, of their
estimated value.
But he could
dispute Prussia’s right to conclude military conventions with Brunswick and
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha for the incorporation of their federal contingents in the
Prussian army, and seek to prevent an exchange of Baden and Prussian troops by
preventing the transit of the former by way of the federal fortress of Mainz.
Radowitz was full of wrath; but the King was still for peace, and the Tsar,
intent upon the settlement of the Danish Succession, still sought to keep the
peace between his Allies. Thus matters stood, when a constitutional quarrel
arose in the very heart of Germany, which seemed precisely calculated to bring
the political conflict between the two Great Powers to an issue: since on this
occasion the territorial sovereign and his Minister, supported by Austria,
stood opposed to the representatives of the people, to the civil and military
servants of the State, and to the whole of the population, who were warm
adherents of Prussia and her German policy. The Elector Frederick William of
Hesse-Cassel had from his youth upwards been in the habit of suspecting all his
servants and all his subjects; and his vindictive nature had made him the
bitter foe of all who adhered to the public law of the land. He had indeed
joined the Union of Princes brought about by Prussia, but only in the hope of
thus obtaining some support against his territorial Diet, with which he was at
odds about his Civil List. When his Ministers had demurred to his throwing up
this engagement with Prussia, he had dismissed them and appointed a new
administration under his and his father’s former Minister, Hans Daniel
Hassenpflug, who had since been in the Prussian service, but had quitted it
under a cloud. The Elector’s subjects regarded the appointment of this avowed
reactionary as an open defiance of their rights and aspirations; and some of
his colleagues were hated almost as much as he was himself. When the
Hesse-Cassel Diet was at last convoked, it refused to vote the direct taxes
unless a proper budget were laid before it, and was promptly dissolved
(September 2). The machinery of government in the electorate speedily came to a
deadlock; the Elector quitted his capital, and none of the state officials
would obey the hated Minister when he attempted to carry on the Government.
This was the celebrated “revolution in a dressing-gown”—for there was no
demonstration of violence, but a passive resistance all round.
No grievance
on the part of the Elector was likely to find consideration with the Erfurt
Parliament; but the case was different with the restored old Confederation at
Frankfort, where Schwarzenberg was master. After a fruitless struggle to obtain
supplies, Hassenpflug accordingly appealed to the so-called Exceptional Law
passed by the Diet in 1832, but revoked by it in March, 1848, and, after
proclaiming martial law in the electorate, and being in return indicted by the
Committee of the Estates on a charge of high treason, appeared with the Elector
at Frankfort to present his case. The Diet at once took preliminary measures
towards a Federal execution, which led to the
resignation
of the large majority of the officers in the electoral army (September). On
the other hand, the pride of the King of Prussia shrank from entering the old
Confederation at such a moment in order to defeat the action of Austria at the
Diet; and he had probably no desire to pose there as defender of the
Hesse-Cassel Constitution. There accordingly remained only the alternative of
meeting any action on the part of the Diet, which was still legally
incompetent, by force. This was the course advocated by Radowitz, who was at
this very time (September 29,1850) appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. If he
could persuade his master to stand firm, the destinies of Prussia and Germany
seemed to lie in his hands.
But such was
not to be the case, even though the eleventh hour seemed to have passed; for on
October 11 at Bregenz the sovereigns of Austria, Bavaria, and Wiirtemberg
agreed, on putting an army of
200,000 men into the field, and on both sides troops
were moving towards the Hessian frontier. Meanwhile, King Frederick William IV
was still hesitating; and on October 15 Count Brandenburg, still at the head of
the Prussian Ministry, was sent to discuss the situation with the Tsar at
Warsaw, whither he was speedily followed by Prince Schwarzen- berg. From
Brandenburg’s reports it is clear that the Tsar, though mainly interested in
settling the Danish Succession question, and generally desirous of promoting a
good understanding between the German Great Powers, insisted on the continuance
of the Germanic Confederation, which would of course be entitled to send troops
into Hesse-Cassel on the requisition of the Elector. Brandenburg waived the
proposal of a German popular representation, and agreed to the admission of the
whole Austrian monarchy into the Confederation—in other words, to the abandonment
of the policy of the Union.
But, on his
return to Berlin (October SI), he found the capital and the country aflame with
indignation at the insolence of the Confederation, the arrogance of Austria,
the impudence of Bavaria (of whose troops the army of execution in Hesse was
mainly to consist), and the audacious obstinacy of the Elector and Hassenpflug.
King Frederick William’s pride was touched; he was determined not to allow the
Federal execution in Hesse, and on the arrival of news that 6000 Bavarian troops
had occupied Hanau, Prussian troops were ordered to occupy both Fulda and
Cassel. At a ministerial Council held at Berlin on November 1 and 2, under the
presidency of the King, a proposal for mobilisation was advocated by Radowitz,
but opposed by Brandenburg and Manteuffel—the Minister of War, Stockhausen,
declaring that Prussia was not equal to a conflict with Austria and the German
south, supported by Russia. The Prince of Prussia vigorously supported
mobilisation; the King favoured it, but left the responsibility to his
Ministers. A majority hereupon voted against the proposal; and, as the King
acquiesced, his strangely timed resolution to act on strictly constitutional
lines seemed to have decided
the issue in
favour of peace. On the following morning Count Brandenburg, whose opinion had
carried the day, fell ill, and on November 6 he died. When in his absence the
Ministers had met under the presidency of Manteuffel, Radowitz and his
supporters (Ladenberg and von der Heydt) announced their resignation; that of
Radowitz was accepted by the King in an eloquent letter.
Meanwhile,
popular opinion in Berlin and the country, wholly in the dark as to the
ministerial discussions, awaited some vigorous action on the part of the
Government. On November 2 General Count von der Groben occupied Fulda, and
General von Tietzen held his entry into Cassel, warmly welcomed by the
inhabitants. The Austrians had massed
76.000 troops in Bohemia, whose numbers rumour of
course exaggerated. On November 4 an Austrian despatch arrived demanding the
withdrawal of the Prussian troops ■ from the electorate, and an
intimation from St Petersburg that the Tsar would regard a refusal of this
demand as a casus belli. On the evening of November 5, Manteuffel, believing war
to be now inevitable, whether the Prussian Government wished it or not, with
some difficulty persuaded the King to issue, after all, orders for the
mobilisation of the army, though accompanied by a declaration that the measure
was defensive only. Much enthusiasm marked the carrying out of this measure,
which was published on November 6, while diplomatic negotiations with Austria
were still in progress.
Still, every
effort was made on the Prussian side to avoid an actual collision. On November
8 the Prince of Thurn and Taxis at the head of the mainly Bavarian army of
execution (which finally amounted to
25.000 men) approached von der Groben’s position
at Fulda; and at Bronzell, near that city, a slight skirmish of outposts took
place, which was immediately stopped by the officers after five Austrian
riflemen— and it was said, one Prussian horse (der Schimmel von Bronzell)—had
been wounded. Von der Groben received immediate orders from Berlin to evacuate
Fulda and take up a position near Hersfeld, where the military route
(Etappenstrasse) open to Prussia by treaty led through the electorate. Fulda
was hereupon occupied by the Federal troops, and the “ execution ” proceeded in
due course as it had at Hanau.
And now it
became gradually clear that, the mobilisation notwithstanding, the Prussian
Government was about to give way. Radowitz’ mission to England after his
resignation had failed to exercise any favourable effect; and, though France
was massing troops on her eastern frontier, a bargain with the President of the
Republic, who had suddenly become apprehensive of the preponderance of the
Austrian power, seemed to Frederick William out of the question. On November 9,
the day on which the news of Bronzell had reached Berlin, the King approved a
despatch in which his Government gave way as to the Union (it was practically
dissolved on November 15), and with regard to the Federal occupation of
Hesse-Cassel merely demanded a joint undertaking as to
its object
and duration on the part of Austria and her allies, and the acceptance of the
occupation of the Prussian military routes in the electorate by Prussian
troops. Even to this last concession, evidently designed to save Prussia’s
honour, Schwarzenberg demurred; and once more a crisis seemed at hand. Orders
had actually been given that on November 27 Thurn and Taxis should at any risk
occupy Cassel, where von der Groben still stood, and an ultimatum to this
effect had on the 25th been sent to Manteuffel by the Austrian ambassador at
Berlin. At the last moment, King Frederick William persuaded the Emperor
Francis Joseph to approve a personal interview between Schwarzenberg and
Manteuffel for the settlement of all questions at issue, and a temporary
postponement of the order to the Federal troops.
On the
evening of November 28 Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel met at Olmiitz, and on the
following day they agreed upon a “ punctation,” of which the substance may be
very briefly stated. As is remarked by Sybel, on whose masterly account of
these transactions any attempt to put the substance of them into a small
compass must base itself, Manteuffel, who had long opposed the Union and who
detested the Hessian rebellion, besides being perfectly content to let the King
of Denmark deal as he would with Holstein and the Succession, might well have
asked Schwarzenberg, “ What is there really in dispute between us?” Since it
was certainly not Manteuffel’s fault that Prussia had drifted into her present
plight, and since his conviction that war at the present juncture would be
disastrous to Prussia was soon shared even by spirits as fiery as Bismarck
(although Bismarck like the Prince of Prussia objected to premature
disarmament), the obloquy heaped on his head was unjust. It was Prussia, not
her Minister, who was in a false position. She was proposing to negotiate on
equal terms with Austria, though the attempt of Radowitz to make good, in at
least some measure, his master’s failure to accept for her the leadership of a
reorganised Germany had broken down all along the line.
The
dissolution of the Union was already a settled matter. Austria’s
counter-concession of free conferences between all the German Governments had
already been offered at Warsaw. It was devoid of value, inasmuch as, with
regard to the conclusions to be reached at these conferences, Schwarzenberg
adhered to the conditions accepted by Prussia at Warsaw, including the
continuance of the old Confederation; while he absolutely rejected the
principle of a dual headship, shared by Austria and Prussia, in its Diet. The
settlement in Holstein, to be made by an Austro-Prussian Commission, would
present no difficulty. Finally, as to the burning Hessian question, it was
settled at Olmiitz that the Federal Execution should put an end to the
opposition maintained against the Elector by his subjects, and then withdraw. A
single Prussian battalion was, honoris causa, to remain at Cassel, with another
battalion demanded by the Elector, of course Austrian.
It was
understood that no objection would be raised to a few Prussian troops covering
the “military route.” The final settlement of the constitutional trouble was to
be left to an Austro-Prussian Commission, to be appointed by the
above-mentioned frea conferences. Finally, it was agreed that the King of
Prussia should fix an early day (before the meeting of the conferences, which
were to be held at Dresden) for the demobilisation of his army; Austria would
hereupon stop all armaments, in reliance upon the same course being followed by
all the Governments represented at the Diet.
In Prussia
the feeling of humiliation was general; and the Second Chamber, which met on
December 3, was so vehement in its denunciations of the agreement that the
Landtag had to be prorogued for a month. But King Frederick William, who saw
wrong in many things, saw right in perceiving that it was a gain for Prussia to
have brought Austria to consent to the settlement of the affairs of Holstein
and of Hesse-Cassel by the two Great Powers alone.
Meanwhile,
the Dresden Conferences, which were to wind up the constitutional conflict,
opened on December 23, 1850. Schwarzenberg was resolved not only to uphold the
principle of the Austrian presidency in the Diet and in the executive council,
but that this executive should be formed by Austria, Prussia and the four minor
kingdoms, whose interests were thus identified with those of Austria. All the
able diplomatists of the secondary States were there, ready to follow
suit—including Baron von Beust, the chosen champion in after days of the
Confederation which he was now helping to resuscitate—a loyal combatant in
substance, though fond of the methods of his craft—and Baron von der Pfordten,
who from a Saxon Liberal Professor had become a Bavarian reactionary.
Hassenpfiug and Baumbach, unabashed as ever, represented Electoral Hesse. With
Schwarzenberg, who assumed the direction of the discussions as a matter of
course, was Buol, with Manteuffel the shrewd Conservative Alvensleben, who
usually found the right word at the right moment. The Russian Baron Schroder
bore himself as one who had an undisputed right of entry behind the scenes.
In the
discussions of the Commissions appointed by the Conference it seemed as if the
Austrian programme would be carried without substantial resistance; in which
case, though the composition of the proposed Federal executive was modified by
allowing a representation of the petty States, Austria would still have
commanded a working majority in a body of 11. The admission of the entire
Austrian monarchy into the Confederation had also been accepted, though the
proposal of a Customs Union between all the federated States was deferred; and
the principle of a popular representation was rejected by Austria and her
friends. But now the Prussian Government awoke to the fact that there was no
prospect of the principle of parity between the two Great Powers in the
Confederation being conceded, and, encouraged by a vote of 18 out of
35
Governments against the proposals of the Commissions so far as they had
proceeded, Manteuffel announced that the admission of the whole Austrian
monarchy into the Confederation (to which he cannot but have known that the
Western Powers were strongly opposed) would be conditional upon the concession
of parity in its presidency. If this were rejected, he proposed a return to the
Confederation on its former lines.
The latter
alternative was accepted by Schwarzenberg; and, when after a long holiday the
members of the Conference reassembled, it simply resolved that the Federal Diet
should be reestablished at Frankfort in the form settled by the Acts of 1815
and 1820, and then separated. On the same day (May 16, 1851) a secret alliance
was signed between Austria and Prussia, which bound each Power to assist the
other in case of an attack upon any of its possessions, whether or not within
the Germanic Confederation. The history of the Dresden Conferences was thus by
no means a mere repetition of the Olmiitz surrender. But to Germany and Europe
it seemed as if the overthrow of the policy of Prussia were completed by the
restoration of the old Confederation, and in his exile Metternich rejoiced.
Holstein submitted. The Elector of Hesse-Cassel returned to his capital before
the year was out, and in March, 1852, the Diet declared the Hessian
Constitution and Electoral Law invalid, so that in the following month
Hassenpflug could recommence operations. But though the old Confederation and
Austria’s position in it had been propped up for another day, her relations
with Prussia in German affairs had been fundamentally changed both by the
political conflict between the two Powers and by its closing incident. As for
Prussia, not without reluctance and not without ignominy, she had been brought
to the conclusion that she must wait.
THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF SWISS FEDERAL UNITY.
The one region on the Continent to which
the storms of 1848 brought immediate advantage was Switzerland, for to them it
owes its transformation into a well-organised Federal State. Probably in no
other part of Europe were such diverse elements in contact as in this land,
where of old Celts, Rhaetians, Italians, Alamannians, Burgundians, and Lombards
had striven for the mastery, and in which even now dwell four wholly distinct
races—Germans, French, Italians, and Romansch. And to the variety of tongues
must be added the diversity of religious creeds. The Zwinglians and Calvinists
held Zurich, Bern, Basel, Schaff- hausen, Vaud, Neuchatel, and Geneva; while in
primitive Switzerland, as well as in Luzern, Zug, Fribourg, and the Valais, the
Roman Catholics were all-powerful. In the Protestant Cantons the people were
busily engaged in trade and manufactures, taking also an active part in the
intellectual movements of the day, while the Catholic Cantons were inhabited by
a population which clung firmly to their ancient traditions, and was devoted
mainly to pastoral and agricultural pursuits, though many also took service in
foreign armies. Their intellectual development was almost exclusively under
ecclesiastical influence.
Down to 1798
the political institutions of Switzerland were essentially medieval in
character, and presented the most amazing contrasts. Side by side with the
medieval Landsgemeinden (or assemblies in which every citizen had the right to
appear in person) which continued to exist in several of the smaller Cantons,
were the leagues, subject to the “Referendum,” of the Grisons and of the
Valais; and the civic aristocracies in Zurich, Bern, Luzern, Basel, Fribourg,
Solothum, Schaff- hausen, not to mention the King of Prussia in Neuchatel and
the two spiritual rulers, the Abbot of St Gall and the Bishop of Basel. As
regards the legal position of the various parts of the Confederation itself,
these different States fell under one or other of three categories—the Cantons
or Orte, which were full members, the “ Associates ” or Zuge- wandte, and the “
Allies ” or Verbiindete, the two last being, so to speak, half-blood members.
In addition there were the “Common Bailiwicks” (Gememe Vogteien), which were
ruled as subject lands by two or more of
1798] Establishment of the Helvetian Republic.
235
the Cantons
together. Within each Canton, too, the most violent contrast existed between
the rulers and the subjects. In those which took their names from their
capitals the town was really the sovereign, and looked upon the rural districts
simply as subjects held by right of conquest or of purchase. Out of the
citizens admitted to the franchise, especially in Bern, Luzern, Fribourg, and
Solothurn, a small number of families had gradually come to monopolise all the
offices of State, so that the “Patricians” excluded the “ordinary citizens”
from any share in the government. Even the democratic Cantons, as well as the
principal among the “Associates,” possessed subjects of their own. Strictly
speaking, the Confederation before 1798 did not form a real State, but was made
up of a bundle of States, held together with difficulty by more or less close
alliances. The Diet was not a real Parliament, but rather an assembly of envoys
of various sovereign States, who could not go a step beyond their instructions,
unless expressly empowered to do so by their respective Cantonal authorities.
The majority of the Diet, too, could not bind the minority by any resolutions
or decisions. Thus neither the Directory nor the Diet possessed any real
political power.
Despite all
its weaknesses and defects, the establishment of the “Helvetian Republic”
(1798) ushered in a period of regeneration for Switzerland. The new system not
only abolished at one blow a thousand antiquated formalities which had tightly
fettered the Swiss people, but it destroyed the odious distinction between
ruling burghers and subject peasants, and between “Cantons,” “Associates,” and
“Subject Bailiwicks,” establishing in their place the equality of all Swiss in
their relations to the State, and a uniform Swiss citizenship. It introduced,
for the first time, a single common suffrage throughout the whole land, and
provided for the eligibility of all citizens to all offices, for the absolute
separation of the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary, for complete
freedom of residence and of trading within the Confederation, for the right of
redemption of land taxes, for liberty of belief and of the Press. There was now
a real common Parliament, a central Executive, a common judicial tribunal, a
single coinage, a single postal service, and a single penal code. Torture was
abolished; the rights of the State in relation to the Church were clearly
defined; the extinction of monasteries was projected, and special attention
bestowed on the improvement of all grades of education. In one word, this
revolution, due to external pressure, for the first time set Switzerland in
face of the problem of binding in a real State her various fragments, deeply
divided as they were by language, customs, and religion—a problem which has
ever since occupied the energies of her most energetic citizens.
The process
of decomposition in the Helvetian Republic, which Bonaparte as First Consul
intentionally promoted, led to the formation of the two great political
parties, which, though under different names, remained in all essentials the
same till 1874. One party, which looked
backwards and
bore the name of “Federalists,” clung to the ancient Confederation and the old
state of things, seeking its leaders among the “Patricians” and its main
support in the Catholic democracies of the forest Cantons. The other was the “
Unitary ” party, which maintained the Liberal ideas of 1789, the unify of the
State and equality of all before the law, and relied for supporters on the
great mass of “subjects” thus set free. The natural opposition between these
two political parties seemed likely to lead to a Federal State, when Bonaparte
intervened. By his “ Act of Mediation ” (1803), he turned the unitary Helvetian
Republic back again into a loosely-joined Confederation of nineteen independent
Cantons, with a Constitution which has been elsewhere sketched. Yet, though he
sacrificed entirely the conception of Helvetian unity, he stoutly maintained
the other great principle of the Revolution, the equality of all men before the
law. He therefore did not permit the old plan of "Subject Lands” to be set
up again. To the old thirteen Cantons he added six new, made up out of former
“Associates” and “Subject Lands,” viz. St Gall, the Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau,
Ticino, and Vaud. Within the several Cantons the equality of burghers and
country folk was established, at least in principle. The larger Cantons became
representative democracies, although the suffrage was limited by the
requirement of a property qualification, and some preference was shown to the
old capitals. The ancient Landsgemeinden were set up again in the smaller
Cantons, though the former “subjects” received the suffrage and the right of
being elected to public offices. The League, which bound the several Cantons to
each other, was in several respects a closer one than that of 1798. The power
of making war and concluding treaties was entirely withdrawn from the Cantons.
On some subjects at least the Diet was empowered to pass by a majority resolutions
which should be generally binding. The great differences in size between the
Cantons were recognised by giving the larger two votes apiece, the smaller
having but one. Throughout Switzerland freedom of residence and freedom of
trade were guaranteed.
The
arrangements made by the “Act of Mediation” were readily accepted, as they were
excellently adapted to the prevailing opinion of the Swiss people. The
intrigues of the Bernese “Patricians” who (December, 1813) called in the
Austrians in order to upset the “ Act ” and to restore the old Confederation,
with “subject lands” as of old, nearly kindled civil war. Fortunately, the Tsar
Alexander forced Mettemich to put a stop to this reactionary policy, and
induced the Great Powers, which desired the abolition of the “Act of
Mediation,” to recognise the nineteen Cantons which'it had brought into being.
In 1814, this number was raised to twenty-two by the admission of the Valais,
Neuchatel, and Geneva. Long and tedious negotiations resulted in the conclusion
of the new “ Federal Pact,” which was solemnly confirmed by oath at Zurich
(August 7, 1815). The Congress of Vienna arbitrated
on the matter
of territorial changes and on the claims for compensation between the old and
the new Cantons. It was made a condition that the result of this arbitration
should be accepted by the Confederation; on this stipulation only would the
Great Powers agree to the long desired declaration of the perpetual neutrality
of the country.
In spite of
the complete suppression of French influence after the occupation by the
Allies, the further political development of the Confederation proceeded on the
foundations laid by Napoleon. Yet the reactionary attempt of 1813-4 had a
certain influence upon it. The “ Federal Pact” of 1815, which remained the
Constitution of Switzerland till 1848, still further weakened the authority of
the Central Power. Thus, it permitted the Cantons to make alliances among
themselves, subject to the condition that these should not be to the
disadvantage of the Confederation as a whole—a permission which opened the way
later to the Sonderbund. The equality of all citizens before the law was
imperfectly guaranteed by the very elastic provision that the enjoyment of
political rights should never be the “ exclusive ” privilege of any one class.
The right of residence anywhere in Switzerland was no longer secured by the
Confederation; of which omission certain Cantons took advantage to expel from
their territories Swiss who belonged to other Cantons. No mention was made of
liberty of belief in this Constitution any more than in that of 1803, while, at
the special request of the papal Nuncio, the Swiss monasteries were placed
under a Federal guarantee. In the Diet each Canton, great or small, was given
but a single vote, so that the 12,000 inhabitants of Uri had in Federal matters
precisely the same influence as the 200,000 inhabitants of Zurich, or the
300,000 of Bern. The Directory now shifted between three Cantons only (Zurich,
Bern, and Luzem), the Governments of which acted in turn, for the space of two
years, as the Central Federal Government.
One great
advantage the Pact of 1815 certainly had over the Act of Mediation: in form at
least it was the work of Switzerland itself, and was not guaranteed by the
Great Powers, for the Swiss statesmen of the day took great care not to lay it
before the Congress of Vienna for sanction. Thus Switzerland was responsible to
itself only for this Constitution; and therefore the later attempts of the
Great Powers to interfere in Swiss constitutional struggles rested on no legal
ground. The new Constitution, too, afforded the opportunity of reorganising the
Swiss army, a plan which Napoleon had intentionally thwarted. The Diet obtained
the right of organising the Federal army, of seeing to its training and its
equipment, and of appointing the General Staff as well as the colonels. A
modest beginning was also made with the creation of a Federal exchequer, for
the Cantons were bound to hand over the produce of certain customs duties with a
view to the formation of a Federal war-chest, into which were subsequently paid
the 3,000,000 francs that formed the Swiss share of the war compensation
exacted from the French.
238 Reaction.—The Act of Neutralisation. [1814-5
The
reactionary movement of 1814 was much more marked in the Cantons than in the
Confederation. In Bern, Luzern, Fribourg, and Solothum the patricians drew the
power again into their hands. In order to meet the requirements of the Federal
Pact the Bernese patricians admitted into their Great Council or Legislature
(composed of 200 life- members) 99 representatives of the rural districts, who
were partly coopted by themselves and simply formed an appendage, without
influence, to the aristocratic party. The same course was taken in Fribourg and
in Solothurn. A more reasonable scheme was adopted in Luzern, where for every
50 patricians there were to be 50 representatives of the rural districts. In
the other Cantons also, where the constitutions made under the Act of Mediation
had not been violently overthrown, the systems of government were altered in an
oligarchical sense in 1814. In Zurich, the town with its 10,000 inhabitants
received 130 representatives, while all the rural districts together, with a
population of 200,000, obtained only 82. In Basel, the city had 90
representatives for 15,000 inhabitants, as against the 60 representatives of
the rural districts for 30,000. In Schwyz, the formerly subject “outward
districts” had to be satisfied with one-third of the number of representatives;
while the district of Schwyz, being the “old” country, though far less populous
than the rest, obtained two-thirds of the members of the local Landrath.
In the new
Cantons, where there was no town which had formerly been the ruler and might
therefore claim privileges, an attempt was made to give the Constitutions an
aristocratic tinge by raising the property qualification for the suffrage and
by complicating the electoral system. NeucMtel occupied a very singular
position, for in 1814 it had returned to the King of Prussia, though he had
consented to its incorporation into the Swiss Confederation as the twenty-first
Canton. Its connexion with the King of Prussia was, however, purely personal.
Except in the case of the Governor, no one could hold any state office in the
Canton who was not a bom citizen of Neuchatel. The Estates possessed the power
of legislation; but practically all power was in the hands of the aristocrats
of Neuchatel, from among whom were chosen the higher officials, in particular the
Council of State, which acted as the Executive under the presidency of the
Governor. The Confederation had expressly stipulated, when NeucMtel was
admitted as a Canton, that the instructions given to the Federal
representatives of Neuchatel, as well as the ratification and the execution of
Federal measures, should be approved only by the Government residing in
NeucMtel, without the necessity of any further sanction or approbation, and
that NeucMtel should be bound to fulfil its Federal obligations like any other
Canton.
The Act of
Neutralisation of November 20, 1815, guaranteed to Switzerland the
inviolability of her territory, and her “independence of any foreign
influences.” This stipulation did not, however, hinder the Great Powers, down
to 1848, from claiming a far-reaching
right of
guardianship over Switzerland; in particular of preventing it from giving
asylum to political refugees. After the Congress of Verona ended (December,
1822), the semi-official newspapers of the neighbouring Powers threatened a
military occupation. To avert this calamity, the Diet, by the “ Concluswm ” of
July 14, 1823, surrendered for many years the traditional right of asylum. If
the external aspect of Swiss affairs, during the period following upon the
Restoration of 1814, was not very glorious, its internal aspect presented no
very edifying spectacle. In some Cantons the methods of government and of
administration of justice were those of the Middle Ages: for instance, in the
year 1821 a criminal in Schwyz was tortured no less than 52 times. The
Governments were so intent upon economical administration, that their
achievements in the matter of education, public works, and the like, were
mostly very modest. Newspapers and books were subject to a severe censorship.
In some Cantons religious intolerance again prevailed, in others only a limited
toleration. After their restoration in 1814, the Jesuits reappeared in the
Catholic districts of Switzerland, first of all in the Valais, then in Fribourg
(1818), where they put an end to the educational work of the highly meritorious
Franciscan friar, Pere Girard, because their fanaticism disapproved of this “
Pestalozzi of Catholic Switzerland.”
On the other
hand, during the peaceful years from 1815 to 1830, Switzerland regained her strength
after the terrible sufferings she had undergone during the period of the French
Revolution. Manufactures and trade revived; the carriage-road over the St
Gothard Pass, constructed by the Governments of Uri and Ticino, was a worthy
rival to the great road built by Napoleon over the Simplon Pass; while from
1824 onwards steamers began to ply on the Swiss lakes. Swiss societies
displayed great activity in the promotion of matters relating to public
utility, art, and science. The more advanced Cantons sought to fill up the gaps
in the Pact of 1815 by means of voluntary agreements (“ Concordats ”). Thus in
1819 twelve Cantons agreed to allow freedom of residence, and nineteen to adopt
the same coinage; and in 1820 seventeen permitted mixed marriages. Capable
officers, among whom William Henry Dufour of Geneva was especially prominent,
worked hard to improve the army. In 1817 the Diet founded a Federal military
organisation, and in 1818 it founded a military school in Thun; from 1820
onwards troops from different Cantons were for the first time brought together
for the purpose of military manoeuvres on a large scale.
With the
commencement of the Greek struggle for liberty, of which John Gabriel Eynard of
Geneva was one of the most ardent champions, Liberal and democratic ideas
acquired new strength. Around the veterans of the days of the Helvetic
Republic, such as La Harpe, Usteri, Zschokke, gathered a talented band of young
men, who worked for a keener public spirit in the Cantons and a strong central
authority in the Confederation,
while the
country folk, discontented with the fashion in which their interests had been
ignored, were prepared, at the first opportunity, to follow these Liberal
leaders. In 1829 Zurich abolished the censorship, and Luzern separated the
legislative power from the judicial; while in Ticino the Constitution was
amended in a democratic sense, and thus an end was put to the power of a
corrupt oligarchy (June 30, 1830).
In the July
Revolution in Paris a few weeks later the Swiss Guards, as in 1792, bravely
defended the lost cause of the Bourbons. The immediate result was the dismissal
of all Swiss troops serving in France; and, as Holland had already disbanded
the Swiss soldiers in her pay, this event really meant the end of the system of
Swiss mercenary service in foreign armies. The one exception was seen in the
kingdom of Naples, which retained her Swiss regiments till a later date. In
Switzerland itself the mere example of the Paris Revolution gave a great
impulse to the democratic movement. An immense impression was created by the
numerously attended popular meetings, especially by the imposing assembly at
Uster in the Canton of Zurich (November 22, 1830). These meetings demanded the
recognition of the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and the reform
of the Cantonal Constitutions either by the Cantonal legislatures or by
special parliamentary assemblies elected for that purpose by the people, the
inhabitants of the towns and of the country districts being placed on the same
legal footing. In the Cantons of Zurich, Luzern, Solothum, St Gall, and Thurgau
similar monster demonstrations sufficed to intimidate or coerce executives and
legislatures. In Aargau, in Vaud, in Fribourg, and in Schaffhausen, armed but
fortunately bloodless expeditions of the country folk against the capitals
contributed to the success of the movement. In Bern the “Patricians,7
made a show of opposing it not only in their own territory, but, by virtue of
their directorial power, in the entire Confederation also. However, on December
27, 1830, the Diet, under the lead of Zurich, refused to sanction any Federal
intervention in the reform of Cantonal Constitutions. But, when disturbances
broke out in the Bernese Jura, and a popular meeting held at Miinsingen on
January 10, 1831, fixed in a threatening mood a period within which a
commission to consider the reform of the Cantonal Constitution should be
summoned, the haughty Bernese “Patricians” decided to yield and to let matters
take their natural course.
The new
Cantonal Constitutions, framed in 1830-1, and submitted everywhere to a popular
vote, except in Fribourg, made representative democracy the prevailing
government in Switzerland. The people were considered sovereign, but exercised
their rights only by the acceptance or rejection of the constitution, and by
the direct or indirect choice of their representatives in the Legislatures
(Grosse Rathe). In St Gall alone had they the right of veto on resolutions
passed by the Legislature. Property qualifications for the franchise
disappeared
1830-4] Democratic
reforms.—Disturbances in Basel. 241
almost
everywhere. The Cantonal Legislatures, elected for a limited period of years,
passed laws, levied taxes, appointed the Executives and the Supreme Courts of
Justice, superintended the whole administration, and decided the Cantonal vote
in the Federal Diet. The new Constitutions guaranteed the separation of the
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, the publicity of official
proceedings, freedom of belief, of the Press, of trade, of the right of
petitioning, and protection against arbitrary arrest, and prohibited the
extortion of confessions from accused persons and the like. Finally, the
Cantonal Constitutions provided everywhere the possibility of constitutional amendment.
In the Cantons thus “ regenerated ” a lively rivalry prevailed as to building
up the State on the basis of Liberal principles, improving the administration
and the courts of justice, freeing both trade and commerce from all shackles,
constructing roads and other works of public utility, and particularly as to
the education of the young, which was declared by the new Constitutions to be
one of the first duties of the State. The system of primary education was
thoroughly reconstructed, compulsory attendance was everywhere enforced, and
seminaries for training teachers were founded. The institutions for higher
education were also reformed; the middle schools were better organised; while
the High Schools of Zurich and Bern were raised to the full rank of
Universities in 1833-4.
Though in
most Cantons these constitutional reforms were carried out without any great
disturbance of the peace, they led in one case to prolonged strife and even to
a regular civil war—in the Canton of Basel. Here the rulers of their own accord
undertook the amendment of the Cantonal Constitution. This reform, however, did
not satisfy the country folk, because the new Constitution assured, as before,
to the city the majority in the legislature. The first armed rising of the malcontents
was put down on January 13,1831, by the Cantonal troops without much trouble;
and the amended Constitution was declared to be in force. The institution of
criminal proceedings against the leaders of the countiy folk kindled the flames
of revolt afresh; and a second advance of the Cantonal troops succeeded ill
(August 21). Even the occupation of the rural portion of the Canton by the
Federal forces failed to restore peace to the distracted region, especially as
the internal divisions of the Federal Diet prevented decisive measures. The
Federal Diet being reluctant to resolve upon upholding unconditionally the
Cantonal Constitution, so hateful to the Basel country folk, the Legislature
of Basel on February 22, 1832, withdrew from forty-^ix recalcitrant communes
the right of managing public affairs, thus handing them over to anarchy. But
the only result of this measure was that on March 17, 1832, these communes
formed themselves into a separate Canton, under the name of “ Rural Basel ”
(Basel-Land). All the efforts of the Federal Diet to prevent this division of
the Canton failed, owing to the obstinacy shown on both sides. Nothing
remained, therefore, but to recognise
242 Schwyz-Neuchatel troubles.-ContendingLeagues.
[1831-2
(September
14) this division, the right of reunion being reserved, and meanwhile half a
vote in the Diet being attributed to each of the new half-Cantons. Disturbances
of a similar kind threatened to cut the Canton of Schwyz into two halves. The
“Outer Districts,” after the refusal of “ Old Schwyz ” to recognise their
political equality, met (April 15,1832) in a Landsgemeinde at Einsiedeln, and
proclaimed themselves an independent half-Canton under the name of “ Outer
Schwyz.”
A third
troublesome member of the Confederation was Neuchatel. The stronger the feeling
of Swiss nationality became, the more unnatural did its double position appear.
Its ruling aristocrats considered loyalty to the King of Prussia their first
duty and took their orders from Berlin, while on the other side the restless
democratic watchmakers of the Jura sympathised warmly with Switzerland, and
wished to belong to her entirely. Certain modifications of the Cantonal
Constitution granted by the King of Prussia were insufficient to meet the
wishes of the Republican party, which by a surprise obtained possession of the
Castle of Neuchatel (September 13, 1831). The Council of State appealed for
help to the Federal Diet which, fearing foreign complications, despatched
troops to Neuchatel, and induced the Republicans to lay down their arms by
promising au amnesty. But the amnesty was not strictly observed, so that the
Republicans again rose in arms, though the Executive put down this revolt by
its own efforts, without invoking another Federal intervention. Fourteen rebels
were condemned to death by a court- martial, but their sentences were commuted
by the clemency of the King to imprisonment for life. Other leaders were
banished, put in chains, placed in the pillory, or flogged.
These
troubles in Basel, Schwyz, and Neuchatel caused a very great sensation
throughout Switzerland. The Conservatives rejoiced that the flood of democracy
had been stemmed in the city of Basel, in “Old Schwyz,” and in Neuchatel, and
hoped for foreign intervention. The Liberals and Radicals, on the other hand,
sympathised warmly with “Rural Basel,” “Outer Schwyz,” and the Republicans of
Neuchatel. Swarms of volunteers from other Cantons desired to aid the defeated
parties, and were only held back with difficulty. In consequence of the refusal
of the Conservative Cantons to grant the Federal guarantee to the Radical
Cantonal Constitutions of 1831, seven of these, viz. Zurich, Bern, Luzern,
Solothurn, St Gall, Aargau, and Thurgau, concluded (March 17,1832) the
so-called Siebnerkonkordat (Agreement of Seven), their object being to secure
their new Constitutions against any violent overthrow. Soon this Liberal
separate League was faced by a more dangerous Conservative League. On November
14,1832, a conference held at Samen by Basel city, Neuchatel, Uri, Schwyz and
Unterwalden declared that the recognition of the division of the Canton of
Basel by the Diet was a violation of the Federal Pact, and refused to take part
in any Diet to which representatives of Rural Basel and Outer Schwyz
1831-3] Proposal to amend the
Pact of 1815.
243
should be
admitted. On the occasion of an extraordinary Federal Diet summoned in March,
1833, by Zurich, then the Federal capital, with a view to the amendment of the
Federal Pact, this “ League of Samen ” carried out its threat. A rival Diet met
at Schwyz, and declared that the resolutions of the Federal Diet sitting in
Zurich could not be recognised as binding. This declaration, however, was
chiefly directed against the meditated amendment of the Pact of 1815.
The results
of that Pact had not turned out favourable for Switzerland. The Diet and the
ruling capital had too often shown themselves incapable of safeguarding the
honour and the interests of the country, whether against the separatist feeling
of the Cantons, or as regards foreign Powers. The Swiss Diet resembled the
German in its cumbersome business arrangements, in being firmly tied to
instructions, in its powerlessness to do anything really useful: it could pass
absolutely no resolutions on subjects as to which twelve Cantonal Legislatures,
or Landsgemeinden, had not come previously to an agreement. Above all, the
Directory itself was merely a Cantonal Executive, which regarded Federal
business as simply a crushing burden of extra work; which had to be got through
somehow; and which, after two years, was gladly shifted on to some one else’s
shoulders. Quite apart from the fact that its powers were confined within the
narrowest limits, there could be no question of any steadily pursued policy, of
farsightedness, or of energetic action, so long as the Federal Executive
migrated from one spot to another. Most of all did the lack of an active
Federal Executive make itself felt in practical matters, in the lamentable
confusion as to coinage, in the defects of the postal service, in the
intricacies of the customs duties. These latter seemed to exist only to clog
the channels of commerce within the country, and completely failed to attain
their aim, when the question of protecting the economic interests of
Switzerland against its foreign rivals arose. It was characteristic of the
state of things in Switzerland that St Gall preferred to send its merchandise
to Lyons through Strassburg, instead of by the direct route through Geneva;
that goods destined for Milan and Genoa were, despite the tremendous extra
journey of some 30 to 40 hours, sent over the Stelvio Pass rather than over the
Swiss mountain passes; or, again, that it cost more to send a letter from
Geneva to eastern Switzerland, than from Constantinople to Geneva. And how humiliating
it was for a “ free ” Swiss that he could not freely select his residence
within his small native land, because the narrow-mindedness of certain Cantons
denied to him such a right!
While the
system of the Restoration age was breaking down, newspapers and pamphlets (of
which the most prominent was the Zuruf, written by the Luzern statesman,
Kasimir PfyfFer) directed public attention to the second great object of the
Liberals, the strengthening of the Federal Executive. The Canton of Thurgau formally
proposed to the Diet in 1831 to undertake the amendment of the Federal Pact of
1815.
244 Threatened intervention of Great Powers.
[1832-3
This proposal
was accepted (July 17,1832) in principle by 15£ votes out of 22. A committee,
presided over by the Mayor of Luzern, Edward Pfyffer, was appointed by the Diet
to make a first draft. This scheme centralised military instruction, the
customs, the postal service, and the coinage, guaranteed freedom of residence
anywhere in Switzerland; created a permanent Federal Executive of five members,
to be fixed at Luzern; and provided also for a Federal Court of justice. The
supreme authority in the Confederation was still to be the Diet, in which each
Canton was to have the same right of vote. But the members of the Diet, though
bound by their instructions as to the conclusion of alliances, the declaration
of war, the making of peace, the amendment of the Federal Constitution, and
some other matters, were to vote according to their individual opinions on all
other subjects.
Although this
draft carefully preserved the Federal basis of the Swiss Constitution, it
encountered bitter opposition from the Catholics and the Conservatives. Not
merely the members of the League of Samen, but also Zug, Appenzell, Ticino, and
the Valais maintained that any alterations in the Federal Constitution must be
accepted unanimously by all the twenty-two Cantons. Since this unanimity could
never be attained, they thus practically denied to the Diet the right of
altering the Pact. This division of opinion as to the amendment of the Pact was
all the more dangerous because at the same time ideas were afloat as to foreign
intervention. The reform of so many Cantonal Constitutions in a democratic
sense had never been favoured by the Powers of eastern Europe, so that the
decision to amend the Federal Pact inspired Mettemich with the firm resolve to
intervene against this project. He had to admit that the Treaties of 1815 in no
sense guaranteed the Federal Pact. But this difficulty was overcome by the
sophism that Switzerland would forfeit the advantages granted to her by the
Congress of Vienna if she renounced her ancient character of a Confederation
of sovereign States, and submitted herself to a central Executive. A memorandum
from Vienna, June 5, 1832, recommended the Great Powers (together with
Sardinia) to take steps in common against Switzerland. Prussia and Russia were
quite ready to do so; but France and England thought that the very moderate
draft of the Constitution elaborated by the committee did not afford any
pretext for interference. Hence Mettemich was obliged to take up a waiting
attitude, contenting himself meanwhile with encouraging the resistance made by
the League of Samen.
The Federal
Diet, which met at Zurich in the spring of 1833, finally settled the text of
the draft Constitution, by making further concessions to the party of
Federalists. But, when even Liberal Cantons like Aargau and Vaud joined the
Opposition, a bare majority of 12 votes out of 22 was all that could be hoped
for. One member of that majority must necessarily be Luzern, whose consent
seemed certain, since the draft assured it the honour of becoming the seat of
the Federal Executive. The
Cantonal
legislature had already almost unanimously accepted it (subject to its approval
by a vote of the people) when the unexpected happened. The people of Luzern,
influenced by the priests, rejected the proposal (July 7,1833) by a majority of
11,000 to 7000, and thus put an end for a long time to any ideas of amending
the Federal Pact.
This defeat
of the Liberals encouraged the members of the League of Sarnen to make an
attempt to force the revolted half-Cantons to return to their allegiance. On
July 31, 1833, the Inner Schwyzers occupied the village of Kussnacht, which
belonged to Outer Schwyz; and on August 3 the city of Basel made an attack upon
Liestal, the capital of the half-Canton of Rural Basel. But the country folk
offered so valiant a resistance at Pratteln that the city troops were compelled
to retreat to Basel, with a loss of 63 killed. The Federal Diet, spurred on by
the strong adverse public opinion as to this breach of the peace, acted with
unusual energy, and occupied Schwyz and the city of Basel with 20,000 Federal
troops. The rival or League of Sarnen Diet at Schwyz broke up in confusion on
the advance of the Federal troops, which were only withdrawn when the relations
between the two Cantons were finally settled. The two halves of Schwyz were now
reunited into one single Canton, on the basis of absolute equality. A similar
course was not possible in the case of Basel owing to the violent hatred
excited between the city and the rural districts by the bloody encounters that
had been waged between them. The separation of the two halves of this Canton
was definitively sanctioned. As towards the Confederation, however, both halves
formed but a single Canton, just as in the case of Unterwalden and Appenzell,
so that, if they could not agree to vote in the same sense, their collective
vote was not to be counted. The League of Sarnen was dissolved, as contrary to
the Federal Pact, and its members compelled again to attend the Federal Diet.
The most protracted resistance was offered by Neuchatel, whose Prussian ruler
was working for its separation from Switzerland. But, when the Diet ordered
6000 men to prepare for a march on the town, the Canton renounced its
opposition. Hence the rent, which had threatened to break up the Confederation,
was patched up for the time being, while the failure of constitutional reform
put an end to the foreign intervention which Metternich had planned.
But the
motley crowd of foreign refugees, who had sought shelter in friendly
Switzerland after the failure of the revolutions in Poland, Germany, and Italy,
afforded the Great Powers abundant excuse to make that little country feel
their displeasure. Nevertheless, the Swiss displayed an ever increasing
sensitiveness in the matter of their honour and independence. The complaints of
the Great Powers were, at the same time, by no means always without foundation,
for the invasion of Savoy by the Poles (prepared by Mazzini on Swiss soil in
February, 1834) was certainly a grave violation of international law. But it
was a glaring contradiction that, while the Great Powers urged imperfect police
246
Disturbances concerning religion.
[1834-43
measures
against Switzerland as a crime, they denied her the sole means of maintaining
order, viz. the privilege of creating a strong Federal Executive. The
Government of the citizen King of the French rivalled Austria in its lordly
contempt for the independence of Switzerland. Late in 1838 the French
Government nearly brought about a war with Switzerland through requiring the
expulsion of Louis Napoleon (who had been named an honorary citizen of
Thurgau), the conflict being avoided only by his voluntary retirement to
England.
Within the
country party feelings were sharpened by religious disputes. In January, 1834,
the Governments of Bern, Luzern, Solothum, Rural Basel, St Gall, Aargau, and
Thurgau concluded a Concordat at Baden, with the object of defending the rights
of the State as regards the Church. But these “Articles of Baden,” condemned by
the Pope as “false, audacious, inclining towards heresy, and schismatic,” were
rejected in St Gall (1835) by the veto of the people. Even Bern, in face of the
agitation fanned by France in the Roman Catholic districts of the Jura, did not
venture to maintain them; the sole result was to exasperate the Roman Catholic
inhabitants. In the Protestant Canton of Zurich the promotion of the
Wiirtemberg professor, David Friedrich Strauss, the famous freethinking author
of the Life of Jesus, to a theological chair in the University raised such
indignation among the orthodox Protestant pastors and the country folk, that on
September 6, 1839, thousands of armed peasants, under the leadership of Pastor
Bernhard Hirzel, marched on the town. The Liberal Government promptly made room
for one composed of Conservatives.
After this
Zurich insurrection, it seemed as though the whole public life of Switzerland
would fall into a state of utter lawlessness, and that the rule of the
strongest would prevail. In Ticino the Radicals at once imitated the example of
the Zurich Conservatives by violently overthrowing the clerical Government. On
the other side an attempt made in Aargau by the Roman Catholics to turn out the
Liberal Government ended in defeat (January 11, 1841), and resulted in the
decision taken by the Cantonal Legislature, acting under the influence of
Augustine Keller, headmaster of the Normal School, to suppress all the monasteries
situated in the Canton because the disturbances had been instigated by them.
This suppression of monasteries was, however, unconstitutional, as their
maintenance had been guaranteed by the Pact of 1815. The Romanist Cantons
therefore demanded the immediate reestablishment of the monasteries by the
Diet, if necessary by force of arms. Bern threatened that it would back up the
Aargau Liberals if arms were taken up in defence of the monasteries. This
question as to the Aargau monasteries disturbed the minds of the Swiss for
several years, till in 1843 the Cantou in question found it best to reestablish
the four nunneries, on' learning which the majority of the Federal Diet decided
that the matter was finally settled. This view was, however,
rejected by
the Roman Catholic Cantons. Luzern, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg and
the Valais protested against this violation of the Federal Pact by the majority
of the Federal Diet. In a conference held by these six Cantons (the Valais not
taking part) at Luzern (September 12-13, 1843), Siegwart-Miiller, Mayor of the
Canton, proposed, even at this early date, the separation of the Cantons which
were “ loyal to the Pact ” from the rest, the establishment of a standing council
of war, and preparations for an armed conflict. Though these proposals were not
yet completely approved, yet they formed the basis of a Romanist “ Separate
League ” (Sonderbund), which was joined (June, 1844) by the Valais after the
Roman Catholics of that Canton had put down the Liberals by a regular civil
war.
At the Diet
of 1844 these seven Cantons renewed their demand for the reestablishment of all
the Aargau monasteries. Aargau, however, parried this stroke by itself
proposing the expulsion of the Jesuits, the recall of whom to Luzern was just
then being proposed by the extreme Roman Catholics, under Siegwart and Leu. The
monastery question was thus unexpectedly transformed into the Jesuit question;
and the Roman Catholic Cantons had to exchange the offensive for the defensive.
The Diet attempted to reconcile opposing parties by declaring, on the one hand,
that the question of the monasteries was definitely settled, and on the other,
by refusing the demand for the expulsion of the Jesuits. Hence the Luzern
Legislature could now decide (October 24, 1844) to hand over the establishments
for higher education to the Jesuits. The Luzern Liberals hereupon organised two
armed risings with the assistance of armed volunteers from other Cantons. Their
second attempt resulted in a bloody defeat (April 1,1845) near Malters. Over
100 volunteers were killed; 1900 were seized, including Steiger, a former
member of the Luzern Executive, who was condemned to death, but succeeded in
saving himself by flight. Party hatred rose to such a height that Leu, the
chief supporter of the recall of the Jesuits, was assassinated (July 20) by one
of the volunteers.
Despite the
miserable failure of these insurrections, the majority of the Swiss people
became more and more convinced that the establishment of the followers of
Loyola in one of the three Federal capitals was a national misfortune, and the
storm of hatred continued to increase throughout Switzerland. In the Canton of
Vaud, so early as February 14, 1845, the Conservative Government, which
hesitated to demand the expulsion of the Jesuits in the Federal Diet, had been
forced by a popular rising to make way for Radical successors. In Zurich the
Conservatives lost the confidence of the people, by coquetting with the Roman
Catholics: and the Liberals gained the victory at the election of the new
Government. Ochsenbein, the leader of the volunteers who had attacked Luzern,
with some friends of similar views, became a member of the Executive of the
Canton of Bern (July, 1846), then Vice-President, and
was certain
to be President of the Confederation, because on January 1,
1847, Bern became the Federal capital for two
years.
On the other
hand, the seven Roman Catholic Cantons formally concluded (December 11, 1845) a
defensive Covenant, thus placing themselves in opposition to the rest of
Switzerland, and forming an “armed Separate League” (bewqffheter c
Sonderbund) with a common council of war, presided over by Siegwart-Miiller. In
contrast to the Confederate States of North America of a later date, it aimed
less at a complete separation from the Swiss Confederation than at obtaining
the supremacy within it. It offered resistance to “ unauthorised Federal
resolutions”; it desired the reestablishment of the monasteries in Aargau, the
maintenance of the Jesuits, and the abandonment of all Liberal ideas of
amending the Federal Pact. These seven Cantons, which formed about a fifth of
the Swiss population, claimed to be the sole qualified interpreters of the Pact
of 1815, and to have the right of opposing by force of arms any resolution of
the Federal authorities which might displease them; they even proposed, in case
of need, to call for the intervention of foreign Powers. It was impossible for
the Confederation to tolerate this “ League within a League,” which
substituted force for law, and threatened treason towards the State. Even if
the Pact of 1815 had not expressly forbidden the formation of separate Leagues
of a nature prejudicial to the Confederation, the dissolution of the Sonderbund
was an imperative necessity.
When, in
June, 1846, the terms of the Sonderbund (hitherto kept secret) became public,
the Federal capital, Zurich, solemnly protested against them, and proposed to
the Federal Diet that met in July the dissolution of this Sonderbund. But this
proposal was supported by ten votes only, a majority of twelve being necessary
to pass a Federal resolution. Besides, the half-votes of Rural Basel and the
Outer Rhodes of Appenzell were neutralised by the contrary votes of the city of
Basel and the Inner Rhodes of Appenzell. An eleventh vote was gained on October
8, 1846, when the Genevese Radicals, under the leadership of the journalist
James Fazy, drove out the Conservative Government by means of barricades and
bullets, thus gaining the supremacy at the ensuing elections. Finally, in May,
1847, the twelfth vote was secured, when the Radicals obtained a small majority
at the elections for a new Legislature in St Gall, which was nicknamed in
consequence the “Canton of destiny.” In July, 1847, the Federal Diet met at
Bern, under the presidency of Ochsenbein, and now adopted decisive measures. On
July 20 it decreed the dissolution of the Sonderbund by a majority of twelve
votes (besides those of the two halves of Basel and of Appenzell), and on July
30 named a committee of seven members to consider further steps. On August 16
it decided by thirteen votes that the amendment of the Federal Pact should be
taken in hand, and on September 3, by twelve votes (besides those of the
half-Cantons named), it decreed the
1844-7] Strife between Sonderbtmd and Federal
Diet. 249
expulsion of
the Jesuits. The members of the Sonderbund had not the slightest idea of giving
way, but mobilised their forces, threw up entrenchments, and looked for help
from foreign Powers.
The events in
Switzerland during the years 1844-7 had. more than a merely local importance.
They formed part of the mighty struggle of ideas that was going on all through
Europe; they acted as a sort of prologue to the Revolution of 1848, and were
therefore the object of the most attentive observation for peoples as well as
for Cabinets. The Powers of the Continent, with singular unanimity, took the
side of the Sonderbund, in which they saw incorporated the principles of
Conservatism. Its chosen guardian, Mettemich, had steadily urged since 1845 a
common intervention of the Great Powers to “ rescue ” Switzerland, “ which was
in the throes of social dissolution.” As in 1832, his excuse for this policy
was derived from the wording of the Pact of 1815, which was based upon the
unlimited sovereignty of the twenty-two Cantons, a principle to which the
Radicals were continuously opposed. The fantastical Frederick William IV of
Prussia was eager for intervention; he wrote to Bunsen (November, 1847) that
there was for the Great Powers absolutely no question of right or wrong in
Switzerland, but only whether the godless and unrighteous sect of Radicals
should gain the dominion there by means of murder, blood, and tears, and should
make out of the land a centre of infection for Germany, Italy, and France. On
Russia Mettemich could also count. In France Louis-Philippe and Guizot
transferred their hatred of the Radical Opposition in France to the Swiss
Liberals. The smaller Courts, such as that of Sardinia, followed the example of
the more important. The Sonderbund received arms and money from Piedmont,
France and Austrian Italy; it wished also to secure an Austrian general, and in
1846 Mettemich actually sent Prince Frederick Schwarzenberg to Luzem. He had prepared
a plan of operations, but was suddenly recalled; and, though he reappeared
there after the outbreak of the war, he was not charged with the direction of
hostilities.
The greater
the danger for the Sonderbund seemed to be, the more busy was European
diplomacy in working in its favour, though, luckily for Switzerland, combined
action on the part of the Great Powers proved very hard to attain. Already at
the end of 1846 Mettemich had elaborated a programme, according to which, on
the occasion of the transfer of the Federal capital to Bern, now “ dominated by
the bands of volunteers,” all the accredited Ministers of the Great Powers'
should withdraw from the town, address identical protests from the Great
Powers, and finally bring about an armed intervention. But Louis- Philippe and
Guizot still shrank from such far-reaching measures in view of public opinion
in France and of the effect of such steps on England. Guizot therefore made the
sapient proposal that Austria should take the lead in the armed intervention,
and that France should
later follow
her example; in other words Austria was to incur the odium of intervention, and
the French were to play the grateful role of coming in as the apparent
protectors of Swiss independence, Metternich, however, would not hear of such a
repetition of the Anconade of 1832. Though Prussia was prepared to join Austria
and France under certain conditions, the difficulty of a union of the Great
Powers was increased by the policy of England, on whose support both France and
Prussia laid great stress. The British Cabinet was the only Government which
possessed any sympathy with or understanding of the objects of the Swiss
Liberals. The historian of Greece, George Grote, then staying in Switzerland,
had—by his excellent letters on Swiss politics in the Spectator— placed Swiss
matters in an entirely different light from that in which they were represented
by the semi-official newspapers of Germany and France. Besides, Palmerston was
rather glad of an opportunity to pay off France for the Spanish marriages and
Austria for the annexation of Cracow. At heart he was averse from any
intervention in Switzerland; hence, instead of merely standing aloof he did
more, and that which was best for Switzerland. By apparently assenting to the
wishes of the other Cabinets, he secured to himself the leadership of the
proposed campaign against Switzerland with uncommon dexterity, and then checked
the eagerness of its promoters, thus delaying its opening till it was too late.
While the
five Great Powers discussed again and again the manner of their intervention
and Austria stationed provisionally 10,000 troops on the Swiss frontier, the
twelve Cantons which formed the majority of the Diet, without troubling
themselves about the threats of the foreign envoys, took the requisite measures
for maintaining the integrity of the Confederation. Federal representatives
travelled through the seven Cantons to employ all means for bringing about a
reconciliation, but their efforts met with no success. On October 21, 1847, the
Federal Diet nominated the best qualified Swiss officer, William Henry Dufour
of Geneva, commander-in-chief of the Federal forces, and placed at his
disposition an army of some 100,000 men and 260 guns. In consequence of the
zeal displayed by most of the twelve Cantons, the mobilisation of the troops
was carried out with a celerity and a completeness which surprised the foreign
Cabinets. Appenzell (Inner Rhodes) and Neuchatel alone refused obedience to the
summons of the Diet, the latter declaring itself to be neutral, though in
reality, by the directions of Prussia, it was openly coquetting with the
Sonderbund. The Sonderbund could dispose of 74 guns and 79,000 men, of which
half were an ill-armed rabble, the chief command being entrusted to Ulrich von
Salis-Soglio, a Conservative Protestant of the Grisons.
On October
29, the deputies of the Sonderbund Cantons quitted the Diet at Bern. On
November 4, the Diet ordered the execution of its resolution for the
suppression of the Sonderbund by armed force, and the campaign began. Dufour’s
simple and yet very effective plan was
to attack,
one after the other, yet in each case with overwhelming force, the three
isolated blocks into which the territories of the Sonderbund Cantons naturally
fell—Fribourg, Luzern with the three Forest Cantons, and the Valais. Within a
few days Fribourg was surrounded by 25,000 men, and capitulated on November 14,
without making any real resistance. Next, Dufour, without letting himself be
turned from his plans by attacks of the enemy on Aargau (November 12), and on
Ticino (November 17), divided the centre and right wing of his army into five
columns and advanced in a concentric circle on Luzem, in order to strike a
mortal blow at the very heart of the Sonderbund. Even before the beginning of
these operations Zug surrendered (November 21). The chief attack was directed
by Dufour against the wooded hills between the Reuss and the Lake of Zug, which
were strongly occupied by Salis-Soglio, as forming the natural defences of Luzern.
On November 23 the divisions commanded by Gmiir and Ziegler won this position
after battles at Meyerskappel, Honau, and Gislikon, while Ochsenbein’s
division, by a fight near Schiipfheim, cleared the route through the Entlebuch.
This one defeat sufficed to demoralise entirely the members of the Sonderbund.
On the very evening of November 23 their council of war, the executive of
Luzem, and the Jesuits fled to Uri. Next day the victors made their entry into
Luzem. On November 25 Unterwalden laid down its arms, without offering any
further resistance; on the 26th Schwyz also, on the 27th Uri; on the 29th the
Valais; and received the Federal troops. The campaign of twenty-five days cost
the Federal army 78 killed and 260 wounded, while the Sonderbund estimated
their losses at a still smaller number. Thus the humane intention of Dufour to
decide the war, as far as possible, by mere demonstrations proved completely
successful.
Even
considering the enormous difference in proportions, the rapid and comparatively
bloodless Swiss War of Separation stands in the strongest contrast with the
great Civil War in the United States, which lasted four years and cost the
lives of half a million men. In Switzerland, not only the majority of the
actual numbers that could be put in the field but also the advantages of good
organisation and a capable generalship were on the side of the loyal Cantons.
Above all, the members of the Sonderbund lacked any deep ideal or material
interest capable of inciting them to a life and death struggle. The people of
the Sonderbund Cantons realised beforehand that, notwithstanding the
declamations of their spiritual and lay leaders, only their pride and not
either their faith or freedom were in real danger, and their enthusiasm soon
became chilled. Everywhere the Governments of the Sonderbund Cantons had to
retire from office: in Fribourg, in Luzem, and in the Valais, the Liberals came
into power. The defeated Cantons had to defray the expenses of the war, while
Neuchatel and the Inner Rhodes of Appenzell were fined for not fulfilling their
Federal obligations. As order was restored in the Sonderbund Cantons and
security given for the payment
252 Proposed coercive measures against
Switzerland. [1847-8
of the war
indemnity, the Federal troops were gradually withdrawn, so that the last
detachments regained their homes by February, 1848. The assistance from foreign
countries, for which the Sonderbund had formally appealed on November 15,1847,
was not forthcoming. Guizot indeed had laid before the Cabinets a new project,
according to which the Great Powers were in concert to appear as mediators
between the contending parties, and to impose their will on Switzerland. But
Palmerston drew up a rival plan, a harmless and not binding offer of mediation which,
in case of refusal by Switzerland, entailed no further consequences. On
November 30, a day after the Sonderbund had ceased to exist, the French envoy
presented the Note agreed on by the Great Powers. Austria, Russia, and Prussia
followed suit; but England never took this step, inasmuch as the need for
mediation had now entirely ceased to exist. The reply of the Diet on December 7
refused to admit the principle of foreign interference with the affairs of
Switzerland, since her independence had been so formally recognised in 1815.
Switzerland had now for the first time really reconquered her independence,
thanks to the courage with which she had disregarded the threats of
intervention uttered by the continental Powers. In spite of them, she had by
her own might overcome the Sonderbund, and settled her own internal affairs
according to her own opinions. Thus the Sonderbund war really meant the
definitive liberation of Switzerland from the foreign yoke, that, had lain on
her so heavily ever since 1798, and her readmittance into the ranks of the
genuinely independent States of Europe.
As the
permanent result of this remarkable display of energy, it now only remained to
carry out the scheme of amending the Federal Pact of 1815. Once more the
continental Great Powers, which had decided to proceed without the support of
England, attempted to block the way. Two special envoys from Austria and
Prussia, Colloredo and Radowitz, appeared in Paris at Christmas, in order to
come to an understanding with Guizot. It was suggested that the “ twelve
Cantons ” should be required to evacuate the territory of the Sonderbund, to
lay down their arms, and to give up all idea of amending the Pact of 1815
without the unanimous approval of all the Cantons; while a conference of the Great
Powers, of the German Confederation, and of Sardinia, should assemble in
Neuchatel, to settle Swiss affairs. In case of the refusal of these demands on
the part of the Diet, coercive measures were contemplated. A memorandum by
Radowitz proposed that in such a case the envoys should be recalled, and the
Swiss frontier be blockaded; while, should these measures fail, he proposed the
occupation of Ticino by Austria, of Rural Basel by Prussia and the south-German
States, of the Bernese Jura by France, and of Geneva by Sardinia.
In pursuance
of these arrangements made in Paris the envoys of the three Powers assembled in
NeucMtel despatched to the Diet (January 18, 1848) a threatening collective
Note; and on February 13, Russia
suspended her
guarantee of Swiss neutrality and independence, in order to leave a free hand
to the neighbouring Powers to carry out their intentions. The Diet, in a
dignified answer (February 15), maintained its decided refusal to allow any
interference with Swiss affairs from the outside. The February Revolution in
Paris put a sudden end to all further projects. On the very spot where the
representatives of European diplomacy had intended to meet in order to sit in
judgment on Switzerland, in Neuchatel itself, revolution broke out. In La Chaux
de Fonds, Le Locle, and in the Val de Travers, Republican committees were
formed as soon as the news of the events in Paris was received. The Neuchatel
Government begged for help from Bern, the Federal capital; but, instead of
coming to the aid of the Neuchatel aristocrats, the President Ochsenbein
summoned the Neuchatel Republicans to action in a note that contained but the
two words, En ava/nt. On March 1, 1848, the Republicans marched in arms against
the capital, deposed the Council of State, formed a provisional Government, and
proclaimed the Republic. A committee, appointed to draft a constitution,
endowed the young Republic with a democratic form of government, which was
accepted (April SO) by the people of Neuchatel by 5800 to 4400 votes, and guaranteed
by the Federal Diet. King Frederick William IV, threatened by the Revolution in
Berlin itself, allowed matters to slide; but the Diet neglected to profit by
the favourable moment to induce him to renounce all his rights over this Swiss
Canton.
The European
Revolution freed Switzerland from any fear of interference from without, and
afforded her the leisure to amend the Pact of 1815. The reforms were drafted by
a committee under the presidency of Ochsenbein, revised by the Diet, and
accepted by 15£ Cantons (with a population of 1,900,000) as against 6J Cantons
(with a population of 290,000), and on September 12 the Diet declared that it
had the force of law. This Constitution transformed the Swiss “League of
States” into a Federal State which, especially as regards foreign Powers, now
formed a compact whole. The Confederation was given the exclusive right of
declaring war, concluding peace, making alliances and treaties with foreign
Powers, and in general the control of all external affairs. Special treaties of
a political character could no longer be concluded between the Cantons. The
Confederation was entrusted with the organisation of the army, the training of
the engineers, the artillery, and the cavalry, as well as with the
superintendence of all higher military instruction. It also obtained the
decision as to weights and measures, the coinage, the postal service, and the
customs. It guaranteed the Cantonal Constitutions, in so far as to assure
itself that they should continue to be of a Republican, purely representative,
or democratic character, it established equality before the law, liberty of
residence, liberty of belief for all Swiss citizens belonging to any of the
Christian denominations, and the liberty of the Press and of public
meeting. It
was authorised to establish a Federal University and a Federal Polytechnic
School, and to contribute to the cost of works of public utility. The power of
legislation was no longer to be vested in the old Diet, but in a Federal
legislature, whose members were to vote freely, and without instructions. This
legislature was framed after the pattern of that of the United States of
America, having two Houses. The first was the Senate (Standerath or Conseil des
ittats), which represented the Cantons, each of which sent two members. The
lower House was known as the National Council (Nationalrath or Conseil
National), represented the Swiss people as a whole, and was composed of members
elected in proportion to the population of each Canton. The moveable “ Directory
” was replaced by a permanent Federal Executive, composed of seven members
elected for three years by the two Houses of the Federal Legislature sitting
together. The chairman of this Federal Council, Bundesrath or Conseil Federal,
was to be called the Federal President, Bundesprasident, or President de la
Confederation. A Federal Court of Justice was also set up. The Constitution
could be amended at anytime, by vote of the majority of the Cantons and of
Swiss citizens.
On December 6
the new Federal Assembly met in Bern, which by a special law was constituted
the permanent capital, and chose the first Bundesrath from among the
distinguished men, who had been the real leaders of the twelve Cantons which
formed the majority during the Sonderbund period. Such were Jonas Furrer
(Zurich), who was the first Federal President, Ochsenbein (Bern), Druey (Vaud),
and the like. Soon,- many new institutions were called into being by the
harmonious collaboration of the Federal Council and the Federal Legislature.
In 1849 a postal service was created, and by the abolition of internal customs
duties a heavy load was lifted off trade and commerce. In 1850 Switzerland was
endowed with a single coinage, based on that of France, and in 1851 with a
single set of weights and measures, as well as with the electric telegraph. In
1854 great undertakings in regard to roads and the straightening of rivers were
begun, which were rendered possible by the financial support of the
Confederation. In 1855 the Federal Polytechnic School in Zurich was opened.
Formerly notorious as a centre of perpetual unrest, Switzerland now extorted
even from its foes a great amount of respect owing to her regularised
conditions and steady progress. In October, 1856, Bunsen, who had visited
Switzerland again in 1854, wrote: “Throughout Switzerland I have found the
country, owing to the strengthening of the central or Federal executive, in a
state of unexampled progress and prosperity.”
With regard
to foreign Powers the position of Switzerland was also quite altered; for the
new Federal authorities, with great tact, declined all suggestions that could
affect the honour and the independence of the country, while, on the other
hand, by their correct and consistent treatment of the refugee question, they
took care that the neighbouring
1852—7] Difficulty with Prussia as to Neuchatel.
255
States should
not have any ground of complaint. Neuchatel alone remained as a dark spot on
the horizon. Frederick William IV, in his morbid yearning for his “beloved,
loyal, little land in the Jura, which was now under the rule of godless men,”
but which had absolutely no value for Prussia though great importance for
Switzerland, rejected the Federal proposals for annexation. In 1852, at the
Conference of London, he obtained an express recognition of his rights to
Neuchatel, though at first he did not take any step to enforce them. In the
autumn of 1856, however, Count Pourtales-Steiger, with the connivance of the
King, gave the signal to the Royalists to rise in arms. On September 3, they
seized the Castle of Neuchatel, before daybreak, and imprisoned the Council of
State. But on the very next day the rebels were overpowered by the hastily
mustered Republican troops, and thrown into prison to the number of 530. When,
in consequence of this rising, the Federal Council ordered that judicial
proceedings should be taken against the leaders of the revolt, the Prussian
envoy in Switzerland demanded, with a reservation of all the rights of his
master, that the proceedings should be stopped and the prisoners restored to
liberty. But the Federal Council was determined to utilise this occasion to
force the King, who could not leave his “ loyal ” subjects in the lurch, to
renounce his rights over Neuchatel, and therefore rejected this demand. The
King then, “ with a bleeding heart and tears in his eyes,” addressed an
autograph letter to Napoleon III. Flattered by this act of confidence, the
Emperor, on November 26, addressed a Note to the Federal Council, in which he
expressed his wish that the prisoners should be at once released
unconditionally. At the same time, he offered his services for a happy solution
of the whole question, since otherwise Switzerland would become involved in
serious complications with Prussia. For Switzerland the matter was not merely
one of honour, but mainly important in that it was not advisable to give up,
before the right moment, the trump- card that the imprudence of her adversaries
had placed in her hand. The Federal Council was aware, through the confidential
communications of Napoleon, that the King of Prussia was willing to renounce
his rights, in certain contingencies, but had also learned from hints from
England that he intended to attach to this renunciation conditions, which would
have afforded him a perpetual pretext to interfere in the affairs of the
Confederation and of the Canton. The Federal Council therefore declined to
accede to the wishes of Napoleon, at the risk of displeasing France and of
going to war with Prussia.
As a matter
of fact Prussia broke off diplomatic relations with Switzerland on December 18,
and arranged to mobilise her troops on January 3, 1857, though she subsequently
delayed till the 15th. Switzerland made preparations for war; all classes of
the population displayed unanimous enthusiasm ; and the Federal Council
provisionally stationed 30,000 soldiers under Dufour, on the northern Swiss
frontier.
256
Mediation of Napoleon.—Reforms.
[1856-70
But a war was
not desired either by Napoleon, although he had encouraged Prussia to take military
measures, or by the other Great Powers. Austria hindered the negotiations, by
which Prussia sought to induce the south-German States to allow the passage, of
troops through their territories. Fresh offers of mediation made by Napoleon
induced the Federal Council to despatch to Paris, at the end of December, 1856,
Kern of Thurgau, who was a personal acquaintance of the Emperor. Napoleon made
further confidential communications (even allowing Kern to read the autograph
letters of the King of Prussia) to the Federal Council, which convinced the
Swiss that their aim would be attained by setting free their prisoners,
especially as England declared herself ready to act in concert with France in
favour of Switzerland. Kern therefore agreed with Napoleon on a new Note
(January 5, 1857), in which France formally bound herself, after the prisoners
had been freed, to arrange a compromise to meet the wishes of Switzerland. The
Federal Assembly therefore resolved (January 16) to abandon the judicial proceedings,
with provision, however, that the liberated prisoners should be exiled from
Switzerland till the matter was finally settled. A treaty was thereupon signed,
on May 26,1857, by which the complete independence of Neuchatel from Prussia
was established.
In 1860
Switzerland was less fortunate in obtaining a rectification of frontiers on the
cession of Savoy to France, an event which made the position of Geneva very
exposed. Napoleon III had spoken of a cession to Switzerland of northern Savoy,
which was included in the Swiss neutrality, but declared it impossible after
the popular vote as to the annexation. A party, headed by Stampfli of the
Federal Council, desired to make this refusal a casus belli; but the majority
of the Federal authorities would not hear of so hazardous a proceeding, while
an appeal to the signatories of the Treaties of Vienna had no success.
Notwithstanding this failure, Switzerland continued to enjoy a high degree of
esteem, as was shown in 1864 by her success in the movement which resulted in
the signature of the Geneva Convention for the care of those wounded in war.
The land
prospered greatly under the Federal Constitution of 1848 and for a long time no
alteration in it was thought necessary, till at last the impulse towards
amendment was given by outside events. An advantageous commercial treaty
concluded in 1864 with France, which guaranteed French Jews full liberty of
residence in Switzerland, led in 1866 to a slight change in the Federal
Constitution, by which such a right, hitherto enjoyed only by Swiss citizens of
one of the Christian denominations, was extended to Jews also. This raised the
general question of reform; and the military lessons inculcated by the wars of
1866 and 1870 necessitated its serious consideration. The conviction grew that
a Federal army composed of contingents from 25 Cantons, serving for different
periods and variously trained, no longer answered the requirements of national
defence. Besides, at a time when the
1867-72] Agitation for “Referendum” and “Initiative257
railway
system was being rapidly extended, it was felt to be a great drawback that
there should be as many legal Codes as there were Cantons and half-Cantons in
Switzerland. Once more, there swept through the Cantons a powerful democratic
movement, tending, by means of changes m the Cantonal Constitutions, to
transform them from representative to pure democracies. Hence the left wing or
democratic party broke away from the great Liberal party which had been in
power both in the Confederation and in the Cantons since 1848. This new party
inscribed on its banner the election of the executive by the people, the
adoption of the “Referendum’'"' as to laws and important financial
measures passed by the Cantonal Legislatures, and the “ Initiative ” or right of
a fixed number of citizens to propose Bills. At the same time it aimed at
relieving the lower classes from some of their burdens, by piling them on the
upper classes. A victory which this new democratic party won in the Canton of
Zurich in 1867 over the Old Liberals proved decisive for all Switzerland.
Referendum and Initiative now made a triumphal progress through all the
Cantons, Fribourg alone clinging to a purely representative system.
This Reform
movement in the Cantons had a reflex effect on the Confederation. Hence, while
Democrats and Liberals often violently jpposed each other in the Cantons, both
united in Federal matters as against the Roman Catholics and the Conservatives
in their demand for a thorough reform of the Federal Constitution, their motto
being “ One Code and One Army.” The Federal Council, under the energetic
influence of Emil Welti, was all the more ready to fall in with this demand
because the occupation of the frontier by French troops in the winter of 1870-1
had laid bare deficiencies in the Swiss military system. Only the resolute
action of the Federal general Herzog, and the utter demoralisation of
Bourbaki’s soldiers, as is told elsewhere, saved Switzerland from the
disastrous consequences which the entry of
83,000 French troops on to Swiss soil might have
entailed. On an invitation from the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly in
1871—2 thoroughly reformed the Federal Constitution. Without departing from the
principles of that of 1848, the draft centralised in the hands of the Federal
authorities military institutions as well as civil and penal law, and otherwise
extended the powers of the Confederation. But, while this draft met with
enthusiastic support from some, it encountered an equally strong resistance
from others. The Liberals of French-speaking Switzerland, who feared that such
a far-reaching centralisation would injure their special institutions and lead
to everything being Teutonised, united with the Roman Catholics and the
Conservatives. The proposed Constitution was rejected by 261,000 votes against
255,000, and by thirteen Cantons against nine (May 12, 1872).
The friends
of reform now offered to the French-speaking Cantons (Suisse Romamde) a
compromise which for the moment gave up all idea
of complete
unification in military and legal matters. The arming and the entire training
of the soldiers was to belong to the Confederation; with regard to legal
matters centralisation was to be limited to certain departments, such as the
law of Contracts, including commercial and exchange law. But the Confederation
was to have the right of legislation as to railways, banks, insurance
companies, and factories, as well as to the straightening of rivers and as to
the control of forests situated high up in the mountains. Freedom of belief was
guaranteed to the widest extent; elementary education was to be compulsory,
free, and solely under the control of the State. The Kvlturkatnjrf, which broke
out in Switzerland in consequence of the Vatican Council, led to the deposition
of Bishop Lachat of Basel in 1873. An attempt of the cure of Geneva, Gaspard
Mermillod, aided by the papal Curia, but behind the back of the Genevese
Government, to make Geneva the seat of a Roman Catholic Bishop, ended in the
expulsion of Mermillod by the Federal Council from Switzerland (1873). These
two events caused the acceptance of a series of amendments in the Federal
Constitution, which strengthened the supremacy of the State over the Church.
New episcopal sees could only be erected with the approval of the
Confederation, new monasteries could not be founded at all; while a clause
placing marriages under the protection of the Confederation led to obligatory
civil weddings. As a counterpoise to the increased powers of the Federal
authorities the Facultative Referendum was introduced. By it all Federal laws
and resolutions passed by the Federal Assembly had, at the demand of
30,000 Swiss citizens, or of eight Cantons, to be
laid before the people for their acceptance or rejection. In this form the
amended Constitution was approved (April 19, 1874) by 340,000 votes to 198,000
and by 14J Cantons to 7-J-. With the adoption of this reform, the Swiss
Confederation entered upon a new period of beneficent activity.
Since 1815
Switzerland has made great progress not only in respect of political
institutions but also in economic matters. In Switzerland the soil fortunately
belonged to the peasants, who displayed an extraordinary capacity for adapting
themselves to those conditions of production which were so fundamentally
altered in the nineteenth century. The peasant proprietors abandoned arable
cultivation, which had ceased to be profitable, and devoted themselves to the
breeding of cattle and the production of milk—industries which had attained
great importance in the land. Instead of the medieval three-field arable and
pasture land, which had still been in general use at the end of the eighteenth
century, they adopted modern methods, artificial manure, agricultural machines,
dairies and factories for cheese; while societies and companies sprang up and
were backed by numerous institutions for the promotion of agricultural
training, and for making experiments and researches, which the Confederation
and the Cantons vied with each other in founding.
Swiss
industries, too, long crippled by the “Continental System,”
1815-98] Industrial and
commercial progress.
259
began to
revive after the fall of Napoleon I. The energy of Swiss traders enabled them
to overcome the trade monopoly enjoyed by the neighbouring Powers, to which Switzerland
could offer no resistance till 1848, and to create lucrative commercial
relations with nations far away over the seas. The new Confederation of 1848,
with its complete freedom of internal commerce, and its unified system of
customs duties, dated from the period when England had become a Free Trade
country, and when protective duties were being lowered on the Continent. All
these circumstances helped to raise the trade and commerce of the Alpine land
to a height of prosperity that had never been attained before. Surrounded by
mighty neighbours, far distant from the sea, having no raw materials to export,
and destitute of coal, Switzerland nevertheless became a real industrial
country. The watchmaking trade of Geneva and of the Jura (whether belonging to
Neuchatel, to Vaud, or to Bern) became the foremost in the world. So early as
1856 it gave employment to about 40,000 persons, and manufactured annually
about
1,100,000 watches, of which the value was about
i?2,000,000. In the matter of cotton-spinning mills worked by machinery, a
system which Switzerland had adopted in the age of Napoleon, she was far ahead
of all other continental nations. In the thirties there were also introduced
into Switzerland weaving looms worked by machinery, which competed in the
different branches of cotton manufacture with Great Britain. In the fifties and
sixties the coloured prints of eastern Switzerland dominated the markets of
India, China, and Japan. When the spinning and weaving industries declined,
owing to growing foreign competition, a substitute was found in embroidery by
machinery which—introduced into St Gall about 1830—gradually became by far the
most important branch of the Swiss cotton-spinning trade. The silk-weaving
industries of Zurich and Basel competed with those of Lyons and Krefeld, as did
the straw-plaiting industries in Aargau and Fribourg with those of Tuscany.
Closely connected with the adoption of machinery in the textile industries was
the development of the machine-making industry, which, especially in Zurich and
Winterthur, has won worldwide fame.
The means of
communication were also vastly improved. Magnificent roads, generally
constructed by the Cantons with financial help from the Confederation, rendered
the lower portions of the Swiss Alps more accessible. In 1847 the first railway
line in Switzerland was opened, from Zurich to Baden. After 1852 when the
Federal legislature rejected the plan of construction of state railways
proposed by its Council, various railway companies were formed, which in a
short time built many lines in all parts of the country. Owing to lack of
combination, however, this activity was open to serious drawbacks, so that the
idea of nationalising the railways became more and more familiar, and was
eventually realised in 1898. Plans for piercing the Alps by tunnels were soon
devised, especially that under the St Gothard, which superseded all others,
partly
260 Railway development.—Education.—Science,
because of
its obvious advantages, and partly by reason of the energy of its principal
supporter, Alfred Escher of Zurich. By a treaty signed by Switzerland and Italy
on October 15, 1869, and joined by Germany on October 28, 1871, the three
Powers bound themselves to finance this immense undertaking. So it became
possible to construct right through central Switzerland a commercial
international route of the highest importance.
The reverse
side of the rapid development of trade and industry is shown especially by the
rise of a numerous class of hired workmen, •having no connexion with the land
and very receptive of Socialist ideas which began to make their appearance
about 1840, though for long this new class followed the lead of the Liberal and
the Democratic parties. Democratic institutions and the keen sense of benevolence
felt by the Swiss folk also helped to prevent a very acute enmity between the
different classes. From 1815 onwards the industrial Cantons strove by means of
legislation to check the abuses of industrialism. The most elaborate laws for
the protection of workmen were those of the Canton of Glarus, which in many
important points served as a model for the later Federal legislation on that
subject. For example, Glarus, on August 10, 1864, was perhaps the first State
on the Continent to introduce a twelve- hour working day, which it reduced to
eleven hours in 1872.
The
Switzerland of the nineteenth century, after she had produced in Pestalozzi the
great educational reformer, attached great importance to the education of the
people. Since the thirties the universal obligation of attending school became
a reality. Even the most remote Alpine villages attempted to make the elements
of education accessible to their children. A steadily increasing number of
secondary schools of all kinds, the small but intellectually vigorous Cantonal
universities, and the newly founded Federal Polytechnic School at Zurich made
it possible for a Swiss to obtain at home an education adapted for all the
scientific professions. The creation of a Federal University was repeatedly proposed,
but the attempt always failed because those Cantons, which already possessed
such institutions, were unwilling to sacrifice them to a central University.
But the Polytechnic School in Zurich soon became one of the very best technical
academies.
In the
Natural Sciences a series of eminent, savants fully maintained in the
nineteenth century the fame that Switzerland had won in the eighteenth through
Jacob, Johann, and Daniel Bernoulli, Leonhard Euler, Albrecht von Haller,
Horace Benedict de Saussure, and others. Such were Ignace Venetz, Jean de
Charpentier, Louis Agassiz, the founders of the science of glaciers; the
geologists Bernard Studer and Escher von der Linth; the botanists Auguste and
Louis Pierre de Candolle, Oswald Heer, and Karl Wilhelm Nageli; the zoologists
Ludwig Rutimeyer and Karl Vogt; the mathematician Jakob Steiner, the astronomer
Rudolf Wolf, and the physicists Jean Daniel Colladon and
X800-70] History.—Literature.—Arts.
261
Auguste
Arthur de la Rive. The great “ Dufour Map ” of Switzerland (1832-64), and the
still finer “ Siegfried Atlas” (in course of publication since 1870) gave
magnificent specimens of cartography to Switzerland. In History also she was
well to the fore. The Genevese Simonde de Sismondi was prominent among the great
French historians of the nineteenth century, Robert Glutz (Solothurn), with
Louis Vulliemin and Charles Monnard (both of Vaud) wrote an excellent
continuation of the celebrated history of Switzerland by Johannes von Muller;
Eutychius Kopp (Luzern) laid the corner-stone of the authentic history of the
origins of the Confederation, and proved the stories of William Tell and of
Arnold of Melchthal to be legendary; Ferdinand Keller (Zurich), by his
discovery of the Lake Dwellings, threw an entirely new light on the history of
Primitive Man in Europe; while in Jakob Burckhardt (Basel) Switzerland could
boast of one of the principal historians of civilisation and of art.
As in the
eighteenth century, Switzerland drew inspiration from the literary movements in
Germany and France, and yet to a large extent went her own way. The originality
and innate qualities which distinguish Swiss literature are particularly to be
discerned in the characteristic fact, that even its most prominent
representatives have wielded their pens, consciously or not, with the intention
of exercising an educational influence over the Swiss people. This perfectly
genuine trait is most strongly imprinted on the writings of the Bernese
Jeremias Gotthelf (whose real name was Albert Bitzius), the first great realist
in German literature, who in his tales painted, with the most merciless
truthfulness and delightful force, the life of Bernese peasants. The finished
poems of Gottfried Keller of Zurich, the first of all Swiss poets, are pervaded
by the atmosphere of his native land, and breathe the patriotic love of country
animating the generation which founded the Federal State of
1848. Another notable Zurich poet, Conrad
Ferdinand Meyer, was far more cosmopolitan than Keller, both in the choice and
the treatment of the subjects in his medieval novels and lyric poems.
Similarly, the writers of the Suisse Romande preserved a healthy independence
of Paris; as in the case of the charming humorist Rodolphe Topfler, of the
Liberal literary historian and thinker, Alexandre Vinet, of the poet Juste
Olivier, and many more. Switzerland took also an honourable part in the
evolution of the arts of the nineteenth century; it suffices to mention Arnold
Bocklin of Basel, the most poetical of painters. But the narrow limit and small
scale of human interest in Switzerland, and the lack of an artistic capital
tended to drive its most talented artists abroad. However, the fact that the
intellectual life of Switzerland is so much divided amongst different centres
has had its good sides as well as its bad, and forms an interesting and
instructive legacy of its political division.
RUSSIA AND
THE LEVANT.
(1) RUSSIA UNDER NICHOLAS I.
It is not certain that we are yet in a position to
do justice to the reign, nor perhaps even to the character, of Nicholas I. We
have not, it would seem, all the necessary documentary evidence, and we are too
close to the period to be free from the bias of personal experience and a too
vivid tradition. Writers who lived then, or who heard from the lips of that
generation an account of those times, cannot escape from the appalling
impression of the weight that lay on the whole of Russian intellectual life,
and the moral and physical degradation of the vast majority of the population.
There had been a reaction in the last days of Catharine and in the second half
of the reign of Alexander; but the policy of repression was not carried through
with the iron thoroughness and gigantic energy that characterised the whole
thirty years of the reign of Nicholas. All freedom of thought was remorselessly
repressed. The secret police, solemnly abolished under Alexander and publicly
condemned as pernicious and demoralising by that monarch, were reestablished in
1826 under the name of the Third Section of the Private Chancery of the
Emperor. The head of this section, the Chief of Police, was by right a member
of the Committee of Ministers, had constant access to the Sovereign, and had
the power of arresting, imprisoning, deporting, and making away with, anyone
whom he pleased, without any restriction whatever. Intended no doubt not only
to frustrate revolution, but also to act, in the absence of liberty and
publicity, as a check on the arbitrary and corrupt action of public officials,
this institution, with politics instead of religion as its sphere, rivalled, if
it did not exceed, the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition.
But, hard and
grievous as his system was, Nicholas was not himself a foe to enlightenment, as
he understood it. Limited no doubt in intellect, limited still more in
education, he regarded himself, and was regarded by his brother sovereigns, as
the only bulwark against revolution in continental Europe. Yet he showed
himself the patron of letters in Karamzin, the protector of indignant satire in
Gogol, the pardoner of rebellious ribaldry in Pushkin. Again he was the
organiser of charitable
effort in the
shape of the institutions of the Dowager Empress Marie, the founder of a long
list of educational institutions of a technical kind, and the giver of
municipal self-government to St Petersburg. He had all the qualities and the
defects of a martinet who had himself been brought up in the school of severe
corporal punishment; but he was a straightforward, honourable gentleman, an
affectionate husband and father, a loyal brother, a sincere friend, and a brave
enemy. He had a kindly heart, and never wearied in his personal efforts to
redress the grievances of his subjects; “ the more tears you wipe away the more
completely you effect my will,” he said to Count Benckendorff, the chief of the
Secret Police, when he asked for instructions. It was his misfortune to spend
his life in valiantly trying to stem the tide of a European movement which he
did not understand. His best excuse must lie in the excesses of the French
Revolution, which still rang in the ears of the Continent; and those who know
Russia, or who have read of the revolt of Pugacheff, can well imagine how far
those excesses would most certainly have been transcended in St Petersburg or
Moscow.
Strange to
say, all the efforts of so determined an autocrat did not succeed in
eradicating Liberal ideas from Russian society. The throne was, it is true,
surrounded by a rising generation of obsequious courtiers and smart soldiers,
given up to pleasure; but the middle class, if such a term can be applied to
the slender body of men and women who constituted the intellect of the
official and professional strata, remained hostile to the ruling camarilla;
among them circulated a manuscript literature, against which the police were
powerless, and which, if only by remote illusion and innuendo, kept alive the
esprit Jrondeur. During the Crimean War, when it appeared that the army, for
which everything had been sacrificed, was unable to maintain the glorious national
tradition of 1812, when all the world saw that the bureaucracy was honeycombed
by sloarth, incapacity, peculation, even more deeply than contemporary satire
had ever suggested, the antagonism to the existing order of things spread
rapidly and became universal.
It is,
however, a mistake to imagine that the reign was one of absolutely blind
reaction. In the first place there was a definite addition to the national
ideals. Hitherto there had been two Russian watchwords, autocracy and
orthodoxy. To these was now added a third, that of nationality, a treasure to
be jealously guarded against foreign influences, on the ground that Russia not
only differed, but should differ from Western Europe, because in Russia alone
was to be found a patriarchal national economy, consonant with the requirements
of religion, of order, and of true political wisdom. In the second place,
serious efforts at practical reform were not wanting on the part of the Tsar,
who recognised clearly the two great evils under which the country
laboured—first, the want of a definite system of law; and, secondly, the curse
of serfdom, which not only undermined the self-respect of the people, but
deprived
264 Legal reforms. Compilation of the Svod.
[1826-57
the upper
classes, as such an institution always does, of those masculine qualities of
initiative, energy, and self-reliance, without which no aristocracy can in the
long run successfully lead the way either in peace or wax.
The reign
commenced with the appointment on December 26, 1826, of a Committee, under the
presidency of Count Kochubei, to examine the papers left by Alexander I on the
organisation and administration of the Empire. Although enquiries on this and
other subjects often bore no other fruit than long reports, solid results were not
wanting. Thanks to the unwearied energy of Speranski, the newly formed Second
Section of the Private Chancery of the Emperor prepared, in 1832, a Code of
Laws, which came into force in 1835. There had long been an abundance, if not a
superfluity of laws in Russia; on the old Muscovite legislation Peter the Great
and his successors had grafted enactments, which were imitated, or actually
copied, from the Codes and customs of Western Europe. The ukases or decrees, in
which these innovations were promulgated, were piled up one upon another, and
were often ill-considered, ill-drawn, and contradictory. Each sovereign
reversed the work of his predecessors, upsetting laws and institutions with
such recklessness, that nothing seemed to the Russian mind so mobile or so
variable as law and legal principles. Nicholas, like his predecessor Catharine,
who had planned a similar undertaking in 1767, had the choice between the
drafting of a homogeneous, reasoned body of law, like the Code NwpoUon, and the
collection and classification of existing laws. He chose the latter course; and
in view of his intention of improving the conditions, and eventually securing
the emancipation of the serfs, there is no doubt he was right. Speranski,
accordingly, by his order, first made a collection of the laws of the Empire
(Sobranie Zakonoff) in 45 quarto volumes, in which the enactments were arranged
in chronological order, beginning with the aulagenie (statute) of the Tsar
Alexis, and then condensed and coordinated-them systematically in a digest,
which is called the Svod Zakonoff.
This Svod is
no doubt a mere compilation of laws, edicts, and ordinances, often belonging to
different periods, and drafted from different points of view, without coherence
and harmony; but it introduced a unity hitherto unthought of and, as compared
with the preceding chaos, may well be called a model of lucidity and
arrangement. There was, however, from the first, a considerable amount of
repetition; and subsequent additions and amendments have not always improved
matters. Since 1857 no complete edition has been issued. Voluminous as it is,
the code is far from being a complete or precise collection of the laws of the
Empire. There are separate laws relating to certain provinces, and to certain
religious questions; and the special legislation relating to the Jews has
become an inextricable labyrinth of severities.
But the law
required other reforms besides those of being simplified and rendered
accessible. It also required amendment; and Nicholas
1825-56] Reforms of the administration.—The army.
265
commanded
that a commencement should be made with the criminal and disciplinary
legislation, with the result that in 1845, an ordinance was ssued as to
criminal and disciplinary punishments, which was preceded by the abolition of
the knout, a reform decided on in principle under Alexander I. Procedure also
demanded attention, for, alike in civil and in criminal matters, it was both
secret and written—an inquisitorial system introduced from Western Europe at
the end of the eighteenth century. The result of secrecy was of course to
promote venality, to turn the advocates into mere traffickers in bribes, and to
make judgment go by auction. Public indignation was not aroused, because the
judges were, for the most part, too ill-paid to live on their salaries, and the
just judge was therefore he who received from both sides, and decided the case
on its merits. To neutralise the ignorance and corruption of the judges, the
Government had increased the number of Courts of Appeal, and multiplied the
formalities and written documents, with the result of making the cases last
longer and cost more; the abuses remained untouched.
Reforms were
also required in the civil branches of the administration, and when made,
generally took the shape of introducing a military gkmeut, For instance, the
branches relating to roads and communications, mining, engineering, surveying,
forestry, and education, received a military organisation. The police were put
upon a military footing, and a great deal of the business of the criminal
courts was transferred to Courts martial.
In the army
itself, on which the external safety and internal order of the Empire depended,
too much attention was paid to mere drill and little or none to the armament,
or the intelligence of the soldiery. The burden of providing both men and money
lay most heavily on the lower classes. The regulations as to the enrolment of
recruits for enforced military service (which the peasant dreaded more than any
other form of punishment) were reformed by new regulations in 1832; but on the
other hand the period of service was lengthened, and the best elements of the
population were swallowed up almost by the armed forces of the Empire. Between
1825 and 1854, the personnel of the army and navy increased by 40 per cent.,
and absorbed on an average almost 40 per cent, of the budget. In this period
the revenue increased from 110 to 260 million roubles, the expenditure from 115
to 313 million roubles. The principal means to meet the deficits were internal
loans. The paper currency became so much depreciated, that when, in 1839, by a
stroke involving the abolition of 427 million roubles of the public debt, the
Finance Minister, Count Kankrin, fixed the legal rate of exchange, he made one
silver rouble equal to 3J paper roubles.
The greatest
reform in finance was the substitution in 1843 of credit notes for the old
assignats which were exchangeable for coin. From 1843 to 1856, as a result of
this reform, the silver rouble was
266
[1800-53
both actually
and nominally the unit of monetary value, and the only legal tender for which
the holders of Credit Notes could claim to have them exchanged. During the
Crimean War, however, the convertibility of paper-money into coin ceased, and
was not again resumed, and the credit rouble became the actual monetary unit
although the silver rouble remained the nominal one. In 1853 the national
funded and non-funded debt including the excess of the note issues over the
total bullion, was nearly i?144,000,000 sterling. No real reforms were introduced
in direct taxation, the arrears of which steadily increased. In 1831, there
were 38 millions of roubles of arrears of direct taxation; in 1845, the arrears
amounted to 71 millions, or 41 per cent, of the ordinary receipts of the
budget. In direct taxation the chief reform was the reintroduction, in 1826, of
the system of leasing the retail sale of spirits to private persons, whose
interest it was to push the sale of drink by all means in their power; and a
substantial increase in the revenue was the result, at the cost of the
demoralisation and impoverishment of the population.
Of the
Finance Ministers of this period, Count Kankrin (1821-44), Vronchenko
(1844-52), and Brock (1852-8), the first, who has been called the Russian
Colbert, was the most capable. Simple and economical in his own personal
habits to the point of seeming miserly, he tried, and at first with success, to
introduce the same economy into the finances of the State. He was resolutely hostile
to the introduction of railways; and, with the exception of a short line from
St Petersburg to Tsarskoye Selo (1834)—extended to Pavlovsk in 1836—the railway
completed later between St Petersburg and Moscow (1851), and a line between
Warsaw and the frontier (in all 632 miles), no attempts were made in this
direction. The system of import duties from 1824 to 1850, which was high but
not prohibitive, was successful in promoting Russian industry. Moscow, as Baron
Haxthausen tells us, formerly a city of residence for noblemen, became in this
period a town of manufacture and commerce. The average yearly value of exports
from 1800 to 1824 was 64,122,000 roubles; that from 1824 to 1849 was
112,123,000 roubles. The average yearly value of imports from 1800 to 1824 was
112,329,000 roubles; that from 1824 to 1849 was
212,174,000.
The National
Church was strenuously supported in her combat with dissent and other
religions. In 1839, some 2,000,000 Uniates in Russia proper were forcibly
united to the Orthodox Church. Heresy was stamped out, according to the
official documents, but not in fact, for it was at this time that one of the
most powerful and respectable sects, the Old Ritualists, received a great
impulse by obtaining, what they had long wanted, a properly consecrated bishop,
instead of being obliged to rely on runaway priests from the Orthodox Church.
In 1844, permission was obtained from the Austrian Government to found a
bishopric at Bielaya Krinitza, in Galicia, near the Russian frontier, and
1832—5i] Education.—The Censorship. 267
in 1846, the
Metropolitan of Bosnia passed over to the Old Ritualists, and accepted this
diocese.
Early in the
reign it was a matter of public policy to discourage the lower classes from
undertaking the higher courses of education; yet, when the University of Vilna
was closed, a new University was founded at Kieff (1832); classes in history
and the Slavonic languages were instituted; and facilities (withdrawn after
1848) were given to young men to go abroad and study in order to qualify as
professors. By the statute of 1835, a certain autonomy was left to the
Universities in the shape of freedom to choose the rector and professors. The
number of students at five Russian Universities, excluding Dorpat, rose from
2002 in 1836, to 3998 in 1848, but was reduced to 3018, in 1850. In the same
year metaphysics and moral philosophy were withdrawn from the programme of the
Universities, the latter on the ground that it was practically useless to young
persons acquainted with the principles of Christianity.
The
Censorship, which received a complete code of regulations in 1828, was pushed
to a degree of severity hitherto unheard of, and became ridiculous by its
persecution of the most harmless statements, which it construed into attacks on
authority. The utterance of an unguarded word, the possession of a forbidden
book, might at any time'lead to exile in a distant government, or in Siberia
itself, practically without either trial or appeal. In 1840, anatomical and
physiological books were forbidden to include anything which might hurt the
instinct of decency. In 1848, newspapers were forbidden publicly to commend
inventions until they had been investigated according to the rules of science
(it was not said by whom) and pronounced to be sound. In the same year a
Committee was appointed to supervise the Censorship, and then another Committee
was formed to supervise the first! Delations came in by thousands; everywhere
there was distrust. The Censorship had no kind of system, and followed the inspiration
of panic. In 1851 a Committee of musical experts was formed to investigate
musical notes, on the ground that they might be used as a cypher, to conceal
ill- intentioned compositions. The reading public was limited, fickle, and
timid, so far as journals were concerned. In 1843 there were only
12,000 subscribers to all the chief Russian
periodicals. In fact, the failure of Russian journalism may be ascribed as much
to the indifference of the public, as to the virulence of the Censor.
Of the whole
population of Russia, the serfs numbered in 1838 44 per cent., being most
numerous in the neighbourhood of Moscow, and in the Black Earth zone, among the
population of purest Russian descent. There had been unrest amongst them, ever
since Peter III abolished the obligation of the nobility to serve in the army
(1763). From that date the serfs had expected their emancipation to follow, as
indeed, it should logically have done; since they had been originally
268 Attempts to ameliorate the lot of the serfs.
[1826-54
bound to the
landowner to enable him to fulfil his military obligations to the State. This
unrest was manifested by fewer outbreaks in the time of Alexander I than in
previous reigns; but serious revolts recommenced under Nicholas in 1826, and
continued all through his reign and after it, until emancipation took place, to
which they contributed more than has been generally recognised. On an average
there were 23 outbreaks a year from 1828 to 1854. Latterly the numbers
concerned increased; and in 1843 there were 31 such outbreaks, more than 40,000
peasants of the imperial domains revolting in consequence of a report that they
were to be handed over to private proprietors. In 1848 there were 64 outbreaks;
and 10,000 peasants belonging to private proprietors revolted in the government
of Kursk alone. Six Committees were successively appointed by Nicholas to
consider the question of emancipation; but the practical results of his efforts
in legislation for the benefit of the peasants were trifling. In 1827 the minimum
of a peasant’s share of land was fixed at 4£ dessiatines (about 11£ acres). In
1831, reforms were introduced into the government of the village communities,
of which to a foreign observer the most striking was the vote by ballot. In
1833, a law forbade landowners to mortgage the serfs and separate them from
the land they lived on; and also prohibited the sale of peasants by retail. In
1837, a Ministry of Domains was appointed, with the special object of ameliorating
the lot of the peasants, and raising, by example, the standard of their
treatment. Under the law of 1842, proprietors were allowed to transform their
peasants into farmers, and 24,700 of these peasants were thus emancipated. By a
law of 1841, it was forbidden to sell serfs, save to proprietors of land with
peasants. When peasants were bought without land, it was necessary to indicate
the property on which they were to be registered. The breaking up of families
of peasants was again forbidden. In addition to this, certain slight restrictions
were placed on the authority of the proprietor. A number of the worst of the
proprietors were removed from the administration of their estates; and a few
who were convicted of atrocious cruelty were exiled to Siberia. But no decisive
or comprehensive measure of emancipation was attempted by Nicholas.
In the
enquiries undertaken so far, it had become clear that the State could not
consent to any project that would uproot the peasant from the soil and leave
him free to wander at will, because such a plan would render the collection of
the taxes impossible, and probably produce most serious agrarian troubles;
next, that, if migration was to be restricted, the peasantry must be provided
with land in the immediate neighbourhood of the villages, otherwise they would
soon fall back into the power of the proprietors. Provision for such land could
only be made by taking it from the proprietors—an inroad on the sacred rights
of property for which Nicholas was not prepared. The peasants did not even
obtain the right of making complaints, for fear of overthrowing the
authority of
the landowners, whom Nicholas himself described as 50,000 most zealous and
efficient hereditary police masters. Such rights and protection as were granted
by the law were illusory, because for the most part unknown, and almost
universally disregarded, so far as the serfs, who were members of the Mir or
village community, were concerned. The domestic serfs, or Dvorovwye, who were
practically domestic slaves under the absolute power and control of the
masters, formed about 6| per cent, of the whole number belonging to the
proprietors at the end of the reign of Nicholas; and their number was rapidly
increasing. No doubt, in a very large number of instances where the landlord
lived on his property, and took a pride in it, he treated his serfs well, and
was a friend to them in time of trouble. But in the case of an absentee
landlord or of an old soldier who introduced the brutal methods of the army
into the management of his property, or worse still, in the case of speculators
who bought properties for what they could make out of them, the lot of the serf
was most miserable and degrading, alike to master and to man.
A power of
resistance similar to that exhibited by the agricultural peasants was shown by
another class of workers—also chiefly serfs— namely the factory hands, whose
numbers increased from 210,568 in 1825, to 532,000 in 1847, falling to 481,000
in 1853, owing no doubt in part to the introduction of machinery, but still
more to the revival of home industries. Industrial work in Russia was carried
on at this time either in proprietary factories under state control or in
factories owned by the nobles. Special privileges were granted to the factory
owners and their families. They were freed from military and other services to
the State, and were subject only to special Courts of justice. The sale of
their produce was either secured by the State, as in the case of the
manufacture of arms, ammunition, cloth, sail-cloth, and paper, or protected by
heavy duties against the foreigner. In spite of the privileges granted to
manufacturers, it became at an early date difficult to find persons to
undertake the business; and foreigners were imported for this object. It was
even more difficult to find sufficient workpeople. Peasants from the state and
crown lands formed the first source of supply, and of these a certain number
were generally allotted to each new factory, and bound to it in perpetuity.
Till 1816, manufacturers were allowed to purchase peasants from the nobles,
and to employ peasants who had run away from an estate; but after that date
they were made responsible for the capitation tax in such cases. As the demand
for labour increased, beggars, criminals, soldiers and their children, children
from the orphanages, prisoners of war, and the wives of soldiers on service,
were sent to the factories, and bound to them either for a time or in
perpetuity. The manufacturers’ rights over these were, however, restricted.
They might not employ them in other than factory work, and were bound to keep
them in employment, and maintain them
at all times.
The State held itself in theory responsible for regulating wages, hours, and
conditions of labour; and the workpeople had a right of appeal to the State.
The jurisdiction
over state factories was transferred, in 1819, from the Ministry of the
Interior to the Ministry of Finance, and, during the reign of Nicholas, was
considered by that department purely from the point of view of the
manufacturers. Under a law passed in 1840, allowing manufacturers to free the
workmen, some 15,000 workmen were liberated, and were enrolled either among the
merchants, or the citizens, or the domain peasantry. Compulsory labour was, in
fact, not only undesirable in itself, but the workmen showed an energy and
pertinacity in asserting their right to the redress of grievances which is not
generally associated with the character of the Russian labourer. The principal
cause of the strikes (which frequently occurred) was the wages; those of the
freemen employed being twice as high as those of the serfs. Other complaints
relate to long hours—16 hours a day for men, and for children of ten years,
15-17 hours a day in summer, and 14-16 in winter. Further, there were
complaints of brutal treatment of every kind, including the punishment of being
sent by the proprietor as recruits to the army instead of his own serfs, the
punishment of flogging, in some cases until death ensued, and the punishment of
banishment to Siberia. Sometimes, after a long struggle, the persistence of the
workmen was rewarded by success, in the shape of freedom. In some of these
contests, most of which took place in the neighbourhood of Moscow, the local
authority, and in particular the enlightened Governor-General Prince Galitzin,
took the side of the workmen, while the central authority at St Petersburg took
the part of the capitalists.
Early in the
century, it was recognised that serfdom was the great obstacle to Russia’s
industrial progress; and in 1811 the Ministry of the Interior was at work on a
project for the formation of a free labouring class. In 1832, Prince Galitzin
prepared a series of proposals to settle the relations between master and
workmen, and in his report he states that the workmen rarely made complaints
against just and honourable masters; but his proposals were successfully
resisted by the employers in St Petersburg and Moscow. In 1835, the first
Factory Act, with regulations as to the keeping of wages books, was passed,
but remained a dead letter. In 1845, in consequence of the strikes near Moscow,
another law was passed forbidding the night labour of children under twelve
years; but, owing to there being no penalty for disobedience, this Act also
remained ineffective. In the same year, an enactment against strikes was
included in the Criminal Code, Even the workmen in the Siberian gold mines
received the attention of the Ministry in 1838, though it is not certain
whether the measures enacted were carried'out. On the other hand, in 1847, as a
result of complaints against the payment of wages in kind, bad food, finesj and
deductions, Prince Scherbatoff, the Governor-
1821-55] Increase in industries and manufactures.
271
General of
Moscow, prepared a scheme for a model labour contract, and for a workman’s
account book—proposals which fell through because of the panic induced by the
revolutions which disturbed other countries in 1848.
The
factories, which were owned by the nobles^ were independent of the State in
their origin, and rested on the power possessed by the nobles, which enabled
them to use the labour of the peasants upon their estates for any purpose. Even
in the days of purely domestic industries, they often sent the peasants to the
towns to work at special trades, or employed them in the workshops attached to
their own houses. When the advantages of manufactures on a large scale became
apparent, the nobles erected factories like those founded by the State, and
employed their own peasantry as workpeople : so much so, that a cloth factory
could be found on every well-managed estate. At first, the peasants worked in
the factories during the winter only, being occupied in agriculture during
summer; but, as the need of more skilled work was felt, the factory hands were
formed into a class distinct from the agricultural labourers, and worked in
factories all the year round, being provided with board and lodging in large
barracks, often far from their homes. These workers received no wages, only
maintenance; but, though very cheap, the labour was unproductive. Attempts were
made in the thirties by Prince Galitzin, the Governor-General of Moscow, to
improve the position of the serfs in the nobles’ factories; but he was not
supported by the Government. The nobles’ factories had the somewhat unexpected
result of reviving the domestic industries carried on by the peasants; for the
workpeople, who were employed in the factories during the winter, returned to
their own homes for the summer, taking with them a knowledge of the simple
processes which alone were used in the factories, and handing it on to the
members of their families who remained at home. The very small prices asked by
these peasants, who still considered their industrial as subsidiary to their
agricultural work, enabled them to compete successfully with the factories in
many cases. Some of these peasants rose by degrees into the position of wealthy
manufacturers or merchants. The landlords found it to their advantage to
encourage the enterprise of the serfs, since, as their earnings increased, they
were able to increase the fixed yearly quit-rent (obroJc) levied upon them, and
in other ways to acquire part of their wealth;—for instance, by imposing fines
on their marriage, or for allowing them to escape military service, or by
exacting still larger sums for complete freedom.
The most
remarkable development during this period was that of the cotton industry,
which owed its prosperity to a great extent to the protective tariff. The
amount of raw cotton imported rose from a yearly average of 7ji,Qtypl puds
(about JpplM tons) in 1821-5, to an average of 1,670,000 puds
(28,414’45 tons) in 1851-5, while the cotton yam imported rose from 120,000
puds (2041 '75 tons) in 1812-5, to
272 Cotton industry.—Advance in Asia. [1804-55
590.000 puds (10,038'64 tons) in 1836-45, from which
it declined to
120.000 puds in 1851-5, owing to the importation of
machinery from England, and the establishment of weaving in Russia. The rise of
the cotton industry was accompanied by a fall in the linen industry. This was
due not merely to the fact that the cheaper routed the dearer product, but
largely to the want of technical knowledge and skill— a want to which was to be
attributed the slow progress of the iron industry, in spite of liberal state
subsidies—as well as the fact that Russia lost some markets already gained
abroad, for instance that of sail-cloth and iron. One of the chief reasons of
the rise of the cotton industry was the employment of wage-earning free labour;
in 1826, out of 47,021 employees in the cotton industry, only 247 were private
serfs, and 2239 proprietary serfs, the rest were all freemen. The cotton
factories were largely in the hands of peasants, in some cases still serfs, or
merchants, or again foreigners, like the famous Knoop, whose activity began towards
the end of the reign of Nicholas. With the development of free wage-earning
factories commenced the fall of the old system. The proportion of the employees
in the cotton industry, to those in all factories, was 7 per cent, in 1804, 21
per cent, in 1825, and 32 per cent, in 1836. The nobles’ factories diminished,
a fact which may to some extent explain their increasing indebtedness. On the
eve of the emancipation the landed proprietors were indebted to the Government
alone to the sum of 425 millions of roubles, and 69 per cent, of their serfe
were mortgaged. Side by side with this, we find an increasing prosperity among
the peasantry. The wages of free labour were rising at this period, owing to
the rapid development of industry and the demand for labour, to the limitation
of its supply caused by the existence of serfdom, and to the already explained
method by which Tcustari, or home industries, competed successfully with the
factories. From an economic standpoint, everything indicated the emancipation of
the serfs to be a most pressing necessity, while, from that of public order and
safety, the frequent outbreaks, both agrar n and industrial, showed that the
old system could only be maintained with difficulty.
During this
period of industrial development at home, Russia was at the same time seeking
fresh outlets for her population and her trade to the south and east. In 1847
Nicholai Muravieff was appointed Governor- General of Eastern Siberia. In 1849
he built the fortress of Petro- pavlovsk on the eastern shore of Kamschatka,
and fortified it so strongly that an attack made by the allied squadron during
the Crimean War was repulsed with loss. In 1850 he established the port of
Nicholaievsk at the mouth of the Amur. Next, being responsible for the victualling
of certain Russian settlements in Chinese territory on the Sea of Okhotsk and
the Sea of Tartary, and needing for the purpose the waterways of the Amur,
Muravieff boldly determined to seize the coveted province in the name of
Russia. His first expedition into the Amur territory
1829-63]
Siberia.—Central Asia.—Caucasus.
273
was made in
1851-3. Other expeditions followed, and in 1858 he was able to lay the
foundations of the town of Blagoveschensk, as well as of Harbarovsk, at the
mouth of the Ussuri. In this same year he obtained from China the Treaty of
Aigun, which surrendered to Russia all the country on the left bank of the
Amur. Two years later, in 1860, Russia obtained from China the cession of the
maritime province between the Ussuri and the sea. By Article II of the Treaty
of Aigun, the rivers Amur, Sungari and Ussuri, were declared open to the
navigation of Chinese and Russian vessels, to the exclusion of all other
foreign countries.
The
population of Siberia did not from the first conquest consist solely, or even
chiefly, of either Asiatic aborigines or Russian exiles. An estimate of the
Siberian population in 1622 showed that the country possessed 70,000
inhabitants, of whom only 7400 were exiles. Large numbers, in fact probably
about 150,000, were exiled to Siberia between the years 1832 and 1852,
suffering terrible privations on the march thither, and in the mines when they
reached their destination. But the population was chiefly augmented by
administrative emigration, under which whole families were moved with all their
property, and also, in spite of the increased severities of the passport
system, by voluntary emigrants who desired to escape the oppression of serfdom,
and the harsh measures of the Government against religious sectaries, and above
all to be released from the hated compulsion to military service. Indeed, so
great was the desire of the Russian serfs to reach the freedom of Siberia, that
many committed offences in Russia in order to be transported. Complete
statistics are wanting, but from trustworthy records we gather that the number
of emigrants to the government of Tomsk alone, during the eleven years 1852-63,
was over eighteen thousand. In addition, there was the large official
population of the military and civil officials for the service of the roads,
the posts, stations, mines, and forts.
A large
extension was also given to the Russian dominions in Central Asia, and the
Caucasus. In Central Asia trouble began in 1829, owing to the plunder of a
Russian caravan by the Khivans; and friction occurred between the western
Kirghiz and the Cossack colonies, which were pushed forward to occupy fertile
patches east of the Russian boundary. In 1834 Count Perovsky, the
Governor-General of Orenburg, endeavoured to overawe the Kirghiz by the
construction of a chain of forts on his southern boundary, beginning with
Alexandrovsk on the Caspian. In 1839 hostilities commenced with an expedition
of Perovsky against Khiva, which ended in a treaty of peace made in 1842,
bringing the Amur Darya under Russian influence. In 1846 a footing was gained
on the Sir Darya by the construction of Fort Kazalinsk. This led to war with
the Khan of Khokand; and in 1853 Perovsky captured the Khokand stronghold, Ak
Mechet, 280 miles inland from the Sea of Aral. In 1854 an expedition penetrated
to Ili; and a fort was built at Verni, between the lakes of Baikal and
Issik-Kul. The Treaty of Turkmanchay
with Persia
in 1828 had secured to Russia the provinces of Erivan and Nakhichevan; while
the Treaty of Adrianople with Turkey (1829) obtained for her the fortresses of
Anapa, Achaltsik, and the Black Sea coast line, including Poti, so that the
whole of the Caucasus was nominally converted into Russian territory.
Nevertheless all through the reign of Nicholas the Lesghians and Cherkesses
kept up a struggle for their freedom. The general advance and expansion of the
Russian Empire during this period may be judged by the fact that it contained
about 2,226,000 square miles in Europe, and about 4,452,000 in Asia; and in
1855 about 2,261,250 square miles in Europe, and 5,194,000 in Asia.
The reign of
Nicholas, apart from the Crimean struggle which dominated its close, is full of
the contrasts presented by every stage of Russian history, and offers problems
of great difficulty and great interest to the historian. It seems at first
sight a period of absolute darkness and despair ; yet the greatest Russian
writers, all of whom sprang from the ranks of the nobles, either first saw the
light or flourished during this period. It seems at first sight a time of
incredible misery for the lower orders, yet one great authority, Sir Donald
Mackenzie Wallace, expresses the view that the lot of a serf, before the
emancipation and under the better class of proprietors, was undoubtedly more
enviable than that of the majority of English agricultural labourers; while
another, Baron Haxthausen who travelled in Russia at this time, records that
wages were excessive, being in some cases twice as high as in Germany. It was
certainly a time of industrial growth, and the commercial policy pursued
promoted the development of that nurse of democracy, the cotton industry, and
laid the foundation of future imperial unity. It was the golden age of home
industries. The foreign policy pursued laid the foundations of future markets
for Russian produce and outlets for Russian colonisation in Asia, and continued
in Europe the national crusade to release the downtrodden Slavonic brethren
from the yoke of the infidel, and to place the Cross instead of the Crescent on
St Sophia. In fact, the germs of the future development of modern Russia are
clearly to be discerned, no less than the promise of her mission in Asia and
her destiny as head of the Slavonic races in Europe.
It is easy to
condemn, as every lover of freedom must condemn, the maintenance of the
institution of serfdom, and the barbarous lengths to which the policy of
repression was carried. But it is only fair to remember that the keynote of the
reign was given by the conspiracy of the Decabrists. It is at least open to
doubt whether the iron system of Nicholas, in view of the unstable and corrupt
instruments with which he had to work at a time of universal ferment and
unrest, was not on the whole of more advantage, since it gave relative,
tranquillity to Russia, than any premature steps that could have been taken in
the direction of those internal reforms which were now becoming plainly
inevitable.
(2) THE LEVANT.
By the
settlement of the Egyptian question, which, after embittering his father’s
closing years, had during the first two years of his own reign almost defied
the efforts of European diplomacy, the young Abd-ul- Mejid was left free to
carry out his measures of reform. These had been accepted in principle by the
late Sultan Mahmud, owing to the influence of their actual author and devoted
partisan Reshid Pasha; but the official proclamation of them had been deferred
until Abd-ul-Mejid’s accession. Four months after that event, on November 3,
1839, in the presence of the foreign representatives, the great dignitaries of
State, and the heads of the religious communities, the important Act known as
the temzimat (legislation) or hatt4-Sherif (imperial rescript) of Gulhane had
been promulgated. This charter laid down formally the principle of the equality
before the law of all classes of Ottoman subjects, guaranteed their lives,
property, and honour; declared that legislation would at once be carried out to
establish regular military service, the control of state expenditure, publicity
in legal proceedings, freedom in commercial transactions, and the abolition of
the confiscation of the property of criminals and of the disabilities
heretofore attaching to their heirs. The new charter, which ended with a
malediction on all such as should infringe its provisions, was proclaimed with
equal solemnity throughout the provinces, but was followed by an immediate and
universal reaction; and it must be admitted that, even when not actively
hostile, prejudice and fanaticism, merely by their vis imertiae, proved too
strong for the well- meant but somewhat premature legislation of the reforming
Sultan and Minister. Indeed there have been few reigns in Turkey during which
bloodshed and massacre in various parts of the Empire have been more frequent
than that of Abd-ul-Mejid. But it would be grossly incorrect to deny that the
tanzimiat, and the other similar enactments by which it has been followed, have
been productive of great and lasting benefit to the subject-races of Turkey,
who, according to the testimony of a foreign eye-witness, in 1571 had been
degraded to such a pitch of abasement that they dared not look a Turk in the
face, and who were saved in 1644 only by the firmness and humanity of the
Sheikh-ul-Islam from the general massacre ordered by Sultan Ibrahim. Life has
come to be regarded as more sacred; property is outwardly respected and is not
interfered with, at least without some show of legality; and, on the whole, the
lot of the ray a or peasant has become far more bearable in ordinary times and
when no wave of fanaticism, real or factitious, passes over the land. One
intolerable symptom of anti-Christian feeling was the tenacity with which the
Turks insisted on imposing the death penalty on apostates from Islamism ; and
among Lord Stratford’s highest achievements must be counted his success in
inducing Turkey to abandon her uncompromising attitude on this head (March 21,
1844).
276 Reforms
ofAbd-ul-Mejid.-Turco-Persianfrontier. [i840-56
Though the
settlement of the Egyptian question had pacified Turkey sufficiently to allow
of the promulgation of the tanzimat, yet order was not thereby restored in
Syria and Lebanon. The quarrels of the Druses and Maronites, heightened by the
dissensions which followed on the exile of the Emir Beshir, Prince of the Druse
Mountain (October, 1840), led to massacres by both parties. The overlapping of
the different nationalities rendered a territorial arrangement of the question
almost impracticable; and the matter was further complicated by the claim of
France to protect the Maronites, as Roman Catholics. In 1845 it was found
possible to draw up an organic statute for the Lebanon, which, while not giving
complete satisfaction, secured a practically autonomous administration, under
the Sultan’s suzerainty, for each of the various classes of the population.
Meanwhile the
educational, administrative, and judicial reforms which had been initiated in
Mahmud’s reign were actively carried forward. One important innovation was the
institution of the Mixed Commercial Court at Constantinople; the presence in
this tribunal of assessors of their own nationality afforded a much-needed
security to foreign litigants. The British Government had instructed their
ambassador to “impart stability to the Sultan’s Government by promoting
judicious and well-considered reforms.” How energetically Lord Stratford
laboured to carry out this instruction is evidenced by the archives of the
Foreign Office and the statute-book of Turkey. But Reshid Pasha, the convinced
advocate of reform, was unable to realise the hopes reposed in him; and his
successors made no serious attempt to overcome the ingrained conservatism of
Turkey. Notwithstanding the newly created ministries, codes, and tribunals, no
long period was destined to elapse before the official belief in the regeneration
of the Empire by spontaneous reform was exhausted; and, only a few years after
the signature of the Treaty of Paris (1856), the most sanguine of Turkey’s
supporters had abandoned all faith in the protestations of the Porte as to its
sincerity in such matters.
The
settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier question was effected only after long
and laborious discussion. Conflicting claims on the part of both States, which
were embittered by the venom of sectarian differences, had nearly led to war in
1842; in the end, the mediation of Great Britain and Russia was invoked,
commissioners of the two Powers proceeded to the debated points, and the Treaty
of Erzeroum was concluded in October, 1847. But the frontier was never definitively
demarcated; and to this day the question remains open and enters upon an acute
stage from time to time.
The
revolutionary movement of 1848, though extending to Moldo- Wallachia, had
little effect on Turkey proper; but she came near a conflict with Russia and
Austria over the question of the surrender of the Hungarian and Polish
refugees, who had fled to Turkey after the
1827-53] Turkey and the
refugees.-Montenegro.-Greece. 277
suppression
of their respective insurrectionary movements. Thanks to the energetic action
of Lord Stratford, who assumed in the cause of humanity a responsibility which
few diplomatists have ever undertaken, and which in these days of rapid
communications is scarcely likely again to fall on a foreign representative,
the Porte held firm. Relying on his assurance of the support of England, it
refused to give up the fugitives, in spite of the threats of the two imperial
Cabinets. Prince Michael Radzivil was despatched with an ultimatum from the
Tsar; but on September 17, 1849, thirteen days after his arrival, he withdrew
without having attained his object; on the same day Russia and Austria broke
off relations with Turkey. It was not until October 26 that Lord Stratford’s
natural anxiety as to whether his Government would endorse his resolute action
was relieved by the arrival, after a memorable ride, of the Queen’s messenger
bearing the approval of the Cabinet. The two Powers hesitated to risk a
conflict in which they would have found England, and probably France as well,
on the side of Turkey. But Austria continued to demand the expulsion of the
refugees, though most of them had decided to emigrate to America by 1851.
In 1850 the
British ambassador was successful in obtaining the formal recognition of the
native Protestants in Turkey as a distinct religious community, and the
enactment of a law prohibiting the embarkation of negro slaves on Turkish
vessels.
In 1852 the
extension of Russian influence in Montenegro led to a conflict between Turkey
and that principality, which the Porte had never recognised as independent. The
Turks regarded as an infringement of their alleged suzerainty the charter
whereby the young Prince Danilo, with the sanction of Russia, had divested
himself of the episcopal character hitherto imposed on the rulers of the land, and
had secured hereditary succession for his descendants. A powerful Turkish
expedition under Omar Pasha was defeated by the Montenegrins with heavy loss
on January 20, 1853; and the mediation of Austria and Russia brought about the
cessation of hostilities.
On April
14,1827, Capodistrias had been proclaimed by the National Assembly of Troezen
President of the country for seven years; but Greece had been thrown into
anarchy and confusion by his assassination on October 9, 1831. Civil war soon
broke out between the partisans of the Commission of Three, appointed
immediately after the murder of the President, and the Constitutional party;
and it became necessary to call upon the French army of occupation in the Morea
to garrison Nauplia, Patras, and, later, Argos. In the latter town an attack
was made upon the French troops by Greek irregulars, who were however easily
repulsed. Such was the internal condition of the country, when Prince Otho of
Bavaria accepted the throne. The guaranteeing Powers had done their best to
settle all the external relations of the new kingdom as satis
factorily as
possible, and to assure the material well-being of its young sovereign. By the
treaty signed at Constantinople on July 21, 1832, the Sultan haid consented to
recognise the kingdom of Greece, and to evacuate those portions of it which
were still in the occupation of his troops, on recei pt of an indemnity of
<£400,000. The Powers guaranteed a Greek loan of £%400,000 and obtained King
Otho’s formal admission into the ranks of European sovereigns. The King of
Bavaria also undertook by the treaty of November 1, 1832, to supply a force of
3500 Bavarian soldiers, in substitution for the French army of occupation.
It was under
these auspices that the young prince, aged 17, landed at Nauplia at the
beginning of February, 1833. His person and demeanour favourably impressed his
new subjects; and the poet Soutzo gave expression to the golden hopes, formed
of the future of the country under his rule, in lines coupling the new
sovereign’s name with those of Lycurgus and Solon. A Council of Regency
consisting of three Bavarians had been appointed by the King of Bavaria to act
during his son’s minority. The choice was unfortunate, and was directly
responsible for the failure of the reign, for the Regents were ignorant of the
country and had no special fitness for their task. Dissatisfaction was at once
caused by the proclamation issued immediately after the King’s arrival, which
contained no mention of the Constitution promised to the Greeks in the
announcement of King Otho’s election made by the guaranteeing Powers. The
Regency proceeded to organise the new administration on the basis of the
practically absolute authority of the King, and of complete centralisation of
the Government, on which even the municipal authorities were made dependent.
Nor was greater wisdom shown in the important matter of taxation. The tithe
system of the Turks was continued with all its abuses; the institution of a
government monopoly of salt gave rise to general discontent, and an attempt to
treat as state property all pasture lands was felt to be so outrageous an
attack on the rights of private landowners that its abandonment was found
necessary. But in drawing up their civil and criminal codes the Regents were more
fortunate, and they endeavoured to settle satisfactorily the difficult question
of the status of the Church of Greece. Since the revolution all relations with
the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople had been broken off, and it was
obviously out of the question that the authority of the Phanar, that is of the
Patriarch and the Greek camarilla, which surrounded him at Constantinople and
was under Turkish influence, should be reestablished. An episcopal council was
convened at Nauplia, and, in accordance with its decisions, a decree was
promulgated naming a Synod for Greece and declaring the Hellenic Church
autocephalous and independent of the Phanar, August 4, 1833. But at a later
date it was deemed advisable to remain in communion with the Patriarchate, and
in 1850 the Oecumenical Patriarch consented to recognise the independence of
the Hellenic Church and Synod.
On June 1,
1835, King Otho attained his majority and dispensed with the services of the
Regents ; and, on February 14, 1837, he married the Princess Amalia, daughter
of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. Meanwhile the development of the country was
neglected, and the proceeds of the guaranteed loan, instead of being devoted to
the construction of roads, maritime communications and public works, melted
away in useless extravagance. The result was that brigandage and disorder were
prevalent throughout the country. The situation was further complicated by the
intrigues of partisans of each of the three guaranteeing Powers, whose views
were far from harmonious, and whose main object was to hinder each other from
acquiring a preponderant influence in Greece. The irregular troops disbanded by
the Regents gave great trouble, until the opportune occurrence of disturbances
in Albania in 1833-4 afforded them congenial occupation on the further side of
the frontier. Political insurrections were not wanting to add to the
embarrassments of the Government; such as those in Messenia and Arcadia in 1834
and in Acarnania in 1836. Until 1843 the whole Government continued under
Bavarian influence.
The
insecurity and oppression, resulting from the incapacity and misgovernment of
King Otho, had disgusted the three guaranteeing Powers as well as the people of
the country, and had led to the cry for a Constitutional Government. The demand
was supported by England and Russia, who pressed for measures calculated to
introduce order into the embarrassed finances of the country; and platonic
advice in the same sense was given also- by France. But the warnings of the
Powers were disregarded; and a revolution was required to induce King Otho to
grant a Constitution. On September 14, 1843, the whole garrison surrounded the
Palace; a deputation of the Council of State waited on the King to present the
demands of the people, and Otho, obliged to choose between abdication and
concession, adopted the latter alternative. The Bavarians were dismissed, and
on November 20, 1843, a National Assembly was called together to draw up the
Constitution. The task was completed on March 30, 1844, on which date the King
gave his assent to the new Constitution. This charter, like most of those
adopted in newly organised countries, was of a strongly Liberal nature. It
declared the equality of all Greeks before the law, and assigned to universal
suffrage the election of the members of the legislature. A senate, consisting
of some fifty high officials, was also created. But little was done to remedy
the shortcomings of the previous administration, or to establish local
m’unicipal self-government, so important for the country, of which moreover the
bases already existed in the organisation which had been allowed to grow up
under the Turkish rule
It was too
much to hope that complete respect for the Constitution would be shown by the
Ministers appointed under its provisions. The first elections, held in 1844, at
which Kolettes replaced Mavrocordatos
as Prime
Minister, were conducted amidst the grossest illegalities on both sides, which
were regularly repeated at subsequent elections. Military insubordination continued;
trouble also arose with Turkey. The new Government had always been strongly in
favour of the “ great idea ” of the restoration of Greece’s former glories,
i.e. of aggrandisement at the expense of Turkey. This “idea” seems ineradicable
from the Greek mind, which is unable to realise the scantiness of the resources
of the country or of its claims on the good-will of the Powers. It relies on
memories of the past and on the enthusiasm of lovers of classical antiquity for
the realisation of this visionary extension of Hellas, though during
three-quarters of a century of independence the Greeks have failed to exhibit
any marked ability in the art of government. The result was a tension in the
relations between Greece and the Porte, ending, through an injudicious reproof
addressed by the King to the Turkish Minister, in a complete rupture in 1847.
The affair was settled through the intervention of the guaranteeing Powers;
but the relations between the latter were far from cordial, and any measure
supported by one of their number was likely to be opposed by the other two.
Partly
through its aggressive attitude towards Turkey, the Government of King Otho
had been growing gradually more and more estranged from England. The British
Minister at Athens was subjected to petty slights worthier of the nursery than
of the Court; and in 1850 Greece came to an open dispute with Great Britain,
arising out of unsettled British claims. One cause of dispute was the question
of the islets of Sapienza and Cervi; it was claimed that these formed part of
the territory of the Ionian Islands; and the British Government, as exercising
a protectorate over the Septinsular Republic, demanded the expulsion of the
Hellenic authorities from the two islets named and the incorporation of the
latter with the Ionian Islands. The British claims included the demand for an
apology for an insult to a British naval officer, and indemnities for injury
done to certain Ionian subjects, besides compensation due to George Finlay,
the historian, for property belonging to him which had been arbitrarily seized
and incorporated in the King’s park at Athens. There was also the claim put
forward by the notorious Don Pacifico, a Jew born in Gibraltar, and
consequently a British subject, who resided at the Piraeus, where he had at one
time occupied the post of Portuguese Consul. During one of those periodical
attacks on the Jews not infrequent throughout the East and elsewhere at the
Easter season, Don Pacifico’s house was plundered on April 4, 1847; he thereupon
presented to the Hellenic Govemrrient a heavy claim for compensation, which
included £500 for the personal sufferings of himself and family, about £5000
for the value of his effects and furniture destroyed or pillaged by the
assailants of his house, and upwards of £21,000 for the loss of documents in
support of demands upon the Portuguese Government. His claim was endorsed by
Her
1829-51]
British claims against Greece.
281
Majesty’s
Government, and their action was vindicated in the House of Commons by Lord
Palmerston in a speech, whose fervent patriotism distracted attention from the
lack of care or precision in examining the details of the claim. The magnitude
of the sum demanded was indeed the subject of much controversy and indeed
ridicule, doubt being generally thrown on the existence of such valuable
property in the house of one in the apparently humble circumstances of Don
Pacifico.
The British
Government, unable by peaceful means to induce the Hellenic Government to offer
the desired apology or to satisfy the claims made, though the demand respecting
Sapienza and Cervi was not included in these and was eventually abandoned,
took the vigorous step of seizing the private property of Greek citizens, in
addition to blockading the Greek ports. This action gave rise to great
complaints on the part of other Powers, who alleged that their commercial and
maritime interests were endangered, and whose intervention was enlisted by the
more or less fraudulent transfer of Greek vessels to foreign flags. Prance and
Russia, the other two guaranteeing Powers, were especially vehement in their
objections to the course followed by England—which lost its novelty in later
days, and gave rise to no international controversy when adopted by France in
November, 1901, in order to enforce compliance by Turkey with the demands of
French citizens. France offered her good offices, which after some demur were
accepted. A French representative was sent to Athens to arrange matters; but
his views did not agree with those of the British Minister, and on April 25,
1850, the blockade was resumed. Two days later the Government of King Otho
accepted the British terms, and paid a sum of 180,000 drachmae (about ,£6400)
in settlement of all claims, including 120,000 drachmae (about £4200) in
respect of Don Pacifico’s losses and personal sufferings. Meanwhile Lord
Palmerston had arranged with Drouyn de Lhuys, the French ambassador in London,
to accept in full settlement a sum larger than that agreed upon at Athens. The
British Government determined to abide by the agreement arrived at in Greece,
and some coolness ensued with France in consequence.
The question
of the damage incurred by Don Pacifico through the destruction of the documents
establishing his alleged claim against the Portuguese Government was referred
to a mixed commission at Lisbon, composed of British, French, and Greek
officials. On May 5, 1851, this commission decided that Don Pacifico was
justified in claiming from Greece the sum, not of £21,000 but of £150 in
respect of such documents as he might have lost and the expenses incurred by
him during the investigation; and that sum was paid by the Hellenic Government
to the British Minister at Athens on June 13, 1851.
By the terms
of the Treaty of Adrianople, concluded on September 14,
1829, Russian ascendancy in the Principalities
of Moldavia and Wallachia
seemed to be
permanently assured; it is not without interest to note the steps by which this
result had been reached. By the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (July 21, 1774)
Russia acquired a vague and undefined right of intervention on behalf of the
Principalities, confirmed in the A'fnali Kavak Convention of March 10, 1779. By
the hatt-i-Sherif of October, 1802, the Porte undertook not to dismiss the
Hospodars without the concurrence of Russia. The Convention of Akkerman
(October 7, 1826) laid down that the Princes were to be chosen from the Boyars
; that they were to be appointed for seven years, and that they could be
dismissed only for serious offences and with the consent of the Russian
ambassador, which consent was necessary also in the event of their resignation.
Further, the Princes were to give ear at all times to the representations of
Russian Ministers or Consuls. The Treaty of Adrianople now secured them in
their office for life, reaffirmed all the privileges and immunities conferred
on the Principalities by previous treaties, and provided that Moldavia and
Wallachia should be occupied by Russia until the payment by Turkey of the war
indemnity, fixed at 10,000,000 ducats. Moreover, during the Russian occupation
a reglement orgcvnique or Constitution was to be drawn up, in accordance with
the wishes expressed by the legislative assemblies of the two provinces, and
sanctioned by the Porte. This reglement, the work of a commission of Boyars
under the presidency of Count Kisseleff, the Russian Administrator, was
completed on July 29, 1829, and eventually received the Porte’s confirmation,
becoming law in Wallachia on July 1, 1881, and in Moldavia on January 1, 1832.
While constitutional in character, it is strongly aristocratic in tone, and all
the exclusive privileges of the Boyar class are therein maintained. Russia
thereby assured the continuance of her influence, and acquired the sympathies
of the Boyars, since, under this instrument, they formed the only section of
the population which had any share in the administration of the provinces. The
organic statute further provided that the election of the Hospodars should be
carried out by an assembly of Boyars, in which, it was supposed, Russian
influence would always be paramount.
But Russia,
largely through the choice of tactless and overbearing agents, has the knack of
converting friendly into hostile dements. The first Princes so appointed were,
for Wallachia, Alexander Ghyka, 1834-42, and for Moldavia, Michael Stourdza,
1834-49. Difficulties in the working of the Constitution first arose in 1837,
when the Russian representative at Bucharest called upon the Prince of
Wallachia to cause the assembly to vote an additioual article to the
Constitution, providing that the reglement could not be modified in any way
save with the assent of both Russia and Turkey. So strong was the opposition to
the insertion of this strange clause in a charter of autonomy that the Russians
induced the Porte to dissolve the assembly by firman. The Prince’s position was
thereby greatly weakened; Russian intrigues caused him to lose credit
1830-48] Russian influence in
Moldo-Wallachia.
283
with the
nationalist party, and in 1842 he was deposed upon a petition from the
assembly, after a joint enquiry held by Turkish and Russian Commissioners. His
successor, George Bibesco, a persona grata at St Petersburg, was soon at
variance with the assembly; recourse was again had to the Porte; and the
Chamber, whose legislative period had still three years to run, was dissolved
(1843). Freed till 1846 from the control of the assembly, Bibesco devoted
himself to public works and financial and fiscal reform ; in 1845 he succeeded,
in spite of Austrian opposition, in inducing Turkey to allow the extension to
Wallachia of the increase in import duties, raised from three to five per cent,
in the rest of the Empire. Further, he abolished the customs between Moldavia
and Wallachia, thus uniting the two Principalities in a Zollverein, which was
to be the first step towards their complete union. In Moldavia Michael Stourdza
maintained his position for fifteen years. Resisting the intrigues of the
Boyars, supported as they were by Russia, he succeeded in effecting many useful
and practical reforms ; he founded schools, sought to improve the condition of
the peasants, and relieved the Jews and Gipsies (many of the latter being
slaves) of some of the disabilities to which they were subjected.
It was
natural that the revolutionary and nationalistic movement of 1848 should spread
to the Principalities. Since 1830 the desire for the union of the two countries
had been growing in intensity, and the whole population was unionist, even in
Moldavia, which would sacrifice her position if the union became an established
fact, as the capital would clearly be Bucharest, the chief town of Wallachia.
Russia had shown herself at first not unfavourable to the union, in the hope
that a Russian prince might be called to the throne of the united Principalities.
But the leaders of the movement, eager to include the whole Rouman- speaking
race on either slope of the Carpathians, and chafing under the oppressive
tutelage of their northern protector, aimed at complete emancipation from the
Russian yoke as the next step after the shaking-off of the Greek incubus. The
example set by the closely related Rouman population of Transylvania in
resisting the Magyarisation, which was hping forced on them, led to outbreaks
in both Moldavia and Wallachia.
The first of
these was limited to a street-riot at Jassy consequent on the presentation of a
petition to the Prince demanding redress of certain abuses. Order was easily
restored, a few only of the ringleaders being punished. But in Wallachia Prince
Bibesco was compelled to accept a revolutionary Constitution and to form a
Ministry from the members of the revolutionary Committee. Russia immediately
formulated an official protest, and Bibesco abandoned office and left the
country, June 14, 1848. The Turks were now urged by Russia to intervene and
restore order by force of arms. Omar Pasha marched with 20,000 troops to
Rustchuk, and a Turkish commissioner arrived at Bucharest, at whose demand the
Provisional Government was dissolved and a lieutenancy
appointed, as
provided by the organic reglement. Satisfied with this compliance, the
commissioner withdrew, undertaking to lay before the Sultan the proposed
modification of the Constitution. This did not suit Russia’s plans;
disturbances, perhaps the result of instigation, afforded her the desired
opportunity ; and the Principalities once more underwent the ordeal of a
Russo-Turkish occupation.
On May 1,
1849, Turkey and Russia entered into the Convention of Balta Liman, which
provided that the Hospodars of the Provinces should again be appointed for
seven years, that the Assemblies should be replaced by divans nominated by the
Princes, and that the joint occupation should continue until the complete
pacification of the country, after which the armies were to be stationed near the
frontiers, so as to be within hail if circumstances should require their
return. The Princes were to be assisted in the work of reorganisation by
Russian and Turkish commissioners. Michael Stourdza, who had retained his
office throughout this troubled period, declined to accept the terms of the
convention and abdicated. He was succeeded in Moldavia by Gregory Ghyka, while
Barbe Stirbey became Prince of Wallachia. Prince Stirbey’s first efforts were
devoted to securing the evacuation of the country, and he attained this object
in 1851. Among the most important reforms due to his reign must be included the
settlement of the relations between peasants and landowners, greatly to the
advantage of the former, and the extension of education and of the national language.
The Russian occupation of the Principalities at the outbreak of the Crimean War
soon made the position of the Hospodars impossible, and towards the end of
October, 1853, they both withdrew to Vienna.
By the Treaty
of Adrianople all the privileges enjoyed by Servia under former treaties were
confirmed, and a year later, on November 30,
1830, Milosh Obrenovitch, who since the murder
of Kara George had been the unopposed ruler of the country, was established,
with the Sultan’s formal recognition, as tributary Prince, with hereditary succession.
Milosh cherished hopes, more than once revived later, of founding a Greater
Servia which should comprise the whole Servian race ; but his arbitrary and
autocratic methods of government gave rise to much popular discontent. The
Prince thereupon made an attempt to introduce Liberal government, and on
February 15, 1835, promulgated a Constitution on Western lines. The nation,
however, was not yet fit for such an experiment, which was soon abandoned, and
the former autocratic system was resumed, with the result that the people again
became seriously disaffected.
Under Russian
persuasion, Prince Milosh on December 24, 1838, published a decree whereby he
divested himself of much of his authority, in favour of a newly created
legislative and administrative council
composed of
seventeen irremovable senators. This body soon succeeded in getting into its
hands the control of supreme power; and Milosh, having no support in the
country, was obliged to abdicate in favour of his eldest son, Milan, on June
13, 1839. Prince Milan, however, died in the course of a month, when his
younger brother Michael was elected by the Senate and confirmed by the Sultan.
The new Prince, after freeing himself from the Regents imposed upon him by the
Porte, was eager to effect widespreading reforms; but the expenditure requisite
for, these reforms necessitated increased taxation, which caused irritation and
alienated the peasant supporters of the dynasty. In August, 1842, Prince
Michael abdicated, and after a short regency Alexander Karageorgevitch, the son
of the murdered Kara George, was called to the throne. Turkey agreed to
sanction the choice, which, however, Russia consented to ratify only upon its
confirmation at a second election held in deference to her wishes and on
condition that the appointment should not be hereditary. Servia now seemed to
have entered on a new era of peace and progress, troubled only by temporary
difficulties with Austria in 1848, due to the natural desire of the Servians to
come to the aid of their oppressed kinsfolk, the Serbs of Slavonic Hungary.
NAPOLEON III
AND THE PERIOD OF PERSONAL GOVERNMENT.
(1852-9.)
On
the evening of December 1, 1852, in a.long procession of two hundred carriages
flanked by torch-bearers, the members of the Senate proceeded in a body to
Saint-Cloud, there to hail the Emperor in due form. The adherents of the older
parties had been silenced; proscription and exile had crushed the “ anarchists
”; the decrees of the Presidency had given new life to the country’s
institutions; and the nation, by
7,839,000 “ ayes,” had once more reaffirmed its
confidence in Louis Napoleon. Clothed with that absolute power which he
demanded as essential to good government, the nephew of the “ Great Emperor ”
was soon to be in a position to realise the dreams which had haunted his
wanderings through the Old World and the New, and his hours of captivity in the
fortress of Ham.
Napoleon was
now forty-four years old; he was no longer the man of stone, “the eyeless
sphinx,” as Veuillot had called him in the years before 1850; and there were as
yet none of the signs of that premature old age which marked the end of his
reign. His pale complexion, dull glance, and phlegmatic bearing gave obvious
indications of a melancholy and dreamy temperament, but his narrow forehead
suggested that gentle and somewhat crafty obstinacy of which he was later to
show himself capable. The bent of his mind had made him the slave of a
tradition; his one object was to bring about, without much scruple as to the
means, the restoration of his dynasty. Ultimately he went so far as to commend
the Coup d'etat; and in acting thus he did not perceive the irremediable
mistake he had made. It cannot however be denied that genuine anxiety for the public
good was mingled in his breast with selfish family ambitions. His letter to
General Vaillant shows a full sense of the “ personal responsibility attached
to his position.” Caesar had a conscience.
The
adventures which he had passed through as Carbonaro, conspirator, and captive
had shaped a remarkable character, which alternated between fits of reckless
impulsiveness and moods of iron determination.
1832-58]
287
He knew how
to keep his own counsel, how to brood over a design, and how to reveal it
suddenly when he felt that his moment had come. His easy cordiality, his
unaffected manner, his gratitude for past kindness, conciliated while it
charmed; he had accomplices, it is true, but he had friends as well. But the
choice of his associates, like the choice of his means, was to him a matter of
small moment; all that he asked for in his adherents was that their interests
should be bound up with his cause, and that their hopes should depend upon its
success. He himself was still the conspirator, the man of small contrivances
and petty intrigues, of combinazioni designed with the view of influencing his
relations, his friends, and the men who surrounded him and in whose hands he
felt himself to be. He was a man of half-resolves, and his powers of decision
were fettered by the perpetual fear that he might compromise the future of his
family. Even when he was seated on the throne, he was beset with the idea of
combining all men, all parties, and all classes in one great secret society
devoted to the welfare of his dynasty.
He believed,
however, in his mission : that he was the man chosen by providence to realise
at last the “Napoleonic ideas.” He had himself expounded the ideals of the
Memorial and the Legende Napol&onienne, in various written treatises,
Political Reveries (1832), Les Idees Napo- leoniennes (1839), Extinction of
Pauperism (1844). These ideals were the “ reconstruction of French society,
shattered by fifty years of revolution, and the reconciliation of order with liberty,
of popular rights with the principle of authority.” For Napoleon I, said his
nephew, had found it impossible to realise his vast projects in ten years. His
mission had been to complete the work of the Revolution and establish liberty
in France. But the substructure must first be laid on solid foundations;
liberty should crown the edifice. Its existence and position must be assured by
a genera] recognition of the authority of government; and, to that end,
government must appear as the “beneficent influence which moves the whole
community.” Napoleon I had attached the highest importance to manufactures, and
had even in certain cases actually created them. Those who come after him, and
with ample means and time at their disposal aim at realising his ideals, should
do so by applying a stimulus to business, by helping and encouraging all
classes alike: the manufacturers, by opening up new fields for industry, the
peasants, by reviving the cultivation of the land through the aid of
agricultural settlements, and the artisans, by providing work in abundance and
so increasing their power of purchase. Thus work will be found for the
unemployed, a demand created for every product, and poverty will disappear. “
The triumph of Christianity abolished slavery; the triumph of the French
Revolution abolished serfdom; the triumph of democracy will abolish pauperism,”
and the foundations of liberty will be laid.
The “
Napoleonic ” conceptions of foreign policy may be summed up in the phrase “a
European Confederation.” No more peace without
honour, as
under Louis-Philippe; no more universal war, as under the Republic; but the
“loyal offer of an alliance with France, to every government willing to combine
with her in the defence of those interests which are common to all.” But what
were these “ interests common to all ” which were to serve as a bond between
France and other governments ? The defence of liberty and of national
autonomy—these came first, for Louis Napoleon could never forget that he had
been the pupil and friend of German philologists and Italian historians and an
aggressive champion of liberalism. Within the lines of the Napoleonic legend,
as it had grown up during thirty years, the Emperor had conceived a vast and
vague combination of socialism and universal peace. His hope was that, by
rallying all classes to his side, he would ensure at once the realisation of
his dream and a glorious future for his dynasty.
In spite,
however, of two triumphant plebiscites, the new Emperor could not be blind to
the fact that opposition, though reduced to silence, still existed. After the
Covp d'etat and the “mixed commissions,” he found himself in the hands of the “
Men of Order ” and forced to take action against the “ Reds.” Before he could
begin to realise his ideals, to develop his vast projects, he was compelled, in
the phrase then current, “ to restore order.” Hence the curious political
system which governed France for eight years—a system of mingled severity and
favours, under which all classes, solely in the interest of the supreme
authority, were alternately harassed and caressed.
The
proclamation of the Empire on December 2, 1852, was no more than the logical
result of the policy pursued by the Prince President since 1849. Its
reestablishment was not, constitutionally speaking, a revolution; it meant
merely that certain readjustments gave a finish to the institutions which had
been accorded to France under the Constitution of January 14, 1852. The
senatusconsultum of November 2, 1852, ratified by the plebiscite of November 21
and 22, and promulgated by the decree of December 2, declared the Empire
reestablished. On December 25, a second senatusconsultum, purporting only to
“interpret and modify” the Constitution of 1852, defined the new regime. The
Constitution of January 14 had already given to the Chief of the State, who was
declared to be “responsible to the nation,” the “free and unfettered authority”
on which he had insisted. He commanded the forces by land and sea; he could
make peace and war; justice was administered in his name; and he possessed the
prerogative of pardon. He alone could initiate laws; he promulgated them and
issued the decrees and regulations necessary to carry them into effect; in
short, he had already absorbed the whole power of the executive and had laid
his grasp on the judiciary and the legislature. The senatusconsultum, of
December 25 defined still more clearly the absolute nature of his power. From
this time forward it was the Emperor by his personal authority, and not the
Legislative Body, who could conclude treaties of
commerce; it
was he who ordered or authorised all works of public utility. It was he who
determined the relations between the Senate and the Legislative Body and
defined the functions of those bodies (decree of December 81,1852); finally,
while the budget of every Ministry was voted by the Legislative Body, the
subdivision under various headings of the sum granted to each Ministry was
settled by imperial decree. Thus the Emperor was, so far as possible, supreme
in the State; in theory he was still responsible to the people who had placed
the power in his hands, but this responsibility had no real existence. As the
Government alone could summon the nation to a plebiscite, the nation was
dependent for the exercise of its rights on the good pleasure of the
Government, while the very wording of the plebiscite excluded anything like a
free expression of opinion.
It was
through his Ministers, through his Prefects, by means of a great network of
centralised administration, that the Emperor governed. Under the Constitution
of 1852, the Ministers “ no longer formed a responsible council, constantly
checking, by their solidarity, the special impulses emanating from the Chief of
the State, and reflecting merely the policy of the Chambers”—a policy subject
to constant modification. They became nothing more than “ respected and
influential aids to the imperial intelligence ”; they swore fidelity to the
Emperor; they were excluded from the Legislative Body; each one worked by
himself in his own special department. The will of the sovereign was thus
present everywhere, but, as it was impossible for the Emperor to look into
details, there was a want of cohesion and general supervision, and, though vast
projects were carried out, every-day details were neglected.
The Ministers
were ten in number. The Minister of State, created by a decree of January 22,
1852, was the medium of all communications with the chief bodies of the State,
the Chamber, the Senate, and the like; he was in addition entrusted with all
matters not expressly assigned to the other Ministries, and on December 14,
1852, was given charge of the imperial household. Besides him, there were the
Ministers of Justice, the Interior, Foreign Affairs* Finance, War, the Navy and
the Colonies, Public Instruction and Worship, Public Works, and finally the
Minister of Police, who had charge also of the Press. Several times in each
week the Ministers attended the Emperor, made their reports, expressed their
views, and received his orders.
Through
the medium of these officials the Emperor conveyed his will to the various
departments of State and to those responsible for local administration. The
Prefect was the representative of the Government and enjoyed in his department
all the authority of the sovereign. A decree of March 25, 1852, gave him the
power to legislate in certain matters and the nomination to certain offices;
and by the law of June 14, 1854, the appointment of teachers in the primary
schools was taken from the Rector and given to the Prefect. He had full control
of all local
bodies in his
department; he appointed the members of the: Academic Council (decree of March
9,1852), and the members of the Chamber of Agriculture (decree of March 20,
1852). The prefectoral system has been regarded as an attempt at
decentralisation; it was at most but an attempt to localise the central power.
Decentralisation involves a transfer of certain elements from the central
authority to local bodies, while in this case each Prefect, as the devoted agent
of the Chief of the State, became a sort of miniature Emperor. He, too,
administered despotically with his Council of State (the Council of the
Prefecture) and his legislative body (the General Council); and he, too,
imitated the methods of his sovereign in his treatment of everything, from
important public works to the balls which he gave at the Prefecture.
Far from
bestowing any independence on departmental and municipal authorities, the
Emperor placed them under a supervision which grew stricter day by day. In the
communes the authority still rested with the Mayor; but, by Article 57 of the
Constitution of 1852, the Mayors, and, by a law of May 5,1855, even
deputy-Mayors, were appointed by the Executive and might be chosen from outside
the municipal council. (Under the Republic only the Mayors of communes with
more than 6000 inhabitants were nominated by the Government.) It is true that
there existed in each commune, except at Paris (sifter July 3, 1848) and at
Lyons (after March 2, 1854), an elective municipal council renewed every five
years, with power to vote the municipal budget. Its sittings, however, were not
held in public, and it was liable to be suspended by the Prefect, or to be
dissolved by the Emperor and replaced by a commission. Its, power was almost
nil; even the municipal employes, the rural constables, the collectors of town
dues, and the like, were appointed by the Prefect. Thus the Government created
a host of adherents on which it could rely. It was through these zealous
agents, these officials in their various grades—Ministers, Prefects, Mayors,
and Deputies—that the imperial will penetrated to the extremities of the
country and permeated provincial life.
Certain
readjustments of detail were all that was necessary to place the machine of
administration under the exclusive power of the Emperor. Revolutionaries like
Blanqui were right in their belief, that he who in France holds the central
power holds all. If Napoleon had been able to strike a successful blow, it was
because he had on his side the army, upon which, after all, his power was
based. Still, on the occasion of the first plebiscite 37,359 soldiers had voted
“ no ” against 303,290 who had voted “ aye.” They all indeed obeyed the orders
of the Emperor; but he was not satisfied with mere obedience, he asked for
affection. The law of April 28, 1855, enabled him to form an army devoted to
himself; for, while under the law of 1832 a conscript who wished to avoid
service might send in his place a relation or a “ paid substitute,” the law of
1855 forbade substitution except between persons within the
sixth degree
of relationship (i.e. second cousins); and, from that time forward, conscripts
might avoid service by contributing certain sums to a fund (Caisse de dotation
de Tarmee) from which payments were made to old soldiers willing to reengage,
the choice of the substitute being thus kept in the hands of the Government. An
immoral traffic was suppressed, and the conscript was no longer held
responsible for the desertion of his substitute; the chief gain however lay in
the raising of an army largely composed of professional soldiers and entirely
devoted to the Government. On March 20,1858, all substitution except between
brothers was forbidden. The substitution fund grew to be more than sufficient
to provide the bounties and extra pay for the reengaged men; and in
1858,12,000,000 francs were taken from it to meet a Treasury deficit.
The army,
having placed the Emperor on the throne, guarded his dynasty against any
possible rising, while the police, on their part, enabled him to keep a
watchful eye on citizens at large. On January 22,
1852, as we have already seen, the police had
been entrusted to a special Minister, who was also made responsible for the
control of the Press and for the Public Safety, and was given the command of
the National Guard, the Gendarmerie, and the like. Everyone agreed that de
Maupas, the new Minister of Police, did his work well; but his unpopularity
gave cause for apprehension, and his office was suppressed by decree on June
21,1853. The police were placed once more under the Minister of the Interior,
while the appointment of Commissaries of Police (1852-5), wherever their
services were required in the departments, the great towns, and on the lines of
railway, enabled the Government to keep a watch on all “dangerous individuals.”
When, in 1858, Orsini’s attempt on the Emperor led to the passing of a special
measure of Public Safety which empowered the Government to imprison, exile, or
deport without a trial, any suspected person, nothing remained but to give the
word to this ready-made army of officials. The liberty of citizens was placed
at the arbitrary disposal of the Government; if men talked politics, they ran
the risk of arrest; and there were spies everywhere, even in drawingrooms.
The police
kept the Press under strict supervision. It had not been thought well to
suppress the political newspapers nor to insist on their being submitted for
perusal before publication; but the security they were required to give was
doubled (it amounted in Paris to 50,000 francs). The stamp duty was also
doubled, and it was made necessary by a decree of February 17, 1852, to obtain
the permission of the Government before founding a journal. The Minister of the
Interior had power to appoint and to discharge the editor-in-chief on the
nomination of the owners; no change could be made in the staff of the paper
without the Minister’s consent. Under the same decree, Press offences, instead
of being tried before a jury, were sent to the police Court, where they were
292
Police and Press.—Imperial Court.
[1852-60
summarily and
severely dealt with. Finally, the Minister might intervene directly and
without legal process by means of warnings, suspensions, and suppression. If an
article was displeasing to the Government, the editor received a warning from
the Prefect; after two warnings, the Minister by his own act could inflict
suspension; and, if the newspaper was considered to menace public security, the
Chief of the State could suppress it by a decree published in the Bulletin des
Lois. The publication of reports of press trials, and of the sittings of the
Legislative Body, and even of news which was disagreeable to the Government,
was forbidden, while, on the other hand, it was made obligatory to insert
official communications; and the Government was thus enabled to interfere in
the actual composition of the journal. During the sixteen months that he was
Minister, de Maupas launched no fewer than ninety-one press warnings. Many newspapers
were suspended; but the authorities permitted the existence, under supervision,
of at least one journal for each shade of opinion. The Constitutionml, the
Patrie, and the Pays represented the Government; the Journal des Dibats
defended Orleanism; the Gazette de France and the Union legitimist views; the
Univers was the organ of the Catholics; and there even survived a republican
journal, the Siecle, but its republicanism was of that antiquated nationalist
and “ interventionist ” type which had in times past done such good service to
the Bonapartist cause. While he allowed them the semblance of freedom, the
Emperor exercised over the Press and over public opinion a sway as absolute as
that which he exercised over the various Departments of State. His system was
carried to perfection; no individual, no transaction escaped the watchful eye
of the supreme authority.
Having
grasped the substance of power, the Emperor, like his uncle, next bethought
himself of adding the splendours of a Court. In the days of the Presidency
those who frequented the Elysee had addressed him indifferently as “ Prince,” “
Citizen,” or “ President ”; but from this time forward, although he proclaimed
himself a national sovereign, the monarchical forms and ceremonies prevailed. Napoleon
III took up his abode at the Tuileries, and, in imitation of the
senatusconsultum of 28 Floreal of the year XII, which itself had followed the
lines of the monarchical constitution of 1791, the senatusconsultum of December
12,
1852, fixed the civil list of the Emperor for the
whole of his reign at
25,000,000
francs. ,
By the
senatusconsultum of November 7, 1852, the imperial dignity was made hereditary
in the direct and legitimate descendants of the Emperor; in default of male
children, he might adopt the children and legitimate issue (in the male line)
of the brothers of Napoleon I. All his relations, who could not marry without
the Emperor’s permission, received an annual sum of 1,500,000 francs, which was
apportioned among them by the senatusconsultum of December 12, 1852.
I852-3] The imperial family.—Napoleon's marriage.
293
As a matter
of fact, the only members of the imperial family at this time were Jerome, the
younger brother of Napoleon I and ex-King of Westphalia (1784-1860), who was
too old to count in the succession, and his two children—Princess Matilde bom
in 1820 and Prince Napoleon (1822-91). As a deputy under the Republic, the
latter had sat with “the Mountain,” and had made a show of resistance to the
Coup cPitat, but soon succumbed to the proffered favours of the Emperor. He was
a man of original and ready intelligence, with just and well-defined ideas; but
he was wanting in tact and moderation. An anti-clerical and a democrat, the
advocate of a policy which embraced the amelioration of the working classes at
home and active interference abroad, he soon gathered round him at the Palais
Royal the most advanced of the Liberals, men who had a leaning to Republican
views. Napoleon III had no fondness for him; he mistrusted him as the possible
leader of an opposition, and he looked forward to replacing him by an heir in
the direct line.
The Emperor
was soon busied with projects of marriage. The Courts of Europe, which had
agreed with very ill grace and under pressure from England to recognise the
Empire at the beginning of 1853, were not disposed to bestow upon him a royal
princess. He took an unexpected step and made a love match with Eug&iie de
Montijo, Countess de Teba, the daughter of a grandee of Spain and a beautiftd
woman of twenty-six (January 30, 1853). He declared, somewhat late in the day,
that he had not aimed at the ennobling of his family by a royal alliance, but
that he took his stand on the position he had won for himself. These
professions flattered the sentiments of the middle classes, while the
aristocracy stood aloof. The Empress was beautiful and charming; her manner was
simple and dignified ; but she lacked depth and fixity of purpose. Impulsive
and ignorant, she was incapable of grasping questions of State, and even her numerous
charities never rendered her popular. Brought up under Ultramontane influence,
she straightway became the opponent of Prince Napoleon and the Liberals, and
placed herself at the head of the clerical faction at the Tuileries. Throughout
his reign the Emperor hesitated between these two parties; and on many
occasions his policy was guided more by the requirements of a coterie than by
the general interests of the country.
There still
existed at the Emperor’s side a Chamber chosen directly from the nation by
universal .suffrage, and there were in addition the great bodies of State—the
Senate and the Council—apparently competent in all respects to discuss and
defend the general interests of the country. As a matter of fact the Chambers,
whether elective or not, had become the mere agents of personal government.
Political representation existed only in form; and a series of regulations
adroitly combined had practically crushed out political life. The Constitution
of January 14, 1852, had retained a Chamber elected by universal
294 Parliamentary elections.—The Chamber. [1852-3
suffrage. All
citizens were voters; and, to facilitate the exercise of the franchise, the
vote by communes had been substituted for the votes by cantons, and one-member
constituencies (scrwtin uninominal) for constituencies represented by several
members (scrutin de liste). But the Government superintended all elections; it
brought forward an official candidate, whose address was printed at the public
expense, whom the Prefects openly and officially supported by spoken and
printed addresses; they “ enlightened the voters ”—as the phrase was—as to his
merits and shortcomings. A vote given to the official candidate was a vote
given to tlje Emperor; and each election became almost a repetition of the
plebiscite. “Universal suffrage, left without guidance to contend with local
passions, might become a real danger,” said Baroche in 1859. During the actual
contest the Opposition candidates met with difficulties at every turn;
political meetings were vetoed on the ground that they threatened the liberty
of the electors; and the Prefect, whose permission had to be obtained before
documents of any sort could be posted up, was disposed to refuse it to a
formidable opponent. Finally, the free distribution of voting-papers was
forbidden, the Court of Appeal having decided that a voting paper was—like a
book—subject to the laws affecting itinerant trading, and that any person
supplying a voting- paper must do so from a fixed place of business.
When the
polling-day arrived, it was the mayor who presided over the proceedings; and
the mayors, as we have seen, were appointed by the Government. The voting
lasted two days, and in the country places the mayor took possession of the
voting-um at the end of the first day; in the towns the working men, acquainted
with official methods, took care not to vote till the second day. In certain
villages, where the peasants were not in the habit of voting, the mayor
manufactured the electoral results; and, needless to add, these results were
not unfavourable to the Government. As the electoral districts were defined,
not by statute, but by a simple order issued afresh every five years in the
form most favourable to the interests of the Government, the official candidate
might nearly always make sure of obtaining a majority; and the arbitrary
grouping of urban with rural districts made it easy to overwhelm the
Republican artisan in a Hood of loyalist countryfolk.
A Chamber
thus elected was, of necessity, composed of supporters of the Government; but,
had it been composed of opponents, it would, by the; provisions of the
Constitution itself, have been reduced to impotence. It did not elect its own
president; it was the Emperor who appointed to that responsible position one of
the most zealous and most trusted of his friends. He appointed in the first
instance Billault and afterwards the Due de Momy, the Minister of the Coup
d'etat. Momy, by a judicious mixture of humour with solid argument, of
haughtiness with conciliation, was most successful in checking the fervid
eloquence of manufacturers and farmers and in keeping them within the limits of
I851-70] Powers of Council of State and Senate.
295
commonplace
discussion. The Chamber, moreover, remained in session for only three months in
each year; in passing the budget, the Chamber could only vote a lump sum to
each ministerial department; and the vote could be practically nullified by
subsequent transfers of funds. As for legislation, the Chamber possessed no
initiative; nor had it power even to move an amendment to a Bill brought in by
the Government.
The principal
part in the work of legislation was played by the “ Council of State,” defined,
in the preamble to the Constitution, as a “body of practical men who could
dispense with oratorical display.” Its President, who was appointed by the
Emperor, held the rank of a Minister; he attended Ministerial Councils and was
the factotum of the Government. He represented it in the Senate and the Chamber
on all questions of general policy. He supported in the Chamber the Bills
elaborated, at the instance of the Ministers, by the Council of State, first in
some one of its six sections and finally in a full sitting. The Council of
State moreover framed subsidiary decrees and exercised jurisdiction in
contentious matters. It was the supreme administrative tribunal; and it alone,
by means of the inspectors of the Prefecture who were chosen from within it,
exercised some sort of control over the Executive.
There was
finally a third body, the Senate, which had a voice in legislation and the
right of initiative and was competent to propose measures to the Government.
But the Senate was above all the embodiment of constituent power. The chief
constituent authority, indeed, although exercised only on occasions, lay with
the people, from whom in theory all sovereignty proceeded, while the Senate
exercised a constituent authority which was secondary but permanent. The Senate
was the “depository of the fundamental pact.” By its consulta it interpreted
and modified the Constitution and annulled such enactments as were not in
accordance with it; it exercised its powers, however, solely in the interests
of the Emperor, composed as it was of Marshals, Admirals, and Cardinals,
Senators ex officio, in virtue of the rank which they owed to the Emperor, and
of 150 other members, likewise appointed by the Emperor, whose fidelity he
secured by the provision of an annual allowance.
Thus in their
very essence, the legislative bodies of the Empire in no sense represented the
will of the country; they were mere agencies which served the Emperor as a
channel of legislation. The text of the Constitution declared formally: “ The
Emperor governs by means of the Ministers, the Council of State, the Senate and
the Legislative Body.”
As a
Government resting on force is never really durable, Napoleon III aimed at
winning the attachment of the country at large. Having already obtained control
of the whole administration, he next took steps to gain over the great
corporations, such as the Church and the Universities, which, while more or
less subject to the Government, remained outside his immediate supervision.
Prom the beginning of his reign Napoleon had had the clergy and the “Christian
community” on
his
side; not that he was personally religious, but because his studied imitation
of Napoleon I, “the restorer of altars,” and the Church as a support of social
conservatism, constrained him to value an alliance with the Catholics. The
Catholics on their side understood the immense impulse which would be given by
the open support of the State to the policy which they had followed since 1830;
and Veuillot, Montalembert, and Dupanloup hastened to- give their adherence to
a Government founded on the Coup d'etat. The clergy received innumerable marks
of favour; crosses which had been destroyed were replaced; the Government was
represented officially at festivals of the Church; Catholic missions were
developed; the laws affecting the recognition of convents of nuns were
simplified; and grants were made to the churches and to •eligious bodies
connected with charity or education. The Empire was indeed, what Veuillot
termed it, a “heaven-sent blessing”; and it is easy to understand why, in
Persigny’s words, “the men in black had grown so amiable.” ■
The
Catholics, however, were by no means unanimous. While Veuillot, and the country
clergy who read the Univers, aimed at developing through the increased
influence of the religious Orders the advantages gained in 1850, Montalembert,
Dupanloup, and the Liberal Catholics looked rather to the formation of a
Catholic party within the Empire, with authority enough to carry certain
legislative reforms such as the abolition of the Organic Articles and the
granting of full powers in matters of education. After having, on December
12,1851, advised all Catholics to accept the new Government, “ that the country
might be saved from ruin,” Montalembert broke with Napoleon and projected a
Liberal opposition. In 1852, addressing the Legislative Body, he demanded a
Government, representative and parliamentary in the true sense of the words; he
reminded Catholics that it was under such a Government alone that they had
obtained any real benefit, and advised them to adopt a more dignified and
reserved attitude in their dealings with the Empire. He explained these views
in his book, Des interets Catholiques au XIX’* Siecle (1852), and he assisted
in the revival of the Correspondant (1855); but he failed to rally the
Catholics to his side. He was defeated at the elections of 1857, and in 1858 He
was convicted of a press offence.
Montalembert
enjoyed the esteem of the doctrinaire Liberals and his colleagues of the
Academy; but it was with Veuillot and the Univers, with the thorough-going
adherents of Napoleon III, that the Ultramontane Catholics threw in their lot.
Veuillot indeed even. ventured to lecture the Bishops in sympathy with
Montalembert; and in 1854 he made a violent attack on Dupanloup, Bishop of
Orleans, one of the keenest advocates of the freedom of instruction. Napoleon
III had his wish; he had compelled the Church of Rome, like the Army and the
Magistracy, to bow to his authority; and this without submission to the
possible exactions of an intermediary.
Without
obtaining those benefits in the shape of fresh legislation which Montalembert
had hoped for, the clergy, now a free and privileged body, were determined to
acquire full control in matters relating to education. Fortoul, Minister of
Public Instruction from 1851 to 1856, undertook the task of securing the
submission of the University to the Government. The professors were required to
take an oath of fidelity; but this the most distinguished among them refused to
do. The Government obtained control of the chief Council of Public Instruction
and of the Academic Councils by assuming the right to nominate the members, who
had hitherto been elected. Professors of higher education (those of the
Faculties, the Museum, and the College de France), who had previously been
irremovable, became liable to dismissal by a decree of the Chief of the State;
professors of lycees could be dismissed by order of the Minister,
assistant-masters by a simple decision of the Rector without appeal. Degrees in
History and Philosophy were abolished; and in 1854 the Minister congratulated
himself on having reestablished the Trivium and the Quadrivium of the Middle
Ages.
The Church
had a free field after these blows had been dealt at the ancient University. In
the secondary schools religious instruction, under the inspection of the Bishop,
was made compulsory for all boarders; while the small seminaries and the large
private schools proved formidable competitors to the lycees. In the department
of primary education the a Congregations ” also by
degrees gained possession of the schools. There were 60,579 primary schools in
1850; there were 68,761 in 1863. But, while in 1850 the secular schools (public
and private) numbered 50,267, and the “congregationist” schools 10,312, in 1863
the secular schools numbered 51,555, and the “ congregationist ” schools
17,206. The development of girls’ schools, and the fact that the law of 1850
gave power to the Communes to indulge their preference for “ congregationist ”
teachers, explains this progress made by denominational education. Finally, the
ease with which the “ Congregations ” obtained assistant teachers secured to
their schools an unprecedented prosperity. Between the years 1850 and 1863 the
secular schools gained 376,080 pupils; the “ congregationist ” schools 588,000.
Little by little the “ wretched little pedants” (affreux petits rheteurs), as
Montalembert called the secular teachers, were ejected from their posts; and
the Church won over the bulk of the country districts to “ religion, morality,
and the Empire.” Nevertheless 27 per cent, of the conscripts of 1863 were
illiterate.
But it was by
means of prosperity, general ease, and the satisfaction of material interests,
even more than by education, that Napoleon III hoped to win over the bulk of
the French people to the Napoleonic dynasty. First among those willing to be
reconciled were the “ Parliamentarians,” Guizot’s old supporters, such as
Fould, Magne, Billault, and Momy, who, under Louis-Philippe’s Minister, had
learnt “ to give satisfaction to the great army of the quiet and reasonable”;
and, secondly,
the
“Saint-Simonians,” a party traditionally indifferent to political forms; who,
since 1830, had clamoured for “ a progressive government ” which would develop
credit, set on foot great public works, and raise national industry to a higher
pitch. To this group belonged Enfantin, Talabot, Michel Chevalier, and the
brothers P&eire, men who took the lead in all the great industrial and
financial enterprises of the new reign.
The
Government assisted the expansion with all its power, scattering favours in all
directions, encouraging every fresh venture, and by its own action multiplying
new schemes for the development of credit, in order to excite and to uphold the
spirit of enterprise. Two great banking institutions were founded, the Credit fonder
and the Cridit mobttier. The decree of February 28, 1852, had authorised the
creation of Societes de credit fonder, which were to grant proprietors long
loaus on first mortgages, redeemable by annuities, and to raise capital by the
issue of debentures. Land-banks (Banques Jbncieres) had already been
established on this basis, at Paris, at Nevers, and at Marseilles. A decree
issued on December 10, 1852, transformed the Paris house into the Cridit fonder
of France, and at the same time authorised it to buy up the two banks of
Marseilles and Nevers, and granted it a subsidy of
10,000,000
francs but compelled it to make advances at a fixed rate of 5 per cent., to
include both interest and sinking fund. Finally, the decree of July 6, 1854, by
giving it a director and two subdirectors, to be nominated by the Emperor,
converted it into a state institution like the Bank of France. By 1854, the
Credit fonder had already lent fifty millions, chiefly on mortgages of property
in the towns.
The Credit
mobilwr, which was developed on parallel lines, was founded in November, 1852,
by the brothers Pereire. The operations of the Paris banks had hitherto been
confined to loans for short terms, discount operations, and exchanges
(arbitrage). The new institution was to be a joint-stock bank, in which money
could be invested and which was to contract loans, make advances and issue
notes. Its function was to set on foot and support great enterprises, to take
part in public loans, to help in the promotion of great companies, and to issue
securities itself to the value of ten times its capital. It soon secured a
position of the highest importance; it took part in the foundation of the
railway system and of the Transatlantic Company, in the public works of Paris
(1854) and in the amalgamation of the ten gas companies into a single company,
for which it obtained the monopoly of lighting the capital for fifty years. In
1855, it paid its shareholders a dividend of 178| francs a share, the shares,
issued at 500 francs in 1852, being now worth, three years later, no less than
1982 francs. It was not long, however, before it experienced serious
difficulties.
The Bank of
France, whose operations, owing to the general prosperity, had been
considerably extended, was authorised (March 28, 1855), to advance money on
deposits of stock and railway securities;
and by the
law of June 9, 1857, the terra of its privileges was extended to 1897. By 1867
the business of the bank had increased to such an extent that the Government
was able to insist that it should establish at least one branch in each
department of France.
The financial
organisation was thus adapted to the growing expansion of commerce, which was
on the eve of being further extended by new developments in the means of
communication, especially of the railways. By the close of the year 1851, the
impulse given in 1842 had slackened, and only 3627 kilometres of line, divided
among eighteen companies, were open for traffic. So much subdivision made the
working of the lines expensive and transport difficult. Without abandoning the
general principles of the law of 1842, the Emperor, by the wise advice of Momy,
extended the concessions for ninety-nine years, guaranteed a minimum interest
of 4 per cent, for half the duration of the concession and, to diminish the
cost of constructing and working the lines, urged the formation of larger
companies, capablc of systematically developing the internal traffic in a
methodical manner and of entering into relations with companies abroad. Such a
policy speedily bore fruit; and six great companies were established by a
series of concessions and amalgamations. The total length of French railways
open in 1858 was 16,207 kilometres. For the moment the Government neglected
communications by water, under the mistaken idea that canals would be rendered
useless by the development of railways. It however organised the Postal and
Telegraphic Services, and by 1855 every prefecture was supplied with the
electric telegraph.
A powerful
impetus was given to the trade and industry of the nation by these new
institutions. But agriculture, strange as this may appear, profited very little
by them. The peasants, so long as they had a good market for their wheat, were
contented; and the Government, in spite of solemn declarations, and regardless
of the fact that the rural classes were its principal supporters, did very
little on their behalf. It increased, it is true, the number of agricultural
societies; it drained the marshes in the Landes, and encouraged horse-breeding;
but the few individuals interested in these matters as often as not found the
indiscreet protection of the Prefects and other incompetent authorities
burdensome. Between 1852 and 1864, the Credit fonder laid out half the
714,000,000 francs, which it advanced on real securities, in rebuilding Paris,
and only lent 57,000,000 francs for agricultural enterprises. The rapid
rebuilding of the large towns drew away the labourers and absorbed capital.
There was a tendency also for the greater landowners to buy up wholesale the
little patches of land belonging to the smaller farmers who were in debt. In
1862, peasant holdings were sold to the value of 2,000,000,000 francs.
Manufacturing
interests, on the other hand, had little cause to complain. Not only were they
well supplied with capital, and assisted
300 Government policy towards industry. [1847-70
by the new
facilities in transport and communication, but they received many favours at
the hands of the Government. On May 31,1856, the patent law was amended; on
July 17, 1856, disputes between partners were referred to the jurisdiction of
commercial Courts of arbitration (juridiction consulaire), and liquidation in
bankruptcy was facilitated by the institution of bankrupts’ certificates. The
formalities relating to the issue of warrants were simplified in 1858. By a
succession of measures great numbers of the smaller tradesmen were exempted
from the license tax (impot des patentes). Finally, freedom was given to the
trades of butcher and baker, both of which had hitherto been subjected to the
narrow regulations deemed necessary either from dread of famine or from fear of
monopoly. A decree of February 24, 1858, abolished the monopoly of the
butchers’ guild in Paris and its regulations. The bakers’ trade, however, had
to wait till June 22, 1863, the municipality still retaining the right of
taxing bread. In Paris, indeed, a compensation fund (caisse de compensation), a
half measure originally established in 1863 in order to keep the price of bread
at 40 centimes a kilogramme, existed until 1870.
In 1855, the
Emperor invited the industrial world to the great fete of the general
Exhibition. A crowd of French manufacturers responded to his call, and thereby
bore witness to the progress which industry was making. A fever of enterprise
had seized upon the whole nation. The bourgeoisie was weary of politics, and
business had become its sole preoccupation. New inventions, facilities for
borrowing, the favour of the Government, all invited to enterprise. From 1852
to 1856 was a golden age for the Bourse; and even London, the chief market of
capital, yielded precedence to Paris. Not even the bad harvest of 1853, nor the
Crimean War, nor the cholera, which from March to July, 1854, ravaged first
Paris and then the provinces, nor the terrible floods in 1855 and in 1856, put
a check on the expansion of business. Speculation rose to such a point that it
alarmed not only socialist philosophers like Proudhon, but the Emperor himself:
so much so that he publicly congratulated the opponents of the stockjobbers,
and attempted to put some check on the joint-stock companies by the law of July
17,1856.
The
production of the nation as a whole, nevertheless, made substantial progress.
The statistics for the years 1852-70 do not always make it possible to
distinguish how much of the economic development belongs to the earlier, and
how much to the later years of the period, but speaking generally, it is
certain that the earlier years were the more fruitful in initiative; and the
results as a whole are remarkable. Between 1847 and 1867, the number of patents
taken out annually was doubled; and the use of steam became so general that the
total amount of horse-power increased fivefold. In the manufacture of
wrought-iron arid cast-iron, the substitution of coal for wood and charcoal,
and of puddled for wrought steel, enabled the metal trades
i847-7o] Industrial developments: their effects.
301
to satisfy
all the new demands made upon them for constructing machines and ships, for
rails, iron buildings, and the like. In the textile industries, the preparation
of cotton and wool was greatly accelerated by the Heilmann and Hiibner
combing-machines; so that between 1848 and 1869, the cotton industry, in spite
of the crisis of 1864, doubled its consumption of raw material. In the chemical
industries, the total value of the output increased tenfold between 1847 and
1865. An enquiiy made in 1865 estimated the total value of French industrial
products at
12,000,000,000
francs; thus showing that, in spite of a considerable fall in prices, the
figure was double what it had been twenty years earlier.
This economic
revolution led to the concentration of great masses of workmen in the
industrial districts in the north, in the Loire valley, and in Alsace; a
concentration which proved a source of uneasiness. The Government had to rely
on the police and on the watchfulness of its administration for keeping them in
check. Men thought for a short time that the remarkable increase in wages (they
rose from 10 to 40 per cent., according to the trade, between 1850 and 1860)
would be enough to gain the Government the affection of the working classes.
Unfortunately, however, during the same period, and especially between 1850 and
1856, the price of food and the cost of rent in the great towns rose
formidably; according to the majority of contemporary writers the cost of
living in fact increased by 50 per cent.
In its
anxiety to check any Republican propaganda amongst the masses of artisans, the
Government made every attempt to better their lot. Its social policy was a most
ingenious one. We have spoken of the exemptions it had granted to artisans, and
also of the bakers’ “ Compensation Fund,” by means of which it had tried to
assure cheap bread to the working classes. In order to prove that “ it had
constantly before its mind the project of ameliorating the lot of those who
suffer and of those who are struggling with the difficulties of life,” the
Government set in motion a great number of original schemes. A decree of 1852
reformed and regulated the pawn-shops (monts-de-piete). When the property of
the Orleans family was transferred to the nation by the decree of January 22,
1852, 10,000,000 francs were devoted to the improvement of workmen’s dwellings.
In times of crisis or of scarcity the Government, or its agents, opened or gave
their support to sub- scription-lists. The Emperor multiplied his donations to
private individuals and his charitable foundations.
Among the
demands put forward by the workmen were some which the Government would not
have been sorry to satisfy, at any rate in appearance. A law, for example, was
passed on June 1, 1853, to regulate the composition of the boards of
arbitration (Conseils de Prud- hommes). By it the election of the boards was
placed in the hands of the masters and the workmen together. The nomination of
the presidents, however, was reserved to the Government; and posts of
this kind
were usually filled by former employers of labour, men over- zealous for “ the
master’s authority.” A law concerning records of identity and employment
(livrets ouvriers) in 1854, permitted workmen to keep their “ livrets ’’ in
their own hands for the future, as they desired; but, to facilitate the work of
the police, the “livret” was made compulsory for all workmen. The working classes
further desired the right to organise themselves and to form associations; but
the Government would not at first authorise the existence of societies in which
ideas of class warfare and socialism were asserted, and whose objects were
resistance or cooperation. For the sake of social peace, however, it encouraged
the formation of Friendly Societies, on the basis of the decree of 1852. In
addition to the independent societies, and certain recognised organisations of
public utility, this decree was directed towards establishing licensed
societies, to be endowed, on the one hand, with numerous privileges, such as
free quarters, free equipment, and free registers, to be supplied by’ the
commune, state subsidies, and the like, but to be subjected, on the other hand,
to numerous restrictions, such as the nomination of a president by Government,
the admission of honorary members, and the acceptance of rules which forbade
the giving of relief to the unemployed. By means such as these, the societies
would be kept under supervision and control; and above all would run no risk of
becoming in reality Trade Unions, under the name of Friendly Societies. To sum
up, “beneficence coupled with supervision” is perhaps the phrase which best
expresses the social policy of the imperial autocracy.
The greatest
triumph of the Empire, however, was won in the Department of Public Works. “
When a labourer is out of work,” said Napoleon I, “ he is at the mercy of every
intriguer, and can be roused to revolt; I fear insurrections caused by lack of
bread. I should be less afraid of a battle against 200,000 men.” The great
Emperor’s nephew; knew the truth of this even better than his uncle, for his
agents Wrl gained experience from the crisis of June, 1848. Great public works
.were a means by which the disparity between workmen’s wages and the increased
price of food might be made good; and they would therefore make the Empire
popular. At the same time, they could be made to increase the power of the
Government over the working classes; for the broad thoroughfares, which the
Government had built everywhere in Paris, were unsuitable for barricades and
street fighting, and would therefore facilitate the maintenance of order.
In all the
great towns of France the municipalities undertook an increasing number of
improvements, stimulated,at once by the industrial development, by the building
of railways, and by the instructions of the Government. At Marseilles the great
docks, whose construction had been begun in 1844, were completed and opened,
Notre Dame de la Garde was rebuilt, and in 1858 the new cathedral was begun;
the Prefecture, the Palais de Justice, the Bourse and the Palais de Longchamp
1851-66]
Great public works.—Paris.
303
date from the
same period. The port of Havre also was enlarged, and Lyons and Lille were
beautified. The Emperor, however, was chiefly interested in Paris, the
revolutionary capital. The very day after the Coup d'etat he decided to carry
out the great works which preceding regimes had so often discussed, such as the
embellishment of the Hailes, the completion of the Louvre, and the opening up
of a number of broad thoroughfares. As Berger, Prefect of the Seine, an “aedile
of the'old school,” hesitated to undertake these works, he was replaced by
Hauss- mann, an iron-handed official, who had repressed socialism in the
Departments of the Yonne and the Var, and whose will-power and boldness of
enterprise had attracted the attention of the Emperor. From the very first, the
new prefect’s audacity carried the day, and overcame the secret hostility of
the executive officials and the public authorities. His plans included improved
facilities for traffic, especially in the approaches to railway stations, the
opening out of great buildings, such as palaces, churches, and barracks, and
the making of large, straight, and magnificent boulevards. By these means he
intended to create a city beautiful at all points, which would be agreeable to
visitors and to foreigners, “ whose advent would repay the cost of the
improvements.”
In a few
years the Paris of the Second Empire was an entirely new city. Not only was it
changed in outward appearance, and in geographical extent—the suburban
districts being annexed to it in 1860 and the number of arrondissements
increased from twelve to twenty-—but its population, and even its very life,
had altered. In 1851, the number of its inhabitants was 1,297,064; in 1866, it
had risen to 1,825,274. By degrees, however, the working class population was
drawn more and more towards the outer circumference, while the central
districts developed into a city of trade, luxury, and pleasure.
The tone of
Parisian society was set by the Court. A theory was then in vogue, and was
upheld by the Moniteur itself, that entertainments were necessary to keep trade
going. The Court therefore organised innumerable entertainments; and banquets,
reviews, and gorgeous official ceremonies succeeded one another without
interruption. In their gaieties the provinces imitated Paris and the Tuileries,
all the Prefectures gave dances and dinners, for the good, as they said, of
“local trade.” The citizens, suddenly grown rich, spent their money in the
pleasures of society and were not to be deterred by the mocking criticism of
their aristocratic neighbours. Social moralists, Republicans, or Orleanists of
the old school, who knew the real worth of political life, were uneasy at this
widespread demoralisation. Music-hall songs and operas-bouffes, races and
public festivals, evening restaurants, and the amusements which they provided,
made the fame of this new Paris. Important foreign events were only looked upon
as so many stage plays, performed to amuse the spectator. “In the depth of
their swamp,” wrote the journalist Pessard in his petits papiers, “ croaking in
chorus the name of their Emperor, an
emasculated
people lived on undisturbed, without memories of the past or aspirations for
the future. It read nothing, it would listen to no voice that was lifted to
recall its abasement.”
Society,
then, was contented; it agreed to everything that the Emperor undertook, asking
only that there should be an end to party - strife and revolutionary agitation.
On the morrow of the Coup d'etat, the whole Conservative party in France had
rallied spontaneously round the agents of strong government, in order to resist
the “ Reds,” with the result that the Executive was obliged to prosecute
Socialists and Republicans with even more severity than it really desired. The
bourgeoisie did not wish to be disturbed in its industrial enterprises, and was
grateful to the “ man of order ” for restraining the “anarchists.”
The ranks of
the Republican party, on the other hand, had been thinned by proscription; its
leaders were either exiled or in prison; and its rank and file had been sent to
Algiers or Cayenne. The “mixed commissions ” had terrorised the country by
26,884 convictions; and, in 1858, a “ bill for the preservation of public
safety ” revived apprehensions, if indeed the measures taken daily by the
police had ever allowed them to subside. Nevertheless the reports of the
Procureurs Generaux bear witness that, in most of the large' towns, the
workmen, and many of the bourgeoisie, who filled Liberal offices, had remained
faithful to their Republican ideas. Any attempt at revolt, indeed, was
impossible. During the whole period of the Empire, there was only one
insurrection, that of workmen in the slate quarries of Trelaze, near Angers
(1855). Republicans who desired to take active measures were only able to contrive
one or two sudden strokes, which were quickly frustrated; such as the
conspiracies of the Reine Blanche in September, 1852, of the Hippodrome in
July, 1853, and of the Commune rivolutionnaire in 1854; or to make attempts
upon the life of the Emperor, like that of Perenchies. Foremost among the would-be
assassins were the Italians, Pianori, Tibaldi, and Orsini, who sought to avenge
their country on the Carbonaro who had betrayed his oath. But all attempts were
fruitless.
In 1857,
accordingly, the few Republicans of note who remained in France, and some young
lawyers who were impatient to take an active part in affairs, decided to bow to
the imperial Constitution, and to offer themselves for parliamentary election.
Three of the party, Cavaignac, Carnot, and Goudchaux, were returned for Paris
at the first ballot and two others, ilmile Ollivier, a clever and eloquent
lawyer, and the son of an illustrious refugee, and Darimon, Proudhon’s disciple
and a great favourite with the workmen, were successful at the second. Two
other Republicans were also returned, Henon at Lyons, and Cure at Bordeaux.
Carnot and Goudchaux refused to take the oath, and were therefore treated as
forfeiting their seats. Cavaignac died before the opening of the Legislative
Body. I^mile Ollivier, Darimon, Henon, and Cure took the oath; but Curd shortly
made his peace with the Empire. In 1858
two more
Republicans, Picard and Jules Favre, were elected, and in this way was
constituted the party of “Five” (les Cinq). The isolation of its members
however—they were kept in the background, and hardly even listened to when they
spoke—rendered this little group absolutely powerless; and advanced Republicans
denied that any useful end had been attained by this compromise with
principles. Order had been maintained, sor‘?ty was saved, and for this the
bourgeoisie was as grateful to Louis Napoleon as it had been in 1851.
In point of
fact, however, the antecedents of the new sovereign might well alarm his
supporters. For, let the bourgeoisie be ever so devoted to peace, might not a
“Napoleon” be tempted to defy the whole of Europe to an armed conflict ? and
was not his name alone sufficient to invite attack by coalitions of the Powers?
The main object of Napoleon III was to prove that this would not be the case. “
The Empire is peace,” he declared at Bordeaux; and, in the early part of his
reign, he was careful in all diplomatic transactions to prove the truth of his
words. Although, to use Bismarck’s words, “ he was vaguely aware that he needed
a war” in order to impose himself on Europe, his diplomacy for two years
invariably aimed at evading one. However, what was necessary was to prevent
this policy of peace from degenerating into a policy without glory. “La France
s'ennuyait,” Lamartine had remarked with reference to Guizot’s Ministry; and
from that boredom a revolution had ensued. Napoleon knew very well that what
the French had required from the Monarchy of July during the previous eighteen
years, they would also expect from a Napoleon. They required two things—glory
abroad, and the satisfaction of their national vanity. To provide this glory
for them without compromising “the material interests which were making such
good progress,” and if possible to accomplish it without war, must be the aim
of the imperial foreign policy. The greatest glory, it was dear, was to be
obtained by immediately realising the “Napoleonic idea,” by tearing up the
treaties of 1815, by giving freedom to oppressed nations, and by restoring her
natural frontiers to a liberty-giving France. But it was improbable that all
this could be attained without a war; and, in order even to make the attempt,
the new Government must first be firmly established.
In the
meantime, the foreign policy of the Catholic party provided the Emperor with
his first opportunity for the active pursuit of glory. The complication of
events which led to the Crimean War will be related elsewhere; it will be
sufficient here to point out the relation of that conflict to the Emperor’s
designs. The war originated in the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches
for possession of the Holy Places at Jerusalem. Since 1850, French diplomacy,
inspired by the Prince President, had upheld the Latin claims at
Constantinople. When Louis Napoleon became Emperor, in great measure through
Catholic assistance, he could not possibly withdraw this support.
Circumstances, indeed,
obliged him
to place himself at the service of the Catholic party, whose policy, since
1830, had been to claim the assistance of French arms for the propaganda of the
Church. Never before, probably, had the policy of the country abroad depended
so much as it did now upon the policy pursued at home. The Emperor would have
been very glad to satisfy the wishes of the Catholic party without resorting to
arms. But Russia, as we shall see, would not allow this; and it was not long
before the embassy of Menshikoff, at the beginning of March, 1853, and the
determination of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, rendered war inevitable. In
October, 1853, hostilities broke out between Russia and Turkey; and, when the
Turkish fleet was destroyed at Sinope by the Russians on November 30, all
Frenchmen, Catholics and Republicans alike, demanded the safeguarding of the
national honour. The Emperor, perceiving that the old national sentiment had
reawakened, no longer hesitated; and in March, 1854, both France and England,
for reasons that are fully stated elsewhere, declared war against Russia.
The struggle,
though long and difficult, terminated with glory; and it ended, as the Emperor
had hoped, in an apotheosis of his Government, the whole nation having learnt,
by the dissemination of popular illustrations, how brave, how heroic, and how
victorious was its army. The terms of peace were signed in Paris on March 6,
1856, and gave the imperial Government what it desired more than anything else
in the world—glory. Frenchmen, indeed, gave little thought to the Four Points
of the treaty; they only congratulated themselves that the Congress of Paris
had avenged the humiliation of 1840. Not without pride they compared this new Congress,
solemnly presided over by the great Emperor’s nephew, to the Congress of 1815,
in which a victorious Europe had crushed both France and the Revolution.
From this
time onward, strong in “ the esteem and admiration with which he felt himself
encircled,” the Emperor began to dream more and more of the realisation of the
“ Napoleonic idea ”; the hour seemed to be at hand when by his help the nations
of the world would gain their freedom. Between 1856 and 1858, he busied himself
actively with the question of Roumanian nationality, annulled the elections
conducted under Turkish intimidation, and secured that the Constituent
Assemblies of Moldavia and Wallachia should be chosen by the people themselves
without Turkish or Austrian interference. But eventually, after complications
which nearly led to war, he had to content himself with bringing about, by
means of another Conference at Paris (1858), that union of the two
Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which is described elsewhere.
But it was
above all the liberation of Italy which haunted the Emperor’s imagination. He
had already enhanced the prestige of Piedmont by accepting her proffered help
in the Crimean W ar (January 26, 1855) and by favours to her at the Congress of
Paris (1856). The
project of
liberating Italy was assuredly gratifying to the self-esteem of many of his own
subjects, and could hardly fail to rally to his side all the enthusiasts for
the “ Legend,” both Liberals and Republicans. But the idea was not acceptable
to the Catholics who feared, not without reason, that the popular movement,
centring round Piedmont, would turn against the Papacy; and they accordingly
persuaded the Empress to bring her personal influence to bear against that of
the Emperor’s Italian advisers. Thus confronted, the Emperor hesitated; but the
Italian Orsini, by attempting to assassinate him (January 14, 1858) as a
traitor to the cause of Italy, supplied him with a reason for disregarding all
resistance and thus decided the fate of the Empire.
Napoleon III
utilised the disclosures made by the Italian patriot, and the discussions
aroused by his trial, to persuade the Empress and the Catholics that it was
necessary, at all costs, “ to do something for Italy.” Their resistance once
overcome, he was free to realise his great scheme. On July 21 and 22,1858,
Cavour met the Emperor at Plombieres, where he arranged the conditions of the
French intervention. At the reception of the ambassadors of foreign Powers held
on New Year’s Day, 1859, Europe was dramatically informed that the Italian
question threatened European peace. Hostilities were not declared till towards
the end of April. But during those few months the Emperor could not fail to be
conscious of direct hostility on the part of his clerical allies, who were uneasy
at the situation which would be created for the Pope. He was able indeed to
congratulate himself on the adherence of the Liberals, and even of the
Republican propagandists; but Jules Favre reserved the right of asking him,
after the victory, to give an account of “the eternal principles,” which he
violated at home but defended abroad. Worse than this, he felt that the strong
diplomatic position which France had gained was likely to be seriously
compromised; and that the English Government, on this occasion, was hostile to
his plans, even while it looked on those of Piedmont with a friendly eye.
Ever since
the Coup d'etat the good understanding with England had been a solid support to
the Napoleonic regime. At the time of the reestablishment of the Empire the
refusal of England’s cooperation had destroyed the plan of a European
coalition, which the Tsar desired to form against Napoleon III. Alone among the
Great Powers England had not treated the Emperor as an intruder. She had in
fact need of his support in her resistance to the claims of Russia in the East,
while Napoleon on his side had need of hey alliance to support him in that
search after glory, which he believed to be necessary for the firm establishment
of his throne. It was not long before the action taken by Lord Palmerston and
the necessities of the Eastern question firmly united the two Powers. When
therefore, in March, 1854, the Tsar refused to answer the Anglo-French summons,
England as well as France was compelled to declare war; and, on April 10, the
two countries joined in an
308 Relations
of Napoleon with England. [i854H
agreement
which bound each Power not to make a separate treaty* nor to seek any private
advantage during the war. England, however, after the conclusion of the
Alliance, had become conscious that the “Napoleonic ideas,” as they gradually
revealed themselves, were not in accordance with English interests. In
December, 1855, even before hostilities ceased, Napoleon III was already
dreaming of a great conflict of nationalities, in which Poland and Circassia
were to gain independence and in which France, by means of a struggle with
Prussia, was to appropriate the left bank of the Rhine and possibly Belgium
also. To all this England was opposed; and her opposition drove Napoleon back
to the peace party; while the concessions, which were made by Russia, for the
moment prevented any further accentuation of the divergent views of the two
Allies. By the Treaty of Paris both Powers and especially England secured
substantial advantages; but the development, even so far back as 1854, of the
Emperor’s policy of “nationalities” and his plans for reversing the treaties of
1815 inevitably reawakened English susceptibilities. In China in 1857 the two
nations worked well together; and at an interview at Osborne (August 6,1857)
the Emperor won the friendly sympathy of Queen Victoria. The vastness of his
plans was somewhat alarming to the Queen and her Consort; but England, having
her hands full with the Sepoy Mutiny, agreed not to oppose his “nationalist”
policy in Roumania. Lord Derby, however, as English Prime Minister, from March,
1858, followed with much anxiety the Austro-Piedmontese crisis which the
Emperor had provoked. He feared lest the compensations, which would certainly
be demanded in the event of the triumph of the principles of “ nationality,”
might lead to a French annexation of Belgium, and he therefore exerted himself
to maintain peace. Public opinion in England, much shaken by the Orsini
incident on which Frenchmen had commented with much bitterness as the plot had
been originally hatched by Orsini in London, showed itself more and more
hostile to Napoleon. Finally it led, as is elsewhere described, to the panic
and the volunteer movement of 1859, both directly due to a belief in Napoleon’s
aggressive designs. It was all to no purpose. The Italian Revolution was to
lure the Emperor on from one enterprise to another; and his boundless ambitions
could not fail to destroy what was left of the good understanding with
England.
At home as
well as abroad, the outbreak of the Italian War marked the beginning of a great
upheaval. The system of imperial autocracy, so perfect in its centralisation
and methods of repression, was severely shaken. From the very beginning of
hostilities, the various political parties and classes in France began one and
all to make their claims heard; while the ambition of the Emperor alarmed those
very “ nationalities ” whom he professed to be assisting.
GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE CRIMEAN WAR. (1852-6.)
The division in which the Conservative
Government was defeated in December, 1852, showed that neither of the great
parties in the State could rely on the support of the House of Commons. The
minority which followed Disraeli into the lobby was a compact body of 286
members. The 305 members who voted in the majority comprised the Whigs under
Lord John Russell; the men who had followed Sir Robert Peel; and independent
Radicals like Bright and Cobden. Lord Derby’s Ministry had been destroyed by
the temporary coalition of all sorts and conditions of politicians, who were
almost as much opposed to one another as they were to their opponents. In the
first instance, the Queen sent for Lord Lansdowne, the Nestor of the Whigs, and
for Lord Aberdeen, who commanded the confidence of the Peelites. Lord Lansdowne
was too ill to obey the royal commands; and the difficult task of forming a new
Administration devolved on Lord Aberdeen.
Its
composition caused some natural heart-burnings. In the House of Commons the
Peelites stood to the Whigs as one to nine: in the Cabinet they stood as six to
seven. It was natural that such a distribution of the prizes of office should
lead to some irritation; and unfortunately this irritation was shared by the
Whig leader, Lord John Russell had already once filled the office of Prime
Minister; he had led a great party with varying success, but with constant
capacity, for nearly twenty years; and he undoubtedly had some claim to the
chief place in any Ministry. He finally consented to lead the House of Commons,
accepting for a time the seals of the Foreign Office, but agreeing to resign
them at the commencement of the session, when the conduct of Parliament would
leave him neither strength nor leisure to discharge the laborious duties of
Foreign Minister. Lord Aberdeen, from the first, intimated that he intended to
retire at the end of the session and thus open the office of Prime Minister to
Lord John himself. In the meantime he strengthened the Whig section of the
Cabinet by appointing Lord Clarendon to the now vacant Foreign Office.
Intellectually, the
310
Gladstone’s
first Budget. [1852-3
new Cabinet
was unusually strong; but its very strength was a source of anxiety. Men like
Lord John Russell, Lord Palmerston, and Gladstone were not likely to yield
their own opinions; and Lord Aberdeen was hardly adapted by temperament to
control or restrain dissentient colleagues. The difficulty thus arising was
enhanced by the anomalous position which the leaders in both Houses occupied,
for Lord Aberdeen’s authority was to some extent weakened by the knowledge of
his contemplated retirement.
Notwithstanding
these difficulties, the new Ministry acquired credit by its conduct of business
during the session of 1853. It succeeded in doing an act of justice to one
great dependency by surrendering to the Canadian legislature the control of
territories known as the Clergy Reserves, whose revenues were applied to the
maintenance of the Established Church in the colony. It conferred a still
greater benefit on another great dependency by abandoning the transportation of
convicts to Australia. In renewing the Charter of the East India Company, it
opened the Civil Service of India to public competition; and it appointed
Commissioners to enquire into the management of charities, and to form schemes
for the better application of endowments. But the chief measure of the session
was the Budget, which Gladstone introduced as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Its
author had been the foremost critic of the finan al proposals which Disraeli
had brought forward in the previous autumn; and it was said at the time, with
some force, that, as he had destroyed one Budget, he ought to make another.
Those who made the statement hardly foresaw the use to which Gladstone was to
put the opportunity before him.
The figures
on which his Budget was based were simple. The expenditure, for which he had to
provide, slightly exceeded =£52,000,000; the surplus reached some £800,000. But
these figures assumed that the Income Tax, which had been reimposed in 1842,
and periodically renewed, would be continued; and, as a matter of fact, the
Income Tax expired in 1853. Gladstone decided not merely to renew the tax, but
to render it more efficient by extending it to Ireland, and applying it to
incomes varying from £100 to £150 a year. On the other hand, he proposed that
its rate should be reduced from Id. to 6d. in 1855, to 5d. in 1857; and that
the tax should altogether cease in 1860. He held out, therefore, the agreeable
prospect of the extinction of an unpopular tax at a comparatively early date;
and he reconciled the Irish to the extension of the tax to Ireland by remitting
the interest due on the loans advanced to the Irish during the famine of
1845-6.
In Great
Britain an objection was constantly raised to the tax that it fell with equal
severity on the secure income which landlords derived from houses and land, and
on the more precarious one which the professional and trading classes won by
their skill and enterprise. Gladstone was able to allay much of the popular
discontent by an analysis of the
facts, which
showed that the existing tax did actually differentiate between the two classes
of income, since it was levied on the gross return from land and houses, and on
the net return from the profits of trade and professions. Recognising, however,
some injustice in the existing arrangements, he extended to all successions
whatever the legacy duty, which had hitherto pressed but lightly on holders of
real property. But the new expedient was not very fortunate in result.
Gladstone had designed the Succession Duty as the first among other projected
reforms, which were intended to provide for the ultimate abolition of the
Income Tax Owing to the encumbrances on estates and the previous operation of
the Legacy Duty, the new expedient had far less success than had been
anticipated. Furthermore the Succession Duty as to land and houses was
calculated on the annual value during the life of the successor, an amount in
most cases much below the actual capital value. But, despite its disappointing
character, the actual yield of the Succession Duty, together with an increase
of the duties on Scotch and Irish distilleries, brought the surplus to more
than three millions.
The
additional revenue thus acquired enabled Gladstone to make extensive changes in
taxation. He continued Peel’s policy of Free Trade by sweeping away several
Customs duties, originally imposed for purposes of Protection, and by reducing
others; he brought down the duty on tea by successive stages of descent from
2j. %\d. to 1«. the pound; he simplified and systematised many of the minor
taxes, such as those relating to domestic servants, horses, carriages, and the
like; and he repealed the duty on soap, which Adam Smith had condemned. These
great and drastic chpr.ges placed the Budget on the same plane as Sir Robert
Peel’s memorable measures of 1842, 1845 and 1846; and they were explained with
a lucidity and eloquence which raised their author to the first rank of
parliamentary statesmen. Large, however, and comprehensive as the Budget was,
it had two defects. First, the Succession Duty had produced an inadequate
return, and, secondly, the whole plan of the Budget depended on the maintenance
of expenditure at its existing proportion. Unhappily events were already in
progress destined to iisarrange the national balance-sheet, by menacing the
peace which the country had enjoyed since 1815.
Since 1740
France had enjoyed a treaty right to the custody of the sacred places in or
near Jerusalem, which were the chief objects of the pilgrimage of devout men
belonging both to the Latin and Greek Churches. For more than a hundred years,
however, France had done little or nothing to carry out the duties thus
entrusted to her. During this period of her neglect members of the Greek Church
had occupied and repaired the shrines which France had permitted to fall into
decay; they had even obtained permits from the Sultan to enable them to do so.
In 1850, however, Napoleon, as President of the French Republic, anxious to
conciliate Roman Catholic sentiment, renewed the claini,
which had
been suffered to sleep for more than a century; and, after a negotiation
protracted over many months, the French ambassador at the Porte succeeded in
obtaining a substantial recognition of the French demand. The news of this
concession at once elicited a strong protest from Russia. The Porte found, to
its dismay, that it could not conciliate one of the disputants without
incurring the hostility of the other. It endeavoured, in the first instance, to
gain time; it tried later on to concede something to both parties in the
quarrel. It communicated its decision in different, and not quite consistent,
terms to the two Powers. The dispute which thus arose between France and Russia
was aggravated at the close of 1852 by the conversion of the French Republic
into the Second Empire. The Tsar, Nicholas I, nurtured amidst Legitimist
traditions, disliked their infraction by the elevation of a new Napoleon to the
imperial throne. He marked his displeasure by the childish expedient of writing
a letter to Napoleon in which he addressed him not as “ Brother ” but as “
Friend.” Napoleon took no active steps to express his displeasure, but
doubtless resented a slight which a hereditary sovereign might possibly have ignored.
While an
unfortunate estrangement had thus arisen between Russia and France, the Tsar,
at the beginning of January, 1853—a few days after the accession of Lord
Aberdeen to office—took occasion to speak to Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British
ambassador at St Petersburg, on the future of Turkey. The change of ministry in
England probably suggested the conversation; for Nicholas had paid a memorable
visit to England nine years before, and had discussed the Eastern situation
with Lord Aberdeen, then Foreign Minister. To Sir Hamilton Seymour, in
1853, he used much the same language that he
had employed in talking to Lord Aberdeen in 1844. The Turk, so he said, was
very ill. It would be a grave misfortune, if we were not to provide beforehand
for the contingency of his death. Five days afterwards he asked Sir Hamilton to
communicate his opinion to the British Government; and Lord John Russell, who
still held the seals of the Foreign Office, replied in a friendly despatch that
provisional arrangements, made without the cognisance of the Powers, might
provoke the crisis which England was anxious to avoid; but that she would in
any case enter into no negotiation for the disposal of Turkish territory,
without arriving at an understanding with Russia in the first instance. On
February 20, 1853, when Sir Hamilton had received Lord John’s despatch, the
Tsar at a third interview again dwelt on the fate impending over Turkey. He had
no desire, so he said, to see Constantinople in the occupation of Russia or any
other great Power; on the other hand, he would not consent to the restoration
of the old Byzantine Empire, to the extension of the boundaries of Greece, or
to the division of Turkey into a series of little States. The Principalities
already enjoyed independence under the protection of Russia; Servia, Bulgaria
and the other Turkish provinces might be given a similar
constitution;
and England might ensure her communications with the East by occupying Egypt
and Crete. The new conversation, like the oldj led to no results. Lord
Clarendon, the new Foreign Secretary, repeated the language of his predecessor.
The British Government did not think the end of Turkey so near as the Tsar
supposed; but, should the catastrophe come, the future of Turkey could be
regulated at a congress of the Great Powers.
Convinced in
his own mind that Turkey could not survive, the Tsar "had already taken a
step calculated to hasten her end. He had despatched Prince Menshikoff on a
special mission to Constantinople, and had strengthened his own armies on the
Moldavian frontier. Menshikoff reached Constantinople on March 15, 1853; he
deliberately neglected to call on Fuad, the Reis Effendi, or Minister for
Foreign Affairs; and Fuad at once resigned office. In the panic which ensued
the Grand Vizier appealed to the Ministers of England and France. It so
happened that, in the absence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who was in
England, and of La Cour, who had not arrived at his post, both of these
countries were represented by charges d'affaires. Benedetti, the representative
of France, contented himself with at once despatching a grave warning to Paris.
Colonel Rose, who represented England, and who was afterwards raised to the
peerage for his services in India, decided on sending to Malta for the British
fleet. On the arrival of the news in London, the British Government overruled
Colonel Rose’s decision, and ordered the fleet to return to Malta; the French
Government, on the contrary, on March 20 directed the French fleet to sail from
Toulon for . Greece.
So far
nothing had occurred to involve this country, either in the original dispute
about the Holy Places or in Prince Menshikoff’s mission. On April 19, however,
the Prince formally asked that the Greek Church in Turkey might be placed under
the protection of Russia. From a Russian point of view there was something to
be said for this demand. It expanded a principle which had been laid down some
eighty years before in the Treaty of Kainardji, when the Greek Church at
Constantinople and its officiating minister had been placed under Russian
protection; and it merely accorded to Russia a right similar to that which
Austria already possessed, of protecting the members of the Roman Catholic
Church. But the members of the Roman Church were few, those of the Greek Church
were many; and Lord Stratford, who had now resumed his duties as British
Minister at the Porte, considered that the Power entitled to protect them would
obtain a right of intervention in almost every Turkish province. Lord Stratford
accordingly induced the Porte to reject courteously but firmly the Russian
proposal; in consequence of which attitude Prince Menshikoff broke off the
negotiation on May 22, 1853, and withdrew from Constantinople. Through the
action of Lord Stratford, and without any express authority from home, the
whole aspect of the situation had been changed; and
314
Stratford de Redcliffe and Turkey.
[l853
England,
which originally had been no party to the dispute, had become a principal to
the quarrel. The change in her position was at once accentuated by her
proceedings. For, in consequence of Prince MenshikofFs withdrawal, Russia at
the end of May threatened to send her armies to cross the Pruth and occupy the
Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), and the Western Powers
retaliated by ordering their fleets to the mouth of the Dardanelles.
Diplomacy,
however, did not relax its efforts to prevent a rupture. Austria, interested in
the free navigation of the Danube, and alarmed at the prospect of the
occupation of the Principalities commanding its banks, added her efforts to
those of the Western Allies to compose the dispute. Through her influence the
negotiation was transferred to Vienna, and the representatives of the Great
Powers in that city adopted in July a Note, originally prepared in France,
which they agreed to present both at St Petersburg and at Constantinople. On
August 3 the Russian Government accepted this proposal, and the diplomatists
believed that peace was ensured. Before the end of the month, however, the
Porte intimated that it could only adopt the note if certain amendments were
introduced into it. Officially, there is no doubt that Lord Stratford urged the
Porte to accept the decision of the Great Powers. Unfortunately, there is
equally no doubt that he took no pains to conceal his opposition to their
policy. Even his apologists declare that “ it is not to he believed that he
could hide his real thoughts from the Turkish Minister ”; and the universal
judgment of historians is that the Sultan’s Ministers, in demanding the
alteration of the note, carried out the private views and disregarded the
official language of Lord Stratford.
For the
moment it seemed that Turkey by her conduct had deprived the Western Powers of
every pretence for continuing to her their support. She had refused, while
Russia had accepted, the terms on which Austria, France, England and Prussia
had concluded that the dispute should be settled. The British Cabinet, however,
with some inconsistency, decided on submitting the Turkish modifications of
the note to St Petersburg. They were naturally rejected by the Tsar, and the
Russian Minister drew up a memorandum detailing the reasons for their
rejection. This memorandum found its way into a Prussian newspaper. On its
publication the diplomatists of Europe were startled to find that the Russian
Government attached a meaning to the note, different from that which its
authors had intended to express. This revelation had the effect of breaking up
the concert of the four mediating Powers. For, while Austria and Prussia still
endeavoured to secure the Porte’s acceptance of the note, France and England
forbore from doing so. Reassured by the attitude of the Western Powers, at the
beginning of October,
1853, the Sultan, with Lord Stratford’s approval:
or at his suggestion, called upon Russia to evacuate the Principalities within
fifteen days, and added that a refusal would be considered as tantamount to a
declaration
of war. In
pursuance of this threat, the Turkish army under Omar Pasha actually crossed
the Danube; and, though Russia announced her intention of remaining on the
defensive during the winter, both in Europe and Asia, engagements occasionally
took place between the hostile armies. A state of war had now actually arisen ;
yet diplomacy at Vienna was still renewing its efforts to preserve or restore
peace; and, in the beginning of December, a new Note was drawn up in which the
Ministers of the Four Powers undertook to mediate between the combatants.
Whatever hope existed that this new intervention might avert hostilities was
destroyed by an event which, strangely enough, no one had foreseen. On November
30 a Turkish squadron, on its way from the Bosphorus to Batoum, was attacked at
Sinope by a Russian fleet, and virtually destroyed.
The news of
the “massacre” at Sinope reached London and Paris towards the middle of
December, 1853. It was received in both countries with the same feelings of
strong indignation. Opinion in neither capital stopped to enquire whether the
attack had been caused by the hostile action of the Western Powers, or whether
it could be justified by historical precedent. Yet it is apparently certain
that the “massacre” was Russia’s answer to the decision of the Western Powers
in the previous September to order their fleets to pass the Dardanelles; for
the Tsar naturally desired to strike a blow at the Turkish navy before the
reinforcements, which had arrived at Constantinople, could intervene in its
favour. The action of the Russian Government, moreover, was not unprecedented;
but provoked or unprovoked, justified or unjustified, the action was eminently
unwise. The chances of peace were almost destroyed by the news of it; and, in
Great Britain, the war party in the country and in the Cabinet became almost
irresistible.
For,
unhappily, throughout the long diplomatic struggle, there were two parties in
the British Cabinet. Both of them were sincerely desirous of peace; but their
methods for maintaining peace were absolutely opposed. Lord Aberdeen and his
immediate friends believed in the good faith of the Emperor Nicholas and had
little confidence in Turkey. Lord Palmerston, on the contrary, had no faith in
Russia, but a strong belief in the possible regeneration of the Turkish empire.
Lord Aberdeen thought that peace could be preserved by endeavouring to meet
what was reasonable in the demands of Russia. Lord Palmerston thought, on the
contrary, that peace was to be secured by convincing Russia that, if war broke
out, she would have to deal with other Powers besides Turkey. If Lord Aberdeen
had stood alone, he might have averted war by conciliation. If Lord Palmerston
had stood alone, he might have averted war by action. But Lord Palmerston’s
action robbed Lord Aberdeen’s conciliation of its grace; and Lord Aberdeen’s
conciliation took the strength out of Lord Palmerston’s action. The contrary
counsels, which to some extent paralysed the Cabinet, gave Lord
Stratford his
opportunity. Lord Stratford, like Lord Palmerston, believed in the possible
regeneration of Turkey; and he was determined to resent Russian intervention in
her affairs.
While the war
party in the Cabinet were supporting Lord Stratford, Lord Aberdeen’s contrary
efforts were weakened by Lord John Russell’s attitude. Lord John was not
prepaled to go so far as Lord Palmerston, but he was dissatisfied with the
drift which was carrying the country into war. He thought that Lord Aberdeen
was not exercising a sufficient control over affairs, and that the time had
come for the Prime Minister to carry out his promise of retirement. But, while
it was easy *for Lord Aberdeen to promise retirement in January, it was much
more difficult for him to fulfil his purpose when negotiations were in
progress, on whose issue peace and war depended. Thus, as 1853 drew to a close,
Lord Aberdeen was still labouring for peace; Lord Palmerston was making ready
for battle; and Lord John Russell was contemplating retirement from the
Ministry. He was finally induced to reconsider his opinion on the assurance
that Parliamentary Reform, which, in his eyes, was only second in importance to
European peace, should be seriously proposed in the succeeding session. But
this concession, which secured a continuance of Lord John’s services, produced
a new crisis. Lord Palmerston, who disliked Reform at home as much as he was
opposed to autocracy on the Continent, resigned office. The Cabinet was nearly
broken up in consequence of his resignation, which he was ultimately persuaded
to withdraw. But he returned to power with the authority attaching to a man whose
presence has been found to be indispensable.
Notwithstanding
the excitement which followed the “ massacre ” at Sinope, and though, at the
instance of France, the French and British fleets were instructed to enter the
Euxine, and “ invite ” all Russian ships of war to return to Sevastopol,
diplomacy made its last effort to avert the impending calamity. At the end of
December, 1853, Lord Stratford prevailed on the Sultan to accept a new Note,
which the representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, had drawn up. In the
beginning of January, 1854, it was forwarded to St Petersburg for the Tsar’s
acceptance. By an unfortunate coincidence, it reached St Petersburg at the
moment when the news came that the British and French fleets were “inviting”
the Russian vessels to return to port. Nicholas refused, in the circumstances,
to answer the new proposal; and, in the beginning of February, the Russian
Ministers were withdrawn from Paris and London, the British and French
Ministers from St Petersburg. War did not actually break out with the
suspension of diplomacy. The first object of war was obviously to dear the
Russian armies out of the Principalities, which they had occupied since the
failure of Menshikoffs mission. And in this object Austria had a more direct interest
than either of the Western Powers. On February 22, she offered to join France
and England in requiring the evacuation of the Principalities by a fixed date.
1854] France and England declare war against
Russia. 317
But the
indignation of the British public at the Sinope “ massacre ” was so great, and
its impatience was so marked, that the Ministry were unable to resist the
demand for war. Without waiting for a formal arrangement with Austria, the
Western Powers addressed an ultimatum to Russia; and, on the Tsar refusing to
reply to it, declared war.
The opening
months of the War were marked by a Turkish success and a British failure. The
Turkish armies under Omar Pasha, encouraged by the presence of the forces
which France and England were collecting at Varna, and by the menacing attitude
of Austria, were enabled to secure the evacuation of the Principalities by
Russia. On the other hand, the British fleet despatched to the Baltic under the
command of Sir Charles Napier did nothing quite worthy of its own reputation or
the expectations of the public. The failure was unfortunate, for otherwise the
evacuation of the Principalities might have led to a resumption of
negotiations. The public, however, in England and the army in France were by
this time longing for military success, and desired to inflict a serious blow
on Russia by destroying the great arsenal at Sevastopol, which they regarded as
a standing menace to the Turkish empire. Thus in September, it was decided that
the Allied armies should be moved from Varna and landed in the Crimea. Under
the command of Marshal Saint-Amaud, an officer who had seen service in Algeria,
and of Lord Raglan, a veteran who had served on Wellington’s staff in the
Peninsula, they landed in the Crimea, on September 14,1854. On the 20th, they
encountered the Russian army under Prince Menshikoff, drawn up on some wooded
heights above the Alma, a little river which flows into the Euxine to the north
of Sevastopol. The Allies had to cross the stream and scale the heights on which
the Russians stood. The battle resulted in a victory which was purchased at a
serious loss. The victors, out of a force of some 60,000 men, had some 3300
killed and wounded; and the larger proportion of this loss fell on the English.
The enemy, with a smaller force engaged, left 1800 dead bodies on the field;
their wounded exceeded 3000. If the Allied armies had followed up their
success, it is possible that they might have entered the north side of
Sevastopol with the flying enemy. But the troops were tired out with the
protracted struggle; and, instead of pursuing the enemy, they remained on the
scene of their victory. The delay enabled Prince Menshikoff to carry out two
momentous decisions. Convinced that the north side of Sevastopol could not
survive the combined assault of the Allied fleets and armies, he blockaded the
harbour by sinking the Russian fleet at its entrance; and, practically leaving
the town and fortress to be protected by the crews of the sunken ships, he
withdrew his own army to the north-east, holding it in a position to watch the
Allies, and at the same time secure its line of communications with Russia. The
sinking of the Russian fleet convinced Marshal Saint- Amaud that the north side
of the town could not be attacked. A task
which would
have been easy to fleet and army combined, seemed difficult .or impossible to
the army alone. With Lord Raglan’s concurrence, therefore, it was decided to
march round Sevastopol and assail it, where probably assault was least
expected, from the south. This strange movement commenced on the 25th, and was
completed on the 27th of September. The line of march of the Allies cut the
line of retreat of Prince Menshikoff. The English who formed the van actually
encountered the Russian rearguard. Yet the Intelligence Departments of the two
armies had received such defective information that neither of them suspected
the movements in which their enemies were engaged.
The
conditions, in which the expedition had been undertaken, required that the
flank march should be followed by an immediate assault. The British Cabinet,
when deciding on the invasion of the Crimea, had relied upon some secret
information that Sevastopol, though strongly fortified on the sea front, was
incapable of defence against an attack by land. So confident was the Cabinet of
the accuracy of this information that it made no adequate preparations for a
winter campaign. So . convinced were the leaders of the army that the town
would fall, that three out of the four Generals of Division directed their men
to leave their knapsacks behind them. Three-fourths of the troops thus arrived
before the town with no tents and no change of clothing. The want of equipment
was the more serious because the troops, which had been suffering at Varna from
cholera, had brought with them the seeds of that disease; and cholera is
especially fatal, if an army is chained to a particular position. If, then, the
leaders of the army had seriously examined the situation in all its bearings,
they would probably have concluded that, if they were not prepared to carry
Sevastopol by assault, they ought not to have been in the Crimea at all; and
that the loss of life attending an attack would in any case be inferior to that
arising from the ravages of disease. These considerations, however, do not seem
to have occurred either to Lord Raglan or to General Canrobert, who had
succeeded Saint- Amaud in the command of the French army. Acting on the advice
of their engineers, they decided that it was wise to shake the place by
bombardment, before attacking it with infantry; and, before commencing the
attack, they were consequently compelled to wait till October 17, the earliest
day when they were able to concentrate on the front the guns and ammunition
required for the bombardment.
The decision
gave the Russians their opportunity; for, while no man of firstrate military
capacity held any important position either in the British or in the French
army, one man of genius came forward in the Russian ranks to animate the
defence. Colonel Todleben, a Russian officer of Engineers, was aware that the
town must have fallen if the Allies had attacked at once. The three weeks’
delay enabled him to throw up a series of earthworks, which were destined to
detain the Allied armies for the best part of a year. When the bombardment at
last took place,
1854] Actions before Sevastopol.—Inkerman. 319
the Allies
found that an open town had been converted into an almost impregnable fortress.
The Russians succeeded in repairing at night the ravages effected in the day;
and Sevastopol was actually stronger after the bombardment which was to have
precipitated its fall, than when the Allies arrived before it.
Their fatal
decision to postpone the attack was attended by another consequence. At the
Alma, the Allies had 60,000 men against 40,000 Russians. Before the end of
October, the rapid arrival of Russian reinforcements had reversed the relative
strength of the combatants. The Allies had received no material reinforcements,
while the Russians had 100,000 men. The Allied armies were, thenceforward,
attempting the siege of a town which the genius of one man had converted into a
fortress, with a force only half as strong as that of the enemy they were
attacking. This alteration in the conditions of the campaign naturally suggested
to Prince MenshikofF that the time had come for attempting to drive the Allies
from their positions; and, on October 25, he directed an attack on the rear of
the British position at Balaklava; on November 5 he struck at the British line
at Inkerman. The first of these movements led to a series of engagements in
which Sir Colin Campbell, with the 93rd foot in line, received and repulsed a
formidable onslaught of Russian cavalry, while General Scarlett, at the head of
the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, completed the victory Sir Colin had gained; and Lord
Cardigan led the Light Cavalry Brigade in that famous but useless charge, of
which the French said, “ c’est magnifique, mais ce rCest pas la guerre.” The
sortie of November 5 resulted in the battle of Inkerman, in which a
comparatively weak British force, eventually supported by the French, withstood
and ultimately defeated a large Russian army.
The losses
sustained by the British seriously reduced an army already too weak for the
work before it. For, after fie failure of the bombardment, it was evident that
the Allied armies would have to remain in the Crimea during the ensuing winter.
The resources at their disposal were, however, obviously inadequate for a
winter campaign. The resources of the transport had been strained to provide
the troops with the guns and ammunition required for the bombardment; and
nothing had been done to provide the men with the equipment which was
absolutely necessary for their health. Even the soldiers who were wounded in
battle or struck down with cholera had neither adequate shelter nor the
necessary medical comforts. Deplorable as was their condition, it was
aggravated by the consequences of a great storm which burst over Sevastopol on
November 14, wrecking many vessels laden with munition and stores, levelling
almost every tent to the ground, and, worse than all, blocking with snow and
slush the roads by which the stores were brought from Balaklava to the camp. It
became almost impossible to supply the army with the ammunition and food on
which its existence depended, or to provide the baggage animals with the
necessary forage.
320 Sufferings of the British army.-Fall of
Aberdeen. [1854-5
For
want of forage the horses died.; for want of horses the transport was
paralysed; for want of transport the stores awaiting at Balaklava could not be
brought to the front; and for want of stores the army melted away. : , > •
A generation
which had no experience of war in Europe, which had entered into the struggle
with a light heart and a confident expectation of victory, was appalled by the
tidings of suffering and death brought to it from the Crimea. For the first
time in the history of war, newspaper enterprise was maintaining at the front
correspondents specially qualified to convey vivid impressions of what was
passing by their pens. A public whose own impatience was, in one sense, the
cause of the suffering called loudly for the punishment of the men who were
ostensibly responsible for it. And, when Parliament reassembled on January 23,
1855, John Arthur Roebuck gave notice that he would move for a Committee of
Enquiry. The notice at once produced Lord John Russell’s resignation. Lord
John, it is fair to say, had strongly recommended the reorganisation of the
War Office in the previous autumn; and he felt that he could not defend in
public an organisation which he had condemned in private. His retirement made
the defence of the Ministry impossible. After two nights’ debate it was
defeated by . a large majority (305 to 148), and Lord Aberdeen resigned office.
Thus ended,
in disgrace and contempt, the career of a Minister who in happier circumstances
might have been recollected as a great British statesman. During the long
administration of Sir Robert Peel, indeed, he had conducted the affairs of the
Foreign Office with consummate prudence, tact, and self-effacement. But the
cautious and conciliatory temperament which admirably qualified him to preside
over the Foreign Office in a period of calm unfitted him for the leadership in
a time of stress and storm. He had not the personality which would have enabled
many men of Capacity inferior to his own to impose their will on a divided
Cabinet; and, under the pressure of Lord Stratford at Constantinople and of
Lord Palmerston at home, he drifted into a policy which he disliked and
disapproved. On his resignation, the public instinct pointed to Lord Palmerston
as his successor; and, after a vain attempt to secure the services of Lord
Derby, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord John Russell, the Queen was forced to send for
the Minister whose conduct of foreign policy she had condemned in 1849 and
1850. In the first instance all the old Cabinet, with the exception of Lord
John Russell, consented to serve under the new Prime Minister. When, however,
Roebuck insisted on the appointment of the Committee of Enquiry, the three men,
most intimately associated with Lord Aberdeen—Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and
Sidney Herbert—retired from the Cabinet.
While this
crisis was still acute, the authorities were straining every nerve to relieve
the wants and sufferings of the army. Supplies were hurried out; a good
metalled road was made from Balaklava to the camp;
the
debilitated army was steadily reinforced; Florence Nightingale and a devoted
band of ladies introduced order into the hospitals at Scutari and Kulali on the
Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. The lengthening days and the finer weather of
the spring assisted the work of administration; and the sanitary condition of’
the army in May, 1855, was about as creditable as it had been disgraceful in
November, 1854.
At the moment
when the public at home and the army in the Crimea were equally regaining
confidence and looking forward to fresh glories, a serious effort was made to
restore peace. In April, 1854, the Four Powers, assembled in Conference at
Vienna, had agreed on a vague Protocol recording their desire to maintain the
integrity of the Turkish empire, and to provide securities for the rights of
its Christian subjects. In the following August three of the Powers, Austria,
France, and Great Britain, adopted a Note detailing four points which they
professed themselves anxious to secure. These points were: the substitution of
an international for a Russian protectorate of the Danubian province; the
freedom of the navigation of the Danube; the maintenance and independence of
the Turkish empire; and the renunciation by Russia of any claim to protect the
Christian subjects of the Porte. In the middle of November, 1854, the Tsar
authorised Prince Gorchakoff, his Minister at Vienna, to discuss the terms of
peace on the basis of these points. At the beginning of January, 1855, he
definitely consented to treat on this basis; and early in March a new
Conference was opened at Vienna. Lord Palmerston entrusted Lord John Russell with
the task of representing Great Britain at the Conference. While Lord John was
on his way to Vienna, the Tsar, whose obstinacy was regarded by Western Europe
as the cause of the war, died at St Petersburg. It was naturally considered
that his son and successor might prove more tractable than his father and
desire to inaugurate his reign by terminating an exhausting struggle. When the
Conference actually began, this hope seemed likely to be fulfilled. The first
two points—the future of the Principalities, and the freedom of the Danube—were
found to raise no difficulties. When, however, the third point was reached, it
was found that the Western Powers desired to ensure the independence of the
Turkish empire by converting the Black Sea into a neutral lake. It was the
misfortune of the Western Allies that this particular demand was faintly
supported both by Austria and Turkey. Austria had secured the objects at which
she was aiming when the two first points were conceded; Turkey was chiefly
anxious for the concession of the last, which would deprive Russia of any
pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire. Prince
Gorchakoff had, therefore, reason for believing that he might venture on
resisting the third point. Instead, however, of rejecting the proposal, he
offered either to open the Black Sea to the ships of every nation, or to vest
in the Sultan the right of permitting at his discretion the warships of any
Power to pass through the Straits. The
322 Failure of Buol’s proposals.—Fall of
Sevastopol. [i855
Western
Powers refused the alternatives, and the Conference practically came to an end.
At this
moment Count Buol, the representative of Austria, unfolded a new proposal. He
suggested, as an alternative to the “ neutralisation ” of the Black Sea, that
an arrangement should be concluded between Russia and Turkey, under which any
addition to the Russian strength might be met by a corresponding addition to
the Turkish fleet and the admission of a certain number of French and British
war-vessels into the Euxine. If this suggestion was adopted, Count Buol
undertook to form a triple alliance between Austria, France, and Great Britain.
Both Lord John Russell, the representative of England, and Drouyn de Lhuys, the
representative of France, considered Count Buol’s proposal to be outside their
instructions, but they decided on at once returning home and on recommending it
to their principals. Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon were, from the first,
opposed to the new project. Napoleon III, who in the first instance was
inclined to regard it with some favour, was induced to reject it. A premature
and inadequate peace—so he was told by Vaillant—would have the worst possible
effect on the army. Both the Western Allies, therefore, decided to reject the Austrian
principle of counterpoise as an adequate solution of the difficulty; Drouyn de
Lhuys and Lord John Russell retired from the Cabinets which rejected their
advice, and the War went on.
The struggle
was renewed under new men and new conditions. The armies of the Allies were no
longer decimated with disease, and their spirits rose with the lengthening days
of spring and summer. The little State of Piedmont, in whose counsels Count
Cavour was predominant, threw in its lot with the Western Powers and sent a
contingent to the Crimea in May, which bore a large and distinguished part in a
battle on the Chernaya. While the conditions under which the struggle was continued
were thus altered, the men under whom it was conducted were changed. In May,
1855, General Canrobert was replaced in the command of the French army by
General Pelissier; in June Lord Raglan succumbed to the labour and the
disappointments of his position, and was succeeded by General Simpson, and
ultimately by General Codrington. The difficulties of the Russians were
increased by some successful operations in the Sea of Azoff, where large
quantities of stores intended for their army at Sevastopol were destroyed. An
assault on the Malakhoff and the Redan, which proved unsuccessful in June, was renewed
in September; and, though the British were repulsed a second time from the
Redan, the French obtained possession of the Malakhoff, which was to give a
title to their commander. The Russians, recognising the importance of its
capture, withdrew across the harbour and gave the Allies possession of the
south side of the town.
The fall of
the southern half of Sevastopol did not immediately end the War. Lord
Palmerston indeed declared that Russia was not beaten
enough, and
wished to continue the struggle. Public opinion in England, a little sore at
the failure of British troops at the Redan and the success of the French at the
Malakhoff, was equally anxious, before consenting to peace, that some new
laurels should be acquired by the English army. On the other hand, the reverses
which Russia had sustained, and the exhaustion from which she was suffering,
made her more ready to negotiate ; while Napoleon, satisfied with the success
which his arms had secured, and conscious of the strain which the War was causing
to his finances, was anxious that it should end. Peace, so he said, was his
object. But if the War went on he should give it a new character, and make an
appeal to nationalities, in Poland and elsewhere, to rise against autocracy.
Napoleon’s intentions to give the War a new character by appealing to the
doctrines of nationalities induced even Lord Palmerston to pause. Anxious as he
was to push matters to an extreme, he was unprepared to raise revolutions in
every part of Europe. Austria again came forward to urge peace on the Tsar;
Prussia, which had hitherto held aloof, recommended the new Tsar to yield, and
on January 16, 1856, the Russian Court finally consented to treat on the basis
of the four points. In the last days of February the representatives of
Austria and of the belligerent Powers, assembled in the Congress of Paris,
agreed on an armistice to endure till March 31.
The task of
the plenipotentiaries at Paris proved much easier than that of their
predecessors at Vienna. In retiring from the south to the north side of
Sevastopol, after the capture of the Malakhoff, Russia had herself destroyed
what remained of her fleet; and, in consenting to the neutralisation of the
Black Sea, she was practically only affirming a state of things which she could
no longer ignore. She claimed, and received, the right to construct some small
vessels of light draft for the policing of her shores; and, with this
reservation, accepted the condition which she had so firmly rejected at Vienna.
The lot of the Christians created more discussion ; and the plenipotentiaries
ultimately contented themselves with a formal promise from the Sultan, to place
his Christian subjects on an equality with their Mussulman neighbours. The
navigation of the Danube was opened to all nations. The Danubian Principalities
were granted entire independence, under the suzerainty of the Porte; and a
small strip of Bessarabia was added to their territory. The boundaries of
Turkey and Russia in Asia were restored to their position before the War;
Turkey was allowed to participate in the advantages of the puhlic law of
Europe; the contracting Powers agreed to respect and guarantee the independence
and integrity of the Ottoman empire, while three of them—Austria, France, and
Great Britain—perhaps a little distrustful of the others, pledged themselves
collectively and severally to regard any infraction of any part of the Treaty
as a cause of war.
Such were the
chief provisions of the famous Congress which brought the Crimean War to a
close. It is perhaps worth while adding that the
firman, under
which the Suitan promised to grant religious liberty and equality to all
classes of his subjects, was never acted on; that the neutrality of the Black
Sea was maintained only till 1870; that the strip of territory, which was taken
from Russia in 1856, was returned to her in 1878; and that none of the Great
Powers, when the integrity of the Ottoman empire was assailed in the latter
year, intervened in its defence. If the policy of the Congress of Paris was not
destined to survive, the arrangements which the Emperor Nicholas desired to
make have been largely carried out. The provinces of Turkey have, to a great
extent, been made the autonomous Principalities which Nicholas suggested they
should become. England is in occupation—not of Egypt and Crete, which Nicholas
suggested she should receive—but of Egypt and Cyprus. So far the views of the
defeated belligerent have come true; the aims of the victorious belligerents
have been set aside. Yet Russia is no nearer Constantinople than she was in
1856. For, clearly as Nicholas foresaw the trend of events, he failed to see
that autonomous provinces placed under Russian protection would sooner or later
cast off their protector; and that, instead of assisting the expansion of
Russia, they would become new and formidable obstacles to her advance towards
the Bosphorus.
Whatever may
have been the result of this great war, the price which was paid for it was
heavy. The estimate of La Gorce that the French lost 95,000 men, the English
20,000, the Russians 110,000, from death and disease in the Crimea,
inadvertently compares two different things. It includes in the French loss and
excludes from the British loss the men who were discharged from effects of
wounds and disease and died on their return home ; and the estimate of the
Russian loss is avowedly imperfect, for it excludes the victims of disease
during the second winter of the siege, and the enormous numbers, who succumbed
to fatigue and illness, during the long marches across Russia to reinforce
their wasting comrades in the Crimea. The English Secretary of State for War
computed the total Russian loss at nearly half a million of men; an estimate
since accepted by English writers. Allowing for a Turkish loss of 30,000, and a
Sardinian loss of 2000, it does not seem an exaggeration to say that the
Crimean War cost the lives of 600,000 men.
Huge and
horrible as the death-roll was, it does not tell the whole story. From 1815 to
1854 the Continent of Europe had practically enjoyed peace; no two of the great
European Powers had, at any rate, been engaged in war with each other. But from
1856 to 1878 the Continent of Europe was afflicted with five great Wars—the
Franco- Austrian of 1859; the Danish of 1864; the Austro-Prussian of 1866; the
Franco-German of 1870; and the Russo-Turkish of 1878—all of which can be
lineally traced to the war of 1854. Thus the obscure and unintelligible dispute
about the custody of the Holy Places developed into a quarrel, which let loose
war upon Europe and terminated the forty years of peace which had followed
Waterloo.
GREAT
BRITAIN, LAST YEARS OF WHIGGISM, PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.
(1856-68.)
While the Crimean War still lasted, there was a general
desire among all classes of the English people that Lord Palmerston should
remain Prime Minister. He had been called to office and maintained in it from a
belief that he could be trusted to conduct the War with vigour. But, when the
War was closed by the Treaty of Paris, the necessity for retaining Lord
Palmerston in power disappeared. It was then recollected that without the
support of the Peelites and of Lord John Russell, who had left him in 1855, he
could not command a majority in the House of Commons; while it was assumed that
a man who had completed his seventy-second year, and who was thought to be
feeling the weight of age, could neither expect nor desire to continue in a
position which no one equally old had ever filled in England before.
Thus,
when Parliament met in February, 1857, men were speculating on the chances of a
change of Ministry. But, before a month of the session was over, news arrived
from the Far East which affected the situation. Owing to certain disputes
concerned with the lorcha “Arrow,” of which an account is given elsewhere,
Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, under orders from Sir John Bowring, British
Governor of Hongkong, sunk a large number of Chinese junks, and destroyed the
forts in Canton harbour. The Ministry at home, on hearing of these doings,
hastily approved Sir John Bowring’s action. ,
Public men of
all parties in Parliament were almost unanimous in regretting these high-handed
proceedings; and motions adverse to the Government were carried by majorities
of 36 in the Lords and 16 in the Commons. Lord Palmerston at once saw that the
division must be fatal either to the Government, which had sustained, or to the
House which had inflicted, the defeat; and he decided on appealing to the
country. In the general election which ensued the electors rallied to the
Minister who, they thought, was upholding British interests. Men like Cobden,
who had led the attack on Sir John Bowring’s policy, and who
had incurred
unpopularity by opposing the Crimean War, lost their seats, and Lord Palmerston
found himself in the new Parliament, for the first time in his life, at the
head of a compact majority.
It so
happened that, almost on the day on which the new Parliament assembled, news
reached England of grave unrest in the native army of India, destined to
develop into a formidable mutiny, and to strain the resources of the British
Empire. The Sepoy Mutiny, whose history is related elsewhere, had the effect of
strengthening the strong position in which the results of the general election
had already placed Lord Palmerston. It was generally felt that the Minister who
had brought the Crimean War to a conclusion, was better qualified than any of
his contemporaries to deal with the new and grave crisis.
In the
meanwhile a session, begun late, afforded only few opportunities for
legislation, and the chief achievement of Parliament in 1857 was the passage of
a Divorce Act. Down to 1857, the Ecclesiastical Courts had been authorised to
grant a divorce a mensa et tkoro, in cases where the husband had reason to
complain of the misconduct of his wife, or the wife of her husband’s cruelty.
But the divorce merely released the parties from the obligations of marriage,
without leaving them free to marry again. For three centuries, however, rich
men, divorced from their wives, had been in the habit of promoting private
Bills in order to obtain Parliamentary sanction for the contraction of fresh
marriages. By a standing order, eminently characteristic of English
legislation, the House of Lords required that every such Bill should contain a
clause forbidding the marriage of the guilty parties, and this clause was
invariably struck out in committee. The Divorce Act of 1857 enabled the poor
man to do what the rich man, who could afford the luxury of a private Act of
Parliament, had constantly done. It removed the hearing of divorce cases from
the Ecclesiastical Courts to a new Civil Court; it enabled that Court to grant
the husband, on the misconduct of his wife, or the wife on the cruelty and
desertion of her husband, a divorce (a vinculo matrimonii) or a judicial separation
(a mensa et thoro); and, when a divorce was granted, it empowered the parties
to it to contract fresh marriages. As it was imagined in 1857 that the new
Court would have some leisure, Parliament decided on transferring to it
testamentary jurisdiction which, in the case of realty, had been hitherto
administered by the Court of Chancery, in the case of personalty, by the
Ecclesiastical Courts. The measure, therefore, incidentally marked a new stage
in the legislation which was gradually transferring secular matters from the
Courts of the Church to the Courts of the State. It was opposed by Samuel
Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford, in one House and by Gladstone in the other, on
the grounds that divorce was contrary to the spirit of the Bible, and that the marriage
of a divorced person had been expressly, condemned by Christ himself. Lord
Palmerston, however, refused to prohibit the marriage of the guilty parties, on
the ground that such
prohibition
would be cruel and immoral, and, when Gladstone opposed, clause after clause of
the Bill with a persistency which the obstructionists of a later period might
have admired, declared that he was ready to sit through September for the sake
of the measure. His perseverance was rewarded. Except that the Government assented
to an amendment which excused a clergyman who conscientiously objected from
celebrating the marriage of a divorced person, the Bill became law almost in
its original shape.
This success
achieved, Parliament was prorogued. But immediately after its prorogation, news
reached London of a serious financial crisis in the United States. Almost every
bank in the United States was compelled to suspend payment in cash. In New
York money was only procurable at an interest of 60 per cent. Institutions in
this country which had extensive dealings with the United States naturally felt
the crisis. In the latter half of October and the first half of November, banks
and other institutions in Liverpool and Glasgow were compelled to stop payment.
The Bank of England, on November 12, was forced to raise its rate of discount
to 10 per cent.; and, at the close of the day, its reserve (the aggregate of
the coin and notes in the banking department) was less than ,£600,000. The
Cabinet was forced to recognise the gravity of the crisis by authorising the
Bank to disregard the law, and issue notes in excess of the limit imposed upon
it by the Bank Charter Act of 1844.
The remedy
was as effectual as it had proved in 1847. Confidence was at once restored by
the knowledge that the Bank was armed with effectual powers; and the financial
hurricane of 1857 subsided almost as rapidly as it rose. The action of the
Government, however, in authorising the Bank to disregard the law, forced it
to summon Parliament, and to ask for an indemnity. Thus the session, which
otherwise would have been postponed till February, 1858, commenced early in
December, 1857. Before any serious business had been transacted, an event
occurred in Paris which, in its ultimate consequences, was destined to overthrow
the Administration. On Januaiy 14, 1858, the Emperor Napoleon III narrowly
escaped assassination at the hands of Orsini and other Italian conspirators. It
was unfortunately proved that the “Orsini Plot” had been planned in London,
that the bombs had been made in Birmingham, and that Orsini had travelled to
Paris under the protection of an English passport made out in an English name.
French opinion was inflamed against England. The Due de Moray, half-brother of
the Emperor, publicly asked how it was that a neighbouring Government was powerless
to destroy the laboratories of assassins; the colonels of French regiments sent
addresses to congratulate the Emperor on his escape, and called on him to
destroy the assassins’ den ; and Count Walewski, the Foreign Minister of
France, denounced England for sheltering persons who by their flagrant acts
placed themselves under the ban of humanity.
The language
thus publicly used created almost as much excitement
328 Defeat of Palmerston.—Derby Premier. ■
-{lsss
in England as
Orsini’s attempt had produced in France. The Government, anxious to appease
agitation, refrained from formally replying to Walewski’s despatch, and
introduced a short Bill making a conspiracy to commit murder either within or
without the United Kingdom a felony punishable by imprisonment for life.
People, however, both in and out of Parliament, whose passions had been
inflamed by the language of the French colonels, and who thought the conduct of
the Government in neglecting to answer Count Walewski tame, had no fancy for a
measure thought to be dictated by France. On the second reading of the Bill,
Milner Gibson asked the House of Commons to express its regret that the
Government had not replied to Count Walewski, before attempting to alter the law
of conspiracy. He was supported by advanced Liberals like Bright, by Whigs like
Lord John Russell, by Gladstone, and by the Conservative party, and his motion
was carried by 234 votes to 215.
There was
something exceptionally dramatic in this division. Of all the public men in
England Lord Palmerston was most closely identified with what was popularly
called the Civis Romanus policy; and Lord Palmerston was driven from power in a
House, in which he usually commanded an overwhelming majority, in consequence
of the general conviction that he had, for once, failed to maintain the honour
of the British name. In his place the Queen selected Lord Derby; who, after
trying but foiling to secure the cooperation of Gladstone, succeeded in forming
a Ministry, in which Disraeli again held the Chancellorship of the Exchequer
with the leadership of the House of Commons, . while Lord Ellenborough, who had
been recalled from the Govemor-General- ship of India in 1844, was placed at
the Board of Control.
The new
Administration contained men of ability and character; but it really depended
for its existence on the sufferance of its opponents, or on the differences
which distracted the Liberal party. Abroad and at home questions of great
delicacy or difficulty awaited solution. The tension between France and Great
Britain was unhappily aggravated by the circumstances of a trial which
attracted general attention. A Frenchman named Simon Bernard, living in London,
suspected of being actively engaged in the Orsini conspiracy, was charged as
accessory to the murder of an Englishman who had been one of the victims of the
explosion in the Avenue de l’Opera. Bernard was defended by Edwin James, who,
declaring that the prosecution had been directed by foreign dictation, asked
the jury to tell the French Emperor that he could not intimidate an English
jury. Amidst a scene of wild excitement the prisoner was acquitted. Happily,
however, the incident did not quench Napoleon Ill’s desire to maintain friendly
relations with Great Britain. Replacing Persigny, his representative in London,
by the Due de Malakhoff, the bluff soldier who had been the hero of the final
struggle in the Crimea, he created an opportunity for reconsidering the whole
controversy. Lord Malmesbury, the new Foreign Secretary, who in
other days
had enjoyed Napoleon’s friendship, showed every disposition to meet his
advances; the foolish language of the French colonels, and the discreditable
incidents of the Bernard trial were gradually forgotten, and the harmony
between France and England was restored.
If the
management of this unfortunate controversy brought some credit to the new
Government, another and more difficult problem nearly led to its fall. On the
suppression of the Mutiny it was felt that the government of India could not be
left with the old East India Company. Before his fall, Lord Palmerston had
introduced a Bill transferring the political functions of the Company to a
president and council of eight members appointed immediately by the Crown. The
proposal was, not unnaturally, resisted by the directors of the Company, and
they formulated their objections to it in a petition to Parliament, drawn up by
John Stuart Mill, the most distinguished of their servants in England. Lord
Derby’s Ministry, possibly influenced by Mill’s arguments, decided on placing
the government under a Secretary of State, assisted by a Council of eighteen
members, half of whom were to be appointed by the Crown and the other half to
be elected by the holders of India stock and five great commercial communities.
The idea of entrusting the formation of a governing body to the holders of
India stock and to the electors of five great manufacturing towns was received
with derision; and the Government would have been defeated, if Lord John Bussell
had not come forward with a suggestion that the Bill should be withdrawn and
its place taken by resolutions, on which a new measure might ultimately be
prepared. The eventual Bill founded on these resolutions effected a compromise
between the plan of Lord Palmerston and the original scheme of Lord Derby’s
Administration. The government of India was transferred to a Secretary of
State, assisted by a Council of fifteen members (in subsequent years reduced to
twelve), eight of whom were to be appointed by the Crown, and seven by the
directors of the old East India Company.
While these
measures were still under discussion, Lord Canning, the Governor-General of
India, sent home a proclamation in which he proposed, as a sequel to the
Mutiny, to confiscate the proprietary rights in the Province of Oudh. He wrote
at the same time a private letter to Vernon Smith, Lord Ellenborough’s
predecessor at the Board of Control, saying that he intended to accompany the
draft with an explanatory despatch, which he had not found time to complete
before the mail sailed. By a strange neglect Smith omitted to communicate this
letter to his successor; and Lord Ellenborough, in a secret despatch, took
occasion to condemn Lord Dalhousie’s policy in annexing Oudh, and, in still sterner
terms, Lord Canning’s draft proclamation. On May 6 the Times published a copy
of Lord Canning’s proclamation, which Lord Canning, it was then seen, had
himself amended. In questioning the Government on these circumstances Bright
was able to obtain from
Disraeli, not
only the pledge that the Government’s despatch to Lord Canning should be
published, but the admission that it disapproved his policy in every sense.
The danger of
the Government’s proceedings in the House of Commons was emphasised by their contrary
action in the Lords. Lord Derby, in that House, declined to produce the whole
despatch which his subordinates had consented to lay on the table of the
Commons. The action of the Government in one House condemned its action in the
other. The difficulty created by this inconsistency was only averted by the
resignation of Lord Ellenborough, who, after a vain attempt had been made to
secure the services of Gladstone, was succeeded by Lord Stanley. For Lord
Stanley’s place at the Colonial Office Lord Derby selected Sir Edward Bulwer
Lytton, a man whose eminence in the world of letters has inevitably dimmed the
part which he played in the world of politics.
The session
had, so far, afforded many illustrations of the difficulties attending a
Ministry unable to command a majority in the Commons. Oddly enough, the next
dilemma of the Government arose from the action of the Lords. From 1847, when
Baron Rothschild was elected to represent the City of London, the Commons had
shown a growing desire to concede, the Lords a resolute determination to
resist, the claim of the Jews to sit in Parliament. In 1858 the Lords
maintained, in the first instance, their previous attitude. But it was plain
that, however much they could refuse this reform while a Liberal Government was
in power, they could not do so while a Conservative Ministry, dependent on the
sufferance of a Liberal majority in the Commons, was in office. The fact that
the leader of the Commons was a Jew by extraction, and that he warmly advocated
the claims of his race, facilitated concession. Lord Lucan suggested, as a
compromise, that either House should be entitled to determine by resolution the
form of oath to be administered to its own members, and his suggestion was
adopted. The resolution, which the Commons thereupon passed, was converted, two
years later, into a standing order; and in 1866 Parliament adopted a new oath,
from which the words offensive to Jews were omitted. The resolution of
1858 enabled Baron Rothschild to take his seat in
the House of Commons; and a few years after the Act of 1866 Baron Rothschild’s
eldest son, on Gladstone’s advice, was raised to the Peerage and took his seat
in the Lords.
The Ministry
still had to deal with the much more difficult question of Parliamentary
Reform. No one, indeed, expected that a Cabinet new to office would produce a
Reform Bill in its first session; and the subject as a whole was postponed to
1859. Even in 1858, however, the Ministry was compelled to assent to the
abolition of the property qualification for members of Parliament, the repeal
of which had formed one of the six points of the People’s Charter. At the
commencement of the session of
1859 it introduced a new Reform Bill, which extended
to counties the
1859]
331
£10 occupation
franchise instituted in boroughs in 1832, and conferred votes on lodgers,
fundholders, graduates of Universities, and other persons whose position
implied superior intellectual qualifications. The scheme cost the Cabinet the
loss of two of its most important members (Spencer Walpole and Henley), who
objected to the assimilation of the borough and county franchise. The Ministry,
weakened by their defection, was beaten on an amendment to the second reading
by 330 votes to 291, and decided on appealing to the country. The general
election strengthened the Conservative party, but did not convert a minority
into a majority. In these circumstances, on the meeting of the new Parliament,
Lord Hartington, who had lately commenced a parliamentary career destined to
raise him to a position of unusual influence, was entrusted with an amendment
to the address, equivalent to a motion of want of confidence. The amendment was
carried by 323 votes to 310, in the largest House which had so far ever
participated in an important division, and Lord Derby at once resigned office.
At the time
of this decisive division Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell had so far
forgot their previous rivalry as to leave to the Queen the selection of either
of them for the first place in the new Cabinet. Her Majesty, not unnaturally,
first attempted to avoid an invidious duty by selecting a third statesman,
under whom she hoped that both of them would serve. Lord Granville, however, on
whom her choice fell, failed to form a Ministry, and the Queen then sent for
Lord Palmerston. Lord John Russell took the seals of the Foreign Office; and
Gladstone, who had long been hesitating between the traditions of his earlier
career and his growing convictions, definitely joined the Liberal party and became
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
At the time
when the new Ministry was formed, Napoleon III was anxious to conclude the
short and decisive war in northern Italy, which had broken out three days after
the defeat of Lord Derby’s Reform Bill. The excitement arising from the war had
undoubtedly affected the issues of the general election, since many people
thought that Lord Malmesbury—strenuously as he had laboured for peace—was
prepossessed against France, whilst Lord John Russell hardly concealed his wish
to get the Austrians out of Italy. In accordance with this view, when Napoleon
III suggested that the new Government might usefully mediate between the
combatants on the terms which were subsequently adopted at Villafranca, Lord
Palmerston did not hesitate to declare the arrangements not favourable enough
to Italy. In fact, the policy of the new Cabinet, from its first formation, was
to leave Italy free from foreign intervention; and it soon became evident that
this policy, steadily pursued, would do much more for the cause of Italian
unity than had been accomplished by the arms of France. For nothing but armed
intervention could induce the rich provinces of central Italy to take back the
old rulers, whom the war had dispossessed, or could prevent
332 Italian policy of Russell and Palmerston.
their
combination with the new kingdom made at Villafranca from the union of Lombardy
and Piedmont.
The policy of
Lord Palmerston’s Cabinet received a still more striking interpretation in
connexion with Garibaldi’s famous expedition from Genoa to Sicily and Naples.
It was not easy, on any principle accepted in the Chancelleries of Europe, to
justify the expedition sailing from a Piedmontese port to stir up insurrection
in the Neapolitan kingdom. But Lord John Russell had the hardihood to say in
the House of Commons that “we had once a great filibuster, who landed in the
month of November, 1688, on the south-west coast of England”; and it was
difficult for a Whig of Lord John’s temperament to place Garibaldi higher than
by comparing him with William III. When, moreover, Garibaldi, after his
sensational success in Sicily, decided on crossing the Straits, and Napoleon
III desired that the British and French squadrons should stop his passage, the
British Government replied that such interference would involve a departure
from the principle of non-intervention. Non-intervention, in fact, as Lord
John Russell interpreted it, became a doctrine under which every Italian, or
every Italian State, was at liberty to interfere in any part of Italy, but
under which no other Power had any right to interfere at all. It is not
surprising that the frank avowal of these views seemed almost as deplorable in
autocratic Europe, as it was popular in democratic England.
The constancy
with which the British Cabinet and Lord John Russell as its exponent enforced
the doctrine of Italy for the Italians won for England the enduring sympathy of
the new Italian kingdom. But, in one respect, the Ministers sustained a serious
reverse. The annexation of Nice and Savoy by Napoleon III (the motives of which
are elsewhere described) elicited a warm remonstrance from this country, and
Lord John Russell in the House of Commons and Lord Palmerston, in conversation
with the French ambassador, used language which threatened war. The views of
the Government were shared by the people, who feared that Napoleon III was
embarking on a policy deliberately intended to reverse the territorial
arrangements made in 1815 at Vienna, and even to humiliate in succession the
Great Powers by whom these arrangements had been imposed on France. The
knowledge that Napoleon was strengthening his own fleet, and completing the
naval works at Cherbourg, suggested the suspicion that the next blow might be
aimed at England, and created the apprehension that the defences of the
country, neglected during a long period of peace, might be unequal to withstand
the invasion on which some people thought that the Emperor had already
determined.
The
prevailing uneasiness led to one of the most remarkable movements that English
history has to record. The people came forward in their thousands to enrol
themselves as volunteers in the defence of the United Kingdom, and the
Government, availing itself of an old Act,
which had
been passed during the Great War, had the good sense to avail themselves of
their services. In the enthusiasm which gave birth to the movement, the whole
expenses of the new force fell on the men or on their friends and neighbours.
But, as its importance became gradually manifest, the Government consented to
provide them with arms, ammunition, instructors, and finally a pecuniary grant.
The formation and organisation of a volunteer force was the most enduring
consequence of what Cobden called the “panic of 1859.” But many members of the
Cabinet wished to take other steps to guard the country from attack. Haunted by
the apprehension that steam, in Lord Palmerston’s phrase, “ had bridged the
Channel,” they desired to fortify the most important and most exposed positions
on the coast. The more extravagant of these alarmists actually suggested the
construction of a ring of forts round the whole island. But the more moderate
among them—including the members of a Royal Commission, appointed in 1859 to
consider the matter—recommended the fortification of the chief dockyards, and
the completion of some works at Alderney as a convenient outpost. Sidney
Herbert, the Secretary for War, who had persuaded himself that war with France
was imminent, staked his position as a Cabinet Minister on the acceptance of
the Royal Commissioners’ scheme. Lord Palmerston, whose distrust of Napoleon
III was continually increasing, vigorously supported him; and the Cabinet, as
a whole, was naturally disposed to accept their recommendations. There was,
however, a considerable party both in the country and in the House of Commons
who did not agree with this opinion. The safety of Great Britain—they were
already urging—was to be found not in fixed fortifications but in a mobile
fleet; and money would be better spent in increasing the navy, than in the
erection of forts certain to become obsolete in the near future. Some of these
men, moreover, refused to believe that alarm was justified. They held that the
French Emperor was actuated by no feelings of ill-will towards this country;
that he realised, on the contrary, that the Anglo-French alliance was the best
guarantee for the security of his dynasty. They contended that, instead of
arousing French susceptibilities by preparations for war, it was wiser to
unite the great nations of western Europe by opening new facilities for trade.
An
opportunity happily occurred for giving effect to this policy. Cobden, who was
paying a visit to Paris, with the warm approval of Gladstone and with the
sanction of Palmerston and Russell, sought an interview with the Emperor, and
explained to him the advantage which free trade might confer on France. The
readiness with which the Emperor received the advice induced the Government to
associate Lord Cowley, the British ambassador at Paris, with Cobden; and in the
course of January, 1860, a treaty was concluded in which France undertook to
reduce the duties on all articles of British manufacture, in return for the
reduction of British duties on French wines and
spirits.
Thus, when Parliament met in February, 1860, it had two distinct policies
before it. It was invited, on the one hand, to conclude a treaty with France,
framed and designed to consolidate the alliance between France and England;
while, on the other, everyone knew that it would be asked to vote large sums of
money for the construction of fortifications, which were intended to resist a
French invasion. It fell to Gladstone’s lot as Chancellor of the Exchequer to
secure the assent of Parliament to the treaty which Cobden had secured; and he
at once decided to widen the scheme. The treaty only committed the country to
reduced tariffs on French goods. Gladstone determined that the reduction
should be applied universally. He thus converted a measure of reciprocity into
a measure of Free Trade. But he also decided to seize the opportunity ’ for
making other and larger changes in the financial system of the country.
Estimating the net cost of the French treaty as a little more than £3,000,000 a
year, he devoted another £1,000,000 to purging the tariff of many vexatious and
unproductive duties, and a third £1,000,000 to cheapening newspapers and books
by sweeping away the excise duty on paper. He found means for accomplishing
these reforms by modifications of the stamp duties and other taxes and by
raising the Income Tax, which according to the promise of 1853 should have
ceased in 1860, from 9d. to 10<Z. in the pound.
A scheme so
comprehensive naturally excited criticism. Some men were disposed to condemn
the French treaty on the ground that it lowered for France the price of
commodities like iron and steel, almost essential to her existence, while for
Great Britain it only affected luxuries like silk, or stimulants like spirits
and wine. Other men argued that, when Napoleon was offending opinion by the
annexation of Savoy and Nice, the moment was inopportune for concessions
favourable to France. But the chief attack on the Budget was directed against
the repeal of the Paper Duties. It was contended that there was no necessity
for reducing the duties on paper; if £1,500,000 could be thrown away, it would
be much wiser and better to encourage an article of universal consumption like
tea, than to squander the money on the promotion of cheap newspapers. These
arguments had their weight in the House of Commons, where Gladstone was
supported by diminishing majorities; and Lord Derby was emboldened, by Lord
Palmerston’s avowed dislike of the Bill, to throw it out when it reached the
Lords. The fact was that, while the Prime Minister disliked Gladstone’s Budget,
he disliked still more Gladstone’s hostility to the scheme for fortifying the
dockyards. Lord Palmerston desired to spread the cost over a series of years.,
Gladstone insisted that, if fortifications were to be erected, they should be
paid for out of the revenues of the year in which they were constructed. The
struggle in the Cabinet was keen, and it was only with difficulty that a
compromise was arranged.
In the
meantime, the action of the Lords in throwing out the Paper
Duty Bill was
raising a grave constitutional question. For nearly two centuries the Lords had
accepted the position that the right of taxation rested with the Commons alone.
*■ It was argued that, if the Lords continued a tax which the Commons
agreed to abolish, they in effect imposed taxation on the people. Lord
Palmerston, with some prudence, avoided the controversy by referring the matter
to a Select Committee; and the Committee, while reasserting the privilege of
the Commons, declared that it was within the power of the Lower House so to
impose or remit taxation as to preserve its rights inviolate. In accordance
with their recommendation, the Commons embodied the financial arrangements of
the Budget in one Bill in 18i62, and thus threw on the Lords the alternative of
accepting the plan as a whole or rejecting it altogether. In these
circumstances, the Lords found it necessary to agree in 1861 to a proposal
which they had refused in 1860. As the growth of the revenue enabled Gladstone
concurrently to reduce the Income Tax to the old limit of 9d., the cup which
the Lords were required to drink was, to a certain extent, sweetened.
The
controversy, thus concluded, left its mark on the Constitution. Thenceforward
the Commons uniformly acted on the advice of the Committee of 1860. The temporary
victory gained by the Lords resulted, therefore, in a permanent curtailment of
their power. But it so happened that, in 1861, or at any rate in 1862, public
opinion was concentrated on subjects other than those which had engrossed it in
1860. The dread of French invasion had disappeared in the dangers and
difficulties created by the American Civil War. On the first outbreak of
hostilities, the British Government decided on maintaining a strict neutrality,
and on recognising, the Confederate States as belligerents. From this policy it
never swerved during the four years of war. With much reason for
intervention—since the blockade of the Southern ports deprived northern England
of the cotton which was the foundation of its prosperity—it refrained from any
hostile act. The North at the time, however, expected more sympathy.
Recollecting the sacrifices which England had made for the prevention of the
Slave-trade and the abolition of slavery in her own colonies, they hoped that
Great Britain would range herself in favour of the Northern States and resented
the haste with which she had recognised the belligerent rights of the South.
Indeed, they afterwards complained that the action of England had encouraged
rebellion and converted insurrection into civil war. Towards the close of 1861,
Captain Wilkes, an officer of the United States Navy, created a new and sharp
dispute between the two countries by stopping a British Mail steamer, the
Trent, on her voyage from Cuba to England, and taking from her the envoys,
Mason and Slidell, who were going to represent the Confederate States at London
and Paris. The British Cabinet, on the receipt of this grave news, at once
decided that the affront to the flag must be made good, and
336 The Trent crisis.—Death of the Prince
Consort. [1861-72
enforced its
decision by sending a large expedition to Canada. There seemed reason to fear
that the excitement, in both countries, might lead to a new war between the two
great English-speaking1 races. Happily, this calamity was averted by
prudence on both sides of the Atlantic. In England, the Prince Consort
suggested a modification of the despatch to America, by the insertion in it of
a belief that Captain Wilkes’ action had been neither directed nor approved by
his Government: and in Washington President Lincoln had the wisdom to acquiesce
in this view.
When the
Prince Consort rendered this great service to the Anglo- Saxon race, he was
already suffering from the illness which caused his death a few weeks later on
December 14,1861, at the early age of forty- two. The prejudices which had
occasionally influenced Englishmen during his life were forgotten on his death,
and a later generation soon recognised the nature and value of his influence
upon the Queen. It is sometimes forgotten that, in the twenty years from her
marriage to her husband’s death, when she was elaborating, by her own conduct,
the traditions and duties of a Constitutional sovereign, the Prince Consort was
her closest adviser. He assisted her to lay down the principle governing the
relation of a Foreign Minister with the Crown in 1850; he supported her in extending
her confidence in 1855 to the Minister whom she had practically dismissed in
1851; and he suggested, in the final and most beneficent achievement of his
life, the modification of the despatch referred to in the previous paragraph.
In these things he was the Queen’s adviser; in his patronage of music, of
science, of industry, and of art, he acted more independently. In almost every
movement intended to encourage development, to stimulate knowledge, and to
diminish poverty or crime, he bore his part. The Queen was profoundly affected
by his loss. For ten years she remained in comparative seclusion, unwilling and
perhaps unable to discharge most of the public functions attaching to her
position. During those ten years the cause of monarchy suffered from the self-
effacement of the monarch. At the end of the ten years, the dangerous illness
of the Prince of Wales aroused the sympathies of the nation with the Queen;
and, when she accompanied her son, in February, 1872, to return thanks for his
recovery, her progress through London to St Paul’s was a scene of heartfelt
enthusiasm.
The crisis
created by the incident on the Trent, at the time of the Prince Consort’s death,
was followed by graver difficulties. The Confederate Government naturally
desired to harass the commerce of the Northern States, and decided on
purchasing, in neutral ports, some fast vessels to be equipped as privateers.
In March, 1862, they bought at Liverpool a vessel then known as the Oreto,
renamed the Florida: and at the same time they were building at Laird’s works
on the Mersey another vessel, destined to win notoriety as the Alabama. Charles
Francis Adams, the American Minister in London, drew attention to the
construction of the vessel in June, 1862; the Commissioners of Customs
declined,
however, to
order her detention. On July 22, Adams renewed his application, supporting it
on the 24th with the opinion of an eminent counsel, Robert Porrett Collier:
that, if the Foreign Enlistment Act were not enforced, the American Government
would have serious grounds for remonstrances. Lord John Russell at once
forwarded this opinion to the law officers of the Crown on Saturday, July 26.
By an unfortunate circumstance Sir John Hardinge, the Queen’s Advocate, to whom
the opinion was forwarded, was incapacitated by sudden illness; and Lord John’s
communication remained unopened till Monday, July 28. On that evening the law
officers considered the case, and advised that the vessel should be stopped.
Orders were at once issued accordingly. But, in the meantime, the Alabama—the
290, as she had previously been called—had left the Mersey ostensibly on a
trial trip; and received her guns and warlike stores at sea, preparatory to
commencing her career of destruction.
There was
little doubt that the leisurely proceedings of official England had facilitated
the unfortunate escape of the vessel. After her flight Lord Russell desired to
repair the mischief by directing the arrest of the Alabama in any British port
she visited. But the Cabinet, as a whole, would not sanction this course. A
large party in the House of Commons, at the time, was in favour of mediation in
the war; three months after the Alabama’s escape the Cabinet was actually
summoned to consider whether the time had not arrived for intervention: and, a
little later, Gladstone made the unfortunate speech at Newcastle in which he
declared that Jefferson Davis had made an army, was making a navy, and had made,
or was making (the words are differently reported), a nation. This famous
speech marks the nearest approach of the British Cabinet to intervention in the
American Civil War. Thenceforward some successes of the Federals strengthened
the hands of those members of the Cabinet opposed to a policy of interference:
and, in the next case that arose, when a great English shipbuilder was building
some vessels of war apparently for the use of the Confederates, the Cabinet
took active steps to enforce England’s neutrality.
Meanwhile the
rival pretensions of Germany and Denmark with regard to Schleswig-Holstein led,
as described elsewhere, to increasing disputes from 1863 onwards. At last, in
the summer of 1863, the German Diet authorised Hanover and Saxony to occupy with
their troops the duchy of Holstein. Paget, the British Minister at Copenhagen,
advised the Danes not to resist this “execution”; and Lord Palmerston, speaking
about the same time in the House of Commons, declared himself convinced that,
if any violent attempt were marlp to overthrow the rights or interfere with the
independence of Denmark, those who made the attempt would find that they would
not have to contend with Denmark alone.
Federal
execution in Holstein did not induce the Danes to give way;
and Prussia
forwarded an ultimatum in conjunction with Austria. The Danish Government, on
the advice of England, consented to convoke the Rigsraad and to submit to it
the reforms which Bismarck was demanding. Prussia, however, refused the brief
delay; and on February 1, 1864, her armies, with those of Austria, crossed the
Eider, and the Danish War of 1864 began. There was no doubt that the people of
this countiy were inclined to support Denmark against what was, in their
opinion, an unjust aggression. The marriage of the Prince of Wales, in the
previous year, with the daughter of the new King of Denmark, gave them a
dynastic interest in the .matter; and, had Lord Palmerston been able to secure
the cooperation of France, he would probably have taken steps to give effect to
his rash promise that, if Denmark was attacked, she would not be left alone.
But Napoleon III was annoyed at the curt refusal by the English Foreign Office
of his favourite scheme of a European Congress in connexion with the Polish
question, and was unwilling, if he went to war, to refrain from accomplishing
some improvement of the French frontier on the Rhine. The Queen, moreover, used
her influence most effectively against a war, which she believed would have
been opposed by the Prince Consort if he had been still alive; and the Cabinet
was at last compelled to fell back on a Conference, reluctantly accepted by
Prussia. The Conference failed to settle the dispute; the war went on; and
Denmark, beaten by her powerful adversaries, was forced to submit to the loss
of Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg, and to the payment of an indemnity. The
inglorious part played by Great Britain naturally annoyed the people; the Lords
earned a motion condemning the Ministiy, and a similar censure in the House of
Commons was only averted by an amendment, which expressed satisfaction that Her
Majesty had been advised to abstain from armed interference.
The closing
years of Lord Palmerston’s Administration were thus clouded by the failure of
his Danish foreign policy. During these years the country enjoyed unusual
prosperity. The expenditure was brought down by four millions in the years
1862-6; the Income Tax was reduced from 9d. to 4d. in the pound; the duties on
sugar from 5s. 6d. to 3s. 4d. per cwt.; those on tea from Is. 5d. to 6& per
lb.; the tax on Fire Insurance from 3s. to 1#. 6d. for every i?100 assured. The
trade of the United Kingdom rose by leaps and bounds, and the value of the
exports and imports increased from ^0375,000,000, the year of the French Treaty,
to J?534,000,000 in 1866.
Parliament in
1865, however, had completed the sixth year of its existence. Its dissolution
was inevitable; Lord Palmerston’s colleagues availed themselves of the
prestige, which still attached to his name, to influence the electors, and
succeeded in increasing their majority. But the old Minister was not destined
to meet a new Parliament. He died in the autumn of 1865, after a career almost
unique in English history. For nearly sixty years, he had sat in the House of
Commons; for nearly
fifty years
he had been a Minister of the Crown. Abroad, he had steadily advocated the
introduction of constitutional reform. At home he had, during later life,
constantly resisted any large changes in institutions. After the promise which
he had given in 1858, and the action of the Conservative Government in 1859, he
could not avoid the introduction of a measure of Parliamentary Reform. And Lord
John Russell on March 1, 1860—the anniversary of the day on which he had
introduced the first Reform Act—was entrusted with the task of explaining a new
measure of Reform. After six weeks, free from either parliamentary excitement
or popular enthusiasm, the Bill passed its second reading. But this effort
exhausted the energy of a reluctant House of Commons. The Bill was eventually
withdrawn; and it was tacitly understood that, while Lord Palmerston lived, no
further measure of Reform should be made by the Government, and no serious
effort to displace the Ministry should be attempted by the Conservatives. The
truce, thus established during Lord Palmerston’s life, was terminated by his
death. His successor, Earl Russell (as he now became) had for the preceding
fifteen years strenuously advocated the extension of the Reform Act of 1832.
Gladstone, his representative in the House of Commons, no longer restrained by
the associations of his earlier life, was almost as eager as Lord Russell. On
behalf of the Cabinet, he introduced a new Reform Bill at the commencement of
the session of 1866. The measure contemplated the reduction of the borough
franchise to £7, and of the county franchise to £14 householders; while it
postponed the redistribution of seats for some more convenient opportunity. It
was calculated, at the time, that this proposal would only add some 144,000
persons to the Register, and would leave the working classes in a numerical
minority. But, mild as the measure was, it was assailed with great force by men
like Robert Lowe, Edward Horsman, and Lord Grosvenor. From a saying of
Bright’s, that Horsman had retired into the cave of Adullam,and had called
about him everyone that was discontented and in distress, these men became
known as “ Adullamites.” They contended that the scheme of the Government only
dealt with the least important part of the subject, and that it was impossible
to pronounce any opinion on its merits until the clauses relating to
Redistribution, as well as those affecting the franchise, were before
Parliament. They also argued that the rent of a man’s house was a less perfect
test of his claim to vote than the assessment at which he was rated. On the
first point the Government succeeded in resisting an amendment, but their
success was only secured by a majority of five votes—a Pyrrhic victory which
compelled them to produce their scheme of Redistribution. On the second point,
after defeating a motion that the county franchise should be based on the
rateable value of the house, they were defeated on the same issue on the
borough franchise, and at once determined to resign.
In the protracted
debates on the Bill, the chief part had been taken
340 Parliamentary Reform. Attitude of the people.
[1866
by Lowe,
whose early experience in Australia had filled him with a profound dread of
democracy, and who enforced his opinions with an eloquence which made a deep
impression on the House and on the country. But, if the chief part was played
by Lowe, his success was due to the constant support which he received from the
Conservative party; and it was to Lord Derby that the Queen turned on Lord Bussell's
resignation. Thus, it happened that, for the third time in his life, Lord Derby
was entrusted with the task of forming a Ministry with only a minority of the
House of Commons at his back. After a vain attempt to obtain the support of
individual members of the late Government, and of the Aduliamites who had done
so much to compass its fall, he was forced to call on those, who had served
under him in the Cabinet of 1858, and on younger men like Lord Carnarvon and
Lord Cranbome (afterwards Lord Salisbury).
The hour in
which the Russell Ministry was defeated was marked by difficulties at home and
anxiety abroad. For, in the week which preceded its defeat, the great house of
Overend and Gurney fell with liabilities of £19,000,000; and the day of gloom,
which succeeded the great disaster, is still remembered in the City as “ Black
Friday.” Moreover, the day on which Lord Russell actually resigned was the day
on which Prussia declared war against Austria, and commenced the campaign which
brought her in seven weeks to the victory of Koniggratz. These difficulties
were now forgotten amidst the domestic troubles which followed the change of
Government. So long as the Russell Administration endured, the people showed
no enthusiasm in the cause of reform. They watched the slow progress of the
measure with the indifference with which they had regarded the withdrawal of
the Bill of 1860. But the defeat of the Bill of 1866 at length supplied the
impulse which its proposals had proved powerless to exert. The working classes
of London, under the auspices of the Reform League, which had recently been
organised under Edmond Beales, a barrister of ability, met in Trafalgar Square
on July 2. ' Encouraged by the passive attitude of the authorities, the League
decided on a much greater meeting to be held in Hyde Park on July 23. The
Government, which was advised that, if the people once entered the Park, no
legal right resided in any body to disperse them, decided on closing the Park
gates. This decision gave a new zest to the crowds which marched at the
appointed hour to the Park. The railings gave way before the pressure of the
thousands who surged round them or hung upon them; and the demonstrators, a
good- humoured laughing crowd, thus triumphantly took possession of the Park.
The Duke of
Wellington once said that it was a difficult matter to march 20,000 men into
Hyde Park, but that there were not three men in Europe who could march them out
again. The people, on that fine summer afternoon in 1866, had settled the first
part of the problem in their own way. The Cabinet were at a loss to know how to
1866-7] JOHsraeM’s first Parliamentary Reform
Bill. 341
solve the
second part. They found it necessary to negotiate with the League, and to
undertake that, if the crowds withdrew, the right to use the Park for political
demonstrations should be judicially determined. This sensible decision, which
the Reform League unfairly interpreted as a permission to hold one more
meeting, excited indignation and alarm in certain quarters, and many
denunciations were heard of the Government which had yielded to mob violence.
And their denunciations were not without reason. For the fall of Hyde Park
railings had swept away all resistance to democracy, and had made the passage
of a new Reform Bill indispensable. The Cabinet as a whole decided to submit to
the House of Commons a series of resolutions, on which a Bill might be
ultimately founded, and which might secure the assent of both timid and bold
reformers.
The
resolutions, which Disraeli brought forward in February, 1867, contained some
harmless platitudes affirming the expediency of increasing the number of
electors and of reducing inequalities by the redistribution of power. But the
resolutions were hardly announced, Defore the House showed an increasing
impatience for details, and the Cabinet were, at last, forced to draw up a
Bill. They only succeeded on Saturday, February 23,1867, in adopting the
details which Disraeli had promised to announce to a meeting of his party and
to the House of Commons on the following Monday.' On the intervening Sunday,
one of his colleagues, Lord Cranbome, came to the conclusion that the scheme
was too democratic for his taste. He communicated his fears to Lord Carnarvon,
who shared his apprehensions; and the two Ministers thereupon informed Lord
Derby that they could not absent to the Bill. Never, perhaps, had a British
Ministry been placed in so awkward a position. It was pledged to explain its
scheme on Monday afternoon, and on Monday morning the only scheme which it had
before it involved its own disruption. Hastily summoned, with literally only
ten minutes for consideration—as one of its members subsequently declared— it
decided to throw over the O' 'ginal scheme, and to confer the franchise on
householders rated at £20 in counties and at £6 in boroughs. The proposal
rested on a principle. For £20 was the minimum rate at which the house tax
began, and £6 was the maximum limit at which the smaller householders were
permitted to pay their rates through their landlords in boroughs in which such
compositions were allowed. The new scheme proved unacceptable to the Liberal
party, as less comprehensive than the Bill of 1866, and to many Conservatives,
who thought it wiser, since reform was necessary, to conciliate the working
classes by adopting a more extended franchise. In consequence, the Cabinet,
thinking that it was useless to persevere with a proposal which no one liked,
decided to fall back on their original plan. The new decision led to the
resignation of Lord Cranbome, Lord Carnarvon, and General Peel.
The Bill, in
its final form, admitted to the franchise all house-
342 Disraeli's Reform Bill.—Disraeli and
Gladstone. [i867
holders in
boroughs rated for the relief of the poor, after two years’ residence, and in counties
all householders rated at £15 a year. It disfranchised some corrupt boroughs
and deprived of one member some of the smaller boroughs hitherto returning two.
But it found compensation for these large proposals by the creation of “fancy”
franchises. For example, a man with £30 in a savings bank or £50 in the funds,
or with certain educational qualifications, was to receive a vote., A man who
paid 20s. a year in direct taxation was to receive a second or dual vote. It is
difficult to believe that the Ministiy had any confidence in these curious
proposals. By amendments in Parliament, the county franchise was given to all
householders rated at £12 a year, the redistribution clauses were widely
extended, and the “ fancy ” franchises, one after another, disappeared. The
safeguards, on which the Government had relied, were thus abandoned; and the
Conservative party found itself face to face with household suffrage. Thomas
Carlyle described the Bill as “shooting Niagara”; Lord Derby admitted that “he
was taking a leap in the dark”; and Lord Cranbome denounced “the Conservative
surrender” in the Quarterly Review. Disraeli, on the contrary, justified the
concessions that he had made by declaring that “he had to prepare the mind of
the country and to educate his party.” His party, at any rate, accepted under
his guidance a measure that, in the first instance, had seemed only tolerable
from the safeguards which were now removed from it.
The passage
of the Bill gave the Conservative Ministry another eighteen months of office.
But its chief was compelled by the failure of his health to resign. Lord
Derby’s retirement was remarkable for another reason. Previously to its
occurrence, the first place in every Ministry since 1832 had been held by
statesmen bom in the eighteenth century, and appointed to high office before
the first Reform Act had been passed. For the seventeen years after 1867 the
country was governed by Disraeli and Gladstone, men bom in the nineteenth
century and introduced to political life in the reign of William IV. Public
attention was concentrated on the rivalry of these two men. The contrast in
their characters and opinions added to the interest of the struggle. Gladstone
had begun life as a Conservative. Educated at Eton and Oxford, he only slowly
shook himself free from the influence of his earlier training. His intense
earnestness, his striking personality, his tempestuous eloquence, excited the
enthusiasm of his followers. Disraeli, on the contrary, nurtured in a library,
the author of a series of admirable novels and romances, had been accepted by
his supporters as a necessity. But the consummate prudence with which he had
led the Opposition, from the fall of the Government of 1858 to the rise of the
Government of 1866, had at last convinced them that they had found a leader on
whom they could rely. The mystery with which he enveloped his utterances added
to the interest of his remarkable personality. For, if
men were
attracted to Gladstone by what he said, they were fascinated by an attempt to
ascertain what Disraeli thought.
Disraeli had
hardly attained the object of his ambition by securing the post of Prime
Minister, when the struggle between Gladstone and himself became acute. Since
the unhappy period of the Irish famine, Ireland had seen a vast emigration of
her people. Her population had decreased and was still decreasing. In 1845 she
had a population of more than 8,000,000. Twenty years later, her people had
diminished to 5,600,000. In Ireland this rapid decrease led to a not unnatural
alarm. In England it was regarded as the only hope for prosperity in the
future. The third Sir Robert Peel, who held the office of Chief Secretary in
Lord Palmerston’s Administration, was never weary of quoting statistics to
prove that, if the people were fewer, their flocks were more numerous, that
wealth was accumulating if men were decaying. Irish discontent was not appeased
by this official disregard of Goldsmith’s famous couplet, and it was increased
by the events of 1865. The termination of the Civil War in America released
from military service thousands of Irishmen, who had not much disposition to
engage in industrial enterprise. These men joined in large numbers a secret
organisation of Fenians—as they were called—intended to bring about the
independence of Ireland. James Stephens, who became the leader of the
Brotherhood, proclaimed early in 1865 that the flag of the Irish Republic
should be raised in Ireland in that year. The Government was so much alarmed
that it decided on the arrest of the chief leaders of the conspiracy and on
trying them before a Special Commission. Stephens, either through the
connivance or the neglect of his gaolers, succeeded in making his escape from
prison. But the Government procured the conviction of almost all the other
prisoners; and the Irish Attorney General, at the conclusion of the proceedings
in January, 1866, declared that every individual of mark, except one or two who
had fled the country, had been made amenable to justice.
When
Parliament met on February 6, 1866, Her Majesty was advised to repeat in
substance the Attorney General’s declaration, and to say that the authority of
the law had been amply and firmly vindicated. It was, therefore, with some
surprise that Parliament heard only a week later that Lord Wodehouse and
Chichester Fortescue, the Lord Lieutenant and his Chief Secretary, had arrived
at the conclusion that it was necessary to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act in
Ireland. The Bill was at once passed through all its stages, with memorable
protests from John Bright and John Stuart Mill. The Act extinguished for a time
the flame of insurrection, which the proceedings of the Special Commission had
already done much to smother. Outside Ireland, however, the leaders of the
Fenian Brotherhood attempted fresh acts of violence. In 1866 bands of armed
Fenians crossed the frontier from the United States into Canada and
344 Fenian outrages.-Gladstone and
Disestablishment. [i867
were only
repelled after bloodshed; and in February, 1867, large bodies of Fenians
assembled at Chester, with the intention it was believed of attacking the
Castle, and of seizing the arms and military • stores it contained. On
September 18, a body of Fenians attacked in the streets of Manchester a
prison-van containing some Fenian prisoners, and shot the officer in charge of
it; while, a few weeks later, the walls of the House of Detention in
Clerkenwell were blown down in daylight, in order to facilitate the escape of
some Fenians confined in the gaol. One man was condemned to death for his share
in the outrage; and, as his sentence immediately preceded the passage of an Act
for private executions within the walls of prisons, he happened to be the last
person who was publicly hanged in England.
These
outrages gave the Government an excuse or a justification for again suspending
the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland. But the necessity for this legislation
naturally drew renewed attention to the chief source of Irish discontent—the
ascendancy of a Protestant minority in a Roman Catholic country. Gladstone
subsequently declared that Protestant ascendancy overshadowed Ireland like a
upas tree; and that the chief branches of the tree—the Irish Church, the Irish
land system, and the arrangements for the higher education of the Irish people
—must be pruned before Irish discontent could cease. Arguments of this sort,
used year after year by a small knot of Irish Liberals and English Radicals,
had hitherto made little impression. And just as in 1828 it had required the
Clare election and its consequences to bring home to the House of Commons the
justice and necessity of Catholic Emancipation, so in 1867 it required
explosion at Clerkenwell and murder in Manchester to force home the arguments
which the friends of Ireland were using. One of these friends, John Francis
Maguire, immediately after the accession of Disraeli to the first place in the
Ministry, drew attention to the state of Ireland. The debate thus initiated was
illustrated by speeches from men like Bright and John Stuart Mill. But its true
importance arose from the declaration elicited from Gladstone, whose speech
altered in a moment the whole position of the Irish question. Everyone knew
that the annual discussion upon it had hitherto been as purposeless as the
utterances of a debating society. But Gladstone now came forward, with a
majority of the House of Commons at his back, to demand the instant
disestablishment of the Irish Church. In a letter to Lord Dartmouth, intended
to rally his supporters, Disraeli declared that Gladstone was preparing to
destroy “that sacred Union of Church and State which has been the chief means
of our civilisation, and is the only security for our civil and religious
liberty.” But this trumpet note of defiance dwindled into a feeble strain in
the Commons, where Disraeli met Gladstone’s motion with an amendment affirming
that considerable modifications in the temporalities of the Church were
expedient, but that the question should be deferred for the consideration of a
new Parliament. Mild as the
amendment
was, it seemed milder from the fact that it was entrusted to Lord Stanley who,
of all the members of the Cabinet, was the least disposed to give expression to
the old Tory sentiment of that sacred Union of Church and State which had
inspired the Dartmouth letter. The amendment was rejected; and Gladstone
persuaded the House to affirm that it was necessary that the Established Church
of Ireland should cease to exist as an establishment.
The political
conditions of a time, in which the Scottish and Irish Parliamentary Reform
Bills were still under consideration, made it impossible for the Minister to
demand the dissolution to which he would have otherwise been entitled; and it
was ultimately decided that the business of the session should be wound up as
soon as possible, and that Parliament should be dissolved in the following
November. The arrangement enabled Gladstone to extort one striking reform from
the Conservative party. For more than thirty years the power of the vestry to
levy a rate for the support of the Established Church had been questioned by
Nonconformist England. And in the earlier years of Peel’s Ministry it was
judicially decided that the churchwardens were powerless to levy a rate which
the vestry refused to grant. In the course of the next four years, Church rates
were refused in over 1500 parishes. These refusals strengthened the arguments
for abolition; and in 1858-9 motions for Church Rate repeal were either carried
in the House of Commons, or defeated only by small majorities. The House of Lords
stood resolute in defence of the law as it stood. But, just as in 1857 the
Peers found it necessary, when a Conservative Government was in office, to
discover some expedient for admitting Baron Rothschild to the House of Commons,
so, in 1868, the Peers, with a Conservative Ministry again in office, felt themselves
obliged to give way. The Lords accepted Gladstone’s suggestion that the power
of levying a rate should be maintained, but that the rate itself should be made
irrecoverable in every case where it had not been assigned as security for a
debt. Under this measure Church rates gradually became little more than a
voluntary offering of Church people for the repair of the church and, in the
great majority of cases, were suffered to expire.
In the meanwhile
both parties were making vigorous preparations for the electoral campaign of
the coming autumn. Its results were remarkable. In the boroughs—where the
effect of household suffrage was felt— the Conservatives suffered an
overwhelming defeat. In the counties, on the contrary, where the electors were
mainly drawn from the middle class, the Liberals were less successful.
Gladstone himself, who did more than any one to influence the campaign by the
eloquence of his speeches and the fire of his personality, lost his seat for
South Lancashire, and had to take refuge in Greenwich. But the result of the
elections as a whole was decisive. In a House of 658 members the Conservative
party could not command more than 270 votes. Disraeli determined on the
convenient
but
unprecedented course of resigning his office into the Queen’s hands, instead of
waiting till the House of Commons had affirmed the decision of the electorate.
His fall was a noteworthy event in the history of modern England. The Reform
Act of 1867 had not only led to the crushing disaster of a great political
party; it had closed finally and for ever a chapter of History. The new
Parliament, elected by a larger constituency, had other interests, other aims
than those which the old Parliament, the creation of a narrower electorate, had
contemplated. The government of the middle classes had been replaced by the
government of the people; and, for good or for evil, legislation was henceforth
to be directed by the people.
Before
finally parting from the old system, which the Act of 1867 had terminated, it
may be convenient to sum up the material results of the sixteen years after
1852. In those years the population of the United Kingdom had increased by
nearly 3,500,000 persons. Some 3,000,000 others had left these shores to
repeople the waste places of the earth, in the United States, the British
Colonies, and elsewhere. The gross value of the trade of the country had risen
from <£*268,000,000 to =£*532,000,000 a year. The mileage of the railways
had advanced from 7336 to 15,000 miles, and the sum expended on these
undertakings had grown from <£’264,000,000 to ,£518,000,000. The number of
passengers which they carried annually had risen from 102,000,000 to
300,000,000; their net earnings from £?11,000,000 to £?21,000,000. The tonnage
of the mercantile marine had risen from nearly 4,000,000 to nearly 5,800,000
tons; the steam tonnage from 250,000 to 948,000 tons. The movements of
international commerce and the intercourse between nations had been greatly
expedited by the invention of the submarine telegraph. Effective communication
across the Straits of Dover had been established just before Aberdeen took
office (1851). Between 1852 and 1858 cables were placed under the Irish Sea,
the North Sea, the Baltic, and the Straits of Bonifacio. The oceans were less
easily crossed. The Atlantic cable of 1858, laid with the support of the
British and American Governments, transmitted a few messages and then became
dumb. A few years later the first cable from Suez to Karachi also failed. But
at length in 1866—after numerous mishaps—the Atlantic was conquered, and a few
years later (1870) the Far East was linked to Europe both by land and by sea.
The wealth of the country had increased so rapidly that the income assessed to
Income Tax had risen from £’260,000,000 to £’434,000,000; and the prudence of
administrators was so great that the whole debt, which the Crimean War had
accumulated, was paid off, while the National Debt stood at a lower point in
1869 than in 1853. Statistics of this kind are sometimes regarded as unworthy
of a historian’s notice. But, if the history of a nation is the record of its
vigour and its growth, they are far better worth recording than the
Parliamentary conflicts of rival statesmen. For it is by such figures as these
that a nation’s progress should be tested, and that the capacity of its people
for rule must be determined.
ENGLISH
LITERATURE.
Theke are two gateways to the English literature of the
Victorian era: the ,key of one is labelled “ Germanism ” (a word which sixty
years ago indicated dislike and fear), that of the other “ Tractarianism ”; and
the master-key to both is Romance. The former key is held by Carlyle and the
latter by Newman; and, even though some violence may be done to the
chronological order, it will conduce to lucidity to treat these two subjects
and these two men first.
Since the
time of Chaucer there always has been some foreign influence (other than the
classics) moulding English literature. Now it has been Italian, and now French.
The fact that in the nineteenth century it became German is of vital
importance; and this great change is mainly to be ascribed, first to Coleridge
and afterwards to Carlyle. The dominance of Goethe is due principally to the latter.
Through Germany transcendentalism and mysticism entered the English thought of
the nineteenth century, and ever since their influence may be detected in forms
and places the most unexpected. Carlyle himself made them felt in almost every
field. With ideas derived from Germany, but remoulded in his own mind, and
coloured sombrely by that Scottish Calvinism in which he was bred, he proceeded
to reform criticism, to rewrite history, and to probe, the diseases of society.
The fundamental principle of his criticism is sympathy. He finds the point of
view of the author, and judges him by his success or failure in respect of
that, but never by any canon which the writer does not acknowledge; of course,
however, the nobility or ignobleness of the aim itself is an element in the
critic’s judgment. Thus such bad criticism as the classical instance of
Jeffrey’s criticism of Wordsworth ought to be impossible. In point of fact, the
difference between the older criticism and that of recent times is less than it
is sometimes supposed to be. More depends upon the critic himself than upon
anything else. There was good as well as bad criticism then, and there has been
bad as well as good criticism ever since. Still, Carlyle, was one of the means
of destroying an evil tradition and of substituting a better principle,
As a
historian Carlyle stands alone. He was not content to spin theories out of his
inner consciousness, as so many writers of the eighteenth century did; but, on
the other hand, no one ever had less belief in the modem theory that histoiy is
a science, in the sense that the one thing needful is a sufficiency of the sort
of facts recorded in state documents. To him universal histoiy was the
biography of great men, and all his historical work is in reality an
illustration of the principles expounded in Heroes and Hero-Worship. An
authentic portrait of a great man of action was of more value in his eyes than
many state documents. And at least this conception of histoiy enabled him to
produce some of the most vital books of the century. For what Carlyle himself
said of it is strictly true: “ there has not been for a hundred years a book
that came more direct and fiamingly from the heart of living man.” And, though
his Frederick (1858-65) may be in some respects perverse, the fact that it was
long used in German military schools as an authority on the campaigns of
Frederick, is better evidence of its essential soundness than the judgment of
any individual.
Alike in the
histories and in all his other works from Sartor Resartus (1833) onwards, the
gist of Carlyle’s teaching is that the essence of good and evil lies in the
soul of man. If that be right, nothing can be wrong; if wrong, nothing can be
right. The spiritual, he maintained, is the real, the material is mere
appearance. This is the “ mysticism ” which he learnt from Germany. Hence his
denunciations of mechanical theories of the universe and “ mud philosophies ”;
for these laid emphasis on the wrong things and led men astray. This, too, is
the point of contact between him and that remarkable group of ecclesiastics who
initiated the Oxford Movement. That there is a connexion is evident. Fiercely
as Carlyle denounced “Spectral Puseyisms,” he has sometimes been charged with
being himself the source of them. That is a mistake. Carlyle’s mysticism and
“Germanism” were not the cause of the Tractarian movement, but both are effects
of the same group of causes. They are phases of a revolt from the negations of
the French Revolution. But there is a profound difference at the root of them,
for Carlyle builds upon reason, and the Tractarians upon authority.
The Oxford
Movement is said by Newman himself to have taken its rise from a sermon of
Keble’s preached in 1833; but it really can be traced much further back, and it
was by no means confined to Knglanrl There were cognate phenomena in Germany
and France too—movements of revolt against the rampant and aggressive
scepticism of the Revolution. In England, the very soul of it seems to be
embodied in Keble’s Christian Year, which appeared in 1827, that is, six years
before the date when Newman held that the movement first began. But, if Keble
had stood alone, it would not have come to much. In his verse, to adopt the
pungent phrase of Bagehot, he translated Wordsworth for women; and this
femininity of spirit is not the stuff of which leaders are made.
349
Neither had
Pusey the gift of leadership. The most learned man among the Tractarians, he
was destitute of the driving power which was essential to success, and, though
he entered into the inheritance left vacant by the secession of Newman, he
could never have made that heritage himself. The richly gifted Richard Huirell
Froude died young; while William George Ward lived to prove that, great as were
the intellectual endowments of the author of The Ideal of a Christian Church,
they were accompanied by defects almost equally great. The true motive- power,
then, was John Henry Newman. He believed that the course of the unfettered
modern mind—what he called “liberalism ”—was towards materialism and the
negation of all religion. But, like Carlyle, he was profoundly convinced that
the universe was in its essence spiritual. The question was, how to bring the
modem mind into harmony with the universe. If Newman had known German, that
keen intellect might have risen to some solution like that of Carlyle himself.
Not knowing German, he could devise nothing better than to fall back upon
authority. At first he was sure that he found it in the Church in which he had
been born and bred; later, he became convinced that it could only be found in
the Church of Rome, and the great secession took place which split the band who
had laboured in Tracts for the Times (1833-41) for what they sincerely believed
to be the truth.
Characteristically,
then, the English revival of religion manifests itself as a compromise. The via
media was to run between the extreme of a Protestantism leading to rationalism
on the one hand, and Romanism on the other. Its importance for our purpose lies
in the fact that it was one manifestation of the spirit which, during this
period, informs not only religion, but poetry, painting, and architecture as
well; and all the manifestations are simply phases of the spirit of romance,
the essence of which is the belief that the things which can be weighed and
measured, or stated in logical formulae, are as nothing in comparison with the
things which are impalpable and which we can never demonstrate. Life, says
Carlyle, is a progress from mystery to mystery. The Tractarians agreed, but
they taught that there was a body clothed with authority to dictate absolutely
as to the mysteries.
Tractariauism
is of the first importance as a force and as a symptom; but, with the exception
of the works of Newman, its whole product is, as literature, negligible. The
author, however, of the essay on The development of Christian Doctrine is not
negligible as a thinker, the writer of the noble Apologia (1864) holds a high
place among the masters of prose style, and the author of The Dream of
Gerontius is no mean poet.
Such was the
matter out of which literature was to be fashioned in the years between 1840
and 1870. For the most part it was fashioned by men who in the former year were
still young; but two veterans survived from the previous generation. Though
the fame of Wordsworth was at its height, for production he was merely magni
nominis umbra, and
the only
important addition to his verse, The Prelude, had been written many years
before. Landor, however, not only lived but wrote; and, after all allowance is
made for pieces of earlier composition, the Hellenics and Heroic Idyls prove
that his poetic faculty remained fresh even in old age, just as the Imaginary
Conversations of Greeks and Romans show that on the verge of fourscore he was
still a master of stately prose.
Yet
marvellous as was Landor’s vitality, in all essentials he was a man of the
preceding generation, and to understand the poetryof this period we must turn,
not to him or to Wordsworth, but to Tennyson and Browning. Of the two, the
former was by much the more influential. Except Carlyle, no one did more to
form the period; and few were more sensitively responsive to its influences.
When the juvenile volume of Poems by Two Brothers (1827) was published,
Tennyson was still under the dominion of Byron. In the quiet Somersby rectory,
where even “ the roar of Hougoumont” was unheard, the boy-poets knew nothing
about such obscure writers as Keats and Shelley. Alfred Tennyson learnt about
them at Cambridge, where he became a member of one of the most remarkable
groups of young men that even Cambridge has ever nursed. They were not least
remarkable for their championship of neglected poets, and it was they who
revealed to Tennyson the poetry of Keats, and so helped to bring it about that
the new romanticism was akin to La Belle Dame sans Merci rather than to Childe
Harold.
Prior to
1840, Tennyson had published two volumes of poems containing much exquisite and
delicate work, yet not without flaws of triviality in thought and theme. The
question whether he would develop the “ high seriousness ” which is inseparable
from greatness was not decided until the two volumes of Poems (1842)
established him in general estimation as the foremost poet of his generation.
The author of Paracelsus, it is true, deserved a consideration which he did not
then receive; but there was no one else to set in the scales against Tennyson.
During the ten years of silence he had reached maturity, and sorrow for his
friend Hallam had led him to sound depths before unplumbed.
Hitherto the
poems of Tennyson had all been short; but doubtless he had cherished the
natural ambition of the youthful poet to execute a work wide in its scope as
well as high in quality. There is probably an element of fact in the playful
allusion in Morte (TArthur to the burned epic. At any rate, in later years the
poet repeatedly made the attempt, but never (except, curiously enough, in his
late dramatic work) demonstrated that he possessed the power of construction.
Though The Princess (1847) contains some fine blank verse, and though it shows
that the author was keenly alive to the life of the world around him, neither
in form nor in substance is it a great poem. In Memoriam (1850) is far more
profound and subtly-wrought. But it is really a collection of lyrics, many as
well as one. Again, the theory that the Idylls of the King form a single poem
of the epic order with a consistent and unbroken thread
351
of allegory
running through and uniting them, can hardly be maintained. To the first group,
published in 1858, additions continued to be made down to 1885; they were made
without discoverable order or system, and the most rational conclusion seems to
be that the poet had no systematic scheme in his mind. Whatever be the value of
the architectonic faculty, there is in these poems no sure proof that Tennyson
possessed it.
Tennyson’s
highest gift was lyrical, and perhaps his fame is most securely based upon such
gems of song as “ O that ’twere possible ” and “ Break, break, break.” It is
partly because In Memoriam is also lyrical that it is usually felt to be the
greatest of the longer poems. Another reason is the nature of the subject,
which appeals to a serious- minded race; a third, that it is the record of the deepest
emotions, probably, ever felt by the poet. It should be contrasted rather than
compared with the great elegies of Milton and of Shelley. Lycidas and Adonais
are battle-cries rather than laments; but Tennyson lingers in the churchyard
with Gray. Yet here again there is more of contrast than of similarity; for,
while Gray’s is the mood of pensive musing, Tennyson’s is that of poignant
feeling.
Some critics
of Tennyson have curiously underrated or even wholly ignored the dramas. Yet
Bechet (1884) is one of the few successful and even great plays of the
nineteenth century, and the dramatic phase is the most striking part of the
development of Tennyson’s mind. It is not confined to the dramas proper. There
is a dramatic element in many of the later lyrics which sets them in striking
contrast to the earlier ones; the dialect poems in particular are profoundly
dramatic in spirit, and so are several of the later patriotic poems.
This strain
of patriotism, which runs through the whole work of Tennyson, attains its
finest expression in the Ode on the Death of Wellington (1852); it is, however,
a feature of the time, which faithfully reflects the political development. The
Crimean War inspired quite a considerable number of poems, among which
Tennyson’s Maud (1855) was one. But the martial spirit is perennial in poetry:
the point of special interest is the ready response of the poets to that spirit
of nationality, the working of which is shown elsewhere in this volume. England
had realised her own national individuality long before, but the great exiles
Kossuth and Mazzini found ready sympathy, and when Garibaldi visited London he
was greeted as a hero. These were but the most conspicuous of a numerous band.
Carlyle has left pictures, touched with his customary vividness, of the exiles
whom the national movements on the Continent had driven to England; and one of
the greatest poets of the time, Rossetti, was himself the son of a political
exile. Sympathy with nationalism was natural in a country which believed itself
to have attained what Hungary and Italy and other countries were striving for,
and it was made all the keener by the presence of the exiles. This sympathy
inspires The Roman (1850) and The Magyar's New-Year Eve,
352
by Sydney
Dobell, the chief of that “ spasmodic ” group, now as unduly depreciated as
they were unduly praised fifty years ago. The throb of the same emotion may be
felt in Clough’s Amours de Voyage, which was the outcome of a visit to Italy
when the French were besieging Rome; while Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s
enthusiasm in the cause of freedom finds expression in Poems before Congress
(1860).
A subtler
manifestation of the same spirit, and one which indicated that England had not
solved the problems of nationality as completely as she supposed, may be found
in the rise of Celticism. Wales reentered English literature through Lady
Charlotte Guest’s translation of the Mabinogion (1849), as the Scottish
Highlands had found a place in the literature of Europe two generations before
through Macpherson’s Ossian; and both in fiction and in poetry there was in the
early part of this period, even as there is at the present day, a noteworthy
Irish element. For the most part it fell below excellence, but it produced one
poet, James Clarence Mangan, who would probably have been great, if the Mangan
who communed with the immortals could have gained the mastery over the Mangan
whose home was the gutter. Superior in achievement to Mangan, though probably
not greater in native capacity, was Robert Buchanan, a descendant of Scottish
and Welsh Celts, though he chanced to be born in England, and a member of the
Celtic School by reason of The Book of Orm (1870), though his best work is far
less mystical and far more realistic. All this indicates a remarkable change of
spirit as compared with that which was prevalent a century before. At the
earlier date the whole tendency was towards the absorption of the weaker and
more backward sections of the population in the stronger and more progressive; at
the later date it was towards the belief that the weaker sections too had gifts
of their own, which it was desirable, in the interest of the whole, that they
should develop.
In most
respects Browning stands in strong contrast to Tennyson. From Pauline\ 1833) to
Asdando (1889) their courses ran exactly parallel, yet they never touched.
Tennyson was popular, Browning was the poet of the few; Tennyson was insular in
sentiment, Browning cosmopolitan; till past middle life Tennyson was lyrical
even when his work bordered on the dramatic, while Browning was dramatic even
in his lyrics. In the last feet lies the key to Browning’s genius. From
beginning to end he was concerned with “ incidents in the development of a
soul.” And yet the greatest dramatic genius among the Englishmen of the
nineteenth centuiy never wrote an entirely satisfactory drama.
However we
may explain the fact, it is certain that, after many trials, the nineteenth
century failed conspicuously in the drama. As a rule, Victorian dramas have
either been closet studies, or they have been of the stage stagey. The works of
Sheridan Knowles and Tom Taylor are not sufficiently literary; those of Bulwer
are melodramatic and sentimental. The work of Sir Hemy Taylor is far more pure
and true, but even
Browning.—Hood.—Ekzabeth Barrett
Browning. 353
Philip
van Artevelde (1834) lacks the fire and energy of life. Though the underlying
thought is sound, and the poetic form good, it is the work of a student, not of
a playwright. Browning was incomparably more dramatic than Taylor, but his
interest centred rather in striking and illuminative incidents than in the
orderly and gradual evolution of character; and hence he had a surer touch in
dramatic scenes (e.g. Pippa Passes) than in regular dramas, and the dramas sometimes
resolved themselves into single-character studies. At his highest point, the
great scene of Ottima and Sebald, he will bear comparison with Shakespeare.
Yet, though the dramatic period was inevitable in his evolution, it was one out
of which it was desirable for Browning to develop. He was nearer his true, self
in Paracelsus than he ever was afterwards, until he definitively adopted the
dramatic monologue.
Browning did
not invent the dramatic monologue, but he made it peculiarly his own, and in the
end he made it popular. Tennyson in his later days followed Browning’s example
; so did Rossetti; so did Robert Buchanan. Much of the best work of our least
adequately appreciated poetess, Augusta Webster, is in this form; so is some of
the best of our least adequately appreciated poet, Lord de Tabley (John
Leicester Warren). But Browning remains the master, and his Men cmd Women,
Dramatis Personas, and above all The Ring and the Book, that wonderful
collection of dramatic monologues, half of miry clay, but half of the purest
gold, are among the richest of all the rich treasures of English poetry.
Though no
other poets of the time were as comprehensive as Browning and Tennyson, there
are some who bring into clearer view particular phases of its thought and
feeling. One of these is Thomas Hood. Most of his work was done when this
period opened ; but it is rather as author of The Song of the Shirt and of The
Bridge of Sighs, than as the jester, the master of vers de. sociite, or the
humourist of Miss Kilmcmsegg, that Hood will live in literature. And the cause
which inspired him in these masterpieces was one which inspired also not a
little of the verse and prose most characteristic of the time. The sense of
something amiss in the social condition of England was growing acute, even
while Philistines were boasting of “our incomparable civilisation.” Elizabeth
Barrett Browning and Tennyson among the poets, and many of the prose-writers
give expression to this feeling, but none more effectively than Hood. The Song
of the Shirt was a force on the side of social reform hardly less notable than
Lord Shaftesbury’s philanthropic labours.
Like Hood,
Elizabeth Barrett, who in 1846 became Elizabeth Browning, was a writer of
considerable experience before the period opens. Her first girlish venture—An
Essay on Mind—proclaimed her a disciple of the school of Pope; but the change
to romance had taken place before she became acquainted with Browning. Her
marriage with him gave rise to the most interesting personal connexion in the
annals of English literature. Her influence on him was slight, for his was by
far
354 Women poets: Christina Rossetti.—Clough.
the stronger
and greater mind of the two, and he had been characterised from the start by an
almost defiant' originality. On the other hand, his influence on her was great,
though not in all respects beneficial; yet for all the evil he did there is
rich recompense in Son/nets Jrom the Portuguese (1850), which are not only Mrs
Browning’s greatest work, but which also form a collection unique in
literature. Nowhere else do we find such an expression of a virtuous woman’s
love for a man. Nearest to them, perhaps, comes Christina Rossetti’s Mornna
Ifmominata, inspired apparently by emulation of the elder poetess. Elizabeth
Browning’s is unquestionably the greater work, and if she permanently retains
her reputation as the greatest of English poetesses, it will probably be by
reason of these sonnets. For her title is not so absolutely ind isputable as it
is commonly assumed to be. Christina Rossetti was more exquisite if less
forcible. If her work is never so massive, it is fax less faulty. Possibly
Emily Bronte had it in her to surpass both. Not without cause did Matthew
Arnold declare that she had known no fellow for might, passion, vehemence,
grief, and daring since Byron died.
Except in
Keble and Christina Rossetti there is in these poets little trace of the direct
influence of the Oxford Movement. Indeed, its most conspicuous effect was at
first negative rather than positive ; for Clough and Matthew Arnold are the
product of a reaction. Oxford was in the turmoil of the Tractarian controversy
when they went up, and both were affected by it (Clough for a short time
profoundly). Though neither could long yield unquestioning obedience to authority,
this influence compelled them to examine more deeply the intellectual
foundations of their life, and made them the poets of doubt, the leaders of a
sceptical reaction, even as the Tractarians themselves were leaders of a
Catholic reaction against the negations of the French Revolution. In this
respect there is something akin to the two Oxford men in Edward FitzGerald,
who, out of the materials of a Persian poet of the twelfth century, contrived
to fashion an image, perhaps the most perfect we possess, of the English mind
in the nineteenth century.
Clough is
less negative than_ Arnold. He suggests doubts, but he does not deny old
beliefs; On the whole, he gives the impression of a man scarcely equal to the
task imposed upon him. Dipsychus, his most ambitious poem, deals with a theme
which demands a greater intellect than his. He is at his best in a few of the
shorter poems, such as Easter Day and the beautiful Qua curswrn Ventus, which
immortalises the very friendship whose close it was written to commemorate.
Arnold, on
the other hand, definitively rejects immortality, and reduces God to “ a stream
of tendency, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness.” It might seem that
there is little left. But then, he thought that stream of tendency the most
real of all things. Many a sentence published during his life, but most of all
the extracts from his notebooks published since his death, prove that to him
the spiritual was
Matthew Arnold.—Romantic influences.
355
the real; and
the tone of wistful longing which gives the subtlest charm to his verse is due
to the wish to believe many things he cannot prove, combined with the “ sad
lucidity of soul ” which convinces him that they remain unproven. Naturally
therefore it is in the elegiac strain that Arnold expresses himself most
happily; and if he has not quite equalled the masters of the English elegy in
any single piece, he is the only poet who has, not once or twice, but over and
over again written elegies of exquisite beauty. The Scholar Gipsy and Thyrsis,
the Obermann poems, the Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse and A Southern
Night, all rank with the best poetry of the time. The secret lies in the pathos
of Arnold’s own intellectual position. In sympathy he is Catholic; but loyalty
to “ the high white star of truth ” keeps him unswerving in the conviction that
the Catholic position is untenable. He is a Newman who has gone the other way,
but who looks back with longing at the closing gates of the Paradise promised
by the Church. The same substratum of thought and emotion underlies all
Arnold’s verse. It is present in Empedocles (1852), though the theme is
ancient. Dover Beach and To a Gipsy Child are elegies of the spirit, though
they are written over no grave; and “ the eternal note of sadness ” sounds
through the lyrical groups entitled Faded Leaves and Switzerland. Thus the
range of Arnold is not great; and perhaps it was this fact that led him in
later days to confine himself almost wholly to prose. He is the only writer of
the period who is nearly as eminent in the one form as in the other.
The most
striking characteristic of the age is the pervasiveness of romance, which
moulded thought through Carlyle and religion through Newman. Its influence upon
art and the close connexion between art and poetry were illustrated with
peculiar effect about the middle of the century by the rise of the group of
artists who took the name of the Pre-Raphaelites, and who were in several cases
also poets.
It is easy to
trace a parallel movement in poetry and in architecture well back into the
eighteenth century. Horace Walpole wrote The Castle of Otranto, and also
gothicised Strawberry Hill; at a later date the author of The Lay of the Last
Minstrel was the builder of Abbotsford. But the stages of development were very
different. While the Gothic of Abbotsford is notoriously false, there is no
more wholesome and sound romance in literature than that which is embodied in
Scott’s works. In architecture the writings of Pugin had already done something
for the diffusion of sounder principles; but the works of Ruskin show how much
remained to be taught. The chapter on the nature of Gothic in The Stones of
Venice was almost a revelation; and Ruskin’s very errors are less a reproach to
him than a proof of the need of such teaching. More serious, because
irretrievable, mistakes were made by the practical men who, venturing to meddle
with churches and cathedrals without fully understanding the art of the
medieval builders, contrived
356 Romanticism in architecture and
painting: Ruskin.
to make the
word “ restoration ” odious. But, whatever were the errors of the reformers,
the significance of the reform is unmistakable. The lofty towers and soaring
spires, the dim vistas, the varied and seer-irgly lawless ornament of columns
and arches and windows, the grotesque corbels, present the same contrast to the
severe simplicity of classical architecture that romantic presents to classical
poetry.
As in
architecture so also in painting; when the mystic and weird and wonderful had
taken full possession of poetry, painting still remained conventional. Turner
looked at nature with the eye of a fresh imagination, and just about the time
when the period opens, Ruskin in Modern Painters (1843-60) was extolling him as
the greatest of the painters of landscape. Before Turner died (1851) the battle
was won, and romanticism was victorious in painting also. In the same year
Ruskin’s pamphlet, Pre-Raphaelitism, and the first volume of The Stones of
Venice, were published. The author was then in the midst of his career as
dictator on all questions of art, and had already published two volumes of
Modern Painters and The Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849). The show of system
with which Modern Painters begins is not justified in the end; but the fact is hardly
to be regretted, for Ruskin, here as elsewhere, is often best in the
digressions. Those digressions revealed already the literary critic as well as
the critic of art, and prepared the observant for the development during the
next decade of the political economist and the social reformer who in Unto this
Last and in Munera Pulveris and, later still, in Fors Clavigera (1871-84),
proclaimed war against the conventions of practical life as he had previously
proclaimed it against convention in art. In their mingling of wisdom with what
looks singularly like its opposite, these works are among the strangest and
most puzzling of the century.
Ruskin’s
defence of the Pre-Raphaelites was upon artistic grounds alone, for he greatly
disliked the ideas which seemed to underlie their work. The cause of his
dislike is, however, to the student of thought the most interesting feature of
Pre-Raphaelite art. Ruskin conceived that Popery and Puseyism were written
large upon the work of the young painters, and, detesting these things as he
did, he was relieved by their repudiation of them. The repudiation was made in
perfectly good faith, yet the kinship was real. Painters, architects, poets,
and ecclesiiastics, all were carried along by the same spiritual current.
The young painters
had followed Ruskin’s own maxim, and gone to nature, “rejecting nothing,
selecting nothing, and scorning nothing.” The soundness of the maxim may be
doubted; for the “art to omit” can hardly be without a place in painting when
it has so great a place in literature; but at least it was a good weapon in the
warfare against convention. Here again extremes meet. Just as in the early
romantic movement the return to nature goes hand-in-hand with mysticism, as the
poetry of the supernatural and the poetry of common life are wedded
Pre-Raphaelite influences in
literature and art. 357
in L/yrical
Ballads, so now dreams of heaven are united with minute and elaborate studies
of twigs and leaves.
Art and
literature were never more closely allied than in the Pre- Raphaelite
Brotherhood. For a short time in 1850 the Brotherhood had a literary organ, The
Germ, which expounded their principles in poetry as well as in painting and
sculpture; and their intellectual chief, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, though by
profession a painter, was greatest as a poet. His earliest volume of poems was
not published till 1870, while Morris’ first volume appeared in 1858 and
Swinburne’s in 1860; but it was nevertheless Rossetti who moulded the new
school. His Blessed Damozel was printed in The Germ, other poems appeared in
The Oxford and Cambridge Magazine, and yet others circulated in manuscript
among the faithful. Nearly the whole of the Poems of 1870 had been written in
the early fifties or still earlier.
Rossetti’s
poetry is profoundly sensuous; but, when Buchanan attacked it on this ground,
he failed to perceive that it is also powerfully intellectual. Rossetti’s was
one of the most massive, though not one of the most comprehensive,
intelligences of the time; and the intellectual force of poems like Jenmy, The
Burden of Nineveh, and The Kings Tragedy, and of sonnets like Lost Days, is
alone sufficient to ensure his fame. The sensuousness which accompanied this
intellectuality is one of the vines of connexion between Rossetti and an ecclesiastical
party about whose theories he knew nothing and cared nothing. As they loaded
the air of their churches with incense and made them gaudy with colour, so, but
with a far subtler skill, does Rossetti load his poems. The languid air seems
heavy with odours in The Bride's Prelude; and The Blessed Damozel, the most
characteristic poem of Pre-Raphaelitism, is marked by a singular materialism.
William
Morris was led astray by his connexion with the Pre- Raphaelites. His genius
was far more objective than Rossetti’s. He had much of the story-telling power
of Chaucer and Scott, and his best work is to be found, not in volumes like The
Defence of Guenevere, where the Rossetti influence is strong, but in The
Earthly Paradise (1868-70), and still more in the splendid northern epic of
Sigurd the Volsung (1876). For Morris did more perhaps than any one else to
strengthen the Scandinavian element in our literature, which Gray had
introduced, and which Carlyle had helped to foster.
A far more
typical Pre-Raphaelite is Swinburne. He may even dispute the throne with
Rossetti himself, for with characteristic vehemence he out-Heroded Herod. All
that marks the school is present in him, more intense in tone, more vivid in
colouring. The world had scarcely finished praising Atalanta in Calydon (1865)
when it was startled, puzzled and dismayed by Poems and Ballads (1866). These
early volumes may be taken as types of most of Swinburne’s subsequent work. The
first, a drama on the Greek model, is Greek with a difference; for it
358 Prose of the period: Bulwer and Disraeli.
is also
intensely romantic. It has little of the Greek restraint, and it has a wealth
of colour which no Greek ever permitted himself; The rich poetic and especially
metrical qualities it displays are illustrated over and over again in his later
works. He is among the greatest masters of English rhythm and metre; and, if he
could have observed measure in thought as severely as he could in his verse, he
would have had scarcely a superior among English writers. It was excess in
Poems and Ballads which alarmed contemporaries—the excess of an undisguised and
exultant sensuousness, derived partly from Rossetti and partly from the French
romantic writers. But it carried its own cure, and already in Songs before Sunrise
(1871) the poet showed a more restrained and saner sensuousness, accompanied by
profounder thought.
Rich as the
period has been in verse, it has been still more rich in prose. The brilliant
success of Scott in prose fiction hastened a development which was inevitable
in any case, and two men of considerable note had begun to write before his
death. Edward Bulwer, afterwards Lord Lytton, attempted nearly every form of
fiction current during his life, and in all just missed greatness. The fatal
flaw in his works, as in those of Disraeli, is artificiality; but the latter
have that extraneous interest attaching to the writings of a man who has made
histoiy. If they reveal nothing else, they at least reveal himself. The central
group of his novels, Coningsby, Sybil, and Tancred, written after his debut as
a politician and before he was completely absorbed in office, are especially
worthy of attention. They show that the “Jew adventurer” was already
entertaining schemes of social reform which, if they had been Gladstone’s, and
if they had been presented with Saxon sobriety in the place of oriental
gorgeousness of imagination, might have been accepted as proofs of earnest
character and high patriotism.
Far greater
as novelists were the two rival chiefs of the early Victorian period, Charles
Dickens and William Makepeace Thackeray. From Pickwick (1836-7) onwards the
career of Dickens was a succession of triumphs, while it was not till eleven
years later that Vanity Fair gained for Thackeray a reputation comparable to
that of Dickens. In popularity he never approached the latter, for Dickens
appealed to the people in an age when popular influences had begun to count for
much in literature as well as in politics; Thackeray, belonging, as he did, to
the upper middle class by birth and training, revealed his aristocratic
leanings, both in tone of mind and in theme. No great man of letters ever had a
smaller equipment of learning than Dickens. His university was the streets of
London, and the best proof of his genius is the masterly way in which he
handled the materials he found there. All his best scenes are located in or
near London, or deal with London characters; and therefore, for his own
peculiar work, his early training was as good as any that could have been devised
for him. His humour is racy of the streets. After Falstaff there is no more
humorous character than Sam
Contrasted influence of Dickens and
Thackeray. 369
Weller; but
Dickens could not have found him anywhere but in London, nor would all the
learning of the Egyptians have served him as well as his own experiences there.
His faults, which must just be forgiven him, come from the same source. That
pathos, so much lauded by contemporaries, which rings false now, is the pathos
of the streets. The perennial Londoner is sentimental, a lover of melodrama,
sometimes maudlin or mawkish in his sympathy. And this fault is precisely the
defect of the pathos of Dickens: he dwells upon it too long, he insists too
much.
It is just
here that the more refined and educated Thackeray has the advantage; for,
though Thackeray was among the admirers of the pathos of Dickens, it is
impossible to conceive him falling into the same errors of taste. His very
merits, however, helped to limit his popularity, for it needs some training to
appree: 1 the satire of Vanity Fair, and still more to feel the exquisite skill
of Esmond (1852) (perhaps, the most perfect,, which does not necessarily mean
tht greatest, of historical novels). The chapter on Waterloo in the one is
among the classical passages of English literature; and there is nothing in
fiction more beautifully written than that entitled “The 29th December,” in the
oilier. A considerable number of the most highly educated have been champions
of Dickens; but on the whole each of the two masters has commanded the suffrage
of the class to which he specially appealed.
Dickens as
well as Disraeli was keenly interested in social problems; but, while the
latter was hardly taken seriously, the immense popularity of Dickens gave
importance to his attacks on the abuses of the law-, courts and of schools
whose object was not the education of the children but the enrichment of the
proprietors. This was a phase of fiction which attained its full development
about the middle of the century, when the problems begotten by the Industrial
Revolution were pressing for a solution. Carlyle thundered out his
denunciations in Latter-Day Pamphlets, as he had done before in Chartism and in
Past and Present (1843); and Kingjsley, Charles Reade, Charlotte Bronte, and
Elizabeth Gaskell, all in one way or another drove home the same doctrine.
The most
effective of Charles Kingsley’s works, Yeast and Alton Locke, were directly
inspired by this sense of social wrong. But Kingsley’s very earnestness made
these books chaotic, and he touched a higher point of art in the historical
romances Westward Ho! and Herewaird the Wake. Neither in the one sphere nor in
the other, however, was he the equal of Charles Reade, whose problem-novels are
so solidly based on documents that they merit close attention, and whose one
great historical novel, The Cloister and the Hea/rth (1861), is of such
sterling, quality that there needed but a few more of the same sort to make
Reade the peer of the greatest. Blackmore’s Lorna Doone stands out similarly
among its author’s works, and is surpassed in its class (during this period)
only by Reade’s great work and by Thackeray’s Esmond.
360
' The two
female writers who have been named illustrate in an interesting way the gradual
emancipation of woman. There were now not merely literary women here and there
; but a class of literary women who interested themselves in a widening range
of subjects. Charlotte Bronte showed in Shirley (1849) a masculine power of
dealing with the problems of labour, and her picture in Jane Eyre (1847) of the
schools, to which girls were condemned, was almost as effective as the satire
of Dickens on schools for boys. Old prejudice, however, still showed itself in
the opinion entertained by some that the author of Jam Eyre had “ unsexed ”
herself, and that Mrs Gaskell had shown deplorable indelicacy in Ruth. In some
respects Charlotte Bronte is clearly inferior to Jane Austen, and in others to
“ George Eliot ”; but in intensify she surpasses both. She is, however, far
less mistress of herself than they, and it may be questioned whether, had her
life been longer, she could have produced other works equal to Jane Eyre and
Villette (1853). Her friend and biographer, Elizabeth Cleghom Gaskell, though
her genius was not storm-tossed like Charlotte Bronte’s, wrote many books of
enduring power and charm, and in Cranford (1851-3) produced an English classic
as delightful as The Vicar of Wakefield.
Among the
many other women of letters, Charlotte Yonge was believed in the fifties to
have composed one of the great books of the world. Such a judgment on The Hew
of Redclyffe was, however, due, not to any intrinsic merit in the book, but to
the adaptation of its High Church sentiment to the time and to the circle,
chiefly of Oxford men, who entertained this opinion. Margaret Oliphant, though
her productions were largely hack-work, was a greater writer than Miss Yonge.
But George Eliot is the only person worthy to be named with Charlotte Bronte
and Mrs Gaskell; and, though critics differ as to her precise position among
novelists, none can doubt that it is a high one. When she wrote Scenes of
Clerical Life (1857), she was already in the full maturity of her powers and
her accomplishments. Her learning and philosophy, never obtruded in her earlier
works, were the firm canvas on which those wonderful pictures of the life of
the English midlands were painted. Her excursion into the region of the
historical romance in Romola (1863) is to be regretted. Though her psychology
was never finer than in the masterly study of Tito Melema, the book as a whole
is decidedly below her own standard. And the change was permanent. She reverted
to English subjects, but it was “never glad, confident morning again.” The
canvas shines through, the philosopher is a;vowed. In Middlema/rch (1871-2) the
philosopher is so great that the change is hardly to be lamented; but probably
most readers prefer the ease and grace of The Mill on the Floss (I860) and
Silas Marner (1861).
Few think of
Anthony Trollope as strictly contemporary with these writers. Yet he was only
three years junior to Dickens, he was four years senior to George Eliot, and he
had begun to Write fiction about
Anthony Trollope.—George Meredith.
361
a decade
before her. The most recent of his books is now more than twenty years old, and
it cannot be denied that his fame suffers from the enormous mass of his work.
He never gave his thought time to mature, and consequently, though his work is
good, it is rarely good enough. Wholesome is perhaps the word which best
describes it.
If it is not
easy to realise the chronological position of Trollope, it is still more
difficult to bear in mind that the veteran George Meredith began his career as
early as George Eliot. Yet The Shaving of Shagpat was published in 1856, the
year prior to the appearance of Scenes of Clerical IAfe. That singular satire
revealed to a few appreciative readers the advent of a powerful and original
genius. The Ordeal of Richard Fever el (1859) made him known more widely, and
Rhoda Fleming (1865), perhaps the least unusual of all his works, reached a
wider circle still. But the very originality of his genius has prevented him
from becoming really popular. In this respect he resembles Browning, and it is
difficult to acquit either writer of a certain wanton defiance of common
opinion and taste. Each hugs eccentricity to his heart; and Meredith has certainly
cultivated the epigrammatic style to excess. The ability which can sustain that
style through a whole book, and which can repeat the exploit indefinitely yet
with constant variety, is amazing; but, if prose plain and unadorned sometimes
palls, so does prose which sparkles and glitters from start to finish without
relief.
Though, with
Fielding and Scott in view, it would be dangerous to say that fiction in this
period reached its highest point, there can be no doubt that more good and even
great novelists were then writing than in any previous age. Their activity was
part of the popular movement, though, as a whole, the novelists took no sides
in politics. The point is that prose fiction is the easiest form of imaginative
literature. Making less demand than poetry upon intelligence and education, it
suits the man who has little time to read, and who probably brings to what he
reads a mind exhausted by the work of the day. Thus it answers the needs of a
world much occupied in the struggle for existence, a world in which the power
to read and a certain taste for reading are far more widely diffused than they
have ever been before, while the higher education has not spread in anything
like a proportionate degree. There is a literary as well as an economic law of
supply and demand, and in unconscious obedience to it the copious floods of
fiction continue to be poured out.
What is emphatically
true of fiction is true also of all forms of prose. Ever since the seventeenth
century, prose has been gaining in relative importance upon poetry. In
particular, there has been a surprising growth in miscellaneous prose
writings, such as those of Carlyle, Macaulay, Leigh Hunt and De Quincey. This
is another mark of the popularisation of literature. It was by no means solely
to gratify a class which desired and was contented with a superficial knowledge
of many
362
things that
journals and periodicals were established in the early years of the nineteenth
century, but it was certainly the existence of this class that enabled them to
flourish. The catering for their taste became the surest means of subsistence
for writers who were dependent upon the pen and who were not writers of
fiction. Monumental works of philosophy or of history can only be produced
after long years of reading and thought; even if he had been ripe for it at the
start, Macaulay could not have made a living immediately by such a work as the
History of England, and the savings of frugal and anxious years were needed to
give Carlyle leisure to write Frederick the Great. The reviews and magazines,
the rise of which is one of the most striking facts in the recent history of
literature, afforded the labourer subsistence. The Edinburgh, The Quarterly and
The London Reviews, Blackwoods Magazine, The London Magazine, The Examiner and
many other periodicals supported a number of writers who could hardly have
lived but for them. It is to the credit of the pe. odi lals that among those
writers are included a number whose fame is still unobscured.
The ultimate
influence upon individual writers of this connexion with the magazines depended
partly upon character, and partly upon the nature of their literary gifts. The
stronger and greater writers used the periodicals as a staff, not as a crutch.
But some remained simply journalists of genius. Where there is any weakness in
the character, the temptation, to rest content with the ephemeralities of
journalism is deadly. De Quincey, with great accomplishments and a marvellous
gift of style, only now and then soars beyond such ephemeralities : the innate
tendency to difiuseness, fostered by the conditions under which he wrote, fatally
weakens most of his work. The same is true of John Wilson, better known as
Christopher North; while his friend and coadjutor, Lockhart, though saved from
oblivion by a noble biography of a noble character, left all the work of his
later years buried in the obscurity of old Quarterlies. It was partly adverse
circumstances that made Leigh Hunt also essentially a journalist through life.
He deserves, however, honourable mention for his manly championship, while he
edited The Examiner, of neglected poets like Shelley, whom he was one of the
first to appreciate. His volumes on Fancy and Imagination and on Wit and Humour
show a fine and sympathetic taste. But perhaps he is most memorable for his
Autobiography, rich in interesting details about the life of the time, and in
that charm which never fails to accompany sincere self-revelation, and
surpassed in this period only by the autobiographies of Haydon and of John
Stuart Mill.
Among the men
who made their entry into literature by the avenue of the reviews, none
attained fame more easily than Macaulay. His early recognition was due in about
equal measure to his merits and to his defects. His bright and lucid style
attracted readers, and his ideas
363
won ready
acceptance, because they were essentially the ideas of the time. The style goes
far to guarantee the permanence of Macaulay’s place in literature; but the
nature of the thought makes it tolerably certain that his place will not be
among the greatest; for, though the world goes on reading what is well written,
the ideas it ultimately approves are rarely those which were most popular when
they were first promulgated. The truth lies between the extreme which ranks
Macaulay among the greatest writers and that depreciation of the History of
England (1848-60) which was once becoming the fashion. Those who like Freeman
really knew what historical work was never joined in the depreciation. Its
defects are obvious. Macaulay was full of Whig prejudice, and his essay on
Bacon proves clearly enough that he had no depth of philosophy. He makes some
mistakes as to fact, and one or two of them are surprising ; but, considering
the enormous number of facts given, it is far more surprising that, the
mistakes are so few. Macaulay’s weakness was, in truth, more in the drawing of
inferences than in the statement of facts.
Macaulay
stood between two periods. The historians of the eighteenth centuiy, with the
exception of Gibbon, had been inspired by ambitions and had followed methods
essentially literary, while the men of the rising generation were scientific in
the sense that they conceived their primary obligation to be to investigate the
truth and to state it when they had discovered what it was. Macaulay
acknowledged the obligation, but he would not have set a high value upon a
history which was not also a piece of literature. The change was marked by an
immensely increased respect for origins as well as by an incomparably more
exhaustive investigation of authorities. After a sharp struggle the study of
Modem History gained a position in the two great English Universities such as
it had never held before; but the period was near its close before the modem
view of histoiy attained complete ascendancy. It was not till Stubbs had been
appointed professor at Oxford (1866) and Seeley had succeeded Kingsley at
Cambridge (1869) that the old era could be said to have passed away completely.
Meanwhile the materials for research had grown with embarrassing rapidity; for
the state documents of many countries, which had been gathering dust ever since
they were written, were made accessible. In the light they afforded many old
theories had to be abandoned, and new ones were invented to take their place.
In this work
the lead was taken by Oxford. Among those of her sons, however, who have
written history, the most brilliant, James Anthony Froude, is hardly recognised
as a man of the Oxford school. The Oxford school prided itself above all upon
accuracy, of which Froude seems to have been constitutionally incapable. No
fault could be more grave: it immensely diminishes Froude’s value as a
historian But from the point of view of the historian as a man of letters,
Froude is masterly. His limpid English in some ways surpasses Macaulay’s. He
is
admirable in narrative, and for pictorial power he has rarely been surpassed.
But perhaps it is his life of Carlyle that will he longest read. Though the
Carlyle there depicted is largely mythical, the book is incomparably vivid.
Great part of the credit, however, must be ascribed to Carlyle, for no one ever
furnished more ample or more excellent material for a biographer. ' :
If Macaulay
and Froude, dealing with subjects centuries old, failed to free their narrative
from bias, far less could the two great military historians, Napier and
Kinglake, treating as they did of things which they had seen, be expected to do
so. Napier had suffered from Spanish incompetence; Kinglake, with the Coup
d'etat fresh in his mind, was virulent against Napoleon. But if they show the
defects of contemporary history, they also illustrate its advantages. Because
their knowledge was direct and personal, they have succeeded in making the
Peninsular campaigns and the war in the Crimea more real and more fascinating
than any other struggles ever waged by Englishmen. Their methods are widely
different. Napier, richer in technical knowledge, is also far more nervous and
strong in his English. There is nothing in Kinglake comparable to the terse yet
eloquent description of Albuera. Napier’s rare illustrative anecdotes seem to
be drawn from a vast store, from which, had he chosen, he might have doubled
the length of his history. Kinglake, on the contrary, is exhaustive, and
appears to aim at telling everything that can be told. The vice of his style is
diffuseness; but, on the other hand, it is picturesque and readable. He is
emphatically the historian of battle; and, thanks to him, no battles ever
fought by Englishmen, not even Waterloo, are known in all their details as are
the Alma and Balaklava and Inkerman.
In thirty
years a young man becomes old; and, occasionally, in thirty years a literature
which has the air of youth about it comes to wear the signs of age. Such was
the case, in a remarkable degree, in the period under review. In 1840 the
destinies of English literature were in the hands of young men; in 1870 the
survivors of those men were still the leaders. But they were old and weary.
After the completion of his Frederick Carlyle did nothing great; Browning never
rose to his old level after The Ring and the Booh\ only Tennyson seemed to be
as vigorous as ever. As it was with the men, so was it with the ideas they
represented. They remained dominant; but they showed signs of wear.
Romanticism, notwithstanding phases of realism in fiction and of classicism in
poetry, was still the key, but it was not quite the same romanticism.
“Germanism,” in philosophy, had scarcely yet attained its full influence, but
in imaginative literature it was already on the wane, and the events of 1870-1
were prejudicial rather than helpful to its development. The' empire made of
blood and iron was a material empire. Technical education, practical skill,
commercial success, were won at the cost of some of the old fine spirituality.
The dreamers turned less eagerly to a nation
Revival of French influence.—The idea
of evolution. 365
which was
itself awaking from its dream. France, on the other hand, had already won back
a large part of her prestige in literature. Matthew Arnold was never tired of
insisting that, for the English, French models were far safer than German ones;
and, through his influence, our later criticism has been largely based on
Sainte-Beuve. Contrast the disparagement , of Coleridge and De Quincey, and the
great change of opinion in the course of half a century becomes manifest.. In
poetry, again, the Pre-Raphaelites were French rather than German in their
sympathies: Hugo, not Goethe, is the god of Swinburne’s idolatry. This is still
more true of the younger men, sometimes called the “ Neo-Romanticists,” who were
just beginning to write about the year 1870. O’Shaughnessy was more deeply
under French influence than Swinburne or any of the older Pre-Raphaelites.
Rossetti was quite alive to its dangers, and in 1873 spoke of Flaubert’s
Salammbo as a phenomenal book which “could only have emanated from a nation on
the brink of a great catastrophe.” Fleurs du mal are indeed poisonous food; and
the poetry of the Neo-Romanticists is not very wholesome. The writers were
young men, but there are more of the signs of age and decay about their work
than there are in the contemporary verse of Browning and Tennyson.
There was,
however, one most fruitful and altogether wholesome conception which has for
the first time to be reckoned with about the close of this period. Darwin is
primarily a figure in science rather than in literature; but the idea of
evolution may prove to be the most important contribution of the nineteenth
century to literature as well as to science. The idea existed, it is true,
before Darwin, in Hegel and in Comte as well as in Lamarck, and can be traced
far away behind any of them; but it was Darwin who made it effective. The year
1859 is, therefore, a memorable date, though it was long before the idea came
home to men and its full scope was understood. Gradually, it has been applied
to politics, to religion, to criticism, to history, to philosophy, and the
probability is that it will influence the treatment of such subjects in the
future even more than in the recent past. There are, moreover, traces of it already
in poetry, and it would be rash to set limits to the possibilities of a
conception of nature at once so comprehensive and so revolutionary.
CAVOUR AND
THE KINGDOM OF ITALY. (1849-61.)
Victoe Emmanuel n, known to his contemporaries as II
Re Galantuomo, and to posterity as Padre della Patria, began his reign, after
the abdication of King Charles Albert, on the awful night of Friday, March 23,
1849, which followed the defeat , of Novara. On March 24 he went to a
conference with Marshal Radetzky at the village of Vignale, not far from
Novara, and there, while doing his utmost to reduce the demands of the
conqueror, he accepted defeat with resignation, and left the conference with
head as high as when he entered it. The terms of the armistice of March 25,
1849, were undoubtedly onerous. They were as follows: withdrawal from the
district bounded by the Po, Sesia, and Ticino; occupation of the fortress of
Alessandria by a mixed garrison of Austrians and Piedmontese till the
conclusion of peace; immediate evacuation of the Duchies; recall of the
Sardinian fleet from the Adriatic; disbandment of the Lombard volunteers; and
repayment of the expenses of the war.
Meanwhile the
inhabitants of Turin remained quiet and apparently indifferent; but the Chambers
were violently agitated. On the night of March 26 Victor Emmanuel returned,
and, accepting the resignation of the Rattazzi Ministry, replaced it by one
under General Gabriele de Launay. Oh the 29th the new King swore fidelity to
the Constitution, in the presence of the two Chambers. He was everywhere
received with a cold hostility, which drew from him tears of indignation. The
Chamber of Deputies, having formally declared the armistice to be
unconstitutional, was (March 29) prorogued, and next day dissolved, without any
indication as to the date of the new elections; and hence arose an increase of
the suspicion that the liberties of the country were in danger.
The
ill-success of the war had an indirect result, in the shape of an organised
revolt at Genoa, which was principally due to Mazzini; this was energetically
put down by General Alfonso La Marmora, who took the city by assault. It is not
clear that there was any connexion between the revolt at Genoa, and the
disobedience of the turbulent ex-Mazzinian, General Girolamo Ramorino, which
had been
one of the
causes of the defeat of Novara; but it is certain that the Genoese insurgents
were counting on his aid, and that Charles Albert had felt much hesitation in
entrusting him with the command of the division which included the Volunteer
Lombard legion. On April 11, La Marmora entered Genoa; and on May 29 Ramorino
was shot by sentence of court martial, for disobedience in face of the enemy.
The Lombard legion were sent to Rome on their own petition; where, instead of
assisting in a crazy revolt, they covered themselves with glory, fighting the
French.
The date of
the new elections was fixed for July 15, the reopening of the Chambers for the
30th. The demand of a war indemnity of no less than 230 millions (£9,840,000)
caused Piedmont to appeal to the mediation of France and England, and thus
interrupted the negotiations; meanwhile, it was thought better to accept the
occupation of Alessandria, which was carried out on April 24. Since May 7
Massimo d’Azeglio had succeeded de Launay as President of the Council and
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Austria had no love for the name of d’Azeglio;
nevertheless, on the intercession of France and England, she voluntarily
proposed a resumption of the conferences. She evacuated Alessandria on June 18;
and on the 20th the plenipotentiaries again met. The war indemnity was reduced
to 75 millions (<£3,000,000); and peace was signed on August 6, 1849. The
new Piedmontese Chamber, which met on July 30, 1849, refused to approve the
treaty of peace, or to recognise its terms; on November 16 it passed a
resolution to suspend the operation of the treaty. On the 20th it was
dissolved, and new elections were ordered for December 9. Victor Emmanuel now
addressed himself directly to the electorate, in the famous proclamation of
Moncalieri, dated November 20, 1849. The country listened to his appeal; and
the new Chambers approved the treaty by an enormous majority on January 9,
1850.
The first
question, that arose in the Chambers, was the glaring contradiction between the
first principle of constitutional government— the equality of all citizens
before the law—and the privileges of the ecclesiastical Courts in Piedmont,
with all their appendages of medieval barbarism. To induce the Roman Curia to
give its voluntary assent to the abolition of a state of things which was not
tolerated in any other civilised country, even in those under absolute rule,
Massimo d’Azeglio, in September, 1849, sent Giuseppe Siccardi as envoy to Pius
IX, only to find that at the papal Court political hatred prevailed over every
other consideration. D’Azeglio replied by nominating Siccardi to the office of
Keeper of the Seals in February, 1850, on the advice of Cavour; Siccardi
thereupon, again at the instigation of Cavour, brought in a Bill for the
abolition of the ecclesiastical Courts, and of all their special jurisdictions.
This Bill extinguished the right of asylum attaching to churches and holy
places; it forbade the acquisition or acceptance by institutions or
corporations,
whether lay or spiritual, of any property under deed or will without the
consent of the Government; finally, it foreshadowed further legislation for the
regulation of marriage as a civil contract. The Bill was enthusiastically
received by the majority, and. its principles were embodied in three statutes,
known as the Siccardi Laws, and famous for this sole reason, that, whereas in
all other countries these arrangements had been carried out by Concordats, to
which the Roman Curia was a party, Piedmont was compelled by the force of
political circumstances to enact them independently of Rome.
There is no
doubt that Cavour was the original author, as he was later the principal
supporter, of these proposals, or that his ends were twofold. He wished, first,
to carry out a reform which appealed to his deepest convictions as a Liberal,
and secondly to test how far the Right section of the Chamber were willing to
go with him. For this purpose he had selected a ground on which the Right
Centre, under his leadership, could count on the certain support of the Left
Centre; thus already pointing the way to a future coalition by means of which
Liberal reforms might be carried out even against the opposition of the Right.
His speech on this occasion—a masterpiece of political wisdom and of closely7reasoned
argument—was his true maiden speech; for he had never before taken part in
parliamentary discussions with such complete and decisive success. His speech
moreover contained an entire programme of administration; to realise which he
must of necessity break sooner or later with his friends of the Right, and put
himself at the head of all the intelligent Liberals in the Chamber. The
Siccardi Laws were carried in both Chambers. The acceptance of these laws by the
Senate, in which Conservatism was naturally expected to prevail, roused even in
quiet Turin a popular enthusiasm which unluckily degenerated into riotous
attacks on the Clerical party, requiring to be put down by force. Thus it came
about that Massimo d’Azeglio was to be seen charging the crowd in his uniform
as a colonel of cavalry— “ Fieramosca,” as a comic paper put it,
“pigeon-shooting on the Piazza Castel”; a joke which'at any rate marked the
stoutness of the Minister’s impartiality towards both the Blacks and the Reds.
He won,
however, little credit thereby from eithei Pope or Piedmontese Bishops. The
Pope protested most solemnly against the Siccardi Laws, as an attack on
religion, and recalled the Nuncio. The Bishops started a very real and open rebellion
against the Government; this was headed by Monsignor Luigi Franzoni,
Archbishop of Turin, who was zealously followed by the Bishops of Sassari and
Cagliari. But not an inch would the Government yield. On the refusal of
Franzoni to appear before the Court, he was forcibly brought into the fortress,
and sentenced by the Court to a month’s imprisonment and a fine. The Bishop of
Sassari was also condemned to a month’s confinement to his own palace, and the
Bishop of Cagliari to banishment from
1850—l] Death of Santarosa.—Cavour head of the
Cabinet. 369
the kingdom;
the Bishop of Asti had already fled the country, partly no doubt on account of
other charges, but partly also through fear of the application of the Siccardi
Laws.
War being:
now openly declared, the quarrel was further embittered by the case of Pietro
di Santarosa, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. At the beginning of August,
1850, Santarosa, feeling that his end was drawing near, asked for the last
consolations of religion. By the orders of Monsignor Franzoni, who had resumed
the exercise of his archiepiscopal functions on the completion of his
punishment, these were only to he granted him on condition of his acknowledging
the sinfulness of the part he had taken as a Minister in passing the Siccardi
Laws, and of withdrawing his adhesion to them. The invalid refused with
dignity, and on August 5 met his death, amid the grief of a family devoted to
their Church, without having received the Sacraments, and under the threat that
a religious funeral and burial might also be denied him. On this last outrage
Franzoni dared not insist; but the funeral of Santarosa excited popular passion
to such a pitch that the Government, who were by this time thoroughly incensed
with the Clericals, suspended the religious body to which the parish priest
belonged who had denied the Sacraments to Santarosa, and sequestrated its
property. The Archbishop was again arrested, and this time condemned to exile.
On October
11, 1850, Count Camillo di Cavour was appointed to Santarosa’s vacant post. For
this the opinion of the nation had already selected him, though he had never
been acceptable to the more conservative of the nobility or to the Court. When
the Ministers submitted his name, the King is said to have observed: “ So be
it; but, mark you, it will not be long before this man will send your Worships
flying head over heels.” And indeed, Cavour had scarcely entered the Ministry,
before he began to display that energy, which the more slow- moving d’Azeglio
was a little later to dub “diabolic.” Day by day Parliament saw him perform the
functions of all the Ministers, and take part in every discussion, and thus
gradually came to accept him as the mouthpiece, or rather as the actual
representative, of the Government. Moreover in November, 1851, on the
retirement of Nigra, Cavour became Minister of Finance as well as of
Agriculture and Commerce; being thus placed at the head of two reciprocally
complementary Departments, he was practically enabled to direct all the material
interests of the country, and became in fact the head of the Cabinet. Thus the
shrewd prediction of Victor Emmanuel began to find its fulfilment.
After the
disturbances caused by the Siccardi Laws, Cavour’s economic reforms and his new
taxation widened yet further the split in the main body of the Right, which had
so far supported the Ministry. The d’Azeglio Ministry was thus sailing in
troubled waters; and the admission of de Foresta in the place of Siccardi as
Keeper of the Seals, and of Luigi Carlo Farini, one of the most illustrious of
the exiles of the
Romagna, as
Minister of Education, had not proved helpful. All that was now possible, as
Cavour clearly saw, was to secure new and surer support by turning towards the
Left Centre, which might easily work in harmony with the more progressive
portions of the Right Centre. Probably d’Azeglio himself was of the same
opinion ; but he could scarcely bring himself to sanction such a change of
front.
Then fell the
thunderbolt of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte’s Coup diktat in France, on December
2,1851. This undoubtedly alarmed the Liberals, and at the same time emboldened
the reactionary governments and factions throughout Europe in general, and the
Clericals and Conservatives of Piedmont in particular, to call for a halt, nay,
even for measures of repression. Cavour and d’Azeglio, with clearer and deeper
political insight, recognised that Italy had nothing to fear from a Bonaparte
at the head of France, who had dabbled from his youth upwards in the
conspiracies and disturbances of Italy, who was the heir of the Napoleonic
feuds, and consequently the hereditary foe of the treaties of 1815 and of the
European system thereby constituted. It became, therefore, all the more
important to gain the favour of this new Republic, which was already standing
on the slippery incline which led towards the Empire; and, as a certain part of
the Press were exuding their venom over “ the man of December 2,” a beginning
was made by expelling some of the lower class of French refugees from Piedmont.
The next step was a Bill introduced by de Foresta, providing for the
transference of indictments for offences against heads of States from the
cognisance of juries to the ordinary Courts. It was thus hoped to anticipate
any awkward requisition on the part of Napoleon; the retrogrades and Clericals
indeed demanded much more than this, and talked undisguisedly of “ leaping the
ditch ”—an expression which became famous. But at this point disagreement
began; d’Azeglio, while admitting the justice of their past action, thought
that they had gone as far as the occasion required; Cavour maintained that, as
their proposed measure, though really unimportant and dictated by ephemeral
considerations, was to a certain extent restrictive of liberty, the Ministry
was bound to give the Liberals some guarantee of its honesty. It ought
therefore to separate from the retrogrades and Clericals of the Right, and form
a new parliamentary combination by the union of the Moderate Right and the Left
Centre.
On February 2,
1852, Rattazzi attacked this measure; but he promised his support to the
Ministry in the next session, should no further measures of restriction be
introduced. The Right, on the other hand, by demanding measures of much greater
severity, gave Cavour his opportunity. Whilst courteously acknowledging
Rattazzi’s promise, he rejected the proposal of the Right with great energy,
thus clearly indicating that he had broken with them (February 5,1852). The new
coalition was cemented by the nomination of Rattazzi (again under Cavour’s
influence) to the Vice-Presidency, and finally on May 11 to the
I852-3] Cavour
Premier.—Economic reforms.
371
Presidency,
of the Chamber. Hereupon d’Azeglio revolted, carrying another of the Ministers
with him; and Cavour, seeing that he was suspected of double-dealing,
resigned; the Ministry was then reconstructed under d’Azeglio, Cavour and
Farini being omitted. But the new Ministry had to take the same line as the
old, thus showing once more that there was no question of intrigue, but only of
meeting the actual political situation; for their first step was to introduce a
Bill on Civil Marriage, which passed the Chamber, but was shipwrecked by a
single vote in the Senate. Its mere introduction, however, at once rekindled
the wrath of the Pope, and once more threw the unfortunate d’Azeglio into the
pathless maze of ecclesiastical discussions. The King, it may be added, was
beginning to hesitate, under the pressure of family and Court influence; and
dAzeglio was weary, and also suffering from the wound so gloriously received at
Vicenza. On October 11, 1852, he tendered his resignation, and advised the King
to recall Cavour. The latter had been travelling in France and England since
his resignation ; in Paris he had presented Rattazzi to the Prince President,
in order to remove the suspicion which that statesman had incurred in some
quarters in France. On receiving the King’s commands, Cavour at first declined
the task, and suggested Cesare Balbo as better fitted for it, Balbo thereupon attempted
to form a Ministry, but failed. The King, loyal to his duty, then reverted to
Cavour, who forthwith constructed a Ministry (November 4, 1852); his triumphal
entry as Prime Minister was greeted, and justly, as the great and definitive
victory of the Liberal coalition, henceforth known as the cormubio.
Nevertheless,
to all appearance, the honeymoon was but short-lived. Cavour was beaten in the
Senate on the Civil Marriage Bill; but, as he had promised the King not to make
it a Cabinet question, he remained in office and withdrew the Bill. In carrying
out the reorganisation of the finances, he was very soon obliged to resume the
practice of alternating between large loans and heavy taxation, measures which
certainly did not increase his popularity; but he neglected no opportunity of
invigorating the country, of winning for it outside sympathy and respect, and
of ensuring it against the ever present danger of the implacable hostility of
Austria. To these years belong the various commercial treaties, and the
revision of the Customs Tariffs, a first approach towards Free Trade, which had
the immediate effect of cheapening the necessaries of life and the raw
materials of industry; the domestic legislation on Companies, Cooperative
Societies, Agrarian Credit, on Banks of deposit and of discount; the completion
of the Railway System, and its connexion with neighbouring districts, the
institution of permanent lines of Atlantic Mail steamers, even the project for
the Mont Cenis Tunnel; and, lastly, the reorganisation 'of the army and the
fortification of Alessandria and Casale. The whole constitutes a monument of
administrative achievement, the like of which has not since been seen in
Italy.
372 Union of the Moderate Bight and Left Centre
parties. [i853
But such a
programme involved the treatment of Piedmont as if it were already Italy, an
assumption which created enormous difficulties with other Powers, especially
with the other Italian States and with Austria, to whom it was a standing
menace; and, while the principle had the support of the loftier intellects in
Piedmont as elsewhere, and of the more earnest Liberals and the refugees, it
was opposed by the vast mass of the uneducated, who had to bear the brunt of
the temporary sacrifices required, while incapable of sei >ng, or at any
rate of appreciating, their purpose. At one time irritated' by the
retrogrades—the priests, at another by the demagogues, or by public calamities,
such as bad harvests or the vine-disease, the uneducated masses and
ultra-demagogues made Cavour responsible for everything, and even attacked his
palace, and attempted his life, on February 18,1853. He, however, kept true to
his course; and, in October, 1853, Rattazzi was made Keeper of the Seals, thus
formally consummating the alliance with the Left Centre. As the Senate, in
which the retrograde and ultra-conservative elements prevailed, was inclined to
hinder or even reject his Bills, Cavour did not hesitate to call upon the
electors to decide between them; he dissolved the Chambers, and summoned the
new House for December 19, 1853. The result was a triumphant majority for the
policy of Cavour; the small amount of popularity that he had lost by his
financial provisions, being returned to him, with interest, on account of his
foreign policy; and this not in Piedmont only, but throughout Italy.
One of the
charges made by Austria against Piedmont was that of complicity in the ever
recurring Mazzinian conspiracies. The brutality of the political trials held in
Lombardo-Venetia during 1852 had not satisfied the vengeance of Austria; and on
the failure of the attempt organised by Mazzini in Milan in February, 1853 (to
which, as of the trials previously mentioned, reference will be made later), an
Imperial Edict, dated February, 1853, sequestrated the whole property, real and
personal, of all, without distinction, who had left Lombardo-Venetia for
political reasons. Cavour protested, but in terms of this strictest legal
correctness, confining himself to the cases of refugees naturalised as “Sardinians’';
Buol made an ill-tempered reply, to which Cavour retorted by recalling his
ambassador from Vienna. Thus Piedmont openly assumed the defence of Italians
crushed under the unwarrantable outrages of Austria; and this new attitude
brought over some of Mazzini’s most conspicuous adherents to her side.
Piedmont’s protest^ supported by the good offices of France and England (which
Buol had rejected with the same rudeness), was the first step towards the
isolation of Austria, which from this time forth became Cavour’s chief object.
In
consequence of the financial condition of the country, Rattazzi now introduced
a Bill for the abolition of sundry ecclesiastical corporations and the
confiscation of their property. This rekindled the religious controversy; though
the fire was momentarily smothered by another
1854-e] Piedmontese alliance with France and
England. 3 73
matter of far
wider scope, the alliance of Sardinia with France, England, and Turkey agiainst
the Russian Empire, and her participation in the Crimean War. The alliance
between France and England was signed on April 24, 1854, and after long
negotiations, rendered additionally difficult by the hostility of Austria
towards Piedmont, was joined by Cavour, on January 25, 1855. Piedmont and all
Italy appreciated and enthusiastically backed his bold initiative and
farsighted intuition. On April 21, 1855, 15,000 Piedmontese, commanded by
General Alfonso La Mkhnora, sailed from Genoa to the Crimea.
But, in
Turin, the quarrel about friars and nuns began afresh. Cavour’s enemies were
not slow to make profitable use of the sovereign’s grief for the death of his
mother, wife, and brother (January—February, 1855), and the Ministry found
themselves face to face with an insidious scheme of compromise, elaborated in clerical
workshops and favoured by the King, which left them no alternative but
resignation. But the effect on the King’s emotions had been less serious than
the retrogrades and Clericals had hoped. Cavour retained his post, and the King
signed the slightly amended Bill (as Cavour writes) “ with a graciousness which
has enabled me to forget several uncomfortable moments.” The Minister’s path
was at last brightened, after long and anxious delays, by the news of La
Marmora’s victory on the Chernaya, August 16, 1855. The military importance of
this deed of arms has perhaps been exaggerated; but the ill-nature, which
derides the Italian enthusiasm occasioned by that victory, fails to take into
account the moral value of the ray of glory thrown on her tricolour after so
many disasters. And it ignores the share, small as it was, which Italy might
fairly claim in the triumph of her two powerful Allies, at the very moment when
Austria had alienated Russia by her ingratitude, and offended France and
England by her equivocal neutrality.
The
improvement in the position of Italy was at once seen on the visit of Victor
Emmanuel to Paris and London in November, 1855, with Cavour and d’Azeglio in
his suite, and in the spontaneous cordiality of the reception accorded to the
warrior King alike by Governments and peoples. On their return through Paris,
the Emperor Napoleon III publicly proclaimed his heart-felt interest in the
Italian cause by suddenly putting to Cavour the celebrated query, “What can be
done for Italy?” Cavour’s reply to this question is to be found in his
Memorandum of February, 1856, a diplomatic document which contained an eloquent
description of the extreme sufferings of Italy, and a judicious suggestion of
the more obvious remedies, while it avoided forcing any premature conclusions
on the Emperor.
The general
political situation of Europe had begun to change; the Crimean War, like every
other undertaking of Napoleon III, was cut short at the moment of success; and
the preliminaries of the peace which the desperate straits of Russia had forced
Alexander II to accept
374 Cavour at Paris.—Francis Joseph in Lombardy.
[i856-7
were the work
of Austria, who thus secured a very dangerous preponderance in the Congress
then about to assemble in Paris. Under these unfavourable conditions Cavour saw
the moment approaching when he was to make good before a sceptical world the
value for Italy’s own safety, in a very broad interpretation of that term, of
the patriotic crusade which she had gone out of her way to wage in the Crimea.
For it was still doubtful whether the King of Sardinia would be admitted to the
Congress on equal terms with other Powers, and still more doubtful whether, if
the last difficulty were surmounted despite Austrian opposition, any mention of
Italian affairs would be allowed. Thus Cavour started for the Congress—more, as
he said, to “ sniff the air ” than for any better reason. He was at length able
to bring up the Italian question (on April 8,1856), and with outstretched
finger he pointed at Austria as the author of all Italy’s woes. He defended
Italy with gallantry; “ a viso aperto ” said the Tuscans, applying to him
Dante’s phrase as the highest of compliments; but his own confession was that
the results of his advocacy had been disheartening. Nor did the visit he paid
to London, on the advice of Napoleon III, raise his spirits. Yet he had induced
even the representatives of Prussia and Russia to condemn Austria, and perhaps
had a vague consciousness that he had in fact won a moral victory of great value
in the eyes of the world, and that he had given a gloriously new sensation to
Italy, hitherto known in the diplomatic Olympus only by the wails of her
exiles, the platitudes of her sentimental amateur politicians, and the
incendiary proclamations of Mazzini. The universal feeling in Italy that Cavour
had won his battle at the Congress of Paris, was needed in order to bring home
to him his own success.
Austria had
been the object of so many accusations at the Congress of Paris, that she
determined, against the opinion of the experienced Radetzky, to make a final
attempt at conciliation. She therefore relaxed the severities in
Lombardo-Venetia, and removed the much-impugned sequestrations of the property
of emigrants (December, 1856). The Emperor Francis Joseph visited the provinces
in person in January, 1857, accompanied by his handsome wife; and he sent them
the best-natured of his brothers, as Governor. Milan replied by erecting, at
her own expense, a monument in Turin to the Piedmontese army; Venice declared
through its illustrious exile, Daniele Manin, then a resident in Paris, “We do
not want Austria to mend her ways in Italy; we want her to go ”; and Cavour,
who, in his alarm at the cajoleries of Maximilian towards Lombardo-Venetia, had
bidden his friends “force Austria, if you can, to restore the state of siege in
Milan,” took the opportunity, supplied by the violent invectives of Count Buol,
to break off all relations with her, even severing the last diplomatic threads
which remained after 1853.
The attitude
of Piedmont was becoming daily better defined after the Congress of Paris, in
spite of the coldness of England^ and the
advice, not
to say the reproofs, of France. But however imprudently audacious Cavour’s
attitude may have appeared in some quarters, it was clearly impossible to
effect any speedy solution of the questions at issue. Piedmont was incapable of
provoking a crisis single-handed; and, besides the cost of her sacrifices old
and new, had to face the expenses of the Crimean expedition and of the
necessary renewal of her armaments. The Mazzinians and the Clericals took
advantage of the distrust of Cavour; the former to repeat the rebellion of 1849
at Genoa in June, 1857; the latter to capture, by skilful manoeuvres, a large
number of seats in the Chamber at the general elections of November 15, 1857.
The attempt at Genoa was undoubtedly the most criminal of Mazzini’s
enterprises; and his admirers have tried in vain to excuse him, on the absurd
suggestion that he only wished to obtain arms for the support of Carlo
Pisacane’s revolutionary movement in Naples. The fact is that Mazzini, feeling
that his revolutionary quasi-dictatorship was slipping from his hand, was now
making a desperate attempt to recover it, by striking at the one hindrance in
his path. The attempt in Genoa was put down; and the excess in the number of
Clerical deputies was modified by the discreditable expedient of disqualifying
many of them on scrutiny. But no sooner was one difficulty overcome than
another arose, of far more serious character.
The sensation
produced throughout Europe by the abominable crime of January 14, 1858, when
the Italian, Felice Orsini, attempted the life of the Emperor Napoleon, was
enormous. Orsini was executed on March 13, 1858. Soon afterwards the Emperor
made public a letter from Orsini, dated March 11, 1858, in which he accepted
the permission given to his counsel to submit a previous letter to the Court
during his trial, as an indication not only of the Emperor’s generosity, but of
his good-will towards Italy. He thanked him for the consolation thus afforded
to him in his last moments, and, while offering his head as an expiation for
his crime, which he declared to have been the result of temporary aberration,
expressed his horror of all political murders.
The attack of
Orsini, the conspiracies in Lombardo-Venetia, the attempts of Mazzini, the
rising at Genoa, and the expedition of Pisacane were the last of the efforts,
as varied as they had been unfortunate, of the Secret Societies to work on their
traditional methods, before their final absorption into a wider policy. From
this time public opinion tends towards the idea of the political unity of
Italy—the one invaluable outcome of Mazzini’s persistent preachings—but
through, and by means of, Piedmont and the Savoy dynasty. This was the
political testament of Daniele Manin, as delivered by Giorgio Pallavicino,
Giuseppe La Farina, and Giuseppe Garibaldi. It was also the accepted programme
of the “National Society” which these three men had started in August, 1857,
and which became a powerful instrument for preaching and developing the perfect
harmony that prevailed during the next three years.
In Piedmont
the attack of Orsini all but upset the friehdly relations with France, at the
very moment that Cavour was straining hard to improve them yet further, and
when the advent of a Tory Miniftry in England was threatening Piedmont with
further isolation. This difficult situation, however, was overcome; and there
can be no doubt that thenceforth Orsini’s attempt and the rapprochement between
England and Austria rather hastened than retarded the resolution of Napoleon.
In June, 1858, he invited Cavour to a secret conference at Plombieres. Three
points were settled under the shade of the great trees of Plombieres: war with
Austria, the marriage of Prince Napoleon with the eldest daughter of Victor
Emmanuel, and the cession of Savoy to France. The detailed steps were rather
vaguely discussed; and the final events did not entirely correspond with the
prognostications.
Before
proceeding to describe the attack on Austria, designed and executed by France
and Piedmont in cooperation, it is necessary to notice the condition of those
other Italian States, which exercised so profound an influence on the course of
the war. The disasters of the Revolution of 1849 had been followed by reaction
in every State of Italy. “Reaction and the hegemony of Austria, whose mastery
is felt even where her arms are absent”—these words summarise the condition of
Italy everywhere, except in Piedmont, from 1849 to 1859. In Milan and all
Lombardo-Venetia the vigorous rule of Radetzky prevailed, unrestrained even by
the scruples which sometimes affected the Viennese politicians. Reform was in
this case mere court-plaster to a gaping wound, and Radetzky knew it. Of the
summary military executions, the imprisonments, the floggings, on mere
suspicion, for imaginary crimes or for petty offences, no count is possible.
The result was seen in the immediate revival of conspiracies, into which the more
impetuous threw themselves with the determination of despair. Here, too,
Mazzini made himself felt; he was now enjoying in London a short period of
revived influence, which he was, however, soon gradually to fritter away by his
adherence to the figment of universal revolution. In addition his dictatorial
attitude, almost that of a Pretender in exile, was odious to many, and led him
to multiply those demands for purposeless self-sacrifice which were as
unsuccessful in their result as they proved detrimental to his reputation.
Thus the
first conspiracies in Lombardo-Venetia after 1849 (since the claim of
Monarchical Piedmont to the leadership had not yet been declared) were
Republican, if not entirely Mazzinian. The most important of these was that
started at Mantua, on the evening of November 2,1850, by Enrico Tazzoli, a
priest of blameless life, of distinguished intellect, and of heroic
temperament, a sublime type of the inspired martyr of patriotism. During 1851
the conspiracy grew, its existence remaiirng unknown to the Austrian police. It
had central committees in Milan and Venice, and branches everywhere. Part of
its business was to raise money by
1850-7] Lombardo-Venetia.—The “Mantuan
Trials." 377
the sale of
the National Loan Stock, started by Mazzini; but its principal object was to
shake off the iron rule of Radetzky and the Austrians. The first suspicions of
the Government, the first prosecutions, and the first condemnations appeared to
deal with isolated cases. But the arrest of Enrico Tazzoli on January 27,1852,
and of many others, gave rise to the notorious “ Mantuan Trials,” the scandal
and abomination of the entire world for the brutality of the tortures inflicted
on the accused. It was a pitiful fact that, although one among the many dreams
of these poor conspirators had been to seize the Emperor’s person on his visit
to Venice in 1852, of real revolutionary action there had been absolutely none.
The legal proceedings lasted, one following upon another, from 1852 to 1855.
Beginning the count with Enrico Tazzoli, who was hanged with four others on
December 7, 1852, and closing it with Pier Fortunato Calvi, hanged on July 2,
1855, there were twelve of these “ martyrs of Belfiore ” (so called from the
name of the terrace outside one of the gates of Mantua where executions were
carried out), the heroes of a tragedy of patriotism and self-sacrifice which is
the sublimest episode in the present story, and to which is due the impassable
gulf then created between Austria and Italy.
The same can
scarcely be said of the next attempt, one of purely Mazzinian origin, viz. that
of February 6, 1853; though intended to be another Sicilian Vespers, it only
afforded some excuse for the rigours of Radetzky, and finally made impassable
the breach between Mazzini and the best of his supporters. But it was at any
rate an additional testimony to the implacable hatred, against which the tardy
repentance of Austria and the blandishments of the chivalrous Maximilian in
1857 were alike powerless. Throughout these ten years Milan and all
Lombardo-Venetia maintained their inflexible resistance, their determination
as to union with Piedmont, and their willingness to follow the direction given
by Cavour to the Italian Revolution.
Slightly
different was the state of affairs in Florence and Tuscany. Leopold II had been
restored by a vote of the people; but he had returned a confirmed Austrian. The
amnesty which had at first been proclaimed turned out to be a mere blind, and
resulted in an increase of severities. The Constitution was certainly
mentioned, but it was not put into force, being treated as in abeyance. The
Moderates who had advocated the restoration became restive; but, with the
Austrians installed, there was little to be done. On September 21, 1850, the
Grand Duke, alleging (with some show of reason) that the Constitution had been
wrecked, not by himself, but by the democrats, Montanelli, Guerrazzi and their
friends, adjourned the meeting of the Chambers indefinitely. Finally on May 6,
1852, he simply abolished the Constitution.
Such was the
temper of one side and the other when the famous trial of Guerrazzi began. This
was a review of the whole past, and in
fact an
indictment of all concerned: of the Grand Duke, for his fickleness and breach
of faith; of the gloomy and violent Guerrazzi, for seeking only to gratify his
own ambitions and dislikes; of the Democrats, for hounding their country into
anarchy; of the Moderates, for giving the first impulse to reaction, a remedy
worse than the disease.
On the close
of the Austrian occupation (April, 1855), the Government, though still the
creature of Austria, resumed on the whole its old attitude of kindliness and
respect for law; prosperity returned; life in Florence and fertile Tuscany
became once more easy and cheap. All might have settled down again comfortably,
but for that national idealism which had been awakened in 1848, and which was
now working in the minds of all. The principles of the “National Society” had
spread everywhere; and the only opposition lay in some petty provincial vanity,
and in the insignificant and self-interested protests of the adherents of the
Grand Duke. The Moderates were working against the Government on a system of
pin-pricks; the lower classes mainly by the methods of Mazzini, especially in turbulent
Leghorn. The Government on its side had no strong feelings of dislike, except
for Constitution- loving Piedmont and for Cavour. And it was towards Cavour,
too, that the foremost of the Moderates were now looking, though still somewhat
doubtfully, the most resolute among them being he whose iron will was to knit
all the Liberal parties into one, and decide the fate of Tuscany— Baron Bettino
Ricasoli.
In Rome,
after the restoration of the Papacy, it was evident that the Pope and Cardinal
Antonelli, while thoroughly sympathising with the Grand Duke’s dislike of
Piedmont and of Cavour, were also specially incensed against Napoleon III. The
personal views of that monarch the Pope and Antonelli never forgave. As for his
expedition to Rome in 1849, its only result for France and for himself was that
he was compelled to mount guard over the Vatican throughout nearly the whole
of the Second Empire, without securing a single one of the reforms which he had
laid down as absolutely indispensable. The Pope, suspicious of French
intentions, delayed his return as long as possible. He had heralded his arrival
by a motu proprio, dated Portici, September 12, 1849, which promised some
trifling reforms (never carried out), and by an amnesty, from which some 7256
persons were excepted. Meanwhile there was a deluge of indictments,
condemnations, and political persecutions of all sorts; and the reaction in
the whole country was still more strongly accentuated after the return of the
Pope on April 12, 1850. Political excesses were succeeded by disciplinary and
dogmatic extravagances ; the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in England
and in Holland (1851-2), and, lastly, the proclamation of the dogma of the
Immaculate Conception on December 8, 1854, to be soon followed by the Syllabus
(1864), and later by the proclamation of the dogma of Papal Infallibility
(1870).
1848-51]
379
But the
situation in Rome was as nothing to that of the kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand II
had started his own reaction on May 15,1848; indeed, in the conferences of
Gaeta and Portici, where he was the host, and the exiled Pope and Grand Duke
his guests, he put on all the airs of Agamemnon, King of Kings. His sole
thought was now for himself, his one desire vengeance, first on the Liberal
party, and next on all of his subjects whose political wishes or aspirations
extended beyond the kingdom of Naples.
Silvio
Spaventa, perhaps the only Neapolitan who ever supported Charles Albert, had
been a member of the Constitutional Parliament of Naples in 1848, and had then
formed a new secret “Society for the Monarchical Unity of Italy,” which had
little success and ended at last as Republican and Mazzinian. The
Administration knew and cared little or nothing about it. ;The
police nevertheless, by dint of intrigues, perjuries, and other devices, got up
a prosecution against forty-two of its members, which lasted from June 1, 1850,
to January, 1851. So monstrous was the procedure that William Ewart Gladstone,
who attended the trial, and visited the convicts after their sentence in the
prisons of Nisida, thought it incumbent upon him to write to Lord Aberdeen the
well-known letters in which he quoted and made popular the description of the
Neapolitan Government as the “negation of God ’’^—letters which were endorsed
by Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, and subsequently circulated through
every Court in Europe.
This was
followed by two other political trials, resulting from the occurrences of May
and September, 1848, which had given the excuse for suspending the
Constitution. The two were intimately connected; but the second is the better
known, as it resulted in the conviction of Silvio Spaventa. Though he was the
founder of the Unita Italiana, his name had not been mentioned in the course of
the proceedings against that Society, in which Carlo Poerio had been tried and
convicted, in spite of proof that he had refused to be a member, and had, in
fact, publicly repudiated its principles.
The second of
the above-named trials, which lasted over ten months, was one long triumph for
the accused, and one long disgrace to the Government. Not the least
extraordinary part of the business is that, while the Bourbon King had so
strenuously objected to the criticism of any constitutional body, in these
trials he created a debating-ground in which his prisoners were the judges, and
himself the accused, and where the audience was the whole civilised world. The
occurrences in Naples had their counterpart in the provinces, at Lecce, at
Potenza, and in Calabria. The victims were counted by hundreds; and, though the
King did not venture to carry out the capital sentences against political
offenders, of whom the majority, by their spotless lives, their high birth, and
their culture belonged to the very flower of the nation, yet by herding them
into gaols, which were sheer hells on earth, by racking
them with
every form of torture, and by classing them with thieves and murderers, he
wreaked on them a more deadly revenge.
Though the
Revolution in Sicily in 1848 had been put down by Carlo Filangieri with
ruthless severity, he would no doubt have been personally inclined to
conciliatory and lenient methods, but for the blind and jealous hostility of
the King and his Ministers on the one hand, and the incessant conspiracies and
disturbances in Sicily on the other. The only result of this brutal system was
the isolation of Ferdinand II, and his increasing discredit both at home and
abroad; and hence even his attempts to put the economic condition of the
kingdom on a better footing by legislation were of no effect.
After the
revelations at the Congress of Paris as to the condition of Naples, France and
England made continued efforts to induce the King at least to show a little
clemency towards political prisoners. The fatuous pride with which he rejected
their advice may have deserved the praise of his courtiers, but it exhausted
the patience of the two great Powers, who recalled their own ambassadors, and
dismissed those of Naples on October 24,1856. He was deafer than ever to the
suggestions of Piedmont, which Cavour so skilfully framed that, come what
might, all the blame should lie on Naples. The terrible solitude, which the
King had thus created around him, occasioned the renewal of Sicilian
conspiracies and troubles, in which Mazzini also took part; the most notable of
these was the attempt made in November, 1856, by Baron Francesco Bentivegna,
who was executed for it on December 19. On the 18th of the same month, during a
review in Naples, a private soldier named Agesilao Milano, an enthusiastic
Mazzinian, suddenly stepped out of the ranks, and made a murderous attack on
the King. In the same year, the celebrated refugee, Antonio Panizzi, tried to
assist the escape of Luigi Settembrini and his unfortunate companions from the
prison of Santo Stefano; and in June, 1857, Carlo Pisacane effected a landing
on the shores of Naples, with the view of starting a revolution. This and other
similar acts of violence, in which the hand of the revolutionary party was to
be discerned, seriously affected the health of the King and completely upset
his already tottering mental equilibrium.
None of these
attempts had succeeded, but the constant repetition of them showed the
uselessness of repression, and at the same time sapped the King’s power of
resistance. Weary, infirm, and perhaps at last alive to the truth, he
determined to ship off his troublesome political prisoners to America. The
first batch, 66 in number, including Settembrini, were put on board in
December, 1858; but, instead of going to America, they managed to land in
England; and the opportunity was taken to make fresh demonstrations against the
Bourbon King. The last ray of sunlight that fell on his gloomy Court was the
a,rrival of the Bavarian Maria, a Princess of great beauty and charm, who was
married to the Crown Prince Francesco in January, 1859. King Ferdinand died a
few months
1849-59] Naples and the Duchies.—Napoleon and
Austria. 381
later, on May
22, 1859. With him the kingdom of Naples may be said to end. All that came to
his unlucky successor was a kingdom in a state of dissolution, an edifice so
crumbling from the foundations upwards, that—as the event proved—it could not
but fall to pieces at the first vigorous blow.
During the
reaction of 1849-50, Parma and Modena, while nominally independent, were in
fact mere provinces of Austria. The “National Society ” had spieac itself far
and wide’ through the two duchies; and the period of reaction was, as far as
they were concerned, a mere interlude p> seeding their union with Piedmont.
Such were the
more characteristic features of the general condition of Italy from 1849 down
to the moment when the secret of Plombieres was revealed, and the words of
Napoleon III and of Victor Emmanuel sounded through the country like a war-cry.
Though no doubt prepared for any risk, Cavour was well aware of the dangers of
French assistance; and he was determined first that the rupture, when it came,
should be brought about by Italy single-handed, and secondly that Piedmont,
even though unsupported, should take the initiative in throwing down the
gauntlet to Austria. But the language addressed by the Emperor to Hiibner, the
Austrian ambassador, on New Year’s Day,
1859—“
I regret that our relations are not as satisfactory as formerly ”— disconcerted
the whole of his plan: so much so, that, while they kindled a perfect blaze of
rejoicing in Italy, Cavour described them to his ambassador in London as an
“ill-mannered outbreak.” This reckless revelation of the Plombieres plan was
tantamount to a direct provocation to war, whereas it was of the first
importance to secure the isolation of Austria by forcing her to become the
provoking party. The Emperor had imagined that his New Year’s greeting to
Hiibner, as well as the Note in the Moniteur by which he attempted to allay the
resulting clamour, would be taken in good part by Austria and others. But the
contrary was the case; and the anxiety was increased a thousandfold by the
speech with which Victor Emmanuel opened his Parliament on January 10,1859—a
speech to which Napoleon had added some touches, which really aggravated, while
pretending to moderate, its tone. “With all our respect for treaties,” said the
King, “we are not insensible to the cry of pain which rises towards us from so
many parts of Italy ”— words which resounded like a trumpet-call to war against
Austria, and to revolution against all the petty tyrants of Italy. For of all
these Austria was the mainstay; and a threat addressed to her was equally
addressed to them.
Close upon these
events followed Prince Napoleon’s visit to Turin, the Treaty of January 19,
1859, the Military Convention between the two Allied Powers, and the marriage
of the Princess Clotilde. Events were thus moving rapidly; and Cavour was the
soul of the movement. He left it to Napoleon to discuss the Italian question at
his leisure in the
382 Different policies of Cavour and Napoleon,
[1859
apocalyptic
pages of de La Gueronniere, whose newly published pamphlet, The Emperor and
Italy, had been notoriously inspired by Napoleon III. In that work the author
depicted the actual situation in Italy in vivid colours; rejecting all idea of
unification, he advocated a federation of the Italian States (including an
enlarged Piedmont), under the presidency of the Pope, who, in return for this
honour, was to modernise and humanise his administration. As for the future of
Austria, the conclusions of the imperial pamphleteer were somewhat more vague.
He appealed to public opinion, and expressed a hope that, in view of the clear recognition
of the rights of Italy by all statesmen of repute, Austria would yield to
persuasion. But what if she refused to yield? Then, it would perhaps be
necessary to revert to force.
But this last
point was the only one about which Cavour cared. So long as Austria had a
direct hold on Lombardo-Venetia, and an indirect one on all the rest of Italy,
it was idle to discuss the future Constitution of the country; although his
views on that point were by no means those of the Emperor. He therefore obtained
the assent of the Chambers to a war loan, while at the same time he urged the “
National Society” to yet intenser activity, so as to draw closer the fiery
circle within which Austria was to be eventually enclosed. Moreover, he had now
embarked on that great political campaign which has been justly accounted his
masterwork, and which he may be said to have fought unaided, that is, if we
except the assistance received from English statesmen. The objects before him
were threefold: to quash every attempt to stop the war; to isolate Austria; and
to force her to declare war on her own account, and thus ensure her isolation
during the contest, As for Napoleon, Cavour’s great anxiety was to prevent him
from wandering off into any of his usual dreams, or from allowing his generous
but unstable mind to be swayed by the arts of. his advisers, who were nearly
all hostile to Italy.
Suddenly,
however, Napoleon, being much troubled by the evident aversion of the French
from a war in favour of Italy, proposed to override their objection by
enlarging the ambit of his plans, so as to include a war on the Rhine. While
England first suggested disarmament, and next adopted as her own the customary
specific of a Congress, which had originally been proposed by Russia, Cavour on
his side had already summoned his contingents of recruits to the colours.
Volunteers were flocking into Piedmont from all Italy, showing how universal
was the determination to accept her leadership in this great crisis. Some of
these were drafted into the regular army, others were formed into a new corps,
called the Chasseurs of the Alps, the command of which was given by Cavour with
a happy audacity to Giuseppe Garibaldi, the exGeneral of the Roman Republic,
the man who had escaped from Rome sword still in hand, and miraculously evaded
the pursuit of four armies and ten generals—the man who therefore now
represented, in its purest
ideal, the
revolt of Italy against the Papacy and the Empire, against Austria and the
petty Italian tyrants who had made common cause with her.
If Cavour was
now to make head against the warnings and threats of united Europe, his only
course was to maintain an unshakable grip of the principles asserted so
gloriously by Piedmont and its King during the last ten years, and fearlessly to
confront every menace. In March and April, 1859, the enemies of Italy made
their final effort; they brought to bear upon Cavour the representations of
those interested in the preservation of peace, who one and all charged him with
being ready to plunge Europe into war in order to satisfy the personal ambition
of his King, and to further the cause of Revolution. The crisis was terrible,
but Cavour maintained his position against the diplomatic deluge which
threatened to overwhelm him. It was fortunate that he had foreseen the
obstacles in his path, and had taken care, before having recourse to arms, to
secure the equally important preliminary support of public opinion. Morally,
the cause of Italy was won, before a shot was fired in 1859. But, before reaching
the issue of war, not only Cavour, but the whole of Italy, had to pass through
much cruel uncertainty. At one moment a Congress and a general disarmament
seemed inevitable, and this would have meant death to all the hopes of Italy;
for disarmament, in view of the acute differences among European nations,
could only suit those who looked for a Congress to restore everywhere the
status quo, or, in other words, to give a fresh sanction to the treaties of
1815.
Cavour’s game
was much facilitated by the blind obstinacy of Austria; but none the less
admirable were the ease and versatility with which he steered through the
rocks, up to the moment when war, which had been declared on April 19, 1859,
was actually commenced by the Austrian invasion of Piedmont on the 29th. On
April 27, Tuscany had called upon the House of Lorraine to choose finally
between Austria and Italy. The Grand Duke solved the problem by electing to
leave the country, and Tuscany then rose, quietly, but as one man; this was the
first of those extraordinary revolutions which succeeded one another in central
Italy during 1859. On May 1, Victor Emmanuel put himself at the head of his
army; on the 12th Napoleon followed his example. On the 20th the Austrians were
beaten at Montebello; on the 30th at Palestro, both victories being specially
Piedmontese: on June 4, the French, after crossing the Ticino at Turbigo, won
the battle of Magenta, and thus freed Milan ; on the 8th they conquered at
Melegnano, after a tremendous and sanguinary struggle. The Allies then advanced
towards the Mincio; but, before they crossed it, the Austrians once more confronted
them in full force at Solferino and San Martino, on June 24. The battle was on
an enormous scale, and the victory was won with difficulty, mainly by the
valour of the French and Piedmontese soldiers.
The previous
defeat at Magenta had obliged the Austrians to abandon
the Duchies
and Bologna, and the territories on the right bank of the Po. These districts
immediately rose, and, in obedience to the instructions of the National
Society and to the general sentiment, offered the dictatorship to Victor
Emmanuel. Cavour accepted the offer, and sent royal Commissaries to carry on
the administration during the war. As in 1831, the movement which began at
Bologna on June 12, spread like lightning to Ferrara, the Romagna, the Marches,
and Umbria. But in the Marches and in Umbria the papal mercenaries reunited in
force sufficient to reduce these defenceless countries again to the papal
authority, shedding much blood at Perugia.
The further
the war advanced with its rapid succession of victories, the more evident was
the yearning for unity felt, if not always openly acted on, by the whole
Italian world. This result, as we have seen, was exactly what the Emperor had neither
foreseen nor intended. It was true that Umbria and the Marches had been
restored to papal dominion; but at any moment they might revolt again if
assisted from without, and the whole Pontifical State might thus be thrown into
confusion, while a French garrison still lay in Rome. The problem was large and
complicated, and likely to create further embarrassments for Napoleon. Germany,
suspicious of French ambition and egged on by Austrian diplomacy, was beginning
to grumble; Prussia was calling on the Confederation to arm in defence of the
Rhine. The burden of the war might become excessive; so far victory had been
won only at great cost of labour and blood; What if a defeat occurred ? This
argument was urged from Paris by the Empress, and the many influential
opponents of the Italian war; and after the battle of Solferino all these
considerations pressed heavily on the mind of the Emperor. At any rate, from
June 25 to the beginning of July, although the Allies, crossed the Mincio and
prepared for an advance, they did not attack the Austrians, who were now
concentrated inside the well-known Quadrilateral of fortresses. Cavour was
beginning to dread the uncertain mind of the Emperor, which might manifest
itself at any moment in some unexpected arrest of action, some “half-peace,” as
he described it to Kossuth at the time. Nor was he mistaken.
On the
evening of July 6, without any preliminary understanding with Victor Emmanuel,
Napoleon submitted to the Emperor Francis Joseph proposals for an armistice,
and for a conference at Villafranca. On July 8, an armistice was concluded, to
remain in force till August 15; on July 11, the two Emperors met at Villafranca
and agreed that Lombardy (exclusive of Mantua and Peschiera) should be ceded to
France, and that France should transfer the territory thus ceded to the King of
Sardinia; that Venice should remain Austrian; that the Italian Princes should
be restored on guaranteeing the pardon of their subjects. The preliminaries of
peace were shortly afterwards arranged at Verona, and were signed by Victor
Emmanuel; with the qualifying clause,
“I agree for
so much as concerns me,” which secured him a certain amount of liberty in
dealing with the question of central Italy.
On the first
intimation of a suspension of hostilities, Cavour hurried to the royal
quarters. However strong might have been his suspicions, the actual news struck
him like a thunderbolt, and almost drove him out of his senses with grief.
Hence the violence he displayed in his interview with the King, and the
wildness of the advice which he then dared to offer him, but which the King
refused to accept. He resigned, and was succeeded by a; La Marmora-Rattazzi
Ministry. In the beginning of August, 1859, the plenipotentiaries of Sardinia,
Austria, and France met at Zurich to negotiate the formal treaty, which was a
mere repetition of the Preliminaries of Villafranca. After some lengthy and
tortuous discussion, the Treaty of Peace was signed on November 10, 1859.
Except in some administrative and financial details the Treaty of Zurich only
needs mention at all, because its futile ambiguity is the best illustration of
the extraordinary political situation, which arose from the Preliminaries of
Villafranca on the one hand, and from the insurrection of central Italy in
favour of unity on the other.
Before
resigning office, Cavour sent instructions to his friends in central Italy,
which contained the germs of the programme that was to ensure future success.
After wandering about with no fixed object, he finally turned his steps towards
Switzerland, the “ sanatorium of wounded politicians,” as he described it to
the Countess de Circourt. There his temper became calmer, and he gradually
recovered his former serenity. On his return to his villa at Leri some months
later, he was able to write to Prince Jerome Napoleon: “ How often have I, in
this solitude of Leri, felt thankful for the Peace of Villafranca! ” What was
it that had so completely altered his feelings and his attitude ? Nothing but
the unconquerable and now triumphant resistance of central Italy, which had
developed during the negotiations at Zurich. Napoleon resisted so long as he
could, raising objections principally to the union of Tuscany and Piedmont,
which was the real pivot of the Unionist programme, and which excited the most
opposition. But, to make up to the Italians for the interruption of the war at
its most favourable conjuncture, he stood stoutly by the principle of
forbidding all armed intervention tending to hamper the free expression of the
popular vote. The plebiscite had been the foundation of his own power in
France, and its maintenance was a service which, as Cavour said, was worth more
to Italy than the victories of Magenta and Solferino.
In spite of
all this, the Preliminaries of Villafranca, the Peace of Zurich, the immediate
withdrawal of the Piedmontese Commissaries from central Italy, and the
threatening hostility of Austria, so completely and so unexpectedly upset all
the hopes formed during the war, that no nation less attempered to misfortune
than the Italian could have stood fast. But the inhabitants of central Italy
had no difficulty in understanding
386 Duchies and Florence declare for union with
Piedmont.[ism
that, if the
conditions of Villafranca gave their exiled rulers the right to return, it did
not secure them the power to do so; and, under the guidance of the great
intellect and determination of Luigi Carlo Farini, who had been proclaimed
Dictator first in the Duchies and later in Romagna, and of Bettino Ricasoli,
who had the same position without the name in Tuscany, they recognised that it
by with themselves to prevent any such restorations. This deliberate movement
of central Italy , in favour of union, though, it encountered great
difficulties in the Romagna and Tuscany, met with little or none in the
Duchies. The first public indication of it took the shape of a popular vote in
Parma; later, in August and September, 1859, the Representative Chambers of
Modena, Florence, Bologna and Parma, decreed the downfall of their late rulers,
and their union with Piedmont under the Constitutional government of Victor
Emmanuel II. These votes were passed unanimously, and practically without
discussion—an unusual feature, denoting the resolute temper of the voters. But,
on the notification of these votes at Turin, the Rattazzi Ministry were smitten
with nervous timidity, and, hesitating whether to *ccept them or not, turned to
Paris for advice. Still greater was their anxiety when the idea was mooted, not
of a mere military confederacy consisting of Parma, Modena, Bologna, and
Florence, but of their incorporation into a State under the Regency of the
Prince of Carignano, preparatory to the final unification of central Italy with
Piedmont. This scheme, be it said, was not favoured by Ricasoli, who considered
that this meant nothing but the creation of a separate kingdom, with a throne
I'eady prepared for any prince that might choose to occupy it. Such an one
might be the son of Leopold II, or the Duchess of Parma, or Prince Napoleon.
The visit of the last-named to Florence at the outbreak of the war, at the head
of a corps d'armee, on the pretext of forming a rallying-point for the small
forces of Tuscany, was probably not without a purpose; and though, in the face
of the marked coolness of his reception, he had gone away again, who was to
say that his return might not suit the views of his imperial cousin ? The
Piedmontese Ministry dared not give their formal sanction to a regency under
Carignano; and the project ended like a dream, while the dictatorships of
Farini and Ricasoli in the Emilia and Tuscany continued to have a very real
existence.
Such was the
general situation at the signature of peace; and it looked as if an European
Congress was imminent for the definitive settlement of the Italian question.
For Napoleon III, however, the assembly of an European Congress at this moment
would have been singularly inopportune. Despairing of finding an issue from
the contradictions and confusion created by the calculated ambiguities of an
incoherent policy; swayed in one direction by his own Italian inclinations, and
in the other by the anti-Italian views of his Ministers; recognising at last
the impossibility of hindering the Union between central Italy and Piedmont—he
had determined to seek compensation by the annexation of Nice and Savoy
1859-eo] La GuSronniere's pamphlet.-Cavour resumes
office. 387
to France;
and he could not submit this plan to an European Congress. On December 22,
1859, on the very eve of the meeting, one of the usual semi-official pamphlets
appeared, from the pens of de La Gueronniere and Mocquart, entitled The Pope
and the Congress. Its main theme was that the Pope must resign himself
henceforth to the loss of the Marches, and be satisfied with the possession of
the city of Rome. As for the Marches and Umbria, it appears to assume that the
Pope might keep them, if he was strong enough, and if they were
willing—conditions in which the germ of future events may be perceived. But
Rome was another matter; Rome was the city marked out by fate from the
beginning of history to be for ever the property of the Popes. The arguments in
support of this thesis to be found in the pamphlet are so crudely artificial as
almost to give it the air of an ironical parody in the style of Voltaire. More
important is the assertion that, as counsels and threats had availed nothing
with the obstinate people of central Italy, it was not for France to impose her
will upon them by force. Still less would she allow Austria to do so, and thus
neutralise the benefits won by French arms; nor could France admit the
interference of the King of Naples without risking civil war in Italy. As a
political tract the pamphlet is worthless, as a diplomatic move it was
decisive. The Pope was infuriated, and used abusive language in reply; the
Liberals welcomed it with an enthusiasm, which was increased when Napoleon
dismissed Walewski, made Thouvenel his Foreign Minister, and addressed a letter
to the Pope on December 81, 1859, affirming and adopting the ideas of the
pamphlet. England did not perceive till later that this characteristically
Napoleonic outburst was only a mask for the cession of Nice and Savoy to
France. With results all thus cut and dried, a Congress became useless, and the
idea was allowed to drop.
Rattazzi had
already disgusted Lombardy by the avalanche of ill- considered and very
questionable legislation under which he had overwhelmed her, on the pretext of
carrying out unification; and now, when called upon by Napoleon to face the
necessity of the cession of Nice and Savoy, which Cavour had already accepted,
he gave an emphatic refusal. He resigned his post to Cavour, whom the whole
country had already designated for office, hoping evidently that his dreaded
rival would lose some of his popularity through the cession. Thus Cavour
resumed power on January 20, 1860; and, on the return of the great Minister,
Italy breathed again. But it then appeared that in addition to the cession of
Nice and Savoy, to which Victor Emmanuel had pledged himself in the secret
compact of July 20, 1858, Napoleon was insisting on the formation of a separate
State in Tuscany. England therefore proposed to remove every difficulty by
calling upon the population of central Italy to confirm, by a formal plebiscite
under universal suffrage, the wishes they had already expressed. The plebiscite
was taken in Tuscany and the Emilia on March 11 and 12, 1860, and was
practically unanimous; on
388 Piedmont and central Italy.—Garibaldi in
Sicily, [i860
March 18 and
22 the King signed the decrees for their union with Piedmont. At this juncture
the Emperor desired that the treaty for the cession of Nice and Savoy should be
made public. Cavour demurred, but at last he was obliged to give way, and, at
the signature of the Treaty of Turin on March 24, 1860, he is reported to have
said to Benedetti, the French plenipotentiary, “Now we are fellow criminals!”
It may be that even at that humiliating moment he found some consolation in
looking beyond Bologna and Florence to another phase of the Italian Revolution
which was already beginning to emerge. The Parliament, which met on April % was
now formed of deputies from Piedmont and Tuscany, from Liguria and Lombardy,
from the Romagna and the Emilia; and, not without justification, Victor Emmanuel
opened it with the proclamation that the Italy of the Italians was bom.
It is true
that, so far, those words only expressed a pious hope. But on April 4 a
revolution had broken out in Sicily; and Giuseppe Garibaldi was "'irc’ing
on his sword to convert the King’s hope into a great reality. On May 5 he
started with his “Thousand” to the aid of Sicily, landed at Marsala on the
11th, won the battle of Calatafimi on the 15th, and entered Palermo on the
27th. The revolution was now triumphant; the victory of Milazzo, on July 20,
only confirmed its success, and won all Sicily to his cause. On August 22
Garibaldi crossed the Straits of Messina and seized Reggio di Calabria. From
that moment the Bourbon army, which ought to have stopped him, was dissipated before
him, like mist in the sun; on September 7, with a few companions, he entered
Naples, whence the King Francis II had already fled. This brief summary not
inaptly symbolises the lightning-like rapidity which marks that marvellous
coirpound of audacity, heroism, craft and good-luck, which makes up the
Garibaldian epic, and at the same time illustrates the state of rottenness and
disintegration to which the Bourbons had reduced their country.
Cavour’s
attitude towards the Sicilian Revolution and the expedition of Garibaldi, with
all its hesitations and inconsistencies, can only be properly judged in the
light of the great duties incumbent upon him as a patriot and a Minister, which
were often in diametrical opposition—a fact often forgotten by his many detractors,
republican, Bourbonist, legitimist, and radical. The origin of the Sicilian
Revolution of 1860 was Mazzinian; and Mazzini was the more willing to take part
in it, since he knew how much ground he had lost in northern and central Italy.
Garibaldi, by his watchword of “Italy and Victor Emmanuel ” had completely
dislocated Mazzini’s plans; the then rallied round their leader to hinder the
union of Sicily and Naples; and the Bourbon King showed a willingness to
negotiate. This was of course merely a new trick devised in the Austrian and
Roman Foreign Offices to the detriment of Piedmont; and Cavour, while conforming
of necessity to ordinary convention, was not its dupe. He tried,
but
unsuccessfully, to have a popular vote for annexation carried in Naples before
Garibaldi’s arrival; thus widening the existing breach between himself and
Garibaldi, to which the cession of Nice to France had already given rise. There
was a critical moment, of painful anxiety to all, a moment of uncertainty and
dimness even for the lucid intellect of Cavour. But his genius soon recovered
itself; and his clear perception of the proper solution of the problem is
manifested in the despatch of troops to the Marches and Umbria, and in the
appearance of the Piedmontese army with the King himself at their head in the
kingdom of Naples (October 3,1860).
The threats
uttered by Garibaldi, since his accession to the command of the forces of the “
League ” in central Italy, the Sibylline prophecies of the pamphlet The Pope
and the Congress, Napoleon’s letter of December 31,1859, and the return of
Cavour to power, had all increased the anger and the warlike impulses of the
Court of Rome, and its distrust of Imperial France. Monsignor Saverio de
Merode, a political visionary, came forward with a rival policy to that of
Cardinal Antonelli, and conceived the idea of making Rome the centre of a great
legitimist crusade against France, another war of the Vendee, only larger and
more cosmopolitan than the first. Pius IX adopted this grand idea with his
usual impetuosity and enthusiasm; and Merode, being now ProMinister of War,
selected for his Commander-in-chief General Christophe Lamoriciere, a personal
enemy of Napoleon. From all sides there now flocked into Rome (along with a
herd of mere adventurers) the flower of the Belgian, Irish, and French
nobility, the blue-blooded descendants of the Crusaders, dreaming of the
defence of religion and of the return of the Legitimate King and the White
Standard to Paris. Thereupon Cavour, who had been alarmed at the turn which
events were taking in Naples under Mazzini’s influence, determined, with
unerring judgment, to strike there himself with King and army. Napoleon—if he
did not actually utter the words attributed to him, “ Make haste, and good luck
to you ! ”—can scarcely have been displeased at the promised conclusion of this
new war of the Vendee, which had been organised in Rome under the protection of
his own troops for the destruction of Italy and of himself; especially as both
Merode and Lamoriciere were living in hopes of a speedy resumption of war by
Austria. Without a moment’s delay, Cavour summoned Cardinal Antonelli to
disband his papal “ adventurers ”; and on the 10th, the Italian forces entered
the States of the Church on two lines, under General Manfredo Fanti; on the
11th they occupied Orvieto, on the 14th Perugia. On the 18th the army of
Lamoriciere was annihilated at Castelfidardo; Lamoriciere withdrew, almost
unaccompanied, to Ancona, which capitulated on the 25th.
The change of
policy which had led King Francis II of Naples on June 20, 1860, in sheer
despair to renew the promise of a Constitution (although his father had never
positively annulled the former) and to
390 VictorEmmanuel and Garibaldi meet.-Fall
ofGaeta. [1860-1
change his Ministry,
had only created fresh trouble which degenerated into anarchy. The disheartened
King withdrew from Naples with the better part of his forces to a position
between Capua and Gaeta. On October 12, 1860, an attack was made upon the
Garibaldians on the Voltumo, and Garibaldi was placed in a very critical
position, from which he only extricated himself with serious loss. This
situation, together with the constant bickerings between the Unionists and
Non-Unionists on his staff, began to weary and disgust the honest and
frank-minded soldier; he had had trouble enough already with the Mazzinians,
and now a new sort of cosmopolitan revolution was beginning to grow up around
him.
Meanwhile
Victor Emmanuel, at the head of his army, had crossed the Neapolitan frontier
on October 13. Cavour, confident and audacious as ever, called upon Parliament
to decide between himself and Garibaldi; and Parliament, while applauding the
enterprise of the hero, asserted its entire confidence in its great Minister.
Garibaldi, shaken by this vote, submitted the question of annexation to the
decision of popular assemblies. The Neapolitan vote was taken on October 21,
the Sicilian on the 22nd; and in both cases the cause of annexation triumphed.
Meanwhile the Italian forces advanced, beat the Bourbonists at Isemia, Sessa,
Capua, the Garigliano, and finally at Mola; after the last defeat the remains
of Francis II’s forces, some 10,000 in number, accompanied by the King and the
Queen, took refuge in the fortress of Gaeta, which did not fall till February
13, 1861. The 25th of October, 1860, will be for ever memorable as the date of
the meeting of Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi at Caianello between Teano and
Calvi; there Garibaldi saluted Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy. On November 4
and 5 the Marches and Umbria in their turn gave an unanimous vote in favour of
annexation. On November 7, Garibaldi rode by the side of Victor Emmanuel into
Naples; on the night of the 8th, after refusing a dukedom, he sailed for his
hermitage at Caprera.
The
Parliament that met at Turin on February 18, 1861, included deputies from
Naples, Sicily, Umbria, and the Marches; on March 17 the kingdom of Italy was
proclaimed. In this rapid current of events the only signs of disapprobation
given by Napoleon were the recall of his ambassador from Turin, and the
permanent location of a French squadron before Gaeta, thus preventing the
completion of its investment by the Italian forces by sea. Later, however, on
January 19, 1861, he withdrew the ships, yielding to the remonstrances of
Piedmont and the evident annoyance of England, who had openly justified the
attack on the Neapolitan Bourbons, and who viewed the continued presence of the
French squadron as nothing but a disguised form of intervention. In less than a
month Gaeta, the last bulwark of the Bourbons, was forced to capitulate. 1
Great as was
the glory of Garibaldi, it was not greater than that earned by Cavour for his
combined versatility, good luck, and courage,
1860-1]
“A free Church in a free State.”
391
which had
succeeded in controlling the two dominating motive-forces of Italian reform:
that which would work by lawful methods only, and that which is more popular
and frankly revolutionary. By his inimitable skill he compelled them to
cooperate, in spite of the discrepancy of their methods, towards the wonderful
result so speedily effected.
But it was
now made manifest as a political necessity that the Temporal Power of the Popes
must be entirely extinguished, and Rome made the capital of Italy. Cavour perceived
this fact from the day of Garibaldi’s entry into Naples; for it was obvious
that, if Garibaldi were persuaded by Mazzini to postpone the annexation
question, it could only be with the intention of making an immediate move on
Rome from Naples, and in the teeth of the French garrison; and this would mean
not only the entire reversal of the principles on which the policy of Italy was
based, but the committal of the country to the endless horrors of a general
European revolution. By his expedition into the Marches and Umbria Cavour
succeeded in stopping Garibaldi on that fatal road. At the same time, he saw
how urgent it was that the Government should state openly their views on the
subject of Rome, lest it should be thought that Garibaldi, Mazzini, and the
party of action stood alone in their desire for that city. In the famous speech
delivered on October 11,
1860, he associated himself with the general
desire to make Rome “ the magnificent capital of the new Italian Kingdom.” As
to the methods by which he was to attain his end, they were to be such as would
leave undisturbed both the alliance between Italy and France, and the moral and
religious order of the Catholic Church.
In this way
Cavour once more assumed the political lead of the revolutionary movement, and
initiated the policy which became a tradition in dealing with the question of
Rome. He explained his ideas more fully on March 25 and 27,1861, insisting as
before on the absolute necessity of working in full accord with France; while
as to the Catholic Church, he summarised his views in the formula, “ A free
Church in a free State ! ” (libera chiesa in libero stato). It has been
suggested that this formula was, in the mouth of Cavour, a mere device,
borrowed from a spurious French Catholic Liberalism. This is not the fact;
Montalembert, who claimed priority of authorship in it, forgot that the liberty
of which he was thinking had for its object the subjection of the State to the
Church, whereas Cavour’s engagement was to do away with all the old devices for
defending the civil jurisdiction against ecclesiastical encroachments. Thus
State and Church were to move, each in its own orbit, to react on each other
for mutual improvement, and, where occasion offered, to cooperate in forwarding
the well-being of humanity. Cavour never claimed the paternity of this somewhat
idealistic and Utopian conception, although he had preached it with sincere
conviction from his earliest youth, as appears from every record of his public
and private life.
It
is this conviction of his that explains the almost passionate haste with which
Cavour, in October, 1860, pushed on confidential overtures to the Court of
Borne, in the belief that the now inevitable loss of her Temporal Power would
make her more disposed to negotiate. These transactions were conducted by Dr
Diomede Pantaleoni, a Liberal of old standing, two Cardinals of rather slight
authority, Vincenzo Santucci and Girolamo d’Andrea, and one Jesui .,, Father
Carlo Passaglia. Pantaleoni even got so far as to draw up actual heads of
agreement, which might be submitted to the Pope and Cardinal Antonelli, after
receiving certain modifications from Cavour’s own hand. At the same time Cavour
also allowed himself to be approached by certain secret agents of a lower
order, in a manner which smacks of the secret conspirator, and is little in
harmony with the importance and novelty of the matter in hand. Cavour’s
impatient and feverish hurry certainly show that in this respect he suffered
from serious illusions, and even from a singular ignorance as to the
traditional atmosphere of the Boman Curia, the men who compose it, and their
mental and moral dispositions. This fact he was to find out for himself,
through the final breakdown of all these negotiations, and the banishment from
Rome of all who had taken any part in them, small or great, and especially of
Pantaleoni and Passaglia. .
Thereupon
Cavour devoted all his energies to bring about the evacuation of Rome by the
French: relegating the religious questions to his own special field of action,
that of formal parliamentary discussion. His two speeches on this theme, on
March 25 and 27, 1861, had a marked and triumphant success; their echoes were
still sounding through all Europe, when another personal quarrel between him
and Garibaldi, as to the treatment of the disbanded Garibaldian Volunteer
force, developed into an actual conflict. On April 18,1861, Garibaldi appeared
in Parliament, and, in a savage burst of passion, charged Cavour with having
attempted to stir up civil war by his expedition to the Marches and Umbria. Confronted
with an accusation of such enormity, Cavour lost all self-control; and the
House broke out into an indescribable uproar. Garibaldi retired beaten and
humiliated from this deplorable scene, for which he alone was responsible;
possibly, it was owing to his own consciousness of this fact that there is not
one word on this incident in his memoirs. The tempest was stilled for the
moment by an apparent reconciliation effected by the command of the King, and chivalrously
accepted by Cavour. But Cavour had evidently received a mortal blow. From April
18 onwards his intimate friends noticed an unusual change in him. Under
incessant fatigues, and the long-continued and excessive tension of intellect
and nerve, even that iron constitution had lost the power of resistance. At the
end of May he was attacked by fever. On June 6, 1861, he died, in the arms of
his favourite niece, the Marchioness Giuseppina Alfieri.
AUSTRIA,
PRUSSIA, AND THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION.
(1) REACTION AND REORGANISATION.
(1852-62.)
The Revolution of 1848 ran very different courses in
Germany and Italy. Austria had to subdue Upper Italy by force of arms and
France to take violent possession of Rome, before Italian hopes of unity and freedom
were destroyed; but in Germany the issue was determined by internal dissensions
and the weakness of King Frederick William IV. Though he would gladly have
extended Prussian influence over all Germany outside Austria, his love of power
was less than his hatred of the democratic revolution; and he therefore
preferred coming to terms with the Emperor of Austria, an end which could only
be achieved by the humiliation of Prussia by the Convention of Olmiitz
(November 29,1850), which has been already described. Catholic Austria carried
off the victory over Protestant North Germany, in spite of the undoubted
superiority of the latter in intellect and culture. But, in a jtruggle for
dominion, strength and will are the decisive elements; and in these qualities
the Austrian President of the Council Prince Felix Schwarzenberg had proved
more than a match for the Prussian Ministers. His indomitable courage, sullied
though it was by cruelty after his victory over Hungary, and his absolute
disregard for the feelings of others carried him from success to success.
Whenever a blow at democracy could be struck in any part of Europe, Austrian
support might be counted on. So early as September, 1851, Prince Schwarzenberg
vainly urged the Prussian Government to repeal the recently granted
Constitution, and Louis Napoleon, after his coup d'etat of December 2, 1851,
found plenty of sympathy at Vienna. In this conflict with Liberal principles he
found his only declared opponents in England and especially in Lord Palmerston.
Schwarzenberg was indignant at the honourable reception accorded there to Louis
Kossuth after his long exile in Asia Minor. The triumphs achieved by the
patriot’s eloquence were a condemnation of the policy of suppression in
Hungary.
Prussia
rescued one valuable treasure from the shipwreck of her hopes, the German
Zollverem (Customs Union), which, founded twenty- five years before, had
continued steadily to increase. The State owed
394
Struggle over the G-erman Zollverein.
[1848-52
this result
to its bureaucracy, which here at any rate kept the King in the domain of
actuality. In the defence of the Zollverein Rudolf Delbriick, the future
assistant of Bismarck, won his spurs. Schwarzenberg had intended to overthrow
even that bulwark of Prussian influence, by admitting Austria into the
Zollverein, and thus taking from Prussia the direction of German commercial
policy. He found an excellent supporter in the Austrian Minister of Commerce,
Carl Ludwig Bruck, perhaps the greatest political talent possessed by Austria
at that time. Bruck was born at Elberfeld in 1798, but found a second home in
Trieste, where he founded the Austrian Lloyd service, which controlled the
navigation in the Levant from 1840 to 1860. In the capacity of Minister of
Commerce he was literally a pioneer (1848-51). For the prohibition of foreign
imports he substituted a moderate protective tariff, and in 1850 Austria and
Hungary, which had up to that date been separated by a customs frontier, became
a joint customs territory.
But Bruck’s
aims went beyond this. He and Schwarzenberg not only desired the admission of
Austria into the Zollverein, but also the establishment of a common tariff
union, including central Europe and, if possible, the Balkan peninsula and
Italy. In order to check Austria’s advance a clever and effectual antidote was
devised at Berlin. After the reform of her tariff Austria was no longer
completely cut off from foreign countries, but in the weak condition of her
industries, a transition to complete free trade seemed too dangerous. In view
of this, Prussia imposed on herself and the Zollverein a tariff with so great
an inclination to free trade, as to make the entry of Austria impossible. This
tariff was arranged by Prussia and Hanover, by which means the latter State was
won for the Zollverein. Austria now put pressure on the south-German States to
prevent them renewing the customs treaty with Prussia (which was to expire in
1852), and to bind them to Austria instead. But, during the last decades, these
south-German States had been incorporated with northern Germany in an economic
union, and found a good market there for their productions. Therefore, they
neither could nor would separate themselves from Prussia, and renewed their
agreements, in spite of the annoyance caused by her arbitrary proceedings in
determining the new tariff. As Hanover, Oldenburg, and Brunswick also joined,
the whole of non-Austrian Germany was comprised in the Zollverein, and Austria
definitely set aside. This success, compensating in some degree for the
political defeats of Prussia, formed the prelude to the era of victory which
was to begin in 1866.
Amidst these
negotiations, Schwarzenberg died on April 7, 1852, only fifty-two years old,
but prematurely aged by dissipation. He resembled the princes and politicians
of the Renaissance rather than his kinsmen of the Austrian aristocracy. But, in
trying to keep down Germany, Italy, and Hungary, while refusing liberty and
self-government to the Austrian peoples, he overestimated the power of
Austria.
Directly
after his death the tension between the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin began to
relax, and his successor, Count Buol-Schauenstein, abandoned the hopeless
contest with the Zollverein. In 1853 Brack was sent to Berlin, to arrange a
commercial treaty with Prussia, which effected a closer union, but set up a
higher tariff rate against the rest of Europe. Bruck saw in this the beginning
of a complete economic union between the two countries—an expectation not to be
fulfilled.
The internal
development, as well as the external policy, of Austria and Prussia proceeded
on different lines. At Vienna a ruthless imperialism, prone to heroic means of
action, rode roughshod over every obstacle; at Berlin King Frederick William
cherished a deep- rooted dislike of the modem State, with its concession to the
masses of a participation in government and legislation. Yet his was a loyal
nature; and, as he had confirmed a new Prussian Constitution on February 6,
1849, he refused to abrogate it at the suggestion of Schwarzenberg and his own
brother-in-law, the Tsar Nicholas. His Ministers, however, were unfavourable to
the extension of the rights of the people or of the personal liberty of the
individual. Westphalen, Minister of the Interior, and Raumer, Minister of
Education, on all occasions manifested religious intolerance, and advocated
reactionary principles, though the President of the Council, Otto von
Manteuffel, showed greater comprehension of the tendencies of the age. But not
being averse from intrigue, he tried to retain office by giving in to the
wishes of the Court and the aspirations of the nobles. The persecution of
independent politicians and deposition of liberal teachers was the order of the
day. Daily prosecutions, in which perjured police agents brought false testimony
against the accused, roused the indignation of all right-thinking men. The
Berlin president of police, Hinckeldey, was universally unpopular on account of
his severity1 and brutality, and his death in a duel caused general
satisfaction.
It was not
the weak sovereignty of Frederick William IV, but the nobility and Prussian
Junker class who reaped the advantage of the political reaction. This class
utilised the King’s prejudice in favour of feudal institutions to recover and
strengthen the privileges which had been lost or weakened in 1848. These
privileges consisted legally in a lower scale of land taxation and in the
magisterial authority appertaining to a class of estates still in the hands of
the nobility; but, as a matter of fact, the Junkers really directed the State
by filling all the Court posts, and nearly all the high military and official
positions. The King fourd in them his best allies against an exacting
democracy, whose proceedings in 1848 had filled him with a life-long disgust.
Oddly enough, the intellectual leader of the Conservative aristocratic party
was a converted Jew, Friedrich Julius Stahl, Professor of Constitutional Law at
the Berlin University and the most remarkable brain in the Upper Chamber. Stahl
was a convinced convert to orthodox Protestantism,
and attacked
the conception of the sovereignty of the people, to which he opposed the rule
of authority, in learned works as well as in brilliant speeches. He likewise
opposed the modem representative Constitution with its free popular elections,
preferring to it the rule of the Estates, especially of the nobles and
ecclesiastics. He largely supplied the ruling party with the learning and
wealth of ideas on which to found their claims. Their organ was the
Kreuzzeitung, and the party was called by its name. Hermann Wagener, its chief
editor, and Ludwig von Gerlach, brother of the King’s Adjutant-General, who
wrote the monthly survey for the paper, fought in the front rank of the small
but powerful party which dominated the King, and which included Otto von
Bismarck, until in his capacity of ambassador at Frankfort he speedily outgrew
its narrow outlook. This Kreuzzeitung party cherished a certain suspicion of
the Prime Minister, Manteuffel, and accused him of a leaning to Caesarism, because
he on occasion defended the rights of the State against the excessive claims of
the Junkers. In this guerilla warfare the Prime Minister had recourse to
unworthy weapons; he bribed some servants to procure him a copy of the King’s
correspondence with Adjutant-General Leopold von Gerlach and Marcus Niebuhr,
the King’s Secretary, in the hope of thus getting on the track of his enemies’
plots. But he paid the police agent, who had procured him the copy at the
greatest personal risk, so badly, that the latter sold the secret papers to the
French ambassador and others. In this way the intrigue was made public and the
Government exposed.
The
opposition to this foolish and intolerable rule did not come from the Liheral
party only; it was reinforced by a group of high officials and diplomatists.
These men, among whom were Bethmann- Hollweg, Count Robert von der Goltz, and
Count Albert Pourtales, published their views in the Preussische Wochenblatt,
which gave its name to the group. An important adhesion to their moderate point
of view was that of the heir to the throne, the Prince of Prussia, afterwards
Emperor William I. Before the Revolution, he had been in full accord with the
Conservative party, and had himself opposed his royal brother’s proposal to
satisfy public opinion by creating a representative assembly. His clear
intellect was able to derive a lesson from the events of 1848, and on his
return from exile he was more strongly in favour of the acceptance of the
German Imperial Crown by his brother than was Frederick William himself. His
opposition to the Government was due to his disapproval of the King’s weak
attitude tpwards Austria, and he joined with Radowitz in voting for war, which,
with the pride of a soldier and a Hohenzollem, he preferred to humiliation.
This ill- humour also presented him from accepting any office in Berlin;
instead, he took up h's quarters at Coblenz as commander of the Rhenish army
corps.. Though a sincere Protestant, he was opposed to the orthodox Church
policy of the Government, as well as to the romantic doctrines
1850-64] Reaction in Prussia
and other German States. 397
of Leopold
and Ludwig von Gerlach; and being more clear-sighted and less prejudiced than
his versatile and fantastically-minded brother, he opposed the petty reaction
of these years.
Meanwhile the
Kreuzzeitung party was reaping the fruits of its influence over the King, and
storing up its harvest. While still under the influence of the Revolution, the
Government had, by the law of March 11, 1850, created a Liberal municipal
system,: which had put an end to the privileged position of the nobility, in so
far as it affected the village communities. The Junker party would not put up
with this, and they succeeded in getting the law repealed by' a ministerial
decree. The old order of things, and with it the magisterial power of the
landed proprietors, was reestablished. The next step was the transformation of
the Upper House. The number of elected members was diminished and the great
landowners regained the preponderance. Since the arrangements for the
elections to the Lower House had been forced upon it by the Crown, the
democratic party had abstained from voting; and, as a result, a House was
elected in which there were only Conservatives, and some moderate Liberals
under the leadership of Georg von Vincke. But even these were for the most part
excluded in the elections of 1855, and after that date the majority of the
members consisted of officials. The leading men were Stahl in the Upper House,
and Ludwig von Gerlach in the Lower; and Prussia seemed entirely given over to
reaction.
Events took a
similar course in the smaller and middle-sized German States. The condition of
things was, as has been seen, at its worst in Electoral Hesse. It was much the
same in Hanover and Mecklenburg, where the nobles could not rest till the
Government had repealed the laws passed during the Revolution, and restored
their former privileges. In Hanover this was effected by a decision of the
Diet, to which the nobles had referred their grievances. In Saxony^ where
Beust, and in the grand duchy of Hesse, where Dalwigk was at the head of
affairs, matters were conducted with a greater pretence of deliberation, but no
less decision. Only a few rulers, like Duke Ernest of Coburg and Grand Duke
Frederick of Baden, showed any feeling for the wishes of their people. King
Maximilian II of Bavaria also was an enlightened ruler, who appointed
Protestants equally with Catholics to official and professorial posts, and,
after a conflict between the von der Pfordten Ministry and the Chamber,
dismissed the Cabinet, saying: “ I mean to live in peace with my people.” His
early death (1864) gave the crown to his young, highly cultured, but eccentric,
son Louis II.
A striking-
contrast to Prussia was presented by Austria, under a Government characterised
by audacity, strength, and a certain greatness. On the other hand it showed a
lack of considerateness and of due respect for the law, as well as of prudent
regard for the requirements of the age. When the sword had achieved a decisive
victory, the Government went
back on all
its promises, and an arbitrary absolutism set aside not only the recent Liberal
legislation, but all former rights and customs. The years 1849-51 witnessed a
number of important reforms, many of them of a social character, which were in
great part due to the Minister of the Interior, Count Francis Stadion, whom
disease obliged to retire from active life in 1849, after a short but fruitful
term of office. (He died in 1853.) The emancipation of the peasants from
corvees aiid tithes was satisfactorily accomplished; and the State definitely
took over the magisterial and police functions wrested from the landowners.
Although there was no cause to fear any further revolts, the state of siege in
Hungary, Galicia, and Italy continued, together with executions and
confiscations. The only reform left untouched was the emancipation of the
peasants from their former burdens, because the dynasty wished to win over the
agricultural population, and to deprive the Hungarian and Polish nobility of
the possibility of revolting from Ausr an rule. However, the great landowners
throughout the Empire received a sum of 600,000,000 florins in compensation for
the loss of their feudal rights.
The period
after 1848 received its stamp from the dominating personality of Schwarzenberg,
but took its name from Alexander Bach, who in 1849 succeeded Stadion in the
Ministry of the Interior, and retained this post till 1859. He was remarkable
for his intellectual gifts as well as his business capacity and unusual
administrative powers; and this period is commonly known in Austria as that of
Bach’s system. Yet there were weak points in his character; for he was prompted
by ambition to renounce the Liberal ideas he had cherished before the
Revolution and in 1848, and to become an instrument of oppression. The
Emperor’s mother, the Archduchess Sophia, shared Schwarzenberg’s view, in which
the Generals also concurred, that the collapse of the patriarchal system in
1848 was really due to its weakness and clemency, and that the spirit of the
Revolution could only be suppressed by iron severity. Similar opinions animated
the eighteen year old Emperor, Francis Joseph, and overcame the natural
kindness of his disposition. After 1852 the most influential persons at Court
were, besides the Archduchess Sophia, the Emperor’s former tutor Cardinal
Rauscher, and his Adjutant-General, Count von der Griinne, who was almost
all-powerful in military affairs. By accommodating himself to the overpowering
force of circumstance, Bach was enabled to obtain an authority which he would
have been obliged to renounce had he remained faithful to his past.
Hungary was
the worst sufferer under the Bach system. After the suppression of the
rebellion, the Old Conservative party, which had remained faithful to the
monarchy, approached Prince Schwarzenberg, and advised a reconciliation with
their country. They recognised that, for good or ill, Hungary must cease to be
an independent State, and must henceforth regard itself as a part of Austria;
on the other hand, they expected the national language to be maintained for
official and legal
purposes, as
well as in the schools. They also demanded the restitution of their autonomy; a
parliament, though with restricted rights, like that which had existed before
1848; and above all, the continuance of selfgovernment in the counties and
towns. But Schwarzenberg and Bach would not permit any part of the old
Hungarian Constitution to be revived. Instead, they resolved to govern Hungary
as a province of Austria, like Bohemia or Styria, and to replace elected
officials by Crown nominees. Bach organised these new offices with remarkable
skill and indefatigable zeal, and for this purpose flooded the country with
German and Cech officials, since there were not enough natives available for
his needs. Croatia, Transylvania, and Southern Hungary (the Banat and
Voivodina) became provinces separated from the kingdom; the rest of Hungary was
split up into five administrative districts, though all were placed under the
jurisdiction of one Governor resident at Buda. The final aim was no doubt to
blot out by degrees all remembrance of the former unity of the lands of St
Stephen’s crown, and to add to the three provinces Croatia, Transylvania and
Southern Hungary the five more definitely Magyar provinces. German also became
the State and official language in Hungary. Every Hungarian citizen, who knew
German, was bound to use this language officially and in the law Courts, and to
accept decisions given in German. The Magyar language, like the Slav and other
dialects, was only employed by officials in intercourse with the common people,
when it was necessary to be understood by them. Bach thus became the medium of
a ruthless centralisation, accompanied, at first cautiously, but afterwards
more definitely, by a rigorously Germanising tendency.
This policy
alienated even the monarchical elements in the Magyar people, as well as the
German middle classes, who had been accustomed to municipal self-government in
Hungary, and who were now suffering from the state of siege and martial law,
besides having to obey Austrian officials. An even greater blunder was the
fanaticism which extended these unpopular measures to the Slavs and Boumanians,
who had remained faithful to Austria in 1848. Although many of the Croats,
Slovaks and Serbs had taken up arms for the Emperor and against the Magyars,
they, as well as the Saxons of Transylvania, forfeited their autonomy, and were
governed from Vienna quite as autocratically as the other nationalities. The
Hungarians said to them in scorn: “ What is meted out to us as a punishment is
given you as a reward.” The Government desired to create a united kingdom by
these autocratic measures, to rule in the grand manner, to fuse all into one
united Austrian nation. A great scheme, but impossible to achieve, and one
which Joseph II had already attempted in vain.
The tariff
walls between the two halves of the monarchy having been, as already mentioned,
overthrown, the Austrian system of taxation had been introduced en bloc into
Hungary. Taxes on wine and meat had
been unknown
in the rural districts, as also the tobacco monopoly, which interfered with the
freedom of cultivation. These innovations were not calculated to make Austrian
rule popular. Yet the people gradually grew accustomed to them; and,- when in
1867 Hungary again became independent, they were retained along with many
reforms, chiefly in the administration of agriculture and education. For the
German officials administered the land in a more modem spirit and with greater
social justice than did the nobility, who had formerly elected the magistrates
and officials every three years in the county assemblies. Before 1848 the
nobles only were allowed to vote. The Parliament of 1848 had already abolished
the corvees of the peasants and other oppressive customs instituted for the
benefit of the nobles; and Louis Kossuth, the spokesman of the reform party,
had become the idol of the Magyar peasantry. There had been very many political
executions and confiscations of land; but it is to the credit of absolutism
that, although hard and oppressive in all political matters, it carried out the
social legacy of the Revolution in the most thorough manner. The Hungarian
nobility were the more embittered by the concession to the peasants in the
abolition of the corvees, because this deprived them of many economic
advantages as well as the privilege of rule. The country, however, was the
gainer, especially as the Government instituted a general cadastral system of
property registers (Grundbiicher), previously almost unknown, laid out good
roads, and, by removing the customs line, brought about a considerable export
trade in com and meat to Austria, although the tariff did not favour the development
of Hungarian industries.
Still, the
Hungarian people would not have been reconciled to the break-up of their
national life and the loss of their old liberties, even if the Austrian
administration had been quite exemplary. In view of the breach with the ancient
established conditions, the executions and alienations of land, and the
multitude of innovations, this was far from being the case. And, as the
non-Magyar nationalities were also discontented, Hungary became an open sore in
the body of the Empire. Moreover, the Hungarian people, was so well provided
with political ability that a comparison of her statesmen with the Austrian
officials, who were dubbed “Bach Hussars,” always gave the advantage to the
former. Those who had remained in the country were principally the men who
disapproved of the rebellion kindled by Kossuth as well as of the breach of the
Constitution by the Viennese Court. Of these the most prominent were Francis
Dedk and the foremost political writer of Hungary, Baron Joseph Eotvos, with
many others of ability and reputation; and they were joined by Count Julius
Andr&ssy in 1857, when an amnesty permitted his return to his country.
A tragic fate
was that of Count Stephen Szechenyi, who, of all the men then living, had done
most towards the reawakening of the Hungarian nation. After his attack of
madness in 1848, he remained
1851-60]
Magyar resistance to Bach’s policy.
401
in the asylum
of Dobling near Vienna; but his brain was restored to its restless activity in
1851. In his indignation at the development of events in Hungary and the
suppression of its independence, he devoted himself to the refutation of a
pamphlet published by the Government, and entitled A Retrospect of the latest
period of Hungary's development. Szechenyi’s answer, called A survey of the
anonymous Retrospect, appeared anonymously in London in 1858, soon after the
visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph and his Queen Elizabeth to Hungary in 1857.
It is a passionate indictment of the Bach system, full of bitter irony and
sarcasm, with passages that recall the writings of Swift, and it kindled the
greatest enthusiasm. Many other Hungarian patriots were however so completely
discouraged by the impregnable position of the system, that they signed an
address to the Emperor (1858), which said uothing as to the restoration of the
Constitution or of an independent Hungarian State, but prayed only for the
retention of the national language and institutions. The Ministry would have
acted wisely in profiting by this conciliatory mood to make a few concessions
and so reconcile Hungary with the idea of the united Empire. They neglected the
opportunity, and thus missed the last chance of coming to an agreement on the
basis of a united monarchy. Two years later, on April 8, 1860, Count Szechenyi
committed suicide in the asylum at Dobling, to escape arrest by the Austrian
police.
The Minister
of the Interior, Alexander Bach, though allowed a free hand in Hungarian
affairs, was in many respects hampered by Court influence. The nobility mistrusted
him, because he owed his rise to the Revolution. He therefore tried to obtain
support from the Catholic Church, and to this end entered into the closest
alliance with the Archduchess Sophia, a strict Catholic, Cardinal Rauscher, and
the Minister of Education, Count Leo Thun. The latter won great credit by
instituting, on the advice of distinguished authorities, a thorough reform of
the Austrian Universities and High Schools, which brought them up to the level
of the German institutions. But in all political matters his point of view,
both spiritual and political, was that of Rome. Thus Bach and Thun helped to
bring about a Concordat with the Roman See (August 18, 1855), which handed over
the supervision of the national schools to the bishops and clergy, gave the
Church the decision as to the legality of Catholic marriages, and promised the
restoration of the estates confiscated by Joseph II. All the more
liberal-minded inhabitants of the Empire were repelled by this agreement, and
at the predominance of bigotry which it attested; and Austria’s position in
Germany unmistakably suffered through this blunder.
Another
injurious factor was the disordered state of Austrian finance. Matters came to
a climax when, during the Crimean War, Austria sent a force of 300,000 men to
the eastern frontier, to compel Russia to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia.
Since foreign loans did not suffice
for the
military preparations, the sale of the railways constructed by the State, and a
compulsory loan, in which every man of property was forced to invest, were the
expedients used to raise 611,000,000 florins. The national debt increased
between 1848 and I860 from 1,200,000,000 to
3,000,000,000
florins. After the subscription of the so-called national loan, Bruck, as the
most capable man for the post, was appointed Minister of Finance (1855-60). But
all his endeavours were frustrated by the enormous military expenditure and
other extravagance; he did what he could for the prosperity of the country; but
he could not cure its financial ills.
This epoch
had thus witnessed a great advance in administrative reform, and the adoption
of a military policy in Germany, Italy, and the East, despite the financial
crisis and the decline of Hungary. Even the Germans in Austria, who were apparently
the gamers by the Ger- manisation of Hungary, Galicia, and Bohemia, were
dissatisfied, because they, as the most cultured people of the monarchy,
disapproved of the political reaction. The centralising and Germanising
absolutism stood on a basis of day, and was incapable of resisting any attack
from without.
Everything
now depended on the question, whether the direction of foreign policy and of
the military organisation would be sufficiently skilful to ensure the
permanence of the radical changes made in the body politic. Unfortunatdy Count
Buol-Schauenstein, the successor of Schwarzenberg, had inherited none of his
ability, and quickly squandered his whole inheritance of European influence. He
was haughty and bad- tempered, though attaching excessive importance to
diplomatic arts; and his lack of consistency caused him to offend all the
European Powers in turn during the Crimean War. Austria entered on an agreement
with Prussia (April 20, 1854) to maintain an armed neutrality between East and
West. Relying on this compact, Austria, by sending an army to her eastern
frontier, compelled the Russians to evacuate the Balkan peninsula. The Tsar
Nicholas I was deeply wounded by the ingratitude of Austria; and he and his
son, Alexander II, cherished an undying grudge against the Emperor Francis
Joseph. It was expected that Austria would now substitute for her traditional
alliance with Russia an understanding with England and France; but, though a
treaty to this end was drawn up on December 2, 1854, Francis Joseph refused to
take the decisive step of forcing Russia by threats, or even by a dedaration of
war, to conclude a satisfactory peace. The result was an extreme annoyance on
the part of the Western Powers; and, as her alliance with Russia was naturally
broken, this weak and indecisive policy led to the eventual isolation of
Austria.
It was at
this time that Bismarck, in his capacity of ambassador at the Frankfort Diet,
gained his first insight into the weakness of Austria; and it vexed him that
this State, in its condition of internal weakness, should take precedence of
Prussia. He disapproved most
strongly of
the Austro-Prussian agreement of April 20, 1854, because it might cause
hostility between his country and Russia. Indignant with the vacillating policy
of the Viennese Cabinet, he expressed his opinion with his customary frankness
to the French ambassador, Marquis de Moustier, saying that Prussia ought to
enter into an alliance with France and Russia, against Austria. These hostile
utterances came to the ears of the Austrian Government, which remonstrated in
Berlin about Bismarck. When Manteuffel informed him of this, he answered
haughtily: “When I went to Frankfort four years ago, I was not in principle
opposed to Austria; but I should have had to belie every drop of Prussian blood
in me, had I desired to preserve even the smallest affection for that Austria
which its present rulers have called into being.”
These
circumstances were utilised by Napoleon III and Cavour to throw a net round
Austria in her isolation. This time Buol advised a cautious policy; but the
Emperor Francis Joseph, indignant at the aggressive communications and acts of
Piedmont, resolved on war, and sent an ultimatum to Turin without informing
Buol (1859). That Minister handed in his resignation, and was succeeded by
Count Rechberg. Then the unsatisfactory organisation of the army under Count
Griinne, the Emperor’s favourite, came to light. Count Gyulai and the other
Generals whom he had favoured proved themselves utterly incapable; and the
defeats of Magenta and Solferino (June 4 and 24,
1859) overthrew Austrian power in Italy, and as
a result in Hungary also.
Public
opinion throughout Austria, without distinction of nationality, demanded the
fall of the Bach system. Consequently, the Minister of the Interior was
dismissed from his office, and was followed soon after by the Count von der
Grdnne, Adjutant-General; while the Emperor, in a manifesto, issued with a view
to meeting the wishes of his people, promised to put an end to the “inherited
abuses” in his dominions.
In the
reorganisation of the Empire two plans were possible. The first, the idea of
Count Stadion, was to create a single central Parliament comprising the whole
Empire. This would have preserved centralisation, though with certain
modifications, would have given all parties and opinions some opportunity for
free expression, and would, by increasing political freedom, have compensated
the nationalities, especially those of Hungary, for the limitation of their
former authority. The Finance Minister, Bruck, was the representative of this
view in the Imperial Council, and he was supported by the German middle class
and the official section, which at that time was also exclusively German. Very
different were the wishes and aims of the Bohemian and Hungarian nobility, who
strengthened the Emperor in his dislike for an Imperial Parliament, on the
ground that a vigorous popular representation would endanger both monarchy and
aristocracy. They therefore suggested giving a limited measure of independence
to each of the kingdoms and provinces, especially to Hungary, and the
institution of provincial
parliaments
in them all; while in Vienna there was only to be an Imperial Senate with
limited authority and deliberative powers. The Magyars and Slavs naturally
followed the lead of their nobles, since nothing could be more in accordance
with their wishes than the weakening of the united and predominantly German
Empire. Thus two opposing parties faced each other—on the one side the German
Liberal centralising party, on the other the various federalists and
centrifugal sections.
The Emperor
summoned the notabilities of the Empire to an assemhly at Vienna, known as the
enlarged Imperial Council ( Verstarkter Rekhsrat) (spring of 1860). Here the
members of the aristocracy were in the majority; and their vote had the greater
weight because the new Minister of the Interior, Count Goluchowski, supported
them. In the end Goluchowski and his Hungarian colleague Count Szecsen drafted
a Constitution, which was published on October 20, 1860, and became known as
the “ October Charter.” Its fundamental aim was the restoration of the
institutions which had been in force before 1848, and which the nobility
perhaps regretted. Hungary received back its pre-revolutionary form of
government, and the Constitutional Laws of 1848 were abrogated. Even this was a
great concession. From the provincial Parliaments of the whole empire an
Imperial Diet was to be chosen, to consist of a hundred members, whose function
should be the voting of fresh supplies and a deliberative voice in legislative
matters. Full of hope, the Magyars and Slavs watched the revival of Hungarian
and Bohemian privileges, while the German centralising party anticipated the
break-up of the Empire into two or more parts.
The first
important result of the October Charter was a change in the administration of
Hungary. The restoration of the pre-’48 institutions revived the county
assemblies in Hungary as well as the free election of officials and judges by these
bodies, and the revival of this historic system of self-government once more
placed power completely in Hungarian hands. The whole system of German
administration, as organised by Bach, thus fell to pieces; and the
non-Hungarian professors and officials were without exception dismissed. The
Emperor’s counsellors had assured him that the country would show its gratitude
by leaving the connexion with Austria unbroken, and that the monarchical party
among the nobles would continue to direct the people. But this proved to be an
error. The committees and their officials were not satisfied with the
Constitution in force before 1848, and clamoured for the laws enacted in that
year. Several of the counties tried to force their point by refusing to levy
taxes and recruits; and the result was complete anarchy. The Crown therefore
had given up all its authority without satisfying the people.
The Emperor
now resolved to keep Hungary as part of the Empire, and gave his adhesion to
the German centralising party, which had opposed the October Charter. Their
leader Schmerling headed
the new
Ministry (December, I860), though the Emperor’s cousin, Archduke Rainer, took
the presidency in the Cabinet which he formed. Their work was the Imperial
Constitution of February 26, 1861. It achieved what the Liberals had desired, a
united Parliament for the whole Empire with the functions of legislation and
taxation. This was a great step in advance and a final breach with absolutism.
True, this Imperial Diet was not to be elected direct by the people, but by the
Diets of the provinces, Hungary included. In this way, and by granting to
Hungary a separate administration, similar to what she had enjoyed before 1848,
Schmerling hoped to come to a satisfactory agreement with that country. But
this was not to be. Excitement in the country was at the highest pitch, and the
programme adopted was: no elections to the Viennese Imperial Council,
restoration of the laws of 1848, establishment of an autonomous State, complete
independence of Vienna. Each individual concession was rejected; and in the
name of continuity of rights, and on the basis of the oaths of former kings,
they demanded that the Emperor Francis Joseph should also by oath confirm the
Hungarian Constitution. The Diets were summoned to conduct the elections to the
Imperial Parliament. In Austria there was almost universal agreement, but the
other votes were overpowered by those of the Diet of Hungary, which created a
great impression by its unanimity, and clearly indicated that Hungary was ready
to come forward armed in defence of its freedom. Very impressive too was the
personality of the national leader, Francis Dedk, who, in a historic address to
the King, rejected the Constitution of February 26, 1861, and pronounced all
Imperial decrees which had not been ratified by the Hungarian Diet
unconstitutional. His fundamental demand was always restitution of the laws of
1848, which had been granted in due form by the Emperor-King Ferdinand.
At first
there seemed no possibility of harmonising the opposing views. For the
fundamental idea of Deck’s address was that the union between Austria and
Hungary was merely of a personal character, that the two countries had nothing
in common but the dynasty, and that, save in regard to this bond, Hungary must
have complete autonomy. There was more than one occasion during the next few
years when the flames of civil war seemed on the point of breaking forth.
Kossuth, from his exile, advocated separation from Austria, the deposition of
the Habsburg dynasty, and the formation of a great union—including the
liberated Balkan peoples—under the leadership of Hungary. But her experiences
in the Civil War of 1849 and the suffering that resulted from it had brought
Hungary to a calmer and more prudent state of mind, and she rejected the
leadership of Kossuth in favour of the wiser counsels of Francis Dedk.
Recognising that the Emperor Francis Joseph was prepared to revive the
Hungarian Constitution, Dedk published an article (Easter, 1865), in which he
pointed out a way of peace. He put aside
the rigid
demand for a personal union, and sketched the outlines of a dualistic
Constitution as a mode of settlement. According to this scheme, the two
countries were to be united, not only under one dynasty, but also in foreign
affairs and military organisation; in all other matters Hungary was to have
complete freedom of action. This hopeful beginning gave promise of allaying the
storm. But Austria was still too powerful to be willing to accept De&k as
lawgiver. But the defeat of 1866 forced her to consent to the division of the
Empire into two independent but closely allied States. It was unfortunate for
Austria that, while engaged in these internal conflicts, she was forced into
the decisive struggle for predominance in Germany, and it is no wonder that she
was overcome by an aspiring and united Prussia.
Prussia was
nearing the fulfilment of a great destiny when, in 1857, Frederick William IV
fell a victim to mental malady, and his brother William took over the Begency,
to mount the Prussian throne on January 2, 1861, as William I. His capacity for
rule was not at first apparent, as his abilities were not of the dazzling
order, nor had he the genius that carries all before it. But he was
conscientious, industrious, well-meaning, and, above all, absolutely
trustworthy in his dealings. And, as he possessed the gift of discovering the
most capable men for each post, and gave them his fullest confidence when
appointed, he was enabled by their help to found a great empire. At the very
beginning of his regency he appointed Moltke head of the Prussian general
Staff; and in 1859 that admirable organiser, Albert von Boon, was made his War
Minister. He was King William’s first adviser in the reorganisation of the
army, and without his help it is certain that Bismarck would have striven in
vain to subdue and unite Germany.
William was a
rigid conservative, deeply religious, and fully convinced of the divine origin
of kingship; but he was as opposed to Manteuffel’s detestable police government
as to the pietistic environment of Frederick William IV. He therefore dismissed
his Ministers, and appointed a Cabinet of Moderate Liberal tendencies (1858),
with Prince Anton von Hohenzollem at its head, and Count Schwerin as Minister
of the Interior. The new elections resulted in a majority of Moderate Liberals
in the Lower House, and some reforms were at once undertaken, such as the
abolition of the fiscal privileges of the noblemen’s estates. The people
rejoiced at the relief from oppression in the “ new era,” and were hopeful of
great reforms. Above all, they desired Prussia to set herself at the head of
the Liberal movement, unite all the national elements throughout Germany and
utilise the irresistible spirit of the age to create a strong and united
fatherland. Similar advice was offered to King William by his friend, the
Prince Consort of and by his son-in-law the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden; his
son, the future Emperor Frederick, was also a believer in a broad Liberal
policy on
these lines.
William I had indeed stated, on taking over the Regency, that Prussia must
achieve moral conquests in Germany; but he was too cautious and also too
Conservative to be carried away by the flood of popular enthusiasm. He had
mistrusted the Liberals since 1848, and only followed cautiously the lead of
his Ministers, or rather of Roon, the man of his heart and his choice. Roon too
was a Conservative, and confirmed the King in his theory that he ought to
govern his people from above, and not to share the power with his Parliament.
The greatness of Prussia must be sought in military achievements, alliances
with German Princes, and the strengthening of the monarchical power. For the
attainment of this end, the hegemony of Prussia in Germany without any
diminution of the power of the Crown, a great Minister was needed ; since the
King himself was not a man of bold initiative, and his clear but slow intellect
had to be gradually won over to far-reaching undertakings.
Hence arose
the uncertainty of Prussian policy during the Italian War and the following
years. William I was prepared in 1859 to come to the assistance of Austria on
the Rhine against France, but insisted that Austria should give him the chief
command in this campaign over the troops of the smaller German States. The
Emperor Francis Joseph preferred to conclude a disadvantageous peace with
Napoleon III, which compelled him to give up Lombardy, rather than accept help
from Prussia, and allow her to take the military lead in Germany. The result
was to increase the bad feeling between the two chief German Powers. The unity
of Italy had an inspiring effect on the German nation, which could not endure
being outstripped by its southern neighbour. A National Union was formed, with
the Hanoverian statesman, Rudolf von Bennigsen, as President; its aim was to
unite all Germany outside Austria under the lead of Prussia, with due regard
for Liberal ideas. The success of this scheme would inevitably lead to the
exclusion of Austria, and this was opposed by many sincere patriots in Germany
proper, especially the Catholics of southern Germany and the Rhine, who
disliked the idea of a Protestant Empire. Ip
opposition to the Prussian party, another was formed on a Pangerman basis,
which was to include the whole German fatherland, and which took another
association, the “Reform Union,” as its centre. Once more jealousy blazed forth
between Berlin and Vienna, and the two Governments became rivals for public
favour. Count Albert Bemstorff, Foreign Minister in King William’s Liberal
Cabinet, at last induced his sovereign openly to declare Prussia’s intentions
in the diplomatic note of December 20, 1861, Prussia reiterated the
declaration of 1850, that the unity of Germany could only be brought about by a
closer union of the smaller and middle-sized States under her leadership.
Afterwards a treaty might be made with Austria, so as to combine all German
races into one powerful whole. This announcement however was a theoretical
programme rather than a political fact. Both at Vienna
and in other
German Courts indignation was rife at the revived pretensions of Prussia, which
were not unreasonably looked upon as calculated to humiliate all other German
dynasties. The reaction did not fail to set in. The Saxon Minister Beust had
already made another proposal for a sort of triarchy, consisting of the two
Great Powers with the combined smaller and middle States as a third partner.
Such was the idea for the future that prevailed at Munich, Dresden, and other
Courts—a condition of things which would have given a kind of casting vote to
the third factor, in case of a dispute between Austria and Prussia. Yet this
dream of the lesser German Princes could never be realised, because they were
quite as much divided among themselves as Austria and Prussia.
The Viennese
Cabinet neither could nor would be left behind in these reform projects, and
came forward with a third proposal. Schmerling, who at that time was the
leading Minister, had already led the Pan- german party at the Frankfort
Reichstag; and, now that he had come into office, he wanted to carry out its
programme. His aim was to unite Germany under the lead of Austria; this was to
be accomplished by a directorate of a few persons, representatives of Austria,
Prussia, and the most important of the other States. Of course the Vienna
Cabinet would claim the presidency, an arrangement which would greatly increase
its power. As a concession to Liberalism, there were to be some elected
deputies besides the members of the directorate; but the Chambers of the
individual German States and not the people were to have the right to elect.
The whole scheme bore the impress of weakness, and it could not have been
carried out, as the Hohenzollem would in no circumstances have entered a
confederation, whose army should be subject to the orders of a directorate
controlled by the Habsburg. Wise men perceived even then that this was the main
hindrance to German unity, and that this question could only be decided by the
sword. Schmerling would have shrunk from violence as little as Bismarck; but he
did not find in the Emperor Francis Joseph the same support that Bismarck had
in his King. Still, Schmerling was determined to pursue his project
energetically and at once; and with this object Francis Joseph invited all the German
Princes to discuss in person the question of German unity at Frankfort in
August, 1863. Since the Ministers and representatives of the people had not
been able to achieve it, the Kings and Princes must take the matter in their
own hands. This was such an attractive way of putting it, that all the Princes
accepted the invitation, and even King William doubted the wisdom of being the
only one to stay away. But at that time Bismarck was already his Minister; and,
as he threatened to resign if the King helped Austria to her desired triumph,
the project had to be abandoned.
Amidst all
this medley of projects, speeches, and endless diplomatic correspondence, an
act of incalculable importance occurred, in which King William took the
initiative. This was the reorganisation of the
Prussian
army, which converted it into the strongest military force in Europe. In this
domain William I was an expert and past master; in every other he followed the
advice of experienced and carefully selected Ministers, humbly conscious of his
own limitations. He was a soldier to the core, and knew all the faults of the
Prussian military system, which had come most clearly to light in 1859, when
the troops were mobilised against France. The King himself had taken part in
the French campaign of 1814, and knew the capacities of the newly formed
Landwehr (militia). He was folly aware that a great European policy could not
be carried through with a standing army of 200,000 with 400,000 Landwehr; it
was sufficient for the defence of the fatherland, but not for the foundation of
a Prussian-German Empire. The Liberals refused to acknowledge this, and either
kept aloof from the King’s proposed reforms or gave them a hesitating adhesion,
for they believed that their ideas would prevail even without fighting.
The King
insisted on a stricter interpretation of the universal liability to service; of
the 156,000 young men who every year attained the age of twenty, he wished to
include 63,000 in the army, instead of, as before,
40,000. The length of service in the standing army
(effective forces and reserve) was to be raised, and that of the Landwehr
forces diminished; thus the striking efficiency of the army would be increased.
This reform resulted in a large increase in the number of recruits, which became
too numerous for the old cadres. It was necessary to form thirty-nine new
regiments at an annual expense of 9,000,000 thalers. The Chamber now agreed to
the King’s wishes, on condition that the infantry service should be reduced to
two years, as in the campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815. But, even in his
brother’s lifetime, William had lengthened the term of service, and he now
refused to go below three years. At first a compromise was attempted: the
thirty-nine new regiments were sanctioned and enrolled, and the decision about
length of service and the other questions at issue was reserved. The Liberal
Ministers vainly sought to induce their partisans in the Chamber to yield this
point, if only to avoid driving the King into the arms of the Conservatives. On
the other side the Kreuzzeitung party encouraged the King to abide by his
proposal, and not yield to the Chamber. The strongest pressure was brought to
bear by the Chief of the military Cabinet, Edwin von Manteuffel, and by Roon,
who wrote to King William that the Parliament was trying to degrade him to the
role of a sham-king, and exhorted him not to be intimidated by the noisy
clamour of the day. William I was ready to come to terms with the Liberals, if
only they would consent to the continuance of the new organisation, which would
provide an effective war force of 371,000 line, 126,000 reserve, and
163,000 Landwehr. As these troops were at that time
the only ones in Europe armed with the breech-loader (needle-gun) and had been
trained under the King himself and the most capable masters, an army had come
into being
fit to grapple with any foe in Europe. The King often said to his faithful
friends, with tears in his eyes, that he would rather abdicate than give way;
and he himself believed that it was destined for his son and not for himself to
found the unity of the German fatherland.
The new
elections turned out badly for the Army Reformers. In the Chamber, which met on
January 14, 1862, the numbers of the Conservatives and Moderate Liberals were decreased,
and the Progressive party (Fortschrittsspa/rtei), which formed the real
Opposition, had a stronger representation, though not an absolute majority. The
Government proposed a definite scheme of military organisation to the Chambers,
and, on its meeting with an unfriendly reception, at once dissolved the Lower
Chamber. The Ministry thereupon resigned, and Prince Adolf von Hohenlohe formed
a Conservative Cabinet. This had but a short life, because the result of the
new elections made all compromise impossible. The Conservatives numbered 100;
the Moderate Liberals had sunk to 23; but the Progressive party counted 235
members, and these were resolved to compel the King, if necessary by force, to
leave the power and government to the parliamentary majority. Prussia was now
face to face with the alternatives that had confronted England under the
Stewarts: her choice lay between government by King or by Parliament. In order
to make their power felt by the King at the outset, the majority decided, on
March 23, 1862, to strike out of the Budget the estimates provisionally agreed
on for army reform. This would have necessitated the dissolution of the 39 new
regiments and the dismissal of two or three thousand officers; and the proud
edifice built up by the King and his generals seemed about to fall to pieces.
William I was deeply grieved at the frustration of his projects, and the
impossibility of cooperation with the representatives of the people. But there
seemed no way out of the difficulty, as the Hohenlohe Ministry scrupled to
maintain the army in its increased strength in defiance of the Chamber, if the
necessary sums were not voted.
With the
former Chamber a compromise would have been possible, if the Government had
consented to shorten the service to two or two- and-a-half years; now it was
too late, and the whole army reform was in jeopardy. At this juncture Roon and
Manteuffel advised the King to entrust Otto von Bismarck with the formation of
a Cabinet; for all who knew him were convinced that he would not shrink from an
open battle with the Chamber, and would risk his life to enable William I to
hand on the royal power undiminished to his son. The King, who knew Bismarck’s
fiery spirit, hesitated to challenge public opinion by his appointment. But he
found himself at length compelled to decide in its favour; and, from this time
forth (September, 1862), he followed all his Minister’s counsels with
unhesitating confidence. Nor had he cause to repent; for Bismarck contrived to
conciliate or overcome by the success of his foreign policy the bitter
opposition, which his disregard
of legality
for some time aroused. While he served the cause of national unity, which at
that time dominated every other, he contrived also to increase the power of the
Prussian monarchy. He gave the Germans a united fatherland, and also checked
the victorious course of democracy m central Europe, which was making more and
more headway in the west. His fellow-countrymen could not agree as to the
motives of his action, some asserting that the unity of Germany, and others
that the greatness of Prussia, was his aim. To those who raise that question,
Bismarck’s mind must remain a sealed book; for, in his political laboratory,
ideas and theories were never an end in themselves, but rather a changing
series of means which he used to influence the minds of men, to create an
Imperial polity, and to maintain it upon a firm and enduring basis.
(2) GERMAN LITERATURE.
(1840-70.)
During the
nineteenth century German Literature passed through three great revolutions,
which took place, roughly speaking, in the first, fourth, and eighth decades.
Between 1800 and 1810 occurred the Romantic revolt; between 1830 and 1840 the
literary revolution of the authors of “Young Germany”; while about the middle
of the eighties the latest upheaval was produced by writers who are often
called the “Youngest Germany” or “Die Modeme,” and who attempted to strike out
altogether new lines in poetry and art. The two earlier literary revolutions
have been dealt with in a previous volume; the last movement does not fall
within the limits of this chapter. The period between 1840 and 1870 is one of
comparative calm, a time of sustained endeavour, and, on the whole, of
remarkable artistic achievement. It includes in every domain of literature some
brilliant writers who, although they did not surpass the great Weimar classics
at their best, nevertheless produced a considerable number of works of a high
order, and who proved no unworthy successors to the masterpieces of Lessing and
Wieland, Goethe and Schiller. They eclipsed the poetic output of the
Romanticists and of the writers of Young Germany, and much of their work bids
fair to live for a long time to come.
In 1840 and
for several years following some authors of consequence, such as Tieck,
Immermann and Lenau, noticed in the preceding volume, were still actively
engaged in writing, but the more important part of their life’s work was done,
and their productions can therefore be passed over in this place. Others, such
as Heine, Gutzkow, and Laube, brought out not a few of their most brilliant
works during the period dealt with
412
in this
chapter, and these productions will be mentioned in due course. Again, some
writers of importance, such as Anzengruber, Konrad Ferdinand Meyer, Luise von
Francois, began their literary career in 1870 or immediately before that date,
and the consideration of their works belongs in reality to the later period. It
is worthy of notice that women authors, the number of whom had been exceedingly
small up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, began from the days of the
Romanticists to take an ever increasing part in German literature, especially
in the domains of lyric poetry and prose fiction, but among the great dramatists
of the period, quite up to modem times, there is not a single woman.
Lyric poetry,
the stream of which had been flowing freely in the various parts of Germany
ever since the days of Burger and Goethe in his first period, was represented
between 1840 and 1870 by a number of excellent writers who distinguished
themselves in widely different styles. The political events of the times called
forth a host of political songs, some of more than ephemeral value; many
splendid ballads were composed; and a large number of simple and touching
Lieder that are still widely read and some of them sung in Germany, but are not
yet familiar to British lovers of German literature.
The political
songs were partly called forth by foreign complications, and partly served as
weapons of attack on the German and Austrian Governments and institutions
during the years preceding the great revolution of 1848. In the autumn of 1840
the whole of Germany was deeply stirred by the scheme propounded by some French
writers of repute to obtain for France the left bank of the Rhine. In October, 1840, Nicolaus Becker wrote his vigorous
song, Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den jreien deutschen Rhein, and in November
Max Schneckenburger entered the lists with his Die Wacht am Rhein (“Es braust ein
Ricf wie DonnerhaM'"). This poem was repeatedly set to music
and was much sung in 1840; but the impressive setting, in which it became the
national song of the Germans in 1870, was composed as late as 1854 by Karl
Wilhelm. In the following year (1841) Hoffmann von Fallersleben, a learned
professor as well as a popular poet, wrote the patriotic Deutschland,
Deutschland iiber alles, which is still often sung on public occasions by the
side of Die Wacht am Rhein. The Danish troubles and the unsuccessful struggle
of the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein in the following years for freedom from
Danish control gave rise to the composition of Schleswig-Holstein,
meerumschhtngen. This was written by Friedrich Chemnitz, and was much sung all
over Germany for many years; while the sad fate of Schleswig-Holstein left its
traces in some fine poems by Theodor Storm, such as his Abschied (1853).
The great
year of 1870 did not produce so many really fine and stirring songs as the
years of the Wars of Liberation (1813-5). Most of the songs that were then sung
with real enthusiasm were of an older
Political satire: Heine.
Geibel. Herwegh. 413
date and had
been written either in 1813-5 or in 1840-1. Among the contemporary poets of
repute Freiligrath and Geibel produced a few poems that were often recited at
the time, and some of the actual combatants, such as Jensen, Wolff, and
Liliencron, wrote admirable verses. But none of these were genuine songs like
the old ones that had been sung on the march or in the camp. The only new poems
of this kind that were actually sung everywhere in Germany and were favourite
marching and camp songs with the troops in the field were two humorous
compositions. Both were written in August, 1870, by men who were not poets of
any importance. One of them (by Wolrad Kreusler) begins “ Konig Wilhelm sass
gamz heiter,” and was sung to the tune of the old popular song Prinz Eugen, der
edle Ritter. The other (by Gotthelf Hoffmann) is that known as the
“Kutschkelied” which at the time enjoyed an immense popularity.
The principal
political poems called forth by the internal struggles of Germany were written
immediately before and after 1848. The most important among a great number of
political poets of various shades of opinion were Georg Herwegh, Franz Dingelstedt,
Ferdinand Freiligrath, Anastasius Grim (Count Auersperg), Heinrich Heine and
Emanuel Geibel. Herwegh and Freiligrath were the most radical and earnest among
the advocates of revolutionary measures, while Heine ruthlessly satirised and
ridiculed, fairly and unfairly, any person, party or political tendency which
he thought gave him a chance of attack. In contrast with Herwegh, “the iron
lark (i.e. the song-bird of war),” and Heine, “ the mocking-bird of Germany’s
poetic grove,” Emanuel Geibel opposed in a dignified and manly way the
destructive and revolutionary spirit of Herwegh’s muse, maintaining that the
true poet should in his art rise above party politics. In later years, when the
revolutionary poetry had grown pale and been forgotten, Geibel became the
mouthpiece of the feelings and political aspirations of millions of his
countrymen. He was the true herald of the New German Empire, the creation of
which he demanded in his Heraldsrufe and other pieces with the earnestness of a
genuine patriot and the impressiveness of a great poet. Freiligrath and Grim
are now remembered as the authors of charming songs and poems rather than as
writers of revolutionary lyrics.
Those
epic-lyric poems which in German are sometimes called “ Balladen ” and
sometimes “Romanzen ” flourished during the three decades preceding 1870. After
the great ballads of Burger, Goethe, Schiller, Uhland, and Platen, we find
ballad poetry in our period represented by Heine, Strachwitz, Geibel, and
above all Fontane. Heine reproduced with marvellous success the simple popular
style of the old German ballad; and several of his ballads, well set to music,
have long been the property of all lovers of poetry and music. Such are Die
beiden Grenadiere and Die Lorelei. Among his finest short ballads are no doubt
Belsazar and Der Schelm von Bergen; and English readers
will be
interested in his ScMachtfeld bet Hastings, a curious mixture of the rugged
straightforward style of the old ballad with Heine’s own very modern ironical
touches. Moritz von Strachwitz—like his greater successor Fontane—was obviously
imbued with the spirit of Percy and the old English ballad, and in this respect
continued the traditions of Burger and Herder. His finest ballads are poems in
celebration of faithful devotion, viz. Helges Treue, a grand Scandinavian
subject, and Das Herz von Douglas in the old ballad metre of Chevy Chase. Less
powerful than Strachwitz, more truly lyrical, and sometimes directly
philosophical in his ballads is Emanuel Geibel. Still his BothweU and his
Tannkauser are true ballads, while in Der Tod des Tiberius, Herkules aufdem
Oeta, and others, he created fine specimens of philosophical ballad poetry. The
greatest of the four, and indeed one of the greatest ballad writers of Germany,
is Theodor Fontane. Ballads of the first order were produced by him in very
large numbers, the subjects being mostly taken from Prussian, [English,
Scottish or Scandinavian history and legendary lore, though even modem
occurrences, such as the disastrous collapse of the Tay bridge, supplied him
with the material for some splendid poems. His Archibald Douglas, Schloss Eger,
Der 6 November 1632, John Maynard, Gorrn Grymme, Die Bruck’ am Tay, are worthy
to be ranked with the best of Uhland’s ballads. Apart from these his numerous
fine translations and adaptations from Percy, and his spirited treatment of the
popular old Prussian generals Derffling, Zieten, Seidlitz, and “ der alte
Dessauer ” deserve mention.
In the domain
of the lyric proper we find several great masters of the Lied. The most
important are Heine, Morike, Geibel, Storm and Groth, the last mentioned of
whom wrote in Low German. Some of the songs of Hebbel, Heyse, Lingg,
Freiligrath, and Fontane, will likewise live for many years to come; and during
this period the first German woman poet of importance, Annette von
Droste-Hiilshoff, published her fine lyrics. In the domain of humorous verse
and students’ songs must be mentioned Victor von Scheffel’s Gaudeamus, which in
the seventies became the acknowledged pattern for similar compositions. The
greatest writers of lyrics were composing between 1840 and 1850, and some good
poets also appeared in the next decade, while the last decade before 1870, so
rich in political achievement, yielded a less brilliant crop in the field of
lyric verse and indeed of literary production in general.
In the domain
of dramatic literature the same tendencies are exactly reproduced, and the
great decade for new talent is that between 1840 and 1850. In 1840, the year in
which the Austrian Franz Grillparzer ceased from publishing, although not from
writing, his grand tragedies, a new star of the first magnitude rose above
Germany’s literary horizon—the Frisian poet Friedrich Hebbel. About the same
time Gutzkow, Laube, Freytag, Benedix and Bauemfeld enriched German dramatic
literature with many successful plays, not a few of which are still frequently
acted.
415
In the field
of musical drama Richard Wagner produced his Tarmhdiiser (in 1845) and several
similar operas, of which the subjects were taken from German legendary lore
while the texts were written by the composer himself. On the other hand, in the
fifties the only new writer of real eminence is the Thuringian Otto Ludwig, who
deserves a place by the side of Hebbel as one of the great tragic dramatists of
the middle of the nineteenth century. The sixties did not give Germany any new
author of the first order, although Heyse made some welcome contributions to
the stock of good plays. But, immediately after 1870, Austria was again well
represented by Anzengruber, though his full value was not immediately
recognised throughout Germany. In the domain of high tragedy, the names of
Grillparzer, Hebbel and Ludwig shine above all others, while Gutzkow, Laube and
Freytag were the authors of much creditable work. In the domain of comedy, the
best plays were produced by Bauemfeld, Benedix, Gutzkow and Freytag. Some of
the dramas of Lessing, Goethe, Schiller and Kleist continued to draw large
audiences; and the centenary of Schiller’s birth (1859) was made the occasion
throughout the whole country for impressive manifestations of devotion to the
manly and lofty spirit of Germany’s favourite poet and greatest dramatist. The
longing for political unity, which had been steadily growing in Germany between
1840 and 1870, found its own ideal forcibly and beautifully expressed in many
passages of Schiller’s poems and dramas. Hebbel and Ludwig, it is true,
protested by their works and critical writings against the style of Schiller’s
later historical dramas. They wished to free German dramatic literature from
the idealistic and typical style of the great Weimar classics, and were anxious
to cease the imitation of the Greek tragedians and abandon too close an
adherence to the tenets of Aristotle, and return to a more truly national style
of poetic realism. Ludwig, who criticised Schiller rather unfairly by censuring
every point in which his practice deviated from Shakespeare’s, wished, like
Hebbel, to create a truly national drama, based on the earlier plays of Goethe
and Schiller and on some of the work of Kleist, while acknowledging the
influence of Shakespeare, the greatest of Teutonic dramatists. Both Hebbel and
Ludwig were highly gifted and earnest men, whose influence on the modem German
drama is far from exhausted.
Although he
produced some minor comedies and a number of fine lyrics and epigrams, Hebbel
is above all a tragic dramatist of stupendous power of language which is united
to a gift of penetrating psychological analysis. This was at once apparent in
his first (biblical) tragedy, Judith (1840), and in the grand domestic tragedy
Maria Magdalena (1844) in which he shows himself a worthy successor to Lessing
in Emilia Galotti and to Schiller in Kabale und Liebe. But Genoveva (1841),
Herodes und Mariamne (1850), Agnes Bernaiuer (1855), Gyges und sein Ring
(1856), and the grand trilogy Die Nibehmgen (1862) are also, each in their own
way,
excellent works. Hebbel was the first German dramatic author who, in 1862, was
awarded the Schiller prize (founded in 1860 by the then Prince of Prussia); and
the appreciation and study of his works is still steadily increasing. In most
of these, the great hardships through which the poet had to pass during his
youth and early manhood have left their traces—a certain acerbity and harshness
of feeling and expression; but his lofty nature, his manly courage, and his
wonderful imagination, in addition to his purely dramatic talents, render his
plays without exception worthy of attentive study.
Otto Ludwig
was unable to complete a large number of great plays, as ill-health and his
meticulous and unsparing self-criticism prevented him from achieving the
majority of his dramatic plans. But his grand biblical tragedy Die Makkabaer
(1852) and his impressive domestic tragedy Der Erbforster (1849), both entirely
recast more than once, are productions of the highest artistic value. Hebbel’s
Maria Magdalena and Ludwig’s Erbforster were intended to hold up the mirror to
the narrow-minded and self-satisfied bourgeoisie of the middle of the century,
who were unable to get out of their narrow groove and sacrificed dignity and
happiness to their short-sighted prejudices. Both Hebbel and Ludwig scorned to
pander to the taste of the masses ; they despised the use of empty phrases, and
combined with the high-mindedness of Schiller the directness of Kleist.
Grillparzer,
whose comedy Wehe dem, der litgt (1840) had been badly received by the Viennese
theatre-goers, gave up writing for the stage. But hfe still continued his dramatic
authorship, and the works produced by him after 1840 were published after his
death (1872). They were the three tragedies Libussa, Die Judin von Toledo, Ein
Bruderzwist in Hahsbwrg, and the fine fragment of a psychological biblical
drama Esther.
Among Karl
Gutzkow’s dramas the comedies Zopf und Schwert and Das Urbild des Tairtuffe
deserve to be mentioned; his fine tragedy Uriel Acosta is perhaps the best
German play dealing with the subject of religious toleration since the time of
Lessing’s Nathan der Weise. Heinrich Laube, who afterwards was for many years
the influential and successful manager of the excellent Burgtheater at Vienna,
produced several good plays for the stage, among which Graf Essex is still
sometimes acted. In greatness of conception, depth of feeling, and
psychological analysis Gutzkow and Laube are much inferior to Hebbel and
Ludwig. Gustav Freytag’s tragedies, some of which reflected the social problems
of his time, are now antiquated ; but his delightful play Die Jowrnalisten (1853),
which grew out of his own experience as an editor and political writer, is one
of the best German comedies and is still frequently acted. The comedies of the
Austrian Eduard von Bauemfeld either satirised the despotic police regime of
Metternich, as in Grossjdhrig, or gave amusing sketches of Viennese society, as
Prose fiction: Tieck.—Historical
romance: Aleocis. 417
in
Biirgerlich und Romantisch. The prolific comedy-writer Roderich Benedix did not
attempt to deal with any deeper problem arising out of the nature of the
characters which he portrayed. With him,, amusing complications are brought
about by accident or intrigue. His plays, the best-known of which are Dr Wespe,
Eigensinn, and Die Hochzeitsreise, are good stage-pieces; the best of them are still
amusing and depict the weaknesses of the bourgeoisie of his time with
cleverness and good- humour. .
In the domain
of prose fiction there is an unusually large array of excellent writers who
began their literary career after 1840 and continued it in not a few cases long
beyond 1870. Of the writers of the Romantic School and of “Young Germany” (who
have been dealt with in an earlier volume), Ludwig Tieck and Karl Gutzkow
continued to write novels during our period—but Gutzkow’s most important novels
“with a purpose” (“Tendenzromane”), Die Ritter vom Geist (1850-2) and Der
Zauberer von Rom (1858-61), were written long after 1840 and remodelled in the
early seventies. After 1840 the novel becomes of quite exceptional importance
in Germany; in the hands of many writers it is lifted high above the atmosphere
of unrest and fermentation characteristic of the times. It deals with
interesting problems, but in a truly artistic fashion ; it is true to life, but
its realism is of the poetic order. The writers of these novels are still
mostly men; and the majority of them—Keller, Storm, Freytag, Heyse, Ludwig,
Riehl, Raabe, Spielhagen, Scheffel, and Reuter—began their brilliant literary
career in the decade between 1850 and 1860. Besides Tieck and Gutzkow there are
only three new important novelists to be noted between 1840 and 1850—one an
accomplished writer of historical romances, the other two distinguished by
their successful sketches of contemporary peasant life.
Wilibald
Alexis (whose real name was Wilhelm Haring) produced a long series of excellent
historical novels, the scene of which is the Mark Brandenburg and the events of
which are taken from different periods of Brandenburg and Prussian history.
They were not written in chronological order with the intention of forming a
series, but as a matter of fact they do accomplish this end. They reach from
the medieval struggles of Derjulsche Waldemar down to the rising of Prussia
against Napoleon (Isegrim). To the intervening period belong Der Roland von
Berlin, Die Hosen des Herm van Bredow, Dorothea, Cabanis, and Ruhe ist die
erste Biirgerpjlicht. Alexis did for Brandenburg, and for the Prussia which has
grown out of Brandenburg, something of what Scott did for Scotland. While his
older contemporary, Wilhelm Hauff, was the author of some good romances based
on Swabian history, Alexis became the father of the North German historical
novel. ' He found several followers in this field, but was not surpassed by any
of them.
The Bernese
pastor Albert Bitzius, who called himself Jeremias Gotthelf, produced a large
number of capital studies of Swiss peasant
418 Prose fiction: Keller. Storm. Frey tag.
life, the
most important of which are Uli der Knecht and Uli der Pachter, while the.
Swabian novelist, Berthold Auerbach, published delightful sketches of peasant
life in the Black Forest under the title Schwarzwalder Dorfgeschichten. Among
bis later tales of village life Brosi und Moni, the tragic Diethelm von
Buchenberg, and the longer story Barfiissele, deserve to be mentioned. Later,
Auerbach contrasted the life of the peasants with the life of the Court in his
long novel Avf derHohe (1865), and treated in subsequent works of fiction with
much cleverness, but with an increasing artificiality of style, the political
and social problems of his time as they presented themselves in south-western
Germany.
Early in the
fifties the Swiss Gottfried Keller brought out his- fine psychological novel
Der griine Heinrich (1854-5), the greatest work in its line since Goethe’s
Wilhelm Meister, full of thought and poetry, and exhibiting a great variety of
contents. After this important and largely autobiographical novel, Keller
published several shorter stories under the collective title Die Leute von
Seldwyla, an imaginary typical locality somewhere in Switzerland, and added to
their number in later editions. One of the finest among these is the “
Dorfgeschichte'" Romeo und Julie avf dem Dorfe. Many important tales were
written by him after 1870, and he is without doubt one of the ablest representatives
of poetic realism among the novelists of the last century.
' Before the
publication of Keller’s Der griine Hemrich Theodor Storm, a native of North
Germany, had begun to publish his first novels and lyrics. His novels are all
short stories—Novellen, not Romane—but all exquisite in their way, admirable
character studies in refined language saturated with poetry and full of true
sentiment. The number of Storm’s fine novels is very large; most of them are
serious or tragic, and they are often told in the form of reminiscences,
chronicles or diaries of North German men or women. Among the best-known are
Immensee, an early work, Spate Rosen, Psyche, Renate, Aquis submersus, Die
Ckronik von Grieshuus, Carsten Curator, and Der Schimmel/reiter, some of which
were published after 1870.
The two great
Romane of Gustav Freytag written during this period take the reader to German
homes where the work of the nation is done in the office, and the study, and on
the estate or farm. They are SoM und Haben, a Silesian story with Breslau as
its centre, and Die verlorene Handschrift, of which the scene of action is to a
great extent laid in Leipzig among the professors of the university. Both
novels reflect very faithfully the healthy and active life of the German middle
classes between the time of the Revolution and the Franco-German War. After
them Freytag wrote (in the seventies) a series of nine historical novels in six
volumes, under the title Die Ahnen, the clue to which he has given in his
autobiography. He also published, in five volumes, a splendid series of
sketches of German life .from the early Middle Ages down to the War of
Liberation under the ,itle Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit.
Heyse. Ludwig. Riehl. Raabe.
Spielhagen. 419
To these
historical sketches the poetic tales of Die Ahnen form a sort of counterpart.
Paul Heyse
began his vast novelistic productivity in 1855 and has for over fifty years
written a very large number of Romane and Novellen, many of which are works of
art of the first order. On the whole his short stories are superior to his
Romane. His language and style are of the highest excellence, his characters
interesting, his problems attractive and well developed. His scenes and
personages are not unfrequently Italian, but usually south German, for Heyse,
although a native of Berlin, lived the greater part of his life in Munich or in
Italy. His novels do not so much reflect the German problems of the time in
which he has lived as the themes which move the hearts of men and women at all
times and under all climates—love and friendship.
Otto Ludwig,
the great dramatist, is no less excellent as the author of some Novellen, the
heroes and heroines of which belong to the peasantry or to the lower middle
classes of Thuringia. The two best are Die Heiteretei and the grand tragic tale
of a slater’s family, Zwischen Himmel ttnd Erde<s one of the finest short
stories of modern German literature.
Wilhelm
Heinrich von Riehl not only distinguished himself as a professor and writer on
questions of sociology, political economy and German archaeology, but also
wrote many short “ kulturhistorische Novellen ” in a number of collections with
different titles; some of these are capital stories told by a man who was
thoroughly familiar with the social conditions and the state of feeling
existing in Germany at very different periods. Like Keller, Frey tag, Heyse,
and many others, he produced much of his best work in the fifties and sixties,
but continued to write for many years after 1870.
The novels of
Wilhelm Raabe, like those of Riehl, depict the life of small German towns, out
of the way nooks, simple and genial people, .men and women in humble positions,
but with rich treasures of kindliness and humour. He is one of the greatest
German humourists. Among his works published during the period of 1840-70 Die
Chromic der Sperlingsgasse, Der Hungerpastor, Der Schiidderump, deserve to be
mentioned, while, of his later works, Horacker is a most delightful story
characteristic of German life and feeling in small North German country towns
about 1870.
Friedrich
Spielhagen, who began to write about the same time as the before-mentioned
authors, excels in stories in which the scene of action is laid on the island
of Riigen or on the shores of the Baltic. He is fond of depicting the life of
noblemen, the owners of large estates, gentlemen farmers, and the society of
small North German towns between the Elbe and the Oder. Among his early novels
Auf der Dune, Ultimo, Hammer und Amboss should be mentioned; among his later Quisisana,
Sturmflut, and Faustulus. The first novel by which he made a great impression
on his contemporaries, Problematische Naturen, is, in spite of
420 Novelists: Scheffel.
Reuter.—Generql survey.
many
interesting details, not free from numerous exaggerations and must be used with
some caution by readers desirous of studying the state of Pomerania and Riigen
before the revolution of 1848. In all his novels Spielhagen proved himself a
staunch Liberal, and his political views sometimes largely influenced his
poetic representation of the aristocracy.
If
Spieilhagen is above all the painter, of modem men and modem conflicts, Victor
von Scheffel created, in the same year in which Spielhagen began to write, one
of the finest novels dealing with old German life and conditions. In 1857 he
published his Eklcehard, a tale of the tenth century, the scene of which is
laid-partly in the monastery of St Gall and partly on the Hohentwiel, a castle
of the Duchess of Swabia perched on a steep hill north of the Lake of Constance.
This novel, based on the most thorough historical and literary research, became
the model for Jiany similar works dealing with old German life and conditions.
The
last great novelist of this period is the humourist, Fritz Reuter, who wrote
his racy Mecklenburg stories in his native Low German dialect. The finest of
these are Ut de Franzosentid, a tale of the years 1812 and 1813; Ut mine
Festungstid, a tale of the time when Reuter was, on the strength of an absurd
accusation, imprisoned successively in several Prussian fortresses; and, best
of all, Ut mine Stromtid (“ a story of my farming days”), in which he created
the quaint and sympathetic figure of inspector Brasig and produced from
personal experience most graphic sketches of the life of the farmers in the
North German agricultural districts. :
From the
outline attempted in the foregoing pages it will be seen that, during the
thirty years preceding the great War and the foundation of the new German
Empire, there was a fruitful literary activity in all German-speaking
countries, and that it is wrong to say that, after the death of Goethe, there
was no German literature worth mentioning. If the golden age of German letters
came to an end with the death of the patriarch of Weimar, there was certainly in
every domain of German literature no lack of writers of very high poetic
talent, the value of whose work far surpassed the productions of the Romantic
School and of “Young Germany.” The lyrics of Mtirike, Geibel, Storm, and Groth,
the dramas of Hebbel and Ludwig, and the novels of Alexis, Auerbach, Keller,
Storm, Freytag, Heyse, Ludwig, Riehl, Raabe, Spielhagen, Scheffel, and
Reuter—not to mention many others of but little lesser merit or any of those
who, like Anzengruber, produced excellent novels and dramas in the years
immediately following the great War—furnish conclusive proof that German
literature was developing in several new directions, while successfully
continuing old styles inherited from the classicists or romanticists. It is
consequently not in accordance with the facts to brush aside the literary works
produced by the successors of Goethe in Germany—works which contain so much
that is valuable in achievement while varied in range and subject—with the
contemptuous term of “ Epigonendichtwig.'”
(3) THE NATIONAL SPIRIT IN HUNGARIAN LITERATURE.
(1686-1-900.)
Of no nation
in the world can it be so truly said that its soul is wrapped up in its
literature, as of the Magyars; and their attempts to preserve their peculiar
form of political independence have always been, and still are, indissolubly
connected with their anxiety to maintain the ascendancy of their national
language and literature.
It is
impossible to attempt here to treat of the beginnings of Magyar literature, of
the old sagas* of the grandeur and high intellectual standards of the Courts of
Lewis the Great (1342-82) and Matthias the Just (1458-90), or to discuss the
effects of the Reformation upon both language and literary achievements. Our
summary begins with the new era that opened with the recovery of Buda (1686)
and the final expulsion of the Turkish invaders in 1687. Hungary was fatigued
and languid, a result not merely of the Ottoman oppression but of civil wars
and •J\*cord, and the rising of Francis B&koczi II (1704-11) was, as it
were, the last effort of national aspiration. The “ peace at any price ” party
wished to show its gratitude to the ruling dynasty for the liberation of Buda.
The Hungarian nobility made their castles the familiar haunts of German
players, and found their principal pleasure in frequenting the Court at Vienna,
where they were gradually stripped of their national feeling and character. The
only people who, in aristocratic circles, seem to have introduced a Hungarian
tone into social functions, were the gipsy-musicians, whose strains recalled
the days of Bocskai, Bethlen, and B&koczi, and their struggles for national
rights and aspirations.
The
scientific literature of this age, called the aureum scientiarum saeculum, was
for the most part written in Latin. Yet the writings of Francis Faludi
(1704-79), a Jesuit who may justly be considered the regenerator of Hungarian
prose, were in the vernacular. But the most important work, that served to mark
the Magyar literary Renascence, was carried out by the members of the noble
bodyguard formed by Maria Theresa as a mark of her gratitude for the loyalty of
the Hungarian nation, and stationed in Vienna. The leader of this devoted band
of noble youths was George Bessenyei (1747-1811)—the first writer in Hungarian
literature to mention Shakespeare’s name—who, in the cultured atmosphere of
the Viennese Court, discovered and set himself to remedy the ignorance of
himself and his compatriots. In 1772 he published his first drama, Agis
tragediaja (“The Tragedy of Agis”), not a very successful production, though
important as marking the commencement of the new literary era. It shows the
influence of French models, particularly Voltaire, whose! radical spirit and
formal fineness attracted the mind of Bessenyei, though he drew his real
inspiration from Magyar
sagas
and Magyar history. Bessenyei did much to reform the style of Hungarian
literature, opposing strongly all bombastic tendencies, and always endeavouring
to strengthen the language and establish it on a firm basis. .
The “French
School” which he founded had many adherents, of whom the most famous were
Alexander B&roczy, a careful and laborious translator; Abraham Barcsay, a
brilliant penman and ardent enthusiast; Joseph Nalaczy, the talented translator
of Young’s Night Thoughts and of the Spectator; Baron Laurence Orczy, whose
national pride and patriotism alone saved him from becoming the prey of the
attractions of the Court circles; Paul Anyos, “the melancholy poet of the pale
moon”; and Joseph Peczeli, who won fame by an adaptation of Young’s Night
Thoughts, and whose works denote the triumph of the Alexandrine in Hungarian
poetry.
Side by side
with this “French School” we find the “Classical”: of which Vergil was the
fountain-head and main inspiration. The adherents of the “Classical School,” of
whom the most eminent was Benedict Virdg a monk, found that, of all the modem
European tongues, Magyar was best adapted to the reproduction of classical
metres. Latin had always been of importance, not merely politically as the tongue
of Parliament until 1833, but socially and educationally. The spirit of the
Latin language, its use in oratory and satire, the political and military
ideals of the Latin people were influences that could not fail to inspire every
Magyar with a touch of classic feeling, and to suggest Vergil, Horatius,
Propertius, and Ovid as their models.
The system of
Joseph II, the son of Maria Theresa, whose centralising and Germanising
tendencies aimed at the overthrow of . the Hungarian Constitution and the suppression
of the Magyar tongue and traditions, gave rise to a third school, which is
indelibly connected with the name of Stephen Gyongyosi (1625-1704), the poet
who created the so-called “Magyar School.” Its chief exponents were Andrew
Dugonics, the enthusiastic champion of narrative prose and a scientific
neologist, Adam Horv&th de Pdloc, who in his lyrics recalled ,the spirit of
Balassi and the Kurucz (Crusaders’) poetry, those monuments of national ardour
and patriotic Germanophobia, and Count Joseph Gvaddnyi (1725-1801), a man of
Italian extraction, who surpassed even his fellow-enthusiasts in his Magyar
Chauvinism, and created an immortal figure in his Peleskei notarius (the
journey of the notary of Peleska to Buda, 1790).
The subjects
of this school are taken from Hungarian history or popular life, and their
inspiration from the ancient folk-lore and traditional poetry, while their aim
was to keep national feeling alive. The Parliament held at Buda in 1790
heralded their success and the triumph of the national movement. The ambitions
of Joseph II were buried with him; the Rdkoczi airs were struck up afresh, and
Hungarian national costumes appeared again. In literature, the enthusiasm for
the develop-
Karmdn. Csokonai. Kisfaludy.
Kazinczy. 423
ment of a national
culture and a national literary genius left no class of society untouched.
One of the
leading spirits of this age was Joseph Kdrmdn (1769-95), who threw himself
heart and soul into the literary movement. Saturated as he was with love and
admiration of Wieland and Schiller, he was yet a bold and outspoken champion of
the lawful rights of his native tongue. Kdrm&n’s greatest importance rests
on his creation of a style which combined the graces of extensive erudition and
wide reading with the vigour and expressiveness of his native language.
The influence
of Pope is seen in the Dorottya (“Dorothy”) of Michael Vitez Csokonai
(1773-1805), who, like the minstrels of old, wandered from place to place
singing his peerless songs. Though he felt the charm of Burger, Metastasio and
Rousseau, he never allowed their influence to tamper with his originality. He
took life easily, with the abandon of a true viveur; but he was not void of
deep sentiment and a real enthusiasm for great ideas. Besides the Dorottya
Csokonai wrote another comic epic, Beka-egerharcz (“The War of Frogs and
Mice”); a Lelek halhaS- atlanjaga (“on the Immortality of the Soul”), a poem
treating of the fearful struggles over the theme of a world beyond the grave
between sceptics, deists, and followers of the various religious confessions,
and ending with the triumph of simple Christian faith; the Lilla-dalok (“ Lilia
songs ”); and the Anakreoni-dalok (“ Anacreontic songs ”). He displays a
Tennysonian mastery of epithets, and many of his songs were written not merely
to be a “ poetry of words,” but to be set to music. And though at times
distinctly inclining to euphuistic conceits, he is the greatest exponent, after
Pet6fi, of Hungarian popular songs and ballads.
A complete
contrast to Csokonai was Alexander Kisfaludy, his rival in popularity. In his
wanderings abroad he learned to love Petrarch, under whose influence, and
during his journeys in Italy and Provence, he began to write his Himfy-dalok (“
Himfy songs ”) in a sonnet form of his own creation, the passionate ardour of
which is as inexhaustible as is his lyrical imagination. In these poems we
have, for the first time in Hungary, Rousseau’s conception of nature, in its
full poetic force. The poet’s imagination takes the whole of nature into the
service of his passions. Yet the poems are written in the old-world popular
rhythm in which the oldest relics of Hungarian poetry sound the praises of the
Virgin Mary. Kisfaludy wrote Regek (“ Tales ”) in verse dealing with the
storied ruins of the Balaton district, subtle stories “ instinct with the
chivalrous ideals of knighthood and love,” and dramas chiefly dealing with
subjects taken from Hungarian history.
Though these
two men were the most popular poets of the time, the real leader in literature,
the Johnson of Hungary, was Francis Kazinczy (1759-1831). He began his literary
activity early, with sentimental poems of a German tone which, for poetical
worth, were later surpassed by his witty epigrams and his lively, instructive,
and scathing
epistles. But
his influence was not due to these; rather to his remarkable susceptibility,
his wonderful enthusiasm, great learning, and refined taste, to his whole
individuality, in which—‘for the first time in Hungary— the conception of a
modem littirateur was embodied. His correspondence with his contemporaries
fills volumes that are the richest sources for the literary history of his age.
He was a voluminous translator and critic, in fact a “living academy,” bent
upon the perfection of the language he loved. “ In his aesthetic conceptions he
was inspired by the Germano-Greek classicism of Goethe, with a little touch of
sentiment, yet without any national bombast.” As a neologist his principle was
to enrich the Hungarian language with new words, and to adapt it to the forms
that had taken root in foreign tongues, and by his translations he served the
same purpose. His position and his theories met with an opposition considerable
enough to divide the whole country into two camps; a whole voluminous
par:phlet-literature arose, in which both sides used all the weapons of satire
and ,wit to prove their cause; and poets, linguists and politicians all took
part in the discussion.
Enthusiastic
pupils of Kazinczy were Daniel Berzsenyi, “ one of the most brilliant writers
of odes of all ages,” and Francis Kolcsey (17901838), the immortal author of
the Hungarian National Anthem (“ Men, aldd meg a magyart.'”), who followed in
the wake of Burger and introduced the ballad into Hungarian literature.
Like a flash
of lightning in the sombre darkness which overspread the. political horizon
during the period of the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent reaction, Joseph
Katona (1790-1830) appeared with his drama of Bank ban (1821), the first glory
of Hungarian tragedy. An episode taken from the era of the Arpdd dynasty served
as the poetical outlet for the feelings of the day.. The drama is a portrayal,
on the stage, of national sufferings, the outciy of a nation struggling under
the yoke of foreign despots, with recollections of the tragedies of Brutus and
Hamlet, which show the author’s deep study. Katona’s other dramas, The
Destruction of Jerusalem and Lucza szike, remind us of the “ dramas of horrors
” of the early Elizabethan period.
Charles
Kisfaludy (1788-1830), “the most popular dramatist of the twenties and the real
founder of Hungarian speculative poetry,” entered the lists with historical
dramas, the first of which, A Tatarok Maguar- orszagqn ( The Tartars in
Hungary”), was received in 1819 with an applause that knew no bounds. This
enthusiasm was due to the feeling that the poet was the interpreter of national
self-esteem and
PnT', sh°WS the influence of
Voltaire’s Zaire, his Stibor
vajda
(which treats of the opposition of the oppressed feudatory to .
his despot liege lord) that of Schiller’s Kabale und Liebe. A whole cvcle of
dramas is taken from the history of the Hunyadis. His dramatic treatment is
decidedly weak, but this defect is counteracted by his sincere and earnest
patriotism ■ and his excellent portrayal of the amusing
Vorosmarty.—New Hungary: Szechenyi.
425
sides of
Hungarian life, the typical figures which crowd the stage in his dramas, make
his work of inestimable value as a reflection of the age in which he lived, and
have given him the title of the “ Father of Hungarian Comedy.” He wrote also
short novels, humorous sketches and lyrical poetry: but it is as a dramatist
that he must stand or fall.
To the
influence of Kisfaludy was due the foundation of the Aurora- Kor (Aurora
Circle), which in 1831 developed into the Kisfaludy Tarsasag (Kisfaludy
Society). One of its most prominent members was Michael Vorosmarty (1800-55),
who was bom at Debreczen. He was the founder of the new Hungarian poetic
diction, which went back to the older language for its inspiration, and, while
accepting the principles of Kazinczy, endeavoured to form new words in
accordance with the natural laws of analogy and linguistic feeling. His muse
was inspired by the mighty movements of the twenties, which reached their acme
in the reforms introduced at the great Diet of 1825, from which period the real
hour of national awakening may be dated. His great epic poem, Zalan futasa (“
The Flight of ZaUn ”), began with the significant line:
“Ancestral
glory, where art thou belated in the dusk of night?”
The poem was
intended to arouse the nation to emulation of the past: it thrills with
patriotism and national pride. It is written in hexameters, a form of verse
which Vorosmarty made popular at one blow. ,
His tragedies
written for the stage are less successful, their characters refuse to develop
into dramatic characters, and they suffer as a whole from a dearth of action.
All the more wonderful are his translations from -
Shakespeare—Julius Caesar, King Lear, and a scene of Romeo amd Juliet. The
first almost takes rank beside its original for beauty of language, power, and
wealth of expression. It is certainly the finest translation of the play that
has appeared in any European language. His dramatic poem Csongor is Tiinde,
founded on the old legend of Argirus and Tiinder Ilona, reproduces the
enchanting fairy-world of Shakespeare.
Distinguished
alike as dramatist, linguist, and politician, Vorosmarty was greatest of all as
a lyric poet. Here he is at his best as a reformer of his native tongue. The
forms of the Latin school are replaced by the prosody of the West, while he
displays complete freedom from any German sentimentalism. The ringing glory and
beauty of his lyrics reflect the happiness of mankind, his native land, and his
own heart. His Sz6zat (“ Address to the Nation ”) embodies everything that
could raise his compatriots to higher things.
The leader of
the New Hungary was Count Stephen Szechenyi (1791
1860),
whose political achievements are elsewhere described. The work of the “
greatest Hungarian,” who was the founder of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
(1825), and who, in a score of different ways, helped to elevate and develop
the economic and political greatness of his native land, was not chiefly seen
in literary achievement. Yet he was a fertile
426
writer, and
among his Works those dealing with political economy were of the most
importance. His style was somewhat long-winded and extremely subjective; but he
coined new words of importance {e.g. alkotmany, “ constitution ”), and abhorred
purism of every kind., Some of his works are of permanent value as the
beginnings of a sound development of economic science in Hungary, while others
are only less essential to the understanding of Hungarian politics than are the
speeches and writings of Louis Kossuth, the leader of the Revolution of 1848-9*
and of Francis Dedk, the statesman of the Compromise (Ausgleich or, in Magyar,
Kiegyezes) of 1867.
Literary
criticism, too, received new impetus in this age. Of the critics of the day the
most famous were Joseph Bajza (1804-68), the initiator and editor of the
Kritikai Lapok and, after its decease, of the Athenaeum; Alexander Vachott; and
Francis Toldy (1805-75). The latter’s most important work, A short History of
Hungarian National Literaturefrom the oldest times to the present day, was
published in 1864. Toldy wrote many other critical and biographical works, and
was also the greatest exponent of his day of literary criticism.
Before the
War of Independence three important novelists appeared on the scene—Baron
Nicolas Josika (1794-1865), Baron Joseph Eotvos (1813-71), and Baron Sigismund
Kemeny (1814-77). All three entered the political lists too, in the cause of
Szechenyi’s policy of reform. Jdsika was the pupil of Walter Scott. Brought up
in the romantic surroundings of a Transylvanian castle, ■“ amid
collections of ancient armour and manuscript chronicles,” he breathed the
spirit of the past, that most potent inspiration of the historical novelist. In
Az utolso Bathory (“The Last of the Bathorys”) and Rak6czi Ferencz II are
reflected the influence of his great English predecessor; Abaft, is a Hungarian
Waverley, and, in A csehek Magyarorszagon (“Bohemians in h angary”) Jdsika
transplants the figures of Ivamhoe on to Hungarian soil. His later works show a
tendency to imitate Dumas in preference to Scott, and, though his popularity
was too great to allow of his being neglected, the critics received his Eszter
coldly. They felt that the magic charm of the romantic world, which he had
conjured up, had vanished. He remains, however, the founder of the
novel-literature of Hungary.
Eotvos’
greatest work is his Karthausi (“ The Carthusian ”), 1838, a peep into the
wonders and mysteries of life in France, with the moral that “unselfish work is
our greatest possession.” It is in truth a lyrical poem in prose, “ the
despairing cry of the human heart over the thousand miseries and wretchedness
of life,” which only belief in God and adherence to the teachings of Christ
can relieve. Eotvos also produced some important political writings, in
addition to founding the Budapeati Szemle (“ Budapest Review ”), the leading
literary review of Hungary, which is still in existence. Of these political
writings the foremost is that entitled “ The Predominant Ideas of the 19th
century” (A xix szazad
Eotvos. Szigligeti. Erddlyi. Kriza.
427
uralkodo
eszmlr), the most important work on political philosophy in Hungarian
liteiature. These writings were aimed at the abuses practised during his days,
particularly in county administration and parliamentary usage. Eotvos detested
“ caste ” arrogance and privileges, and was one of the boldest pioneers of the
centralisation of power in the hands of a strong “responsible” Ministry, the
activity of which should be controlled by the representatives of the whole
people. Of his novels, perhaps the “Village Notary” (A Falm jegyzoje) is almost
better known than “The Carthusian,” bearing as it does a distinctly political
character; for it serves the purpose of a protest against the unjust
suppression of the masses, and against a system which reserved political rights
for the privileged few. The same object is served by his historical novel
“Hungary in 1514” (Magyarorszag 151J/. ben), which treats of the peasant revolt
under DJzsa, the Hungarian John Ball, and was intended to act as a finger-post
to Eotvos’ countrymen to warn them of the awful consequences that might arise
from a continuance of the hard and fast line of demarcation between villeins
and the nobility. Kemeny, the scion of a princely Transylvanian family, tool
the subjects of all his greatest works from Transylvanian history; he treats of
the weakness, the fallibility of humanity, and creates veritable tragedies in
his novels.
The influence
of French literature, which towards the end of the eighteenth century had given
place to that of German writers,, began to assert itself afresh, and Victor
Hugo, Dumas, Sue and Balzac were the writers most in vogue in the thirties and
forties. In 1837 a permanent home (which later became the National Theatre) was
given to Hungarian dramatic art. The first drama presented at this theatre was
the Arpdd ebredese (“The Awakening of Arp&d”) of Michael Voros-; marty, but
the greatest popularity was attained by Ede Szigligeti (181478). He began his
career as a dramatist “with the imitation of the sharp antitheses,
extravagances and surprised of the French Romanticists.” But he was soon
induced by his democratic sympathies to create dramas d la vaudeville with
characters and situations peculiar to the lower grades of society, with their
poetical feelings, songs and humour. In thirty years he produced no less than
87 dramas, which were presented 842 times!
The national
feeling awakened by the age of Szechenyi proved stronger than the imported influences
of Latin, French and German literatures. A movement similar to that seen in
English literature in the eighteenth century now took place in Hungary too.
People began to look for inspiration t«. the traditions and poetry of the past,
and the work of men like John Erde'lyi (1814-68), the compiler of a collection
of Popular Songs and Folk-lore, and John Kriza, whose Vadr6zsak (“ Wild
Roses”), which resuscitated the ancient ballads of the Transylvanian Szeklers
(who are racially akin to the Magyars) as Percy’s Reliques did those of
England, was received with national acclamation. A certain
feeling of
Chauvinism, awakened by the justifiable pride in national tradition, due to the
reaction of the day, invoked the genius of the past. A return to a simpler and
more natural vehicle of thought, the language of ancestral poetry, was
proclaimed, and the new spirit gave birth to three great poets, Michael Tompa,
Alexander Pet6fi, and John Arany.
The first
■ of the triumvirate to appear was Michael Tompa (1817-68), the son of a
simple shoemaker. Taking orders as a Calvinist priest, Tompa, inspired by the
beauty of his surroundings, began to publish his Nepregek is Mondak (“ Popular
Tales and Folk-lore ”), in which he combined creations of his own romantic
fancy with the traditions of the past. These were followed by ViragregiTe
(“Tales of Flowers ”). In both collections Tompa maintained his individuality,
the subjectiveness of the truly lyric poet, and a freedom from all external
influences. The popularity of these works came as a surprise to everybody ;
but the tendency of the age accounted for it. Though not so zealous in his
accentuation of patriotic feeling and sentiment as Pet6fi, there can be no
doubt about his patriotism and his love for the traditions of his country. His
style, like that of Petofi, is popular, simple, unstudied, sincere.
Alexander
Pet6fi has been called “ the Bums of Hungary.” The son of a butcher, Petrovics
by name, a Slav by descent and birth, Petofi was bom on January 1, 1823, amid
the monotonous, but, in its own way, grand and majestic scenery of the
Hungarian Lowlands, the romance of which inspired some of the poet’s finest
lines. Pet6fi led a most remarkable life. Unhappy at home, though he loved his
father and mother passionately, he fled from the fetters of what he called “
slavery”; sought refuge in the attractions of a wandering actor’s career;
enlisted as a private, only to find that the yoke of a military life was harder
still to bear, and, after finally discovering that his true vocation was that
of a poet (much to his father’s disgust), ended by following the standard of
national liberty and fell, as he had wished to fall, in the midst of clashing
arms, at the battle of Segesvdr, in 1849. In his popular songs and poems we
find the whole world of feeling of the Magyar race: he was bom in the heart of
Magyardom, the home of the purest Magyar tongue, and the most downright Magyar
sentiment. As we read his poems we become familiar with the most typical
figures of Magyar, country life. Here we have a Magyar to the backbone. “But
there is another source of his popularity,” as Professor Zsolt Beothy has
written, “ the connexion of his personality with his age. Petofi is not only
the idol, but the ideal representative of the youth of that Hungary which.was
rejuvenated in the age of reform by the aqua vitae of national feeling. : His
nation is the Hungarian people; his dream the liberty of the world. He hates
princely despotism as heiartily as he detests the privileges and indolence of
the upper classes.” He has won for himself a worthy place in the literary
appreciation of all the great nations of Europe, except perhaps
that' of
England, and Herman Grimm has described him as a kindred spirit of Homer,
Shakespeare and Goethe.
This fertile age,
which produced the greatest lyrical poet of Hungary, also brought forth her
most distinguished epic poet, in the person of John Arany (1817-82), like his
great contemporaries, the son of poor parents. His poetry was inspired by the
legends and folk-lore of his native soil, traditions of the old days of Turkish
occupation, and of the struggles of the nation for political and religious
liberty. But perhaps the most decisive influence was exercised by his thorough
study of the classics, both ancient and modem, as seen in his translations of
Aristophanes and Shakespeare. Yet his studies in no way impaired his
originality or naivete; he clung with true devotion to the traditions of the
past, to the sanctity of his home, and the teachings of the Bible. He felt the
pathos of the tragedy and the humour of the comedy of popular life, and took as
his models the “ free and fresh poetry of the fields.”
Arany was
well advanced in years when he first appeared in the field of literature.
Encouraged by the success of Az Elveszett Alkotmany (“Loss of the
Constitution”), a satirical epic written in 1846, Arany produced Toldi. This
work gained not only the laurel wreath offered to “ the best Hungarian epic
written in a popular form and spirit,” but also the admiration and friendship
of Pet6fi, who was already the darling of his country. In this epic of the age
of Lewis the Great (1342-82) Arany not only made careful use of history and
tradition, but contrived to interweave the spirit of his own age—the desire for
political rights and equality—into this romantic setting. Arany then set
himself to elaborate the whole story of Toldi in the form of a trilogy. The
final part, Toldi Esteje (“The Downfall of Toldi”), was written first (1854).
We feel that, in portraying the death of Toldi, Arany is really tolling the
death-knell of the golden era of knighthood. The second part of the trilogy,
Toldi Szerehne (“Toldi’s Love”), was completed in 1879, and consists mostly of
creations of the poet’s imagination. There is more pathos here than in the
other two, and less of humour. Of his trilogy connected with the Hun sagas,
Arany only completed one part, Buda Halala (“The Death of Buda”), “the epic of
the men of iron,” a complete contrast to his poems dealing with the age of
chivalry. “ It is no longer a story told by the shepherd’s fire, but a solemn
song.” Arany wrote a comic epic, A Nagyidai Cziganyok (“The Gypsies of
Nagyida”), which won its way at once to the front in this field of literature
by the soundness of its conception and the humorous reflexion of the spirit of
despair, which the failure of the national ambition had awakened.
After 1848 he
turned to the writing of folk-songs, and for his productions in this field he
has been called “ the Shakespeare of the ballad.” He took his inspirations from
the songs of the outlaws of the Lowlands, the collections of Percy and Kriza:
yet, with one exception (The Bards of Wales), his subjects are Hungarian, his
method of
430
presentation
and his musical language all his own. Arany wrote lyrics as well, and his
wonderful translations of Shakespeare’s King' John, Hamlet, and A
Midsummer-Night’s Dream, with their wealth of language and poetical
inspiration, vie with Vorosmarty’s Julius Ccesar for the palm of beauty and greatness.
The
popularity and influence of Petflfi created a school of lyrists, of whom the
most eminent representative was K&lm&n Tdth (1831-81), with his tender,
warm and rich love poems. The extravagances and flowery bombast of this school
were counteracted by the publication of the shorter poems of Arany, with their
masterful simplicity; by the transplantation of the masterpieces of the
literature of other civilised nations; and by the comments of Hungarian
critics. Of the latter the greatest was Paul Gyulai (born 1826), who still acts
as the editor of the Budapesti Szemle, a man who all his life through has been
the sworn enemy of all extravagance, himself a poet of no mean calibre and the
author of five classical works of literary criticism, and of lives of
Vorosmarty and Katona. Another critic was Charles Sz&sz (1809-1906), who
also did great work as a translator.;
In 1861 was
produced one of the greatest triumphs of Hungarian dramatic literature, the Az
ember tragediaja (“The Tragedy of Man”) of Imre Mad&ch (1823-64). It is a
treatment of the fate of mankind, a speculative enquiry into the meaning of
human jfe, after the manner of Goethe and Byron. The “ Tragedy of Man” reaches
the greatest height to which Hungarian speculative poetry has attained. Its
tragedy lies in the collision of interests between great men and the general
mass of human beings,—the strivings of the latter after freedom being always
nothing more than an endeavour to secure ruling power. “ The people is a deeip
sea, into the depths of which no sunlight can penetrate.” The whole is the
strife of feeling against cunning and the power of knowledge. There are
recollections, here and there, of Faust:, they are, however, so scattered as to
prove nothing more than that Maddch had studied Goethe. The whole drama
reflects the ultimate triumph of good over evil; the trials and temptations of
mankind must end with the, overthrow of the tempter, and^r-44 God
fulfils Himself in many ways.”
The
historical novel in the genre of Kemeny was continued by a whole array of,
younger writers, from among whom we, must mention particularly Louis Abonyi;
and Josika found a greater successor in a friend of Petofi, Maurice Jokai
(1825-1905), who is probably the best known in England of pll Hungarian
writer^. He created a new style in narrative prose, wealthier, more Hungarian,
more lively and coloured than that in vogue before his days. In point of
vocabulary he is the Shakespeare of Hungary, and he takes his inspiration from
direct contact with the people, thus continuing in prose what Petfifi, Tompa,
and Arany had begun in poetry. His characteristics are seen in the flight of
his fancy when dealing with foreign scenes or with events of
the distant
past, and in his wonderful mastery of detail and nice exactness when treating
of the world around him and of events better within his reach. His
inexhaustible fund of humour and his mastery of pathos throw an irresistible
spell over his readers; and his descriptions of the beauties of nature are
fascinating in the extreme. His characterisations are often exaggerated; but
not one of his figures fails to excite our sympathy or our horror. As a
tale-teller he is peerless: his naivete, his optimism, his good humour attracts
and delights. The best known of his two hundred and fifty odd works are Egy
magyar nabob (“The Hungarian Nabob”), Az uj faldesur (“The New Landlord”), Mire
megvenuliink (“Debts of Honour”), Karpathy Zoltan, A Locsei feher asszony (“The
White Woman of Locse”), A szegeny gazdagolc (“The Poor Plutocrats”), Erdely
Arany-Kora (“’Midst the Wild Carpathians ”).
Scientific
literature and scholarship was not neglected. The work begun by Francis Toldy
was continued. The field of linguistics was covered by scholars of the calibre
of Paul Hunfalvy (1810-91), Budenz, Vambery, Czuczor, and Fogarasi; and the
work of all these eminent men found a fitting centre in the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences. History was not neglected, and the work done in this field is the
undying merit of scholars like Michael Horv&th, Ladislas Szalay, and
Alexander Szil&gy i.
The slight
sketch here given of the development of Hungarian literature during a period
of some two centuries shows that the writers— poets, prose writers,
dramatists—had to deal with difficulties thrown in their way by the defects of
the language, by its neglect for other tongues (particularly for Latin), and by
the attempts made, especially under Joseph II, to Germanise the country. Their
efforts had to be devoted to the creation of a national spirit, to the arousing
of an enthusiasm for the traditions of the past, and to the formation of a
uniform literary medium of speech. The work begun by Bessenyei and Faludi was
completed by Kazinczy, Vorosmarty, Arany, Petofi, and Jokai. A national drama
has been created : the legendary figures and episodes of bygone days have been
set in a literary framework of surpassing merit; the old folk-lore has been
revived* and a new literature of the fancy and the imagination has arisen. The
Magyar language, standing alone amidst a confusion of other tongues, has served
as the means of literary expression to such men as Arany, Pet6fi, Szechenyi,
Louis Kossuth, Katona, Kisfaludy, all of whom—in one respect or another—are
entitled to a renown that should not only be national but European.
BISMARCK AND
GERMAN UNITY.
The keynote of Bismarck’s policy is to he found in
his resolve to drive Austria out of Germany and make Prussia the leading Power
there. As Austria was not likely to relinquish voluntarily the preeminence she
had enjoyed for centuries, Bismarck was prepared to face a war to gain his end,
and from the first he endeavoured to make Prussia ready for the contingency. To
effect this it seemed to him essential that the entire political control should
remain absolutely in the hands of the King and not devolve on the Parliament,
as he was convinced that no party government was capable of carrying out
successfully so dangerous a policy. For neither Conservatives nor Liberals
would hear a word of war and conquest: the Conservatives wished to uphold the
alliance with Austria, the Liberals hoped to wrest the leadership from that
State with the help of public opinion. In these circumstances, when the King
and Parliament disagreed about the organisation of the army, Bismarck had to
insist that Parliament should give way. Hence, his first step after his
appointment (September, 1862) was to urge his sovereign to continue the
struggle. King William, who had despaired of solving the difficulties
confronting him and was prepared to abdicate, allowed himself to be persuaded
when Bismarck appealed to his honour as a soldier to hold to his post. But,
ready as the new Minister was to fight, the conflict with the Parliament was by
no means the end he had in view. He first tried to bring about a peaceable
settlement by offering to include the leaders of the Liberal Opposition in the
Ministry, if they would consent to the army reforms. The negotiations were
wrecked by their demand for reducing the term of military service to two years,
which the King, having consistently opposed it before, could not now grant
without humiliation. Bismarck, for his part, was generally regarded as a
thorough-paced reactionary. The result of the first parliamentary debates was
that the House of Representatives was prorogued without having passed the army
estimates—in fact, without having voted a budget—for 1863. At the same time,
the House had expressly declared it unconstitutional for the Government to
enter into any fresh expenditure without the sanction of the Representatives.
Bismarck was, however, resolved, in spite of this pronouncement, to carry out
the rejected proposals for reorganising the army, and therefore
did not
hesitate to dispose of the state revenues as he deemed necessary in the public
interest. He proceeded to govern without a budget, the Constitution being thus
rendered nugatory. Any cooperation with the Liberals being thus impossible, he
had no alternative but to rely on the support of the Conservatives, who, though
neither knowing nor sharing his views as to foreign policy, recognised their
own principles in the Minister’s defence of the prerogatives of the Crown. With
characteristic relentlessness Bismarck put his plan into immediate execution:
important military and administrative posts were given to Conservatives ;
officials of the opposite party were pensioned or degraded; Liberal judges were
insulted by having others advanced over their heads; officers of the Landwehr
were persecuted by judicial enquiries on points of military honour, and so
forth., The Press was to be held in check by confiscations and lawsuits. By
these means he hoped to subject all the organs of the State to his 'control; he
was in no fear of a revolution, as he could depend upon the army, and,
moreover, the mass of the people took little interest in the constitutional
struggle. The conflict was carried on principally by the middle class—which was
the predominant class among those represented by the Parliament. Bismarck
hoped, gradually to conciliate it by his successful foreign policy and the
establishment of German supremacy in Europe. Thus Prussia came, in effect, to
be governed by a party (the Conservative) which only possessed eleven votes, in
the House of Representatives.
The beginning
of Bismarck’s Ministry was not calculated to improve Prussia’s position in
Germany. As has been pointed out, Prussia, was strongly opposed to Austria on
the question of Federal reform; should a conflict ensue, Prussia could not
count upon the support of public opinion. The political sections which longed
for a united Germany, with Prussia at its head, were for the most part Liberal,
and now the Prussian Government was carefully shutting out every breath of
Liberalism and apparently pledging itself to the most narrowminded reaction.
Austria, on the other hand, appetu'ed to have adopted far more popular lines of
government. The Constitution of February,
1861, was, for the time being, working well,
and was in particular approved by the German subjects of the Habsburg monarchy.
This approval influenced public opinion among German Liberals at large; there
were many sceptics with regard to Prussia’s German policy; and the widespread
Nationalverein, for instance, favoured the proposals for Federal reform
advocated by Austria and the secondary States.
Abroad, Prussia’s
policy could not but depend upon the relations existing between the continental
Great Powers, especially between France and Russia. When their mutual relations
were strained, Prussia was able to hold her own between her stronger
neighbours; when the two Powers were in alliance, she was exposed to
overwhelming pressure, especially if—as at the moment—;she were on bad terms
with Austria.
Already when
ambassador in Frankfort, Bismarck had always made it an axiom that Prussia must
try to prevent a Franco-Russian alliance; but that, should such an alliance be
formed, she must be a third member of it to escape being crushed by the other
two. When he became Minister, he strove to bring about an agreement between
France and Russia, though public opinion in France was averse from a Russian
alliance because of the oppression of the Poles. This obstacle, however, was
not insurmountable; for Prince Gorchakoff, the Russian Chancellor, was trying
to establish a separate Liberal administration for the former kingdom of
Warsaw. Thus a treaty between Tsar and Emperor became possible, which might not
only damage the general political position of Prussia, but, by creating an
autonomous Russian Poland, might react dangerously upon the Poles under
Prussian rule.
This situation
Bismarck entirely changed, thanks to an unforeseen event which he turned to
account with resolute promptitude. When the Polish insurrection suddenly broke
out in Warsaw, Bismarck persuaded the King to send Count Alvensleben to St
Petersburg to assure the Tsar that Prussia would not countenance any assistance
sent from Posen to the Polish insurgents, but, on the contrary, considered
herself the natural ally of the Russian Government in opposing them. At the
same time Prussia put half her army—four army corps—in the field so as to be
able to guard the frontier. This attitude, in the first place, caused the Tsar
to repudiate Gorchakoff’s plan of pacifying the Poles by concessions and
launched him upon a war of extermination with the rebels. An end was thus
effectually put to the possibility of a Franco- Russian alliance; for in France
public opinion had enthusiastically espoused the cause of the Poles. A further
consequence was that henceforth Alexander placed implicit confidence in
William, who, of his own accord, had shown himself a friend in need. The
friendship between Russia and Prussia became yet closer when, a few months
later, France, England, and Austria attempted to intervene on behalf of Poland;
relying on his understanding with Prussia, Alexander could refuse to listen to
their threats, well aware that the three Powers would not dare to make war upon
both Russia and Prussia. Thus Bismarck’s prompt initiative had substituted a
Russo-Prussian for the threatened Franco-Russian agreement, and had rescued
Prussia from her isolation.
Only a bold
spirit could have been capable of such a course of action. There was no doubt
that Prussia would have to bear the brunt of the first encounter, if the three
Powers really decided upon war; for Russia’s hands were too full with the Poles
during the summer for her to have been able to render prompt and efficient help
against France and Austria. Bismarck, it is true, did not believe in the danger
of war; but public opinion considered the situation in which he had placed
Prussia extremely critical, and all Liberals resented his alliance with Russia.
In this way the chasm between the Prussian Government and public
opinion was
still further widened; while Austria was winning fresh sympathy, by combining
with the Western Powers in defence of Poland.
These
circumstances, which seemed so favourable for Austria, provided the Emperor
Francis Joseph with the opportunity for a sudden move in German politics. In
July, 1863, he convened a meeting of all the German Princes at Frankfort in
order to obtain their sanction for a scheme of Federal reform, by which the
reconstituted central authority was to be placed permanently in the hands of
Austria and of her allies, the secondary States. As the Federal Constitution
made no provision for an assembly of rulers of this kind, it was essential that
all of them should attend it voluntarily. Francis Joseph therefore endeavoured
personally to persuade the King of Prussia to attend, by representing to him
that this Congress was the best means of carrying out the reform of the
Confederation on Conservative lines and without danger of a revolution. King
William, under the influence of patriotic and dynastic feelings, was on the
point of yielding to these arguments; but Bismarck, convinced that Austria
would strengthen her position in Germany by obtaining a majority at Frankfort,
persuaded the King, after considerable demur, to absent himself from the
assembly and so render its decisions abortive. Bismarck had expressed his
intention of resigning if the King were to go to Frankfort, and William knew
that he could not spare Bismarck in the struggle with the Parliament. In
consequence of Prussia’s absence from the assembly of Princes* nothing could be
accomplished. Austria’s proposal for a closer union within the German
Confederation, on the lines of her own scheme of Federal reform, was rejected
by the secondary States as definitely as they had formerly rejected analogous
proposals brought forward by Prussia. They perceived that, if they were to ally
themselves with one of the two Great Powers, their relation to it would ibe
that of subordinates; allied to both, they might decide the issue. /Neither was
Austria’s proposal received with greater approbation by public opinion. An
informal assembly of about three hundred representatives declared her scheme
inadequate, as making no provision for a parliament elected by popular
franchise (August 22). To such a demand it was impossible for Austria to
accede. Bismarck, on the other hand, hastened to announce that on this point
Prussia’s views coincided with public opinion. Prussia, according to an
official note, was anxious for a reform of the Confederation, including “ an
assembly made up of members from the whole of Germany, in proportion to the
population, elected by a direct franchise.” The general distrust of the
reactionary Minister was not allayed by this declaration; which, however,
showed that Prussia was less averse than Austria from the national demands. An
alliance between Habsburg and the Liberal advocates of union was out of the
question. It had proved impossible for Austria to take any decisive step
against Prussia with the help of the secondary States; consequently it became
necessary for her to find a modus vivendi with
436 Napoleon's proposal for a congress rejected.
[i863
Prussia, so
that the two Powers might conjointly control the Confederation as they had
done in the past. Thus an immense improvement had taken place in the position
of Prussia during the first year of Bismarck’s Ministry : the German question
had lost its ominous aspect, and Prussia's rival, Austria, was courting her
friendship. At the same time (in the autumn) the Russian troops had been
successful in Poland, so that Russia, the friend of Prussia, was once more free
to take action; and this again was to Prussia’s advantage.
Of the very
greatest importance for Prussia was a sudden move on the part of Napoleon, Who
had suffered a grievous defeat on the Polish question, and was anxious to find
a means of erasing all traces of his discomfiture by some success. He conceived
the idea of proposing a congress of all the Powers at Paris (November 5), at
which the European questions under dispute might be discussed, and which, under
his presidency, might serve to restore his lost prestige in France. The
proposal was directed against Austria, as concerned in the Italian question,
which Napoleon was manifestly desirous of settling. As his purpose was to make
an attack upon Austria, it was natural that he should put himself on good terms
with Prussia; and he hinted to the Prussian ambassador that France would be
willing to help Prussia against Austria in German affairs.
The proposal
for a congress was received with suspicion by all the Powers, more especially
by Austria. Though determined in no case to agree to the congress, she
refrained from openly declining the proposal: for she could not expect support
from any quarter if an open rupture with France ensued, being as she was at
enmity with Prussia on the G-erman question, and with Russia on the Polish. In
this dilemma, compelling him either to offend France deeply or to agree to the
congress, distasteful as it was, Count Rechberg resolved to attach himself
without reserve to Prussia in the hopes of frustrating the congress by her
help. Thus, Prussia, as a result of the independence she had shown on the
Polish question, found herself courted by France and Austria, and in a position
to dictate the terms of a rapprochement with the latter.
These
advances by Austria to Prussia were most opportune (November, 1863). For it
was just the time when a question, which had repeatedly occupied the attention
of the European Powers, was approaching a solution, viz. the quarrel between
Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. We have seen elsewhere how the Danish
Government had refused all demands, on the part of the two German Great Powers
and the Germanic Confederation, that the cotoditions under which the London
Protocol of 1852 had regulated the relations between the duchies and Denmark
should be fulfilled by the latter. She had trusted to the differences among the
Great Powers, notably between Austria and Prussia. The Polish insurrection,
which for a time seemed likely to lead to a European war, caused the
Eider-Danes, then dominant in Denmark, to go one step
further. On
March 30, 1863, a royal charter was issued, proclaiming a new Constitution. By
this Schleswig became merely a Danish pro ince ; Holstein retained its
independent ppsition, but was to be exploited financially in the interests of
the whole Danish State. This proceeding on the part of Denmark was a twofold
infringement of the law. First, she had thrust the new charter upon Holstein
without consulting its representatives; secondly, she had annexed Schleswig: in
the one case disregarding the rights of the German Confederation, in the other
acting contrary to the London Protocol.
In Germany,
this proceeding called forth great indignation. Public opinion demanded that
the Confederation should forthwith declare the agreement of 1852 to have been
violated, should forcibly wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, and establish
the Duke of Augusten- burg as reigning sovereign. Most of the minor German
States, under the influence of a sustained agitation, were inclined to support
these demands at the Federal Diet. But the two Great Powers, with whom the
actual decision of the question lay, steered their political course in
accordance with their particular interests. The Austrian Government, far from
caring for the emancipation of the duchies on its own account, was anxious not
to be entangled in these remote disputes, particularly now that it was entering
upon diplomatic discussions of the Polish question with Russia. But to remain
neutral was out of the question. Everyone in Germany considered the protection
of Schleswig-Holstein of vital importance, and Austria could not afford to
disregard public opinion, as being at this point most anxious to gain the
support of the nation for her scheme of Federal reform. Accordingly, Rechberg
proposed that the Confederation should demand the withdrawal of the charter of
March 30 under penalty of Federal Execution, on the ground that the charter
disregarded the vested rights of the Holsteiners. Bismarck, like Rechberg, did
not regard the emancipation of Schleswig-Holstein as an end in itself; he
considered that, if the duchies were wrested from Denmark and given a
Constitution of their own under Augustenburg, the interests of Prussia would be
hindered rather than promoted, since the Duke would be in constant dread of
annexation by Prussia and would therefore attach himself to Austria. If, then,
Prussia undertook the liberation of the duchies, it was necessary, in his
opinion, that they should be bound to her by some kind of political tie.
Bismarck also knew that the Great Powers were opposed to the reduction of
Danish territory; and he was therefore not prepared to enter upon a war with
Denmark so long as Prussia was, as in 1850, confronted by the opposition of
every one of them. At least, he wished to be certain that Austria would second
Prussia, instead of, as then, attacking her in the rear. The Austrian proposal
that federal execution should be carried out by the Confederation fitted in
exactly with his wish for postponement; for, as experience showed, considerable
time must elapse before this could be
carried out,
and in the interval entirely new combinations in foreign politics might arise,
to which Prussia would be able to adapt her action. Thus, although strongly
opposed to each other on the Polish question, Austria and Prussia conjointly
carried the resolution in the Federal Diet (July 9, 1863) that Denmark should
be directed to annul the March Charter and put in force the provisions of 1852.
In case of refusal the Confederation would occupy Holstein in order itself to
restore the administration of justice. Meanwhile, in spite of this threatening
language, the Danish Government repudiated any kind of compromise and bluntly
announced (September 28) that an edict for a Constitution embodying the main
provisions of the March Charter would shortly be issued. Only one answer was
possible: on October 1 the German Confederation resolved amid general rejoicing
to take action at once. This decision was unwelcome to both the German Great
Powers. The enthusiasm throughout Germany made it impossible to evade carrying
out the resolution, and interminable complications might result from the
conflict with Denmark, because of England’s friendly attitude towards her. In
particular, Bismarck advocated another attempt at a peaceful solution, because
the conditions which, as has been seen, he considered requisite for a termination
of the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty were not yet realised. Bismarck
accordingly endeavoured, with the help of England and of the Moderate party in
Denmark, to postpone the rupture once more. In these attempts he was favoured
by fortune inasmuch as Napoleon’s sudden proposal for a congress caused Austria
to side with Prussia: Bismarck could, therefore, rely on Austria’s support.
Just as the situation began to assume so promising an aspect, another
unforeseen event occurred: Frederick VII, King of Denmark, died (November 15).
His successor, Christian, the “ Protocol Prince,” coerced by the Eider-Dane
party, put the recently drafted Constitution into force, and thereby broke off
all relations between himself and his German subjects on the one side and the
German Confederation on the other. Moreover, a new entanglement resulted from
the change of sovereign. Prince Frederick of Augusten- burg, the son of the
aspirant to the throne in 1848, laid claim to Schleswig-Holstein as tbe heir by
right of birth. The fact that his title was doubtful in consequence of his
father’s resignation of his claim (1852) was ignored by the German nation; he
was regarded as the national candidate whose accession would deliver
Schleswig-Holstein once for all from the hated Danish yoke. Hence a more
persistent agitation in his favour was now carried on by the Confederation, and
he was acknowledged by several of the German principalities, such as Baden and
Coburg. The two Great Powers were unable to adopt this attitude so
light-heartedly, since they had signed the London Protocol and by so doing had
excluded Augustenburg from the succession. For the same reason they now
recognised the new King Christian as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. Nevertheless,
Bismarck hoped
that an
opportunity of settling the old dispute had now come. He intended to allow the
federal execution voted by the Confederation to take place; if, as might be
assumed, King Christian under pressure from the Eider-Dane party still adhered
to the November Constitution, it would be possible to declare that the London
Protocol had been violated, and to set about the liberation of the duchies. In
this way, he considered, the Germans might make the Protocol the legal basis of
their action, while the Danes, by rejecting this basis, would put themselves in
the wrong and so make it difficult for friendly Powers to interfere on their
behalf. Only a few weeks earlier, this course of action had seemed to him too
hazardous; now, thanks to the changed European situation, he saw that the right
moment had come. Prussia, as a matter of course, must play the leading part in
a Danish war of this kind, so as to be able afterwards to dispose of the
conquered duchies to her own advantage. Bismarck’s plan of making the London
Protocol and the resolution of the Confederation the starting-point of his
procedure coincided exactly with the views of the Austrian Government; although
Bechberg, unlike Bismarck, hoped by this policy to reach a pacific solution. In
accordance with the instructions of the German Confederation, the federal
execution was rapidly carried out; in December, 1863, Saxon and Hanoverian
troops occupied Holstein; Austrian and Prussian forces being stationed behind
them in reserve. The Danes evacuated Holstein without striking a blow; but in
Schleswig they prepared to offer a stubborn resistance.
It need
hardly be said that the policy of the two Great Powers was strongly condemned
by a large majority of the German people, for, should it be carried out, the
Danes m’ght, if they pleased, by recognising the London Protocol, remain in
undisturbed possession of the duchies. In fact there was a widespread suspicion
that the Great Powers were willing to hand over the duchies to the King of
Denmark because of their repugnance to any kind of popular movement. This
apprehension was shared by the Prussian Parliament, whose Lower House attacked
Bismarck vigorously and at the same time demanded immediate recognition of the
Duke of Augustenburg (December 2). Even the Federal Diet allowed itself to be
carried away by the general excitement and declined to continue the federal
execution in support of the resolutions of 1852, thus tacitly refusing to
acknowledge Christian IX, and relinquishing its adherence to the London
Protocol (January 14, 1864). This decision was welcomed by Bismarck. Since the
Confederation no longer recognised the constitutional principle involved,
Prussia determined thenceforth to act in the matter independently of the
Confederation, as one of the European Great Powers and as signatory to the
London Protocol, and to settle the whole question without reference to the Confederation.
Austria, who in her fear of Napoleon had no alternative but to be on friendly
terms with Prussia, gave her consent. After brief negotiations both Powers
agreed (January 16,1864) to send an ultimatum
to Denmark,
demanding the repeal of the Constitution imposed' by the King on the duchies in
the previous November. Should Denmark refuse,
60,000 Austrians were immediately to march into
Schleswig. What was to be done with the duchies after they were taken was not
stated; but both Powers pledged themselves to regulate their future course “ by
mutual agreement.” This arrangement was a great achievement for Bismarck, who
had now secured the wished-for ally in the liberation of the duchies together
with the possibility of, somehow, attaching the provinces to Prussia. Rechberg
would have liked some final understandings to the future so as to prevent later
complications in the north; but; as Bismarck did not respond to his wishes, he
had to give way. The developments foreseen by Bismarck took place; the Danes
refused the ultimatum ; war was declared; and the allies marched into Schleswig.
Neither in
Prussia nor in other parts of Germany was the success of Bismarck’s diplomacy
appreciated, because the Great Powers still ostensibly adhered to the London
Protocol. The Prussian House of Representatives1 even refused funds
to defray the expenses of the war (January 22, 1864), because it considered
Bismarck’s policy to be antinational. This opposition—no new experience to
Bismarck—caused him little anxiety ; more serious was the fact that the King’s
attitude was for a time doubtful. His German patriotism and his natural regard
for legitimism engaged his sympathies on behalf of Augustenburg, and inclined
him to withdraw his support of the London Protocol. The Crown Prince Frederick,
a whole-hearted adherent of the National and Liberal views of the time,
naturally encouraged his father’s inclination. Many Conservatives too—even
Bismarck’s closest ally, Roon, the Minister of War, and many other military
men—favoured Augustenburg. Thus Bismarck stood quite alone, but nevertheless he
did not waver. He alone perceived that the recognition of Augustenburg meant
the relinquishment- of future advantages to Prussia, and might, by this
disregard of the legal basis of the international problem, furnish the Great
Powers with both pretext and motive for supporting Denmark. Once more he forced
his policy upon his sovereign by threatening- to resign. From motives concerned
with internal policy the King reluctantly accepted the foreign policy of his
Minister.
The campaign
brought success to the superior forces of the allies, although the conduct of
the war by the Prussian Field-Marshal Wrangfel left much to be desired. The
Danes were surrounded and driven out of their strong position at the Danewerke
(February 5), but made their escape with few losses to Diippel. With the
exception of this stronghold and the islands, the whole of Schleswig-Holstein
was now in the hands of the allies. But the Danes’ power of resistance was not
broken so long as their army was intact and so long as they held the command of
the sea; their hope was to protract the war, to tire out the Germans by
interrupting their commerce, and if possible to induce the European
Powers to
intervene. In addition to Sweden they counted especially on England, where the
Government and public opinion had always protested vehemently against the
dismemberment of Denmark. Meanwhile, they suffered further serious reverses:
they lost Jutland, and a still more grievous blow was the storming of the
Diippel entrenchments (April 18) by the Prussian ai-my—the most notable
military achievement of the war.
As Bismarck
had foreseen, the result of the strictly legal procedure of the Germans was
that no intervention of the Powers took place. Even England, the Power most
friendly to Denmark, had to content herself with summoning the signatories of
the Protocol of 1852 to a Conference in London. Immediately after the fall of
Diippel a truce was arranged and the Conference met (April 25). The German
nation, which had acclaimed the successes of the war with enthusiasm, regarded the
Conference with aversion, and in the midst of a strong public agitation,
petitions were sent up to the King and the Emperor demanding1 that
the whole of Denmark should be overrun and the wishes of any other Powers
ignored. The Prussian statesman again went his own way. He followed the same
tactics as hitherto and, trusting to the ohstinacy of the Eider- Danes,
advanced the most conciliatory proposals, in order to put the enemy in the
wrong in the eyes of all Europe hy his refusal of them. Naturally, Bismarck now
claimed more than the reinstatement of the London Protocol: he demanded, as the
price of victory, the union of the duchies as independent States under the
sovereignty of Denmark, and the admission of Schleswig to the German
Confederation, so as to ensure its safety from Danish future encroachments. In
spite of his contempt for public opinion, he knew how to make use of it as an
ally when it served his purpose. Thus, he secretly ahetted the agitation in
favour of the separation of the duchies, and in London pointed impressively to
this excitement in Germany, which might end in revolution if the nation were
not appeased by at ieast this one token of victory. By this argument he
compelled Austria to support him. Again Rechherg would have preferred to adhere
to the less drastic provisions of the London Protocol; but h a fear of
alienating all sympathy in Germany, and the fear of France, drove him anew into
Bismarck’s arms. Once again, Bismarck’s calculations proved correct. The Danes,
relying on England’s aid, refused the German demands, and after prolonged
negotiations the Conference broke up without result (June 25). An appeal to
arms was now inevitable. The general- situation favoured the German jrreat
Powers: Russia was unwilling to put difficulties in Prussia’s way; France
desired her friendship; and England saw in her and Austria the best security
against Napoleon’s restless policy. After this general refusal of help to
Denmark by the Great Powers, the Scandinavians in the north were of course unable
to succour her.
Even before
the fate of the Conference was decided that of the Duke of Augustenburg was
settled. So soon as Bismarck perceived that the London
Conference
would prove fruitless, he had to consider the question of the investiture of
Prince Frederick of Augustenburg. King William had never lost sympathy with
Augustenburg, and, as the abandonment of the London Protocol made the
establishment of the independence of the duchies probable within a short time,
it was more difficult than ever for Bismarck to oppose his wish. The Minister
was therefore prepared to recognise Prince Frederick’s claims, but only on
condition that he gave certain guarantees of his future political action, such
as putting his army, post and railways under Prussian control. However, in the
end, the Prince declined these conditions, unwilling—perhaps in consequence of
Austrian influence—to limit his independence. Henceforth his cause was
hopeless. Bismarck immediately published the negotiations with Augustenburg and
the Prince’s refusal of terms (beginning of June), and convinced the King and a
great part of the Prussian people that Augustenburg’s candidature was
ill-timed. At this point Bismarck’s policy for the first time received the
general approval of the country; Conservatives as well as members of the
Opposition began to see that a Duke in league with Austria was a source of
great danger both to Prussia and to the future of Germany, and were ready to
discuss tbe alternatives of annexing the duchies or establishing a protectorate
over them.
The military
operations, which formed a necessary preliminary to the fulfilment of Prussia’s
wishes, were rapidly carried out. Immediately after the conclusion of the
Conference the Prussians captured Alsen (June 29) with a great part of the
Danish army; and the allies were just preparing to cross over to the Danish
islands, the backbone of the kingdom, when the Danish Government capitulated.
The Eider-Danish Ministry resigned, and their successors instantly concluded a
preliminary peace, by which the German duchies Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauen-
burg, i.e. about two-fifths of the whole kingdom, were handed over to Austria
and Prussia (August I). Some further negotiations followed, defining the exact
frontiers, and fixing Schleswig-Holstein’s share of Denmark’s national debt;
but they were soon brought to a conclusion, and on October 27 the final treaty
was signed at Vienna.
By this peace
the duchies were protected from Danish encroachments ; but in other respects
their future was obscure. Provisionally, they were administered in concert by
the two victorious Powers. It has been seen by what different considerations
the two Powers were actuated at the outset; and no sooner had the common foe
been defeated than this divergence in their point of view made itself felt.
While the war was still in progress, Austria had recognised Bismarck’s avowed
intention of securing some prize for Prussia, and naturally sought to hinder an
unfair addition to Prussia’s power. With this end in view, the Austrian Government
wished the duchies to be handed over to Augustenburg, this course being no
longer blocked by international difficulties. Austria would thus be relieved of
the inconvenient necessity of maintaining troops in the far,
north, and
would besides win the approval of non-Prussian Germany. Bismarck of course
rejected this solution; but he was not yet able to carry his intentions to
their ultimate conclusion. He had to reckon with the fact that Austria would
try to frustrate these ends even at the price of a war, and for such a war he
was not nearly ready, since at present it would be quite impossible to gain the
King’s consent to it. Bismarck knew that his sovereign would not draw the sword
until he had palpable proof that Austria was attacking the honour or welfare of
his country. But this contingency was still remote. Moreover, the Minister was
unwilling to provoke a war with Austria, unless he was secure from all outside
interference, especially on the part of France. As at present he had no such security,
his object, unlike that of Austria, was to preserve the status quo. The
provisional joint administration assured the predominant influence in
Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia because of her geographical proximity; and the
claims of Augustenburg were set aside. Thus Bismarck rejected Rechberg’s proposal
on the grounds that the titles of all claimants, and in the first place that of
the House of Oldenburg, must be investigated before Augustenburg was accepted.
Pending fliis investigation, the European situation might perhaps assume the
aspect desired by Bismarck. The Austrian Government could not adduce any legal
justification for its proposal, while, still less than Prussia, could it afford
to hurry on a breach; for French policy had continued to direct menacing shafts
towards Austria, and within the last few months had again made overtures to
Italy, Austria’s mortal enemy. Hence the Vienna Government, in the event of
wishing to concentrate its forces against an attack from the south, would find
great difficulty in withdrawing from the northern entanglement without
important concessions to its German rival. Manifestly, the Austro-Prussian
alliance had so far been advantageous to the Prussians and disadvantageous to
the Austrians.
And at the
same time Prussia was scoring an economic victory over Austria. When the
struggle between the two Great Powers on the question of Federal reform had
broken out again (1860), Austria had renewed her former attempt to overthrow
the German Zollverein. She hoped with the assistance of the south German
secondary States, which disapproved of Prussia’s liberal customs policy, to
become a member of the tariff union and then decide the whole customs policy in
her own interests. This attempt was rendered abortive by the divergent economic
interests of the north German secondary States which, as being enclosed by
Prussian territory, were excluded from benefiting by Austria’s policy of
protection. Saxony, in particular, in spite of her political sympathies with
Austria and Bavaria, adhered to the old Zollverein policy. The south German
secondary States, which had counted on the agreement of their north German
sister States, were left out in the cold, and were consequently obliged to
accept the Prussian customs policy, since they
444
ZoUverein renewed.—FaU of Rechberg.
[l864
were
unwilling, by forming a tariff union with Austria without th§ north German
States, to fall a helpless prey to the economic interests, of the Empire which
.in many respects differed from their own. Still less could they remain alone;
so that the best course still open tjo them was to accept the north German Free
Trade policy. Hence the ZoUverein was renewed in its original form for a period
of twelve years (October, 1864). In this matter, as on the question of Federal
reform in
1863, it was evident that Prussia, and not
Austria, represented the wishes and interests of the great majority of the
German nation.
The events of
the last year were, as was inevitable, severely criticised in Austria. In the
imperial Council as well as in the Cabinet, Rechberg was sharply censured; he
was accused of sacrificing the ancient friendship with the secondary States
and of impairing the relations with all the Great Powers; the alliance with
Prussia, which had nearly brought about the Prussian annexation of
Schleswig-Holstein, would be sure to end in the surrender of Austria’s position
of supremacy in Germany to Prussia. In particular, Schmerling, the Minister of
Home Affairs, and Privy Councillor von Biegelebep represented this point of
view; both were dominated by the conviction that Austria was bound to retain
the leadership in Europe and prevent any accession to Prussia’s power.
Rechberg, on the contrary, saw plainly that his opponents were working towards
a war with Prussia, since Bismarck, he knew, would never give way before
Austria’s threats. Nor did he at any time disguise from himself that Austria’s
future in Germany must be determined by this war, and that Italy would take the
opportunity of seeking to seize Venice. He would have preferred to avoid all
these dangers by maintaining the alliance with Prussia, even at the cost of
concessions in Schleswig-Holstein. But he was not the man tp impose his will
upon his Emperor and his colleagues after the manner of Bismarck. Since the
Emperor could not spare Schmerling from his Home Department, and as it was impossible
for both Ministers to work together, Rechberg was obliged to quit the field. He
was superseded by General Count Mensdorf, like Rechberg a strong Conservative
at bottom and an adherent of the Prussian alliance. But under the new Minister,
who had hitherto held aloof from foreign affairs, Biegeleben became the moving
spirit in politics; and it was his determination to revive the dropped
friendship with the secondary States, and to settle the fatal
Schleswig-Holstein question with all possible speed. Buoyed up by his hatred of
Prussia, and his confidence in Austria, he believed that by an attitude of firmness
he would be able to compel Bismarck to give way. Immediately, therefore, upon
the change in the Ministry, Mensdorf despatched several aggressive notes to
Berlin in which he again represented the investiture of Augustenburg as the
best solution of the difficulty. As may be imagined, they failed of the desired
effect. Since, as we know, Bismarck was not concerned to hurry on a crisis, he
allowed nearly three months
to elapse
before making any answer, and then replied that Prussia could allow
Augustenburg to become Duke only under certain conditions. Prussia would always
be obliged to protect the Duke against Denmark, and must therefore claim in
return the control of his army and finances (beginning of February, 1865). As
Bismarck had expected, the Court at Vienna refused these terms unconditionally,
as inconsistent with the principles of the German Confederation of which only
sovereign Princes formed part. The new leaders in Austria replied by
encouraging the Augustenburg agitation in the duchies and appealed to the
secondary States, which were all in its favour, to help in inducing the German
Confederation to bring about a decision in the same sense. But this appeal to
the Confederation was contrary to the agreement of January 16, 1864, and
Prussia retaliated at once. The Augustenburg agitation was suppressed in her dominions
by special police regulations, and her chief naval station was transferred from
Danzig to Kiel, in order to show her intention of settling down in the duchies.
To Austria’s protest against this strengthening of Prussia’s position Bismarck
replied by referring to their agreement, which he was interpreting quite
correctly when he pointed out that there was nothing to prevent Austria from
acting in the same way and from transferring her fleet from Pola to Kiel!
Prussia could adopt this tone, for Austria had put herself in the wrong; and
Napoleon’s anti-Austrian attitude made the position of foreign affairs more
favourable to the Prussians than to their rivals. Negotiations were continued
in the same spirit until the advisability of going, to war on the question of
the duchies was debated at Berlin in a Crown Council (May 29). The King was now
in favour of annexing Schleswig-Holstein, since the Crown lawyers had
pronounced Augustenburg’s right of succession to be unfounded; and, now that
his conscientious scruples were removed, he could adopt the course most
consonant with Prussia’s interests. Nevertheless the decision to provoke war
was not taken as yet. The King commanded that another attempt to arrive at a
mutual understanding should be made; and, as Austria was by no means in a state
of readiness for war, after months spent in discussions, both Governments
agreed upon a compromise, embodied in the Convention of Gastein (August 14,
1865).
By this
Convention both Powers were to share the administration of the territory under
dispute; Austria undertaking to administer Holstein, Prussia to administer
Schleswig. Lauenburg, the third territory taken from the Danes, fell to Prussia
in return for the payment of a sum of money to Austria. In its case there was no
rival claimant; Austria could, therefore, resign her share to Prussia without
infringing on the rights of anyone else; moreover, the increase to Prussia’s
power represented by this small domain was inconsiderable. In this purely
provisional solution, the real point at issue, Augustenburg’s right of
succession, had been left untouched. Bibmarck was quite sure that the dispute
would
soon break
out again, but he accepted the compromise because he was aware of the King’s
desire for peace, and because the European situation did not seem to him
favourable for war. The attitude of France was still undeclared; moreover, at
this point Prussia would have had to face Austria and the secondary States
alone. Hence his plan was to make use of the lull afforded by the Convention of
Gastein to secure the friendship of Italy and the neutrality of France.
Prussia was thus able to profit from the new situation without losing anything;
while for Austria the agreement meant the continuation of the troublesome tie
in the north; taken altogether, the agreement was generally regarded as marking
a further success in Bismarck’s policy and as a step on the part of Prussia
towards annexing the duchies or establishing a protectorate over them.
Consequently Bismarck’s foreign policy received increasing support from the
several parties in Prussia; and among the Kleindeutsche outside Prussia there
were some who, like Mathy in Baden, felt that Bismarck was the man to place
Prussia in the van of the German States; for the same reason Prussia’s enemies,
Grossdeutsche, Ultramontanes, Democrats and Particularists exhausted themselves
in attacks upon the Convention and upon Bismarck’s dupes at Vienna. They even
tried by means of a popular demonstration to compel the Great Powers to
abrogate the Convention. The south German Democrats convened a great meeting at
Frankfort (October), to demand in the name of the German people the speedy
investiture of Augustenburg; but the attempt was a lamentable failure. For
hardly any Prussians attended the assembly, and the few who did expressed their
disapproval of a demonstration directed against their own country. As to the
present issue Bismarck clearly had the whole of the Prussian people at his
back.
In foreign
countries the same view was taken of the Convention as in non-Prussian Germany.
Under the pretext of safeguarding the rights of the population of
Schleswig-Holstein, the two Powers were declared to have forcibly wrested the
duchies from Denmark and to be now themselves rudely violating the ancient right
of the duchies to permanent union. English and French official despatches
pointed out that the love of justice and the conscience of the nations could
not fail to be outraged by so high-handed a policy. In spite of these outbursts
of feeling, there was no need to apprehend warlike measures against the
signatories of the Gastein Convention, since the two Powers which had protested
had not been parties to the agreement; but Bismarck used his utmost endeavours
to overcome this feeling as soon as possible on the part of France at all
events. Napoleon’s friendship was essential to him for two reasons : first, to
secure the neutrality of France during the war with Austria, and, secondly, as
a preparation for the alliance between Italy and Prussia, to which Bismarck
knew that Victor Emmanuel would not consent without consulting Napoleon. In
order to conciliate Napoleon, the Minister sought a personal interview with the
Emperor, who received him kindly.
In
consequence of his unfortunate venture in Mexico, Napoleon was feeling even
more strongly than before the necessity of some definite success in foreign
policy, and German affairs seemed to offer the best opportunity for achieving
this end. The antagonism between Austria and Prussia seemed to him to make a
war between them probable, and in this he hoped to play the part of umpire;
settling the German question according to his pleasure, and securing in return
for his services a slice of Germany or some other acquisition. The plans
evolved by his fertile brain changed frequently, but his general intention
seems to have been to strengthen Prussia in northern Germany, so that she might
be a match for Austria, which he considered the stronger of the two. With
Prussia supreme in the north, and Austria in the south, the forces of the two
Great Powers might hold each other in check yet more effectually than before,
for the benefit of France. Besides solving the German question, Napoleon wished
at the same time to settle the Italian difficulty, by compelling Austria to
surrender Venice. We have little information about the conversations held in
Biarritz in October, 1865; but it seems certain that Napoleon encouraged
Bismarck to proceed against Austria, holding out a prospect of France remaining
neutral and signifying a wish for compensation should Prussia gain fresh
acquisitions by the war. Bismarck, in return, appears to have made no definite
promises, but to have implied that if Prussia improved her position in Germany,
there would be no objection to the acquisition of new territory by France: both
parties must have referred to the annexation of Belgium or of part of the Rhine
province. The Emperor was strongly in favour of the alliance with Italy and
promised to recommend it in Florence: for Prussia would, he thought, instead of
attacking Austria, eventually succumb to her unless supported by Italy. Both
statesmen parted outwardly on the best of terms: Napoleon counted on war in
Germany, with France as arbiter claiming a share of the spoils, while Bismarck
was confident of overcoming Austria with Italy’s cooperation, and of then
tricking France out of her expected booty. For, of course, he never
contemplated any cession of German territory : in no circumstances would King
William have given his consent, nor, after such a concession to her natural
enemy, could Prussia have looked for sympathy and respect in Germany or have
become a dominant Power. Henceforward Bismarck and Napoleon are the two chief
actors who confront each other in all important European transactions; and a struggle,
at first secret, then open, begins between them which ends at last on the high
road to Donchery.
With all
possible speed Bismarck set about gathering in the fruit of the Biarritz
interview: a commercial treaty between the Zollverein and Italy was to pave the
way for the political alliance (November). Naturally the rapprochement between
Prussia and Italy and the consequent danger to Austria did not remain a secret.
The only possible alliance against the threatened danger was that of the German
secondary States.
In order to
induce them to join, Mensdorf had to meet them on the Augustenburg question :
accordingly, he again began to encourage the agitation in favour of the Duke;
which was precisely what Bismarck wanted. He could now denounce Austria to the
King and to the world at large as a faithless ally and a breaker of the peace
of Gastein. King William, as a matter of fact, allowed himself to be convinced
that the Convention would not last long and that, as Prussia must not loose her
hold on Schleswig-Holstein, the prospect of war would have to be faced. It was
therefore resolved (February 28, 1866) to send General von Moltke, Chief of the
Staff, to Florence. The negotiations for an alliance with Italy began in
February; but some time passed before either of the two Powers, mutually
suspicious, was convinced of the serious intention of the other to go to war;
at last, after renewed stormy representations from Napoleon, the alliance was
concluded. If within three months war broke out between Prussia and Austria,
Italy was also to declare war, while neither Power was to conclude peace
without the consent of the other (April 8, 1866).
Thus the task
of provoking war within three months was laid upon the Prussian M’luster. The
German question was to furnish the means: but still more important than the
discovery of a pretext were the military preparations. The King was, however,
anxious not to be thought the originator of the war, as having forced Austria
to an outbreak by his premature armaments. William’s cautious attitude was
everywhere approved by puhlic opinion; even the Klevndeutsche, such as
Treitschke, who could not sufficiently condemn Austria’s policy., were still
anxious for a peaceful solution of the German quest ion, and there was always
in the background the fear of French interference. Once again, Bismarck stood
alone; while his sovereign’s opposition to warlike preparations increased
Italy’s suspicions as to Prussia’s good faith. Luckily for him Austria, afraid
of being surprised by Prussia and Italy, began to collect troops in , Moravia
and in Venetia. In view of this threat the King gave his consent to certain
military preparations, but not to a mobilisation of the whole army (end of
March). Then, when the Italian alliance had been successfully concluded,
another serious difficulty occurred. The Viennese Government suddenly made a
proposal in Berlin for simultaneous disarmament, and the King, with the
approval of his people, was prepared to assent. Thus the whole Bismarckian
policy was called in question; even a merely temporaiy agreement would end the
alliance with Italy, and so favourable a European conjunction was not likely
soon to occur again. However, the danger passed away, since Austria was willing
to disarm only in the north and not in the south; whence the King concluded
that Austria, in a state of partial preparation, would very soon come to terms
with Italy and then fall upon Prussia while she was wholly unprepared. From
this time forth (end of April) William was in favour of rapid mobilisation.
During those days of suspense Bismarck’s agitation threw him on a sick
bed; now,
after the decision to mobilise had been taken, his joy, as Roon wrote, restored
him to health;
On April 9
Bismarck had brought forward a motion for Federal reform in Frankfort,
amounting to a further development of Prussia’s former proposals and advocating
a strong central authority and representation of the people by universal
suffrage. This motion was intended to arouse Austrian opposition and to win
popular approval; But Bismarck found that the Prussian nation refused to
support him, for it considered him a violator of popular rights in consequence
of his having governed without a budget; and that in various quarters, his
proposal was declared to be pure hypocrisy. His purpose of rousing Aust' 'a
succeeded better, for she began to prepare systematically for war. But Austria
differed from Prussia in having no one man at the head of affairs; hence the
object aimed at and the method of attaining it changed again and again.
Hitherto the idea had sometimes been to make war on Prussia and Italy
simultaneously, at other times to make peace with Prussia in order to settle
accounts with Italy; now, a sudden resolve was taken to sacrifice Venice and
let Prussia make good the loss. The French Emperor was therefore asked by
Francis Joseph to obtain from Italy a promise of neutrality during the
Austro-Prussian war. Napoleon consented, but the scheme was foiled by Italy’s
refusal to break the alliance with Prussia (middle of May). Napoleon made a
second attempt to settle the difficulty peaceably, and he proposed his
favourite expedient of a European congress under his presidency—but to no
purpose. Bismarck, it is true, though with a heavy heart, consented to the
congress, in fear of appearing implacable in the eyes of the world; but Austria
rejected the proposal. Although Francis Joseph was prepared to sacrifice
Venice, he did not relish the idea of giving it up at the dictates of a
congress. He thus gave Bismarck new cause to represent Austria as eager for the
attack, and enabled him to overcome the last vestige of opposition to the war
in the King’s mind.
By about the
beginning of June a speedy explosion had become inevitable; and in fact it was
Austria that directly brought about the rupture. The feeble state of her
finances would not allow her to maintain the atmy on a war footing for any
length of time; to avoid bankruptcy she had to strike at once. A sudden move in
favour of Augustenburg was to provide the occasion. Directly after the
rejection of the proposed congress the Austrian ambassador in Frankfort
proposed that, seeing that Prussia had refused to come to any agreement on the
subject, the Confederation should decide what was to be done with the duchies.
At the same time the Austrian Governor of Holstein convened a meeting of
Holstein representatives to find out the wishes of the Holsteiners as to their
future. Austria hoped by this means to force Prussia into open rupture and at
the same time to find a satisfactory pretext for war. She counted upon all the
secondary States to take her side. Bismarck
immediately
responded with a vigorous counter-thrust: he declared in an official despatch
that the Convention of Gastein had been violated by the appeal to the
Confederation, and accused Austria of trying to provoke a war. He proclaimed
the joint administration, as established before the Convention, again in force,
and forthwith marched Prussian troops into Holstein. It was mere sarcasm when
he declared that this was not meant as an act of hostility, and urged the
Austrians on their side to send troops into, Schleswig. Instead of complying,
the Austrian Governor retired to Hanover, protesting against the entry of the
Prussian troops (June 7). The aim of all Prussia’s measures was to deprive
Austria of every possibility • of return along the path she had chosen On June
10< Bismarck published the substance of his scheme for Federal reform, which
aimed at a closer union and the exclusion of Austria. But the action taken in
the duchies had already determined the desired rupture. The Austrian Government
declared the entry of the troops into Holstein an act of hostility and proposed
that the Confederation should mobilise the Federal army in order to resist
Prussia’s breach of the peace (June 11). At the same time the Austrian ambassador
was recalled from Berlin, and the Prussian at Vienna received his papers. Thus
war was decl'ared. There is no question that Austria by this course had put
herself in the wrong, for the Confederation’s right of jurisdiction over
Schleswig-Holstein was doubtful in the extreme, and the proposal that the
Confederation should instantly proceed to Federal execution was out of order.
Bismarck, of course, did not overlook these weak spots in his adversary’s attack;
he announced at Frankfort that the discussion of this unconstitutional proposal
was a violation of the terms of the Confederation, and Prussia would regard
every member who voted for the motion as her enemy. These threats impressed the
secondary States so far that a Bavarian modification of the Austrian proposal
was passed (June 14). The adherents of Austria were Prussia’s old enemies, the
lesser kingdoms, both the Hesses, Nassau and several smaller States. Thereupon
Prussia formally withdrew from the Confederation and immediately began military
operations.
Having now
assumed the offensive, Austria took steps to improve her international
position. With this end in view the Hofburg, after bringing the Augustenburg
question before the Confederation, at once proceeded to negotiate once more
with Napoleon, in order to obtain from him a guarantee of neutrality. He was
willing to grant it, in return for the promise that the Emperor Francis Joseph
after conquering Silesia would hand Venice over to him, and not enter upon the
redistribution of German territory without consulting France (June 12). In
spite of this agreement, the Vienna Government continued the defence of Venice,
thus dissipating its forces. Although willing to give up Venice, the Austrians
did not consider it compatible with the dignity of the Empireto evacuate the
countfy without striking a blow, while the
Italians,
whom they had so often defeated, looked on. Both Emperors believed that they
would not be the losers by this agreement. Francis Joseph looked forward to
overmastering Prussia and conquering Silesia; Napoleon hoped to play a
remunerative part as umpire on the further side of the Rhine, Germany paying
the cost. For his part, Bismarck also believed he had hit on a favourable
moment for the conflict: he was sure of the neutrality of Russia and France,
and Italy was his ally.. The decision must depend upon success in the
battlefield. What strikes us most in Bismarck’s character at this time was his
unalterable faith in the superiority of the Prussian over the Austrian army—a
faith on the strength of which he embarked on a war with a kindred race and
therefore abhorrent to the majority of his contemporaries. At last his courage
enabled him to carry out his policy, which was successful because of its
boldness. Had the war ended badly or even long remained doubtful, and Napoleon
came forward to claim the compensation which Bismarck had not, indeed, formally
promised but had led him to expect, Prussia would have had either to grant the
compensation or with weakened forces carry on an arduous war with France, and
Bismarck would have been condemned as the betrayer of his country, who behind
the back of his King had conspired with the national foe.
In the
meantime he was at odds with public opinion. The Prussian people were not
anxious for war; on the contrary, during May and June the King was deluged with
petitions entreating him to preserve peace and dismiss his terrible Minister.
Only a few voices protested against a weak compliance and expressed confidence
in the patriotism of the Prussian people. Among those who upheld this view were
an assembly of Old Liberals in Halle, the municipal council of Breslau, and in
the Press the Preussische Jahrbiicher. On the other hand the Germans in Austria
were burning with military ardour, for they were anxious to assert their
connexion with Germany and the preeminence of the Empire over Prussia; their
Press threatened Prussia with a second Olnmtz or Jena. Thus in 1866 political
insight and energy prevailed over popular aims and desires.
Bismarck’s
efforts to make Austria appear as the aggressor must be regarded, as a mere
diplomatic manoeuvre. On the, other hand, his opponent was as a matter of fact,
in a sense, aggressive; for Austria was constantly endeavouring to effect some
change in the German Confederation, which should be to her own advantage and
to the detriment of Prussia. This covert struggle had been going on for a long
time, and only awaited the right moment to be decided openly. Then it became
patent that the Prussian leadership was more resolute than the Austrian. The
minor States were by no means desirous of war; they feared that a victory,
whether Austrian or Prussian, would impair their position in the Confederation,
where they had hitherto decided, the balance. They therefore plied Vienna and
Berlin simultaneously with
452 Langensalza.—Movements of Benedek. [1866
admonitions
of peace. In the final voting, indeed, they had to take the part of Austria,
for she accepted their standpoint in the Augustenburg question, while, for the
time being, Prussia was more active than her rival in prosecuting the reform of
the Confederation, which they had hopes of frustrating with the aid of Austria.
Thus the minor States were by no means entirely at one with Austria: they
wished to retain the constitution of the Confederation, Austria to see it
altered.' The consequence of this political discord was that even in the war
the minor States did not range themselves unconditionally beneath the Austrian
flag. Instead of advancing their troops on Bohemia, so as to concentrate there
in overwhelming numbers against Prussia, they kept their armies separate. They
were quite willing that the two Powers, unassisted* should wear themselves out
by fighting without coming to any definite issue, so that everything might
remain virtually m statu quo. But Saxony sent her army into Bohemia, and thus
there came to be two theatres of war, the Bohemian and the German. This
division allowed the Prussians to mass their main body (263,000 men) against
the Austrians and Saxons (261,000 in all) ; while, to meet the Confederate
troops, Prussia sent only 48,000 men under General Vogel von Falkenstein.
Moltke well understood the doctrine of Clausewitz, that victory at the chief
seat of war brought victory all along the line. This distribution over two
seats of war also meant that Austria’s German allies were acting slowly, so
that they could be defeated in detail. The first blow struck the Hanoverians:
at Langensalza their way southwards was blocked by a smaller force of
Prussians; and, although they repulsed the first attack (June 27), within the
next two days they were surrounded by other Prussian columns and forced to
capitulate (June 29). Hereupon, Falkenstein turned to the south Germans; but, before
he could fall in with them, the die had already been cast in Bohemia.
During April
and May the Austrian army had been mustering in Moravia; and, after war had
been declared, it advanced into Bohemia in order to get between the Prussian
forces. These were collecting in two great masses, in the kingdom of Saxony
under Prince Frederick Charles arid General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, and in
Silesia under the Crown Prince of Prussia. Moltke’s plan was that the two
columns should advance separately with the view Of concentrating towards the
same point, Gitschin (Jicin) in northern Bohemia, for decisive action. The
Austrian Commander-in-chief, Field-Marshal Benedek, was trying with a few
divisions to block the passage of the Prussian army in Silesia across the mountains
into Bohemia. While the Crown Prince was to be held in check in the passes in
the neighbourhood of Nachod, Benedek was to march against Prince Frederick
Charles with his main body, and annihilate him somewhere on the Isar. After
that he could make short work of the Crown Prince. This plan broke down,
inasmuch as the Crown Prince’s army won its way thrdugh the defiles on the
frontier in several engage-
ments (at
Nachod on. June 27, at Skalitz and at Burkersdorf on the 28th), and was able to
collect in the plain to the south. On the same days Prince Frederick Charles’
army had repulsed Benedek’s vanguard repeatedly (at Hiihnerwasser on June 26,
at Miinchengratz on the 27th, and at Prodol on the 28th), and occupied Gitschin
on the 30th after an encounter on that day. After that, if his original plan
were to be retained, Benedek must have simply waited to be caught between two
fires. His troops were demoralised by their defeat and his retreat would be cut
off in case of defeat. Consequently, at Josephstadt (Jaromer) on June 30 he
decided to abandon the offensive against Prince Frederick Charles, and to lead
his army back into a safe position on the Elbe between Josephstadt and
Koniggratz. If he there succeeded in repelling the Prussian attack by a victorious
counter-stroke, the campaign might perhaps yet be won. But luck had deserted
the Austrians. Prince Frederick Charles, who was marching up from the west and
was therefore nearer to the Austrian position, attacked it from the front early
on July 3. Two Austrian corps on the right wing, which were to have carried out
the defence against the Crown Prince, quitted their position to attempt an
effective counter-stroke. When the Crown Prince advanced from the north, he
found Benedek’s right flank almost unprotected, and the victory was in fact
decided. The Austrian army could be crushed into helplessness, from north to
south. With this battle the campaign was won; after such a blow it was
impossible for the Austrians to redress the balance.
The
unparalleled successes of the Prussians were mainly brought about by two
causes, the superior strategy of their chief command, and their better infantry
tactics. The Austrian mode of attack was to advance in close order for bayonet
charges, after firing for a short time by way of preparation. The Prussian
infantry had laid greater stress on fighting in loose order, and thus managed
to keep up a steady and powerful fire against the massive attacking columns of
the Austrians. This advantage, due in the first place to the tactics of the
Prussians, was enhanced by the fact that in the needle-gun they possessed a
quicker firing weapon than the Austrian percussion-gun.
The Austrian
empire was not, however, annihilated by the defeat at Koniggratz. The splendid
behaviour of the imperial cavalry and artillery induced Moltke to underestimate
the extent of the victory; the pursuit was therefore conducted with caution,
and the defeated side was able to save a large proportion of its trpops. But,
as a change in the fortunes of the war was no longer to be anticipated, the
Emperor Francis Joseph decided to appeal to diplomacy. On the day after
Koniggratz he telegraphed to Napoleon asking his intervention and, in order to
win his good-will, carried out the cession of Venice previously promised by
him. Napoleon was on the horns of a dilemma. The rapid victory of the Prussians
was entirely contrary to hia expectations. Austria had no
464 The political situation after Koniggratz.
[1866
German
territory to give away, as had been assumed on June 12; artd, if he now meant
to step in and dictate peace, or even demand compensation, he must be prepared
for an encounter with the Prussian army in the flush of victory. His own army
was far from being ready for war. He could not, however, remain passive, for
throughout the length and breadth of France the Prussian victory was regarded
as a direct blow to French interests, a/nd the Emperor was already being
censured on all sides for having allowed Austria to be abased, and the
unification of Germany effected by the hand of Prussia. In this exigency, he
determined on intervention; called upon both Prussia and Italy to cease
hostilities, and to set about negotiations for peace; and even tried, by means
of threats, to deter the Italians from entering Venice (July 5).
Meanwhile,
the military position of Prussia was still thoroughly insecure. The extent of
the victory had not yet been ascertained; the powers of resistance of the
Austrian army were still overestimated, and the south German troops had
remained in the field; lastly, it was uncertain whether Italy would keep
faith, and whether Austria could move her Italian army into Bohemia. The
situation would be one of extreme danger if Prussia, while still occupied in
the east, should be attacked by France in the west. Bismarck’s mind was soon
made up; he urged that energetic hostilities should be resumed against the
Austrians, but without running the risk of a reverse. The south Germans were to
be overthrown with all speed, so that French troops might not join with them.
However much Bismarck might resent the intervention of Napoleon, he was
perfectly ready to treat with him amicably, and to act in conjunction with him
in settling the terms of peace. First and foremost, he desired to learn whether
Napoleon fell in with his views for the aggrandisement of Prussia, and the
reorganisation of Germany, and whether he would demand compensation for France.
The Prussian
statesman’s plan for the treaty was, first, that Prussia was to be consolidated
in such a way that her territory should be no longer separated into two large
almost detached pieces; secondly, that she should secure the lead in Germany
north of the Main. Austria was to withdraw from Germany, and have no connexion
either with north or south, so that the States south of the Main might remain
independent. In deference to France, Bismarck confined himself to the
leadership of northern Germany. He knew from his discussions with Benedetti and
Napoleon that the Emperor, while he would never allow the union of the whole of
Germany, had already conceded the aggrandisement of Prussia in the north. If he
now adhered to his word, Austria would have to accept the conditions proposed.
Bismarck had not as yet determined what districts were to serve for the
consolidation of Prussia; the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein alone was
resolved upon, and, for the rest, Hanover, Hesse, Saxony, and Nassau were under
consideration. The details depended upon the agreement with Napoleon; the great
thing was to
obtain his complete compliance with an extension of the Prussian frontiers
amounting to some four million fresh inhabitants. The King, in his turn,
cherished other schemes—a vague plan for restoring German unity, a more
definite one for extending the power of Prussia, by reducing the size, rather
than by annihilating the existence, of the smaller north German States. It was
contrary to his legitimist principles to dethrone ancient and honourable
dynasties. Last, he required that Austria should cede territory, say on the
Glatz frontier, in order that the chief offender, as he said, might not escape
unpunished. Bismarck would not hear of all this. He opposed the cession of
territory by Austria on the ground that it would be a grave insult to the
empire, and would occasion a lasting estrangement between Austria and Prussia.
If Austria withdrew from Germany and no longer disputed the leadership with
Prussia, the two Powers would have no further conflicting interests. They had
much better be faithful allies against France and Russia. The preservation of
the small dynasties seemed to him sentimental and unpractical; kings whose
dominions had been curtailed would always be stirring up their former subjects
against the new regime.
Even in the
face of these difficulties from within and without, Bismarck succeeded in
carrying out his own views. To begin with, the Italians adhered to the
alliance; Falkenstein gained several successes and occupied the whole territory
as far as the Main (July 16); most important of all, an agreement was reached
with Napoleon, who at length consented to Prussian annexations to the extent of
four million inhabitants, to the reestablishment of a North German
Confederation, and to the expulsion of Austria from Germany (July 22). He did
not demand any concession for himself, but only stipulated that Austria should
remain intact: he felt himself bound to protect the Emperor Francis Joseph, on
whom he bad strongly urged this war, at any rate from loss of German territory.
Next, Bismarck had little by little to win his master over to his own view;
first of all, William agreed to the deposition of the dynasties, and decided
that Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, Nassau, together with the Free City of
Frankfort, should be annexed; then, he consented to let Saxony remain intact—a point
on which Austria insisted, King John having been her best ally. Last, King
William relinquished his plan of acquiring a district on the Bohemian frontier,
and of making a public entry into Vienna.
In these
encounters with the King, Bismarck’s best helper had been the Crown Prince, his
keen opponent before the War. But, so soon as war was imminent, he began to
support him, recogn: ing that the man who had brought on the war must also cany
it through. He had therefore joined Bismarck in impressing upon his father at
an early date the necessity for armaments, and in the negotiations at
Nikolsburg also steadfastly upheld the Minister. The Crown Prince had a more
versatile mind than his father and could therefore grasp Bismarck’s ideas more
quickly,
although, to him too, some of them were in the first instance absolutely
strange—as, for example, the deposition of the princely families. At Nikolsburg
the old King was left almost alone in his opinions. In his Thoughts and
Recollections Bismarck, indeed, states that he had to face single-handed a
close military ring, who had prejudiced the King against him, and who urged
more severe conditions, protraction of the war, and an entry into Vienna. We
find, however, that all the military leaders like Moltke, Roon, Blumenthal, and
others of independent judgment like Stosch and Boyen, were of opinion that the
Austrians must be dealt with gently, and that peace should be made with all
speed.
The
negotiations with Austria passed off rapidly. So soon as a favourable reply from
Napoleon reached headquarters, an armistice was concluded (July 22), and in
four days’ time (July 26) the preliminaries of peace were signed at Nikolsburg.
Austria had to submit, as help from France was not forthcoming. But, though
their terms had been accepted, the Prussians were not yet out of the wood, for,
now that the French intervention had been settled, Russia threatened to
interfere. Friendly as Tsar Alexander was to Prussia, he was unpleasantly
affected by the enormous increase of her power, because she thus became more
independent as towards Russia—a point of view very specially present to the
mind of the Chancellor, Prince Gorchakoff. The Russian Government, therefore,
proposed an international congress to settle the terms of peace, as the Confederation
had been founded in 1815 by the whole of Europe in concert, and could,
therefore, not be set aside by Prussia alone. Bismarck was obliged to fear that
Napoleon would come forward once more and claim compensation, now that Russia
had stepped in. It might be, too, that the Russo-French understanding in all
its terms would be restored at the congress. Once more Bismarck’s courage and
dexterity enabled him to avoid the pitfall before him. He at once refused the
proposed congress, since Prussia had no intention of allowing the Powers to
settle the reward of her victory for her; and he hinted that she would leave no
stone unturned in resisting any foreign interference. The whole force of the
German nation would be called into action, with that of the border countries,
which meant that insurrections would be organised in Poland and Hungary. These
threats took effect both in Paris and in St Petersburg, and the proposed
congress fell through. Bismarck was not, however, content with this. With a
view to dispelling the Tsar’s continued vexation at the independent attitude of
Prussia, he sent to Russia General Manteuffel, who was popular at the Court of
St Petersburg, to explain more fully the reasons for the changes in Germany,
and to offer the help of Prussia in the event of Eastern complications. Thus
the Tsar became really reconciled to the new state of affairs, while Prussia
retained his invaluable friendship.
After
Nikolsburg and the withdrawal of Russian intervention, the
1866] The south German States-French demands
waived. 457
conclusion of
peace with the allies of Austria was only a question of time. They had met with
a series of misfortunes in the field; by August 2 the Badeners, Wiirtembergers,
and Bavarians had been successively defeated; then an armistice was concluded
and the negotiations for peace began. The terms were not for the most part
oppressive. Hesse-Darmstadt and Bavaria were obliged to surrender certain
districts in order to rectify the Prussian frontier, and the northern half of
Hesse- Darmstadt had to enter the North German Confederation, while the
southern had simply to pay an indemnity. Wiirtemberg and Baden were the first
to accept the terms, the others, Hesse in particular, resisted, but by October
peace was signed with them all. The final treaty with Austria had been already
concluded at Prague, on August 24. Some difficulty had been occasioned here,
for a short time, by the desire of the Italians to secure a part of southern
Tyrol as well as Venice. However, as Prussia had only promised them Venice,
they had to withdraw this further demand and to make their peace with Austria.
Bismarck immediately put the finishing touch to his work of pacification by
entering, into a secret defensive and offensive alliance with the south German
States. They were eager and willing to take this step . because, in their
isolated position, it was now their only chance of protection against
annexation by France. So soon as the proposed North German Confederation had
been established, the whole of non-Austrian Germany would for the first time be
united, at all events in case of war. As a matter of fact, there was every need
of defence against the greed of France. For, just at the time of the
negotiations with the south Germans, Napoleon suddenly came forward with his
demand for compensation, which he had refrained from pressing in the critical
days between Koniggratz and Nikolsburg. Benedetti, the French ambassador, now
received orders to demand the left bank of the Rhine and Mainz; but the reply
was even blunter than he had anticipated: the demand of France, Bismarck
pointed out, meant war, and in this war against her hereditary enemy the whole
of Germany would be at one. For such a war the prospects of France were by no
means favourable, as she was unprepared for it and would have to face Prussia,
whose army was still mobilised. Napoleon accordingly waived his demand, which
now afforded Bismarck fresh means of inspiring the southern Germans with a
terror of France, and of thus attaching them the more closely to Prussia.
The battle of
Koniggratz had a twofold significance: for non-Austrian Germany it smoothed the
path to unity, and for the vanquished foe it marked an immense step forward. By
the separation from Germany and Italy, the Habsburg State was rid of the burden
of maintaining its sway in those countries, and its energies were set free for
a vigorous Eastern policy. This beneficial effect on its external policy only
became manifest, it is true, some ten years later, but these events likewise
had
an important
bearing on the home policy, which will be discussed in a later volume.
The treatment
of Austria’s former German allies furnishes a brighter page of history. The
first task before the victorious Prussian Government was to make its peace with
the Diet. The struggle had proceeded with unabated vigour since 1862; the
approval evoked by Bismarck in the Schleswig-Holstein question had not secured
a majority for him in the Diet; and his policy of war against Austria was
condemned by almost the whole nation. But Bismarck was not mistaken in his
conviction that victory abroad would imply victory at home. When the Diet met
on August 5,1866, after the preliTrna js
of peace had been concluded, the numbers of the adherents of the Government had
been increased not only by the general election in the middle of the war, but
by secessions from the ranks of the Opposition. The victorious Minister, who
was now acclaimed by the nation, had it in his power peremptorily to close the
budget controversy; but he preferred to follow constitutional methods, and sued
for an indemnity for having carried on the government without a budget for the
last four years. This the Representative Chamber could not do otherwise than
accord (September 8) by a large majority. A portion of the Left veered towards
the Old Liberal party, and by degrees combined with it to form the “ National
Liberal ” party, which was practically Ministerial in the years that followed,
though it had by no means renounced its traditional adherence to parliamentary government.
Together with the Conservative party, it henceforth formed a safe majority in
questions concerned with foreign policy and army.
The next
important point was to confirm the North German Confederation, the formation
of which was the chief result of the war. When Prussia had declared the German
Confederation dissolved, Bismarck had at once (June 16) invited the supporters
of Prussia among the north German States to form a fresh Confederation. After
the preliminary peace, he had repeated this invitation to all the Governments
north of the Main, and had proposed his scheme of reform of June 10 as the
basis of the alliance. All the States assented within a few weeks, and in
December delegates from all the north German Governments assembled in Berlin for
discussion. The principle of Bismarck’s scheme was that the Confederation
should ensure the integrity and independence of the individual States and the
integrity of •their territories as towards foreign Powers, while they continued
to manage their own home affairs so far as was possible. Hence, of course, it
lay with the Confederation to regulate the fighting strength and foreign policy
of its members. To cement the union between them, a common right of settlement
was established, and legal jurisdiction in economic and judicial matters was
for the future vested in the Confederation. Within its limits legislation was
to be carried on by means, first, of the Reichstag, elected by universal,
equal, secret, and direct suffrage, and, secondly, of the Bundesratti
(federal
council), an assembly of deputies from all the several States, closely modelled
on that of the old Confedei ation. The King of Prussia was of course President
of the new Confederation, and the Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) presided in his
name over the debates of the Bundesrath. What the old Confederation had chiefly
lacked was a definite military system and a united foreign policy, such as were
now secured by the obligation laid upon the Confederate States to bring their
armies up to the Prussian standard of efficiency, and to place them under
Prussian chief command both in peace and war, the King of Prussia thus securing
as a matter of course the direction of foreign policy. The federal officials
were also appointed by the President, in whom alone the executive power was
thus vested. For the rest, considerable scope was allowed to the Confederate
States. The Bundesrath consisted of forty-three members, seventeen of whom were
appointed by Prussia, which could therefore be outvoted by the smaller States.
There was no federal Ministry—only the Chancellor with Secretaries of State for
the various departments under him, so as not to restrict the independence of
the several States too greatly. Bismarck was convinced that the stability of
the new Confederation depended on the good-will of its members, rather than on
its legal provisions.
Objections
were of course not wanting from many Prussians. Bismarck, in reply, pointed to
the potent prerogative of the President and the enormous ascendancy of Prussia,
which made it plainly impossible that she should be overborne in matters of
real importance. For the same reason, it had been possible to forgo the
presidential veto in legislative affairs. His argument was irrefutable, that
the sense of being able to outvote Prussia would relieve the lesser States of
the bitter feeling of subjection to her, and enable them to become willing
members of the Confederation. In this, as in everything else, Bismarck managed
to temper extreme energy with caution. Many Conservative and Liberal
politicians disapproved of the universal franchise, fearing revolutionary
disturbances or the return of a despotic Government on Napoleonic lines.
Bismarck’s reply to them was that the masses had, at one time, bid fair to be
more conservative than the middle class, and to prove better supporters of the
Government. From other quarters came complaints about the prerogatives of the
presidency, and the infringement of the legislative powers of the separate
States. As the whole nation was looking for a speedy settlement of the question
of Federal reform, the Governments had perforce to adopt Bismarck’s scheme
(February 2, 1867).
Then came the
election of a constituent Reichstag (February 12), for the discussion of the
scheme. The elections turned out well: a large majority of the deputies were
seriously resolved to come to an agreement with the Governments. The objections
were of course revived; the restriction of th% Confederation to northern
Germany was made a further
ground of
complaint; the Left, in particular, were dissatisfied that in the Constitution
the supreme power should lie, not with the Reichstag, as in the Constitution of
1849, but with the Bvmdesrath and its President, that the Constitution embodied
no schedule of liberties, and so on. In answer to all these attacks, the framer
of the Constitution maintained the necessity of devising not what was
absolutely best, but what was feasible and adequate ; and thus gained a
majority. After several weeks of deliberation, the Reichstag, on April 16,
1867, passed the Constitution by 230 votes to 53. The minority consisted of
Ultramontanes and Radicals. The struggle had been keenest over the army
estimates, the Left attempting to carry a demand already preferred in Prussia
for a yearly vote of supply.- In the end, a compromise was reached, to the
effect that the existing arrangement should hold good till 1871, and should
then be further determined by legislation. The army could, therefore, not be
reduced, as the Left wished, by the independent action of the Reichstag, since
every law had to receive the sanction of the Bundesrath. During the-following
months the Constitution was adopted by the separate Diets of the States
affectedand on July 1 it came into force.
Within a few
years the regulations in respect to army, navy, right of settlement, and
finance were adopted so far as the Constitution required; then, the postal
■ arrangements for the Confederation territory were centralised by the
purchase of the old hereditary postal administration of Prince Thum and Taxis.
The reduction in postage, with which the new Administration began its
operations, contributed materially to the promotion of internal communication
and to the consolidation of the Confederation. On these measures followed the
drafting of a uniform penal code (completed in 1870), and several minor bills
dealing with economic and financial matters. The Confederation was constantly
extending the range of its legislative power to branches of home affairs, and
the socio-political legislation of the Germany of to-day shows how far-reaching
and salutary have been the effects of the process. Bismarck purposely* and, as
it has proved, most judiciously, left the powers of the Confederation undefined
in regard to internal affairs.
The principle
of the North German Confederation having once been established, all parties
desirous of German unity assumed that sooner or later southern Jermany would
also join it. Here, however there was keen opposition to this idea. The
Governments of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg were disinclined to limit their
sovereignty by entering the Confederation, and among the populations too
various currents set strongly against a union. The Pangermans, notably the
Ultramontanes, deplored the exclusion of Austria; the Democrats continued to
mistrust Bismarck, as one who despised parliamentary rights, and they detested
the military regime in Prussia; the thorough-going Par- ticularists desired to
be protected from France by Prussia, with as little inconvenience as possible
to themselves. But in Baden both Government
and people
wished to join the Confederation, and repeated endeavours to gain admission
into it were here made from 1867 onwards. Bismarck abstained from promoting
such efforts, having regard both to the state of feeling in the south and to
the jealousy of foreign Powers. The Peace of Prague, which formed the basis of
relations between north and south, left it open to the south German States to
form a southern Confederation of their own, which could then conclude an
alliance with the Northern Confederation. This southern Confederation had not
come to pass, and the Baden Government inferred in consequence that every
southern State was now at liberty to join the Northern Confederation* being as
an independent State possessed of the power to control its foreign relations
according to its own discretion. The Bavarian Government, on the other hand,
was of opinion that the four southern States (including Hesse) could only act
conjointly in the matter of entering the North German Confederation; similarly,
of course, Austria interpreted the provisions of the Peace of Prague in such a
way as to impede the encroachment of Prussia in southern Germany. Inasmuch as
the compact in regard to the future position of southern Germany had been
concluded with Austria, the protest of that Power against a separate
transaction with Baden could not be simply passed over. Bismarck paid the more
heed to it, because he knew that France also was against an extension of the
Confederation beyond the Main, and that thus an Austro-French alliance against
Prussia might easily ensue. Since a large proportion of the southern Germans
were still opposed to joining the Confederation, he moreover saw no reason for
hastening that step by pressure on Bavaria or otherwise; besides, he was, in
any case, sure of their support in the event of war. He thought that, when once
the system of the Confederation had proved its efficiency, the southern
Germans, who continued ill-affected towards Prussia, would gradually recognise
its value and sue for admission. This was the policy of securing voluntary
allies with which we are already familiar.
If political
union must be postponed, the economic agreement could still be cemented. The
Zollverein needed reforming, as it had been established on the principle of the
old German Confederation; every measure required the unanimous agreement of the
members; therefore any alteration of tariff-policy, the conclusion of
commercial treaties, and so on, could only be accomplished after interminable
negotiation. To remedy this drawback, a committee must be formed, which could
expedite legislation as modem economic conditions required. On the motion of
Prussia all the members of the Zollverein, accordingly, expressed their
readiness (in the summer of 1867) to place the management of economic affairs
in direct connexion with the legislature of the North German Confederation. The
Bundesrath and the Reichstag were to vote on matters concerning the Zollverein.
On these occasions the southern Germans sent government representatives and
deputies to Berlin, so that
462 Renewed French demands. Luxemburg. [1866-9
they might
have a voice in such decrees. Thus the committee of the North German
Confederation actually developed into the Zollbundesrath (federal tariff-council)
and Zollparlament (customs parliament). The economic disadvantage of this
innovation is obvious; but it was of political consequence, on the other hand,
that subjects of all the States of Germany met in a single council, and that
the German people grew accustomed to receiving the impulse from Berlin in one
important branch of public life. Here, again, there was, of course, much
parliamentary resistance; and the first elections to the ZoBparlament in
Bavaria and Wiirtemberg proved substantially anti-Prussian (1868). Gradually,
however, the sheer weight of economic interests overcame the political dislike
of a closer union with the north.
Bismarck’s
blunt refusal of the French demands of August, 1866, did not deter Napoleon
from renewing them. He had, indeed, renounced all idea of acquiring Rhenish
territory, but he asked Prussia to “ compensate” France by assisting him to
obtain possession of Luxemburg (1866-7). This negotiation led, as related
elsewhere, to the evacuation of Luxemburg by Prussian troops, to its
disarmament and subsequent neutralisation (May, 1867). The French public
regarded Germany’s endeavours to compass a union with more disfavour than ever,
and looked upon Bismarck as the sworn enemy of France. Wherever things went
amiss for France* the French thought they could detect the work of their evil
genius: so, for example, when Garibaldi mexiaced the Papal State and thus
compelled Napoleon to garrison Rome (1867).; when in Spain, Queen,Isabel, who
was friendly to the French, was exiled (1868); and when Napoleon’s attempt to
subject Belgium to France, by means of a railway convention, was frustrated by
Belgian opposition (1869).
After
these mishaps it became increasingly urgent for Napoleon that he should have
some success to offer to the French. The alliance with Prussia having failed,
he, therefore, endeavoured to ally himself with Austria and with Italy, and, as
is narrated elsewhere, securefl expressions of good-will but no definite or
binding engagements from both Powers. , .
, , .
,. ,
Bismarck was
tolerably well-informed as to the brewing storm, Lhough of course unaware how
far precisely the negotiations of this triple alliance had proceeded. The
vacancy, which had existed,on the Spanish throne since 1868 gave him the means
for thwarting the policy qf France, and for strengthening the position of
Prussia,. When, as described elsewhere, the Spanish Government offered the
Crown to Leopold* Hereditary Princes of Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen, a kinsman of
the Prussian royal family, he strongly recommended the King and the Prince to
accept that, honour. With a friendly dynasty reigning in Madrid, he had hopes
of an economic and political rapprochement between Prussia and Spain. He felt,
too, that France would always mistrust such a Government and that therefor^, in
any complication with Prussia, she would not leave the
i87o] The Hohenzollern candidature-France
declares war. 463
Pyrenean
frontier without military protection. The King and the Prince hesitated for
some time and began by refusing, but in the end Bismarck succeeded in
persuading them to decide on acceptance (June, 1870).
The Prussian
Minister was well aware that in France nation and Government alike regarded
Prince Leopold’s candidature as prejudicial to French interests $ nevertheless,
he did not scruple to urge it. Should the French Government complain on the
subject at Berlin he would represent it as a private family affair of the
princely House of Hohen- zollem, which concerned neither the Prussian State nor
the reigning dynasty, and so refuse to treat on the subject. If, regardless of
this refusal, France insisted on the withdrawal of the candidature and even
threatened war, he felt sure of the support of the whole of Germany against so
unjust a demand. Matters turned out, in the first instance, as Bismarck had
intended. The Press and the Chamber demanded with threats that the Prince
should withdraw, and the French Government was obliged to put forward these
wishes in Berlin. There, as Bismarck directed, all discussion of the question was
refused on the ground that it was no affair of Prussia’s; but King William
entered into the matter with Benedetti at Ems. Meanwhile, the Prince withdrew
his candidature (on July 12, 1870). The French were not content with this de
facto termination ; the Government, under pressure from the .Chamber, required
of King William that he should give a further assurance that it should never be
repeated. This preposterous demand—in itself a keen humiliation for Prussia—was
curtly rejected by the King personally and by Bismarck officially, who even
hinted that he. should expect satisfaction from France for this insult (July
13). He immediately made these last dealings public, so that the German nation
might be fully cognisant of the obtrusiveness of the French policy and the
repulse it had received, and in order to “wave the red rag before the Gallic
bull.” Thus the French Government, in its arrogant efforts to degrade Prussia,
itself met with a fall: and no other course was now open to it but to declare
war. On July 14 Napoleon accordingly resolved on a declaration of war, and on
the 19th this was carried into effect. Thus, by adroitly seizing the
opportunity which the unjust demands of France afforded, Bismarck involved the
French in war before their allies were ready for action. The Wax appears to
have been inevitable, but the occasion and pretext were selected by Bismarck,
who caused all German patriots to look upon France as a Wanton disturber of the
peace, and the conviction which had never been entirely lost, that France meant
to get the upper hand over Germany and lesseii her power, now once more gained
currency. No doubt the German nation judged correctly at that time. It has
often been stated subsequently that the war was Bismarck’s doing; that he
deliberately insulted the French nation by means of the Hohenzollern
candidature and by his reply to their demands on Jidy 13, and forced them to
take up arms. But it can easily be shown that it was not in Bismarck’s power
to avoid the
war, since Napoleon had long been making careful preparation for it.
The French
declaration of war found a loud echo throughout Germany. The North German
Reichstag immediately voted a large loan for mobilisation and emphatically
expressed the hope that the war might end in the union of the country; and the
south too was soon imbued with this idea. Among the Ultramontane population of
Bavaria there was at first, it is true, but little inclination for war with
France. In the first half of July the Press agitated against the recognition of
the casus foederis, and the majority in the Chamber was actually in favour of
cutting down the army estimates, since Bavaria had nothing to fear unless she
allowed herself to be made the tool of Prussia’s aggressive policy. The
Government indeed was more far-sighted and began to equip the troops for war,
even before the money for the purpose had been voted. Then came the French
demands of July 13, which here also awakened the sense of common German
brotherhood. Even those who did not share this feeling perceived that Bavaria
too would forfeit her independence if France were allowed to subdue Prussia. On
the day on which war was declared, the Chamber voted the supplies by a large
majority. Things went more smoothly in Wiirtemberg, where, from the outset, patriotic
enthusiasm was stronger than in Bavaria; and, as the Diet only met on July 21,
the supplies were therefore voted as a matter of course. Baden, where
Government and people had long been desirous of joining the Northern
Confederation, determined from the first to support Prussia.
In the
Reichstag, and in nearly all the war demonstrations, stress had been laid on
the idea that the time had now come for setting aside the dividing line of the
Main. Soon, it was further demanded that the war should lead to the reconquest
of Metz and Strassburg, the territory of the old German Empire. Only then would
Germany be secure against further invasion. So early as 1814 this idea had
found expression and had never since been forgotten. The south German
Governments and the leaders of the Northern Confederation had to face these
questions, so soon as all doubt as to the result of the war had been removed by
the first battles. The Unionists in north and south were at no loss for a
solution of the question which they had at heart. They considered that the next
step was for the south Germans to enter the North German Confederation, whose
President should take the title of Emperor. Among the south German States Baden
fully concurred in this plan, while Bavaria and Wiirtemberg demurred to it:
subordination under the leadership of Prussia seemed to them to involve a loss
of their independent power. In the German empire that was to be they wished at
all events to occupy a privileged position, and to withhold from the jurisdiction
of the imperial legislature certain branches of administration, such as army,
railways and post office. In this matter Bismarck
acted
as he had done at the establishment of the North German Confederation : he
endeavoured, so far as the general security permitted, to meet the wishes of
the south Germans, in order to gain willing members for the great alliance. He
had no intention, therefore, of inviting the Governments to join while
undecided; he meant rather that they should be compelled by public opinion to
solicit admission. As a matter of fact, so soon as Baden had led the way
shortly after Sedan, the other two southern Governments began to treat about
the terms under which they might join. In the ensuing discussion Bavaria began
by putting forward sweeping claims; but she had to moderate them in the end in
accordance with the feeling of the majority of the German nation. She still
insisted on independence with regard to army, postal and railway affairs1;
she also declared that she must retj in a certain measure of influence on
foreign policy. A confidential committee of foreign affairs was to be formed in
the Bwndesrath, of representatives of the four smaller kings, with Bavaria as
perpetual president. Thus the federal' character of thei German Empire was
still more strongly marked than had been the case in the formation of the North
German Confederation. These concessions were, in the opinion of many Unionists,
carried too far, and Bismarck had to submit to severe criticisms from the
leaders of that party—the Crown Prince and several lesser Princes. He adhered
to his opinion, however, well knowing how deep-seated was the particularism of
the Bavarians, and being unwilling to drive them into any attempt to gain
support from Austria. Wurtemberg was weaker than Bavaria and could not rely on
Austrian help ; she had therefore to content herself with reserving fewer
rights as regards military and postal affairs. '
,By November
25 these treaties of union had been concluded with all four south German Governments,
that is to say with Bavaria, Wiirtem- berg, Baden and Hesse (as to its southern
half); henceforward the North German Confederation took the name of the “German
Empire,” as now extending over all Germany. It still remained for the North
German Reichstag and the south German Diets to ratify- the terms and sanction
the alteration of title. All these Parliaments promptly expressed their
approval, except the Bavarian, which could only be induced to do so by a small
majority (January 21, 1871). This fact proves how well- considered was
Bismarck’s policy of concession. The new Constitution of the Empire, however,
came into force on January 1, 1871, before it had been ratified by the Bavarian
deputies. Jointly with these negotiations, others were being carried on as to
the assumption by King William of the title of Emperor. There were two
obstacles in the way of this: William’s own belief that as Emperor he would
have to maintain a magnificent Court and give,up the simpler old Prussian ways,
and the disinclination of Lewis of Bavaria, who felt that the exaltation of the
Hohenzollem meant the abasement of the Wittelsbachs. The Crown Prince convinced
King William as to the necessity of establishing an
Imperial
throne in Germany, representing to him that such was the desire of all patriots
and that it was of great political importance' as symbolising the unity of the
nation in the eyes of the outside world. Thus the King was prevailed upon in
October to accept the dignity of Emperor; his only requirement being that the
Crown might be offered him by the German Governments and not by the
representative assemblies, as in his brother’s case in 1849. There was
considerable difficulty in obtaining King Lewis’ consent, but in the end he was
led to concur by the promised reservations in favour of Bavaria under the
prospective Empire; and even undertook the duty of proposing to King William,
in the name of the German Governments, that he should take the title of Emperor
(December 17). King William immediately expressed his acceptance. After the
envoys from the Princes, the King also received a deputation from the North
German Reichstag, to which he gave the same assurance, so that there seemed to
be nothing further to prevent the solemn proclamation of the Empire. But Bavaria
suddenly raised fresh objections, demanding that the new title should not be
“Emperor of Germany” as William and the Unionists had assumed, but “ German
Emperor ” in order to imply that the Emperor did not claim sovereignty over the
members of the Confederation. Bismarck attributed no political importance to
this demand on the part of Bavaria, and succeeded in carrying it in face of
violent opposition from the King and the Unionists, who felt the new title to
be empty and meaningless. The Crown Prince, as in 1866, helped him to overcome
the King’s resistance, and although himself dissatisfied yielded the point in
order to arrive at a settlement. At length, all these obstacles were removed,
and the Empire was solemnly proclaimed at Versailles on January 18, 1871.
And so the
keystone was added to the great imperial structure. There can be no question as
to who was its architect. Bismarck did not of course create the desire for an
empire, but he stimulated the movement which he found already begun and he infused
his own spirit into it. He employed all that could be turned to account in the
work—the interest of the various Sovemments, foreign affairs, the most widely
differing parties and persons, however little they knew or approved his aims,
willing and unwilling helpers alike must bring him stones, but he himself
directed where and how they were to be fitted into the building. The sovereign
in whose name the new Empire was brought about had no part in its plan or
execution. But, in spite of that, the importance of the first German Emperor
must not be underrated. Without his protection the execution of the Minister’s
task would have been impossible, and it must not be forgotten that his
poptdarity materially helped to gain for Bismarck’s work the whole-hearted
support of the nation,
THE LIBERAL
EMPIRE.
(1859-70.)
^ “ A feeling of satisfaction was to be found
everywhere; and all men, with the exception of those whose minds were filled
with the evil passions of party spirit, rejoiced in the public good fortune.”
These words, used by Thiers in speaking of the Consulate, were recalled by
Napoleon III on February 16, 1857, when, in the full splendour of his fame, he
described and extolled the benefits which France had received from his reign.
Indeed it really seemed as if a stormy period in French history had at last
been brought to a close. For the time being, within the fixed limitations
imposed upon them by the Imperial Government, all classes of the community were
apparently submissive and peaceable; and seemed to consider economic prosperity
and national glory to be the only subjects worthy of their attention. At the
same time, the demands of the various classes of society and the national
aspirations were either controlled or used for his own advantage by the
Emperor, who flattered himself that his policy of personal government was
securing a great reign for himself, and a certain future for his dynasty. This
personal policy of the Emperor, however, was destined to arouse the opposition
of the several parties and classes, so great as to' force the Government to
make concessions to them; and was finally, in the midst of most tragic
vicissitudes, to bring it to utter ruin.
Trouble was
first started by the Italian War, the progress and results of which are
elsewhere described. Ever since the latter part of 1858, the Catholic party,
always the faithful supporters of Napoleon III, had shown considerable anxiety
on this subject. To prevent the anxiety of the Catholics from interfering with
his designs, the absolute monarch, therefore, appealed to the Liberal party. He
endeavoured to excite the sentiment of national amawr propre among all
Frenchmen. He ordered —it is possible that he even dictated;—the famous
pamphlet entitled The Emperor and Italy, which appeared on February 3, 1859,
with the signature of de La Gueronniere, one of the Councillors of State; and
in which France was reminded that her role should be that of
arbiter among
peoples and protector of nations. The Liberal Press acted in concert with the
Emperor.
Matters grew
far worse during the war. After the victory of Magenta (June 4,1859) the
Emperor issued an enthusiastic proclamation, in which (June 8) he invited all
the States of Italy to emancipate themselves, and to form a free confederacy.
The bulk of the Italian people, however, answered this proclamation by an
insurrection in favour of union; the States of Parma, Modena and Tuscany drove
out their Princes, and the Legations rebelled against the Pope. The fears of
the Catholics were thus fully justified. The clergy expressed their
displeasure. The Empress and Walewski became alarmed, and despatched telegram
after telegram to the Emperor. It was probably this movement in the Catholic
party, even more than the threats uttered by Prussia, or the outbreak of
disease in the army, which brought about the Emperor’s hasty decision to bring
the war to an end, on July 11, by the Preliminaries of Villafranca. Napoleon
III thus abandoned the attempt to realise his promise to give the Italians “ an
Italy free to the shores of the Adriatic,” and endeavoured, instead, to save
the temporal power of the Papacy. He now proposed to make the Pope president of
an Italian confederacy. In taking this course, the Emperor, for the first time
in his reign, gave way to party pressure. But it was already too late for
concessions; for it was no longer in his power either to satisfy the Catholic
part) or to arrest the course of the Italian revolution.
Accordingly,
the Emperor made use of the tactics employed at the end of 1858, but on a
larger scale. For the second time he appealed to the Liberals, and sought for
support against the Catholic party among the members1 of the Left.
On April 17, 1859, “a full and complete amnesty was granted to all persons who
had been sentenced for political crimes or misdemeanours, or who had been the
object of measures taken for the public safety.” Proscribed Bepublicans, even
the most uncompromising enemies of the Government, were permitted to return to
France unconditionally. Perhaps the principal reason for the recall of these
exiles was that they were anticlericals, who he believed would serve as an
effective counterpoise to the Bishops, in the new quarrel which the Imperial
policy was on the point of provoking.
In December,
1859, the publication of another pamphlet by de La Gueronr;'ire,
entitled The Pope and the Congress, was the signal for the commencement of a
new phase of Napoleonic action in Italy. Through the pamphlet the Emperor
advised the Pope to renounce his claim to the Legations, and allow northern
Italy to unite with Sardinia, if he desired to have the remainder of his
temporal power guaranteed to him.. In January* 1860, these terms were
indignantly refused by the Pope, and Napoleon III, now once more “the
accomplice of Cavour,” agreed to recognise the annexation of the Central States
by Piedmont, on the condition that Nice and Savoy were ceded to France (Treaty
of
Turin, March
24). In April, Garibaldi, as described elsewhere, organised a successful
revolution in Sicily, with some suspicion of Imperial connivance; and in
August, he crossed the Straits and drove Francis II from Naples. In September,
1860, Cialdini, with a Piedmontese force, defeated the Pope’s troops at
Castelfid’ardo, overran Umbria and the Marches, and only refrained from
attacking Rome, because it was still occupied by the French garrison quartered
there since 1849.
In France, in
the meantime, opposition to the Imperial policy had reunited the whole Catholic
party from Montalembert to Veuillot. Hostilities were opened by Monsignor
Dupanloup ; who, in his Letter to a Catholic, a pamphlet written in answer to
The Pope and the Congress, delivered a public challenge to the Emperor. On
January 19, 1860, an Encyclical was issued; and on every side the Catholics set
their pens furiously to work. Mandates, pamphlets and articles followed one
another in rapid succession. Lacordaire, Monsignor Gerbet, de Falloux, de La
Rochejacquelin, Nettement, Veuillot, and Monsignor Pie—almost every Catholic
indeed who knew how to write—intervened in the controversy. Members of the
Senate gave vigorous support to petitions in favour of the temporal power
(March 29-30, 1860); while guarantees for its preservation were imperiously
demanded in the Legislative Assembly, by the Catholic deputies Lemercier,
Plichon and Keller (April).
These
oratorical and epistolary demonstrations were supplemented by solemn church
ceremonies after the action at Castelfidardo on September 18. The defenders of
the Pope who fell on that day were honoured as martyrs. Monsignor Pie denounced
the new Pilate; and the aisles of the cathedrals rang with cries of grief and
hatred. Repressive measures, such as the suppression of the Umvers in January,
1860, the regulation which obliged all episcopal mandates in pamphlet form to
be stamped and legally registered, and the suppression of illegal associations
formed to collect subscriptions for the papal cause, were all alike
unsuccessful in checf ing this clamorous opposition.
Just at this
time, also, another scheme, personally initiated by the Emperor, began to cause
trouble. A second opposition party—consisting of the great manufacturers of
the country, whom he had raised to the rank of legislators in 1852—now showed
itself seriously displeased on account of the Treaty of Commerce with England,
which the Emperor had concluded in defiance of their objections. Napoleon III
was a Free Trader. The experiment made by England had early convinced him that
modem requirements would be best served by a system of Free Trade, which would
draw nations closer to one another, and encourage each country in the rational
development of its individual resources. Mechanical improvements, he was
persuaded, would prove a sufficient incentive to competition; and he fel t
confident that the harmonious relations which he desired could be established
without friction. A. reduction of duties, he believed, would assure cheap
living to the
consumer, and
would therefore secure him the gratitude of the working classes. But, at the
same time, he was well aware—as the procureurs generaux had often reported to
him—that such a policy would run counter to the prejudices and customs of
manufacturers traditionally devoted to protection. For this reason he had
always moved in the matter with extreme caution; and had limited his
experiments in free trade to tentative measures, such as making the Scarcity of
1853 a pretext for the temporary removal of the duty on corn; or taking
advantage of the great industrial prosperity of the country to lower the taxes
on raw materials, such as coal, iron and wool (1856). In that year the
opposition of the Legislative Assembly had forced him to abandon a project for
the removal of all prohibitions.
But, at the
end of 1859, after the Free Traders in England had helped to bring back Palmerston
to power, Napoleon believed that he could safely cany out his designs. At a
meeting between Michel Chevalier, his confidant in economic matters* and
Richard Cobden, then travelling in France and acting with the approval of
Gladstone, the new English Chancellor of the Exchequer, a Treaty of Commerce
was provisionally sketched out. The fact that France stood in need of English
support for the further development of her Italian policy, after Villaftanca,
was expected to prove a valuable argument against the Protectionists; while
hopes were entertained that the actual commercial prosperity of the country—now
completely restored after the slight crisis of 1857—would render the change
bearable to the manufacturing classes, and mitigate any inconvenience which
might be caused by the new system.
Accordingly,
on January 5, 1860, a letter from the Emperor to his Minister of Finance gave
France solemn warning of a new fiscal programme. Free Trade was to be
introduced, and to be rendered endurable by encouragements of all kinds to
agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. On January 23 came news that the
Emperor, exercising his privilege with regard to treaties of commerce, and with
the assistance only of Rouher, had elaborated and signed an Anglo-French Treaty
of Commerce with Cobden. Prohibitions on English goods were suppressed, and
were replaced by duties which could not be raised beyond 25 per cent. ad
valorem; in return, French products were admitted into England duty free,
except where similar articles produced in England were subject to internal
taxation. No sooner had this treaty become known than the opposition of the
Protectionists burst forth with a violence which surprised the Emperor.
Throughout their ranks this fiscal coup d'etat was denounced as a national
disaster. In April, in the Legislative Assembly, and at the manufacturers’
meetings in May, Pouyer-Quertier eulogised Protection, and declared that the
French negotiators had been duped by Cobden. The two Chambers, indeed, which
were both entirely submissive to the Government, passed the Bill for the treaty
almost unanimously; but the agitation continued throughout the country.
Dissatisfaction reached
I860]
Liberal decrees of November 24.
471
its height
during October and November, when the special conventions fixing the new tariff
became known.
By the end of
1860, Napoleon III, now censured and opposed both by Catholics and
Protectionists, found himself in a singular position. His triumph in 1856 had
led him to believe that he would succeed in establishing his personal
policy—Free Trade and the policy of nationality ; and he had sufficient
confidence in the “ Napoleonic idea ” to believe that it would rally all
Frenchmen to him, and secure his dynasty. As it was, however, he had only
succeeded in making his most faithful supporters discontented; and, now that
their irritation, which he alone had provoked, was beginning to cause trouble,
he became alarmed. If he was to succeed in rallying all parties to himself and
his dynasty, it was obvious that he must not be held solely answerable for all
administrative mistakes; it was necessary to make the representatives of the
nation share in the responsibilities of government, in appearance at any rate.
As de Gramont said at the time: “ The moment has come to lighten the Emperor’s
burden, and to relieve him of the full weight of the discontent which his
policy must inevitably produce. In saying this I do not mean to reproach him ;
I merely point out a fact from'which there is no escaping. The Emperor can satisfy
neither reactionaries nor revolutionaries. The role of mediator, which he has
elected to play single-handed, makes it impossible.” The Comte de Morny, a
faithful follower and counsellor of Napoleon III, was also of this opinion.
Give the Opposition the right to advise, and let there be a strife of parties,
and eventually the Emperor’s role of mediator would win appreciation; while the
blame for his mistakes, if he made any, would fall upon one or other of the
parties, and not upon him alone.
It was this small-minded
Machiavellian calculation, be it noted, and not a trustful, generous belief in
the principles of Liberalism, which produced the decrees of November 24, 1860.
These empowered the Senate and the Legislative Assembly to move, and to discuss
freely each year, an address in reply to the speech from the throne. This gave
them an opportunity of criticising the policy of the Government, which was to
be defended in both assemblies by Ministers without portfolios. For the future,
also, parliamentary debates were to be fully reported. Thus the country would
be kept informed of the responsibilities incurred by all parties; and, if the
policy of the Government should ever prove unsuccessful, it would at any rate
appear to have been approved and discussed by a majority of the nation’s
representatives. But this majority, having been carefully selected, as has been
pointed out, was certain to be faithful to the Government; and indeed the
Emperor did not despair of adding to it from the Left itself, by utilising his
policy of nationality to rally to his side the democratic Opposition.
His
calculations were, however, disappointed. The parties which he was seeking to
play off one ag nst another took advantage of the
decrees of
November, 1860, to make a unanimous demand for greater powers; the decrees
became the point of departure, first, for a slow but certain revival of
parliamentary institutions, and, before long, for a return to liberty. Even in
March, 1861, when the Chambers first voted on the address, the new interest
taken by the nation in parliamentary debates made itself felt. The little group
of Republicans, it is true, known as the Cinq, were as yet only able to attempt
an opposition that was quite elementary; and the manoeuvres of de Morny so
quickly disunited them, that Illmile Ollivier even promised the Government his
conditional support. Members of the Catholic Opposition, on the other hand,
such as de La Rochejacquelin, and Heeckeren in the Senate, and Plichon and
Keller in the .Legislative Assembly, violently criticised the Emperor’s Italian
policy; while minorities of 61 in the Senate, and 91 in the Legislative
Assembly, demanded the maintenance of the Pope’s temporal power. Manifestations
such as these had, however, been expected, and were undoubtedly insufficient in
themselves to modify the policy of the Emperor; indeed they made him better
able to understand, the conditions under which the parliamentary shadow, which
he had just evoked, might be rendered harmless to his own power.
The first
condition of success for the Government was a strong financial position. But on
this point the wisest advisers of the Empire could only endorse the opinion of
the Opposition—that the absolutism of their sovereign was leading the country
to bankruptcy. , A policy of glory abroad and of favouritism at home,
distant expeditions, and great public works, were all equally costly. The
Emperor’s power to redistribute the estimates for the various departments,
after the Budget had been voted en bloc by the Legislative Assembly, and to
authorise supplementary loans on his own responsibility, enabled him to spend
money without accounting for it. Between 1851 and 1858 supplementary loans
amounting to 2400 million francs had been contracted. During 1858-61 the public
debt and the deficit in the Treasury increased by another 400 millions. The
annual deficit was about 100 millions; and by the end of 1861 the floating debt
had almost reached 1000 millions. Business men were growing anxious; and Fould
himself echoed their uneasiness in a confidential report which reminded
Napoleon III that, if he was to be sole sovereign, he must also be solely
responsible. It concluded by telling the Emperor that, “ if he would restore
to the Legislative Assembly the privileges which unquestionably belonged to it,
he would identify that Assembly with his Government”—that is, would make it
share, in some degree, in his responsibilities. Here again the idea inspiring
the decree of the preceding year made its appearance. In financial measures, as
in measures of general policy, Napoleon III decided to attempt making the
nation share in the responsibilities of administration. In a letter of
November 14,1861, he renounced his right to borrow money while the Chambers
were not sitting, and declared that, for the
future, the
ministerial Budget should be divided into sections, on each of which the
Chambers should vote -separately. At the same time Fould was appointed Minister
of Finance; a decree of December 1 made him even a kind of prime minister. For
the future, no decree authorising or ordering public works, or any measure
capable of leading to charges on the Budget, was to be submitted to the
OEmperor for signature without a recommendation from the Minister of Finance.
On December 81, 1861, the Senate issued a decree for the ratification of these
reforms.
But, like the
parliamentary reforms in 1860, these measures were intended to be only a blind.
The fact that the Emperor retained the right to alter the estimates (section by
section, even in case this led to supplementary borrowing,,made parliamentary
control illusory. In 1862, supplementary loans, the deficit, and the floating
debt, were still increasing, and itt was somewhat naive to suppose
that parliamentary parties would accept responsibility, unless they received
compensation in the shape of more real powers. The decrees of 1860 had revived
a taste for parliamentary control and liberty; hut the parties had been made to
perceive their own want of power, and before long were to find it insupportable.
In 1862, this result was already noticeable, and the question of the control of
the Budget was continually debated. Before the firm opposition of a commission,
the Government was obliged to withdraw its project for a grant of 50,000 francs
to General Cousin-Montauban, on his return from China; while lilinile Qljivier
emphatically pointed out the necessity of extending the financial powers of the
Chamber.
Still more
serious was the fact that even the Catholics no longer limited their opposition
to the Government’s foreign policy. They had been quite ready to agree with the
internal policy a short time previously, when it only injured their
adversaries; but they protested when measures were taken against themselves on
account of their violent campaign in the papal interest. Owing to the
recognition of the kingdom of Italy by the Emperor, in July, 1861, and to the
help he bad given the southern provinces in suppressing the brigandage which
the Bourbonists had encouraged, and at which the papal Government in .Rome had
connived, the opposition of the Catholics had redoubled in fury. The religious
Orders, and other powerful associations at the Church’s disposal, joined in the
battle. At a general assembly of the Society of St Vincent de Paul at Lusignan,
the Bishop of Angouleme declared that Catholics ought not to be afraid of
Judas. The Minister of the Interior, de Persigny, representative of democratic
and anticlerical Bonapartism, had no difficulty in recognising whom the Bishop
meant by Judas; and he decided that measures must be taken. In a circular of
October 16, he asserted the right of the State to supervise charitable
associations, praising, indeed, their aim, but declaring that certain persons
were proposing “to use them for a purpose other than that of charity.” He also
ordered the Society pf St Vincent de Paul to accept—like the
Freemasons
before them—a president nominated by the Emperor. As the Society refused to
agree to this condition, its central committee was consequently obliged to
retire into obscurity.
During 1862,
it was not without significance that the protagonists of the Catholic party
intervened for the liberty of the Press and the right of association; Segur
d’Aguesseau called the Minister Persigny a “ Polignau,” and complained of the
restraints on the liberty of the Catholic Press.' Once again there were
protests against the surveillance to which the religious Orders were subjected;
while the Government proved in vain, by enumerating the riches and effective
strength of these associations, that its control had not injured their
development. The Catholic party was no longer content to receive favours; it
demanded, in its turn, guarantees and liberty.
The Emperor
became uneasy at these symptoms. Up to this time he had remained tolerably
faithful to the Italian policy which he had followed since the middle of 1861.
He had helped Piedmont in its difficulties; and he had endeavoured to obtain
from the Papacy, “ a real compromise, which would bring peace to the bosom of
the Catholic Church; and also permit it to share in the triumph of Italian
patriotism” (.Instructions to M. de La Valette, January, 1862). But the Pope
had obstinately refused any concessions; while, on the other side, the consequences
of the national movement led by Garibaldi, the new impulse of the Italian
people towards Rome, as described elsewhere, all showed the Emperor that
conciliation was impossible, and that any encouragement given to the Italians
would quickly let loose a storm. At the Tuileries, the Emperor was surrounded
by a Catholic coterie, headed by the Empress, who pointed out to him the danger
at home from the approaching elections. In October, 1862, this party carried
the day. Drouyn de Lhuys replaced Thouvenel as Minister of Foreign Affairs; and
the Cabinet of the Tuileries gave the Piedmontese Ministers to understand that
it was not going to lead them to Rome.
This
concession to the Catholics came, however, too late. The most ardent spirits
among the party, having once again realised the value of constitutional liberty,
enrolled themselves for the future in the ranks of the Opposition, whence they
prepared to claim that liberty in concert with its old defenders. For this
purpose, a coalition was gradually formed; and Catholics and Protectionists
alike reconciled themselves with the enemies of the Government, with Catholic
Liberals, with Orleanist Doctrinaires, with Legitimists, and even with
Republicans. The Cinq, who in their annual amendments to the address had
demanded a more independent and genuine universal suffrage, liberty to hold
meetings, liberty of the Press, ministerial responsibility and complete
financial control, were well qualified to play a part in this Opposition. A
large number of young men, from both the labouring and the educated classes,
were reading Proudhon, listening to Blanqui and the exiles of 1852, and
publishing an
increasing number of ephemeral and insignificant newspapers. Burning for
action, this party sought everywhere for an opportunity of striking at the
Empire. The Orleanist Doctrinaires, also, who between 1852 and 1860 had only
been able to mourn over the unhappy times in letters to their friends—often
very beautiful compositions—or in discourses at the Academy, no longer looked
askance at the Republicans. Thiers himself, the old Orleanist Minister, again
took part in the battle, where he proved more ambitious and warlike than ever.
In spite of conflicting opinions—on such subjects for instance as the temporal
power—democrats and men of the old parties combined against a Government which
was now intolerable to them all.
On the very
eve of the elections a common emotion cemented this union. In January, 1863,
the young men in the Polish towns, who were suspected of encouraging the
agitation for Polish nationality, were ordered to serve in the Russian army;
and an insurrection broke out in Warsaw, which public opinion in France
unanimously supported. The Catholics considered that nation a martyr to its
faith; for Democrats its independence was a dogma; while even Conservatives
remembered the historic role of Poland as the ally of France against Austria.
This event gave the Emperor a unique opportunity of rallying all parties; but
the distrust of England, the embarrassment of Austria, and the complicity of
Prussia, caused him to renounce the idea of intervention. He sought indeed to
satisfy parties at home with a semblance of glory; for, at the very time when
he was allowing the unhappy country to be crushed, he addressed a remonstrance
to Russia (Notes of April and July, 1863). But in doing this he hopelessly
alienated the latter Power, without giving satisfaction to the various
opponents united against him.
Such were the
conditions under which the general election of 1863 took place (May 31 and June
1). Neither Proudhon’s abstention from the election, nor the resistance of
those Republicans who still scrupled to ally themselves with Royalists, nor
finally the resistance, more energetic than wise, of the Government, which once
again made alterations in the constituencies, and denounced its adversaries as
traitors to their country, were able to prevent the Liberal Opposition from
obtaining a notable success. 7,262,623 voters went to the poll, and the
Opposition obtained 1,954,369 votes against 5,308,254 secured by the Government
candidates. For the future, an Opposition numbering thirty-five (of whom
seventeen were Republicans) existed in the Legislative Assembly, of whom the
greater part were men of talent, well known for their parliamentary services.
Members such as Jules Favre, lilmile Ollivier, Ernest Picard, Jules Simon,
Berryer, and above all Thiers, were quite able to baffle the ablest supporters
of the Empire.
The moral
effect of the election in the country was very great; and several exiles in
London or Brussels imagined that the end of the regime had come. But in this
they were mistaken. This Liberal opposition
was not, in
itself, at all revolutionary. The Emperor estimated the situation more
accurately when he dismissed Persigny, the incompetent Minister of the
Interior, and made Duruy, a democrat and a reformer, Minister of Public
Education. At the same time he gave the portfolio of Public Works to an
Orleanist, Behic, and sought to form a closer link between the Government and
the Chambers by creating, as a kind of prime minister, a Minister of State*
who—in the place of the Ministers without portfolios of 1860—was charged with
defending the Imperial policy, and of commending it to the general public
(Decrees of June 1863). But, if concessions of this kind were to become an
effectual means of stopping, or at least of controlling, the Opposition, it was
necessary that the Emperor’s personal policy, and the administration of his
Ministers, should refrain in future from giving offence to the sentiments of.
their opponents, from reawakening the desire for guarantees, from discouraging
loyalty, and from ultimately turning an opposition to the Government into an
opposition to the Empire.
As it
happened, however, the foreign policy of Napoleon III was quickly to turn all
parties against him. By the end of 1863, France had quite lost the prestige
acquired by the peace of 1856. The abrupt change of the E.iiperor’s policy in
October, 1862, had alienated Italy, without gaining over the Holy See.
Remonstrances to Russia on the Polish question had estranged all those Powers
who had interests in Poland; while relations with England were every day
growing more strained, on account of the colonial expeditions. Syria and China,
and finally Mexico seem to have attracted Napoleon III. In Mexico, ever since
1821, the Clerical and Liberal parties had been engaged in a struggle; and
since 1859, an Indian, Benito Judrez—the Liberal vicepresident—had managed to
hold his own there against a Conservative rebellion, and a financial crisis
precipitated matters. The Liberal Government ’ieing unable to pay European
nations the debts recognised by the “Foreign Conventions,” France, England and
Spain decided to force Mexico to fulfil her financial obligations (October
31,1861). From the very outset, the Emperor’s imagination was busily at work.
While England was proposing to assure herself an advantageous compensation for
her wasted loans in Mexico by administering the customs; while Spain was
dreaming of reestablishing one of her own Princes there; Napoleon III was
seeding to satisfy both the Catholics and the Liberals at the same time, by the
establishment of a great Catholic and Latin Empire in Mexico—a scheme which
was, in fact, “ the great idea of his reign.”
Conflicting
designs, and the intrigues of French agents, quickly brought about a rupture
between the allies. The English troops reembarked ; and the Spaniards, as
elsewhere described, soon followed their example. By March, 1862, only the
French remained in Mexico, where they were now definitely engaged hi a war for the purpose of conquering
Judrez. In May, 1863, Puebla was taken; and in June the French troops
I863-4] Danish question.—The “indispensable
liberties 477
entered
Mexico, where they proclaimed as Emperor, Maximilian of Austria, a son-in-law
of the King of the Belgians, to whom Napoleon III had promised this Catholic
throne; But, even before the new Emperor embarked for Mexico, the ultimate
success of the expedition had become very doubtful. Ju&rez in the northern
provinces, and Porfirio Diaz in the jouth, collected an ever increasing force
of patriots to oppose the foreign invader. The expedition was costing France
fourteen millions a month; it locked up 40,000 troops far from home; and
sensible people began to ask if it would not be better to make terms with
Ju&rez,
Just at this
moment there arose the further question of the Danish Duchies. In November,
1863, Frederick VII of Denmark died; and the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein
proclaimed the Duke of Augustenburg King, in defiance of the Protocol of London.
In February, 1864, Prussia, with Austria following suit, occupied the Duchies
with an armed force. To this high-handed action the Emperor, restrained at once
by French public opinion, which showed much sympathy with Prussia, and by his
policy of nationality, offered only a vague and partial objection, although he
had a dim presentiment of its danger. In the following August, the conquered
Duchies were ceded by Denmark to the two Powers.
These events
were not of a nature to increase French prestige abroad, or to pacify the
Opposition. In the debate on the address for 1864, Thiers, who, according to
Pessard, had become the “ Egeria of all the groups of the Opposition, whether
in alliance or independent,” denounced the squandering in Mexico, and sharply
criticised the “ great idea ” of the reign. At the same time, Jules Favre
pointed out the violation of right which was being committed in the Duchies ;
while the whole Opposition unanimously denounced the financial confusion,
military waste, and loss of prestige abroad. With as much firmness as
moderation, Thiers demanded what he called “the indispensable liberties”; and
in so doing supplied his party with a watchword (January 11, 1864).
Meanwhile
Rouher, who in October, 1868, had succeeded Billault as Minister of State, and
who was, to all appearance, a real prime minister, was very far from advising
his master to execute any pledges for constitutional reforms. He kept
repeating, it is true, the official formula which asserted that in 1860 the
Emperor had been a voluntary and generous promoter of liberty; and he even
declared that, when the right time came, he would “crown the edifice" by
definitely establishing that liberty; but in reality he abandoned few of the
practices of the absolute Empire. In August, 1864, he answered Thiers’
challenge by prosecuting the thirteen principal members of a committee which,
at some bye- elections in February, had supported the Opposition candidates,
Garnier- Pages and Carnot. These men he had sentenced to a fine of 500 francs;
while at the same time public lectures, or dinners, which were disapproved by
the authorities, were again forbidden. The numerous strikes, brought about by
the industrial expansion between 1861 and
478 Renewal of the religious quarrel. Pius IX.
[i864-6
1864, had
indeed forced the Government to acknowledge the right of combination by a law
passed on May 25, 1864. But this law was incomplete, for it did not allow
workmen the right of association, a corollary without which no strike could be
effectual. Since, moreover, the law was made use of by the Government to win
over a portion of the working ‘.lasses, it could not, in any circumstances, be
made to look like a concession to the Democrats.
A year later,
in spite of the solid facts supporting their arguments, and in spite of the
firmness with which they presented their demands, the Liberals still appeared
unable to obtain those privileges and guarantees which they desired. But, once
again, the Emperor’s foreign policy was to give them an opportunity. In the situation
occupied by. France after the events in Poland, in the Duchies, and in Mexico,
the only country in Europe with which she could possibly form an alliance was
Italy, and to obtain it she must abandon the cause of the Pope. By another
sudden change of policy on September 15, 1864, Napoleon concluded a convention
with the Cabinet of Florence, by which he undertook to withdraw his troops from
Rome within two years, Victor Emmanuel on his side engaging not to attack the
actual dominions of the Holy See. The Emperor secretly hoped that he might be
able to give Venetia to-. Italy, and thus divert her from Rome.
The immediate
result of these negotiations was the exasperation of the Holy See, and a
renewal of the religious quarrel. On December 8,
1864, Pius IX replied to the convention
concluded on September .15, by issuing the Encyclical Quanta Cura, and the
Syllabus. The tendencies of these documents will be examined elsewhere; but it
is necessary to notice here that, though their meaning was veiled by generalities,
they were partly an attack upon the French Government. Not only the
philosophical principles of modem societies, such as liberty of worship,
liberty of the Press, and free speech were condemned in these documents, but
also the supremacy of the nation and universal suffrage. Napoleon III had
gloried in being the representative of the revolutionary tradition; and had
always advanced thiu profession with much solemnity. He understood the Pope’s
intention immediately, and forbade the publication of the Syllabus in- France,
on the ground that it “contained propositions contrary to those principles on
which the Constitution of France rests” (January, 1865). This roused the
resistance of the Bishops, who, from their pulpits and in their charges, read and
commented on the papal document, of which almost all of them unreservedly
approved. They went, so far as to issue a protest against the Government’s
decision, but the Council of State refused to consider their grievance. The
Government, irritated in its turn, seemed as if it meant to take the offensive;
for it permitted a demonstration to take place at the funeral of Proudhon, the
great Socialist thinker and enemy of the Church (January, 1865); encouraged
Rouland, when he vigorously
refuted the
Encyclical in the Senate; and published a remarkable report by Duruy in the
Moniteur, recommending free and compulsory primary education (February, 1865).
Such a bold
resistance, however, only increased the anxiety of moderate and loyal
Catholics. Those statesmen, also, who had remained faithful to the traditional
foreign policy of their country, and who had watched the accomplishment of
Italian unity with profound regret, did not hesitate to denounce the September
Convention as disastrous for France. Thiers, especially, demonstrated with
unsparing precision the new dangers (April, 1865). Many deputies entirely
devoted to the Emperor now found agreement with the orators of the Opposition;
many, also, began asking if the Empire could not be regenerated by a gradual development
of free institutions, and if a constitutional Opposition could not be created*
which, before long, would be capable of supplying the Emperor with a new
Government.
The events of
1866 hastened this evolution. In Mexico the Emperor Maximilian was powerless
between the Liberal and Monarchical parties; while Bazaine, the commander of
the French troops, was intriguing against him, with a view to taking his place.
As Ju&rez still held out, it became necessary either to send fresh troops
or to abandon Maximilian. The one course would ruin French prestige; the other
would probably lead to a war with the United States, whose Government, now that
the war of Secession was ended (April, 1865), was in a position to assert
itself, and was already sending haughty notes to Paris. In either case France
was forced again to deprive herself of, useful troops, at the very moment when
affairs in Europe were becoming seriously complicated. A more detailed account
is given elsewhere of the quarrel between Prussia and Austria, which had arisen
in August, 1864, over the settlement of the Duchies; showing how, between
February and August, 1865, these two countries appeared to be on the eve of
war; and how, in order to avoid hostilities, Prussia consented to the
Convention of Gastein which awarded Schleswig to her, and Holstein to Austria.
A useless circular, protesting against this Convention, was issued by Drouyn de
Lhuys, in which he recalled the partition of Poland, and invoked the rights;of
nationalities. It was evident that the Convention was only a patched-up
reconciliation. Bismarck had need of a war. In October he visited Biarritz; and
conversations took place there which led to an alliance between Piedmont and
Prussia against Austria, under French auspices, on the understanding that
Piedmont was to have Venetia, In January,
1866, the differences of Austria and Prussia
began to be acute; and in April, a Treaty of Alliance was signed between Italy
and Prussia.
With this
great conflict impending, public opinion in France became more and more uneasy.
Not only did Thiers draw new arguments^ from the situation abroad for the “
indispensable liberties ”; not only did the Republican Left reiterate its
demands, declaring that “the French people,
surrounded by
free States, to which it had shown the path to liberty,... could not be treated
as incapable or unworthy of bearing the glorious burden of its destiny”; but
forty-five of the Imperialist majority at last decided to separate from the
Right, and to assert their favourite ideal by asking the Emperor “ to further
the natural development of the great act of I860.” This was the first
appearance! of what was known as the Third Party, which with the help of
Ollivier and a few others; who joined the original forty-five, mustered 63 votes
in favour of an amendment on March 19, 1866. From this time onward, the Liberal
Opposition was no longer the only party demanding constitutional1
evolution and the development of parliamentary guarantees—a visible sign that
the public confidence in an absolute rigime was gradually being shaken.
It was
useless for Rouher to declare “ that the Emperor had established the
prosperity of his dyniasty and of the country ” upon the solid basis of that
absolute government which was now being called in question. The Opposition
believed that the reestablishment of a parliamentary System would be a better
guarantee of prosperity than the genius of any sovereign; and the country was
beginning to be of the same opinion. A speech delivered by Thiers, on May 3,
upon Prussian ambitions and the reconstitution of the Empire of Charles V,
produced a considerable stir; and the Emperor tried in vain to'appease it by
reviving the popular hatred of the treaties of 1815—treaties which, he
declared, “ some persons presume to make the sole basis Of our foreign policy.”
While public opinion was in this state; the news of Koniggratz startled all
parties (July 3): The victory of Prussia, the swift and complete overthrow of
Austria, at once put an end to all the Emperor’s hopes of appearing as an armed
mediator, in his own interest, between two exhausted belligerents. Italy,
indeed, obtained Venetia, but the control of northern Germany was acquired by
Prussia The interests of France called for immediate intervention. But the army
was not ready, and' the best troops were still in Mexico. The Emperor, ageing
and in bad health, was unable to come to any rapid decision; and he ultimately
acquiesced in the formation of the North German Federation. “ Nothing is' left
for us to do,” said Drouyn de Lhuys, “ but to shed tears.”
An outburst
Of indignation followed in the Press. Public opinion was not in the least
grateful to the Emperor for peace; it was conscious only of the humiliation of
France. All Frenchmen alike dreamt of “ revunche ” Those political parties
which the Emperor had formerly hoped “to unite beneath the mantle of
his‘gloiy,” now indeed united but in opposition to himself. Republicans,
Liberals, Nationalists, Conservatives, even Imperialists, all alike demanded
satisfaction for the national amour propre. The unfortunate sovereign, now
anxious for his dynasty, was for the future obliged to seek the dazzling but
ever illusive glbry’which he needed, in novel diplomatic intrigues and fresh
adventurous contrivances. By such devices, however, he only succeeded in giving
a
still severer
shock to his authority at home, and in concentrating the anger of every patriot
in Germany upon the French nation.
At home the
consolidation of the Third Party, brought about in the early months of 1866, had
been the signal for the opening of a struggle between the supporters of the
Absolute, and those of the Liberal and Constitutional Empire. This Third Party
now formulated its programme. It did not desire a complete parliamentary
system, but rather, as it said, “ a development of political freedom ”; by
which it meant, a homogeneous Ministry, whose responsibility to the Legislative
Assembly would give that body the power of controlling the Government, and the
means of intervening effectually in matters of general policy. It also demanded
the liberty of the Press and the right to hold public meetings. Before claims
of this nature the partisans of authority began asking themselves whether
granting the right to vote an address had not been a regrettable concession,
which ought to be repealed; and in any case they made up their minds that for
the future the constitution should be defended by some definite bulwark.
The struggle
rapidly assumed the form of a personal rivalry between Rouher, the Minister of
State, who had been the accomplice of the events of December, 1851; and ^mile
Ollivier, who was now seeking to convince the Emperor that, provided confidence
were placed in him, he would save the regime by his own unaided efforts. The
struggle for parliamentary liberty was therefore transferred to the Tuileries,
and it lost the character of an opposition to the regime, which had still
belonged to it in 1863, in the view of Thiers as well as of the Republicans.
The conflict—no longer a subject of eager popular interest—was nevertheless to
bear fruit almost immediately. At first, Rouher appeared to be carrying all
before him. He brought forward a Senatusconsultum, which became law in July,
1866, and which decreed that all constitutional changes should be discussed by
the Senate only; and that power to debate on such subjects should in future be
denied to the Legislative Assembly. Any discussion, also, on these questions in
the press was to be punished by a fine, which might amount to 10,000 francs.
Petitions to the Senate, relating to any modification of the constitution, were
only to be brought before a public sitting if they obtained the authorisation
of at least three public offices. Such was the bulwark with which Rouher sought
to defend the mock Constitution of 1852. But at the very hour of its
promulgation foreign events had already rendered the Senatusconsultum a dead
letter. The consequences of Koniggratz were unfolding themselves; the situation
in Mexico was growing more embarrassing; while outside the Chamber opposition
and discontent were increasing. The vacillating Emperor believed that the time
had arrived for new concessions, and for transferring a few more responsibilities
to the nation. On January 19,1867, a semi-Liberal decree made Emile Ollivier
believe that his triumph was at hand. This decree
restored the
right of interpellation to the Deputies, suppressed the address as useless, and
enacted that a Minister might be specially deputed by the Emperor to represent
him at the Luxembourg or the Palais Bourbon. A letter from the Minister of
State, accompanying this decree, also gave notice of two new Bills; one for the
purpose of freeing the Press from government interference; the other for
partially restoring the right of public meeting.
During the
first six months of 1867, Imperialist deputies were much occupied in
speculating as to whether this measure foretold the fall of Rouher, and the
triumph of Ollivier. But it required no very fine discrimination to perceive,
even at the publication of the decree, that Rouher might very possibly still
retain the favour of the Emperor; and that the hour for a new personnel had not
yet come. All interpellations required the signature of at least five members,
and the approval of four L'ommittees; formalities which permitted the majority
to reject any demand disagreeable to the Government. The presence of Ministers
in the Chambers by no means indicated ministerial responsibility; for a
communication of January 19, expressly stated that Ministers were responsible
to the sovereign alone. In fact, Rouher, who was supported by a majority still
secretly hostile to Ollivier, continued to hold his own in everything. At the
moment when a numerous society of ultra-reactionary Bonapartists—firmly
resolved to oppose every Liberal concession—was establishing itself under his
auspices in the Bue de 1’Arcade, he boasted shamelessly in the Chamber that he
had himself inspired the Emperor with the idea of introducing the Liberal
measures of January 19. At his instigation, also, on March 12, the Senate demanded
and obtained the right of thoroughly examining all laws, instead of merely
deciding if they were constitutional, and thus constituted itself a
collaborator, and one sure to be reactionary, in the work of legislation.
Before long, Walewski, Momy’s successor, and Jilmile Ollivier’s friend and
protector, was obliged to resign the presidency of the Legislative Assembly.
Finally, the Bills promised in a communication issued on January 12 were
adjourned indefinitely. Ollivier—defeated and dissatisfied—attacked the “
Vice-Emperor” in a most violent speech; but this action only secured a more
dazzling mark of favour for his rival. On the morrow of this attack the Emperor
sent Bouher the insignia of the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour in diamonds;
in order to compensate him “for the unjust attacks to which he had been
subjected” (July 12,1867).
But
parliamentary battles and court intrigues were alike vain; indeed, they would
have probably nullified the action of the constitutional Opposition had not
events abroad, together with a revival of the Republican and Socialistic
movements, suddenly compelled some definite concessions. The advocates of
despotism were fully aware that the Imperial Government must give satisfaction
to the national amour
propre
if it was to win power and prestige. To attain this object the Arcadiens (i.e.
the supporters of the Government) did not shrink from the possibility of war.
But the Emperor, who was ill, and had also a real knowledge of the situation,
preferred to use diplomatic means to gain the success which another method
would have been less likely to secure.
During the
negotiations at Nikolsburg between Austria and Prussia, after the battle of
Koniggratz, Benedetti, acting for France, had presented a demand for the
cession of Mainz and a portion of the left bank of the Rhine. Bismarck styled
this “an hotelkeeper’s bill,” and refused to accede to any such demand,
expecting an outbreak of war in consequence. But no war ensued; and by not
declaring it Napoleon III admitted his weakness. On August 20, however, he
again naively claimed a price for his neutrality by demanding the friendly
connivance of Prussia for an occupation of Luxemburg, and an invasion of
Belgium. Bismarck allowed him to engage in negotiations, to state his demands,
and to supply everyone with some pretext for alienating themselves from him,
and then declined to pursue the matter further. At the beginning of 1867,
consequently, Napoleon III was obliged to content himself with demanding a much
humbler compensation, namely, Luxemburg, “the road to Brussels, in default of
Belgium itself.” In January, 1867, the Dutch, who were the actual owners of
Luxemburg, offered to cede that province to France, in return for a payment in
cash, if the Prussians would agree to withdraw the garrison they had maintained
there since 1815. The proposed annexation had been agreed to by the people of
Luxemburg, and the King of Prussia had consented to it; when, at the beginning
of March, 1867, German patriotism suddenly took fright, and the Prussian
ambassador von der Goltz in Paris roughly summoned de Moustier, who had been
Minister of Foreign Affairs since October, 1866, to put a stop to the treaty of
purchase. French diplomacy, which was skilfully conducted, was fortunate enough
to maintain an honourable position during this crisis; and the question was
referred to a Conference of the Powers in London. Eventually, France renounced
her scheme for the purchase of Luxemburg; but Prussia evacuated the fortress,
which was declared neutral and dismantled.
Harmony being
thus reestablished between the two Courts, the magnificent fete of the Great
Exhibition at Paris in 1867 opened under favourable auspices. This was a gay
and brilliant episode. For a period of two months, the reception of sovereigns,
and of pleasure- seekers from all nations, together with a succession of
reviews, banquets, and fireworks, obliterated all thought of public affairs
from the minds of the French people. But tine fetes were destined to end in a
cloud of melancholy and anxiety; and the awakening to reality was a sad one.
During the
night of June 29-30, a telegram brought the intelligence that the Emperor
Maximilian had been shot at Queretaro. The lamentable adventure was now indeed
at an end. Ever since February, 1866,
484 The Meocican disaster-Continental
complications. [i865-7
Napoleon III
had decided to withdraw his troops from Mexico, and to abandon the unfortunate
Maximilian, whose wife, the Empress Charlotte, had been to Saint-Cloud in the
hope of awakening the Emperor’s pity. But she could obtain no help from him;
and in her despair she had gone out of her mind (September, 1866). In December,
Maximilian refused to abdicate his throne at the request of Napoleon III; and
in March, 1867, Bazaine embarked the last of the French battalions. In the
following May, while trying to organise a last despairing resistance,
Maximilian was traitorously delivered into the hands of Juirez, and shot
without mercy. This mournful news made a deep impression upon public opinion.
It was the end of the gloiy of the Empire. From every side, also, during the
summer of 1867, came tidings of humiliations and rising difficulties. The
Emperor had hoped that the Tsar’s visit to Paris would obliterate the
impressions of 1863; but, when the Pole Berezowski shot at the royal visitor,
and a Parisian jury brought in a verdict of extenuating circumstances for the
patriot, this diplomatic expectation was disappointed (June). A few weeks
later, when the Emperor reminded Germany in a Note of the rights of the
populations of the Duchies, the Prussian Government gave him to understand that
it was not his place to intervene in German internal affairs (July). The
discouragement of the sovereign after this rebuff is easy to realise, and also the
anxiety with which he watched “the black shadows,” as he called them, which
overshadowed the horizon (Speech at Lille, August 27).
At this
point, however, an understanding was arrived at with Austria. In August, to the
great dissatisfaction of the Prussian Press, the French Emperor went to
Salzburg, on a visit to the Austrian. In the following October, Francis Joseph
returned the visit, and during his stay in Paris admitted the possibility of an
alliance, which “would be a fresh guarantee for the peace so essential to the
prosperity of the nations of Europe.” But, in order to secure a lasting
alliance between France and Austria, which would become a real guarantee for a
balance of power against the ambitions of the Berlin Cabinet, Italy must first
be detached from her alliance with Prussia. By a sort of fatality, however, at
the end of
1867, Napoleon III, in answer to the Catholic
demands, was once again to engage in hostilities with the patriots of Italy.
After the sharp conflict at the beginning of 1865, the Emperor, whose
determination was never much more than a half-determination, had made the
Clerical party some important concessions. Duruy’s report had been quickly disowned;
and Prince Napoleon was publicly reprimanded for declaring that the Empire would
never betray the Revolution (May, 1865). In defiance of the September
Convention, Napoleon III had even allowed French officers and soldiers to enter
the service of the Pope. But all this was insufficient to satisfy the Catholics
and the Bishops who, like Dupanloup and Pie, had joined with the Univers
against the Emperor. They grew more arrogant than ever, and demanded fresh
concessions: At
home, they
furiously attacked Duruy, the Minister of Education, who was increasing the
number of elementary schools, claiming the right of the State to superintend
the education of girls, endeavouring to make the encroaching religious Orders
keep within the law (Bill of 1867), and working, like a true democrat, by means
of popular libraries, evening classes and public conferences, at the task of
educating the voters under universal suffrage. Abroad, the Catholic party
demanded that efficacious means should be employed for the protection of the
Pope’s temporal power.
By the end of
December, 1866, the last French troops had evacuated Rome, in accordance with
the September Convention. In February, Garibaldi left his nest at Caprera, and
revived the zeal of his faithful followers with the cry of “ Rome or death ! ”;
and in September led his followers into the States of the Church. This time
Napoleon was not strong enough to withstand the anger of his Catholic subjects
; and on October 25, a French force left Toulon for Rome. On November 3, this
army completely routed Garibaldi’s troops at Mentana; and General de Failly telegraphed
“that the chassepots (the new breech-loading rifles) had done wonders.”
Napoleon’s rupture with the Italian patriots was now complete. A few weeks
later, on December 4, Rouher in the Chamber officially sanctioned this rupture,
declaring amid the applause of the majority, “that Italy should never take
Rome; that France would never, never permit such a violence to her honour and
to Catholicism.”
In France,
however, this last expedition to Rome at once showed the power of a new
opposition, alike irreconcilable and irrepressible, that of the new
reconstituted Republican party. Mentana had not only set Italians and Frenchmen
at enmity; it had also set the Revolutionists against the supporters of
authority. The word for action came from the Republican Congress sitting at
Geneva. Napoleon III had sent his troops to Italy principally in order to avert
a revolution; on November 2, by way of an answer, the first attempt at a public
demonstration took place in Paris. Since the election of 1863, the Republican party
had been growing larger and stronger. Side by side with the Parliamentary
Opposition composed of the veterans of 1848, the returned exiles of 1859, the
young lawyers who had supported the Cinq, and who had been candidates in 1863
(to all of whom an alliance with the Liberals became daily more unbearable),
another opposition, at once more audacious and uncompromising, had now come
into being. Men like Jules Favre, Jules Simon, Ernest Picard, and iWle
Ollivier, had been the most illustrious representatives of the earlier
generation. Leon Gambetta, a young lawyer from Cahors, whose eloquence was the
admiration of the Quartier Latin, quite realised the utility of their work, but
at the same time was already conscious that an opposition of another sort had become
necessary. Between 1863 and 1868, a great quantity of political and religious
criticism had been published, and had influenced the minds of the younger
generation. Wise and moderate Reviews, like the Revue de
Paris,
insignificant daily papers containing literary criticism, like the Revue pour
tons, the Jeunesse, and the Travail, all of which had been quickly destroyed by
their own audacities, had now been succeeded by papers of even stronger
Republican and Socialistic tendencies. Such were the Rive Gauche, to which
Rogeard and Charles Longuet contributed; the Courrier Jrangais, under
Vermorel’s direction, in which Valles collaborated; and Cawdide, edited by
Blanqui and his disciples. An International Congress of students at Liege, in
October, 1865, and the aforementioned Republican Congress for the promotion of
Peace and Liberty at Geneva, in September, 1867, had given the new men
opportunities of solemnly affirming their materialistic opinions and their
violent Republicanism.
The
formation, in the wake of this party, of a strong labour opposition was of
special importance. The industrial expansion, which had been going on since
1851, had concentrated the working classes in the towns; and little by little a
perception of their interests as a class had arisen among them. The sentimental
and utopian form of socialism, current in 1848, had given place to a more
reasonable scheme for' defending their own interests. At first, the Government
had endeavoured to use this new force for its own purposes. In 1862, it
assisted the working classes to send delegates to the London Exhibition. It
allowed them to express their demands freely, and granted them the right of
combination (May 25, 1864); and, though it had not permitted the formation of
unions, it had tolerated the existence of French branches of the “Workmen’s
International Association,” founded in London in 1864.
But since
1866 any realisation of the Government’s hope of attracting anticlerical and
Republican workmen, until now more or less neutral, by means of social
concessions had grown more and more problematical. When, however, the Empire,
on the one side, required a declaration of support from them, while the
Blanquists, on the other, pressed them to proclaim their Republicanism—the
working classes realised, as time went on, that they would be obliged to
declare themselves politically, if it were only with a view to the future of
their own movements for cooperative and social purposes. In September, 1867,
the second International Congress at Lausanne sent a delegation to the Peace
Congress at Geneva; and Socialistic workmen thus united themselves with genuine
Republicans against the Empire. On November 4, 1867, the Internationalists took
part in the demonstration against the second expedition to Rome; and, on
December SO, the members of the Paris Branch were prosecuted for having
interfered in political matters.
At the
beginning of 1868 the position of the Empire seemed more than ever precarious,
and the Prussian danger loomed larger. “Any accident,” wrote the French
military attacM at Berlin, “may bring on war.” In view of this coming struggle
the alliance with Italy was indispensable to France, but after Mentana it was
out of the question.
After the
Mexican fiasco and in face of Prussia’s military position, a reorganisation of
the army was necessary, and for this the consent of the nation had to be
obtained. But the nation exacted fresh pledges and guarantees; the
parliamentary Opposition was hostile; and Republican and Socialist tendencies
were undermining the Imperial authority.
The unlucky
sovereign was thus compelled to carry out in 1868 some of the reforms which he
had succeeded in putting off. At the risk of offending all parties and classes,
he began by demanding the reform of the army. After the campaign of 1866 Niel
had proposed universal service in imitation of Prussia. The Chamber, however,
would not agree, and the Republicans advocated the creation of a militia on the
Swiss system and the adoption of a pacific policy. The Chamber rejected these proposals
contemptuously, but compromised by conceding to the Government a system of nine
years’ service (five years in the active army and four in the reserve) which
was calculated to yield 200,000 men. It also agreed to the establishment of a
Garde Nationale, to include those who had escaped or avoided regular service,
and thus double the number of effective troops (February 1, 1868). But the
Government shrank from increasing the general discontent by calling out this
force for service, and in 1870 it existed on paper only.
The time to
make concessions had come, and it was necessary to make them openly and not
under specious pretexts as in 1860. From this time forward the Emperor could
only hope to silence his opponents by yielding to their demands. The Liberals
and the members of the Third Party obtained the enactment of two laws which had
been promised on January 19, 1868. On May 11, a Statute relating to the Press
reduced the formalities for founding a journal to a simple declaration, and
abolished administrative interference in the way of warning, suspension and
suppression. Newspapers were placed within the jurisdiction of the Courts, that
is to say, of correctional tribunals, not juries. The stamp and the deposit by
way of security were still insisted on; but the administrative system was
practically at an end. On the other hand, an enactment of June 11 authorised
the holding of public meetings subject to the signature by certain persons of
the necessary declaration, and provided that each meeting should take place in
a closed building under the supervision of a commissary of police who had power
to dissolve it.
But these
half-liberties came too late; men are not grateful for what they extort by
force. No one was deceived. The edifice was no sooner complete than it began to
crumble away; the concessions were turned into weapons against the Government.
Immediately on the publication of the Press law, Republican journals began to
multiply. The elections were to take place in May, 1869, and an active propaganda
was necessary. In addition to the Siecle, to the Opinion nationale (founded in
1859), to the Temps (1861), and the A venir national (1865), there appeared the
Tribune, edited by Eugene Pelletan, the Revue politique of Challemel-Lacour,
the
488 Influence of the Press: Rochefort. Tdnot. '
[1868-9
Democratie
of Chassin, the itledeur of Ernest Picard, the organ of the Moderate
Republicans, and the Reveil of Delescluze, a gloomy revolutionary who had
returned to Paris from Cayenne ready- once more to enter the lists as the
champion of a Jacobin Republic. On May 30,
1868, Henri Rochefort began to publish his
Lamteme, a periodical pamphlet which quickly eclipsed these other publications.
The witticisms, the puns, the impertinences of that able and fervid controversialist
flew from mouth to mouth; neither prosecutions nor police measures could
prevent the terrible little sheets from crossing the frontier. At the Tuileries
all was consternation. At the same time the public gatherings of Socialist
workmen became more frequent; social questions were ventilated, and the various
economic systems came into violent collision; but before long the discussions
degenerated into political disquisitions. Imperial institutions, religion and
the rights of property were made the subjects of debate; and Conservatives of
every hue, Imperialist or Liberal, began to feel misgivings.
Towards the
end of the year certain events showed how strong and uncompromising was the
opposition to the Empire. Eugene Tenot in Paris m December, 1851, in moderate
and simple, but merciless, terms had told the story of the Coup d'etat. On
November 2, All Souls’ Day, some Republican workmen, after a demonstration over
the grave of Manin, the Italian patriot, discovered the forgotten tomb of
Baudin, who had fallen while fighting on a barricade. The Republican newspapers
opened a public subscription for a monument. They were prosecuted; and during
the trial Gambetta, who defended Delescluze, fulminated a crushing charge
against the Coup diktat. He denounced the men “plunged in debt and crime” who
had originated it, recalled the “ slaughter ” in the streets of Paris, and
wound up by invoking a “ great national expiation.” His clients were found
guilty; but Gambetta’s words were applauded throughout Republican France.
Every day new
enemies appeared. The democratic propaganda made headway even amongst the
bourgeoisie, that “influential class” whose example had much weight with the
people. The adventurous and revolutionary spirits whose aim it was “to disturb
public tranquillity,” in the words of the Emperor at the opening of the
Chambers (January 18, 1869), gained more and more influence. Even the
parliamentary Opposition, inspired by the popular movement, gained both in
activity and numbers; and during the session of 1869 it terminated successfully
its protracted campaign in defence of the liberties of Paris. From that time
forward the extraordinary Budget of the City was to be voted by the Municipal
Council under the sanction of the Legislative Body, and no longer depended
entirely on the will of the Government.
The elections
of May 23 and 24, 1869, gave proof of the progress of the Opposition in the
country. The parties of which it was composed fought their battles separately,
sometimes even in rivalry with each other,
but with the
certainty that their common cause—such was its strength— could not suffer from
their divisions. The Republican party, the most robust and the boldest of all
the political groups, ventured even in Paris to support candidatures hostile to
the Government, some of its members giving their adherence to Moderates, others
to Irreconcilables, others even to Insermentes—that is, candidates who refused
to take the prescribed oath, while a few even advocated the candidatures of
working men. The Government had not ventured to put forward its officials as
candidates, and the nation could therefore concentrate its interest in the
struggle between the Moderates and the Irreconcilables, between Carnot and
Gambetta, Jules Favre and Rochefort. The result more than fulfilled the hopes
of the Republicans. Throughout the country the Government secured 4,438,000
votes, the Opposition 3,355,000. Since 1863 the Government had lost 662,000
adherents, while the Opposition had gained 1,350,000. In Paris the number of
those who voted for the Government did not exceed 74,000 while 231,000 rallied
to the Opposition. The Opposition moreover gained not only in numbers but in
strength; Orleanists and Liberals were defeated by Repub11 :ans and
Democrats; and out of ninety candidates of the Opposition something like forty
were the irreconcilable foes of the Empire. The Government did its best to
alarm the country and to rally the Moderates to its side by pointing to the red
spectre of revolution. Its own agents, the blouses blanches (white blouses),
instigated disturbances; and domiciliary visits, arrests and prosecutions
followed. Its paid writers enlarged upon the terrors of the Socialist
propaganda which, under the guidance of able and prudent leaders like the
chiefs of the second “International Congress,” was gaining ground rapidly
amongst the working classes. These tactics, which the Republicans had no
difficulty in exposing, might rally to the Empire a few moderate Liberals
alarmed at democratic and Socialistic tendencies; but, in order to detach and
win over again to the dynasty a part of the Opposition, it was necessary to
admit the justice of their claims.
During a
whole year, while Prussia was arming and the tide of democratic revolution
rising, there ensued between the two factions, each of which proclaimed that it
would save the Empire, a last and dramatic struggle which ended in the ruin of
France. The Third Party imagined that they could restore order and create a
stable government by means of a Liberal regime \ and on June 28 the 116
deputies, of which it was composed, brought forward an interpellation, in which
they demanded “the creation of a responsible Ministry, and the recognition of
the right of the Legislative Body to regulate the essential conditions of its
own activity.” With the help of forty deputies of the Left the 116 obtained a
majority. The Emperor had no choice, if he was to avoid a struggle with at
least one-half of his subjects, but to grant the demand of the Third Party. On
July 12 by a Message to the Legislative Body the Emperor adopted the programme
of the 116;
but to
prevent the discussion of these constitutional questions, he, in a strange
spirit of contradiction, prorogued the very body whose powers were in process
of being enlarged (July IS). For another six months, by a succession of
intrigues, the contest was maintained between the party of. Government and the
Liberals, while the unhappy sovereign, worn by illness (in August his life was
despaired of), and helpless in the face of opposing influences, hesitated to
cast in his lot with one party or the other.
On July IS
the Emperor had suppressed the Ministry of State and appointed Rouher President
of the Senate, but he had chosen Forcade de La Roquette, the great supporter of
official candidatures, as Minister of the Interior, and he shrank from calling
to office the men who, in the eyes of the country, would have heralded the new
regime. On September 6 the Senate adopted the draft of the Decree framed in
accordance with the promises of the Message. The Legislative Body became a
parliamentary assembly after the English fashion; it had the right to choose
its own president and secretaries, to propose enactments, to criticise and vote
the Budget, and discuss amendments in detail. The Senate also became a
deliberative assembly; its sittings were public; it had the right of
criticising and discussing laws voted by the Chamber and of sending them back
for reconsideration, the Ministers too were declared responsible and liable to
be arraigned before the Senate. The Emperor, however, shrank from becoming a
constitutional monarch in the true sense. The Senatus- consultwm declared that
the Ministers depended on him alone—a reservation showing how unreal was their
responsibility. There could be no doubt that at heart he sympathised with the
Government party—the Arcadiens or Mameluks—who found in the Empress, now that
the physical strength of the Emperor was declining, an ally more powerful than
ever.: Rouher continued to be the Emperor’s trusted adviser.
On November
29, in opening the Chambers, the Emperor expressed incidentally his doubt and
distress at the prospect of all these reforms. The new rSgime, “ avoiding
reaction on the one hand and revolution on the other, ought,” said he, “ to be
founded on order and liberty.” “ As for order,” he added, “ I answer for it; as
for liberty, it is for you to aid me in preserving it.” But the Third Party,
after the six months’ grace, were no longer satisfied with declarations and
promises, and the negotiations between their chief Ollivier and the Court were
hurried on. On December 28 ^mile Ollivier was entrusted by the Emperor with the
“formation of a homogeneous Cabinet, representative of the majority of the
Legislative Body”; and on January 2, 1870, the new Ministry was constituted.
The Ministry was, from the first, confronted with grave difficulties, both in
Parliament and in the country. The party which should have formed its chief
support was already divided; the majority following Ollivier were satisfied, with
the Senatusconsultum and formed the Right Centre; but the other members, under
the leadership of former
parliamentarians
and former Orleanists, Buffet and Daru, detesting all that savoured of
Caesarism, demanded wider powers for the elected chamber and that ministerial
responsibility should be made a reality. After protracted negotiations Ollivier
had been compelled to admit to his “homogeneous” Cabinet four members of the
Right Centre and four of the Left Centre, while he retained three of the former
Ministers.
What was to
be the trend of the new Minister’s policy ? On the Right he was supported by
the official ministerialists, original adherents of the Empire who had grown
with its evolution, and who secured him an enormous majority; but he was
opposed by the Extreme Imperialists, men whose intractable temper was stiffened
by the fact of their secret relations with the Court, and who welcomed any
blunder of the Minister’s as a pretext for the advocacy of their own methods.
On the Left the forty Liberal or Republican deputies were no doubt helpless;
but they spoke in the name of the populations of the great towns, of the
working classes and of the educated middle class, and their pronouncements had
the weight of revolutionary manifestos. The Republicans, as a matter of fact,
no longer felt for parliamentary opposition the enthusiasm of 1863. The
programme of their most popular deputies— of Gambetta for instance, known as
the programme of Belleville, comprising as it did “ universal suffrage in its
widest sense, the freedom of the Press, the right of meeting and of combination
and of trial by jury for all political offences, the separation of Church and
State, the suppression of permanent armies,” could exist under the empire only
as an enunciation of principle, for it was a declaration of open war. Behind
the Radicals moreover sprang up the Socialists of the “International,”
preaching republicanism and revolution to the workmen in the great towns,
organising trades unions, supporting strikes and denouncing even the most
advanced politicians for their timidity on economic questions. The collectivist
theories adopted by the “International” at Brussels (September, 1868) and
again at Basel (September, 1869) together with the Blanquist traditions, were
preparing the ground in the artisan quarters of Paris and the great towns for
acts of open revolt. So early as October 26 an outbreak was only averted by the
absence of the Deputies. In November the election of Rochefort, who was
returned by 17,900 votes for Belleville at a bye-election—Gambetta having
decided to sit for Marseilles—was regarded as a Socialistic and revolutionary
triumph. On January 12, 1870, the Ollivier Ministry had to deal with the
manifestations provoked by the death of Victor Noir—the victim of Prince Pierre
Bonaparte—around whose body a crowd of 100,000 persons assembled to testify
their hatred of the Empire.
In reality,
at the beginning of 1870, it was no longer a question whether the Left Centre
or the Right Centre would prevail, or if Ollivier was capable of converting a
Liberal Empire into a Constitutional
492
[l870
monarchy, but
only whether he could save the Empire from destruction by dint of liberal
concessions and a policy of peace. The history of his Ministry is the history
of his surrenders to the Arcadiens, and to the policy of despotism and war. At
the outset he had promised legislation in favour of the Press, the repeal of
the Law of Public Security of 1858, and the authorisation of the public sale of
newspapers. The Ministers, too, of the Left Centre were anxious to emphasise
their fidelity to their principles, and to do away with the right of the
Government to reshape at will the electoral districts and support its official
candidates. They proposed in addition to suppress the constituent authority of
the Senate, which made it impossible for the elected Chamber to achieve
Constitutional progress. In February, by a clever manoeuvre of the Republican
Left, Ollivier was compelled to condemn the system of official candidature. In
March he was forced to redeem his pledges by proposing a revision of the
Constitution; and, in a Message of the 21st of that month, the Emperor
proclaimed his willingness to adopt all the reforms that Constitutional
government demanded. By April 20 the reform was accomplished; the Senate became
an Upper House sharing legislative power with the elected Chamber, and the
constituent authority was henceforth to rest with the people. No change in the
Constitution could be made without a plebiscite, and the Orleanist Ministers
hoped that no change would be made without the sanction of the Chambers. In
spite, however, of these reforms, nothing indicated that Ollivier had succeeded
in consolidating the Empire. In dealing with the Republicans and Socialists,
whose audacity grew day by day, he was compelled to return to the methods of
absolutism. He arrested Rochefort at Belleville (February 9) for taking part in
the obsequies of Victor Noir; he arrested the editors of the Marseillaise, and
kept under police supervision the leading spirits of the International—Varlin
at Paris, Richard at Lyons, Aubry at Rouen and Bastelica at Marseilles. But,
notwithstanding all these measures, and in spite of the acquittal of Pierre
Bonaparte by the High Court of Tours, uneasiness was still felt in Imperial
circles.
It was at
this point especially that the suggestions of the Absolutists were listened to,
and that the counsels of Rouher prevailed once more over those of Ollivier.
Already the idea of war, and of seeking beyond the frontier the needed
popularity, haunted the Imperial counsels; but the Emperor, weary and old, with
no confidence in the future, inclined to less perilous measures. A triumphant
plebiscite, placing fresh power in his hand, was his dream. The Senate, led by
Rouher, supported him. The extreme Bonapartists hoped to find in this
repetition of an act in itself peculiarly Napoleonic, a check on the growth of
parliamentarism, and the assertion of the triumph of personal government over
Liberalism. Ollivier saw through the manoeuvre; he resisted at first, but
afterwards gave way. The Orleanists Buffet and Daru would be no parties to this
return to despotism; and, as they could no longer look forward to the
establishment
of the parliamentary and constitutional monarchy of their tradition, they
resigned.
On April 23
the French nation was summoned to declare by plebiscite “ whether it approved
the Liberal reforms effected in the constitution since 1860 by the Emperor with
the concurrence of the chief bodies of the State, and whether it ratified the
Senatusconsultum of April 20,1870.” In his summons to his people, Napoleon III
urged them to vote “aye” in order “to avert the peril of revolution,” to
“establish order and liberty on a firm basis,” to “assure the transmission of
the crown to his son.” From April 23 to May 8 a great battle raged between the
Empire and the Republic. The Republican forces, it is true, were once again
divided; some, amongst them Ernest Picard, became alarmed at the Republican and
Socialistic movement, and feared that the Empire might use it as a weapon
against the Republic; they resolved therefore to break with the Extreme Left,
and formed the Open Left (Gauche ouverte), as contrasted with the Closed
(Gauche J'ermee'). The Democratic Committee of the Rue de Sourdiere carried on
nevertheless a vigorous campaign; and in opposition to it the Central
Plebiscitory Committee (Comite central plibisdtaire), the organ of the
Autocratic Right, engaged in the struggle. While the contest went on, Ollivier
could not remain in the background. He required of his officials a “ devouring
activity,” and to emphasise the vigilance of the Imperial Government, the
defender of order and property, he announced the discovery of a plot against
the life of the Emperor, and began a fresh prosecution of the “ International.”
The voting took place on May 8: 7,358,786 voted “ aye,” 1,571,939 voted “no,”
and there were 1,894,681 abstentions; Napoleon III secured once again.the
triumphant majority which in the past had raised him to the throne. The Empire
seemed to have gathered strength, and the Emperor called upon Frenchmen to contemplate
the future with confidence. The Ministry was reconstituted; the Due de Gramont,
a trained diplomat, became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Plichon Minister of
Public Works. The revolutionary agitation seemed to be quieting down, and
abroad also there was apparent calm. In reply to Jules Favre on June 30
Ollivier declared: “ On whichever side we look there is an absence of troublesome
questions; at no moment has the maintenance of peace in Europe been better
assured.” A few days later, the storm broke which was to sweep away a
government undermined in every direction, and to lay bare the contradictory impulses
which convulsed the French nation. The effort of the Liberals to extort a
system of constitutional guarantees and parliamentary liberty, coupled with the
social demands of the working class, had given fresh vigour to all political
parties; Parliamentary Orleanists, Moderate Republicans, Radical Democrats and
Socialists—all joined forces to attack the Empire. But which of them was to
carry the position and to use for its own ends the vast energies thus let loose
? Once more, it was the
shock of
events beyond the frontier which decided the question and it was amid the
scenes of a cruel tragedy that the political constitution was reshaped.
From the
beginning of 1868 the threat of a Franco-Prussian war hung over Europe. War was
necessary to Bismarck to enable him to create German unity under Prussian
headship, while the French were driven headlong into it by the interests of
their dynasty combined with the intense feeling excited by the campaign of
Koniggratz. It was with an eye to Prussia that in July, 1868, the Emperor, with
the aid of certain picked officers, had attempted to reorganise the army; and
it was against Prussia that he had been endeavouring to form permanent
alliances with Austria and Italy. During the whole of 1869 negotiations had
been going on between Florence, Paris and Vienna: Italy especially leaned to
war as a means of satisfying Italian patriotism after Mentana and of
reconciliation with France. Austria on her side dreamed of revenge for
Koniggratz; and the French Government anticipated a success which would restore
all its former authority. But the Emperor, whose energies were sapped by
successive attacks of hematuria and whose hesitation and timidity increased
with age, was anxious to come to such an agreement with Prussia as should
ensure peace and at the same time bring glory to France; and, contemporaneously
with his negotiations with Italy and Austria, he pursued the project of a
Franco-Belgian Zollverein for which the assent of Prussia was necessary.
The Italian
alliance, though indispensable, was offered only on a condition which prevented
a treaty. Italy demanded a return to the Convention of 1864 and the withdrawal
of the French troops from Rome. In June and again in September, 1869, this
condition was pressed upon the Emperor, but he still hung back. The Catholics,
in the consciousness that the support which they furnished against the rising
wave of revolution was necessary to the Empire, asserted themselves with
greater energy. Since the middle of 1868 they had carried on a furious campaign
against Duruy, the democratic Minister of Public Instruction, and they finally
brought about his dismissal (July, 1869). So early as July 10, 1868, the Pope
had summoned an (Ecumenical Council to meet at the Vatican on December 8 of the
following year; but he had omitted to invite, in accordance with the invariable
custom of the Church,,the ambassadors of the Great Powers; and it soon became
known thpt the object of the meeting was to proclaim the infallibility of
thejrope and to make all bishops immediately dependent upon him. The French
Government, more endangered than any other by these Attempts to trench on the
civil authority, tried a remonstrance and, for a moment, even contemplated
breaking off negotiations with the Vatican. On the other hand, in order not to
offend its Catholic subjects and to avail itself of their aid against the
Vatican, the Government was compelled to maintain its soldiers at Rome and
thwart the aspirations of Italy. Under these
1869-70]
495
conditions
the negotiations for a triple alliance had very little chance of achieving
success.
At this
juncture, while the diplomatic position was still uncertain, the candidature of
Leopold of Hohenzollem to the throne of Spain was announced. From the time when
he was first spoken of (April, 1869), the comments of the French Press and
certain steps taken by the Government satisfied Bismarck that this was the “red
rag” for the “ French bull.” From March to June, 1870, he was quietly preparing
for his great stroke; and on July 2 France was informed that Leopold of
Hohenzollern was undoubtedly a candidate for the throne of Spain. The
excitement at the Tuileries was intense, and in the opinion of Emile Ollivier,
who since May 8 had drawn nearer to the Imperialists, the Emperor needed a great
diplomatic success, which, following on the plebiscite, would complete the
discomfiture of the Republican and Liberal Opposition. Such a success was
indispensable; the newspapers devoted to the empire were foremost in clamouring
for it.
Ollivier,
Marshal Lebceuf, and the Emperor desired that this satisfaction should be
gained by diplomatic methods; but during the night of July 5-6 the counsels of
the Empress and de Gramont prevailed, and a note was framed in arrogant terms.
If, however, Bismarck wished for war, the King of Prussia was not equally
decided. On July 10 he yielded to the demands of the French Government; and on
the 12th, by his order, the father of Leopold, on behalf of his son, renounced
the throne of Spain. Bismarck, in despair, was on the point of resigning; while
Ollivier was overjoyed in the belief that he had secured peace abroad and
tranquillity at home. The Absolutists, infatuated by their conception of
Imperial glory, regarded the proffered satisfaction as insufficient; it was
also necessary, they considered, to humiliate the King of Prussia or to conquer
him. It will be seen elsewhere how on the evening of July 12 the Government
decided to require from the King of Prussia an undertaking for the future; how
on the 13th Benedetti obtained by a piece of unexpected good fortune a further
concession from the King—the public approval by Prussia of the withdrawal of
the candidature—and how, finally, Bismarck on the same day, making use of a
telegram received from Ems during the last negotiation, turned it into an
attack on France, which, while it roused German patriotism, at the same time
excited the “ French bull ” to fury. The fates had declared for war. The French
Government, after contemplating the summoning of a congress on the 14th, decided
that evening, on the strength of information which promised the assistance of
Austria and the south-German States, to propose to the Chambers a declaration
of war. The Emperor shed tears; but the Empress rejoiced in a war which seemed
to her to bring salvation. On the 15th the Chamber, without requiring further
information, voted for war, Thiers, Gambetta, and eight others alone opposing
the motion.
The
Marseillaise was sung in the streets, and the people shouted “ A Berlin
As a matter
of fact, in spite of the assurances of Marshal Lebceuf, the army was not ready;
and, with respect to alliances, it is now known that, at the moment when she
entered upon the struggle, Prance had received nothing more than vague
assurances from Austria and Italy. On July 14, to obtain the armed cooperation
of the Italians and consequently that of Austria, the Government decided to
recall its troops from Civita Vecchia. It was too late to induce Italy to
abandon her neutrality; before doing this she demanded the evacuation of Rome
and a free hand to deal with the Holy See. It was in vain that Count Beust
insisted that the French Government should consent to take the only steps by
which the,alliance could be brought about; for on July 25 the Emperor declared
that he “ could not defend his honour on the Rhine to sacrifice it on the
Tiber.” When on August 19, after the first defeats, he yielded, it was once
more too late; the concessions forced from him failed to induce Italy to
stretch out a helping hand. In their eagerness to save Rome, the Catholic party
had brought about the ruin of the Empire and the humiliation of France.
The end of
July and the beginning of August witnessed the first defeats. On receipt of the
news the Republicans and Socialists of Paris, burning with patriotism and
intoxicated with memories of the Revolution, clamoured for war to the knife.
The majority, yielding to the pressure of public opinion, abandoned Ollivier.
The Emperor being with the army, the Empress, as regent, chose the new
Ministers from among the Bonapartists of the extreme war party (August 10,
1870). The National Guard were thereupon called out; a loan of 1,000,000,000
francs was arranged; and Councillors of State were despatched on special
missions. The Government of the Empire accepted all the methods adopted during
the revolutionary wars, except the permanence of the Chamber and the creation
of a Committee of National Defence, which were demanded by Jules Favre (August
13).
But this
ill-assorted Government could not bring itself to pursue a frauk and bold
policy, the only one which under the circumstances could possibly succeed. They
confined their efforts to searching for assistance in Europe, which England,
alarmed by the revelations of Bismarck as to the designs of Napoleon III upon Belgium,
was perhaps not anxious that they should find; and, fearing an insurrection,
they neglected to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Paris the remaining
armies. It was the opinion of some persons that a Republic alone was capable of
defending the country. Blanqui attempted to establish a Republic on August 14
by seizing the barracks of La Villette. He failed, but by the end of August
Bazaine had been forced back into Metz; and on September 2, at Sedan, the
Emperor and 80,000 men under Macmahon surrendered to the Germans. The army had
remained the sole support of the Empire against the tide of republicanism and
Socialism. The
Emperor had
refused to preserve the army for his own ends by making peace, and, now that it
had been destroyed, the fall of his Empire was inevitable.
On September
3, at the news of the capitulation of Sedan, the Left proposed to the
Legislative Body to vote the deposition of the Emperor and the appointment of a
committee of government. On the following day the Ministry made an attempt to
preserve the regency by urging the acceptance of a proposal, under the sign
manual of the Empress, for the formation of a council of five deputies
(September 4). But the revolutionaries, who in 1869 had attempted Republican
outbreaks, now under Socialist leaders felt themselves to be irresistible. They
invaded the Legislative Body with cries of “ Deposition " and “ B epublic
”; and in the midst of tumult the Republic was proclaimed. Thereupon the Left,
refusing to negotiate with the former ma'ority, repaired as in 1848 to the
Hotel de Ville; and a Provisional Government under the presidency of Trochu,
the Military Governor of Paris, and including certain deputies of the Left,
such as Jules Eavre, Ernest Picard and Gambetta,took over the National Defence.
Through the medium of a proclamation, issued by Slanqui and his friends, the
proletariate of the capital declared that they would support the Provisional
Government ungrudgingly in carrying on .the struggle with invaders and
reactionaries to the last extremity.
Thus, at the
very beginning of the new government, two of the chief influences which had
combined against the Empire were brought into collision: on the one hand, the
republican and Soqiaiistic population of Paris, who had brought about the
revolution, with the express purpose of carrying on war to the knife; on the
other, the moderate parliamentary Republicans, between whom and the
Revolutionaries disputes had already occurred, had come to the Hotel de Ville
to rescue the national movement from the hands of the extremists. The history
of the Provisional Government is that of the struggle between these two forces;
and they first came to blows on the question of the conduct of the war. At
first the Government of Defence seemed to encourage the praiseworthy
self-devotion of the Parisians The 300,000 men of the National Guard were
armed, and Paris was turned into a vast entrenched camp; but neither Trochu,
Jules Favre, nor Jules Simon had faith in the efficacy of this “ heroic
madness." On September 12 Thiers departed to visit the European Courts
and, if possible, to arrange for a European congress and a diplomatic
intervention; and on the l9th, hardly a fortnight after the proclamation of
the National Defence, Jules Favre was at Ferrieres attempting to treat with
Bismarck.
In order to
negotiate it was necessary, in the first place, to know if the Germans would
recognise the Government of National Defence. They would perhaps have done so,
had Jules Favre agreed forthwith to a cession of territory, or to the surrender
of some fort commanding Paris, in exchange for an armistice. The Parisian
patriots however
would never
have permitted this, and Bismarck was compelled to have recourse to the late
Government. He had endeavoured by a series of somewhat obscure negotiations and
intrigues to induce the Empress to agree to the cession' of Alsace and
Lorraine, in return for which the army of Bazaine was to be released from Metz,
and so left free to aid in reestablishing her authority. On October 23,
however, the Empress, who was in London, declared, on the advice of her
Council, that she would not agree to the mutilation of France, and asked that
an armistice might, be granted for the army of Metz. The King of Prussia
refused. On October 27 the army of Metz capitulated; and from that time forward
the German Government declined to treat except with the Government of National
Defence. The delegation, composed of three members^ sent into the provinces by
the National Defence, had started previously to the investment of Paris, had
been reinforced on October 9 by Gambetta, and seemed thoroughly imbued with the
spirit of passionate hope which animated the capital. Since his arrival at
Tours, Gambetta had worked furiously, recruiting, calling out and arming new
regiments. He acted like the Government of 1793, as an absolute dictator “for
the welfare of the country”; and he nowhere met with opposition except for a
moment at Lyons (September 22). His armies* however, were in no condition to
march on Paris; and the inhabitants of the capital, to whom every day brought
news of a fresh disaster, grew exasperated at the sluggishness of Trochu and
the leaders in authority there. Little by little, the inaction of the rulers
weakened their authority, and the voice of the Revolution made itself heard.
Already, on the negotiations at Ferrieres becoming known, the revolutionary
party showed signs of disquiet; and at a meeting held at the Bourse nineteen
majors of the National Guard had supported the proposal of Blanqui and Plourenj
to proclaim martial law and to organise a “Commune” as in 1792.
At the end of
October the capitulation of Metz, at first denied, but later admitted by the
Government, the abandonment on the 30th of the village of Le Bourget, which a
force from Paris had succeeded in capturing on the 28th, and finally the rumour
of negotiations between Thiers and Bismarck at Versailles—all these events,
happening one after another, exasperated the people of Paris and provoked a
formidable rising against the incapable men whose object it was to arrange a
peace— Trochu, Jules Favre and Picard. A revolt, even in the presence of the
enemy, seemed justifiable, as it offered the only prospect of carrying on the
war to the end. “In 1848,” wrote Blanqui, “Democracy stood alone and allowed itself
to be destroyed; in 1870 it has the country behind it, and this time it will
defend itself with teeth and claws.” On October 3 the National Guard were
persuaded by Flourens and Blanqui to imprison all the members of the Government
and set up another in their place. The members of the new Government did not
however put in an appearance, and, on the evening of the same day, the
“battalions of order” and the Gardes Mobiles of Britanny liberated Jules Ferry
and
Trochu. The
Government of the Defence remained master of the field; it suppressed the
revolt in no very vigorous fashion, and then caused the municipal elections to
be held. They obtained a vote of confidence in themselves by means of a
plebiscite (November 5); 557,996 “ayes” approved their action against 62,638
“noes.”
For three
months yet the armies of the National Defence held out against the Prussians,
but they were unable to force the lines encircling Paris. Gambetta and his
subordinates showed tireless energy, but Paris once again lost hope. A prey to
famine, feeling no confidence in leaders without energy and without a
programme, the Parisians gave signs of serious restlessness, crying “ Vive la
Commune! ” and displaying the red flag. When, after the last attempted sortie
on January 19, it was learned that Trochu, while he remained President of the
Government, had abandoned the command of the National Guard to the Bonapartist
Vinoy, the National Guards liberated the prisoners of October 31 and prepared
for a fresh revolt (January 22). The affair however was ill planned; the
Government, forewarned, had occupied the Hotel de Ville with the Mobiles of
Britanny; the Moderate Republicans deserted the Revolutionaries; and the
Government refused to proceed to the immediate election of the Commune. The discharge
of a few rifles before the Hotel de Ville provoked a sortie of the garrison,
and fifty National Guards were killed. On January 28, the extremists of the war
party having thus been brought under control, the Government of National
Defence felt that its authority was assured; and Jules Favre in conjunction
with Bismarck signed an armistice. On the same day the Government abdicated and
summoned the voters to elect a National Assembly, which should discuss and
arrange the terms of peace. The election of the Assembly was to follow the
forms of 1848, the electors voting in their cantons and upon a list of
candidates for each department ; 750 deputies were to be returned who were to
receive payment for their services.
What would
this Assembly do? to what hands was the fate of France about to be confided ?
In October, when Gambetta had wished to appeal to the electors, an Assembly
pledged to peace and genuinely Republican would without doubt have been
returned. After the furious crusade of Gambetta, at once a Republican and an
advocate of war to the knife, the candidates supported by the delegates at
Bordeaux seemed, as was inevitable, to belong to the war party, whereas on the
other hand Gambetta’s opponents appeared to belong to the party of peace. It was
for this reason that the^ peasants elected a body of Orleanists and
Legitimists, not, in most cases, because of their political opinions, but
simply because they were well-known men, who could be trusted and who were in
favour of peace.' These men formed the majority in the Assembly (400 against
350). The departments in the south-east which had suffered invasion had elected
Republicans; while, as for Paris, the
electoral
struggle was merely a fresh episode in the conflict between the Revolu lonary
party and the adherents of the Government. Many of the Revolutionaries were
elected. The Assembly met at Bordeaux on February 12,1871. It was clothed with
absolute power; but the majority fell short in the necessary monarchist
elements, and dared not, at the outset, risk a collision with the Republicans.
It shrank from entrusting a prince (whether Legitimist or Orleanist) with an
enterprise so precarious and so difficult. The Assembly was determined,
however, that it would not submit either to the dictatorship of Gambetta, or of
Paris. It refused to proclaim the Republic; it decided to reserve to a future
time “ the decision of France as to the definite form which her Government
should take”; but it chose Jules Grevy, a Republican and an opponent of
Gambetta, as its president, and at the head of the executive power it placed
Thiers, who had been elected in twenty-six departments, and whose protest
against the war in 1870 had made him the most popular man of the day.
From the
first, all men turned to him, members of the loyalist parties because of the
clear foresight which he had shown in his opposition to the Empire; the people
in general, because of his share in the peace nego 'itions, the Moderate
Republicans because they had faith in his “honest attempt” to form “such a
government as would create the fewest divisions.” On February 17 a decree of
the Assembly organised the executive power; it was Thiers who was chosen to
exercise it under the supervision of the Assembly and with the help of
Ministers whom he was to select and preside over. He selected Moderate Republicans
who belonged to the peace party, and undertook that his policy should be
confined to the task of “pacification, reorganisation, the restoration of
credit and the revival of industry” (February 17). This promise of neutrality,
so far as it related to constitutional questions—renewed once more on March
10—became known as the “Pact of Bordeaux.”
The Assembly
had been elected, above all, to conclude a peace; and on February 26, Thiers
and Jules Favre signed the preliminaries. On March 1, by 546 votes against 107,
there being 23 abstentions, the Assembly ratified them, and formally pronounced
the deposition of Napoleon III, who was declared responsible for the ruin of
France. Four of the revolutionary deputies for Paris thereupon resigned, on the
ground that they refused to sit in an “assembly which had surrendered two
provinces, dismembered France, and ruined the country.” It was inevitable that
a conflict should break out in the Bordeaux Assembly between the
Revolutionaries of the towns—of Paris especially—and fie rwraux representing
country districts. The patriotic and Socialistic passions—excited by the sic
ge—were only intensified by the decisions of the National Assembly.
In arranging
the preliminaries of peace, Thiers had ransomed Belfort, by agreeing that the
Germans should enter Paris and march through the Champs £lysees. This decision
aroused intense indignation in the city;
and between
February 26 and March 1 there were signs of a coming storm. The populace
employed themselves in removing into the districts of Montmartre and Belleville
the cannon for which their own' subscriptions had paid, though they had
sufficient good sense not to attack the Prussians. On March 10 the Bordeaux
Assembly gave fresh cause of offence in deciding to sit at Versailles and not
at Paris. Further than this, it forgot the sacrifices that the Parisians had
made and attacked their material interests. Commercial transactions and
payments due in respect of rent had been postponed during the siege, and a
further postponement was asked for, on the ground that business had not yet
revived; but this the Assembly refused. Working men too were without employment
and had no means of support besides their pay of 1 franc 50 centimes a day as
National Guards; and this also the Assembly declined to continue. Finally,
Thiers, when he arrived at Paris on March 15, decided to assert the authority
of the Government and sent troops to bring back the cannon from Montmartre. On
March 18 the soldiers, surrounded by the men of the faubourg and their wives,
refused to fire and made common cause with the people. General Lecomte, who
commanded them, and General Clement Thomas, who happened to be passing, were
both made prisoners and shot by the mob. During the day, as the insurrection
grew, Thiers and the other members of the Government quitted Paris. Thiers’
plan of action—the plan which he had advised Louis-Philippe to adopt in 1848,
and which Windischgratz had actually adopted at Vienna in 1849—was to reenter
the city with an army, and make short work of a “body of rebels who would
pillage Paris and work the destruction of France.” On the morning of the 19th
Paris was without any regularly constituted government; and, as was inevitable,
all authority passed into the hands of the former advocates of war to
extremity—the National Guards and the revolutionary Republicans. Since the end
of January the National Guards, especially those of the revolutionary quarters
in the east, had decided to combine and form a central committee, by way of
protecting themselves against the reaction in the rural districts. At the end
of February, after long discussion, the Republican Federation of the National
Guard had been formed; it was to be managed a Central Committee of delegates
which had been definitely chosen on March 15. On the 19th, when Thiers had
deprived Paris of all its administrative machinery, this Central Committee
installed itself in the Hotel de Ville and sent representatives to the
different ministries.
The mayors of
the arrondissements and the deputies who sat for Paris attempted, nevertheless,
during more than ten days, to avert the threatened struggle. Many of them acted
from a genuine desire to conciliate, and with the object of preventing the
Federates from marching on Versailles and of thus gaining time in the interests
of Thiers. In the first instance, they succeeded only in exciting the
middle-class Liberals of the western quarters against the Central Committee,
and in provoking
those demonstrations
which, on March 22, culminated in the massacre of the Place Vendome. A few days
later, however, they contrived to obtain from the Chamber a promise that, at
all events, a further delay should be granted for the payment of debts and
rents; that the National Guard should have the right to choose their officers;
and, finally, that members of the Paris Commune should be elected by universal
suffrage. The Central Committee, who had cause for mistrust, desired that the
elections should take place at once, and fixed them for March 25 ; but the
National Assembly treated this decree with reference to elections as illegal,
and the rupture became final.
These
preliminaries marked clearly the character of the movement in Paris. In spite
of the fact that they were for the most part Republican Socialists, the members
of the Central Committee formulated no social programme; their one desire was
to defend Republican principles and the autonomy of the communes against the
“men of Versailles.” 226,167 free citizens (out of 485,569 voters, of whom many
had left Paris) elected the ninety members of the “General Council of the
Commune” on Sunday, March 26. Fifteen retired within a few days of the
election; men who had been returned for the more well-to-do districts, such as
Ferry, Moline, Marmottan and others of the party of conciliation. The rest, who
belonged to the party of insurrection, retained their seats. Among them were a
dozen members of the Central Committee, obscure individuals such as Ranvier,
Billioray, and the like; but there were associated with them representatives of
all the revolutionary doctrines which had, since the fall of the Empire,
attracted the proletariate of Paris., There were Blanquists pure and simple, or
dissident Blanquists; advocates of a democratic dictatorship, such as Riganlt,
Ferr£, Ranc, Protot, Tridon; Radical publicists of the last years of the
Empire, steeped in the Jacobin tradition of 1793, such as Felix Pyat and
Delescluze, or imbued with Socialistic ideas like Vermorel and Flourens; the
representatives of “the red clubs” knowing little of either theory or practice,
but reflecting the vague craving for revolution of the populace of Paris, such
as Amouroux, Allix, Rastoul; finally, seventeen members of the International,
who
favoured
sweeping social changes to be carried out by peaceful means
Varlin,
Theisz, Lefranijais, Malon, Vaillant, Beslay—the stout hearts and clear heads
of the new Government.
It was thus
that the new Government of Paris was constituted; but oeside it, after a show
of definite abdication, the Central Committee continued to act, under the
pretext of “ serving as a bond between the Council and the National Guard.” The
Central Committee, in spite of the Socialist minority on the General Council,
succeeded by degrees in obtaining a share of the actual power; and it was able
to do this by reason of the peculiar authority which it exercised over the
National Guard. It is, in fact, this double authority of the General Council
and the Central Committee which characterises the rule of the Commune.
On March 29
the General Council set to work; it framed a scheme
of government
by appointing committees with full powers; an executive committee, a finance
committee, and committees having charge respectively of war, justice, public
security, provisioning, labour, manufactures and commerce, foreign relations,
public services and education. The Commune then proceeded (March 29) to remit
all rents due in October, 1870, and January and April, 1871, and after due
consideration granted a respite of three years in respect of commercial
obligations. It abolished conscription, established compulsory military service
for all able-bodied men of from eighteen to forty years, adopted the Republican
calendar and the red flag, and declared all the acts of the Government of
Versailles null and void. In each of the Committees the ablest of the members
laboured with praiseworthy zeal to realise the democratic programme. Protot, a
member of the Committee of Public Security, endeavoured to teach respect for
individual liberty; Vaillant reorganised education by an appeal to public
spirit, and by relying solely on trained secular teachers; Fraenckel
endeavoured to make the artisans cooperate and use the workshops which their
owners had abandoned; he forbade the bakers to work at night, and abolished the
system of commercial travellers. If circumstances, for the most part, forbade
the realisation of these measures, the Journal Offlciel enables us to form an
idea of the serious nature of the preparatory work which they entailed.
But it was
inevitable that the struggle with Thiers and the Assembly at Versailles and the
effort to find support in France should determine the line to be • followed by
the Commune. On April 3 the Federates (Gardes Nationalize federes, the name
given to the soldiers of the Commune), in retaliation for a sudden attack by
the Versaillais on the evening before, attempted a sortie, and marched upon
Versailles in three columns. Some of their leaders were taken prisoners and
shot without trial, the Government treating the Communards not as political
rebels but as criminals. The Commune ordered certain men of good position, who
were suspected of an understanding with Versailles, to be taken as hostages,
and gave out that the execution of a Federate would be followed immediately by
the execution of three hostages.
The Reds,
however, of the south and centre incited the towns to revolt against the
Assembly and to set up Communes of their own. At Lyons, where an irregular
government was installed, but which allowed itself to be peacefully dissolved
under the eye of delegates from Paris (March 19-23); at St Etienne, where the
prefect de L’Espee was killed (March 25); at Creusot, where the Mayor Dumay
proclaimed the Commune (March 26); at Narbonne, where Digeon, who had been
exiled under the Empire, seized the Mairie (March 23-31); at Marseilles, where
Gaston Cremieux carried the Clubs with him, but where the movement was speedily
checked by artillery (March 23-April 3); at Toulouse (March 23-26), and finally
(April 4) at Limoges, where the National Guard drove back the regular troops—in
all these towns, the
populations
which had risen at the cry of “ Vive Paris* though for a moment successful,
showed themselves devoid of authority and in the long run incapahle of
combination. Thus the attack could be concentrated on the Commune of Paris;
and, when the army of Thiers, composed largely of soldiers who had returned
from Germany, was sufficiently strong to enter upon the struggle, the second
siege of Paris was undertaken.
The final
attempts at conciliation made hy the Chambers of Syndics, by the League of
Republican Union, or hy masonic bodies, during the first fortnight of April,
were thwarted by the blank refusal of the Government to treat with the
insurgents. On April 10, obstinate fighting began in the suburbs to the west
and south of Paris round the positions from which the Prussians had previously
bombarded the town; and by the end of the month the investment was almost
complete. Meanwhile, within the city the drama of the Commune was developing.
Brought to bay hy the army of Versailles, the Federate leaders were determined
to proclaim their creed. On April 20, in the midst of the struggle, appeared
the Declaration to the French people. “ What does Paris ask for ? ” it
enquired. “ The recognition and the establishment of the Republic and that the
absolute autonomy of the ‘Commune’ should prevail everywhere in France....Paris
asks for nothing more... provided that the chief central administration which
derives its powers from the Federate Communes shall realise and carry out their
principles.” This declaration: marked an advance over that of March 25: it proclaimed,
in the face of Jacobin centralisation and possibly under the influence of
Bakunin, the theory of communal federalism; it described the situation in Paris
and indicated a growth of Socialistic influence. Oi iputes amongst themselves,
however, occurring at the same time as the struggle with Versailles, prevented
the “ Internationals ” from proceeding with their work. The supplementary
elections held on April 16 had added twenty-one new members to the Council; and
on the very day of the Declaration (April 20) the execute was reorganised: each
one of the nine special Committees was replaced by a delegate who acted as
Minister, and the nine delegates together formed what was practically a
ministry. In this recasting of the Government the theories of the Radical
revolutionary majority had prevailed over those of the Socialistic minority. On
the 28th, after a panic at Fort d’Issy, the majority carried by forty-five
votes to twenty-three the appointment of a Committee of Public Safety; hut the
Committee itself, whose memhers had been renewed more than once in the midst of
fierce disputes, was reduced to impotence by the encroachments of the Central
Committee. On May 15, the minority in disgust declared that they would no
longer attend the sittings of the Committee, but their electors compelled them
to do so.
While this
was going on, the Versailles troops were preparing to enter Paris; and on the
21st they advanced without fighting as far as the Point du Jour, and occupied
the western districts. The Council of the Commune dispersed, each member
returning to his own district for
the purpose
of organising the defence; barricades were erected, and every man defended
himself as best he could; no general plan having been agreed on. Fierce
fighting continued for seven days (May 21-28), the so-called “Bloody Week.” The
army of Versailles, officered by aristocrats and composed of well-drilled
troops—taught to hate and to fear the republican capital—were sufficiently
ruthless; while the Federates, in order to defend themselves, had recourse to
the traditional methods of terrorists—the murder of hostages and the
destruction of public monuments. Archbishop Darboy, Louis Bonjean, and many
priests were put to death; the Hotel de Ville, the Palais de Justice, the
Tuileries, the Ministry of Finance, and the Cour des Gomptes were burnt down.
The work of
repression was carried out with terrible severity. District by district,
barricade by barricade, the city was retaken by the besiegers from the Point du
Jour to Pere La Chaise. Thiers had proclaimed on the 21st that the full penalty
would be exacted; and the army proceeded to massacre the conquered. Officers,
provosts-marshal, and soldiers put men to death as they chose, after a pretence
of trial or without any trial at all. It was admitted that the dead numbered
17,000—they amounted in fact to 20,000 at least—while 38,568 persons were
arrested, of whom 1058 were women and 651 children; and of the total number
arrested 1179 died in consequence of bad treatment. The prisoners were tried by
Court martial; and, in contradiction to French usage, which looks upon acts
committed during civil war as political offences punishable by transportation,
the Federates were condemned to death or penal servitude. 13,450 persons were
sentenced, of whom 270 were condemned to death and 7500 transported. The Courts
martial continued to sit as late as 1876.
As the result
of this massacre, which exhausted the principal corporate bodies of Paris, the
revolutionary and Socialistic party, which had seemed destined to give a
powerful impulse to the democratic movement in France at the fall of the Empire,
was swept out of existence. It was, in the words of Malon, “the third defeat
suffered by the French proletariate.” The ancient party divisions were all that
remained; on the one side, Monarchists, Legitimist or Orleanist, and on the
other Republicans. How, after the storm had subsided, was the evolution, which
had been taking place since 1860, to be completed ? What was the definite form
of constitution which France should finally attain? Which of those two parties
but lately united against the
Empire Liberal Monarchist or Republican—would end
by carrying the
country ?
Seven more years were still to pass before the question was definitely decided.
After 1871, however, various symptoms pointed out the direction in which French
political life must inevitably develop. It was undoubtedly true that the
monarchist deputies had obtained the abrogation of the laws relating to exile
and the confirmation of the elections of the Due d’Aumale and the Prince de
Joinville, but at the
very moment
of the struggle with the Commune, official communications and private
intelligence disclosed the advance of republican feeling in the towns; and
Thiers himself accepted the legislation relating to the princes, only subject
to formal reservations.
The nation
indeed had chosen the Assembly with a view to peace, but it already showed a
preference for those who had been most careful of the national unity, for those
who, while they rejected all thoughts of war for the present, were determined
that the country should be strong. In July, at the supplementary elections, the
Republicans were successful in twenty-five out of thirty-nine departments; and
of twenty-one deputies returned for Paris, sixteen candidates, belonging to the
Union of the Press and followers of Thiers, were elected. Thus the monarchical
majority in the Assembly no longer represented the opinion of the country; but
they held the supreme power, and no legal process existed by which, they could
be deprived of it. They proceeded to exercise the constituent power “which they
looked upon as the essential attribute of their supremacy”; and, in virtue of
it, they forthwith bestowed on France a provisional Constitution. Thiers was
sufficiently adroit to make his authority felt and to prevail upon an Assembly
which was monarchist at heart to legislate in such a way as to prepare for the
future of the Republic. But, as his friends asserted when they brought in their
Bill dealing with the organisation of the Government, it was essential, in the
interests of the working classes, of commerce and manufactures, that there
should be a feeling abroad of stability, unanimity and reconciliation.
On August 81,
1871, by 491 votes to 94, the enactment known as the Riyet-Vitet Law was
passed. It provided “ that the Head of the executive should take the title of
President of the French Republic ”; that he should have the power of appointing
and dismissing his Ministers, and the right to address the Assembly whenever he
thought necessary; but that the individual Ministers, the Ministerial Council as
a whole, and the President himself, should remain responsible to that body.
This, then, was the outcome of the continuous efforts of Constitutional
Liberalism during the Empire, which the pressure of events had inevitably
produced. The Monarchists saw that, after the late crisis, it was impossible to
rekindle the old political animosities, while the advanced Republicans, who
were looked upon as advocates of war, and who had lost their working-class
vanguard, were unable to make headway. The provisional Constitution expressed
with accuracy the position of political and sopial forces brought about by the
events of the last few years; and, after the convulsions of this terrible year,
it was, broadly speaking, the Liberalism of 1863 which had prevailed. The
definitive Constitution was not to come for another four years; but from this
time forward, while the energy of the whole country was concentrated on its
work of reconstruction, its political life was to enjoy a development more
continuous in its character, and, above all, more independent of the hazards of
foreign politics.
THE REACTION
AGAINST ROMANTICISM IN FRENCH LITERATURE.
(1840-71.)
Little did Madame de Stael guess when she introduced the
term “ Romanticism ” into France the stir that it was destined to make. Yet it
heralded the most important literary movement, and the most fruitful in
unforeseen results, which Europe has seen since the Renaissance.
And yet, if
Romanticism were at its zenith in 1830, by 1843—owing, first, to the failure of
Les Burgrctves, and to the speedy success of the naturalistic and realistic
theories in art—it seemed almost dead. Thus, in the space of thirty years, the
main stream of literature had apparently, divided into two great currents, not
merely flowing in different, but in what seemed totally opposite, directions. How
did it come to pass that a movement on so large a scale, and of such importance
not only in France but in Europe generally, should have experienced so brief an
existence, and won such barren victories? The answer to this must be sought in
the fact that under the one term “Romanticism” we are apt to include two
wholly different things—a literary coterie which gained much notoriety but
whose life was short, and a revolution in the world of letters, not only French
but European, under whose influences and amid whose results we are living to
this day.
The name of
this literary coterie was the “ Cenacle ”: it consisted of the group of authors
who gathered round Victor Hugo, and met at Charles Nodier’s salon at the
Arsenal; their theories of art and of literature are to be found in the preface
to Cromwdl and in the articles of Deschamps in La Muse Franqaise. It was above
all in their work for the stage, which as it were sets the crowning and ratifying
seal upon all literary reforms, on whose boards, moreover, the noisiest battles
of the new School were fought, that the weak points in the Cenacle's theories
made themselves most conspicuous, and that it showed its inability to
reconstruct where it had pulled down. A manifesto, in fact, is of no value
unless based upon achievement and illustrated by example'. The Romanticists, it
is true, produced works constructed according to their theories; but, instead
of supplying their justification, these works seemed only to help them to fall
the quicker into a predestined disrepute.
Moreover, it
is worth noticing that, if the period saw the growth and blossoming of so much
fine literary achievement, it was a time marvellously suited to the cultus of
letters and to the experiments of literary innovators; and, while we admit the
genuine inspiration of the authors of the period, we do not find it
attributable to the theories of the Cenacle but, rather, independent of them :
it is not by rule and precept that masterpieces'are made. Men like Lamartine,
de Musset, and Vigny were in no way indebted to such doctrines; and even Hugo
himself, in his capacity of lyric poet, rather expounded his, theories to
justify his works, than wrote his works to illustrate his theories.
To sum up,
Romanticism, regarded as a poetic school, did not and could not last long; but
to regard it under this aspect is to see merely its smallest and least
interesting side. Romanticism was, in reality, a literary revolution, which
originated in Germany towards the close of the eighteenth century, and
preached, before all else, a return to nature and to the ideas and formulae of
the Middle Ages. It spread rapidly throughout Europe because it responded to a
certain intellectual need— the longing to substitute for the worship of an
antiquity but ill-understood, of classic models but poorly imitated, something
new and personal, in the realm of art as well as in that of letters. Its direct
progenitors were Rousseau tod Chateaubriand, who were the true forerunners of
the new birth of religious feeling and of admiration for the Middle Ages; it
was they'who revived the feeling for Nature, who preached revolt against
accepted ideas and prejudices, and who taught the theory of the fatality of
passion; it was they who, by developing the sense of human personality,
prepared the soil wherein lyric poetry could flower. It was, in truth, a
revival, under other names, of the old conflict between Regnier and Malherbe,
between the Independents and Boileau in the seventeenth century—between the
Ancients and the Modems at the beginning of the eighteenth. A movement so
important, so widespread, so vast, came, by the very multiplicity and vagueness
of the principles which it enforced and of the rights which it claimed, to have
incalculable consequences. One of the most apparently surprising, but in
reality most natural of its results was its’ eventual development into realism
and naturalism from which in its origin it seemed so far removed. To put the
matter more clearly: Romanticism, or rather the Cenacle regarded merely in the
light of a literary School, went too far, and failed to keep its promises,
especially in the realms of the drama and the novel; its existence was
inevitably short, for it was consumed by its own zeal and its own
exaggerations. As was to be expected, a reaction in the opposite direction set
in. That every too sudden advance must of necessity be followed by a recoil is
a fixed law; and, in this instance, the recoil consisted in a perception of
the excess and absurdity which had marked the pretensions of the Cinacle, and
in a keener appreciation and admiration for the great classics of the
seventeenth century. But, if the Ctnacle
were dead,
Romanticism proper remained very much alive, with all its elements of sanity,
fruitfulness, and essential novelty—elements which had already ensured its
victory over an outworn and conventional idealism; and one of its fundamental
principles, more fully understood and applied to better purpose, was destined
to give birth to realism.
We have just
seen that Romanticism demanded “truth drawn from Nature herself”; it would have
none of “ historical landscape,” pretentiously arranged and grouped—of heroes
on an extra-human scale— of false idealism. This “ natural ” truth, this
reality, the writers of 1830 had seemed scarcely able to appreciate or
delineate, and they had fallen rapidly into the extraordinary and the
improbable. Their works were essentially the outcome of imagination and
feeling. Acting under the influence of the scientific sp" it, of that love
of clearness and precision, that quest for the definite fact and the document,
which was the peculiar characteristic of the latter part of the century, a new
literature gradually took form and shape, a positive literature which adopted
as its guiding principle the faithful reproduction of the life around it,
without any modifications save those which the laws of art necessarily impose
upon the artist. When the Romanticist claims “ to reproduce Nature in its crude
entirety,” as it appears to our eyes, it seems to be a realist who is speaking,
and, when Victor Hugo describes the environs of Le Treport, his method seems to
foreshadow that of the painters of the Barbizon School. The best proof,
however, that there is no real antinomy between Romanticism and realism and
that the , difference is one of degree and not of kind, is the fact that the
majority of the great writers of the nineteenth century belonged, at one and
the same time, to both schools. For example, Balzac, Gautier, Michelet, Renan,
Flaubert, and many others, borrowed from each school what was best in it, and
harmoniously mingled the two influences.
Thus,
Romanticism tended in the beginning towards the development of the lyric and
individualist spirit; then, its exaggeration and eyppss produced a natural and
inevitable reaction; and later, under the influence and through the normal
development of the salient principles of the scientific spirit, it experienced
a complete transformation, passing inall into realism and naturalism. This
result will be traced in greater detail later, in dealing with the particular
writers and especially with the men of pronounced literary genius to whom this
chapter is devoted.
One of the
definitions which has been applied to Romanticism is that it is “a literature
in which the lyric element predominates.” Lyric poetry did not, so to speak,
exist in France before the Romantic period; and, if Hugo is to be regarded as
the leader of the new School, it is for this reason among others—that he was
almost exclusively a lyric poet and that the basis of his, inspiration was
generally lyrical. All the early works of Hugo since Odes et Ballades (1832) up
to Les Rayons et Les Ombres (1840) are essentially lyrical and subjective; from
1840, on the
510
contrary, a
difference is perceptible and other influences are apparent. Careful as always
to follow the varying currents of prevailing taste and fashion, penetrated
moreover by the idea that the poet should be not only a poet but a shepherd of
his people, a “ vates ” responsible for the doctrines of the common herd, we
find him throwing himself airdently into political life, and endeavouring to
guide and direct public opinion. His poetry reflects these preoccupations, and
becomes more detached, more lofty—in a word, more objective. Viewed from this
standpoint there is a marked difference between the tone of the Contemplations
and that of the preceding volumes. With him every sensation tended more and
more to develop into a symbol^ every symbol into a myth. This tendency, which
grew daily more and more noticeable and which formed the basis of his lyric
faculty, made him the most objective of the Cenacle poets: his poetry became
the expression of emotions, human it is true, but expressed in a universal
sense. And it is precisely this quality which gives to his poems their peculiar
and original charm. In Les Chatinients,' for instance, we see the product of a
disappointed vanity, a violent outburst of political hatreds and personal
bitterness. Thanks to his peculiar mastery over his materials, Hugo succeeded
ih creating a type of literature in which he often excelled, in which occasionally,
as in ISExpiation and Les A beilles, he was supreme. And his finest works are
precisely those which are most largely symbolic, most impersonal.
All the
violent and passionate emotions which had shaken his soul, time was to soften,
to purify and to universalise. His personal hatred of the Emperor was merged in
a horror of tyranny in general, in pity for all the unhappy and oppressed; and
La Legende des Siecles presents a series of pictures on the heroic scal6, a
cycle of turbulent dramas, symbolic rather than historical, and inspired by the
same philosophic and social ideas-—by an unshakable belief in God and in
immanent justice, by love for the poor, the suffering, and the helpless, by
hatred for the oppressor whether in the form of priest, king, or conqueror. It
is a “cycle of incomplete epics,” which fill a gap in French literature and in
which he has tried to enclose the history of humanity, characterised by what he
believes to be its chief epochs, from Creation to the Last Judgment. All Victor
Hugo is contained in these three volumes, which filled a void in French
literature. In them, passing from poetry of the personal type, he attained an
inspiration purely symbolic and objective, thus revealing himself as one of the
great lyric poets of the world.
Though a
member of the famous Cbiacle, Theophile Gautier was a man of wholly original
character, altogether distinct from the other members of the circle. His genius
was narrow and peculiar; but, confined within its limits, he was a poet of the
first rank. He was without ideas, without eloquence, and possessed of only
average sensibility and intelligence. The sole principle to which he clung, and
which was indeed
511
the
very source of his inspiration, was a hatred of everything which either closely
or remotely savoui ed of middle-class Philistinism. Both literally and
figuratively, he never put off the red waistcoat in which he' arrayed himself
on the first night oi Hernani. • ;
Theophile
Gautier (who had been for a time a pupil in Rioult’s school of painting) was
essentially a painter whom chance had made a poet. Though he is scarcely ever
more than this, his peculiar faculty enabled him to accomplish the apparently
impossible, to render by means of words and phrases, so as to make his reader
feel, the precise sensations experienced in the presence of the actual scene,
of the visible landscape described. He transcribes a corner of the park at
Versailles, or a Flemish Cabinet picture, in the manner of a painter, and never
fails to produce his effect. Moreover in all his work there is always this kind
of specialised talent which is the essence of his originality. A large part of
Mademoiselle de Maupin is devoted to a series of descriptions of various
landscapes; the Roman de la Momie brings to life before our eyes, like a
picture from the brush of some Eastern painter, the actual Egypt of the Pharaohs;
and the larger half of Le Capitaine Fracasse is nothing but a series of
pictures irresistibly recalling the etchings of Callot. Even in his capacity of
critic, instead of critically appraising works of art or literature he contents
himself with the reproducing them, in his own inimitable fashion, with offering
them, so to speak, for the individual inspection of the reader.
To this rare
and individual gift he joined a keen and unerring sense of colour and
decorative effect, an inexhaustible vocabulary, both rich and accuratej a
brilliant virtuosity sometimes verging on insolence and excess. Finally, in his
style, whether in prose or verse, though always smooth, polished, and carefully
wrought, he never betrays effort—rather seems to be improvising in a language
full of lightness, ease and sanity. All these qualities make of him a writer
altogether apart, bearing no resemblance to any other; and his work, small in
output, but delicate, refined, perfect, even to the smallest detail, has often
been compared with the masterpieces of Benvenuto Cellini. His influence over
his contemporaries was immense, and he is a striking example of those writers
who passed insensibly from romanticism into realism. “ His hatred of what was
Philistine and commonplace lent inspiration to Baudelaire; his pictorial sense
of form and colour led him to renounce the subjective methods of the lyric poet
in favour of devotion to the thing seen—and thus gave birth to an impersonal
literature. The perfection of his aesthetic faculty quickly enabled him to
appraise the medieval colour of the romanticists at its true worth; the
Parthenon conquered him. He ended by abjuring the Gothic ideal, that he might
the more fully reveal that worship of the classical which formed the basis of
his whole being. In him, indeed, we see the actual pivot upon which French
literature revolved, in passing from romanticism to naturalism.”
Alfred de
Vigny was one of those rare poets to be found among the romanticists—perhaps
indeed the only one—-whose inspiration, though he never spoke of it himself,
was at all times purely lyric, and, at the same time always impersonal. To say
nothing of his plays and his novels, even his poems take the form of
narratives, episodes, the theme of which is always a berg or an object
altogether distinct from himself. This is in complete accord with Vigny’s own
character: he was a solitary from his youth up, and one to whom the acute and
painful consciousness of his solitude brought deep suffering. A Catholic by
birth and education, he had lost his faith; a soldier, who knew the soldier’s
life through and through and had realised both its heights and its depths, and
whose hopes of personal glory were extinct, he saw around him nothing but
grounds for disillusion and disenchantment. Ever a prey to doubt he gave
himself up to meditations upon the great problems which agitate
humanity—problems to him for ever insoluble. A stranger to the over-confident
and exaggerated optimism of a Lamartine, Vigny turned towards pessimism and
unbelief. Indifferent and contemptuous as he was towards political affairs and
persons, he suffered much through the state of things brought about by the
Revolution; for him the past was dead indeed, the future full of darkness. All
that he saw around him—even the circumstances of his private life—offended and
alienated him from the world. He sought refuge in poetry, which should at least
bring him consolation. But of poetry he had formed for himself so high, so
lofty an ideal, that even here he was tormented by self-distrust, even here he
found nothing but suffering and disappointment. This is the explanation at once
of that detached and impersonal note in his work and of the smallness of his
literary output. Filled with respect for his art, and sensible of its difficulties,
he was content to leave nothing to chance, to await inspiration in a state of
religious withdrawal and—through a medium ever more finely wrought and more
perfected—-to seek patiently the realisation of that ideal of beauty which he
had fashioned for himself. These were the ideas—at once individual, in the
sense of being profoundly and painfully felt, and universal, in that they were
capable of arousing die interest of all men— developed or rather condensed in
his few works, some of which compare worthily with the finest achievements of
Lamartine or of Hugo.
In many
aspects of his work he was a true romantic poet, but through his own life,
through his conception of art, through his poetic idoal and method, through the
restraint and conciseness of his manner, he ultimately diverged as widely from
romanticism as Musset himself, or as Leconte de Lisle in later days.
Occa~ionally, at certain points, a personal touch unveils to us for one moment
the suffering soul of the poet. But these moments of sens >ility, which the
true romanticist hugged to his breast, and which fused their emotions into
literature, are very rare. De Vigny’s poems demand a place apart in the history
of romantic poetry, as the
513
work of an
individual and peculiar temperament, rather than as a consequence or
illustration of the theories of a new literary school.
Alfred de
Musset began his career as a perfervid romanticist with Contes d'Espagne et
d'ltalie, which contained everything that the poets of the new school were then
claiming and advocating—love of the exotic, local colour, exaggeration of
manner and of feeling. The Romanticists were easily deceived and acclaimed him
as one of themselves. Yet in truth Musset, in advance of his age, perceived all
that was false and futile in Romanticism, iand, while the new School fought and
triumphed in defence of their ideas, he was gradually returning from them to
the classics of the school of 1660. He soon realised how much was meretricious,
artificial, and trumpery in the exaggerated search after local colour, in the
high-sounding, empty epithet, in the rich yet needless rhyme, and could never
bring himself to admit that form and expression should take precedence of the
matter and thought to be expressed. Does that mean, however, that Musset owes
little, or nothing,to Romanticism? This was impossible; but he borrowed from it
only what was best: he laid down as a principle that the whole art of the poet
consisted in laying bare his heart, in “ moving ” others through his own
emotion, a principle which is, in fact, the very essence of lyric poetry and,
consequently, of Romanticism.
On the other
hand, cert'-’’ sides of his character were in direct opposition to the
principles animating the writers of the new School; or rather the qualities,
which they .lacked, were possessed by him. Owing to temperament, to an innate
fastidiousness, and also to the natural limitations of his talent, the artist
in him was by no means faultless; yet Musset was the sole romanticist who
showed “psychological intuition,” and this not only in Les Nuits, where he
analyses, with a delicacy and an exquisite precision very rare in those days,
the finest shades of the soul’s diverse emotions. This trait is above all
conspicuous in his plays, in which, though clearly showing the influence of the
foreign literatures then newly revealed by the Romanticists, he accomplished
original and charming work, unlike anything he had hitherto achieved. To sum
up: it must be admitted that Musset was influenced, though perhaps unconsciously,
by the Romantic movement; but his natural gifts likewise made him a great and
original poet. “ He found inspiration in his own nature, and instinct and taste
taught him what to avoid.”
Charles
Baudelaire, a late comer in the Romantic field, who found little save the
gleanings left by his great predecessors—the idol of some, the scorn of
others—is to us the last representative and the last champion of the ideas and
principles of the Cenacle. His work, original and strange, sometimes disturbing
and often unequal, may be taken as typical of the Romantic methods, both at
their best and at their worst: at their best, because Baudelaire was curiously
preoccupied with form, because, as a writer, he was subtle, painstaking, for ever
striving after
the highest,
and occasionally realising perfection; at their worst, because of his
deliberate and too frequent unveiling of repulsive things. There were two
reasons for this: one, since by merely exaggerating one Romantic
tendency—hatred of the commonplace—it was easy for a man to become pretentious,
non-moral, unreal, and unwholesome; the other must be sought , in the fact that
all the highest places were already filled, so that, desiring at all costs to
be original, he had to fall back upon the bizarre and the subtle. He invented a
“ new thrill,” and, all his life, was a slave to the form of art he had chosen
to make his own. This deliberate abandonment of the realm of seriousness and
beauty for that of strangeness and ugliness was a profound blunder on his part;
and that Baudelaire triumphed in spite of it was due to the faultlessness of
his workmanship, the perfert finish of his form. Unfortunately, however, he was
idolised by a host of incompetent and unintelligent imitators who could not
fail to detract from the effect of his work—last direct offspring as it was of
the Romantic poetry of 1830.
Leconte de
Lisle, on the other hand, brings us back to the domain of pure beauty and
serenity, and in him we can watch one of Romanticism’s evolutions actually at
work. When he began writing, the great lyric themes were, to a certain extent^
exhausted. Poetry was growing gradually less personal, and was becoming steeped
in the scientific spirit. Vigny’s completed work had already given us many wonderful
examples of that symbolic poetry, which tends to efface whatever personal and
intimate element there may be in the actual emotional life of the poet. In
harmony with the taste of the age, and following in the new direction of a
poetry at once impersonal and scientific, the soul of Leconte de Lisle despised
a lyric poetry which confined itself to an outpouring of the inti mate hopes
and fears of the poet himself. He concealed his own suffering, doubt, and
despair behind that of humanity in general, whose pain became his own.
Despising the too personal, over-intimate note of modern life, he sought refuge
in the past, in the contemplation of ancient civilisations, in the portrayal of
the ever varying religions whereby men at all times have endeavoured to benumb
their insatiable curiosity, to assuage their griefs. In this way he created a
new subject- matter—new because so very old—the germ of which existed already
in Romanticism. It is to Leconte de Lisle that we owe the idea of historical
reconstruction, aided by science, and the intellectual effort to comprehend all
art, of whatever age or country; and for such a task no one moreover was better
equipped than he. Learned and conscientious, faithful interpreter of the great
Greek poets, he brings before us in long procession, all the gods and all the
faiths of old—Indian, Celtic, Polynesian, and Hellenic—giving to all in turn
their peculiar character.
Finally, in
this poet and student there was ever the fervent lover of form and plastic
beauty, striving to compress into verse, imperishable and immortal because of
its perfection, those fleeting aspects of being in
The Romanticist dramas: Scribe.
515
which his
soul delighted; of each passing phenomenon, however brief and fugitive, he
tried to seize the peculiar beauty, and as a rule he succeeded. These
descriptions of his, though absolutely objective, are marked by an intensity, a
glow, a purity and an exactitude to which nothing else is comparable. Thus,
claiming descent from Victor Hugo and regarding him as his sole master, though
all the while an unconscious disciple of Vigny, Leconte de Lisle touched
romanticism at a thousand points, while at the same time moving further and
further away from the theories of 1830. He easily outstripped those men of
secondary talents, who had not the power to win freedom for themselves nor to
fix their own standpoints, once for all, amidst all the incoherent impulses
which, at that time, swayed men’s minds. Hence he became the leader of that new
School which was to include masters like Sully- Prudhomme, and Heredia, serving
as a link and transition-point between the Cenacle of 1830 and the Parnasse
contemporain.
The Romantic
School had made the theatre the scene of its noisiest battles, but, all the
same, had never succeeded in producing live drama. The failure of Les Bur
graves was the best pos' ble proof of this; but, apart from this, no author of
the time seemed to possess the true dramatic instinct: the only merit of Hugo’s
plays lies in the beauty of their verse; the dramas, of Alexandre Dumas pere
are as poor in style as in psychology. Musset’s comedies alone deserve a place
to themselves in the history of the French theatre, but it is well known that
they were not written to be acted, and that it was owing to a peculiar chance
that they were ever staged. Romanticism had freed the theatre from all rules
and all conventions; but its work was purely destructive, and it had laid no
new foundation. Tragedy was dead, historical drama no longer appealed to the
public, the play of passion was tending towards melodrama pure and simple. The
vacant place had to be filled by comedy, which became, especially in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, the only permissible literary form for drama to
assume.
Few men have
had a luckier or more prosperous career than Scribe; few men also, especially
sincc his death, have been so persistently depreciated. The real explanation
of his success is to be found in the fact that he provided the play-goer with
precisely what he wanted—and with nothing more. He was the typical
representative of the middle class —of the general public of his day. Neatness,
clearness, logic: these were the favourite intellectual qualities of the time.
But, despite his limitations, it must in justice be admitted that the stage
instinct of Scribe, and his mastery over all the resources of his craft, were
both supreme. Judged from this standpoint, Bataille des Dames and Un Verre
cTEau are without a rival. Gifted with an inventive faculty of great range and
fertility, he confined himself to the search for dramatic conjunctures, and,
led by admirable sagacity and ingenuity, he found them in endless number. He
was solely but perfectly a writer of the
stage, and,
through this very quality, exercised a noteworthy influence over both his
contemporaries and his successors. The notion that play- writing, apart from
its aspect, as a school for the study of manners and character, is a highly
specialised art, having its own technique, its own peculiar methods of
workmanship, is traceable to him ; and it is hardly too much to say that, in
all the plays which have come after him, we can trace a comedy or an idea,
originally emanating from Scribe.
On the other
hand it is impossible to ignore the influence exercised upon modern comedy by
the innovators of the eighteenth century— those inventors of middle-class drama
and sentimental comedy who, as it were, discovered the setting wherein the
author of the future was to place his characters, thus paving the way in a
direction along which others were advantageously to follow. Finally it should
be noted that the Romanticists, by ignoring the unities, by mingling tragedy
with comedy, by devoting themselves to the exact reconstruction of the surroundings
appropriate to the personages of their plays, provided all subsequent comedy
with some of its leading characteristics. Of this later comedy we may take
Iilmile Augier and Alexandre Dumas fils as the two great representatives.
On many sides
of his character Augier touches Scribe very closely. He too was a
representative of the bourgeois spirit—both in its best, and in its most
limited, aspects—a man of reason and good sense. He was to find his true
polarity when subjected to the influence of Balzac. The novel had in fact
preceded the drama in the depiction and observation of real life and
character. The drama was, in its turn, to take up the task of the novel, while
making use of the methods peculiar to itself. A study after the manner of
Balzac, strengthened by a plot after the manner of Scribe—such seems, in fact,
to be the formula by which the comedies of Augier and Dumas fils were constructed.
The whole problem consisted in the transference to the stage, in a manner
interesting to the general public, of a study or picture—no longer merely of a
particular vice, eccentricity, or absurdity^ as was the way with Moliere, but
of a man, as a member of society, planted amid his own immediate
surroundings—and in the subsequent endeavour to show to the spectator the slow
and successive development in this man’s character under the influence of his
profession, of the current standard of manners, and of the circle in which he
lived.
Since it was
essential to interest a public spoilt by the comedies of Scribe, a situation
had to be selected which would serve to throw into as high relief as possible
the characteristics of the leading personage, and produce the most striking
dramatic effect attainable. The field was a vast one, since it comprised no
less an area than the study of mankind and its imperfections. Augier especially
delighted in studying the vices of our social organism, and interested himself
principally in questions relating to money and the intermingling of different
classes,
realising,
clear-sightedly enough, that in them were to be found the keystones on which
the society of his day rested. This is the basis of what is undeniably his
finest comedy, Le Gendre de M. Poirier (1854), the play of all others in which
his qualities as a painter of the society he saw around him shine with the most
brilliant lustre. His portraits are marked by an arresting fidelity and
boldness, an incomparable depth and subtlety of insight, a supreme largeness of
touch. For example, Maitre Guerin, the peasant-notary who bends the law to his
own uses and steals while quoting his favourite authority; Giboyer, type of the
Bohemian, who has tried his hand at all trades; and, finally, Poirier himself,
that perfect picture of the bourgeois-gentilhomme of the nineteenth century.
Add to this a dialogue of simple, easy and natural quality, a true and subtle
observation of traits which reveal the character in a single word, a moral
attitude at once sturdy and straightforward if at times somewhat limited, and
you have in Augier one of the most typical representatives of his age, a mind steeped,
moreover, in the characteristically French tradition of the nineteenth century.
In certain of
his plays, not perhaps to be numbered among his best (as Lions et Renards, Le
fils de Giboyer), Augier tried his hand at political comedy; but he particularly
devoted himself to the comedy of manners. Alexandre Dumas Jils busied himself
principally with the problem of love, and was led on insensibly, by the
peculiar bent of his temperament, to the “ problem-play.” Instead of confining
himself to the depiction of human vices or of social incongruities, to
presenting his fellow-men with a picture of their failings or their vices,
Dumas, confronted with the problem of evil, was irresistibly drawn to desire an
improvement in manners, and, within his limitations, to prepare the way for it.
In his work for the stage he came gradually to aim at the acquirement of a
guiding and moralising influence over his audience ; and it was thus that
Dumas, through his desire to reconstruct family life and society in general, upon
a basis of love, justice, and equality, through his attacks upon those laws,
customs, and prejudices which he held responsible for the existing state of
things, found himself naturally drawn to the comedie d tMse. It should not be
forgotten that Dumas fils, passionate admirer of his father as he was, was
completely steeped in Romanticism, especially at the outset of his career. But
in his case Romanticism gave place gradually to a mystical habit of mind, to
the tone of a visionary moralist who must preach, even in the most brilliant of
his plays. Realising as we must the moralist in him, combined with the insight
of a keen observer, with a capacity for taking swift and sure surveys of life,
and for producing in us the sensation of life itself in all its intenseness and
actuality, we can perhaps appreciate something of the alluring—sometimes even a
little disconcerting— originality of Dumas’ plays. Beginning his career with
comedies of manners (e.g. La Dame aux Cornelias, 1852), he sought to realise
his
518 Drama: Dumas fils. Labiche. Sardou.
ideal of a
morally helpful drama;, wherein should be solved, or at the least discussed,
the most pressing and serious problems which beset contemporary society.
• The
dramatic genius of Dumas has indeed its limitations; one could wish that he had
given a somewhat larger range to his studies, that he had not always interested
himself in exceptional cases; one might blame him for his taste for paradox,
sometimes, even, for things bordering on the unclean. At the same time it
should never be forgotten that he possessed in a supreme degree those rare
qualities which go to make the playwright—actuality, the vis comica,, a
vigorous style, the gift of biting, witty dialogue; above all, it must be
remembered that his influence over his contemporaries was considerable, and
that a large part of our present-day drama owes its existence directly to him.
Of a very
different order was the spirit animating all the plays of Labiche. All that he
cared about was to laugh himself and to make others laugh, and in the pursuit
of this ambition, he was triumphantly successful during a period of thirty
years. It would be a complete misconception, a stupid blunder, to take his
plays seriously, to dissect them and endeavour to construct a philosophy from
them. The value of Labiche’s plays lies in their droll imaginings, their
inconceivable buffoonery, the fascination of their extraordinary and absurd
situations as exemplified for instance in Le Chapeau de PaiUe d'ltalie or La
Cagnotte. What gives them their peculiar flavour is their practically universal
basis of good sense and shrewd observation; while occasionally, as in such
plays as La Poudre aux yeux, Le voyage de M. Perrichon, or Le Misanthrope et
VAuvergnat, a certain insight into the human heart is revealed.
In spite of
having tried his hand, and that successfully, at most things, perhaps even
because of this very versatility, Victorien Sardou, direct disciple and
successful rival of Labiche, is first and foremost, a playwright—and is perhaps
scarcely more than that. Gifted with exceptional faculties, with an
incomparable inventiveness and wealth of resource, he has always reflected too
faithfully the fickle taste of the public, passing, as he has, from the comedy
of observation (such as Nos bom Villageais, La FamiUe Benoiton) to political
comedy (Rabagas), from moral comedy (Daniel Rochat) to historical drama
(.Patrie). In all, thanks to his vigour, his suppleness of mind, his instinct
for the stage, he has achieved genuine success—in none has he given us that
masterpiece which one had almost the right to expect from him.
Before
the advent of the nineteenth century the output of fiction_______
with certain
brilliant exceptions all the more noteworthy for their rarity—had been devoid
of any real literary value. UAstree, Le Roman Comigue, La Princesse de CUves
cover the seventeenth century; with Gil Bias, Manon Lescaut, La Nouvelle
Helo'ise, Paul et Virgmie we have exhausted the eighteenth. On the other hand,
in the nineteenth century the novel is the form of literary expression which,
during the whole
Influence of the novel: George Sand.
519
course of the
century, has shown the highest capacity for expansion, and some of the
masterpieces of our time belong to this hitherto but little appreciated
category. This is, no doubt, due to the fact that the literary form of novel is
at once the most subtle and the most plastic imaginable. Moreover, throughout
the whole of the last century, the novel was undergoing a perpetual process of
transformation, thus presenting us with the fullest possible picture of the
changes in literary taste and temper, from the most extravagant Romanticism to
the crudest naturalism. The majority of the Romantic novelists had made their
reputation before 1840. We need not therefore concern ourselves with them in
this chapter. We need only note that coming first under the influence of Sir
Walter Scott and the Romanticist taste for historical reconstructions the novel
was at the outset chiefly of the historical or personal type. Alfred de Vigny’s
Cinq Mars, Hugo’s Notre-Danie de Paris and a great part of Les Miserables, and
esp«"uly the novels of Alexandre Dumas pere, may be taken as typical of historical
fiction, the first three basing their claim to attention upon serious qualities
of style, literary workmanship, and genuine literary beauty; while the last,
though the success which they attained was remarkable, possessing only a
somewhat remote link with pure literature, in spite of their astonisV in"
qualities of invention, ready wit and infectious gaiety. There was in truth
something false, something self-condemnatory, in this whole class of work. It
exercised, nevertheless a certain influence at this period, and through its
preoccupation with the surroundings, its careful construction of the setting of
its characters, it paved the way by degrees for the conception of the novel of
manners as we know it to-day. We may take Chateaubriand’s Rene, or Madame de
Stael’s Corinne, as the type of the personal novel in its lyric, while Benjamin
Constant’s Adalphe may serve to represent its analytical, aspect. It is from
this type of fiction that we derive the modem psychological novel.
George Sand,
in her early works at any rate, combined both these two aspects. Influenced by
the romanticist advocacy of the lyric note, of sentimental exaltation, of the
worship of the ego, of the fatality of passion, George Sand, admiring follower
of Rousseau as she was, published one after the other and with prodigious
success, Indiana, Valentine, and Jerques. In her depiction of their heroines,
sisters of Werther and of Rene, suffering from the malady of the century, and
wearing ever, like Chateaubriand, their hearts upon their sleeves, we see her
rebelling against all prejudices, opinions and principles, then accepted and
established, and boldly championing the rights of passion. Thence she passed on
naturally to the novel with a purpose, wherein the story serves merely as a
vehicle for the author’s admirable theories—theories characterised, in her
case, by a socialism as generous as it was vague and ill-defined.
Among the
most interesting of her novels of this type may be mentioned Consuelo and Le
Meumer d'Angibaidt. Later, her socialism
520
developed a
rustic tinge, and she produced such little masterpieces as La Petite Fadette,
La Mare au Diable and Francois le Champi. Her mind had, indeed, always inclined
in the direction of country things, and even in her most passionate or most
mystical novels, such as Valentine, Le Meunier and Consuelo, one comes across
enchanting descriptions of country sights and sounds. “ What I wished to write
was ‘ the eclogue of humanity’” she says in a letter to Balzac; and no one has
ever succeeded in achieving clearer-cut, fresher, more supremely true, word-
pictures of the country and its peasant-dwellers than hers. She has been
accused of idealising her peasants; the real truth is that she was an optimist,
and that it was her pleasure to view things and people from the angle most
favourable to them. Finally, in her last works, Jean de la Roche, and Le
Marquis de VUlemer, steeped as they are in simple poetry and in sunny
philosophy, she produced idylls after the pattern of Francois le Champi in a
setting similar to that of Valentine and Indiana. As a writer she was chiefly
remarkable for an extraordinary facility, an incomparable wealth of ideas, a
careless prodigality full of charm and grace, a style varied, flowing, and
subtle—all of which qualities go to place her in the front rank of the Romantic
novelists.
No two
writers more remote from George Sand could well be imagined than Stendhal and
Merimee, whom we may group together for purposei- of study, so like were they
to each other in both work and character. Henri Beyle (Stendhal) stands out as
one of the most original figures in our literary history and one of the most
difficult to appreciate. He belonged to no one school, yet, through some one
side of him, to all. In his irony and enthusiasm, in his harsh sincerity and
delicacy, in his impulsiveness and cool analysis, he was essentially a man
apart, clinging all unconsciously to the traditions of the eighteenth century,
and seeing in literature nothing save a means of amusement. He was a sensualist
like Condillac, an atheist like Ch&iier; force was the chief god in his
Pantheon, and Italy ever the land of his predilection. What he chiefly prided
himself upon was his knowledge of the human heart. In Le Rouge et le Noir, for
example, he sets himself to trace in his hero, Julien Sorel, all the varying
influences—temperament, climate, surroundings—by which human beings are
affected. As he himself predicted, it was not until the latter years of the
nineteenth century that he was really appreciated and admired, and proved him
to be one of the immediate precursors of the psychological novelist.
Prosper
Merimee was one of those few contemporaries of his upon whom Stendhal exercised
an undoubted influence. They had, in truth, the same tastes, the same
antipathies, the same type of character, the same tendencies. Both, in their
worship of force, regarded literature as a profession with disdain, both
possessed in equal degree the passion for sarcasm, and mystification, and both display
the same hankering after the objective and impersonal note. Steeped to the lips
in irony and
pessimism,
Merim^e confined himself to the short story in which he excelled. His plots are
solidly put together, his characters logically conceived and developed; a lover
of simplicity and clarity, he viewed emphasis and sentimentality with dislike.
He tells his stories with brevity and sobriety but with an astonishing insight,
conciseness, and truth. In six lines he draws a landscape, in as many words a
character; but he has an extraordinary faculty for making a character live, and
live humanly, completely (as in the case of Colombo, or Carmen); and an equal
faculty for the accurate and vividly realistic presentment of scenes, whether
tragic or commonplace (e.g. La Chronique de Charles IX.— Matteo Falcone). His
style, by its purity, its intentional and studied restraint, its perfection of
form, enhances the illusion, and to it he owes his definite and unique place in
literature.
In Balzac’s
imaginative faculty, in that element of the extraordinary and the visionary
which he had in him, in the extravagance and superabundance of his work, in
his taste for incredible adventures and fabulous personages, the influence of
Romanticism can easily be traced. Nevertheless, posing as a philosopher and
man of science, his ambition was to write what may be called the Natural
History of Man. His aim was to be a savant, a student of natural science,
solely occupied in observing, describing, classifying, unconcerned with the award
of moral praise or blame: he studied humanity in fact as an entomologist
dissects an insect. To study society as a whole under all its diverse aspects,
he must needs bring them all under one focus, conceive for their closer union
one universal plan. This was to be called La Comedie Humaine, in which the same
characters were to appear and reappear—studied, now in the provinces (Eugenie
Grandet); now in Paris (Le Pere Goriot, La Cousine Bette); now in private life
(La Femme de trente am); now following a military career (Les Chouans); now the
life of the fields (Le CurS de Village, Le Medecin de Campagne), and so forth.
He set himself, in truth, to describe all he saw, good as well as bad, the
grotesque and the repulsive as well as the sublime, and, in truth, his
temperament and inclination impelled him to the depiction of humanity in its
more degraded and vicious aspects. Such preference is, indeed, one of the
salient characteristics of the realistic art, and in this direction, moreover,
he achieved his most striking successes.
On the other
hand it must be confessed that Balzac, ill-served by a style heavy, pompous,
often in bad taste, and never either delicate 01* refined, failed in his
portrayal of the higher types of humanity. We may go even further, and find him
lacking in sense of proportion, in restraint, and with absolutely no feeling
for nature. His field was limited to the study of average characters, and of
life as lived among the middle and working classes; but in this domain he was
supreme. Never has the wreckage of a whole cycle of existences, nor the ruin of
a whole family, through the vice or madness of one of its individual
522
members, been
revealed with greater power and knowledge. Take for instance the avarice of
Pere Goriot, the envy of Cousine Bette, the lust of Baron Hulot, the madness
for invention in the house of Claes, all of them types, monstrous, out of
proportion, almost symbolic if you will, yet incomparably vivid, intensely real
in their moral and physical determinism. A Romanticist, then, Balzac certainly
was—at times even extravagantly so—and Romanticism is the element in his work
which is most salient. But, in the main, he must be. regarded, alike in temperament,
in his choice of subjects, and in his method of treatment, as the father of our
contemporary realism..
Where Balzac
had failed was in his appreciation of the subtleties of poetic feeling, and
most of all in his delineation of well-bred, distinguished society: it was in
this latter direction, on the other hand, that Octave Feuillet won his most
signal trumphs. A disciple of George Sand, he stands for us as the
representative of the idealist and romantic type* of fiction (e.g. Le Roman
<Tun Jewne Homme pauvre, Sibylle). Nevertheless, in his later novels (La
Morte, M. de Camort, Julia de Trecceur) conscious of the depth of moral
deterioration reached by the members of a .certain limited world of fashion, he
seems to have aimed at unsparing verity and strength. Herein he was often
successful; but he remains chiefly a delicate, optimistic writer, invaluable as
a real inmate of the world of fashion, as the sole “Romantic” who succeeded in
painting aristocratic society as it really is. :
After 1850,
the novel, which had so greatly extended its range since: the beginning of the
century, shows a tendency to oust all other literary forms. It was the sign of
a new literary standpoint, the novel being, with rare exceptions, essentially
the: perception and expression of sentiments external to the
author. If,, therefore, one may trace in it both of the two main tendencies ,
which characterised the century as a whole, it is' nevertheless, realism which
we find predominating. And Flaubert’s originality lay precisely in the fact
that he caught up and combined harmoniously in himself the main elements of
both realism and Romanticism. He was a Romanticist by taste and by temperament,
also by natural reaction (he began his career with verse and his first book was
La Tentation de St Antoine), by his disgust with his age, his hatred for the
commonplace and the Philistine, his admiration for Chateaubriand and Hugo, in
his passion for perfection of form and faultlessness of style, and in the very
selection of his subject-matter; all this his. private letters and notes show
more than abundantly. He is a naturalist, by reason of his absorbing interest
in physiology (to which he subordinated psychology), his scientific habit of
mind, his documentary accuracy (as minute as that of Balzac), his passion for
describing the platitudinous mediocrity of middle-class life (e.g. Vltducation
sentimentale, Madame Bovary, Bouvard et Pecuchet), and, most of all, by reason
of his impassive, impersonal attitudes towards life. These dual tendencies are
to be found
running in harmonious combination through all his works, remarkable for their
accurate analysis of feeling, for their appropriate setting, their incomparable
beauty of word-painting, their brilliant, restrained, and perfect style, their
intimate combination of “dramatic interest and documentary truth, of the ideal
and the real, of perfection of form and depth of meaning.”
Lyric
poetry, fiction and history—these had been to the time of the Revolution the
three great lacunae in the classic literature of France —lacunae which it was
reserved for the nineteenth century to fill. Before 1789, in fact, almost the
only works which can be cited as purely historical, are UEssai mr les Mceurs
and Le Siecle de Louis XIV of Voltaire. It was the nineteenth century which
gave history a new eminence in the field of literature; and it was to
Chateaubriand, in his sixth book of Les Martyrs, that the initiative in the
direction of picturesque and descriptive history was due. Nevertheless we must
also take into account, in this connexion, the influence of Sir Walter Scott,
the awakening of the patriotic spirit brought about by the Revolution, and the
publication of authentic documents (e.g. the Memoires de St Simon, 1830, and
the like). .
History,
indeed, in common with all other kinds of literary achievement, was destined
to undergo those two great influences by which our century has been
dominated—to become “ extravagantly Romanticist ” in the hands of Michelet;
realistic, in those of Thiers; scientific, in those of Taine and Renan. Under
the influence of Romanticism, history began by being, before all things,
artistic, picturesque, evocative of past times; it sought to make the men and
ages of the past live again, in all the colour, specific traits and outward
characteristics peculiar to each historical character and to each epoch,
endeavouring always to relate and to describe, rather than to philosophise or
discuss. What Thierry and Michelet wished to do was “ to create an art,
fashioned out of the materials furnished by an exact and impartial erudition
”—a work at once of science and of the imagination, alike of art and of
criticism. In this manner, Thierry tried to relate La Conquite de VAngleterre
par les Normands and to depict France in the sixth century in the Recits des
Temps Merovingiens. Unfortunately, despite a certain picturesqueness of colour
and a certain happiness in the choice of epithets, the form, in his case,
lacked grace, harmony, and beauty, and as a rule remains unworthy alike of his
intentions and of his theme. Michelet, on the other hand, possessed all the
qualities which Thierry lacked—imagination, overflowing sensibility,
enthusiasm, poetry, a sense of the picturesque, a faculty alike for form and
colour. If he has the defects of his qualities, if many errors are to be found
in his history of the Revolution, no one, on the other hand, has better
understood or resuscitated the mystic and Catholic Middle Ages, and his Vie de
Jeanne d'Arc is a work unique of its kind. But the historical work of Michelet,
the Romanticist, remains, in spite
524 Guizot. Tocqueville. Thiers. Lamartine.
of all his
efforts, lyric and personal. We read our facts as mirrored in the soul of the
narrator, and it is solely through the subjective processes of his own genius
that we are made aware of the reality of facts.
With Guizot
and his followers, on the other hand, history becomes more precise, more
scientific, more philosophic, more impersonal, and confining itself to the
field of ideas rather than of facts (thereby continuing the traditions of
Montesquieu and of Voltaire), sets itself to deduce the social philosophy
therein contained. Guizot—a statesman first and foremost—who wrote only to
defend his two great political principles, religion and Liberalism, neglects
the recital of facts to devote himself more to causes and consequences; the
very titles are the proof of this; Histoire generate de la Civilisation en
Europe, Histoire de la Revolution d’Angleterre, and the like—“great works,
cold' and strong, in which he studies the progress of society, in such fashion as
to represent the Monarchy of July as the necessary and legitimate crown of the
whole history of France.” Fashioned in this School, yet never writing solely in
defence of his ideas, de Tocqueville (1805-59) gave evidence of a larger,
deeper and more impartial spirit, and his work may, for our time, be regarded
as the model of historical philosophy and philosophic history. He set himself
to study the progress and the future of Democracy m America, and produced an
original and profound work, “ an austere and vigorous presentment of precise
facts, of judgments and of forecasts.” In L’Ancien Rigime et la Rivolution he
tries to explain the underlying causes of 1789, and to study the play of
political and social institutions. These two books are sufficient to establish
his renown, and are the most solid works of social philosophy that have
appeared in France since Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois. Louis-Adolphe Thiers
(1797-1877), in his old age, compared Romanticism to the Commune, which means,
in very truth, that he understood nothing of the movement, that he even went
through it all without understanding its content of art and poetry. But that
which he possessed in the supreme degree, that which he introduced into the
study of history, was the faculty of clarity, of precision, and, above all, “
le don de comprendre,” applied to matters till then neglected—such as finance,
diplomacy, administration, strategy, and the like. He was, at least, the first
to relate a whole section of French history (VHistoire du Consulat et de
I'Empire)—the first to carry light and leading into realms hitherto lying
fallow and unexplored. After him, history, falling under the influence of
Taine, becomes more and more precise, accurate and scientific. Take for example
Mignet, with whom it becomes a generalisation based upon specific facts; or
Renan, whose whole work springs in reality from Semitic philology, and others.
The only historian, whom we must needs place in a class apart, is Lamartine,
who carried on the romantic tradition, and whose Histoire des Girondins
(1847)—eloquent, impassioned, enthusiastic as it is—is no more history than is
Michelet’s VHistoire de la Rivolution.
Fustel de Coulanges.—Criticism: Sainte-Beuve. 525
It was,
indeed, inevitable for history to develop more and more into a science—and as
exact a science as possible—as it came more and more to rely upon original
documents, as criticism of the original sources became more definite and more
exacting, in proportion also as, side by side with it, there grew up new and auxiliary
sciences—philology, epigraphy, the history of art, archaeology (especially
Egyptology with Champollion (1790-1832) and his successors, Assyriology,
etc.)—which brought to it ever new materials, preventing its relapse into
abstraction.
With Fustel
de Coulanges (1830-89), for example, history, detached once and for all from
all Romanticist influence, becomes at once the work of a philosopher and a man
of science. He himself declared history to be “ the science of human societies
and of sociological fact,” and he seeks only an exact presentment of the past,
studied solely and scrupulously in the texts themselves. In La Citi Antique
(1864) and in L'Histoire des Institutions de TAnderme France (1875) he dissects
the causes which led up to the two great revolutions of history. In these two
books there is a range of information, a force of thought in the setting forth
and interpretation of facts, a firmness and robust simplicity of style which,
taken all together, entitle them to rank as masterpieces.
Instead of
claiming for criticism that it profited by the progress of history, it would be
fairer and truer to say that it experienced a simultaneous renewal and
transformation, in obedience to the same causes, and yielding to the same
influences. History, in renouncing its former errors, developed into an affair
of science, art and truth. In like manner the old type of criticism, whether
realist or dogmatic, which judged all things by the light of the one “canon,”
the one dogma, according to one sole and unvarying ideal, gave place by degrees
to the modem type, which judges works of art by replacing them in their
original setting, by taking into account the social conditions and circumstances
under which they were produced. The names of Villemain, Vinet, Scherer, and
Fromentin can here only be cited, since each would deserve a special study; but
it is in Sainte-Beuve that we find nineteenth century criticism really
personified, first, because he was incontestably its leading spirit from 1835
to 1867, and, next, because, beginning his career as a Romantic poet and ending
it as a critic and historian, he stands as one of the most striking
exemplifications of the evolution of literary taste in the nineteenth century.
Up to 1835
Sainte-Beuve, himself a Romantic poet, bravely upheld the Romanticists, and
came boldly out as an innovator. During this period he accustomed the public to
the innovations of the new School and gave wise counsel to his confreres. By
degrees, removed from the friendship and influence of Hugo, and seeing with
clear eyes the exact condition of Romanticism—realising, moreover, that
henceforth it would be quite capable of defending itself—he came to judge it
with perfect detachment, and, up to 1850 or thereabouts, we find him growing
ever more
526 Sainte-Beuvc.-Journalism-Philosophy: Victor
Cousin.
circumspect,
more noticeably conservative. He joined, in a word, the “ Left Centre,” to
which, at heart, he had always belonged, and in whose bosom he remained to his
death. Finally, after 1850, he showed himself in the light rather of a literary
historian than of a critic—even in that of a historian pure and simple as
opposed to a literary historian. He possessed, indeed, in the supreme degree
the qualities essential to the critic—profound erudition, vivacity,
intelligence, above all, an insatiable curiosity, which caused him to seek in
everything the spectacle of humanity engaged in the actual work of living; and
the very plasticity and alertness of his mind enabled him to pass through the
most varied surroundings and judge them with understanding and insight, to see
into and analyse the most opposite types of character. By dint of studying,
first and foremost, the life-stoiy, the moral and physical presentment of a
writer, he seeks to get at his temperament, his manner of being, his tastes,
endeavouring always to revivify the past of a man in his present, to explain
his work by explaining the man himself. And thus his criticism, by its pure
realism, by its elucidation of individual character, possesses an immense
artistic value.
We might here
associate journalism with criticism; but, as a matter of fact, during the whole
of the nineteenth century, the small claim which the Press ever possessed to be
regarded as literature grew smaller and smaller, absorbed as, it was, on the
one hand, in politics, and, on the other, in the pursuit of information,
however obtained. We will confine ourselves to the mention of Paul-Louis
Courier (1772-1825) who wrote in defence of liberal ideas under the
Restoration, and whose “ vivid alert prose carried on the tradition of Voltaire
”; of Emile de Girardin, the discoverer in France of the value of advertisement
and the founder of the halfpenny paper; of Armand Carrel, one of the last
representatives of the old newspaper apostolate; of Veuillot (1813-83), the
champion of the Catholic Church and of the temporal power of the Pope; of
Prevost Paradol (1829-78), a man of brilliant and scornful intelligence who
fought against the Imperial regime; lastly, of Edmond About (1828-85), “exquisite
stoiy-teller and charming talker,” independent Voltairian and republican; and
many others.
With regard
to philosophy, viewed in its purely literary aspect, it is difficult to
consider it apart from other things. Maine de Biran, Saint-Simon and especially
Auguste Comte, “ the most powerful thinker of his half-century,” must be at
once dismissed from this survey, their purely literary merits being of the
smallest: Comte writes badly and the whole of his school is outside the domain
of literature. Victor Cousin (1792-1867) was at once university orator and
learned philosopher, at first a Romanticist, then purely a scholar, an eloquent
and admired professor. Eclecticism—the philosophic system, which he defended,
has fallen into discredit. Besides being a writer, he discovered the original
text of Pascal’s Pensies, was one of the founders of the history of philosophy,
and
did something
towards making German philosophy known to Frenchmen. There remain Renan and
Taine, who are as much to be classified as critics and men of learning as
either philosophers or historians. In Renan there were two personalities,
represent' g the dual tendencies of the time—a deKcate and exquisite artist, a
weighty historian and man of learning. His wit, the charm of his style, the
superior literary vesture in which he clothes his philosophic ideas have
brought upon him accusations of dilettantism; the truth being that in studying
faith he lays most stress upon the need of exact knowledge, that in criticism
he never strays far from the moral aspect of things. For France he will ever
stand as the founder of religious history, the historian of Judaism and of
Christianity (UHistoire du Peuple (FIsrael, La Vie de Jesus, Les Origines du
Christianisme). It was he who first brought the method of comparative philology
to the study of history, who succeeded in reconstructing the characters of
bygone personages, in making the scenes and the setting of past ages live
again; as a philosopher, he “.represents, in the history of thought, a kind of
metaphysical scepticism at once subtle and lofty.” As a writer he is especially
remarkable for a simplicity, a subtlety, a harmony, which do not exclude the
gifts of a painter or of a colourist; and, because of his very delicacy, he has
influenced only a few choice spirits.
As for Taine,
it is difficult to speak freely of and judge fairly, a writer so close to our
own day. His philosophic theories practically created the naturalist and
realist movement of the latter half of the century. A disciple of the English
Empiricists, he became the champion of psycho-physiology, maintaining that
humanity should be studied scientifically, so that through the interpretation
of a host of minor details, carefully observed, the underlying psychological
laws might be revealed. For him, the true task of the historian consisted in so
grouping facts under their different formulae as to bring them readily into
conformity with one universal axiom. What the historian does for the past, the
novelist and the dramatist were to do for the present. It was for them to
collect all the “human documents” possible, so that reality and truth might be
the more loudly proclaimed; the most interesting cases being naturaHy the
abnormal ones, viewed either pathologically or teratologically, because in them
reality is magnified. Finally, when all this has been accomplished, we may
proceed to introspection and to the study of ourselves. From this brief survey,
we may estimate the influence he exercised over men’s minds, when we consider
how many men of letters, novelists, and dramatists have worked on his lines,
and how largely the criticism of to-day, adopting his theories concerning “ the
surroundings, the time and the race ” has followed in his footsteps, while
adding on its own account that analysis of individual character which he was
too apt to neglect. Whatever may have been his defects and his errors, we
cannot but recognise in him one of the most powerful minds of that
half-century,
which “by its opening out of so many new paths has left such a profound
impression upon contemporary thought.”
Art has ever
presented the same features and undergone the same influences as literature.
The resemblances between Poussin and Corneille, Watteau and Marivaux are
undeniable; between Greuze and Diderot they are infinitely more striking,
because, towards the end of the eighteenth century, art and art-criticism
entered into the domain of literature. Since then, the links between them have
been drawn ever closer and closer, until we come to men like Fromentin, at once
a painter and a writer of distinction. May we not even divine something far
stronger than a link or a relationship between such men as Fontanes and Guerin,
Delacroix and Hugo; Delavigne and Delaroche, Courbet and Flaubert? Art in the
nineteenth century in fact underwent precisely the same variations as
literature—from the pseudo-classicism of Girodet-Trioson down to the naturalism
of Manet, passing through Romanticism and realism on the way.
After 1840
Romantic art (represented only by Hugo and Delacroix) withered; nevertheless,
even then, this art set moving a current of new ideas, and provided each of the
various arts with a fructifying germ which it was for each to develop according
to its own nature.
In painting,
it meant the triumph of nature-study and pure landscape, as exemplified by such
men as Corot, Rousseau, Millet, Troyon and above all Courbet. Historical
landscape had had its day; henceforth there were to be no more rules for any
particular type of work, save those each individual man of genius fixed for
himself. Italy and Greece were forgotten, men turned to nature, devoting
themselves to its faithful interpretation as it presents itself to our bodily
eyes— sun, sky, trees, water, air, chiaroscuro. If there must be figures they
must be the peasants of Millet, or the wood-cutters of the neighbouring
forests. Instead of seeking inspiration at Capri or Paestum, men began to paint
the wild or picturesque environs of Paris—Fontainebleau and Barbizon. Was it
not by these same principles that Flaubert was actuated when he wrote Madame
Bovary P
Thus, in the
arts as in the literature, Romanticism culminated, in the middle of this
century, in the triumph of that which, from Rousseau and Bemardin de
Saint-Pierre down to Chateaubriand, had first inspired this whole great school
of French thought—that is to say, in the admiration and worship of nature,
studied and observed as it really is.
THE
COMPLETION OF ITALIAN UNITY.
(1) THE SUCCESSORS OF CAVOUR.
(1861-70.)
The purposes and life work of Cavour have
been nowhere more worthily summarised than on the morrow of his death, by Sir
Robert Peel, Lord John Russell* and Lord Palmerston, when they described him as
the real author of that great work of liberty, the resuscitation of Italy, which
had earned him the gratitude, not of his country, but of mankind. “ The man who
has wrought this great deed,” said Lord Palmerston, “will live eternally in
history; and premature as his death may seem, and indeed is, and deeply as it
may have shaken the hopes of his fellow citizens, it has not come too early for
his glory.”
Such was the
judgment on Cavour of the leading statesmen of England, the classic land of
constitutional liberty, from whom the great Italian had learnt his lessons, and
drawn his inspirations. Massimo d’Azeglio, on the other hand, thought that he
had died exactly at the right moment for his reputation, so precarious did he
think the life of the hastily constructed edifice, so vast the piles of ruin on
which its foundations were laid. His immediate successors earned the somewhat
contemptuous nickname of the “ Generals of Alexander,” not always without
reason. But it is only fair to observe that the change in the dispositions of
men and of things, which had begun shortly before the death of Cavour, had
become seriously aggravated since the sudden removal of his immense authority.
Italy had staggered under the blow; her unification was still incomplete, the
financial need was sore and continual: and, while the lines of external policy
were pretty well fixed and secure, those of internal administration were still
uncertain.
In the end it
was determined to adopt throughout the kingdom, with a ,few alterations, the
laws enacted by Urbano Rattazzi in virtue of his extraordinary powers. These
were, however, modified, in consequence of some jealousies, by a number of
provisos, such as the division of the country into districts corresponding to
the former States, and by the arbitrary union of provinces. Unfprtunately,
these laws contained the
seeds of a
yet graver difference, in the shape of a revolt against centralisation under
Piedmontese hegemony; and in the meanwhile the real decentralisation for which
the people craved, the decentralisation which would secure the true and
complete autonomy of the Commune, that historical germ and essential principle
of Italian life, remained little more than a phrase. At the same time, the
riddle of Naples and its provinces was puzzling in succession the various
Viceroys who were sent there. The problem remained unsolved; in Naples every
function of ordinary government was impossible; in the southern provinces,
anarchy borrowed strength from the brigandage indigenous there, which, much to
its discredit, the Government was unable to cure.
Baron Bettino
Ricasoli, who had succeeded Cavour as Prime Minister, was undoubtedly the most
influential political leader of the moment. A man of powerful mind, inspired
with patriotic feeling and noble ideals, he was yet, owing to a stiff and
rather unbending character, in many respects the antithesis of the great
statesman he had succeeded. The external outlook was gloomy, the new kingdom
was nowhere recognised, except by England in an informal and semi-official
fashion. It is true that a few days after the death of Cavour, Napoleon III
recognised her, as a fresh proof of the good-will felt towards her in her
immense loss. But though he had previously come to an understanding with Cavour
as to the withdrawal of the French from Rome, he now declared that this
recognition was not to be construed as detracting from the validity of the
papal protests against the occupation of the Marches and Umbria, or as
approving the results of the Unionist policy of Italy; he further signified
that France was resolved to maintain the occupation of Rome, so long as any of
the interests she had undertaken to protect remained unsecured. Thus the value
of the French recognition was reduced to a minimum. Nevertheless, her example
was followed, first by England, this time acting officially; and then by other
nations, notably, in the following year (1862), by Russia and Prussia. Italy
having been thus duly adopted into the family of nations, was naturally the
more anxious for the accomplishment of her own unity, to which Rome and Venice
only were now lacking—Rome, the cause of all her difficulties with France;
Venice, on whose account the chronic hostility of Austria, now the more
formidable in that she had less territory to defend, might at any moment become
an imminent and mortal peril to the new kingdom.
Though
convinced that his duty was first to establish the country on a peaceable and
orderly basis, and to strengthen the army both in numbers and organisation,
Ricasoli nevertheless felt bound to follow up the Roman question at once. The
failure of the confidential negotiations of Cavour, which is mentioned in a
previous chapter, had exasperated the hostility of Pope and Curia against
Italy. The presence of the Neapolitan Bourbons in Rome so demoralised the Pope
and his Administration as to make them deaf to the most elementary rules of
political morality. Recruiting for
I861-2] Ricasoli's policy in Church and State.
531
the brigand
bands was carried on openly at regular well-known centres; Chiavone, Crocco,
Guerra, Giordano, brigand chiefs notorious for their enormities and atrocities,
came and went without hindrance, and all this under the very eyes of the French
garrison and their commander General Goyon. Ricasoli determined to try the
effect of direct and public overtures to the Pope, by invoking the good
offices of the French Government. The latter, however, declined its aid; but
Ricasoli held to his purpose too firmly to lose heart on this account. What he
had been unable to obtain from Napoleon and the Pope by diplomacy, he
determined to wrest from them by means of a vast national agitation, by the
voice of all Italy, throughout its length and breadth, demanding Rome. With
this idea in his mind, he showed greater cordiality towards Garibaldi, whose
name was being used to organise a network of democratic associations throughout
the country. Their objects, indeed, extended beyond Rome, but nevertheless
Ricasoli hoped to be able to keep them in hand. He went a step further, and
left Mazzini free to return to his country, so that all divisions might disappear,
in the growing unanimity of the Italian cry for Rome. Besides endeavouring to
appeal to the democrats, Ricasoli also set on foot a movement among the Clergy,
to induce the Pope to be reconciled to Italy. The movement was headed by Carlo
Passaglia, Monsignor Eusebio Liverani, and other prelates, but it did no more
than give birth to the so-called “ Petition of 9000 Priests.” It was generally
looked upon as an attempt to start a new schism on a magnificent scale ; but it
was weakly supported and had no success, as is, strangely enough, invariably
the case with the agitations of rebellious clergy in Italy. The parliamentary
majority that supported Ricasoli was becoming alarmed at his domestic policy,
and at his procedure towards Rome; still, they dared not break with him.
Indeed, they accepted sundry very important proposals of his, one after
another: e.g., the abolition of the viceroyalties of Naples and Sicily, and
that of the administrative independence of Tuscany; the issue of a loan for
twenty millions sterling; the consolidation of the debts of all the States; the
increase of expenditure on the great public works, and especially on railways,
which were to restore the economic prosperity of the country; a law on weights
and measures, involving the universal adoption of the decimal system;
unification of the coinage; fresh taxation on a large scale for the
replenishment of the Treasury.
The attitude
of Ricasoli towards Rome had displeased Napoleon III, who considered that Italy
made no sufficient allowance for the serious embarrassments to which he was
thereby subjected at home. Victor Emmanuel, for his part, was quite ready to
devote himself entirely to the liberation of Venice (therein agreeing with
Mazzini, rather than with Garibaldi and Ricasoli), by planning an insurrection
in Hungary, which would force Austria to abandon Venetia. Ricasoli was now
becoming the object of a sort of conspiracy, which, originating at the Court,
was
spreading to
the Chambers and beyond, and was even favoured by no less a person than
Beneiletti, the French Minister at Turin. Rattazzi was the soul of this
conspiracy, and to his ambitious and intriguing spirit all weapons were lawful.
Meanwhile, the semi-official agents of Victor Emmanuel had secured for
,Rattazzi a more exalted support, and a conference between him and Napoleon III
actually took place in Paris in October, 1861.
Ricasoli was
fully aware of what was going on, and warned Victor Emmanuel not to risk his
country and his Crown in a hazardous game, which might end in his finding
himself, not at the head, but at the tail, of the Mazzinian and Garibaldian
parties. The King received his frank observations with ill-humour; and at
length, on February 28, 1862, he sent a letter which caused Ricasoli to offer
his resignation. It was at once accepted; and Rattazzi was commissioned to form
a new Cabinet. Ricasoli had no doubt been guilty of many mistakes, but was at
least pure in intention, while the King had given way to evil counsels and to
the impulses of an impatient patriotism; and Rattazzi’s rise to power signified
the success of a low intrigue.
Rattazzi was
apparently surprised at his own victory; and his first Ministry was hastily and
imperfectly constructed of representatives of different parties. The old Cavour
majority distrusted him; but, after its desertion of Ricasoli, it dared not
open its mouth. The extremists came to some temporary arrangement with the new
Ministry, which might have been of some solid value to them, but for the
plottings, the secret understandings, and the general atmosphere of conspiracy.
Of the extremists Mazzi-i was perhaps the least dangerous, inasmuch as he
always conceived revolution as a cosmopolitan affair; he would make one
revolution engender another ; Hungary, Bohemia, Peland, next Greece, then the
natiinaliHes of eastern Europe were -to pass on the sacred lamp; the Austrian
empire was to be dissolved, and the destinies of Europe were to be changed!
Garibaldi, on the contrary, had but little faith in such far-reaching
schemes—both from old experience and from an equally old opposition to
Mazzini. All he desired was an understanding with Rattazzi to enable him to go
his own Way; and Rattazzi, on his side, fully believed in his own ability to
control Garibaldi’s activity. Garibaldi summoned a congress of the democratic
associations, which had been growing up for some time, partly under his
auspices, partly under those of Mazzini. The meeting was held at Genoa on March
9,1862, with Garibaldi as president, «nrl was numerously attended; a resolution
was passed merging all the societies into one, under the name of the “ Society
for the Emancipation of Italy.” War was declared for the liberation of Rome and
Venice; and Garibaldi was persuaded not only to be reconciled to Mazzini, but
even to insist on his recall from exile.
Meanwhile the
Government gave no sign by word or act, and seemed
more than
ever to have some secret understanding with (Garibaldi. But just then King Otho
was driven from Greece by a military revolt, which appeared to be connected with
the Slav agitations on the Danube and the movements in Herzegovina, Bosnia,
Servia, and Montenegro. We cannot say what impression these events made on the
mind of Garibaldi; but we know that Rattazzi promised to supply him for the
purpose of some armed enterprise with arms and a large sum of money (J?40,000,
as declared by Crispi in open Chamber, and Rattazzi did not gainsay him).
Shortly afterwards Garibaldi took a journey into Lombardy, whence he sent a
request for the promised arms and treasure; Rattazzi, fearing that the prestige
of the King might suffer in the general uncertainty as to the nature of
Garibaldi’s next enterprise, arranged to accompany Victor Emmanuel to Naples;
and was received there with great enthusiasm, in spite of the wretched condition
of both capital and provinces. Whether Rattazzi and Garibaldi kept to their
reciprocal engagements is doubtful. Rattazzi thought that he could play with
fire; Garibaldi had but one clear idea, which was to attack Austria* He
continued to hesitate between an attempt on Greece and one on Venice; but
meanwhile he had taken up his quarters at Trescorre, the central point of the
valleys that lead into Italian Tyrol, whither, according to the information of
the Government, he proposed to penetrate by way of Anfo and Edolo.
Peremptory
orders were immediately sent to stop him at all costs, and many Garibaldians
were consequently arrested and imprisoned in various border-towns, amongst
others at Sarnico. Thence they were transferred under arrest to Brescia, where
the populace attempted to rescue them; a conflict ensued with the Italian
troops, in which many of the inhabitants were killed or wounded. Garibaldi took
up the cause of the prisoners of Sarnico as his, own, and charged the
Government with a breach of their understanding; although in all probability it
was he who, yielding not unwillingly to the arguments of the Mazzinians, had
departed from his promises to Rattazzi. It is easy to conceive the disgust felt
by Cavour’s old majority at these discreditable proceedings. Nevertheless,
though much against their will, they supported the Government ; and Garibaldi
retired to Caprera, sick at heart, indignant both with the Government and the
Mazzinians, and yearning to act once more with entire independence and without
any secret understandings. On June 29, 1862, he appeared unexpectedly at
Palermo, passed in triumph along the path of his former victories from
Calatafimi to Marsala, and there, in the midst of a vast crowd assembled in a
church, he raised for the first time the cry “Rome or death!” The Government,
in its first surprise and terror, took no active steps, an attitude which gave
rise to a general belief that the King and Rattazzi were still in collusion
with Garibaldi. Intrigues of such a sort have sometimes been too readily
admired in Italy as examples of superfine astuteness. Garibaldi himself never
even dreamed that an attempt would be made to stop him; but he did all he could
to
avoid
collision with the troops in Sicily. However, on August 8, 1862, a royal
proclamation was issued, countersigned by all the Ministers, which publicly
disavowed his action, and threatened him and his followers with the most
rigorous penalties of the law. But this was unheeded by Garibaldi. On August 24
he crossed the Straits on two vessels, with some 8000 volunteers, and landed
near Mileto in Calabria; but, hearing from Reggio that a state of siege had
been proclaimed in Sicily and Naples, and that the King’s army under Cialdini
was advancing, he directed his forces to concentrate on the table-land of
Aspromonte, which he reached himself on August 29. On the same day Colonel
Pallavicini, at the head of the royal forces, arrived at the same spot and
attacked the Gari- baldians with great vigour. Few volleys were exchanged, as
Garibaldi had forbidden any resistance; but unluckily a bullet struck him on
the right ankle. His companions were made prisoners of war; and he was himself
placed with all due respect on board a man-of-war, and taken to the fortress of
Varignano near Spezia. This was the second step on the road to Rome, and it was
not taken without bloodshed. Rattazzi now issued, through Giacomo Durando, his
Minister for Foreign Affairs, a circular dated September 10, 1862, in which he
laid claim to Rome as the reward of it, and adopted the cry of Garibaldi, “
Rome or death.” On October 8 he addressed a despatch directly to the French
Government, in which he put his demands still higher; ignoring all that had
happened, he proposed, it was said, to take up the question of Rome at the
point where Cavour had left it, and insist upon the withdrawal of the French
occupation of Rome, and thd recognition of the principle of non-intervention in
Italian affairs. He thus gave a monumental example of political tactlessness
and diplomatic naivete, and the attitude immediately adopted by Napoleon must
very quickly have enlightened him. Drouyn de Lhuys (who had replaced Thouvenel
at the French Foreign Office) simply left this despatch of October 8
unanswered; and, as to the circular of September 10, he only reminded its
authors that, in the negotiations concerning Rome, the imperial Government must
confine itself to the attempt to reconcile two interests equally deserving of
respect, and could not hear of sacrificing one to the other.
So far,
therefore, the external situation was settled, and unfavourably for Italy. What
was to be done with the domestic difficulty? Was Garibaldi to be indicted ?
Fortunately the marriage of Maria Pia of Savoy to the King of Portugal relieved
the Ministry of trouble on this point, by giving them an opportunity of
declaring the customary amnesty. Rattazzi next tried to regain touch of the old
majority of the Right by a rearrangement of the Ministry, but without success.
He also thought of dissolving the Chambers, but was afraid to do so; on
November 18, however, a bitter discussion took place in the Chamber^ in which
the Ministry were violently attacked; and, on December 1,1862,
Rattazzi
announced the resignation of the M’ristry. It was succeeded on December 8,
1862, by a Ministry of the pure Right, or, to adopt the name by which the
Moderates were now beginning to be known, a Consorteria (“log-rollers”)
Ministry. This was headed first by Farini, and later, on his somewhat sudden
retirement, by Marco Minghetti (March 24, 1863). Out of the troubles and
vicissitudes of the Rattazzi Ministry the old majority of the Right had issued
in a more disintegrated condition than ever. The principal deserters were the
Piedmontese members, who felt that they were losing much of their former predominance
with the resignation of Rattazzi. By the side of the great parliamentary
Consorteria clique there were smaller provincial and local associations, which
were perhaps even more intolerant and more exclusive. Minghetti, now President
of the Council, was undoubtedly one of the widest intellects and most
disinterested spirits among the Consorteria; but he was without the nerve
requisite for controlling the profound antipathies to which their mutual
intolerance and systematic exclusiveness had given rise. Face to face with this
party of order stood a body which was not so much an Opposition, in the true
sense, as a confused and chaotic crowd; old antagonists of the Moderates and
enemies of Cavour; ambitious young men struggling to rise; Garibaldians acting
rather from sympathy with their old general than on any political principle.
Around these were grouped the derelicts of the shipwreck of Mazzinianism, and
of other old dogmas and lost causes'—Neo-Guelfs, Autonomists, Bourbonists, Republicans,
Federalists, the still impenitent survivors of the secret societies, and other
political combatants of 1848-9. All Italy was still agitated by the late
occurrences at Aspromonte; Turin and Piedmont suspected the new Ministry of
designs hostile to them; the reactionary feelings which had been provoked by
the extravagances of Garibaldi were now giving place to the opposite sentiment;
in Sicily discontent was profound and threatening; brigandage showed signs of
lifting up its head again in the provinces of Naples.
The fact is
that the brigandage of those countries was partly a symptom of local reaction,
partly an ancient evil, deep-rooted in the social and economic conditions of
those provinces, which was not curable by force alone. It has been said, with
some plausibility, that the true conquest of Naples was effected, not when
Garibaldi flashed like lightning from Reggio di Calabria to Naples, but by the
war against brigandage. The situation created by the prevalence of brigandage
was essentially a problem demanding the interference of the National
Government, as Garibaldian enthusiasm and the good sense of Neapolitan Liberals
had failed to suppress the disorders. For, though the middle class Reformers,
who took up arms in I860 to the number of 18,000 (according to the trustworthy
estimates of Racioppi, and Turiello), unquestionably aided the success of the
general movement in favour of Garibaldi, they proved unable even to stop the
reactionary peasants from recovering possession
of the whole
provinces of Abruzzo and Molise, within a few days of the battle of the
Voltumo; nor could they prevent that reaction, combined with the dispersion of
a part of the Bourbonist army after the first victories of Cialdini, from
giving rise to brigandage. It is with this problem of brigandage in Naples that
the success of the newly formed kingdom of Italy was largely bound up, for its
suppression had become a pressing necessity. Brigandage began by being mainly
political; later, as its existence was prolonged by the aid of the Bourbons who
haid taken refuge in Rome, by the complicity of the papal Court and the!
toleration of the French, it once more became a social institution. Moreover,
while the old Government had lost all power of controlling it, the new had, for
some time, failed to make itself felt directly by its own strength.
The reaction
in favour of Bourbonism which brigandage kept up, had been started some time
before, as we have seen; and, duririg their viceroyaltifes, neither Farini nor
Prince Carignano, nor San Martino had been able to arrest it. From the military
point of view Cialdini had been the most successful; his method was, while
vigorously repressing the Bourbonist plots in the interior, so to envelop the
brigand bands as to force them away from the papal frontier—their base of operations—aaid
drive them into Calabria, where he hoped to be able to crush them by a single
blow. But the vice-regal office was abolished, Cialdini Was recalled, and La
Marmora succeeded him with the title of Prefect of Naples and
Commander-in-chief. The ranks of the brigands were at first eagerly filled by
foreign fanatics of Legitimist views, who really believed they were joining a
new Vendean Crusade, but these gentlemen adventurers could not give Neapolitan
brigandage an exclusively political character. When they were got rid of,
brigandage returned to its original type, which was that of a morbid
anart-Tilt- development. It had been fostered by superstition, ignorance, and
misery, by the impulsiveness of Southern blood, by class hatred, family feuds,
and personal quarrels, by selfishness on the part of the rich and wretchedness
among the poor; and finally by the state of semi-villenage, by which peasants
and agricultural labourers were tied to the soil, starving and hopeless of
redress. It is to be feared after all that the only efficient remedy for these
evils is one that has come without the assistance of statesmen, viz., the
emigration of these poor country folk in a body; and even this, in the
proportions that it has now assumed, promises to become a scourge in its turn.
The Minghetti
Ministry, immediately on assuming power, appointed a parliamentary commission
on this question. Giuseppe Massari, an old and respected Neapolitan patriot,
drew up their report, which remains to this day a standard autlio ity on the
matter. Their proposal was to extend the basis of property in these provinces
by getting rid of mortmain, to make roads, to cut down the woods which
sheltered the brigands, to start schools, and to increase the vigilance of the
police, as
well as the
severity and swiftness of punishment. On this report an Act was based known as
the Pica Law; its effect was good, but its operation was neither general nor
continuous. Besides the repression of brigandage, there was another pressing
necessity—that of regulating the finances of the State, which the great
political changes between 1859 and 1863, and the wastefulness of the various
provisional Governments, that held power before the annexation, had reduced to
something very near ruin. Minghetti, as a moral philosopher and a learned
political economist, went hack to first principles, and drew up a complete
scheme, which, he had the audacity to predict, would in four years’ time
produce equilibrium between the debit and credit side of the ordinary (not the
extraordinary) budget, if nothing interposed to disturb its symmetry. He
submitted his proposal to the Chambers in a speech of great eloquence and
lucidity on February 14, 1863; beside it a previous scheme of Sella, drawn up
under the Rattazzi Ministry, now looked rather pessimistic; and people were
grateful to Minghetti for his confidence. Unluckily, as it turned out, there
was some flaw in the calculations of both; and he who had speculated with the
greater confidence in the future was the financier who incurred the greater
blame. But the Chambers went on to sanction a special loan of ^28,000,000, out
of which Minghetti proposed to meet immediate wants, at the same time keeping
in hand a reasonable sum to meet eventualities in the political world.
In truth the
atmosphere of Europe was growing murky. Russ/an Poland had been the first to
rise in 1863. Germany was preparing to wrest the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein
from Denmark; and it was impossible to say whether Austria and Prussia would
fall out or agree on the partition. Napoleon was nursing his day-dreams, as
usual. A European conflagration was not impossible; and it behoved Italy to be
ready. Unrest and disturbance had its counterpart in the internal life of
Italy; Garibaldi, it is true, was incapacitated for a time by the wound
received at Aspromonte ; but Mazzini was busy with all manner of chimerical
projects for the liberation of Venetia. During 1863 and 1864 events developed
as follows: the Ministers were hesitating to avail themselves of any assistance
from revolutionary bodies, being doubtful of their own ability to keep them
under control; next, King Victor Emmanuel, self-confident and secretive, with a
view of his Constitutional powers peculiar to himself, and intensely anxious
to break with Austria on the first possible opportunity, was negotiating with
Hungarian refugees. He also had relations with Mazzini himself, whose distrust
and reservation he never succeeded in quite breaking down and whose promises of
loyalty were always strictly limited in the way of date; and, finally, with
Garibaldi, with whom he always found it easier to come to an understanding,
from a certain conformity between their characters. The King’s plan was, as
usual, to foment an insurrection in the Austrian empire, to be backed up in the
Danubian principalities; the first centre
538 Improvement in finances.—Industrial
development. [i864
of
insurrection being Transylvania. Garibaldi was to form an army composed of the
Hungarians, Roumanians, Servians, and other southern Slavs, and to take the
command of it against Austria. Italy was to take that opportunity to declare
war. The King was liberal in his promises of support in arms and money. As soon
as all this warlike preparation became known to Mazzini, he broke off all
negotiations with the King, and did his best to thwart his plans. Just then
Garibaldi paid a visit to London, where he doubtless hoped to obtain valuable
support for his new enterprises, and where he took the opportunity to effect,
in appearance at least, a reconciliation with Mazzini.
As, for the
time being, these questions had ceased to agitate Europe, the Minghetti
Ministry felt it incumbent on them to take up the Roman question. The ever
growing scandal of the complicity of the papal Court in the Neapolitan
brigandage, the responsibility and disgrace of which was now beginning to be a
serious burden on the French Emperor; the disgrace of the contract for the
construction of the southern railways which had been given to an ex-Minister
Bastogi; the attitude adopted in Parliament by the Piedmontese Opposition, all
increased the difficulty of the Ministry. On the other hand, though the
condition, of the finances - did not quite come up to the confident
expectations of Minghetti, it had at any rate much improved. Indeed it may be
said that the movement towards equilibrium in Italian finances dates from his
tenure of office, having been initiated by three important measures of
taxation, viz. the increase of the land-tax (with temporary provisions for its
equalisation throughout the kingdom), the imposition of the tax on personal
property, and the imposition of the tax on food. Besides this, new treaties of
commerce were made, or old treaties renewed with France, England, Russia, Holland,
and Denmark; and there were, in addition, to be discerned the first signs of an
economic, industrial, and social awakening, which was of great importance for
the first years of the existence of the new kingdom. Companies were started for
the development of the sulphur mines, railways, gas-works, canals, and banks;
also for the acquisition of public property; and there arose popular and
cooperative loan institutions, workmen’s associations on Mazzini’s
anti-socialistic basis, cooperative stores, and societies for making advances
to landowners. Now that the old state boundaries had disappeared, the various
districts began to exchange their products; while the public authorities gave
constant attention to the supply of roads and schools. Of course all such developments
were at present more or less in embryo, and the hindrances were so many and
grievous that the Government was induced to attempt to score a success in its
negotiations with Rome or France, in order to relieve the strain of its
internal difficulties.
Negotiations
with France were resumed in June, 1864; and a Convention, providing For
the withdrawal of the French from Rome within
the next two
years, was drawn Up on September 15, Napoleon III required, in return, that the
capital should be transferred from Turin to Florence. This condition gave rise
to a dispute; the Italians contended •vhat it recognised the advance of the
capital one stage nearer to Rome, while, in the French view, it was a final
renunciation of Rome. Turin resented fiercely the insult to its dignity and the
injury to its prosperity; and the disturbances, in which the inhabitants of
this generally peaceful and quiet city expressed their feelings, were put down
with ill-considered recklessness. Two massacres of unarmed citizens took place
on September 21 and 22; and the King was so shocked and upset by these
disastrous events that he dismissed the Ministry on September 23, 1864.
Minghetti was
succeeded by General Alfonso La Marmora with a Ministry consisting mainly of
Piedmontese members, which induced both Chambers to approve the French
Convention and transferred the capital to Florence. But the old majority was
now broken up, and a Piedmontese Opposition had been constituted, with a temper
so furious that even Mazzini thought he could use it for his own purposes. For
many years this body had a disintegrating effect on the Government, and
paralysed all its relations, especially towards the extreme parties, in spite
of the sound parliamentary majority, by which the Ministry was supported.
Thus the
Italians had reached the third milestone on the road to Rome; but there were
yet to be terrors and convulsions before the Milliarium Aureum—the Golden
Milestone of the Forum—was reached. So far as Rome itself was concerned,
experience showed how difficult it was for both one and the other of the
contracting parties to carry out the Convention, in the face of the refusal of
Garibaldi and the party of action to come to any terms, and of the equally
implacable hostility of Pius IX and the Roman Curia. The Pope, indeed, by way
of demonstrating the impossibility of any accord, took the opportunity of
declaring his disagreement, not with Italy only, but with the whole of modem
civilisation, by the publication of the Syllabus (on December 8, 1864) whose
importance is indicated elsewhere. The general elections of 1865 had laid bare
the depths of the gulf which had been formed between political parties since
the death of Cavour. There was a Ministerial crisis; and, scarcely had the
Ministry been reconstituted, still under the presidency of La Marmora, than it
narrowly escaped a second disaster. But the first whispers of war were in the
air; and disputes ' ' were allayed under the influence of the thrill of
expectation that heralds great events, and by the secret hope that the
opportunity had at last come for expelling every Austrian from Italy. The
rivalry between Austria and Prussia, Bismarck having come into power on
September 23, 1862, was threatening to burst out into war. Italy thus had an
excellent excuse for dropping the Roman question, and bringing the Venetian
trouble to a solution by forming an alliance with Prussia—a policy known to
have been favoured by Cavour so far back as 1858. The success of La Marmora
in
negotiating and concluding this alliance will never cease to deserve the
gratitude of his country.
The direct
negotiations between Prussia and Italy, in the matter of this alliance, began
only in March, 1866, and were conducted by Bismarck in person; but, indirectly,
they had been going on much longer. His object in seeking an alliance with
Italy was not only in order to secure her material aid against Austria, but in
order to assure himself of the neutrality or at any rate of the acquiescence of
France. Bismarck always distrusted Napoleon III, who was at any moment capable
of crossing the purposes of Prussia ; at the same time he distrusted La Marmora
and Italy, as on too intimate terms with Napoleon. La Marmora on his side
suspected that Bismarck’s main purpose was to intimidate Austria, and that, if
he succeeded, he would leave Italy in the lurch. These mutual suspicions at the
outset, and the stratagems which Bismarck was compelled to adopt in order to
draw his recalcitrant King and Court into the war, very seriously aggravated
the difficulties of the negotiations, and later were to produce very serious
consequences. However, on April 8, 1866, a treaty of offensive and defensive
alliance was concluded between Prussia and Italy. Scarcely was this signed,
under conditions of the greatest secrecy (which of course were not kept), than
Napoleon, on May 5,1866, notified to La Marmora that Austria had made a formal
proposition to cede Venetia, in return for a simple promise of neutrality.
Austria had in fact resolved, in face of the extreme peril that threatened her,
to abandon Venetia, and throw it as an apple of Atalanta in the path of Italy.
La Marmora had already rejected the proposal when first mooted. On its renewal
on May 6, with more urgent insistency and in greater detail, he maintained his honourable
refusal. Italy intended, he said, to remain! faithful to her treaty with
Prussia. Italy would otherwise fail in loyalty and in honour, and her honour
was dearer to him than even the acquisition of Venetia.
On June
20,1866, Italy declared war against Austria. Thus began the third war of
independence. No description is needed of the universal enthusiasm of the
country, of the hopes of glory which inspired both the army, under the command
of the King in person, and the volunteers under Garibaldi. La Marmora went to
the front by the side of Victor Emmanuel, and was succeeded as President of the
Ministry by Ricasoli. But on June 24 the Italians were defeated at Cus'.ozza,
and, what was worse, so badly defeated that, in the opinion of their chiefs, it
was useless to resume operations before July 5. Two days before that date the
Prussians had conquered at Sadowa; and Austria, beaten to the dust, renewed her
offer to cede Venetia to Italy through Napoleon III, in exchange for an
armistice which should enable her to concentrate the whole of her forces
against the victorious Prussians, This then was the end of all the enthusiasm,
all the hopes of Italy—this ghastly unavoidable dilemma; Venetia within her
reach, but on terms which it was
alike
shameful to accept, and madness to refuse! To add to the gloom, came a naval
defeat at Lissa on July 20. Nevertheless Italy remained to the end true to her
obligations towards Prussia; while Prussia, without troubling herself to inform
her unfortunate but loyal ally, concluded an armistice at Ndkolsburg. La
Marmora took upon himself the responsibility which, in the general state of
doubt and hesitation, no one else would assume, and igreed to an armistice on
behalf of Italy also. This was concluded at Cormoy on August 12,
1866, and orders were given to Garibaldi to
retire from the district of Trent, which he had just reached at the head of his
volunteers. Garibaldi replied with one word only, “I obey.” In connexion with
this matter, ,he wrote in his autobiography: “ it gave occasion later to the
usual complaints of the Mazzinians, who once more wanted ime to proclaim a
Republic and march on Vienna and Florence.” Prussia, ever distrustful of the
intentions of Napoleon, hastened to make peace with Austria by the Treaty of Prague,
August 12. Italy, with great but useless reluctance, was fain to accept peace
also, and a treaty was signed at Vienna on October 3. The wretched farce of the
retrocession of Venetia by France to Italy was then played—a farce which the
demeanour of General Lebceuf, the French commissioner, rendered still more
absurd. But, through the good sense of General di Revel, the Italian
commissioner, it was possible to carry it out on October 19 without any parade;
and an unanimous vote of the people, given on October 21 and 22, did all that
could be done to rectify the awkwardness of the position in which Italy had
been placed by the unskilful conduct of the war, and by French mediation.
Nevertheless,
a period of general intense moral depression followed. The nation was vexed to
its very soul; a reactionary movement, of which the purpose was less easily
defined than the cause, had to be put down by force at Palermo; and when, after
Venetia had been evacuated by Austria, and after the French had w'Jhdrawn
from Rome in accordance with the Convention of 1864, the King was able to
declare on December 15, ,1866, that “Italy is at last free of all forei-Ti
domination” —even this announcement failed to raise the spirits of the
Italians.
Pius IX, in
spite of his affected indifference, was alarmed at being abandoned by the
French, and negotiations with Rome were therefore resumed on the old pretext of
providing for the vacant sees; but the results were as negative as before. A
little later, the Government brought up a Bill to dispose of ecclesiastical
property for the relief of the deeply indebted Exchequer, by way also of a sort
of experiment in the organisation of a “free Church in a free State” (libera
chiesa in libero stato). In substance, it provided for a sale of the property
of all religious corporations, by which the State would benefit to the amount
of ,£24,000,000. It contained a provision authorising the Bishops themselves
to carry out the operation; and to redeem the property by the
542 Rattazzi carries the confiscation of church
property. [i867
payment of
the £24,000,000 to the Government. The Opposition rose fiercely against this
proposal both in the Chambers and in the country; and the Chambers placed the
Ministry in a minority. A dissolution followed, and Garibaldi threw himself
with all his energy into the ensuing contests, hot with delight at the hope of
at last solving the Roman problem according to his own views. The elections
went against the Government; and, without further challenge, Ricasoli resigned
on April 4, 1867.
On April 10
Rattazzi once more appeared at the head of the Government. To the Radical party
he was only known as the man of Aspromonte;! to the Moderates he was
a constant and inveterate enemy. Now, Rattazzi was a curious character, whose
type still unfortunately exists on the political stage of Italy; his favourite
r6le was to throw himself into the midst of a perplexed situation, in the
belief that he could manipulate circumstances for his own benefit. He quietly
explained his policy to the Chamber, and the Chamber not less quietly accepted
it. No sooner had he tested his ground, than he hastily proceeded—with the
deftness of a man well versed in legal chicanery—to carry out the complete
confiscation of the Church property (the whole of it was afterwards miserably
frittered away); he next proceeded to concoct one of his favourite political
schemes, which came to the same end as all the others. Garibaldi, following his
usual plan, had determined, if revolution would not break out spontaneously in
Rome, to introduce it there on his own account. Rattazzi, on his side,
pretended to object, and even went so far as to arrest Garibaldi; but, at the
same time, he carried on underhand negotiations with him and others, intending
in fact to forward his own ends by their help, while in fact they were playing
with him. On finding that he had been out-generalled, he resigned. He was
succeeded by Menabrea, who issued, on October 27,
1867, a royal proclamation formally disavowing
connexion with Garibaldi's scheme. Amid the general unwillingness to assume
authority or accept the responsibility of government, his Ministry showed a
lack of courage, though it contained some men with a great reputation for
bravery, such as Cialdini. Garibaldi was in no way moved by the proclamation;
leaving Caprera, whither he had been banished, he once more placed himself at
the head of the bands that had already entered the Pontifical territory, and
marched straight on Rome. The scheme for raising insurrection inside the city
had ended with the death of the heroic Cairoli brothers at Villa Glori on
October 27, 1867; and the project of waiting for an outbreak and of then
hastening to its assistance had therefore vanished, even before the occurrence
of the final and decisive catastrophe. Garibaldi, seeing this, and, once in a
way, following a suggestion from Mazzini, determined if possible to concentrate
all his forces at Monterotondo, and march thence to Tivoli, with the ultimate
object of throwing himself into the province of Abruzzo, and of carrying revolt
into the interior of the old Neapolitan kingdom. This
might well
have been the ruin of Italy ; and, had the Papal troops only been aware of his
object it would have answered their purpose to let him carry it out. Not
knowing it, they devoted all their energies to hinder the concentration of the
Garibaldians and to eject them from the Papal territory. Thus it came about
that, on November 3, 1867, Garibaldi was taken in flank at Mentana, while on
the march from Monterotondo to Tivoli, and was forced to accept battle.
Quarrels and desertions had weakened his motley army; but there was left a
residue of the stoutest hearts and the sincerest' enthusiasts, who, though
scarcely 4000 in number, held their ground against the Pontificals. They had in
fact already repulsed them, when the French troops, which had returned to Rome,
came up in support; the chassepots mowed down the handful of heroes, whose
weapons were so inferior that they could not even reach their enemy; and the
piteous tragedy came to a close. Yet it was this bloody sacrifice that actually
opened to Italy the gates of Rome! It not only reduced the Convention of 1864
to a mere name, barely to be mentioned as a convenient diplomatic fiction; but
it gave a mortal blow to the French alliance, up to this time the sheet-anchor
of Italian foreign policy. This was very soon made clear; though it did not
occur to de Failly, when he boasted of the “ marvels worked by the chassepots,”
nor to Rouher, when, for the purpose of pleasing the clericals in France, he uttered
his unlucky prediction, that the Italians would “never” enter Rome.
On December
15, 1869, in a welter of the worst possible financial and political conditions,
Menabrea’s Ministry gave way to a new one, in which Giovanni Lanza was
President, Quintino Sella again Finance Minister, and Emilio Visconti Venosta
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Their programme was one of modest frugality, and
contemplated even a reduction of the army; they were confronted inside their
own doors by grave Mazzinian disturbances; in Rome by the (Ecumenical Council
and the dogma of Papal Infallibility; abroad, by the first signs of the great
struggle impending between Germany and France.
Not that they
were much troubled by the (Ecumenical Council, or by Pius IX’s last move, the
dogma of Infallibility, the effect and meaning of which are elsewhere
discussed. The Italian Government let him entirely alone, and very wisely gave
the Bishops absolute freedom to attend the Council, the more willingly as the
Pope would have much preferred a prohibition. On July 19, 1870, the dogma of
Papal Infallibility was solemnly voted. But war was on the point of breaking
out between France and Germany and lay minds had other things to think about
than clerical dogmas.
The imminence
of the Franco-Prussian War made it impossible for the Lanza Ministry to indulge
their pacific illusions. They were in fact once more in deep waters; they had,
of course, nothing to do with the secret dealings for a triple alliance of
Austria, Italy, and France, which had been going on from the date of Mentana to
the dawning of this war,
544 Rome the capital of the Italian kingdom. ,
[i846-70
inasmuch as
these consisted only in an exchange of letters addressed by the several
sovereigns one to another and in negotiations, couched in language so general,
as in no way to commit their States. Still they were bound to take account of
the moral obligation which Victor Emmanuel had assumed, on the mere impulse of
a chivalrous generosity, towards his old ally of 1859; and, on the other hand,
they were forced to respect the determination of the country to remain neutral
and to have no thought but for Rome. Of this fixed purpose Quintino Sella was
the chief and the stoutest representative in the Cabinet; but it derived its
main support from the infatuated opposition of the unforcunate Napoleon III,
who absolutely refused to give way on the Roman question. Even Austria, who
withdrew from the negotiations before compromising herself, admitted that an
alliance with Italy was out of the question, unless she received Rome. Though
war began in July, the French troops did not entirely abandon Pontifical
territory till August 19, 1870. Then, of course, every, idea of alliance
vanished; and all that Italy had to do was to declare a platonic adhesion to
the “ League of Neutrals.” The Italian Government certainly, by way of
expediting the departure of the French, consented to the revival of the
Convention of September, 1864. But the disasters to the French arms, the defeat
of Sedan, and the fall of the Empire, solved the whole problem once and for
ever. The voice of the people was now heard, unanimous and irresistible,
demanding the occupation of Rome. In order to meet, or rather, to anticipate
resistance, the Government sent an army of about 60,000 men, under the command
of General Raffaele Cadoma. Force, however, had to be used; a breach haa to be
made in the walls at Porta Pia, before an entrance could be effected on
September 20, 1870. Rome was thus at length reunited to Italy by the. general
vote of the people on October 2, 1870.
(2) THE LITERATURE OF THE RIS0RGIMENT0 AND
AFTER.
(1846-70.)
During this
period it might almost be said that the engrossing interest of warfare and
politics had absorbed all the activity that might have been expended upon quiet
thought and study, upon the flights of fancy, and upon the beauties of art. As
in France during the i revolutionary and Napoleonic era, the minds of men were
too much occupied in external things, too anxiously , absorbed in the trend of
events, to give free play to their literary and artistic faculties, which
require for their development that life should be, indeed, intense and ardent*
but not agitated or feverish. During this period, Italians gave to their
country the foremost place in their hearts, and patriotism formed the keynote
of their intellectual work. The patriotic note resounded most loudly amid the
outburst of enthusiasm and exultation during the years 1846 to 1849. Long
cherished hopes seemed about to be realised; and the
1843-8] The poetry of the Risorgimento.—Niccolini.
545
poetic muse
was invoked to sing the praise of unity, to provide war songs, and to kindle
hopes of victory. “ We owe a large part of the new Italy to our poets,” said
Garibaldi. Certainly, at this time of strenuous action, the patriotic lyric
spread far and wide, encouraging the brave and consoling the exiles and the
prisoners. Gabriele Rossetti, who in 1820 had heralded the dawn of the
short-lived Neapolitan Constitution, took up his lyre once more to welcome the
Liberal Pope and to proclaim the first triumphs of Italian arms over Austria.
His example was followed by hundreds. War songs were multiplied and met with
extraordinary success. They were upon every one’s lips, filling all hearts with
the noblest aspirations. Among the most popular were three poems composed in
1847—Filippo Meucci’s hymn to Pius IX, Giuseppe Bertoldi’s Le Riforme in honour
of Charles Albert, and beginning “ Con Vazzurra coccarda nel petto ” (“ With
the blue ribbon upon his breast ”), and lastly Carlo Alberto Bosi’s L'Addio del
Volontario. All the fervent love which they cherished for their country
vibrated in the stanzas of Alessandro Poerio and Goffredo Mameli, who both died
fighting as heroes. Mameli’s famous song “FrateUi tfItalia—VItalia j’e desta”
(“Brothers of Italy, Italy awakens ”) became the war-cry of those youthful
bands who fought, without training or discipline, under the noble illusion that
the holiness of their cause carried with it the certainty of victory. With this
must be placed other songs by Luigi Mercantini, who afterwards wrote “ Si
scopron le torribe—si levano i morti ” (“ The tombs are opened, the dead
arise”), which formed the musical accompaniment to the exploits of the red
shirt on the battlefield, and thereby earned the great name of “ Garibaldi’s
Hymn.” Circumstances made poets of these men and of others like them, and, now
that the conditions whence they drew life and vigour have disappeared, their
artistic poverty is revealed. To-day these writings should be considered rather
as documents illustrating the history of the Risorgimento than as contributions
to literature. Others already tried and proved in the field of literature, who
had won fame from works of another kind, sang of the hopes and vicissitudes of
Italy with higher and more conscious artistic intention. Such was Giavan
Battista Niccolini, the renowned author of Arnaldo da Brescia (1843), who expressed
his opinions on the affairs of his country in a sort of rhyming diary,
interspersed with epigrams, sonnets, hymns and odes. He has thus left a
complete collection of political verse, consisting almost entirely of
spontaneous outpourings during the years round 1848. Moved by the same impulse,
Luigi Carrer and Nicolo Tommaseo turned from the more arduous work of research
and criticism to the production of patriotic poems, notable alike for intensity
of feeling and for originality of form and conception.
The political
character, which satire had assumed with Carlo Porta and Tommaso Grossi, increased
in bitterness and malignity. While Antonio Guadagnoli, Angiolo Brofferio and
Arnaldo Fusinato all
646 Giusti.—Prose: Gioberti. D'Azeglio. [1842-50
distinguished
themselves in this sphere, Giuseppe Giusti held the chief place. That love of
liberty and of Italian independence which had, as Giusti himself says, always
animated him, upheld and encouraged him in his last efforts. He died in 1850 in
the house of Gino Capponi, to whom he had dedicated his Terra dei Morti. The
following works belong to this period of Giusti’s activity:—La Guerra, in which
he mercilessly satirises the preachers of peace; Sant' Ambrogio, his famous
masterpiece, in which irony and sentiment combine to create a spier did whole;
Delenda Curtago, where, a new aphorism, “ E rum vogliam Tedeschi” (“We will
have no more Austrians”), takes the place of Cato’s maxim; II Congresso dei
Birri, and other poems, in which the civic note of his genius is fully
revealed. With Foscolo and Leopardi dead, and Manzoni in retirement, Giusti is
the only really great poetic figure of these years. “ I have no illusions about
myself,” he once said, “ my verses will die, and are, perhaps, already dead,
with the events and circumstances that brought them into being.’’ Yet Giusti’s
verses are still read and studied with pleasure. In them we taste the crisp,
fresh charm of the Tuscan tongue, which was all too rare among the enthusiastic
but slovenly productions of the national revival.
The prose of
this revolutionary period also savours of the battlefield. Vincenzo Gioberti’s
Gesuita Moderno (1847) elaborates the ideas first expressed in his Primato and
in Prolegomeni al Primato, while he fiercely attacks the Jesuits. Moreover,
d’Azeglio’s: celebrated Lutti della Lombardia (1848) exhibits him
in a new character; and, instead of the moderate man who counsels prudence, we
see the politician who adds fuel to the fire of revolution.
Literature as
a whole shared in that great wave of feeling which swept through the length and
breadth of Italy. At the theatres, the iudier.ce insisted that the last three
words of the magnificent chorus from Giuseppe Verdi’s Lombardi, “Noi Siam corsi
air invito di un Dio” (“ We have come at the summons of a God”), should be
changed to udi un Pio” (“of Pope Pius”); and the alteration was
received with frantic applause. All forms of art, if they would meet with
popular favour, were forced to yield to the predominating thought, to the one
feverish hope of an eager and excited multitude.
In the twenty
years after Novara this enthusiasm waned. But the change, more especially in
its first years, did little to enrich or enliven lyrical poetry, of which the
prevailing tones remained grey and monotonous. The principal figures in this
domain were Giovanni Prati and Aleardo Aleardi. Their works, though possessing
power of invention and depth of feeling, abound in a weak and sentimental
romanticism which tends at last to become wearisome. The defects already
visible in Prati’s best work, Edmenegarda (1842), namely excessive
sentimentality and thoughts,, not always worthy of the stately and sonorous
form in which they are clothed, became accentuated later. Aleardi is even more
1850-70] Prati. Aleardi.—Political
writings.—Memoirs. 547
morbid than
Prati; there is a strain of weakness and poverty in his art, and his
romanticism exhibits none of the balance of Manzoni and Silvio Pellico. Yet
both writers were sincere and ardent patriots; and their poetry gained strength
and nobility when it was inspired by the romantic uncertainty of their
country’s future. In works published between 1850 and 1860, Prati shows himself
to be fully alive to the social and political mission of the Italian poet. All
the great themes which occupied the mind of Italy, bearing witness alike to the
sorrows of the moment and to the hopes of the future, were reflected in his
lyrics, which rang with noble and sincere emotion. The dead of Curtatone and
Novara, the return of the ashes of Charles Albert from Oporto, Napoleon Ill’s
coup d’etat, the triumphs of Montebello and Palestro, all supplied him with
worthy material for poetry. The same may be said of Aleardi. Although a
feminine strain runs through his work, he cannot be denied the merit of having
done more than perhaps any other Italian poet to unite the love of woman to the
love of country. A mixture of tenderness and wrath, of idyllic love and
national pride and hatred lends an individual and wholly pleasing distinction
to much of the Veronese poet’s copious production. Between 1860 and 1870,
Giacomo Zanella stood forth as the rival of Prati and Aleardi. Himself a
priest, he united the faith of a Christian with enthusiasm for social progress,
zeal for the Church with love of country. Though entirely modern in conception,
his work has a certain classical tone. Yet his correct, graceful, and stately
verse is too slight to excite strong feelings; it pleases and charms, but
cannot enthral.
Prose, like
poetry, failed to rise to great heights during this period. Books such as I
Promessi Sposi (1827) and Le Mie Prigioni (1832) were not to be found. Art
showed signs of weakness, and the end in view was uncertain and obscure. Yet
here again writers gained fresh life with politics as their inspiration and
guide. Among those who made public events the subject of books and pamphlets,
Giuseppe Mazzini, Cesare Balbo, Carlo Cattaneo, and Massimo d’Azeglio, occupy
the front rank. Gioberti, moreover, comes into the period of which we are
treating owing to his Rinnovamento Civile dltalia, published in 1851. In this
fine book, which proved to be his last, Gioberti abandons the opinions
enunciated in the Primato and maintains that henceforth the hopes of all
Italians must centre round Piedmont, and that the Pope should not be the
temporal sovereign of “ either a State or a territory.” Volumes of reminiscences—which
recalled the deeds of the immediate past, and seemed to lay down rules based
upon experience for future conduct— were particularly acceptable at that time.
Of these, I Miei Ricordi (1867) by Massimo d’Azeglio is especially notable. It
is a sound and powerful book, seeming to take its keynote from the thought to
which he wished to give expression after 1861: “ Now that Italy is made, we
must make the Italians.” Autobiographical elements also have their
part in
Ippolito Nievo’s Confer'oni di un Ottuagenario (1867), where the stirring and
still unclosed episode in the life of Italy. is depicted with bistomal accuracy
and elegant simplicity of form. In this work, he set himself to show by means
of a concrete example how, between the last years of the eighteenth and the
middle .of the nineteenth century, the sentiment of Italian nationality arose,
matured, and found expression.
In the sphere
of romance proper, results were very meagre; and Alessandro Manzoni’s
influence, which had boldly asserted itself in the writings of Grossi and
d’Azeglio, declined "steadily. The fate of tragedy was no better, getting
aside the final efforts of Niccolini, Filippo Strozzi (1847) and Mario e i
Cmibri (1858), there remain nothing but long dead and buried works. Comedy, and
modem drama were somewhat more flourishing, Paolo Giacometti as a playw ght
succeeded Alberto Nota, of the famous Compagnia Reale Sarda. The elements of
tragedy and comedy were happily blended in his, art; and some of his works,
such as La Morte Civile, a play which found magnificent interpreters in Ernesto
Rossi and Tommaso Salvini, still hold the Italian stage. Far superior to him,
however* is Paolo Ferrari, whose histprical comedies— II Goldoni e le sue
sedici commedie nuove (1852) and La Satira e Parini (1854-6)—are equally
celebrated in literature and in the theatrical world. These works, with their
rich humour, their picturesque setting and lively dialogue, will long survive
all changes of teste and fashion. Ferrari’s later “problem-plays,” which aim at
elucidating definite moral and social questions, are not without merit, yet
they lack the freshness and originality of his earlier efforts. Yielding to the
prevailing fashion, he adopted as his models the chief French dramatists of the
day, such as Augier, Dumas JUs, and Sardou. Hence his work lost its distinctive
and wholly Italian character.
If historical
writing did not attain to a high literary level at this time, it gained in
scientific importance, thanks to stricter methods and to definite research.
Besides Gino Capponi, Ercole Ricotti and Michele Amari, who are all well known
and even famous, there are many others whose names deserve to be
remembered—writers of national and muni-, cipal history whose work paved the
way for future and more ambitious historians. Perhaps the best fruits of
Italian thought during these two decades sprang up in the field of criticism,
where Francesco De Sanctis, to whom we owe the revival of psychological and
aesthetic criticism, held the first place among a host of able writers. In his
admirable Saggi Critid (1866), he proves that the true task of a critic is to
glean the animating thought from the work of art before him. He sweeps away the
old rhetorical method, based upon formulas and precepts, and vindicates the independence
of individual judgment which applies itself to literature, and connects it with
the development of life. In this sense he is the Sainte-Beuve of Italy, less
versatile and without Sainte-Beuve’s elegance of style or power of
reconstruction, but perhaps with greater philosophical depth and wider horizons
of thought.
It has been
seen that Italian literature was marked by no especial brilliance in these
years. The same may be said of the arts, with the exception of music, where the
genius of Giuseppe Verdi found new and marvellous means of expression. Between
1860 and 1870, however, there appeared on the scene a writer whose many-sided
genius asserted itself in various spheres, quickening and ennobling the entire
literary life of the nation. This was Giosue Carducci, whose poetry pointed the
rising generation the road of escape from ultra-romanticist affectations and
from the fluent versifiers, who sought nothing beyond the empty resonance of
metre. “ I am proud to own myself inspired by Alfieri, Parini, Monti, Foscolo,
and Leopardi,” Carducci once said in speaking of his work. “Through them and
with them I arrived at the ancients and communed with Dante and Petrarch. Upon
them my eyes have always been fixed.” His debt to this school of poetry is already
visible in Juvenilia and Levia Gravia, although it is more fully revealed in.
Odi Barbare (1877). In Carducci, classical art—the art of the Greeks and
Romans—seems to flourish once more. Yet his classical style is no mere
mannerism or servile imitation. It is rather the art of the ancients, stirred
to fresh life by a breath of modem thought, the realisation of Andre Chenier’s
maxim: “ sur des pensers nouveaux faisons de vers antiques.'" By this
means Carducci rescued Italian poetry from the feeble romanticism in which it
had been plunged, not so much by Prati and Aleardi as by their followers, and
which he himself calls “ an extenuation of life,” and in so doing, restored it
to all the purity of its splendid traditions.
With the same
ideals Carducci proved no less happy as a prose writer. Invective and satire,
humour and pathos, grave learning and patriotic fervour, all flowed from his
pen with equal ease and effect. His most celebrated works are, however, his
numerous essays in criticism, which range from the origins of Italian
literature to Parini, from Dante and Cino da Pistoia to Heine and Goethe, from
Poliziano and Ariosto to the bards of the Risorgimento. In this sphere,
Carducci perfected and completed the work of De Sanctis. Starting from the concrete
study of literary facts, from the analysis of texts, from minute researches in
archives and libraries, he rose to criticism of another nature, to aesthetic
considerations, to wide and penetrating appreciations in which the artist
joined hands with the scholar. He proved by his example, as no one had done
before him, that there is not and cannot be any opposition between the
aesthetic and historical schools of criticism. For him who estimates the
critic’s task at its highest, the two are blended into one. An opinion fails to
convince if it is not based upon sound and carefully weighed premises. In the
same way, learned researches fail of their effect if they are not clothed in
the words of an artist, who sets them before our eyes in their true light, quickened
by the spirit of the past.
THE COURSE OF
REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.
(1845-71.)
A long period of reaction followed the
overthrow of Espartero, which a coalition of extreme Conservatives and Radicals
had produced; but the breach between these unnatural allies was not immediate,
and the transition from revolution to absolutism was adroitly contrived. With
the ostensible object of avoiding the difficulties inherent in a Regency, the
two Houses assembled on November 8, 1843, and proclaimed Queen Isabel of age,
before the legal term of her minority had expired'. The election of a Liberal
Regent being thus rendered impossible, the formation of a Cabinet was entrusted
to the democratic orator Salustiano de Oldzaga, formerly tutor to the Queen.
The course of coming events was indicated by the inclusion of .several
Moderates in the new Ministry, and by the removal from the bench of Judges
known to be Liberals ; the Government candidate for the Presidency of the
Chamber was defeated, and Pedro Jose Pidal, a Conservative, was elected.
Convinced that no political reforms could be undertaken with success against an
Opposition secretly fostered by Court influence, Oldzaga determined to dissolve
the Cortes, and on November 28 obtained the necessary decree. His plan
miscarried owing to the Queen’s statement that her signature had been extorted
by the use of physical violence; and this fabrication—suggested to the
sovereign by the Marquesa de Santa Cruz, the mouthpiece of the Palace
camarilla—served its purpose. Oldzaga Was dismissed on the following day
(November 29); his denials were received by the Chamber with cries of indignant
incredulity; officets of the regiment of San Fernando in the tribunes
threatened him with their drawn swords; he fled into exile, and his party was
involved in his disgrace. The subterranean campaign of the Palace clique had
succeeded; the Liberal group was seriously discredited; and a Conservative
Ministry was called to power under the presidency of Luis Gonz&lez Bravo, once
the editor of El Guirigay, a Radical journal notorious for its attacks on the
Queen-Mother.
1844]
551
The
articles published by Gonz&lez Bravo, under the pseudonym of Ibrahim
Clarete,had been the starting-point of the movement which forced Cristina to
abdicate. He had made public the fact that she had forfeited the Regency by her
secret marriage, within three months of Ferdinand VII’s death, to Agustin
Fernando Munoz y SAnchez, a handsome soldier, on whom the dukedom of
Ri&nzares was afterwards conferred. Gonzalez Bravo now made amends for his
malignant revelations by renewing ithe ex-Regent’s pension, and by providing
lavishly for the children of her second marriage. The pretence of respecting
parliamentary forms was abandoned. A stringent censorship of the Press was
established; such prominent members of the Opposition as Manuel Cortina and
Pascual Madoz were imprisoned by ministerial warrant; the National Militia, the
fighting force of Liberalism, was disbanded, and the country was placed under
martial law. Gonz&lez Bravo executed his arbitrary policy with conspicuous
ability and courage; but his position was insecure, for the sincerity of his
sudden conversion was justly suspected by the reactionaries, and, despite his
.recent complaisance, the Queen^Mother had not forgiven his description of her
in El Guirigay as an “ illustrious prostitute.” Moreover, he was a civilian
mistrusted by the military element, and it was held that the policy of
“thorough” should be carried out by a Minister who could reckon upon the
unquestioning support of the army. Such a Minister was Ramrfn Maria Narvdez, a
general who had made himself remarkable by his severity during the Carlist war. 1
Narv&ez
succeeded Gonzalez Bravo on May 2, 1844, and speedily proved that his
reputation as a martinet was deserved. Before the close of the year 214
political prisoners were put to death; while many more were sentenced, on
insufficient or flagrantly false evidence, to long terms of imprisonment.
Though the Cortes were in session, they were treated with contempt, and a levy
of 50,000 conscripts was called out by ministerial aecrec Insurrectionary
movements in the provinces and colonies were ruthlessly put down; the right of
public meeting was suspended; and the censorship of the Press became still more
rigorous. Narvaez, who was strangely sensitive to criticism, informed, General
Femdndez de Cordova that, though confiscation of newspapers was a palliative,
the execution of Opposition journalists was the sole safeguard against
sedition; and two prominent editors, whom he had imprisoned, were only released
in deference to a protest from the foreigr diplomatic corps. Narvaez has been
described by a judicious admirer as a brigand of considerable intelligence. He
was at least intelligent enough to know that something more than a negative
policy of repression was needed, and he attempted to increase the efficiency of
the administration. He reorganised the Guardia Civil, a body of military police
established by Gonzdlez Bravo, and finally stamped out brigandage in Spain. No
less beneficial were the reforms of his Finance Minister, Alejandro Mon. The
normal
deficit annually amounted to two millions sterling; the pay of the troops, the
navy, and other branches of the public service was in arrears; pensions were
capriciously multiplied, and irregularly revoked, by phantom Ministers;
departmental corruption was the rule. The incidence of taxation varied greatly
in the different provinces, and was not always uniform even within the limits
of smaller administrative units; duties and restrictions hampered industry, and
the cost of collection was excessive. Mon produced relative order by substituting
for the complicated, vexatious arrangement of propios y aroitrios—hereditary
revenues and arbitrary specific taxes—a less cumbrous system of taxation,
applied to commerce, agriculture, land registration, mortgages, rents, and
legacies. The customs dues were simplified, and the establishment of octroi
duties formed a lucrative but unpopular source of income. Incomplete as they
were, these financial reforms went as far as public opinion would allow; they
contributed largely to the material development of Spain ; and the national
credit was raised by the issue of three per cent, bonds, to meet the floating
debt of ^25,000,000.
Exhausted by
the political anarchy of previous years, the country welcomed the stability
secured by despotic administration. Even without the exercise of official
pressure a majority for the Government was assured; it was made inevitable by
the action of the Progressists, who, as a protest against the methods by which
the elections were conducted, adopted a policy of abstention at the polls. The
new Cortes of 1844 contained only one Liberal member. Parliamentary Opposition
was at an end. Narvaez was practically dictator, and he revised the Constitution
of 1837 with characteristic thoroughness. The introduction of a property qualification
narrowed the franchise by which the Lower House was elected; the nomination of
senators was reserved to the Crown, and the senatorships were made tenable for
life; the Upper Chamber was packed with grandees, ecclesiastics, successful
soldiers, and financial magnates. By amendments to the Constitution of 1837 the
duration of the Cortes was extended from three to four years. The recognition
of Roman Catholicism as the established religion was emphasised; the
recognition of the sovereign rights of the people was retained in a very
attenuated form. As precautions against revolution, severer press laws were
embodied in the Constitution; the calling-out of the National Guard was left to
the discretion of local authorities, and the latter were placed directly under
the central executive. Far-reaching as was the effect of these constitutional
changes, they excited less attention than a clause authorising the Queen to
contract a marriage without the preliminary assent of the Cortes. In its
immediate results this was the most momentous article in the Constitution of
May, 1845.
The question
of the Queen’s marriage was more than a matter of domestic interest, and the
various candidates for Isabel’s hand had already been discussed by French and
English statesmen. The ex-
Regent
Cristina had received the active support of the French Government in plotting
the downfall of Espartero; as the price of this assistance she was prepared to
sanction the marriage of her daughters Queen Isabel and the Infanta Maria Luisa
Fernanda to Louis-Philippe’s sons, the Due d’Aumale and the Due de Montpensier.
The proposal was withdrawn at the request of the English Government, which
undertook in return to abandon the candidature of Prince Leopold of
Saxe-Coburg, the cousin of Queen Victoria and of Prince Albert. The project
was, however, brought forward again in a modified form by Guizot, who suggested
that the choice of Isabel’s husband might be postponed, and that meanwhile the
Due de Montpensier should marry Isabel’s sister, the Infanta Maria Luisa
Fernanda. Since the result of this arrangement would have been to make
Montpensier King Consort of Spain, if Isabel had died without issue, it was
declined by Palmerston. Henceforth it became the object of French diplomacy to
detach the British Government from the Spanish Liberals; and the task became
easy since Peel’s accession to power. In 1843 Queen Victoria and Prince Albert
visited Louis-Philippe at the Chateau d’Eu, where it was agreed that the
British Government should refrain from promoting the candidature of any prince
not of the Spanish Bourbon line, and that, after the succession to the Spanish
throne had been secured, Montpensier should be free to marry the Infanta Maria
Luisa Fernanda. The marriage of the Due d’Aumale to the Princess Caroline,
daughter of the Prince of Palermo, in 1844 was accepted as a guarantee that the
French Government intended to abide by the recent agreement.
While these
negotiations were in progress between the British and French Foreign Offices,
the marriage of Queen Isabel became a party question in Spain; and the
candidature of the Count of Montemolin was supported by the Austrian and
Prussian Governments. By the abdication of Carlos Maria Isidro de Borbon at
Bourges on May 15, 1845, his son Carlos Luis, Count of Montemolin, became the
official leader of the Carlist party, to whom he was henceforward known as
Carlos VI. His candidature was immediately vetoed by Narvdez, whose hostility
to Carlism never wavered. The ex-Regent Cristina suggested that her halfimbecile
brother, the Count of Trapani, a lad of sixteen, should be accepted as Isabel’s
husband; and Narvdez, anxious to avoid a rupture with her, affected to
entertain the proposal. The candidate of the Liberal party was Don Enrique,
Duke of Seville, the elder son of Cristina’s shrewish sister Carlota, and Don
Enrique was reported to be personally acceptable to Isabel herself; but his
chances of success were diminished by his ostentatious parade of Radical
opinions. Early in 1846, Cristina—not without reason^—suspected that Narvdez,
in spite of his friendly professions, was secretly intriguing against the
candidature of Trapani. Though the ministerial majority in the Chamber was
intact, the Queen-Mother secured the dismissal of Narvdez (now Duke of
554 Fall of Narvaez.—Question of Isabel's
marriage. [i846
Valencia)
on February 11.' His place was taken by the Marquis de Miraflores, a courtier
of mediocre abilities with the reputation of being amenable to court and
clerical influence. But the Cortes, which were Narv&ez’ creation, resented
his dismissal; the new Minister declined to favour Trapani’s candidature, and
opposed the Queen-Mother in other ways. This decided his fate. Narv&ez was
recalled; but his energetic action against stock-exchange speculators, and his
refusal to support one of the Queen-Mother’s morganatic sons as a candidate for
the throne of Mexico, caused him to be dismissed again within nineteen days of
his return to office. He rejected the offer of the Naples embassy, and retired
to France to await his time. ■
'
A
rising in Galicia was easily suppressed; and the Duke of Seville, who was
implicated in it, was banished from Spain by Narvdez’ successor, Francisco
Javier de Isturiz, a politician of Liberal tendencies, who had previously: urged
that the Cortes should be consulted with respect to the Queen’s marriage.
The'advocates of this view, among whom were Francisco Pacheco and Pastor Diaz,
were known as “Puritans”; and, as their leader was now in office, the projects
of Cristina and of Louis-Philippe were imperilled. The Cortes might prove
unable to resist pressure to repeal the article in the Constitution authorising
the Queen to contract a marriage without parliamentary sanction, and it was not
impossible that such pressure might be applied. The Opposition was gathering
strength, and banishment had not destroyed the popularity of the democratic
Duke of Seville. Isabel was beheved to be well-inclined towards her cousin; and
it was known that Palmerston, who was likely soon to be in office in England,
would endeavour to thwart Guizot’s policy; Finally, the arrogance of the Comte
de Bresson, the French ambassador at Madrid, had alienated a section of the
Moderate party, while the British Minister, Sir Henry Bulwer, made no secret of
his sympathy with the Progressists. '' ,
The
Queen-Mother and Louis-Philippe resolved to act without delay. It is doubtful
whether Cristina’s support of Trapani was more than a ruse. In any case, she
suddenly withdrew it, consented to the marriage of Isabel with Don Francisco de
Asis, the Duke of Seville’s younger brother, and arranged that the Infanta
Maria Luisa Fernanda should marry the Due de- Montpensier at the same time.
This compact, concluded by Cristina and Bresson during the temporary absence of
Bulwer from Madrid, was a manifest breach of the Chateau d’Eu agreement. In
reply to the objections of the British Government, Guizot pleaded Aberdeen’s
consent to the arrangement that neither the Queen nor the Infanta should marry:
out of the Bourbon family, and further alleged that Palmerston had cancelled
the Chateau d’Eu compact by secretly supporting the candidature of Prince
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. The latter assertion may have been made in good faith,
on the strength of information supplied by Bresson : it was none the less
incorrect, for Palmerston
hesitated
between Coburg and the I)uke of Seville. Bulwer was instructed to remonstrate
with the Spanish Government; but it was too late. On August 27, yielding to the
imperious command of her mother, Queen Isabel had formally contracted herself
to Don Francisco de Asis. The marriages of the Queen and the Infanta .Maria
Luisa Fernanda were duly celebrated on Isabel’s sixteenth birthday (October 10,
1846). The Spanish nation, as a whole, was indifferent to the international
dispute; it resented Guizot’s dictation on the one hand, and Palmerston’s
interference on the other; and, in ordinary circumstances, it would have
rejoiced to see the question of the Queen’s marriage settled. But her union to
Don Francisco de Asis .shocked the public conscience. Her husband was known to
be a man of ignoble character, and of feeble constitution. This last
consideration had recommended him to Louis- Philippe and to Cristina; they
regarded it as certain that Isabel would bear him no children, and that the Due
de Montpensier would sit on the throne of Spain as the King Consort of Maria
Luisa Fernanda. French influence and French prestige would thus be permanently
established beyond the Pyrenees. The. cynicism of this manoeuvre revolted
honest men; but the marriage was an accomplished fact, and the British
Government sought to avenge > its , diplomatic defeat by promoting the
designs of the Spanish Opposition.
A new Cortes
was elected under the restricted franchise of the Constitution of 1845; and, as
a Conservative majority was assured, it was thought expedient to allow the
voters unusual freedom. The result was a disagreeable surprise: a minority of
Radicals was returned, smaU in numbers, but composed of able and determined
men, led by Mendi- zabal and Olozaga. The latter left France to take his seat,
was arrested at Pamplona, and finally sent across the frontier; but his
election was taken to show mismanagement on the part of Isturiz, who was
consequently compelled to resign in favour of the Duke of Sotomayor (January
28, 1847). The new Cabinet, a “Ministry of Conservative concentration,” was at
once confronted with painful difficulties. The Queen openly flouted her unmanly
husband, separated from him, and took more notice than was prudent of Genera)
Francisco Serrano Dominguez, a handsome officer of moderate Liberal opinions.
The scandal was public property in Madrid; but the Government made no attempt
to deal with it, till they discovered that the favourite had allied himself
with Bulwer in order to .undermine their credit with the Queen. To remove
Serrano from the Court, they appointed him to a command in Navarre; Serrano
declined the post, and was protected against the consequences of his
insubordination by the Queen, who dismissed Sotomayor and called Pacheco to
office (March 28). Pacheco, a representative of the “Puritans,” was
embarrassed by the inclusion in the Cabinet of Salamanca, who, through the
influence of the Queen-Mother, became Minister of Finance; yet the Government
introduced a more
Liberal
spirit into the administration' of affairs, and amnestied such political exiles
as Mendizabal and Oldzaga.
Meanwhile the
relations between Isabel and the King Consort grew worse; and both resented the
efforts of the Ministry to bring about a reconciliation. The Queen-Mother
withdrew in anger to Paris; the Queen stayed at Aranjuez and La Granja with
Serrano, and contemplated the formation of a Radical Ministry; surrounded by
reactionaries, clericals, and Carlists, Don Francisco de Asis resided at the
Pardo, scheming to profit by his wife’s dishonour. At this time the general
sympathies of the Liberals were with Isabel, while the majority of
Conservatives sided with her husband. Political discontent was spreading; a
serious Carlist rising took place in Catalonia; and local feeling was
exasperated by the execution of Benito Tristany, a priest who headed one of the
roving bands. The revolutionary movement in Portugal led to Spanish
intervention, and a force under General Manuel de la Concha marched on Oporto.
Order was easily restored, and Concha—now Marques del Duero—was sent against
the Carlists in Catalonia, who maintained a desperate struggle till the
beginning of 1848.
Before this
date, Pacheco had resigned office (August 81, 1847). Narvdez had returned from
France, and had refused to join the new Cabinet formed by Salamanca. His turn
was soon to come. His policy, as he declared to his intimates, was “to kick
Bulwer and to shoot Serrano.” He found it advisable, however, to conciliate the
favourite; and Serrano accepted his advances. The Ministry fell on October 4;
Serrano became Captain-General of Granada; and Narvdez undertook to govern
Spain after stipulating that he should be free “to use the stick, and to strike
hard.” He had an early opportunity of striking. The fall of Louis-Philippe
(February 24, 1848) and the establishment of a Republic in France encouraged
the revolutionists at Madrid to rise on March 26; they were dispersed, the
leaders imprisoned, and martial law was proclaimed. Before leaving for Paris,
Decazes, the Due de Gliicks- berg, Louis-Philippe’s ambassador at Madrid, drew
attention to the close relations which existed between the Radicals and Bulwer.
Palmerston not only refused to recall his agent, but instructed him to suggest
the formation of a new Government including “some of those men who possess the
confidence of the Liberal Party.” Bulwer obeyed, protested energetically
against the unconstitutional conduct of Narvdez, and published his menacing
despatch in a Liberal newspaper. This proceeding was irregular, and the tone of
Bulwer’s note was offensive to the national pride. Narvdez returned the British
Minister’s note with an angry reply, but went no further.
Another
rising occurred at Madrid on May 7; thirteen ringleaders were executed that
evening, and six or seven hundred prisoners were deported to the Balearic
Islands and the colonies. The Madrid
movement,
which was said to; be financed by Salamanca, was followed by a rising at
Seville (May 13), organised by Bulwer’s close friend Jose Portal. Reckoning
that the British Government would be too fully occupied with Chartist agitators
to proceed against Spain, Narv&ez handed Bulwer his passport (May 17). It
was a dangerous hazard; for Palmerston, confident that the Queen-Mother would
rather sacrifice a Minister than risk her financial interests in Cuba, prpposed
to make a naval demonstration off Cadiz. His colleagues vetoed the project; and
accordingly,, for the first and last time in his life Narv&ez became popular
in Spain, while he was admired in other countries as the man of iron who had
humbled Palmerston. His good fortune continued. He cashiered the Duke of
Seville from the army; he crushed the Carlists and struck terror into the
starving peasants of Andalusia. His policy had succeeded, at least for the
time: he had used the stick mercilessly, and every blow had told. He had
tranquillised the country; in externals, he had reformed the morals of the
Court; he had protected the monarchy from a tempest which had shaken other
thrones. When he faced the Cortes in November, he was justified in assuming the
air of a conqueror. .
Yet, though
his courage and energy were indispensable to the Moderates at critical moments,
Narvdez could not rely on their fidelity when the danger was past. The
Clericals profited by his despotic methods, but complained that he was not
sufficiently vigorous in promoting ecclesiastical interests; the despatch of
an expedition against the Roman Republic failed to satisfy them; and they found
an ally in the person of the King Consort. Under the influence of Fray
Fulgencio, a foolish and disreputable monk acting in concert with Sor
Patrocinio—a nun notorious for having fraudulently simulated tht .stigmata—Don
Francisco de Asis procured the nomination of a new Cabinet, October 19, 1849,
the day before the Cortes were to meet. But the “ Lightning Ministry,” as it
was called, was spared the ordea of facing Parliament. It was easier to obtain
a decree dismissing Narvdez than to enforce it against his will: he curtly
rebuked Don Francisco de Asfs, and stated that he had no intention of
resigning. He remained in office, banished Fray Fulgencio and Sor Patrocinio in
different directions, and ordered the King Consort’s secretary to leave Madrid
for Oviedo. The camarilla was beaten, but not discouraged. The birth of a son
to the Queen in July, 1850, threatened to lead to grave complications, for the
paternity of the child was doubtful, and its survival would have been fatal to
the Montpensier succession: the death of the boy was attributed to foul play in
which Isabel’s mother and sister were alleged to have been concerned. These
circumstances damaged the position of the Cabinet, and Bravo Murillo’s Budget
produced a ministerial crisis. Early in 1851 Narvaez retired, and was succeeded
by Bravo Murillo, who dissolved the Cortes, and passed his financial scheme by
ministerial decree.
Gonzdlez
Bravo had fallen because he was not a soldier; Narvaez, because he was not a
clerical. Relying on clerical support, Bravo Murillo resumed the negotiations
with Rome, and concluded a Concordat (October, 1851). The concessions of the
Pope were insignificant in substance : as the expropriation of purchasers who
had bought church lands would have led to revolution, no direct attempt was
made to cancel their newly acquired rights, but the necessity of restitution
was implied. On its side, the State undertook to restore all ecclesiastical
properties unsold, to provide stipends for the clergy, to confirm the right of
the Church to moneys derived from the sale of indulgences, to recognise the
Roman Catholic religion as established by law, to promote the teaching of its
doctrines in all schools, and to aid its ministers in combating heresy. This
arrangement was denounced by the Radicals as a surrender, and by the
reactionaries as a betrayal. Absolutists had, indeed, ground for complaint. The
Concordat secured to the Church some part of its former endowments; but its
implicit admission of Isabel’s dynastic claims amounted to a repudiation of
Carlism.
The
success of Louis Napoleon’s coup d'etat (December 2, 1851), tempted Bravo
Murillo to repeat the experiment in Spain. He dismissed the Cortes (December
9), arrested his political opponents* and confiscated their newspapers. But he
could not count upon the undivided support of the Madrid garrison; a mutiny,
which occurred on January 10, 1852, was put down with difficulty, and officers
of high rank were suspected of complicity in the outbreak. Undaunted by these
disquieting symptoms, the Minister kept on his way. Prim, who represented the
Radical element in the army, was gived unsolicited leave of absence “ to travel
abroad ”; other opponents were removed to a safe distance; and till the end of
the year Bravo Murillo ruled alone, adding daily to his immense unpopularity.
At last he resolved to legalise his position, summoned the Cortes (December
1,1852), and published in the Gaceta his plan for revising the Constitution.
The new project was tantamount to the abolition of the parliamentary system.
The Senate was to be transformed into an hereditary body; the number of the
deputies was to be reduced by more than half; and the franchise was to be still
further limited, so as to diminish the power of the learned professions. Both
Houses were to sit in secret session; the Presidents and Vice-Presidents were
to be appointed by the Crown; the Budget was to be passed by royal decree;
Government Bills were to be accepted en bloc without even verbal amendments.
Ministers were to be relieved from the duty of attending parliament, and were
to be represented by deputy; the settlement of all questions concerning public
order, personal security, and private property, Was to be transferred from the
judiciary to the central executive. Lastly, the discussion of these proposals
in the Press or on the platform was made a penal offence. '
The political
soldiers, headed by Narv&ez, and the more enlightened
I852-4] Ministerial difficulties and changes.—San
Luis. 559
Conservatives,
headed by Pidal and Mon, joined with the Liberals in denouncing the proposed
changes. Bravo Murillo met the military opposition by declaring that he would
“hang the generals with their own sashes”; and, as a beginning, he virtually
exiled Narv&ez by ordering him to Vienna. The order was obeyed, but
Narv&ez halted at Bayonne, and there wrote to the Queen pointing out that
the new constitutional scheme would end in disaster to the monarchy. The
warning was understood, and the Queen-Mother withdrew her support from Bravo
Murillo. Deserted by all except the camarilla, he resigned (December 14), and
was succeeded by General Federico Roncali, Count of Alcoy, who summoned a new
Cortes on March 1, 1853. Roncali hoped to obtain by persuasion the organic
changes which Bravo Murillo had sought to impose by force; but the Opposition,
though heterogeneous and numerically weak, was emboldened by the consciousness
of popular support. Debate was skilfully diverted from constitutional issues
to the corrupt practices of the Queen-Mother, the Duke of Ri&nzares, and
Salamanca in connexion with railway concessions ; and the Cortes had to be
hastily prorogued. The disconcerting integrity of the Finance Minister,
Uorente, had already produced an unfavourable impression at Court; Roncali’s
own lukewarmness in defending the eminent peculators was punished by dismissal
(April 12) ; and the more accommodating General Lersundi held office till
September 18, when he was succeeded by Luis Sartorius, Count of San Luis, whom
Narv&ez had drawn from obscurity. The new Ministry vainly endeavoured to
appease the disaffected generals by recalling Narvaez, and to conciliate the
constitutional Moderates by external observance of parliamentary forms.
As San Luis,
in his brief political career, had risen from poverty to wealth by methods open
to reproach, he was not well-suited to withstand the attacks on the system of
railway concessions which were now increasing in vehemence. His embarrassed
explanations were coldly received by nominal supporters; even the Conservative
Senate placed him in a minority. He replied by proroguing the Cortes, by
expelling the Conservative senators who had voted against him, and by exiling
the generals who acted with them. The Budget was enacted by decree; the Press
was gagged; and Madrid was placed under martial law. But the long reign of
reaction was drawing to a close; the resources of coercion were exhausted ; men
of all parties were allied against the Government. On January 5,1854, the Queen
gave birth to a daughter—an event which newspapers of every shade of opinion
refused to announce. Indications were not wanting that the revolutionists were
preparing to strike a blow; and a premature rising at Saragossa showed that the
army was wavering. The scandals of the Court exasperated the respectable
classes in the capital. In defiance of the press laws, a journal entitled El
MurcUlago {The Bat) ivas launched at Madrid without the names of editor,
publisher, or printer. It brought detailed charges of peculation against the
Queen-
Mother;,
the Duke of > Rir.raares, Salamanca, and San Luis; the Queen-Mother was
alleged to have received a commission of i?400,000 on a single transaction. In
its fifth and last number El Murciilago exposed the Quieen’s immorality, stated
that her present lover was Jose Arana (afterwards Duke of Baena), and mockingly
described the rapid promotion of this voung colonel who had never distinguished
himself in the field; . _
Public
opinion was now ripe. The conspiracy was organised by Antonio C&novas del
Castillo^-a future Prime Minister—and by the end of June his plans were
completed.' Among the generals exiled by San Luis was Enrique O’Donnell, Count
of Lucena, who had won his title by fighting for the Queen-Mother against.
Espartero. O’Donnell had concealed himself in the capital; and on June 28,
1854, at a signal from C&novas, he left his hiding-place to join General
Dulce, -who awaited him in the suburbs with the cavalry garrison of Madrid. The
troops “pronounced” against San Luis, while C&novas plotted a popular
rising in Madrid; the populace hesitated; and an indecisive encounter took
place at Vicdlvaro (June 80) between the cavalry under O’Donnell, and the rest
of the Madrid garrison under General Blaser. On July 7 C&novas published
the “ Programme of the Manza- nares,” which advocated the expulsion of the
camarilla, financial reforms, pure administration, and the reestablishment of
the National Militia. Up to this point the combat had been waged between two
sections of Conservatives at Madrid. The promise of the National Militia brought
the whole Liberal party into the field in every province of Spain. Barcelona
and Valladolid rose to arms; Madrid followed on July 17; San Luis resigned and
fled; and for ten days the capital was given over to the mob, which lynched
Francisco Chico, the head of the police, and the detested instrument of
Narv&ez and San Luis. The Court capitulated to the revolutionists; a Junta
of Public Safety was formed; Liberal measures were promised. Liberal officers
were promoted; and Espartero was summoned to save society (July 19). He duly
became Prime Minister (August 3), while O’Donnell had to be satisfied with the
Ministry of War. But O’Donnell knew his own mind, whereas Espartero undid
himself by his procrastination and infirmity of purpose.
Within a
month Espartero’s popularity was on the wane. It was easy to provide for the
military leaders of the movement against San Luis, and to substitute one set of
partisans for another in the civil service; it would have been easy to deal
with the charges of corruption against San Luis, if they had stood alone. But
similar accusations were levelled against the Queen-Mother; and a large section
of the public demanded that she should be brought to trial. Her old enemy
Espartero was not unwilling to inflict on her this supreme humiliation; but it
was scarcely likely that Queen Isabel would consent to it, and the Cabinet was
divided on the subject. It was decided that Queen Cristina
1854-5] Departure of Queen Cristina-Religious
agitation. 561
should leave
the country, but she refused to leave as a private person, and the Ministry was
pledged not to connive at a clandestine escape. Her departure in state (August
28) irritated the populace to riotous demonstrations, which were promptly
suppressed, and had no effect but to strengthen the Conservative wing of the
Cabinet. Espartero had been willing to leave as open questions the maintenance
of the dynasty and the opening of the Cortes by the Queen; he now adopted the
Moderate view, and the monarchy was upheld by a large majority in the
Constituent Cortes (November 8) against twenty-three Republicans. A Liberal
Constitution drawn up by Oldzaga and other Liberal deputies was presented to
the Constituent Cortes in January, 1855. The forms of parliamentary government
were guaranteed; life-senators were abolished; financial control was vested in
the Cortes, which was to meet once a year or oftener; liberty of the Press was
granted, and political offences were distinguished from ordinary crimes. After
a prolonged discussion it was agreed (February 28, 1855) that, while the nation
undertook to protect the Roman Catholic religion and its ministers, no Spaniard
or foreigner should be prosecuted for his opinions or beliefs “ so long as he
does not manifest them by public acts contrary to religion.” The Constitution
of 1855, judged by Spanish standards, was drawn in a Liberal spirit; but it was
never put into force, for the Constituent Cortes separated without promulgating
it.
Another
aspect of the ecclesiastical question was brought into prominence by the
ministerial proposals concerning communal lands and church property. A Bill had
passed the Constituent Cortes establishing peasant proprietorship; and, as
part of the scheme, church lands as yet unsold were to be put upon the market.
The project was strenuously opposed by the Clericals, who contended, with much
force, that the clauses relating to church lands involved a breach of the
Concordat. The Queen was sincerely attached to the Church, and refused her
sanction to the measure. Espartero and O’Donnell threatened to resign; and
Isabel at last gave her assent under protest (May 1, 1855). An agitation was
set on foot by Don Francisco de Asis and Sor Patrocinio; the middle-class
citizens regarded the action of the Government as a breach of public faith; and
the latent fanaticism of the illiterate was stimulated by circumstantial
reports that a crucifix in one of the Madrid churches had sweated blood after
the Bill was passed. Riots were organised, and the Cabinet was forced to expel
the clerical camarilla from the Palace. These proceedings were watched by the
country with growing disapproval, and the responsibility for them was laid at
Espartero’s door. A band of able writers founded (September 24) El Padre
Cobos, a journal which ridiculed the Minister’s personal foibles, satirised his
public conduct, and made him the laughingstock of Madrid. As Espartero’s
influence waned, O’Donnell’s grew. Every post vacated by a supporter of
Espartero was filled by a supporter
of O’Donnell;
O’Donnell’s lieutenants held the most prominent military commands; and the
Prime Minister was occasionally outvoted in the Cabinet by his own colleagues.
Early in July, 1856, Escosura, the Minister of the Interior and Espartero’s
close ally, was sent to report upon the causes of recent riots in the province
of Old Castile. The chief disturbing causes were famine and maladministration;
but Escosura’s minute barely touched on these points, and digressed into an
indictment of Moderate principles. Rightly construing this tirade as a personal
attack on himself, O’Donnell refused to remain in office as Escosura’s
colleague. Espartero sided with Escosura, but dared not part with O’Donnell; he
suggested that, if the two Ministers could not agree to sit in the same
Cabinet, they should agree to retire from it together. This suggestion implied
a complete misapprehension of O’Donnell’s strategy. Without a suspicion that
Isabel would throw him over, Espartero begged her to compose the differences in
the Cabinet, or to choose between his two colleagues. She decided in favour of
the War Minister. Espartero at once resigned, and within a few minutes
O’Donnell had formed a new Ministry (July 14).
Though the
late Premier had been completely outwitted, the people still believed in him.
The National Militia rose to arms, and severe fighting took place at Madrid on
July 15 and 16; but the popular force was without a leader, for Espartero’s
nerve had failed him at the critical moment, and he hid in a friend’s house
till order was restored. He was soldier enough to know that the raw National
Militia was no match for the regulars, and that a conflict could only end in
defeat. His abstention from armed opposition to the Government was honourable
to his humanity; but appearances were against him, and his Sight ruined his
reputation. The local risings of the National Militia in the provinces were
sternly quelled, and the force was disbanded; the Constituent Cortes were
dissolved (Septelnber 2), and the Constitution of 1845 was revived, mitigated
by a supplementary Act (September 15) providing for the control of national
finance by the Cortes, and for an elected Senate. But O’Donnell’s position was
far from secure. If he was the arm of the Cabinet, Rios Rosas was its brain,
and the brain dominated the arm. It was proposed to devote to the restoration
of ecclesiastical buildings a sum of £600,000 raised on church property; the
project was opposed by Rios Rosas, and was vetoed by the Queen. O’Donnell
reluctantly yielded and parted with his Finance Minister. But Isabel was not to
be propitiated. She had sacrificed Espartero to O’Donnell; she now made ready
to sacrifice O’Donnell to Narv&ez, who had returned to Madrid. The coldness
of her demeanour left O’Donnell in no doubt as to her intention ; he
anticipated dismissal by resignation (October 12,1856).
Narv&ez
thereupon took office, and appointed to the Ministry of the Interior
C&ndido Nocedal, a recent convert from radicalism, whose manipulation of
the elections reduced the Liberal Opposition in the
Cortes to
five members. For the next twelve months the Cortes did not count as a
political force. The reforming measures of the Constituent Cortes and of the
O’Donnell Ministry were rescinded; the Constitution of 1845 was reenforced; the
central executive was strengthened ; and laws of exceptional severity were
enacted against the Press. The harshness of this legislation seemed excessive
even to a group of Conservatives in the packed Cortesi; but their protests were
treated with contempt. Narvdez ruled despotically, invoking Liberal principles;
Nocedal ruled no less despotically in the name of orthodox absolutism. The
defiant brutality of their methods produced a slight Liberal rally; a
mysterious affair at the Palace, which ended in the violent death of
Urbiztondo, the Minister of War, once more drew attention to Court scandals;
Narvdez declined to promote over the heads of other- officers the Queen’s
latest favourite—Antonio Puig Molto, a lieutenant in the engineers. Narvdez was
dismissed in disgrace (October 15, 1857), and, after other parliamentary
combinations had been tried ineffectually, a Ministry of a new type was formed
by O’Donnell (June 30, 1858).
He had
learned that no reliance could be placed upon the Queen; she had inherited her
father’s jovial perfidy with her mother’s sensuality, had many superstitions
but no principles, and alternated between the influence of her ecclesiastical
advisers and that of her numerous transitory lovers. O’Donnell perceived that
the support of the dynastic Progressists was indispensable, and that he must
adopt a line of policy which should conciliate all Clericals except the
obscurantist Ultramontanes. He therefore formed a broad-bottomed administration
composed of men of divergent opinions, but from which extremists were excluded.
Yet, though he had the wit to conceive this plan, he had not the patient skill
to execute it. He enlisted the services of Posada Herrera, an astute tactician,
whose conduct of the elections disarmed his adversaries by its artful
moderation. When the new Cortes assembled (December 1), it was found that,
though the Government had a commanding majority, every shade of opinion in the
Opposition was represented. Posada Herrera had observed that, by reducing the
parliamentary Opposition to a handful of members, Narvdez, Bravo Murillo, and
Nocedal fomented secret plots in democratic clubs and conspiracies in
barrack-rooms; he preferred to reduce his enemies to impotence by apparent
concessions. Friendly relations were resumed with Rome and the camarilla was
mollified by the Ministry’s general attitude. Progressists were nominated to
high posts; Prim and other prominent Liberals were made senators; and the
public interest was adroitly diverted to problems of foreign and colonial
policy.
The refusal
of the Government to entertain the American proposals concerning the purchase
of Cuba was approved by the nation; the menacing terms of Buchanan’s
presidential message only served to strengthen O’Donnell’s Cabinet. Opinion was
more divided respecting
564 The “Liberal Union."—-Moroccan campaign.
[1859-60
Napoleon
Ill’s campaign against Austria; while the Spanish Liberals hailed the
emancipation of Italy as a revolutionary triumph, moderate men feared that
success might encourage France to pursue an aggressive policy at the expense of
Spain ; and Absolutists, Clericals, and courtiers were alarmed as to the future
of Austria, of the Temporal Power, and of the Spanish Bourbons in Italy.
Differences on these points might,, in ordinary times, have shattered “the
Liberal Union,” the heterogeneous majority which supported O’Donnell; but the
prospect of a war with Morocco united all parties against the traditional
enemies of Spain. A plausible pretext was afforded by the raids of Arab
tribesmen in the neighbourhood of Melilla and Ceuta. O’Donnell demanded
reparation for outrages committed on Spanish subjects, rejected the offers of
the Sultan of Morocco as inadequate, mobilised an expeditionary corps of
40,000, and declared war on October 22, 1859. His peremptory action excited
enthusiasm in a public unaware of his negotiations with the British Government.
In language of unmistakable plainness Lord John Russell informed the Spanish
Cabinet that no annexation of African territory would be permitted by Great
Britain; and O’Donnell—less concerned to annex territory than to increase his
personal prestige—gave way. The coast towns of Morocco were blockaded; and
O’Donnell assumed the command of the Spanish troops. He was unequal to his
position. He had expected a military promenade: he found himself engaged in an
arduous enterprise. The plan of campaign was badly conceived; the troops were
disembarked at an unsuitable spot; the roads were impracticable; cholera was
rife; half the army was in hospital; and the Moors offered a stout resistance
to the Spanish advance. A fierce engagement at Los Castillejos (January 1,1860)
was won by the brilliant intrepidity of Prim; Tetuan was occupied on January
81; and, after severe fighting at Wadi-Ras (February 23), peace was concluded
on April 26. The cost of the campaign was ruinous, and the loss of life great.
Yet, for the moment, the country was satisfied. The dukedom of Tetuan was
conferred on O’Donnell; and Prim—now Marquis of Los Castillejos—became a
national hero, with whose ambitions statesmen would have to reckon in the
future.
The Carlists
had profited by O’Donnell’s absence, and by the transfer of regular troops to
Morocco, to organise a rising. They won over to their side the Captain-General
of the Balearic Islands, Jaime Ortega, who landed at San Carlos de la
B&pita in company with the Pretender, the Count of Montemolin (April 2).
The General proclaimed Monte- molin King of Spain; but, as his men declined to
follow him and the peasantry did not stir, the expedition proved an absurd
fiasco. Ortega was shot; Montemolin was captured, and only released on signing
a formal renunciation of his claim to the throne. The hopes of the Carlists
were at an end when the Spanish army, returning from its victorious campaign,
marched through Madrid (May 11). The Liberal Union
remained
intact; and the Government continued its policy of postponing controversial
measures. A foreign complication enabled O’Donnell to divert attention from
domestic questions and to remove from his path a personal rival. The triumph of
Benito Judrez over Miramdn accentuated long-standing differences between Spain
and Mexico. JuArez, the Mexican President, expelled the Spanish envoy Pacheco
early in 1861, and on July 17 suspended the interest on the foreign debt for
two years. The British and French Governments protested without effect, and
finally agreed to make common cause with Spain against Mexico. By the
Convention of London (October 31) the three contracting Powers disclaimed any
intention of territorial aggrandisement, or “ of exercising in the internal
affairs of Mexico any influence calculated to infringe the right of the Mexican
nation to choose and constitute freely the form of its government.” So far as
Great Britain was concerned, this declaration was sincere. Both France and Spain
secretly hoped to set up a monarchy in place of the existing republic; but each
concealed her intentions from the other. Napoleon III was bent on bringing
forward the Archduke Maximilian of Austria as candidate for the throne of
Mexico, Isabel on pressing the claims of her sister the Duchesse de
Montpensier. Prim, whose exploits in Morocco marked him for promotion, was
appointed to command the Spanish contingent of the allied forces (November 12),
and was instructed as plenipotentiary to abide strictly by the Convention of
London. A part from his merits as a soldier, Prim was personally agreeable to
the French Emperor, with whom he had discussed Mexican affairs; and it was
thought that, as his wife was a Mexican, he would have little difficulty in
winning the confidence of the local leaders. He disembarked at Vera Cruz on
January 8, 1862. O’Donnell’s motives in appointing Prim were not wholly
patriotic and disinterested. He assumed that, if a Spanish Bourbon obtained the
throne of Mexico, Prim would remain to consolidate the new kingdom; or that, if
the Mexican Republic survived, Prim would be permanently discredited. In
either case, O’Donnell would be rid of a daring competitor.
These
calculations were false, for they were made in ignorance of the French Emperor’s
designs. These were unofficially disclosed to the Spanish Government at the
beginning of January, and were communicated to Prim in a private letter from
Napoleon III. Prim, by this time well acquainted with the state of public
feeling in Mexico, warned Napoleon (March 12) that, though nothing could be
simpler than to proclaim Maximilian King or Emperor of Mexico, his power would
disappear with the withdrawal of the French soldiers. In the negotiations with
Judrez, Prim dissented from the proposals of the French representatives, and
acted in concert with the British Envoy, Sir Charles Wyke; finally, on
discovering that the French contemplated a breach of the Convention of London,
he took upon himself the grave responsibility of ordering the
Spanish troops
to embark for Havana (April 22). The news of his retirement from Mexico was
unwelcome to the Cabinet, and was badly received by the public. O’Donnell
succumbed to the temptation of crushing a personal rival, who had taken
independent action of the most serious character without consulting his
official chief. A public repudiation of Prim would avert Napoleon llFs
displeasure, and smooth O’Donnell’s path. But two officers sent by Prim from
Havana to justify his actions were beforehand with O’Donnell at the Palace; and
the Premier, to his astonishment, found the Queen emphatic in praise of Prim’s
sagacity. Ministers were therefore compelled to uphold their nominee; but their
advocacy was lukewarm, and the attacks of the Opposition increased in
bitterness. Prim defended his conduct with great spirit in the Senate (December
9), and came victoriously through a motion of censure in the Chamber (January
7, 1863). But, by this date, the Liberal Union was on the point of breaking up.
The Ministry had lasted longer than any other Cabinet formed during the reign,
but had outlived its usefulness and popularity. Its more Liberal supporters
were alienated by its deliberate neglect of domestic reforms, and by its savage
repression of agrarian disturbances in Andalusia; its restless policy of
adventures and expeditions abroad had yielded no substantial results in Morocco
or Mexico; its readmission of Santo Domingo as a Spanish colony (March 19,
1861) had been a blunder which had disorganised the national finances, and was likely
to derange them still further. Reconstruction had been tried in vain;
O’Donnell was himself condemned as lacking in foresight. As in 1856, he
anticipated dismissal. He proposed to acknowledge the newly established kingdom
of Italy, and, on the Queen’s refusal to accept his advice, tendered his
resignation (February 27, 1863). The Liberal Union was at an end.
It was not
easy to find a successor to O’Donnell. The Queen appealed in vain to Prim, and
to five other prominent politicians. The Marquis of Miraflores at last
consented to take office (March 2), dissolved the Cortes, and issued a
proclamation (August 12) restricting the right of public meeting to electors on
the register. The Liberals resolved to adopt the policy of abstention from the
polls; but, though only one Progressist was returned, the new Parliament was
unmanageable, and Miraflores retired in favour of Arrazola (January 15, 1864).
On the Queen’s refusal to dissolve the Cortes, Arrazola gave way to Mon (March
1). The period of short-lived Ministries had returned. Debarred from
Parliament, the Liberals formed secret associations, and Prim organised a
mutiny of the Madrid garrison in June. His plans were rendered futile by a
tactless speech of Oldzaga’s, hinting at the abolition of the monarchy; the
army, though discontented, was not yet disloyal to the throne. The rising was
abandoned; but the Palace clique was alarmed, and, as usual in times of danger,
sent for Narvdez (September 16). He formed a Cabinet which included Gonzdlez
Bravo,
1864—6J Madrid riots.-Recall and resignation of
O'Donnell. 567
and, after
ineffectual efforts to wean the Liberals from their policy of abstention,
reverted to a policy of coercion. An excuse for striking hard was forthcoming.
On the pretext of relieving the embarrassments of the Treasury, the Queen
proposed that the greater part of the patrimony of the Crown should be sold,
and that 25 per cent, of the proceeds should be paid to her private account,
the rest to the exchequer. The financial position of the country was
unquestionably bad, and it was rendered worse by ill-advised naval expeditions,
which finally culminated in the bombardment of Valparaiso and Callao. The
Queen’s proposal was essentially unsound, and was declared to be
unconstitutional by Emilio Castelar, afterwards famous as an orator and as the
dictator of 1873, but then editor of La Democracia, a Radical paper, and
professor of the philosophy of history at the University of Madrid. The
Ministry instructed the Rector of the University to deprive Castelar of his
chair. The order was not obeyed; the Rector was suspended; and a group of
professors (including Nicolas Salmeron, afterwards President of the Republic)
resigned as a protest. An orderly demonstration in their favour was organised
by the University students (April 10, 1865); the authorities fired upon the
crowd, killing eleven and wounding 103 persons. This proceeding excited the
utmost indignation all over Spain, and was vehemently denounced by Prim in the
Senate.
The Queen,
perceiving that Narvaez had gone too far, threw him over and recalled O’Donnell
(June 29). Like his predecessor, he began by trying to persuade the Liberals to
abandon their policy of abstention. He extended the franchise, and entered into
diplomatic relations with Italy; he expelled the Palace camarilla, and
sacrificed his personal feelings in endeavouring to arrive at an understanding
with Prim. But it was too late. Prim was convinced that the dynasty must be
swept away, and was indefatigable in his attempts to win over the garrison of
Madrid. A rising planned for January 2, 1866, was a grievous disappointment to
him; only two cavalry regiments joined him at Villarejo de Salvanes, and he
escaped with them to Portugal by a series of forced marches. The abortive
attempt drove O’Donnell to repressive measures. The garrisons of various cities
in the province of Old Castile were known to be disaffected; a happy accident
alone prevented a serious mutiny in Madrid. Martial law was proclaimed, but
Prim’s furtive propaganda continued. Two regiments of artillery stationed at
Madrid rose on June 22; the mutineers were overcome after a desperate
resistance, and
66 were executed. Isabel was ready to profit by
O’Donnell’s severity, but was unwilling to share his unpopularity. She refused
to sanction his nominations to the Senate, and he resigned (July 10), declaring
that he would never enter the Palace again so long as it was occupied by the
Queen, “with whom it was impossible to govern.” O’Donnell and Prim, by
different routes and methods, had arrived at almost the same conclusion.
Narvaez was
reinstated in office, for the fifth and last time, and,
568 Narvdez’ autocratic rule.—Prim and the
dynasty. [1865-8
with Gonzdlez
Bravo for his lieutenant, governed as an autocrat. Since the accession of
Isabel, Ministers, however despotic, had gone through the form of assembling a
packed parliament to ratify their decrees. Narvdez set a new precedent, and,
though the Constitution provided for annual sessions, the Cortes were not
convoked between July, 1865 and December, 1866. After an interval of more than
eighteen months, the members of the different parties, who were in Madrid, met
to petition that the Cortes should be summoned. The meeting was dispersed
(December 28); the petitioners were declared to be “ enemies of the public
peace,” and exiled from Spain on the following day—Rios Rosas, the. President
of Cong-ess, being shipped abroad with a gang of common convicts. Serrano—then
President of the Senate as well as Commander-in-chief—remonstrated with the
Queen against this treatment of his colleague; he was arrested on his return
from the Palace, and was deported to the Balearic Islands. Neither soldiers nor
civilians, who criticised the executive, were safe. Moderate men, naturally
averse from violent courses, began to think with Prim that absolutism could
only be met by armed resistance, and that the army must be persuaded to declare
against the Government. A new Cortes, elected under the severest ministerial
pressure, met on March 30, 1867. As one nonentity after another took his seat,
Gonzdlez Bravo, astonished at his own handiwork, exclaimed audibly: “Who are
these people ? ” Only four members of the Liberal Union were returned to the
Chamber, which obsequiously voted away all its rights and privileges before the
prorogation (July 13).
Prim
continued to organise his schemes at Brussels, and secured adherents among the
garrison at Valencia, where a rising was to take place in August; he reached
Valencia on August 11, but retired discomfited to Geneva, for his rash promise
to abolish conscription had alarmed the officers, and they withdrew from the
plot before the day appointed. But military rebellion was not the sole menace
to the throne. Clouds of scandal were gathering round the Queen. The
irregularities of her private life had long been known to those about the
Court; and the simple-hearted Pius IX had amazed and amused the diplomatists of
Europe by bestowing on her the Golden Rose in recognition of her virtue.
Growing more and more careless of appearances, she conferred the marquisate of
Loja on her latest favourite, Carlos Marfori, a cook’s son, who had risen to be
an actor, before royal caprice made him a Minister of State. Her shortcomings
were now cruelly exposed in Radical newspapers, which the Government vainly
strove to suppress; these revelations reached the provinces, and scandalised
the whole community. Nothing contributed more to Isabel’s downfall. Her
position was further weakened by the deaths of O’Donnell (November 5,1867), and
of Narvdez (April 23, 1868). Narvdez, though he persistently declared himself a
Liberal, was pledged to combat the revolutionary party to the last; O’Donnell,
though
1868] Gonzalez Bravo.—Unpopularity of Queen
Isabel. 569
he wished
Isabel to abdicate in favour of her son Alfonso, was staunch to the Bourbons;
and both were influential enough to keep the army loyal to the dynasty. The
generals attached to the Liberal Union shared their chiefs opinion that it was
impossible to work any longer with Isabel, but they were not agreed as to her
successor; while Serrano intrigued on behalf of the Duchesse de Montpensier,
Dulce endeavoured to- bring about an understanding with Prim and
other leaders of the anti-dynastic party.
The
appointment of Gonzdlez Bravo in place of Narvdez was injudicious. He
remembered with unmitigated resentment that the military group had procured his
dismissal in 1844; he knew that he was distrusted by many officers of high
rank, and that they were once more banded against him. He appointed to
important posts two distinguished soldiers on whom he could rely—Jose Gutierrez
de la Concha, Marquis of La Havana, and Manuel Pavia, Marquis of
Novaliches—and, with force on his side, he believed that, civilian as he was,
he could cow the disaffected generals. Since his enemies were irreconcilable,
and bent on his humiliation, he determined to strike first. On July 7, 1868, he
suddenly ordered the arrest of the Liberal Union generals—Serrano, Dulce,
Caballero de Rodas, Cordova, Echagiie, Serrano Bedoya, Zabala and others—and
exiled them to the Canary Islands. The Montpensiers were ordered to leave Spain
at once. Most of Gonz&lez Bravo’s foes were trapped, but not all; and what
he thought to be a masterstroke of statecraft was his destruction. By expelling
the Montpensiers, he made an enemy of Admiral Topete, the Commander-in-chief of
the Cadiz squadron; before embarking at Cadiz, the Liberal Union generals
enlisted Topete’s sympathies, and a plan of combined action was agreed upon.
On September
8, the Buenaventura left Cadiz to bring back the Liberal Union generals from
the Canaries; on September 17 Prim disembarked from the Delta at Gibraltar,
met Topete and persuaded him to act instantly without waiting for the return of
the Buenaventura. The pronunciamiento was made on September 18; the garrison at
Cadiz rose next day; the banished generals arrived in the evening; and a joint
manifesto to the nation was issued proclaiming a new Government on a popular
basis. One passage drew scornful attention to Isabel’s misconduct by insisting
that “the motives determining the gravest issues should be such as may be
mentioned before mothers, wives, and daughters.” The taunt struck home at San
Sebastian, where the Queen was now residing with her husband and Marfori; yet,
as she had so often seen order restored at the point of the bayonet, she did
not lose hope. She refused to believe that the game was lost, and that her
kingdom was required of her. Gonz&lez Bravo knew better; the generals had
beaten him once more, and he hurriedly abandoned office. Novaliches marched to
check the advance of Serrano on the capital, was wounded at the battle of
Alcolea (September 28), and retired with
his
wavering troops, which deserted the royal cause four days later. On September
29, Madrid rose. The reign of Isabel was over ; and, on September 30, she fled
from the country which she had misruled for twenty-five years, leaving a few
shillings in the national exchequer. Her errors may be explained; they cannot
be forgiven. Many sovereigns have been as sensual, selfish, and superstitious;
few have been so devoid of political instinct, so reckless of consequences, and
so indifferent to the welfare of their people. _
t
On October 7
a Provisional Government was formed at Madrid, with Serrano as its figurehead,
and Prim as its leading spirit. On October 25 it issued a manifesto which,
while promising universal suffrage and other democratic measures, left the form
of future government an open question. Prim and his colleagues were known, however,
to favour the establishment of a constitutional monarchy; but a noisy minority
organised a republican agitation. Dangerous socialistic riots took place at
Cadiz and Malaga; voters were intimidated at the polls, and sixty Republicans
were returned to the Constituent Cortes, which met in January, 1869. A new
Constitution was prepared guaranteeing individual liberty, trial by jury, the
right of combination and of public meeting, and liberty of the Press. Civil
marriage was legalised, but the proposal to establish liberty of worship was
combated in the Cortes, and fiercely opposed in the country. Though finally
passed, it was denounced by churchmen as sacrilege, by Republicans as a futile
compromise, and it remained a dead letter. The clause in the Constitution
providing that the monarchical form of government should be adopted was carried
by 214 votes to 71, against prolonged Republican opposition in debates which
gave Castelar, now member for Saragossa, a superb opportunity of displaying,
with the eyes of Europe fixed on him, the vast resources of his impassioned
eloquence. Serrano was elected Regent on June 18; the Cortes rose on July 15,
and Prim was free to find, if he could, a monarch for the vacant throne. The
result of his preliminary enquiries had been discouraging. The only candidate
ambitious of the position was the Due de Montpensier, whose claims bad been
pressed by Serrano, Topete, and Silvela; but Montpensier was inacceptable to
Prim and the Cortes, and Napoleon III would have resented his selection. The
Duke of Aosta had been approached without success; and, after some hesitation,
Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, father of King Luiz of Portugal, had rejected
all advances (April 5).
New
candidatures were suggested by various groups. Some representatives of the old
Liberal Union would have welcomed the succession of Isabel’s son Alfonso; but
he was far too young, the feeling against his mother was still strong, and a
meeting of the Government supporters (April 10) carried a motion that the Bourbons
were incapable of holding any public office. This resolution of a party
gathering had, indeed, no legal force, and was primarily aimed at Montpensier;
but it effectually
excluded
Alfonso, and could not be rescinded abruptly. The Pan- iberians, who desired a
legislative union with Portugal, carried on a boisterous agitation in favour of
King Luiz; this the King brought to a close by stating in an open letter to
Louie (September 26) that he meant to die, as he had lived, a Portuguese.
Prim’s original candidate had been the Duke of Aosta; he now supported the Duke
of Genoa, Victor Emmanuel’s nephew, and sounded the Italian Government. The
offer was declined (January 3,1870); and this new check was peculiarly
mortifying to Spanish pride, for Prim, feeling confident of success, had
announced his project unofficially through the Foreign Office. This series of
refusals compromised the dignity of the country, and encouraged the
Republicans. By temperament and training Prim was intolerant of disorder, and
he dealt summarily with the instigators of riots in the provinces, with
insubordinate militiamen, and with the “ Volunteers of Liberty” who resisted
disarmament. The financial situation and the uncertainty of the political
future contributed to the general uneasiness. Prim struck as hard as
Narv&ez, for the speedy establishment of order was essential to his plans.
These continued to miscarry. He received a refusal from Prince Leopold of
Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen (March 15), and renewed his offer to Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg,
who once more declined it (May 15).
Notwithstanding
the ridicule heaped upon him by the Republicans, Prim persisted in his efforts;
and, chiefly owing to the arguments of Bismarck’s agent, Major-von Versen, who
had recently returned from a secret mission to Spain, Prince Leopold was
prevailed upon to accept the nomination to the vacant throne. Prim had at last
found a king; but the manner in which the news was received by Mercier de
Lostende, French ambassador at Madrid (July 2), convinced him that he had
blundered, and on July 10 he despatched a confidential agent to secure
Leopold’s withdrawal. Before the messenger reached Berlin, Leopold had declined
to stand (July 12); but the mischief was done, and out of this trifling
incident arose the Franco-German war. Prim had contrived to offend France and
Prussia, but he avoided the efforts made by both Powers to enlist Spain on
their side; and, while the Franco-German war was in progress, he again
approached the Duke of Aosta, who gave a reluctant assent. On November 26 the
Ministerial candidate was adopted by 191 votes against 153. The majority was
significantly small. It is doubtful whether Prim was well inspired in choosing
for the throne of so Catholic a country as Spain a prince whose father, Victor
Emmanuel, was regarded by many Spaniards as a sacrilegious despoiler. It is
possible, though unlikely, that the experiment might have succeeded under
Prim’s direction. But this was not to be. Attempts on Prim’s life were made on
October 25 and November 14; on December 27 he was shot in the street by a bat'd
of assassins, and died of his wounds on December 30,1870, the day on which the
Duke of Aosta touched Spanish
soil at
Cartagena. It was a sinister beginning. The new King stood alone; and as Amadeo
I he lived two years of political martyrdom, isolated and with every hand
against him. Then he laid down the Crown which had been thrust upon him, and
left Spain to the dreary round of anarchy, civil war, clerical intrigues,
republican excesses, military conspiracies, and reaction.
During this
period Portugal, like Spain, underwent a succession of revolutions and
counter-revolutions. Thomar’s administration was marked by acts of petty
tyranny, which arrayed the commercial classes of the capital against him, and
increased the discontent of the provinces. A popular uprising suddenly swept
him from power (May 11,1846); and he fled in disguise to Spain. His successor
Palmella was unable to restore tranquillity. A general strike against the
payment of taxes paralysed the executive; the Migfcelists were allied with the
Septembrists to annul the Charter, and Oporto fell into the hands of the
insurgents. Disaffection spread to the regular troops; but the bulk of the
army was kept to its allegiance by the influence of Saldanha, who became
Minister of War on October 6, and was rewarded by a dukedom (November 4). The
rebel forces were defeated at Torres Vedras (December 22); but the Opposition
held Oporto till the following summer, when foreign intervention, constantly
demanded by Saldanha in conformity with the terms of the Quadruple Alliance,
was at last obtained. By surrendering to Sir Thomas Maitland, the military
chiefs of the rebellion secured British protection against the vengeance of the
loyalists; the promise of a general amnesty (June 9, 1847) induced the Junta to
submit; and the regulars under Saldanha took possession of Oporto in the name
of Maria da Gloria (July 7).
Though the
insurrection was at an end, the condition of the country provided a predatory
adventurer with an opportunity; and the sudden reappearance of Thomar at Lisbon
(August 27) indicated that the reactionaries were preparing to seize office.
Their plans were disturbed by Saldanha who, on becoming Prime Minister
(December 18), adopted a policy of conciliation, restoring to the Conservative
leaders the dignities of which Palmella had deprived them, and appointing
Thomar ambassador at Paris. The establishment of the French Republic in 1848
raised the hopes of the Portuguese revolutionists; but Saldanha’s firmness
prevented the coalition of Miguelists and Septembrists from disturbing the
public peace. He had to deal with a wilier foe in Thomar, who returned to
parliamentary life in 1849, and brought about Saldanha’s resignation (June 18).
Reversing his predecessor’s practice of not allowing party politics to
influence appointments in the civil service, Thomar discharged many of the late
Ministry’s nominees. The Opposition retaliated by accusing him of peculation,
and a vote of censure in the Upper House was supported by Saldanha; the vote
was
1850-6] The Acto Addicional.-Pedro V.-Fall of
Saldanha. 573
defeated, but
the Minister was not content with this victory and, against all precedent,
dismissed Saldanha from the post of Majordomo of the Palace (February 7,1850).
Incensed at the slight put upon the Marshal, the generals and the Liberal
nobility joined with the Radicals; and during the ensuing months the
probability of a revolution became so apparent that the British Minister, Sir
Hamilton Seymour, urged the Queen to dismiss Thomar. The advice was rejected;
but no overt action was taken till the following spring, when the storm burst.
Saldanha raised the standard of revolt at Cintra (April 7, 1851), calling upon
the army to save the throne and charter from the peril in which Thomar’s
despotism had placed them. The garrisons of Oporto and other cities responded,
and Thomar once more escaped from his enemies to Spain (April 29). Saldanha was
offered the presidency of the Council on May 1—but, as was widely believed,
solely with the object of inducing him to return at once to Lisbon
unaccompanied. If there was a design to assassinate or capture him, the plot
failed. The wary soldier took the precaution of entering the capital with his
troops, dictated his own terms, and formed a Ministry of “regeneration,” which
asked for the support of all independent men in purifying the executive and in
carrying out a policy of moderate reform.
Saldanha
failed to create a national party; but he rendered signal service to the
country by passing the celebrated Acto Additional, which introduced liberal
clauses into the Charter, and settled a long-standing difficulty. The most
important innovation of the Acto Additional was a provision for the direct
election of deputies; and among other changes were the curtailment of the power
hitherto exercised by the central executive, the creation of representative
municipalities, and the abolition of capital punishment for purely political
offences. Measures to readjust the incidence of taxation met with so much
obstruction that the Government prorogued Parliament, and resorted to the
unconstitutional device of imposing its scheme by ministerial decree. Still,
the unbroken peace which characterised Saldanha’s long tenure of office
reassured native capitalists, attracted foreign investors, and stimulated
commercial enterprise.
On the death
of Maria da Gloria (November 13, 1853), she was succeeded by her son Pedro,
during whose minority the King Consort acted as Regent. Pedro V, who came of age
on September 16, 1855, was a self-willed youth of narrow understanding, too
prone to meddle in the details of routine administration. The inevitable crisis
occurred when, on the rejection of a financial measure by the Upper House, the
Ministry advised the creation of a sufficient numbers of peers to force the
Bill through. The King refused his assent; and Saldanha resigned (June 6,1856).
He had rescued the country from despotism by his coup d'etat in 1851; he had
strengthened the monarchy by lowering the qualification for voting; he had
administered affairs with integrity, and
with but few
lapses from constitutional practice; and he left office at the end of five
years, with the respect of his bitterest opponents. He was never again to stand
so high in public esteem.
His
successor, the Marquis de Louie, formed a more democratic Ministry, which bid
for the support of the Septembrists, and of the Freemasons. But the most
memorable incident during Louie’s term of office was a diplomatic difficulty
with France. Napoleon III had already protested against Saldanha’s conduct in
allowing French republican refugees to settle in Portugal; it was now in his
power to mark his displeasure by humiliating Saldanha’s successor. On November
29,1857, the Portuguese authorities at Mozambique seized, in the neighbourhood
of Quintanghona, a French slaver, the Charles-et-George; the captain was duly
tried, sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, and fined. The French Government
protested, and sent two men-of-war to the Tagus (October 3,1858) to exact
reparation. Louie reckoned on English support, which he might have obtained,
had Palmerston been in office; but Derby and Disraeli were not disposed to
intervene, and Portugal was finally compelled to pay a sum of 349,000 francs as
compensation. The Louie Ministry was discredited, and resigned on March 16,
1859, but was recalled a year later. Towards the end of 1861, Lisbon was
devastated by epidemics of yellow fever and cholera. Saldanha’s life was
despaired of; the King’s brother Dom Fernando died on November 6; and five days
later Pedro V fell a victim to the plague. He was succeeded by his brother Dom
Luiz, who took the oath on December 22. But the misfortunes of the royal family
were not at an end; the King’s surviving brother, Dom Joao, died on December
27. The Lisbon mob fell into a panic, credulously imagined that poisoners were
at work, stormed Thomar’s house, and clamoured against Louie. It was long
before public confidence was restored; but the sympathy and courage shown by Luiz
I made the monarchy more popular than it had been during the reigns of his
immediate predecessors.
His marriage
to Maria Pia of Italy (October 11, 1862) pleased all parties; Liberals welcomed
her as a daughter of Victor Emmanuel, and Conservatives as the god-daughter of
Pius IX. The Louie Ministry abolished capital punishment in 1862, and continued
a decentralising policy; but its financial measures were ill-conceived, and it
alienated many supporters by expelling the popular Sisters of Charity. Louie resigned
on April 14, 1864; and, a month later, Saldanha, who had represented Portugal
at the Vatican since 1862, reached Lisbon. He advised the King to dismiss the
Ministry, and to govern by royal decrees, which might be confirmed when
convenient by an amenable Parliament. Though not unwilling to nominate Saldanha
to the first place in the existing Cabinet, the King declined to withdraw his
confidence from Ministers upheld by a parliamentary majority. Saldanha
returned chagrined to Rome, declaring that Portugal was “rotten to
the core.”
Apart from the personal rebuff which he had suffered, the growth of the
democratic spirit filled him with misgivings; and his dissatisfaction deepened
after the dethronement of Isabel, for the establishment of a Spanish republic
would encourage the Portuguese republicans. His fears were exaggerated, yet
they were shared at the time by many observers. Republican opinions were, no
doubt, prevalent among the educated professional classes; but they were chiefly
held by doctrinaires incapable of organising an armed rebellion. There was
likewise a socialistic tendency among the workmen in the large cities, and
among the labourers in the provinces; but these inchoate groups were without
competent leaders, without definite aims, and without the franchise. Early in
1869 Saldanha was transferred to the Paris embassy, and took part in the
negotiations to place King Luiz’ father, Ferdinand of Saxe- Coburg, on the
throne of Spain. Later in the year, he returned to Portugal, denounced the policy
of the Louie Cabinet, and on May 19,
1870, made his last cowp d'etat.
The army
again supported him; and the King appointed him Prime Minister, good-naturedly
allowing the octogenarian Marshal to believe that he had saved the dynasty once
more. But it was not possible to indulge him for long; and his dismissal on
August 29 caused no stir. The conduct of affairs was entrusted to statesmen of
a less melodramatic type, more in accord with modern ideas, and more
interested in the policy of colonial expansion. This process had been begun by
Joaquim Rodrigues Grata’s effective occupation of Angola in 1848; by the
abolition of slavery at Macao in 1854, and at Ambriz, Cabinda and Molembo in
1856; by the settlement of a European colony at Mozambique in 1857, and by the
exploration of Nyassaland. The further colonial developments lie outside the
limits of our period.
THE
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR,
(1870-1.)
The swift completeness of the victory of Koniggratz
had raised Prussia at a bound into the front rank of the military Powers of
Europe; the secret agreements following on the Convention of Nikols- burg, by
which the south-German States bound themselves to fight under the leadership of
Prussia in the event of war, had laid a broad foundation upon which the edifice
of German unity might be solidly built. The French Emperor, conscious that his
tenure of the throne depended upon the prestige of his Government, watched with
deep concern the rise of a great and powerful neighbour; the French people,
jealous of their military renown, looked with envy on laurels fresher and more
glorious than those won at Magenta and Solferino. Thus the Treaty of Prague,
while ending one war, sowed the seeds of another.
Napoleon III
had committed a grave political blunder in 1866 ; sure of the success of
Austria, he had planned to intervene at the right moment on behalf of Prussia,
at the price of substantial concessions. Koniggratz found him unprepared to
intervene in the only way in which he could hope to obtain any real advantage for
himself or for France. Hence the victory of Prussia came to be regarded by the
Imperialist party as a humiliation which it was essential to avenge. East of
the Rhine, it was recognised at once that the situation created by the defeat
of Austria was but temporary. Urged forward by the voice of the people, among
whom the idea of a united Germany was gathering strength, as much as by the
necessities of the moment, the rulers of the southern States had consented
readily enough to place themselves under the hegemony of the Hohenzollern; but
they made it perfectly clear to Prussia that, while France held Strassburg and
dominated the left bank of the Upper Rhine, they lay under a menace more
pressing and more real than the prospective advantages of a union with the
Northern Confederacy. Thus, on the one side, Bismarck set himself to face a
conflict with France as necessary to complete the work he had begun; On the
other, Napoleon began to scheme to obtain some advantage at the expense of
Prussia, which would lower the prestige of that Power in the eyes of Europe. In
the years immediately following the downfall
of Austria
neither Power was prepared to proceed to extremes; France was in the act of
reforming her military system under the guidance of Marshal Niel; Prussia
required time to fit the contingents of the allied States to her model; but
Napoleon’s repeated attempts to strengthen and extend his eastern frontier,
always detected and met by Bismarck, produced a state of friction between the
two countries which was viewed with growing apprehension in Europe.
In 1868 the
principals were engaged in preparing for a conflict which both regarded as
inevitable. Napoleon turned to Austria, Denmark, and Italy as the Powers most
naturally inclined to resent the aggrandisement of Prussia or most disposed to
repay past favours. But, since his foreign policy had for years been swayed by
moods, and had lacked concentration of purpose, he found his prospective
allies loth to commit themselves. Bismarck had been working towards the goal of
German unity ever since King William had called him to office (September,
1862). Aware that Russia, as is described elsewhere, had deeply resented her
abandonment by Austria during the Crimean War, he sought at St Petersburg an
effective counterpoise to anti-Prussian designs. By ungrudgingly helping Russia
in her Polish troubles, and finally by promising to acquiesce in the abrogation
of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, he obtained from Prince
Gorchakoff a guarantee of benevolent neutrality; at the same time, he lost no
opportunity of conciliating and assisting Italy, with whom Prussia had been
allied against Austria in 1866.
Thus, in the
year 1870, Austria, with her military preparations incomplete, with her
finances disorganised, and above all apprehensive of the action of Russia,
returned vague replies to the overtures from Paris. Italy, desirous of
consummating her unity, coveted Rome, from which Napoleon, posing as the
protector of the Pope, and fearful of losing clerical support at home, was not
disposed to withdraw his troops. She was therefore anxious to avoid a conflict
with her former ally, though she held that the cession of Nice and Savoy had
more than compensated France for her aid in 1859. Denmark was equally bent on
non-committal; for, though eager to regain Schleswig-Holstein, and to profit by
the discomfiture of Prussia, she saw clearly that a false step would mean ruin.
It was recognised, both in France and in Prussia, that England, busied with
domestic reform under Gladstone, was unwilling to interfere in continental
affairs, but that the neutrality of Belgium was very dear to the English
people, who would certainly not brook the presence of either Power at Antwerp.
The question was definitely settled by the publication, at the instance of
Bismarck, in the Times (after the declaration of war) of a proposal made by
Benedetti in the autumn of 1866 that Prussia should help France to acquire
Belgium, in return for French connivance at certain annexations in northern Germany.
England was intensely moved by this exposure; and Lord Granville at once
negotiated
a treaty with the belligerents by which each was bound to oppose, jointly with
England, any violation of Belgian ;erritory by the other. : 1 _
Though the
political atmosphere was highly charged- there did not appear to be any
immediate cause of danger in the middk of the summer of 1870. The French
Premier, ]£mile Ollivier, was able to tell the Chamber on the last day of June
that in no direction could a question be detected that was at all dangerous. ,
Within four days the whole of France was in a ferment. The French Foreign
Minister, the Due de Gramont, was informed on July 3 that Prince Leopold von
Hohen- zollern-Sigmaringen had been selected, with his own consent, as a
candidate for the vacant throne of Spain. It was more than probable that this
step was approved by the . head of the House of Hohenzollem. In the existing
state of her relations with Berlin it was impossible for France to allow Spain
to fall under the influence of Prussia. Benedetti, the French ambassador to
Prussia, was directed to proceed to Ems, where King William was taking the
waters, and to press for an immediate renunciation of Prince Leopold’s claims.
He was informed that the matter was one for Prince Leopold and the Spanish
people, but that his Majesty would communicate with Prince Leopold’s father on
the subject. The Due de Gramont was not satisfied, and insisted on an explicit
order from King William to Prince Leopold; but, while despatches were passing
between Paris and Ems, it was announced from Madrid that Prince Leopold had
withdrawn. This was not sufficient for Napoleon* who, in the state of French
opinion, dared not close the incident without inflicting a public diplomatic
defeat upon Prussia. On July 13 Benedetti was ordered again to seek an
interview with the King, and to demand that he would not at any future time
sanction any similar proposal coming from Prince Leopold. King William
absolutely refused to bind himself by an engagement without limit of time, and
on the persistent ambassador seeking yet another interview, he was politely
informed that the King,, who left Ems that evening, could not receive him. A
telegram published by Bismarck, and conveying, through its abbreviated form, the
impression that King William, had treated the French ambassador with
disrespect, drove Paris into a condition of frenzy. The Cabinet, in which the
Liberal majority was at first disinclined to adopt extreme measures, was
carried away by the popular outburst, and on the evening of July 14, 1870, the
Emperor Napoleon III in Council decided on war. The next morning the forces of
the Empire received orders to mobilise; on the evening of the same day the King
of Prussia issued similar orders to the States of the North German
Confederation and his example was followed in southern Germany, on July 16.
■
Though the
formal declaration of war was not received in Berlin until July 19, it is from
the issue of the orders for mobilisation that the war must be dated, since as
much depended, upon, the smoothness and rapidity with which the ponderous
machinery, then set in motion, did its
work, as upon
the qualities of the rival leaders, or upon the valour of the opposing troops.
The Prussian military system, adopted in northern Germany from the birth of the
Confederation, and gradually extended with slight modifications to the southern
States, after the Peace of Prague, was founded by Scharnhorst as an answer to
the limit to her standing army imposed upon Prussia by Napoleon I. Briefly,
Scham- horst’s principle was to make the standing army the school for the war
training of the nation, and to pass through the school the largest number of
men, compatible with sound teaching, with the object of creating an enormous
potential reserve. Through years of patient labour, often in the face of
violent opposition, the King, Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon had toiled, until now,
at their call, Europe saw for the first time not an army, but a nation in arms,
preparing for the field. Under the Prussian system the army was in the true
sense of the word territorial. The majority of its units drew their recruits
from the districts in which they were permanently stationed; and these
recruits, returning to their homes after their period of training, became the
reservists required to bring the standing army up to its war strength. The
villager, on rejoining the colours, drew from a shelf labelled with his name
his clothing and equipment, ready fitted for his use. Thus the railways were
left free to prepare for the movement of the completed units to their places of
concentration. The battalion, when ready, joined its regiment, the regiment
its brigade, and so in succession, without rest but without haste, till three
great armies ready for the field were advancing towards the Rhine.
The
obligation to serve was universal, and was rigorously enforced. Exemptions were
rarely granted ; but the period of service with the colours was at the same
time reduced to the utmost, with the object both of keeping the youth of the
country as short a time as possible from their ordinary avocations, and of
passing the largest number through the ranks. In 1870, the terms of service,
except for the more scientific corps, were two and a half years with the
colours, four years in the reserve, and five and a half in the Landwehr
(militia). The reserve formed the complement of the standing army; the Landwehr
had a distinct organisation. This system produced a field army of 500,000 men
on the outbreak of war. Moltke had recognised that armies of this size could no
longer be controlled by precise orders issued by one man. To assist him in his
scheme of organisation, and in the preparation of plans of campaign, he had
called into existence a General Staff, to which the best brains of the nation
were attracted. He kept this carefully chosen body of officers in closest touch
with the army, by regularly sending them back for duty with the fighting units;
and by means of them he taught the whole body to exchange the old rigid
compliance with orders for an intelligent interpretation of general
instructions. All ranks entered upon the war with the spirit of initiative
highly developed, and with an intense belief in the advantage of adopting the
offensive.
Moltke’s plan
of campaign had been prepared in the winter of 1867, its details being
constantly re» sed by his General Staff, in accordance with the military and
political conditions of the moment. So carefully was this done that more
detailed information as to the capacity of the French railways was available in
Berlin than in Paris, and a later and more accurate map of the country between
the Rhine and Paris was issued to the German regiments than was in the hands of
the French staffs. The plan consisted in the formation of three armies and a
general reserve. The first army, commanded by Steinmetz, 60,000 strong, and the
second, under Prince Frederick Charles, of 131,000 men, were drawn from the
troops of the North German Confederation. The third army, under the Prussian
Crown Prince Frederick, was composed of 130,000 men, chiefly south Germans. The
general reserve, 63,000 men, was directly under the orders of the King of
Prussia. Three army corps and one division of regulars and four Landwehr
divisions, were utilised to watch the Danish and Austrian frontiers, and the
northern coast. Thus 384,000 men were immediately available for the invasion of
France. The information collected by the General Staff showed that the French
could not place in the field at once more than 250,000 men. A study of the
French railway system showed that, if this force were to be brought rapidly to
the frontier, it must be assembled in two main portions about Metz and
Strassburg, and must be divided by the Vosges. It was held improbable that
France would violate the neutrality of Luxemburg and Switzerland, or would
attempt an invasion of Germany from the south, which would leave Paris
uncovered. Therefore it was decided to deploy the three armies behind the
fortresses of the middle Rhine, and to move the first down the Moselle, the
third down the Rhine, the second army followed by the reserve forming the
connecting link. Thus a superior force could be brought against the French,
should they invade Germany, without waiting to complete their mobilisation; for
either fiank or the centre could be reinforced more quickly than the parts of
the French army, divided by a mountain range, could be brought together.
Moltke’s plan was simplicity itself; Paris was his ultimate objective, but his
immediate intention was to seek out and crush the enemy’s field armies.
Though
universal service existed in France in 1870, its obligation was very partially
enforced. The terms of service were five years with the colours, and four in
the reserve. In practice, anyone who could pay for a substitute was allowed to
do so; and the State’s share of this money provided bounties for men who
extended their service. This produced a long-service professional army which
was not in touch with the nation, a,nd also depleted the reserve. Those not
required to serve did indeed join the Garde Nationale in the large towns, and
elsewhere the Garde Mobile; but their training was purely nominal, and they had
no organisation for war. Thus the standing army had little to fall back on; and
the strength of the nation was undeveloped.
These defects
did not lie on the surface. Under the second Empire the army had waged
successful war in the Crimea, in China, in Algeria, in Mexico, and in Italy.
The veteran soldiers parading on the Champs de Mars impressed the spectator more
than the young troops which defiled before the King of Prussia on the
Tempelhofer Feld. Europe had not yet learned that the men in uniform at a given
moment do not represent the power of a nation in a life-and-death struggle.
Though a few of the more thoughtful, Marshal Niel, the War Minister, among
them, had been startled by the success of Prussia in 1866, the French army, in
its own estimation and that of the world generally, was the first in Europe.
Niel had carefully examined the system of mobilisation in 1867 and had
formulated proposals for increasing the efficiency of the reserves. His
premature death (1869) put an end to these reforms. The long-service system had
proved the most convenient and effective for the numerous foreign expeditions
of the Empire, and pressed lightly on the people as a whole. The proposed
changes were unpopular and were not carried through by Niel’s successor,
Marshal Lebceuf. Lebceuf had calculated that on the ninth day of mobilisation
150,000 men could be assembled in Lorraine, and 100,000 in Alsace, and that the
total would be raised to
300,000 within a few days, when all the reserves had
come in. On this the Emperor based his plan of campaign. He was aware that
united Germany could put into the field an army of about 400,000 men, but he
expected that, if France acted swiftly and successfully, Germany would not long
hold together. He believed that the wounds of 1866 were too recent to be
healed; that a rapid advance across the Upper Rhine would divide Germany, and
make the southern States hesitate; that an early advantage would bring them
into the field with Austria once more at their head, and perhaps even with
Denmark and Italy to support them.
This plan had
much to recommend it, but it required before all rapidity of execution. A large
part of the French army was quartered in eastern France. Napoleon hoped to
assemble these troops quicldy, and to be in a position to strike at Prussia
while she was mobilising. But years of careful preparation in peace are
essential to rapidity in war, and this preparation had been altogether
neglected in France. The French officers were selected and trained for the
staff as boys and never returned to the fighting units; their knowledge was
almost entirely theoretical; and they were out of touch with the army. They had
evolved a highly centralised organisation, which worked well enough in peace,
but which killed initiative, and was fatal in war. The French headquarters,
which should have been chiefly concerned with the doings of the enemy, were
overwhelmed with details of the merest routine. Subordinate commanders, even of
the highest rank, were not informed of the plan of campaign; the details of the
concentration were not worked out. The railway companies, left to deal with the
transport of the troops, were not acquainted with the data
of the
problem they had to solve, though the organisation of the army made that
problem extraordinarily complex. The French axmy was not localised, but
regiments, quartered in accordance with the exigencies of the moment, were
supplied from fixed depots. Thus reservists at Strassburg and Metz, whose
regiments were within a few miles of their homes, had to travel to Britanny, to
Picardy, or even to Algiers, for their arms and equipment, and, returning to take
their places in the ranks, sometimes found their regiments had moved no one
knew whither. The railways required for the concentration of the fighting
units, and for the transport of war stores, were soon thrown into confusion by
this incessant cross-traffic, nor was the supply of those essentials which make
an army out of an assembly of units more successful. The system, centralised in
the hands of a few overworked officials broke down. While the troops were in
want of everything, the sidings at Metz were congested with trucks of which no
one on the spot knew the contents. Thus it fell out that, when the Emperor
joined the army at Metz on July 28, the thirteenth day of mobilisation, he
found that there was not a single corps in a condition to take the field, and
that doubts as to the possibility of assuming the offensive were already
expressed.
In one
respect only was France incontestably superior; the Prussian navy was in its
infancy; the French possessed the second fleet in Europe. It was proposed to
land an expedition of 30,000 men in Schleswig- Holstein, and to invoke the aid
of Denmark. But the preparation of the navy for war had been neglected equally
with that of the army; and, before the first ships were ready for sea, every
vulnerable point on the Prussian coast was guarded. Before the expeditionary
force assembled at Cherbourg could be embarked, it was needed for the defence
of the capital; and even the ships’ guns and crews had to be diverted to arm
and man the forts of Paris. Though part of the fleet under Bouet-Willaumez
sailed for Denmark and passed through the Great Belt, it effected nothing; the
navy remained impotent throughout the war, and Moltke was very soon able to
leave the protection of the coast to the Landwehr. By the end of July any idea
of combining the two forces assembling in Alsace and Lorraine in an immediate
offensive movement was abandoned; and, though the Emperor still attempted to
direct the whole, the French army was virtually divided by the Vosges into
separate commands. The first corps and a division of the seventh in Alsace,
about 35,000 strong, were under Marshal Macmahon; while the Emperor immediately
controlled the second, third, fourth, fifth and Guard coq>s, called the army
of the Rhine, 128,000 men, scattered over Lorraine at and to the east of Metz.
The sixth corps, 35,000 strong, at Chalons, formed the general reserve under
Marshal Canrobert; the remainder of the seventh corps concentrating at Belfort
to watch the exits from the Black Forest.
Meanwhile,
the German armies, covered by detachments on the
frontier, and
by a boldly handled cavalry, were steadily drawing near. Daring reconnaissances
had brought information that the main French army was near the frontier in
Lorraine about St Avoid, and that northern Alsace was clear of the enemy.
Moltke, foreseeing the possibility of the French advancing, and sufficiently
confident of the ultimate result to avoid any unnecessary risk, decided to
check the second army in order to reinforce it with the 63,000 men of the reserve.
At the same time, the first corps and first cavalry division were directed to
reinforce the first army, as it had become obvious that there was no immediate
danger of a raid on the coast, and as the formation of the Landwehr divisions
was far advanced* This measure of precaution enabled the second army to move
through the wooded defiles of the Palatinate in battle array, and the first
army to check an advance against the second.
The French
cavalry, accustomed to act as a reserve upon the battlefield, and untrained to
be the eyes and ears of the army, remained inactive. No certain information was
available at the French headquarters, where confused rumours, resulting in
contradictory orders, added to the existing chaos. Partly;to clear up the
situation, partly to appease the Empress and the Court party, who, judging the
temper of PVance from that of the noisy mobs which thronged the Boulevards,
demanded an instant invasion, of Germany, the Emperor decided on a
reconnaissance in force for August 2. Its execution was entrusted to Marshal
Bazaine, who, besides his own corps, the third, had the second (Frossard) and1
the fifth (de Failly) under his orders. But even this operation could not be
carried out in its entirety, and resolved itself into an advance on Saarbriicken
by Frossard’s corps, supported on its flanks by detachments from the other two.
The day, famous as the bapteme de feu of the young Prince Imperial, was
otherwise only remarkable for the stubborn resistance offered by a detachment
of the German eighth corps, consisting of one regiment, three squadrons, and a
battery pushed forward on outpost duty to the Saar. This little party was
forced to evacuate Saarbriicken, but was not pursued by Frossard, who could not
move far from his depots for want of transport and supplies.
This blow in
the air served-only to confirm the information already received at the Prussian
headquarters. To give time for the second army to come into line with the
first, and to ensure the cooperation of the two in the expected battle, Moltke
directed the first army to delay its march and to concentrate towards the
second. At the same time, the Crown Prince Frederick was ordered at once to
cross the frontier with the third army, to prevent any transfer of force from
Alsace to Lorraine and to cover the left flank -of the second army. Macmahon
had meanwhile pushed forward two divisions to cover the junction of the first
and seventh corps. One of these divisions, the second under General Abel Douay,
rashly advanced to the very frontier, and occupied Weissenburg on August 3,
where it was unconsciously in presence of the third army,
584 Advance of the 3rd German army. Battle of
Worth. [i87o
advancing to
cross the Lauter between Weissenburg and Lauterburg. Douay was surprised in bivouac
on the morning of August 4. He was him ■ self killed; and his division
escaped with difficulty and joined Macmahon in the neighbourhood of Worth. The
greater part of the Crown Prince’s cavalry, being delayed because their line of
march was crossed by columns of infantry hurrying forward to the sound of the
guns, did not reach the battlefield till dusk. Hence all toUch with the
retreating enemy was lost. On August 5, the third army, groping for the
vanished French, discovered Macmahon in position behind the Sulz and Sauer
brooks in the neighbourhood of Worth. There the French Marshal had collected
the whole of the first corps, and had one division of the seventh corps within
reach. On hearing of the rout at Weissenburg, the Emperor had definitely placed
Macmahon in command of all the troops in Alsace, including the fifth corps (de
Failly) then near Bitsch, but immediately afterwards drew half of one of de
Failly’s divisions to himself. De Failly, in face of conflicting orders, could
only send one division to Worth, which arrived too late to take part in the
battle, while the greater part of the seventh corps was still in the
neighbourhood of Belfort; so that Macmahon had only 32,000 infantry* 4850
cavalry, 107 field guns, and 24 mitrailleuses available. The Crown Prince had
within reach the fifth and eleventh Prussian corps, the first and second
Bavarian corps, and part of the Wiirtemberg division; in all, 72,000 infantry,
4280 cavalry, and 231 guns.
The outposts
of the two armies were in touch on the night of the 5th, yet neither commander
intended or anticipated a battle on the next day. Macmahon, vaguely informed of
the enemy’s strength, had planned an advance on the 7th; while the Crown
Prince, whose army had scattered in its search for the enemy, leaving him
unfavourably disposed for attack, proposed to pass the day in manoeuvring
preparatory to enveloping the enemy’s flanks. When armies are in contact,
commanders have but limited control of events. An affair of outposts early on
August 6 involved the second Bavarian and fifth Prussian corps in an attack,
which could not be broken off in accordance with the Crown Prince’s wishes.
Both these corps, particularly the fifth, suffered heavily in this premature
attack; but the fire of a greatly superior artillery, effectively massed on the
heights east of Worth, swept away the head of every counter-attack. Though the
Crown Prince arrived too late upon the scene to take up the reins of control
effectively, and although the German attacks were generally disjointed, the
principles of Prussian training triumphed. Each commander hurrying forward to
the noise of battle threw his men into the fight where they were most needed.
The French, fighting with desperate valour, were pressed back on both flanks by
weight of numbers. About 3 p.m. part of the Wiirtemberg division appeared on
the French right, and the first Bavarian corps came into action on their left.
Macmahon, who had exhausted his reserves, and had no troops to meet
these new
assailants, withdrew his shattered troops through the Vosges passes; the tardy
appearance of one of de Failly’s divisions enabling the retreat to be covered
to some extent. In panic haste the beaten army streamed through the mountains
by Saverne and Luneville to Neufehateau, which it reached on August 14. Thence
they were sent by rail to Chalons, arriving on August 19, and were joined
eventually hy the remainder of the fifth and seventh corps, which had been
drawn into an ignoble retreat without firing a shot.
The battle of
Worth had not merely cost the French some 7000 men killed and wounded, 4000
unwounded prisoners, 24 guns, and much material of war, but the right wing of
the French army was utterly demoralised, and all this though circumstances
combined to make the German pursuit singularly ineffective. A pursuit cannot be
improvised when approaching darkness is adding to the confusion of a
battlefield. The headquarters of the third army being unprepared for battle on
August 6, the greater part of the cavalry was not within reach; when it did
arrive, it was assumed that Macmahon would seek to rejoin the Emperor either
towards Metz or towards Bitsch. The French Marshal’s rapid retreat westwards
enabled him to get away undiscovered. Nor was this the only penalty which the
assailants paid for provoking an unpremeditated fight. They lost 489 officers,
10,150 men killed and wounded—nearly a third more than the vanquished—while
more than half this loss fell on the fifth corps which had attacked
unsupported.
While the
south Germans in Alsace were thus proving to Europe that German unity rested on
solid foundations, events had heen moving fast in Lorraine. It had been
Moltke’s intention that the first and second armies should be concentrated
behind the Saar on August 6, and that they should not cross the frontier until
the third army had secured the eastern passes of the Vosges, and had obtained a
firm grip of the enemy in Alsace. The commander of the first army, Steinmetz,
was not fully informed of Moltke’s plans, and only knew that a general offensive
was proposed. On the news of Saarbriicken, his divisional and corps commanders
had already sprung forward, like hounds straining at the leash, beyond the line
appointed them, in order that they might act on the flank of any attempt to
interfere with the second army. Prince Frederick Charles had pushed his
advanced guards well to the front to cover his march through the Palatinate;
and thus it happened that the left of the first army, which Steinmetz had seen
no reason to check, was approaching Saarbriicken on August 6, while the leading
troops of the right of the second army were making for the same place about
half a day’s march ahead of the remainder.
After the
theatrical display of August 2, Frossard had remained with the second corps in
the neighbourhood of Saarbriicken, and had made no use of the French cavalry
for scouting. Ignorance of the enemy’s doings bred nervousness, which was
increased by the constant presence of hostile
vedettes, and
the dark forests across the frontier were believed to conceal masses of
'Prussians. The news of Douay’s disaster convinced Frossard that his position
was too exposed;. he therefore applied for and obtained permission to Withdraw
his corps to a defensive position which he had prepared an the Spicheren
heights, east of Forbach; the movement being quietly carried out during the
afternoon and night of August 5. That evening Napoleon, after much vacillation,
came to the conclusion that the enemy intended an advance on Nancy, and decided
to effect a junction with Macmahon by way of Saargemiind and Bitsch. The
operation was not: to begin until the 7th. Earlier in the day he'had, while
appointing. Macmahon to the command in. Alsace, placed- the second, third and
fourth corps under Bazaine “ for military operations only,” retaining in his
own hands the Guard and sixth corps * as a general reserve. Thus, on the night
of August 5, Frossard was holding the ground about the Spicheren heights with
one and a half divisions, one and a half divisions and the cavalry being in
support near Forbach. He could, if necessary, be supported by 60,000 men, for
the third corps was Echeloned along the Saargemiind-St Avoid road, on a radius
of some ten miles from Spicheren; the fourth corps was 15 miles away at and
east of Boulaythe Guard had come up to Courcelles, 28 miles off; one brigade of
the fifth corps was at Saargemiind, the remainder were near Bitseh, preparing
to join Macmahon. Frossard’s retirement from Saarbriicken had been duly
reported by the ever watchful German cavalry, the news serving only to confirm
Steinmetz and his subordinates in their intention of pressing forward*
Early on the
6th the advanced cavalry of the second army drew the fire of the French
outposts; but Frossard’s position was wooded, his troops were well concealed,
and there was nothing to show that the heights were occupied in strength.
General von Kameke, the commander of the 14th division of the first army
arriving with his first troops at Saarbriicken about midday, made up his mind
that the French were retiring, and that he had only a rearguard in front of
him. He was sure of support, for he had met General von Goeben, the commander
of the eighth corps, who had ridden forward to see the situation for himself,
and had undertaken to hurry forward his 16th division. The cavalry of the
second army had also informed him that Alvensleben, who commanded the third
corps, had been similarly employed and was bringing up the 5th division.
Therefore, without hesitation, he sent the only infantry he had at hand—a
single brigade—against one and a half divisions strongly entrenched. A resolute
counter-attack, must have swept the rash assailants from the field; but
Frossard was away at Forbach, telegraphing to Bazaine; and, owing to that fatal
lack of initiative, which was the curse of the French army throughout the
taimpaign, the opportunity was let slip. The gallant Prussian brigade, storming
forwards in spite of the loss of their general, carried and held
the
Rotherberg, a bluff which marked the centre of the French position. But they
were beaten off on both flanks, and were only able to maintain themselves by
the successive arrival of the remaining brigade of the 14th division, and of
the leading troops of the 16th and 5th divisions which were thrust into the
fight wherever they were most needed. On his arrival, Frossard, impressed by
the boldness of the first attacks, had ordered forward a division from his
reserve; and at no time were the Germans in superior numbers. Indeed, a
counter-attack, delivered by a brigade of this division of Frossard’s reserve,
was press, lg them steadily back, when it died away, and the French began
everywhere to retreat sullenly and in good order. The appearance of the 13th
division of the eighth corps upon his left flank, as darkness was coming on,
caused Frossard, fearing that his line of retreat might be cut, to withdraw
from the battlefield* and decided the fortunes of the day.
Again the
victors had to pay in killed and wounded more heavily than the vanquished, the
Germans losing 4871, the Frei.ch 4078 inclusive of about 1000 prisoners, taken
mostly on the left flank late in the day. The French had in action 23,700
infantry, 72 field-guns, and 18 mitrailleuses; the Germans 26,500 infantry and
66 guns; but this superiority was not attained until the arrival of the 13th
division upon the field. On the one side every available rifle and gun had been
employed, and as successive reinforcements arrived the command changed hands,
first from Kameke to Goeben, then to Zastrow, the commander of the seventh corps,
and finally at nightfall to Steinmetz. On the other side 60,000 French infantry
had remained passive throughout the day, withiu reach of the battlefield.
Frossard, anxious to keep in touch with Baaaine, did not join his men till late
in the day; Bazaine, equally anxious to keep in touch with the Emperor, did not
appear at all. Had a like spirit animated the two armies, the Germans must have
suffered a great disaster. The same causes as at Worth prevented an effective
pursuit; indeed, Moltke was so impressed by the seriousness of the danger which
he had escaped that the next days were ipent rather in consolidating the
armies, the advanced troops of which had pressed far beyond the line intended,
than in following up the advantage gained.
The victories
of Worth and Spicheren were not won by superior generalship or greater valour;
they were the outcome of years of thoughtful study in the military cabinet and
on the training ground. The bubble of French prestige was pricked; Alsace and
Lorraine, with the exception of their fortresses, lay at the mercy of the
invader ; Italy, Austria, and Denmark had abandoned all thoughts of
intervention; the expedition from Cherbourg to the North Sea was given up, and
the marines were hastily called to the capital; though less than a third of
their armies on the frontier had been engaged, a profound depression, from
which they never recovered, affected the French troops. Vacillation and lack of
forethought had exposed them piecemeal and ill-equipped to
an enemy,
fired with unity of purpose, equipped and ready, though he did not boast of the
fact, to the last button. ;
The French
army, reeling from these staggering blows, everywhere fell back. On August 7
order; were issued for a general retirement behind the Moselle—undoubtedly the
wisest course in the circumstances. But the stability of the Empire was too
uncertain to admit of the military situation alone being considered. Paris,
injured in its pride, demanded at the least a general engagement east of Metz.
This fortress, far from being a support to the harassed Emperor* proved, like
the field army, to be unprepared. The forts were not provisioned; many were not
even completed. The Imperialist party succeeded in ousting the Ollivier
Ministry on August 9, and replaced it by one of its own creatures, with
Montauban, Count of Palikao, at its head. The new Ministers could not face the
prospect of Metz falling into German hands; and it was decided to make a stand
on the French Nied. This position, which had been laboriously entrenched, was
found to be untenable. Fresh orders were issued to retire on Metz, where the
greater part of the army was collected under the eastern forts on August 18. .
The marching and counter-marching consequent on these changes exhausted and
demoralised the troops; and the army heard, with a feeling of relief and of
hope, that Napoleon had at last recognised his own incompetence and had
definitely handed over the command to Marshal Bazaine.
' Meanwhile
the cautious Moltke was bringing his armies together. With this end in view,
the first army on the right was kept back, while the third army on the left
threaded the difficult passes of the Vosges. The advance was slow, for the many
forts d1 arret in the frontier provinces had to be masked; the
direction of Macmahon’s retreat was doubtful; and Moltke, aware that he had as
yet met in the field a bare third of the French army, was inclined to treat his
adversary with respect. A force sent to surprise Strassburg failed in its
object; the Baden division was therefore detached from the third army to invest
the fortress; the Guard and first Landwehr divisions with a siege train were
brought from Germany, and the investing forces (40,000 strong) were placed
under the orders of General von Werder. Strassburg was no better prepared than
Metz; a single line regiment was the only formed body in the garrison; but, by
dint of strenuous effort, the French commander, General Uhrich, succeeded in
forming a defending force of 23,000 men, composed of depot battalions, Gardes
Mobiles, and Gardes Nationales, and of a number of refugees from Macmahon’s
army. This motley force was handled with such energy that Werder, after a
futile attempt to frighten the town into surrender, was compelled to begin
regular siege operations. „
On August 13
the first German army, on the right, had reached the French Nied; the advanced
guard of the second army had secured the important bridge over the Moselle at
Pont-a-Mousson; while the leading
columns of
the third army were approaching Nancy and Luneville. Bazaine, on taking over
the command, gave up the idea of defending the line of the Moselle, and ordered
a retreat on Verdun. Additional bridges were thrown over the Moselle in Metz;
but the river, coming down in flood, swept them away; the retreat could not be
begun until August 14, and even then was greatly delayed by the fcongestion in
the town. Thus, on the morning of August 14, a great part of the French army
was still in position east of Metz, covering the retirement. As the day wore on
and the lumbering baggage trains cleared the town, division after division
quietly fell back on the bridges. This movement was observed by the advanced
guard of the seventh corps of the first army, under Baron von der Goltz, who,
like Kameke at Spicheren,' dashed forward to hold the retiring enemy to his
ground. He was met near Colombey by Bazaine’s old corps, the third, now under
Decaen, and eventually also by the fourth, under Ladmirault; The battle was not
begun until 4 p.m.; and the lateness of the hour prevented a German
concentration before dark. The French, everywhere in superior numbers, held
their own, withdrawing under cover of night in accordance with their original
orders. The encounter did not appreciably delay the French retreat, which was
hindered by the encumbered roads in their rear rather than by: any action of
the enemy. The Germans lost close on 5000 killed and wounded, the French about
4000, Bazaine being slightly and Decaen mortally wounded.
While this
combat was raging to the east of Metz, more decisive events were taking place
to the south and west. The 5th cavalry division of the second army, crossing
the Moselle at Pont-a-Mousson, pressed forward in a north-westerly direction on
to the Verdun road. On August 15 the division came into contact with three
French cavalry divisions near Vionville and Rezonville; but the French
horsemen, waiting for their infantry to close up, made no serious attempt to
drive back their weaker opponents, who established themselves south of Mars-la-
Tour, nearer to Verdun than the French, and within striking distance of the
main road. By that evening the tenth German corps was across the Moselle at
Pont-a-Mousson and the third at Noveant; thus the French retreat was already
seriously compromised, though Prince Frederick Charles wrongly believed the
enemy to be well on his way to the shelter of the Meuse. A general advance of
the second army was ordered for August 10, in the hopes of catching the French
before they reached that river, two corps only, the tenth and third, being
directed on to the Verdun road. In point of fact, none of Bazaine’s troops lay
west of the French cavalry, which had been met by the 5th cavalry division. The
conduct of the retreat of an army, in touch with an active and enterprising
enemy, through the congested streets of a town, is perhaps the most difficult
problem of war which a staff can be called pen to solve. Bazaine, suddenly
placed in charge of a tottering
organisation,
unaware even of the exact positions of his troops, could not issue the detailed
instructions which a vicious training had taught the army to expect. Only two
main roads, those from Metz to Dancourt and to Mars-la-Tour, were available for
the retreat; and not till the night of August 15 did the leading infantry gain
touch with the cavalry, which had passed the day about Vionville, while the
tail of the army was still toiling wearily through Metz.
At
daybreak on August 16 the Emperor decided to quit the army, and drove off to
Verdun by the northern road, shortly before the guns of the German cavalry
opened one of the most remarkable battles of the war. Bazaine, ignorant of his
peril, had decided not to move till the afternoon, so as to allow his rear
divisions to close up; his patrols from Vionville, trotting out for a mile or
two after daylight, had come in reporting that no enemy was near; when
suddenly, about 9 a.m., shells burst in the camp from German batteries, which
appeared to have sprung from the ground. The cavalry retired pell-mell behind
the shelter of Frossard’s corps (the second), encamped in front of Rezonville,
and the daring gunners, following them up, dropped their shell among the
infantry tents. These were the artillery of the 5th cavaliy division, which had
been directed by Voigts-Rhetz, the commander of the tenth corps, to reconnoitre
towards Rezonville, while he moved, in accordance with Prince Frederick
Charles’ orders, westwards in search of the enemy, believed to be retiring on
the Meuse. The 5th cavalry division was almost immediately supported by the 6th
and by the leading infantry of the third corps marching on Vionville. General
von Alvensleben, the commander of this corps, on arriving on the scene,
decided at once to attack. He had barely 30,000 men under his orders, while in
front of him, though he did not know it, lay nearly the whole army of the
Rhine. A cavalry brigade and Frossard’s second corps had already been met;
behind them at Rezonville lay the greater part of Canrobert’s sixth corps,
which had joined the army at Metz on the 13th from Chalons. A little further
back at Gravelotte were the Guard and the reserve cavalry, in all some
70,000 men. To the north on the Doncourt road was
Lebceuf who had succeeded Decaen in the command of the third corps, while
Ladmirault with the fourth corps was coming up from Metz. Thus some 60,000 more
Frenchmen were within reach. ■
Then followed
a soldiers’ battle, in which the decisive factor was the moral condition of the
two armies. Confident in themselves and in their leaders, the German troops
pressed forward without thought of the odds; doubt and hesitation prevailed in
the French ranks. '. The French advanced troops were hustled out of Vionville
and Flavigny; Frossard’s corps fighting stubbornly was pushed back on
Rezonville. Here Canrobert’s sixth corps checked the triumphant enemy, who,
obliged continually to extend his front to meet French reinforcements coming
up, now from Doncourt, now from Gravelotte, had to throw his last infantry
i87o] The battles at Vionville and Mars-la-Tour.
591
reserves into
the fight. It was now about 2 p.m.; the tenth German corps was still some
distance from the field; and Alvensleben was grimly struggling to hold what he
had won. A resolute advance must have reopened the French line of retreat. But
Baraine, who had just arrived upon the field, having narrowly escaped capture
in a cavalry skirmish, was not the man to be resolute in adversity. He was in
two minds; without definitely giving up the retreat on Verdun, he became
suddenly anxious about his communications with Metz, and moved a great part of
his precious reserve, which should have been supporting Canrobert, to the left
where it remained comparatively inactive. Canrobert, with greater firmness,
finding Lebceuf’s corps coming up on his right and the enemy’s fire slackening,
ordered an advance to retake Vionville. The French divisions were seen by
Alvensleben deploying in front of Rezonville. To meet the attack he had only
eight squadrons of cavalry under General von Bredow. It was vital to gain time
for the tenth corps to come up ; and the cavalry were sent on a mission no less
desperate but more useful than that of the Light Brigade at Balaklava, Straight
at and through Canrobert’s division rode these splendid troopers, bringing the
French movement to a standstill before it had well begun, but at a cost of more
than half the number of those who started on this famous death-ride. The charge
was the turning-point of the battle. Detachments from the seventh, eighth, and
ninth corps, crossing the Moselle, enabled Alvensleben to hold his own on his
right. His left was indeed pressed back for a time by the arrival of parts of
the third and fourth French corps; but these were in turn checked on the
long-expected appearance of the tenth German corps. Prince Frederick Charles,
arriving about 4 p.m., took over the command, and by hard fighting was enabled
to hold his ground, till darkness gave relief to his exhausted men.
Neither
side could claim any marked tactical success; the losses, about 16,000 on
either side, were equal; but the moral and strategical advantages won by the
Germans at Vionville and Mars-la-Tour were decisive. A French army of 130,000
men, glad to have held their own against an enemy barely half as numerous,
abandoned the idea of the retreat to the Meuse. On August 17 this retreat was
still possible by the northern roads; but the attraction of Metz was
irresistible, and Ttg/ainp ordered the army to fall back on a strong position,
west and north-west of the fortress. He alleged, that the number of wounded,
the state of the troops, and the want of ammunition and supplies left him no
choice. That the army should have fallen into this .condition, almost within
sight of a great depot, shows how deeply the canker of disorgam'sr*ion had
eaten into the French military system. ,
, The French
movement was carried out without interference;; and by nightfall on the 17th
the army of the Rhine was in position. On the left, under the shadow of the
great fort of Plappeville, lay Frossard with the second corps; Lebeeuf with the
third corps extended the line northwards;
592
[l870
next came
Ladmirault with the fourth corps about Amanvillers, Can* robert with the sixth
corps held the right at St Privat, with his flank extended and thrown slightly
back to Roncourt; behind Frossard, on the glacis of Plappe\ ille, Bazaine
himself took position with the Guard corps as his general reserve—dear proof
that .his thoughts were still centred on maintaining touch with Metz.
Moltke had
meantime been planning to reap the fruits of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour. The
whole of the first army, and the second were within, reach except the fourth
corps, which was making a dash at Toul; and the reinforcing second corps,1
which was advancing by forced marches from Germany to the Moselle at Pont-k-Mousson.
The events of the 16th had shown that the army of the Rhine was west of the
Moselle; therefore only the first corps and some cavalry were left to watch
Metz from the east; the seventh, eighth and ninth corps were brought up on the
right of the tenth and third corps, which remained in their positions at
Vionville and Mars-la-Tour, while the Guard and twelfth corps extended the left
of the third corps west of Mars-la-Tour. At nightfall on the 17th about 140,000
men were in line parallel to the Metz-Mars-la-Tour road. The second corps which
had reached Pont-a-Mousson, and the fourth approaching Toul, formed a
connecting link with the third army, which was at and beyond Nancy. The seventh
and eighth corps had, in order to reach their positions on the German right, to
make a flank march within striking distance of the Metz forts. It was essential
to the safety of the movement that no dashing Subordinate should bring on a
premature engagement, such as had hitherto heralded every battle of the war.
Stringent orders were issued from headquarters and were only too literally
obeyed. The cavalry of the tenth and third corps were exhausted by their
glorious efforts of the day before; but the fresh squadrons within call were
not energetically handled, and the French were allowed to slip away not only
unmolested but unobserved. At daybreak on the 18th, Moltke was still uncertain
whether Bazaine had resumed his retreat to the Meuse by the northern roads, or
had fallen back on Metz. But he was ready for either contingency*- and his
orders for August 18 directed the second army to move northwards to Doncourt,
while the seventh and eighth corps of the first army covered the movement from
any interference from Metz. If the enemy were in retreat, the second army could
fasten on their rear till the first army came up in support; if he had elected
to stand north of Metz, the second army pivoting on the first would wheel round
to the right and envelop his right flank.
Soon after
daybreak on the 18th the German corps were in motion; but still there was no
certain information of the enemy, and it was not until 10.30 a.m. that Moltke
knew that the French were in position and meant to fight. Even then he believed
the enemy’s right flank to be at Montigny, south of Amanvillers, a point
actually at about the centre of
the line. In
accordance with his plan the great wheel to the right oegan ; pivoting on the
seventh corps, the eighth, ninth, Guard and twelfth corps successively moved
round, the tenth and third corps following in support. Thus the two armies were
about to meet, each facing towards its own capital—a situation which meant
disaster to the vanquished.
The battle of
Gravelotte was opened prematurely about noon by the artillery of the ninth
corps, which was unable to resist the temptation to shell Ladmirault’s camp,
where on the high ground south of Amanvillers the French could be seen quietly
preparing their dinners. The position of the guns being too exposed, the
infantry of the ninth corps had to be brought into the fight, and the battle
began in earnest. Moltke had issued orders to hold the fiery Steinmetz in check
until the second army had had time to envelop the enemy’s right; but, believing
this flank to be some miles south of its actual position, he now allowed the artillery
of the seventh and eighth corps to become engaged. Steinmetz, anxious that the
ninth corps should not be left without support, exceeded his instructions, and
sent forward his infantry against the French left under Frossard, who held what
was naturally the strongest part of a position, which he had skilfully
strengthened by defensive works. After some two hours of hard fighting, the
attack appeared to be making good progress; and Steinmetz, under the impression
that the enemy was yielding, Ordered a column of cavalry and guns to advance
and confirm the success he imagined he had won. But Frossard’s main position
was unshaken; his men turned a deadly fire upon the helpless horsemen, crowded
in a ravine, which ran in front of the French lines, and thus caused, about
4.30 p.m., something like a panic among the Germans in that part of the field.
Meanwhile
Prince Frederick Charles, moving with the Guard and twelfth corps behind the
ninth corps,'which was struggling desperately to make some impression upon Ladmirault,
reached the village of Ste Marie aux Chenes, opposite St Privat, about 3.30
p.m., only to find that the flank, for which the Germans had been groping all
day, stretched some two miles further north. The twelfth corps was accordingly
sent to make a yet wider detour, while, partly to cover this movement, partly
to assist the hard-pressed ninth corps, the Guards were moved to the attack
;■ but, finding no cover in the open ground in front of St Privat, and
advancing in too dense a formation, they suffered terrible loss, 7951 men
falling killed or wounded, the greater part in one short half-hour. The'remnant
of the devoted corps disdaining to give ground, dung to what they had won,
until the twelfth Saxon corps at last appeared, driving before it Canrobert’s
extreme right. By a combined attack of Saxons and Guards, St Privat, already in
flames, was carried at the bayonet’s point, and the French right was crumpled
up. Ladmirault’s corps, involved in the ruin of Canrobert’s, gave way,
darkness and
the tardy arrival of part of the French Guard alone stopping the weary
pursuers. Though their right had suffered a disastrous defeat, the French
centre and left had repulsed all attacks. A division of the second German corps
had been hurried forward to support Steinmetz; and, on its arrival, a renewed
attempt was made to carry Frossard’s lines, with the object of preventing
reinforcements being sent to Canrobert. This attack met with no better success
than the former; and at nightfall the French in this part of the field had more
than held their own. The battle of Gravelotte had, however, been won and lost,
as Moltke had foreseen, on the other flank. There were many anxious hearts at
the royal headquarters during the afternoon, but through it all Moltke had awaited
the result with quiet confidence. Bazaine had altogether underestimated the
strength of Frossard’s position. Deceived by mere demonstrations against the
town and by Steinmetz’ fierce attacks, he was deaf to appeals from Ladmirault
and Canrobert, and kept his reserves behind his left six miles from the point
where the issue of the day was decided. Absorbed in the events on his left, he
considered that he had at last succeeded in baffling the enemy, until late in
the evening, when he received the news of the disaster to his right. Thereupon
he issued orders to the army of the Rhine to retire under the guns of Metz,
whose shelter they were never to leave again except as prisoners of war. On the
German side about 200,000 men were engaged; on the French about 140,000. The
German losses in killed and wounded amounted to 20,584 men, those of the French
to about 13,000, besides 5000 prisoners.
On August 19,
the fact that the army of the Rhine had fallen back on the forts surrounding
Metz, and was holding positions which could not be carried by assault, was
known to Moltke. The original plan of campaign had contemplated that, while the
armies advanced to Paris, Metz should be masked by a Landwehr division, which
was already approaching. The new situation demanded a reorganisation of the
armies, which was at once undertaken. The whole of the first army, and the
second, third, ninth and tenth corps of the second army, with the Landwehr
division, were formed into an army of investment, 175,000 strong, under Prince
Frederick Charles. From the remainder of the second army (the Guard, the fourth
and twelfth corps), the army of the Meuse was created, and placed under the
Crown Prince of Saxony. Thus, with the third army, 240,000 men were available
for the advance on the French capital. The third army and fourth corps had
reached the Meuse on August 19, and were there halted to enable the new army to
come up. On August 22 a general advance was begun on Chalons, where troops were
believed to he collecting.
When the
Emperor drove into Chalons from the battlefield of Mars-la-Tour on August 16,
he found there the twelfth corps, which had been formed of troops from the
Spanish frontier, a division of
marines from
the expeditionary force, and some newly formed regiments ; also one infantry
division, the cavalry and half the artillery of Canrobert’s corps which had
been unable to get through to Metz, and some Gardes Mobiles from Paris. During
the next few days the refugees from Worth and the fifth corps arrived, while
the seventh corps was on its way from Belfort. Macmahon was directed to form an
army, to be called the army of Chalons, out of this collection of units. The
material was not promising; many of the regular units were in a state of
demoralisation, while the Parisian Gardes Mobiles were openly insubordinate,
and had to be sent back to the capital. Of the machinery that makes an army an
effective weapon of war part was totally lacking, the rest wofully deficient.
Yet something had to be done, for the third German army was already across the
Meuse, and there was no time for hesitation.
Macmahon was
for leading the army back to Paris, where a thirteenth corps was being formed,
and where, with the immense resources of all France upon which to draw, he
would have more time for organisation. The Emperor agreed; but the Empress and
Palikao had still to be reckoned with. A despatch from Bazaine after
Mars-la-Tour had reached Paris, in which he announced that, after replenishing
his supply columns, he intended to march west. If Macmahon were to fall back,
the Paris mob might construe the movement to be an abandonment of the army of
the Rhine; and in that event the Empress did not care to face the consequences.
Macmahon, in perplexity, proposed a compromise. It was clearly impossible to remain
at Chalons with the army incomplete in every detail, while the enemy were fast
approaching. So, on the 21st the camp was abandoned in haste; immense accumulations
of stores were burnt; and a move was made to Reims. Here the seventh corps
joined the army by rail, bringing its strength up to
150,000 men organised in four corps. At Reims
Macmahon was in a position to act against the flank of a direct advance on
Paris, and could still stretch out a hand to Bazaine, if opportunity offered.
The state of the troops which had last arrived confirmed Macmahon in his
intention to move on Paris. Orders to this effect were issued, but, on the
22nd, another dubiously worded despatch arrived from Bazaine, giving details of
Gravelotte, and announcing his intention to break out towards Chalons, by
Montmedy, or if that were not possible, by Sedan. Macmahon inferred that
Bazaine was about to start, and reluctantly and with full knowledge of the
danger, ordered the fatal march to the Meuse, which was to lead to the downfall
of the Empire. If the army moved swiftly and secretly, it might be possible to
get round the right of the army of the Meuse before the third army could come
up; but the condition of the troops, and of the supply and transport services,
upon which the mobility of armies depends even more than upon the marching
powers of the men, gave little promise of swiftness, while the want of a
numerous cavalry
trained to
keep prying eyes at a distance warranted small hope of secrecy. In brief, a
hastily organised, ill-equipped* and half-demoralised force was attempting the
desperate venture of a flank march between the enemy and the Belgian frontier,
on the ground that Bazaine might be doing something, and could not, if he were,
be left without support.
Fortune at first
favoured Macmahon; the German headquarters, well aware of the condition of the
army of the Rhine, could not believe that the French would uncover the capital
and risk their last field army in a forlorn hope. The lines of march of great
armies are not to be lightly altered. Ill-considered changes throw into
confusion the immense trains toiling painfully in the rear, and, as many a
luckless Frenchman had found, entail hardships no less severe than the loss of
a battle. So, not until the evening of August 28, when news from London had
confirmed the reports of the cavalry, did Moltke direct a movement northwards
to intercept the rash enemy. The army of Chalons had thus gained three days;
but already the intendance was breaking down, and in three days the army had
only reached the Aisne, barely 25 miles on its way. Still the position was not
hopeless. Macmahon expected Bazaine to break out to the north-west, and hoped
to join him near Montmedy. To do this he had to cross the Meuse near Stenay or
Mouzon; for the Belgian frontier bends to the south near Montmedy, and he would
have been cramped for room, had he crossed lower down.
On the
evening of August 25, the right of the army of CMlons was some twelve miles
nearer Ster ay than was the right of the army of the Meuse. The Germans were
still uncertain of the enemy’s movements, and had to execute a difficult change
of direction. The next few days altered the situation decisively. On the 26th
an encounter with a strong body of German cavalry on the right flank caused
unwarranted alarm; and the 27th, on which day the first German troops occupied
Stenay, was spent in moving, the rest of the army to the assistance of the
seventh corps which was on the right. The events of this day once rmore
convinced Macmahon of the hopelessness of his task, and orders were issued for
a retreat. But during the night' vigorous protests arrived from Paris, whence
Palikao telegraphed, “If you,desert Bazaine, there' will be a revolution in
Paris.” Macmahon preferred the probability of defeat and capture, if he
advanced, to the certainty of slander and disgrace if he retired. The
counter-orders produced more than ordinary confusion, and the army gained
little more than ten miles on the 28th, on which day the twelfth Saxon corps
held the Meuse at and south of Stenay, while the remaining German corps were
fast approaching from the south. Macmahon moved northwards to seek a crossing
lower down the river, leaving the fifth corps under de Failly to cover the
movement. This corps had a skirmish with the advanced guard of the Saxons on
the 29th, yet allowed itself to be surprised next day a few miles further
north, near Beaumont.
On the
morning of the 30th the head of the third German army had, by splendid
marching, come up with the army of the Meuse. The German line stretched from
Stenay on the Meuse to Vougiers on the Aisne, down which river the eleventh
corps and three cavalry divisions were marching to cut off Macmahon, should he
try to fall back westwards. Six corps could be concentrated for a battle, a
seventh corps, the sixth, was following half a march in rear. Thus the net was
already spread, and, as it was drawn together, the French were pressed back on
the Meuse. August 31 found their army hemmed into a triangle with sides about
four miles ir length. The base, with the town of Sedan in its centre, was
formed by the Meuse, which was swollen by rains. Lines of hills skirted by
streams formed the sides, and furnished natural ramparts strengthened by
well-built villages, positions capable of a stubborn defence, but with the
cardinal defect that they were everywhere encircled by heights, which afforded
unlimited opportunity for the employment of em overwhelming artillery.
Within this
triangle many anxious conferences were held. Macmahon was above all desirous
of getting the Emperor away to safety; but Napoleon III, sick in body and
broken in spirit, a passive spectator of the miseries of his troops, not
permitted to return to his capital, whence orders were issued of which he
disapproved, and left with nothing but the honour of a great name, preferred to
remain and suffer with his men. As to the future, the French Marshal had no
very definite idea. The most pressing need was a day’s rest for the troops,
which were arranged rather with a view to holding off the enemy than to
accepting a decisive battle. Macmahon did not grasp the extent of his danger,
for he had not learned that lesson in tactics which September 1 was to make
clear to the military world. Till then it had always been, believed that it was
only necessary to mass sufficient force, and to drive it home with
determination, to be certain of breaking through any hostile position. In this
war breech-loader was meeting breech-loader for the first time, and long-range
field artillery was first employed. Few, if any, had perceived the power of
resistance which the increase of range, accuracy, and rate of fire had
conferred on an attenuated line, or the deadly effect of converging fire
whether in attack or defence. Macmahon did not conceive it possible that
Bazaine could be held in by a less numerous foe; and, believing the strength of
the enemy in front of him to be exaggerated, he considered that he could break
through at will, if his adversary were rash enough to attempt to surround him.
During the
31st General de Wimpffen, a protege of Palikao, joined the arm to replace de
Failly in command of the fifth corps, with a brevet from the Minister
appointing him Macmahon s successor in the event of any accident to the
Marshal. On the same day a thirteenth French corps, which had been organised at
Paris under General Vinoy, and moved by rail to the front, was directed by
Macmahon to halt at
Mezieres, a
clear indication of his intention to retreat on that place. The German plans
were simple and consisted in an enveloping movement by two corps against each
of the sides of the French triangle, covered from any movement from Mezieres by
two cavalry divisions, and the Wurtemberg division. The first Bavarian corps
was to attack the village of Bazeilles at the foot of the eastern face, while
two corps remained on the left bank opposite Sedan in second line. The
Bavarians opened the battle during the afternoon of the 31st, and, resuming it
at daylight the next morning, carried the village after a fierce fight by 10
a.m., by which hour the two corps operating against the eastern face had
developed their attack, and established a long line of guns on the heights
behind them. During the fight at Bazeilles Macmahon was severely wounded, and
handed over the command to Ducrot. The latter, impressed with the danger of the
situation, ordered a retreat on Mezieres; but the movement had scarce begun
when de Wimpffen, producing his nomination from his pocket, countermanded it,
after a fierce wrangle with Ducrot, and directed the army to break out eastwards
towards Montmedy.
While the
French generals were quarrelling, the Germans, methodically deploying battery
after battery, crowned the heights west, south, and east with a circle of iron,
which poured a ceaseless rain of shell into the ever narrowing space in front
of the advancing infantry. Overwhelmed by artillery fire, de Wimpffen’s efforts
on the east were meeting with scant success, when his attention was called to a
more pressing danger on the west. Here Douay’s corps, attacked by two German
corps, was in great peril; and it became necessary to countermarch troops to
his assistance across ground swept by the German guns. Still the pressure on
the western face was not relieved; and, as a last desperate throw, the cavalry
were called up to retrieve the fortunes of the day. Five regiments of cavalry
under General Marguerite charged home again and again, riding through the
enemy’s skirmishers,, only to be swept back by the unshaken fire of the
supports. Three generals and nearly half of those brave horsemen fell killed or
wounded on the field. The splendid and hopeless gallantry of the attempt made
it a fitting climax for the death-throes of an empire. Soon afterwards, the
eastern and western attacks, uniting near the apex of the triangle, completed
the'pitiless circle which fenced in the unlucky army of Chalons; and by the
Emperor’s order the white flag was hoisted over Sedan. Macmahon’s force had
ceased to exist. No less than 81,000 officers and men, including the Emperor and
a Marshal of France, surrendered as prisoners of war; while during the battle
21,000 had been captured, 3000 killed, and 14,000 wounded. The German losses
amounted to 8960 men.
While the
army of' CMlons was struggling into the trap which Moltke had set, Bazaine,
lost in the fog of war, uncertain whither Macmahon was moving, or whether he
was moving at all, but possessed
1870]
Bazaine driven back at Noisseville.
599
with a vague
desire to do something, was tapping in half-hearted fashion at the lines which
Prince Frederick Charles was daily drawing closer round Metz. After an
ineffective demonstration on August 26, it was decided, on August 30, when
definite news of Macmahon’s march had come through the German lines, to make a
serious attempt to break out on the right bank of the Moselle and to move
northwards on Thionville. But Bazaine’s staff was not equal to the task;
columns crossed each other; delays, orders, and counter-orders produced
vacillation when decision was imperative; the attack could not be developed
till late in the afternoon of August 81. Superior numbers enabled the French to
gain some minor successes in the direction of Noisseville during the evening
and night; but the dawn of September 1 showed German columns hurrying forward
from all points to strengthen the threatened portion of the line of investment;
and by midday Bazaine had abandoned the attempt, and retired under cover of the
forts.
Down
to this time, Bazaine does not appear to have grasped the fact that he was
besieged. He still looked upon his troops as a field army, which, kept intact,
might, by threatening the German communications, have a decisive influence on
the course of the campaign. He had not doubted his power to break through the
German lines; he was rather obsessed by the difficulty of maintaining his army
without a base when he did break through. He was even more in the dark than
Macmahon as to the effect of modem inventions upon tactics. It was a revelation
to him that the breech-loader would enable a small body to hold out against
greatly superior numbers, while the telegraph, spreading instantly the news of
attack, brought at speed to the threatened point reinforcements which, thanks
again to the busy brain of the inventor, could carry sufficient sustenance to
make them for a time at least independent of the heavy trains which more than
all else fetter the movements of armies. Nor were the French Marshals alone in
this condition of ignorance; the people of Paris, soon in their turn to be shut
in by a thin circle of iron, spoke loudly of treason as the sole explanation of
the astounding failure of their leaders, spreading distrust throughout the
country, accustomed to draw inspiration from the capital. Indeed, the events of
the month of August, 1870, culminating in the stupendous catastrophe of Sedan,
had set all Europe agape with wonder. Within one short month the whole of the
regular army which a great military empire had sent forth to meet the foe had
been dispersed, put hors de combat, taken prisoners, or closely invested. Few
even among the most thoughtful remembered that the grandsons of the men of Jena
were much as their grandfathers had been, that the German was not irresistible,
that the Frenchman was still brave, that a Colossus had not sprung fully armed
from Moltke’s brain—but that the weapon of war, which they saw used to such
effect, had been slowly and painfully forged by men of like passions with
themselves. .
The immediate
result of the capture of the Emperor and the destruction of the Imperial Army
at, Sedan was a bloodless revolution in Paris, on September 4. The Empress and
Palikao fled to England; and a Provisional Government of National Defence was
formed in Paris under the Presidency of General Trochu, with Jules Favre,
Gambetta, Arago, Grevy, and Rochefort as members. Such a Government could not
be other than Republican ; but an appeal was made to all parties to unite in
the defence of the country, while a pledge was given that the nation should
have an opportunity of deciding between the claimants to power when the foe:was
driven from , the land. Paris became the natural centre of further resistance;
surrounded on two sides by deep rivers, encircled by an inner line of ramparts
and an outer one of detached forts, the great city was capable of a stout
defence. After Gravelotte, armies of workmen had been employed in strengthening
the defences, and stores had been hurried in, to supplement the already large
accumulation of supplies; for Paris had been designated as the main base of the
armies operating on the eastern frontier. Of regular troops there were the
thirteenth corps, which Vinoy had cleverly withdrawn from Mezieres, the
fourteenth corps, which had just been formed in the capital, and a number of
marines, sailors, gendarmes and police—in all about 80,000 men, and in addition
115,000 Gardes Mobiles and 100,000 Gardes Nationales. Heavy guns and ammunition
had been brought from the fleet and coast fortresses; and the forts were on the
whole well armed. •
At the German
headquarters there had been no hesitation as to the next step. In France, more
than in any country in Europe, the capital represented the country. The capture
of Paris would be the best guarantee of a satisfactory treaty of peace. As soon
then as arrangements had been made for the disposal of the prisoners of Sedan,
and the supply system of the armies, somewhat disorganised by the sudden wheel
to the north to intercept Macmahon, had been disentangled, the advance on the
capital began. By September 19 the line of investment had been completed with
trifling opposition. On this day and the next Jules Favre was engaged in
negotiations with Bismarck, to discover what terms the Germans would concede;
but, the Provisional Government having decided not to yield a stone of the
fortresses or an inch of territory, these ended abruptly, and both sides
prepared to continue the war.
In spite of
the overwhelming successes already won, the task before the German leaders was
full of difficulties. The detachments required for the various sieges, to
protect the lines df communication, and to conduct the numerous prisoners back
to Germany, the losses in battle, the ravages of sickness, had all greatly
reduced the strength of the army. Not more than 147,000 men were at first
available to hold an enceinte of over fifty miles, and to cover the investment
from possible interruption. The Capture of Toul and Strassburg at the end of
September relieved the strain by setting free the besiegers, and by
opening
direct railway communication with Germany; but by the beginning of October it
had become evident that the war was entering on a new and, to the Germans, a
most unpleasant phase.
Hitherto, the
people of the invaded provinces, being for the most part out of touch with the
Imperial army, had treated the war as the affair of the soldiers, and, with the
object of easing their burdens, met the enemy’s demands more than half-way. In
the first weeks of the war, the German cavalry patrols found little difficulty
in obtaining information; small foraging parties, entering towns and villages,
often found that obsequious mayors had anticipated their requisitions. But the
defeats of Gravelotte and Sedan and the investment of Paris had stirred France
from coast to coast. An appeal issued by the Provisional Government, calling on
the whole able-bodied population to cooperate in the defence of their native
land, met with a ready response. The cavalry of the armies besieging Metz and
Paris found it increasingly difficult to obtain supplies; patrols were attacked
by assailants who disappeared as rapidly as they had appeared; the escorting of
convoys, which had at first been an almost unnecessary precaution, became a
dangerous and arduous duty. The German cavalry, shy of venturing far from
support, failed to obtain information, and rumours took its place—rumours of
levies in the north about Amiens, in the south about Besan9on and Lyons, above
all, rumours of preparations on a large scale in the valley of the Loire. Till
now the checking of information and the classification of reports had been
carried by the German staff almost to the stage of an exact science, for the
organisation of the French army was known to the smallest detail. From the
capture of a few prisoners wearing a particular button, the whereabouts of the
regiment, brigade, and corps to which they belonged could be accurately deduced
with the aid of a little corroborative evidence. The strength of the corps in
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, even the names of the commanders and staffs,
and their idiosyncrasies, were known. But nothing was known about the
organisation of' the new formations springing up round the beleaguered capital:
there were no data to which reports could be referred. The machine-like regularity
with which the advance to Paris had been conducted became impossible; blows
were struck in the air; the German commanders, still inspired with the desire
to meet and defeat the enemy’s forces in the field, now discovered that the
finding of an army to defeat was their chief difficulty.
Fortunately
for them, the immense resources of France had not been organised for war;
though the Provisional Government had done much in the short time at its
disposal. After the investment of Paris there remained of regular units,
outside the besieged fortresses, but twelve battalions of infantry, nine
regiments of cavalry, and a single complete battery of artillery. There were,
in addition, a large number of depot companies, which had been collected after
Gravelotte into regiments
de
marche, of men who had not joined at the outbreak of the war, of untrained or
partially trained men, and of men who had escaped from the early battles.
Behind these there were the Garde Mobile, scattered throughout France, more
than 600,000 strong; some 40,000 Francs tireurs or irregulars formed in small
bodies under local leaders; and the Garde Nationale, strengthened and vivified
by the accession of all able-bodied males not otherwise employed who were
willing to strike a blow in defence of their country; of these last, there were
not less than 700,000, used chiefly in the defence of their own districts. Of
arms there was no lack, and deficiencies could be readily supplied, through the
Atlantic and western channel ports, by purchase from abroad. But of trained
leaders there were few, and of* those supply and transport services, which give
life to armies, none.
The
Provisional Government had despatched a delegation to Tours to organise
resistance in the provinces, and had selected the valley of the Loire as the
chief centre of activity; Lille in the north, Rouen in the north-west, Alen^on
in the west, and Besan^on in the south, being other centres of organisation. By
the end of September little had been done beyond the partial organisation of a
fifteenth corps at Tours, which had been placed under the command of the
veteran general, de La Motte Rouge, with vague instructions to do something,
and that quickly. He accordingly drew his forces towards Orleans and sent his
cavalry, supported by some infantry, northwards through the town towards
Paris. On October 5 this body met, and pushed back to ]£tampes, within thirty
miles of the capital, the 4th German cavalry division. The German headquarters
staff, already somewhat uneasy at the extent of their commitments, saw in the
movement the beginning of a general offensive on the part of the forces known
to be assembling in the Loire valley. General von der Tann, with the first
Bavarian corps, was accordingly directed to cover the besiegers from the threatened
advance; and later, as the French showed no sign of advancing, the 22nd
division was added to his force, and he was ordered to advance and occupy
Orleans. The fifteenth French corps was anything but ready for the offensive;
and, though the men fought bravely on the defensive, they were badly led, so
that von der Tann, after some stiff fighting, succeeded in occupying Orleans on
October 11.
Meantime, an
event destined to have a far-reaching effect on the course of the campaign had
taken place. On October 7 Leon Gambetta escaped in a balloon from Paris and
reached Tours on October 9. Alone of the members of the Provisional Government,
Gambetta saw clearly that Paris was but a small part of France ; he alone
appreciated the potentialities of the immense resources of the nation as a
whole. Aided by de Freycinet, a young civil engineer, he succeeded in inspiring
the provinces of France with his own fiery patriotism. Endowed with a genius
for organisation and an extraordinary capacity for work, he
created in
the short space of six weeks an army of 180,000 men, lacking only the
discipline and training which no human power could improvise. So early as
October 25, Gambetta, who had replaced de La Motte Rouge by General d’Aurelle
de Paladines, agreed with the latter that an advance should be made on Orleans,
with the object of capturing that town and forming there an entrenched camp
within which an army could be assembled to raise the siege of Paris. For this
operation, 120,000 men were already available, while von der Tann, still in
Orleans, had not more than 20,000. D’Aurelle de Paladines’ advance was delayed
by the ominous news that on October 27 Bazaine had capitulated, and that the
200,000 besiegers of Metz were hurrying forward to relieve the pressure on the
armies round Paris. Gambetta, however, insisted that the programme agreed upon
should be carried out. Accordingly, on November 9, von der Tann was attacked
near Coulmiers, a few miles south-west of Orleans, borne back by weight of
numbers after a fierce struggle, and compelled to evacuate the city. The
recently organised French troops were in no condition to undertake protracted
operations, and a proposal to follow up the success by an advance on Paris was
abandoned in favour of the original plan. The French troops, therefore,
prepared defensive positions north of Orleans. •
The activity
of General Fiereck, who had collected in the west a force of Gardes Nationales,
Gardes Mobiles and Francs tireurs, had already caused the German leaders
serious anxiety. Incapable of sustained operations in the field, but admirably
handled as guerillas, these troops continuously harassed their enemy, who was
never able to discover their strength or their intentions. It was therefore
decided, even before d’Aurelle de Paladines advanced, to reinforce von der Tann
by a division of cavalry and by one of infantry, and to place the whole under
the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. When the news of
Coulmiers and of the loss of Orleans arrived, there was serious talk of raising
the siege; and kits were actually packed in the headquarters staff. It had not
been supposed at first that Paris would stand a regular siege; but now, when
there were no signs of surrender after six weeks of investment, it became
necessary to form and bring up a siege-train from Germany, and to arrange for
reinforcements for the attenuated line of circumvallation, against which a
sortie in force was daily expected. Efforts were made to check the spread of
guerilla warfare, the chief bane of the German leaders, by an organised system
of reprisals. Villages and towns were fired without mercy, and even given over
to pillage for a stated period, while the leading inhabitants were taken as
hostages and shot, when attacks were made by guerillas in their vicinity. By
the end of October the strain on the German resources had become very severe,
but the capitulation of Metz (October 27) brought a welcome relief. Of the
troops thus set free—the first and second armies— the former were directed to
move on Rouen and Amiens, and to deal with
the French
troops gathering in Normandy and Picardy; the latter, to cover the siege of
Paris from the army of the Loire. Immediately after the fall of Strassburg,
Werder had pushed through the Vosges towards the Upper Seine, with a view to
covering the German communications from the troops which CreiUer was known to
be assembling about Besan^on, assisted by Garibaldi, who had come to the aid of
the Republic, and was raising a force of irregulars at Dole. By the end of October
Werder had occupied Dijon; and, during the first week of November, a detachment
of his force under Tresckow had invested Belfort. With the deployment of the
first army and of Werder’s corps, the German communications were to some extent
covered; and the second army was free to deal with the masses gathering in the
Loire valley.
Bazaine’s
surrender of Metz had come at a most inopportune moment for the organisers of
the national resistance to the invader. Its moral effect was second only to
that of Sedan, for not only did it neutralise the effect of the recapture of
Orleans, but by producing a sense of hopelessness in all but the most valiant,
it greatly influenced subsequent operations. Had Bazaine, looking beyond the
miseries of his own army, held out for another fortnight, as he might certainly
have done, the army besieging Paris would have been most seriously embarrassed.
The sur- •ender of Metz delayed d’Aurelle de Paladines, and settled any
question of an immediate movement on Paris. By November 14, the ninth corps of
Prince Frederick Charles’ army had reached Fontainebleau; and the Germans,
though there were still many weeks of hard work before them, had passed
successfully through the crisis. The solution was, however, by no means clear.
Fiereck’s operations had convinced the Germans that a French army was forming
in the direction of Le Mans, which would threaten the flank of any movement on
Orleans. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg’s detachment was accordingly sent
westward in search of this imaginary army; while Prince Frederick Charles,
awaiting the arrival of the remainder of his command from Metz and the return
of the Grand Duke,- adopted a defensive attitude north of the forest of
Orleans. By November 21, the third and tenth corps had come up; and the army
was disposed on an extended line from the Loing to the main Paris-Orleans road.
Preparations were now begun for an advance on Orleans; and, with this object,
Prince Frederick Charles drew in the left of his line from the Loing to Beaune
la Rolande; but, before he was ready, the enemy had anticipated him.
D’Aurelle de
Paladines, distressed by the lack of discipline and training in his newly
formed units, and busied in repairing these defects behind his fortified lines,
urged, in reply to Gambetta’s demands for an advance on Paris, that the second
German army might at any moment take the offensive, and that with half-trained
troops it would be better to await their onset behind earthworks. When the
Germans did not attack, Gambetta insisted that an effort must be made to push
Battle of Beaune la Rolande-Germans
recapture Orleans. 605
through to
the assistance of the capital. Accordingly, on November 28, d’Aurelle de
Paladines massed 50,000 men on his right with the object of overwhelming the
Germans left at Beaune la Rolande. The tenth German corps about this place did
not number more than 9000 and at first was in great danger of defeat. But the
training of the French troops did not admit of large concerted movements;
columns missed their way and were late, thus allowing time for the inevitable
German reinforcements inarching to the sound of the guns to relieve their
hard-pressed comrades, and drive back the assailants. The French lost in all
about 10,000 men; with such desperate valour did the young levies, seeking to
atone for their lack of skill, hurl themselves on the enemy. Under the stress
of defeat the discipline of the newly formed army broke down; and the French
fell back in great confusion. Fortunately for them the Germans, too exhausted
to pursue, had not perceived the extent of their success. Undaunted by this
repulse, Gambetta, who had heard from Trochu by balloon that the garrison of
Paris would make an effort to break out towards Orleans on November 29,
directed d’Aurelle de Paladines to try the other'flank. Thus, on December 2,
the French, advancing with some 80,000 men in the direction of Toury met the
detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg coming up to extend Prince
Frtde^.ck Charles’ left, near the villages of Loigny and Poupry. Again the
Germans were at first aard pressed; again the French attack, though gallantly
delivered, failed owing to want of combination; and again the timely arrival on
the field of a German division of the ninth corps turned the scale. The French
were everywhere repulsed.
The effect of
these two defeats was to break up the organisation of the army of the Loire;
the tiansport and supply arrangements were thrown into complete confusion; and
the defeated troops, wearily retreating through snow and slush, suffered terribly.
D’Aurelle de Paladines had intended to stand in his lines outside Orleans; but
the state of his army made him abandon all idea of organised resistance. After
some haphazard but severe fighting north of the forest of Orleans and outside
the town, the Germans drove back their opponents and reentered Orleans on the
night of December 4: Among the French, General Chanzy, the commander of the
sixteenth and seventeenth corps, who had throughout these operations shown
marked ability, alone succeeded in maintaining some semblance of organisation
in his command, which he rallied at Beaugency south of Orleans.
Meantime the
sortie from Paris, which Trochu had announced for November 29, had taken place.
Ducrot, the guiding spirit of the defence, had been busy throughout the months
of October and November in reconnoitring, under cover of a number of minor
enterprises, the circle of investment. He had decided that an attempt to the
north of Pans offered most prospect of success, and preparations to carry his
proposals
into effect
were well advanced, when the news of Coulmiers and the hopes aroused of the
approach of the army of the Loire caused Trochu to insist on an immediate
effort to break out to the south. The strength of the German position in front
of Versailles forbade a sortie on that side; and it was decided to advance from
Vincennes across the Marne in the direction of Villiers and Champigny on
November 29. The preparations for the movement were however not completed in
time; the bridges over the Marne were not ready; and it was necessary to cancel
the orders which had already set the troops in motion—a fated step with
half-trained troops enlisted from the critical population of Paris. The
attacking columns failed to combine; and the Wiirtemberg division, upon whom
the brunt of the onset fell, fighting stubbornly throughout December 1, and
again, after an armistice to bury the dead on December 3, withstood every
effort to break through their lines. Ducrot led his men back into Paris on
December 4; and the city relapsed into the dull struggle with hunger, broken
only by the occasional political emeutes stirred up by the extreme Republicans.
Northwards of Paris Manteuffel, who had taken Steinmetz’ place in command of
the first army, had occupied Amiens on November 27, and Rouen on December 5;
while to the south Werder, firmly established at Dijon, was more than holding
his own against Cremer and Garibaldi. Only at Belfort, where a gallant
engineer, Colonel Denfert Rochereau, had trained a garrison of Mobiles and
Franctireurs round a nucleus of regulars, and by sheer energy and ability was
keeping the besiegers in a state of constant anxiety, did the French flag still
retain something of its old prestige.
The loss of
Orleans (December 4) had created a panic throughout Touraine. The Delegation of
the Provisional Government removed the seat of administration to Bordeaux, and
was followed by a stream of diplomats, officials, clerks, correspondents, and
the majority of those who could afford to leave their homes. Undaunted in the
midst of the general depression and confusion, Gambetta and de Freycinet still
toiled ceaselessly at the creation of new forces, still elaborated fresh plans
of offence. The troops of the German second army, exhausted by their rapid
marches from Metz, and by the severe fighting in bitter weather which had led
to the recapture of Orleans, were in urgent need of repose. Both Prince
Frederick Charles and Moltke believed the army of the Loire to be in a state of
dissolution; and the pursuit was entrusted chiefly to cavalry, who however soon
discovered that Chanay was standing stubbornly in front of Beaugency, and that
they could make no headway! The weary victors were again compelled to take the
field, and for six days were engaged, in frost and snow, with an enemy who
doggedly refused to be driven from his position.
The
sufferings of the French during these days were appalling. Chanzy resolutely
kept his troops bivouacked in the open in alternate snow and mud, foreseeing
that his army would inevitably dissolve if he allowed it
Chanzy at Le Mans.—Faidherbe’s
advance on Amiens. 607
to be
scattered to seek shelter in the surrounding towns or villages. On December 12,
finding the men could endure no more, he began a retreat on Vendome, where, standing
again at bay, he brought his army successfully across the Loir, a tributary
which runs west of and parallel to the great Loire, and finally, drew back
westwards towards Le Mans. Rarely has a retreat under such adverse conditions
been conducted with equal ability. By drawing the enemy upon himself, and
stoutly refusing to give way, Chanzy allowed time for the shattered right wing
of the army of the Loire, under Bourbaki, to re-form south of Orleans and to
take up positions covering the great arsenal at Bourges. The wisdom of the
retreat was at once shown by the fact that Prince Frederick Charles, uncertain
of the situation to the south, could not venture to uncover the army of
investment by following Chanzy to Le Mans, where the latter, reaping the reward
of his self-sacrifice and firmness, won the time needed for his worn-out troops
to recruit. A truce of exhaustion followed for some weeks in the south-west,
Prince Frederick Charles withdrawing the second army to the neighbourhood of
Orleans and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg’s detachment to Chartres.
For a time
the centre of interest shifted north, where, after the occupation of Rouen and
Amiens by the Germans, the fortress of Arras had become the base of French
resistance. There General Faidherbe, who had gained a reputation in north
Africa, arrived on December 3, and, completing with great energy the work of
his predecessors, had by the middle of December ready for the field an army of
40,000 men, which, as it contained a number of refugees from Sedan and Metz,
was superior in discipline to any other of the levies raised by the Provisional
Government. After occupying Rouen, General ManteufFel was directed to seize Le
Havre. This harbour was of great value to the French, who were importing
immense stores of war material; and, to save it, Faidherbe advanced on Amiens.
The German garrison was compelled to evacuate the town, and ManteufFel had to
give up all thoughts of Havre and to hurry back to meet Faidherbe, who on
hearing of his approach took up a position north-east of Amiens on the Hallue
stream. ManteufFel advanced to the attack with 25,000 men on December 21, and
opened a three days’ struggle amid ice and snow, in which Faidherbe held his
own, retiring during the night of December 24, only because his ill-equipped
troops, forced to bivouac in the open, could no longer endure the cold.
The news of
Faidherbe’s advance roused fresh hopes in Paris; and preparations were at once
begun for the attempt to break out to the north which Ducrot had always counselled.
The sortie, which took place on December 21, resolved itself into an attempt to
capture the village of Le Bourget, which, if successful, was to be the signal
for a general advance through the investing lines. Favoured by fog, the French
managed to enter the village, but were never able completely to drive
out the
defenders; and, on the arrival of German reinforcements, Trochu broke off the
fight before half his troops had been engaged. Indeed, Trochu at this period
seems to have considered failure inevitable, and to have undertaken any
enterprise rather with a view to pacifying the populace than with any hope of
success.
For some time
past, loud expressions of impatience had been heard in Germany at the delay in
reducing the French capital. Pressure was brought to bear on Moltke to bombard
Paris—a step to which he was supposed to be averse from motives of humanity.
But Moltke understood better than his critics what the bombardment of a
fortified town of the size of the French capital entailed. He knew that it
would be useless to begin a cannonade which could not be sustained; and, until
the large number of guns, and immense stores of ammunition required aad been
collected (a difficult operation with congested lines of communication), he
turned a deaf ear to those who urged him to begin. At last, when all was ready,
the bombardment of the forts began on December 27, 1870, and that of the town
on January 5,1871.
At the
beginning of the new year, when it was becoming daily more clear that the
powers of endurance of the capital were nearing their limit, the untiring and
still hopeful Gambetta had started another great effort to rescue Paris. While
yet the halves of the army of the Loire were reeling back from the blows
received about Orleans, the left under Chanzy westwards towards Le Mans, the
right under Bourbaki south towards Bourges, de Freycinet had conceived the idea
of transporting a part of the army of the Loire eastwards. This was to be
combined With Cremer’s and Garibaldi’s troops, and with a new corps whose
formation at Lyons was far advanced, in a great movement against the German
lines of communication, which should incidentally raise the siege of gallant
Belfort; simultaneously Chanzy from the west and Faidherbe from the north were
to resume the offensive. The plan, admirable as a war-game manoeuvre where the
all-important element of morale is of no account, had the defect of demanding a
mobility and an organisation such as the army of the Loire did not possess.
After the
loss of Orleans, d’Aurelle de Paladines had been removed from his command; and
Gambetta had practically assumed the direction of the armies in the provinces.
He accepted de Freycinet’s abovementioned proposal, overrode the objections of
Chanzy, who, appreciating the situation more correctly, advocated the simpler
operation of a combined movement from west and south on the capital, and
directed Bourbaki to begin the entrainment of the three corps under his orders
eastwards on December 23. But the movements of great masses cannot be
improvised. A large proportion of the railway officials brought in for the
occasion were unacquainted with the lines they were required to work, with the
result that delays were endless. The men, cooped up in narrow carriages for
days together in severe cold, suffered torments,;
1871J JSourba/ci's troops disarmed in
Switzerland. 609
supplies,
abundant where they were not required, were not available where they were
needed. The first troops did not gain touch with the newly formed corps from
Lyons, which had moved forward to Besan^on, till January 2; while Bourbaki’s
third corps, which was left in front of Bourges to cover the movement from
prying eyes in the German second army, did not come up till a week later.
Werder, warned in time of this massing of 100,000 men against him, evacuated
Dijon and concentrated at Vesoul; then, when it became clear that Bourbaki was
moving on Belfort, by a brilliant dash against the French flank at Villersexel
he further delayed their already hesitating advance. Finally, slipping between
them and Belfort, he took up a strong position on the banks of the Lisaine.
Here for three days, from January 15 to 17, he withstood all attacks, till
Bourbaki was compelled from exhaustion to draw off' and Degin a disastrous
retreat.
At the German
headquarters at Versailles, Werder’s reports of the concentration in the
neighbourhood of Besan^on had been regarded as exaggerated. Bourbaki was still
believed to be in front of Bourges and to be meditating an advance on Paris;
and it was not until January 5, when Werder captured a number of prisoners of
Bourbaki’s regiments, that Moltke acknowledged his mistake, and immediately set
about repairing it. A new army was promptly formed from one of the corps
besieging Paris, together with a division from the lines of communication and a
division set free by the fall of Mezisres, and was placed under Man ;euffel,
who had hitherto been directing the operations of the first army in the north.
Manteuffel moved rapidly southwards and, sweeping down on the flank and rear of
Bourbaki’s luckless force, hemmed it in aga. .at the Swiss frontier. Bourbaki’s
one chance of keeping open his line of retreat lay in the cooperation of
Garibaldi, who with 40,000 men occupied Dijon. But Garibaldi, who had lost the
fire of his youth and was in failing health, allowed himself to be neutralised
by' a single German brigade. Left without succour, cut off from his base, his
starving troops exposed to the rigours of winter in the Jura Mountains,
Bourbaki had no choice but to cross the frontier, within which on February 2
over 80,000 men were disarmed by the Swiss. Fifteen days later, Colonel Denfert
Rochereau marched proudly out of Belfort at the head of the garrison, having
stood a siege of 106 days and having surrendered only on the express orders of
the French-Government.
The events
which had led to the issue of these orders may be told in a few words. ’
Towards the end of December Chanzy, who, thanks to Gambetta’s energy, had
re-equipped and reorganised the two corps with which he had retreated to Le
Mans, and had been largely reinforced, was preparing to renew the offensive,
and had pushed forward strong detachments with this object. Moltke still
believed Bourbaki to be in front of Bourges, and, wishing to deal with the two
armies while they were separated, ordered Prince Frederick Charles, on January
1, to march
against
Chanzy, who was considered to be the more ready to take the field. With the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg’s detachment, Prince Frederick Charles disposed of
about 60,000 men, as against Chanzy with 150,000. The Germans, advancing on
January 5, at once came in contact with French detachments^ which were steadily
pushed eastwards. In view of the German offensive, Chanzy decided to give up
his forward movement, and to occupy a position which he had prepared in front
of Le Mans. Prince Frederick Charles attacked him there on January 10; and in a
fierce battle, which lasted throughout the two following days, the French were
everywhere driven from their entrenchments, suffering a loss of more than 6000
killed and wounded, and 20,000 prisoners.
The removal
of Bourbaki’s army eastwards, and the defeat of Chanzy, had cleared the country
south and west of Paris, and left Faidherbe in the north the only immediate
menace to its besiegers. After the battle of the Hallue, Manteuffel had left
his eighth corps under Goeben to watch Faidherbe and to besiege the fortress of
Peronne east of Amiens, which was a standing danger to his communications,
while he proceeded to Rouen, in the neighbourhood of which the Francs tireurs
and Mobiles were becoming daily more active. On January 2 Faidherbe, with about
35,000 men, moved against Goeben, who with 15,000 was covering the siege of
Peronne, and began an attack on the German position, which was continued the
next day. Fighting gallantly and in superior numbers, the French had, by
nightfall on January 3, gained a substantial success, and driven the Germans
everywhere back on their last positions; But the strain of battle was too much
for the raw troops ; and when, on January 4, Faidherbe found Goeben still
standing in front of him, and his own men in no condition to renew the fight,
he drew off, greatly to the relief of the hard-pressed Germans.
Peronne fell
on January 9 after Manteuffel had left to take command of the army formed to
deal with Bourbaki. His successor, Goeben, as it was no longer necessary to
keep troops in advance of Peronne, concentrated the greater part of the first
army behind the Somme, an operation which was barely completed, when news
arrived that the French were moving eastwards in the direction of St Quentin.
Faidherbe had been induced by Gambetta to take this step, with the triple
object of threatening the communications of the first army, of reaching out a
hand to Bourbaki in his expected march northwards from Besanyon, and of aiding
a great sortie from the capital, which was in preparation. The manoeuvre
proposed was indeed an attempt to march round the right flank of the German
first army; and Faidherbe, perceiving its danger, had consented to it with
reluctance. By January 18 he had assembled his forces about St Quentin; but
Goeben had divined his adversary’s intention, and, having rapidly collected his
army by road , and rail, was marching that same day up both banks of the Somme
to the attack. On January 19 the Germans advanced upon St Quentin, and,
capturing the town, inflicted a decisive defeat upon Faidherbe.
Thus north,
south, east, and west, Gambetta’s heroic efforts to save the capital had met
with disaster; but, ere they had all failed, it had become clear that the
limits of endurance had heen nearly reached. The Paris mob still believed in
itself, however, and clamoured for a sortie en masse. Accordingly, Trochu
agreed to make a great effort, in which the Garde Nationale, hitherto chiefly
employed in manning the ramparts, should take part, rather to convince the
populace of the futility of further resistance than with any hope of success.
90,000 men, massed under the guns of Mont Valerien, moved southwards on January
19 against the German lines before Versailles. The attack was delivered in
three columns; but, being disjointed, it was foredoomed to failure. Parts of
the force by sheer hard fighting forced their way into Saint-Cloud and into the
park of Buzenval, where refusing to be dislodged, they maintained themselves
until the following day; but the greater part was streaming back to the city
before dark. Four days later, Jules Favre arrived at Versailles to open
negotiations for the capitulation.
The
Provisional Government had at length recogi sed that any hope of foreign
intervention was futile. After the downfall >of the Empire, Thiers had
undertaken a mission to the Courts of London, St Petersburg, Vienna, and
Florence, to invoke the mediation of the Great Powers. The time was ill-chosen.
Italy was already engaged in securing Rome, while the attention of England and
Austria was fully occupied by the action of Russia, who on September 29
announced: that she would no longer be bound by the Black Sea
clauses of the Treaty of Paris. The utmost that Thiers was able to bring back
to Paris was a proposal made by England, and supported by the other Powers,
that the Provisional Government should negotiate an armistice for the purpose
of taking the sense of the French people. One of Bismarck’s strongest cards, in
his dealings with Favre, was that he had no grounds for supposing the Provisional
Government to represent France. He let it be known that he had opened
negotiations with Napoleon; and the fear that the Imperial Army under Bazaine
would be released, for the purpose of restoring the Empire and enforcing any
compact which had been agreed upon, brought Favre to his knees. On January 28 a
three weeks’ armistice was signed, to enable elections to be held for an Assembly,
which was to meet at Bordeaux to decide the question of peace or war. The outer
defences of Paris were surrendered ; the garrison became prisoners of war; and
the city purchased exemption from occupation at the price of £8,000,000.
Elsewhere, the troops of both nations were to retain their positions; but the
eastern theatre of war was expressly excluded by Bismarck from the terms of the
armistice. By a strange blunder Favre omitted to communicate this fact to
Bourbaki, and thus rendered his fate doubly sure.
Gambetta
absolutely refused to recognise the authority of the Paris Government to act in
the name of France, and called loudly for the
continuance
of the war; but he found no one to follow him, and he -^signed. a disappointed
and discredited man. Though at the moment he was stigmatised as a madman, his
work was more than justified. It is true that the terms offered by Bismarck
after Sedan were not substantially different from those he ultimately
accepted, but the second period of the war not only preserved for Frenchmen
their self-esteem, but impressed their adversaries with respect for the great
resources and power of resistance of the French nation. When, in the years
following the Peace of Frankfort, the wonderful recovery of France from her
disaster was watched with jealous eyes by, the hot-bloods in Germany, the
memory of the resistance offered by. an unprepared and unorganised people lent
Weight to the counsels: of the prudent. Thirty-five years of peace are
Gambetta’s best apology for his administration.
The result of
the elections proved France to be eager to end the war. Thiers was appointed on
February 17 as chief of the executive, and, together with Favre and Picard, was
commissioned to conclude peace. The preliminary proposals were signed on February
26, France agreeing to the cession of Alsace, and of German Lorraine with Metz,
and to the payment of an indemnity of £200,000,000; but she retained possession
of Belfort. These terms were ratified by the Assembly of Bordeaux ; and the
formal treaty was signed at Frankfort on May 10,
1871. The chief p lze of victory had not
however been included in the capitulations. On January 18 King William of
Prussia had been proclaimed German Emperor in the Salle des glaces of Louis
XIV’s historic palace at Versailles. Thus the work begun in 1866 was completed.
The blood shed by north and south side by side on many a victorious field had
made of Germany a united nation, which, from its birth could proudly claim to
be the first military Power of, the world.
RUSSIA AND
THE LEVANT AFTER THE CRIMEAN WAR.
(1) RUSSIA
AND THE PERIOD OF REFORM.
If the tradition of the terrors of the system of
Nicholas has unduly prejudiced men’s minds with reg<~rd to his thirty years
of resolute repression, it is probable that opinion has been somewhat biassed
by the sympathetic figure of the Tsar liberator, so cruelly slain on March 13,
1881, in favour of his twenty-six years of far less stable rule, in which great
expectations alternated with, great disappointments. A careful ' examination of
historical documents, as they become accessible, will, it is to be feared,
somewhat detract from the halo of idealism which has surrounded Alexander, and
also diminish the deep sympathy that has been felt with the sacrifices imposed on
society and the governing classes during this fateful period. The early life of
Alexander, and his activity up till his accession, gave little promise that he
would be known as a reformer. He seemed impregnated with the spirit of his
father’s reactionary r&gime, though to his father’s disappointment he
showed no love of soldiering, and indeed gave evidence of a heart too soft for
the heir to a military despotism. He was, however, no enthusiastic idealist,
but a man of limited education, limited experience of affairs, and a cautious
spirit. Acquainted through his tutor, Vasili Zhukovsky, with the ideas of
German romantic literature, but devoid of the technical knowledge of the social
and economic problems with which he had to deal,; he was obliged to choose
between plans put before him, rather than criticise or initiate. As a result
there appeared a vacillation in his policy, and a want of staunch adherence to
his councillors, of which a striking instance was the dismissal of Nicholas
Miliutin as soon as the Edict of Emancipation was published. He was fond of his
country, and a believer in her destiny, but alike in internal and external
policy inclined to take a middle course. For some years he managed to steer
between the two extremes. But at home years of labour and anxiety weakened his
desire for reform; and, when revolutionary societies
appeared, he
gave way to the advisers who advocated repression. Abroad he was sincerely
anxious for peace, though jealous of the national honour, and desirous of
amending those provisions of the Treaty of Paris which he considered derogatory
to Russia. With these objects he twice risked a European War: first in 1863,
when the Western Powers threatened interference in the Polish question, and
again in 1870, when he repudiated the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris.
His first
great work was the Emancipation of the Serfs. The manifesto issued on his
accession to the throne did not contain a word with regard to this question;
and the retirement, on August 20, 1855, of Bibikoff', the Minister of the
Interior, who was considered a foe of serfdom, quieted the fears of the
nobility. The manifesto, issued on March 19,1856, on the conclusion of the
Treaty of Paris* spoke of laws equally just for all his subjects. But in the same
month the Emperor, in addressing.a deputation of the Moscow nobility, said:
“There are reports that I desire to proclaim the emancipation of the serfs.
That is wrong; but, as a result of these menaces, there have been instances of
the peasants disobeying the1 landowners....I do not say that I am
entirely against it (emancipation). We live in such an age that in time it
cannot but take place. In this, I think you too agree with me. Consequently, it
is better for it to come from above than from below.” ' While the Emperor
showed prudence, and common sense, and looked with, a critical and suspicious
eye upbn panaceas, society, including all who made any pretensions to
enlightenment, was in a state of excitement, one might almost say exaltation.
Men seemed to breathe more freely when the death of Nicholas was announced. On
all sides were heard cries in favour of liberty; on alll sides were heard
confessions of past delinquencies, even from high officials; on all sides
enthusiasts registered vows to prove themselves worthy of the new era, which it
was felt was now dawning on Russia. All alike expected reforms so thorough that
Russia would be placed at one bound in the van of civilisation..
The
emancipation of the serfs had been long and eloquently advocated by writers
like Griboiedoff, Bielinski, Grigorovich and Turgenieff, and earnestly expected
by the peasants, who, by repeated revolts during the war, extending over nine
governments, in 1854 and 1855, showed their belief that their military service
had given them an additional title to fveedom, and their intention of obtaining
it. But the Emperor proceeded with 'deliberation. On his coronation in 1856, he
suspended recruiting for three years, and granted an amnesty., among others to
the Decabrist conspirators. At the end of 1856 he appointed a secret Committee
to consider the question of emancipation. It met for the first time on January
8, 1857, and consisted of Prince Orloff, the Finance Minister Brock, Count
Adlerberg, Muravieff, Chefkin, Prince Vasili Dolgorukoff, Prince Gagarin, Baron
Korff, Count Lanskoi, Z unt Bludoff and Rostovtseff. Only the last three, with
the Secretary Vladimir
Butkoff, were
for emancipation; the majority were rather in; favour of measures for improving
the condition of the peasants. The Emperor was not contented with the progress
made, and to expedite matters, appointed the Grand Duke Constantine a member of
the Committee. On August 18, 1857, the nobility of three Lithuanian governments
presented a petition asking for permission to liberate their serfs, but retain
their right to the lands. In reply, the Emperor issued a rescript on November
20,1857, empowering the nobility of each of the governments named to form a
committee to draw up projects “ for the amelioration of the condition of the
peasants”—a permission which was extended in the same year to the nobility of
St Petersburg and Novgorod, and in the following year to Moscow and other
governments.
After some
intermediate steps, including the appointment of a Principal Committee and a
Central Statistical Committee, the question of emancipation became definitely
the order of the day; and there were formed on February 17, 1859, two
Elaboration Committees under the presidency of Rostovtseff, to work up the
materials forwarded by the Local Government Committees. On one of these served
Miliutin, with his friend George Samarin; and it is noteworthy that their
efforts in favour of the serfs, while supported throughout by the landowners on
the Committee, such as Vladimir Cherkasky, were opposed by the bureaucrats. The
material so worked up was then presented to a small committee consisting of
Lanskoy, MuraviefF, Constantine Palen and Rostovtseff, and was finally
considered by the Principal Committee, of which the Grand Duke Constantine was
now made President. These deliberatioris occupied the whole of the years 1859
and I860; and it was only through the personal interference of the Emperor that
the scheme was presented to the Council of State in January, 1861. The
manifesto of emancipation was completed on February 19, 1861. This measure
dealt with the private serfs. By imperial Orders of September 7, 1859 and
October 23, 1861, in a similar way, a number of the state serfs, who held an
intermediate position between serfdom and freedom, were also partly liberated—a
process which in their case was not completed till 1866.
The general
result of the Emancipation was, that with the exception of the dvarovuye, or
serfs personally attached to the nobles, who after two years more service
received their freedom, the peasants were not only liberated from their
personal dependence on nobles or Crown, but were also formed into a body of
landed proprietors. A certain proportion of the land was left to the nobles as
their private property; the rest was distributed amongst the peasantry, on
condition that they should eventually redeem their lots by paying compensation
to the former landowners. The State issued bonds to the latter, representing
the amount due from the peasants, which was to be paid within forty-nine years.
The redemption was not to begin at once; but the peasants were allowed to
enter into an arrangement with their former proprietors, by which they
remained in
partial dependence upon them, and paid rent for the use of their lands. The
payments were fixed at different rates, according to the locality, and levied
in such a way that the rate rose, as the lot of land diminished. In determining
the amount of the lot, the State fixed a maximum and minimum, varying in
different localities, which generally corresponded to the amount of land
allotted to the peasants while serfs, When the amount of land occupied by the
peasant exceeded the maximum allowance the landowner might appropriate the
surplus; but, when the peasants’ lots were below the established minimum, the
deficiency was made up out of the estates of the nobles, i By voluntary
arrangement with the peasants the landowners had the option of giving them at
once one-quarter of the maximum as a free gift, and so closing all further
relations or mutual claims; Special local provisions were made in the case of
serfs belonging to small proprietors.
The former
state serfs received very much larger lots than the former private serfs.
10,749,845 private serfs received 92,708,690 acres or on an average 8"62 acres
each, while 10,745,788 state serfs received 185,595,295 acres or 17'56 acres
each, and 900,486 crown serfs received 10,833,153 acres or 12'03 acres each.
The emancipation legislation did not require any alteration to be made in the
existing mode of tenure in any locality. Where communal ownership was
customary, the land was apportioned to the community as a whole. Communal
ownership prevailed in the north, east and south, but in Little Russia, in
Poland and the west, individual ownership was general. Where individual
ownership prevailed, the land was allotted to individuals. The deeds were in
all cases delivered to the village community,- which was made responsible for
all taxes and redemption j
payments. This led to ah increase in the communal system; for the community was
directly interested in seeing that the labour on each piece of land was
sufficient to discharge the obligation attaching to it, hence a redistribution
of land took place at definite or indefinite periods. Where the pressure of
taxation was most severely felt, the partition of the land according to the
number of the labourers, and even according to the capacity of the individual,
became most precise, so that no member of the community should shirk his share
of the burden. If any peasant was left without cattle or means of cultivation,
and became hopelessly involved in debt, his land was taken from him and given
to someone else. At an early stage, in central and eastern Russia, there arose
from this cause a large number of landless peasants. Originally, it was
expressly stated in the Emancipation Act, that the peasants should have
absolute possession of their lots, after they were redeemed, with power to sell
or otherwise dispose of them.
To carry out
the emancipation and to determine the area to be given by the proprietor, and
the money compensation payable to him, negotiations of a most delicate
character were necessary. For this purpose the office of Arbiter of the Peace
was instituted (1861); to the
great credit
of the nobility, men of position and character were found,' who brought
infinite patience, tact, and knowledge to their difficult task. So far did they
abandon class prejudice, that they were even accused of siding too much with
the peasants; and, thanks largely to them, the peaceful revolution was carried
out almost without an outbreak. It may be said that the credit of this
extraordinary measure, and its successful fulfilment, was due not only to the
Emperor, the Grand Duke Constantine, and the Grand Duchess Helena (a Wurtemberg
princess by birth, who warmly supported him), but also to the nobility, who, in
the vast majority of cases, were ready, with unhesitating generosity, to
sacrifice a large portion of their cherished hereditary rights. It was due not
less to the peasantry, who patiently accepted what they believed to be only a
fraction of the benefits due to them.
The result of
the emancipation, so far as the landlords were concerned, was wittily
summarised by one of the nobles, as reported by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, in
the saying: “ Before the emancipation we drank champagne, and kept no accounts;
since the emancipation we keep accounts, and drink beer! ” The direct monetary
compensation was probably inadequate. The new dues, to be collected from the
peasants, not only fell short of the value of the compulsory labour, now
abandoned, but were extremely difficult of collection. When a proprietor was
energetic and careful, he became much better off, and in the southern section
of the Black Earth zone at any rate the land increased enormously in value;
but, when the money obtained under the emancipation scheme was ill employed,
the proprietor and his family became bankrupt, and went to swell the educated
proletariate of the local town. So far as the peasant was concerned, there is
no doubt that his enthusiastic worshippers were disappointed; and within ajvery
short time of the emancipation we find them admitting their disillusionment.
The peasant often proved lazy, careless, drunken, and dishonest; and it was
very difficult to make him adopt any of the requisite! improvements in his
primitive methods of cultivating the land. From] the peasant’s point of view,
the money dues and taxes were more burdensome than the old compulsory labour
dues; and the old ill-defined rights as to grazing cattle on the landlord’s
pasture, and obtaining wood from the landlord’s forest, and pecuniary help in
time of need from the landlord were missed at every step. Everything under the
new system had to be bought and paid for. But, slowly and surely, the capable
and industrious agricultural peasant saved a.n«1 bought land and prospered,
while the lazy and incompetent lost even the share of land he had, and sank to
a misery unknown before. The best proof of the general success of this great
measure is that, on the whole, it may be said that for the first twenty years
the taxes were paid without great and serious arrears.
After
agriculture come industry and commerce. Free labour was on the increase in
industrial employment in the period preceding the
emancipation
. That event was certain not only to accelerate the tendency, but also to
produce a crisis in production. The crisis occurred in the industries most
dependent on serf labour, such as the iron industries of the Urals; there in
many cases the labourers lost their heads, and simply gave up the work they had
such reason to detest, and departed. The production of pig-iron in the Urals
fell from 14*513,000 puds in 1860, to 10,467,000 in 1862. In the Bogosloff
district of the Perm government about 3000 men, being three-quarters of the
men workers, either deserted their land, houses, and gardens, or sold them
before leaving at a ridiculous price. In one summer, 800 of the best workmen
left the Berezoff works, and similar instances might be multiplied. It was the
same with the mines. If the factories were not all affected in the same degree,
it was because free labour had already made good its footing; The cloth
factories suffered most; in 1858 there were 423 cloth factories employing
97,168 workmen* in 1863 there were 365 employing 71,797. In other industries,
there was less trouble. The decline in the cotton industry was due not to the
emancipation, but to the great diminution in the import of cotton owing to the
American Civil War. This decline in cotton led, as a not unnatural result, to a
revival of the linen industry.
There was
added another of those disturbing factors which make it so difficult to draw
economic conclusions on any subject, at any time. At the end of the fifties, a
commercial expansion took place in Russia, and an alteration was made in the
law relating to public companies, introducing limited liability, which
produced a fabulous increase in the number of joint-stock companies. There
followed, of course, overproduction ; then either panic, or complete
indifference, on the part of the public, to such undertakings. In 1856, the
capital subscribed to limited liability companies amounted to 15 million
roubles, in 1857, to 30 million roubles, in 1858, to 51 million roubles, and,
in 1859, to
67 million roubles. Another factor in the
situation was a movement beginning in 1857 in favour of the prohibition of
child labour in factories, and the limitation of the hours of labour of minors.
In that year a special Commission on this and cognate subjects was appointed by
the Governor-General of St Petersburg, which prepared the project of a law for
the prevention of accident, the promotion of sanitary regulations, as well as
housing and other reforms which was supported by the St Petersburg employers,
but resisted by those of Moscow and elsewhere. The same year saw another
Commission appointed in the Ministry of Finance, under the presidency of
Stackelberg, to reform the whole of the Russian factory and labour laws; and
this Commission was sufficiently enlightened to record its protest against
Article 1865 of the Penal Code, which had made a strike a criminal offence. No
legislation, however, followed.
The
emancipation of the serfs further revolutionised the conditions of the
industrial labour market. The first result was a rise in wages; but prices rose
still higher, so that real wages fell. The industrial
labourer
showed an inclination to return to the land; nevertheless, the productive power
of the factories rose to such an extent, owing to the introduction of
machinery, that domestic industries decli- ed. , Thus an enormous incentive was
given to a new development of travelling labour, followed by a fall in the
normal rate of wages and a deterioration in the conditions of labour.
An impulse in
favour of industry was due to the development of railways. In 1856 Alexander II
directed his Committee of Ministers to consider the whole question of railway
construction ; and, as a result, the railway system, was developed, more or
less rapidly, under the general control of the Government, although the actual
building of the lines was carried out by private companies, and was largely due
to men of energy and initiative like von Dervies. During 1856-78 about 600
miles of railroad were annually constructed; and the railways formed a fairly
complete network for the European portion of the Empire, extending as far as
Orenburg in Asia, and including the Poti-Tiflis line in the Caucasus. The
construction of these lines was rendered easier by the lower tariffs of 1859 and
1861, permitting the importation of pig and cast iron either at a very low duty
or entirely free. In 1866 the Government ordered that all railway plant should
be of Russian manufacture ; and in 1869 an import duty was, for the first
time, placed on foreign machinery, which led the way to a more stringent
protective policy in 1877 and later years. The average value of all exports
from 1850 to 1874 was 261,389,000 roubles, and the average value of all imports
during the same period was 263,869,000 roubles.
The Finance
Ministers of this period were Alexander Kniazhevich 1858-62, and Count Michael
Reutem 1862-78. The principal achievement of the former was the establishment,
on May 31, 1860, of the Bank of Russia. He left it to his successor to carry
out the project which effected the supersession in 1862 of the system of
leasing the retail sale of spirits to private persons, by a system of excise.
In the first year of the excise system the consumption of spirits in Russia
doubled; and the number of cases of open intoxication increased sixfold. The
gain to the revenue was by no means proportionate. The income derived from
spirits in 1865 was £18,000,000, or only one million more than that obtained in
the last year of the farming system. The very low original duty, 4 roubles per
vedro (27056 gallons) was accordingly raised till it reached 10 roubles per
vedro. The result was a decrease in consumption, and hence a relative but not
an absolute falling-off in the revenue. Reutem was one of the Committee on the
^nance of the emancipation, which succeeded in solving the financial side of
that complex question, so as to involve no sacrifice on the part of the public
exchequer. During his long tenure of office he showed himself a man of
prudence, method, and integrity. He succeeded not only in effecting some
economies, and in introducing some order into Russian finance, but also in
developing the
national
credit by' the creation of private banks, thirty-three of which were founded
during his administration. He reformed the system of the audit of accounts and
at length, in 1872, after a long series of deficits, managed to produce for the
first time a surplus. To him must be given in great measure the credit for the
development of the railway system.
The
emancipation of the serfs was only the first in a series of reforms. It was
followed by the institution of a system of local selfgovernment, by reforms in
the law Courts, as well as in the military and educational systems. ,
The
introduction, after enquiries which commenced in 1859, of local self-government
in the shape of elective local Councils (1864), was all the more popular,
because the local committees—formed to consider the question of the
emancipation—had been much hurt that no general assembly had been held in St Petersburg,
at which they might have aired their views. It was characteristic of Alexander
II that the reform was introduced giadually, and that in twelve
years—1865-76—it was brought into force only in 34 governments of European
Russia, and in the Cossack district of the Don, where it was abolished later
(1882). It involved a measure of decentralisation and of liberty, and it
embraced in one scheme all classes of the population. At this time, there were
on the one side the assemblies of the nobility, under, their marshal, with the
right of petitipn to the Crown; on the other hand were the peasant assemblies
of the M'vr (village community), and the Volost (canton). The new authority
combined both classes, and also the towns, in two new bodies, the District Assembly,
and the Zemstvo or Provincial Council, the latter being elected by the former.
The principal duties laid on the new bodies were, to keep the roads and bridges
in proper repair, to provide means of conveyance for the rural police and other
officials, to elect the Justices of the Peace, to look after primary education
and sanitation, to watch the state of the crops, and take measures against
approaching famine. They meet once a year, and elect a bureau or committee,
which is a paid body and is responsible for the cbnduct of affairs. Every three
years the deputies are elected in certain proportions by the landed proprietor,
the rural communes, and the municipal corporations. It was a remarkable{fact,
noticeable from the outset, that no trace was found of class hatred, resulting
from the emancipation; on the contrary, peasant and noble sat peaceably side by
side in the local assemblies, and peasants often chose nobles or priests to
represent them. The elections were on the whole satisfactory. At peasant elections,
no doubt, the local chief of police and the president of the electoral meeting
made their influence felt, and corruption in the shape of drink or actual
bribery was not unknown. At the meetings the nobles preponderated by dint of
education, if not by dint of numbers; and attendance, being unpaid, was found
burdensome by the peasants. A few years later, out of 13,000 deputies elected
for 33 governments, there
were
6204 landowners, 5171 peasants, and 1549 representatives of towns. The
officials of the Central Government regarded the plan askance from the first,
and not only took care that any attempt of the Zemstva to combine, or to
exercise any political influence, should be frustrated, but also exerted
through the veto of the Governor a benumbing effect on the work. That veto
could be used if any resolution passed appeared to the Governor to be “
contrary to the true interests of the Empire ”; which opened a very wide door
to reactionary influence. .
Another
hindrance to an active policy was that of finance—a drawback most acutely felt
in the District Assemblies, where the interests of the ratepayer were most
active. Of the burden, some three-quarters fell on rural districts, and of this
about three-fifths was paid by the peasantry, the imperial taxes taking
precedence of the local rates. At first, the revenue did not amount to more
than half the expenditure, and the burden rose rapidly; in fact, the total
expenditure—originally six million roubles—rose in 1868 to nearly 15 millions,
and in 1875 to nearly 28 millions. In 1868 the combined revenues of 30 Zemstva
were expended in the following percentages:—houses for the police and other
imperial officials 4'6 per cent.; quarters for the troops 0'8; means of
conveyance for the police and other officials 17'0; special administration for
peasant affairs 14'9 ; Justice of the Peace Courts 13*2; roads and bridges
13*1; sanitary affairs, physicians’ hospitals, and the like, 8'3; popular
education 5-l; payment of debt and sundries 3'8, and working
expenses of Zemstvo administration 19 2, per cent.
On
the whole the new institution worked well. The ordinary duties were well
performed, with but little taint of peculation or jobbery. Reforms were
introduced into the hospitals, lunatic asylums, and benevolent institutions; a
good deal was done, considering the limited means, for popular education, by
founding village schools and a few seminaries for schoolmasters; a new and more
equitable system of rating was created; and a plan for mutual fire insurance
was carried into effect—an institution of great. value in a country where
wooden houses are usual, and fires not exceptional. Perhaps too much attention
was paid by the new administration to the more attractive work of education and
too little to the more prosaic needs of good communi-, cations; but,
considering the expenditure, and the difficulties of obtaining gopd
administrators for the tiresome detailed work, which was rewarded by none of
the decorations or official promotion, such as were given for other public service,
and none of the profits ^ realisable in the new world of railways, banks, and
joint-stock companies, the wonder is rather that so much good work, was done in
these early days., >
, In 1870,
the principle of local self-government;was extended to the tojvns. In the time
of Nicholas, a project drawn up by Miliutin had been, applied to St Petersburg;
but now a complete system was introduced, at first tentatively, for St
Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa,
which
substituted representation of property for representation by class or
corporation, and even adopted the advanced idea of women’s suffrage.
The reforms
of the law Courts were characterised by the same cautious deliberation as
marked the other great measures of Alexander II. First, there were references
thereto in imperial manifestos; then, the Council of State examined the
question from the historical, theoretical, and practical point of view; then, a
commission discovered no less than twenty-five radical defects in the existing
system; then, the fundamental principles underlying the changes to be made were
published in an Imperial Order of September 29,1862; finally, the new
legislation was completed, and received the Emperor’s approval on November 20,
1864.
Unlike the
other reforms, it was not an original creation, but an adaptation of elements
borrowed from the civilised West. This was a disappointment to the Slavophiles
and to reformers like Samarin, who feared that the peasant tribunals set up by
the Emancipation Act might suffer. But, although not original, judicial reform
was planned on a larger scale, with more unity and logic, and was carried out
more resolutely, than any of the other reforms of Alexander II. The principles
on which it was based were the separation of the judicial from the administrative
power; the independence of the magistrates and the tribunals; the equality of
all Russian subjects before the law, without distinction of birth or rank; oral
procedure; publicity; and, last but not least, the direct participation of the
people in the administration of justice, through the institution of the jury,
and by the election of the judges.
There were
two complete sets of tribunals: on the one hand, for petty cases, where no
abstract legal principle was at stake, the Justices of the Peace Courts, the
members of which were selected by the new elective District Assemblies, subject
to confirmation by the Senate; on the other hand, for the more important cases,
the regular tribunals, the ordinary members of which were to be appointed by
the Crown through the judges, who submitted lists of suitable candidates. These
two sets of tribunals were parallel, and contained each an ordinary Court and a
Court of Appeal, with the Senate as the complete and final Court of Appeal
above them all. The Justices of the Peace Courts were to be competent for all
civil cases in which the sum at stake was not more than 500 roubles, and for
all criminal cases in which the fine was not more than 300 roubles. If the sum
at stake exceeded 30 roubles, or the fine 15 roubles, there was an appeal to
the monthly sessions. The institution of elective Justices of the Peace was
introduced gradually, and was not extended, for instance, to the Polish and
Lithuanian provinces.
Complete and
logical as the reform appears, there were from the first a good many
exceptions. There were the peasant tribunals, with the judges elected under the
Emancipation Act. There were the commercial Courts instituted by Nicholas for
commercial men. There were the ecclesiastical Courts with their medieval
jurisdiction, not only over the
clergy, but
over the laity also, in such matters as divorce, in which the reforms planned
by Alexander II were never carried into effect. Apart from administrative
justice, with its totally irregular proceedings and the creation of certain
special examining magistrates for criminal cases (1860), which constituted a
serious modification of the new system, there were the Courts martial. These
played an important part in the troublous times at the end of the reign; but
they did not escape the influence of the prevalent zeal for reform. The
wholesome light of publicity was introduced, with a system of regimental and
District Courts under a supreme Court at St Petersburg. • But, though a
juridical education was given to the officers who filled judicial posts, the
presiding judge remained more like a prosecuting counsel than an impartial
authority. In addition to these important exceptions, there was always in the
background the Ministry of Justice, which could still exercise pressure. Though
judges could not be dismissed, except for the commission of a felony, or a
misdemeanour, the threat, whether expressed or implied, of their removal by the
Ministry of Justice to a distant disagreeable post, or other methods, were used
to subject them to the Executive. There also remained the crying evil—severely
felt in every department of official administration—the lack of competent men,
and the inadequacy of salaries, which provoked, and in the eyes of contemporary
Russian society extenuated, corruption and other such abuses. At the beginning
of 1870, in the 32 District Tribunals which then existed, there were 221
judges, of whom 44 had never received a legal education.
The want of a
proper personnel was even more keenly felt in the composition of the Bar, now
called into existence by the new juridical institutions. The profession of
advocate, though lucrative, enjoyed but little credit with the public; for few
of those who sought this new avenue of work were possessed either of adequate
knowledge of the law or of the keen sense of professional honour required by
their calling.
Abuses
therefore remained both in civil and in criminal cases. Moreover, there seems
no doubt that, in some form or other, bodily torture was still exercised. In
the peasant Courts there was even an increase of the corporal punishment
expressly forbidden by a ukase of 1863, to such an extent that, in one
government the number of cases in which it was inflicted rose from 5452 in
1866-8, to 10,884 in 1872-4. The worst infractions of the new judicial laws
took place from the action of the secret police, the Third Section of the
Imperial Chancery, which, at the close of the reign, acted with the same
arbitrary disregard of legal forms and principles, as in the worst days of Nicholas.
It is perhaps the best tribute to the vitality of the new judicial institutions
that they survived the terror and confusion of the Nihilist period.
At the very
commencement of the reign, military reforms were introduced; military colonies
came to an end; the period of military service was reduced from twenty-five to
fifteen years; degrading corporal
punishments
were abolished; attention was paid to the education of officers, and the
military educational establishments were reformed. In 1862, the Minister of War
was instructed to review the whole military system, which suffered, among other
defects, from over-centralisation. The first result was the publication, on
August 6,1864, of an order with regard to the formation of military districts,
of which ten were founded at once; four more were added on August 6, 1865. In
each circle, a special commanding officer was appointed; On January 1, 1874, a
new order was issued, under which the whole male population, without
distinction, became liable to military service. Six years were to be spent with
the colours, nine years in the militia, and in the reserve men were liable for
service up to 40 years of age.
The question
of national education occupied the attention of the Emperor from the first year
of his reign. In 1856, a Committee was appointed to enquire into subjects of
instruction and text-books. On June 18, 1863, a general code of regulations for
Russian Universities was published, based on the labours of a Committee
appointed on the initiative of Alexander Golovin, the Minister of Education, to
enquire into the management of educational establishments, and consisting
chiefly of Professors of the University of St Petersburg. According to this
Code, the Universities received a certain measure of autonomy under the
Ministry of Education, the system of instruction being placed in the hands of
the different faculties and the Council of the University. Each faculty
constituted an independent assembly, consisting of the ordinary and
extraordinary Professors, under the presidency of a Dean chosen for three
years. The Council consisted of all the ordinary and extraordinary Professors,
under the presidency of the Rector, who was chosen by the Council for four
years and confirmed by imperial ordinance. The code laid down what was the
sphere of independent action of the faculties, and the Council, and those
cases, in which the confirmation of the Warden and the Minister was required.
The administration of the economic affairs of the University was placed in the
hands of the Dean and; the Inspector, who was called in only on
questions relating to the students, under the presidency of tiie Rector. A
University Court, to deal with the offences of the studtent, was formed,
consisting of three judges, chosen annually by the Council from the Professors.
Besides this, the stipends of the Professors, the number of professorial
chairs, and the revenuesi of the Universities, were all augmented.
On November
19, 1864, a new code of regulations was published on the subject of secondary
schools, which was later amended and supplemented by the code of June 19, 1871.
Secondary educational establishments were divided into classical schools, or
gymnasia, and modem schools (Realschulen), from which the ancient languages
were excluded. Popular education was thoroughly revised by a code published on
the subject on June 14, 1864. Special attention was paid to
i856-7o] Growth of journalism and power of the
Press. 625
the education
of women, in institutions which were grouped under the foundation of the
Empress Marie. Similar institutions were founded in 1870, under the auspices of
the Ministry of Public Instruction. The higher education of women was provided
for by pedagogic instruction, and advanced courses in St Petersburg, Moscow,
Kieff, Kazan, and Odessa.
With regard
to the Press, the new reign brought the outbreak of journalistic activity,
described by Bernard Pares in his Russia and Reform. In 1856, the Russian
Causeries (Besyeda) of Alexander Koshelyeff, and Terty Philipoff, and the
Russian Messenger of Michael Katkoff were founded at Moscow. In 1857,
government newspapers were instituted in four towns in Siberia, and eleven
Russian specialist magazines, such as the Engineer's Magazine, the Library of
Medical Science, and the Journal of the Imperial Archaeological Society. Many
new newspapers appeared, which were not only sent to subscribers, but also sold
on the streets. Among the papers which became influential were the Golos (the
Voice), founded by Andrew Kraevsky at St Petersburg in 1862, and the Moscow
Gazette, the editorship of which was taken up by Katkoff on January 1,1863, and
the Den (the Day) founded by the Slavophil Ivan Aksakoff in October, 1861,
wbich lasted till 1865 and had a circulation of 4000. During the years which
elapsed before the new press law, published at last on April 6, 1865, the
Censorship acted spasmodically. In 1857, Prince Paul Viazemsky was placed at
the head of the Censorship. He drafted a report in 1858 advising that the
regulations should be relaxed, but he did not obtain the complete concurrence
of the Emperor, and therefore resigned. In 1859, the secret Committee was
reestablished to control literature, in harmony with the views of the
Government; in 1862, the duties of the Censorship were divided between the
Ministries of the Interior and of Public Instruction, preventive duties being
assigned to the latter, and punitive duties to the former. It is noteworthy
that, when the emancipation was promulgated on March 5,1861, not a journal in
St Petersburg or Moscow had a word of comment on it, and that only on March 7
did the Moscow Gazette insert a few sympathetic lines in reviewing a book in an
obscure comer of the paper. The chief Russian journal of this period was the
Kohhol (the Bell), founded by Alexander Hertzen in 1857, and published in
London, with its motto, “ Vivos voco> mortuos
plamgo,fulgura frango.'" Although strictly forbidden in Russia, it was to
be found everywhere, even in the Emperor’s Cabinet. In fact, on one occasion,
when an ofHcial who had been attacked in the Kohleol took the precaution of
printing a special number for the Er.peror, omitting the incriminating article,
means were found to bring an original, unexpurgated copy into the Emperor’s
hands.
In the matter
of the Censorship, as on other great questions, the Emperor vacillated. In
February, 1856, on the occasion of the performance of Count Vladimir
Sollogub’s play, The Chmovnik (The Official), he expressed himself in favour of
outspoken criticism. In 1859, he agreed,
in
conversation with Isakoff, that publicity was indispensable; “ only,” he said,
“ with us it takes a bad direction.” .In 1860, Alexander Nikitenko, who had
been placed in 1859 at the head of the Committee on the affairs of the Press,
wrote : “ for literature there has come a very unfavourable epoch; the chief
thing is that the Emperor is strongly set against it ”; and in 1862: “ now we
have a thoroughgoing reaction.”
The
Commission of 1863, which collected information from France, Germany, England
and Belgium, preceded the law of 1865. This Act tried to make a transition from
the system of preliminary Censorship so strongly opposed by Aksakoff to that of
legal punishment, but all the fundamental guarantees were wanting. The punitive
powers belonged not to the law Courts, but to the Minister; the accused had no
right to be heard; the punishment was not confined to the offender; the offence
was not defined, by the law; the accuser was the judge. The result was that,
after an attempt on the Emperor’s life in 1866, terrorism and hysteria
prevailed. Journals were suppressed right and left. The public, to which the
journals appealed, was as unstable as in the days of Nicholas. In 1863, Hertzen
wrote sympathetically of the insurgent Poles, and the circulation of the
Kololcol fell from 2500 in 1861 to 500. In 1866, he wrote strongly against
Karakozoff’s attempt on the Tsar, and alienated Radical sympathy. Katkoff, on
the other hand, attained power and influence, by the genuine patriotism of his
articles on the Polish question. In 1862, the Moscow Gazette had a circulation
of 6000. In 1865, its circulation had risen to 12,000, and he was able
successfully to withstand the Censor. But he was the exception, and from 1862
to 1868 the Press deteriorated rapidly. Repressive laws were applied to the
Press in 1866, 1867, in 1872, and in 1873. Between 1865 and January, 1880, no
less than 167 warnings were issued to the Press, and 52 publications were
stopped.
The date of
the reaction from the reforming spirit which inspired the earlier part of the
reign cannot be definitely fixed. In a despotism, even with a clear-sighted,
determined, and experienced head, there are always undercurrents. In Russia,
from 1855 onwards, there was a whirlpool of undercurrents which make it almost
impossible to gauge the force and direction of the stream at any given moment.
The causes of the reaction are among the most interesting phenomena which the
historian of this period will have to trace, when all the necessary documentary
evidence is forthcoming, and when a sufficient length of time has elapsed to
make a proper perspective possible. At present only a rough sketch is possible,
and one that must reflect the confusion of the time.
First and
foremost, there was the thoroughly Russian characteristic, a feeling of profound
despair which quickly succeeded confident enthusiasm, as each of the great
reforms failed to bring about the complete regeneration of the whole Russian
Empire which its advocates had expected. Then there was the character of the
sovereign, cautious to the point of
vacillation
and always inclined to look back as well as forward. Then there was Russian
society with its inherent want of moral purpose and steadfastness, and the
continuous internal conflict, due to its being largely composed of men who were
both officials and landowners. For thirty years these men had been bound hand
and foot and ruled with a rod of iron. Now that freedom had come, they were,
with the exception of a small minority, too benumbed in spirit to take
advantage of it, and too much aghast at the speed and thoroughness of the
transformation the Empire was undergoing, to become accustomed to the new order
of things. In the opinion of the enlightened few, the reforms had been too long
deferred; a gradual start should have been made at an earlier epoch; now it was
too late for half-measures.
It has
already been indicated that one great reason of the failure of the reforms was
the terrible dearth of competent administrators for ordinary posts. But it is
true that previous despotic reigns, by keeping society aloof from politics, had
not only prevented the growth of such administrators, but also had turned men’s
minds to speculative philosophy. This speculative direction was now encouraged
by the daily Press, especially in St Petersburg, which showed a total want of
moral and political principle in the use of the newly acquired freedom. The
wildest socialist and materialist ideas were now openly as well as secretly
preached to the Russian youth of both sexes. The Government might have looked
to society for some sound element to oppose the new and dangerous movement
which culminated in revolutionary Nihilism. But society still regarded the
Government as its foe, and neither the defenders nor the opponents of the new
institutions had any faith in the courage or sincerity of the Administration.
The policy of the Emperor, in entrusting the execution of the reforms to
bureaucrats who were hostile to the policy in question, was intended no doubt
as a measure of conciliation, but it conciliated no one, and was only regarded
as a sign of weakness. Therefore, the enemies of the new reforms openly opposed
the Government, while the friends of the new reforms did not support the
Government, and the Government, for its part, did not stand by its own friends.
The extraordinary result was that the Liberals bitterly attacked anyone who
said a word in favour of the Government as a hireling in search of a career,
and he received no protection from the imperial Administration.
In these
circumstances, Socialism, with its secret organisation, advanced by leaps and
bounds. At the very time of the emancipation secret proclamations were being
issued advocating the destruction, not only of the whole imperial family, but
also of the nobility and the highest official classes. The Universities were
seething with disaffection, and the Government did not know what to do with
them. Harsh measures were tried, but only increased the trouble. Incendiary
fires took place in St Petersburg, which were ascribed to the secret organisation.
Investigations showed that the agitation was confined to the educated
proletariate,
and was practically the product of the Universities and Technical Schools, such
as the Medical Academy and the Agricultural Institute. The Government, which in
response to a demand for a scientific and practical, as opposed to a classical,
education, had encouraged scientific studies, now discovered, to its
astonishment, that there seemed to be some occult connexion between natural
science and revolutionary tendencies. The young persons supposed to be
preparing for a commercial and industrial career were, it now appeared,
devoting their time to pknning the reconstruction of society; and, when they
wished to put their plans into practice, they naturally came into collision
with the police. Exile by deportation increased enormously. From 1853 to 1862
there were 101,230, and from 1863 to 1874 there were 146,380 persons deported
to Siberia. In the country the detailed work of the reforms went slowly but
surely forward In the largest towns, and especially in the two capitals, there
was an unexampled ferment of excitement. To make matters worse, there arose
foreign troubles. First came the Polish insurrection. The Poles proved unable
to profit by the benevolent intentions of the Emperor, who had shown himself,
in the case of Finland, ready to go far to meet national susceptibilities by
granting a distinctive coinage in 1860, and in some other respects.
The Poles,
however, were not content with gradual progress. They desired all or nothing,
and their ambitions not only involved rebellion against Russian government, but
went beyond the Peace of 1815, and claimed for Poland the boundaries of 1772,
thus provoking the resentment of Austria and Prussia as well. The economic
condition of Poland in 1855 was remarkable.. The nobility, as sole proprietors
of the land, and entitled to demand forced labour from their peasants, enjoyed
a position of great wealth and influence. The peasantry, on the other hand,
were, in general, the mere chattels of their masters, with no land of their
own, and impoverished by the burden of forced labour. The Agricultural Society
founded in 1855 by Count Andrew Zamoiski, with the object of affording a centre
for all efforts to ameliorate the condition of the peasants, became, before
long, the rallying-point of public spirit. Its aim was nothing less than the
settlement of the peasant question, which would have gained immense popularity
for the society, but the imperial Government determined to secure for itself
any credit that could be gained in this way. By a ukase of March, 1861,
concessions were granted in the shape of a separate Ministry of Instruction and
Public Worship, under Marquis Alexander Vielopolski, who had persuaded the
Emperor to adopt a policy of conciliation. Elective Boards were established in
every province and district, with the power of representing the local needs to
a Council of State sitting at Warsaw. Before these institutions could have a
fair trial, there were differences between Vielopolski and Zamoiski, and the
Governor-General Prince Michael Gorchakoff suddenly suppressed the Agricultural
Society on April 6,
1861.
Throughout the year, demonstrations took place, repeatedly checked by the
Cossacks, who fired upon the passive crowds. In 1862, the Grand Duke
Constantine was appointed Viceroy, with Vielopolski as Vice-President of the
Council, and Director of the Civil Administration; but, in spite of reforms,
including the reopening of the University of Warsaw, which had been closed since
1832, and the adoption of Polish as the official language, disaffection
increased. Repeated attempts were made on the lives of the Viceroy and
Vielopolski; the secret national organisation extended its activity; the
neighbouring Russian provinces were affected.
At the
commencement of 1863, the revolution broke out. The insurgents were unarmed and
unorganised, and the insurrection was an act of national despair. It was
relentlessly repressed, and every remnant of Polish autonomy was obliterated.
The most important consequence of the rebellion, for Poland, was the economic
revolution embodied in the law of 1864—the work of Prince Vladimir Cherkasky
and Nicholas Miliutin. The rebellion had been carried out by wealthy nobles;
the peasants had remained inactive. As a reward for their loyalty, and as a
measure of precaution against the power of the nobility, half the land was
bestowed as freehold property upon the peasant holders, who were at the same
time freed from all obligation to work on the estates of the large proprietors.
No change was made in the peasants’ undefined right of access to the nobles’
forest-land and pastures, as it was the aim of the Government to perpetuate the
difference of interest between the two classes and to complete the incorporation
of Poland with Russia. To this radical measure, and to the effect of the tariff
of 1877, is due the marvellous subsequent development of Polish industry,
which has bound Poland and Russia with chains of self-interest likely to prove
a serious obstacle to the realisation of Polish hopes of independence.
The most
important consequence of the rebellion, for Russia, was an outburst of
patriotic feeling, in which Michael Katkoff took the lead, which not only
strongly supported the Emperor in his attitude of resistance to the
interference of Foreign Powers in Polish affairs, but which set the seal of
public approval on the policy of repression followed by Muravieff in Lithuania,
by Erast Dlotovsky in Livonia, and by Michael Annenkoff in the south-western governments,
and on the policy of Russification in matters both political and religious,
henceforth remorselessly applied in European Russia. Yet, in spite of the
patriotic enthusiasm of Katkoff, and the renascence of Panslavism, the revolutionary
movement grew and prospered in the heart of the Empire; and the new ideas were
strengthened, if not by missionary efforts among the people, yet, in
considerable measure, by the exile of their advocates to distant parts of the
Empire, where they were hitherto unknown. The escape of Michael Bakunin from
Siberia, in 1864, marked a new era in the development of militant Nihilism,
which was more clearly defined in the programme put forward at the Nihilist
Congress at Basel, in 1869,
and received
a great impulse from the action of the Paris Commune in 1871. Michael Bakunin
preached the destruction of all existing political institutions; Nicholas
Chernishevsky grafted on this negative doctrine the views of socialism; Peter
Lavroff advocatectethe necessity of going among the people to enlighten and
instruct them. The first-fruits of these efforts were seen in the attempt of
Karakozoff on the life of the Tsar in 1866, and the foundation of the special
organ the Narodmoye Dyelo (the Cause of the People), at Geneva, in 1870. Two
classes played an unexpected part in the spread of the new doctrines, which
included atheism, namely, descendants of priests of the Orthodox Church and
persons of Jewish descent—a nationality which enjoyed a far greater measure of
toleration under Alexander II than was accorded to them in the,preceding or the
succeeding;reign. Women also were especially conspicuous; and the educated
proletariate furnished 99 per cent, of the revolutionaries, whose enthusiasm
and audacity present, at the end of this period, a striking contrast not only
to the indifference and torpor of society, hut also to the moral isolation and
indecision of the governing classes.
Through all
the changes and commotions in the interior, Russian external policy was
unmoved.: Prince Alexander Gorchakoff had given the word, “La Russie ne boude
pas, elle se recueille'"; and recueillement was her attitude to Western
Europe during 1856-70, except when Prussia required her support. That steady
support was granted, on the whole, during the quarrel of Prussia with Austria,
and, without qualification, in the, transactions leading to the Franco-German
War.
But. in
Central Asia, in the Far East, and in South-Eastern Europe, the attitude of the
Government of Alexander II at once maintained Russian prestige, and gratified
the national pride and amhition. The question of Central Asia was early brought
home by the embassies sent by the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara to congratulate
the Emperor on his accession. Musaffar-ed-din, the then Amir of Bokhara, had openly
sympathised with the Khokandians in their efforts to retake Fort Perovski.
Those efforts were supplemented by the pillage of caravans, which kept the
frontier in a ferment. In 1863, Michael Chemaieff, starting from the basin of
the Ili, marched southwards against Ali Alta, while Colonel Verevkin, from a
base on the Sir Darya, marched eastwards on Hazrat; the two columns then
combined, and captured Chimkent. This advance gave alarm to Great Britain,
which had long felt apprehension on behalf of India; and Prince Gorchakoff
deemed it wise to issue a circular note to the Powers, explaining the policy
which was being carried out, and defending the action of Russia on the plea of
necessity (1864). This note pointed out the dilemma in which civilised States are
placed when in contact with wandering tribes. They find it impossible to live
in unity with such neighbours, and must establish a system of control, or see
their frontiers a prey to chronic disorder. But, when the frontier tribes are
subdued, they in their turn are exposed to the aggression of
more distant
tribes; and hence the frontier line must be extended until it come into contact
with a regularly organised State, which , can maintain order within its
borders. Prince Gorchakoff declared that the protection of her own frontier,
and not encroachment upon the territory of others, was Russia’s object. To the
commanders on the spot, however, perpetual advance seemed the only practical
policy. Thus, Chernaieff, learning that a strong body of Khokandians were
gathered at Tashkent, immediately marched against them without waiting to be
attacked. His first attempt at Tashkent (October 2, 1864) failed; but a second,
undertaken in direct defiance of the orders of the Tsar, succeeded in reducing
the town. In 1865, Turkestan was constituted a frontier district with Tashkent
as its capital.
Russia had,
by this time, subdued the whole of Eastern Turkestan, and only the Khanates
remained to be dealt with. The struggle was immediately renewed. In December,
1865, the Amir of Bokhara assumed the offensive on behalf of the three
Khanates, occupied the city of Khoz- hend, and imprisoned four Russian envoys.
General Dmitry Romanovsky, who was sent against him, encountered him at Irgai,
where a great battle, reminding one in some respects of Plassey, was fought on
May 20, 1866; and Khozhend was taken by the Russians. A ukase signed in 1867
placed Turkestan under a Governor-General, whose authority extended over the
provinces of Sir Darya and Semirechensk, the latter including all the territory
between the lakes of Balkash and Issik-Kul. General Constantine von Kaufmann,
who was appointed to establish the Government, began by making overtures of
peace to the Amir of Bokhara. No reply was vouchsafed, but the Amir instead
massed his troops for an attack on the Russian outposts. Without waiting for
this, Kaufmann pushed on to Samarkand, and, after defeating the united Khivan
and Bokharan host, received the surrender of the city on May 12,
1868. Leaving a small garrison in the city, he
pushed on, with his main force, against the Amir. During his absence, the
townspeople introduced reinforcements, and for three days closely besieged the
little garrison. This act of treachery was punished by Kaufmann, on his return,
by an indiscriminate massacre. The submission of the Amir was complete; and a
treaty was signed between Russia and Bokhara on June 18, 1868, the chief
articles of which were the cession of the province of Zerafehan to Russia, the
payment of a war indemnity, and the right of trading throughout the Khanates to
all Russian subjects.
The reduction
of Khiva was a corollary to that of Bokhara. In the year following the conquest
of Samarkand, Khivan bands penetrated the steppes of the Orenburg government,
and urged the Russian Kirghiz to revplt. The troubles, which then arose,
continued till 1872, when rumours of an intended expedition reached England,
and occasioned sa much anxiety that Count Peter Shuvaloff was despatched to
London to explain the intentions of Russia. According to his statement, which
632 Reduction of Khiva and Khokand. —Alaska.
[i86i-76
was repeated
to Parliament by Lord Granville, the sole object of the expedition about to be
despatched to Khiva, was to punish acts of brigandage^ to recover fifty Russian
prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could not be
continued with impunity. In regard to the suggested desire of the Tsar to annex
Khiva, Count Shuvaloff declared that not only was it far from the intention of
the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been given to
prevent it. In March, 1873, an expedition consisting of three Russian columns
advanced simultaneously against Khiva. After a short bombardment, and before a
final assault was made, the city capitulated, and a treaty of peace was signed,
the terms of which were entirely contrary to the declared intentions of Russia,
whose representatives subsequently stated that an expression of intention did
not amount to a solemn pledge given for all time. The terms included the
cession to Russia of the entire territory of Khiva on the right bank of the
Oxus together with the delta of the river, the payment of a large indemnify,
and the relegation of the Khan to the position of a dependent. In 1875 Kaufmann
invaded Khokand, and defeated the Khokandians at Makhran. In 1876 the capital
was occupied by a force under SkobelefF, and after several engagements, in
which the native forces were defeated, Khokand was declared a portion of the
Russian empire,1 under the name of Ferghana, with General Michael
SkobelefF as its first Governor. Russia was thus in possession of the whole of
Eastern Central Asia.
During the
alarm caused in England by the conquest of Samarkand, Prince Gorchakoff, in a
note of February 24, 1869, instructed the Russian ambassador, Baron Brunnow, to
inform Lord Clarendon that the Tsar considered Afghanistan entirely outside the
Russian sphere of activity in Asia, and that it had at no time entered his mind
to interfere with the independence of that country. In 1872 he agreed with Lord
Granville to delimit the Afghan frontier by an imaginary line, running from old
Sarakhs to Khoja Saleh on the Oxus, and excluding Russia from the oasis of
Pendjeh. On the Chinese frontier, a Mohammadan adventurer, named Jakub Beg, established
himself in 1866 as ruler of Kashgar; and his growing power excited the jealousy
of the Russians, who created a fortress at Naryn and occupied the district of
Kulja in 1870.
In the Far
East the favourable results of the Treaty of Aigun (1860) have been already
indicated. The course of Russian diplomacy in China and Japan is elsewhere
described, but the important transactions with reference to Russian policy in
America need some notice. On December 31, 1861, there expired the last charter
of the Russian American Company, to which in 1799 the trade and regulation of
the Russian possessions in the region now known as Alaska had been confided.
Prince Maksutoff was appointed to administer the affairs of the territory! In
1864 authority was granted to an American company to explore the territory with
a view to establishing an overland telegraph line. This
1834-73] Persia.—The Danubian Principalities. 633
led to
important investigations in the Yukon district, commenced in 1865 by Robert
Kenhicott and others. In 1867 negotiations were initiated by the United States
with the Russian Government which had no idea of the value of the territory,
but was only acquainted with the difficulties and expense of its
administration. These negotiations were terminated by the formal sale of the
territory for 7,200,000 dollars, on October 18, 1867, to the United States.
On August
25,1859, the long struggle of Shamil against Russia was concluded by his
surrender, and the Eastern Caucasus was pacified. The tribes of the Western Caucasus
offered a longer resistance, being supported by the Turks, who secretly
supplied arms, by the English, who subscribed money, and by the French, whose
ambassador in Constantinople openly took the side of the Tcherkesses. Thanks,
however, to the energy and local knowledge of General Nicholas Evdokimoff, good
progress was made. Early in 1863 the Grand Duke Michael was named Viceroy of
the Caucasus, and in June, 1864, he was able to report that the country was
completely subdued. The Caspian became practically a Russian lake in 1869.
Since that time no ships flying the Persian flag have been allowed upon it;
none but Russian companies may navigate it; and the transport of goods by sea
is secured to Russia. The relations of Russia to Persia at this time were based
upon a series of treaties between Great Britain and Russia beginning in 1834.
The first of these, signed by Lord Palmerston in 1834, affirms the desire of
the British Government to maintain the independence and integrity of Persia.
This agreement was confirmed in 1838, and again in 1839, by an exchange of
notes between Count Charles Robert Nesselrode and Lord Palmerston, when the
latter accepted with satisfaction the declaration of the imperial Cabinet that
it did not harbour any design hostile to the interests of Great Britain in
India, that its own policy with regard to Persia remained unchanged, and was no
other than that which the two Powers had in 1834 agreed to adopt. On July 2,
1873, Lord Granville informed the Persian Grand Vizier of the understanding
arrived at in 1834, and communicated what had passed to the Russian ambassador,
who expressed satisfaction.
In his
relations to the Turkish Empire both in Asia and Europe, /llmrgntW II was
guided by two principles—his desire to protect the Slav Christians, and his
determination to free Russia from the clauses of the Treaty of Paris relating
to the Black Sea and Bessarabia, which he considered derogatory to her.
Consequently, he took part in the Conference which met at Paris in 1858 and
placed the Danubian Principalities under Hospodars, elected by representatives,
with a reservation of Turkish suzerainty; and, as elsewhere described, gave his
support to the union of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1861, under the name of
Roumania. He gave moral assistance to the French Emperor in 1859 in the
question of Italian unity, as against Austria; and, had he not been estranged
by
the
subsequent Sardinian invasion of the Papal States, his joint action with France
in regard to Syria in 1860 might have led to a complete understanding between
himself and Napoleon with regard to the future of Turkey. In 1863 Alexander
joined England and France in recognising Prince William of Denmark as George,
King of the Hellenes; and in 1864 he approved of the British surrender of the
protectorate of the Ionian Islands, and of their incorporation in the kingdom
of Greece. With the appointment of. General Nicholas Ignatieff in 1865 as ambassador
at Constantinople, a more active policy commenced, which was accentuated by the
enthusiasm excited in Russia by the Panslavist Congress, held at Moscow in
1867. In 1866 Russian diplomacy persuaded the Turks to evacuate Belgrade and
the Servian fortresses, and in 1869 procured the recognition by the Porte of
Milan IV as King of Servia, on the murder of his uncle, Prince Milan
Obrenovitch. The action of Alexander was less fortunate in the matter of Crete,
when the inhabitants rose against Turkey in 1866. He invited England and France
to join him in obtaining the autonomy of that island. England refused, and the
proposals of the Powers were negatived by Turkey. Greece intervened with armed
force; but Prince Gorchakoff brought about a Conference at Paris in 1869 which
imposed neutrality on King George, and left the Cretans to fight their own battle.
In 1869 appeared Nicholas Danilevsky’s famous book Russia and Europe, which
contained the gospel of Panslavism and proclaimed the mission of Russia as a
civilising power. In Bulgaria the struggle for freedom, which commenced in
1870, received tbe support of Ignatieff; and the first substantial result was
obtained by the establishment of an exarchate independent of the Patriarch at
Constantinople in 1872, and the consequent recognition of the freedom of the
national Church. .
In 1870 the
Franco-German War gave . Alexander the desired opportunity for the repudiation
of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, which forbade Russia to
construct naval arsenals on the coast of the Black Sea, and closed those waters
to all ships of war. This step excited considerable enthusiasm in Russia, and
was followed by a Conference of the Treaty Powers in London in 1871 On March
13, 1871, a treaty was executed by the Powers abrogating the clauses of the
Treaty of Paris which limited the naval rights of Russia on the Black Sea, but
affirming the Sultan’s rights to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to
warships. On March 18, a convention was signed between Russia and Turkey,
declaring that each Power had the right to maintain fleets of any size in the
Black Sea.
The following
year (1872) saw the termination of the long estrangement of Russia from
Austria, and the culmination of the long friendship with the House of
Hohenzollem, in the conclusion of the Triple Alliance between the three
Emperors, which was for sixteen years to be the main factor in European
politics.
1853-8] Fanatical outbreaks against Christians.
635
(2) THE BALKAN LANDS.
Through the
inopportune intervention of Russia the question of the Holy Places merged into
wider issues, and, after occupying the chancelleries of Europe for many months,
passed out of the domain of diplomacy to the arbitrament of the sword (July 3,
1853). The story of the Crimean War is told elsewhere; its chief results for
Turkey were the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian
Principalities and o£ the Tsar’s claim to a special right of intervention on
behalf of the Christian subjects of the Sultan; the closing of the straits to
the warships of all nations; and, especially, Turkey’s formal admission into
the family of European Powers. In return for this concession and for the
guarantee of her independence and the integrity of her territory, which looms
large in the : Treaty of Paris, the hatt-i- Houmayoun of 1856, whereby the
principles of the tanzimat are reaffirmed and amplified, was incorporated in
that international Act. The proviso however was made that the signatory Powers
could base on this insertion no claim to intervene on behalf of the Christians
of Turkey.
It might have
been hoped that the fact that three Christian States had just taken the
Sultan’s side in a great war against another'Christian Power would have induced
the statesmen and people of Turkey to adopt and. endeavour to carry out really
effective measures of reform, and to establish the proclaimed equality of all
classes of Ottoman subjects otherwise than theoretically and on paper. But the
occurrence, not long after the conclusion of the treaty, of several fanatical
outbreaks, proved once more how deep-seated were the animosities of the different
nationalities. The first of these, which occurred at Jedda in June, 1858, is
said to have been due to the ill-considered action of certain European
officials in hauling down the Turkish flag which had been hoisted on a vessel
purchased by an Ottoman subject, though the formalities of registration had not
been completed. Immediately mobs began to assemble in the streets, and a rush
was made for the foreign consulates, where the inmates were murdered. The
comparatively few Christian residents in the town, mostly Greeks, were then
slaughtered: it is to their lasting honour that not one of them accepted the
offer made them by the mob of saving their lives by apostasy to Islam. England
and France, whose Consuls had been killed, took vigorous action : the chief
Turkish officials were held responsible and publicly executed; and the fact
that fifty years later the respective embassies are still occasionally busied
with claiming from the Turkish treasury the arrears of annuities due to
relatives of the murdered Consuls furnishes another example of the proverbial
longevity of pensioners. The energy displayed after the event by the two Powers
produced a salutary impression on the ultra-fanatical population of Jedda; and
nearly forty years elapsed before the next murderous attack on a consular
official there.
Disturbances
next broke out in 1860 in Syria and the Lebanon, which, if not actually
instigated by the local authorities, at least took place with their connivance;
it has been alleged that the central Government was acting with the settled
purpose of punishing the population for having assisted Mehemet Ali in his
designs of conquest. If this incredible story be true, it argues an astonishing
lack of foresight on the part of the Porte. For the Syrian troubles were nearly
the cause of the permanent occupation of the country by France, who, while
loyally cooperating with England in the cause of reform, never lost sight of
her own interests. The Turkish ambassador in Paris, the distinguished Ahmed
Vefyk Effendi, succeeded in protracting negotiations with Drouyn de Lhuys until
Fuad Pasha had arrived in Syria with 20,000 troops, and all danger of French
conquest was at an end. A European Commission, in which Lord Dufferin made his
first appearance in diplomacy, drew up on June 9,1861, a Constitution for the
Lebanon which, with slight modifications, has worked not unsatisfactorily until
the present day. It provides for the nomination, by the representatives of the
Five Powers at Constantinople, in conjunction with the Porte, of a Christian
(hitherto always a Roman Catholic) Governor for the Lebanon, appointed for five
years but eligible for reelection.
On June 25,
1861, Abd-ul-Mejid died; he was succeeded by his brother Abd-ul-Aziz, in whose
reign Turkey was not destined to enjoy more repose than in that of his
predecessor. Soon after Prince Dartilo’s death in 1860, disturbances in
Montenegro called for serious efforts on Turkey’s part before they could be
suppressed. On May 13, 1858, the Montenegrins had inflicted a crushing defeat
on a Turkish expedition at Grahovo. Frontier incidents and an insurrection in
the Herzegovina led to a renewal of the war in 1862; the superior armaments and
discipline of Omar Pasha’s troops overcame the valour of the mountaineers;
Cettinje was invested, and on August 81,1862, the Convention of Scutari was
concluded, whereby the Montenegrins were precluded from building forts on the
frontier and from importing arms.
Servia, the
Principalities, and Crete were successively the scene of disturbances. At last
Turkey, exasperated by the assistance openly afforded to the Cretan insurgents
by the Hellenic Government, on December 11, 1868, presented an ultimatum. This
required within five days compliance with five points, which provided for the
cessation of the formation of bands and the equipment of ships in Greece
destined for acts of aggression against Turkey. These terms being rejected, a
rupture of relations ensued, and Hobart Pasha, a retired British naval officer
in command of the Turkish fleet, threatened the Greek coasts with a blockade.
European diplomacy intervened, and a Conference of ambassadors met at Paris on
January 8,1869. The scope of the deliberations was limited to the five points
comprised in the Turkish ultimatum; and at its sixth sitting on January 28,
1869, the Conference decided
that a
declaration should be forwarded to Athens calling on the Hellenic Government to
comply with the Turkish demands. Greece, more than usually unprepared for a
conflict with Turkey, accepted this declaration on February 6, 1869, and
diplomatic relations were resumed; the grant on January 10, 1869, of a
Constitution providing Crete with a measure of local self-government calmed for
a time the turbulence of the islanders.
Meanwhile,
Turkey had taken advantage of the complaisance of the European investor to
accumulate an enormous debt in successive loans, the proceeds of which were
squandered in unproductive and useless expenditure. By 1865 it had become
apparent that the interest on the debt could be met only by contracting fresh
liabilities; but the inevitable bankruptcy was staved off for several years.
The Sultan was able to count on the prodigality of his vassal, the Viceroy of
Egypt, to supplement his resources; besides a large addition to the annual tribute,
vast sums were given as bakshish by Ismail in order to obtain the increase of
his privileges, and, especially, the alteration of the law of succession. The
firmans granted on May 27,1866, and June 8, 1867, conferred on the Viceroy the
title of Khedive (the equivalent of ruler or lord) and settled the succession
on his eldest son. Until then the inheritance had devolved on the oldest male
of the family, irrespective of relationship; this is still the rule followed in
the House of Osman, being a custom derived from the original nomadic condition
of the Turks, when the leadership of a child was obviously out of the question.
Abd-ul-Aziz was the more readily inclined to make the change, as he was medi
ating a similar alteration of the succession to the Ottoman throne in favour of
his son Youssouf Izz-ed-din, which, however, owing to adverse public opinion,
he was unable to effect. ■
In 1867, the
Sultan, accompanied by his nephew, the present Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid, and by his
Foreign Minister Fuad Fasha, travelled to England and fiance—the first Ottoman
sovereign who had ever undertaken such a journey. Two years later various
European rulers and princes visited Constantinople on their way to the opening
of the Suez Canal.
The
transactions leading to the opening of the Suez Canal, which will be fully
described in another volume, need some notice here, however brief. To restore
the ancient waterway that led from the Nile to Suez and thence fall on the
flank of the Cape route to India was one of Napoleon’s dreams in 1798. A
generation later, the cutting of the isthmus formed a part of the nobly-planned
Mediterranean system” of international communications devised by Michel
Chevalier and popularised by the zeal of his fellow Saint-Simonians; and about
that time also some such scheme fascinated Ferdinand de Lesseps, then French
consul at Tunis. In 1847 the Saint-Simonian propaganda actually led to the
making of a survey.
The accession
of Said Pasha (1854-63) enabled Lesseps, who was his personal friend, to:secure
a comprehensive concession in that very year. Supplemented by a second document
of January, 1856, it promised to the unborn Company land and materials for the
maritime canal and the sweet water canal, claims over all the area which the
latter would irrigate, generous exemptions from taxes, and the corvie labour of
the fellahin. Later in the year a strong international committee of engineers
blessed Lesseps’ plan. In 1855 he had opened his long campaign for Turkish
recognition and European support, through the Press, public meetings, the
chancelleries and the embassies. He won much sympathy; but for three years his
plans broke against the wills of two old men— Stratford Canning and
Palmerston—who could not believe that this scheme of a retired French diplomatist
was other than a continuation of the old struggle between France and Britain
for the control of the East. At length, however, in 1858, Lesseps, assured of
the benevolent attitude of his own and the Austrian Governments, started his
Company without the formal approval of the Porte, and work began in 1859. But
for a favourable report from Sir John Hawkshaw, in Said’s last days, Ismai'1,
who succeeded him as Khedive in 1863, might have stopped the work altogether.
He withdrew the corvee labour, resumed much of the expropriated land, and took
over the sweet water canal—giving the Company compensation on a scale fixed by
Napoleon III as arbitrator (1866), in which year the Porte gave a belated
sanction to the enterprise.
Three years
later the canal was opened. Its success was immediate and the bulk of, the
tonnage that passed through it was British. But, as Englishmen had subscribed
very little capital, England was not possessed of influence in proportion to
her interests, until Disraeli, by buying Ismail’s shares in 1876, made the
Government which had steadily opposed the canal the greatest of the Company’s
shareholders.
To return
again, after this slight digression to an event which was to influence deeply
the future of Turkey, to the mere purely internal affairs of the Ottoman
Empire. A noteworthy proceeding was the grant of the firman establishing the
Bulgarian Exarchate as a separate religious community (March 10, 1870). The
Bulgarians had long resented the tyranny of the Greeks in ecclesiastical and
educational matters, and towards 1860, under French instigation, had seriously
contemplated joining the Church of Bome. Several revolutionary outbreaks, which
the Turks strove to characterise as mere acts of brigandage, had occurred; and
in 1868 one band, under Hajji Dimitr, had crossed the Danube and had penetrated
as far inland as Kezanlik, before encountering serious opposition. Russia,
gradually improving her relations with Turkey, took advantage of her growing
strength and of the Porte’s apprehensions to press for the concession of an
independent Church to the Bulgarians, her
fellow-worshippers
and fellow-Slavs; and Turkey eventually yielded, in spite of the protestations
and warnings of the Oecumenical Patriarch. The Phanar finally fulminated a
decree of excommunication against the adherents of the new ecclesiastical
denomination, whose only point of divergence from the Orthodox Church lay in
the fact that they used in their liturgy the Bulgarian instead of the Greek
language. The effect was at first to produce among the Bulgarians a feeling of
unbounded loyalty towards the Sultan. But this evanescent sentiment soon gave
way to the awakening consciousness of nationality, and the Exarchate Firman of
1870 was the direct forerunner of the Bulgarian insurrections of 1875-6, just
as these led in turn to the Russo-Turkish War and the loss of Bulgaria to
Turkey.
The
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, by crippling for a time the power of France,
offered to Russia an opportunity of which she was not slow to take advantage. There
is indeed little doubt that her neutrality had been conceded at the outbreak of
the war on condition that Prussia would allow her, if circumstances permitted,
to denounce those clauses of the Treaty of Paris which she found most galling,
i.e. those which restricted her sovereign rights in the Euxine. Far-sighted
statesmen had long foreseen that these restrictions would not be endured by
Russia indefinitely, and Lord Palmerston had prophesied that they would last
only ten years. When it became clear that France could not move and that
England would be left alone to assume the championship of the treaty, the
Russian Chancellor, by a note dated October 81, 1870, denounced the articles of
the Treaty of Paris which limited Russia’s naval forces and armaments in the
Black Sea. This action was based on the allegation that infractions of the
treaty had already occurred in the modifications of the status of the Principalities,
and in the passage of the straits by certain warships, contrary to its
provisions. Europe found no satisfactory rejoinder to this application of the
theory that one breach of an engagement, if established, justifies another. The
British Government was obliged to state that, while treaties in a general way
were binding, Russia might have asked for the revision of such of the
provisions of the Treaty of Paris as pressed unduly on her, and that in that
event Her Majesty’s Government would have taken her wishes into consideration.
The upshot was that a Conference met in London, and on March IS, 1871, a
treaty was signed restoring to both Russia and Turkey the power of possessing
unrestricted naval forces in the Black Sea.
The outbreak
of the Crimean War was hailed by the anti-Turkish party in Greece as the
long-awaited opportunity of freeing their compatriots from the Turkish yoke.
Russia’s triumph was looked upon as certain, the King and Queen actively
supported the policy of aggression, and the Greeks hastened to carry out the
armed invasion of Thessaly
and Epirus.
Some 6000 men took part in the inroad, which was little more than brigandage
and cattle-lifting on an unusually large scale. Turkey’s official patience gave
way, and all Greek subjects were expelled from the empire; when at last the
Turkish troops came up, the invaders offered little resistance. Finally,
England and France interfered: on April 22, 1854, England .threatened Greece
that, if she persisted in squandering her scanty resources in attacking Turkey,
it would become necessary to insist on compliance with those clauses of the treaty
establishing King Otho on the throne which made the payment of the interest on
the guaranteed loan a first charge on the state revenues. In May, 1854, the
Piraeus was occupied by English and French troops, which remained in occupation
until February, 1857. King Otho was required by England and France to give an
undertaking that Greece would preserve strict neutrality during the continuance
of the war, failing which Athens would be occupied by Anglo-French troops at
the cost of the country. By her ill-considered and unsuccessful action Greece
thus lost the respect of friends and foes alike, and sacrificed the prestige
gained during the war of independence. The continuance of brigandage in
particular compromised Greece seriously in the eyes of Europe, and directly
resulted in prolonging the foreign occupation of the Piraeus.
During the
Paris Conference the guaranteeing Powers decided to take measures for the
amelioration of Greek affairs: and a commission was sent to enquire into the
state of the finances. But the divergence of views between the three Powers
prevented any good result. On May 4,
1859, the Commission published its report, in
which attention is directed to the manifold shortcomings of the Government in
financial matters, and the conclusion is drawn that a sum of 900,000 francs,
subject to eventual increase, should be paid annually by Greece towards the
interest and sinking-fund of the guaranteed oan; in June, 1860, Greece agreed
to these terms, but failed to carry them out.
Meanwhile,
the unpopularity of the King and Queen increased daily; The war of 1859 between
Austria and Italy brought out strongly the divergence between the Court, which
was entirely in favour of Austria, and the people, whose sympathies were
naturally with the Italians. Discontent prevailed throughout the army, and the
desire to rid the country of the Bavarian domination grew apace. Even the
frustration of an attempt to murder the Queen (September 18, 1861) failed to
restore popularity to the discredited royal pair. Five months later the
garrison of Nauplia openly revolted, and the mutiny was not suppressed for
nearly two months. The King endeavoured to gain favour by lending his support
to a visionary scheme for the invasion of Turkey in imitation of Garibaldi’s
successful raid, and by actively fomenting discontent against English rule in
the Ionian Islands. But the disaffection of the people was increased by the
doubts as to the succession to the throne. The Constitution of 1844 required
that King Otho’s
1862-3] Deposition of King Otho. Accession of
King George. Gil
successor
should be a member of the Orthodox Church, and the absence of a properly
qualified heir afforded a powerful argument to the anti- dynastic party.
Warnings of impending revolution were unheeded. In October, 1862, when the Bang
and Queen had left for a tour through the country, the revolt of the troops at
Vonitsa, near Arta, spread rapidly to the capital. On October 22, 1862, a
provisional Government was formed which declared the deposition of King Otho,
and announced the forthcoming convocation of a national assembly for the
election of his successor and the drawing up of a fresh constitution. King Otho
was unable to return to Athens, and on October 24,1862, he left Greece for
ever; five years later he died. His departure was for the guaranteeing Powers a
matter for neither surprise nor regret: all recognised the right of the Greek
people to expel a sovereign whose mismanagement and incompetence were
abundantly proved.
By the
treaties and protocols of 1832 it had been provided that no person connected
with the reigning families of the three guaranteeing Powers could be chosen to
occupy the Greek throne. On the deposition of King Otho England at once
proposed to France and Russia to reaffirm this principle, and the Cabinets of
Paris and St Petersburg expressed a praiseworthy desire to respect the choice
of the people of Greece, so long as any likelihood existed of its falling on a
prince of their respective nationalities. But they hastened to comply with the
British proposal when it became evident that the Greeks were determined to
elect Prince Alfred, afterwards Duke of Edinburgh. On December 4,1862, the
three Powers joined in a formal declaration excluding their princes from the
throne of Greece, which was communicated to the provisional Government on
December 13, 1862. But when the matter was referred to popular suffrage, out of
241,202 votes cast 230,016 were in favour of Prince Alfred and only 2400 for
the Russian candidate, the Duke of Leuchtenberg. England now felt it her duty
to show gratitude for the choice of an English prince, even though debarred
from accepting the proffered Crown. She accordingly notified the provisional
Government that if a suitable person were chosen as King, if the constitutional
form of government were preserved, and all attempt at aggression against Turkey
were abandoned, the Ionian Islands would be ceded to Greece.
After various
personages had refused the vacant throne, the choice eventually fell on Prince
William, the second son of King Christian of Denmark, who on March 30, 1863,
was unanimously elected as King George I. On June 5, 1863, the Powers entered
into a treaty by which they recognised the election; England undertook that the
legislature of the Ionian Islands, before the annexation to Greece was
effected, should vote a sum of <£10,000 annually to the King’s Civil
List—thus raised to j>45,000. Each of the three Powers consented to
relinquish in favour of King George an income of ,£4000— in all £*12,000—out of
the 900,000 francs which Greece had undertaken to pay annually in respect
of the
guaranteed loan. In compliance with these conditions effect was giyen on May
SO, 1864, to the constantly expressed desire of the Ionian legislature; and
this State, which by the treaty of 1815 had been placed under British
protection, but which had never properly realised the benefits derived by it
from an arrangement to which it was not a party, was annexed to Greece on
condition that the forts should be dismantled and that perpetual neutrality
should be observed. Popular satisfaction found expression at the time in songs
not complimentary to the late rulers; but it was not long before many regretted
the period when the only public works in the Islands had been carried out. Nor
were the islanders slow to appreciate the advantages of the Engl h sovereign as
a circulating medium over the unwelcome notes of the National Bank of Greece.
The
Provisional Government which managed the affairs of the country until King
George’s arrival was as incompetent to maintain order as its predecessors.
Civil war prevailed at Athens; on July 3, 1863, British, French and Russian
troops had to be landed for the protection of the Bank; and on the same day the
three Powers threatened a rupture of relations unless tranquillity was
restored. Some semblance of order was hereupon established; and King George’s
arrival on October 30,1863, found the National Assembly discussing the new
Constitution which was to take the place of that of 1844, abrogated by the revolution
of 1862. A year later, the new Constitution became law, being ratified on
November 28, 1864. Its provisions are of a strongly democratic chan cter, and
confer on the people liberties which have been allowed but too frequently to
degenerate into licence. One legislative Chamber was established, each member
receiving a salary of 2000 drachmae (,£80). The Senate created by the
Constitution of 1844 had distinguished itself mainly by illegally prolonging
its existence and therewith the enjoyment of its emoluments; the National
Assembly of 1862 in drafting the Constitution decided to dispense with a second
Chamber, more especially as Greece contained no class from which its members
could be supplied. But the total suppression of an upper Chamber being considered
too democratic a measure, it was agreed to create a Council of State—of from
fifteen to twenty members—named for ten years by the King upon the recommendation
of the Ministers. The duties of this body were to consist in preparing and
revising projects of law; but, in spite of the wishes of the King and his
Ministers, it was abolished by a vote of the Chamber on November 19,1865. The
Assembly thus freed itself from the one salutary check on its action; it has
since been the tool of ier'agogues, and subservient to the inordinately
sensitive and passionate public opinion, which is so marked a feature of the
modern Greek democracy.
The new
regime was more successful in establishing discipline in the army and order in
the administration than in constitution-making. Its
relations
with Turkey were far from cordial: reference has been made already to the
rupture over Cretan affairs in 1868-9. Brigandage continued to be the scourge
of the country until 1870, when a more than usually conspicuous outrage at
Marathon on April 11 of that year induced the Powers to adopt towards Greece so
peremptory a tone that efficacious measures were taken, and briguntiage
disappeared for many years.
During the
Russian occupation at the outset of the Crimean War, Russian Governors were
appointed to Bucharest and Jassy. When, in 1854, the Russian troops were
withdrawn from the Principalities, the Princes returned, accompanying the
Austrian army which took the place of the Russians. Prince Stirbey continued to
effect reforms, among these being the total emancipation of the gypsies: Prince
Ghyka, his colleague in Moldavia, followed a practically identical course of
action, and greatly contributed to the eventual union of the Principalities.
The two Princes’ septennate of office came to a close in 1856, the year of the
signature of the Treaty of Paris. By that instrument the portion of Bessarabia
bordering on the Danube was incorporated with Moldavia, and a European
Commission was instituted for regulating and supervising the navigation of the
river; Russian exclusive protection was suppressed, and Turkey Undertook to
maintain an independent and national administration for the Principalities. It
was further agreed that the existing laws should be revised by a special international
commission to be convoked at Bucharest, while a “divan ad hoc,” or Constituent
Assembly, was to meet in each of the Principalities to discuss and transmit to
the Commission the views of the population as to the definitive organisation of
the provinces; the Commission was to draw up its report without delay, and a
convention was to be concluded by the Powers and confirmed by a hatt-i-Sherif
which should in future constitute the organic charter of the provinces, placed
henceforth under the collective guarantee of the Powers signatory to the
treaty.
These
stipulations had been agreed to as a pis-aUer by England and France, whose
representatives at the Paris Conference had proposed the union of the
Principalities, a proposal strongly opposed by Austria and Turkey. It was at
once obvious that every obstacle would be placed in the way of a free
expression of opinion by the population. Tin-key appointed in each Principality
acting Governors, instead of commissions of lieutenancy, who worked
energetically against the union; Austrian intrigue was indefatigable in seeking
to pack the Divans and to limit their field of discussion ; moreover, England’s
advocacy of the union soon gave way to a less friendly attitude, through
apprehensions that it would be too favourable to Russian interests—a
consideration destined to weigh with her representatives at Berlin in the case
qf Bulgaria some twenty years later. France now took up the question
vigorously;
and Napoleon III in an interview at Osborne in August, 1857, sought to induce
Queen Victoria to acquiesce in the proposed union. But the fear of facilitating
Russian aggrandisement proved too strong; England would only agree to certain
internal measures of union ; and France was obliged to content herself with the
formal satisfaction of the annulling of the improperly conducted elections to
the Moldavian Divan, and the holding of fresh elections. ,
The Divans
met in September, 1857; and the Wallachian Divan decided on submitting to the
international commission at Bucharest the following desiderata: guarantee of
autonomy and neutrality for Moldo-Wallachia; union of Wallachia and Moldavia in
a single State with one (Government; appointment of a Prince belonging to some
European dynasty, with hereditary succession; establishment of constitutional.
representative government, with one Chamber, based on an extensive suffrage The
Moldavian Divan also voted the same four points. Turkey, much disappointed at
the result, proceeded to dissolve the two Divans. The ambassadors of the Powers
now assembled at Paris in May, 1858, and on August 19, 1858, concluded a
convention embodying a constitution proposed by France, which excluded a
political and administrative union. None the less it endowed the “ United
Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia,” as they were therein styled in an
official terminology savouring somewhat pf irony, with a large measure of
constitutional autonomy and some appearance of internal union: thus Moldavians
and Wallachians were declared eligible for any office in either principality.
Separate Hospodars (Princes), and separate elective assemblies, were provided
for each principality; but a Central Commission common to both was to sit at
Fokshani.
The
nomination of the two Princes was by the Convention referred to popular
suffrage under the superintendence of commissions of lieutenancy, consisting
of the three highest officials in each principality. But the Powers had not
taken into account the contingency of the choice of both principalities falling
on the same person. After many intrigues and much discussion, the Moldavian
electoral assembly on January 5,1859, unanimously elected as Prince of
Moldavia, Alexander John Couza, a colonel who had attracted favourable notice
by his resignation during the discussions attending the elections to the Moldavian
Divan. On Januaiy 23, 1859, the Wallachian assembly chose the same Candidate,
and the <( personal11 union of the two principalities,
so long the subject of opposition, became an accomplished fact. Austria indeed
showed signs of an intention to occupy the principalities, but the Italian war
claimed all her attention. On September 6, 1859 the Conference of ambassadors
sitting at Paris took formal cognisance of Turkey’s recognition of Prince
Couza’s nomination to both principalities, exceptionally and pro hac vice-,
and the first Prince of the United Principalities was left to enter upon his
sufficiently arduous
i$>5Q-m~\Roumania.
FallofCouza.AccessionqfPrinceCharles. 645-
It was soon
clear that this exceeded his ability: the working of the Constitution was
attended with constant difficulties, notwithstanding the modifications
successively introduced. By the first of theses the firman of December 6,1861,
the Porte consented to the abolition of the Central Commission and to the
establishment of a common Chamber and Ministry; subsequently, in the Convention
agreed to at Constantinople on June 28, 1864, provision was made for altering
the electoral law and instituting a Senate and a Council of State. By
endeavouring to confiscate the ecclesiastical properties, and by enfranchising
the peasants, Prince Couza incurred the enmity both of the Church and the
boyars. The unwise introduction of a government monopoly of tobacco put the
finishing stroke to his unpopularity. On February 23,1866, he was the victim of
the first of those nocturnal palace depositions which have since become the
regular methods of revolution in Balkan States; armed conspirators forced their
way into his apartments and compelled him to abdicate. A provisional Government
was formed and the nation was convoked for the election of a Prince belonging
to some foreign reigning House, though this was an infringement of the
Constitution of 1858. The people’s choice fell on the Count of Flanders,
younger brother of the King of the Belgians, but Turkey raised strong
objections and began to mass troops along the frontier.
The crisis
was ended temporarily by the refusal of the Count of Flanders to accept the
dignity offered him; Prince Charles of Hohen- zollem-Sigmaringen was next
elected by acclamation on April 20, 1866. The Powers at once protested, and the
Conference of ambassadors then sitting in Paris agreed, on April 24, 1866, at
the suggestion of the Russian ambassador, to instruct the foreign,
representatives at Bucharest to declare that the Convention of August 19, 1858,
restricted the choice of the assembly to a native, and, moreover, that, if a
majority of the Moldavian deputies should declare against the union, such a
vote would entail the separation of the two Principalities. On May 11, 1866,
the assembly by 118 votes to six abstentions voted the union under Prince
Charles; it also decreed the naturalisation of the Hohenzollem-Sigma- ringen
family, thus hoping to remove the technical objection on the ground of nationality.
Russia and Turkey demanded the strict application of the international
agreement of September 6, 1859, which stipulated that in the event of any
infringement of its provisions an enquiry should be held on the spot by an
Ottoman Commissioner and delegates of the Powers. They also suggested coercive
measures; but the opposition of England and France defeated the proposal. The
Austrian War diverted attention from the question, the Prince was supported by
England, France and Prussia; and on October 23, 1866, an imperial firman
recognised Prince Charles, with hereditary succession and the right of
increasing the army to 30,000 men. A new Constitution had been voted by the
Assembly on July 12,1866, on which day the Prince
took an oath
to respect it. This Constitution declared the country to be a single and
indivisible State, under the name of Roumania. It provided for a Senate and a
Chamber of deputies, and endowed the people with the liberties usually
conferred in similar charters, such as equality and the abolition of titles,
the freedom of conscience, of the Press, and of public meeting; but it failed
to grant to the Jews the privileges of citizenship, and by its radical
character accentuated the cleavage between the Conservative and Liberal
parties, thereby giving rise from the outset to acute and rancorous political
controversies. Finally, it laid down that if the throne should become vacant
without a successor being forthcoming the two Chambers should meet to elect a
Prince belonging to one of the sovereign dynasties of Europe.
The
path of a foreign Prince called to rule a Balkan State is not strewn with
roses. In spite of great qualities and an attractive personality, Prince
Charles gradually grew unpopular; his marriage on November 15, 1869, with Princess
Elizabeth of Wied did little to counteract this feeling. The Roumanians have
always been strongly Gallophil; and it was thought that the Prince did not show
sufficient gratitude for the constant support which France had given him. The
candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne alienated
French sympathy from Prince Charles; the consequence was in certain quarters in
Roumania a growing hostility towards him, culminating in August, 1870, in an
anti-dynastic outbreak at Ploeshti. Moreover the finances had been thrown into
disorder by the failure of the German banker Strousberg, to whom large railway
concessions had been granted. The Prince now determined to abdicate, and in
December, 1870, addressed letters to the sovereigns of Europe explaining that
his position had become intolerable. But statesmen of different parties united
to urge Prince Charles to reconsider this decision. A journey throughout the
principality convinced him that the country was firmly attached to him; and the
complete victory gained by the Government at the elections of May 22, 1871,
induced him to abandon all idea of abdication. ,
The relations
between Roumania and Turkey had not been untroubled, although Prince Charles
had maintained a uniformly correct attitude, rejecting the proposals of Greece
to unite against Turkey in
1869, just as he had refused in 1866 to listen
to the advances of Hungarian emissaries anxious to take advantage of Austria’s
embarrassments. The asylum afforded to Bulgarian revolutionaries, and the
passage of Bulgarian bands across the Danube, more than once gave occasion for
sharp reproof from the Porte, which also protested against the coinage of money
by Roumania (March, 1870). Such tension between suzerain and vassal is almost
inevitable; Prince Charles deserves credit for not having allowed it to become
acute.
1858-67] Servia. Withdrawal of Turkish garrisons.
647
During the
Crimean Wax Austria imposed on Servia a strict neutrality from which Prince
Alexander Karageorgevitch, who had no special cause for friendship towards
Russia, saw no sound reason for departing. But this subservience to Austria was
held up by his enemies as a crime; and, when Servia was found to have gained
nothing by the Treaty of Paris, the Prince’s unpopularity increased rapidly. On
December 23, 1858, the Assembly voted his deposition and the recall after
nearly twenty years’ exile of Milosh Obrenovitch. The few months of Milosh’s
second reign showed him to have preserved his autocratic ideas unaltered. He
presented a bold front to both Turkey and Austria, and one of his last acts was
to induce the Assembly to vote a declaration, recognising the hereditary right
of the House of Obrenovitch to the throne. On his death on September 26, 1860,
his son Michael succeeded him. This prince at once took measures for curtailing
the authority of the Senators and for rendering them amenable to the law. He
also introduced fiscal reforms and reorganised the army. To Prince Michael is
due the final evacuation of Servia by the Turkish garrisons, whose residence
was restricted by treaty to the actual fortresses, save at Belgrade where a
suburb was assigned to the Turks. In course of time Servians also began to
inhabit this suburb, and hence conflicts frequently arose. On June 15,1862, a
more than usually serious riot took place; the fortress of Belgrade, threatened
with an attack, replied by a bombardment of the city (June 17, 1862) and
matters assumed a serious aspect. Turkish Commissioners were sent to hold an
enquiry which in the excited state of the public mind proved abortive. The
Powers decided that Turkey’s right to garrison the forts, consecrated by
treaty, could not be called in question; but it was considered advisable to
summon a conference of the ambassadors at Constantinople to devise some
compromise which should be acceptable to both Turkey and Servia.
On September
4, 1862, the ambassadors drew up a protocol whereby it was agreed that all
Moslems should be withdrawn from Servia save the actual garrisons of Belgrade,
Feth Islam, Shabatz, and Semendria, Servia undertaking to .compensate the
dispossessed Moslem proprietors. Obliged to content himself for the time with
this concession, Prince Michael continued to work for the complete evacuation
of the fortresses. The war of 1866 left Austria, its chief opponent,
disinclined for the possibilities of a campaign on the Save; and, after
carefully paving the way by acquiring the good-will of the other Powers, Prince
Michael, on October 29, 1866, addressed to the Grand Vizier a letter, dwelling
in courteous and temperate language on the uselessness to Turkey of the right
of garrison and the great importance which Servia attached to its abandonment.
The tone of this communication, and the desirability of conciliating Servia at
a time when the Christians of Turkey were in a state of unrest, induced the
Porte to give way, and on March 8, 1867, the Grand Vizier informed the Prince
that the Sultan was willing to
allow the
substitution of Servian for Turkish troops, on condition that the Turkish flag
should be hoisted over the forts together with that of Servia. But the
adherents of the Karageorgevitch dynasty viewed Prince Michael’s successes with
unpatriotic dissatisfaction, and on June 10, 1868, he was assassinated while
walking in his grounds. A strong attempt was made to proclaim as his successor
Peter Karageorgevitch, but the hurriedly summoned National Assembly declared
that family to be perpetually excluded from the throne, and conferred the
succession to the murdered Prince on his cousin Milan, then aged 14.
The regency
appointed during Milan’s minority proceeded to elaborate a new and more
Liberal Constitution, whereby the Senate or Council of Administration was
abolished, and supreme authority was vested in the Prince and the National
Assembly. This Constitution, promulgated on July 11, 1869, remained in force
until January 3, 1889.
(3) RUSSIAN LITERATURE.
(1800-1900.)
Russian
literature, in the years covered by the present volume, passes through two
stages, one of romance and the other of realism. The first stage is
indissolubly connected with the names of Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837) and
Michael Lermontoff (1811-41); Pushkin, though the possessor of a historic
Russian name, and brought up in a household characteristic of the old Russian
nobility, was of negro blood on his mother’s side. Neither in appearance nor
genius was he a typical Russian. His poetry is beautiful in form, happy in
expression, and adroit in versification, but has neither depth, nor elevation
of feeling. His great services to Russian literature consisted in throwing off
the yoke of French classicism, purifying the language, creating a literary
style, and arousing an intellectual life. His first verses, circulated in
manuscript as was then the custom, were entitled Ruslan and Ludmila, and show
the influence of the folk-lore learned from his nurse. His next works, An Ode
to the Knife, some epigrams on Arakcheieff, and the profane and licentious
Gabrielid, entailed on him a temporary exile to the southern provinces, where
he was inspired by the grandeur of the Caucasian scenery, and where he studied
tire poems of Byron, whom he calls the master of his thoughts, but whose love
of freedom and hatred of hypocrisy he never understood or shared. His most
popular work, Eugene Onyeghin, is a novel in verse, its hero a dull, selfish
profligate, without a vestige of the mysterious Gharm with which Byron could
invest his characters. Pushkin was in fact a sybarite, with a strong admixture
of the negro. He was killed in a duel at an early age, at the height of his
fame, but, morte sua, as he had exhausted both his mental and physical powers.
One looks in his work in vain for the mysticism and spirit of unrest which
characterises the most distinguished
649
of his
successors. His melancholy was not that of the philosopher, but that of the
worn-out man of pleasure; his religious sentiment is merely part of the scenery
which he uses for dramatic effect. Even his patriotism has no definitely
national ring.
Michael
Lermontoff, also in part an alien through his Scotch ancestor George Learmonth,
was more thoroughly Byronic in his cynical contempt for his age and
surroundings, as well as in his rejection of all authority. He rose to fame by
some passionate verses on the death of Pushkin, directed against the circle
round the throne. His chief poem, The Demon, is a story of a fallen angel,
exiled from Paradise, who is enamoured of a Georgian princess The descriptions
of the Caucasus —to which, like Pushkin, he was exiled-^-contain passages of
exquisite beauty; and the power with which the evil spirit is represented
recalls Milton rather than Byron. The scenes remain graven on the mind, and
many of the lines, once read, vibrate on the memory. Lermontoff also wrote a novel,
A Hero of our Time, giving a most graphic picture of the disenchantment which
had come over literary society. His pessimism is not merely the:pessimism of
despair; it is a militant, almost a spiteful, protest against all that is
ignoble in Russian life. All his heroes strive against the stream. Like
Pushkin, Lermontoff perished in a duel at an early age.
Vissarion
Bielinski (1810-42), the great national critic, marked and encouraged the
transition from romance to realism. He pointed out that all that could be said
about gloom, disenchantment, ideals, the celestial virgins, the moon, the
hatred of the human race, lost youth, treachery, brigands, poniards and poison,
had already been said and repeated a thousand times, in the beautiful creations
of Pushkin and his imitators. The time for juvenile enthusiasm was over; the
time for serious thought had now come. The reading public was not only growing
wider; it was becoming more exacting, and no longer either understood or cared
for lyric poetry. It became necessary to direct attention wholly to the people,
the masses, to depict common men, and not merely those pleasant exceptions from
the universal rule, which produced a false idealisation, and bore on them a
foreign and romanticist stamp. Bielinski discovered the need of this
transition, Gogol accomplished it.
The first
works of Nicholas Gogol (1807-52), the great national satirist, the founder of
Russian realism, were published at the same time as the last poems of
Lermontoff, and, as Bielinski observed, “ the reign of the novel began.” It has
never waned. In Gogol’s novels, The Mantle and Dead Souls, and in his play The
Inspector, the Russia of Nicholas I found herself confronted with a pitiless
mirror, which revealed every wrinkle in a visage seamed by the corruption,
brutality, and ignorance of a tyrannical bureaucracy and the nameless miseries
of serfdom, hopeless, helpless, and irresponsible in its degradation. It is a
picture of unspeakable gloom; and, as the author said, his countrymen looked
at
it in terror.
He invented types from which, through infinite variety^ the works of Russian
genius which followed him were to proceed. “We have all come forth,” said a
successor, “from the mantle of Gogol.”
Among these
successors three stand out preeminent: Ivan Turgenieff (1818-83), Feodor
Dostoievski (1882-81), and Lyof Tolstoi (bom 1828). In artistic construction,
in the finish and beauty of his work, Turgenieff surpassed his great
contemporaries; his knowledge of the human heart is profound, and his greatest successes
are attained in depicting the heart of a young, thoroughly honest, and
reasoning girl, when she awakes to higher feelings and ideas, and above all
when that awakening takes, unconsciously, the form of love. Of this the
character of Lisa in The Nobleman’s Nest is perhaps at once the most touching,
and the most typical instance in his work; here the strength and purity of
character of an unschooled maid resemble the shadow of a great rock in a weary
land, to which all turn for refuge. The heroes are generally like Turgenieff
himself, aristocrats—Russian gentlemen who have completed their education
abroad, well-bred, well-mannered, well-informed, but fit for nothing except
making love, and, even in love, irresolute and destitute of initiative and energy.
Sometimes, as in the case of Rudin, they are so incapable of action as even to
be guilty of cowardice; or again, though patriots and full of knowledge,
honourable feeling, and disinterested eagerness to serve their country, they
are ruined hy an utter incapacity to face difficulties, by a fatal
predisposition to despondency, and by a total lack of saving common sense. But
in each novel there is a striking figure—such as that of Bazaroff (the first
Nihilist) in Fathers and Sons—which marks a stage in the moral and intellectual
growth of the country; and in each book, from the Sportsman’s Sketches onwards,
there is a grace* a tenderness, a delicacy of touch and feeling, not to be
found in the work of his great rivals.
Dostoievski
takes us a step further in our knowledge of Russian pathos and the Russian
feeling of ochaimia, so inadequately translated by the English word “despair.”
Ochaiania is partly no doubt the result of the long struggle of man with nature
which the Russian climate necessitates; but it is also the brand of the Tartar
yoke, just as the gospel of suffering which Dostoievski preaches, and his
unfathomable depths of compassion, mystic, wild and weird in its
manifestations, proclaim the origin of Russian Christianity to be as truly
Byzantine as does the church of St Basil at Moscow. That church is not, as
Napoleon called it, a mosque, but, for all its labyrinth of strangeness, a
church of the true Christ—the Christ of the weak, the down-trodden, and the
maimed in mind, body, and spirit. No other work save the Inferno of Dante
produces on the reader the impression made by The Poor People and Memories of
the Home of the Dead; an impression of bitter, helpless, hopeless, endless
suffering. Hither, into darkness that can be felt, only one ray of comfort
penetrates—the word which the peasant soldier
651
whispered to
the author himself, when in gaol in Siberia, “You are sorely tried. Suffer with
patience. Christ also suffered.” Nowhere else in modem literature are the
feelings of those who, like Russian dissenters from the established religion,
not only suffer, but also torture themselves for conscience’ sake, so clearly
represented. Nowhere is there the same sympathy not only with crime and the
criminal—a genuine Russian trait—but also with the insane. It is difficult in
Western literature to parallel the horrors of the end of the prisoner
Michailoff in Crime and Punishment. It is even more difficult for the Western
mind to understand many of the characters, their words, and actions. That
Sonia, a poor prostitute, should bear her calling like a cross, with
resignation and piety; that Raskolnikoff should fall at her feet and worship
her, a girl who maintains her parents by her shame; and that, when she lifts
him up, he should say “ I am not bowing before you, I am prostrating myself
before all the suffering of humanity ”—these are hard sayings, but they contain
the key to Dostoievski’s religion. He believes that only by suffering can
humanity rise, and that, by suffering and expiation, any and every crime can be
redeemed. He has faithfully portrayed his own life, his own struggles his own
exile* his own misery. To the student of psychology and religion he reveals new
worlds in these lengthy volumes. They cannot be recommended as either light or
pleasant reading; but they are works of genius which set forth a side of human
nature never before portrayed with such accuracy and insight, though without a
touch of pruriency or a trace of that gloating over human jiisery, vice,
brutality, and crime, which characterises the Russian literature of despair in
the hands of lesser writers of the period.
In Tolstoi we
have the most complete, and, so far as this period is concerned, the final,
manifestation of Russian literary effort. But the labourer’s task is not yet
over, and it is impossible to appreciate so great a genius till his last word
is written; and one of his greatest works, Resurrection, is also one of the
most recent. An aristocrat by birth and education, a gallant soldier, a
sportsman, a man of fashion, a country gentleman, a historian, an economist, a
philosopher, a theologian and a mystic—these are many parts to fill, but he has
filled them all and in a most striking fashion. Who can forget the entry of
Kitty into the ball at Moscow in Anna Karinma, or the salon of Anna Scherer in
War and Peace, and the respectful melancholy with which the imperial family was
mentioned there? The account of snipe-shooting and the steeplechase at
Tsarskoye Selo, in Anna Karbmia, are masterpieces of their kind; and the
description of the author’s experiences in Sevastopol is regarded bv experts as
an authoritative historical document. In War and Peace we find, in spite of the
Censorship, a complete review of the religious and political problems of the time.
This review includes the origin and growth of national consciousness, for the
novel is in fact a great national epic* a paean of triumph over the defeat of
the French in 1812, in which
the part
played by the Russian peasant in the national development and his value as a
moral force are made clear. In Anna Karenina the everlasting tragedy of
unlawful love, which played so large a part in the literature of the nineteenth
century, is treated with unparalleled power, judgment, tact, good feeling, and
truth. Side by side with the inexorable descensus Avemi of the adulterers,
there is the course of the true and honourable love of Kitty and Levin rising
from strength to strength, through all the changes and chances of this mortal
life. In the background is the growth of Tolstoi’s own religious beliefs. His
creed, which is largely though not wholly negative, may be summed up in the
folio,ving commandments: Be not angry; do not commit adultery; take no oath;
use no violence even in self-defence; make no war—a creed which late leads him
to call himself an anarchist, and to say that the three things which he hates
are autocracy,' orthodoxy, and militarism.
But
it is not for his political and religious views that he will be read so long as
Russian civilisation endures—it is for his marvellous insight into the
characters of men and women, and above all for his comprehension of his
countrymen. His portraits of emperors, statesmen, generals, noblemen,
officials, merchants* and peasants, form a gallery which no historian of this
epoch can neglect. Moreover, Tolstoi is one of the few Russians who never
writes unless he has something new to say* something which his conscience
compels him to utter; he also is one of the few who always know what they want,
and whose object in writing is always good. Ever independent in thought and
action, all his writings show an independent spirit full oi profound ideas and
profound convictions. In his own words, the heroine of his story, whom he
loves with all his heart* and whom he desires to represent in all her beauty,
is Truth. In his novels he never moralises, but the effect of his work is in
the highest degree a purification of the passions* by pity and fear. There is
no need to prefix to Anna Karenina the words “Vengeance is mine, I will repay.”
At every step in the pitiless analysis of the main characters down to Anna’s
suicide, no less than in episodes like the death of Levin’s brother, we are
conscious of a sovran presence, more than mortal, august and awe ‘nspii ;ng,
watching, directing, loving, healing, and above all punishing, with just but
unfaltering hand. '
In
conclusion, if it be thought that too great a space has been devoted to one
branch of literature, to the exclusion of other forms of art, it should be
remembered that in Russia, during the period under review, the novel took the
place of Parliament, Pulpit, and Bar, and also to a great extent of the
University and the Press. In Western countries the novel was a pastime for the
leisured classes; in Russia it was, to all who could read, as manna in the
wilderness. The novelist was the guide, philosopher, and friend of the
individual, the poet, priest and prophet of the race. To him his readers looked
not only for an answer to all the problems of their daily life below, but also
for an ideril of the life of the world to come; and they did not look in vain.
(4) NATIONAL
INFLUENCES itf BOHEMIAN AND POLISH LITERATURE.
The first
notable fiechish national manifesto is to be dated from March, 1792, when three
and thirty “ Bohemian aborigines ” (i.e. Bohemians of Slavonic origin)
petitioned the Bohemian Diet against the policy of Germanising their
compatriots, which had been steadily pursued under Joseph II. Somewhat later,
the “ nationality ” idea was resuscitated by the majority of the Bohemian
gentry in the Diet, as a card which might be effectively played in order to
preserve their “ historical rights,” failing the success of the purely
political methods adopted hitherto. From 1792 till 1848 its protagonists were,
mostly, scholars of middle-class origin acting as tutors in the families of
nobles who, wished to promote Cechism for personal reasons, but, being
incompetent .themselves to use their native language with effect, employed the
practised pens of scholars for the purpose. The long French War which seemed,
at first, to arrest the national movement, ultimately gave it a fresh impetus
and a new character that has influenced it profoundly ever since. The Austrian
Slavs had followed with wonder and admiration the successes of the Russians
against Napoleon. Their racial pride was kindled by the reflexion that Europe
owed its deliverance to the one great Slavonic Power. As members of the
Slavonic family they claimed a share in the glory of its head. A new ideal, an
enthusiasm for the solidarity of the Slavonic races, extinguished, for a time,
so far at least as regards the south-western Slavs, the older striving after
local autonomy, and “ Panslavism ” eclipsed patriotism in Bohemia.
It should be
remarked, however, that Panslavism was, originally, extra-political, the affair
of scholars and students rather than of statesmen. But, from the first, there
was a vague, dreamy, affection for a Slavonic policy; and, during the long
residence of the Russian “deliverers ” at Prague in 1813, a very amicable
intercourse began between Russian officers and Cech professors which was kept
alive by epistolary correspondence long after the northern visitors had
departed. The study of the Russian tongue was now taken up with ardour by Cech
scholars; and some enthusiasts, the poet Antonin Puchmajer (1769-1820) for
instance, proposed the composition and propagation of a universal Slavonic
language whose area was to extend from Prague to Kamschatka. But there was an
infinite distance between this intellectual Panslavism and the later political
Panslavism, whose fundamental postulate was the union of all the Slavonic races
in a single State. The earlier stages of the movemerit are intimately
associated with the names of three eminent Cech writers, Josef Dobrowsk^
(1753-1829), Josef Jungmann (17731847), and Frantisek Palacky (1798-1876).
654 Josef
Dobrowsfctf. Josef Jungmcmn.
Dobrowsk^ was
the first critical historian of Bohemia in the modem sense of the term.
FrantiSek Pelcl (1734-1801) before him had done something towards sifting out
the truth of the ancient annals ; but it was preeminently the merit of
Dobrowsk^ that he took his stand immovably on the exclusive authority of
incontrovertible documentary evidence. The'attempts of later scholars to place
nationality above accuracy were offensive to his severely dispassionate
judgment; and, when dubious expedients were employed to prop up the crazy
claims of Ceehism, he protested against it with all the weight of his
authority. This was notably the case in his famous exposure of the Hanka
frauds.
In 1817
Vdelav Hanka (1791-1861), a passionate nationalist of wide but superficial
scholarship discovered, in a room in the church tower of Koniginhof, a
parchment containing Cech poems of presumably hoary antiquity. In the following
year another document (known as the Griineberg ms)
came to light embracing what purported to be the “ Judgments ” of the
mythical Bohemian Princess Libussa. The younger generation of Cech scholars,
all of them enthusiastic nationalists, including the well-known Slovak Paul
Josef Safarik (1795-1861), and the Cecil, Vdelav Svoboda (1791-1849), hailed
these discoveries with transport as revealing unimagined palaeographical depths
in the Cech language. But Dobrowsk^, after the most searching examination,
pronounced them to be forgeries; and subsequent investigations have confirmed
his verdict. It is needless to enter into the details of this fierce and
perennial controversy. The Cech language has by this time so firmly established
itself in both literature and politics, that its importance or otherwise cannot
be materially affected by the ultimate decision reached with regard to these
questionable documents.
While
Dobrowsky laid the foundations of historical science in Bohemia, Josef Jungmann’s
great merit was the popularising and modernising of the Cech language, partly
by means of his famous dictionary (begun in 1810 and published between 1834 and
1839) and partly in the columns of the literary journal Kroik, financed, in the
nationalist interest, by Count Frederick Berchtold. Jungmann’s enthusiasm for
Panslavism made him comparatively indifferent to purely Cechish
aspirations—hence his opus magnum is not so much a Bohemian as a Slavonic
lexicon. He was a zealous propagandist of the Panslavonic idea. On one
occasion, by way of stimulating the youths to learn all the Slavonic languages,
he gravely told his pupils at the gymnasium of Leitmeritz that, if they
travelled from Leitmeritz to China, they would encounter nothing but Slavonic
races. He professed his indifference as to whether Polish or Bohemian
ultimately became the official language of the Austrian Slavs, and, while
expressing his sympathy with the Poles in 1830, found consolar tion
for their overthrow in the presumption that the spread of Russian influence
would tend to promote the cause of Slavdom generally.
The
succeeding stadium of the national movement is intimately
655
associated
with the great name of Frantisek Palacky, who, in 1827, founded a learned periodical1
to champion the cause of fiech autonomy against the out-and-out Panslavism of
Hanka and other ultras. Palacky was, at first, a moderate man as well as a
patriot, and openly preferred the hypercriticism of Dobrowsk^ to the lack of
all criticism in Dobrowsky’s detractors. The most extravagant member of the
opposite camp was the Slovak poet and preacher, Jan Kollar (1793-1852), who
carried Panslavism to the verge of absurdity. In his StaroitaUa Slavijanska,
Koll&r tried to prove that Latin was an old Slavonic tongue corrupted by
Greek influences. He attributed the facility with which the Slavs acquire Latin
to the fact that it is really their second mother-tongue. He even maintained
that the . .boriginal inhabitants of Italy were Slavs. Yet, despite the
eccentricity of his scholarship, Koll&r enjoyed the extraordinary influence
which must always belong to a man of genius who is also an ardent patriot. His
first volume of verse published under the simple title of Basne {Poems) in 1821
established his reputation as the first of Bohemian poets. An amplified and
rearranged edition appeared in 1824, under the title of Slavy Deer a (The
daughter of Slava—SMva was a mythical <5ech hero). This famous book,
lyrico-epic in form, is, in substance, a pathetic lament of the oppression of
the Slavs by their German neighbours. Koll&r’s
critical views are set forth in his Uber die litera/rische Wechselseitigheit
zwischen den verschiedenen Stammen und Mundarten der slavischen Nation, Pest,
1837. Palacky’s
clear and critical mind naturally rejected these chimeras. His position was
strengthened when, in 1831, he was appointed a director of the newly instituted
fiech section of the National Bohemian Museum and a member of the society
“Maiice fceslca," founded, the same year, by Prince Rudolf Kinsky, for the
promotion of Cechish literature. Palacky’s principal work was his History of
Bohemia, in five volumes, which appeared, from 1836 to 1876, in German and Cech
simultaneously. He also wrote thirty-six politico-historical monographs, all
remarkable for great ability, for an outspoken nationalism, and for a very
pronounced Teutonophobia. He differed from his preuecessors in being, on the
whole, rather a Cech Chauvinist than a Panslavist.
In the early
forties, the National Bohemian movement transgressed the domain of literary
speculation and became an active political factor in the hands of demagogic
agitators and adventurers. External influences, such, for instance, as the
large influx of revolutionary Poles into Bohemia after Ostrolenka, and the
awakening of national aspirations in the southern Slavs (this latter movement a
reaction against the Magyarising policy of the Hungarian Diet), were the chief
causes of this metamorphosis. The political historv of this movement is recorded
1
Two originally, one in Cech and the other in German. The latter, however, only
lived for a few months.
656 Cech political literature.—Polish historical
traditions.
elsewhere;
here, we can only, very briefly, consider the effect Upon Bohemian literature. ■ 1
The views of
the Cech nobility were best expressed in Count Leo Thun’s pamphlet, ijber den
gegenwartigen Stand der bohmischen Lite- ratur (1842), which favoured the
official adoption of the Cech language, but also postulated mutual forbearance
among the various races in the Austrian dominions. Palacky delivered a series
of brilliant lectures advocating the federalistic union of all the
nationalities with a central authority at Vienna. Two very notable works of
this period were the Nase znovuzrozeni (Our Regeneration) of Jakub Maly
(1811-85) in favour of the old Cech programme of local autonomy and gradual
reform, and the Pamiti (Memoirs) of Josef Fric (1829-90) which combined
political Radicalism with violent Panslavism. Another stormy petrel was Karel
Havli&k (1831-56) who, as editor of the Narodni Novrny, exercised a
determining influence over the masses. His political views were ultra-Cechish,
but a brief visit to Russia effectually cured him of Panslavism. In his later
days Palacky, while distrustful of Russia, was also opposed to ariy close union
between Austria and Germany. Thus on April 11,1848, he deprecated the election
of Austrian representatives to the Federal Diet. His views were crystallised in
the famous phrase, “ If the Austrian Imperial State did not exist already, in
the interests alike of Europe and humanity, it would have to be invented ”;
which defines his point of view fairly well. The reaction after the Revolution
of 1848 condemned impartially all the conflicting constitutional programmes,
and, when a relative freedom of speech was once more permitted after 1860, the
political oracles of the Bohemian nation, for some years to come, did little
more than flatly contradict each other as they had always done.
The principle
of nationality among the Austrian Slavs, at least in its earlier stages, seems
a trifle academic to an outsider. Anyhow, it was largely stimulated by
linguistic aspirations. With the Poles, on the other hand, it has ever been a
political sine qua non, the natural condition of things in fact. The cause of
this sharp distinction is very simple. An unbridgeable chasm of ages separates
the western and southern Slavs from the period of their independent historical
existence, whereas Poland survived to the very end of the eighteenth century,
nay, almost to the middle of the nineteenth century, if we count the
Congressional Kingdom and the Republic of Cracow as genuine if extenuated prolongations
of the ancient State. For the same reason Panslavism, as a definite political programme,
could never appeal to the sympathies of the Poles. Their ancient and glorious
traditions made it impossible for them to regard Russia, their secular
antagonist, in the light of a protector. The rehabilitation of Poland, as a
leading independent element in the Slavonic world, has always been the aim of
the Polish
Polish parties: Lelewel and
Dzieduszycki. 657
nationalists.
So far, the ambition of the “ Reds ” and the “ Whites ” (these terms, though
not prevalent till 1863, may conveniently be used to denote the Revolutionaries
and the Conservatives) has always been identical. It is only on the question of
how to realise this ambition that they are hopelessly divided.
From 1815 to
1849 the “ Reds ” indisputably held the field and to their ultra individuality,
indiscipline, and utter lack of practicability (the three original, and,
apparently, ineradicable vices of old Poland) the disasters of the Poles in
modem times are mainly attributable. The literary oracle and champion of this
party was the historian Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861). His political principles
are best expressed in Considerations on the history of Poland and her people,
written, originally (1844), in French, and subsequently (1855), translated by
the author into Polish and German. He rightly insisted that one of the chief
causes of the fall of Poland was the aristocratic aloofness of the szlachta, or
gentry, from the nation at large; but, in attempting to redress the balance, by
an indissoluble union between Western democracy and the Polish people, he only
submerged Polish patriotism in the flood of a Jacobinism which was inherently
antipathetic to mere nationality as falling short of its own ideal—the
emancipation of the whole human race. Lelewel was largely responsible for the
crazy Polish Revolution of 1831, when the Poles, for the sake of a fantastic
idea impossible of realisation, ruined the little congressional kingdom which
was the focus of the national aspirations and might, with the exercise of a
little tact and patience, have become the nucleus of a gradual agglomeration of
the other Polish lands beneath the Russian sceptre into an autonomous Polish
State.
An active,
frantic, hatred of Russia, natural enough in the circumstances but entirely
mischievous from a purely political point of view, was, indeed, the determining
cause of all the ill-advised Polish insurrections. This feeling has been
largely shared by writers who have little sympathy with the ordinary methods
and principles of the “Reds.” Thus, Count Izydor Dzieduszycki, in Der
Patriotisms in Polen (1884), goes so far as to say, “ a war with Russia is and
must ever be our most ardent desire.” As he wrote twenty years after 1863—and
is singularly independent of both “ Whites ” and “ Reds ”—it is significant
that this should be his attitude here.
The Polish
Conservative party was dominant from 1849 to 1862, that is to say during the
eclipse of the Revolutionaries between the insurrections of 1831 and 1863.
Their watchwords were peaceful progress and political compromise. They sought
to convince European public opinion, their own rulers included, that Polish
patriotism, although imperishable, was by no means synonymous with a
predilection for political upheavals. Their chief representative in Russia was
Count Andrzej Zamoiski (his views are set forth in Moje przeprawy (My
tramitiom), 1830-1, first published in 1906), to whom we shall return
658
presently. A
group, difficult to place elsewhere, of more or less philo- Russ authors, is
sometimes associated with the Conservatives. Of these we need only mention the
poet, Antoni Eduard Odyniec (1804-85), who, in 1858, presented to Alexander II,
during his visit to Vilna, a poem in which the Tsar was extolled as a worthy
successor of the Jagellos; and the novelist Henryk Rzevuski (1791-1866), the
panegyrist of the old Polish aristocracy (in Pamiatki Seweryna Soplica and
Listopad, still the best historical romances in the Polish language) and the
opponent a outrance of modem democracy.
Independent
of “Reds” and “Whites” alike, and rejecting contemptuously the aspirations of
both, there has always existed in Poland, since 1815, a small group of
politicians of a peculiar character, hardheaded, dictatorial, bureaucratic
patriots, intent on securing, with the direct cooperation of Russia, an
irreducible minimum of local autonomy for Poland. This class of men has always
been veiy unpopular; yet their work alone has been fertile in practical result.
The first notable epresentative of this group was Frantisek Lubecki, whose
statesmanship and financial genius did so much for the economical welfare of
the congressional kingdom before 1831; but Lubecki was completely overshadowed
in later years by the Marquis Alexander Vielopolski (1803-77).
Vielopolski
first came prominently forward in 1846 with his Lettre (Tim gentilhomme
polonais au Prince Mettemich. He rebuked the Vienna Cabinet for being
responsible for the horrible jacquerie in Galicia, when the Ruthenian and
Polish peasants massacred and plundered the Polish gentry, and warned Mettemich
that any repetition of these atrocities would inevitably drive the Polish
nation into the arms of the Tsar. Subsequently Vielopolski entered the Russian
service, and in May, 1862, was sent to Poland, as Civil Administrator with the
portfolios of Education, Justice, and Public Worship, in the train of the
enlightened Polonophil Governor, the Grand Duke Constantine Nikolaevich.
There can be
no doubt that the Russian Government meant to deal fairly and even generously
with the Polish people on this occasion. Vielopolski brought with him from St
Petersburg considerable concessions, e.g. permission to use the Polish
language in schools and public places, permission for Polish students to wear
the national uniforms and the national colours, the election of Polish
assessors in the tribunals, and of Polish representatives in the town and
county councils. In a word, these tentative reforms, in the hands of a Polish
administrator of constructive genius and adamantine character, were the best
obtainable guarantees, in the circumstances, for a more liberal government in
the future. They were also, obviously, the first steps in the direction of a
fuller measure of local autonomy at a more favourable time.
But such a
pacification was by no means to the liking of the “National Central Committee”
of the “Reds,” which took its orders direct from Paris, and determined to
provoke a rupture with Russia
The Grand Duke Constantine and
Poland.
659
at any cost,
and at the first opportunity. They began with a series of outrages. On June 27
an attempt was made to assassinate the Russian General Liiders. Four days
later, the Grand Duke Constantine arrived at Warsaw in the uniform of a Polish
Uhlan. His attitude was more than conciliatory. He addressed public meetings in
Polish, which he spoke fluently. He took care that his Court should be
predominantly Polish, and set about repairing the splendid but dilapidated old
royal palace in the Belvedere Park, with the view of living in it. The “ Reds ”
responded by firing at him as he was leaving the theatre. Two almost
simultaneous attempts were made on the life of Vielopolski. The would-be
assassins were seized and promptly executed; but, on the very day after their
execution (August 27), the Grand Duke issued a proclamation, in the
circumstances pacific enough, and concluding thus: “ Poles! place the same
confidence in me as I place in you! Let us unite for the same objects, let us
labour for the good of Poland! Pray God that he may bless our efforts to bring
about a new era of happiness and prosperity for the country we all love so
much!”
Bad as the
conduct of the “ Reds ” had been, it is a question whether that of the “ Whites
” was not more exasperating. If ever there was an occasion when the Polish
Conservatives should have rallied, unconditionally, to the side of the
Government, it was in the summer of 1862. Unfortunately they failed to grasp
the true significance of the situation. They had learnt nothing from the past,
they expected too much from the immediate future. A “White” deputation waited
indeed upon Vielopolski with an offer of support, but only on condition that
the autonomous Constitution of 1815 was reestablished. The dangerousness of
such a suggestion is obvious. The war of 1831 had proved to demonstration that
Russia would never again consent to the erection of an adjacent independent
Poland. The “Whites” ought to have known that, if any substantial concessions
were obtainable at all by negotiation, the Conservative party must begin where
Vielopolski proposed to begin, at the very bottom of the political ladder. No
wonder Vielopolski was angry. No wonder that he repulsed the deputation with
even more than his usual roughness. “ I neither ask for nor desire assistance
from you or from anyone else,” he cried. “ It is possible to do some good for
the Poles sometimes, but through them never.” Failing to move Vielopolski, the
“ Whites ” proceeded to intrigue against him at the grand-ducal Court.
Constantine consented to an exchange of views with the Conservative leader,
Count Zamoiski, at a private audience; but any hope of an accommodation in this
direction was ruined at the outset by the incredible tactlessness of the Count.
By this time the “ Central Committee of the National Government,” working
incessantly and secretly, had become more powerful than the responsible Polish
Government, and when Vielopolski (in his manifesto of November 6, 1862)
attempted to anticipate the “Reds” by calling out as recruits the most
refractory
elements of
the population, the outbreak of an insurrection became merely a question of
time. On January 21,1863, the “ Central Committee” gave the signal for the
most senseless, hopeless and heroic rising of modem times. The desperate valour
of the insurgents prolonged for some months a straggle which, according to all
military calculations, should have been extinguished within a fortnight. It
really never had the remotest chance of success. A feeble protest of the
Western Powers on behalf of Poland (February 23, 1863) was contemptuously rejected
by the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gorchakoff. Thus Poland, in consequence of
the criminal recklessness of the “ Reds,” was plunged back into the slough of
despond from which the superhuman efforts of Vielopolski had barely succeeded
in extricating her.
Since 1863,
the Polish national cause has been skilfully championed in Austrian Poland by
the notable group of patriotic publicists who, in 1866, started the famous
Przeglqd Polslci, or Polish Review, the standard of modem Polish nationalism.
This group includes Jozef Szujski, the founder of the Cracow school of histoiy;
Count Stanislaw Tamowski, the Brunetiere of Poland; Count Ludwik Wodzicki, the
descendant of one of Kosciuszko’s best generals and himself a volunteer in the
rising of 1863; Frantisek Smolka, from 1867 to 1881 the most influential Polish
member of the Reichsrath, his son Stanislas, one of the most prominent of the
younger historians of Poland. Their standpoint is, briefly, the pacific
regeneration of Poland, but they have leamt from experience not to aim too
high. They are averse from all revolutionary expedients; would obtain from
Austria, by arrangement, or compromise, the best possible terms; are not
unfriendly in their disposition towards Russia; but rightly regard Protestant
Germany as an irreconcilable enemy. They have attracted within their orbit the
flower of the ability of Young Poland, and are the only Polish political party
which seems to possess a consistent and intelligible programme.
HOLLAND AND
BELGIUM.
(1839-70.)
(1) HOLLAND.
The Treaty of 1839, which put an end to
the period of the status quo (1833-9) and finally under the guarantee of the
Great Powers established the independence of the kingdom of Belgium, was very
welcome to the Dutch people. The obstinacy with which King William I had
refused to assent to the conditions of the Twenty-four Articles had imposed
heavy burdens upon his subjects. A large army had been kept practically on a
war footing since the Revolution of 1830; and the taxes, though continually
mounting, had been insufficient to meet the heavy expenditure. The interest on
the National Debt, which in 1815 had amounted to 15,000,000 florins, had
reached 38,000,000 florins in 1839. In these circumstances, it is not
surprising that the attachment of the Dutch people to their sovereign, which
had led them to place almost autocratic powers in his hands, and for so many
years to give him their unanimous support against Belgian discontent in his
policy -riming at the unification of the Northern and Southern Netherlands,
should have been weakened. The alarming condition of the finances, over which
the States General exercised a supervision little more than nominal, aroused
widespread distrust; and there arose a powerful Liberal Opposition, which
demanded a revision of the Fundamental Law, ministerial responsibility, and
public control of the finances. The report also that William wished to conclude
a marriage with Countess Henriette d’Oultremont, a Belgian and a Catholic, who
had been one of the late Queen’s Court ladies, was received with great
dissatisfaction. To meet the demands of public opinion, a revision of the
Fundamental Law was actually proposed and carried out in 1840; but the changes
were of a very limited character, and were far from satisfying the Liberals.
The chief modifications were a reduction of the members of the States General,
necessitated by the separation from Belgium; a division of the province of
Holland into two provinces; a reduction of the Civil List; and the abolition of
the distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure. The entire Budget was
henceforth to be submitted to the States General every two years for
confirmation, and the Colonial balance sheet yearly. This extremely limited
measure of constitutional reform, though conceded by the King, was distasteful
to him. He became weary of a position which exposed him to so many rebuffs and
disappointments in his really honest efforts to promote the welfare and
prosperity of his subjects. He accordingly abdicated (1840) and handed over the
reins of government to his son. He married the Countess d’Oultremont
immediately afterwards; lived in retirement, chiefly on his private property in
Silesia; and died at Berlin in 1843.
His successor
William II, a soldier of experience and distinction, chivalrous, genial,
kind-hearted, was different in temperament and character from his father. Ajt
his accession he had to face a situation full of difficulties, especially as
regards finance. Though the settlement of all differences with Belgium had
removed one of the chief obstacles to retrenchment and reform, the position was
still critical. The public debt stood in 1840 at 2200 million florins; and the
burden of interest had become unendurable. The State stood upon the verge of
bankruptcy. After several ineffectual attempts, this serious problem was
successfully taken in hand by the Minister of Finance, Floris Adrian van Hall.
He offered the Dutch people the choice between subscribing a so-called
“Voluntary Loan” of 127 million florins at 3 per cent., or submitting to an
oppressive Income Tax. The money was subscribed (1844), the royal family
setting a patriotic example by a joint contribution of 11 million florins. By
this loan and by capitalising a large portion of the annual payment due under
the Treaty of 1839 from Belgium, van Hall was enabled to clear off the past
four years’ arrears, and to convert the 5 and 4| per cent, scrip into 4 per
cents. By this means, and by help of the large annual balance of profits which
from this time onwards began to flow into the treasury from the East India
Colonies, an equilibrium between the public income and expenditure was at
length established.
It was hoped
that the spirit in which the people had met the call for a voluntary loan would
have been requited by a generous response to the general demand for a thorough
revision of the Fundamental Law. But the King, though profuse in expressions of
gratitude, had no initiative or strength of character. In 1844, nine members of
the Liberal party in the Second Chamber, under the leadership of Johan Rudolf
Thorbecke, at that time professor of jurisprudence at Leyden, put forward a
definite proposal of revision. William having, however, declared himself
opposed to it, the proposal was rejected. Another proposal of a less
far-reaching character made by Nedermeyer van Rosenthal met with the same fate
in 1845. But the spirit of discontent was rising in the land, and was
heightened by the distress
caused to the
labouring classes by the terrible outbreak of potato disease in the years 1845
to 1847, which deprived the poor of one of their chief means of subsistence,
and raised the general cost of provisions. Riots and disturbances had to be
quelled by the military in various parts of the country. These troubles were
but part of that general reaction against the autocratic principle of
government which had been for some years slowly gathering force, and which came
to a head in 1848. In that year, the Revolution of February 24 at Paris
overthrew Louis- Philippe, and found an echo in nearly every capital of Europe;
and William II, alarmed at the spread of the revolutionary spirit, determined
to satisfy the popular demands. Finding that certain proposals made by the
Ministry (March 8) were deemed inadequate, he took the bold and
unconstitutional step of consulting the President of the Second Chamber, Boreel
van Hagelanden, as to the wishes of the deputies in the matter of revision. On
March 17 he named a States Commission, consisting of five members, four of whom
were the recognised Liberal leaders (Thorbecke, Donker-Curtius, Luzac, and de
Kempenaar) and the Catholic representative of North Brabant, Lambertus
Dominicus Storm, to draw up a scheme of reform; Count Schimmelpenninck formed a
new Ministry, but, not finding himself in accord with his colleagues, speedily
withdrew. On May 11 a provisional Ministry under Donker- Curtius and de
Kempenaar was formed and charged with carrying out the revision. No further
obstacles arose; and the new Fundamental Law, after passing both Chambers and
receiving the royal assent, was solemnly promulgated on November 3, 1848.
Its chief
provisions were as follows. The Crown is hereditary, both in the male and
female lines of the House of Orange. The executive power resides with the
Sovereign; the legislative with the States General. The King can do no wrong;
the Ministers are responsible to the nation for all his acts. The States
General consists of a First and a Second Chamber, whose members must be at
least 30 years old. The First Chamber—of 39 members—is to be elected by the
Provincial States from those most highly assessed for direct taxation; the
Second Chamber to have one member for every 45,000 of the population, and to be
chosen directly by those electors who pay a certain amount in direct taxation.
Annual budgets are to be presented and approved. Freedom of worship and equal
protection are assured to all religious denominations. The authority of the
States General over colonial affairs is extended. Public primary education is
placed universally under state control, though full liberty is conceded to
private education. The provincial and communal administrations are to be
reformed and regulated, the direct popular vote being here likewise introduced.
The Ministry,
charged with the carrying out of the revised Fundamental Law, took steps at
once for holding the new elections. On February 13, 1849, the States General
were opened in person by the
King. William
II had been on principle opposed to a revision of the Constitution in
accordance with Liberal ideas; but he was prepared to accept loyally the
changes to which he had assented. Unfortunately his country, at this important
moment in its constitutional history, was deprived of his experienced guidance.
William died suddenly at Tilburg (March 17, 1849). He had married Anna
Paulovna, sister of the Tsar Alexander I, and was succeeded by his son, William
III. The new King, who was 32 years of age, was speedily called upon to deal
with a ministerial crisis. The majority in the newly elected States General
were Liberals; and Johan Rudolf Thorbecke formed a Ministry. Thorbecke was a
learned jurist, a great orator, a man of varied talents and commanding
personality. It was in a large measure owing to his efforts and initiative that
the revision of the Fundamental Law had been accomplished, and that a powerful
Liberal party had been called into existence; and it was only fitting that the
task of applying the principles of the new Constitution to the details of
provincial and communal administration should be now committed to his hands. It
was indeed fortunate that the country possessed at this crisis of transition a
statesman capable of carrying out such important changes in a spirit of
moderation. There were at this time in Holland four political parties or
groups—the Liberal, the Conservative, the Catholic, and the Anti-revolutionaiy.
For some years after 1849 the Catholics, in their struggle for religious and
political equality, supported the Liberals, though diametrically opposed to
them on many other points. The Conservatives (strictly so-called) lost touch
with the electorate, and gradually ceased to be powerful, being replaced by the
Anti-revolutionary party, founded by the well-known historian Gulielmus Groen
van Prinsterer. This party placed in the foreground the upholding of the
Calvinistic Reformed faith and of the religious principle in the State. The
educational policy of the Liberals was at last to sever their alliance with the
Catholics, and to lead to a coalition in defence of religious instruction
between the Catholic and the Anti-revolutionary parties.
The manifesto
of Thorbecke, on taking office in 1849, was comprised in four words, “ Wait for
our deeds”; and he lost no time in translating them into action. The electoral,
provincial, and communal laws, which were successively passed, placed every
kind of representation and administration on a thoroughly popular basis
(1850-1). It was the aim of Thorbecke to reform the system of finance by
removing as many as possible of the indirect imposts, which interfered with the
free development of trade and industry, and substituting for them direct
taxation. The navigation laws of the Minister of Finance did much to effect
this object. All differential dues favouring ships under the Dutch flag were
reduced, and the tolls on the Rhine and Yssel on through cargoes were
abolished, subject to a registration fee on foreign vessels. The excise on pork
and mutton was removed (1852); and other changes in the incidence
1862] Religious difficulties. The “ April
Movement665
of taxation
were introduced to lighten the burdens of the poorer classes of the community.
The first Ministry of Thorbecke left, however, a more permanent memorial than
its legislative activity, by its conversion of the Haarlem lake into an expanse
of good pasture land (polder). This gigantic undertaking was completed in 1852.
Meanwhile the
Minister had contrived to draw upon himself the enmity of the powerful forces
of Calvinistic Protestantism. Thorbecke tiiuself favoured the principle of the
separa tion of Church and State, and of non-intervention of the Government in
purely religious questions. The Fundamental Law of 1848 had established
complete freedom of worship and organisation for all forms of religion, and by
abolishing the right of Placet (the ratification by the State of papal decrees)
had finally removed the last trace of Roman Catholic disabilities. Hitherto
there had been no Roman episcopate in the kingdom of the Netherlands. The Pope
now determined (1852) to create an archbishopric at Utrecht, with four
bishoprics (Breda, Haarlem, Hertogenbosch, Roermond). He made, however, the
great mistake of issuing his allocution without previously consulting the Dutch
Government, and of laying stress in it upon the importance of counteracting in
Holland the errors of the heresy of Calvin. A wave of fierce indignation swept
through the Protestant population of the Netherlands, already prejudiced
ag& nst the Liberal Ministry by a law placing all religious charitable
institutions under government supervision. The cry of “ Down with the Bishops”
recalled the days of Granvelle and Philip II. A petition, drawn up at Utrecht
by Professor Gerrit Jan Mulder and others, obtained 200,000 signatures in a few
days. The King’s reply on its presentation at Amsterdam was taken by Thorbecke
as a call for his resignation. It was offered and accepted; and a new Ministry
was formed under the joint leadership of the former mutual opponents, van Hall
and Dirk Donker-Curtius. A dissolution followed, and resulted in the return of
a majority for the Conservative-Protestant (Anti-revolutionary) over the
Liberal-Catholic coalition. Thorbecke himself sought refuge in a Catholic
constituency, owing to this sudden turn-over of public opinion, which is known
in Dutch history as the “April Movement.”
The name of
Donker-Curtius was a pledge that the new Ministry, though Conservative, would
not be reactionary. A Church Associations Law was passed, laying down that no
foreigner could undertake any church office without the King’s consent, and
forbidding the wearing of a distinctive religious dress outside closed
buildings. In accordance with certain Articles of the Fundamental Law of 1848,
Acts were passed Ogling with Poor Law administration, ministerial
responsibility, and the right of public meeting. The Ministry fell in an
attempt to deal with the subject of Primary Education. The dispute was whether,
the State was to give compulsory education in “ mixed ” schools (gemengde
scholen), where only the simple truths common to all forms of religious
belief were
to be taught; or in denominstional schools (gezindte schplen), where the
religious instruction was to be in complete accordance with the principles of
the religious body to which the scholar belonged. It now became, and was for
many years to continue, a burning question, dividing the Dutch people into two
hostile camps. Van Hall and Donker-Curtius endeavoured (1856) to establish
universal “ mixed ” schools; but the proposal stirred up such a violent
agitation in the country that the Ministry gave way to a new one under the
presidency of Justinus Jacob Leonard van der Brugghen. * The numbers of the
Anti-revolutionary party were small; and from the first the existence of the
van der Brugghen Ministry was precarious. It contrived, however, to pass in
1857 a Law of Primary Instruction, by which the principle of the “ mixed ”
school, to the great chagrin of Gulielmus Groen van Prinsterer and the
upholders of denominational education, was adcp Set by the State. In the
following year van der Brugghen was replaced by Jacob Jan Rochussen, who had
recently been Governor-General of the Dutch Indies (1850-6), and whose tenure
of office (1858-60) was marked by the abolition of slavery in the East Indies.
He was succeeded by van Hall, whose third Ministry had a short life (1860-1). A
measure regulating the construction of a system of state railways was the chief
fruit of its activity. The Colonies, which had for a series of years been a
source of considerable profit to the Dutch treasury, furnished the funds for
the carrying out of an undertaking, which promoted the welfare of the country
without adding to the National Debt.
Another
ephemeral Ministry, under Baron van Heemstra, followed (1861-2); but the “April
Movement” had now exhausted its force, and there was once more a Liberal
majority in the Second Chamber. Thorbecke again formed a Cabinet, and was
actively engaged (1862-6) in developing the material interests of the country,
and in removing the restrictions pressing upon trade and industry, which had
been interrupted by the change of public opinion in 1853. With this object
indirect taxation was superseded to a considerable extent by direct, and the
communal dues were abolished. A law for secondary and technical education was
passed (1863). Bills were also passed for making a waterway through the Hook of
Holland, for the formation of the Canal of Holland, and for the reclaiming of
many thousands of acres covered by the Y and the construction of the
sea-harbour Ymuiden at the mouth of that river. A dispute about colonial
administration led in 1866 to the formation of a Ministry under Francis van de
Putte, which only lasted four months. His Bill for enabling the natives of the
East India Colonies to become proprietors of the farms which they cultivated
(cultimr-wet) was defeated by the Conservatives, who were supported on this
occasion by Thorbecke and some Liberals.
A Ministry
was then formed under the joint leadership of Baron Jacobus Petrus van Zuylen
van Nyevelt (Foreign Affairs) and Jacob
I815-72] Death of Thorbecke.—Dutch colonies.
667
Heemskerk
(Interior), which had a stormy existence (1866-8). A dissolution gave them a
small majority; but serious difficulties arose in 1866 and 1867, after the
dissolution of the old Germanic Confederation, concerning Limburg and
Luxemburg. As a consequence of the Conference of London (1867), Limburg was
entirely severed from all connexion with Germany and became a Dutch province,
while Luxemburg, of which King William remained sovereign, was created a
neutral State, as is told elsewhere in this chapter. The Chamber, however,
resented the part taken by the Foreign Minister in this treaty, and the foreign
financial vote was thrown out by 38 votes to 36. A dissolution followed; and
the Government, finding tbemselves in a minority after the general election,
resigned. Thorbecke declined office; but, on his advice, the King entrusted the
formation of a Cabinet to Pieter Philip van Bosse, which held office till 1870,
and which is principally remembered by its law for the abolition of capital
punishment. It had not, however, strength to deal with the many difficult
questions arising out of the Franco-German War of 1870; and Thorbecke was
called upon (1871) to undertake the part of First Minister for the third time.
He continued in office until his death in the following year. For more than a
quarter of a century, whether in or out of office, he had been the most
influential politician and statesman in Holland; and this period of Dutch
history has been largely associated with his name.
No account of
that period would be complete without some reference to the administrative
history of the Dutch East India colonies and of their relations with the mother
country. At the close of the Napoleonic wars all the Dutch colonies were in
British hands; but in 1815 they were, with exception of the Cape and the Guiana
colonies—Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice—restored to Holland. In the East
Indies the treaty of 1824 finally settled various disputes between Great
Britain and the Netherlands, the Dutch being henceforth supreme in Sumatra,
while the British obtained Singapore and the command of the Straits of Malacca.
Two formidable and costly wars, however, for some years checked the peaceful
and profitable development of the principal Dutch possessions in the Malay
archipelago. A serious Javanese rising in Djokjokarta, under Diepo Negoro, was
subdued with considerable difficulty after the despatch of a series of
expeditions (1825-30). In the uplands of Sumatra the final overthrow in 1833 of
the power of a Mohammadan sect, known as the Padres, was only effected with the
loss of many lives during several years of desultory fighting.
The advent of
Johannes van den Bosch as Governor-General (1830-3) was, however, to mark the
turn of the tide in the prosperity of the East India colonies. He introduced
into Java what was known as the cultuurstelsel (cultivation system). By this
system the native cultivators, instead of paying to the Government, according
to the system introduced
by Governor
Raffles in the period of British rule, one-fifth (sometimes two-fifths) of the
produce of their rice fields as rent, were compelled to set apart one-fifth of
their land or one-fifth of their time (sixty-six days in the year) to grow for
the home-market certain prescribed products, such as coffee, sugar, pepper,
tea, tobacco. For these products the Government agreed, besides a remission of
rent, to pay a certain fixed price. These commodities were shipped to Holland,
where they were sold at a large profit; and thus the colonies were made to
contribute a large annual sum to the advantage of the taxpayer in the mother
country. At first these profits, the disposal of which was under the sole
control of the King, were absorbed in the upkeep of large forces on a war
footing during the period, of the status quo. With the accession of William II,
as has been already told, the colonial treasure-trove was very helpful to the
Minister van Hall in his reorganisation of the national finances, and at later
times in the carrying out of costly public works—such as the building of
railways and canals, and the reclaiming of the large areas covered by the
Haarlem lake and the waters of the Y.
The revision
of the Fundamental Law in 1848 brought the colonies under the control of the
States General; and required the Government to submit an annual report to the
Chambers upon all the Dutch oversea possessions. Cidtuurstdsel was from the
first regarded by the Liberals as, in principle, obnoxious, and their efforts
were directed to modifying and relaxing the system of compulsion in the
interest of native cultivators. The Conservative party on the other hand were
strongly for its retention. After the abolition of slavery in 1860, finally
carried out under the Governor-Generalship of Sloet van de Beele (1861-6), and
after Francis van de Putte became Colonial Minister in 1863, many reforms took
place. In 1864, van de Putte by his comptabiliteits-wet made it necessary for
the Indian Budget to be annually confirmed by the States General; and an end
was put to the Government’s cultivation of tea, pepper, tobacco, and various
other commodities, while that of sugar was restricted. But the ideas of van de
Putte were in advance of those of Thorbecke and of a large section of the
Liberal party; and, after his proposals for the abolition of compulsoiy culture
had been rejected in 1866, van de Beele was recalled, and the principles of
reform advocated by him received for the time a decided check. In 1870,
however, on the return of the Liberals to power, the Colonial Minister passed
two laws, one for the determination of the sugar culture in 1890, the other an
agrarian law which facilitated the ownership of land by natives; and these were
to be followed by a series of administrative Acts lessening the burdens and
improving the lot of the Javanese population under the rule of
Govefnor-General James Loudon (1871-5).
1831-42]
State of affairs in Belgium in 1839.
669
(2) BELGIUM.
The Belgian
people submitted to the hard conditions imposed upon them by the will of the
Powers in 1839 with feelings of grief and resentment. The forced relinquishment
to Holland of portions of Luxemburg and Limburg, which had been treated as
Belgian since 1831, and whose populations had become thoroughly Belgian in
sentiment, was especially bitter. It was a severe trial; but the sacrifice had
to be made. Belgium, though shorn of territory, saddled with a portion of the
Dutch debt, and hampered by restrictions on the navigation of the Scheldt, now
became an independent State, whose integrity and neutrality were guaranteed by
the Powers. The Belgian people were thus henceforth able to pursue their own
national destiny under free institutions of their own choosing, unhampered by
fears of attack from without. The success of the Belgian Revolution had been
chiefly due to the alliance between the Catholic and Liberal parties, and the
patriotism with which they had sunk their differences in their common ardour
for the national cause. This alliance King Leopold, on entering upon his difficult
task in 1831, had done his utmost to maintain, and he had succeeded.
Barthelemi
Theodore Theux de Meyland had headed a Coalition Cabinet in 1834; hut, in the
interval between that date and 1840, the Ministry had been gradually acquiring
a more Conservative character. At last, after having successfully administered
the affairs of the country through the difficult years of the status quo, it
was defeated in the Chamber of Deputies, and replaced by a homogeneous, but
moderate, Liberal Ministry under Jean Louis Joseph Lebeau (1840). This Ministry
had, however, to face a Catholic majority in the Senate; and, as the King would
not consent to a dissolution, Lebeau resigned. This event brought Leopold face
to face with a somewhat delicate and critical constitutional situation, which
was, for the time, surmounted by the formation of a Coalition Cabinet, at the
head of which was Jean- Baptiste Nothomb. Nothomb had been prominent in the
events of 1830-1, and, though a Conservative, was a man of moderate views. He had
the difficult task of conciliating two parties, whose views on many subjects
were absolutely opposed. Among the thorny questions with which he had to deal,
that relating to public primary education most sharply divided the
Conservatives and the Liberals. In 1842, however, the Nothomb Ministry
succeeded in passing a law, which failed to give satisfaction to the extreme
partisans on either side, whether Catholics or Anti-Clericals, though it
effected a settlement approved by all moderate men. This was shown conclusively
by the fact that the final vote in the Senate was unanimous, and that in the
Chamber there were only three dissentients. The leading principles of the law
of September 23, 1842, were the necessary inclusion in the scheme of public
education of
religious instruction in a definite faith; the obligatory maintenance of at
least one primary school by each commune; the obligatory support of these
schools by the State and the province, in the case of the insufficiency of
communal resources.
Nothomb’s
tenure of office was marked by many useful measures; and his own great ability
and conspicuous moderation enabled him to remain, until an adverse vote at the
elections of June, 1845, led to his resignation. Such a result was not
surprising, for Belgium had been passing through a most serious industrial and
financial crisis since 1843. The introduction of machinery in England for
spinning yam and weaving linen had crushed one of the chief industries of
Flanders and Brabant. The goods made by hand-looms could not compete in price
with those produced by steam. In less than four years the exportation of
Belgian linen fell by one-half; and of the 500,000 workpeople dependent on
this industry ai large proportion were reduced to beggary and starvation. To
crown misfortune, the potato disease in 1845 almost destroyed a crop most
important to the poorer classes; in 1847 the wheat crop was also a dismal
failure. The price of provisions rose alarmingly; the streets and villages were
filled with beggars; and only the promptness of the measures taken by the
Government prevented disorders breaking out. Fortunately, in the south and east
of the country, the coal, iron, cotton and cloth industries continued to
flourish; and occupation was found by the State for those who were out of work,
by the carrying out at the national charges of various public works of great
utility—such as the extension of the railway system in Flanders and elsewhere,
the construction of the canal at Tumhout, and of many hundreds of miles of new
roads. Steps were also taken for the introduction of the machinery required
for the revival of the linen industry; and model workshops and technical
schools were set up to give skilled instruction in the latest methods of
textile manufacture. Thus a crisis was averted and provision made against its
recurrence.
Meanwhile a
no less important political crisis had taken place. The system of government by
neutral Ministries had always found favour with King Leopold, who had striven
to moderate between the two extreme parties, and who was inclined by natural
caution towards a policy of compromise. Hence, on Nothomb’s resignation, he was
averse from placing a purely Liberal Ministry in power. Accordingly, he asked
Sylvain van de Weyer, then Belgian envoy in London, to form once more a mixed
Cabinet (July, 1845). Van de Weyer was a moderate Liberal, universally
respected for valuable services rendered to his country during a long series of
years; but he speedily found his position intolerable, and resigned on March
31,1846. The King was now obliged to turn to Charles Rogier, the acknowledged
Liberal leader, who was, however, unwilling to take office without the King’s
consent to a dissolution. Leopold declined to give it, and called upon Theux
to
attempt the
task of government at the head of a homogeneous Catholic Ministry, a step which
aroused fierce opposition.
A General
Congress of the Liberal party, summoned to Brussels on June 14,1846, was
attended by 320 delegates from all parts. The meeting, which was very orderly,
drew up an Act of Federation and a programme of reforms; and the party was
thoroughly organised and united for the next general election which took place
in 1847. A large Liberal majority was returned; and Charles Rogier was invited
to form a Ministry. The King, putting aside his prepossessions, never
hesitated, as a constitutional monarch, in giving full effect to the
unmistakable expression of the popular will; and thus he enabled Belgium to
pass unscathed through the period of revolution, which followed the expulsion
of his father- in Jaw, Louis-Philippe, from the throne of France on February
24,1848. In wellnigh every country of Europe insurrections and risings took
place, but the Belgian people remained calm. Satisfied with the liberty they
had acquired, and with jtheir progress under the wise and sympathetic rule of
the sovereign of their choice, they had confidence in their future. An
attempted invasion by a band of French revolutionaries was easily dispersed by
a body of Belgian troops (March 30) at Risquons- Tout, near Mouscron. Leopold,
whenever he appeared in public, was received with striking demonstrations of
the popular good-will.
The Rogier
Ministry, the crisis of 1848 overpast, set to work to redeem its pledges by
carrying out a scheme of electoral and parliamentary reform. The qualification
for the franchise was reduced to 20 florins direct payment to taxes; and by a
series of laws this reduction was made applicable to parliamentary, provincial,
and communal elections. This change was very favourable to the Liberals, as it
doubled the number of urban voters, while that of the rural districts did not
increase in anything like the same proportion. The result was manifested in the
election which followed; 85 Liberals were returned against 23 Catholics. The
Ministry, now secure of an overwhelming majority in the Second Chamber, passed
a number of measures of considerable utility both to the commercial and the
working classes, among which were the establishment of a National Bank, and of
a General Savings and Assurance Bank. Import duties upon comestibles were
lowered or abolished; and the credit of the State was used to carry out large
public works for the benefit of the suffering and unemployed poor. It was at
this time that a heavy blow fell upon the King and the country by the death of
Queen Louise-Marie. The daughter of Louis- Philippe, who had been for some time
in delicate health, had been greatly afflicted by the misfortunes of her family
in 1848. Her health was much shaken, and she expired at Ostend, October
11,1850. The entire country mourned her loss; for she had endeared herself to
all Belgium by her charity, her kindly disposition, and many personal virtues.
The question
of education had to be dealt with by the Liberal
Ministry; and
aroused party pas 'ons once more. Rogier determined to leave the compromise of
1842 with regard to primary education severely alone. A law with regard to
higher education was introduced and passed in 1849 without much difficulty; but
that which organised secondary education in 1850 met with the bitterest
Catholic opposition. In the new schools that were set up, the privileges
accorded to denominational religious teaching by the law of 1842 for primary
education were not conceded. In 1853 the council of the secondary school at
Antwerp surmounted the obstacle by passing a regulation, that the only religion
taught within the school should be that professed by the majority of the
pupils, i.e. the Catholic faith. The necessity of the imposition of new taxes
had made the Ministry unpopular; and Rogier found his majority diminished after
the elections of 1852. He resigned office in the following year, and de
Brouckere formed a Cabinet of Moderates. With a view to gain' ig Catholic
support the new Government caused the Chambers to assent to the universal
application to all secondary schools of the “ Regulation of Antwerp.”
After the
elections of 1854 the parties were almost equally balanced; and in March, 1855,
de Brouckere made way for a Ministry drawn from the Right Centre, under de
Decker. But in 1857 the Liberals gained once more a decisive majority; and
Charles Rogier again became head of the Cabinet. He was to remain in power for
a long period (1857-70) which was market by two achievements of considerable importance;
The system of octrois was abolished hy a law introduced by the Minister Walter
Frere-Orban (afterwards First Minister) July 19,
1860. To provide for the deficit thus caused, a
“communal fund” was created to the support of which a portion of the receipts
of the Post Office and of the dues collected at the frontier on sugar, coffee,
beer, and vinegar were assigned. The amount thus raised was divided between the
various communes in accordance with their just claims. A still more important achievement
was the suppression of the Scheldt tolls in 1863. This obnoxious and
humiliating burden had greatly hindered the commerce of the country and the
development of the port of Antwerp. Its removal was largely brought about by
the insistent diplomacy of the I ing, which at last overcame the obstinate
negative interposed by Holland and Great Britain to any proposals to modify the
terms of the Treaty of 1839. He succeeded in obtaining the meeting at Brussels
of a Conference of the interested Powers, at which it was finally agreed that
the river should be freed, in consideration of a sum of 32,276,566 francs to be
paid to Holland in compensation by the Powers interested. Of this sum Belgium
contributed 12,000,000 francs.
The death of
King Leopold, aged 75, December 10, 1865, after a reign of thirty-four years,
was felt as a personal loss, throughout the length and breadth of the nation,
which he may be said to have created. By his rare sagacity, prudence and
political insight, the Saxe-Coburg
1840—vo] First years of Leopold II.-A dvanced
Liberalism. 673
prince,
chosen amidst countless difficulties and embarrassments to rule the destinies
of the new Belgian kingdom, had slowly won for himself the unstinted confidence
and respect both of his own subjects and of foreigners. At the time of his
death he was spoken of at home as the father of his people, and abroad as the
Nestor of Europe. England owes him special gratitude for the valuable advice
and assistance which he gave to Queen Victoria during the early years of her
reign. He was succeeded by his son Leopold II (bom April 9,1835), who had
married (August 22, 1853) Marie Henriette, daughter of the Archduke Joseph of
Austria.
The downfall
of the Liberal party was brought about by its own divisions. From the beginning
it had a moderate wing—the Doctrinaires —and a radical wing—the young Liberals
or Progressists. The latter party objected to any compromises with the
Catholics on religious education, like those of 1842 and 1854. They wished for
universal and obligatory secular instruction, and also aimed at lowering the
franchise, the more advanced section advocating universal suffrage. The
Doctrinaires, of whom Rogier was the chosen leader, worked: for the
centralisation of power in the national Government. Rogier was himself bom in
France of a French mother; and his political sympathies and principles were
those of the French Revolution. The liberty of the historical Belgian provinces
and towns had been the immemorial liberty of local immunities, customs, and privileges,
and these anomalies were offensive to the French ideas of Charles Rogier, who
set himself to vork to make the State supreme. Hence his consistent advocacy of
universal military service, his carrying out of great public works at the
national charges, his desire to place the Railways and coal-mines under
government control. Many of his measures and proposals were thus distasteful to
a portion of his own party, no less than to the Opposition.
The Catholics
took up the position of defenders of local and individual freedom against
state and governmental interference, and they were helped by the rapid growth
of the “Flemish Movement.” The separation of Belgium from Holland had no sooner
taken place than the newly aroused national spirit began to show itself among,
the Flemishspeaking part of the people by a revival of interest in their
ancestral Teutonic language. There had always been a distinct line of cleavage
in the Southern Netherlands between Fleming and Walloon, and a movement set on
foot by Jan Frans Willems, Hendrik Conscience, and other writers against the
Gallification of the country found a ready response in Flanders and northern
Brabant. King William I’s attempt to make Dutch the official language had met
with universal opposition; but as early as 1840 a demand was put forward for
the use of the Flemish tongue (which is closely akin to the Dutch) on equal
terms with French in the Legislature, the law Courts, and the army. As the
years passed by, the movement gathered ever increasing numbers of adherents,
and the demand was repeated with growing insistence. It
was steadily
opposed by Charles Rogier, a devoted admirer of all things French, and by the
Liberal party, which found its chief support in the Walloon provinces. The
Flammgamts, as they were called, were especially numerous in those parts of
Belgium where Catholicism had maintained its firmest hold; and the Clerical
party, already sure of the votes of the peasantry, was able by their expressed
sympathy with the movement to secure the adhesion of the working classes in the
large Flemish towns. The defection of Antwerp and Ghent from the Liberal cause
in 1870 was largely due to this cause. The elections in that year rendered
possihle a coalition of the Clerical party with the malcontent progressives,
which led to the defeat of the Ministry and the accession to power of a
Catholic Cabinet, at the head of which was Baron d’Anethan.
(8) THE
LUXEMBURG QUESTION.
Luxemburg had
been erected by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 into a grand duchy and declared
hereditary in the male line of the House of Nassau, in exchange for the
ancestral domains of that House in Germany,—Dietz, Siegen, Hadamar and
Dillenburg. The new grand duchy was thus attached to the Netherlands hy a
personal union, but remained a member of the Germanic Confederation, and its
capital, as a federal fortress, had a Prussian garrison. William I however
treated Luxemhurg as if it were an integral portion of his kingdom, extended to
it the Dutch Constitution of 1815, and administered it through Dutch officials.
That dissatisfaction was felt at the Grand Duke’s' autocratic rule was
conclusively shown in 1830. The Belgian uprising against Holland spread to
Luxemburg, and the whole province revolted, with the exception of the capital,
which was garrisoned by foreign troops. During the period of the status quo
(1831-9) no active steps were taken to interfere with accomplished facts.
Luxemburg was regarded at Brussels as a Belgian province, and became in fact
thoroughly Belgian in sentiment. In 1839 however the sudden determination of
King William I to agree to the 24 Articles of 1831, which he had so long
refused to sign, completely changed the situation. The Conference of London
decided that Belgium should retain the part of Luxemburg contiguous to her
frontiers, but should cede to the King of Holland a part of the duchy of
Limburg in compensation. The remainder of Luxemburg was once more declared to
be the hereditary possession of the House of Nassau, and forms the present
grand duchy.
William II
endeavoured to conciliate the good-will of his Luxemburg suhjects by giving to
them a separate administration, and by promising them a Constitution after the
Belgian model. The revolutionary outbreaks of 1848 followed by the death of
the King caused, however, a delay in the carrying out of this project. William
III, shortly after his accession, appointed his brother, Prince Henry of the
Netherlands, his
1850-70] Luocerttburg tmder
Prince Henry.
675
representative
in Luxemburg, with full grand-ducal powers. From 1850 to 1879 the Prince
continued to fill this responsible post with singular discretion and ability;
and under his wise administration the little State quickly became prosperous
and contented, and was the model of an unambitious and peaceful community. In
1856 a parliamentary Constitution was granted to the Luxemburgers in the name
of the Grand Duke. It established a Council of State nominated by the
sovereign, and a House of Representatives elected directly by the people,
though it fixed a somewhat high property qualification for the franchise. Its
powers were limited, and the right of initiative remained in the hands of the
sovereign. This was not a very liberal concession, but it appears to have
worked fairly well, and to have aroused no active dissatisfaction.
Luxemburg
remained a pori'on of the Germanic Confederation, and the capital was still
garrisoned by Prussian troops until 1866, when the dissolution of the
Confederation took place, and created a new situation. As Luxemburg was one of
the strongest fortresses in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon III objected to its
remaining in Prussian hands, and entered into negotiations with King William
III for the purchase of the grand duchy by France. Prussia, on being consulted
by the King of Holland, protested; and finally a conference of the
plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers met in London, May, 1867, to consider the
question of the future of Luxemburg. The issue of their deliberations was a
treaty, which declared the grand duchy to be a sovereign and independent, but
neutral, State, under the guarantee of the Powers. The fortress was accordingly
evacuated by the Prussians, and the fortifications were demolished ’five years
later. The connexion between Luxemburg and Holland was henceforth purely
dynastic. The destiny of the Luxemburgers being thus settled by the concert of
Europe, the Grand Duke proceeded to revise the Constitution in a liberal
direction (1868). The sovereign still retained very extensive powers; but all
laws required the assent of the representatives of the people. The outbreak of
the Franco-Prussian Wax of 1870 exposed the treaty of neutrality to a severe
strain, as at different times a breach of it was obviously in the interest of
either belligerent. William III however announced his intention of rigorously
enforcing the treaty^' and, despite the difficulties of the position, succeeded
in doing so.
(4) LITERATURE IN THE NETHERLANDS.
(1800-70.)
Literature in
the Netherlands had a great revival in the nineteenth century. In the early
decades the name of the versatile and prolific Willem Bilderdyk (1756-1831)
occupies the first place and overshadows those of all his contemporaries. His
power was undoubted, his command of language extraordinary; but, although he
excelled in every kind of
verse, he did
not attain the highest rank as a poet. But as a fiery Orangist and Calvinist—as
one holding strong opinions, which he expressed with force and felicity—he
exercised during half a century a kind of spell over the minds and imaginations
of his countrymen, and his influence is still far from extinct. Among his
contemporaries may be mentioned Jan Frederik Holmers (1767-1818), Rhijnvis
Feith (1753-1824), Johannes Kinker (1764-1845), Antoni Staring (1767-1840) and
Comelis Loots (1754-1834)—all of them writers of verse of considerable merit.
Four other poets of this time survived to the second half of the century:
Hendrik Tollens (1780-1856), Adrianus Bogaers (1795-1870), Petrus Augustus de
Genestet (1830-61) and Isaac da Costa (1798-1860), and so belong to this
period. Tollens has been styled “ the People’s Poet ” of the nineteenth 1
century. He took as his theme for a series of lyrical romances, different
heroic episodes of the national history, and wrote in addition a great number
of popular songs and ballads. He possessed a real poetical gift, full at once
of fire and sweetness. The genius of da Costa: was of a loftier type.. He was
of Jewish descent, an avowed disciple of Bilderdykbut he far surpassed his
master in sounding the depths of passion and tenderness.
The writing
of Dutch prose has been carefully cultivated since the end of the eighteenth
century, and has attained a high standard of excellence. It is inferior to that
of no European tongue in vocabulary, flexibility, clearness and strength. The pioneers
were Bilderdyk, and Johannes Henricus van der Palm (1763-1840). One of the most
voluminous writers of the middle of the century was Jacobus van Lennep
(1802-68), who wrote many historical novels upon various episodes of the
national history. Of more permanent value was his great critical edition in
twelve volumes of Vondel’s works. The romances of Madame Bosboom Toussaint,
like those of van Lennep, belonged to the school of Scott; but her literary
quality and the truth of her representation of past times was greater. Two
other writers of varied gifts were Nicolaes Beets and “Multatuli ” (E. Douwes
Dekker). The masterpiece of Beets was a series of humorous sketches of Dutch
life entitled Camera Obscura, that of “Multatuli,” a novel Max Havelaar. In the
fields of history, science, theology and criticism, Holland has been rich in a
succession of able and cultured writers, whose number and intellectual activity
is very remarkable, when the smallness of the population from which they
spring and which they address is considered.
In Belgium
the most striking literary characteristic was the rise and spread of the
Flemish Movement, of which Jan Frans Willems (17931835) has been called the
“father.” His writings were chiefly philological. The poet of the movement was
Karel Ledeganck (1805-47); but the popular romances of Hendrik Conscience
(1812-85) were perha- still more potent in furthering the propaganda, and in
raisin ■ up a powerful force in politics.
SCANDINAVIA.
(1815-70.)
(1) SWEDEN
AND NORWAY.
The year 1815 has been termed the honeymoon of the
House of Bemadotte and the Swedish nation. Although the devotion of his adopted
countrymen soon lost its first exuberance, the personality and policy of
Bemadotte continued to dominate Sweden until his death in 1844. Charles XIII,
though aged and infirm, survived, indeed, until 1818; but both he and his queen
were the willing vassals of their adapted son, whose irresistible fascination
subdued even the dethroned and exiled Gustavus. Nothing more reveals the
character of Bemadotte than the ascendancy which he rapidly acquired and long
continued to command among a people whose language he could not speak. Elected
with the expectation that he would bestow upon Sweden far greater riches than
he possessed, that he would propitiate Napoleon and reconquer Finland, he did
none of these things, and yet became supreme. He had the greatness to perceive
the true path for Sweden in the nineteenth century and to guide her into it,
although in so doing he abandoned the traditions of her history and of his own.
A soldier and a man of the Revolution, called; upon to rule a nation whose
victories, but few generations earlier, had dazzled Europe, he made peaceful
progress his aim and interpreted strictly the provision of the Swedish
Constitution that, in spite of the existence of Diet and Council, “the King
shall rule the realm.” After his advent and through his exertions, therefore,
the true history of Sweden changes its character. It becomes a record in which
statistics count for more than campaigns, and economic and social progress is
of greater moment than political. If in modem times “ the patriotism of the
Swede has but one ambition—to prove equal to the intellectual demands of the
age and to be among the leaders in the field of progress”—the Swedish career of
Bemadotte has proved its abiding worth.
Bemadotte,
who became Charles XIV in 1818, owed his command] ..g position in 1815 partly
to what he was and partly to what he had already done for Sweden. His adopted
father, Charles XIII, gladly acquiesced in a state of things in which both
Swedish policy and its execution came from his heir. Such was the influence
which the
munificence,
the personal charm, the warlike renown, and the commanding greatness of
Bernadotte procured for him in Sweden, that, on the morrow of her dismemberment
by Alexander, he had leagued her with Russia against France, her secular ally.
It was he who had won Norway, and who had dictated the terms, without parallel
save in the case of Russia and Finland, on which the Union was ^accomplished.'
He had already made the Swedish army formidable and had conquered peace almost
without bloodshed. . An,unrivalled athlete, a skilled tragedian, and a bom
king, his public appearances were always splendid. He had a royal presence, a
royal memory, and a charm which made men devoted to him in an hour, and kept
them true to him in spite of his volcanic upbraidings. No appeal to his
benevolence passed unheeded, and nothing pleased him better than to hear that
his people called him Father. By impulse and by training a benevolent despot,
he displayed many of the virtues of that type of ruler while he took pains to
avoid its defects. In his case, unlike that of George I, inability to speak the
language of his adopted country tended to make government more absolute, for hi
French the councillors were no match for the-eloquent King. , Yet
Constitutional forms were on the whole observed. He recognised his tendency to
suspicion, took pains to curb his temper, and -tried to give due weight to the
opinion of a Council which he often despised,’and which the Form of Government
of 1809 in no way bound him to follow.
Though
impatient of contradiction, he loved men of character, and did not seek to fill
his Council with mere creatures of his own. To his heir, whom he took pains to
educate, he always showed an affection which in a lesser man the' difference
between their political views might well have quenched. In some respects,
however, Bernadotte exhibited a weakness which went far to determine the
domestic history of Sweden dining his reign. Appreciating the power of money,
with which he was wont to combat opposition, he wrongly believed- himself a
great dnancier. “There may be three hundred better soldiers than myself in
Sweden,” he once declared in Council; “ but there cannot be a better financier,
for I have long made a special study of high finance.” When exhorted on his
death-bed to talk of religion, he preferred to discuss the East Gotland Private
Bank, of which his confessor was a director. His private economy was conducted
with the minute care native in the bourgeoisie of France; Each month he
rigoroilsly inspected the accounts of his household and paid his tradesmen by
instalments. The speculative investments which he made for his own sake, and
for that of the nation, were innumerable. The great bargain by which he
undertook to pay the external debt of the nation in return for a perpetual
annuity of 200,000 dollars deserves special mention. But, although some of his
economic principles were less antiquated than the parochial ideas of industrial
and commercial policy which still survived in Sweden, his theories of currency
and exchange produced nothing but disaster, though
1815-44]
Internal difficulties of Sweden.
679
the extent to
which they received application was fortunately limited. Despite his constant
munificence, moreover, he became suspected of enriching himself at the expense
of the State. He was, indeed, the first Swedish king who distinguished between
his private and public purse, and it was doubtless difficult to effect a
complete severance between the financial policy of the King and of the Crown.
Yet towards the end of his reign he was able to show that he had laid out many
millions for the national good, and he died probably no richer than when he
came to Sweden.
He
was also prone to a distrust of public opinion, natural perhaps in a Frenchman
of the Revolution who •filled the throne from which the third and the fourth
Gustavus had been dispossessed by violence, and who ruled two foreign races.
Fearless alik6 of armies and assassins, he dreaded factions, newspapers, and
mobs. His suspicions, worked upon by the unscrupulous for their own advantage,
caused him to institute a system of spies and secret police, to prosecute
writers, to confiscate journals, and to resort to bribery and chicanery in the
futile hope of paralysing an opposition which he did not Understand. Even in
his last hours his dread of opinion at home and abroad did not leave him. By
his command the bulletins of his doctors were translated into French, submitted
to him for alteration, retranslated into Swedish, and revised by one of his
intimates before being published to the world. His reputation for avarice and
suspicion gave to Swedish Liberalism a growing bitterness against the King,
which marred his reign more and more, until it culminated in the Diet of 1840. ■
I * . , ■ ■ ■
Sweden in
1815? though full of hopej stood in urgent need of wise rule.
Suchtelen, the Russian Minister in Stockholm, had lately declared that the
political character of the Swedes resembled that of the Poles, and that Sweden
was on the verge of dissolution. Her, economic condition, never flourishing,
appeared at its worst in the years which followed the great war. The herrings
had deserted her western coast, and her harvest had failed. Such was the lack
of currency that some districts were compelled to resort to barter, while a
mass of depreciated notes ruined foreign trade. The Bank tried to keep a mixed1
currency in circulation by cashing notes to the value of less than one dollar
for each applicant daily. This device brought a crowd of commissionaires,
sailors, and other disorderlies, to fight for places at the bank counter, so
that they might get drunk for a day on part of the difference between the value
of the notes in metal and in paper. Soon cash payments were abandoned; and a
long series of operations was necessary before the national credit could be
restored. At the same time, while luxury was rampant among the upper classes,
the towns were filled with bankrupts and throughout the country peasants were
protesting against the ruin of the land.
The Diet of
1815 called Upon the Government to interfere; and in
1817 those,
who used wine, coffee, tea, silk, gilded furniture, mahogany or other foreign
wood, playing-cards and other similar luxuries, were subjected to personal
taxes designed to inculcate better domestic economy. Soon the import of porter
and many other articles was forbidden. These measures gave rise to smuggling,
and this to friction with the Danes. At the same time, to encourage a popular
Swedish industry, the right of distilling brandy was conceded to all
householders. The Jews in Sweden owed their continuance there only to the King,
who evaded the demand of the Diet for their expulsion.
Sweden and
Norway were now engaged in hastily cementing the insecure foundations of their
new Union. From the first, however, the nature of the body politic was
disputed. According to Bemadotte, Norway had been acquired by the Swedish
dynasty rather than by the Swedish nation, and owed her novel freedom to
himself. The Swedes and the statesmen of Europe, on the other hand, believed
that Sweden had gained compensation for Finland and Pomerania by the extension
of her frontiers to the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The Norwegians,
however, loathed and dreaded close union with neighbours almost thrice as
numerous as themselves. Conscious of a national character distinct from that of
the Danes or the Swedes, they regarded the elevation of their country from a
vassal to a constitutional State merely as a step towards the independence
which, under Prince Christian, it had for a moment enjoyed. A small party,
indeed, headed by Count Hermann Wedel-Jarlsberg, shared the hopes for the future
of the “brother-nations’ welfare” which inspired Ber..adotte and the mass of
the Swedish people; but to the Norwegians as a whole Sweden remained the
national enemy of nearly three centuries’ standing.
, Early in
August, 1815, by a breach of the Swedish rules regarding the due notice,
discussion, and enactment of legislation, the Riksakt for determining the
constitutional relations between Sweden and Norway became law. It provided that
Norway should be a free and independent, indivisible and inalienable
(oafhdndeligt) kingdom, united with Sweden under one King. The constitutional
position of the King as King 0f Norway was to conform in the main to
the Norwegian fundamental law of 1814; while as King of Sweden his powers were
exercised iri accordance with the Swedish fundamental laws of 1809-10. It was
now provided that the Norwegian Premier (Statsminister) and two other members
of the Norwegian Council of State were always to remain with him during his
residence in Sweden. By a corresponding rule, the interests of Sweden were
protected during his residence in Norway. In either case, the affairs common to
both countries were to be transacted in a combined Council of State, formed by
the Council of State of the country in which the King might be, together with
three representatives of the other. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs
and the Swedish consuls were also to serve for Norway; and a war-flag in which
the blue
and gold of
Sweden greatly predominated was to be that of the united realms. Both countries
were to contribute to the common defence in proportion to their population.
While none save a Crown Prince or his eldest son could act as Viceroy in
Norway, the office of Lord-Lieutenant (st&th&llare) in that country
might be filled by a Swede.
Charles XIV
hoped that in time, under the favouring influence of common kinship,
geographical neighbourhood, and a skilful dynasty, the union of Norway with
Sweden would become as close and as mutually beneficial as the union of
Scotland with England. He himself strove to carry out the spirit of the
RiJcsalct, construed in the sense of a moderate Norwegian nationalist, and to
further the interests of Norway in trade, industry, military preparation, and
intellectual training. Even in old age he spent months in Norway; and, when
neither King nor Crown Prince could undertake the journey, he spared no effort
to find a Lord-Lieutenant acceptable to the Norwegian people. Norwegian
nationalism, however, defied all such endeavours. Charles himself, who was not
a Swede, received in Christiania and Trondhjem marks of personal respect and
even gratitude such as he could by no means always command in Stockholm. His
son enjoyed an almost dangerous popularity. The Lord-Lieutenancy, on the other
hand, suggested that Norway was less than the equal of Sweden. This office
robbed all who filled it of their pleasure in life, so that after 1829 it could
no longer be safely committed to a Swede. From 1824 onwards, May 17, the day on
which, in 1814, Prince Christian had dared to accept the Crown of independent
Norway, was celebrated as a national festival, in spite of all the efforts of
the Government to prevent it. The Storting, or Norwegian Parliament, in which
the peasants gained more and more the upper hand, steadfastly refused to grant
to the King an absolute veto over its measures, and abolished the relics of
noble and hereditary privilege, in direct opposition to his wish. In the region
of foreign affairs, Norway proved a burden to Sweden rather than a source of
strength. The land, however, advanced in economic and political organisation. .
The Bank of Norway owes its existence to the labours of Wedel-Jarlsberg in
1816; and in 1837 communal self-government was established with a thoroughness
hardly excelled in Europe.
Although
destined to be monarch of two realms, Bernadotte never forgot that of all the
Frenchmen whom Revolution had made royal, he alone had escaped overthrow. So
long as the heirs of the dethroned Gustavus IV survived, he could not feel
secure. In Sweden he prepared for his accession as for a corwp d'etat, and he
watched with the utmost anxiety for repudiation by Europe. The result
suggested, however, that there was little to fear. Louis XVIII reminded the
French Legitimists that some one must begin a royal line, and that Pepin and
Charlemagne had been upstarts. Alexander, notwithstanding the strained
relations to be presently described, eagerly welcomed the new dynasty. The rest
of Europe
followed Russia and France; and the favour shown to the Crown Prince Oscar at
the Congress of Verona proved that the Gustavian party might well abandon hope.
Prior to the deposition of Charles X of France, however, the .iernadotte
dynasty remained in a somewhat anomalous position While its natural allies were
the constitutional Governments of the West, the prime necessity of its policy
lay in a good understanding with the Tsar., Full acceptance of the Union by the
Norwegians, moreover, constituted the dearest aim of Charles XIV; and with
regard to. Norway, England and Russia held views irreconcilable with one
another, while the members of the Holy Alliance conceived themselves entitled
to regulate the affairs of the smaller States. A Scandinavian monarch who
desired peace but who was determined to uphold the honour of his nation
therefore found his task by no means light. For Charles XIV 'it was
complicated, as was soon proved, by the ancient and abiding hostility of
Denmark.
The sixth
article of the Treaty of Kiel had provided that Norway should be charged with a
share of the Danish debt “in proportion to its population and resources.” This
provision gave rise to a controversy which illustrated the new relation between
the three Scandinavian kingdoms, the attitude of the Great Powers towards them,
and the statecraft of Bernadotte. The question might well be raised* Was the
Treaty of Kiel still in force ? It had been made between Denmark and Sweden for
the cession to one of territories subject to the other. But, before Sweden
could be said to have entered into possession of those territories, they had
asserted their independence—and this, as Sweden not unwarrantably alleged,
with' the connivance of the Danish King. That independence they had not laid
down; and Sweden might argue that, if any debt was due at all* it was due from
Norway, who had incurred it on her separation from Denmark, and had
subsequently joined Sweden of her own free will. The natural rejoinder must be
that Denmark'had carried out the treaty by renouncing Norway, and that the'
concession of sovereignty by Sweden to Norway did not exempt the former from
paying the price of that renunciation. The matter was further complicated^ both
by the fact that the payment of this debt formed part of the general-
settlement of Europe, and that the Great Powers were not disposed to allow their
arrangements to be frustrated, and also by the straitened circumstances and
mutual jealousies of all three natibns concerned.
In these
circumstances the course of Bernadotte was clear. Something must be paid; the
debtor must be Norway ; Denmark must receive as little as possible; and the
matter must be settled by the Scandinavian Powers alone. In November, 1814, he
persuaded the Storting to admit the principle that Norwaiy must pay a portion
of the Danish debt, and to entrust the negotiations to her King. Next year, to
the disgust of Denmark, who protested that her treaty was with Sweden,
Norwegian commissioners appeared in Copenhagen. A long wrangle ensued.
I817-21] Swedish, ptlicy towards Russia and
Denmark. 683
Denmark
claimed 7,000,000 dollars, while Norway responded with counter-demands for the
restoration of Greenland, Ireland, and the Faroe Islands, and for a share in
the Sound Dues. The Powers, Russia in particular, were constantly appealed to
by Denmark; while Bemadotte consistently maintained that negotiations were
proceeding, that a constitutional monarch could not dictate to the Storting,
and that, as no Power had guaranteed the Treaty of Kiel, none had a right to
interfere.
The hardihood
of such conduct was unmistakable. In December, 1817, the ambassadors of
Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain represented to the Tsar that it was
advisable for the Allies to compel the Court of Stockholm to fulfil its
engagements. Although Alexander bore with great patience the rebuffs of
Bemadotte, and most cordially recognised him as King, the danger to Sweden was
growing greater throughout the year 1818. On November 15, three identical notes
were despatched by the sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle, and the Prince Regent and
Louis XVIII followed suit. These notes concluded a personal appeal to Charles
XIV by stating in the phrase of Mettemich that “ it was not for him to disappoint
their expectation.” In his reply the indignant King lamented the abyss of
misfortune into which the lesser States would be plunged, if force were
suffered to take the place of the Law of Nations. He affronted the Tsar and
massed 15,000 Swedes and Norwegians in Scania, but secured the mediation of
England and concluded a treaty in September, 1819, by which Norway undertook to
pay 3,000,000 dollars in the course of ten years. A noteworthy feature of the
negotiations had been that Norway had attempted to throw part of the burden
upon Sweden. She only accepted the treaty under great pressure in 1821. Sweden,
on the other hand, had so far accepted liability as to offer to Denmark certain
assets of doubtful value in order to facilitate a settlement.
During the
remainder of the reign, the chief problems of foreign policy aorose out of the
relations of Sweden and Norway with Russia; and Charles derived great profit
from his friendship with the Tsar. No transaction better illustrated the
character both of the King’s policy and of his relations with his Ministers and
Diet than the affair of the Swedish ships, which has become a leading case in
the Law of Neutrality. Always desirous of securing funds for the navy and the
secret service, Charles welcomed a suggestion for the sale of old warships to
Colombia, then in revolt against Spain. Two ships thus changed bands, being
sold nominally to a firm of Swedish Jews and by them to an English house, while
their armament reached Colombia by a circuitous route. Everyone concerned was
bribed, though indirectly; and soon a similar bargain was made with Mexico.
This time, however, the secret was not kept, and Spain, supported by the three
despotic Powers, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, interfered. The flimsy fictions
which disguised the breach of law were swept away; and the demand of Charles
XIV that Russia or Spain
should
compensate Sweden for her loss was treated with contempt. The King tried to
carry matters with a high hand; but Russia practically threatened war. At great
financial sacrifice, therefore, the bargain was cancelled; and, for several
years, the Government had to manoeuvre desperately to prevent the Opposition
from exposing the whole affair.
In 1826,
thanks to the distraction of Nicholas I by the Eastern Question, another danger
of collision with Russia was averted. After long negotiations a treaty was then
signed in St Petersburg, which provided for the partition between Norway and
Russia of the districts in Finmark which had been hitherto occupied in common
by the subjects of both Powers. Thenceforward, Charles XIV’s growing distrust
of Liberal ideas drew him nearer to the Tsar. Their relations received clear
illustration in 1838, when Nicholas delighted his brother monarch by a surprise
visit. At that moment, however, the streets of Stockholm were filled by
dangerous mobs, demonstrating in favour of the journalist Crusenstolpe, who lay
under trial for slandering the Crown.
To the
domestic progress of Sweden, the greatest contribution of Charles XIV was
peace. Yet, in establishing the national credit, in improving agriculture and
other existing sources of wealth, in facilitating and applying new inventions,
in furthering education, and in seeking for the best commercial policy, he and
his Ministers deserved well of their country. Under their leadership, Sweden
drew freely upon England for ideas and for the instruments of progress. William
Chalmers had bequeathed an industrial college to Goteborg (Gothenburg), where
James Keiller established a great factory. Edward Nonnen taught agriculture and
Samuel Owen mechanics to all Sweden, while Thomas Telford played a great part
in the construction of the Gota canal. English cattle, English sects, the
English system of smelting and English notions of unfettered industry and
commerce entered Sweden together.
At the same
time, the Government and the nation did much to solve their problems without
foreign aid. The mass of depreciated paper-money, which had frustrated all
attempts to create an exchange favourable to Sweden, was absorbed in
consequence of a decision of the Diet in 1830. By calling down the paper-dollar
to three-eighths of its face-value in silver, the nation secured enduring
relief at the cost of a momentary humiliation. The Bank was compelled to keep
an adequate reserve in metal; and private joint-stock banks, with a limited
right to issue notes, now began to arise. This, the final restoration of Swedish
credit, was due rather to Provost Schwerin and Baron Nordin than to the King.
The simultaneous improvement of the old sources of national wealth, on the
other hand, owed much to his direct endeavour. He purchased estates, and by
gifts and exhortations encouraged individuals and public bodies to further
agriculture and industry. The establishment of agricultural schools helped on
the emancipation of Sweden from the system under which much of the land was
tilled by the
villagers in
common with an antiquated rotation of crops. New areas were laid under
cultivation; and local societies were founded for the promotion of agriculture
by discussions, exhibitions, and prizes. The result was seen in 1830, when
Sweden took rank as a grain-exporting country. A decade had sufficed to double
the yearly production of wheat and almost to double that of rye. The extraction
and smelting of iron-ore and the manufacture of machinery also underwent a
notable development; and here again the lead was taken by the King. Communications
likewise owed much to himself and his reign. The famous Gota canal, connecting
Stockholm and Goteborg, which was constructed in great measure by the army and
subsidised by the nation, is but the most conspicuous among many improvements
in communication by land and water. The invention of gas and the application of
steam power to navigation rendered industry on a great scale possible in a land
where almost every town lies near navigable water, and where daylight is most
unequally ,distributed through the year.
These
measures, though they prepared the way for a period of rapid material progress,
did not, however, preserve the Government from attack. To the standing
disquietude of the King, the political and economic discontent in Sweden gave
birth to an Opposition inspired by that of England and encouraged by the
progress of Liberalism in France. In spite of all that Government could do to
propitiate the leaders and to influence the elections and procedure, the
Opposition grew until it held the upper hand in 1840. Its leaders, among whom
Provost Schwerin and Baron Anckarsvard were most conspicuous in the Diet, and
Hierta and Crusenstolpe in the Press, were in some cases influenced by spite
rather than by patriotism. They drew increasing strength, however, from the
fact that in 1809 Sweden had made herself by law a constitutional State and
that her sovereign was an autocrat at heart. The critics in the AftonblaxL and
in the Diet found a broad mark for their arrows in the autocratic
administration of the finances, the incapacity or subservience of many of the
Ministers, the lavish distribution of pensions and places, and a censorship of
the Press so injudicious and so ineffective that, after the censor had done his
worst with each of the preceding series, a twenty-seventh Aftonblad could
appear. With the peasants the cry for the reduction of the army was always
popular; and in the King’s later years—the period of the so-called Bed-Chamber
rule—every Estate found cause for discontent in the influence exercised by
Count Magnus Brahe and other courtiers less noble and devoted than he.
The Swedish
Diet was, however, too clumsy a machine for rapid progress even when it acted
in harmony with the Government. In 1838, by reason of a popular outbreak
against the imprisonment of Crusenstolpe, Stockholm was for a short time under
martial .law. The last Diet of the reign, which met in 1840-1, was dominated by
the Opposition, which in talent and influence proved superior to the
686 A ttack on the Crown intheDiet.-Nationalprogress.
[1830-44
supporters of
the timid and undistinguished Government. Such was its bitterness that the aged
poet Tegner declared his fear that the Swedes would themselves annihilate their
ancient freedom, which had defied every assault from without. The Diet brought
some of the Ministers to trial, while compelling the King to accept others and
to reorganise the administration under seven departments, each with a
responsible jhief. Other reforms, particularly that of the nat nal
representation, were advanced a stage; and, by refusing to vote money which had
been borrowed for the diplomatic service, the Estates left the King and Crown
Prince to pay nearly 776,000 dollars out of their private fortunes. Such
violence, however, recoiled upon the malcontents themselves. Instead of
procuring the King’s abdication^ they found their own power broken. The nation,
if not the Diet, listened to the royal exhortation to “ understand their
Government,” and to remember what it had done for Sweden. Charles could point
to “ freedom maintained, riches won, canals opened, rivers made navigable, new
roads and harbours constructed, fortresses rising, an army of more than 100,000
young men and veterans, a coast defence of nearly 250 gun-boats and yawls, new
ships of the line and frigates, agriculture improved ievery year, the product
of many important manufactures doubled, the whole external debt and the greater
part of the internal paid off, the income of the Bank considerably increased,
the customs revenue almost trebled, a population approaching that of Sweden and
Finland tdgether before Finland was lost.” During his few remaining years a
comprehensive law for elementary education was added to the long list of
benefits conferred upon Sweden in a period of peace, which was Without
precedent in her history, and in which the lines of her future policy and
progress were clearly traced. Early in 1844, Charles XIV died, at the age of
eighty-one.
Among the
most memorable features of his reign are movements which it was not in the
power of the Government to initiate. The springs of religious feeling flowed
afresh in the heart of the people; and “ readers,” despite the law, made their
way through the scattered homesteads of the north. From 1830 onwards a
determined effort was made to check the drunkenness which was threatening to
destroy the nation. Ten years earlier popular thrift had given rise to savings-
banks. At the same time Sweden was striving to attain in science and in
literature the national greatness which could no longer be hers by means of
war. The chemist Berzelius almost takes rank beside Linnaeus, her greatest
savant. Ling was not only a poet of merit, but a man of practical insight, who
strove to train a new generation on a plan which founded modem gymnastics. The Romantic
Movement in literature gave rise to a Scandinavian school of writers and
historians, among whom Tegner and Geijer, the Swedish Macaulay, were the most
eminent. The names of Tegner and Geijer, indeed, are inseparably linked with
each other and with what is best in modern Swedish literature. Both were
famous bards,
Liberals, educationalists and men of religion. Both derived inspiration from
the ancient history' of the North. Tegner, drawing fire from Greece and
Scandinavia alike, won a high place in the world of poetry. His Frithiof's Saga
has been translated into eleven languages. But he was a national poet above all
else, and so great was his influence that he modified the diction of the
people. Geijer’s profound and versatile genius made its greatest mark on the
history of his own land, which he may be said to have transformed by- writings
equally admirable for philosophical depth and lucidity of exposition.
Newspapers—some subsidised by the King, others by members of the
Opposition—flourished in great numbers, and the political and social
aspirations of the time found expression in a mass of pamphlets. These signs of
life, together with the new prospect of an educated peasantry, promised well
for the intellectual future of the nation.
The advent of
Oscar I, a cultured philanthropist (1844-59), filled the I berals with
expectation.! The new King, however, though he called new men to
office and convoked the Estates, soon added another name to the long roll of
princes who have been bolder reformers before than after their' accession.
After the Revolution of 1848, which roused an echo in the streets of Stockholm,
he ceased to be a political progressive; and his rule, as a Whole, formed a
prolongation of that of his father in hands less powerful either to guide or to
obstruct the political and social forces of the nation. Fbrtunately for Sweden,
a strong foreign policy was at this time not indispensable. In Norway, Oscar I
reaped a harvest of good-will due to the sympathy for Norwegian aspirations
which he showed both as Viceroy and as King.’ Powerfully attracted by the
Scandinaviariism which at this time won many adherents in the three kingdoms,
he declared that the Eider was the natural frontier of the north, and drew
closer to Denmark both during and after her war With Schleswig-Holstein. In
1857, a treaty with Denmark abolished the Sound Dues, and thus relieved Sweden,
with other countries, from a vexatious impost.
With Russia
relations became strained, In 1851 the Tsar attempted to secure Tights over the
Norwegian coast of the Varanger Fiord, and avenged his failure by closing his
dominions to the Norwegian Lapps. Soon afterwards the Crimean War put to the
test the alliance with the Tsar into which Bemadotte had entered in 1812, but
which could never commend itself to a free nation from which Finland had been
tom. At first neutral, Oscar concluded in 1855 the so-called Treaty of November
with the Western Powers. By this compact England and France gave a guarantee of
help to Sweden and Norway, in case their refusal to grant territory or
privileges to Russia should provoke her attack.
From the
domestic policy of Oscar I, Sweden derived more unquestionable advantages.
Although the movement for the reform of the Diet was frustrated by the King,
his reign forms a period of advance towards
social and
economic freedom. From 1844 onwards the Diet met at intervals of three years
instead of five. The power to confiscate newspapers was given up, together
with the power to compel attendance at church. Prisoners were no longer flogged
or herded in common gaols. The first legislative step was taken in a campaign
which has converted the most drunken country in Europe into the classic land of
the temperance movement. In 1854, thanks to the crusade begun by Canon Peter
Wieselgren of Goteborg and Dr Magnus Huss, the production of brandy was changed
from a domestic industry into one that could be, taxed and controlled in
factories. At the same time communications were improved by the introduction of
the electric telegraph, and the first cautious advances were made towards a
system of state railways. The coinage was again reformed, the decimal and
metric system introduced, and the modern system of postage established.
Further, under the guidance of the Finance Minister, Gripenstedt, the work
initiated under Charles XIV for the establishment of freedom of trade and
industry was carried on. In 1846, the gild system was done away with, and
within twenty years every man stood free to follow in town or country whatever
calling he might choose. In 1853-4, the Diet consented to reduce the customs,
and to permit many exports and imports hitherto forbidden. In 1857, free trade
was definitely and consciously established.
During this
period agriculture continued to improve; and industry and commerce advanced by
leaps and bounds. In twenty years, 1840-60, Swedish manufactures trebled in
value, while the sum total of exports and imports rose in almost equal degree.
The progress of a decade equalled that of the prepeding century; and Sweden could
prepare to assume a debt of 110,000,000 dollars for the construction of her
five trunk railway-lines. Norway was enjoying a similar material development ;
and for a time political agitation ceased. In 1854 the birthday of the
Union—November 4—was actually made the occasion of public rejoicing in
Christiania.
Charles XV,
who began to rule in 1857 and to reign in 1859, applied to the government of
modem Sweden the test of a weak King. The first Bernadotte King bom on
Scandinavian soil, he has been styled “half a viking of the north and half a
knight of southern France.” Young, quixotic, an artist, and popular even to
legend, he lacked the discernment, the pertinacity, and the industry necessary
for political success. From his father he differed as widely as Oscar from
Charles XIV. The Ministers found it almost impossible to induce Oscar I to
sanction a sentence of death, or Charles XV to show mercy. He began his Regency
with a complete and arbitrary change of ministry, and always remained
conservative at heart. Yet, thanks to sage councillors and to the accumulated
force of the nation, his reign became the *imt> 0f harvest for
the reforms which had long been germinating.
Much of the
achievement of the reign was due to the exceptional political ability of Baron
Louis de Geer, a penniless cadet of a well- known family founded by the rich
merchant who came from Holland to serve the great Gustavus. A young man almost
without political experience or ambition when called to office as Minister of
Justice (1858), de Geer made his mark by advising the King to refuse to allow
Norway to abolish the Lord-Lieutenancy without consulting Sweden (1860). He
then set himself to make the Government harmonious, solid, and responsive to
public opinion, which was deeply stirred by problems of railway construction,
volunteering, and Reform. By the force of high ■ character and sound
judgment he won for himself and his colleagues the complete confidence of the
nation, and a commanding influence over. Charles XV. Many reforms, conceived and
promulgated in the spirit of moderation, now came into effect. In 1862 the communes
received responsible self-government. The Church was provided with a novel
representative system in the shape of quinquennial meetings of clergy and laity
comhined. The criminal law was rendered milder. Freedom of religion, of
industry, and commerce became wider.
Above all,
the long struggle for a reform of the Diet was brought to a peaceful issue. The
need for some change in a legislature, which was little better than the
simultaneous session of four, exclusive corporations, had become more clear, as
jthe growth of new classes of society, the increased occasion for fresh laws,
and the weakening of the barriers between class and class, demonstrated that
Sweden was developing into a modern State. Drawing inspiration from England and
from Norway, the Liberals had for many years demanded a bicameral system and a
wide franchise. Two of the Estates, the burghers and peasants, expected to gain
in power by a more direct representation of the people; and the King was
induced to abandon the active hostility to change which his father and
grandfather had shown. But the spirit of privilege, which filled the nobles and
higher clergy, long defied the arguments, of the Ministry, although they were
supported by deputations and petitions from the people and by an almost
unanimous Press. At last, however, in December, 1865, Reform was accepted. The
new Diet was to meet for four months every year as well as when specially
summoned by the King. It consisted of two Chamhers chosen without regard to
birth or calling. The First Chamber comprised members, aged at least 35 years
and possessing landed estates or taxed incomes of 4000 crowns, elected for nine
years by communal councils and unpaid. In the Second Chamber, whose members
received a small salary, deputies were chosen directly or indirectly by the
country districts and by the towns, according to population. They must be
electors domiciled in their constituencies, of at least 25 years of age, and
qualified by property or income according to a standard which was fixed
somewhat too high to include the mass of the people. Under certain
circumstances the Chambers might vote together,
690 Swedish difficulties with Norway. [1859-72
and Ministers
who were not members might address them. The remainder of the reign of Charles
XV (1859-72) sufficed to show that power was passing from the King and
Ministers into the hands of the Diet, and that within the Diet the agricultural
interest formed the strongest force.
Thanks
chiefly to de Geer and his colleagues Gripenstedt and Carlson* Charles XV had
thus won renown as a reformer. In the domain of foreign affairs, however, the
aspirations of both King and nation were frustrated. Overjoyed at the downfall
of Russia in the Crimean War, Charles and many of his people had dreamed that
Sweden might yet play a great part in the politics of Europe. A sense of their
own freedom inspired outspoken sympathy with the insurgent Italians and Poles;
while Panscandinavian sentiment and the encouragement of Napoleon III impelled
the King to promise support to Denmark against the German Confederation. The
sequel was deeply humiliating. Failing the alliance of one of the Great Powers,
de Geer, Gripenstedt, and the Norwegian Minister, Sibbern, vetoed an adventure
for which their two realms were not equipped and for which the people felt no
general enthusiasm. By rashly issuing the Constitution of November, 1863,
Denmark gave excuse to her foes to advance and to her friends, among whom
Sweden stood foremost, to retreat. Expressions of sympathy, a few hundred
volunteers, and a demonstration of defensive armaments formed the meagre
contribution of Sweden and Norway to the losing side in the war of 1864.
Charles XV,
though beloved in Norway and crowned at a moment when the tide seemed to be
running towards true “ brotherhood,” failed to draw closer the bonds of
Scandinavian union. His refusal in 1860, at the bidding of the Swedes, to
confirm the abolition of the Lord- Lieutenancy by the Storting provoked in the
Norwegians, whose growing national literature is characterised below, a
determination to resist all proposals for the revision of the Riksakt in a
Unionist spirit. Although the downfall of the Danes in 1864 emphasised the need
of Scandinavian defence and even caused the jubilee of the Union to be
celebrated with enthusiasm, the Storting of 1871 rejected revision by a
majority of more than five to one. The original defects and obscurities in the
contract between the two nations were thus perpetuated, while the weaker grew
every year more capable of standing alone. The triumph of the Young Norse
party, which was anti-Swedish, in Norway, and the victories of Prussia, then
the foe of Scandinavia. ,n Europe, came at a time when the Swedes were unable
to solve the question of national defence. They were emigrating in tens of
thousands to the New World; but abundant harvests and the industrial
stimulus—due to the Franco-German War and peace—had brightened the horizon,
when Charles XV died in September, 1872.
(2) DENMARK.
Denmark, like
Sweden, emerged from the chaos of the Napoleonic wars a mangled and
poverty-stricken State. The minute duchy of Lauenburg could compensate neither
King nor nation for the loss of Norway and of the fleet, the devastation of
Copenhagen, and the ruin of the finances. In spite of a national bankruptcy,
Denmark owed more than ten years’ revenue at the conclusion of peace; and it
was long before her annual income could be made to balance her expenditure. In
the following twenty years the debt rose from 240,000,000 to 260,000,000
crowns. During this period the limit of practicable taxation was passed, while
the price of com fell heavily; and of industrial and commercial enterprise
Denmark showed little sign. Her administration was almost of necessity corrupt.
In Copenhagen, for five years, bankruptcies occurred at the rate of one per
week, while in 1840 the population of the capital was only one-fifth greater
than in 1801.
Despite all
misfortunes, however, until the death of Frederick VI in 1839, his dominions,
both Danish and German, enjoyed a period which seemed harmonious and even happy
by contrast with the succeeding generation. Norway had indeed been lost, but
the King still ffcignet n Schleswig and in Holstein. The Norwegians had been
turbulent neighbours rather than brethren. Frederick returned from the Congress
of Vienna to be welcomed as the saviour of the nation, and to rule as the most
benevolent of despots. For more than thirty years he had been at the head of the
State, associated first with the emancipation of the peasants, and in later
days with national sufferings, in which his share had been the greatest. Now,
out of respect for him, the Danes were content for a time with a measure of
real liberty and tranquil progress which, though small in comparison with what
came later, surpassed that of their German neighbours at that time. A new
religious enthusiasm moreover animated great sections of the people, while the
upper classes showed in many ways that they were inspired by sentiments of
humanity. The poor and the afflicted were cared for as never before;
prison-reform began; the rights of the Jews were enlarged; savings- banks were
established; education became compulsory; and English methods of instruction were
introduced. Liberal ideas therefore began to ripen in a not unkindly air.
Much of the
quiet progress which Denmark made in the later years of Frederick VI must be
attributed to the efforts of private persons rather than to those of the King.
Frederick VI, indeed, remained first and foremost a soldier. He lacked
political imagination, and was by no means fond of contact with intellects
superior to his own. His humanity and common-sense, however, secured to his
subjects not only a continued enjoyment of the liberties which the Crown had
already granted* but also, though by slow degrees, their enlargement. : In the
darkest days
of European
reaction, the Press, in the Kingdom though not in the Duchies, continued to
enjoy considerable freedom. Thus the famous Kieler Blatter, when proscribed by
the German Confederation in Holstein, found a refuge north of the Eider. In a
small State, at peace within itself and more free than its Continental
neighbours, art and letters flourished. Copenhagen was fertile in academic and
literary achievement ; and Qehlenschlager beheld Grundtvig dedicate the studio
which a rich noble had built for Thorwaldsen.
In the sphere
of politics also liberty found some place. While other tulers broke their
promises to their people, Frederick, who had promised nothing, granted to his
Danish and German subjects a measure of Constitutional government. At the close
of the war he announced his intention of admitting the Privy Council to a
regular share in public business, yielding thereby something of his autocratic
rule. In 1816 a commission was appointed to consider the grant of a
Constitution to Holstein. In 1818 a national bank,: independent of
the Government, was established. In 1831 and 1834, “to knit closer the bonds
which unite the royal house to the people,” Frederick created four provincial
Diets, for the islands, Jutland, Schleswig and Holstein respectively, whose
functions should be to deliberate and advise upon questions of legislature and
finance. Provision was made for the election to these bodies of a fixed number
of burgesses, landowners and peasants, while a few landowners, professors and
clergy were to be nominated by the King.
These
measures, however, though creditable to an aged autocrat, could not satisfy the
constitutional aspirations which grew up during a quarter of a century of
peace—a period renowned for the rise of Liberalism and Nationalism throughout
the Western world. The expulsion of Charles X from France in 1830 stimulated
the desire of the Danes for a national representative system. In the following
year, Uwe Jens Lomsen, a young Schleswig official, in a pamphlet which started
the German national movement of Schleswig-Holstein, gave clear utterance to the
demand of the Germans in the Duchies that their union with the Kingdom should
be merely dynastic. Lomsen was thrown into prison; but in Frederick’s last
years, when men expected that a Liberal would succeed to the throne in the
shape of Prince Christian, Nationalism expressed itself boldly. Even the Danish
minority in northern Schleswig began to show that it was not a negligible
factor in the State. At the same time Panscandinavian ideas, which drew
inspiration from the long past history of the North, found vent in a meeting
between Danish and Swedish students, the first of a remarkable series which
continued at intervals for more than twenty years. When to the new hostility of
the Germans in the Duchies towards the Danes was added the new friendliness of
the Swedes, the political future of Scandinavia became indeed uncertain. At the
same time the probability that no male heir would be born to Frederick, Prince
Christian’s only son, rendered
dubious the
question of the eventual succession to the dominions of Frederick VI. Christian
VIII, who succeeded his uncle in 1839, thus found himself confronted with a
complex problem which no statesman then living could have solved. The element
of greatest difficulty lay in Schleswig-Holstein. Simultaneously with the grant
of Diets, these Duchies had received a common administration and a common
tribunal, which emphasised the distinction between them and Denmark proper. In
many respects indeed they formed a single corporation. From the Kongeaa to the
Elbe and the Trave, the upper classes were Germans or Germanised Danes, conscious
of a unity unsevered by the Eider and accentuated by the existence of Jutland
on their flank. In the Diets, the law Courts, the schools and the churches, the
sole language was German. That Schleswig and Holstein were inseparable had been
admitted by the Treaty of Ribe in 1460; and the Danish elements of the
population had been so far Germanised that only a remnant in northern Schleswig
retained the speech and consciousness of their race. The governmental union
with Denmark was threatened, moreover, by differences in the law of succession.
In Holstein at least the succession could not be said to pass, as in Denmark,
through females, while the Germans asserted that in Schleswig the same
objection held good.
The Danes, on
the other hand, regarded the Eider as the historic boundary of their State.
Their monarch had annexed Schleswig in 1713; and his title had been recognised
throughout a long series of European pacts. While many Danes felt a certain
indifference with regard to the future of Holstein, the nation was resolved
that Schleswig must be retained. Yet even the Danes of Schleswig belonged to
the duchy rather than to the kingdom; while, to complete the confusion of the
situation, Holstein was a member of the German Confederation and Schleswig was
not.
Such was the
burden which weighed down Christian VIII. The new King, though energetic,
cultured, and enlightened, won little appreciation from his people. Liberal
opinions, for which in earlier days he had been excluded first from the
Council, and afterwards for a time from the country, he now disavowed. Always
susceptible to external influences, he had learned from the Tsar, Mettemich and
many other rulers whom he visited in 1838, to regard a centralised representative
system as dangerous to monarchy. But, although he abjured political change and
did not shrink from imprisoning Orla Lehmann, when that brilliant demagogue
indicted autocracy, his reforms proved him at least to be a conscientious
ruler. During his short reign (1839-48), he effected great and beneficial
changes in all departments of the administration, and developed communal
self-government in town and country alike. He set the finances in order,
published the national accounts, revised the Sound Dues, sold the unprofitable
colonies, bought up the exemptions of his German nobles from customs dues, and
paid off
debt at the
rate of 3,000,000 crowns a year. Stimulated by the visit of Elizabeth Fry, he
furthered the reform of prisons, the abolition of the slave-trade, and the
toleration of the Baptists. Crimes began to be punished more wisely, and
flogging in the army was abolished. Iceland received a Constitution.
Communications by road and railway were rapidly developed, and the peasants
were thereby helped to take part in public life. Thanks to the King’s labours,
Denmark became sufficiently rich and well-organised as to be able to endure not
long afterwards a three years’ war on land.
In dealing
with the great problem of knitting his dominions into a firm whole and passing
it on to a determinate successor, however, Christian VIII was less successful.
The antipathy between his Danish and German subjects increased in intensity.
During the session of the : Schleswig Estates in November, 1842, a
member advanced the unprecedented^ claim to speak and to be reported in Danish.
This challenge to the German majority began a struggle which raged until 1864,
The King, by a patent of March, 1844, conceded the use of Danish in
exceptional cases but not as an inalienable right, and thereby satisfied
neither side. Henceforward the majority of the Danes, who desired to make the
E'.ler the frontier of a unified State, gladly countenanced the coercion of the
Germans in Schleswig; while the Germans of the Duchies, supported by the public
opinion of the German Confederation, showed themselves equally harsh towards
the Danes. Christian’s attempt to provide for the future added bitterness to
the strife. His open letter of July 8, 1846, declared that the succession
established by the Kongelov, the autocratic fundamental law of Denmark,
undoubtedly held good for Schleswig and Lauenburg, but that concerning parts of
Holstein the question was uncertain. This implicit endorsement of the views of
the Eider-Danes found its almost inevitable consequence in the war of 1848.
The concluding
months of the King’s life were passed in endeavours to combat the growing
spirit of separatism in the Duchies by means of a Constitution in which the
whole monarchy should share. This work was taken up in a spirit of filial piety
by Frederick VII, who ascended the throne in January, 1848, and who was to be
the last unquestioned heir to kingdom and duchies alike. In him the Danes found
a monarch, whose indolent kindliness and real sympathy with his people won him
the affection of every class, while the society and influence of his low-born
wife made him constitutional rather than absolutist at heart. With
undiscriminating obedience to the letter of his father’s commands, he called to
his councils Karl Moltke, a strong and perfectly loyal statesman, but dangerously
inclined to emphasise the claim of the Duchies to form a single body politic.
Under his influence, the Crown prepared to establish for the whole of its
dominions a Diet, which should momH* annually in Copenhagen or in Gottorp. Such
a “ whole-State ” policy,
involving as
it did the equality of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein, ran counter to every
hope of the Eider-Danes. Both sections of Frederick’s subjects pro -csted,
demanding respectively that Schleswig should enter the Kingdom of Denmark and the
German Confederation. The Danes gained the ear of the King, who complied with
their national demand for greater freedom of the Press, and challenged the
Duchies by establishing a Danish Nationalist Ministry in power. Amid the
general excitement produced by the Revolution of 1848, Denmark found herself
involved in the first Schleswig-Holstein War.
The course of
the three years’ struggle is traced elsewhere. Its influence upon the remainder
of Frederick’s reign (to 1863) was deep and manifold. The victories at Bau,
Fridericia and Idstedt, and, in general, their successful defiance of Germany,
inspired the Danes with a national self-confidence, which was soon to prove
disastrous. The problem of the Duchies had not been solved by fighting. The
partition of Schleswig on the basis of language which England suggested had
been rejected; and Danes and Germans hated one another more fiercely than
before the war. The pause in their armed strife, moreover, had been purchased
largely by Danish pledges with regard to the future government of the Duchies,
which had given to foreign Powers a precedent and a pretext for future
interference. Above all, the King’s surrender to the Danish Nationalists had
produced the Constitution of 1849, by which the monarchy finally abandoned its
claims to autocracy north of the Kongeaa. With little or no struggle and
sacrifice, Denmark proper had become a limited hereditary monarchy, in which
the King shared legislative power with a Diet elected by the people.
Responsible Ministers appeared, each at the head of a department of State; and,
without the signature of one of them, the royal ordinances were thenceforward
to be invalid. In composition and mode of election the two Chambers, the
Folksthing and Lcmdsthing, closely resembled the Swedish, Chambers of
1866 described above. Freedom of religion, of the
Press, of public meeting and of industrial career were granted; and all
privilege was abolished. In this Fundamental Law Schleswig found no place.
Early in 1852 it was removed from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal,
under which it had hitherto been associated with Holstein. For some years,
Moltke governed the Duchies in the spirit of pure autocracy, while during
1852-4 the hopes of the Eider-Danes were flouted by the sway of a Ministry
which depended largely on foreign support and governed without special regard
to Danish nationalism. From 1854 onwards, however, a series of measures aimed
at making Schleswig Danish by force; and the way was thus prepared for the
remonstrances and demands of the German Powers, which eventually precipitated
the war of 1864.
The position
of Denmark, both national and international, was at the samp time complicated
by the question of succession. After the nephew of Christian VIII had ceded to
his sister Louise his rights under
the Kongelov,
and the dynastic claim of the Duke of Augustenburg in the Duchies had been
bought off, a settlement seemed to have been reached by the Treaty of London of
1852. This was signed by the Five Great Powers and Sweden and Norway, which all
severally undertook, in the interests of the peace of Europe, to recognise the
eventual succession of Christian of Gliicksburg, and his heirs male by Princess
Louise, to “ all the lands which are now united under the sceptre of His Majesty
the King of Denmark.” Offensive as this arrangement could not but be to the
Eider-Danes, they were not strong enough to oppose it in the Diet; and it
became law in 1853. Next year, the Government followed up their success by
promulgating a Constitution common to all the King’s dominions. By this a
Council, whose powers were closely limited, was established of whose fifty
members twenty were nominees of the Crown. The Diet rose in defence of the
Fundamental Law, and in October, 1855, reaped the reward of its efforts in the
shape of a Council enlarged in numbers and in powers.. In 1856, however, the
German Great Powers stepped in to denounce a Constitution granted in violation
of the agreements which Denmark had made with them in 1852. For years the
quarrel went on at intervals, Denmark yielding slowly,, the Germans claiming
more and more, the tide of Eider-Danish and Panscandinavian enthusiasm rising,
and, to all appearance, the European situation changing in Denmark’s favour. At
last in March, 1863, the Government, headed since 1857 by Hall, announced a
separate legislature and army for Holstein and Lauenburg, to be followed by a
common constitution for Denmark and Schleswig. The German Confederation
continued to threaten military action against Denmark, while the Germans of
Schleswig made constitutional government impossible. On November 13 the Council
accepted by forty votes against sixteen the common Constitution for Denmark and
Schleswig which had been foreshadowed in March. The nation was thereby pledged
to the policy of “ Denmark to the Eider,” just at the moment when the death of
Frederick VII prevented it from rallying round an uncontested throne. Within a
year, as is narrated elsewhere, his successor, > Christian IX, had been
compelled by German arms to renounce Schleswig-Holstein for ever, and to accept
the frontier of the Kongeaa.
With the loss
of the Duchies, Denmark ceased to need the political institutions of a de facto
federal State. What body, or bodies, had power to establish a Constitution was
now, however, a disputable question It was not until after a heated conflict
and a new election of the Diet that the Agricultural party made their will so
far prevail that, in July, L866, a new edition of the Fundamental Law of 1849
received the royal signature. This for the most part confirmed the Constitution
granted by Frederick VII, but contained modifications designed to secure more
permanent and substantial elements in the Landsthing. Of its sixty-six members,
twelve were now to be appointed by the King for life, and the
others
indirectly elected by voters possessing an income of 2000 crowns. The fact that
a Ministry supported by the Landsthing felt itself entitled to govern in
defiance of the popular will, as represented in the FolTcsbhmg, lent importance
to the Constitution of 1866 and led to political conflict in Denmark during
many years.
(3) DANO-NORWEGIAN LITERATURE.
(1815-65.)
The
nineteenth century had opened for Denmark with less internal disturbance than
for most of the countries of Europe. But, in 1807, she also was drawn into the
whirl of the Napoleonic crisis, and her political and social conditions
underwent a succession of disasters. The devastation of Copenhagen by fire, the
capture of the Danish fleet, the forcible separation from her ancient
dependency, Norway, culminated in a national bankruptcy that plunged a large
part of her population into severe poverty. But while these calamities wounded
the vanity and sapped the comforts of the people, the intellectual life of
Denmark had never blazed so high, or with a flame so clear or so pure from
foreign influence as it did immediately after these terrible calamities.
In
the course of the eighteenth century, Danish literature had brought forth many
admirable specimens, particularly in lyric and dramatic poetry. In Holberg it
had produced a great comic playwright, in Johannes Evald an exquisite lyrist
and the first pioneer of Scandinavian neo-romanticism. The veteran of Danish
literature, as the century closed, was Jens Immanuel Baggesen (1764-1826),
satirist, rhetorician, lyrist, and almost a great writer. But Baggesen was a
Germaniser, and the new writers, who rose in violent opposition to Baggesen in
the opening years of the new century, were in their own way Germanisers too.
Their ideas were those which the Norwegian philosopher, Henrik Steffens
(1773-1845) had brought back from Germany. The earliest of the great lyrists of
the new age, Adolph Wilhelm Schack-Staffeldt (1769-1826), clothed in an
extraordinary beauty of form thoughts and types which were borrowed directly
from his romantic German contemporaries. .
But the
veteran Baggesen, who had sometimes written in German, and who had been deeply
tinged with the colour of earlier German descriptive and didactic poetry, in
his latest period—partly in pique at the successes of the new poets, no doubt,
but partly also in response to the dictates of his own sound judgment—went back
to the original Danish characteristics and strongly opposed all exotic
influences. It is interesting to note that his strongest utterance in this
direction dates precisely from 1814, the year of the separation from Norway.
Baggesen, who possessed the limpid common-sense of the eighteenth century,
698 Danish Poetry: Oehlenschlager. Grundtvig.
ridiculed the
mysticism and the opacity of the romantic Danish imitators of Novalis. He did
not spare even what he considered Germanising tendencies in Oehlenschlager,
whom he had greeted with so splendid a gesture, as more than the inheritor of
his own renown, as the Aladdin who had discovered and had relighted the sacred
lamp of poesy in Denmark.
When the
period we are discussing began, Adam Gottlob Oehlenschlager (1779-1850) was
unquestionably the greatest figure in the living poetry of the North. It was
the pride and joy of the Danes in the darkest hour of their political
humiliation that they possessed a poet of surpassing greatness, a poet who, as
it seemed to them, could hold his own With Goethe, with Alfieri, with Byron. In
1805 the new writer, already celebrated, had poured out of his golden horn a
cluster of works, epic, dramatic, descriptive, lyrical, which placed him, at
once, far above any preceding Danish writer in each of these kinds. Oehlenschlager
called his imagination a fairy ring;- he had but to turn it on his finger, and
it brought him all he asked for. Then followed the majestic series of his
saga-dramas, with which he stirred to its depths the patriotic sentiments of
his wounded country. Never, had his verse sounded with a louder, more
passionate harmony than in the collection called Helge, printed in the unhappy
year 1814.
If in the
poetry of Oehlenschlager there remained to the last a slight touch of
Germanism, an echo of the romantic ideas he had listened to. in his youth from
the impassioned lips of Steffens, in Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig
(1783-1872) these have wholly disappeared, and every word and every thought is
redolent of Danish soil. As a poet, as a priest; as a teacher, as a politician,
all through his long and violent life Grundtvig fought for the national
principle; in him the sentiment of the independence of Denmark found its
raciest exponent. In his incessant publicity, in his character as a tireless
intellectual Berserker, he contrasted with the subdued and pathetic Steen
Steensen Blicher (1782-1848), whose voice seemed scarcely louder than that of
the wind blov ng over his native heaths in Jutland. But Blicher also did a
great work, by means of his incomparable peasant stories, in building up an
independent form of literature, owing all its character to Danish elements.
It was by
poetry mainly that the revival of Danish letters was illustrated; but in
Bernhard Severin Ingemann (1789-1862) Denmark produced her first great
novelist. His historical romances, started, no doubt, by the example of the
Waverley Novels, enjoyed an extraordinary popularity. Ingemann was followed by
innumerable imitators; but the real birth of Danish prose fiction was not yet.
Drama, as has often been the case in the history of literature, awakened first.
Before 1815 several playwrights had attempted to follow in the steps of Holberg
by composing comedies on themes of a purely local character, but these homely
dramatists had to fight against the overweening popularity of German
699
models, and
particularly of Kotzebue. Foersom’s admirable, and still classic, translation
of Shakespeare, began to be printed in 1819, and prepared the way for better
things. Then, in the fulness of time, appeared Johan Ludvig Heiberg
(1791-1860), a man not merely of lively and exquisite fancy, but equipped, as
perhaps no other Dane was then equipped, with the culture of Europe. In 1825
Heiberg brought to Copenhagen from Paris the form of the vaudeville, but
clothed it with robes of delightful wit and fancy, combining an ironical
observation of local manners with a delicate sense of poetry. It would be
difficult to exaggerate what Heiberg did, as poet, playwright, journalist and
critic, to extend and modernise Danish taste, lifting it to a level with its neighbours,
while preserving its essential independence.
The poets who
immediately followed Oehlenschlager were somewhat eclipsed by the splendour and
fulness of his output. But the lamp of Aladdin flickered and declined some time
before the poet’s bodily powers decayed, and there was found room for a new
generation to assert itself. Of these there stand out five who deserve mention
among the most eminent writers of the century; they are, in the order of their
birth, Ludvig Adolph Bodtcher (1793-1874), Christian Winther (1796-1876),
Henrik Hertz (1798-1870), Hans Christian Andersen (1805-75), and Frederik
Paludan-Miiller (1809-76). These are the poets who represent at its height the
poetical genius of Denmark in the central years of the nineteenth century. Bodtcher
and Winther were lyrists, Andersen the world- famous fabulist, while Hertz and
Paludan-Miiller excelled in almost all branches of the art of poetry. It was
Hertz who put his stamp on the romantic drama of the country, and he has the
distinction of having influenced Ibsen more directly than any other writer.
Paludan-Miiller, doubtless the most accomplished poetical artist that Denmark
has produced, summed up the tradition of his day, very much as Tennyson was
doing in England and Victor Hugo in France. In 1870 all these five poets were
still alive, and at the height of their influence, though they had almost
ceased to write.
In prose
there should first be mentioned the great philologist Rasmus Kristian Rask
(1787-1832), who insisted, more emph& .:cally than any man before him, on
the relationship between the language and manners of the ancient Scandinavian
races and those of their living successors. He was followed, in his admirable
work, by Petersen and Madvig. A glory of Danish science was Hans Christian
Oersted (1777-1851), the inventor of electro-magnetism, and an excellent
author. But perhaps the most important prose-writer of this period was the
philosopher Soren Aaby Kierkegaard (1813-55), whose value was scarcely
recognised in his own day, as he threaded the streets of Copenhagen in
meditation, but who has slowly risen, since his death, to be one of the
principal stars in the Danish firmament. His chief contribution to philosophy
bears the title Either—Or. With these
exceptions,
however, the glories of Danish literature during this period were mainly
poetical. Here Denmark could compete on equal terms with any literature in
Europe. But the revival of her prose, in which the personal genius of Georg
Brandes has had a large share, belongs to the generation after 1870.
The
intellectual condition of Norway, for a long time after the separation, was far
less satisfactory than that of Denmark. Hitherto the writings of Norwegians
had, in consequence of the identity of the language, been merged in Danish literature;
and, although a large number of the leading writers of the eighteenth century,
such as Holberg, Tullin, Fasting, Wessel, and Jonas Rein, had been Norwegians
by birth, they no more formed a Norwegian literature than Swift and Berkeley
formed an Irish literature. After 1814, the authors of Norway continued for
some years to follow exactly in the steps of their Danish brethren, but with a
great poverty of invention and under humiliating conditions. The immediate
result of the separation was to impoverish all forms of intellectual life in
Norway; and even the boasted expansion of the University of Christiania, which
had been founded in 1811, did little at first to enrich the State. The jealous
spirit in which the Norwegian politicians protected the vindicated independence
of their country was in itself highly unfavourable to any international movement
in the directions of literature, art, and science ; while Norwegians were
indignantly excluded from all participation in the intellectual successes of Denmark.
The official
histories of Norwegian literature present to us the names of three patriotic
poets who rose into local eminence at the moment of the separation. These are
Konrad Nicolai Schwach (1793-1860), Henrik Anker Bjerregaard (1792-1842), and
Mauritz Christopher Hansen (1794-1842). It is impossible for a foreign critic
to regard these writers of political songs and occasional festival pieces with
the indulgence given 'hem in Norway, where, indeed, though they are still
honoured as ancestors they are no longer read for pleasure. To compare these
poets with their immediate Danish contemporaries is to throw a cruel light on
the poverty of Norway. But there were two children in the nursery at the
beginning of Norwegian independence who were destined to win for themselves a
permanent position. Henrik Wergeland (1808-45) was the champion of ] arwegian
independence and the inspired darling of the people. By the critics of
Copenhagen he was uniformly treated with neglect and ridicule, and he has, even
to this day, received no cordial consideration from Danish writers. Treated in
Norway as if he were Kino- David and Victor Hugo rolled into one, and in
Denmark as a raw poetaster, Wergeland exemplifies the difference of taste which
at that time divided the countries. Without refinement, ignorant of all
aesthetic art, Wergeland could but scandalise the delicate Danish critics •
filled to the lips with a rough kind of lyric fire, pouring forth his odes,’
epics
Welhaven. Munch.—Norwegian Prose. 701
pantomimes,
and hymns, all to the glory of Norway, he could but gratify a national
susceptibility. Those who now judge his work with impartiality may see beneath
his extravagance of form and turbidity of phrase a genuine poetical passion.
Under the
infliction of so much noisy verse, Johan Sebastian Welhaven (1807-73) long
preserved an angry silence. But in 1834 he broke out with Norway's Twilight, a
polemical poem in sonnets, which provoked a huge sensation. In the course of
this diatribe, the young satirist exposed all the faults which disgraced the
weltering confusion of Norwegian ideas, and in particular the chaotic literary
taste of his fellow-citizens. The national vanity and the emphatic redundancy
of the poets was pitilessly scourged in these brilliant sonnets, from the
publication of which the literary history of Norway really takes its
starting-point. Welhaven quitted satire, and published many volumes of original
poetry, full of elegance and charm, but in Norway's Twilight he had performed
his life’s work. He was accompanied by Andreas Munch (1811-84), whom it was
long the pride of the Norwegians to pit against Tennyson, Geibel and
Paludan-Miiller. He had something in common with each of these great writers,
but it was reduced into timid and commonplace terms; his success was even less
permanent than that of Wergeland and Welhaven. This school of Norwegian writers
rose to its zenith about the year 1845, after which there was a gentle decline
until the opposition set in of the group to which Ibsen and Bjomson belonged.
As in
Denmark, so in Norway, the period was preeminently a poetical one. But there
grew up a sense of the value of the ancient monuments of tradition and legend,
and this took literary form in the folk-lore of Peter Christian Asbjomsen
(1812-85) and Jorgen Moe (1813-82), whose popular stories, written in
collaboration, began to appear in 1841; these were continued and expanded for
thirty years, forming at last a monument of national Norwegian prose, and a
well into which future writers have dipped the buckets of their imagination.
The best prose work done by Norwegians in these years was of an antiquarian
character. Much is forgotten; but the philology of Ivar Aasen (1813-96), the
popular songs collected by Magnus Brostrup Landstad (1802-80), the collection
of dialects by Sophus Bugge (bom 1833), the researches into Norwegian history
of Rudolf Keyser (1803-64), and Peter Andreas Munch (1810-63) deserve
remembrance.
Prom a
European point of view, however, the interest in Norwegian literature begins
with the coming of Ibsen and Bjomson, the only authors whom Norway has
contributed to the class which enjoys a universal publicity. Neither of these
illustrious writers properly belongs to the period of which we are here
recording the productions. Ibsen had passed through a long apprenticeship to
Danish forms, and particularly to the romantic tragedies of Hertz. His full
originality
702
The youth of Ibsen and BjdrnsOn.
was only
asserted towards the closing years of this epoch. Bjornson, whose Arne dates
back to 1858, had, indeed, already enriched the literature of his, country by a
number of pathetic and romantic short stories of peasant life, far exceeding in
beauty and skill anything performed in Norwegian prose before. But the Bjornson
we have known since, in the larger flights of his genius, was still
unrecognised and hardly guessed at. He leaned slightly towards a movement which
Ibsen always repudiated, the maalstrcev or effort after the formation of a
national language. Of this movement, the peasant poet, Aasmund Vinje (1818-70)
was the protagonist, but he received little definite encouragement at the time,
although at a later date the maal or patois was strenuously cultivated. Nor'
were the supremacy of Danish taste and the irksome provinciality of intellectual
life in Norway successfully overcome until a date subsequent to that with which
we here close.
In a general
survey, we are struck by the difference between the classical development of a
literature long nourished on tradition and cultivated upon conservative lines,
and the rough emergence of one forced by political conditions to depend upon
its own resources. Although these two literatures were composed in identically
the same language, their differences and discords are far more noticeable than
their similarity. There is a certain parallel in the relations between the
literatures of Great Britain and the United States between the Revolution and
1800. The imitativeness and crudity of the early Norwegian writers bear a close
resemblance to the jejune qualities of what Americans call the Colonial Period.
It took Norway half a century of liberty to free herself from the servitude of
style.
ROME AND THE
VATICAN COUNCIL.
(1846-70.)
On June 17, 1846, Giovanni Mastai-Ferretti, Bishop
of Imola, was proclaimed Pope under the name of Pius IX. The election, as
generally happens, was the result of a compromise; the “Gregorians” would have
preferred the late Secretary of State, Lambruschini; the reformers, Micara or
Gizzi. Mastai was understood to have Liberal leanings, and to have been out of
sympathy with his predecessor’s policy. But his Liberalism, in no sense
religious or theological, was matter of temperament rather than of principle,
and dictated largely by circumstances. The system of repression, inaugurated
under Pius VII by Pacca, and adopted unreservedly by the last three Popes, had
broken down. Mettemich himself had remonstrated against the medieval administration
of Gregory XVI, which discredited absolutism; and, whatever his personal views
or feelings, the new Pope could not but make efforts in the direction of
reform. That his changes brought upon him the ill- will of the Legitimist
Governments was the result less of his Liberalism, which was but slight, than
of the unreality of the European situation and, in particular, of the
contradiction involved in the notion of a Pope-King.
The character
of Pius IX has been variously estimated. It passed through more than one phase;
and, while retaining certain leading qualities throughout, it was wanting in
consistency. The abrupt change in his policy after 1848 gave the impression
that Pius IX was a Liberal before, and a reactionary after, that date. It may
be doubted whether he was ever by conviction either the one or the other. He
had the obstinacy of a weak man; and the epileptic tendency which he never
wholly lost was the key to his personality. His original aim was
self-contradictory: the papal theocracy and the modem State were incompatibles;
their union was the most impossible of dreams. A man of sentiment rather than
of fact, he moved in a world of signs and wonders: his credulity was abnormal,
and his piety, sincere as it was, stood in no relation to the mind or facts of
his time. He magnified his office; and, regarding opposition to his will as the
unpardonable
sin, viewed
great political and ecclesiastical questions from a personal standpoint. At the
Vatican Council he canvassed energetically for the definition of Infallibility;
he pleaded, menaced, cajoled. He met the loss of the temporal power on occasion
with dignity, oftener with querulous invective. Italian as he was at heart, at
times the patriotic instinct asserted itself; but, since he was an ecclesiastic
by profession and prejudice, the class interest more commonly subordinated the
man to the priest. He was unequal to his times and to his office. As a simple
priest, he would have left a happier record; his was not the stuff of which
leaders of men are made.
At his
accession the government of the Papal States was, with the possible exception of
the kingdom of Naples, the worst in Italy. Every public department was in
disorder. The finances were desperate; taxation was heavy and unequal; trade
was limited to small industries; manufactures did not exist. The higher posts
in the administration were open only to the clergy; the police, whose number
was out of all proportion to the population, were employed mainly for political
purposes ; smuggling and brigandage were rife: Railways were forbidden— chemin
de fer chemm d'enfer, ran the saying; education was nominal and difficult of
access; the mental and moral life of the people was deliberately stunted. The
reforms instituted by Pius IX were inconsiderable ; some of them, indeed, had
been urged on the papal Government in vain by the Powers since 1815. But the
temper of the time was sanguine; the reforms excited enthusiasm more by what
they were understood to promise than by what they performed.
The legend of
a liberty-loving Pope was diffused throughout Ital’ and Europe by the issue of
an extensive political amnesty (July 16,1846), by the establishment of a
Council of State (April 81,1847), and finally (March 14, 1848) by the grant of
a Constitution. Slight however, and hedged in by limitations, as the
concessions were, the very word Constitution was enough to alarm Austria and
to encourage the rising tide of Italian Liberalism. The Giovine Italia found an
echo in other camps than that of Mazzini and the Republicans; the presence of
the Austrians in the peninsula was universally resented; the ideas of national
independence and unity were in the air, and among the Neo-Guelfs of the school
of Gioberti they took the shape of a confederation of the Italian States under
the presidency of the Pope.
Such
aspirations were calculated to fire the susceptible imagination of Pius IX: at
first protesting and reluctant, he was swept away by the tide. From the balcony
of the Quirinal he solemnly blessed Italy, now no longer a geographical .
cpression but a nation; he saw himself in fancy the idol of the populace and
the over-lord of kings. But, when it came to action, he drew back. No reliance
could be placed on his varying moods and resolutions; he said and unsaid. When
the flame of revolution kindled in Upper Italy, his troops marched to the
defence
of the
frontier; but he wavered as to further measures, and could not make up his mind
either to take part in or to withdraw from the war. His justification, had he
been prepared to plead it, was the impossibility of reconciling his spiritual
claims with his temporal sovereignty. The question indeed admitted only one
solution; for which neither Europe nor the Church was yet ripe. In despair he
called Gioberti and Rosmini, the two wisest men in the Church, to his councils;
but other and less scrupulous advisers were in, the ascendant. The sport of
contending factions and forces, he leaned—as pressure was brought to bear upon
him—now to this, now to that side. The people, ignorant and untrained in the
duties of citizenship, got out of hand; and the murder of the Minister Rossi, a
doctrinaire Liberal, closed the first chapter of the pontificate. On November
25, 1848, the Pope fled from Rome, now a prey to anarchy, to the Neapolitan
fortress of Gaeta.
Here his
vacillation ceased; henceforward he stood for the lpst cause of European
reaction. It was at this time that he fell permanently under the influence of
Antonelli. Never were two men less alike; but the famous secretary, at once
resourceful and supple, succeeded in making himself necessary to his master,.
whose foibles he could flatter and to whose prejudices he could condescend. His
loyalty has been questioned, but not disproved. He had little fixed conviction;
he had been absolutist ander Gregory XVI, Liberal during the first years of
Pius IX. But he was neither a visionary nor a fanatic; he relied on diplomacy,
not on force, and persistently opposed Merode’s grotesque war policy. Pius IX
had worse adviser? than Antonelli. Corrupt and unprincipled, he was driven into
ambiguous alliances and doubtful paths; but, substantially, his policy was in
accordance with the traditions of Roman diplomacy, which is astute rather than
farsighted; and he may well have believed that, in the circumstances, it was
the safest that could be pursued. The religious fervour of the Pope was foreign
to him; his mind was set on more material objects—the maintenance of the status
quo in Rome, and generally in Italy. This was not, as matters turned out, in
accordance with the historical development pf events. But, at the time, it did
not necessarily appear either visionary or mischievous; w ser men than Pius IX
might have believed in it ; better men than Antonelli might have regarded it as
a desirahle end.
Generous as
were the enthusiasms of 1848, they were premature and, in their original shape,
impracticable: Mazzini and Garibaldi had to be supplemented by Victor Emmanuel
and Cavour. Hence a plausible if inadequate explanation of the revolutionary
movement, which ascribed it to the aspirations of a comparatively small middle
class and the agitation of demagogues, and declared ;the masses to be
indifferent to political change. The disturbances were less significant than
they appeared, and might be treated as episode/3; the framework of society was
as solid as before. The adoption of this view might perhaps have led to
definite
results, had
the Italian Governments been patriotic or progressive. But, excepting that of
Piedmont, they were neither. The politico-religious influence of Rome was
brought to bear on the better dispbsed Princes; Leopold of Tuscany was induced
by the Pope, who feared the contagion of constitutional government, to revoke
the Fundamental Statute of 1848. Under similar pressure he revived the medieval
law forbidding Jews to practise medicine; treated the reading and distribution
of the Bible as a penal offence; and prohibited the reprinting of the works of
the great eighteenth-century scholar Muratori. Benedict XIV had guaranteed
Muratori’s orthodoxy; but the critical temper, admitted, within limits, in the
eighteenth century, could; not be tolerated under Pius IX.
In the Papal
States, things were almost as bad as they had been in the time of Gregory XVI.
Irritated by the clemency of the French to his revolted subjects, Pius IX
leaned on Austrian protection, and wished to transfer the seat of government to
Loreto, and live under the shadow of the Holy House which, tradition said; had
been miraculously transported from Nazareth, by way of Dalmatia, to that
sanctuary. He was persuaded, however, to abandon this fantastic design ; and
reentered his capital, April 12, 1850, where, supported (except for a brief
interval) by French bayonets, he reigned for ■ twenty years. Laymen were
again excluded from office;-the electoral bodies were not even convened; in
1851, the number of political prisoners reached 8800; the vendetta pretma was
in full swing.
Charles
Albert, King of Sardinia, wishing at all costs to keep foreign troops out of
Italy, had offered his intervention between the Pope and the Romans; but Pius,
embittered and distrustful, refused his offer. Italy never forgot or forgave
him. The despatch of the French expeditionary force under Oudinot, sowing, as
it did, lasting seeds of discord between France and Italy, was a disastrous
step on the part of the Second Republic; Napoleon III in later years spoke of
the occupation of Rome as the great mistake of his reign. But it must be
remembered that, both at the time and subsequently, French diplomacy did its
best to induce the Pope to make reforms; and that the military intervention of
the Prince Pres -lent barred the way to action on the part of the more
reactionary Powers. He was the dupe at once of circumstances and of a diplomacy
more astute than his own. Pius IX accepted everything, and conceded nothing;
and, while lavishing effusive gratitude upon Austria, Spain, and Naples for the
part taken by them in his restoration, treated his French preservers with
marked coldness. Their position was a false one, but escape was difficult, and
after the Coup d'itat impossible. The Emperor dared not openly quarrel with the
French Clericals; and the Pope was master of the situation. Hence, however,
arose a standing danger to the French empire ; its Achilles’ heel was Rome. The
Vatican pursued its advantage to the Utmost; and its assistance was valuable to
1801-60] Growth of French Ultramontanvm.-De
Maistre. 707
the new
dynasty. Forgetful alike of the crime of December 2 and of the interest of his
Legitimist allies, the Pope was the first European sovereign to congratulate
Napoleon, and contemplated officiating in person at his coronation. It was the
policy of the Emperor, on the other hand, to pose as the friend of the clergy
and of religion; and in his changed circumstances his zeal for constitutional
government cooled.
The civil and
religious claims of the Papacy, in their most extreme form, were championed by
a powerful section of French Catholics, whose influence dominated what had once
been the Gallican Church. Contrary to the intention of Napoleon I, the
Concordat of 1801 had made the French clergy more dependent than ever upOn
Rome. The suppression of the historical hierarchy, if justified by the
circumstances of the case, was the greatest stretch of jurisdiction on which a
Pope had ever ventured. The abrogation of the old canon law made the priests,
now for the most part mere desservants, defenceless against the Bishops, and
the Bishops equally so against Rome. Deprived of the privileges and possessions
enjoyed under the monarchy, they were unable to hold their own with the Pope*
as their predecessors, when need was, had done; rather they looked to him as
their protector against the violence of the Revolution and the encroachments of
the civil power.
The brilliant
politico-ecclesiastical theorising of de Maistre supplied a systematic
framework to the practical requirements of the situation, and influenced not
only religious enthusiasts, but thinkers like Comte and statesmen like Gu .ot,
to whom the maintenance of order seemed the first social need. This,, for de
Maistre, was fundamental; and the Papacy was its embodiment. For him, a
dialectician of the first rank, history was non-existent: he viewed the
supremacy and infallibility of the Pope as political necessities rather than as
religious or theological truths. The Church stood for order; and this order
must not be an idea—de Maistre detested ideas—but a concrete force, present,
available, energis- ng; Rome was the Church, and the Church was Rome. Starting
from different premisses and with a different end in view, Lamennais reached
the same conclusions. The timorous and ineffectual Gallicanism of the
Restoration repelled him; Ultramontanism represented all that was living in the
Church. With entire conviction, remorseless logic, and the command of every art
of popular journalism, Louis Veuillot pushed these principles home; and his
organ, the (Jnivers, became a power in France, and even in Rome, greater than
that of the hierarchy. The Vatican itself affected at times to disavow the
utterances of its too impetuous advocate; bishops quailed under his vitriolic
pen. No paradox dismayed, no consequences deterred him; he pressed premisses
granted, half-heartedly enough, by his opponents, to their most extreme conclusions
; he identified the Papacy with a party, and the Church with a sect. If France
to-day is broken up into two conflicting factions, if the public peace is
disturbed, if the interests of religion and society are
imperilled by
the struggle between two rival ideas of civilisation, two incompatible
interpretations of life and experience, the seeds of the discord were sown by
the insolent tyranny of the religious journalism “ sans mission, et sans
pudeur,” as Montalembert described it, of which the Unipers was the
representative, and Pius IX the patron.
Politically
Austria had been the mainstay of the Papacy, but Mettemich was no Ultramontane;
among clergy and laity alike the •;rad:tions of th’e antipapal
policy of Joseph II still lingered; and the concessions, with regard to
marriage, education, and the censorship of the Press, made by the State to the
Church in the Concordat of 1855, excited no little discontent. Similar
Concordats were concluded with Wiirtemberg and Baden. The motives at work were
not wholly religious; Francis Joseph wished to use the papal authority as a
means for drawing together the various States of his heterogeneous empire. But
Rome had the best of the bargain; not only did she obtain the important
advantage mentioned, but she was enabled to play off Austria against Piedmont,
whose home and foreign policy inspired her with increasing disquietude. In
Piedmont the Siccardi laws had abolished the immunity of the clergy from the
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals, which Victor Emmanuel I had restored;
in 1855 Rattazzi dealt drastically with the religious Orders and their property;
while it became more and more evident that the King and his advisers aimed at
the independence and unity of Italy, and Ultimately at the possession of Rome.
In Prussia,
Frederick William IV had inaugurated a conciliatory policy towards the Church,
whose influence in the Rhine Provinces was great. The Constitution of 1848
secured to the different confessions, reformed and unreformed, a greater
freedom than they had hitherto possessed; and the Romantic movement
inliterature and art had helped towards a more sympathetic understanding of
Catholicism. But, for Pius IX and his Court, Prussia remained a heretical
Power, the hereditary enemy of the Catholic House of Habsburg. The alliance
between William I and Victor Emmanuel, and the subsequent Austro-Prussian War
of 1866, accentuated this attitude; and, but for a significant hint given him
by Napoleon III, the Pope would have declared himself on th6 Austrian side. The
result of the campaign reacted politically on the fortunes of German
Catholicism. Protestantism became preponderant in Germany as a whole; while in
Austria a reform agitation was set on foot, which led to the establishment of
constitutional government, in 1867, and in the following year to the abolition
of the unpopular Concordat of 1855. Josephism was not dead; stimulated by
national sentiment and by the Munich school of scientific history* it was to be
superseded by the tendencies associated with the name of Dollinger, and finally
by the movement known to-day as Los von Rom.
In Spain, a
disputed succession called for the most characteristic qualities of Roman
diplomacy. Theory was with the Carlists, fact with
1851-61] Spanish Concordat. - Victor
Emmanuel King ofItaly. 709
the
successful Cristinos; and Rome, while pledged to the theory, accepted the fact
by recognising Isabella as Queen. Whichever branch of the Bourbons reigned,
papal interests seemed secure. The Spanish- Concordat of 1851, anticipating
the lines of the Austrian of 1855, was a triumph for the Papacy, into whose
hand the Revolution had played unconsciously by the weakening of local
authority in Church and State. From none of the old monarchies could such terms
have been obtained. The devotion of the young Queen to the Holy See was
exemplary; the Liberalism of her Ministers shadowy. Spanish troops helped to
reimpose the papal rule in the revolted provinces; on the Roman question the
Cabinet of Madrid acted with Austria and Naples rather than France.
The phases
through which this question passed, the various attitudes adopted towards it by
Napoleon III according to the exigencies of policy, and the untiring efforts of
Victor Emmanuel and Cavour to bring about the only possible solution, have been
described elsewhere. No French statesman wished to see a powerful Italy. Two
strong neighbours, Germany and England, were enough; it was the policy of
France to keep the peoples south of the Alps divided and weak. But the
Emperor’s personal sympathies at length induced him to cooperate actively with
Victor Emmanuel. In 1859 the Romagna, in 1860 Umbria and the Marches, Naples
and Sicily, were annexed to the kingdom of Italy. By September of the latter
year nothing but the “Patrimony of St Peter”—the territory immediately round
Rome —remained subject to the papal Government. The excommunications launched
in 1860 against the violators of papal territory lent a touch of the
incongruous to the struggle; it became evident that the knot must be cut, if it
could not be untied. Antonelli was less resolute or more politic than Pius IX;
in 1861 negotiations were on the verge of conclusion which, while retaining a
nominal sovereignty for the Pope—and securing certain material advantages to
the Cardinal and his family^-would have made over the administration of Rome
and the States of the Church to the Italian King. Other influences intervened;
and the Minister, quick to see how things were going, passed over into the
extremist camp. He would never, he declared, come to terms with the robbers;
and his desperate throw of the dice was translated in northern Europe into the
language of vehement religious sentiment. Dnpanlonp’s rhetorical appeals, and
John Henry Newman’s famous sermon, The Pope and the Revolution, showed how
strong a feeling was roused even among the more moderate Catholics. The
obstinate resistance of the Vatican did not seem hopeless to those who recalled
the past without perceiving that it furnished no parallel to the present. They
saw that before now Popes had lost and regained their dominions ; they did not
see that, for good or evil, a new era had set in.
In England
one result of the Oxford Movement had been a considerable number of secessions
to Rome. A section of the Established
Church, it
seemed, was gravitating towards Catholicism; the most sanguine expectations
were entertained by the enemies of the Reformation at home and abroad. These
expectations were destined to disappointment; The movement was part of the wave
of reaction which passed over Europe early in the century. That genuine
religious feeling entered into this reaction is unquestionable; but other
causes—the interests of the governing and commercial classes^ professional
pietism, and the ignorance of the masses, whose influence in the community was
on the increase—combined to further it. Building on the foundation laid in
Germany in the preceding century by Spener and Francke, it took the shape of
Romanticism on the Continentin England, modified by the Puritanism which had
left so deep a mark on the national character, it appeared first as
Evangelicalism; then, in an effort to return to medieval precedsnt, to the
teaching and practice of the Pre-Reformation Church; Its partial success was
due to the.ifailure of the Liberalism of the time to appeal to the imagination
of the people. The enthusiasm of the French Revolution had long been extinguished;
and, though the zeal of the Parliamentary Reformers of 1832, the Utilitarians,
the Free Traders, and the like, was sincere; and their measures were popular,
their temper was uninspiring; there was a certain aridity and provincialism
about the men and their ideas. This the Tractarians saw; what they did not see
was the proiiiise of the future. Their movement was, to a large extent,
retrograde and temporary. On the higher levels, of thought there
was no reaction; the shadow o.n the dial did not go baqk. But a considerable
amount of English religion was diverted from the main channel of European
thought; the old unity between the nation and the Church was broken up. The
opposition between the lay and the clerical mind, familiar in Catholic countries,
became naturalised in England. It was an evil importation : increase of
religious observance was dearly bought at the price of interior contradiction
and exterior strife.
The
characteristic features of Tractaria,nism were summed up in its protagonist, John
Henry Newman, An acute dialectician, his critical faculty moved in a narrow
field; but within the limits, of that field it was remorseless. No weak point
in his opponent’s armour escaped him: he questioned, suggested, pleaded; he
useu irony, satire, pathos, with supreme art. As a writer of English prose he
stands with Burke; he played on human nature with a master touch. His excessive
subtlety, which was moral as well as intellectual, left an impression of disingenuousness:
to get at his meaning it was necessary to decipher and unravel, to read behind
the letter and between the lines. His knowledge, even judged by the standards
of his time, was inadequate, and would not sts*nd comparison with, that of
Thirlwal! or Mihnan. German research, contemporary science, the actual movement
of life—all this was a closed book to him ; the world of his experience, if a
decorous and an academic, was a thin and restricted, world. The lqgic of his
position
eventually
led him to Rome (1845); and not a few of the rank and file followed the
seceding leader. Pugey and Keble remained; their followers captured the
historical High Church party, and secured, first toleration, then
preponderance, in the Church. In his later years Newman, distrusted from the
first by Pius IX, displayed Liberalising tendencies. A Liberal, indeed, he
never was; but the temper of actual, as opposed to ideal, Catholicism jarred on
his susceptibilities, and his horizon widened with age. It is a paradox of
history that the man who more than any other revived the medieval spirit in the
Church of England came to be hailed as the precursor of modernist, or Liberal,
Catholicism. Whatever may be the future of the latter movement, it is easy to
exaggerate the importance of the former: the sturdy Protestantism of England
was in little danger from the solicitations either of Oxford or of Rome.
The High
Church propaganda made little immediate impression on the general sense of the
people; and the seceders, though not a few were men of character and
distinction, were in no way representative; they had simply fallen out of the
current of national life, which ran in another direction, and pursued its
course unchanged. A more important factor in English Catholicism was the influx
of Irish immigrants after the famine year, 1847. This made an increased
ecclesiastical organisation at once possible and necessary. The establishment
of the new Catholic hierarchy in England (1851) might have passed unnoticed,
had it been less strongly emphasised by the progress of Tractarianism in the
national Church and by the zeal of Roman Catholic converts, who saw in it the
prelude to the conversion of England. A matter of internal policy, it was
followed by no marked increase either of number or of activity. The leakage
feom the Catholic body more than balanced the conversions; and its new
machinery was out of proportion to its real consequence. Historically an
interesting survival, Catholicism in England was rather a religious and social,
than an intellectual or political force. In Ireland, on the other hand;, it is
an effective and energising power, the expression of a vigorous national life.
Nor is this so only, or even chiefly, in Ireland itself. Where the Irish race
goes, the Church goes with it; the flourishing and democratic Catholicism of
the British colonies and of the United States is Irish in origin and spirit;
the exile from Ireland is the missionary of Rome.
The harsh
measures of Russia against the Catholic Poles had produced chronic Polish
disaffection—partly the cause and partly the effect of these severities—which
broke out in 1863 into an open rebellion, connived at, it was believed at St
Petersburg, if not instigated by Rome. In 1866 these disagreements ended, to
the credit of Pius IX, in open rupture; and the Russian representative at the
Vatican was withdrawn.
The
theological aspirations of the pontificate had been more successful than the
political. What was gained in intension had indeed been lost
in extension;
but the centralisation, or acute Romanising, of ecclesiastical life
contemplated had been in great measure attained. It was no longer safe to
express the Febronian or Pistoian principles so commonly held, even in high
places, in the eighteenth century ; Gallicanism and nationalism in religion
were crushed out. A series of condemnations directed against such writers as
the canonist Nuytz, the Italian patriots Gioberti and Ventura, the philosophers
Baltzer, Frohschammer and Ubaghs, and finally against the historical school of
Munich, warned thought off the territory of religion and its ill-defined
Hinterland. Local usages were suppressed; Italian beliefs and devotions
introduced into the Cisalpine countries; from the shape of an arch to the cut
of a vestment, conformity to the practice of Rome was enforced. But under the
surface of uniformity the ground was shifting; a conflict between the Church
and the historical conscience of Europe was preparing, in which the latter,
defeated for the moment, retired to sharpen its weapons and to plan a more
dangerous and more radical assault. The phases of this conflict, so closely
associated with Pius IX, must now be discussed.
While
Antonelli was scheming for the Temporal Power, the Pope was preparing a series
of dogmatic pronouncements, which opened in 1854 with the definition of the
Immaculate Conception, and, after the Encyclical Quanta Cura with the annexed
Syllabus (1864), closed, for the time at least, with the promulgation of Papal
Infallibility in 1870. To appreciate the attitude of the Church to the
historical, theological, and political issues involved in these pronouncements*
it is necessary to bear in mind certain fundamental assumptions of Catholicism.
The philosophy of Catholicism is clearly defined, and has been carried to its
furthest conclusions by the logic of speculative thinkers as acute as any that
the world has seen. It starts from a sharp Dualism taken over from the late
Greek philosophy, and in particular from Neo-Platonism; a hard and fast line is
drawn between God and creation, mind and matter, the Church and the world. The
notions of immanence and evolution are absent; the two forces confront each
other, and are separate and opposed. From this position the reasoning is
rigorous: the one is to rule, the other to be ruled; short of unquestioned
supremacy, there can be neither peace nor truce between the two. Hence, on the
one side, the ascetic, on the other, the theocratic idea. Not only the teaching
of the Church, but her ministers, her privileges, her possessions are covered
by a Divine sanction. To touch the latter is sacrilege ; to subject the clergy
to secular tribunals, to resist or question their jurisdiction in mixed
subject-matter, such as education, marriage, the censorship of the Press, and
the like, to interfere with religious Orders or corporations, to invade papal
or ecclesiastical territory, is to resist God.
On the
abstract notion of the Church an enormous superstructure was erected. Being a
society, it could not be other than a “perfect” society, independent of and
superior to the State, entitled to hold
1200-1854] History of dogma of Immaculate
Conception. 713
property, to
enact laws, to coerce its subjects not only by spiritual but by temporal
penalties, which the civil power could be invoked to execute under pain of
censure. Criticism was unknown; it was assumed that the existing teaching and
practice were invariable, and of Apostolic origin; the theory ‘ of development
associated with the name of John Henry Newman is tolerated rather than
sanctioned—as an expedient to solve a not readily admitted difficulty. Finally,
the Scholastic doctrine of the reason was no less a priori than that of
Rousseau. Its competence to deal with either transcendental or historical
subject-matter was taken for granted. From vague, uncertain, and often
erroneous premisses an exact logic deduced the most startling conclusions ;
and, as the former were admitted without question, the latter were held to be
beyond doubt.
The
Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, that is her exemption from the stain not
only of actual but of original sin, was an opinion of the schools held by the
Scotists and denied by the Thomists. Later, it was enthusiastically championed
by the Jesuits; some of whom forged documentary evidence in its favour, known
from the place of its origin as the tablets and parchments of Granada. The
fraud was discovered, and denounced by Urban VIII and Innocent XI. Not,
however, till it had done its work. The scaffolding was reino\ed, but the
belief had advanced from the position of a disputed opinion to that of a doctrine
which it was unlawful to criticise. It chimed in with the popular devotion to
Mary; to question it seemed to be wanting in reverence and affection for the
Mother of God. The allegorical method of interpretation found scriptural proof
in such passages as Proverbs viii. 22, and EzeT&el xliv. 2; nor were
arguments claiming to be based on reason wanting. The Baptist had been
sanctified before birth; Mary, being greater than he, must have been sanctified
still earlier, i.e. in her conception; and the dogmatie temper, not satisfied
with freedom to hold and teach this belief, insisted on its being imposed on
the Church under anathema.
The proof
from tradition was difficult to establish ; but the papal theologians were
equal to the emergency. The general witness of the living Church, they argued,
was an infallible proof that the truth to which it bore witness was contained
in tradition; and this independently of any historical evidence. Were this not
so, they urged—and it was difficult to refute them—not a little of the received
teaching of the Church would be open to dispute. In Germany the Catholic
faculties of Munich and Tubingen hesitated to endorse Perrone’s theory. But
Rome was strong, and her opponents were inconsistent. Tied by previous
admissions both as to the privileges of the Virgin and as to the papal
authority, they held false ground. Given the premisses, which they admitted, or
at least were not free to deny, Rome had the best of the argument. The dogma
was defined, on December 8,1854, by the Pope on his sole and personal
authority; the remonstrances of certain of the Bishops against their relegation
to the part ; of spectators were brushed
714" Religious journalism.—Development of
dogma, [issi-66
away. In this
definition the dogma of 1870 was contained. The ground was cut away by
anticipation from subsequent demur; the promulgation of Papal Infallibility was
now only a question of time. The opportune apparitions and miracles at Lourdes,
which took place shortly afterwards, were taken as a confirmation of the new
dogma: “ I am the Immaculate Conception,” were the words said to have been
addressed , by the Virgin to Bernadette Soubirous.
Quick to see
where.the enemy could be attacked with its own weapons, the Vatican was alive
to the influence of the Press. What is called la >onne presse is a feature
of modern Catholicism; and what the Univers was in France the (Jnita Cattolica
was in Italy; Veuillot and Margotti had throughout the approval and backing of
Rome. It was thought, however, that the Holy See should possess a distinctive
organ; and the return of Pius IX from Gaeta saw the birth of the Jesuit Civilta
Cattolica, in which the ablest members of the Society were to meet the modem
spirit, and combat the Reformation and the Revolution in all their forms. The
connexion between the Vatican and this publication was semi-official; its
utterances, when most inspired, were tentative, and could be disavowed. But it
claimed with reason to be the faithful echo of the Papacy; and, in a brief of
February 12, 1866, Pius IX declared that it had been expressly entrusted with
the defence of religion and of the authority of the Holy See; So close a
connexion between the Pope and a particular religious Order was without
precedent, and would have been impossible had not the older Orders fallen into
insignificance, and the influence of the episcopate become a shadow of its>
former self. But the centripetal tendency in the Church was in the ascendant,
and the Jesuits knew how to turn it to their advantage; a cownubium, to use
Dollinger’s phrase, was concluded between the Society and Rome.
So early as
1851, a sweeping condemna .on of the errors of modem society and modem thought
had been contemplated. It was proposed to associate this with the definition of
the Immaculate Conception; but, though -ts preparation began early in the
pontificate of Pius IX, it was not until 1864 that the famous Syllabus
appeared. Its publication was an answer to two important events—one in the
political world, the Convention of September, 1864, by which Napoleon undertook
to withdraw his troops from Rome, on Italy engaging not .to attack or suffer
an attack on what was left of the Pope’s dominions; the other in the religious,
the Catholic congress of Malines. In the former, denounced as it was by the
Italian patriots, the instinct of Rome discerned the beginning of the end as
regarded the Temporal Power: in the latter, signs of radical differences in the
Catholic camp became manifest; Montalembert definitely threw over the
theocratic idea, and declared for Cavour’s policy, “ a free Church in o free
State ” (libera chiesa in libero stato).
Political
events had gone fast—Piedmont’s annexations in the years 1859-60 have already
been described^ The Jesuits themselves were divided.
Passaglia and
Curci counselled a change of front towards Italy. But the Pope, under the
influence of less prudent counsellors, was obdurate. Modem society, with its
Constitutions, its extended suffrage its parliaments, its freedom of worship
and of the Press, had been , fatal to priyilege, ecclesiastical as well as
civil; he saw, and he was right in seeing, that it stood for an idea of
civilisation other than that of the Church. The gulf between the two cannot be
bridged. In ordinary times and on ordinary occasions moderation and good sense
bring about a modus vivendi. Men are not always consistent; they refrain from
drawing inconvenient conclusions from p.amisses to which they assent, or
believe themselves to assent. But the essential divergence remains; and, when
circumstances bring it to light, an alternative is forced upon many who are
unwilling and unprepared to face it. They have come to the parting of the ways;
they,must go back or forward, Pius IX deliberately forced such an alternative
on the Catholic world. What did he hope to gain by this ? To many, perhaps to
most, it seemed that, looking from the windows of the Vatican .at the world, he
saw it out of focus. He did not know that he was speaking to living men in a
dead language; he believed in the possibility of their return, if not by
reflexion, by a miracle, to the standards, and beliefs of a past that had gone
beyond recall.
The
Encyclical Quanta Cura was a declaration of war against modem ideas, liberties,
and institutions. The annexed Syllabus particularised its pronouncements. This famous
document was negative in form; and it has been questioned whether, from the
condemnation of the various propositions which it enumerates, the affirmation
of their contradictories is to be inferred. The question is technical; the intention
of the Pope is beyond doubt. The Jesuit Schrader, who had drafted the Syllabus,
transposed its negative statements into their corresponding affirmatives; its
drift must be judged by the action, both historical and contemporary, of the
Holy See. Its censures were not new, but taken from previous Encyclicals,
Allocutions, and Apostolic letters; what was new was the emphasis, the
reiteration, the more authoritative accent. Theologians of repute did not
hesitate to describe it as infallible ; and it was hoped in influential
quarters that its doctrines would be imposed by the Vatican Council as of
faith. Prominent among the errors condemned was that of those; who deny the
Church’s right to employ force, that is to inflict civil and criminal
penalties. A practical comment on this was the beatification, a few years
later, of the Inquisitor Peter Arbues and other officials of the Holy Office;
thus the practice as well as the principle of the Inquisition was approved.
That Popes have exceeded their power, and encroached on the rights of Princes;
that the immunities of the Church and the clergy have their origin in civil
law; that the pretensions of the Papacy helped to bring about the separation of
the Eastern from the Western Church; that it. is no longer expedient that
Catholicism should be the only religion of the State to the exclusion of all
others;
that freedom
of worship should be gran ';ed to foreigners resident in Catholic countries;
that the Roman Pontiff can and. should, reconcile uimself with progress,
liberalism, and modem civilisation—such, with others of the same sort, are the
propositions condemned.
It was urged
that, if these censures were to hold, history as commonly read must be
rewritten, and that the legal code of every European nation must be revised.
The plea that they refer to an abstract and non-existent state of things can
scarcely be taken seriously: the Pope must be assumed to know the significance
of words and to mean what he says. The motive of > the Syllabus was
practical; the absolutism in the Church, which is the essence of
Ultramontanism,'is incompatible with freedom in the State. Rome at least has
never endorsed the special pleading to which not a few of her advocates have
condescended. She has been consistent throughout, reducing her principles to
practice where, and in so far as, it was possible to do so, at most tolerating
their violation under protest, waiting, and at the- same time working, for
more propitious times. ‘ Leo XII pronounced against the French, Gregory XVI
against the Belgian, Constitution. In Italy, as has been said, Pius IX brought
pressure to bear on the several Governments to prevent the introduction of
representative institutions; the Austrian Constitution of
1867 was anathematised as “abominable” and “unspeakable”;
the Pope proclaimed it null and void by his apostolical authority, and bade its
authors, with all those who presumed to propose, accept, approve or execute its
provisions, remember the spiritual' penalties incurred ipso facto by the
violation of the rights of the Church.
- On December
8,1864, the Encyclical and the Syllabus were published. Great was the tritmiph
in the Ultramontane, great the consternation in the Liberal, camp. Dupanloup, a
zealous champion of the Temporal Power, but theologically a Moderate,
explained, qualified, minimised. He toned down the most startling points of the
papal pronouncement, endeavouring to show that it meant considerably less than
it appeared to mean, and conveyed; in the technical language of theology,
truths to which, translated into popular terminology, few would refuse assent.
His opponents called his pamphlet “Anti-Syllabus”; Veuillot roundly stigmatised
its publication as a crime. In England a similar difference of opinion
manifested itself. Newman insisted that it was a technical document only to be
interpreted by experts, and spoke pointedly of the malaria that hung about the
base of the Rock of Peter. Manning and William George Ward were for its natural
and literal sense; it was for the Pope to explain the theologians, not the
theologians the Pope. In the political world the sense of insecurity was
general: Nothing it must be admitted, took place to justify the apprehensions
excited; it was forgotten that the average man is at little pains to reconcile
theory and practice. A later theory maintained that such utterances of the Holy
See, though dogmatic in form, are disciplinary rather than dogmatic in
character,
and call for submission rather than for interior assent* They express the
temporary opinion of the governing body, and are to a great extent matters of
policy; in time they will be tacitly, if not avowedly; withdrawn. This theory
gives a correct account of what in many cases actually happens; but its value
is historical, not theological. The pronouncement remains, as a weapon in
reserve, in the hands of Rome; and it is difficult to reconcile this
explanation either with the terms of che documents or with an intelligible view
of the authority either of Pope or Church.
Despite the
efforts made to suppress or disguise them, differences of opinion, which might
easily become formidable, were to be found among Catholics. The growth of the
school of scientific historians in Germany caused special disquietude. So long
ago as 1832, Lamennais had noted among the Bavarian clergy a certain Protestant
spirit, which would have led, he thought, to a breach with the Papacy, had not
its ideas already gone far beyond mere Protestantism. Of this school Dollinger
was the most eminent living representative. Its spirit, methods and conclusions
were diametrically opposed to those of the dominant Ultramontanism. The
perspective of current theology altered under its criticism; much that had been
taken for fact was seen to be fiction; and the facts that remained unshaken
appeared in a new light. Meanwhile, Ultramontanism was preparing to make a
desperate bid for power. The Emperor Napoleon, whose troops, withdrawn in 1866,
had a year later regarrisoned Rome in consequence of an alleged breach of the
September Convention by Italy, was now in high favour at the Vatican. Sadowa
was to be avenged on Prussia by France, which, after a short and victorious
campaign, was to lead Europe, confirm the Pope in the possession of his
dominions, and champion the Catholic interest throughout the world. German
science was to be crushed as effectually as German military power: with
Napoleon III, as a new Pepin, the golden age was to return. The result of the
Franco-German War of 1870 upset these calculations; the material force' on
which they had reckoned was on the German side. But the other half of the
programme was carried out by the definition at the Vatican Council of the
Infallibility of the Pope.
The name, and
in its modern sense the idea, of Infallibility was foreign to the primitive
Church. In the first days, believers spoke as they were moved by the Spirit,
whose power attested the genuineness of their utterances. As time went on, the
charisma Veritatis was held to reside rather in the office-bearers, and, after
the rise of the monarchical episcopate, in the bishop than in the1
subordinate members of the community; he alone possessed the unquestioned
right of voting at the Councils whose decisions were taken as the voice of the
Church. Usage tends to harden into ritual, and opinion into dogma; the
prophetic or spiritual speech, originally free and elastic, was embodied in
fixed formulas; and the predominant position early acquired by the Roman Church
caused a
peculiar weight to be attached to her decisions both in matters of discipline
and of faith. The infallibility of the Roman Bishop stood in close connexion
with his supremacy; from the notion of a Court of final appeal in the matter of
doctrine to that of the inerrancy of this Court the transition is easy. Nor, in
this connexion, can we overlook the series of fabrications, interpolations, and
forgeries beginning in the sixth century with the Liber Pordificalis and
continued, with the decretals of the pseudo-Isidore and Gratian, to the end of
the Middle Ages. The one bearing most directly on Papal Infallibility was the
catena of spurious quotations from Greek Fathers and Councils* which had been
composed in the thirteenth century by a Latin theologian, probably a Dominican
who had lived long in the East. This catena deceived St Thomas Aquinas, who
unsuspectingly embodied it in his theology; from which it passed without
question into the dogmatic system of the Schoolmen, Cajetan and Melchior Canus
taking it over on his authority—ran event the importance of which can scarcely.
be exaggerated.
Early in his
pontificate the idea of holding a General Council had occurred to Pius IX; and
by 1864 it had taken definite shape. The ostensible reasons were to make an
effective demonstration on the part of the Church; to condemn modem errors; to
deal with the status of the rei'gious Orders, and the relation of canon to
civil law. But Infallibility was in the air; and the ground was carefully
prepared for. its proclamation. Three great gatherings of Bishops at Rome
preceded the Council—that of 1854, at which the Immaculate Conception was
defined; that of 1862, at which the Japanese martyrs were canonised; and that
of 1867 for the centenary of St Pete*. Provincial Councils, inspired by Rome, were
held in various countries, which with singular unanimity pronounced for the
dogma. It was desired to define the teaching of the Syllabus, as against modem
society and its liberties; the temporal power, as against the Revolution; and
the Infallibility of the Pope, as against Gallicanism and German science. To
this programme the Jesuit Civilta added the Assumption, or bodily translation
into heaven, of the Virgin. , Only one of these four points was carried. As a
formula, the Syllabus of 1864 is dormant; for the time being, the temporal
power is in the background; the Assumption has not’ so far, become an article
of faith. But the definition of Infallibility included all, and more than all,
the rest in its plenitude, subjecting as it did the content of faith to the
discretion of the Pope.
The Council
was summoned for December 8, 1869. The Catholic ..ivereigns were not, as at
Trent, invited to send ambassadors; the State had become neutral in matters of
religion, and Catholics as such stood' outside it. The Catholic Church is so
large and so powerful a body that statesmen view with suspicion any tendency on
the part of its riders to adopt an attitude of opposition to the manifest
temper of the age or to civil society. On the other hand, they are unwilling to
i869-7o] Controversial literature at the Council.
119
interfere in
technical controversies which concern them only indirectly, or to risk a
conflict in which experience shows victory and defeat to be equally disastrous.
In this case the latter consideration prevailed. Prince Hohenlohe, then
Bavarian Foreign Minister, urged diplomatic intervention. But Prussia, Austria,
and France declined to move in the matter; to protest, Bismarck replied, was
always a thankless task, and one to be undertaken only when those who make the
protest have power to enforce it. The mistake was recognised when it was too
late to repair it. Had the influence'of the Governments been brought to bear
upon Rome and the Bishops in 1869, the Kulturkampf might have been avoided; and
in that case the Central or Clerical party, that great disturbing force in
German politics, would have been unknown.
Meanwhile it
rained pamphlets. The most important of these were the famous articles
contributed to the Allgemeine Zeitung by Dollinger (published in book-form
under the title of The Pope arid the Council, by Janus). Their object was to
show that the doctrine of Papal Infallibility was unknown to antiquity, in
contradiction with history, and based on the forgeries and misconceptions
above-mentioned. Whatever may be thought of their conclusions, their facts,
even after Hergenrother’s Anti- Janus, the only serious answer attempted,
remained almost beyond dispute. The key to the difference of opinion was that
the two parties looked at the question from fundamentally different
standpoints. To the one, Papal Infallibility was a self-evident theological
conclusion; to the other, it was a statement in palpable contradiction with
historical fact. The dispute therefore resolved itself into one concerning the
relation of theology to history, and involved controversies unforeseen,
far-reaching, and even now unsolved. The position of the Munich theologians was
not always consistent. While refusing to consider the Papacy and the Church as
convertible terms, they admitted that the former rested on Divine appointment.
“ The Church from the first was founded upon it; and the Head of the Church
ordained its type in the person of Peter.” This admission was their weak point.
To the rising critical school in and outside Germany it seemed unwarranted;
while the Ultramontanes, stronger in logic than in history, argued that the
notions of Supremacy and Infallibility were contained in that of Primacy, and,
being necessary to make it effective, had been realised more and more clearly
in the Church’s consciousness as time went on. The forgeries, which they could
no longer deny, had but stereotyped existing usage; and the plausible moral
argument that, at least till the sixteenth century, every considerable reform
of the Church had been associated with an advance of the authority of Rome, was
on their side.
The German
Bishops put forth a reassuring but non-committal pastoral; the most influential
prelates in Europe were avowedly inopportunist ; a few, like Hefele and
Darboy, had the courage of their opinions, and declared openly that the opinion
which it was proposed
to raise to
the rank of a dogma was untrue. Meanwhile, at Rome, preparations were being
made for the meeting and r>rocedure of the Council; These arrangements were
made independently of the Bishops. The Pope’s right of presidency was made! to
cover a carefully conceived scheme of direction by which every possible
obstacle was placed in the way of the minority, whose learning, independence,
and political influence were greatly feared. The matters to be discussed were
kept secret, the Bull of Indiction confining itself to generalities; and the
theologians employed in the preliminary ‘work were rigorously bound to silence.
These theologians ■ were divided into a Directive Congregation and six
commissions, of which that on dogma was the most important. The members of
these bodies were selected with a view to the results desired. When the
subjects for discussion and the form of procedure had been fixed by the
Congregation, the reporters proceeded to work upon their several drafts, which,
to the number of 51, after approval by the special commission to which they
were submitted, were laid before the Council—as “ schemata ” de Ecclesia, de
disciplina, and the like. No criticism of these prearranged dispositions was
tolerated.
Even after
the Council had met, the-presidents of the five Congregations which it was
called upon to elect were nominated by the Pope. On these bodies the minority
was scantily, if at all, represented; their members were chosen from official
lists by a disciplined majority voting as one man. In the general Cong~egations
the nominal liberty of speech was so hampered that the freedom of the Bishops
was practically confined to their vote; and the episcopal oath, by which every
Bishop on his consecration swears not only to maintain but constantly to
increase the rights of the Pope, was held in terrorem over the weak; the moral
and material power at the disposal of the Curia—and it was great—was used to
the full. A rigorous censorship was exercised on their meetings; they could not
print even their speeches or memoranda ; books sent to them through the post
were confiscated; meetings of over fifteen, or at the most twenty, Bishops were
forbidden. The papal Government felt bound, it was urged, to hinder the
diffusion of error, and could not tolerate attacks on the Holy See. So much for
the freedom of the Council. As to its representative character, the Italian
Bishops, owing to the multitude of sees in the peninsula, swamped their
northern colleagues. Further, many of the Bishops from a distance were brought
to and maintained at Rome at the expense of the Pope—a fact which they were not
allowed to forget; many, again, were merely titular Bishops,without sees and unrepresentative;
come what might, the majority for the definition—and a majority was held to be
sufficient—was secure.
In February a
new order of procedure, imposed like the former, by the Pope, still further
restrained the little freedom of speech originally tolerated. A hundred Bishops
protested. To shorten the debates by legitimate means was one thing; to
suppress discussion, and introduce,
contrary to
all precedent, the closure and voting by majorities another. But protest and
remonstrance were in vain; the Curia was resolved to carry things through, if
necessary, with a high hand. The position of the minority Bishops was difficult
in the extreme. It seemed strong at first sight; they were men of greater
distinction, personal as well as official, than their opponents; they had on
their side the good-will of their Governments and the general' sympathy of the
educated classes in every country. But, as had been the case with those who had
opposed the definition of 1854, if history was with them, logic was on the
other side. If Rome was what she had been made by the current Catholic
teaching, which they admitted or were theologically bound to admit, the
proposed dogma necessarily followed. Again, whatever weight they might carry as
individuals, they had neither cohesion nor discipline as a party. Personally
unacquainted with one another, differing in nationality, temper, and
standpoint, they were unable to work together effectually. Some were timid and
half-hearted, others open to the influences which the Curia had at its disposal
and used with dexterity. Above all, the majority had the control of the
ecclesia stical machine, whose pressure was. as calculated as it was
persistent, and the active support of the Pope. Pius IX, endowed as a man with
no very commanding qualities, had,, as the representative of a cause, become
the object of a more than Byzantine cultus. With this many of the leading
inopportunists had identified themselves; and they were consequently bound hand
and foot by chains of their own making. “ Amas me?” (John xxi. 16) was the
question put by Pius IX to Ketteler of Mainz: it was difficult to give it any
answer but one ; and the answer covered the vote.
The minority
could reckon originally on from 150 to 200 votes out of some 700. This fact
made the proposed carrying of the dogma by acclamation impossible; had it been
attempted at least 100 Bishops would have left the Council. Here, however,
their influence stopped short. Remonstrances against the rules of procedure
were ignored or overruled; the proposals for decentralisation and reform of
discipline, with which not a few even of the majority associated themselves,
were shelved. Outside the Council the opposition gradually became more
pronounced. The learned Oratorian Gratry denounced the dominant “ icole
d'erreur et de mensonge ”; Montalembert even spoke of the “idol of the
Vatican”; Newman stigmatised the party identified with the Univers and the
Civiltd as “an aggressive insolent.faction,” and declared that, if it was God’s
will that the Pope’s infallibility should be decreed, then it was God’s will to
throw back “ the times and moments” of that triumph which he had destined for
his kingdom. In January, Darboy, Archbishop of Paris, complained to his Emperor
of the Council’s want of freedom and suggested that the Governments should
assist the hard-pressed minority. Daru in France and Beust in Austria were
inclined to regret, and if possible to repair, their previous inaction.
722
[l870
It was too
late. The Schema de Ecclesia, asserting the Pope’s immediate and ordinary
jurisdiction over all the Churches, a jurisdiction to which “pastors and
faithful alike of whatever dignity were bound to submit themselves, not only in
matters of faith and morals, but in questions affecting the government and
discipline of the Church”—and what would not this cover?—was already in
circulation; and Antonelli, while he endeavoured to reassure the Governments as
to its practical results, refused to withdraw it. In the last section of .this
dogmatic Constitution the Infallibility of the Pope was proclaimed. It was “ a
dogma divinely revealed that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra,
that is, when in the exercise of his office as pastor and teacher of all
Christians, he defines by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority doctrine
concerning faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church, is by the
Divine assistance promised to him in the person of St Peter possessed of that
Infallibility wherewith the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be
endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and that therefore
such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are unalterable of themselves and not by
reason of the consent of the Church.”
The
anti-infallibilists resisted, but more and more feebly. The noose was gradually
tightened; the inevitableness of the end grew more apparent day by day. Eighty
Bishops protested against the closure; finally, overborne by numbers, they
agreed to refrain from speaking, 88 voting against the whole scheme concerning
the Primacy. At the last moment the Pope wavered. But he had gone too far to
stop; his personal inclinations and the pressure of the majority overcame his
fears. Faced by the final issue, the minority capitulated. Twenty only were
prepared to vote Non Placet at the Public Session; it was agreed that, out of
reverence for the Pope, they should absent themselves and leave Rome without
voting. Their conduct was not heroic. The weakness of the position had
translated itself into weakness of moral fibre; it was difficult even for sj
mpathisers to feel enthusiasm for men who, so circumstanced, could act in such
a way. The definition was voted, on July 18, by 535 Bishops. The actual
proportion between the parties was as five to one; though, if the votes were
weighed, either as to their representative or moral value, the proportion would
have been greatly altered.
The
submission of the dissentients was a matter of time. Some, no doubt, recognised
the voice of the Holy Spirit in the decision of the majority. Till it was
given, they were justified in their opposition; now opposition and doubt were
at an end. Others, like Hefele, avowed
themselves
unable to endure the consequences of continued resistance
suspension,
excommunication, and the like: unity meant more to them than truth. Most, it is
probable, felt that, while a formula could be explained away, or might become
obsolete, an act of schism was definite and irreparable ; of two evils they
chose the least. Again, while some at least, who had taken part in it, found it
impossible to accept the Council as either free or valid, the dogma, as
defined, fell short of that for which
the extreme
party had contended. It left important questions open— it did not decide what
papal pronouncements are ex cathedra, or, more far-reaching still, what is
“that Infallibility wherewith the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should
be endowed.” Again, as Gratry pointed out, the Infallibility of the decree was
official, not personal; it was not ascribed to inspiration; it was limited to
definitions given ex cathedra, and touching faith and morals. It was by such
reasonings as these that theologians, somewhat half-heartedly, reconciled
themselves to what had taken place. To the world, even the Catholic world at
large, the quarrel was one of the sacristy: the professionalising of religion,
or at least of theology, had been fatal to its life and actuality, and had
removed it at once from the cognisance and interest of the average man.
The Old
Catholic Schism in Germany and Switzerland was on a small scale, and its
adherents were rather respectable than representative. It went at once too far
and not far enough. The Tridentine position, which it professed to take up, is
unthinkable without the Papacy, and contained, implicitly and after the manner
of a theological conclusion, the dogma against which Old Catholicism was a
protest. A half-way house, it offered no real halting-place; those who occupied
it did not see how much stood, or fell, with Rome. Dollinger, while in
sympathy, did not identify himself, with them. After his excommunication
(April, 1871), while steadfast in his loyalty to his historical conclusions, he
submitted externally to the censures which an authority legitimate, from his
standpoint, though acting unjustly, had inflicted.
The weapon
placed in the hands of the Curia has not hitherto been used in the manner
feared by some and hoped for by others. So far, no further definitions have
been made, and no indisputably infallible pronouncements put forth by the Holy
See. It has taught rather, as if it were infallible, than infallibly; though
its dogmatic utterances have been more frequent than before. Those who so
energetically promoted the definition had more than this in view. It was not
worth while to venture so much to gain so little; what they dreamed of was a
tribunal which should speak frequently and unmistakably, counteracting
Rationalism and Liberalism at every turn. It has been suggested on the other hand
by sanguine observers that in the hands of a strong Pope the Infallibility
dogma; might heal the wounds which it had inflicted, and be the means of
freeing the Church from the burden of the past. It is difficult to conceive so
complete a reversal of policy, and the signs of the times point in the opposite
direction. The intension of Catholicism increases, if not as rapidly as some
would wish; but it increases inversely with its extension. In so far as the
Vatican Council aimed at the centralisation and concentration of the Church, it
succeeded. But the world is the material on which the Church works and in which
it realises itself; and the Council broadened the gulf, already wide and
threatening, between the Church and the world.
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.
(1815-69.)
The foundations of an empire resting upon justice and
the good of the people had been truly laid by Lord Hastings’ predecessors in
the Office of Governor-General of Bengal. But, despite the activity of Lord
Wellesley, slow progress had been made in the work of building. It was not
until November 14,1834, that the title of Governor-General of India was adopted
by Bentinck, while the imperial style of Viceroy was first accorded to Lord
Canning in November, 1858. Nevertheless, from 1815 onwards the work of
expansion and consolidation proceeded without interruption. For forty years the
stir of war rang through the pages of Indian history. The battleground shifted
from Bombay and central India to Burma; campaigns followed the course of Alexander’s
victories in the Punjab and Sind, embraced Afghanistan and Persia, and took the
Sepoy army across the seas to Canton. Each Governor-General, as he left the
shores of England, flattered himself that the era of peace and material
progress was about to dawn ; and more than one, although he had seen his hopes
frustrated, was induced to disband a part of his victorious army in the
confident assurance that at last the end of warlike operations was reached.
Finally, the Company’s troops, having no foreign foe to face, rebelled against
their own employers, and the fabric of British rule so laboriously raised was
shaken to its very foundations.
Two
circumstances invested the year 1816 with special significance. The Directors
of the Company were able to breathe more freely when the question of the
abrogation of their Charter was deferred by the House of Commons for another
seventeen years> and since their Governor- General on the spot was Francis
Rawdon, first Marquis of Hastings, a man full of initiative and strength. In
June of the same year a change of ministry brought to the Board of Control
George Canning, who realised the futility of pious resolutions in arresting the
brutal excesses of the Pindaris. In September, 1815, the Secret Committee under
the orders of that Board had scouted the idea of a general league against those
“human jackals,” as they were termed. Precisely a year later they told Hastings
that their orders were not “ intended to restrain your Lordship in the exercise
of your judgment and discretion, when actual war upon our territories might be
commenced by a body of marauders,
1815-7] League formed against
the Pindaris.
725
and when the
lives and properties of British subjects might call for efficient protection.”
Thus
liberated from the shackles imposed upon him, Hastings made his preparations
for the last Maratha War, one of the most confusing of all the tangled
transactions of Indian histoiy. Its immediate object was the suppression of the
Pindaris, those lawless gangs of Fathan or Rohilla origin, who were the
children of the disorderly times on which they battened, and whose chief
patrons were the rulers of native States. Chitu, or Situ, a Jat sold as a slave
in time of famine, called his followers the Sindhia levy; and many of his
brother leaders adopted the orange standard of the Peshwa and the Raja of
Berar. Imam Baksh and his allies, dubbing themselves the Holkar host, hoisted
the striped flag of that chief. Karim Khan had risen to power in the service of
Bhopal. Amir Khan, founder of the Tonk State, was himself a leader of Pindaris,
holding territories under Indore. Would the ruling chiefs join hands with the
British in suppressing these freebooters, who had followed the Maratha hosts to
the stricken field of Panipat in 1761 and since then had helped their leaders
to acquire dominions of their own ? This was the problem that had to be solved;
and, if Hastings anticipated that the chiefs of western and central India would
rather become his foes than his allies, he honestly gave them the choice. But
there was no time for hesitation. The latest irruption of the Pindaris into the
northern districts of Madras in March, 1816, was of so destructive a character
that it could not be allowed to be repeated. Their stay in that part of the
Company’s dominions lasted for only eleven days and a half; but in that time
they plundered 339 villages, killed 182, wounded 505, and tortured 3603
persons. They spared neither sex nor age; they violated the living and profaned
the dead.
Fortune gave
Hastings the first move. The ambitious designs of the head of the regency at
Nagpur, Apa Sahib, led that wily Maratha to strengthen his position by
concluding, May 27, 1816, a treaty of alliance with the British against the
Pindaris or other enemies of the Company. This undertaking, if only it were
kept, would close the passes of Berar to the invaders. Events on the extreme
west of the area of disturbances were equally favourable. Baji Rao, Peshwa of
Poona, had imprudently shielded his Minister, Trimbakji Danglia, who had caused
the death of the Gaekwar’s accredited Minister, Gangadhar Shastri, on July
14,1815. Mountstuart Elphinstone, the British Agent, at last secured Danglia’s
imprisonment at Thana. Escaping from his confinement Danglia had spread
disorder throughout the districts near Poona, his master declining to act
against him. Elphinstone was firm, and, on June 13, 1817, compelled Baji Rao,
the Peshwa, to sign a treaty, which bound him to suppress the disorders created
by Danglia, placed several forts in the hands of the British, and transferred
to them territories for the maintenance of troops.
With these
two positions secured in Berar and Poona, Hastings lost no time in offering to
Sindhia the choice of war or peace. Crossing the Jamna in October, 1817, he
advanced towards Gwalior, whose ruler, Daulat Rao Sindhia, observing the
movements of Sir Thomas Hislop’s army and other supporting columns, was
compelled on November 5,1817, to accept a treaty of cooperation, and admit the
right of the Company to conclude treaties with the Rajput States. Accordingly
Karauli, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Bhopal, Jaipur, and other States were brought into
the political system of the Company, Amir Khan also was guaranteed the
territories he held under the Raja of Holkar, on condition of disbanding his
freebooter levies. While these events were taking place in central India, the
Peshwa determined to strike for himself. He attacked the residency at Poona,
and watched his army of 30,000 men prepare for battle on the field of Kirki.
There they were attacked by Colonel Burr with a brigade of 1200 men and
ignominiously defeated, November 5, 1817. When General Lionel Smith arrived on
the scene, Poona was captured, and the Peshwa had fled. At Koregaon a small
detachment of 900 men under Captain Francis Staunton, January 1, 1818, held
their own, inflicting heavy loss on the Peshwa’s force of 25,000 men. At Ashta
Baji Rao was surprised, and Gokla, his ablest general, killed; so that lothing
was left for him but to seek an asylum in one of the Maratha States with which
he had been in correspondence.
■ But
the rashness of the Raja of Berar, and the indecision of Holkar’s troops, had
already closed this last door of escape. The Raja, in defiance of his recent
treaty, was massing his force near the residency at Nagpur, under the shadow of
the Sitabaldi hills. The Resident, Richard Jenkins, called in a detachment of
1200 men who, gallantly led by Colonel Scott, wore down the repeated attacks of
12,000 cavalry and 8000 infantry, including 3500 Arabs. The engagement
(November 25-6, 1817) lasted eighteen hours, and cost the British 365 in killed
and wounded. The army of Berar was crushed a few days later by General John
Doveton; the Raja was deposed, and the Nagpur State rendered powerless.
Meanwhile the
forces of the Minor Maharaja of Indore determined upon advancing towards Poona
in support of the Peshwa. Sir John Malcolm in vain protested; and a collision
between them and the British took place at Mehidpur, December 21,1817. The
British casualties were 775; but the affair was decisive. Holkar signed away
forts and territories to the Company by the Treaty of Maundsaur, January 6,
1818. The Pindaris, now deprived of their supports in the native States, were
roughly handled wherever met. Karim Khan’s band was routed by Major Richard
Clarke, January 13, with a loss of 1000 killed. Chitu, leader of the Sindhia
levy, was driven into the forests and there devoured by a tiger. Other leaders
surrendered, and their followers dispersed. The Peshwa of Poona, reduced to the
last extremity, accepted the terms offered by Malcolm, resigned his sovereign
powers, and eventually
retired to
Bithur, where he adopted a son, Dhondev Pant, afterwards known as the Nana
Sahib. His territories went to build up the presidency of Bombay; and the
local Government, copying the example set them, lost no time in making treaties
with the neighbouring States of Kutch, Kolhapur, and Baroda, and even with the
Amirs of Sind and the Arab tribes of the Persian Gulf.
In March,
1818, Hastings was able to break up his army and devote himself to
administrative reforms. He managed his finances with great ability, bequeathing
a substantial surplus to his successor, encouraged education, and improved the
tone of the public services. Notwithstanding the exhaustive despatches in which
he justified his policy, the Directors, while making him a grant of i?60,000,
repeated their regrets at the extension of their territories. A more serious
difference between him and his masters arose out of the loans granted, with his
permission, by William Palmer and Company to the Nizam of Haidarabad. The Court
of Directors, while satisfied as to his integrity, were suspicious of his
motives, and ungracious in their language. Hastings tendered his resignation,
and left India in January, 1823, having finally by his treaties broken down the
ring-fence within which the home authorities had vainly endeavoured to confine
him. All the native States outside the Punjab were now parts of the political
system, and from Singapur to the Persian Gulf British interests were
permanently secured.
Lord Amherst
had hardly taken his seat, August 1, 1823, when his hopes of a peaceful
administration received a shock from a new quarter. Bagyidaw, King of Ava, had
conquered Assam, and vainly demanded the surrender of its Raja, now under
British protection. This, however, was not the only cause of dispute. His
troops had attacked a small British fort on the island of Shapuri, at the mouth
of the Naaf, near Chittagong, and levied tolls on British boats entering the
river. A small military detachment was ordered to occupy Shapuri; and Bagyidaw
replied by sending his famous general, Bandula, to take command of his troops
in Arakan. Kachar, a protected State, was also invaded. Amherst had no option
but to declare war upon Burma. But, before the expedition was fully organised,
a mixed British force was defeated and driven back at Ramu, causing a panic in
Bengal. The war which now ensued exposed many weaknesses in the Company’s
military system. The Bengal sepoy, ready enough to march overland, was
unwilling to break caste by crossing the “black water,” as he termed the sea.
The successes gained in the Maratha War had raised the Company’s prestige, but
rumour magnified the difficulties and disasters in Burma; and a rebellious
relative of the Raja of Bhartpur, trusting in the strength of his impregnable
fortress, did not hesitate to defy the victors of Mehidpur and Sitabaldi.
Defective
preparations had also much to answer for. Two attempts to move troops through
Kachar into Ava, and to reach the Irrawaddy from Chittagong through Arakan,
proved expensive and disastrous failures.
Colonel
Thomas Shuldham, unable to transport the first of these columns through forests
and over mountains, withdrew the wreck of it; while the notorious Arakan fever
decimated and rendered powerless the troops sent from Chittagong. The main
army, consisting chiefly of Madras troops—men less scrupulous about caste—with
the support of naval forces, reached Rangoon in May, under the command of Sir
Archibald Campbell. The enemy’s stockades were soon carried. But further
progress was stayed by the drenching monsoon, by the lack of fresh food
supplies, by want of accommodate -n for the troops, by insufficient hospital
arrangements, and by the putrid condition of the stores sent from Calcutta.
What the Burmese forces failed to accomplish, fever and dysentery quickly
effected.
When the
monsoon was over, the British, having meanwhile taken Martaban and secured
Tenasserim, advanced'against the stockades near Kyaikhalo, but were foiled in
their attacks; and, emboldened by these events, Bandula moved down with 40,000
ill-armed troops to expel the invaders from Rangoon, December, 1824. In this
enterprise he failed, and, after suffering heavy losses, he withdrew to an old
Talaing fort strongly garrisoned and defended by guns and stockades at Danubyu,
60 miles from Rangoon. General Willoughby Cotton, with his division, was the
first to reach the fort by river; but his attacks were repulsed in March, 1825,
with heavy losses. Archibald Campbell, proceeding with his division by land,
turned south to the rescue, beating off successive attacks of the Burmese; and
in the assault on April 2, the death of Bandula by a shell scattered his army
and gave the position to the British. Prome was occupied in April, and its
stores of rice enabled the force to remain there for the rainy season; while
the Burmese army was established at Myede.
In August,
the King of Ava professed his readiness to consider proposals for peace, but
indignartly refused to surrender Arakan and jther coast districts, which the
British had occupied, or to pay any indemnity. War was therefore resumed in
November, and, after four days’ fighting, the Burmese position at Nai-padi, a
cliff facing the river, was captured, Myede being entered in December. The new
year, 18^6, opened with further successes gained at Matun, and again Bagyidaw
sent a British prisoner with L s agents to negotiate a peace. This, however,
was but a feint. For, learning that Campbell’s effective force was reduced to
some 1300 men, he persuaded himself that one of his generals at the head of
15,000 troops could overwhelm them in a pitched battle without recourse being
had to stockades. Sir Archibald easily scattered the Burmese at Pagan, and pushed
on to Yandabu, only 45 miles from Ava. Here on February 24, 1826, he received
the treaty wrung from the King, and the war was at an end. The British gained
the provinces of Assam, Arakan, and the coast of Tenasserim, the payment of an
indemnity, with possession of Rangoon until the payment was received,
commercial facilities, and the right to maintain a British Resident at Ava. But
the war cost
more than five millions sterling and the lives of thousands of soldiers, and
caused troubles in India to which attention must nowbe called.
As has been
told, the Bengal sepoy had the utmost abhorrence to crossing the sea; and, on
being summoned for service with the column proceeding overland to Arakan, the
47th Native Infantry not unnaturally asked for assistance in furnishing itself
with transport. But the authorities, annoyed at these religious scruples, were
in no mood to grant the men’s demands. When, then, in November, 1824, the
greater part of the regiment refused to fall in on parade at Barrackpur, they
were ruthlessly mowed down by European artillery and cut up by cavalry. The
incident left an ineffaceable impression upon the whole army, which bore fruit
when the Company had to undertake oversea expeditions at a later date. The
disturbances which led to the capture of the Fort of Bhartpur were hardly less
unfortunate. The Minor Raja of that Jat State had been imprisoned by his
cousin, Durjan Sal, and Sir David Ochterlony, the chief political officer,,
promptly called on the Jats to support the.-r lawful sovereign, at the same
time summoning a British force to cooperate. Amherst, preoccupied with Burma,
shrank from the risk of failure in the heart of India, remembering that the
famous fortress had defied the assaults of Lake in 1805, and that numerous free-lances
were easily to be collected from neighbouring States. Ochterlony was therefore
ordered to suspend his preparations— an act of weakness which only increased
the disorder. The gravity of the situation was however perceived by Sir Charles
Metcalfe, who warned the Governor-General that Upper India would again be in a
blaze, unless public peace were restored. Lord Combermere, who had become
Commander-in-chief in October, 1825, was therefore authorised to collect an
army of 20,000 men, with which he commenced the siege of the fort in December.
The solid walls of clay, five miles in circumference, resisted the impact of
shot and shell; and it was not until a mine charged with
10,000 pounds of powder had exploded on January
18, 1826, that the fort was captured. The immense treasure found in it was
appropriated as prize money, and Durjan Sal became a state prisoner. This
success, combined with the conclusion of the Burmese War, restored confidence
in the Company’s power, and enabled the Government to raise loans to meet the
heavy debt incurred in obtaining these results.
Lord William
Bentinck became Governor-General at Fort William in 1828, and left India in
March, 1835. During these seven years of comparative peace he acted up to the
principle, recorded at the foot of his statue in Calcutta, that “ the end of
government is the welfare of the governed.” He converted the deficit of a
million sterling (a crore of rupees) into a surplus of the same amount,
improved and rendered secure interraj communications by land and water, and
opened the way for the overland route by despatching the first steamer, the
Hugh Lindsay, that ever made the passage from Bombay to Suez. The credit,
however,
which history
has exclusively attached to his name for the suppression of Sati must be shared
by the Marquis Wellesley, who in 1802 prohibited by Regulation the practice of
exposing children to be devoured by sharks or drowned in the Ganges, and who
also instituted an enquiry into the prevalence of Sati. The public conscience
was shocked by the discovery that between April 15 and October 15, 1804, no
less than 116 widows had been burnt alive within thirty miles of Calcutta. But
Bentinck had the courage to stop the practice in British India in 1829, and to
qualify the doctrine of toleration by declaring that all classes would “be
secure in the observance of their religious usages, so long as that system can
be adhered to without violation of the paramount dictates of justice and
humanity.” In another direction he prepared the path for Lord Ellenborough’s
Act of 1843 abolishing property in slaves, for by a Regulation of 1832 he
rendered illegal the removal of slaves for traffic from one British district to
another; and he vigorously prosecuted the war upon Thags and Dacoits, so that his
successor was able without difficulty to enact that any one proved to have
belonged to such gangs should be imprisoned for life. In education also it was
Bentinck who really settled the long controversy in favour of the advocates of
instruction in English and the vernaculars, and paved the way for the
abolition of Persian (accomplished in 1837) as the language of the Courts.
While India
reaped the victories of peace under Bentinck, she could not avoid further
acquisitions of territory, although the wars of Hastings had been condemned for
bringing about a similar result. Kachar, saved from the clutches of the Burmese
and recognised as a native State under its own Raja, Govind Chandra, was in
1830 left without a head, its ruler, who perished by assassination, being
heirless. The State was claimed by one of his officers, a rebel against his
rule; but Bentinck rejected his claim and annexed the State under the “
doctrine of lapse ”—a doctrine which gained such notoriety in Dalhousie’s time.
To the south of India, in the highlands of Coorg, another principle, which
afterwards became famous, was laid down as a justification for annexation—the
intention “ to secure to the inhabitants the blessings of a just and equitable
government.” One of its Rajas after another had asserted, by more brutal
methods than his predecessors, “ the right divine of kings to govern wrong.”
Among them Virarajendra Wodiyar, agent of his own orders, delighted in
executing not only his subjects but his nearest relatives. To the remonstrances
of the Governor-General he sent insulting answers, while imprisoning his envoy.
Bentinck retorted by annexing the State (May 7,1834) in compliance with the
unanimous wish of its inhabitants. The same policy induced him to interfere in
Mysore, whose Maharaja was left in possession of nominal sovereignty while the
administration was conducted by British officers; and in Oudh the King was
warned that, if he did not reform his government, the country would be taken
over by the Company.
Bentinck was
compelled by ill-health to quit India before he 'iad completed his programme of
reforms. This was unfortunate, because the new Charter Act of 1833 brought to a
close the commercial business of the Company and emphasised their position as
rulers of an Indian empire in trust for the Crown. The whole administration as
well as the legislation of the country was then placed in the hands of the
Governor- General in Council, and authority was given to create a third
Presidency of Agra. Before his retirement Bentinck assumed the statutory title
of Governor-General of India, November 14, 1834, thus marking the progress of
consolidation since Warren Hastings in 1774 became the first Governor-General
of Fort William. Lord Heytesbury was appointed his successor; but, before he could
sail, the accession of Lord Melbourne to office caused George Eden, afterwards
Lord Auckland, to be sent out in his stead.
Whatever
plans Auckland had formed for the expansion of Indian trade and the material
development of the country were soon shattered by the fatal decision at which
the Board of Control arrived in their fear of Russian aggression. When at last
they perceived their error, Auckland had not the courage to cast adrift the
counsel of William Macnaghten and to withdraw from the enterprise on which he
had embarked. The war with Afghanistan dragged in its train the annexation of
Sind, the Sikh wars, and the inclusion of Baluchistan in the protectorate of
India. It is necessary therefore to review briefly the events which brought
these several States into such close relation with each other.
Ahmad Shah
Abdali, whose invasions of India and capture of Delhi left northern India
strewed with the wreckage of the Moghul empire, belonged to the Sadozai branch
of the Abdalis, whose name he changed to the Duranis. Crowned at Kandahar in
1747, he bequeathed to his successors unquestioned dominion over Sind,
Baluchistan, Kashmir, and the Punjab, as well as Afghanistan. His descendant,
Shah Shuja, was reigning at Kabul in 1809, when Lord Minto, alarmed at the
designs attributed to Persia and France, sent Mountstuart Elphinstone to
conclude an alliance with him, while at the same time Metcalfe cleared away a
difficulty by fixing with Ranjit Sing the Satlaj as the boundary of the Sikh
kingdom. Shortly afterwards Shah Shuja was ousted from the throne by his
brother Mahmud, who committed the fatal error of blinding and putting to death
the Barakzai Minister, Fateh Khan, by whose aid he had himself obtained the
Crown. This outrage exasperated the Barakzai section of the Duranis, and they
ousted Mahmud, dividing the Afghan provinces between themselves. Dost Mohammad
secured Gbazni and Kabul; but Herat remained in the possession of the Sadozai
Kamran, son of Mahmud. The Indian provinces which Ahmad Shah had conquered
rapidly fell away from Afghanistan; the Sind Amirs withheld their tribute and
asserted their independence; while Ranjit Sing established his authority over
Lahore, and, in 1833, having relieved Shah
Shuja of the
famous Koh-i-nur diamond, offered to support him in an attempt to recover
Kabul. Shah Shuja thus encouraged marched through Sind and occupied Kandahar,
but was driven back into India by Dost Mohammad. The latter followed up his
success by proclaiming & jehad against the Sikhs. With a large army he
invaded Peshawar; but the intrigues of Ranjit broke up his followers, and he
retired home, leaving the wily Sikh master of his possessions in the Punjab.
Persia next
sought profit out of the distractions of her neighbours. Encouraged by Russia,
the King besieged Herat in November, 1887; but it ch a reed that a young
officer of the Company’s service, Eldred Pottinger, found shelter within its
walls, and his sound advice and indomitable courage enabled the garrison to
hold the fortress aga'ist the attack of
40,000 Persian troops, directed by Russian
officers, for a period of ten months. Before, however, the siege was raised,
the Persians and their Russian allies had entered into negotiations with Dost
Mohammad, trusting in his hostility towards the Sadozai ruler of Herat. The
Dost was the more disposed to favour their proposals because he had been
greatly disappointed by the failure of his attempts to secure from Captain
Alexsnder Burnes, whom Lord Auckland had sent on a “commercial ” mission to
him, a promise of support against the Sikhs.
Such was the
position of affairs on the Indian frontier when the British Cabinet were
considering how they could checkmate the designs of Russia in Asia. They
regarded the Afghans no less than the Persians as already won over by that
Power, and turned to Ranjit as a means of redressing the balance. They
therefore approved of Auckland’s proposals for restoring Shah Shuja to his
throne and maintaining Herat as a separate principality independent alike of
Persia and Afghanistan. By these means it was hoped to establish a buffer State
in the latter country *md to confirm the Sikhs in their rule over Kashmir and
Peshawar, at the same time relieving the Amirs in Sind of Afghan supremacy and
tribute. A tripartite treaty between the Governor-General, Ranjit Sing, and
Shah Shuja, on these lines, was signed at Simla July 25, 1838.
The
failure of the Russian and Persian attack upon Herat did not arrest the
prosecution of this risky policy. A British column left Firozpur in December,
1838, and marched towards Sind, while troops from Bombay under John Keane were
landed at Karachi. The Sind Amirs were required to give assistance to an army
which was advancing to free them from dependency on Afghanistan. From the start
to its tragic finish, the expedition met with difficulties that might have been
foreseen, and left behind in its course a bad moral effect, which was only
effaced by the shedding of more blood. Deficient in transport and means of
subsistence, the British troops forced their way by‘dogged perseverance through
the deserts of Sind and the inhospitable Bolan Pass. W
surrendered
without a blow, and Shah Shuja was crowned there May 8, 1839. Ghazni was
brilliantly taken by storm, and in August Shah Shuja
made his
triumphal entry into Kabul where, however, he was coldly received by its
inhabitants.
Dost Mohammad
fled north, and, eventually giving himself up, was sent to India. With the
entry into Kabul Auckland might have rested content, and thus have avoided the
terrible sequel. He was anxious however to restore to his ally a settled go\
ernmenfc, and it never occurred to him that it was a more difficult task to get
out of Kabul than to enter it. After a few months insurrections broke out,
headed by the son of Dost Mohammad; the army was dispirited by the hardships it
had undergone, and in deference to the Shah’s vishes it abstained from securing
the commanding position of the Bala Hissar. An incurable optimism took
possession of the authorities, military and civil. The internal administration
was conducted by British officers, who came into collision with the Afghan
populace; and Major D’Arcy Todd, who had been sent to Herat as Agent, found the
Minister, Yar Mohammad, actively engaged in intrigues with Persia. The cost of
maintaining troops at Kabul pressed heavily on the finances; and the reduction
of the liberal allowance to the local chiefs increased the unpopularity of the
British occupation.
In the state
of feeling thus created, the murder of Burnes and his brother by a party of
Ghilzais was the spark that fired the gunpowder so carefully laid on all sides.
Consultations with the Shah, and the hesitation of General William Elphinstone,
who would neither relieve Burnes nor send aid from the cantonment to the
detachment besieged in the fort, encouraged a general rising against the
foreign invaders. General William Nott, summoned to Kabul, was unable to obtain
transport for more than a small detachment, which soon retraced its steps;
while Robert Sale, weighing the cost resolutely, retired to Jalalabad, which he
hastened to strengthen for the inevitable attack. The British at Kabul were
left to shift for themselves; and a pitiful succession of blunders led up to
the final disaster. The commissariat fort was captured by the Afghans, Elphinstone
making no effort to rescue the provisions on which the cantonment depended. The
citadel might have been secured by John Shelton as a place of refuge; but he
preferred to waste time in quarrelling with Elphinstone. On November 28,1841,
the British were defeated in action on the Behmaru hills; and demoralisation
succeeded to hunger. Every endeavour to obtain supplies for some 15,000 men was
frustrated by Akbar Khan, one of Dost Mohammad’s sons; and on December 11
Macnaghten, seeing nothing but starvation before them, gave hostages, promised
to evacuate Kandahar, Ghazni, and Jalalabad, and to leave Kabul in three days,
in return for provisions to be furnished on payment of their value. These terms
were violated; Macnaghten was assassinated; and, after the retreat had begun,
Lady Macnaghten and ten other ladies, with fifteen children, were rescued from
certain death only by accepting shelter in Akbar Khan’s camp. Elphinstone and
Sheltou were given up as additional hostages; and the hostile Ghilzais
wreaked their
vengeance on the rest. in the passes covered with snow. One solitary survivor,
Dr William Brydon, reached Jalalabad, wounded and exhausted, on January
13,1843.
Auckland’s
first step on receiving news of the disaster was to give General Nott at
Kandahar authority to act upon his own judgment “to secure the paramount object
of the safety of his troops and to uphold at the same time the honour of
British arms.” He also directed Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-in-chief, to
push forward a strong division under George Pollock to the Peshawar frontier.
Hearing, however, of the doubtful attitude of the Sikh Government and of
Nicolls’ misgivings as to any renewal of the contest, he impressed upoi Pollock
the necessity of concentration. It is true that he half-heartedly referred to
the release of the British captives ; but he added that the “Governor-General
in Council does not contemplate any great effort in the present season for the
reoccupation of Afghanistan.”
Ellenborough,
on his way out to relieve Auckland, learnt the gloomy news as he entered the
Madras roads, February 21,1842. His mind was full of the expedition to China,
which had occupied the attention of Palmerston’s Government before he left
England; and, when he heard of the discontent of the troops at Haidarabad, the
numerous desertions reported from the Punjab, and the rumours of trouble in
Sind and Burma, his heart failed him. In March, he wrote to Nicolls that “ in
war reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the
most gallant troops.” Meanwhile Nott, unable to move for lack of transport,
anxiously awaited the arrival of General Bichard England with reliefs from
Sind. But on March 28 England fell back from Hakalzai to Pishin with a loss of
27 killed and 71 wounded, while the garrison at Ghazni capitulated on March 1,
and Kandahar narrowly escaped capture. Ellenborough ordered Nott to withdraw to
Sakhar, and Pollock to concentrate on the Indian side of the Khaibar at the
earliest practicable period. He was so sure of his own judgment that he even
made the following boast to the Duke of Wellington on May 17; “I stand alone
and have to contend against the whole monstrous body of political agents. I
have acted altogether in all I have done upon my own judgment.” .
Neither his
colleagues in Calcutta, from whom he had separated himself, nor his generals in
the field, were prepared to acquiesce in Ellenborough’s humiliating orders.
When Pollock reached Jalalabad, he found that Sale, reduced to almost his last
half-rations, had not merely repaired the injury caused to his defences by
earthquake, but in a pitched battle had soundly thrashed 6000 Afghans under the
walls of the citadel. The “ illustrious garrison ” had in fact relieved itself.
To Ellenborough, however, this success, and the minder of Shah Shuja, made no
difference. So he at once told Pollock, who forcibly pointed out the danger of
retiring, and finally demonstrated, the impossibility of doing so without
carriage. From Kandahar came the same story. Nott, whom England
had at last
joined with 2500 men and 3000 camels from Sind, withdrew the garrison from
Kelat-i-Ghilzai because he had “no option” save to carry out definite orders.
But, with only 52 casualties in his own force, he succeeded in inflicting heavy
losses upon the enemy, 12,000 in number, outside Kandahar; and he too declared
that he could not safely withdraw until he had collected supplies. And now,
while Pollock with 15,000 men, including his sick, at Jalalabad, and Nott with
10,000 at Kandahar, held fast, public indignation asserted itself. Ellenborough
therefore reluctantly wrote to Nott, July 4, that he left to his discretion “
the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country ”; and
Pollock was at first authorised to make his strength felt before abandoning his
position, and finally to cooperate with the Kandahar force if it marched by
Kabul.
Nott
naturally selected the way by Ghazni and Kabul as the route he would follow,
after despatching England to Sakhar with a part of his troops. Sir Charles
Napier was summoned with reinforcements from Bombay to take command of all the
forces in Sind, which with England’s contingent numbered 10,000 men; and a
reserve army was organised on the Punjab frontier. It now became a race for
Kabul between Nott and Pollock. The former started in August, defeating an
Afghan force of
12.000 in the same month, took Ghazni after heavy
fighting, September 6, thereby releasing 327 sepoys from captivity, and
arrived, September 17, within five miles of Kabul, to find that Pollock’s
troops had occupied the Bala Hissar on the previous day. Both armies fought
several actions; but the signal defeat which Pollock inflicted upon Akbar
Khan’s army of
16.000 men at Tizin, September 13, was decisive,
and opened the door to Kabul. The European prisoners, with the exception of
General Elphinstone, who had died in captivity, and one other, numbering 105
persons, were rescued on September 21, and before Christmas Day both Pollock
and Nott, not without some fighting, had crossed the Satlaj, the latter bearing
the so-called gates of Somnath in triumph to India. England, with the rest of
the troops from Kandahar, had reported his arrival at Dadar in October.
Ellenborough,
having first ordered his generals to retire, and then thrown upon them the
heavy responsibility of advancing upon Kabul, could not restrain his
extravagant joy at the successes which they had achieved. He met Pollock on
December 18 at the banks of the Satlaj and loaded the troops with medals and
honours. The resonant periods of his “prancing” proclamations struck a false
note and offended the public ear; and, when he bade the princes of India
rejoice that “ the insult of 800 years is at last avenged” by the restoration
of the (spurious) gates of Somnath, he only provoked a contemptuous smile. The
Mohammadans were offended at the desecration of a tomb; the Hindu princes knew
that, even if Mahmud, the Mohammadan invader of India, had carried away any
gates from Somnath to Ghazni in 1024, they were
not made of
Deodar nor carved with a Mohammadan pattern. A spirit of triumphant insolence
took possession of him, as he thought of the 30,000 effective troops, gathered
at Firozpur at the close of 1842, and reflected upon the successful issue of
the war with China. But grave exception was taksn in England to the destruction
of the bazaar and two mosques at Kabul and to the unnecessary losses which the
armies had incurred in their retreat. Moreover events in Sind alarmed the home
authorities eager for settled peace, and even called forth a warning from
Ellenborough’s friend the Duke of Wellington, who urged a policy of
conciliation rather than of menaces.
The conquest
of Sind was not merely a sequence but a consequence of the Afghan War.
Commercial intercourse with that province had been established by the Company
in 1758, and more particularly with the Haidarabad Mirs of the Talpur family
than with those of the two other branches,. Mirpur and Khairpur. But, when the
tripartite treaty was concluded with the Sikhs and Shah Shuja, the temporary
occupation of Shikarpur became a matter of necessity. The Amirs were by that
engagement to be relieved from the dominion of Afghanistan; and the sum claimed
by the Afghans was to be fixed by the British, who in turn were to pay Ranjit
Sing a solatium of 15 lakhs out of it. As the price of this freedom, the Amirs
engaged to allow the temporary occupation of Shikarpur and the passage of
troops and supplies through their country. The Khairpur family entered readily
into these arrangements; but the Haidarabad Amirs objected to the payment of
any tributary arrears to Shah Shuja and to the intrusion of the British into
their dominions. In fact, a military force under Brigadier Thomas Valiant on
its way to Afghanistan from Bombay was opposed at Karachi in 1839, with the
result that the fort and town had to be taken. Eventually, the Amirs agreed to
the terms imposed on them which fixed their share of the tribute. But they
failed either to pay the money or to surrender the lands demanded in lieu of
it; and, when the news of the Kabul disaster reached Sind, insolence was added
to refusal. Moreover, they disputed the right of navigation on the Indus and
the commercial tariff which the Government of India regarded as already
secured to them by existing treaty.
Such was the
position when Charles Napier took command of the forces in Sind and Baluch stan
in August, 1842. Strengthened as he was by the vindication of British honour at
Kabul, Napier was in no mood to be trifled with; and, in February, 1843, the
Amirs, learning that a force was advancing and had blown up the fortress of
Imam Ghar, agreed to accept the terms of a new treaty dictated to them. Those
terms included the cession of territories to the British and to their allies
the Nawab of Bahawalpur and the Mir Sobdar Khan, as well as the surrender of
the privilege of coining money, and a free passage to the Company’s troops
through Sind. That Napier’s conscience was pricked by the enterprise entrusted
to him may perhaps be inferred from the humorous message by
which he
announced his success—“peccavi"', but it is also clear from his diaries
and letters. “ My present position,” he wrote on January 16, 1843, “ is not to
my, liking; we had no right to come here, and are tarred with the Afghan brush
”; and on the following day he admitted that the enemy were incapable of real
opposition.
The incidents
of Indian history, however, constantly repeat themselves ; and, as at Kirki
and Sitabaldi the Peshwa and the Raja of Berar had put themselves in the wrong,
so now at Haidarabad the ink upon the treaty was hardly dry when the Sindis
treacherously attacked James Outram in the Residency. There he defended himself
against 8000 men until his ammunition was exhausted, and then fell back upon
Napier’s force at Matari. Outram was still disposed to treat with the Amirs;
but Napier was anxious to fight his first battle as generalissimo, and with
2800 men and 12 guns he inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy of 22,000 men
at Miani, losing 300 and killing or wounding 5000 (February 17). The Amirs
themselves surrendered, but their followers maintained an attitude of
hostility, till they received a second defeat at Dabo, six miles
from'Haidarabad, March 24. The whole of Sind, with the exception of the
Khairpur territories, which were continued to Mir Ali Murad, was annexed; and
the Amirs, after being deported, were eventually allowed to return to Ha
jcrabad on pensions. The justification pleaded for these proceedings was “ the
welfare of the inhabitants of the country,” and the treachery and misrule of
the Amirs. Napier persuaded himself that the act was morally defensible; but,
although there is no doubt that the people were delivered from a bad government
and the risk of Afghan and Sikh invasions, the treatment of the Amirs was
harsh. The necessity of securing a free passage for troops and commerce between
Bombay and the Punjab as a mere act of self-defence is the best excuse that can
be made for Ellenborough’s policy.
His actions
in Gwalior rested upon firmer grounds of principle and statesmanship. While the
Amirs in Sind were gathering together their forces for the conflict at Miani, a
revolution was in progress at Gwalior, which, in view of the growing insolence
of the Sikhs, demanded the utmost attention. The young Raja Jankoji died without
issue, and his child widow, with the permission of the Governor-General, at
once adopted a son. Ellenborough recognised Mama Sahib, uncle of the late
Maharaja, as regent in preference to Dada Khasji, the Minister favoured by the
widow and the Court, and concentrated a large force on the frontier to support
his authority. The troops of the State had not forgotten the lesson taught to
them in the Maratha War, when they had been isolated by the dispositions of
Hastings’ army while they hesitated to strike a blow for the Peshwa. On the
other hand, they had not experienced for themselves the futility of resistance,
as Holkar’s army had at Mehidpur, and they lent too willing an ear to
exaggerated tales of British weakness in Afghanistan. They fancied themselves
masters of
the situation, and, when the regent was dismissed from office, and the British
Resident withdrew from the capital, where Dada had won over most of the army
and taken control of affairs, matters could only end in an open conflict.
In December,
1843, Ellenborough proceeded to Agra ; and, fearing that the Sikhs would
declare war before Gwalior affairs were settled, he warned the Maharani that
the time had come for active interference in the interests both of the Company
and of the protected State of Gwalior. The Dada was thereupon sent to the
frontier town of Dholpur, and a deputation was despatched to the
Governor-General to ask for a conference before the British force should cross
the Chambal. But the interview fixed for December 26 fell through; and Sir Hugh
Gough, with some 6400 troops advanced to Maharajpur, while General John Grey
proceeded from a direction south-east of Gwalior to Punniar, with a view to
cooperation with the Commander-in-chief’s force. The enemy, however, numbering
25,000 men, prevented the two wings from uniting. Part of them, taking
advantage of a delay in the arrival of the four 8-inch howitzers, fell upon
Gough’s troops before they were fully prepared, and an obstinate struggle
ensued in which, though losing 106 killed and 684 wounded, Gough gained the
day. On the same day, December 29, Grey too won a victory at Punniar, with a
loss of 217 killed and wounded.
These
successes achieved in a campaign of two days put an end to further resistance.
The two wings of the army joined forces at Gwalior, January 4, 1844, and on the
13th the Maharaja accepted the treaty dictated to him. By this he agreec’ to
reduce his armed forces to 9000 men with 32 guns, leaving his fort in the hands
of a contingent of
10,000 men under British officers, but retaining
his independence. Peace and order, thus established, continued until 1857, when
the contingent joined the mutineers at Cawnpore, and Tantia Topi, one of its
Brahman officers, raised the standard of revolt in central India.
Ellenborough
was now able to turn his attention to the critical state of affairs at Lahore.
Since the death of Ranjit Sing, June 27, 1839, the Khalsa army of 82,000
well-drilled soldiers under the guidance of a military committee had taken part
in a sc. es of revolutions at that capital. Dhulip Sing being an infant, Janda
Khaur, supported by her paramour Lai Sing, was now regent. The recall of
Ellenborough by the Court of Directors in June, 1844, and the succession of Sir
Henry Hardinge, did not interrupt the policy being pursued of gradually
increasing the British forces round about Amballa so as to prepare for
eventualities without alarming the Sikhs. Gough was thus able to count upon
32,000 men to protect Firozpur and the Company’s possessions, when suddenly, on
November 17,1845, the Sikh Committee resolved on war, and the Lahore Government
dared not say them nay. The Khalsa, under Tej Sing, crossed the border, and to
their invasion Hardinge replied by a proclamation annexing all Sikh territories
on the left bank of the Satlaj.
The validity
of this paper victory was at once put to the test of war. Part of the Sikh
forces remained round Firozpur, watching the British garrison; while another
part, under Lai Sing, moved on to Firozshahr and entrenched itself in a formidable
position of an oblong shape. But the Sikhs were not content with playing a
waiting game. They also sent out a force of 12,000 men with 22 guns to Mudki,
to bar the way of Gough and Hardinge now approachiiig with a force of 11,000
men. Oh December 18 Gough came into contact with the enemy late in the
afternoon and at once attacked them, losing 215 killed, including the gallant
Sale, with 657 wounded. If the honours of the short fight rested with the
British, the fruits of victory were snatched from them by the falling of
darkness and by their fatigue after a long march.
The Sikhs
made good their retreat to the shelter of their entrenchments at Firozshahr;
Gough, when his men had rested, followed them thither. On reaching that place,
December 21, he would again have hurled himself upon the Sikhs; but Hardinge,
who had placed his services at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief as second
in command, interfered as Governor-General and insisted upon waiting for John
Littler to come up. The British forces, together 17,000 strong, were unable to
effect a junction and take up their positions before 8 p.m. Littler’s division,
though weary after a long march, were allowed no rest, and he was repulsed and
compelled to fall back. Everywhere the Sikhs took advantage of their splendid
position ; but by nightfall the entrenchment was pierced, and Sir Harry Smith
held the village in its centre. Darkness and the confusion caused by constant
explosions of magazines obliged Gough to draw back his men, who for many hours
were unable to move or light a fire without exposing themselves to the enemy’s
artillery. At length the “ night of horrors ” began to give way to dawn; and
the British troops, spent though they were by hUnger and want of rest, once
more advanced, driving the enemy out of their retrenchment. At that moment Tej
Sing arrived with 25,000 fresh Sikhs, and it seemed as if victory must be
tinned into disaster. But, though the ammunition for the guns was exhausted,
and men from sheer fatigue were dropping from the ranks, the combat was
stubbornly upheld; and1 the Sikhs, losing heart at the capture of
their entrenched camp, made no serious effort to retrieve the day. The victory,
known as Firozshahr, thus won cost the British 694 killed, while 1721 were
wounded.
The Sikh
army, however, soon discovered that there was no cause for despair. Awaiting
reinforcements from Lahore, it detached 8000 men to attack Ludiana and break
Gough’s communications with British India. Sir Harry Smith was therefore
despatched to relieve Godby, thus assailed, and to frustrate the threatened
interruption. Having carried out this duty, Smith, at the head of 12,000 men,
won a brilliant victory over the Sikhs in the battle of Aliwal, January
28,1846, though with a loss of 580 killed and wounded. He then rejoined the
main army at Sobraon,
740 Peace with Lahore.-Kashmir.-Multan
rebellion.' [1846-8
where the
enemy had entrenched themselves in a strong position, resting upon the Satlaj
and connected by a bridge of boats with their heavy batteries on the other side
of the river. Here Gough, with 15,000 men, gave battle to the Sikhs numbering
some 35,000 with 70 guns. Again his ammunition jan out; and the position had to
be carried by the bayonet. Nicholas Penny’s brigade on the right failed to push
home its advance, while Walter Gilberts attack on the centre, was twice hurled
back. But eventually a complete victory was gained. The Sikhs were driven
pell-mell into the river, and sixty-seven of their seventy guns were captured.
The British losses on this day, February 10, were 320 killed and 2063 wounded.
Diplomacy now
stepped in; and,; their overtures for peace being accepted, the Sikh Government
escaped the full chastisement they had merited. By a treaty signed March 9,
1846, and by subsequent arrangements, the Lahore State was preserved from
annexation. Its sovereignty over Kashmir was transferred to G°lab
Sing on payment of a crore of rupees; while the Sikh possessions in the
Jalandar Doab and Hazara were annexed and the Lahore army reduced to 32,000 men.
Henry Lawrence, soon to be temporarily succeeded by his brother John, now took
up his appointment as British Besident to guide the Council of Regency in the
administration, a force of 9000 British troops, to be paid by the Durbar, being
quartered at Lahore. Believing that by these measures the Sikh kingdom would
become an orderly member of the British protectorate, Hardinge now proceeded to
effect economies, reducing the Company’s army by 50,000 men, breaking up his
transport, and devoting the remaining months of his term of office to financial
reforms. So sanguine indeed was he of peaceful times that, though the Resident
soon had to complain that his advice was disregarded, and later to report
designs upon his life, the Governor-General turned a deaf ear to these warnings
and assured Lord Dalhousie, who relieved him on January 12, 1848, that all was
quiet.
On April 18
these pleasant dreams were dissipated by the treacherous murder of two British
officers, William Anderson and Vans Agnew, sent by the Council of Regency to
relieve Mulraj, Governor of Multan, of a trust which he had abused. With great
gallantry, Herbert Edwardes raised troops and inflicted losses upon the rebels
at Kineyri and Sadusain; but it was soon perceived that Multan would not be recovered
without serious effort. Moreover, as Dalhousie foresaw, there was imminent
danger that the whole Sikh nation, secretly encouraged by the Council of
Regency, would rise in arms. The general sentiment of India was therefore in
favour of the immediate despatch of all available troops to the assistance of
Edwardes at Multan. But the Governor-General resolutely adhered to his plan of
preparing for extensive operations after the rainy season, concentrating, his,
forces in the meanwhile. The regiments reduced by Hardinge were brought up to
their former strength; troops were moved forward to advanced positions on the
frontier; and transport and supplies
collected for
a winter campaign. For the present, the State authorities at Lahore were urged
to punish a rebellion against their own Government; and Sher Sing was therefore
despatched to Multan with the forces under their command, while later on
Frederick Currie, the Resident, acting upon his own responsibility, directed
William Sampson Whish with the British troops lent to the Sikh Government to
advance to the relief of Edwardes. Whish accordingly commenced operations
against the fort in September. But, at his first reverse, Sher Sing threw off
the mask and joined the rebels. The British general, thus forced to raise the
siege, could only await reinforcements from Bombay. On their arrival in
December, he resumed operations, carried the city by assault, and opened fire
upon the citadel, which surrendered on January 22, 1849.
Long before
this Sher Sing had withdrawn his forces from Multan and, expecting to be joined
by Chatar Sing with the Sikh troops from Peshawar, returned towards Lahore to
meet the army now assembled under Gough. On November 22,1848, Gough, without
waiting for the completion of his arrangements, directed Colin Campbell and
Charles Cureton to drive Sher Sing out of Ramnagar. The British lost 26 killed,
and 59 wounded, the enemy, who suffered but little, withdrawing into the Jechna
Doab. Gough, confined by his instructions to operations on the Chenab, now
despatched Thackwell to cross the river higher up and attack the Sikhs. Owing,
however, to mistakes and misunderstandings, Thackwell missed his chance; and
the only result of the battle of Sadulapur, December 3, 1848, was the orderly
retreat of the Sikhs to Chilianwala, five miles from the Jhelum. Thither Gough
pursued them with a force of 13,000 men and 60 guns, intending to engage the
enemy, 40,000 strong! before Chatar Sing’s troops could join them. The armies
met on the afternoon of January 13, 1849 ; and, as the position had not been
fully reconnoitred, a scene of the utmost confusion ensued, almost each
regiment fighting a battle of its own. If Sobraon was described as the “ night
of horrors,” Chilianwala is known as the “day of blunders.” The immediate
sequel too after each of these actions was much the'same. The guns, taken at
the bayonet by Campbell’s and Gilbert’s divisions, were recaptured by the Sikhs
during the night; the killed, 697 in number, were left on the field, while 1641
wounded men lay out in the bitter cold. Pursuit was impossible on the morrow;
and British guns and standards remained in the hands of the enemy who occupied
a position of their own choosing close by at Rasul, and presently offered
battle to Gough, which his instructions forbade him to accept.
For
Dalhousie, on hearing the result of the battle, issued explicit orders that no
further offensive action should be taken until General Whish, with his troops
from Multan, could join Gough. The Sikhs had now been reinforced by Chatar
Sing’s arrival from Peshawar and by a cavalry contingent of Afghans sent down
by Dost Mohammad,
742 The Punjab annexed. ^-Second Burmese War.
[1849-54
raising their
numbers to some 40,000 men. When the two armies finally, met, February 21,
1849, at Gujarat, Gough could place 20,000 in the field; and on this occasion
his plans were deliberately formed and carried out. Walter Gilbert was also
prepared with a suitable force to pursue the enemy. The battle began in the
morning, free play was allowed to the artillery before the infantry were
launched upon the positions, taken up in the villages; and by 1 p.m. the enemy
were in full retreat, a decisive victory being gained at the cost of 96 killed
and about 700 wounded. On- March 12 the Sikhs surrendered at discretion to
Gilbert at Rawal Pifldi,. and the Afghj.n contingent fled ignominiously through
the tribal passes, to report their discomfiture to the Amir Dost Mohammad.
Dalhousie,. rejecting the advice of the Lawrences, and without awaiting
instructions from home, forced the young Maharaja to sign a treaty, and at once
annexed the Punjab. Its affairs he placed in the hands of three Commissioners,
of whom two were the brothers Lawrence; in addition he entirely reorganised the
whole administration, civil and military, visiting the newly acquired
territories and settling every question on the spot.
Peace being
now reestablished throughout the country, the Governor- General hoped to devote
his entire attention to internal reforms, but in this congenial task he was
interrupted towards the close of 1851 by (nsults which the King of Ava offered
to the British flag at Rangoon. Commodore Lambert was sent to demand redress;
but his emissary met with nothing but insolence, and finally a cannonade, from
a stockade on the banks of the Irrawady, was opened upon H.M.S. Fox. War with
Burma was thus rendered inevitable, and Dalhousie determined to avoid the
mistakes that had marred the conduct of the campaign in 1824. I'onfening
frequently with General Henry Godwin, the commander of the expedition, he made
minute provision for the comfort and health of the troops to be sent from
Bengal and Madras. At the same time, he kept the door open for negotia on,
being resolved to avoid an appeal to the sword, if this could be with honour,
and to confine operations to the district of Prome. The King remaining
stubborn, Martaban, Rangoon, and Bassein were taken in April, 1852, and terms
of peace offered, preparations being at the same time made for a renewal of the
contest in September. These terms, which involved the cession of Pegu, were
treated with contempt, in consequence of which hostilities were hereupon
renewed. Prome was taken in October, while in the following month the enemy
were defeated and driven out of Pegu. With these successes Dalhousie was
satisfied, and since the King refused to sign any treaty, the annexation of the
province of Pegu was proclaimed, December 20, 1852. Subsequent attempts were
made to secure a treaty of cession, a Burmese embassy being received at Calcutta
in 1854, and a British mission being sent to Ava. But the Burmese monarch,
while prepared to accept an accomplished fact, was not ready to sanction it by
uegotiation.
With the
exception of necessary but unprofitable conflicts with the
1852-6] “
Rule of lapse.”—Oudh annexed.
743
Mohmands,
Hasanzais, and other uncivilised tribes on the new frontier of the Punjab,
Dalhousie was able to avoid further military operations. But his conduct of
foreign affairs was hardly less operative than his wars had been in adding to
the Company’s domain and in linking together its scattered portions. His treaty
with the Nizam for a perpetual cession of Berar removed a source of dangerous
friction with Haidarabad regarding payments due for the military contingent,
while it opened a direct line of communications between Nagpur and Bombay. The
“rule of lapse,” recognised by the Court of Directors in Bentinck’s time and
applied by Auckland to Mandavi and Kolaba, enabled him to go further in the
direction of consolidation. He boldly declared that the Government “is bound
not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory
or revenue as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from
the lapse of subordinate States by the failure of all heirs of every
description whatever, or from the failure of heirs natural, when the succession
can be sustained only by the sanction of Government being given to the ceremony
of adoption according to Hindu law. The Government is bound on such occasions to
act with the purest integrity and the most scrupulous good faith.” But he made
it clear that in addition to these limitations, he would only, as a general
principle, apply the rule of lapse to those Hindu principalities which had been
created or revived by British authority, and, in very exceptional cases, to
other Hindu sovereignties tributary and subordinate to the paramount Power.
Under this general rule Satara, Jaitpur, and Jhansi, created by Hastings in
1819, Sambalpur established in 1820, and Nagpur, revived by Amherst’s agreement
in 1826, were annexed by Dalhousie on failure of issue to their recognised
rulers.
The
annexation of Oudh rested upon different grounds; and Dalhousie, who would have
preferred to retain a titular sovereign while administering the province in his
behalf, merely carried out the orders he received on the eve of his retirement.
All parties were agreed on two points : first, that “the King,” for to that
dignity the Nawab Wazir had been raised in 1819, was bound by his treaty of
1801 to govern properly, and, secondly, that intolerable misgovemment prevailed
in the land, as the reports of William Sleeman and James Outram showed. But the
Directors feared that, if the consent of the King were asked and refused, it
would then be necessary to tolerate a further period of misrule, until the
patience of his subjects was exhausted and revolution followed—a cruel process
for which they would not take the responsibility. They therefore preferred to
adopt more stringent measures. The King was offered the alternative of
surrendering administrative powers to the British by treaty, or of being
forcibly deprived of them. As he refused to sign away his powers, Oudh was
annexed in 1856, minute instructions being laid down for respecting the rights of
the landed proprietors, conciliating the people, and pensioning the servants
and retainers of the deposed sovereign. It was
744 Dalhousie's administrative, reforms.—Canning.
[1855-6
Dalhousie’s
further intention to dismantle all forts, disarm the people, and station
adequate British gar*.sons in the province. Unfortunately, his term of office
expired before he could complete his arrangements, and his successor, Lord
Canning, did not at once put them in force.
Exclusive of
the value of Oudh, Dalhousie had added three millions sterling to the Company’s
revenues ; and his last year’s budget showed a surplus of two and a half
millions. Yet this was only a small part of the great work he accomplished. He
entirely reorganised the internal administration of India, and many of his
reforms lasted throughout the century. He swept away cumbrous boards, placing
responsible officers at the head of several military departments and those of
the public works and gaols. He laid the foundations for the survey and forest departments;
and, if in completing the Ganges canal he finished a work begun by others, the
telegraphs, railways, and postal system were his own creation. He detached the
Government of Bengal from the charge of the overworked Governor-General; and to
him was due the erection of the Punjab to a Lieutenant-Governorship, to which
John Lawrence was appointed after the Mutiny. Annual administrative reports had
tbeir origin in his orders, and effective steps were taken by him to secure the
departmental training of civil servants: Although the Government of India
continued to be the sole legislature for all India, it was Dalhousie’s doing
that representatives of the local Governments were summoned to its
deliberations, while at his instance the status of the legal member was raised
to that of the other members. In the matter of education he laid down the lines
of a department of public instruction and initiated more practical measures
than any of his predecessors had devised. Yet, in spite of his wars and his
vigorous internal policy, the public credit stood so high that he was able to
save <£*300,000 a year by the conversion of the 5 per cent, loans to others
at 4 per cent. Above all, he set a splendid example of untiring devotion to
duty, and with a wise foresight selected for responsible posts the men who
afterwards steered the ship of state through the dangerous seas of the Mutiny.
His successor
Lord Canning, who relieved him on February 29, 1856, passed an enactment
permitting the remarriage of widows, which Dalhousie had introduced. He also
carried a step further the friendly arrangements commenced with the Amir of
Kabul, one effect of which was to secure the correct and friendly attitude of
Dost Mohammad during the Mutiny. In March, 1855, a treaty with the Amir, drafted
by Dalhousie, and successfully negotiated by Herbert Edwardes, had been signed
by John Lawrence. It was based on the principle of “letting bygones be
bygones,” and matters were so arranged that Dost Mohammad made the first
overtures. If we had grievously wronged the Dost in the Afghan War, the latest
provocation had come from him, since he sent an Afghan contingent to aid the
Sikhs at Gujarat. Dalhousie therefore contented himself with a bare treaty of
mutual
“ forget and
forgive.” But Canning had a new situation to. deal with. Persia, in violation
of her understanding with us, had attacked and taken Herat, adding to .this
injury insults to the British agent. War was therefore declared by the British
Government and Outram was sent with a force to Bushire. This brought the
Persians to their senses, and peace was restored by the Treaty of Paris, on
March 4, 1857. But before that conclusion was reached, a subsidy was granted to
the Amir of Kabul, and a fresh treaty of alliance was executed on January 26, 1857.
The events
narrated were now rapidly leading up to a catastrophe expected neither by the
statesmen responsible for them nor by the impartial onlooker. The constant
wars in which the Company had engaged required a large mercenary army; and in
1857 the native troops, 311,038, outnumbered the British, 39,500, by nearly
eight to one. Of the former, 137,580 belonged to the Bengal army, and were
mainly recruited in Oudh, where, as servants of the Company, they enjoyed the
privilege, denied by the King to his own servants, of prompt and fair trial in
the native Courts, a privilege that since the annexation no longer
differentiated them from their fellow-countrymen. The Sepoys had moreover
learnt their own importance, observing that special allowances had been given
for services beyond the Indus, and that their agitation had wrung from Sir
Charles Napier a more liberal compensation for dearness of provisions. They
were keenly awake to the numerical weakness of the Company’s forces,
especially after the heavy losses sustained in Gough’s campaigns; and they did
not forget that British prestige had suffered grievously from the Afghan
disaster. Nor were they blind to the fact that between the Company’s European
regiments and those of the Queen’s army there were jealousies and
disagreements, that the two served different masters under different
conditions, and that the latter were liable at any moment to be recalled from
India, thus Weakening the proportion of European soldiers, already too small.
To the
exaggerated idea of their own value were added offences against their religious
sensibilities. Wars with Burma, China, and Persia, involved crossing the “
black sea,” and thus losing caste, and now came Canning’s General Order, July,
1856, constraining every future recruit to “ serve beyond sea whether within
the territories of the Company or beyond them.” Evil counsellors outside their
ranks warned them that a systematic attack was being made upon their faith,
that the Government was turning the world upside down, opening the schools to
children of all castes, abolishing Sati and slavery, making Brahman and Sudra
amenable to the same laws, and, with its telegraphs, railways and hospitals,
practising magic arts and sorcery. The East, which had hitherto bowed low before
the West “in patient deep disdain,” now resented the inexorable march of
civilisation; and a spirit of unrest was abroad. At this moment the Enfield
rifle was being substituted for the Brown Bess; and it was reported that the
cartridges, smeared
with the fat
of sacred cows arid the lard of polluted pigs, were to be bitten by Hindu and
Mohammadan alike. The ferment caused by this rumour spread from Dum Duni to
Barrackpur, and so on to Mirat, where the spark burst into a flame.
In May, 1857,
India was startled by the news that, on Sunday the 10th, the 20th Native.
Infantry and the 3rd Light Cavalry, having mutinied at Mirat, had gone off to
Delhi, captured its magazine, and been joined by the regiments there. At many
military stations British men and women were being murdered, and fugitives
endured terrible sufferings in the attempt to reach a place of safety. Before
the month was out, all eyes were turned to Delhi, Cawnpore, and Lucknow,, to
which places nearly the whole of the mutinous Bengal army had betaken itself. 1
George Anson,
the Commander-in-chief, at once ordered such forces as he could collect, at
Amballa, to join the British troops at Mirat in an advance upon Delhi. Dying of
cholera on the road he was succeeded by Henry Barnard, who, defeating the
rebels at Badli Sarai, June 8, gained his footing on the famous ridge at Delhi.
But Barnard 'Iso died of cholera, July 5; and Thomas Reed, who took his place,
was compelled by illness to give place to Archdale Wilson on the 17th. Despite
these adverse circumstances, the British force of 4500 effective men—for such
reliefs and additions as it received served only to repair the waste of war and
diseas-’—stubbornly maintained its position in the presence of
30,000 to 50,000 mutineers, until August 14, when
the gallant John Nicholson brought an additional 1600 infantry, a battery of
artillery, and 200 cavalry, which, with the siege-guns received a month later,
rendered an assault possible.
While the
small force of Europeans and loyal Gurkhas, exposed to the burning sun, was
improving its defences on the ridge,- repelling assaults by day and night, at
all times under a deluge of shot and shell from the fortified walls of Delhi,
that city received fresh streams of rebels, as the tide of revolt overflowed
Bareilly, Jalandar, Nasirabad, Jhansi, and other stations. The arrival of new
bodies of mutineers was frequently the signal for a general attack. In two of
these, fought on July 9 and 14, the British lost 408 killed and wounded out of
a force then numbering 5367 men. Disease, especially cholera and sunstroke,
daily carried off their victims. When the rains came, things were no better. On
September 6, there were 2800 in hospital; and, even with the arrival of all
their reinforcements, the “Delhi army” could only parade 4720 infantry—of whom
I960 were Europeans—for the four columns finally told off for the assault and
their reserves. These figures did not include the Jind and Kashmir contingents.
With the
coming of the siege-guns the batteries were at once advanced. Over the
crumbling ruins of the Kashmir gate, blown in by Duncan Home and Philip Salkeld
on September 14, Colonel Campbell led his men, and Nicholson formed up his
troops within the walls. Near the
Lahore gate
the heroic Nicholson was mortally wounded; other columns were checker ; and by
nightfall the British hat’ secured but a foothold within the city, with a loss
of 66 officers and 1104 men killed and wounded. In the following days, for all
the stubborn resistance of the sepoys, ground, was gained step by step; the
magazine was taken on the 16th; and on the 21st General Wilson occupied the
imperial palace. The King was taken prisoner, and the three princes were
captured and shot by William Baikes Hodson the next afternoon. Then not a
moment was lost in detaching a force of 1000 British and 2000 native troops to
proceed to Cawnpore. On the way they relieved Agra, fought several engagements,
destroyed forts, and arrived at their destination before the end of October.
Human
imagination has never conceived a scene more heartrending in its details than
that witnessed at Cawnpore, when news arrived of the mutinies at Mirat and
Delhi. Sir Hugh Wheeler, with but 50 European artillerymen at his back, though
aware of disaffection in the four native regiments under his command, dared not
attempt disarmament. Nothing remained but to prepare for the defence of 330
women and children, although by so doing he betrayed his suspicions. The Nana
Sahib, concealing his bitter resentment at Dalhousie’s denial to him of the
life pension paid to his adoptive father, Baji Rao, the last Peshwa of Poona,
offered his Maratha troops to guard the treasury* On May 21 the women and
children took refuge in the rough entrenchment which Wheeler had improvised. A
fortnight later the native regiments mutinied; Nana Sahib treacherously seized
the magazine; and the investment began. Wheeler had now 240 European soldiers,
with six guns, to protect 870 non-combatants. For twenty-tWo days the defenders,
with a row of loaded muskets by their sides, replied day and night to the
attack of 4000 rebels well supplied with guns and ammunition. The women and
children burrowed in holes to escape the bullets or the fall of crumbling
masonry. Several of both sexes died from sunstroke or thirst; others were burnt
to death in the hospital set on fire by red-hot shells; and many fell in
attempts to procure water. But the remainder bravely held the enemy at bay,
surrendering only on the sworn guarantee of the Nana that boats and provisions
should be supplied for their departure by the Ganges. On June 27, those still
alive, for the most part wounded and fever-stricken, were embarking on the
boats when a murderous fire was opened upon them. The survivors were dragged
ashore, the men being shot or hacked to pieces before the eyes of their wives
and children, while the latter, numbering some 150, were taken back to
Cawnpore. Here, with other women and children captured in the attempt to escape
from neighbouring stations, they were butchered and mutilated, their bodies being
thrown intq a well, only just before Henry Havelock* having defeated the Nana’s
forces, arrived to the relief.
Nothing was
now left but for that general to proceed in all haste
to Lucknow.
Oudh, so recently annexed, was administered by Henry Lawrence. At the capital
were 16,000 native troops, besides many soldiers and retainers of the ex-King
and of the nobles, waiting for the signal Of revolt, while the British portion
of the garrison comprised only 700 men, including 60 gunners. As the tide of
mutiny rose, the human driftwood of refugees from various quarters floated down
to Lucknow, and Lawrence prepared the residency for the struggle so surely
imminent. On June SO he moved out to Chinhat, to meet 6500 rebels., coming
mostly from Faizabad. His native gunners deserted, and, incurring heavy losses,
he barely effected his retreat to the residency, where 927 men of British
extraction, including civilians' and aged pensioners, with 765 natives,
composed his garrison. Two days later he was mortally wounded; and John Inglis
took command. By the middle of September his garrison had been reduced to 1179,
many being sick and wounded, and disease had carried off nine women and
fifty-three children. The relief column under Havelock, whom James Outram
generously declined to supersede, could only reinforce the besieged by 2000
men, and the be - eged had to renew their heroic defence without even an
addition to their food supplies. Outram, who took command directly the relief
was accomplished, was so closely invested that he could not communicate with
the detachment left at the Alambagh, though that ridge was only four miles
distant. To the constant fire of grape-shot and the trials of climate were now
added reduced rations. At length, the arrival at Cawnpore of the Delhi column,
and of the troops pushed up from Calcutta, enabled the new Commander- in-chief,
Colin Campbell, to take command of the second relief force. Yet, when his
reinforcements, including William Peel’s naval brigade, assembled on November
16 for the final advance through' the city, his force numbered only 3500
infantry and 400 cavalry, to whom were opposed
30,000 mutineers holding formidable positions
behind walls and canals.
Every step
through the streets and gardens of Lucknow was contested, 2000 bodies of
rebels being afterwards removed from the Sikandar Bagh alone. But the residency
was reached, and in the silence of the night, November 22, its 2000 helpless
prisoners and wounded soldiers were withdrawn to Cawnpore, and thence to
Allahabad. Outram was left with 4000 men at the Alambagh, where Havelock was
buried in the hour of victory ; and Colin Campbell returned to Cawnpore to deal
with the rebels in his rear and then organise a force for the capture of
Lucknow.
The British,
hitherto compelled to act on the defensive, were now free to advance so far as
their limited transport would permit. While Outram watched Lucknow, Nana
Sahib’s troops^ swollen by the Gwalior contingent, were driven out of Cawnpore;
other mutinous bodies were defeated at Fatehgarh; and an army for the
occupation of Oudh was assembled by the end of February, 1858. A Nipalese force
took part
in the
operations against Lucknow., then held by some 60,000 sepoys and 50,000
irregular Oudh troops and protected by a formidable line of defences. Outram
advanced on the other side of the Gumti and cooperated with Colin Campbell’s
attack on the front of the position. On March 21 the city was captured, and
gradually the whole province was recovered. A campaign in Rohilkhand followed.
Meanwhile, in central India Sir Hugh Rose, starting from , Mhow, demolished
several forts, defeated the rebels before Jhansi, took that city by storm in
March, and under a burning sun routed a large force at Kalpi. On hearing that
Tantia Topi had occupied Gwalior, he recaptured that city and fort in June, and
then, broken down in health, handed over his command to Robert Napier. After
his defeat, Tantia Topi maintained for ten months a reduced, body of adherents,
who outstripped the movements of several British columns, until at last he was
betrayed and captured (April, 1859). About the same time, the force cooperating
with Jung Bahadur against some 10,000 sepoys and the followers of the Nana
Sahib and the Begam of Oudh.was joined by troops under Hope Grant, who dispersed
the enemy. Organised resistance was at an end, the Nana Sahib disappearing for
ever in the inhospitable jungles of Nipal. Votes of thanks were passed by both
Houses of Parliament, and on May 1, 1859, services of thanksgiving were held
throughout the kingdom.
, Lord
Canning had no time to congratulate himself on the suppression of the Sepoy
Rebellion when he was called upon to deal with a white mutiny. The Company’s
European soldiers bitterly resented the effect of the Act of Parliament by
which, on the transfer of the government of India to the Crown, they were
driven like sheep into the fold of the British army. Eventually they were given
the option of discharge, of which. nearly 10,000 took advantage. The
reorganisation of the whole military system of India was thus necessitated ;
but was not completed until much later.
The more
congenial task of restoring the civil administration and regaining the
confidence of the ruling chiefs was accomplished by Canning, who had exerted
himself from the outset to assuage the bitter feelings of revenge which events
had excited. Wholesale executions, the blowing of rebels from guns, and the
extermination of entire bands of fighting men without quarter asked or given,
might have been justified by considerations of public safety. But panic, and
the cry of blood for blood had desolated villages and emptied cities of their
inhabitants, and it was necessary to put a stop to excessive measures of
repression. On November 1,1.858, the Governor-General, then appointed the first
Viceroy in token of the direct responsibility assumed by the Crown, announced
the terms of the Queen’s Proclamation in great state at Allahabad. The gracious
message lost none of its force by being delivered while the clash of arms was
yet being heard in central India and on the frontiers of Nipal. Her Majesty
accepted all treaties and engagements made by
the Company
with the native princes and promised to respect their rights, dignity, and
honour. In an impressive passage, inserted by her own special desire, the Queen
acknowledged with gratitude the solace of religion, and ieclared that all her
Indian subjects should be protected in the exercise of their religious
observances. A principle already enunciated in the Charter Act of 1833 was
reinforced, and all, of every race or creed, were to be admitted as far as
possible to those offices in ber service for which they might be qualified. The
Viceroy’s proclamation of amnesty was confirmed, and tbe royal clemency
extended to all rebels save those convicted of taking a direct part in the
murder of British subjects. The aim of the Queen’s government was to be that
which had so frequently been announced by the Company, the benefit of all her
subjects resident in India—“ In their prosperity will be our strength, in their
contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward.”
Canning
opened a new chapter in the history of British relations with the chiefs by
issuing to them Sanads (Charters) of adoption and succession, ensuring the
continuance of native rule. The terror of annexation under the “ rule of lapse
” was finally removed, while fresh emphasis was laid on the duty of loyalty to
the Crown, and a new responsibility placed upon their shoulders. Fifty years
had passed since the policy of non-intervention had given way under Hastings to
one of subordinate isolation, each State entrusting the whole control of its
external affairs to the paramount British power. Now, a more active career of
cooperation and partnership in an imperial system was offered to ■ the
Queeti’s allies. Hitherto, it had been enough to define their duties to the
Company for the common defence, and to take entire charge of their external
relations. For the rest, within their own territories the chiefs had for the
most part governed as they pleased, until the people of Coorg or Oudh had cried
out for annexation, or a failure of heirs had enabled Dalhousie to substitute
British for native rule in the interests of the people. But now Canning
confirmed the intention of the suzerain Power to perpetuate native rule, if the
chiefs remained loyal and true to their engagements. Henceforth, therefore,
friendly advice and timely interference must be exercised to correct gross
abuses of power, to maintain peaceful successions, and to place the continuance
of native rule upon the only sure foundations of peace and order, law and
justice. It might even be necessary to depose an unworthy ruler, or for a time
to govern on his behalf; but, if the State was to be preserved from annexation,
its ruler must prove himself a worthy member of the imperial system.
Upon British
India the transfer of government to the Crown produced1 no immediate
or substantial change. New masters were installed at home, but no new powers
were conferred upon them. A principal Secretary of State aided by a Council of
India, at first composed of fifteen members, gathered into his hands all powers
previously exercised either by the Board of Control through its faithful
servants, the
“ Secret Committee,” or by the Courts of Directors and of Proprietors. The
Secretary of State was given the power of overruling his Council in most
matters; while in others, such as appropriations of revenue, he required a
majority of their votes, and he could on his own responsibility give orders regarding
foreign affairs and other “secret” matters with which the “Sccret Committee”
used to deal. An independent audit of the accounts was provided, and the
control of Parliament secured over military operations outside India; while
annual reports upon the moral and material progress of every province were to
be laid before that body. All existing laws, treaties, and orders were to
remain in force, and generally the Statute was an enabling and continuing Act,
rather thar one which created a new order of things.
The Mutiny
had not merely ousted British authority from certain districts, it had also
suspended everywhere the introduction ■ of reforms contemplated by the
last Charter Act and commenced by Dalhousie. The Indian Civil Service was
already being recruited by public competition, Haileybury College having been
closed in 1857; but the rule of seniority prevailed, and civil offices were
reserved in each presidency for civil servants appropriated to it. An Act of
Parliament (1861), validated appointments made in disregard of these
provisions, swept away numerous restrictions, and threw open a large number of
offices to persons not being members of the Covenanted Civil Service. By
another Act of the same year the High Courts of Judicature in Calcutta, Madras and
Bombay were established. But the most important of the changes in the civil
government effected by Lord Cam hg was that which the Indian Council’s Act
enabled him to carry out. A fifth member was added to the Govemor-General’s
Executive Council, which for purposes of legislation was reinforced by
additional members who might be twelve in number. The legislative authority of
the Government of India was clearly defined both in respect to Parliament, and
in regard to the Councils of Madras and Bombay, to which were restored powers
of egislat’.on taken from them in 1833. Power was given to establish
legislative councils in Bengal, the North-West Provinces, and the Punjab. The
Act was amended and extended in 1869; but its introduction so soon after the
Mutiny was worthy of a strong and progressive Government. Simultaneously,
progress was made in the codification of Indian law; when, for the first time,
were reaped the fruits of Macaulay’s labours on the Indian Law Commission
established in 1833. :The Civil Procedure Code of 1859, the Indian Penal Code
of 1860, and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, were primarily devised for the
guidance of untrained judges and magistrates; but they have proved to be instruments
of education and civilisation spreading broadcast among the people of India
Western idea* of right and wrong.
, Before
Canning left India “in prosperity and peace,” he had reassured the Talukdars
and other classes in Oudh, and had, with the aid of
752 Viceroyalties of Elgin and, Lawrence.—Bhutan.
[1860-9
James Wilson
and Samuel Laing, restored the financial equilibrium. The year 1860-1 closed a
long series of deficits with one of four millions; but in the following year
the drastic remedy of reducing expenditure by five millions enabled Lord
Canning to make both ends meet, and even to relieve the Indian taxpayer of the
license tax. Fortunately, the country could look forward to a period of
tranquillity, and, with the exception of small operations on the frontiers,
including Bhutan, and the Abyssinian War, the army could pile arms while the
process of military reorganisation ran its course. Lord Elgin, who relieved his
predecessor on March 12,1862, had declared his intention of pracf sing,
self-denial and of walking “in paths traced out by others ” before he shaped
his own course. That time never arrived; for he died of heart disease at
Dharmsala (November 20, 1863). Without delay, at the call of duty, John
Lawrence left England, and took over the office of Governor-General, January
12, 1864, which he held till 1869.
The
complicated task of reorganising the Indian military system could not have
fallen into better hands, strengthened as they were by the experience of his
colleague Mansfield, Commander-in-chief, and Norman, his Mii"^ary
Secretary. The difficulties were perplexing. The Mutiny and its suppression had
extinguished the native army of Bengal, and left a legacy of confusion owing to
the enlistment of irregular regiments under varying conditions. Parliament had
transferred to the service of the Crown all the European forces of the Company,
naval and military, and India could no longer recruit Europeans for her
service. But, while the naval forces ceased to exist in 1863, the officers and
soldiers of the late Company, whether artillery, infantry or cavalry, had to be
accommodated in a new military system, often as much against their own wishes
as those of the Queen’s service. It was decided that the artillery should be
almost wholly European, that of the Company being amalgamated-with the Royal
Artillery, while the proportion of Europeans to natives in infantry and cavalry
was fixed at one to two in the Bengal army, and one to three in Madras and
Bombay. The creation of a local European force being disallowed, the necessary
regiments were to be lent from home and paid for by Indian revenues. The native
army was reconstructed in Bengal, and reorganised elsewhere, the officers being
supplied from a staff corps in which they gained a step in rank according to
length of service.
Despite
financial difficulties, and the painful experience of famine gained in Orissa,
1865, the reorganisation of the army proceeded without a call to arms.
Operations were indeed required in Bhutan, whither Ashley Eden was sent on a
mission at the end of 1863. The TongSa Penlop extorted from him under duress an
engagement which Lawrence repudiated; and,before peaceful relations were
restored, the Bengal Duars, or passes into Bhutan, were annexed as a
punishment. More serious and expensive were the operations in Abyssinia, where
the Emperor Theodore,
1815-69]
153
enraged at
receiving no reply to his letter to the Queen, committed to prison Consul
Cameron and other Europeans, and finally sent the envoy Rassam to join them.
Robert Napier was entrusted with the command of an expedition of 16,000 men to
Annesley Bay; whence a force, after crossing the mountainous tracts, finally
stormed Magdala, May, 1868. The captives were recovered; Theodore killed
himself; and, despite the protests of Lawrence, Indian revenues were charged
with the cost of troops employed in a war with which India had no direct
concern.
Looking back
at the course of Indian history from 1815 to 1869, one is struck by the growth
of centripetal tendencies and the closer connexion established between London
and Calcutta. When Lord Hastings proposed a “ general league ” for the defence
of British India against the Pindaris, he was rebuked. His successors threw the
aegis of British protection over every native State, extending their treaties
even to Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and Arabia, and in later days despatched an
Indian force to Malta and to Pekin. At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the three armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay were watertight compartments of
the military system. In 1869 they were parts of one organic whole, for the
sepoys were enlisted for general service even oversea, and the European troops
were merely lent by the Crown. The royal navy had also undertaken the defence
of Indian waters. A Viceroy, aided by an enlarged Council, controlled and
overshadowed the local Governments to a degree which no Governor- General of
India, and still less a Governor-General of Bengal, had ever contemplated. With
this increased centralisation of authority in India, improved communications
gave to the home authorities ampler means for enforcing their imperial ideas.
No sooner had the East and. West been linked together, than the Governments of
India found themselves compelled to watch two currents of opinion and try to
satisfy two opposite ideals. The Mutiny had not quickened any national desire
for social reform in India, and the country at once relapsed into the
immemorial conditions produced hy the thraldom of caste, by religious
animosities, and by the strange credulity of the masses. It desired from its
alien Christian rulers nothing beyond justice and order; but with the
satisfaction of these demands Western opinion was no longer content, as it had
been in 1816, for it now began to press for the introduction of reforms and
political institutions borrowed from Europe. The transfer of government to the
Crown—with its necessary consequence of parliamentary control—was therefore an
epoch in Indian history. It directed new influences and currents of thought
upon the rulers of India, and it has placed them in the difficult position of
serving two masters, endeavouring to reconcile the impatience of Englishmen at
Westminster with the halting steps of Indian progress.
GREAT BRITAIN
AND HER COLONIES.
(1) THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY.
(1840-70.)
During this period England, by the adoption of a new
pblicy, and by endowing some of her colonies with self-government, produced a
system of imperial relations unknown to previous history, which has had the
effect of making the British Empire unlike any other political organisation in
the world. In its internal aspect the British Empire may be viewed as
comprising a most varied series of political communities, ranging from States
under absolute despotism to colonial democracies with the most extensive
self-government; from this point of view the structure has little trace of
imperial unity and every mark of local variety. But externally, as regards
other nations, the aspect was different, at any rate till 1870; till that date
the Empire was united, and presented a single and unbroken front for all
purposes of defence, for foreign policy, and, to a very large extent, even for
trade. In the first case, it was an empire in solution; in the second, an
empire in actuality. This dual aspect of the British Empire must never be
forgotten ; politically it is % hybrid, an eclectic, an antinomy; for it
combines the opposite traits, unites the contradictory systems, and reconciles
the conflicting principles of Liberty and Empire.
The causes of
the growth of this particular form of empire must be sought in the ideas of the
generation with which we deal, in the clash of different systems of political
thought and practice, and in their reconciliation by means of that English
spirit of moderation and compromise which is nowhere more characteristically
displayed than in the solution of this most complex of political problems.
Paradoxically
enough, the result of the American Revolution, though it taught England not to
impose internal taxation on her colonies, tended, in all other respects, not to
a relaxation but to a tightening of •control from the centre. The American
colonies had denied the authority of Parliament on the ground that they held
charters not from Parliament but from the Crown; to prevent such pretensions
in future,
1783-1856] Introductory.^-Lord Durham and Canada.
755
subsequent
colonial charters (like the Canada Constitutional Act of 1791) were granted not
by Order in Council but by Statute, making the control of Parliament
unassailable and supreme. In general, relations with the colonies grew closer,
and the control of their internal politics was more rigid, though, indeed, the
wiser statesmen, such as Canning, recognised that these powers were of the
arcana of the constitution, and should only be used spari igly. None the less,
his policy with reference to the slave- owning colonies in 1823, and the
abolition of colonial slavery by the second Earl Grey’s Ministry in 1833, were
remarkable, and indeed unprecedented, instances of interference in the internal
affairs of colonies by Parliament. As to the question of military defence, the
Napoleonic struggle compelled the Home Government to recognise its obligations
in a manner unknown to the days before 1783, when colonials themselves had
often undertaken to raise and maintain large forces, not only for their own
protection, but even for purposes of aggression. As some compensation for the
increase of military burdens, and reminiscent again of American difficulties,
the Home Government demanded and maintained a control of colonial trade and
commerce more rigid than of old. Thus the American revolt and the Napoleonic
struggle had tightened the mother country’s control of the colonies, alike from
the political, the economic, and the military, point of view. It will be found
that the measures taken to relax this control in these three directions
synchronise roughly with the revolution in the political system of the mother
country effected by the Reform Bill (1832), with the revolution in its
commercial system initiated by the repeal of the Navigation Laws (1825) and
culminating in the abolition of the Com Laws (1846), and with the revolution in
its military system produced by the Crimean War (1854-6).
The
relaxation of the centralised system of control over the internal politics of a
colony was first and most obviously necessitated in Canada. The general
Canadian policy of Lord Durham and his successors is elsewhere described; it is
essential here to mention the change effected by him in the relations between colony
and mother country. In this respect he found a system of rigid control by the
parent State, and left one which contained the germ of all future imperial
relations towards colonies with representative governments. In Upper and Lower
Canada, owing to the proximity of the United States, to the presence of a
French population in one province, and to the outbreak of rebellions in both
(1837-8), the Governors were likely to preach and to practise the doctrine of
imperial control in its extreme form. Sir Francis Bond Head, Governor of Upper
Canada (1836-8), even went so far as to declare that the Governor of a colony
possessing a two-chamber system, must, as the sole representative of imperial
power, be endowed with an authority which should be ultimately decisive and
supreme in everything. To a statesman of the type of Lord Durham, surveying the
problem alike
from a wider
and more thoughtful standpoint, this doctrine of “unitarian responsibility” was
untenable^ The exercise of practical absolutism on the part of the Governor was
obviously: condemned by that official’s inability to understand and to settle
all local questions on their merits.. But the interference of the local
Governor was not the only or the worst evil resulting from the existing
colonial system, for a system of rigid control meant centra' sation, and
centralisation sometimes meant the reference of even the smallest
administrative matters to the Colonial Office. In many respects the colonies
were governed from the other side of the Atlantic by a Power unable to
understand their local needs, and unable to act with the promptitude, so
needful for the development of a young country, in settling the numerous and
complicated problems of colonial administration. Thousands of miles of
intervening sea rendered speedy communication or intelligent centralised
control alike impossible. In addition to these inevitable defects in the
colonial system, as then constituted, there existed others more remediable.
Between 1827 and 1839 there had been eleven Secretaries for the Colonies and
for War, and all continuity of policy had hence disappeared. All these defects
were clear to Lord Durham—who was one of the first English statesmen to realise
the paramount importance of conciliating the local prejudices of the colonists.
That the local interests of the colonists were as important, and demanded as
much safeguarding, as the imperial interests of the mother country, was a
fundamental principle with Lord Durham.
In
elaborating his scheme for reconciling the two interests it is curious that
Durham does not seem to have drawn inspiration from previous colonial history,
or to have wished to revert to the old colonial system of semi-independence
prevalent in the New England States in the early eighteenth century. The example
of this independence was frequently quoted in England as a model for colonial
policy in the forties and fifties, but apparently did not impress Durham, whose
Report bears witness to other ideas and influences. He was certainly much
imbued with Whig traditions of liberty, and he specifically states that he
desired to see the counterpart and model of the institutions of 1688 applied to
each colony. But he had also accepted the larger and more humanitarian
interpretation given to Whig ideas by Fox, and was probably influenced by that
statesman’s famous utterance on the question of Canadian government in 1791
that “the only method of retaining distant colonies with advantage was to
enable them to govern themselves.” But Durham was not only a Whig, imbued with
the Foxite tradition of generous confidence and trust in liberty. He had been
one of the many Whigs who had studied the more logical, more unsympathetic,
but more practical creed of the Radical Utilitarian Bentham, with whom he was
on intimate terms. Beniham’s famous pamphlet, Emancipate your Colonies (1789),
had indeed laid down that colonies should be abandoned as profitless and
extravagant; but in extreme old
1839]
757
age Bentham
abandoned this view. This conversion was probably known to Lord Durham; at any
rate, he was quite aware of Bentham’s famous contention that the colonies were
chiefly of use as providing posts and patronage for our corrupt governors at
home. When a deaf and dumb peer governed Barbados; when a public official in
England drew a salary for being secretary to the Council of Jamaica, in which
island he had never set foot; when there was something more than satire in
Disraeli’s assertion—that younger sons were at times “ saved from destruction
by the friendly interposition that sends you in an official capacity to the
marsupial sympathies of Sydney or Swan River”—this charge could not be put
contemptuously aside. As a parliamentary reformer and as a member of a Ministiy
which had abolished many useless sinecures and pensions in England, Lord Durham
had had experiences of measures for destroying corruption. The remedy for
abuses of this sort, and for restoring harmony between colony and mother
country was, he believed, to establish an identity of interest between
governors and governed. If the public, as represented in the colonial
legislature, could control the colonial executive, and therefore the colonial
patronage, it would be to their interest to abolish useless and corrupt posts.
If the public in England, as represented in the Reform Parliament and
controlling the Reform Ministiy, had done this, why should not a similar system
be applied to Canada? This doctrine of establishing identity of interest
between governors and governed is derived directly from Bentham; and, together
with the generous ideas of liberty and self-government derived from Fox, seems
to have lain at the root of Durham’s peculiar system for regulating future
colonial relations with the mother country.
In his famous
Report on Canada—presented to the English Parliament on February 11,
1839—Durham advocated the establishment of a working identity of will and
interest between governors and their executive council on the one hand, and the
popular assembly on the other. Upper and Lower Canada were in future to form a
single province, with a single legislature, consisting of a legislative council
(or Upper Chamber) and a popular assembly. But he recommended that the new
relations between the Lower House of the Legislature and the Governor and his
executive should be wholly different from those previously obtaining in North
America. Not only Upper and Lower Canada, but Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, all possessed representative government:
that is to say, in each case the colony was ruled by two chambers (legislative
council and popular assembly with partial or complete financial control), and,
in each case, the Governor chose his own executive council independently of
them. The consequence had been to produce relations between executive and
legislature that were not only everywhere inharmonious, but were everywhere
threatening to the authority of the Governor, and thus, indirectly, to the
imperial connexion. The reason was that
patroftage
had been wholly controlled by the Govem6r,i in his own interests, who gave
posts to exclusive and corrupt minorities, to “ family compacts,” to hereditary
office-mongers. No attempt had been made to adjust the control of policy or
patronage, or the choice of executive Ministers, to the views of the Lower, or
popular, Chamber. The consequence had everywhere been disunion, and in the two
Canadas had resulted in actual rebellion. The only way to restore harmony and
avert separation of interests was to make the control of the popular Chamber
over the executive real and effective; with certain limitations and
reservations, the executive should be made responsible to the parliamentary
majority of the Lower House as in England; in a word, representative should be
succeeded by responsible government. In this way the interests of the executive
council, of'the majority of the popular assembly, and of the people at large,
would be bound up with maintaining the existing form of government. Durham
pointed out that the value of the control exercised by the Home Government in
the patronage or internal affairs of the colonies with representative
institutions was, in itself, trifling and not comparable to the dangers and
irritations which it provoked. At the same time, he drew a strict line between
internal and imperial affairs, defining the latter as matters concerned with
external trade, with defence. and with diplomacy. ■ Durham pledged
himself that the adoption of his system of responsible government and of his
view of the mutual obligations and privileges of mother country and colony
would lead not to separation jut to 'inity. Never was a promise more strikingly
fulfilled, or confidence more signally justified.
For the time
Durham’s doctrine of “responsible government” was strangely advanced; and the
marvel is, not that its acceptance was grudging and imperfect, but that it
found any acceptance at all. In 1840 Wellington was still advocating the Tory
view that “local responsible government (in a colony) and the sovereignty of
Great Britain were completely incompatible.” On January 16, 1838, Lord John
Russell, then leader of the Whig Ministry in the Commons, declared that “if the
Executive were to be named by the popular assembly of a colony, he could not
conceive what was to become of the orders of the Imperial Government and the
Colonial Governor.” Early in 1839 he was still holding the same views, and it
is still something of a mystery how he and the rest of the Cabinet were
converted to the views expressed in his despatches to Lord Sydenham (Durham’s
successor in Canada) on September 7. and 15, and October 14, 1839. In the first
place, Lord John, now Secretary for the Colonies and for War, made it quite
clear that abuses of patronage, in so far as they emanated from Governor or
Home Government, in representatively governed colonies, must cease. “
Responsible government ” was a vague term and one liable to misinterpretation,
but “ Durham’s practical views of colonial government ” might be adopted in
Canada. The executive was to conform to public opinion
1839-46] Metcalfe's difficulties in Canada.—Earl
Grey. 759
and endeavour
to be in harmony with the popular assembly; at the same time cases were
conceivable where the imperil Government might have to interfere in internal
matters in a colony; and in all imperial matters—concerning “the honour of the
Crown and the unity of the Empire ”—the Governor must take orders, not from the
local legislature but from the Home Government. These instructions do not seem
entuely in harmony with Durham’s views-r—they were, in fact, perhaps
intentionally ambiguous; in any case, the disturbed state of the country did
not allow his successor, Lord Sydtnham, to realise them to the full. That
opportunity first came under Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe,, who was Governor
from 1843 to 1845, and who tactlessly at once raised the questions which Durham
had hoped to settle for ever. A quarrel; between him and’ his : executive
council over a question of patronage led to their retirement (1843)j, As they were supported by a majority
of the1,Assembly, the identity of interest between “governors and
governed” was dissolved. Metcalfe formed another Ministry and, by a timely
dissolution of the Lower House (1844), secured a majority in a new assembly.
Unfortunately for him, he had earned the permanent hostility of one great party
in the State, had dissociated the personal views and authority of the Governor
from those of his council, and had thus directed the whole fury of
parliamentary opposition not only against the Governor, but against the
imperial connexion which he represented. Not perhaps unnaturally, the same
difficulties confronted Lord (Falkland, the Lieutenant-Governor in Nova Scotia
in 1846. Though the ambiguities of Lord John’s instructions to Sydenham had
justified both Metcalfe and Falkland, it was clear, from the irritation aroused
in both .colonies, that actions such as theirs might seriously endanger the
imperial, connexion.
In 1846 Lord
John Russell became Prime Minister, and the third Earl Grey, a man of
comprehensive intellect and Liberal views, had the Colonies entrusted to his
care. He quickly grasped the situation, saw that the pursuit of a personal
policy by the Governor strained colonial loyalty, and resolved, from
henceforth, to shroud the individuality of the Governor behind that of his
Ministers. His instructions to the new Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia, Sir
John Harvey, (November 3, 1846) interpret “ responsible government ” to mean
that a change must take place in the position of the Governor. He is to be
transformed from a benevolent autocrat into a presentable likeness of a
constitutional king. Transfer of power from one party to another in the colony
was to be made to appear as the result of the wishes of the people themselves;
the executive council was not to be changed arbitrarily, but only when it was
perfectly cleftr that they did not enjoy the confidence of the legislature. The
Governor was not to identify himself with any particular party, and was, in
general, to act the part of mediator or moderator between extremes. The power
to forbid certain acts of the
760 Elgin in Canada.—Australia. New Zealand.
[1847-9
colonial
executive in matters of high imperial interest was indeed recognised, but it
was to be exerted “sparingly,” and only on matters of “ very grave concern.”
The general
spirit of these instructions was carefully inculcated on Lord Elgin, before he
left England to assume the government of Canada in January, 1847. How wisely he
executed them, how carefully he divested his governorship of all traces of
personal policy, and avoided opposition to his executive or to the dominant
party in the Assembly, is told elsewhere. In the matter of the Indemnity Bill
of 1849, he sided with the dominant party—an action which was very unpopular in
the mother country. He refused to make use of his power of veto, although the
slightest deviation from strict justice might have enabled him to interpret the
question as one of imperial concern. At the same time, though Lord Elgin
conformed to the will of the majority of the Assembly in a way unknown to past
colonial history, it must be admitted that his actual influence was more
dominant and direct than that of the modem colonial Governor. Under the
direction of Earl Grey, colonial Governors, in Canada and elsewhere, took
advantage of their position to induce their advisers to institute most valuable
reforms, such as the creation of municipal institutions and of extensive local
government, the promotion of systems of education, and also—which was perhaps
even more important—the institution of a permanent civil service and the
consequent destruction of the immediate possibility of the corruption of
political life through an extensive spoils system. But, even in these cases,
the reforms were secured by the exertion of unofficial influence. There can be
little doubt that, from the point of view of political control of the
self-governing colonies, Grey and Elgin together realised to the full, and for
the first time, the inner meaning of Durham’s contention that the establishment
of identity of interest between governors and governed was the true means of
reconciling local responsibility in the colonies with imperial unity.
The course
that was pursued by Earl Grey in Canada was systematically imitated elsewhere.
Colonies, such as the Cape of Good Hope, under almost autocratic Governors with
Councils, or colonies, such as Nova Scotia, with representative governments,
were gradually prepared for full responsible government in the Canadian sense.
The preliminary stage of probation was sometimes rather long, and, alike in
Australia and New Zealand, the Home Government committed some serious errors
and drew on itself rather unmerited opprobrium. The main principle, in these
and in other colonial constitutions of the period, appears to have been to
train imperfectly developed colonies for full responsible government, by giving
them various forms of transitional government during a period of probation. In
principle the idea was sound enough; but it obviously gave opportunity to misrepresentation,
as well as to a good deal of vexatious or unnecessary interference by the Home
Government.
It is not, however, fair to criticise Earl Grey’s colonial policy on the lines
of the contemporary accusation that he desired to interfere with the purely
local administration of colonies. The instances adduced to support the charge
were drawn from colonies in a transitional stage of development, not from those
which, like Canada, were in full enjoyment of responsible government. In the
fourteen years between 1846 and 1860 five colonies in British North America and
six in Australasia received responsible government—and the movement towards it
had, in all cases, been greatly aided, and in some expressly sanctioned, by the
policy of Earl Grey. It is true indeed that he declared that a departure from
rules of strict justice towards a class or individuals might compel imperial
interference in the local affairs of a self-governing colony. But his hearty
approval of Elgin’s action in the matter of the Indemnity Laws shows within
what extremely narrow limits this interference was to be confined. Further, the
complete abrogation by the imperial Government, during the fifties and
sixties, of rights of control over the State (or Crown) lands and over the land
policy of self-governing colonies not only made it clear that the Home
Government was determined to deal generously with them, but set the final seal
upon its policy of entrusting local affairs to the local governments. In only
one respect—with regard to native races who might be ill-treated by the laws or
administration of a colony—was the interference of the Home Government
continuous. But, though England’s enthusiasm for the abolition of the
slave-trade rendered this intervention for a time inevitable, it gradually
ceased towards the end of the period. Earl Grey interfered on behalf of the
negroes in a colony with representative government like Jamaica, and in his
Constitution Act for New Zealand (1852) he separated the natives from colonial
control and placed them directly under the Crown. The singular lack of success,
which had already befallen the imper ial riterference in native affairs in
South Africa, attended it also in New Zealand and induced the repeal of this
provision in 1864. About the same time such rights of interference, on behalf
of the natives, were tacitly dropped in other colonies with responsible
government. These rights were, however, seldom specifically withdrawn; and, as
late as 1885, Bechuanaland (which, on its acquisition, might naturally have
been annexed to Cape Colony) was directly controlled by the Crown. The
privilege of royal veto on local acts of colonial legislatures was never
abrogated during this period, and might conceivably have been used for
specific acts relating to natives, after the general principle of direct
imperial control had been withdrawn. It was applied also in cases which
involved international affairs, as in 1877, when a Queensland measure—imposing
a special fee on Chinese gold- mjners—was disallowed on the ground
“that exceptional legislation, calculated to exclude from any part of Her
Majesty’s dominions the subjects of a State at peace with Her Majesty, is
highly objectionable.”
The limits of
the political control to be exercised by the mother country had thus been
decided by the fulfilment of Durham’s ideas; but in the question of her
economic control the eventual solution was in direct contradiction to his view.
The control of the external trade of the colonies, which had played so
important a part in the American revolt, had been even more jealously reserved
by the Home Government after 1783. In 1819 Goulburn, speaking for the Ministry,
declared that the colonies received full compensation for any hardship which
this system might inflict, in the military.protection;afforded them by the
mother country. Under Huskisson and Canning the repeal of the most important of
the Navigation Laws (1825), ,and the establishment of differential dues in
favour; of the colonies and against foreign countries, and of a relation
intended to be of. mutual benefit and obligation between the mother country and
the colonies, breathed a more enlightened spirit. But commercial policy
towards the colonies vacillated in subsequent years;. and Lord John Russell, on
January 16, 1838, reasserted most rigidly the doctrine of Goulburn and the
right of the mother country “ to compel a colony to receive [her] produce, and
a right to, restrict that colony in its commerce with other nations.” Durham
expressly supported this view, and the principle was freely admitted by. John
Howe, the Nova Scotia publicist and statesman, then one of the strongest
champions of responsible government for the colonies in its most extended
sense. The dangers likely to result from such control of colonial commerce by
the mother country were not as yet apparent to responsible statesmen, and the
commercial independence of the colonies was established in deference to the
dictates not of a political, but of an economic, philosbphy.
In 1843 a
circular from Lord Stanley prohibited the imposition of differential dues by
one colony against another; and, in repealing the Com Laws in 1846, Peel
abolished the differential dues in favour of the colonies, and placed colonial
and foreign com on precisdy the same footing. The principle, of which this
measure was the most important example, was carried to its logical outcome by
Earl Grey, Secretary for the Colonies and for War (1846-52), an ardent Free
Trader. Measures were carried for the alteration of the duties on coffee, sugar,
and timber, and for the complete repeal of the Navigation Laws (1846-9): which
last measure threw open the colonial coasting trade and severed the last link
in the old commercial system. The sudden cessation of all differential dues or
preferences to the colonies temporarily disorganised their trade, and inflicted
considerable immediate losses on Canada and the sugar colonies. Their
assemblies resented the loss most keenly and expressed open regret for the fall
of the old system. Had their political selfconsciousness been more developed,
their sense of nationality1 more mature, the imperial connexion
would probably have been seriously endangered.
1
The following Memorandum from the Executive Council of Canada to Lord Elgin
(May 12, 1848) reveals how little the idea of nationality was realised by the
For the
moment the tumult subsided. Power was given to the colonial legislatures to
abolish differential dues, and strong pressure was used by the Home Government
to induce them to do so. The Constitutional Act of Australia in 1850 contained
provisions forbidding the imposition of all differentia] dues whatsoever
between different colonies, or between colonies and mother country—provisions
which were modified in 1873, but which, in a less rigid form, continued to
testify to Earl Grey’s ideas of colonial policy till their repeal in 1895. In
the case of New Brunswick, which instituted a bounty on hemp, Lord Grey,
finding that he could not prevail by advice or persuasion, ratified the
specific measure in question, but declared that in future all similar measures
imposing differential dues would be vetoed. He was not prepared to “ abdicate
the power or duty of regulating the commercial policy of the whole empire.”
Earl
Grey carried his points with several other- colonies, and thus imposed upon the
empire a general policy of obligatory Free Trade. The new economic system was,
on the whole, an improvement on the old, but there lurked in it a considerable
element of danger* inasmuch as it was perfectly possible to conceive of cases
in which a given colony might think itself injured by such a policy, and might
regard its commercial interests as different from those of the mother country.
It could not be expected that colonial assemblies would always submit, as the
Canadian legislature had submitted in 1846, to the mother country in this
matter; and the raising of such a question was particularly langerous because
the Home Government’s interference with the tariff of a colony might be
construed into indirect interference with the assemblies’ rights of internal
taxation. But, as the adoption of the commercial principles of Free Trade had
opened up this dangerous dispute, so it was to be closed by the wider political
principles which it brought with it. ’
. The old
Benthamite contention of the worthlessness of the colonies oegan to revive, and
some Free Traders argued that, if the colonies were no longer valuable for
their commercial advantages to the mother country, they might as well be
abandoned. One result of this view was to produce a decline of interest in the
colonies, and an unduly low estimate of their importance. This, no doubt, had
the effect of inducing Earl Grey’s successors to abandon his system of
enforcing a uniform commercial policy on the empire. When Canada imposed a
tariff of distinctly protective character in 1859, the Duke of Newcastle, then
Colonial Secretary, contented himself with ineffectual remonstrance. In reply
the Canadian Finance Minister, Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt, vigorously denied
the right of the imperial Government to interfere in the adjust-
colonies
before 1870. It refers to the Welland Canal and other public works— “as a
series,of undertakings which would do honour to the enterprise and industry of
a nation, it was hoped for the colony” etc.
ment of their
tariffs, on the ground that they were matters of internal concern. Of this
action Lord Grey expressed strong disapproval; but his protest was not
generally upheld, and from this time forward the fiscal independence of
self-governing colonies was definitively acknowledged and all attempts at
authoritative interference by the Home Government ceased. Henceforward,
however, the principle that the Home Government had a right to be treated as
the most favoured nation in all commercial treaties which the colonies might
make, has always been upheld.
The limit of
the political and commercial control to be exercised by the mother country had
now been settled—thare remained that of military control; and on the solution
of this problem, as of the two others, was based the new conception of imperial
policy as a whole. Though the Colonies contributed something towards their
military defence, the imperial Government bore the greatest part of the
expense, and men like Cobden, Roebuck, Molesworth, Gladstone, and Lowe bewailed
the enormous and increasing burdens entailed by these costly establishments. It
was pointed out, with great force, that, wherever representative governments
prevailed, the colonies had reduced imperial expenses and raised local
militias, and that self-defence was the corollary of selfgovernment. Such a
policy, it was contended, far from dissolving would actually strengthen the
imperial bond, and weighty strategic arguments backed these political and
economic contentions, when the Crimean War compelled the revision of England’s
system of military defence. The numerous commissions on colonial expenditure
and defence which sat between 1848 and 1862 united in recognising that the
empire as a whole was best defended, not by a diffusion of force in many
isolated spots, but by concentration at a few strategic centres.
The decision
to reduce or withdraw a large number of colonial garrisons was accordingly
carried out in the years 1862-70; military establishments were oiily retained
in such places as the necessities of the empire as a whole might, require.
Although the supreme direction of military policy was retained by the Home
Government, the new arrangement increased the responsibility without
diminishing the loyalty of the colonies. Similarly, the right of the imperial
Government to appoint Governors to each colony, and to control all intematidnal
and diplomatic relations, was not seriously questioned during this period, cho
jh there were signs that, in the latter respect, ideas were changing.’
In reviewing
the whole question of imperial policy towards the colonies during 1840-70 it is
well to enquire how far the prospect of separation between Grecit Britain and
her dependencies was really an object of practical political discussion.
Colonial opinion, so far as it can be gathered, though often resenting
interference from Downing Street, was nearly always sensible of the enormous
advantages of the imperial connexion. In England, as late as 1850, Lord John
Russell declared that,
though he
believed that England gained by her colonial connexion, there might come a time
when such advantage would cease and their independence become necessary. But
no one was more resolute than Lord John in maintaining the imperial connexion
at the existing time, and for so long as it would reasonably last. Such seems
also to have been the attitude of Sir James Graham, though he opposed
expansion, and thought colonies only of advantage as commercial or military
centres. One responsible statesman in 1852 certainly used expressions which
suggested that the colonies were useless encumbrances; another as late as 1867
advocated the policy of giving them self-government, with a view to preparing
them for complete independence. Yet the necessity and possibility of retaining
the colonies by a wise policy of conciliation and liberality was urged by
statesmen so different in view, calibre, and predilections, as Grey, Durham,
Molesworth, Charles Buller, Gibbon Wakefield, Lowe, and Gladstone. The way in
which this view aflected all parties, though in different ways, is best
illustrated in the evolution of the political opinions of Gladstone. In his
early days, as representative of the high Tories, he advocated retention of the
colonies even at the cost of sacrifices to the mother country, on the ground
that they were “an integral part of the empire”; later, under the influence of
the ideas of Liberalism and Free Trade, he advocated the extension of the
largest powers of self-government to the colonies, on the ground that liberty
of self-government would in reality produce unity of imperial interest. It was
indeed, perhaps, not altogether an accident that the first principles of
colonial self-government were enunciated by Bentham, who began by proposing to
abandon the political control of the mother country; that they were advocated
by Durham, who proposed to retain complete economic sovereignty, and put into
practice by Grey and Newcastle, one of whom supported obligatory Free Trade,
while the other stood for complete fiscal independence. The resultant
compromise of principle and ideal was not heroic, was not logical, was hardly
even intelligible; none the less, it has proved eminently practicable in its
results. Moreover, the immediate results of the new policy were striking.
British North America as a whole was infinitely more prosperous and more loyal
to the mother country in 1870 than in 1840.
Sir George
Comewall Lewis, a Whig statesman of eminently judicial mind, in composing, in
1841, an academic treatise on the Government of Dependencies could not conceive
how the sovereignty of the, mother country could be reconciled with the
self-government of the dependency. There can be little doubt that his deduction
was correct, and that, in theory, the problem was insoluble. The mother country
has never disavowed her supremacy and remains legally sovereign throughout the
empire, but the political or de facto sovereignty has passed, in the case of
self-governing colonies, to. the legislature or people of. the colony itself.
This new conception of the position and relations of Great
766 Idealism of colonial policy.—Canada. , -[i840
Britain and
her colonies could hardly have developed save by judicious compromises of
principle between the warring interests and parties. The Tory idea of retention
at all costs, the Whig idea of political liberty but of commercial control, the
Free Trade idea of commercial freedom, all mingled together. The Tory abandoned
the theory that local responsibility and imperial unity were incompatible; the
Whig abandoned commercial control; the Free Traders, like Sir William
Molesworth, who believed in the possibility of retention, abstained from
pushing their ideas to their extreme limit and allowing the colonies to appoint
their own Governors, without reference to the mother, country.
In
conclusion, it is important to note that the question was not finally settled
on purely economic grounds, on the lines of profit and loss, as has sometimes
been asserted. The two men who—at the most critical period—realised the
difficulties and set themselves to solve them, were both inspired by idealism.
Grey, regarding the matter from its imperial aspect, declared that, though he
did believe England gained both morally and materially by retention of the
colonies, yet the colonies gained so much from her that the necessity of
retaining them was a matter of duty and obligation. Elgin, looking to the more
purely colonial aspect, saw the future possibility of a union from which both
parties might derive benefit. Though the practical measures were undertaken by
these two men, it is well not to forget the statesman, to whose influence and
ideas they owed so much. And perhaps Durham himself, had he been praised for
the originality of his ideas, might have replied that not he but Bentham and
Fox—names not usually associated with imperial unity—were the real inspirers of
his famous Report, and the true legislators for generations yet unborn.
(2) THE FEDERATION OF CANADA.
Lord Durham’s
Report—which has been justly termed the most valuable document in the English
language on the subject of colonial policy—marks the line of cleavage in the
treatment of Canada. It was written with the help of facts and statistics which
Buller, Wakefield, Turton, and other able lieutenants accumulated, but its
constructive aspects and its conclusions were the work of the great statesman
who died, baffled and discredited, in 1840. It came as a revelation of the
actual condition of the country to the public men of England, and it overthrew
the autocratic traditions and high-handed procedure of the Colonial Office at
the beginning of the Victorian era. It vindicated the only just principle of
authority, and laid the foundation of, responsible government. It took a large
and generous view of England’s responsibilities, and, beyond everything else,
it was inspired with the passion of patriotism; Durham’s successor, Lord
Sydenham, built wisely and well during his unhappily short career in Canada on
the foundations of his great
predecessor;
and the Act of Union, which became law in 1840, was itself a vindication of
Durham’s policy, as well as a substantial measure of justice to Canada. It
provided for the union of Upper and Lower Canada, with one legislative council
and one legislative assembly. The former was to consist of not less than twenty
members nominated by the Crown, and the second of eighty-four
representatives—forty-two from each province—elected by popular suffrage. It
was the beginning of a new epochs the concession of the right of the people,
though with limitations, to control their own affairs. The new machinery of
government did not always run easily. The old order had changed; but old
traditions died hard. Durham and Sydenham were exceptional men; they laid down
great principles, they had broad ideas of statesmanship, they had generosity
and moral vision. They were followed by men of less political sagacity; it
would be unjust to say of less sincerity. Sir Charles Bagot during his
short-lived tenure of power, from 1842 to 1843, in spite of antecedents
scarcely reassuring, acted consistently on the principle that the majority,
without respect of race, had the right to rule under the new Constitution. He
was succeeded by Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe in 1843 (created Lord Metcalfe
in 1845), and the latter by the Earl of Cathcart in 1846. Neither of them was a
conspicuous success, nor showed any real grasp of the political situation.
Metcalfe, though personally popular, was too much inclined to insist on his own
prerogative and was thus brought into conflict with the representative
assembly. Cathcart was a stiff old soldier, who was appointed when a war with
the United States seemed imminent, and was recalled when the cloud vanished.
Lord Elgin,
who succeeded in 1847, was Durham’s son-in-law, and came to Canada impressed
with the magnitude of the task over which his wife’s father had broken his
heart. The charming personality of Lady Elgin, who as a girl had been in Canada
with her father, the knowledge common to all classes of the community that
Durham had been unjustly treated, gave Elgin an opportunity which he amply
redeemed. He was himself an open-minded, capable, far-seeing statesman, who
knew well how to take occasion by the hand; and his career in the colony is one
of the brightest chapters in her annals. Elgin was not possessed of the genius
or the personal magnetism of Durham; but he was not so high-handed, or so
impulsive, and he proved himself to be the best ruler that Canada had known
since Durham quitted her shores. He set himself with guiet determination to
develop the resources of the country, to settle old grievances, to bring about
that condition of public affairs without which any real and substantial
progress was impossible. His policy in Canada was, in the best sense of the
term, enlightened. He settled the Clergy Reserves question, which had long been
a bone of contention. He allayed the jealousy of Upper Canada against the
sister province on the old question of the disloyalty of the French Canadians
768 Achievements of Elgin.—His successors.
[i847-68
at the period
of the Rebellion, and succeeded in passing a Bill of Indemnification. His wise
attitude did much to discredit the dangerous movement in Canada for annexation
to the United States. Imperial nominees had previously filled the chief places
in the Civil Service, but under Lord Elgin a great change in this respect was
made possible by the absolute control over the Civil List conceded to the
Canadian Government in 1847. One of the most useful achievements of his
administration was the Seigneurial Tenure Act of 1854, which abolished one of
the chief grievances in Lower Canada by liberating the land from a complicated
survival of feudalism imported from France under the arwien regime. Elgin came
to Canada in 1847 with the reputation of a just man; he left it in 1854 with
that of a popular and saga jus ruler. He took a bold and independent course,
and during his tenure of power nothing was more sharply criticised than his
announcement, in 1849, of the Royal assent to the measure entitled: “ An Act to
provide for the indemnification of parties in Lower Canada whose properties
were destroyed during the Rebellion in 1837-8.” Many prominent politicians in
Upper Canada, both of the Conservative and Reform parties, raised the cry of “
No pay to rebels ”; and some of them went so far as to urge annexation to the
United States if such a subsidy was granted. Lord Elgin had the courage to
stand firm. He took his stand on the fact that the measure had passed both
Houses by large majorities, and he refused to make a distinction, in this
respect, between Upper and Lower Canada, or, by reserving the measure to throw
on the imperial Government a responsibility, which he justly claimed, “ought to
rest with the Governor-General of Canada.” By his courageous action at this
crisis Lord Elgin won the sympathies of the French Canadians, and effectually
prevented Lower Canada from falling, for the second time, into the mischievous
hands of Papineau. Elgin strengthened the links which bound the colony to the
mother country; and, besides settling the knotty problem of land tenure in
Lower Canada, he helped to repeal the Navigation Laws, and thus gave a stimulus
to the shipping and trade of the colony. In 1854, the year in which Lord F.Igin
relinquished his authority, a reciprocity treaty was concluded between Canada
and the United States, which determined the commercial relations of the two
countries until 1866. The reciprocity treaty was the crowning achievement of
Lord Elgin’s administration, and his own share in bringing it about was so great
that it deserves to be recorded. This measure was of the utmost commercial
importance not merely to Upper and Lower Canada, but to all the maritime
provinces.
Lord Elgin
was succeeded by Sir Edmund Head, who remained Governor-General until 1861,
when Lord Monck became his successor; the latter resigned office in 1868, but
not before the great scheme of Confederation had become an accomplished fact.
Canada under Sir Edmund Head continued to make substantial progress both in a
political
and in a
material sense, and, despite sharp conflicts of opinion, the Constitution was
settled on an elective,basis., The colony became alive to the principle that
the, privileges and burdeins of freedom were inseparable. The first volunteer
force was organised, and the Royal Canadian regiment was added to the British
army, while,, during the crisis of the War in the Crimea, the colony showed
practical. sympathy with the English nation by sending through the legislature
not mer,ely congratulations on military victories, but substantial help for the
relief of the widows and orphans of soldiers who had fallen in the struggle.
The Act of Union (1840) had decreed that the Upper House or Legislative Council
should be nominated by the Crown;, but, as will be seen, it was determined in
1867 that the members of this responsible body should be chosen by the vote of
the electors of the whole colony. It is a curious fact that in 1864 the Quebec
Conference, composed of thirty-three leading representatives of every shade of
political thought in Canada and the maritime provinces, unanimously resolved
that the Upper House or Senate should be appointed by the Crown. One important
question was settled by a direct appeal to the Queen. The expansion of the
colony made a new seat of government not merely desirable but imperative. Five
cities were competitors for the honour, and the Queen selected Bytown, then an
obscure place, the Ottawa of to-day. There the Legislative buildings were
erected and the government offices concentrated. Ottawa, known in early days as
“ Westminster in the wilderness/1 is now a flourishing city, and the
wisdom of the selection of such a site has been fully justified. Canada, at
that time, had no connexion by rail with the maritime provinces and was, during
half the year, dependent upon the United States for communication with England.
Trade was paralysed and credit ruined. Lord Monck was confronted by a political
situation which might have spelt disaster to a less capable man. Parties were
so closely divided that neither side could obtain a working majority. Three
dissolutions occurred in two years, and good government became impossible. Lord
Monck acted at this juncture with strict impartiality; he interpreted the
duties of .his position in a constitutional spirit, and was neither; to be
flattered nor coerced into partisanship. The result was that a coalition took
place between men like .Cartier, Macdonald, and Tache, who represented the
jQonservative party, and Brown, McDougall, and Mowat, typical leaders of public
opinion in, Upper Canada. The coalition Government took office in 1864,
committed to the policy of a federal union of all the colonies, or, if that
could not be accomplished, of Upper and Lower Canada. The movement towards
closer union had already taken definite shape in the maritime provinces, before
the coalition Government in Canada had come into power, pledged to this very
policy. Before the alliance of the two political parties in Canada, Dr
(afterwards Sir Charles) Tupper, then Prime Minister of Nova Scotia, organised
a conference of public men in that province with responsible
representatives
from New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island to consider the desirability of
legislative union. In advocating this policy, Tupper expressed the hope that
the movement, which was thus begun, would lead eventually to a confederation of
the whole of British North America. It was felt by men of all parties that the
state of perpetual Ministerial crisis, chronic discord, and sectional
jealousies must cease, if Canada was to prove worthy of the splendid
opportunities presented by an ever expanding territoiy, and the steady growth,
not merely of the population, but of the resources and public spirit of the
country.
The final
phase in the movement toward Confederation began in 1864, both in Upper and
Lower Canada and in the maritime provinces. In June of that year a Committee of
the Legislative Assembly appointed to consider the administration of public
affairs reported in favour of “changes in the direction of a federal system,” applied
either to Canada alone or to the whole of the British North American provinces.
In September, 1864, the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince
Edward Island sent delegates, who assembled at Charlottetown to devise measures
for a legislative union' of the three provinces. As soon as the new coalition
Government heard of the conference at Charlottetown, the admirable decision was
made to send a delegation of which the principal members were Macdonald, Brown,
Cartier, McGill, and Galt, to bring before the Assembly the much greater
question of the union of all the provinces. The delegates of the Canadian
Government were corjially received at the Charlottetown Conference, and, after
a full discussion of a federal union of all the British North American
provinces, it was decided to hold a Conference at Quebec to advance this end
under the sanction of the imperial Government. The desire for union by this
time was widespread. The Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince
Edward Island were quifck to recognise that union spelt strength, whilst the
British of Ontario and the French of Quebec were not less eager to secure
political autonomy and the power to settle local controversies originating in
conflicting laitfs, customs, traditions, and eligion. After an interval of six
weeks, which was full of political activity throughout British North America,
thirty-three delegates representing all parts of the country met at Quebec on
October 10,1864, with full authority to thresh out the matter. The Quebec
Convention sat in private for eighteen days, and the outcome of the discussion
of the thirty-three public men who composed it—they represented all shades of
opinion—was an elaborate document of seventy-two resolutions which was
subsequently submitted to the imperial Government, and became the foundation of
the Act of Union. Despite a good deal of opposition to some of its decisions
both in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, especially those which related to
finance, the Quebec Convention of October, 1864, nevertheless marked a new
departure in the annals of Canada.
Confederation
was now clearly in view. The Canadian Legislature
in
the summer of 1865 adopted addresses to the Queen, in which were detailed
proposals for the great constitutional reform on which the heart of the
majority of the people of Canada was clearly set. This was followed by a‘
Conference in London (December, 1866) of delegates from Canada, Nova Scotia,
and New Brunswick, but not from Prince Edward Island. The Quebec resolutions,
especially those which related to finance, were modified to meet the objections
raised in the maritime provinces, but no other substantial change in the
original scheme was adopted. To the last, those who wished, for various
reasons, to keep Canada disunited, some of whom were Republicans at heart, and
in favour not of a union of the provinces but of annexation by the United
States, made their voice heard. The “ people’s delegates ”—for so those who
opposed the Union styled themselves—came to London in the wake of the
responsible representatives of Canada, and did their best to make mischief. Hie
Earl of Carnarvon, an enlightened and far-seeing statesman, was happily at that
time Colonial Secretary; and, so soon as the final details had bee: settled by
the London Conference, he introduced the historic measure, founded on the
resolutions of the Quebec Convention, to the House of Lords on February 17,
1867. It was called an “Act for the Union and Government of Canada, Nova
Scotia, and New Brunswick; and for purposes connected therewith.” It passed
rapidly through both Houses of Parliament, received the Queen’s assent on March
29 as the British North America Act, 1867, and came into force on July 1, as
the law of the Dominion of Canada. It was at first proposed, at the suggestion
of Sir John Alexander Macdonaldj to call the United Provinces the Kingdom of
Canada. But this was overruled by the Earl of Derby, on the ground that such a
title might ruffle the political sensibilities— which at that time were in a somewhat
exasperated condition, both towards England and Canada—of the United States.
The British North America Act, 1867, thus brought about a federal union between
the old Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and at
the same time made provision for the ultimate inclusion into the newly
constituted Dominion of Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, British Columbia,
Rupert’s Land, and the great, and at that period ill-defined, territories of
the North-West.
•
Since
Confederation brought about a new era in Canada, the constitutional changes
which it effected require to be broadly indicated. The basis of the new
Constitution was the control of the general affairs of the country by the
Dominion Parliament now called into existence. There were, however, two
exceptions to this rule. One was the paramount authority of the Crown, as
represented by the Governor-General, and the control of all naval and military
forces by the Crown. The other was the authority given, within strictly defined
limits, to the provincial legislatures for the management and sale of public
lands within their area; for the regulation of railways, public
works,;charitable
and municipal
institutions; for the administration of justice; and, though with a proviso for
the protection of religious minorities, for the advancement of education. The
provincial legislatures were also given the power to make laws concerning,
agriculture and immigration within their own area, but with the express
stipulation that no measures of this kind were to conflict with the enactments
of; the Canadian Parliament. The Provinces, in short, were made subjfect to
the Federal Government rather than to imperial authority. No Province, in other
words, could make laws which imperilled the general interests of the Dominion
as interpreted by the Canadian Parliament. If any Province exceeded the lawful
bounds of its own jurisdiction, or asserted a principle or preferred a claim
imperilling the interests of any other portion of the Dominion, or those of the
Confederation as a whole, the Court of appeal ■ was not the imperial
Parliament, but the Governor-General acting in concert with a Dominion
Ministry. It remains to state what in reality is more important, the outlines
of the scheme of confederation. The broad principles of the Act of 1867
provided the framework of a Constitution; avowedly based on that of the United
Kingdom, liberally interpreted in the light of modem conditions and local
requirements, The task of government, under the supreme authority of the Crown,
was delegated to the Governor-General, the newly, constituted Privy Council of
Canada, the Cabinet, the Senate, and the House of Commons. The Governor-General
holds office for five years, and is vested with executive powers. He represents
the authority of the Crown, subject to the advice of the Cabinet, With him
rests the appointment of the Governors of the provinces and the judges of the
supreme Courts. No Act of the Dominion Parliament can become law without his
assent* and he alone can disallow the sentence of a Court of, justice.] He has
the virtual command of all the military and naval forces of the Dominion, and,
acts, in concert with a Cabinet of responsible Ministers, in all matters
relating to the general administration. , The Cabinet consists of members of
the Privy Council selected from either the Senate or the House of Commons. The
Premier sits in either Chamber, and allots the various departments of
Government to his colleagues.
The Senate
consists of members appointed for life, nominated by the Crown, or in reality
by the Governor-General in Council. They must be British subjects, and live
within the province for which they are; gjepted, and they must possess private
means. They constitute— thejr number , is. at present 83—the nearest approach
in Canada to the House of Lords. The House of Commons is elected for a maximum
period, of five years by a popular vote under,a uniform franchise for the whole
Dominion except the North-West Territories. It consists at the present time of
214 members. Both senators and members of the House of Commons receive salaries
and travelling expenses, but unless illness is. proved deductions axe made pro
rata in the case of absentees.
Measures of
any kind can be introduced in either Chamber, except proposals in regard to
finance which must originate in the Commons, to which Chamber no senator is
eligible. All questions which affect the Dominion collectively are determined
by the Federal Parliament at Ottawa. It settles all matters of public debt and
property, taxation, customs and excise, currency, banking laws, the postal
service, the military and naval defence of the country, navigation, fishing
rights, criminal law, patents and copyright, marriage and divorce, questions of
naturalisation of the aliens, Indian reserves, the taking of the census, and in
a word all laws which touch and control the general life of the community. The
apprehension was expressed, even by responsible statesmen, when the terms of
confederation were under discussion in the imperial Parliament, that the
British North America Act of 1867 was an attempt to reconcile conflicting
ideals. It was deemed hazardous to link monarchical institutions to so bold an
adoption of federal principles. If the Constitution' bf Canada represents a
compromise between the authority of the Crown and the supremacy of democratic
liberty, the new departure has admittedly worked well. Provincial jealousies
have dwindled to vanishing point; racial antipathies no longer imperil the
prosperity of the Dominion; religious animosities have lost their mischievous
power in a new atmosphere of common justice and toleration. Canada, as the
direct outcome of Confederation, has grown strong, prosperous, energetic. The
unhappy divisions which prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
and which darkened with actual revolt and bloodshed the dawn of the Victorian
era, are now only a memory. The links which bind the Dominion to Great Britain
may on paper seem slight, but they are resistless. Imperial federation has still
great tasks to accomplish within our widely scattered Imperial domains, but its
success in Canada may be accepted as the pledge of its triumph elsewhere.
Canada is a nation within the Empire, and in Kipling’s phrase is “daughter in
her mother’s house, and mistress in her own.” The ruling idea of Confederation
and the principle, which has made it in an ever broadening sense successful,
was the concession to the Dominion as a whole of the right of self-government,
and the preservation at the same time to each province of a sufficient measure
of local independence. In one important respect, apart from the paramount
authority of the Crown in Canada, the new Constitution of the Dominion differed
from that of the American Commonwealth. In the United States new problems,
which at the time were unforeseen, but which afterwards arose, were left not to
the Federal Government but to the sovereign States of the Union. Exactly the
opposite course was pursued in Canada, where all undelegated authority was left
to the Federal Government. This, perhaps inevitably, led in earlier years to
friction between the Dominion Parliament and the provincial legislatures, with
the result that the former sometimes claimed the right to intervene and at
other times refused to do so, acting in both
instances on
the principle of the general good of the whole community. Happily, almost every
possible conflict of authority between the Federal and provincial Governments
has been determined either by friendly compromise or judicial decision.
One great
result of Confederation apart from material advantages—; these were many,
instant, and sprang up in every direction—was the evolution of a common
sentiment, to which all things were possible. After Confederation Canada saw
its own destiny, in Lord Strathcona’s phrase, as “first of the new nations
within the Empire,” and out of this grew loyal devotion to the Crown, a new
sense of citizenship j and with it the gradual adoption of a Canadian policy
sympathetic with Imperial ideals, yet exempt from the old racial jealousy and
the bitterness of a house divided against itself. Confederation did not settle
by a stroke of the pen all the difficulties of Canada; but it made a settlement
of them possible by the creation of a new political atmosphere, and gave fresh
and almost unbounded possibilities of both moral and material progress, and
loyalty to a new system of government which the people of the Dominion, with
few exceptions, realise to be at once conservative and progressive. Confederation
placed the basis of representation on population—a notable advance on the
hard-and-fast system of 1841, which gave the same number of representatives to
both Upper and Lower Canada. Then, the balance of the population was with the
French ; in the next decade, the flowing tide; of emigration shifted the
numerical advantage from Quebec to Ontario, and with every year which passed
until Confederation was accomplished the disparity increased. This question of
inequality in the representation between the two Provinces was one of the
moving causes of the- Quebec Convention of 1864, which led, as we have seen,
to, the epoch-making measure of 1867.
The statesmen
who brought Confederation about were representatives of both races and all
parties and classes in Canada. In the course of four decades, the “ Fathers of
the Confederation,” as they were called, have all passed away with one
distinguished exception, Sir Charles Tupper. His services to the Dominion, not
only at that juncture, but during a long term of strenuous official life in
which he has filled many responsible offices, including that of High
Commissioner and Prime Minister, have made him, like Lord Strathcona—whose
chief activities have been thrown into the development of the trade and railway
resources of the country—one of the historic figures of the Dominion. Amongst
others who remodelled the political institutions of Canada and led the movement
which transformed a number of isolated, jealous, and feeble colonies into a
commonwealth, destined within cpmparatively few years to expand by a natural
and inevitable process from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was George Brown. He
was a Toronto journalist of Scottish birth and Presbyterian convictions, who
rose by force of character and capacity to the forefront of public life. He was
a man who made
1837-80] Cartier.—Macdonald.—Growth of the
Dominion. 775
enemies as
well as friends, but who never found any to question either bis integrity, his
love of civil and religious liberty, or his devotion to his adopted country.
His services to Confederation can scarcely be exaggerated, and his tragic death
in 1880, when he was killed by the cowardly bullet of an assassin, was regarded
throughout the Dominion as a public calamity. A very different type of Canadian
statesman was Sir George Etienne Cartier, a typical French Canadian, in his
youth a disciple of Papineau, and one who had borne arms in the short-lived
rebellion of 1837, but afterwards a powerful and able defender of the supremacy
pf the Crown. Always loyal to his own race, Cartier, who acted as Premier of
Dower Canada (1858-62), was a man of chivalrous and ardent temperament, and was
one of the first at a time of warring interests to see the necessity of
compromise and conciliation in a country of different races and conflicting
ideals. Sir Charles Tupper has always declared that, but for Cartier’s
patriotic devotion in the face ol great difficulties and dangers, the great
project of Confederation could probably never have been accomplishes Sir John
Alexander Macdonald was the great man of the movement—it is impossible to speak
of Galt, McDougall, D’Arcy McGee Tache, Langevin, Chandler, and Tilley.
Macdonald was born in Scotland, but was taken as a child of five to Canada, and
no man served her with more passionate devotion. Like Cartier, in later years
his political colleague and close friend, he carried a musket in 1837, though
on the opposite side. He entered public life in 1844, and it was then that he
uttered words which were the keynote of his whole career: “I need scarcely
state my firm belief that the prosperity of Canada depends upon its permanent
connexion with the mother country, and I shall resist to the utmost any
attempt—from whatever quarter it may come—which may tend to weaken that union.”
It may be said of him with perfect truth that he held Canada for the Crown
against enemies within and without the Dominion. He was a man of fascinating
personality, an incisive speaker, a keen tactician, and a statesman of wide
and enlightened views. For nearly forty years he laboured, through good and
evil report, to advance the prosperity of Canada, and to make it in the most
vital and abiding sense an ever growing and influential part of the Empire.
Here it
becomes necessary to state in outline the fortunes of the newly constituted
Dominion up to 1870. Self-government was now a reality. Lord Monck, under whom
Confederation had become an accomplished fact, retained the post of
Governor-General until 1868, and was succeeded by Sir John Young, afterwards
Lord Lisgar, who held office until 1872. The first Federal Premier was Sir John
Alexander Macdonald, and his Government represented a coalition of Liberal and
Conservative statesmen pledged to make the development of the resources of the
country the chief object of their policy. The growth of Confederation, though
its full story is elsewhere told, may here, perhaps,
be briefly
stated. The Hudson Bay Territory was ceded to Canada by the imperial Government
on the payment of a subsidy to this great trading corporation, May 12, 1870, and
out of it the province of Manitoba and the North-West Territories were created.
Part of the North-West Territories were afterwards divided into the provisional
districts, Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Athabasca. In 1895 the vast
outlying territory to the north and west was divided into the four districts of
Ungaba, Franklin, Mackenzie, and Yukon. Meanwhile, on July 20,1871, British
Columbia with Vancouver Island, and on July 1, 1873, Prince Edward Island,
entered the Confederation. The whole of British North America, with the
solitary exception of Newfoundland— the most ancient English colony—is
therefore now within the limits of the Dominion.
Newfoundland
refused to join the Confederation in 1867, and to this day the oldest of the
colonies remains self-excluded. The existing form of government (established
1855) consists of a Governor appointed by the Crown, an executive council of
seven members, a legislative council of fifteen members appointed by the Crown,
and a House of Assembly of thirty-six members elected by popular vote. Manhood
suffrage obtains, Subject to two.years’ previous residence. Between 1840 and
.1870 the wealth of the colony consisted almost exclusively in the fisheries.
But, even before 1870, a considerable area of land was brought under
cultivation; the timber trade was developed, and the mineral resources, chiefly
coal, copper, and iron, hitherto regarded as a negligible quantity, began to
render the colony prosperous in a more marked degree. Considerable friction
arose in Newfoundland at this period over fishing disputes with the French, due
in part to a vague clause in the Treaty of Versailles, 1783, and in part to the
proximity of the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon. Fishing disputes were not
peculiar to Newfoundland. Canada had her own difficulties in that respect with
the United States, especially after the abrogation by that country of the
Reciprocity Treaty (1866). The relations of Canada with her powerful neighbour
were at that time distinctly strained, and the situation was complicated by the
Alabama claims, and the belief which was common in the United States that
Canada as well as T?nglanrl had sympathised with the Confederates in the Civil
War. The Treaty of Washington (signed May 8, 1871) settled the Fisheries Question
for the next twelve years. It accorded the Americans the right of navigation,
not merely in the waters of the St Lawrence, but in the canals of the Dominion
on equal terms with British subjects, subject to the right of the Dominion
Government to levy tolls or other charges. The , free passage of goods in bond
through either country, and Canada’s right to free navigation of the rivers of
Alaska., formed other provisions of the treaty.
Questions of
boundary arose all through the period under review
between
Canada and the United States. In 1842 large concessions were made to American
demands, with the result that the State of Maine now projects into the
provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec. In 1846 the Oregon boundary question was
settled by the adoption by Great Britain of the 49° to the Pacific coast; but,
unfortunately; San Juan, an island in the channel between Vancouver and the
mainland, termed because of its strategic position, the “Cronstadt of the
Pacific,” remained debatable territory. The matter was submitted to the arbitration
of the German Emperor, William I, who gave a decision in favour of the United
States (1872).
But Canada,
while protecting her rights alike by sea and land, was also developing her
internal resources on a broad scale. Confederation rendered possible the
construction of railways from end to end of the new Dominion—a practical
embodiment of the;new community of interest. In 1867 there were
scarcely more than two thousand miles of railway throughout the whole Dominion.
Thirty years later nearly seventeen thousand had been constructed, and of the
capital required for such splendid progress no less than four millions were
contributed by the Dominion and provincial Governments. When in 1869-70 the
Hudson’s Bay territory was transferred to the Dominion and divided into the
province of Manitoba and the four provisional districts of the NorthWest,
trouble arose with Louis Riel, who incited the half-breeds to armed opposition
in the Red River rebellion (1870). The revolt was suppressed by an armed force
commanded by Colonel (now Viscount) Wolseley; and the natives were first
intimidated and then conciliated. The Dominion Government subsequently allotted
an extensive area, alike in Manitoba and the North-West, for the exclusive occupation
of the natives—an act of conciliation which has borne excellent fruit in the
settlement of the country.
Since
Confederation, Canada has acted on the principle laid down in the British
Parliament in 1862, that all colonies exercising the right of self-government
ought to provide for their own internal order and security, and assist in any
emergency which might arise in regard to their external defence. Questions of
fiscal policy have been determined in Canada in the main by her geographical
position and her trade relations. The bulk of her commerce has always been with
Great Britain and the United States, though it found other markets in the West
Indies and in Europe between 1840 and 1870. The difficulty in Canada in these
earlier years arose from the fact that Great Britain stood pledged to Free
Trade, whilst the United States adopted Protection. As long as the Reciprocity
Treaty with the United States existed—until 1866— Canada found an abundant
market across her borders; when that measure was abrogated her trade was
crippled, and, in the period of commercial depression which followed, the rway
was prepared for the adoption of a protective policy in 1878. The progress of
education
falls in the
main outside the; sphere of this chapter. High schools and collegiate
institutes existed, in response to the demand for secondary education, in all
cities and towns ; while each province provided normal and model schools' for
the training of teachers. The requirements of culture, both literary and
scientific, were met by the older seats of learning,, such as the universities
of Laval, McGill, Kingston, and Toronto, all of which made great strides, in
the period between 1840 and 1870. Since then they have grown in wealth,
efficiency, and influence,; while new foundations have been created in other
parts of the Dominion, to follow the Western march of civilisation and the ever
widening growth of the Dominion.
(3) THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA.
(1815-70.)
The British
occupation of South Africa began in 1806, when Cape Town surrendered to General
Baird; but it was not until 1814 that the London Convention was signed.. By
this instrument the Dutch formally surrendered their claims to. Cape Colony and
certain other of their former possessions, on payment of an indemnity of six
millions sterling. Although the history of the Cape as a British Colony dates,
therefore, from 1814, many of the most important factors in shaping the history
of this part of our colonial empire were already at work before that year. At
first the English conquerors made little change in the method of government.
The division of the country into five districts—the Cape, Stellenbosch,
Swellendam, Uitenhage, and Graaf-Reinet—was retained, with the local
administration by landrosts and the quasi-military organisation under the veldt
comets of the sub-districts. The population was small and scattered, except at
Cape Town. The slave population consisted of Malays, introduced from the East
Indies by the Dutch, and of a number of negroes from Madagascar, Mozambique,
and the West Coast. The slaves numbered, in all, about 30,000, the free native
population being estimated at 1,700,000—1,800,000, and the whites 26,000.
An important
epoch in South African history is marked by the beginning of the missionary movement,
which had before been impossible. The Dutch not only sought to prohibit among
whites all forms of religious .worship, save that of Protestant communions akin
to their own, but were inclined to disapprove of attempts to convert the
natives. Religious toleration and missionary zeal began to take effect soon
after the British occupation, with the result that an enquiry was officially
instituted into the conduct of the white settlers towards the natives (1811).
Considerable bitterness was fostered, and throughout this whole period we find
the continuance of this unfortunate dispute—the colonists aggrieved at the
attitude and accusations of the missionaries, who, in their turn,
championed
the cause of the native with a zeal which sometimes made them unfair to the
white man.
The long
series of Kaffir wars, which began in 1779 and were renewed at intervals
throughout the following century, deeply influenced the attitude of the white
settlers, particularly of the isolated baclcveldt Boers, towards the native.
These “wars” always began with an unexpected attack upon lonely farms and the
murder of all who were taken unawares. The colonists fought side by side with
the troops sent by the British Government, and frequently bore the brunt of the
battle; but they were seldom consulted as to the after settlement. The growing
strength of the party at home, who, in the French phrase, were “ friends of the
black man,” made it increasingly difficult for the agents of the Government to
keep a straight line between justice and weakness. The Boer farmers were
ignorant and inarticulate; the missionaries, particularly the rich and powerful
London Missionary Society, had the ear of the public in England—and these
unevenly matched opponents struggled to dominate the native policy of the
Government, with the result that it was vacillating and unsatisfactory. The
notorious affair of Schlachter’s Nek, which happened in 1815, had its origin in
this unfortunate state of things. A fanner named Frederick Bezuidenhout refused
to obey a summons issued by the District Court, at the instance of one of his
Hottentots. In the attempt made to arrest him by the Government, Frederick
Bezuidenhout was killed. Of the thirty or forty men who took up arms to avenge
, him, his brother Jan was killed, but the majority surrendered; and five of
the leaders were hanged under exceptionally painful circumstances. The episode
has assumed in Boer annals an heroic aspect to which it is not entitled. No
incident in South African history has been made more use of, or has been more
distorted, than the affair of Schlachter’s Nek; but the unbiassed historian
cannot fail to see that the Cape Government was bound to assert its authority
sternly, in order to check the lawless spirit of the frontier Boers, who had always
been averse from recognising a superior authority, even when the Government at
the Cape was of their own race. It should, however, be remembered that the
British Government was assisted in its suppression of the revolt by many of the
Boers themselves, and that it was the treatment of the rebels after the
suppression of the rising which excited, and has continued to excite, intensity
of feeling.
British
emigration to Cape Colony began in 1819; and in the next two years about five
thousand people were brought out. The number does not seem large nowadays; but
at that time it represented a great effort, since the size of ships available
and the time occupied by the voyage made emigration slow and difficult work.
The Home Government paid fares, and gave free land to each head of a family,
almost all the newcomers being located in the same district, on the eastern
frontier between the Fish and Bushman rivers. After considerable weeding out,
and many
trials and troubles, the English, colony took root and prospered exceedingly;
and to-day their descendants make the eastern province, of Gape Colony
distinctively English, and in physique and morale show some of the finest
developments of, the British type.
In
1825, an Executive Council was formed to assist the Governor of the Colony, who
had hitherto enjoyed almost despotic authority-.:- Soon after this, Lord
Charles Somerset, who had held office for twelve years, resigned, in order to
escape impeachment on a variety of counts charging him with autocratic action.
The reports of a Commission, which had been collecting data on the government
of all the British settlements, were presented in 1826. Partly as the result of
this enquiry, modifications were made at the Cape. English was declared, and
remained till 1882, the sole official and school language, although only a
small number of the Dutch—who formed six-sevenths of the total population—had
facilities for learning that tongue. There is not very much trace of
unwillingness to adopt the English language at this period, for it was the
avenue to promotion and prosperity; but the facilities for learning it were so
scanty that Dutch, or rather the Tacd, remained the true mother-tongue of the
Cape Boers. ■ ■■ ■
The same
period saw the promulgation of an ordinance (1828) ensuring to the Hottentots
equality at law with Europeans. This measure, so just and merciful from our
present standpoint, seemed revolutionary to the Boer of that time. It certainly
had the effect of removing from the native the restraints of ancient custom,
while the provisions for securing his obedience were lacking, and before there
had been time to teach him respect for the new authority. Discontent as to this
measure was still seething, when the news came (1833) that the imperial
Parliament had passed a measure for the abolition of slavery. The quondam
slaves were to serve a short period of apprenticeship before acquiring full
freedom, and, in 1835, the sum of £1,250,000 was allotted to compensate the
Cape slave-owners. This sum was quite inadequate, in view of the scarcity of
labour in the Cape and the extent to which the farmers depended on their
slaves. It was still further reduced by being payable in London, so that
farmers sold their claims to speculators and got very little in exchange. Many
were entirely ruined, especially as the emancipated slaves often refused to
work for their former masters for wages, so that harvests were lost and cattle
died from lack of tending.
Of course
this stage was not reached immediately; but other circumstances combined to
make these few years notable and unfortunate alike. A great irruption of
Kaffirs into the newly formed eastern province, where the settlers were just
becoming prosperous, was only repelled after twelve months’ hard fighting
(1834-5). For Sir Betijamin D’Urban, sent to carry otit the Abolition, this
Kaffir war (the sixth) was his first experience. He drove the invaders beyond
the Keiskama river and formed a new province, called Queen Adelaide, in which
he located the
Fingo
tribes who had placed themselves under British protection. His action was
viewed with disfavour at home, owing to the - representations of. the
well-known missionary John Philip: His arrangements were cancelled; the Kaffirs
were restored to their,land in close proximity to the colonial homesteads; and
D’Urban himself was eventually recalled. Both English and Dutch settlers united
in indignation against the Home ■Government, which declared that the
Kaffirs were quite right in resorting to force, and that justice was on the side
of the conquered and not of the conquerors. , ,
An immediate
result was the determination of many Boer farmers to leave the colony, and as a
large portion of the hinterland (including what is now the Orange River Colony,
the Transvaal and Natal) was almost depopulated by the savage wars of
extermination waged by the Zulus, the farmers hoped to secure for themselves a
new country far away from missionary interference or British domination. In all
the history of pioneering there is nothing more remarkable than the Boer treks.
They were carried out by a people ignorant of the country to which they were
going, who plodded with incredible patience and daring over a trackless land
infested with wild beasts and,savages. Women and children took part in these
marches, sharing the dangers and fatigues and the frightful isolation. The mere
extent of the country covered by these slow-moving columns, in which the
household goods were packed on the creaking ox-waggons and the able-bodied
members of the party went on foot, is almost incredible. The food provided at
the start could not last long, and beyond the possibility of occasionally
getting mealies from the natives, the only resource was the meat and game shot
by the wayside.. In these treks the Boers lost many of the distinctive
characteristics and customs of their race. The women, divorced from
house-keeping, lost their house-pride and sense of cleanliness, as well as the
traditions of cookery. The children grew up illiterate^, though hardy and
daring; the elder people lost all sense of citizenship and broke away somewhat
from the ties of church membership. Widely scattered homesteads and the growth
of a sturdy local self-government had already tended to substitute for the
Teutonic tradition of conformity to established law a love of individual
liberty. This tendency was promoted and increased by the treks, and it
continues to be a striking feature of Boer character.
The
first trek took place in 1836, and was made by two parties, numbering about
fifty each. After reaching Zoutpansberg they separated, one of the
peculiarities of the Boer trekkers being that, even in the isolation of the
African wilds, they were jealous of each other. While one band (with the
exception of two children) was massacred by the Matabele, the other reached
Delagoa Bay, and, after being reduced to twenty-five by fever, was finally
transported to Natal. Natal already had a population
of English, who, at the outset, of their career,
had
christened their country Victoria and their chief town D’Urban. They had,
however, vainly petitioned to be recognised as a British colony. This incident,
and the fact that the Cape Colonial Courts were authorised by an Act—not passed
in the imperial Parliament till as late as August, 1836—to deal with offences
committed by his Majesty’s subjects south of latitude 25° (that is, just north
of Delagoa Bay, where Portuguese influence began), must be remembered in connexion
with- the Boer attempt to escape British jurisdiction. The Colonial Government,
however, was not very sure of its ground, and refused for some years to
recognise the existence of the new communities. During 1836-40 the Boer treks
went on steadily, the total number taking part in them being estimated at
10,000. One of the first of the enemies encountered was the Matabele nation, an
offshoot of the Zulus and formidable in fight. Eventually, they were driven
across the Limpopo, and the Boer leader Potgieter proclaimed all the territory
south of that river forfeit to the emigrants, and concluded treaties with the
Bechuana and Basuto tribes dispossessed by the Matabele. Another party of
Boers, under Pieter Retief, made their way across the Drakenberg to Natal,
where (as we have seen) a small English settlement already existed. Retief and
many of his followers were treacherously murdered by the Zulus under Dingan
(February 6,1838); Andries Hendrik Potgieter and Andries Willem Jacobus
Pretorius came to assist their kinsfolk to avenge this crime, and with a small
force defeated Dingan near the Blood river and slew 3000 Zulus. This event is
celebrated in “Dingan’s Day” (December 16), still kept as a holiday by the
Boers. They then dethroned Dingan and founded what they called the Republic of
Natalia, with the town of Pietermaritzburg as its capital. Their leader was
Pretorius; for, on account of < 'sagreements, Potgieter and his friends had
retired to the Transvaal, where they seceded and set up a rival government at
Potchefstroom. The word “government” is rather a misnomer, for the emigrant
farmers were each a law unto themselves, and it was not until some years later
that pressure from without organised them into any semblance of a State. •
Although the
Home Government had previously shown no readiness to accept Victoria as a
colony, there was no desire to lose the port or to see a Boer republic
established on the coast. Accordingly a small force was sent to take
possession, and was besieged in Port Natal by the Boers (1842), receiving
relief only after twenty-six days’ severe suffering. A memorable incident was
the ride of Richard King to fetch help from Cape Colony. He covered the
distance to Grahamstown in nine days, fording deep rivers and crossing hundreds
of miles of savage country inhabited by hostile tribes. Natal was declared a
British colony in May, 1843, the Drakenberg being subsequently taken as the
frontier. Immediately afterwards a number of the Boers left Natal and formed
settlements in what are now the Transvaal and Orange River Colony.
1812-53] Battle of Boomplatz.-Orange River
Sovereignty. 783
The Home
Government was not conciliatory; and in 1847 the Boer leader Andries Willem
Jacobus Pretorius (a man of fine character and ability) arrived to lay the
grievances of his countrymen before the Governor at Cape Town. He was denied an
audience, with the result that many other valuable farmers were lost to Natal,
and their places filled with natives. In 1853 Natal was at length recognised as
a separate colony; up to that date she had been managed, or mismanaged, from
Cape Town.
Meanwhile the
efforts of the missionaries at the Cape, who desired to form a chain of
protected native States round the colony, had been successful in securing
conventions with the Basutos and the Griquas. The latter were a half-caste
tribe, descended from Boer men and Hottentot women, who had formed
Christianised communities north of the Orange river as early as 1812. Their
chief, Waterboer, settled in what is now part of the Orange River Colony and
entered into treaties with the Cape Government (by which he was subsidised and
provided with muskets) to form a protective frontier against the natives.
Another community of similar origin, under Adam Kok, was established at a
considerably later date, east of Waterboer’s territory and near a mission
station of the London Society called Philippopolis. By recognising the independence
of Kok, and by fixing his boundaries to coincide with those of Waterboer on the
west and those of the powerful and able Basuto chief Moshesh on the east, a
barrier of protected States was spread across the north of the colony from the
Kalahari desert. This was completed by a treaty with the Pondo chief Faku,
whose territory was fixed between the Umzimkulu and Umtata rivers, the
Drakenberg and the sea.
The arrival,
in 1848, of Sir Harry Smith as Governor of the Cape initiated some changes in
policy, both as regards the natives and Boers. He was a man of energy and
resource, familiar and popular with the Boers. He attempted to turn the tide of
emigration from Natal, but, failing in this project, declared the whole of the
area between the Orange and Vaal rivers British territory, and named it the
Orange River Sovereignty (February 3,1848). To accomplish this, he was obliged
to do away with the so-called Treaty States of Griqualand and Basutoland, a
proceeding acceptable to some of the white settlers, who resented the
overlordship of a half-caste or a native chief. But it was resented by the
Boers wht -.ad emigrated to escape British rule. Their resistance finally
culminated in the battle of Boomplatz (August 29,1848), when Pretorius and his
followers were defeated and obliged to recross the Vaal river. A British
residency, with a small garrison, was established at Bloemfontein.
The Orange
River Sovereignty (although settled by a good class of farmers, both Dutch and
British) was handicapped by the penny-wise, pound-foolish policy of the Home
Government, which expected it to be self-supporting and self-defending from the
first. The latter responsibility was especially heavy in view of the proximity
of the Basutos under Moshesh. Discontent was met with indifference; and at
last,
after the
Basutos had gained an advantage over an expedition led by Major Warden at
Viervoet (June 30, 1851), the Home Government decided to abandon the Orange
River Sovereignty. This was the opportunity of Pretorius, who was waiting
beyond the Vaal for just such a contingency. The Cape had recently passed
through two crises whiph did not increase her popularity with the British
Government The first, was caused by a strenuous refusal to receive convicts.
The ship,,in which they were sent Out was successfully boycotted and at length
ordered to proceed to Tasmania. The second crisis was the eighth Kaffir war
(1850 to 1853), which proved the most costly of the series. There was at this
time a republican party in the Orange River Sovereignty; the British taxpayer
was represented as resenting the expenses of that far-off and useless colony,
and the temper of the Home Government was in favour of avoiding responsibility
at all costs. Pretorius offered to mediate with the disaffected Dutch in the
colony and obtained the reversion of the sentence of outlawry passed on him.
Shortly after, the long-sought-for recognition of an independent State beyond
the Vaal was granted in the Sand River Convention (signed January 17, 1852).
The country south of the Vaal was formally abandoned by England in 1853; and,
on February 23,1854, a convention was signed at Bloemfontein, which transferred
the government to representatives chosen by the inhabitants. Thus the Orange
Free State came into being. Great but useless efforts were made by the
missionary parties and British settlers to avert this; the Crimean War absorbed
too much of the attention of the Home Government to leave any for the
complaints of a handful of missionaries and farmers.
In 1852, the
energetic, hot-headed soldier Sir Harry Smith was recalled, and eventually
succeeded by a real statesman in the person of Sir George Grey (1854-9). Cape
Colony had just made a step forward in her constitutional history by the
creation of a representative. Parliament of two elective Chambers, a
Legislative Council and a House of Assembly (1853). Members were elected by a
franchise conferred on all British subjects over twenty-one years of age, with
a low property qualification and without distinction of race or colour. The
qualification was slightly raised later, and an educational test added (1892);
but the franchise remains the most liberal in South Africa. The Governor, who
was nominated by the Crown, appointed the executive officials, notably the
Governor’s Council, members of which did not resign on defeat of their measures
in Legislative Council or Assembly. Sir George Grey did much to promote the
welfare of the colony, and was far ahead of his tivne in proposing a scheme of
federation for all the South African States, which probably wquld have been
supported by the infant Boer republics, had it, received approval in England.
The readiness, of the Boers, especially in the Free State, to listen to such a
proposal was undoubtedly due to their unexpected difficulties in managing their
own
affairs. The
Orangia burghers waged perpetual war with the Basutos, over whom they did not
begin to get the upper hand till 1864. As for the Transvaal t was for many
years in a condition of chaos. There were, at least, four separate republics in
different districts, Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg, Potchefstroora, and Utrecht—a
fact afterwards commemorated in the Vierhleur (flag of four colours) which
became the national flag of the Transvaal. It was not till 1857 that the
Grondwet, or Constitution, was drawn up at Potchefstroom as an attempt at
organisation, and in 1858 was accepted by Zoutpansberg. Its principal points
were the abjuration of slavery (already stipulated in the Sand River
Convention), and the restriction of all the rights of citizenship to the white
inhabitants alone. The territory was open to all strangers who obeyed the laws;
every able-bodied male was subject to be called out on commando; suffrage was
granted to every burgher of twenty-one, but not to natives, bastards, or
members of any Church save the Dutch Reformed Church. No churches of any save
the State religion might be built. The President was elected for five years,
and was assisted by an Executive Council of four, and by the Rood, a
representative body of twelve members. In 1860 this Constitution was accepted
by the previously united republics of Lydenburg and Utrecht, and the Transvaal
Republic- was fairly launched, with Marthinus Wessel Pretorius as its first
President (1857-60). Civil war again intervened, but in 1864 Pretorius was
accepted by all as the legal President, while Stephen John Paul Kruger, who, as
a small boy, had shared in the “ Great- Trek ” of 1836, became
commandant-general. The question of revenue was a pressing one in the new
Republic, since its citizens disliked nothing so much as paying taxes, and
indeed had forgotten the use of money, and used cattle and crops for barter
during their wanderings. Even to-day the backveldt Boer is chary of any
transaction which means parting with cash. In addition the vast territory north
of the Vaal was very sparsely settled, and many strangers from all parts of
Africa and Europe flocked to this free and lawless country, which became a
veritable Alsatia.
No sketch of
South African history, however brief, would be complete without some account
of the part played by the Dutch Reformed Church and its synods. Among the
earliest acts of the Dutch in South Africa was the formation of presbyteries,
and round the Church organisation their whole social and political life was
built up. When the “Great Trek” was carried out, the emigrant farmers took with
them their Bible, their Church forms, and a sense of allegiance to their mother
Church and the Cape Synod. For twelve years they had no regular places of
worship and only the occasional ministrations of a Natal minister. When their
communities began to form and settle, however, the Cape sent missionaries to
visit them—only to find that, while holding firmly to the faith founded on the
Confession of Dort and adopted by the Dutch Reformed Church, they were not
inclined to any form of
dependence on
the Cape. In the conflicts that ensued between the various Boer communities,
the question of dependence on the Cape Synod was frequently debated, but
eventually the Transvaal and Orange Free State established their own synods, in
communion with, though independent of, the Cape. At the same time a secession
took place from the orthodox body, owing to the influence of a minister of a
dissenting sect in Holland. He drew away' a number of Boers, including Paul
Kruger, and founded the “ Gereformeerde" or “Dopper” (“Roundhead”) Church,
which had a great influence on the future course of Transvaal politics. Its
distinguishing feature was a narrow nationalism, opposed to the wider ideas of
an Africander nation which was already dawning, and a bigoted opposition to
most of the tendencies of modern civilisation. Its ministers were drawn from
the dissenting colleges—not the great State colleges of Holland; and their
influence was that of narrow, bigoted, and often ignorant men opposed to any
movement which would take their people into a world of wider experience and
opportunities. The Cape Colony seminaries about this period began to supply
ministers for the orthodox Churches of the Transvaal; and both they and their
brothers in the colony (mostly recruited from Holland) were concerned to
preserve that Dutch nationality on which the supremacy of their Church
depended. This tendency did not become plainly visible until the sixties, when
the gradual strengthening of the Government at Cape Town, under representative
institutions, led to the beginning of state- regulated education. The
management of schools and selection of teachers (hitherto the prerogative of
local committees and therefore of local predikants) was then partly assumed by
the Superintendent of Education. In no country, not even in Ireland, has the
influence of the Church been so prominent. The predikants have always taken a
leading part in politics as well as in education, and their influence has
almost invariably been on the side of Dutch rather than that of a broad South
African nationalism.
In this sketch
of the position of the Church we have slightly anticipated the march of events,
especially in the Cape, which we left in its first stage of self-government. An
extraordinary occurrence in 1857 destroyed many of the Kosas, a tribe lodged in
the territory between the Keiskama and the Kei—the abandoned province of Queen
Adelaide, which had been reabsorbed as a separate province under military,
rule, under the title of British Kaffraria. Sir George Grey did all he could to
further the progress of the natives, and among other institutions encouraged
the foundation of Lovedale—the Free Church educational mission which was to
become the nucleus of the native college of South Africa. The Kosas, however,
were the victims of their own superstitions. Certain prophets—probably with
the ulterior motive of forcing the natives to attack the English — promised
them the return of their national heroes, if they destroyed all their cattle
and crops; in
consequence,
the natives deliberately deprived themselves of the means of subsistence, and
died of starvation in thousands. Some of the gaps thus created were filled by
settlers on a military tenure, taken from the Anglo-German legion disbanded
after the Crimean War; but more permanent settlements were made by German and Swiss
peasants. The peculiar conditions of farming in South Africa and the jealousy
between the eastern and western provinces, with their respective English and
Dutch complexions, retarded the economic prosperity of the colony for a time ;
but two great sources of prosperity for South Africa were at length revealed,
in 1869-70, by the discovery of diamonds at Dutoitspan and Bulfontein, and by
the establishment of ostrich farming.
In 1866, the
long struggle between the Free State and the Basutos seemed about to end in
favour of the former, when Moshesh appealed for protection to Great Britain.
His request was granted, and the protests of the burghers were met by the
Treaty of Aliwal North (February 12,1869), by which a strip of territory lying
to the west of the Caledon was incorporated in the Free State. This district,
known as the “ Conquered territory,” has some of the best farming land in South
Africa. The Free State resented the intervention of Britain, although,, by the
definite relations now established, the Basutos were henceforth kept in check
by Great Britain. In 1871 Basutoland was formally annexed to Cape Colony and
was governed henceforward under a system resembling that in certain protected
Indian native States. The native chiefs enjoy considerable discretionary
powers, but are under the tutelage of British Residents and subject to the
direct administration of the High Commissioner.
The same year
which saw the annexation of Basutoland to Cape Colony witnessed the sensational
find of diamonds at Old De Beers and Colesberg Kopje, and the rush of miners to
the spot which led to the foundation of Kimberley. In a few months the
population on the small area of diamond fields increased to 10,000, and a
question arose as to the ownership of the territory, which was claimed by the
Griqua chief, Waterboer, and by the Free State. A Court of arbitration presided
over by Lieutenant-Governor Keate of Natal, decided in favour of Waterboer, who
at once offered both land and people to Queen Victoria. The dispute was not
settled till 1876, when the Free State accepted a compensation of £90,000. The
enormous impetus given to the development of South Africa by the discovery of
diamonds brought about a change of attitude on the part of the Home Government.
At the same time the influx of miners, not only to the diamond mines but to the
Transvaal (where gold had been found in 1867 at the Tati and in 1871 at
Zoutpansberg), led to internal changes which Boer conservatism was powerless to
resist. This was especially true with regard to the beginnings of urban life,
which could only have otherwise developed very slowly among a people so
essentially pastoral in their habits.
Meanwhile,
the colony of Natal, which received a representative
ystem in
1856, was chiefly occupied with the serious question of the control of the
numerous natives surrounding her tiny handful of white inhabitants. Between
1848 and 1851 some four to five thousand English emigrants arrived; but not all
remained. The disadvantages of dwelling in a country so largely occupied by the
black man were obvious, and after the British occupation great numbers of
natives took refuge in Natal, where they multiplied exceedingly. In 1848,
occurred a serious native outbreak, which was put down by the colonists with
promptitude, but (so far as can be judged from our knowledge of the
circumstances) without undue severity. Their action was, however, censured in
England, owing to the representations of the Aborigines Protection Society and
Bishop Colenso, and the Governor was in consequence recalled. The impassibility
of obtaining adequate labour, even with the teeming black population, for the
cultivation of sugar, cotton, and other tropical produce, led to the
importation of coolies, on contract from India, many of whom settled. A regular
stream of Indian settlers followed, so that Natal has now three distinct races,
of which the white is the least numerous.
The year
1872, which marks the beginning of responsible govern-nent in the original
colony of South Africa, found her in the first flush of the diamond fever. She
was already face to face with the two most serious questions in her
development—how to work the black population into a social and political scheme
which would secure them justice and liberty, while leaving the reins of
government in white hands; and how to reconcile the conflicting interests of
town and country, which coincide so closely with the racial division between
Briton and Boer. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 inevitably made a great
difference to the Cape, which ceased to be the halfway house between Europe and
India. It was only by a development of her hinterland that the colony could
hope to make up for what she had lost. Thrown upon her own resources she would
have had a hard fight for existence as a pastoral and agricultural country,
since she has to contend with conditions far less favourable than those, for
instance, of the Australasian colonies. But the rapid upspringing of mining
communities gave an impetus; and their organisation into great industries, on a
more permanent basis than that of most mining enterprises, has entirely
modified the economic position of Cape Colony by supplying the much needed
industrial element. In 1871 there came, also, to South Africa the man who was
to play so great a part in controlling its destinies—Cecil John Rhodes.
The year
which saw Cape Colony embark on a fresh stage of its career in more senses than
one, found the Orange Free State settling down to a period of peace and
prosperity. The republic across the Vaal was just losing its President
Pretorius (1871), who was succeeded by a Cape colonist, the Reverend Thomas
Francis Burgers. The emigrant farmers had hardly as yet coalesced into a
genuine State; but President Burgers, who was a man of education, intended to
give them a more
civilised
form of government. They were still at war with native tribes, in the north and
north-east particularly, and also endeavouring by treaties and concessions to
obtain that foothold in Bechuanaland whicb would have cut the British colonists
off from possible expansion northwards. Already, the necessity of an outlet to
the sea had caused Pretorius to make an effort to secure Delagoa Bay—an attempt
which was foiled by the action of Great Britain and Portugal. But the action
eventually led (1869) to a commercial treaty between Portugal and the
Transvaal, which was afterwards to be of great importance to the latter.
In
conclusion, the period which ends with the grant of responsible government to
the Cape had seen the modification of the views of the Home Government on the
native question; and, from this time forward, an increasing tendency to entrust
the native policy to South African hands becomes evident.
(4)
THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AUSTRALASIA. •
(1815-70.)
The history
of Australasia during 1815-71 falls into four periods— one in which new penal
establishments were founded in the interests of free settlement; one in which
free settlement extinguished the convict system ; and one of conflict, and one
of harmony, between the Home and the colonial Governments. In New South Wales
these periods coincided with the rule of autocratic Governors, nominee
Councils, representative Councils, and responsible Ministers, respectively.
In 1815 the
first judge of the Supreme Civil Court of New South Wales had just arrived from
England, while two magistrates acted as jury; but criminal justice was still
administered by a Judge-Advocate and six officers. In 1819, in consequence of
appointments by Governor Macquarie of ex-convict magistrates and of protests
received by the Home Government, John Thomas Bigge proceeded to Australia on a
commission of enquiry. By an Act based on his Beports (1822-3) the first
nominee Legislative Council and the first criminal judge and attorney- general
were appointed (1824). Questions of fact were to be decided in the Criminal
Court by seven officers or magistrates; in the Civil Court by two assessors or
a jury; and at Quarter Sessions (until 1828) by a jury. Similar privileges were
accorded to Van Diemen’s Land, which was separated from New South Wales in
1825. By an Act of 1828 the Governor was deprived of power to suspend the
Constitution; and control over the application of the proceeds of taxation was
entrusted to the Council. These political changes were the result of physical
and economic growth.
Before 1816,
Australian farmers lived like Indian ryots, in equal dread of plenty and
dearth. Surplus com could not be sold or even used until
790 Period of autocratic Governors.*—Exploration.
[1811-40
distillation
was allowed (1822); and, but for India and the Cape, dearth would have spelt
death. In 1816—a year of scarcity—relief came not only from India but from Van
Diemen’s Land, which was thenceforth the supplementary granary of New South
Wales; and the last fears of famine were dispelled. Scarcity of com and credit
led in 1811 to large payments by the State being made in rum or rum monopolies;
but Lord Liverpool sent a consignment of dollars from India, which arrived in
1813. In 1817 the Bank of New South Wales was
incorporated; and, although its cash reserve in 1821 consisted only of
£4>4s62 in dollars, its operations relieved urban colonists from recourse to
consumable substitutes for coin.
In 1815 a
road to Bathurst was opened over the dividing range which Lawson, Wentworth, Blaxland
and Evans had crossed for the first time In 1813. Next, a road was built
south-west to the vicinity of Goulbum on the crest of the same range, along a
route discovered by Hume in
1814. Then, a way from Sydney to its only
mainland sub-settlement at Newcastle was discovered (1820), and here too a road
was built. These roads stimulated settlement, and advanced the frontiers of
Sydney district 100 miles in three directions. Lastly, Oxley, after vainly
exploring the Lachlan and Macquarie 300 miles out west, crossed Liverpool
Plains to Port Macquarie, whence he returned to Newcastle by land. His discoveries
bore fruit both on Liverpool Plains and at Port Macquarie.
Bigge
advocated the use of bad convicts as pioneers, who were to work in gangs as far
away as possible from the main army of civilisation, and the dispersion of the
better convicts amongst settlers as assigned labourers. Accordingly, convict
gangs were moved on from Newcastle to Port Macquarie (1820) and Brisbane
(1824), which had been discovered in 1823. Nor were those retreats secure from
intrusion. Cunningham crossed the great range from Newcastle; passed through
Liverpool Plains and New England to Darling Downs (1827), and discovered an
easy route thence to Brisbane (1828). At the same time the Australian
Agricultural Company, which had been incorporated in England for the purpose of
buying, cultivating, and eventually reselling land (1824), began farming on a
gigantic scale on Liverpool Plains and north of Newcastle, so that Port
Macquarie was enveloped on its south and west; and the same fate overtook
Brisbane, when the Darling Downs were occupied in 1840. Convict gangs were
being crowded out of eastern Australia. Accident provided other refuges for the
displaced in the south-west, and north; but these refuges were only temporary.
In 1824-5, Hume travelled south-west from Goulbum, over 400 miles of untrodden
wastes, to Port Phillip, which his companion mistook for Western Port. In 1826
a convict settlement was established at Western Port, and also at Albany
(Western Australia), Melville Island, and Raffles Bay (Northern Territory), in
order to prevent annexation by a French squadron, which arrived in Australia on
a voyage of discovery in that year. The first settlement was abandoned in 1827,
1805—76] Nominee Coundls.-Origin of Western
Australia. 791
and the rest
in 1829, on the return of the squadron to Prance. In 1826, Norfolk Island was
reopened as a convict establishment.
A similar
process went on in Van Diemen’s Land, but without promoting settlement. In
1818 the south-east of the island, excepting Tasman’s Peninsula, and its
centre, from Launceston to Hobart, were occupied. In 1825 detached tracts of
land in the north-west were occupied by a Corporation similar to the Australian
Agricultural Company and styled “The Van Diemen’s Land Company.” During the
twenties escaped prisoners from Macquarie Harbour, which was in the wild west,
and assigned servants from other parts, turned bushrangers; they plundered the
settlers, and attacked the blacks, making the island what was facetiously
called a “ vandemonium.” Then the blacks attacked the settlers, but were
vanquished and deported to Flinders Island (1829-35), where they finally died
out (1876). Shortly after 1829, the convicts of Macquarie Harbour were removed
to Tasman’s Peninsula, where they were more safe though equally useless.
We have now
reached the second period. Before 1824 Australian colonies were essentially
penal settlements. The free, who ever since 1805 and 1824 outnumbered the bond
in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land respectively, consisted mainly of
ex-convicts and the children of the bond. The making of history was due to a
mere handful of ex-officers in the old New South Wales corps, like McArthur,
Lawson and Bell; of officials, like Marsden, Evans, Oxley, and Cunningham; of
colonial-born sons of officials, like Hume and Wentworth; and of capitalists
introduced by McArthur, like Blaxland. After Waterloo the dread of
over-population filled men’s minds; successive Parliamentary Reports preached,
and the two land companies practised, emigration; and, in the middle twenties,
a few hundred persons emigrated annually to Australia. Some effect was
produced; rural land changed hands for 5s. an acre; the Government sold land
competitively (1826), and divided the settled districts of New South Wales into
nineteen counties, in which upset prices were put upon land (1826-9).
Several
events now occurred which transferred Australian destinies from freedmen to
free men and made the convict system an anachronism. In Western Australia
French explorers paid marked attention to the Swan River (1823), which was
accordingly resurveyed (1827); and an appeal was made by the English colonial
authorities to private enterprise to found the first free Australian colony
(1828). Grants of land were offered to capitalists who exported labourers or
stock at their own cost, or who applied capital to the soil. This appeal to
self-interest, unaided by privileges, monopolies, joint-stock companies, or the
promise of state support, was successful—a success unique in English history.
Captain Stirling, R.N., was appointed the first Governor of Western Australia;
Perth became its Capital, and Fremantle and Albany its ports; and nearly 4000
immigrants arrived (1829-31). Much capital was lost, and the
792 Origin of South Australia, Victoria, New
Zealand. [i83i-42
colony relied
during this period on small annual grants in aid by the Home authorities. The
success, though genuine, was dearly bought. In 1831, an Order in Council was
issued by Lord Goderich, tha land should be sold by auction at not less than
5s. an acre, and that the p .’oceeds of sale should constitute a fund for the
importation of immigrants by Government; and in 1835 bounties became payable
out of the fund to employers who imported working men or women at their own
expense. In 1889-40 the upset price was raised to 12s. and £1 an acre, and the
latter price was confirmed by an English Act (1842). Assisted immigration
transformed New South Wales; thus in 1832 its population was 53,524; and in the
next ten years 70,081 immigrants arrived, six-sevenths of whom were assisted.
In 1828-30
Captain Sturt rounded off Oxley’s discoveries by tracing the Lachlan and
Macquarie into the Darling, the Darling into the Murray, and the Murray into
Encounter Bay. On receipt of this news the National Colonisation Society,
formed in England in 1830, started a South Australian Association, to promote
settlement by free people on the shores of Spencer’s Gulf (1833). By their
efforts an Act was passed ncorporating South Australian Commissioners with
power to sell land between 132° and 141° east long., and south of 26° south
lat. at a fixed price of 12«. or more an acre, the proceeds to be devoted to
immigration (1834). In 1836 a cultivating land-jobbing joint-stock company,
called the South Australian Company, raised .£200,000, bought land-orders from
the Commissioners, and equipped the first fleet, which sailed to Kangaroo
Island, Captain Hindtnarsh, R.N., the Governor, following in December. Early in
1837 Adelaide was selected as the capital. The settlers fell into difficulties;
under his successor, Colonel Gawler, and when Major (afterwards Sir George)
Grey arrived as Governor (1841) there was a deficit of £300,000; and bankruptcy
and pauperism prevailed.
Major Sir
Thomas Mitchell’s explorations of 1835-6 covered much the same ground as those
of Captain Sturt, except that, instead of following the Murray down-stream, he
descended on Portland Bay, whence he travelled across what is now Victoria to
Albury. He found one Tasmanian squatter at Portland Bay, and two or three more
had just reached the site of Melbourne. Mitchell’s praises of the new country
sent many thousands of im/r.igrants overland from Sydney, and oversea from Van
Diemen’s Land, and Melbourne was founded by Sir Richard Bourke, the Governor of
New South Wales (1837). Such was the inflow of immigrants that in 1841 the
white inhabitants numbered 11,700. The new country was governed from Sydney, although
it had a Superintendent at Melbourne, and its accounjts were kept separately.
Lastly, a new
free colony was founded in New Zealand. Whalers and sealers from Sydney, had
been in the habit of paying prolonged visits to New Zealand ever since 1792;
Maori, as the natives call themselves, used to serve on board fishing vessels;
a thousand nondescript
vagabond
Englishmen, mostly from Australia, haunted Foveaux Straits, Cook’s Straits, and
the Bay of Islands. Since Marsden established his mission at the Bay of Islands
(1814), the Maori had been rapidly embracing Christianity. In 1833, Busby
arrived in Kororarika in the Bay of Islands as Resident, subject to the
Governor of New South Wales, in order to advise this mixed multitude; and, in
1835, he organised a league of tribes as a bulwark against French encroachment.
In 1835 de Thiery, who had purchased land at Hokianga, boasted at Tahiti of his
sovereignty over New Zealand and the Marquesas; from 1837 to 1840, a French
fleet patrolled the Pacific and annexed Tahiti and the Marquesas, in order to
protect French missions; in 1838, a French mission was established at
Hokianga, and Langlois bought Banks’ Peninsula on behalf of a French Company,
in which Louis-Philippe was a shareholder. The danger was therefore not
visionary. It led, too, to the formation of a New Zealand Association (1837)
modelled on the South Australian Association, and of a New Zealand Company
modelled on the South Australian Company. This Company sold 100,000 acres of
unbought Maori lands, and in 1839 despatched Colonel William Wakefield, who
bought on its behalf the sites of Wellington, Nelson, Taranaki, and other
lands.
A few weeks
after Wakefield’s departure the Government sent out Captain Hobson, R.N., who
with missionary aid concluded the Treaty of Waitangi (February 6, 1840), under
which every prominent chief ceded his sovereignty to the Queen on condition of
the title of the chiefs and tribes to their lands and wastes being recognised,
the Crown reserving preemptive rights over these lands and wastes. One of
Hobson’s first acts as Governor was to send Captain Stanley, R.N., to Banks’
Peninsula, who on his arrival took possession four or five days before the
arrival of a French frigate with Langlois’ colonists. In 1841 Hobson shifted his
capital from Kororarika to Auckland, the site of which was bought from the
Maori and resold to settlers. Then, the Crown waived its preemptive rights over
native lands in favour of the New Zealand Company, proportionately to the
immigrants and capital they introduced; and a Commissioner was appointed to
settle the land claims of Colonel Wakefield’s purchasers and settlers, some
thousands of whom had already arrived. The award, published in 1845, caused
discontent among the representatives of the New Zealand Company, none of whom
had realised the almost Hindu complexity of Maori land tenures. While the
claims to the valley of the Wairau were still sub judice, Captain Arthur
Wakefield, R.N., a brother of Colonel Wakefield, took fifty colonists to arrest
a chief named Te Rauparaha for obstructing his surveyor; a skirmish ensued; the
natives, more numerous but worse armed, won the day, and killed Captain
Wakefield with eighteen of his followers (1843). Captain Robert Fitzroy, R.N.,
who was then Governor, thought the colonists in the wrong, and abstained from
action. He failed, too, to quell the disorders known as Heke’s Rebellion,
which
culminated in the burning of Kororarika. In grappling with the economic crisis
which affected Australasia he issued “ debentures,” which were disallowed,
waived the preemptive rights of the Crown over Maori lands for a penny an acre,
and abolished customs duties. He was recalled in 1845 and succeeded by Sir
George Grey.
These events
produced two effects; the large expenditure first causing an inevitable
reaction, during which trade, credit, and prices collapsed; in Adelaide and
Auckland inconvertible paper-money was current, and in Sydney inconvertible
legal tender notes were advocated by the Council (1843). Secondly, the English propagandists
of emigration, including Archbishop Whately and Dr Arnold, enhanced the
attractions of free colonies by depicting convict colonies in the darkest
colours. In 1837-8 a Parliamentary Committee was appointed, took evidence, and
recommended the abolition of transportation. Accordingly, the transportation
of convicts to New South Wales ceased in 1840; penal establishments were
removed to Van Diemen’s Land and Norfolk Island; and Brisbane, which was now
purged was sold to settlers (1842). The same Committee secured the abolition
of the practice of assigning convicts, who had been invaluable as shepherds.
Wool was the staple export of Australia; shepherds were scarce, and the
interests of sheepmasters began to conflict with those of the rest of the community.
Town was ppposed to country.
The
disappearance of convicts was accompanied by English Acts instituting in New
South Wales trial by jury in criminal cases (1839) and a quinquennial
Legislative Council with 36 members, two-thirds of whom were elected by voters
with a property franchise (1840). The Act of 1840 also authorised the Queen by
charter to sever from New South Wales territory north of 26° lat., and the
Governor to establish elective district Councils by proclamation. In 1842 the
South Australian Commissioners were abolished; and South Australia became a
Crown colony with a nominee Legislative Council like Van Diemen’s Land and New
Zealand.
During the
third period the Legislative Council of New South Wales was acutely conscious
that the only matters in which it was interested, namely, the trade, the lands,
and the peopling of Australia, were matters over which it had no control.
Wrongly attributing the distress of 1840 to the English Orders in Council and
the Act raising the price of Crown lands (1842), it demanded their repeal. An
English Act (1846), and Order in Council (1847), divided the country into
settled, intermediate and unsettled districts, and converted squatting licenses
into leases for one, eight, and fourteen years respectively, with preemptive
rights for the squatters, except in settled districts. This measure occasioned
still greater ferment, urban politicians exclaiming that squatters were being
endowed, rural politicians that squatters were being robbed.
With regard
to convicts the Home authorities made mistakes, the extent of which was
exaggerated. Squatters wanted stockmen; and exiles or comparatively venial
criminals, pardoned 011 condition of not
1844-68] Exploration,—Advance
in prosperity.
795
returning
home, were sent out in answer to rural petitions to supply the void. In 1848,
in pursuance of a resolution of the Legislative Council of New South Wales,
ticket-of-Ieave men were sent out as well as exiles, but without the free
people for whom the Council stipulated. The omission aroused stormy protests in
Sydney and Melbourne. Van Diemen’s Land, which was overloaded with convicts,
organised an Anti-Transportation League with federal branches in eastern
Australia (1850), and transportation to New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land
finally ceased in 1851 and 1853 respectively. Meanwhile Western Australia, the
first free Australian colony, petitioned for convicts (1849), which it received
during-1850-68. During that time this colony remained outside the main stream
of Australasian history socially, politically, and economically.
Stagnation in
Western Australia and extensive and intensive development in eastern Australia
contributed to these results. In 1844-5 Leichhardt travelled through unknown
country from Darling Downs to Port Essington (Northern Territory), which was at
that time occupied by marines as a port of call (1838-50); Mitchell explored
the headwaters of the Maranoa and Warrego, thus completing the exploration of
the Darling-Murray river system, and Sturt’s (1844) and Kennedy’s explorations
(1845) made the Barcoo or Cooper’s Creek river system known. These expeditions
created Queensland. Hitherto, Brisbane had been an appendage of Sydney; it now
began to be the capital of the country on its north and west. Three fruitless
expeditions followed these discoveries. Eyre travelled along the Great Bight
from Adelaide to Albany; Leichhardt started to cross from Darling Downs to the
west coast; and Kennedy went overland to Cape York. The last two journeys ended
disastrously (1848), and the fate of Leichhardt and his numerous retinue is
shrouded in mystery. Purchase did for New Zealand what exploration did for
Australia. During his first period of rule (1845-53) Sir George Grey, after
subduing Heke, Te Rauparaha, and their associates, by physical-and moral force,
bought almost all South Island, the east coast district of North Island from
Wellington to Napier, and some scattered coastal plots north-west of
Wellington. Roads were built connecting Wellington with the newly purchased
lands on its north-east and north-west. The greater part of South Island was
uninhabited, and was bought for less than Is. a square mile.
In Australia
adversity was followed by prosperity. During Sir George Grey’s government
(1841-5) wheat fields, copper mines, and a gift of about £200,000 by the Home
authorities made South Australia solvent and prosperous. The recovery of New
South Wales was equally rapid, owing partly to the thrift of Sir George Gipps,
partly to the revival of its neighbours, but chiefly to the discovery of gold.
Hargraves of Sydney, who had been a gold-digger in California (1849),
discovered gold near Bathurst, and informed the Governor, Sir Charles Fitzroy,
who opened the first Australian goldfield in May, 1851. Further discoveries were
made; and
before 1852
goldfields were opened in Victoria at Ballarat and Bendigo. The wild rush from
Port Phillip to the diggings, fifty or a hundred miles away, threatened to
disorganise every industry; but the disturbance was only temporary. In five years
Victoria exported £39,000,000, and New South Wales £7,000,000 in gold, without
diminishing their normal exports, except in 1852-3. The effect on population
was unparalleled. If we may anticipate the colonial boundaries which were
subsequently adopted, the figures of population for the years 1850-1 and
1855-6, in each respective case, were as follows: New South Wales
187,000,253,000; Victoria 77,000, 364,000; South Australia 64,000, 97,000;
Tasmania, 69,000, 70,000. The New Zealand figures were in 1851, 27,000, in
1856, 46,000; those of Queensland were in 1850-1,9000, in 1856,17,000. The
increased population was due to a vast spontaneous immigration, not from the
sister colonies, but from the mother country. Spontaneous immigration, which
before 1851 had been almost limited to capitalists, became for the first time a
force in Australian history.
Great
constitutional changes accompanied these revolutions in the nature, number,
distribution, and pursuits of the population. In 1845, the New Zealand Company
asked to be made proprietors of a province, which was to consist of South
Island and the neighbourhood of Wellington, and was to be regarded as a colony
won hy occupation, while the rest of North Island was to be regarded as a
colony won by cession. Their request was refused; but, in Decemher, 1846, Earl
Grey, then Secretary for the Colonies, divided New Zealand into these two
provinces, and tentatively suggested a scheme for their federal government.
Objections were taken to indirect election, which was a feature in the scheme,
and to subsidiary provisions which threatened the confiscation of native waste
lands; accordingly, the scheme was suspended for five years by an English Act
(1848). During the suspension, Sir George Grey created a nominee Council for
the southern province, and with Earl Grey discussed and devised the ultimately
adopted scheme. In the meantime, the New Zealand Company sold Otago to an
“Association of lay members of the Free Church of Scotland;” and Canterbury
Plains to a hody of English Churchmen incorporated as the “ Canterbury
Association” (1848). Shortly afterwards it expired. As discussion proceeded,
the two provinces swelled to six, and were named Auckland, New Plymouth,
Wellington, Nelson, Canterbury, and Otago. Each province was to have an elected
Superintendent and Council, with power to legislate on various matters,
subject to the assent of the Governor. Intercolonial matters such as those
concerned with the system of government, with the authority of the supreme
Court of Law, with customs, currency, posts and the like, were reserved to the
General Assembly of the Colony. The latter was to consist of the Governor, and
of two 'Houses, the Legislative Council being nominated for life, and the House
of Representatives being elected on a property franchise. Elections were to be
direct. As before, the
Governor was
to be autocratic in buying native lands and in dealing with the natives, but no
means were provided for mak. g his autocracy <:ffect’ve. This arrangement
was embodied in an English Act .(1852), and came into force after Sir Geoi ge
Grey’s departure (1854).
In Australia,
as in New Zealand, the necessity for division provided the opportunity for
reform. In response to demands for the separation of Victoria from New South
Wales, Earl Grey proposed (1847) to give to the district Councils, created by
the Act of 1842, the election of the representative chamber of each colony; to
endow each colony with a bicameral Constitution, and to federate Australia
under a Governor- General and a central legislature. Western Australia was
excluded until it should become self-supporting. Indirect election, and the
fact that the district Councils of 1842 had never taken root, were obvious
objections to the scheme, which was accordingly withdrawn.
In 1848 Earl
Grey’s scheme was revised by the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and
Plantations, which advised the creation of a federal “House of Delegates” from
the colonial legislatures, and the grant to the latter of Constitutions,
modelled on that of New South Wales, but with power to prepare plans for
responsible government (1849). This advice was embodied in the necessary
English Act (1850); and the new Constitutions for Victoria, South Australia and
Tasmania— the new name adopted by Van Diemen’s Land—came into force in 1851.
All these colonies adopted responsible institutions with power to change their
Constitution, with control over Crown lands and the proceed’ of sale thereof,
and with power to impose customs duties, unless differential. These
arrangements were modified in 1878, but it would appear that, until 1895 no
Australian colony could have granted a preference to the United Kingdom. In all
these schemes the Upper House was longer lived and composed of fewer members
than the Lower House. In New South Wales members of the Upper House were
nominated for life, elsewhere they were elected on a high property franchise
from large electoral stricts, or, as in South Australia, from one electorate coextensive
with the colony. Federation was ignored. Imperial Acts sanctioned these
arrangements (1855), which came into operation in 1856. One result of the
Crimean War was that the Departments of War and the Colonies were separated,
and a Secretary of State for the Colonies alone appointed (1854).
During the
fourth period constitutional, agrarian, and mining legislation in the different
Australasian colonies advanced on parallel Knps South Australia,
from the first, adopted triennial Parliaments; manhood suffrage for the
Assembly, and a sexennial elective Council. In a few years all her sister
colonies conformed to the South Australian type, New South Wales alone
retaining her nominee Council. Again, South Australia secured free trade in
land by the enactment in 1858 of Sir Robert Torrens’ system of registering
titles to land; and the other
798 Victoria, Queensland, South and Western
Australia. [1855-71
Australasian
colonies promptly followed her example. Everywhere the ready-money sales by
auction, and the immigration funds established in 1831 and 1842, were swept
away, and unimproved rural land was opened to “free selection”—a process which
meant different things in different colonies, but the essence of which was to
reestablish non-competitive conditional purchases of limited rural holdings
with deferred payments, and to bring less settled districts more into line with
those that were wholly settled.
Victorian
gold attracted Chinamen; disorders took place; and a £10 entrance fee was
imposed, first in Victoria (1855), then in adjacent colonies. Still graver
disorders arose at Ballarat (1854). Tactless searches for unlicensed
gold-diggers, and the unpunished murder of a drunken digger provoked riots, and
in one case arson. A Commission was appointed, with the avowed purpose of
superseding the licenses, and the murderer was duly tried and condemned. But
the rioters were not pacified. They hoisted a rebel flag, drilled, built a
fort, and hustled the soldiers and police. On December 3, 1854, the soldiers
stormed the Eureka Stockade, as the fort was called, losing seventeen, but
inflicting a loss of twice that number. Twelve prisoners were tried for high
treason and acquitted. Lalor, the ringleader, who was wounded in the assault,
was not tried, and afterwards became Speaker of the Victorian Assembly. The
system of issuing monthly licenses to gold-diggers was abolished.
The colonies
vied with one another, not only in legislation but in exploration. This chiefly
concerned Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia. Sir Augustus
Gregory crossed from the Western Australian border to Carpentaria, followed a
variant of Leichhardt’s route to Brisbane, and then went by the Barcoo and
Cooper’s Creek to Adelaide (1855-6). In 1859, Queensland, whose squatters were
just reaching the Burdekin and Barcoo, was severed from New South Wales, and
received a Constitution like that of its parent colony. In 1860, Burke and
Wills headed a Victorian expedition from Cooper’s Creek to the Gulf of Carpentaria,
and perished on their return at Cooper’s Creek. Numerous search parties traversed
Carpentaria, and the Georgina and Diamentina districts, which were occupied
shortly afterwards. In 1862, Stuart crossed the continent from Adelaide to
Adelaide River and back; then, Northern Territory, or the territory north of
26° lat., was added to South Anst.rn.lin, Port Darwin was founded, and a
telegraph wire was constructed along Stuart’s arid track to connect it with an
English cable at Port Darwin (1872). Stations were occupied along the wire, but
at long intervals. In 1870 Sir John Forrest traced out a telegraph route from
Albany to Adelaide, which proved to be Eyre’s route reversed.
In the same
year representative institutions were introduced into Western Australia, which
now reentered the general political life of the continent. Its connexion with
convicts had already ceased. The
X845-7i] Progress of New Zealand. Troubles with
natives. 799
population of
Australasia in 1871 was as follows: Victoria, 731,528; New South Wales,
503,981; South Australia, 185,626; Queensland, 120,104; Tasmania, 101,785;
Western Australia, 25,353; New Zealand, 256,393.
The progress
of New Zealand thus disclosed was due partly to the energy of the provinces,
which were now ten in number, Hawke’s Bay having been severed from Wellington,
Westland and Marlborough from Nelson, and Southland from Otago; partly to gold
discoveries, chiefly in Westland and Otago, and partly to the agricultural
riches of Canterbury. South Island developed like Victoria, though on a smaller
scale. Meanwhile, so much of North Island as lay south of Auckland and north
of a line drawn from the mouth of the Whanganui to Napier, underwent
experiences unlike any to which Australian colonists were exposed.
Owing to the
construction put upon the property franchise, the Maori had no vote, and their
dealings with Europeans were still regulated by the Governor, whose
responsibility was personal. Sir George Grey’s personal influence over the
Maori was immense; that of his successor, Sir Thomas Gore Browne, was nil.
Moreover, Governor Browne saw things through the eyes of a “ native
department,” controlled by the colonial Ministers. So the Maori tried to work
out their own salvation; and three allied tribes, which inhabited the Waikato
district, banded themselves together, one of the three chiefs calling himself
King. No conflict resulted from this empty assumption. But at Taranaki, the
capital of New Plymouth, the ideas and interests of colonists and Maori were
diametrically opposed. The awards of 1845 seriously cramped Taranaki; the most
influential chiefs opposed further sales of their tribelands; and Sir Edward
Stafford’s Ministry passed Bills for partitioning tribelands, which the Home
authorities disallowed. About this time Parris, a sub-commissioner for the
purchase by the Crown of Maori lands, purchased from Taylor, a member of the
Ngati-Awa, the “Waitara block” on the left bank of the Waitara, near Taranaki
(1859). Taylor was repudiated by William King, the most important chief of the
Ngati-Awa, who occupied the block. Parris was justified by his departmental
superior, Sir Donald MacLean, and by the colonial Ministry, although the claim
of an individual and relatively unimportant tribesman to sell tribelands would
not now be seriously entertained. Governor Browne, without further enquiry,
summoned his Executive Council, and with their approval issued orders;
whereupon King’s tribesmen and their local allies were attacked and driven off
the Waitara block (1860). Technically the Governor was alone responsible, but
the Executive Council of Ministers, one of whom gave orders directly to Parris,
shared the blame. On the other side, Te Rewi, one of the three principal chiefs
of the “King-State,” though hitherto hostile to William King, sent warriors to
his aid. An armed truce ensued, King’s local allies occupying Tataraimaka
block—which was admittedly English—English soldiers occupying Waitara block.
In 1861 Sir
George Grey succeeded Sir Thomas Gore Browne as
Governor,
accepted the inevitable, and devolved responsibility for native policy on the
colonial Government (November, 1861)—an arrangement which the Duke of Newcastle
ratified (August, 1862), and which the colony finally accepted (December,
1863). Persuasion having failed, Sir George Grey in 1863 reoccupied Tataraimaka
bloodlessly, but by force, and urged on his reluctant Ministers the restitution
of the Waitara block. Before this was effected the local Maori, instigated by
Te Rewi, renewed the war. Te Bewi was to blame, but it is difficult to answer
the criticism of the Duke of Newcastle, that “it would have been better if the
reoccupation of Tataraimaka and the abandonment of Waitara had been effected at
the same time." Owing to Te Rewi’s aggression the “ King-State ” was
invaded and conquered, and large tracts near Auckland were confiscated,
subject to reserves for natives (1863-4). In 1865 war still smouldered in New
Plymouth, where the hostile Maori adopted “ Hau-Hauism,” an unholy blend
between Christianity and tenets which in some cases led to cannibalism.
Accordingly a similar policy of confiscation was applied between Taranaki and
Whanganui, and a through road was designed. General Cameron, who commanded the
troops, denounced this policy, prosecuted the war languidly, and amongst other
things refused to attack a fortified position at Weraroa which he declared it
impossible to carry. Accordingly, Grey, in Cameron's absence, at the head of a
few colonials and some friendly Maori took the impossible position by storm.
Thenceforth the war was conducted by colonials and friendly Maori, who, out of
disgust for Hau-Hau practices, flocked to the English side. A “Native Rights
Act” (September 26, 1865) declared, for the first time, that Maori were
natural-born subjects of the Queen; the institution of a native Land Court
guaranteed the Maori against the repetition of the blunder of the Waitara
block; and the removal of the capital to Wellington assured northerners of help
from their southern compatriots.
Although the
war dragged on until 1872, the last campaign which could be strictly so called
occurred in 1870, when colonial and Maori troops marched across the centre of
the island from Whanganui to East Cape. Eleven tribes, few of which had ever
fought on the same side before, fought during this campaign under the English
banner. The tribes were at last united. Only the “King-State” and some wild
mountaineers near East Cape preserved for a time an attitude of unfriendly
isolation. Special Maori representation for both Houses of the Assembly was
accorded in 1867 and 1871 respectively. The significance of the war, from a
Maori point of view, was the union of the two races. Its significance, from an
English point of view, was threefold. First, the Treaty of Waitangi made New
Zealand a colony by cession; but large parts, especially in South Island, were
undistinguishable from colonies acquired by occupation, and now a coastal
fringe in North Island was acquired by conquest. Secondly, by the transfer of
native control to
the colonial
government (1863), responsible institutions were carried to their logical
conclusion. Thirdly, as a corollary to this extension of autonomy, Lord
Granville withdrew the last imperial troops from New Zealand (October, 1869;
March 25,1870), as well as from Australia. These events assimilated New Zealand
to its Australian sister colonies in every important respect, except in its
possession of provincial governments, which were not abolished till 1875.
Periodic
meetings of the Ministers of different Australasian colonies, and the
introduction of Melanesian labourers into the cotton and sugar plantations of
Queensland occurred during the sixties, and initiated movements which ended
respectively, in the annexation of some islands of the Pacific from 1874
onwards, and in the federation of Australia (1900).
THE FAR EAST.
(1815-71.)
(1) CHINA AND
HER INTERCOURSE WITH WESTERN POWERS.
The period treated in this section was
occupied by a conflict of the acutest character between an ancient civilisation
that had become stagnant, and another of much later origin, but of far greater vigour,
which had overtaken and outstripped its rival. The Chinese had invented the art
of printing from engraved wooden blocks in the sixth century; it was not till
the middle of the fifteenth that Europeans discovered the use of movable
types—and this fact is typical. Again, the Chinese have never got beyond the
use of complicated written characters similar to the Egyptian hieroglyphics,
and have neither invented nor adapted an alphabet. These instances will suffice
to mark the far-reaching difference between them and Occidental nations.
It will be
convenient to divide the period into three portions:—
From 1815 to
1842, the Western Power which carried on the conflict being mainly Great
Britain; from 1843 to 1860, when France and the United States began to cooperate
with her; from 1860 to 1871, when these and other Powers, including Russia,
maintained diplomatic establishments at the Chinese capital, Peking.
Until the
middle of the sixteenth century, China had scarcely heard of the existence of
Western nations. From time immemorial she had been a centre of enlightenment to
the countries in her immediate vicinity— to Corea, Japan, Annam, Siam, Burma
and Thibet, most of which recognised her superiority in power and wisdom, and
were content with the relation of vassal to suzerain. To use the Chinese
expression, “all men under heaven” owed allegiance to the Emperor of China.
Other nations came to her to do homage and buy her valuable productions; but of
these nations she had no need. That any other sovereign should claim equality
with the Emperor was inconceivable. China was the only land of culture, and, in
the words of an imperial edict of 1818, “the Empire, in ruling and restraining
the barbarians beyond its boundaries, gives to them always fixed rules and regulations.
Upon those who are obedient it lavishes its rich favours; but to the rebellious
and disobedient it displays its terrors.” “ If the barbarians are contumelious,
they should be chastised; if brought under subjection, they should be
tolerated.” The
Chinese Hong
(Guild) merchants were appointed “ for the continual instruction and guidance
of the barbarians, and to repress their pride and profligacy.” The King of
England is in official documents constantly described as having been
“reverentially submissive,” and he is said to have “repeatedly presented
tribute.” On the occasion of Lord Amherst’s embassy to Peking in 1816, it was
demanded of him that he should perform the ceremony of thrice kneeling and nine
times bowing the head to the ground before the Chinese Emperor; and, because he
declined to pay higher marks of respect than he would to his own sovereign, he
was dismissed in disgrace without being accorded an audience. In 1857 the
American charge d'affaires writes to the High Commissioner at Canton that the
fountain of all difficulties between China and for ign nations is the
unwillingness of China to acknowledge England, France, America and other ^reat
nations of the West as her equals. Even so late as 1870 we find that the
Chinese officials, in addressing their own sovereign, continually spoke of the
foreign diplomatic representatives as if they were not only the subjects of
the Emperor of China, but even the subordinates of the Chinese officials. The
treatment to which the foreign merchants and the English officials were
subjected corresponded to this haughty language.
These
pretensions were not supported by any real military power or capacity. The
Chinese were peace-loving, industrious, and imbued with the mercantile spirit.
They despised the career of the soldier, and were lacking in the tradition of
exploits achieved by warriors against the foreign foe. The Tartars, who had
conquered the country in the seventeenth century, had contented themselves with
placing garrisons in the principal cities, where the descendants of warlike
ancestors soon lost all love of fighting. Their arms, consisting of swords,
spears, cannon and matchlocks, were greatly inferior to those possessed by
Europeans, and in the art of navigation they were equally at a disadvantage.
The rank and file were not wanting in physical courage; but the officers were
ignorant of the art of war, incompetent and unfit to lead, so that, when armed
conflict arose, the Chinese forces were incapable of effective resistance. They
were either put to the rout with the greatest ease, or if they resisted were
slain in numbers out of all proportion to the losses of their assailants.
Now, the
Englishmen who went to Canton from India belonged to a .’ace that had just
emerged triumphantly from a great war in Europe; and they were accustomed to
domineer over Asiatics. Ready to resent insults by the application of physical
force, they had no fear of an unarmed crowd; and, from their history and
traditions, they were not disposed to submit to the exercise over them by their
own officials of any authority which was not based upon legal enactments. If
such a community could but enlist the sympathy of their own Government in
respect to the treatment under which they chafed, the result would
804 Difficulties in the way of establishing
relations. [1816-70
probably be
the use of force to redress their wrongs and to obtain for them greater
commercial privileges; and the superiority of the British military power
promised an easy victory. The task was rendered easier by the want of cohesion
among the provinces of China. The Manchu conquerors had thought it more prudent
to leave to them a large measure of local autonomy, so long as they paid their
quotas for the maintenance of the Court. Particularism was the keynote of both
civil and military administration, and the natives of different provinces
hardly knew that they had a common country. The troubles that arose in the
south did not affect the central or northern parts of the country. If the
Governor-General of Canton got into difficulties with the English, if his forts
were captured, his war-junks destroyed, and the city itself forced to pay a
heavy ransom as the price of being spared an assault, his immediate neighbour,
the Governor-General of Fuhkien, did not regard it as his duty to render
assistance, or even to abstain from friendly relations with the English, and
Cantonese willingly enrolled themselves to carry the scaling ladders for the
English troops, which took by assault the forts at the mouth of the river that
was the highway to Peking.
In passing
judgment upon the decisions taken by Western Governments, and by their agents
in the Far East, it should be borne in mind that the usual time required for a
report from China to arrive in Europe and for instructions to reach the
officers on the spot, was at least ten months, up to 1846; after which date the
voyage one way was reduced to about fifty days, and in 1853 to about
forty-four. Even after 1864, when telegraphic communication had been partially
established, the news of the massacre of Tientsin in July, 1870, took
thirty-five days to reach Europe. Governments were therefore much less able
than in more modem days to control the proceedings of their agents, while
agents, being often obliged to take momentous action, acquired a habit of
deciding for themselves rather than await instructions. Although the
telegraphic wire is capable of being misused, as a rule it is an instrument
that prevents war.
The English
trade to China was a monopoly of the East India Company, which traded thither
in its own ships. The Company was represented at Canton, the only port open to
commerce, by a select committee of supercargoes, who resided ordinarily at
Macao, proceeding annually to Canton for the tea season. They were not permitted
to bring their wives with them to Canton, to enter the walled city, or to roam
about the country. So long as they submitted peacefully to these restrictions
they were fairly well treated; but difficulties frequently arose out of
affrays between the Chinese people and the foreign sailors, as the Chinese
authorities always demanded the surrender of the foreigner who had killed or
wounded a Chinese subject. The rule of a life for a life was applied strictly,
without any of the mitigations recognised by the Chinese penal code, whether
the homicide was
committed
accidentally or in self-defence, but there was no interference tn commercial
disputes where both the parties Were foreigners. Besides the Company’s ships,
other vessels owned in India, known as “ country ships,” were allowed to engage
in the Indian trade, and a certain number of private merchants were also
tolerated. As the time drew near for the renewal of the Company’s Charter in
1834, the agitation for the abolition of its monopoly of the China trade,
fostered by the private traders, and by the merchants of Liverpool, Manchester,
Birmingham and Sheffield, became too strong to be resisted. It was shown that
the annual profits of the Company from the China trade from 1815 to 1829 had
averaged over a million sterling. The British Government had been led to
believe by reports received from Canton, that the Chinese Government itself
desired a change, and that it would welcome the transfer of the control of the
trade exercised by the Select Committee to a Superintendent of Trade appointed
by the British Government. This was a grievous misunderstanding, which was not
discovered until Lord Napier arrived in China and demanded to be received by
the Governor- General of Canton on a footing of equality, as the official
representative of England.
It is
necessary to bear in mind that at this moment the Foreign Secretary was Lord
Palmerston, whose presence, either at the Foreign Office or in some other
influential position in the Ministry, will be found to cover all the occasions
during 1830-65 on which a strong coercive policy in support of British trade
was adopted towards the Chinese Government. When the Chinese authorities first
heard of the expected abolition of the East India Company’s monopoly, they
informed the Select Committee that someone must be appointed to take its place;
but they had never contemplated the substitution of an official personage,
claiming to represent the British Government, for a trading company’s
commercial agent. The Viceroy accordingly refused to hold any communication
with Napier, and threatened to stop the trade unless he withdrew to Macao.
Perceiving that the support of a military force alone would enable him to
maintain his position, Napier proceeded to Macao. The climate of Canton and his
intense application to business had brought on & fever, aggravated by the
annoyances and insults to which he was subjected by petty Chinese officials on
his passage down. His condition rapidly grew worse, and, a fortnight after he
had reached the friendly shelter of the Portuguese colony, death put an end to
his troubles on October 11,1834.
During his
stay at Canton Napier urgently recommended to Lord Palmerston the despatch of a
small British force with three or four ships of war, which, he judged, would
suffice to overcome any opposition, and that possession should be taken of the
island of Hongkong. But his letters reached England after Lord Grey’s
Government had fallen, and <?ame into the hands of the Duke of Wellington,
who replied curtly on February 2, 1835, in the tone which the Directors of the
Company
had always
adopted towards similar representations from the Select Committee, that the
King’s intention was to establish commercial intercourse, not by force, but by
measures of conciliation.
The
Superintendency remained at Macao, in accordance with the policy outlined in a
memorandum signed by the Duke of Wellington during his short tenure of the
Foreign Office in 1835. Unfortunately, no notice was taken of the fact that the
authority of the East India Company’s representatives had been destroyed, and
that the Chinese had not recognised that of the Chief Superintendent of Trade
in its place. Hence no control existed over the proceedings of British subjects
either ashore or afloat, and to this fact are to be traced the international
difficulties that culminated in the war of 1839-42.
Elliot, a
naval officer who had been sent out to hold the subordinate office of Master
Attendant, on being placed in charge of the Super* intendency at the end of
1836, came to the conclusion that it would be better to endeavour to reopen
communications with the Chinese authorities; and he even consented to use the
obnoxious word “ petition ” in addressing them, notwithstanding very precise
instructions to the contrary, and thus led the Chinese authorities to infer
that he possessed the same powers as the old Select Committee.
Besides this
vital question, which Elliot had thus raised, of the conditions of carrying on
official communications with the Chinese authorities, there was another
relating to the Chinese claim to exercisfe jurisdiction over foreigners in
cases of homicide. Thirdly, there were the accumulated debts of the Hong
merchants, amounting to some £600,000, and finally the question of suppressing
the traffic in opium.
As this last
is a matter in regard to which strong condemnation of the course pursued by the
British and Indian Governments has been freely expressed by foreigners as well
as by many Englishmen, it is necessary to state the main facts of the case.
Opium was imported to and grown in China on a small scale from early times. The
import trade was at first in the hands of the Portuguese and Dutch. Opium
smoking was introduced at the end of the seventeenth century, but was
prohibited in 1729, though the drug continued to be admitted as a medicine.
From the end of the eighteenth century it was totally prohibited. Before 1773
the importation never exceeded 200 chests. The East India Company then assumed
the monopoly of the internal trade in Bengal opium, keeping up the price by
hindering the export of Malwa opium through the ports on the west coast. In
1830 the restrictions on the cultivation of the poppy in British territory were
removed. From 1787 to 1830 the average quantity sold for export was about 4000
chests. It continued to expand, till in 1836-9 the average was 30,000 chests.
In 1820 the Canton authorities stopped the smuggling that went on at the
anchorage of Whampoa, and the receiving ships betook themselves to the island
of Lintin, whence the opium was
transported
by Chinese smugglers, with the connivance of the local officials. The edicts
put forth from time to time remained without effect. The danger of the
situation was pointed out to Palmerston in 1836, but he held that this was a
Chinese affair. An expectation that the importation would be legalised was
disappointed, for the Court remained adverse. In 1837 Elliot was ordered by the
Chinese to send away the receiving ships, and his reply that he had not the
requisite powers was regarded as an evasion; but he eventually expelled the
British smuggling boats from the river, and informed the Governor-General that
he was at liberty to seize them. In January, 1839, the Chinese Government acted
on this intimation, and Commissioner Lin, sent from Peking for the express
purpose, ordered the merchants to deliver to him the opium in their possession.
To enforce this, he blockaded the factories and cut off all supplies. Elliot
then took the courageous step of calling on them to hand it over to him “ for the
service of the British Government,” and a quantity, valued officially at over
£1,250,000, was surrendered. The British Government, having previously
disclaimed all responsibility, refused to be bound by Elliot’s undertaking,
but, looking to the violence that had been employed, and to the previous
connivance of the authorities, held that the Chinese Government must provide
compensation.
The
confiscation at Canton gave an impulse to the trade on the coast; but no
serious attempt was made for its repression. To avoid the risk of armed
conflicts between the Chinese preventive service and British smugglers,
Palmerston suggested that it would be wiser to legalise the importation, and to
convert the drug into a source of revenue. Similar instructions were given to
Pottinger when he was sent out in 1841; and, at the time of the signature of
the Treaty of Nanking, he presented a memorandum to this effect. The Chinese
replied that no representations could be made to the Emperor on the subject.
Repeated efforts were made, up to 1847, to induce them to yield on this point,
but without success. In 1858, however, in the negotiations at Shanghai as to
the tariff which was to be appended to the Treaty of Tientsin, the question was
revived. The Chinese plenipotentiaries accepted the proposal to admit opium,
subject to a duty, which, after some discussion, was fixed at 80 taels (£10) a
chest, and the agreement was embodied in a separate customs “rule regarding
certain commodities heretofore contraband.” From 1845 until 1857 the
importation grew continually larger, and in 1869 it attained the quantity of
78,210 chests. All this time, the production in China increased with
corresponding rapidity. The extent to which the habit had spread may be
inferred from comparing these figures with those of 1778.
In 1869,
during negotiations for the revision of the Treaty of Tientsin, the Chinese
Ministers made a further attempt to obtain the cooperation of England in
suppressing the trade. They were told that, even if y.nglflnrl allowed opium to
be treated as contraband, China was in no
position to
prevent its being smuggled, and that, if India ceased to grow it, other
tropical countries could, and would, produce it without limit. The subject was
then dropped.
To return to
the general'narrative of events. After the surrender of the opium Elliot
proceeded to Hongkong (not yet a British possession)* whither he was followed
by the British merchants. Negotiations took place, which finally broke down,
and the Chinese provincial authorities issued what was practically a
declaration of war. Elliot’s despatches of May, 1839, relating what had
happened, together with a memorial from the leading firms trading to Canton,
reached England in September, 1839. The Cabinet came to the conclusion that
steps must be taken to place future relations with China on a definite and
secure footing. With this object, they decided to send out a small naval and
military force, to blockade the Canton and Peiho rivers, and to seize Chusan or
some other island as a rendezvous for the expedition, and ultimately as a
permanent base for the commercial establishments. The demands which Elliot and
his cousin the Admiral were to present at the Peiho included satisfaction for
the insult offered to the British Crown in the person of its representative,
payment for the opium extorted as the price of the lives of British subjects
arbitrarily confined at Canton, payment of the debts of the Hong merchants, and
a share of the cost of the expedition. A letter was also addressed by
Palmerston to the Minister of the Chinese Emperor setting forth the grounds of
complaint—particularly the conduct of the Chinese Government in allowing the
opium trade to go on for a long series of years, and then suddenly attacking
the British subjects implicated, instead of punishing the officials who had
connived at it—and formally enumerating the British demands. As satisfaction
for the insult to their agent, the British Government were willing to accept
the cession of one or more islands from which trade could be carried on with
the ports of China, or, if the Chinese Government preferred it, the conclusion
of a commercial treaty. China would be free to fix her own customs tariff and
to confiscate any goods prohibited by her laws. British subjects charged with
offences were to be tried by a British Court according to their own laws. Great
Britain declared that she did not desire to obtain any privileges of trade
which would not be equally extended to the subjects of every other nation.
The
Government were vigorously attacked by the Opposition, on the ground of their
neglect to furnish to their agent powers and instructions to cope with the
growing evils connected with the contraband traffic in opium, and secured a
majority of only nine—a result which did not affect their determination to
adopt energetic measures. The above-mentioned expedition reached China in the
course of the summer of 1840, and occupied Chusan; the plenipotentiaries
proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, but found it impracticable to force
acceptance of the demands of the British Government with the inadequate force
at their disposal.
1841-s] Attack on Canton.—Mission of Pottinger.
809
Fruitless
negotiations were opened in the south with the Chinese Commissioner Keshen.
Elliot, however, occupied the outer forts on the Canton river, and compelled
the Chinese Commissioner to come to an agreement. The terms of this arrangement
being disapproved by both Governments, Elliot was summarily recalled and
superseded by Pottinger. Instructions were also sent out to reoccupy Chusan,
surrendered in consideration of Elliot’s abortive agreement. But, before
Pottinger could reach the scene, negotiations had proceeded, and a draft treaty
had been agreed to in February, 1841. Orders, however, came down from Peking to
renew hostilities; the remaining defences of Canton were carried in less than a
fortnight; and eventually the heights above the city were occupied, a ransom of
six million dollars being exacted, besides £80,000 as compensation for the
burning of the Spanish ship Biscaino and the losses of British merchants by the
destruction of the factories, which had followed on their departure. Trade was
resumed at Canton, and continued throughout the subsequent operations.
No time was
lost in despatching the reinforcements which events had shown to be necessary,
and Pottinger arrived in China in August, 1841, bearing instructions
practically identical with those addressed to his predecessor. Amoy was
captured on August 26; Chusan was reoccupied, in spite of its huge defences, on
October 1; and on October 10 the naval and military forces appeared before
Chinhai, which was speedily taken by assault. Ningpo fell on October 13; but
further operations were postponed till the following spring. On their
resumption in March, 1842, Tzechi, about ten miles inland from Ningpo, was
captured; Chapu on May 18; Woosung on June 16; and Shanghai three days later.
The force then proceeded up the Yangtze river, and assaulted Chinkiang on July
20, anchoring finally off Nanking on August 21. Negotiations were begun without
loss of time, and a treaty, called after that city, was signed on August 29. It
contained the greater portion of the articles of a draft which had been sent
out to Elliot and his fellow-plenipotentiary two years before. Hongkong, which
had been proclaimed British territory by Elliot on the strength of a verbal
promise given to him by Keshen, was now formally ceded to the British Crown. A
war indemnity was agreed to of twelve million dollars, from which were to be
deducted any sums received for the ransom of towns and cities in China
subsequent to August 1,1841. This did not include the six million dollars paid
as a ransom for Canton in the previous May. Additional articles provided for
the release of all British subjects then in Chinese hands; for an amnesty to
all Chinese subjects who had had intercourse with British officers or had
entered the British service; for the promulgation of a fair tariff of import
and export duties; for correspondence between British and Chinese officials on
a footing of equality; and for the retention of Chusan and the island of
Kulangsu at Amoy, until the articles of the treaty, including the arrangements
for opening the ports of Canton, Amoy,
810 United States diplomacy in China. [i784r-i844
Foochow,
Ningpo and Shanghai, should be carried out. This treaty was supplemented* on
June 26,1843, by an agreement that the transit duties to be levied on British
goods should not exceed the existing rates, which were assumed to be on a
moderate scale. A further treaty signed at Hu-men-chai in the Canton river, on
October 8 of the same year, comprised general regulations for the conduct of
trade, among which were a very important provision reserving to the British
Crown the punishment of British subjects committing crimes and offences in
China, a mostfavoured-nation clause, an article conceding the right to station
a cruiser at each of the ports, and one providing that small coasters of
British nationality, such as schooners, cutters, lorchas, and the like, should
carry a sailing letter or register issued by the Chief Superintendent of Trade.
The first
American ship arrived at Canton in 1784; and two years later a merchant was
appointed Consul; but the Chinese Government refused to recognise his official
status. When Commissioner Lin blockaded the foreign factories in 1839, and
refused permission to any one to depart until the opium was surrendered, the
Americans were subjected to the same treatment as the English. Their share in
the opium trade had been insignificant, and they were able to remain at Canton
after the English had withdrawn and to carry on the trade of the port, until it
was blockaded in June, 1840. When the news of Pottinger’s treaty was received,
the President sent a message to Congress, recommending an appropriation to meet
the cost of sending a Commissioner to China. The House of Representatives
reported in favour of the proposal and justified the recent action of England
by observing that the war had originated in the refusal of the Chinese Government
to receive Ministers appointed by the British sovereign, and in the rejection
and expulsion with insult and indignity of Lord Napier ; that a series of
similar outrages inflicted on other British diplomatic officers, followed by
the seizure and destruction of several shiploads of opium belonging to British
subjects, had finally kindled the war, the origin of which had erroneously been
attributed to this last incident alone; and that the object of Great Britain
had been to compel the imperial despot to treat with the sovereign of another
empire, not less powerful, upon terms of perfect equality and reciprocity. This
American vindication of British policy is remarkable. The choice of the
President finally fell upon Caleb Cusning, who proved himself a highly capable
diplomatist. His instructions left him a wide discretion, fully justified by
the event. Notice was given beforehand of the mission; but, when Cushing
arrived at Macao, in February, 1844, he found that no one had been appointed to
treat with him. By a judicious use of firm yet courteous language he finally
prevailed on the Court to despatch to Macao as plenipotentiary the same high
official who had negotiated with Pottinger; and he was able, on July 8, to sign
a treaty of friendship and commerce. This speedy conclusion was promoted by the
desire of the Chinese plenipotentiary
to get the
American negotiations out of the way before the arrival of the French mission,
whose advent was daily expected. Cushing’s Treaty was, in many particulars, an
improvement on the Treaty of Nanking. The articles providing for the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States as to crimes committed by its citizens, and
in civil cases in which no Chinese subject was concerned, and for
most-favoured-nation treatment, were more clearly drawn. Provision was also
made for the transmission of communications between the United States
Government and the Court of Peking through the highest provincial authorities
in the region of the five ports, and for the permanence of the tariff until the
American Government should consent to its revision. Opium was declared to be
contraband, and United States citizens trading in it were made liable to be
dealt with by the Chinese Government, without being entitled to the protection
of their own Government. Lastly, by notes "{changed between Cushing and
the Chinese plenipotentiary, it was agreed that, if the Ministers of other
Western Powers were admitted to Peking, the United States envoy would also be
received there.
England had
borne the burden and heat of the day in opening the ports to the commerce of
the world, and had thus incurred the enmity of the Chinese Government and
people. It was not difficult for other Powers to enter the gate she had forced
open, and, by contrasting their own moderation with her annexation of Chinese
territory and her exaction of a large money indemnity, to obtain further
concessions. England in her turn participated in the benefits secured by the
United States.
France was
not far behind in taking advantage of the Treaty of Nanking. She had already in
1842 despatched a diplomatic mission to observe and report on the proceedings
of the British expedition, and she now appointed Lagrene, an experienced
diplomatist, to negotiate a treaty of commerce. The British Government, it was
admitted, had ensured that the concessions obtained for itself should be
granted to all Europeans; but a French treaty was nevertheless regarded as a
necessity. Lagrene arrived in China in August, 1844, escorted by a powerful
squadron, and two months later signed a commercial treaty based on that of the
United States. French commerce in China was of insignificant amount, and the
efforts of the envoy were chiefly devoted towards securing a virtual
protectorate over the Roman Catholic converts. Roman Catholic missions had
been founded two and a half centuries earlier. After establishing confidential
relations by representing China’s need of an ally, he persuaded the Chinese
negotiator to memorialise the Emperor in favour of the native Christians. Lagrene
wrote to his Government that this episode was destined to establish French
policy in China on a firm and immovable basis. The Chinese negotiator’s
memorial was approved by an imperial rescript, and the French representative
was recognised to possess the right of intervening
812 Foreign protection of religious Missions,
[l807-60
to protect
the religious liberty of Roman Catholic converts. Guizot, in 1847, declared to
the Chamber that France had resumed the protectorate which she had been
compelled to abandon during the previous halfcentury. The rescript was
followed in February, 1846, by an imperial decree ordering the restitution of
the properties belonging to the religious communities founded in the
seventeenth century, provided that they had not been converted into pagan
temples or private dwellings. Thus was inaugurated a policy which was destined,
in the future, to have far- reaching effects upon the relations of China with
Western Powers.
Protestant
missions in China date only from 1807, when the Englishman Robert Morrison
landed at Canton; American missionaries first arrived in 1830. Lord Elgin, on
proceeding to China in 1857, was instructed to obtain protection for
missionaries travelling in the interior of the country; and it was added that
the British Government would gladly see in any treaty with China a renunciation
by the Chinese Government of any interference with Chinese converts to
Christianity. After the capture of Canton by the allied British and French
forces Eljf i informed the Chinese
Government that the persecution of native Christians in various parts of the
Empire was one of the matters on which he was empowered to treat; and, when the
plenipotentiaries of England, France, Russia and the United States reached
Tientsin in 1858, after the capture of the Taku forts, it was known that a
toleration clause would be inserted in the treaties which China would be
required to sign. Thus it came about that in the Russian Treaty, the first to
be signed, this provision found a place, and that the treaties signed
successively with the United States, Great Britain, and France contained
articles of a similar tenor.
Obviously
these toleration clauses, which were renewed in all subsequent treaties with
European States, gave to any Power that chose to exercise it a protectorate
over the native Christians belonging to its own section of the Church. Neither
Russia, nor the United States, nor England, cherished any such ambition. France
had obtained an undefined right of intervention on behalf of native Christians
in 1844, and looked to establishing her influence on that basis. The amplified
toleration article in her Treaty of 1858, besides stipulating in favour of
native converts for complete security for their persons and property, and the
free practice of their religious rites, further provided for the protection of
missionaries proceeding into the interior under passport, for the abrogation of
everything that had previously been written, proclaimed, or published against
Christianity by order of the Government, and that no obstacle should be placed
by the Chinese authorities in the way of any Chinese subject who might desire
to embrace Christianity. In the Peking Convention of 1860 the edict of 1846 was
inserted, without the limiting clause. Baron Gros, who negotiated it,
considered that the undertaking to restore to the French Minister, for the
benefit of
the native
Christian communities, all the churches, cemeteries, and other properties
confiscated throughout China during the persecutions was a complete set-off to
the conversion, in favour of England, of the perpetual lease of the tiny
peninsula of Kowloon into ownership. Not until some time after was it
discovered that a clause, not to be found in the French, had been inserted in
the Chinese, text, which permitted French missionaries to rent or purchase land
in all the provinces and to erect buildings thereon at pleasure. To avoid
disputes as to the true meaning of this Article, it was agreed in 1865 that
such lands should be registered in the name of the local native church, and not
in that of the missionaries. The important fact is that, while the remaining
cathedral in Peking and the sites of three others that had been destroyed were
readily handed over to the French authorities, pressure had to be applied in
other localities to obtain the execution of the Article. Another cause of
trouble was the claim of converts to be exempted from contributing to the cost
of national ceremonies of a religious character, while their priests sought to
protect them against the cupidity and injustice of the mandarins. Buddhists and
Confucian literati were equally hostile to those who treated the popular
superstitions with contempt. The great influx of Roman Catholic missionaries
after 1858, and their increased pretensions, provoked the alarm of the Chinese
Government. A few years later popular disturbances began to break out in
various parts of the country, and accusations were made that native Christians
exercised magic arts on young children, that they extracted their eyes and even
their souls for use in compounding medicines. No belief of this kind was too
gross for uneducated Chinese to swallow. A special ground of complaint was that
converts were compelled to destroy their ancestral tablets; and, in a country
where ancestor-worship is of the greatest importance, such an accusation was
certain to cause disturbance. Here and there, a missionary was beaten or
murdered, or a native Christian establishment pillaged and destroyed. In 1869,
the Government complained that Christianity, as preached in China, became an
attack on all native institutions, and showed itself subversive of the
established relations of rulers and people. They were puzzled to comprehend the
interest which the French Government took in the missions, and its claim,
asserted with so much warmth, to exercise a protectorate over the converts.
They consoled themselves with the hope that France herself might ere long be so
embroiled in Europe as to have little leisure or power to dictate the law to a
country so far distant as China. This was a remarkable anticipation of the
events of the following year.
The Roman
Catholic Missions included foundling hospitals, and it was alleged that
children were kidnapped by dishonest Chinese for sale to these institutions. In
May, 1870, rumours of this kind were current at Nanking, but the Viceroy
arranged for a public inspection of the buildings, and the rumours were at once
dissipated. In June, the same
stories
gained credence at Tientsin. Before measures could be taken to allay the
popular excitement the mob rose, and, led by malicious persons, lestroyed the
French missionary buildings and murdered ten Sisters of Mercy, the French
Consul, and several other Frenchmen, besides a party of Russians supposed to be
French. The Chinese officials, as usual on such occasions, lacked the courage
and the means for quelling the mob. The news reached Europe six days after the
declaration of war between France and Prussia; and the events which followed
rendered it impossible for the French Government to insist on adequate
reparation. Not until four months had elapsed was the French charge d'affaires
able to announce that a settlement had been arrived at. Sixteen of the rioters
were condemned to death and twenty-one to banishment, as were two of the
leading local officials ; a high functionary was sent to France to present an
apology from the Chinese Government; and a sum of about £80,000 was paid as an
indemnity for the lives that had been taken and for the buildings that had been
destroyed.
Already a
year before the Tientsin massacre the Chinese Government had complained
officially of the manner in which the propaganda of the missionaries was
carried on, and suggested that regulations should be framed to control the
conduct of converts and non-converts towards each other, and for placing the
missionaries under the control of the Chinese authorities. Early in 1871, they
returned to the subject with a definite set of proposals. The language of this
document showed that it was aimed at the Roman Catholic Missions, which it
compared to an infinite number of independent rival States in the heart of
another State. The Protestant Powers replied that the abuses complained of did
not concern them; while the French Government rejected the whole of the
proposals as inadmissible. The result of the step taken by China was thus what
is known in diplomacy as a Jin de non-recevoir.
After the
conclusion of the treaties of 1842, 1843, and 1844 the relations of foreigners
at the newly opened ports were generally of a peaceful character; but at Canton
attacks on the factories, assaults and even murders of foreigners occurred
repeatedly. The officials and populace had been too long accustomed to treat
foreigners with contempt, and they united in refusing to allow them to enter
the walls of the city. On the surface this appeared to be after all a matter of
no vital importance; but it was in reality the sign and symbol of the
unsatisfactory relations between China and the Maritime Powers. In 1847* two
serious instances of maltreatment of British officers and seamen, for which no
redress could be had, led to vigorous action on the part of Davis, the Governor
of Hongkong. In thirty-six hours all the forts defending Canton were
.successfully carried; but, even then, all that he could eeel it
safe to require was an undertaking that the gates should be opened in two years1
time. After the stipulated period had elapsed, the Chinese refused to carry out
their promise. An emphatic warning, addressed to them by Palmi ston,
regarding the
consequences which might ensue from their disregard of treaty engagements, was
treated with contempt. In 1854 matters began to assume a serious aspect.
Bowring was appointed Governor of Hongkong, while Yeh had recently become
imperial Commissioner at Canton. Instructions came out from honie to raise the
question ag ’n; but Yeh turned a deaf ear to all the representations made to
him, although these were supported by the French and American representatives.
Bowring, the United States Commissioner, and the French Secretary of Legation
proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, where they held a fruitless conference
with a delegate sent down from the Court, who absolutely refused to discuss the
detailed proposals put forward by England and America for the revision of the
treaties, including the right of diplomatic representation at Peking. The
conclusion to which their representatives came was that no improvement was to
be looked for unless a stronger policy were adopted. France and America,
however, were not disposed to depart from their previous cautious policy. But
Palmerston was resolved to take advantage of the first occasion to coerce the
Chinese into relations of a normal character; though, for the moment, the
Crimean War stood in the way of sending out to China the necessary naval
forces.
In the summer
of 1856 a remarkable Englishman was sent to act as Consul at Canton. Parkes was
only twenty-eight years of age, but he had already served fourteen years in
China, spoke the language fluently, was able, active, and resolute, and knew
the mind of Palmerston on Chinese matters. The seizure of the crew of the
British larcha “ Arrow ” as she lay off the city of Canton offered the
opportunity. Yeh at first refused to apologise or to surrender the men, and the
original question in dispute became merged in a demand to open the gates of the
city. Btprisals on a small scale having produced no effect, Parkes’
recommendation that possession should be taken of some of the forts between
Whampoa and Canton was acted upon. A few days later the city wall was breached,
and a force of marines effected an entrance. As Yeh still refused to give way,
the Bogue forts were captured. The French, having no trade to protect, hauled
down their consulate flag, the American merchants were withdrawn, and finally
the foreign factories were destroyed by an incendiary fire in December. It was
now judged impracticable to carry on operations until reinforcements should
arrive. The French and American agents, while adopting a neutral attitude,
informed Yeh that they considered him to be entirely in the wrong. The
American was perhaps more inclined to take the British side than his Government
thought desirable.
The British
Government had fully approved the proceedings of their agents, but Cobden
brought forward a condemnatory motion in the House of Commons. He was supported
by a coalition of Peelites and Tories, with whom spoke and voted Lord John
Russell. The result was a defeat for the Cabinet, but Palmerston appealed to
the country, anH remained in power with a triumphant majority, In pursuance of
plans already
mapped out, Lord Elgin was appointed High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary,
while arrangements were made for the despatch of reinforcements. France, having
a quarrel of her oWn with China, arising out of the murder of a French
missionary, was ready to join in measures of coercion, not only for the
settlement of the Canton question, but also for the extension of commerce and
the abatement of Chinese pretensions to superiority. Baron Gros was appointed
her plenipotentiary. The United States Government had the same grounds of
complaint, but was unwilling to resort to force; its peaceful cooperation was
nevertheless accepted by England and France.
It was not
until nearly the clpse of 1857 that the plenipotentiaries were all assembled at
Hongkong. In the meantime Russia had offered to join in negotiations for a new
treaty* and had sent out Count Putiatin, who had met with a rebuff in trying to
reach Peking, first by way of Kiachta and then from the mouth of the Peiho. He
too was instructed to abstain from warlike measures, but was informed that,
whenever the allies went north, they would be pleased to be accompanied by the
Russian flag. Whatever was to be accomplished depended on the military
exertions of the allies. In August the British Admiral had established a
blockade of Canton, and his blockading force was now strengthened by the
accession of the French squadron. Yeh having refused to surrender, the city was
taken by assault after a’ very slight resistance (December 28-9, 1857) and Yeh
himself was captured, and deported to Calcutta, where he died. The Governor was
replaced in office, and was assisted by a joint commission consisting of Parkes
and two military men. (Canton was not restored to the Chinese Government until
October 21,1861.)
Identic notes
were now addressed by the four envoys, inviting the Chinese Government to send
a duly accredited plenipotentiary to Shanghai by the end of March. It was
intimated that, in the event of a refusal, other measures would be taken. The
Russian Envoy’s note, of course, did not hint at hostilities, but mentioned “
frontier questions ” that required settlement. The reply of the Chinese
Government—faithful to their policy of keeping the foreigner at a distance—was
a refusal to discuss business anywhere but at Canton. The fact that the British
and French plenipotentiaries were supported by sufficient forces to be employed
as occasion arose, while their American and Russian colleagues could not resort
to coercion, induced the Chinese to offer to settle questions specially
interesting to the latter, in return for their good offices. They professed
themselves ready to concede all the American demands, except diplomatic
representation at Peking, to concede the opening of the rivers to commerce and
the payment of compensation for the losses at Canton. This intrigue was
defeated by the straightforwardness of Reed and the firmness of Elgin and Gros.
No properly accredited plenipotentiaries having been produced to them, the
allies captured the
Taku forts,
and the four plenipotentiaries ascended the river to Tientsin, where
satisfactory treaties were signed in June, 1858.
Among the
proposals of the four Powers the most obnoxious to the Chinese Court was the
establishment at Peking of resident diplomatic agents. The firmness of Elgin
carried the day, and the British treaty provided that the agent of Great
Britain might reside permanently at the capital, or visit it occasionally, at
the option of his Government. The principle was affirmed less positively in the
other three Treaties. Certain documents found in an official building at
Canton, which Elgin had communicated to the American Envoy, who characterised
them as painful revelations of the mendacious and treacherous habits of the
high officials of China, convinced him that, if American interests were worth
protecting, such protection could only be secured by direct representation at
the capital, and that the contents of these papers justified the coercive
policy of the allies.
Nevertheless
Elgin himself conceived doubts as to whether it might not be well to give way
on this point. He recommended to his Government that, provided the British
ambassador were properly received at Peking when he went there to exchange the ratifications,
he should not fix his residence at the capital, but only visit it occasionally.
This suggestion was approved, and the Chinese Commissioners were so informed in
March, 1859. The words “properly received” signified a ceremonial in accordance
with the forms of respect paid to Western sovereigns. The Chinese were
determined that, unless envoys submitted to Chinese ceremonial, they should not
be admitted to Court at all'. Accordingly, they proceeded to rearm the Taku
forts and when the Ministers of England, France and America, Bruce, Bourboulon,
and Ward, presented themselves there in June, intending to journey to the
capital and exchange the ratifications, they were directed to land at Pehtang
instead. In the Russian Treaty Taku was expressly mentioned as the point from
which the Russian Envoy might proceed to Peking. The English Admiral
endeavoured to force a passage and was repulse i with loss. The American Envoy
accepted the alternative offered, travelled under circumstances of some
indignity to Peking, and there found that no audience of the Emperor would be
accorded, unless on Chinese terms. He refused and retired to Pehtang, where the
ratifications were hastily exchanged as he was about to reembark.
The Russian
Minister had preceded the American to Peking, by way of Kiachta, and had
exchanged the ratifications of the Russian treaty. Consequently Russia and the
United States had no further motive for cooperation with the allies. It is only
necessary here to note that , the delimitation of the Russo-Chinese boundary,
which was to be effected by Commissioners appointed on both sides to cariy out
the Ninth Article of the treaty, was rejected by the Chinese Emperor on the
ground that it conceded to Russia territory properly belonging to China; and a
settlement of
the question was deferred until two years later, as will be seen.
The British
Government approved of the course which Bruce had pursued, and informed him
that preparations were being made for the despatch of forces, which in conjunction
with those of the Emperor of the French, would support him in the execution of
the instructions about to be addressed to him. The Chinese Court, on their
side, did not conceive themselves to be at war with the allies, and relations
at the open ports continued on a normal footing. It was hoped at first by the
British Government that, when the Chinese learnt the demands of England and the
extent of her preparations, an understanding might be arranged without further
bloodshed. But the discourteous treatment to which the United States Minister
had been subjected in return for his conciliatory attitude, convinced both the
English and the French Government that their demands must be supported by a
force strong enough to overcome any resistance which might be anticipated. To
make it easier for the Chinese Emperor to yield, if the ultimatum was not
delivered by the two Ministers who had been repulsed from Taku in the previous
year, the two Powers reappointed Elgin and Gros, but left it to Bruce and Bourboulon
to present the demands. These were an ample apology; ratifications of the
Treaties to be exchanged at Peking without delay, the envoys proceeding to
Tientsin in a man-of-war of their nationality and being conveyed thence to
Peking with due honour; that full effect should be given to the provisions of
the said treaties, including prompt payment of the indemnities stipulated
therein; that the British Government reserved to themselves exclusively the
right of deciding whether their legation should be established at Peking; while
an indemnity to meet the cost of sending additional forces to China was to be
demanded, and an answer was req j ed within 30 days. The demands having been
met by a flat refusal, communicated through the Chinese Commissioner for the
five ports, the first step taken was the peaceable occupation of Chusan. The
allied Commanders-in-chief moved northwards, and concentrated the ships of war
and transports at Talienwan Bay towards the end of June, 1860. A landing was
effected at Pehtang, August 1; three weeks later the whole of the Taku forts
were captured* and Tientsin occupied on August 25. Negotiations were opened;
but, as the Chinese Commissioners had not adequate powers, the allies continued
their advance on Peking. As they approached the city, the Court became
seriously alarmed, and offered to accord all their demands, if they would
consent to stop short of the capital. The spot where the allied forces were to
encamp had been already agreed upon ; but it was found to be occupied by a
Chinese force. An engagement ensued, in which the Chinese were defeated, and
retreated on Peking, taking with them some thirty-seven English and French
prisoners whom they had captured, in spite of the flags of truce they carried.
Among these
were Parkes
and Loch. The Chinese treated their victims with odious brutality, from the
effects of which two-thirds of them died in captivity. Notwithstanding the
refusal of the Chinese to give them up, unless peace was made and the territory
evacuated, the allies continued their march. After another severe defeat the
Chinese armies took to flight, and the allies encamped before Peking. The
French were the first to reach the Summer Palace, which they pillaged and set
on fire. Later, when it became known that it had been the theatre of the
tortures inflicted on the unfortunate prisoners, Lord Elgin insisted on
completing the work of destruction as a penalty upon the Chinese Court, for
having permitted, if it had not actually ordered, the barbarous treatment of
the prisoners who had been taken by treachery. Of complicity it cannot be
acquitted, seeing that, two days after their seizure, an imperial edict was
issued offering money rewards for the heads of “barbarians.”
Prince Kuiig,
a brother of the Emperor, who had already been appointed a plenipotentiary,
after some resistance agreed to exchange the ratifications of the Treaties of
1858 in Peking itself, and to sign an additional convention, by which China
undertook to open Tientsin to trade, and to pay to each of the allies an
indemnity of 2f millions sterling. Of the cession to England of the peninsula
opposite Hongkong and of the undertaking given to Ranee for the restitution of
the ancient Roman Catholic religious properties mention has already been made.
Another article provided for the occupation of certain points in Chinese
territory pending payment of the indemnity. The presentation to the Emperor of
their credentials by the two ambassadors had to be abandoned, because the
Chinese officials still obstinately insisted on an audience being accompanied
by the Ko-t'ou.
The Russian
Envoy, who had followed the march of the allies, and had done everything in his
power to render himself acceptable to the two ambassadors, and to act the part
of a conciliator, was rewarded within a week of the withdrawal of the allies by
the signature of a treaty of delimitation, by which the territory lying between
the Ussuri River and the Gulf of Tartary was ceded to Russia, together with the
grant of commercial privileges in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.
The legations
of the three Powers were permanently established at Peking during the course of
1861, and that of the United States in 1862. Treaties were negotiated with
other Powers—with Prussia on behalf of the ZoUverein in 1861; with Portugal in
1862 (though a difference of opinion regarding the territorial status of Macao
prevented the eventual ratification of this Treaty), with Denmark and Holland
in 1863, Spain in 1864, Belgium in 1865, and Italy in 1866.
On the
establishment of the legations at Peking a new policy was inaugurated towards
China. Instead of leaving disputes with local officials to be settled on the
spot by force of arms, it was thought by the British and French Governments
that the better way would be to treat
the Court as
if it were a central Government, able to give orders throughout the territory
under its control, and to see them executed.
It was not
for the purpose of carrying on with China political relations such as exist
among Western States that the Powers had insisted on the residence of their
diplomatic agents at the capital, hut, with the exception of Russia, for the
sole purpose of protecting the interests of their countrymen engaged in
commerce and proselytism. To enable them to carry out this policy with success
it was necessary that the central Government should be strong enough to make
its authority felt throughout the country; and two things were recognised as
indispensable: first, that the “Taiping” rebellion should be suppressed, and,
secondly, that for the old system of redressing grievances by putting pressure
on the provincial officials should be substituted that of diplomatic
representations.
For some
years past the richest provinces of China had been ruthler.sly ravaged by
rebels, who had proved incapable of establishing any settled form of
government. Their leader was a native of Kwangsi, named Hung Siu-tsuen; he had
imbibed some notions of Christianity from an American missionary at Canton, and
had established on this basis a new sect of his own. In 1850, being joined by
some fellow- provincials, he allied himself with the anti-dynastic secret
society known as the Triads, and thus gave to the movement a political
character. In 1851 these people broke out into open rebellion under Hung, who
proclaimed himself “Emperor of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace” (Tai Ping),
and from this time onwards they were spoken of by foseigners as “Taipings.”
Advancing northward, they laid siege to more than one important provincial city
without success; but, in January, 1853, Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow fell into
their hands. Moving down the Yangtze, they captured KiuTkiang and
Nganking, finally establishing themselves in March at Nanking, the ancient
capital of China. From this point they despatched expeditions to the north, and
penetrated as far as the neighbourhood of Tientsin. After six months,
fruitlessly consumed in attempts to make good their conquests in the north,
they were driven back south in the ensuing spring, and by March, 1855, they
were confined to the neighbourhood of the river.
Many
foreigners, influenced by the belief that they had adopted Christianity,
approved of their efforts to overthrow the Manchu dynasty; supposing that, if
they succeeded, their attitude would be more friendly than that of the Peking
Government. But visits paid to Nanking in 1853 by the Governor of Hongkong and
the French Minister showed that the Taipings were not disposed to abate a whit
of the lofty pretensions put forward by the imperial Court in their relations
with foreigners, and the opinion formed by foreign officials was adverse to the
expectation that they would eventually establish their rule over the whole
country. As time went on, it became more and more evident that their only
policy consisted in plundering the cities they had captured, and in devastating
the regions
through which they passed. Towards the end of 1859, they were besieged by the
imperial forces in their most important strongholds ; but the Anglo-French
expedition in 1860 gave the movement a new lease of life. The siege of Nanking
was raised; and the rich and important city of SuchoW fell into their hands. As
their near approach to Shanghai endangered that important centre of foreign
commerce; the British and French Ministers publidy announced that they would
defend the Chinese city and foreign settlement. About the same time a patriotic
Chinese merchant engaged the services of an American named Ward, who began
operations with a small body of Europeans and Manila-men* and afterwards raised
a force of disciplined Chinese with the object of driving the rebels out of the
province of Kiangsu. The rebels attacked Shanghai in August, 1860, and again in
January, 1862, but were repulsed on both occasions by the allied troops. From
this time onWards, the interest of both the English and the French Governments
was actively enlisted for the expulsion of the Taipirigs from the neighbourhood
of the open ports, and their troops frequently acted as auxiliaries to Ward’s
disciplined Chinese. On one of these expeditions the French admiral lost his
life* Ward was killed in action in September, 1862, and was succeeded by
Burgevine, who later, quarrelling with the Governor of the province* went over
to the rebels. The French had already organised a Chinese contingent under naval
officers; and the British Government now allowed several of its officers to
undertake the leadership of what had been Ward’s force. Among these officers
the most distinguished was the well-known Colonel Charles Gordon. His
operations were so successful that by May, 1864, Nanking was almost the only
place left to the Taipings. With the capture of this city in July of that year
by thei imperial General Tseng Kuotsuan the rebellion came to an end. The
effective assistance rendered to the imperial Government by the allies was an
important factor in the suppression of this disorder, which had ravaged the
richest provinces of the country for over twelve years.
The aim of
the Western Powers had been to place their relations with China upon a normal
footing; and, when the residence of their representatives at the capital was
finally conceded, they at once turned their attention to this question. Consuls
and naval officers had been accustomed to regard themselves as authorised to
exact redress for local abuses by the employment of force. Such a practice
defeated the endeavours of the diplomatists to compel the imperial Government
to recognise its responsibility for the acts of the provincial officials. The
policy adopted aimed at strengthening the central Government as the best means
of restoring cranquillity, and at securing the observance of the treaties
without resorting to force. In earlier days the “ gunboat policy” was the best
that could be resorted to, in view of the length of time required for the exchange
of communications with the home Governments, and of the uncompromising temper
of the Chinese Court, which refused
822
[l862—7
to have any
direct dealings with Western Powers. Peace had not been of long duration at any
intermediate stage between the abolition of the East India Company’s
supercargoes at Canton, who regulated a trading monopoly, and the establishment
at Peking of foreign Ministers, who watched over a trade open to all the world.
In July, 1862, the newly appointed American Minister Burlingame took up his
residence at Peking and joined the other three Ministers in substituting
diplomatic action for the more popular and showy appeal to force. Owing to the
peculiar constitution of the government, which left a large measure of autonomy
to the provinces, such a policy could not be expected to be immediately
successful; and great forbearance had to be exercised by the foreign Ministers,
whose task was rendered more arduous by the dilatoriness of the Chinese and
the impatience of the mercantile communities at the ports. From time to time
consular officers of different nations, in conjunction with naval officers,
continued to act on their own initiative in claiming redress from the local
authorities. It became necessary to remind them that they could not be allowed
to determine for themselves- what reparation or redress was due for wrongs
committed, or by what means it should be exacted—whether by blockade, by
reprisal, by landing armed parties, or by acts of even more hostile character,
since obviously no Government could delegate to its servants in foreign
countries the power of involving their own country in war.
Towards the
end of 1867, when Burlingame was on the point of giving up his post at Peking,
the Chinese Government induced him to undertake a mission to the Treaty Powers,
with the object of disabusing them of an impression believed to be very
general, that the Chinese Court had entered upon a retrograde policy, and to
deprecate any intention, on the part of the Powers, of urging China to adopt
precipitately any new progressive policy which might affect her
independence—such as, for instance, the grant of concessions to construct
railways, which would place the internal communications of the country under
foreign control. He successfully negotiated a treaty at Washington in which the
principle of non-intervention in Chinese domestic affairs was recognised. In
England also the mission met with a cordial reception; and Clarendon wrote to
Burlingame that the British Government preferred appealing rather to the
central Government than to local authorities for the redress of wrongs done to
British subjects. He reminded him, at the same time, that it was the duty of
the central Government to assume, and to be prepared to exercise, supreme
authority over provincial Governments. It was agreed, however, by Burlingame
that force might be resorted to for the protection of life and property in
immediate peril.
Burlingame’s
views, which the British Government confirmed, did not meet with ready
acquiescence either from merchants or diplomatists. In default of a central
Government with adequate power, the only effectual means of preventing war was,
in their opinion, to make the
local
authorities feel a personal responsibility for their own acts. For some years
the general disregard of the treaties by the Chinese authorities at the ports,
and the unsatisfactory tone of the Government towards foreigners generally,had
been the subject of complaint. A large majority of the leading Chinese were
hostile to foreigners, and in the redress of grievances the Government seemed
to have adopted the maxim of Philip II, “ Time and I are a match for any two.”
It was observed that a diplomatic instrument had no binding power with the
rulers of China when they could evade its stipulations with impunity, or when
they believed that the force that imposed them was no longer available. The
answer returned from England was that the British Government looked to the
Chinese Government, and to it alone, for the wrongs of any kind done to British
subjects under any circumstances. They held the Government at Peking alone
responsible for the carrying out of treaties, and looked to it to enforce their
full observance on the provincial authorities. This shows the policy of the
Western Powers, and proves that they hoped by pressure at the centre to modify
the age-long Constitution of the Chinese State, so as to compel the
substitution for the practical autonomy of the provinces of an intelligent and
centralised administration. To expect this result, however, was to
underestimate the force of resistance to innovation which permeates a body
politic of so hoary an antiquity as that of China; and experienced observers
were not wanting who came to the conclusion that the policy of forcing direct
diplomatic relations on the Court of Peking had proved a grievous mistake.
(2) JAPAN.
After the
expulsion of the Spaniards and Portuguese in 1638, Japan was closed to all
foreign intercourse except with the Dutch and Chinese traders, who were
confined within a limited space at Nagasaki. Japanese subjects were forbidden
to travel or trade abroad. The commerce with the Dutch, which had at first been
free, was converted into a government monopoly, and subjected to constantly
increasing restrictions till it seemed scarcely worth continuing. Since the
beginning of the nineteenth century the English, French, Russians and Danes had
in turn endeavoured to establish friendly relations, but without success. In
1842 it was ordered that, if foreign .vessels were driven by stress of weather
on the coasts of Japan, or were in want of provisions, fuel, or water, such
articles might be supplied to them, and they might be allowed to depart in
peace. Two years later the King of Holland counselled the Tycoon to mitigate
the strictness of the law against foreigners. The reply was that no deviation
from the ancient law of Japan regarding foreign relations could be permitted.
In
consequence of the development of the whale fishery in the
northern
Pacific, American seamen were from time to time cast away on the coasts of
Japan, where they received harsh treatment. The desirability of coming to a
direct agreement with the Japanese Government in regard to whalers putting
into Japanese ports, and for the establishment of a coaling depot for the line
of steamers which it was proposed to run between California and China, induced
the American Government in 1851 to send out instructions to Commodore Aulick,
together with a letter from President Fillmore to the “Emperor” of Japan. These
instructions were repeated in November, 1852, to his successor, Commodore
Perry, who was ordered to proceed to Japan with his whole available force; and
if he found persuasion unavailable, was to threaten that chastisement would be
resorted to in case American seamen were hereafter cruelly treated. Perry
reached Uraga, at the entrance to the Bay of Yedo, with a squadron of four
ships, on July 8, 1853.
The material
and mental civilisation of Japan had been derived from China, either directly
or through Corea. The writings of Chinese moral philosophers and historians
were the main objects of study, and classical Chinese was the favourite vehicle
of literary composition. Buddhism, in the form in which it had been early
imported into China, became the dominant religion, and almost entirely absorbed
the temples formerly dedicated to the gods of the country. The early
constitution of the government had been framed on a Chinese model, and the
penal legislation of the Tang dynasty had been adopted in its entirety.
Alongside of classical Chinese there had continued to exist an indigenous
poetical and romantic literature which remained unaffected by Chinese
influences, and a revival of interest in it. had been promoted by a small band
of scholars from the end of the seventeenth century.
The nation
was classified, as in China, into scholars, agriculturists, artisans and
tradesmen, with this difference that the word scholar was applied, not to a
learned and pacific class, but to the noble or military order of Samurai. The
moral code was based on the Chinese doctrine of the Five Social Relations, but
dwelt mainly on the duties of loyalty to the prince and obedience to parents.
This loyalty was due, not to the sovereign, but to the feudal chief, and the popular
literature was full of shining examples of this virtue. From China, too, had
been adopted the view that all Western nations were barbarians, whom it was
right and proper to exterminate, and the isolation in which the Japanese people
had lived for two centuries or more had intensified this feeling. Christianity
was stigmatised as a “pernicious doctrine,” and was believed to be associated
with the practice of sorcery. The Japanese point of honour was that of the
Samurai, ready to sacrifice his life for his lord and to die by his own hand
rather than suffer any imputation of disloyalty; the mercantile point of
honour, strict fulfilment of engagements even where they involve pecuniary
loss, was unknown. It was the
Samurai
class that formed the backbone of the nation, and inspired all its ideals.
Towards the
end of the twelfth century the administration was usurped by the military
class, on whose chief was conferred the title of Sei-i-tai sho-gun, or
Barbarian-quelling-Generalissimo. Civil wars in the fourteenth and sixteenth
centuries Only served to strengthen a polity in which the legitimate sovereign
was relegated to a merely nominal position as head of the State and fountain of
honour, while the ShSgun was recognised as the de facto ruler n both internal
affairs and external relations.
The power of
the latest dynasty of Shoguns, that of the Tokugawa family, was established by
Iyeyasu after the fall of Osaka in 1615, and consolidated by his grandson
Iyemitsu, who succeeded in 1623. He compelled the daimios to pass alternate
years at Yedo, and to leave their families there when they went down to their
fiefs, by this means maintaining a strict control over their actions. Yedo was
the real capital of the country, which was partitioned amongst the Tokugawa family
and the daimios or feudal lords, who numbered some 268, broadly divided int
ofudai, creations of Iyeyasu, and tozama, feudal lords of earlier date. At the
head of the daimios ranked the Go-sam-ke or Three Families, as thfey were
called, or Princes of Owari, Kishiu and Mito, descended from the third, fourth
and fifth surviving sons of Iyeyasu. In case of a failure in the direct line of
Shoguns, an heir could be chosen from either of the first two. It was held that
Mito could not succeed, but he was regarded as peculiarly the supporter and
adviser of the Shogjn. In 1716 the seventh Shogun having died while yet a
child, Yoshimune, Prince of Kishiu, was brought in as his successor. Two of his
sons and a grandson became the founders of the Go-san-kio or Three Nobles,
Tayasu, Hitotsubashi and Shimidzu, who were also capable of succeeding; in
fact, the eleventh Shogun, Iyenari, was adopted from the second of these
houses. With these must be classed the other descendants of Iyeyasu, some
fourteen in number, who bore his family crest, of whom the most important were
Echizen and Aidzu. Next in order came the Koku-shi daimios, nobles whose
territories comprised one or more of the 68 provinces into which the country
was divided, and their cadets, most of whom traced their lineage back to a
period anterior to the victories of Iyeyasu. Amongst them the more prominent in
political affairs were Satsuma, Choshiu, Tosa and Hizen, in the south and west.
A member of the Date family of Sendai, best known by the name of his castle-town,
Uwajima, must also be mentioned. In the list of great daimios was included Ii
Kamon no Kam belonging to one of the four families from which a President of
the Council could be taken, and hereditary protector of the Mikado’s person.
Lastly came the fudai daimios, creations of Iyeyasu, the minor tozama or nobles
of a time preceding Iyeyasu’s rise to power, and the hatamoto or gentry of
826
lesser wealth
and importance. These nobles were subject, as was the Shogun himself, to a
strict ceremonial etiquette, which rendered them almost prisoners in the hands
of their retainers, forming a compact body usually designated as a “ clan.” Of
the latter, the higher in rank held office as clan-councillors by hereditary
right. The effect of this etiquette in the course of time was a curious
degeneracy and aloofness from public affairs. The feudal chiefs gave themselves
up to pleasure, lived a life of artificial seclusion, and allowed their
retainers to think and act for them. If, during the period of storm and stress
which preceded the revolution of 1868, some of them were distinguished for
political ability, it was mainly because they had been younger sons, who had
received an ordinary education.
The
Shogun, or (to call him by the title first adopted at the beginning of the
eighteenth centuiy in correspondence with Corea) the Tycoon, was usually termed
Emperor by Europeans and Americans. His administration was formed from his own
vassals, the great territorial nobles taking no share in it whatever. The
notion that the 18 greater daimios constituted a Council of the Empire is
altogether erroneous. They were not consulted on public affairs until after
1853. .
Entirely in
the background, exercising no governmental authority, secluded in his palace
and never seen by any of the common people, was the Mikado. A sort of phantom
Court surrounded him, bearing administrative titles belonging to the period
when he was de facto as well as de jure ruler. Intermarriage with the leading
daimio families was not uncommon. The Daijo-daijin, a title in later times
combined with that of Kwamibaku, or first Minister, was assisted by the
Sa-daijin, Udai-jin, Nai-daijm and Damagon. They were descended from the most
illustrious families of the Empire, in comparison with whom the daimios were
mere novi homines', but their incomes were on a meagre scale. Even the Mikado
himself received but a very limited revenue. From the time of Yoritomo
downwards, the military chieftain who was able to obtain possession of the Mikado’s
person virtually ruled the country. It was therefore a principal object of the
Tycoon to keep a strict watch over the Court and its surroundings. The garrison
of Kioto was nn<W the command of the Shoshidai, who may conveniently be
called the Tycoon’s Resident, and the civil governor was also a Tokugawa
vassal. None of the feudal lords was permitted to have a permanent residence at
Kioto, nor to communicate directly with the Court, their immediate and
acknowledged superior being the Tycoon, who might almost be styled their
sovereign.
Two things
were requisite in order that this system should be maintained: first, that the
Mikado should be contented with the way in which the country was governed and
his own dignity and safety provided for; secondly, that, if a difference of
opinion arose between the Court and the Tycoon’s Government, the latter should
be strong enough to make
its will
predominate. So long as the country was closed to the entrance of ideas from
the outer world and peace was maintained at home, this dual system, which had
lasted for six and a half centuries, was likely to remain undisturbed; but the
moral fibre of the Tycoon’s Government had degenerated, and it only needed the
arrival of the American squadron under Perry in 1853 to start a movement which,
in the short space of fifteen years, brought it to the ground; while the
necessity of replacing the particularism of the feudal system by a centralised
government deriving its authority from the principle of legitimacy was
gradually forced upon the minds of all thinking men.
At the head
of the Tycoon’s administration was the Council of State, popularly called
Gorojiu, composed of five or six of his greater vassals, not necessarily
endowed with political ability, so that the substance of power passed into the
hands of subordinates. Next in official importance was a Second Council,
called Waka-doshiyori, also composed of Jitdai daimios. The Exchequer, the
Tycoon’s harem, and the ordnance were managed by the Rusui-toshiyori. There
were no written laws, either civil or criminal, but manuscript records of cases
were in existence which furnished precedents for decisions delivered by the
judicial officers. Two Jisha-bugio tried cases affecting the Buddhist and
Shinto temples, and others brought up from distant provinces. Two Machi-bugio
presided over the administration of the city of Yedo, and tried cases arising
among the common people. To the same number of Kamjo-bugiS were referred
agricultural cases, and they also had charge of the posting system on the main
lines of communication. Cases in which daimios, the gentry and ordinary Samurai
were concerned, came before the O-metsuke, of whom there were four. The Metsuke
were similar officers of lower rank. The foregoing classes of officials were on
duty during alternate months. They held general meetings on nine days in the
month to hear appeals, and also to advise on matters of state policy which were
referred to them. During the later years of the Tycoouate it was commonly said
that the confidential secretaries governed the country. In the territories of
the daimios the same transfer of real authority had come about, and the
revolution of 1868 was mainly brought to pass by Samurai of undistinguished
birth, who had gained the confidence of the few Court nobles and feudal lords
whose understanding had survived the soporific effect of the conditions under
which they had been educated. Another factor in the situation was that the
retainers of the Tycoon, residing either at Yedo, a city of over a million of
inhabitants, or in small country towns, had mostly lost the fighting qualities
that had won the victories of Iyeyasu, while those of the daimios, living for
the most part a simple country life away from the pleasures of the metropolis,
retained the warlike vigour and hardihood of their forefathers.
At the
request of the United States Government, the head of the
Dutch factory
at Nagasaki had given notice to the Tycoon’s officials in the previous autumn
that the American expedition would shortly arrive. When the news of Perry's
sudden appearance at Uraga reached the capital, considerable perturbation
nevertheless ensued. The alarm was caused by the fear lest, in the event of
hostilities breaking out, communications by sea should be interrupted, and the
population of Yedo be deprived of the supplies of rice from other parts of the
country upon which they depended for their subsistence. Naiiaki, the ex-Prince
of Mito, who had been forced to abdicate in 1844 for having destroyed the
Buddhist monasteries in his province and confiscated their bells to cast
cannon, and for other measures of reform, initiated with the object of reviving
the military spirit of his clan, which were disapproved of by the conservative
members of the Council, was invited to come forth from his retirement and aid
the Government with his counsels. To add to the confusion^ the Tycoon was so
sick that it was found impossible to take any decision, except that the
President’s letter should be received, and the envoy be told to come back next
year for an answer. To have induced the Government of Japan to receive with
some ceremony a letter addressed to the Tycoon was already a success. When it
was represented to Perry that his proposals were of such a weighty character as
to necessitate reference to the Mikado and the feudal chiefs, he answered that
he would return in the ensuing spring with a larger force, when he trusted to
obtain a favourable response to his overtures.
The
suggestion that the Mikado and feudal lords must first be consulted was an
unfortunate one for the Tycoon. No such obligation existed, and it had been
merely put forward as an excuse for delay. For two and a half centuries the
Tycoon had exercised an authority in domestic and foreign affairs, which had
never been disputed by a single powerful daimid. It was the Tycoon who had
closed the country to foreign commerce, not the Mikado; nor were the daimios
consulted on the occasion. The pretext was, however, again made use of when the
Russian Admiral, Putiatin, arrived shortly afterwards at Nagasaki and delivered
a note from Count Nesselrode proposing to fix the boundary between the two
empires, and to open a couple of ports to Russian trade. Resort was had to
procrastination; and it was not till January, 1854, that an answer was handed
to Putiatin, to the effect that the boundary would have to be carefully
examined with the aid of documents and maps; the weighty questions raised in
the Russian Chancellor’s note must be reported to Kioto, and discussed with the
nobles and great officers of State. This would take from three to five years,
and the result would be communicated in due course. Putiatin, after replying
that, if she desired to avoid disaster, Japan would do well to enter into
commercial and friendly relations with foreign countries, took his leave for
the present.
It was
impossible to conceal the substance of the reply given to the
1854] Opinions of daimios.—Perry’s Treaty. 829
Americans,
and shortly after Perry’s departure copies of the correspondence were
circulated among the high officers of State and the principal feudal lords. In
the course of the autumn their replies came in. Nearly all were opposed to any
alteration in the old law that foreign intercourse was limited to trade with
the Dutch and Chinese; but the imposs;,oility, for the present, of
resisting the forces of which the United States could dispose was generally
recognised. It was suggested that a friendly answer should be given, and hopes
be held out of the demands being granted in a year or two; during that time the
naval and military defences of the country could be completed, when the refusal
to negotiate could be made absolute. A different note was struck by Ii Kamon no
Kami, who was in favour of returning to the system that had prevailed before in
the seventeenth century the country was closed, and the Japanese people
interdicted from trading abroad. He advised that the old prohibition against
the building of sea-g. ug ships should be repealed, and that Dutch masters and
sailors should be engaged to instruct the Japanese in the art of navigation.
Then they would be able to sail the ocean in their own ships and see what other
countries were like with their own eyes, instead of depending upon the reports
of the Dutch. The knowledge and experience thus gained would better enable them
to ensure the safety of the nation than the present system of sitting at home
with closed doors.
The head of
the Ministry, in resuming the memorials and the discussions that had taken
place, declared the inadequacy of the national defences to be recognised on all
hands; consequently, when the Americans returned, they should be put off with a
dilatory reply. Orders were issued that Perry should not be permitted to pass
Uraga, and officials were sent thither to detain him. They were reckoning on a
mistaken view of his character. Perry called at Uraga on February 13, 1854,
accompanied by six ships, with which he moved up. towards Yokohama in spite of
all remonstrance. Five commissioners, of whom two were the governors of Uraga,
were appointed to treat with him. After some three weeks’ negotiation, he
exchanged with the Japanese plenipotentiaries on March 31 an agreement
providing for the opening of the jorts of Shimoda and Hakodate to American
ships for the supply of coal, wood, water and provisions, for the protection of
shipwrecked mariners and their property, for a limited exchange of produets,
for the appointment of a consul to reside at Shimoda after the lapse of
eighteen months, provided either of the two Governments deemed it necessary,
and for the exchange of ratifications withiu eighteen months from the date of
signature. After examin1 g the local conditions at the two ports, he
agreed at Shimoda upon a set of port regulations to be observed by Americans,
and on June 18 he sailed thence by way of the Loochoos for Hongkong.
In May the
Tycoon’s Government let it be publicly known that
830 British Admiral’s Treaty.—Russian Treaty.
[1854-5
concessions
had been made, under pressure of necessity, owing to the present incompleteness
of the national defences. It was supposed that a short interval would suffice
for perfecting the arrangements for resisting further demands. The real reason
which induced the Government to make concessions to the American Commodore was
the emptiness of the treasury, a fact which, however, was unknown to all but a
few of the higher officials, so that they were universally blamed for their
weakness in giving way. It was unfortunate that they adopted this shuffling
policy, which it cannot be doubted contributed to their eventual downfall, and
caused their foreign relations to assume a troubled aspect from the beginning.
The
outbreak of the Crimean War rendering it desirable to prevent Russian ships of
war and their prizes from making use of Japanese ports to the disadvantage of
England and France, the British Admiral on the China station proceeded early in
September, 1854, to enquire what were the views and intentions of the Japanese
Government in regard to the war vessels of belligerents. The Tycoon’s Ministers
held that it would be more prudent to ignore the question, as the exclusion of
belligerent vessels from their ports might involve them in disputes with Powers
towards whom they entertained no unfriendly feelings; but they were willing to
concede to Great Britain permission for passing vessels to obtain provisions,
wood find water, and to effect repairs at Nagasaki and Hakodate, and also, if
necessary, at Shimoda. The Admiral accordingly experienced no difficulty in
concluding a convention embodying these terms, with the addition of a
most-favoured-nation clause, which was signed at Nagasaki on October 14. , .
About the
same time Putiatin, after calling at Osaka, arrived at Shimoda. Here his ship
was damaged on December 23 by a tidal wave, and foundered at sea as she was
being towed round to Toda Bay for repairs. He then resumed negotiations on the
lines originally proposed by him at Nagasaki. The Japanese Government declined
to discuss the boundary question, or to grant any concessions beyond those
contained in Perry’s treaty. A convention was accordingly signed at Shimoda on
February 7,1855. Putiatin succeeded in getting away in May on board a ship
which he had built with materials supplied to him by the Japanese authorities.
Copies of the
American, English and Russian Treaties were forwarded to Kioto for the
information of the Mikado, who on February 13, 1855, caused an expression of
his complete satisfaction with the manner in which the negotiations had been
carried on to be conveyed through the Kwcmbdku, his chief Minister, to the
Tycoon’s Government. Hakodate, which had hitherto formed part of the domain of
the feudal lord of Matsumae, was constituted government territory, a grant of
other lands being promised by way of compensation. The narrative here naturally
falls into two parts, namely the action of foreign Powers and the
I855-7] Harris at Shimoda. He is invited to Yedo.
831
internal
political condition which resulted. It will be found more convenient to treat
them alternately than to adhere closely to the chronological order of events.
Townsend
Harris, the American Consul-General appointed to reside at Shimoda, arrived
there with his interpreter Heusken on August 21, 1856. He found the officials
extremely obstructive. Orders had in fact been given to hinder, by every
possible means, the growth of an intimacy between Japanese subjects and
foreigners, lest the former should be led to embrace Christianity. In spite,
however, of the general unwillingness to hold intercourse with foreign
nations, the current was setting strongly in the direction of its development.
In November, 1855, a convention had been concluded with the Dutch permitting
them to own their settlement at Nagasaki; and the ratifications were exchanged
in October, 1856. A month later Captain Possiette brought to Nagasaki the
ratifications of the Russian Treaty. In April of the same year orders were
given to discontinue the odious practice of enforcing the Jvmi-ye or trampling
on the emblems of the Christian religion, and in October, 1857, this was made
the subject of a treaty stipulation with Holland; but at the same time the
Japanese commissioners declared that it was forbidden to teach Christianity
(then regarded in Japan as a “pernicious doctrine”), or to import books,
pictures and images relating to Christianity or any other foreign religion. In
the autumn of 1856 the governors of Nagasaki reported that Sir John Bowring was
about to visit that port for the purpose of concluding a fresh treaty,
doubtless for the promotion of commerce, and the Metsuke (law officers) advised
that it would be politic to make voluntary concessions with a good grace
rather than to yield to pressure. To meet the emergency, Hotta, one of the
Council of State, was placed in charge of foreign affairs, with a staff of officials
to study commercial questions. Harris in March, 1857, communicated to the
officials at Shimoda part of a letter from the Secretary of State, to the
effect that, if Japan sought to evade the Treaty, the President would ask
Congress for authority to employ such arguments as they would be unable to
resist. He had at an early date after his arrival applied to be allowed to
visit Yedo in order to present the President’s letter to the Tycoon, and his
persistent refusal to deliver it to anyone but “ the Emperor ” finally won the
day. The Council of State had regarded the vigorous action of the British naval
forces against Canton in the later months of 1856 as an omen of what might
befall Japan if they did not change their attitude towards foreign countries, while
Harris lost no opportunity of intimating that it would be wise to accept his
proposals if they desired to avoid subsequent difficulties with Russia, France
and England. His observations evidently made a great impression on them. In
September, 1857, the Government decided to reverse their policy, and to invite
him to Yedo for an audience of the Tycoon. This was made known to him without
delay, and he
arranged with
the governors of Shimoda that the ceremonial of presentation to the Tycoon
should be the same as in the Courts of Europe. For form’s sake a suggestion was
put forward, but immediately abandoned, that he should prostrate himself and
touch the floor with his forehead.
At this
moment the most influential members of the Council of State were Hotta and
Matsudaira. The Tycoon Iyesada was entirely in their lands. Owari enjoyed no
consideration, and Kishiu was a mere boy. Nariaki of Mito was looked up to as a
leader by half Japan. The daimios of Tsuyama, Ecl/zen, Akashi, Kaga, Inshiu and
Awa were connected with the Tycoon by family ties. The other great daimios were
guided by Nariaki. Satsuma and Hizen early perceived that political changes
were imminent, but were more deferential than Choshiu, Eiigo and Tosa, who were
wont to express their views with a good deal of freedom. The daimios sprung
from the same blood as the Tycoon and the great Judai, such as Aidzu, Kuwana,
Ii and Himeji, and those who had been members of the Couno'l, were the main
props of the Government. The lesser daimios did not count.
Harris
arrived at Yedo, November 30, where he was received with the greatest civility,
and commissioners were appointed to treat with him. His audience of the Tycoon
passed off satisfactorily on December 7, and on the 12th he had a conference
with Hotta, at which he enlarged on the changed situation caused by the
introduction of steam propulsion. Japan would be obliged, he pointed out, to
abandon her policy of seclusion. Foreign nations would send fleets to demand
the opening of the country, and the terms demanded by them would not be so
moderate as those asked by a simple diplomatist with no force at his back. He
illustrated this thesis from the case of China in the war of 1839 and the war
then in progress. The chief concessions required were, the residence of foreign
Ministers at Yedo, freedom for foreign merchants to buy and sell without
official interference, and the opening of more ports. A treaty that satisfied
America would be accepted by the other Powers. These arguments proved
convincing,, and on February 18,1858, the terms of the treaty were settled. In
order to give time to obtain the consent of the Mikado and the daimios, it was
agreed that the final signature should be postponed for sixty days, and Hotta
proceeded to Kioto for this purpose, while Harris went down to Shimoda. He was
back in Yedo on April 17. Hotta was still away at Kioto, endeavouring to gain
over the Mikado, and he did not return till June 1. He told Harris on the 5th
that the Mikado’s consent was still withheld, but he undertook that the treaty
should eventually be signed as it stood. Harris reproached him with having
represented the Tycoon to be the treaty-making power, whereas it was now clear
that the real authority resided at Kioto; and he hinted at proceeding thither
himself to pursue the negotiations. Hotta assured him that the Tycoon and his
Council were fully resolved to carry the treaty into effect* but,
1868-63] Harris’ Treaty. Ports to be opened.
833
they required
time to bring the daimios to reason, and asked for a further postponement until
September 4. The Uouncil offering to give him a written pledge to sign on that
date, he agreed to the delay, only stipulating for an undertaking not to
conclude a treaty with any other Power until thirty days after the signature of
his own. The letter was accordingly written, and dated June 12. Harris retired
to Shimoda; but on July 23 an American man-of-War brought him the news of the
conclusion of the English and French Treaties; with China, and of the impending
visit of the English and French plenipotentiaries. He at once proceeded to
Kanagawa, whence he despatched a letter to Hotta with the tidings. Since June
4, Ii Eamon no Kami, whose broad-minded policy has; already been referred to,
had been , at the head of the Tycoon’s Government. He promptly sent down the
treaty commissioners to discuss the situation. Harris urged the importance of
signing without a moment’s delay, because the English and French, having
vanquished the Chinese, and forced on them the signature of a treaty almost at
the gates of Peking, would assemble their fleets and proceed to. Japan to
insist on the opening of the ports. He feared that Japan would find it
difficult to satisfy the demands of two great Powers flushed with their recent
victories. If the Council would ,sign his treaty he could usefully intervene on
their behalf. Returning to Yedo, the commissioners reported the conversation.
Ii argued that the administration of public affairs having been entrusted to
the Tycoon, the delegation to him of, the Mikado’s powers must be held to
include that of deciding in a case of emergency. The Tycoon gave his consent,
and the commissioners were instructed to append their signatures, which was
done on July 29. ; . • v
This Treaty,
which served as a model for those subsequently concluded with Holland (August
48), Russia (August 19), Great Britain (August 26) and France (October 9),
conceded diplomatic and consular, privileges, and undertook to open, in
addition to Shimoda and Hakodate^ the following ports at the respective dates:
Kanagawa (Yokohama) and Nagasaki, (July 4, 1859), Hiogo (January 1, 1863),
Niigata, or some other port on the west coast (January 1,1860), and the cities,
of Yedo and Osaka (January 1,1862 and January 1,1863). The importation of opium
was prohibited; the persons and property of United States citizens in
Japan'were placed under the jurisdiction of United States, consular Courts; the
free exercise of their religion and the right of erecting places of worship
were granted; to them; and a tariff of import and export duties was annexed.
Foreign coin was to circulate in Japan at its intrinsic value, weight for
weight. Ratifications were to be exchanged at Washington on or before July 4,
1859, in accordance with a suggestion made by the Japanese themselves, and
either party was to be entitled to demand a revision after July; 4,1872, on
giving a year’s notice. The Treaty also contained an article providing that the
President,
if requested
by the Japanese 'Government, would act as friendly mediator between Japan and
any foreign Power. '
Nariaki had
been called into council in 1853 on the occasion of Perry’s, first visit.1
In 1855, besides being appointed to advise- on the coast defences and military
reforms, he was invited to take a share in the general administration. He
found>'however, that the obstructiveness of the permanent officials impeded
his efforts, and in 1856 he ceased; to attend at: the castle. On
hearing of the: resolution hat had been taken to invite Harris to Yedo he threw
up his appointments and sent a secret memorial to the Mikado, reviewing the
course of events during the past five years, and accusing the Tycoon’s
officials of weakness and want of foresight. The manner in which Europeans had
spread over the whole globe, annexing one country after another, made it clear
to him that their offers to enter into friendly relations with Japan were
merely a cover for their sinister designs. He prayed the Mikado to arrive at a
decision without delay, and to send stringent orders to Yedo that things must
not be allowed to go on in this fashion; He was convinced that the Mikado did
not approve of the conduct of the Tycoon’s officials. If it were otherw is^3
then the humiliation of Japan would become patent to the whole world, and her
loss of honour and dignity would by succeeding generations be laid to the
charge of the Tycoon’s Government.
From this
moment Nariaki worked persistently against the Tycoon at Kioto, where he
maintained an agent in constant communication with the leading nobles of the Court.
His own sympathies were no doubt influenced by the fact that his wife was a
daughter of Arisugawa, one of the Princes of the Blood; She had borne to him
the son who in 1844 had succeeded him in the headship of the clan, and also the
son who, having been adopted to be head of the Hitotsubashi House, was now
being put forward as a candidate for adoption as heir to the childless Tycoon.
Two of his younger sisters were married to Nijo and Takadfcakasa_ Court nobles
of the highest rank.
Hotta and k s
colleagues of the Council had, however, definitely adopted the policy
recommended by Ii in 1853. Harris’ proposals for a treaty had been communicated
to the daimios, who were informed that the changed world situation necessitated
the conclusion of treaties with foreign nations. If the country were not united
in the face of the emergency, grave danger would result, and they were invited
to express their opinions as to the best course to pursue. Nariaki replied by a
violent tirade, suggesting that Hotta and his colleague Matsudaira ought to
disembowel themselves, and that Harris’ head ought to be cut off. Inshiu took
the same line as his father Nariaki; but Echizen and Awa proiiounced themselves
in favour of the government policy. Satsuma also advocated opening the country.
The general opinion seemed to have become less hostile to the cultivation of
relations with foreign countries; but nearly'all of the daimios recommended
that the question
1868] The Mikado refuses to sanction the Treaty.
835
should be.
referred to the Mikado for his decision. The Mikado thereupon declared his
desire that care should be taken not to admit foreign diplomatists or traders
to the vicinity of Kioto, and that mixed residence must be prohibited, A first
attempt to procure the Mikado’s approval of the negotiations with Harris having
proved fruitless, owing to the uncompromising attitude of the Court, it. became
necessary to use greater pressure, and Hotta proceeded to Kioto in March, 1858,
togeuner with one of the commissioners who had negotiated with Harris. He took
with him a copy of the draft treaty, and laid it before the Mikado accompanied
by a statement of the reasons for asking his ianction. If it were refused, the
internal condition of the country would give rise to grave apprehension, and
cause domestic and foreign war to break out simultaneously. It will be
remembered that the. Council of State had pledged themselves in writing to
Harris to sign within sixty days.
This
declaration caused further animated discussion at the Palace. Various Court
nobles memorialised the throne in an adverse sense. Feudal retainers flocked to
Kioto, and unanimously condemned the treaty. In consequence of this the
independent clansmen were forbidden by the Tycoon to enter the city.
■
The reply of
the Mikado did not amount to a direct refusal, but it reiterated the necessity
of keeping foreigners away from the neighbourhood of Kioto, and again declared
that the daimios ought to be requested to put their opinion in writing. Hotta
rejoined that it was absolutely necessary to grant to foreigners such terms as
they were willing to accept., The Treaty provided effectually against,any sort
of future dispute arising.; It was of course impossible to foresee every
possible' contingency, but the danger of the Powers banding together against
Japan was imminent- A hurried message from Yedo reached him in the middle of
April reminding him that Harris was shortly expected there, and that the
Treaty had to be signed on the 18th. The Council said they would not sign
without the Mikado’s sanction, and they enclosed the draft of a letter which
they proposed should be addressed to Harris deferring signature until Hotta’s
return. On receipt of this ■ news.'Hotta again addressed the Court,
urging a prqmpt reply, as Harris had become very pressing and the English fleet
was expected. He added a copy of a letter , in which the Council acknowledged
the Mikado’s orders to consult the daimios, and said that the Tycoon recognised
the justice of the Mikado’s apprehensions in regard to public opinion, but that
he would guarantee him against having any reason to feel personal anxiety, ,
The only reply he.elicited was a repetition of the previous order, Hotta
thereupon replied that the negotiations with Harris having been concluded, it
was necessary to' give effect to them. The Mikado must give a definite answer
at once, if he desired to avoid danger out complications. ,
The Court
replied that the Mikado’s resolution was unchanged.
Nothing
beyond the Treaty with Perry could be conceded. ' If the Americans resorted to
force, the Tycoon must do his best, and the Mikado would wish to be informed
what measures of defence were adopted. He would not sanction the new Treaty
until the opinions of the daimios had been submitted for his consideration. '
Finding
that he made no impression, Hotta at last gave up trying to persuade the Court,
and left for Yedo. Three days after his return Ii was appointed by the Tycoon
Tairo, or President of the Council, an office not ordinarily filled up, and it
was decided to ask Harris for further delay; At the same time the daimios
actually present in Yedo were sent for to the castle, and in the presence of
the Tycoon a written order was delivered to them reciting the Mikado’s
commands. It stated that the Mikado did not believe there would be war, but
that this result would depend upon the action taken by the Tycoon, who was of
Opinion that the only course to adopt was that already laid before the Mikado.
A further expression of their views was required of1 them, which they
were to furnish without delay. "
Matters were
complicated at this juncture by the urgent need of finally deciding upor. the
adoption of an heir to the Tycoon, who had been married for some years and had
had no children. The question had been pending for several years. Some favoured
the choice of the young Prince of Kishiu, who was only twelve years of age, but
being cousin- german to the Tycoon was the nearest in blood. Many
leading'officials,’ including Hotta, as well as the daimios of Owari, Echizen, Satsuma,
Tosa, Sendai, Awa and Uwajima and the Tycoon’s-own wife’preferred Nariaki’s
son, Hitotsubashi, who was twenty years of age, and known to possess
exceptional ability. , The Tycoon had made u his mind in favour of his cousin.
Moreover he disliked the character of Nariaki, who was likely to arrogate to
himself an inconveniently great share in the counsels of the Government, if his
son were adopted as heir. While this question was still being dgb&ted, the
necessity presented itself of immediately signing the treaty with Harris.
Nariaki, on hearing of Harris’ arrival at Kanagawa, protested violently against
the conclusion of the treaty without waiting for sanction from the Mikado, as a
disloyal and impious act, certain to encounter general reprobation. If they
had, however, actually signed the treaty, either Ii, or one of his colleagues
on the Council, ought to proceed to Kioto at once arid take the Mikado’s
pleasure in the matter. He also declared his absolute opposition to the chief
provisions of the Treaty. Ii replied that when the daimios had been consulted,
not one of them had given his voice for war, but that they had simply urged the
imperative necessity of taking precautions for the future, which had been done.
The Council then informed the Court at Kioto of the momentous step they had
felt compelled to take. The Tycoon had been unwilling to sign Without the
Mikado’s sanction; but the danger of postponement was too great to be risked.
Similar
information
was given to all the daimiosj who were called on to state their opinions
without reserve as to the next steps to be taken.
On August 4
the ceremony of installing the young Prince of Kishiu as the Tycoon’s heir took
place. The partisans of Hitotsubashi, nevertheless, still hoped to upset the
decision. However, a week1 later orders were issued confining
Nariaki to his house; Hitotsubashi was forbidden to attend at the castle; Owari
and Echizen were forced to retire into private life, in consequence of their
opposition to IiV foreign policy; while Tosa and Uwajima were subjected to the
same penalty for having addressed the Court directly with regard to the
Hitotsubashi candidature, and Hotta was dismissed from the Council. On August
10, the Tycoon received in person the congratulations of the daimios on his
choice of an heir; but that night he was suddenly taken ill, and expired bn the
14th, after giving orders for the penalties just mentioned. To add to the
confusion, a decree arrived from the Mikado, commanding the presence of either
Ii or a member of the Council at Kioto. In this the hand of Nariaki is evident.
On the 12th the British and Russian squadrons arrived with the respective
plenipotentiaries. Ii was therefore justified in replying to the Court that
state affairs of pressing importance required his presence at Yedo; but he
promised that Manabe, newly appointed a member of the Council, should be sent
up instead. As the latter could not start during the early days of mourning for
the late Tycoon, a long letter, drafted by Ii, was sent to the Kwambaku (the
Mikado’s chief Minister), defen<? .ig the course pursued by the Yedo
Government.
It is
necessary to explain in a few words the situation at Kioto. When Hotta went
there to get sanction to the Harris treaty he was greatly helped by Kujo, the
Kwambaku, anti his retainer Shimada Sakon, the latter deriving his inspiration
from Nagano Shuzer a retainer of Ii. On the other side were the friends of
Nariaki and his party, namely Takadzukasa and his son, Konoye and Sanjo, all
four of them nobles of the highest rank, with whom sided most of' the Court
nobles, thoroughgoing advocates of the seclusion policy. It was these
personages who defeated Hotta’s mission. To procure the Mikado’s orders in
their favour was, for either party, a matter of first-rate importance, and as
these had to be transmitted through the Kwambaku, the side he favoured must win
the day. >' A contest thus’ arose about the occupancy of that office, and
Ii’s opponents exerted every effort to get rid of Kujo. It was his support that
had enabled Ii to procure the Mikado’s approval to the young Prince of Kishiu
bemg adopted, in spite of Nariaki’s influence, and this success had
exasperated: the other party. The news of the Treaty having been signed gave
them a powerful handle against Ii. Nariaki, after being worsted at Yedo, now
employed all his influence at Kioto on behalf of Takadzukasa and his friends,
who in turn endeavoured to set him on his feet again by procuring direct orders
to him from the Mikado. One
day,
when Kujo happened to be absent from Court, the Takadzukasa party drafted a
letter stating that, the Mikado was not satisfied with the Tycoon’s hasty
signature : of the treaty It, was a rebellious and discourteous
proceeding on the part of the Ministers, which could not fail to cause a breach
between Kioto arid Yedo: the Mikado required, therefore, that all the daimios
should be summoned to give their advice on the critical situation that had
arisen. Instructions were at the same time forwarded to the Prince of Mito
(JSariaki’s son), as the senior daimio, to communicate to the others the wishes
of the Mikado. This document came into the hands of the Prince^ though
obviously intended for his father, and instead of acting on the instructions,
he showed them to the Council. He had. however, already sent off his reply,
promising to act for the best, but this fact he was careful not to disclose.
The Council decided .therefore to reply briefly to the Court letter, defending
what had been done, and to leave it to Manabe, on his arrival at Kioto, to
offer a fuller exposition of their policy ^ Meanwhile, clansmen of Satsuma
(among them Saigo Kichinosuke, afterwards a celebrated political leader),
Choshiu, Echizen,and Mito had assembled, at Kioto to support the opposition
against the Tycoon’s Government. The Tycoon’s Resident and the civil governor
of the city had kept a watchful eye on their doings j and sent information to
meet Manabe on his journey which showed the necessity of adopting vigorous
measures, for traces of a conspiracy to get rid.of the young Tycoon and
supplant him by Hitotsubashi had been discovered. On hearing of Manabd’s having
started from Yedo, the pro-Mito Court nobles put sufficient pressure on Kujo to
make him ;esign; but Ii refused to recognise the resignation on the ground that
by constitutional practice a Kwcmbdku could not.be appointed or dismissed
without the Tycoori’s concurrence, and. instructed Manabe to act accordingly.
The latter reached Kioto on October 23, and the arrest of the plotters
followed. This vigorous step greatly weakened the Nariaki influence. Kujo
agreed: to remain in office, and measures were taken against the hostile Court
nobles, though in such a leisurely manner that six months more elapsed before
they found it necessary to resign their offices. : ■
Manabe told
the Court that the Yedo Government did not really desire to cultivate relations
with foreign countries. The change in the world situation had necessitated the
conclusion of treaties, but the Government would watch for an opportunity and
use every effort to get rid of foreigners so soon as adequate armaments, in the
way of ships and guns, were completed. At present the necessary funds were
lacking. Foreigners would come to Japan solely in pursuit of gain; and, if
things could be so arranged as to prevent their making any profit out of the
trade, they would soon withdraw of their own accord. To rescind the treaties on
the morrow of their signature would unite all the Powers against Japan, and in
the unprepared state jof the country it was not to
be thought
of. Kujo told the Tycoon’s Resident that what the Mikado was most anxious to
prevent was a promise to open Osaka to foreign trade. He wished foreigners at
other places to be placed under the same restrictions in regard to residence
and moving about the country as the Chinese and Dutch had always been subjected
to at Nagasaki, lest the Japanese people should become friendly to them and be
infected by the “ pernicious doctrine.” It is clear that Manabe had undertaken
that all foreigners should be expelled from, the country within a few years.
The result was the issue of an imperial edict''on February 3, 1859, declaring
that the Mikado, while unwilling that relations of friendship and commerce with
“ barbarians ” should be established even temporarily, was satisfied for the
moment with the resolution adopted by the Tycoon, with the concurrence of the
President of the Council and other officials, namely* to keep “the barbarians”
at a distance, and eventually to reestablish the good old law of seclusion.
Harmony had thus been attained between the Mikado and the Tycoon, and it was
confidently hoped that satisfactory plans would speedily be formed for closing
the country again. The Mikado understood the unavoidable difficulties that had
presented themselves, and would for the present await the result of the
Tycoon’s' deliberations. This important edict was regarded as a victory for Ii;
and;it was followed by the resignations of Takadzukasa and his ■ son, of
Konoye
and
Sanjo, which took effect in May. : -
Manabe had
returned to Yedo in the middle of April. The arrested plotters had been
despatched thither for trial, and the qualified assent of the Mikado to the
treaties might' have Seemed to have secured the position of the Tycoon. This
was, however, only in appearance. The prisoners had not yet been convicted, and
the Mitb clan was still in possession of the special order from the Mikado.
What Manabe had obtained was not his sanction to the Treaties, but merely a
postponement of the closing of the country. The Court had abandoned no
principle. The Tycoon remained under the obligation to close the ports, sooner
or later, to commerce, and yet the course of events was adverse to his carrying
out his undertaking. He had contracted it in January ^nevertheless he had not
only to open the three ports in July to several nations, but also to send an
embassy, to the United States to exchange the ratifications of the treaty, -
The language held to the Court and the course pursued towards foreigners became
daily more divergent. That collisions with foreign Po >vers should ensue
became inevitable, because the majority of the ruling classes of the country
was anti-foreign, who learnt nothing from the few whose eyes were opened by
their intercourse with such men as Commodore Perry and Count Putiatin, or their
visit to Washington. Ii having failed to obtain the Mikado’s unreserved consent,
was now driven to attempting to crush the Mito influence by severe sentences on
political offenders, and by bringing about a marriage between the Tycoon and a
younger sister of the Mikado. The decree in
which the
Mikado affirmed his hope that the foreigners would eventually be driven out was
not made public, and those whom it most concerned were left in entire ignorance
of its existence.
The new
treaties came into force on July 1, 1859. Kanagawa, or rather Yokohama, a
village on the opposite side of the bay, was opened to trade, while the
English, American and French diplomatic representatives took up their
residence at Yedo. From the outset every sort of obstacle was ’thrown in the
way of-trade by the Japanese authorities. Difficulties occurred in Connexion
with' the currency, owing to the unwise clause in. the treaties providing ibr
the circulation of foreign gold- and silver coin in Japan weight for weight.
The ratio of gold to silver was much lower than in the West, and the. gold coin
was rapidly exported. Prices; of produce rose, and all classes
complained that living was now much dearer than before- Less than two months
after the opening of the port of Yokohama a Russian naval officer and a seaman
were hacked to pieces in the dark by men of the Samurai class. In November the
Chinese servant of a foreign merchant was the victim of a murderous assault. In
January, 1860, the native linguist of the English legation at Yedo was
murdered, and in February two Dutch merchant captains were cut to pieces in the
streets of Yokohama. No redress was obtained in any of these cases; but every
measure that ingenuity could suggest was taken to prevent the recurrence of
such incidents, especially' by instituting a rigid system of passes for Samurai
visiting Yokohama, and by the erection of guard-houses on the approaches to the
town. The Tycoon’s Government had weakened their own hands by allowing the Mikado
and the daimios to believe that it was their intention to expel foreigners from
the shores of Japan as soon as they considered the country to be sufficiently
prepared, and the impediments placed in the way of trade were part of the
ambiguous policy they had adopted.
In order to
maintain the prestige of the Tycoon they exerted themselves to obtain from the
Mikado a censure on the Court nobles dismissed for the share they had taken in
transmitting orders direct to Mito, and thus fomenting 1 Ksagrecmfint between
the Mikado and the Tycoon, while at the same time, in the name of the latter,
they disgraced Nariaki, and ordered him into confinement at the capital of the
clan. His son was confined to his own house, and Hitotsubashi was forced to
retire into private life; sentences varying from capital punishment to exile
were pronounced on some fifty of the men of lower degree who had been arrested
at Kioto and sent for trial to Yedo; and the officials who had worked for the
adoption of Hitotsubashi were deprived of office and tanas. The source of all
the Tycoon’s troubles being the Mito clan and its intrigues with the Court, Ii
now came to the conclusion that it must be forced to give up the document
containing the private orders received from the Mikado. Through Kujo he
obtained the necessary sanction to the demand being made; but obstinate
resistance was offered
by the Mito
clansmen, some twenty of whom resolved to remove the traitorous President of
the Council who had betrayed his country to the barbarian, insulted their
prince, and persecuted even to the death, upright and patriotic Samurai. On
March 24,1860, as he was proceeding to the castle, the band attacked his train,
murdered him and carried off his head in triumph. ■ Thus the most
strenuous advocate of an enlightened foreign policy disappeared from the scene,
to be followed to the grave six months later by his inveterate enemy, Nariaki.,
From this time onwards dissensions among the clansmen,, some of whom supported
the Tycoon, while others vindicated: the rights of the .Mikado, prevented Mito
from exercising any influence over thet current of national
politics.
In
September, 1860, a Prussian mission under, Count Eulenburg arrived at Yedo to
conclude a treaty of commerce. It can well be imagined that this proposal to.
negotiate was in the highest degree unwelcome to the Tycoon’s Government*
which had already become involved in serious difficulties in consequence of the
Treaties of 1858. The Prussian diplomatist was, however, not to be denied; and,
finally, the Government consented early in December to appoint commissioners,
with the result that a treaty was signed on January 24,1861. From this all:
mention of the opening of other ports or places besides Yokohama, Hakodate and
Nagasaki was excluded. Niigata, or some other port on the west coast, was to
have been opened on January 1, I860, but no steps were taken on either side to
carry out this stipulation. Of more importance were the treaty provisions that
the city of Yedo should be opened for residence and trade on January J:, 1862,
and the city of Osaka with the port of Hiogo, January 1,1863. It was necessary
for the Tycoon’s Government, in order to fulfil the undertaking given by Manabe
to the Court, to obtain from the Treaty Powers their consent to a postponement,
and already in the summer of I860 they had approached the foreign representatives
on this subject. The latter, who had experienced in their own persons the
dangers of residence in Yedo, were not unwilling to recommend this course to
their Governments. Eventually, it was decided by the Council to send a mission
to Europe to negotiate. It started in February, 1862, and: returned home in
January, 1863, after visiting all the Powers in turn, except the United States,
with its object accomplished. In return for the concession obtained,, the
envoys undertook to recommend to their Government, that all restrictions on
trade complained of by foreign merchants should be removed, and also that, inj
accordance with a suggestion thrown out in 1861 by the Tycoon’s Ministers,
Tsushima should , be opened to commerce as a measure o£ protection against
Russian aggression. :
Just before
the negotiations for the Prussian Treaty were concluded, Heusken, the
Secretary, of the United: States .legation, was murdered as he was riding home
one night from the Prussian envoy’s lodgings. The English, French, and
Netherlands representatives decided
to remove
theirestablishrrents temporarily to Yokohama or Kanagswa, uiltil the Japanese
Government should give guarantees for the safety of the legations, while1
the American Minister preferred to remain in Yedo, where, as he maintained,
perfect safety could be enjoyed, so long as foreigners observed the precautions
recommended by the Tycoon’s Ministers.1 It was he who had obtained the
conclusion of the first treaty that accorded the right of diplomatic residence
in Yedo* To him, therefore, it would have been humiliating to admit that he had
made a mistake in insisting on this point during the negotiations. He reported
to Washington that he looked on Heusken’s murder as the result of his own
imprudence in going through the streets at night, though escorted by the
mounted Samurai detailed by the Government for his protection.
The Council
were greatly disquieted by this withdrawal of the three diplomatists, but
procured their return in March, 1861, by engaging to provide effectually for
the protection of the legations. The measures that the Council had engaged to
take were put to a rude test on the night of July 5, when a band of fourteen
Mito clansmen attacked the residence of the British Minister. The Japanese
guard, consisting of clansmen furnished by the feudal chief of Koriyama and
from retainers of the Tycoon, engaged the assailants after they had penetrated
to the Minister’s apartments'and wounded two of his staff. It was discovered
afterwards that the plan had been formed more than a year before, some of the
confederates having visited the building in the disguise- of curio dealers, and
made themselves acquainted with the interior arrangements. Hearing that the
British Minister had returned on July 3 from a journey in the interior, they
proceeded to carry out their design. The motive was merely blind hatred of the
foreigner, and, as in the case of other murderous attacks, the act was not the
*-esult of provocation received. In order to ensure better protection in the
future, the Government undertook that residences should be built for the
foreign Ministers in some defensible locality. The place finally selected was
Goten-yama, an elevated piece of ground commanding the bay, which for
generations had been a pleasure resort of the inhabitants of the capital.
Buildings were’accordingly commenced, but had not been completed, wheu they
were burnt to the ground early in 1863 by incendiaries from Choshiu. The choice
had been very unpopular, and the clansmen had especially resented it as dedicating
to the service of the foreigner an important strategic position. Harris and his
successor Pruyn continued to live at Yedo till, on the night of May 24,1863,
the American legation was destroyed by fire. For some time previous Pruyn had
been urged by the Council to leave the capital, for the residence there of
diplomatists was one of the treaty stipulations most objected to by the
Mikado’s party; and he reluctantly came to the conclusion that the destruction
of his residence was an act of incendiarism for which the ultimate
responsibility must rest on the Tycoon’s Government.
Russia had,
as narrated in a previous section of this chapter, acquired from China an
enormous territory stretching from the mouth of the Amur river down to the
northern boundary of Corea. It contained no warm-water port, and the idea was
conceived that the Japanese island of Tsushima, lying in the Corean channel,
would serve as a convenient additional naval station. Accordingly, in March,
1861, the corvette Possadnzck, commander Barileff, was despatched thither with
orders to form an establishment on shore. When the news of his proceedings
reached Yedo, the Government sent down officials to enquire what were his
intentions. They could obtain no information, except that his ship was in need
of repairs, which appeared to them suspicious, as she had come straight from
Nagasak where, had she required any, they could easily have been executed.' The
commander explained that his real object was to forestall the English, who had
designs on the island and had asked the Tycoon’s Government to give them land
there for a naval station. This was false. Injunctions were left with the
daimio to avoid a breach of peaceful relations, and the officials returned to
report to their superiors. The Russian consul at Hakodate was then appealed to,
who replied that he knew nothing of the matter, but would enquire of the
Commodore. It turned out afterwards that he himself had been the channel
through which the Commodore had received his instructions. .The Japanese
Government then turned for help to the British Minister and Admiral. The
diplomatist advised their addressing a complaint to the Russian Government,
which they accordingly did on September 27. The Admiral proceeded to Tsushima,
where he arrived on August 27, and found a very complete naval depot in
existence, including a hospital arid workshops, with the Russian flag flying on
the hill above. On his addressing a letter to the Russian officer, asking
whether bis orders admitted of his leaving the island if he received a request:
to thiat effect from the Japanese authorities, and whether he had orders to
create a permanent establishment there, he received a polite but evasive
answer. Sir James Hope thereupon proceeded to Olga Bay on September 5 in search
of the Commodore, but not finding him there, he left a letter, enquiring
whether it was his intention to retain permanently the establishment begun by
the Possadnick, and if otherwise, when would it be removed. He added that until
he received instructions from his own Government, it would be his duty not to
recognise any establishment formed on Japanese territory not sanctioned by
treaty* whether by Russia or any other Power, and that he would iriake his
intention known to the Japanese authorities. In reply the Commodore informed,
him that, even before the receipt of his letter, orders had been sent to
Commander Barileff to withdraw. When the official reports reached England, Lord
Russell instructed the ambassador at St Petersburg to make representations to
the Russian Government. Prince Gorchakoff treated the matter as one of no
importance, and complained of the tone
of
the Admiral’s letter to Barileff, but said that the island had been abandoned.
The dates seem to suggest that the relinquishment of this attempt to establish
a naval station midday in, the channel between Corea and Japan, was not
altogether spontaneous. In the unprepared state of Japan at that period the
Russians might have acquired a position on the island from which they could not
afterwards have easily: been dislodged..; .
In November,
1861, on the ocicasion of the intended marriage between the Mikado’s sister and
the young Tycoon, orders came down from Kioto.to proclaim a general amnesty in
favour,of all those who, in the belief : that they were serving their country,
had committed political offences for which they had suffered capital
punishment, exile, imprisonment :or domiciliary arrest. This was virtually a
command to censure retrospectively the whole policy of Ii, the late President
of the Council. Since his assassination* the chief direction of affairs had
passed into the hands of Kuzd and Ando. It was the latter who had sanctioned
the treaty negotiations with Eulenburg, at a moment when the Tycoon was morally
pledged to cancel those already concluded. A reprimand addressed by him to the
actual negotiator Hori, one of the Commissioners for Foreign Affairs, had
driven the latter ; to take his own life, and a party of Hori’s retainers
attempted on February 14, 1862, to assassinate Ando "in the precincts of
the caistle. He escaped with a severe wound, but did not reappear in public
life.
A few days
later an edict was received from Kioto, inveighing against the increasing
audacity of “the barbarians,” and recalling that the result of previous
communications with Yedo had been to fix upon a term of between seven aiid ten
years for severing relations with foreign countries. The Mikado had agreed to a
short delay, in order to give time for the completion of military preparations.
As evidence of the harmony which now prevailed* so necessary for the successful
“quelling of the barbarians,” the Mikado had allowed his sister to espouse the
Tycoon, and the whole country must unite in seizing the occasion for
manifesting the glory of Japan. After Nariaki disappeared from the scene, his
mantle had fallen on Shimadzu Saburo, a younger brother of the late, and father
of the present, Prince of Satsuma, who now appeared at Kioto. A complete change
speedily came over the field of politics. Kuze and Ando were disgraced.
Shungaku, the ex-Prince of Echizen, and the feudal chief of Aidzu were summoned
to the Tycoon’s councils, while at Kioto the Court nobles who had been
disgraced at the instance of Ii were restored to favour. The Kwambaku Kujo was
sent about his business and replaced by Konoyd, who belonged, as will be
remembered, to the party formerly headed by Nariaki. In order to secure the
Tycoon’s hold over the person of the Mikado, Aidzu was shortly afterwards
appointed Military Governor of Kioto. It was a good choice, for the Aidzu
clansmen were the most formidable warriors in Japan, except those of Satsuma.
1862-3] Shimadzu Saburffs mission to Yedo. Richardsonkilled.
845
To bring
pressure to bear on the Tycoon a Court noble named Ohara was despatched early
in June to Yedo, with Shimadzu Saburo as his escort, bearing instructions to
offer to the Tycoon the choice of three alternatives: the first, that the
Tycoon should come up to Kioto with all the daimios to consult with the Court
nobles as to the. government of the country and the “expulsion of the
barbarians”; the second, to copy the system bequeathed by Hideyoshi to his son,
and appoint five of the greater daimios whose territories lay on the coast to
be chief Ministers (toiro); or the third, to appoint Hitotsubashi assistant to
the Tycoon and Shungaku sole chief Minister. The Council finally consented to
accept paxt of the first and the whole of the third alternative. Notice was
given.that the Tycoon would proceed to Kioto “in order to come to a complete
understanding with the Mikado, and to give expression to his sincere sentiments
and intentions, thus laying the foundations of a complete accord and enabling
the military prestige of Japan to be developed until she became the most
powerful nation in the world; the Tycoon therefore called on all the daimios to
aid him with their advice in. the introduction of the necessary administrative
reforms, that finally he might bring tranquillity to the imperial bosom and
confer prosperity on the people.” This proclamation was followed on August 1 by
the appointments of Hitotsubashi as Guardian to the Tycoon and of Shungaku as
President of the Council.
The Tycoon’s Government
had capitulated.
As Shimadzu
Saburo was returning to Kioto in September, 1862, he met on the high road near
Yokohama a party of four British subjects, one of whom (Richardson) was killed,
and two severely Wounded, by men forming part of his retinue. This incident had
important and far- reaching consequences. In the spring of 1863 the British
Government demanded a formal apology for a murderous attack having been
permitted on British subjects on a high road open to them by treaty, with the
payment of a sum of £100,000 as a penalty for this' ■ offence, and a
further sum of £10,000 as compensation to the families of two sentries who had
been murdered by one of the Japanese guards at the British legation at Yedo on
the night of June 26,1862. From the Prince of Satsuma the charge d’affaires was
instructed to claim the trial and execution of the chief perpetrators of the
murderous assault, and the payment of £25,000 by way of compensation to the
relatives of the murdered man and to his companions. The Tycoon’s Government,
which was being pressed by the Court to “expel the barbarians,” would have
refused compliance, but eventually gave way when an ultimatum, backed by a
strong naval force, was presented. They paid the money and offered a written
expression of regret. They intimated their readiness to pay the indemnity on
behalf of the Prince of Satsuma, but declared themselves unable to arrest and
punish the murderers, thus admitting that they.had no power in the territories
of a great daimio.
The British squadron
under Admiral Kiiper, with the charge d’affaires on board, consequently
proceeded to Kagoshima in the month of August to present the demands directly
to the Prince. The Satsuma authorities attempted to justify the slaying of
Richardson on the ground that he and his party had obstructed the passage of
Shimadzu Saburo’s train. They held that, if; anyone were to blame, it was the
Yedo Government for not inserting in the treaty a statement of the Japanese
rule of the road. They declared their inability to find the individuals
implicated, and declined to pay compensation until the question of
responsibility was settled.. The Admiral thereupon seized some steamers
belonging to the Prince, and on the batteries opening fire, engaged them during
a furious storm. Many guns were dismounted and half the town was burnt, besides
a factory and a gun-foundry, the loss on the British side being 2 officers and
10 men killed and 51 wounded. On the following day the squadron quitted the
bay, throwing shells as it passed into what was believed to be the Prince’s
palace. The report addressed to the Tycoon on behalf of the Prince briefly
stated that the seizure of the steamers had rendered it necessary to open fire
and drive off the attacking force. The engagement could hardly be claimed as a
victory by either side, but in November, 1863, envoys from Satsuma presented
themselves to the British charge d’affaires, expressing the desire of their
Prince to come to terms, by undertaking to search for the guilty parties and
offering to pay the sum demanded. This proposal was accepted, and the Tycoon’s
Government provided the money. Prom this time forward1 a friendly
feeling grew up between the plan1 and the British legation, which
was largely facilitated by the business relations existing between Satsuma and
a leading British firm at Nagasaki. In the spring of the following year,
however, Shimadzu Saburo was sent for to the palace of the Mikado, who
expressed his satisfaction at the zeal displayed by the Satsuma clan in the
repulse of the British squadron, and conferred gifts on him and; his son the
reigning Prince. It is highly probable that the arrangement made with the
charge d’affaires had been concealed from the Prince’s knowledge by the
retainers who professed to speak on his behalf. :
To go back,
however, to the previous year—the political situation developed rapidly after
the mission of Ohara, who on his return to Kioto was rewardfed for the success
he had obtained. The Court nobles were informed of the Mikado’s satisfaction with
the Tycoon’s evident desire to amend his conduct and .to respect the wishes of
the sovereign, who- would wait awhile to see the result. About the same time,
notice was given at Yedo to the daimios that they might send their families
home, and that the rules for their own attendance there would be greatly
modified, so as to allow in future of their residing more continuously in their
territories and attending to the interests of their people. One and all
thereupon quitted Yedo, as it proved, for ever; and most of the great duimius,
such as Inshiu,> Chikuzen, Geishiu, Kurumd, Awa,'
Kumamoto,
Satsuma, Choshiu and Tosa, from this time onwards established themselves at
Kioto, thus openly transferring to the Mikado the allegiance they had formerly
paid to the Tycoon.
Finally, it
was decided at Yedo that the Tycoon should start for Kioto in the ensuing
March. Hitotsubashi and Shungaku preceded the Tycoon to Kioto. In response to
an urgent message from the palace they, in conjunction with Aidzu and the
ex-Prince of Tosa, imprudently undertook that when the Tycoon arrived he would
fix the date when “expulsion of the barbarians” should begin... This would be
some time in the month between May 18 and June 15, 1863; but, in order to
provide beforehand a sufficient reason for shortening his stay, they reminded
the Court that they had previously stipulated for an interval of twenty days
between his return to Yedo and the commencement of operations. To the general
body of officials at Yedo, who were only too conscious that the Tycoon was
undertaking the impossible, it seemed that the impatience of the Court was
unreasonable, and that the Tycoon ought not to be made to promise precipitately
what was beyond his power to perform. They counselled the adoption of stringent
measures against all those who were trying to force on him an enterprise that
would not only bring about his rain, but also leave a lasting stain on the
character of Japan in the eyes of foreign nations. But the time had gone by for
resistance, and their political chiefs lacked the moral courage to tell the
Court that the task was hopeless. On the last day of March the start was
m&de. The original intention was that the stay at Kioto should not exceed
ten days, but the Court, having got the Tycoon there, determined to keep him as
long as possible. At first, the Mikado was induced to declare that he left the
performance of the functions of Shogun entirely in his hands; yet at the same
time he announced the possibility of his taking the field himself in person. Mito
was sent down to Yedo to hasten preparations for war. The ohly way of escape
for the Tycoon was to agree on a date for commencing negotiations, by which was
meant an intimation to foreigners that they must depart. June 24 was
accordingly chosen. Notice was given to all the daimios to defend their coasts
from foreign attack, and Hitotsubashi was despatched to Yedo to see that the
Mikado’s orders were executed. Before his arrival, however, notes had been
addressed on the appointed day to the Ministers of England, France and the
United States, stating that orders had come from the Tycoon at Kioto to close
the ports and banish all foreigners. At the same time the Council gave them
verbal assurances that nothing would be done to give effect to this intimation^
Trade would go on as usual, and troops would be sent to support the Tycoon
against his enemies. As a matter of course the foreign representatives replied
by a protest against this attempt to set the treaties aside, and declared they
would take such steps as seemed fitting to protect the interests of their
respective countries.
Troops
were accordingly embarked on board two British steamers chartered by the
Council and brought as far as Osaka, to the unbounded indignation of the.
Court. Ogasawara, who commanded them, was denounced on all sides as a traitor
to the Mikado, and was glad to sscape back to Yedo. Hitotsubashi, moreover, had
sent up a memorial asking to be relieved from his charge, on the ground that he
could not find a single member of the Yedo Government willing to assist in its
execution. Assurances on behalf of the Tycoon that he would carry out the
Mikado’s orders so far as practicable having been given by the Ministers in his
suite, he was allowed, to go down to Osaka, whence they promptly brought ;him
home. to Yedo by steamer. Ogasawara had to be dismissed from office for his
temerity in planning a rescue. ,
The Straits
of Shimorioseki, on the northern side of which lay the. Choshiu territory, were
habitually used by foreign vessels navigating; between Yokohama and Nagasaki.
Powerful batteries had. been constructed in readiness for the day, when “
expulsion ” was to begin. It so happened that a passing American steamer
anchored there on June 24, 1863, and she was at once fired on. On July8 and 11
a French despatch- boat and a Dutch:man-of-war received similar treatment. An
American man-of-war was promptly sent to retaliate. She engaged.' the batteries
on July 16, and isank a steamer and a brig belonging to the Prince. Four days
later the Frenoh Admiral attacked the batteries, and landing, a party of 250
men;; spiked, the guns and destroyed the ammunition., The Straits remained
closed until September, 1864, when a joint expedition of the four Powers,
including Great Britain, attacked, Shimonoseki, captured the batteries, and
removed .the guns. It should be mentioned that, previous to the despatch of the
allied squadrons, a ship had been sent down to convey to Choshiu two young
.clansmen (one of whom was the present Prince I to) who had just returned from.
England, in order to present to,,their lord remonstrances on the part of the
foreign representatives, and endeavour to induce him toj abandon further
hostilities. The answer of the clan was that the Prince had been, merely
carrying out the orders of, the Mikado and Tycoon, and that he could not open
the Straits without^their sanction, (which he would endeavour to obtain if a
delaj of three months were, conceded ;tp him. The failure of this attempt at
negotiation convinced the diplomatists that measures of coercion were
unavoidable*. The result of the operations was an undertaking on the part of
Choshiu not to re-arm the batteries, to allow free passage to foreign vessels,
to furnish them with such supplies as they might need, and to pay an indemnity
for the expenses of the expedition together with a sum as, ransom for the town
, of Shimonoseki.. Eventually,, the Tycoon’s Government undertook the payment
of this indemnity, the; amount of which was fixed at $3,000,00Q, Each of the
three Powers whose vessels had beep molested .received $142,000 as
compensation,
the balance being divided equally among the four, although the force
contributed by each was far from being equal. As in the case of Kagoshima in
1863, this passage of arms was followed by the establishment, of entirely
amicable relations with the Prince and his retainers.
No sooner had
the Tycoon been conveyed safely back to Yedo than a memorial signed by him was
addressed to the Mikado, representing that, in the opinion of Mito and
Hitotsubashi, with whom he had been directed to consult, the present moment was
an unfavourable one for carrying out the exclusion policy. To attempt it would
be merely playing into the hands of the ‘f barbarians.” So soon as order was
introduced into the internal administration and harmony of opinion established,
the necessary steps should be taken. He suggested that the fixing of a date
should be left entirely to his discretion.
It will be
noticed that the authors of thu' document entirely gnored the fact that June 24,1863,
had already been agreed upon by their colleagues who had accompanied the Tycoon
to Kioto. The reply which came back praised the Tycoon for having, by coming to
Court, revived an excellent practice that had remained in abeyance for over two
centuries, and1 thus placed the relations of sovereign and vassal on
a proper footing. A rebuke was added for his not keeping the Mikado constantly
informed of his doings, above all for having gone to Yedo in a steamer, and for
his unsatisfactory language in regard to breaking off foreign relations; he
deserved to be called to account for his conduct, but out of gracious
consideration, proceedings ag&inst ■ him Would be delayed—haughty
language to which the Tokugawa Shogims had not been accustomed.
A sudden and
unexpected change now came about in the Mikado’s counsels, due to the rash
proceedings of the Choshiu chief. By his unprovoked attacks on Ameri'an, French
and Dutch ships he had brought on himself the direct hostility of foreign
Powers, and had been ingloriously worsted. He had violated a constitutional
rule by anticipating instructions from the Tycoon. He had not parleyed before
opening fire. To the Tycoon’s Government the discomfiture of Choshiu was very
welcome, and strengthened their position. Prince Nakagawa,' the Mikado’s
principal adviser, became convinced that the anti-foreign policy of violence
was impracticable, and those who had been foremost in urging it fell into
disgrace. Sanjo and certain other Court nobles were forbidden to appear at
Court, and the Choshiu men were ordered to surrender the guard of the palace
gate that had been in their charge. Easy credence was given to the accusation
that they were plotting to carry off the Mikado and force him to declare war
against the foreigners. Choshiu, being called on to explain his action in
firing on foreign ships and in sending armed men across the strait into the
territory of Kokura, replied that to the order to break off relations on June
24 his retainers
850 Choshiu clan eocpelledfrom Kioto. Murder of
Camus. [i863
had f given
its natural interpretation. They had supposed that any parleyings that might be
contemplated would have taken place previously, and that hostilities were to
be imm acLate. The Kokura clan had1 weakened the' effect of
Choshiu’s efforts by withholding their assistance, and surely to send men to
expostulate with them was in no way irregular.
There
were not wanting sympathiser? with Choshiu. Awa, Inshiu, Uyesugi and Bizen
urged that the Tycoon should be called on to explain the delay in closing , the
port of Yokohama* which the Minister Itakura and his colleagues had promised
should by this time be accomplished. On the other: hand the Echizen clan
frankly gave it as their opinion that both the Mikado and Tycoon were pursuing
an erroneous policy; The, maritime “ barbarians ” had become enlightened, and
friendly intercourse between nations was the rule. For Japan to remain isolated
was impracticable. The; policy of closing the country and “expelling the
barbarians ” had no foundation in reason. To break off relations with the Five
Powers without just grounds would amount to.a breach of faith; The “pernicious
doctrine” so much talked about was quite, different from the “ Kirishitan ” of
former times, and as far as they could hear no harm need be anticipated from
its adoption. Commence would enrich Japan, as it had enriched other countries.
Until the Court changed. itsj line of action it would not be visited either by
the reigrling daimio or by Shungaku. .
The upshot
was that the Choshiu clansmen were forbidden to remain in Kioto, and theyi
accordingly departed in, a body, carrying off with them Sanjq and. six other
Court nobles, who were allied with them politically. Sanjo will be heard of
afterwards.
At
first the Tycoon’s, Ministers hoped to induce the foreign representatives to
consent to Yokohama being closed, on condition of Ogasawara’s Note of June 24
being withdrawn. Finding that they had produced no impression, the Council
wrote on November 12 announcing that, they had changed their policy, and
requested that Ogasawara’s Note might be returned. To keep up appearances, they
circulated a notification that full powers having been given to the Tycoon to
arranges for , closing the ports, and negotiations having begun, the clansmen
must ibstain from all acts ;of violence. The Mikado was also informed that*
negotiations had begun, and he announced reluctantly that he would await the
result. , , ,
On October 14
a, French naval officer, Lieutenant Camus, had been cut to pieces as he was
riding in the neighbourhood of Yokohama. An apology and compensation for this
murder was promised; and, as the foreign representatives had peremptorily
refused to entertain the proposal to close the ports, it was decided to
despatch a mission to France and England, to arrange the Camus affair and at
the same time to negotiate with the two Governments, whom the Council expected
to find
1864] Tycoon again at Kioto.-Choshiu clan attack
the palace. 851
more
yielding than the diplomatists on the spot. The reception they met with in
Paris did not encourage the envoys to pursue their journey further, and they
returned in August, 1864, with a convention By which they undertook >hat the
Tycoon would reopen the Straits of Shimonoseki within three months. This
convention the Government were easily persuaded not to ratify, as they
recognised the impossibility of putting it into execution. :
His
most forknidable antagonist having been obliged to withdraw from Kioto, it, was
thought safe for the Tycoon to prbceed thither again in February, 1864,
accompanied by four out of the seven members of which the Council of State now
consisted. He was preceded by Hitotsubashi in January. Choshiu still had
friends there, who exerted their efforts to obtain leave for himself and his
son to come up and explain their conduct in the previous summer, but without
success. The result of the negotiations between the Court and the Tycoon’s
supporters was that Aidzu, Shungaku of Echizen, the ex-Princes of Uwajima'and
Tosa, and Shimadzu Saburo were designated as personages enjoying the Mikado’s
confidence and therefore suitable counsellors for the Tycoon. An undertaking
was given that the Tycoon and all the daimios^ on succeeding to their fiefs,
should proceed to Kioto to receive investiture from the Mikado, and :that
various marks of respect hitherto withheld should be paid to him and to the
members of the imperial house. In return for these concessions, the Mikado
again committed the government of the country to the Tycoon, and left the
punishment of Choshiu and the seven fugitive Court nobles to his discretion. He
was at the same time ordered to carry out the closing :of Yokohama to foreign
trade with due expedition. As soon as these terms were settled the Tycoon
started for Yedo, where he arrived on June 23. 1
The
Choshiu clan, who were indisposed to admit that their conduct was in any way
worthy of blame, refused to remain under the imputation of disloyalty* and
early in August a band of some 400 warriors, headed by Fukubara, a leading
clan-councillor, arrived at Fushimi. They disobeyed the Court’s orders to
return home at once, and protested that their only desire was to manifest the
loyalty of their princes, and to remove traitorous advisers from the M kadoV
side. Two other bands jiider Kunishi and Masuda followed, raising the total
number to 900. The Tycoon’s party put forth a proclamation, commenting on their
threatening attitude, and announcing that the Mikado had decreed their
chastisement. On the 20th of the month hostilities broke out. The Choshiu men
attacked the palace from three sides, but were repulsed after a bloody fight by
the clansmen of Aidzu, Kuwana, Echizen, Hikone, Ogaki, and Satsuma and the
Tycoon’s troops under Hitotsubashi. They were pursued in their retreat; some
twenty of the fugitives committed suicide rather than surrender, and the rest
dispersed in tht direction ! of their
home.
Five days
later, a decree was issued from the palace denouncing the criminal act of
Choshiu, and ordering the Tycoon to march agaiast the clan. This was proclaimed
throughout the country, \nd the daimios of the west and south were called on to
furnish contingents. The ex-Prince of Owari was named commander-in-'chiefj and
Echizen second in command. ; Further edicts deprived the two Princes of their
titles and rank, and forbade the transport of rice and arms to their
territories. In November the Cbmmander-in-chief arrived at Hiroshima at the
head of the. attacking force; and received the submission of - the Choshiu
Princes. They undertook to execute (the three leaders of the attack on the
palace and to surrender the fugitive Court nobles, while they themselves would
retire to a monastery and await the sentence that might be pronounced on them.
The he<*ds of Fukubara, Kunishi and Masuda having been, prod need and
satisfactory evidence of contrition furnished by the Princes, Owari gave orders
to withdraw the troops.
,It. only
remained, therefore, to decide what Should be done with the two Princes. That
the Tycoon inspired the resolution taken on this occasion is scarcely probable,
and it can only be supposed that his supporters had become infatuated, for they
not only commanded that the Prince of Choshiu and his son should be brought
prisoners to Yedo, but also ordered Uwajima to send troops into the territory
to assume their custody. They also conceived the untimely resolution of
reenacting the old law, abrogated in 1862, which required the daimios to leave
their families in Yedo, and to reside there themselves every alternate year.
These measures provoked not only a protest from some of the leading daimios,
but also a Severe rebuke .from the Mikado, who called on the Tycoon to
forthwith proceed to Kioto and settle with him what steps should be taken to
restore domestic and foreign peace to the country.! Meanwhile disturbances had
broken out in Choshiu, where those of the clan who resented the decapitation of
the three clan-councillors, rose under the leadership of Takasugi and Yamagata,
worsted their opponents, and carried off the two Princes to the inland fortress
of Yamagachi.
On these
events becoming known at Yedo the Tycoon’s advisers resolved on a second
expedition. To reiterated orders to proceed to Kioto no attention was paid; but
at' last they found that delay was no longer practicable, and finally consented
that he should leave Yedo in June, 1865. It was at first intended to reappoint
the ex-Prince of Owari to the chief command, but his principal retainers were
unwilling to see him placed again in that invidious position, and Kishiu was
appointed in his stead. Higo was to lead the van^ but, loyal though his house
had always been to the Tycoon and his ancestors, he was very unwilling to take
part in the operations. Inshiu, a brother of Mito by bloodj remonstrated;
against the vagueness of the expression “ dangerous schemes” used as the
justification for renewed coercion, and warned the Tycoon against the defeat
and loss of prestige which he foresaw would be the result. Echizen likewise
protested, while Satsuma flatly refused
to send a
contingent. To make matters worse, the treasury was depleted, and resort became
necessary to the unpopular measure of calling upon the Buddhist monasteries and
townspeople of Yedo for contributions towards the expense of the contemplated
operations.
The Tycoon
reached Kioto on July 16, and had an audience the same day. The Mikado put
before him three equally unpalatable alternatives, each of which was contrived
so as to reserve to the Court the ultimate decision in Choshiu’s case; and it
was not till November that a reply was given. The Tycoon stated that he had
summoned the cadets of the house of Ghoshiu to appear before him at Osaka., but
they showed no signs of an intention to obey, and under the circumstances it
was difficult to treat the clan with leniency; on the contrary, everything
pointed to the necessity of an advance in force.
Another
complication had arisen from the attitude of the foreign representatives. So
far back as 1858 Harris had twitted the Tycoon’s Ministers with their apparent
inability to conclude a treaty without the Mikado’s permission. Nevertheless
the Treaties were signed by the Tycoon as the high contracting party on the
part of Japan, and to hide this assumption, while he was termed “ His Majesty ”
in the various texts drawn up in foreign languages, in the corresponding
Japanese version these words were either omitted altogether or rendered by a
term of which the only possible equivalent in English is “His Highness,’’ a
title borne also by the Kwambaku. When real diplomatic relations were opened at
Yedo the foreign representatives were not long in finding out that the Tycoon
was not the Emperor of Japan, and that the Mikado was much more than the
supposed “ Spiritual Emperor ” of the early writers. This impression deepened
as time went on. The Tycoon’s Ministers were forced to admit that they were
unable to interfere in the administration of the great fiefs, and that their
inability to carry out the treaties was due to the Mikado having refused
■ his sanction. The necessity of obtaining the ratification of the true
sovereign was forced upon the notice of Western Governments; but until after
the naval expeditions to Kagoshima and Shimonoseki and the gradual assemblage
of ships and troops in the Japan seas, the opportunity of pressing the point
did not present itself. In the summer of 1865 Sir Harry Parkes arrived in Japan
as British Minister, and, as soon as he had leisure to take up this question,
urged it1 upon the attention of his colleagues. Accordingly, a
powerful combined squadron proceeded to Hiogo early in November, carrying the
British, French and Netherlands Ministers and the United States charg^
d’affaires, with the object of compelling the attention of the Tycoon to the
matter. In additibn to demanding the Mikado’s ratification of the Treaties they
offered to remit two-thirds of the Shimonoseki indemnity in return for the
immediate opening of Osaka and Hiogo and the revision of the customs tariff on
a basis 6f 5 per cent, ad'valorem. ’ . . l
854 ' The 'Treaties sanctioned by the Mikado.
[i865-e
The
appearance of foreign ships of war in the bay of Osaka on such an errand
caused'a profound sensation at the Court. The :Tycoon was persuaded by his
Ministers to ask the Mikado’s leave to recommence negotiations with respect to
the treaties frankly and sincerely. Simultaneously he offered to resign
his’office in favour of Hitotsubashi and retire into private life. To increase
the pressure on :the Court it was given out that he would leave at once for
Yedo. Evidently such a step would have placed the Court in a very difficult
position. A similarly worded memorial from Hitotsubashi, Aidzu, Kuwana, and the
Minister Ogasawara reinforced the , Tycoon’s arguments! On the night, of
November 21 representatives of fifteen leading clans were summoned to the
palace, to offer their advice i to the Mikado. A large najority proved to be in
favour of the treaties being sanctioned. Accordingly, on the following day the
wished-for decree came forth, worded as follows: “ Imperial consent is, given
to treatiesj and you will therefore make suitable arrangements.” To this, was
added a rider, stating that there were several stipulations in the existing
treaties wbiob did not harmonise with the Mikado’s views. , A report must be
made on these points after ■jareful examination, and when the clans had
discussed it, he would give his decision. The question of opening Hiogo must be
dropped.
.
In communicating the Mikado’s consent to the foreign representatives the
Tycoon’s Ministers entirely , suppressed the rider, thus leaving them under the
impression that .the treaties .had been sanctioned as they stood. In regard to
the opening of Hiogo they simply said that they were unable to' discuss itf at
the moment.; They would continue to pay the instalments of the, indemnity, and
instructions should be sent to Yedo to negotiatethe amendment, of the tariff. . T;
This
interruption having been- disposed of, the Tycoon reluctantly consented to
remain in office, with Hitotsubashi as his principal adviser, and he was left
free to deal with the. Choshiu question as he judged expedient. , Early in
January, 1866, t* sort jof trial of Choshiu took place at Hiroshima,; that is
to say, three Hw officers put a series of questions to two clan-councillors,
who returned not very frank replies; Finally, a declaration was put in on
behalf of the two Princes, expressing complete submissiveness and readiness to
accept whatever terms might be imposed, The leaders of .the. Choshiu chilled
troops, who had also been eraminpdj spoke out more boldly, and expressed their
confidence that the two Princes would be jicquitted, on the ground that they
had, unwaveringly obeyed, the orders, both of‘the Mikado and the Tycoon. ,
This was tpo
.much for, the ,patienpe of the Council, who felt they were being trifled with.
In March they presented a report bearing the names of Hitotsubashi, Aid?u and
,two of themselves, acquitting the Princes indeed of treasonable intentions
towards the. Mikado, but cen-r ^ufingt^hem for their lax exercise of authority
over the clansmen. In consideration of the loyal conduct of the Choshiu family
in past,times
■they
recommended as a lenient sentence that 100,000 JcoJeu of lands should be
confiscated (say two-sevenths of the Choshiu territory), that the two Princes
should be condemned to seclusion for life, the headship being continued in a
descendant, while the! families of Fukubara, Kunishi and Masuda should be
attainted. This was approved by the Court on the same day, with the significant
recommendation that care should be taken to avoid popular commotion. In the
eyes of the feudal lords the sentence appeared preposterous, as indeed it was,
since the Tokugawa power was altogether insufficient for its enforcement. The
whole population of the two provinces declared their intention of resist ig,
and, so soon as they were ready to take the field, the Choshiu troops invaded
the adjoining provinces, where they occupied positions from which the Tycoon’s
army proved unable to eject them. Kishiu had already protested against the
unnecessary severity of the sentence,- while Satsuma had refused to march on
the ground that there was no justification for an appeal to arms. The
Government was at its wits’ end for money, and tried to raise funds from the
offi: als, from the city of Osaka, and the towns of Htogo and Nishinomiya. The
Tycoon’s forces suffered repeated defeats at the hands of their better drilled
and disciplined adversaries. - •
;
At
the end of September the Tycoon died most opportunely, and Hitotsubashi was
appointed to succeed as head of the Tokugawa family. Hereupon the .Court
commanded a cessation of hostilities and the retirement of. the Choshiu troops
from the territories they had seized: Choshiu affeeted ,tp disbelieve that this
was the genuine order of the Mikado, and. declined to evacuate, on the ground
that there was no guarantee that the war would not be renewed immediately after
the mourning for the Tycoon,was over. On February 3,1867, the Mikado died also,
and was succeeded by the present Emperor, then) only fifteen years of age. This
event was followed by an order from the palace to disband the troops on both
sides in consequence of the national mourning, which was submissively notified
by the new Tycoon to all whom it might concern. ;
The opening
of the port of Hiogo and of the cities pf Yedo, apd Osaka had in 1862 been,
deferred with the consent of the Treaty Powers until January 1, 1868, and there
was no prospect of a further delay being accorded. The new Tycoon, anxipus to
cultivate friendly relations with the foreign representatives, invited them to
visit him at Osaka in the month of April, when he received them in public and
private audience, and entertained them at his own table in accordance with
Western etiquette. During their, stay arrangements were discussed for the
settlement of foreign merchants at those three places, and on April 9, 1867,
the Tycoon memorialised in reference to the opening of Hiogo.,! He confessed
that in 1865 the order of the late Mikado to abandon this treaty stipulation,
had not been communicated to the foreign representatives
by his
.predecessor, for fear of the complications which might have ensued. To have
insisted on modifying the treaties in this respect would have amounted to a
breach of faith,' and was impracticable. As the treaties had been sanctioned in
general terms, nothing had been said on this subject at the time. Then the
Choshiu question and the death of his predecessor had caused the question to
drop out of sight, but the foreign representatives were constantly arguing that
it should be disposed of, as the stipulated date was fast approaching. He was
convinced that the only safe course to pursue was to carry out the treaties
faithfully. Any other policy would interfere with the most urgent need of the
moment, namely, that Japan should acquire the ships and arms in which
foreigners at present possessed the superiority, and develop the resources of.
the^ nation. He , enlarged on the value of international treaties as
guaranteeing the weak against oppression by the strong, and declared that in
the present state of the globe it was no longer practicable to maintain a
policy of seclusion.
The reply was
that it was impossible, out of resp,ect to the late Mikado’s memory and in
view- of opinions expressed by the various clans, to sanction the execution of
the Treaties in regard to Hiogo. In a further memorial of April 26 the Tycoon
returned to the charge, and begged for a reconsideration of this matter, which
he regarded as of the most vital importance to the interests and safety of the
country. The foreign Ministers, confident in the Tycoon’s promise to them that
the Treaties should be carried out, quitted Osaka about May 20, but the
Mikado’s consent was not given until nearly a month later. There were at this
moment in Kioto representatives of Echizen, Geishiu, Tosa, and Uwajima, who, on
being consulted, confirmed the Tycoon’s representations. On June 26 an imperial
decree was issued annulling the orders of1 two years before to
revise the treaties and to refrain from' opening Hiogo. Another decree of the
same date, quoting the opinion of all the clans represented at Kioto, and
especially of the four just named, the Tycoon concurring, ordered a lenient
settlement of the Choshiu case. Two days later the four clans memorialised,
accusing the Tycoon’s Government of having mismanaged the affairs of the nation
for years past, and especially in undertaking a second expedition against-
Choshiu, which was revolting to public opinion. The Choshiii question was the
more urgent df the two which pressed for solution, and now was the occasion for
the Yedo Administration to show that it was disposed to return into' the right
path.: In ariother' memorial of the same date they demanded the
restoration of rank arid title to the two Choshiu Princes, considering this to
be of greater urgency than arrangements for the opening of Hiogo.
It had long
been obvious to every observer, foreign as well as Japanese,' that the
existence of the Tycoonate was an anachronism. Only a governing power accepted
by the whole nation could fitly
1867-1-8] Tycoon resigns; Mikado resumes
government. 857
represent it
in international relations, and bring the latter into conformity with the rules
of intercourse observed among the independent sovereign States of the West.
Expression was given to these views by the ex-Prince of Tosa in October,: in; a
weighty document addressed to the Tycoon, pointing out that the want of accord
between the Mikado, Tycoon, Court nobles and daimios exposed the nation to
'danger from without. He declared it necessary to set aside the dual polity
that had been tolerated in the past and restore the ancient form of government
directly bj the Mikado. To this was annexed a short sketch of a new
Constitution, in which the anti-foreign ! policy was definitely discarded.
Undei tnese circumstances the Tycoon came to the conclusion that the course
pointed out by Tosa was the only way of extricating the nation from a position
full of peril, and, in a manifesto to the daimios on November 8 declaring that
the whole governmental' power* as exercised by his predecessors, must be
restored to the sovereign, he announced that he had relinquished his functions.
His resignation was at once accepted; but he was directed to remain responsible
for the general direction of affairs until the daimios, who would be summoned
to discuss future arrangements, could arrive at Kioto; in the meantime their
retainers would represent them for all necessary purposes. The Satsuma, Tosa,
and Geishiu clansmen at the capital warmly approved the Tycoon’s surrender of
power. Many of his own retainers were, however, deeply incensed at the step he
had taken, and he experienced much difficulty in persuading .them'to acquiesce
in his renunciation of a position from which their own share of political
importance was derived.
Ma ifestly
the institution of the Tycoonate afforded no protection against foreign
attacks; it was powerless to impose its will on any important daimio, and its
influence at the Mikado’s Court had almost completely faded away. Its inability
to; carry out the Treaties and to protect the lives of foreigners, its want of
frankness, and its narrow-minded endeavours to prevent intercourse between the
retainers of feudal lords and the foreigners resident at the ports had deprived
it of the sympathy which its misfortunes might otherwise have merited.
Suddenly, on
January 3,1868, an order was issued from the Court dismissing Aidzu from the
guardianship of the palace gates, and substituting the clans of Satsuma, Tosa,
Geisjiiu, Owari and Echizen. The offices of Shogun (Tycoon) and Kwambahu were
abolished, and three grades' of high office were created, to which various
Court nobles, feudal lords and clansmen were appointed. No servant or supporter
of the late Tycoon had & place in this new list of functionaries. Another decree
declared that the government of the country had been resumed by the Mikado,
whom henceforth we must speak of as the Emperor. This decree added that the
daimios must combine their efforts to place Japan at the head of all the
nations of the earth; The provisional Government was formed with Prince
Arisugawa at its head, two more imperial
858
i\ 2'ycoons attack on Kioto defeated.
Princes, two
Court nobles and the five feudal lords whose men held the palace gates, as
councillors, five Court nobles (of whom Iwakura was one) and three Samurcti
from each of the five clans; as assistant-councillors. The real power lay with
these last fifteen. A further decree restored ;he Princes of Choshiu to their
former rank and titles, and granted permission to the; clan to reenter Kioto.
On this a large body of their troops, which had been held in readiness, at once
entered the capital. The outlawed Court nobles who had fled in 1863 were also
allowed to return. A close alliance had existed between Satsuma and Choshiu
since the end of 1866, and the events which speedily followed were directed and
controlled by the leaders of these two clans.
On
January 6 the ex-Shogun addressed a memorial to theJ Cburt, protesting against
the changes made on the 3rd without consulting him, and announcing his
intention of continuing the provisional direction of affairs, in
accordance‘with the Mikado’s previous commands. He then withdrew* to'Osaka,
accompanied by. his: own drilled troops'and the clansmen of Aidzu
and Kuwana, giving out that he took this step in order to avoid an armed
conflict in the immediate vicinity'of the palace. At a receptioii of the
foreign r<;presen tatives,. who had assembled there in December to watch the
development of the situation, he informed them that he did not recognise the
validity of the measures reoently taken' in the name of the yoUng Emperor. He
would abstain from the use of force to vindicate his. rights, and would demand
of • his opponents that they should ask for the opinion of a general council.
In themean- time he would conduct foreign affairs as before.
......
u These
prudent resolutions were eventually1 overborne by his own military
retainers and ;by the clans of Aidzu and Kuwana. iEchizen and Owari came down
to Osaka to attempt an arrangement.; They proposed that, he should give up a
considerable portion of his heieditary revenues to the Mikado, and enter the
Government as a councillor on a footing of equality with Satsuma and the other
great daimios already appointed; and they offered to guarantee a friendly
reception, if he came up to Kioto with only a small retinue. Unfortunately for
the success of these pacific overtures, a conflict had already occurred at Yedo
between the forces of the ex-Tycoon and the Satsuma men. The Satsumai palace
had been attacked and destroyed, and the clansmen either slain or forced to
fly. A manifesto was immediately published against Satsuma, now regarded as the
ringleader of the opposition, if not the sole enemy, with whom he had. to
contend, and on January 26 the ex-Tycoon started for Kioto :with all his
available force. About half-way thither he encountered the troops of Satsuma
and Choshiu, was completely defeated after four days’ fighting, and had to
retreat on Osaka, whence he returned precipitately to Yedo by sea. A message
was at the same time delivered to the foreign representatives that, as the
Tycoon could no longer protect them, they must provide for their own safety and
that of their country-
men at Osaka
and Hiogo. This was not difficult for them, as the English.. French and
American ships of war were’in port at the latter place. In consequence of some
passing Bizen troops having fired on foreigners, it became necessary
temporarily to occupy Kobe, where the merchants were located; but on February 8
a Court noble arrived from Kioto, bearing a declaration under , the Emperor’s
sign-manual announcing the constitutional changes that had taken place, and
recognising the binding character of the treaties. Satisfactory assurances that
foreigners would be protected in future from similar acts of aggression having
been given by the envoy, the foreign representatives at once requested the
naval commanders to withdraw their men. Neutrality notifications were issued by
the Ministers, of which one important consequence was that an iron-clad ram,
purchased in the United States by the Tycoon’s agents* which arrived shortly
afterwards, was not delivered until the Civil War was over, when it passed into
the hands of the imperial Government. Unfortunately, the anti-foreign feeling
among the clansmen, which had been encouraged for so many years, still
.continued to manifest itseJ, from time to time, And on March 8 the,crew of a
French man-of-war’s,launch were massacred by a party of Tosa soldiers at Sakai;
Both in this and in ;the Kob£ jase the new Government was able to afford
complete redress,'and the incidents failed to disturb the relations between it
and foreign Powers.
’ The
transfer of authority at Nagasaki, Hiogo and Osaka was effected without further
fighting, and by. the middle of February the western half of the country as far
as Lake Suwa had acknowledged the authority of the Emperor. A proclamation was
put forth declaring the ex-Tycoon and the daimios in immediate, attendance on
him, among; whom were Aidzu, Kuwana and members, qf his Council, to
be, in a state of rebellion* and an imperial Prince was appointed
commander-in-chief of the clansmen who now set out for Yedo along the two main
roads from Kioto. Towards the end of March the vanguard crossed the passes into
the plain of. Yedo.. A month later the ex-Tycoon made his submission. The
transfer of the city of Yedo* as well as of the port of Yokohama, was carried
out without disturbance early ill May.
Phe Aidzu
clan had retired to their own country among the mountains north of Yedo* where
they maintained a vigor out. defensive for some months. Sendai, Nambu,
Ypnezawa, and Shonai entered into an alliance with them, more out of a spirit
of opposition to the southern and western clans than from devotion to the
Tokugawa cause. To them flocked numbers of men from other northern districts;
and not a few Tokugawa retainers who were unwilling to accept without;a
struggle the downfall of their chief. In Yedo itself a body of the,latter, with
the assistance of Aidzu and other clansmen, seized, uppn ;the
mausoleum of the Tokugawa Shoguns at Uyeno, but a vigorous ;attaqk made on them
by the Imperialist ;roops drove)them to flight. After long-continued fighting
in Echigo the imperial authority was established in that
860 Imperialist triumph.
Orgctnisationqfnewgovernment. [1868-9
province
also. The armies of the Emperor were now free to dose in upon the capital of
Aidzu, which after a heroic defence surrendered on November 6, and all
resistance on the mainland terminated.
When
the castle of Yedo was handed over on May 2, the ex-Tycoon’s fleet, consisting
of six vessels' mounting 83 guns, was to have been surrendered, but Admiral
Enomoto and his'friends refused to comply with the terms of the capitulation,
and the Imperialists lacked sufficient naval force to compel delivery. They;
continued to lie off the city, dffcvding an asylum to opponents of the
Imperial: party, till early in October, when they suddenly disappeared from
their anchorage, leaving behind them a manifesto in which they denounced the
proceedings of the confederated dans, and declared their intention of fighting,
if need be, to confer peace on the country. After calling in Sendai Bay, where
they obtained some recruits, at the beginning of December they took possession
of '■ the island of Yezo, where the}' proceeded to set up a
republic based on what was styled universal suffrage, though the franchise was
limited to Sanvtirai. They remained unmolested till the following April, when
an Imperialist squadron proceeded in their pursuit.' It included the iron-clad
ram which had now been handed over. Operations began towards the end of May,
and were terminated a month later by the surrender of the rebel leaders to the
overwhelming force that had been brought against them. The dvil war was thus
concluded with the complete triumph of the Imp,: ■ialists. It rem.' ins
only to sketch the constitutional: changes resulting from the
assumption of power by the legitimate sovereign: , > ■
One of the
first acts of the victors in the conflict had been to; set up a
provisional Government consisting of a Council of State composed of Court
nobles, feudal lords and clansmen. Seven other executive departments were
shortly afterwards added, namely, Shinto worship (which was restored to the
position of a state religion), Home, Foreign Affairs, War, Finance;'Justice and
Legislation; To the department of Foreign Affairs were attached'Ito and Inouye,
the: two Choshiu Samurai who in 1864 had endeavoured to dissuade
their Princes from pursuing a hostile policy, and their advice proved of the
greatest utility to the inexperienced heads of the Office. The rest of the
staff were Samurai who had entertained friendly relations with foreigners. In
June the further step was taken of promulgating a Constitution; in which the
principle of subdividing the authority of the State into legislature, executive
and judiciary was recognised. At the head of the Council of State were to be
two Chief Ministers, and each department was to be presided over by a Minister
and vice-Minister assisted by secretaries. Local government was divided into
cities, dans and imperial territories, or prefectures, formed out of the former
domain of the Tokugawa Shoguns and the imperial estates. For the moment the
organisation of the clans, was not attempted, but cities and prefectures were
to be placed under Governors and Collectors
1865-8] Treatment of foreigners and Christian
converts. 861
of Revenue
respectively. This Constitution was merely tentative, and many modifications
were made in subsequent years, as the necessity made itself felt, before the
system of local government was definitively settled.
The intention
of the Emperor to respect the Treaties had ai; eady been announced, and a
memorial on the subject soon afterwards followed signed by the heads of six
influential clans, Echizen, Tosa, Choshiu, Satsuma, Geishiu and Kumamoto. It
dwelt on the supreme importance of placing foreign relations on a proper
footing, of renouncing the idea of “ expelling the barbarians,” and of
receiving the foreign Ministers at Court in accordance with the etiquette
generally observed among nations. A government notification declared that these
suggestions were accepted, and the diplomatic representatives of the Six Powers
were invited to Kioto to have an audience of the Emperor. Three accepted, the
English, French and Dutch Ministers, who were received by the Emperor towards
the end of March, 1868. It was not to be expected that this sudden change in
the attitude of the Court towards foreigners and radical departure from the old
tradition of the unapproachableness of the Emperor, would escape adverse
criticisms, and perhaps something worse, at the hands of the u
Itra-conservatives. A murderous attack was made by a couple of fanatics on the
English, Minister and his suite as they were proceeding to Court on March 28,
when seven men of his mounted escort were severely wounded. Two Japanese
civilians, Goto and Nakai, who were riding with the Minister, leapt from their
horses and despatched one of the assailants, Nakai being wounded in the meUe.
The other was captured, and was afterwards decapitated, while three:
accomplices were condemned to perpetual exile in a distant island. The audience
took place three days later, and was marked by great cordiality. In April the
Emperor broke through the old rule of strict seclusion by moving down to Osaka,
whither he had been advised by Okubo, a leading Satsuma statesman, to transfer
the capital. During his sojourn here he gave audience to the British Minister,
who was the first foreign representative to present his credentials to the
sovereign.
On several
occasions fear had been expressed lest a renewal of foreign intercourse with
Western nation- might be followed by the t
^introduction of the Christian religion which, as it was held, had caused
unnumbered woes in the seventeenth century. Throughout the Empire, in every
hamlet and in every ward of a town or city, tables of the law denounced
Christianity as a “pernicious doctrine,” and offered rewards for the discovery
of priests, lay-brothers and native catechists. At Nagasaki, which had been
founded as a settlement of the Roman Catholic missionaries in the sixteenth
century, the whole population was forced annually to trample on the emblems of Christianity.
The article of Harris’ Treaty authorising the erection of places of worship at
the open ports had been regarded as especially obnoxious, and it was feared
that
862
A second capital established at Yedo.
i [1865-73
if
the people mixed intimately with foreigners they would, become infected: with
foreign j religious doctrines. It was believed for a long time that
Christianity among the people had been completely stamped out by the severe
measures of repression employed. The Roman Catholic missionaries having built a
church , at Nagasaki, people'from the vicinity began towards the end of 1865 to
resort to it in such numbers as to attract the- attention of, the ;
authorities. It was found that some thousands of the peasantry in neighbouring
villages had all along practised Christian rites in secret. They arre^^ed all
they could lay hands on, and endeavoured to compel their recantation. Finding
this impossible, they resolved to banish them to different parts of the empire,
in the expectation that this treatment would induce them to renounce their
belief. Protests were offered igainst the proceeding by the foreign consuls and
Ministers, but only a temporary relaxation of the measure was conceded. Things
were in this position .when the revolution of 1868 occurred. Among other steps
taken to show that the authority of the Emperor had replaced that of the
Shogun, the old tablets were taken down and others substituted-, but these
still contained the mention of Christianity as a pernicious doctrine. The
foreign Ministers renewed their remonstrames. It is true that the Treaties gave
no right of intervention, such as that resulting froih the toleration clauses
of the Treaties imposed on China in 1858; but the argument that it was an
unfriendly act thus to stigmatise the religion professed by the States with
which the Emperor’s Government proposed to maintain friendly relations was
irrefutable. The representations Of the foreign diplomatists produced some
slight effect; but:a Government which was based on the theory of the Emperor’s
descent from the gods of Japan, and had placed the department, of the Shinto
religion on an equality with the Council of State, could not afford to be
tolerant if it was to secure popular support. The decree of banishment was
carried into effect; but,in most of.the localities to which the Christians were
transported they were treated with humanity. That they were not put to ■
death, or treated as criminals, but only as misguided people who required to be
led into the right path by a certain measure of severity, is a fact indicative
of a far more tolerant’spirit than that which had actuated the Government of
the Tokugawa Shoguns. We must not anticipate • events further than by stating
that in 1873 the Offensive tablets were removed and the exiles allowed to
return to their homes, and that, from the year mentioned, toleration-, even if
not legally enacted, became the actual practice of the regime which had taken
for its designation Meiji, or Enlightened Government. ■ > ; >■ ■ >
: t ■ i .. <r
The proposal
to transfer the capital to Osaka was not adopted; but in September,' 1868,1
it was decided that the Emperor should pay a visit to Yedo, which was to be
erected into an eastern metropolis* the name being changed to Tokio, which has
that signification. The coronation
of
the youthful sovereign having taken place on October 12, he left Kioto:on
November 4y and travelling by slow stages reached Tokio on the 26th. Here he
remained till January 20,1869.
'
Tokio and
.Niigata were opened. to trade on January 1, thus completing the list specified
in Harris’Treaty of 1858, and on January 5 the Emperor received the whole
diplomatic body in.audience. During the same month a general council of loyal
daimios voted unanimously the sentences to be passed on Aidzu and the heads of
other: clans, twenty-five in number, whose resistance had prolonged the civil
war. All but two of the heads were forced to retire in favour of a relation,
the domains of Aidzu. and another were forfeited, and eighteen, other daimios
suffered a diminution of revenues, accompanied by a transfer to less desirable
territory. ■ • •
So
far, however, the Emperor had been dependent on the material assistance
contributed by the clans which had overthrown the Tycoonate in his name, and it
was evident: that further changes were necessary to place his Government on a
solid basis.: The first step in the direction of attributing the
substance as well as the form of power to the Emperor was taken by the clansmen
of Satsuma, Choshiu* Tosa, and Hizen, who in March, 1869, induced their
respective chiefs to sign a memorial in which they placed their territories and
retainers at his disposaf It was decided that for the present the feudal lords
should return to their territories, of which they took the title of governor.
The administration of the dans was remodelled so as to bring it into harmony
with that of the imperial cities and territories. ,
Early in 1868
a representative assembly had been planned, in order to give effect to the
oath, ,taken by the Emperor on assuming the reins of government, that the
practice of discussion and debate should be universally adopted, and all
measures be decided by public argument. A year, however, elapsed before the
Parliament thus outlined held its first sitting. Its, most important
achievement was its approval of a proposal that the feudal lords should
surrender their fiefs to the Emperor. Several years had to elapse before the
time became ,ripe for carrying into effect what had always been the intention
of the leaders of the revolution of 1868, namely, the creation qf workable
parliamentary institutions.
After
the fall .of; Aidzu in November, 1868, the greater part of the, western troops
which had fought, on the Imperialist side returned to their native provinces,
and the Government was in a great; measure left to depend on prestige for
procuring obedience to its orders. The Emperor had returned ,to Kioto in
February, 1869, but came back in May to Tokio, where he was joined in November
by the Empress, and the eastern capital became thenceforth the permanent
residence of the Court. ,, . ;
The Satsuma
men were by no means satisfied with the share of influence which they possessed
in the Cabinet. At its h^ad were Sanjo
arid
Iwakura, former Court nobles, who may be sc 1 to have represented the Choshiu
and Satsuma influence respectively, and out of six councillors one only, Okubo,
belonged to the Satsuma clan, the other seats being occupicd by two Choshiu,
two Hizen and one Tosa man. Particularism was still powerful in the clans of Satsuma,
Choshiu and Tosa* but especially in the first of these, where Saigo, whose
tendencies were strongly conservative, enjoyed vast popularity. The future of
the unification of Japan looked gloomy. That more definite material support
must be obtained was patent, and it was decided to address a strong appeal to
the loyalty of those who had contributed most to the victory of Imperialism.
Early in January, 1871, Iwakura and Okubo proceeded to Kagosh. ia, bearing a
letter from the Emperor to Shimadzu Saburo, iu which the old statesman was
adjured to come forward as the chief bulwark of the throne. Saigo was induced
to consent that a large contingent of Satsuma troops should be permanently
stationed at Tokio, and to join the central' administration in person. In the
meantime Kido had gone down to Choshiu, where he was joined by Okubo, and they
prevailed on the two Princes to follow the example of Satsuma. From Choshiu
they went round to Tosa, where an agreement was arrived at with the local clan
leaders to join in the proposed arrangements. The Princes of Satsuma and
Choshiu were to live in Tokio, where the ex-Prince of Tosa had already1
taken up his residence. Iwakura on his way back obtained the adherence of the
important clans of Owari and Hikorie. The total force; thus placed
at the immediate disposal of the Government consisted of nine battalions of
infaintry, two squadrons of cavalry and six batteries of artillery. 11 •
It was time
that the central authority received an accession of strength, for serious disturbances
had arisen in Bungo and Shinshiu, which required to be suppressed with vigour.
The inherent strength of the monarchical principle was such that it eventually
triumphed over all its difficulties, though it was unable to wean the
discontented Samurai from the practice of political assassination.
That the
political unity and development of the national power could only be attained by
the complete abolition of feudality had long been admitted by the most
enlightened of Japanese statesmen, and at the beginning of 1871 the conversion
of the clari domains into imperial territories was openly proposed in a
memorial presented in the name of the Prince of Awa. To this Choshiu gave
cordial approval in the same public manner, as did also Inshiu, who pointed out
the economy in experiditure that would be securied by the amalgamation of
several smaller clans Under a single adtninistratiori. A newspaper was
established under official patroriage, in Which1 such papers as
those just mentioned were published, and by dissemi .ating these ideas
throughout the country prepared the way for their acceptance. Some of the
smaller clans"were converted into imperial territories on their own
application. On August 11 the
existing
Cabinet was dismissed, with the exception of Sanjo, who retained the postof
Udaijin, and Saigo and Kido took office as Councillors of State. Okubo became
Minister of Finance, Okuma of Hizen was reappointed Councillor, and Itagaki of
Tosa was added to the number, so that the list of councillors now contained one
name from each of the four leading I'lans. Iwakura became Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Goto Minister of Public Works. The Shinto religion, which had been
the province of an office ranking with the Council of State, was relegated to a
department. Oki of Hizen, and I to, Inouye and Yamagata of Choshiu were
retained as vice-Ministers. Thus the reconstructed Cabinet comprised all the
leading minds of the country, and was in reality a strong Government. A few
days later the hereditary Governor of Chikuzen was dismissed, in consequence of
an extensive forgery of government paper-money by the clansmen, and his place
was filled by an imperial Prince. On the 29th the final step was taken by the
promulgation of an imperial edict, abolishing the clans and converting them
into prefectures. The hereditary Governors were deposed from office, and
ordered to take up their permanent residence at Tokio, together with their
wives and families, thus reducing them to a position of even greater dependence
on the Government than in the most palmy days of the Tycoonate. For the moment
their places were left unfilled, the local administration being entrusted to
the councillors of the late clans.
With this
event the history of the period may fittingly be brought to a close. In the
comparatively short space of thirteen years, dating from Harris’ Treaty, a
political revolution, which was at the same time a restoration, had been
accomplished, to which no parallel can be found in the history of any country—a
revolution which would have been impossible but for the veneration that
attached to the name of the sovereign whose genealogy extended backwards beyond
the dawn of history.
The power and
prestige of the Tokugawa Shoguns had already begun to decay before the
appearance of Western Powers on the scene. The natural consequence would have
been an attempt to displace them in favour of one of the more vigorous
families, whose clansmen, living a country life, had not been subjected to the
enervating influences of the capital. This would have led to a repetition of
the devastating civil wars which had marked the close of previous dynasties of
Shoguns. The pressure from without exercised by foreign relations hastened the
event, and by demonstrating the community of interests between the clans, gave
to it a different complexion. From the moment that the Tycoon, whose legal
status was that of a subject, entered into treaties with the sovereigns and
heads of Western States, his authority became more difficult to uphold; and his
downfall in 1868 was but the logical consequence of an essentially false
position.
Note.
In many of the following Bibliographies it lias been found impossible to
distinguish between contemporary and secondary authorities, and, even where the
'iistinction is made, many of the secondary works often partake of the nature
of contemporary authorities.
CHAPTERS
I, XI and XIL GREAT BRITAIN, 1841-68.
I.
CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
A. General.
Statutes of
the Realm. Hansard’s Debates. Parliamentary Papers, especially the annaal
volumes of State Papers and the Statistical Abstracts [from 1852]. The Annual
Register.
Among
periodical publications may be mentioned:—The Times, The Morning Chronicle, The
Morning Post, The Edinburgh Review, The Quarterly Review, The Economist, The
Spectator.
Bentinck,
Lord G. A political biography by B. Disraeli. London. 1852. Bowring, Sir J.
Autobiographical Recollections. London. 1877.
Boyle, C. D.,
Dean. Recollections. London. 1895.
Broughton,
Lord. Recollections. Edinburgh Review, April, 1871.
Buckingham,
Duke of. Courts and Cabinets of William IV and Victoria. 2 vols. London. 1861.
Croker, J. W.
Correspondence and diaries. 3 vols. London. 1834.
Elliot, Sir
H. Diplomatic Recollections. Privately printed.
Gladstone, W.
E. The history of the years 1852-60 and Greville’s Journals. Eng. Hist. Rev. ii, 281.
Greville, C.
C. E. The Greville Memoirs. London. Part 2. 3 vols. 1885. Part 3. 2 vols. 1887.
Notes on the
Greville Memoirs. By A. Eng. Hist. Rev. i, 105.
Holyoake, G.
J. Sixty years of an agitator’s life. 2 vols. London. 1892. Knight, Charles.
Passages in a working life. 3 vols. London. 1865.
Lewis, Sir G.
C., Bart. Letters. London. 1870.
Malmesbury,
Earl of. Memoirs of an Ex-minister. 2 vols. London. 1884, Martineau, Harriet
Autobiography. 3 vols. London. 1877.
Melbourne,
Lord. Papers. Ed. L. C. Sanders. London. 1889.
Mill, J. S.
Autobiography. London. 1873.
Peel, Sir R.
Memoirs of. Edd. Earl Stanhope and E. Cardwell. 2 vols.
London.
1856-8.
Papers. C. S. Parker. 3 vols. London. 1899.
Raikes, T. A
portion of the journal kept by T. R. from 1831 to 1847. 2 vols. London. 1856.
Russell,
John, Earl. Speeches and despatches. 2 vols. London. 1870.
Recollections and suggestions. London. 1875.
Selborne,
Earl. Memorials. 4 vols. London. 1896-8.
Senior, N. W.
Conversations with distinguished persons during the Second Empire. 2 vols.
London. 1878.
Ib. [Second series.] 2 vols. London. 1880.
Stockmar, C.
F. von, Baron. Memoirs. Tr. by M. Muller. 2 vols. London. 1872. Taylor, Sir H.
Autobiography. 2 vols. London. 1895.
Victoria, H.
M. Queen. Letters. Edd. A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher. 3 vols. London. 1907.
Vitzthum von
Eckstaedt, Connt C. F. St Petersburg and London in the years 1852-64. Engl. Tr.
Ed. H. Reeve. 2 vols. London. 1887.
B. Ireland.
Irish State
Trials. Report on the Census of 1851. Reports of the Poor Law Commissioners for
Ireland. Parliamentary Papers, 1846-8: Scarcity in Ireland: Relief
Commissioners’ Reports: Commissariat Reports: Relief of Distress and
Workhouses: etc.
Periodicals:—The
Nation, The Freeman’s Journal, The United Irishman, The Irish People, The Irish
Felon.
Baxter, R.
Irish Tenant Right Question. London. 1869.
Butt, Isaac.
The transfer of land by means of a judicial assurance. Dublin. 1857.
The Irish People and the Irish Land. Dublin.
1867.
Cloncurry,
Lord. Personal recollections of the life and times of Valentine, Lord
Cloncurry. Dublin. 1849.
“Devon
Commission.” Report from H. M. Commissioners of inquiry into the state of the
Law and Practice in respect to the occupation of land in Ireland. 7 vols.
Dublin. 1845.
Dufferin,
Marquis of. Irish emigration and the tenure of land in Ireland.
2nd ed.
London. 1867.
Duffy, Sir
Charles Gavan. Young Ireland. Dublin. 1880.
Four Years of Irish History. Dublin. 1883.
The League of North and South. Dublin. 1886.
My Life in Two Hemispheres. Vol. t. London.
1898.
Fitzgibbon,
Gerald. Ireland in 1868. [Two different works with this title. Dublin, 1868 and
Dublin and London, 1863.]
The Land difficulty of Ireland. London and
Dublin. 1869.
Friends,
Society of. Distress in Ireland. [Narratives of visits to distressed districts
by members of the Society.] London. [1846-7.]
Transactions during the Famine in Ireland.
[1846-8.]
Gihhs, F. W.
English Law and Irish Tenure. London. 1870.
Haliday
Collection of Pamphlets, Library of the Royal Irish Academy.
Kane, Sir R.
The Industrial Resources of Ireland. Dublin.
1844.
Kohl, J. G. Ireland. London. 1843.
Loftus, Lord
A. Diplomatic Recollections. 2 vols. London. 1892.
Martin, R. M.
Ireland before and after the Union. 3rd edn. London. 1848. Martineau, Harriet.
Letters from Ireland. London. 1852.
Mill, J. S.
England and Ireland. London. 1868.
Pim, J. The
land question in Ireland. Dublin. 1867.
Ireland and the Imperial Parliament. Dublin.
1871.
Playfair,
Lord. Memoirs and Correspondence. Ed. Sir T. Wemyss Reid. London. 1898.
Repeal
Association, Reports of the Parliamentary Committee of the.
Senior, N. W.
Journals, conversations and essays relating to Ireland. 2 vols. London. 1868.
Sullivan, A.
M. The Phoenix Societies in Ireland and America. Dublin. [1862.] Trevelyan, C.
E. The Irish Crisis. 1880. [First published, 1848.]
C. Economic Conditions.
Arnold, A.
The History of the Cotton Famine. London. 1864.
Ashburton,
Lord. The financial and commercial crisis considered. London. 1847. Ashworth,
H. Recollections of Richard Cobden and of the Anti-Corn Law League. London.
1876.
Caird, J.
English Agriculture in 1850 and 1851. London. 1852.
The Landed Interest and the supply of food.
London. 1878.
Children,
Report on employment of in Mines and Manufactures. London. 1842-3. Children and
Young Persons, Reports on employment of in Trades and Manufactures not already
regulated by law. London. 1863-6.
Children, Young
Persons, and Women, Reports on employment of, in Agriculture. London. 1867-8.
Commercial
Distress, Reports of Secret Committees on. London. 1847-8. Commons’ Inclosure,
Report of Select Committee on. London. 1844.
Cooper, T.
Life. Written by himself. London. 1872.
Elliott,
Ebenezer. Poetical Works. 2 vols. London. 1876.
Engels, F.
The condition of the working class in England in 1844. [Trans.] London. 1888.
Evans, D. M.
The commercial crisis of 1847-8. London. 1849.
Facts, failures and frauds. London. 1859.
Exhihition of
1851, Reports.
Frame-work
Knitters, Report on the condition of the. London. 1845.
Greg, R. H.
Scotch farming in the Lothians. London. 1842.
Health of
Towns, Reports of Commission on the. London. 1845.
Reports of Commission on the State of Large
Towns and Populous Districts.
London. 1844
and 1845.
Report on the sanitary condition of the
Labouring Population (with supplement on Interment in Towns, hy Edwin
Chadwick). London. 1843.
Import
Duties, Report from the Select Committee on the. London. 1840. Lardner, D.
Railway Economy. London. 1850.
Lovett, W.
Life and Struggles. London. 1876.
Martin, R. M.
Railways—Past, Present and Future. London. 1849.
The Sugar Question in relation to Free Trade
and Protection. London.
1848.
Mayhew, H.
London Labour and the London Poor. London. 1849.
Midland
Mining, Report on. London. 1843.
Northcote,
Sir S. H. Twenty Years of Financial Policy. London. 1862.
Porter, G. R.
The Progress of the Nation. 2nd edn. London. 1851.
Prentice, A.
History of the Anti-Corn Law League. 2 vols. London. 1853. Roberts, H. The
dwellings of the labouring classes. 3rd edn. London. 1854.
The physical condition of the labouring
classes. London. 1866.
Tooke, T. A
History of Prices, 1839-47. London. 1848.
> D. The
Cbimean War.
Angeberg, Count. Le traits de Paris. [Includes
also various documents up to 1871 connected with the treaty.] Paris. 1873.
Bengescu, G. Essai d’une Notice Bibliographique sur la question
d’Orient. Brussels. 1897.
Conduite de la guerre d’Orient, de la. [Anon.] Brussels. 1865.
Diplomatic
Study of the Crimean War. (Russian Official Publication, transl.)
2 vols.
London. 1882.
Eastern
Papers (Parliamentary). Report of the Sebastopol Committee.
Etude Diplomatique sur la Guerre de Crimee. Par un ancien diplomate. St Petersburg, [printed] Evreux. 1878.
Feldzug, der, in der Krim...von fast ausschliesslich officiellen Berichten
beider kampfenden Parteien. 4 vols. Leipzig. 1856.
Intendance
militaire au Crimee, la. [Anon.] Lyons. 1864.
Reminiscences
of Crimean campaigning and Russian imprisonment. By one of “The Six Hundred.” Edinburgh. 1883.
Alexandre III, Empereur de Russie. Souvenirs de Sebastopol recneillis et
rediges par. (D’apres les originaux au mus£e historique de St Petersbourg.) 3rd
edn. Paris. 1894.
Bezancourt, C. de. Cinq mois au camp devant Sebastopol. 2nd edn. Paris.
1855. L'expedition de Crimee. 5th edn. Paris. 1857.
- L’expedition de Crimee. La
marine franfaise dans la Mer Noire et la Baltique. 2
vols. Paris. 1856.
Burgoyne,
Sir J. F. The military opinions of. Ed. Hon. G. Wrottesley. London. 1859.
Life and correspondence. Ed. Hon. G.
Wrottesley. London. 1873.
[Calthorpe,
S. J. G.] Letters from headquarters: or the realities of the war in the Crimea.
2 vols. London. 1856.
Chodasiewicz,
R. A voice from within the walls of Sebastopol. London. 1856.
Du Casse, P. E. A., Baron. La Crimee et Sebastopol de 1853 a 1856.
Paris. 1892.
Precis historique des operations militaires en
Orient de mars 1854 k sept.
1855. Paris. 1856.
Fay, C. A. Souvenirs de la Guerre de Crimee. Paris. 1867.
Friedjung, H. Der Krim-Krieg und die Oesterreichische Politik. Stuttgart.
1906. Hamley, Sir E. B. The story of the campaign of Sebastopol. London. 1855.
The War in the Crimea. London. 1891.
Kinglake,
A. W. The Invasion of the Crimea. 6 vols. London. 1863-80.
Adapted for military students. By Gen. Sir G.
S. Clarke with Atlas.
Edinburgh.
1899.
Lyons,
Admiral Lord. Life. [With description of his operations in the Black Sea.] By
Sir E. Wilmot. London. 1898.
Niel,
A., Marshal. Siege de Sebastopol. Journal des
operations du genie. (Atlas.) Paris. 1858.
Raglan, Field-Marshal Lord. Life. [Anon.] 1855.
Rousset, C. F. M. Histoire de la guerre de Crimde. 2
vols. and Atlas. Paris. 1877. Russell, Sir W. H., edited by. Crimean Diary of
Sir C. A. Windham. London. 1897.
The British Expedition to the Crimea. London. 1877.
St Amaud, Marshal. En Crimee par docteur Cabrol et Paul de Regia
[unpublished letters]. Paris. 1895.
Steevens,
N. The Crimean campaign with the Connaught Rangers. London. 1878. [Sterling,
Sir A. C.] Letters from the army in the Crimea, [n. d.]
Thomas,
G. E. M. La Guerre d’Orient (1854-5). Paris. 1900.
Todleben,
Count F. E. I. Defense de Sebastopol. 2 vols. and Atlas. St Petersburg.
1863-74.
Wood,
Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn. The Crimea in 1854 and 1894. London. 1895.
H. SECONDARY WORKS.
A. General.
Anson,
Sir W. R. The Law and Custom of the Constitution. 2 vols. Oxford. 1892.
Bernard, Rt Hon. M. A historical accouut of the neutrality of Great Britain during
the American Civil War. London. 1870.
Buxton,
S. Finance and Politics; an historical study. 2 vols. London. 1888.
Dicey,
A. V. Law and Public Opinion in England during the 19th Century. London. 1905.
Dowell,
S. History of Taxation and Taxes in England. 4 vols. London. 1884. Knight, C.
Popular History of England. Vol. viii.
London. 1862.
Low,
Sidney, and Sanders, L. C. The Political History of England, 1837-1900. London.
1907.
McCarthy,
Justin. History of our own times. 5 vols. London. 1879 sqq. Martineau, Harriet.
History of England during the thirty years’ peace. Vol. in. London. 1850.
May,
Sir T. E. The Constitutional History of England. (10th edn.) 3 vols. London.
1891.
Molesworth,
W. N. History of England from 1830. 3 vols. London. 1871. Montefiore, C. Sebag.
History of the Volunteer Forces to 1860. London. 1908. Paul, H. A history of
modern England. 5 vols. London. 1906.
Stephen,
Sir Leslie. The English Utilitarians. 3 vols. London. 1900.
Walpole,
Sir Spencer. A History of England from the conclusion of the great war in 1815.
6 vols. London. 1878 sqq.
The History of Twenty-five Years [1856-70]. 2
vols. London. 1904
Ward,
T. H. [editor]. Reign of Queen Victoria. 2 vols. London. 1887.
B. Ireland—Histories
and Biographies.
Bryce,
J. [editor]. Two centuries of Irish History, 1691-1870. London. 1888. Davis,
Thomas. The memoirs of an Irish patriot. By Sir C. G. Duffy. London. 1890.
Essays on the Irish Church. London. 1866.
Lecky,
W. E. H. Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland. 2 vols. London. 1903. Lefevre,
Rt Hon. G. Shaw. Feel and O’Connell. London. 1887.
MacHale,
Archbishop. Life. By B. O’Reilly. 2 vols. New York. 1890. Mathew, Father. Life.
By J. F. Maguire. London. 1863.
Morris,
W. O’Connor. Ireland from ’98-’98. London. 1898.
Nicholls,
Sir G. History of the Irish Poor Law. London. 1856.
O’Brien,
R. Barry. The parliamentary history of the Irish land question. London.
1880.
Fifty years of concessions to Ireland. 2 vols.
London. 1883-6.
Irish wrongs and English remedies. London.
1887.
W. P. The great famine in Ireland.
London. 1896.
O’Connell,
Daniel. The Queen v. Trial of 1843-4. Special Report Ed. John Flanedy. Dublin.
1844.
Life. By Michael Macdonagh. London. 1903.
Personal recollections of. By W. O N. Daunt. 2
vols. London. 1848.
and the revival of National Life in Ireland.
By Robert Dnnlop. New York
and
London. 1900.
O’Connor,
T. P. The Parnell movement, with a sketch of Irish parties from 1843. London.
1886.
O’Rourke,
J. History of the great Irish famine of 1847. Dublin. 1875. Rutherford, J. The
Fenian conspiracy. 2 vols. London. 1877.
Sheil,
R. L. Memoirs. By W. Torrens McCullagh. 2 vols. London. 1855. Sullivan, A. M.
New Ireland. 2 vols. London. 1877.
Whately,
R., Archbishop. Memoirs. By W. J. Fitzpatrick. 2 vols. London. 1864. Life and
correspondence. Ed. E. J. Whately. 2 vols. London. 1866.
C. Economio
Conditions.
“Alfred”
[Kydd, S.]. History of the Factory Movement. 2 vols. London. 1857. Aschrott, P.
F., and Preston-Thomas, H. The English Poor-Law Sj^tem. 2nd edn. London. 1902.
Bowley,
A. L. Wages in the United Kingdom in the 19th Century. Cambridge.
1900. '
Cohn, G. Untersuchungen iiber die Englische Eisenbahnpolitik. 2
vols. Leipzig. 1874-5.
Cunningham,
W. Growth of English Industry and Commerce. Modern Times.
Part
ii. Cambridge. 1903.
Gammage,
R. G. The History of the Chartist Movement. Newcastle and London.
1894. [Expanded from a book published in 1854.]
Gamier,
R. M. History of the English Landed Interest (Modern Times). London. 1893.
Annals of the British Peasantry. London. 1895.
Hasbach, W. Die englischen Landarbeiter in den letzten hundert Jahren und
die Einhegungen. Leipzig. 1894.
Holyoake,
G. J. Life of J. R. Stephens. London. 1881.
The history of the Rochdale Pioneers. London.
1893.
The history of co-operation. 2 vols. London.
1906.
Howell,
G. The conflicts of capital and labour. London. 1878.
Hutchins,
B. L., and Harrison, A. A history of factory legislation. London. 1903. Levi, Leone. History of British Commerce.
London. 1872.
Levy, H. Entstehung und Riickgang des landwirthschaftlichen Grossbetriebes
in England. Berlin. 1904.
Mackay,
T. A history of the English Poor-Law. [Vol. iii
of new edn of Sir G.
Nicholls’
history.] London. 1899.
Owen,
Robert. Life. By Frank Podmore. 2 vols. London. 1906.
Prothero,
R. E. Pioneers and Progress of English fanning. London. 1888. Steffen, G. F. Studien zur Geschichte der Englischen
Lohnarbeiter. Vol. iii.
Stuttgart. 1905.
Tildsley, J. L. Die Entstehung und die okonomische Grundsatze der
Chartisten- bewegung. Jena. 1898.
Traill,
H. D. (Ed.), Social England. Vol. vi. London. 1897.
Webb,
S., and B. The history of Trade Unionism. 2nd edn. London. 1902. Wirth, M. Geschichte der Handelskrisen. Frankfurt-a.-M.
1890.
D. Religious Histories and Biographies relating to Scotland.
For
Bibliography of English religious movements v. Bibliography, Chapter XXV, D.
Acts of Assembly of the Church of Scotland.
Brown,
T. Annals of the Disruption. Edinburgh. 1877.
Buchanan,
R. The Ten Years’ Conflict. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1849.
Chalmers,
T. Memoirs of. By W. Hanna. 4 vols. Edinburgh and London. 1849.
On the establishment and extension of national
Churches. Glasgow. 1838.
Correspondence with the Earl of Aberdeen,
1839-40. Edinburgh. 1893.
Innes,
A. T. The law of creeds in Scotland. 2nd edn. Edinburgh. 1902.
Studies in Scottish History. London. 1892.
Miller,
Hugh. Headship of Christ and the rights of the Christian people. Edinburgh.
1861.
Moncrieff,
Lord. Church and State in Scotland. Edinburgh. 1878.
E.
Memoirs and Biographies, mainly political.
Aberdeen,
Earl of. Life. By Lord Stanmore. 3rd edn. London. 1905.
Argyll,
5th Duke of. Autobiography and Memoirs. Ed. Dowager Duchess of Argyll. 2 vols.
London. 1906.
Atlay,
J. B. Victorian chancellors. 2 vols. London. 1908.
Beaconsfield,
Earl of. Public life of. By J. Hitchman. 2 vols. London. 1879.
Bright,
John. Life and speeches. By G. Barnett Smith. 2 vols. London. 1881. Brougham,
Henry, Lord. Life. Lord Campbell’s Lives of the Lord Chancellors, Vol. viii.
London. 1869.
Campbell,
John, Lord. Life. By his daughter, Mrs Hardcastle. 2 vols. London.
1887.
Cobden,
Richard. Life. By John Morley. 2 vols. London. 1881.
Delane,
John Thaddeus, Editor of the Times. Life and correspondence. By
A. I. Dasent. 2 vols. London. 1908.
Denman,
Lord. Memoir. By Sir J. Amould. 2 vols. London. 1873.
Derby,
Earl of. Life. By G. Saintsbury. London. 1892.
Forster,
W. E. Life. By T. Wemyss Reid. London. 1888.
Gladstone,
W. E. Life. By John Morley. 3 vols. London. 1903.
Graham,
Sir J. Life and letters. By C. S. Parker. 2 vols. London. 1907.
Life. By W. M. Torrens. 2 vols. London. 1873.
Granville,
G. G., 2nd Earl. Life. Lord E. Fitzmaurice. 2 vols. London. 1905. Hatherton,
Lord. Memoir. Ed. H. Reeve. London. 1872.
Herbert,
Sidney, Lord Herbert of Lea. A Memoir. By Lord Stanmore. 2 vols. London. 1906.
Hill,
Sir Rowland. Life. By G. B. Hill. 2 vols. London. 1880.
Holyoake,
G. J. Life. By J. McCabe. 2 vols. London. 1908.
Houghton,
Lord. Life. By T. Wemyss Reid. 2 vols. London. 1890. Lyndhurst, Lord. Life. Lord
Campbell’s Lives of the Lord Chancellors. Vol. vm. London. 1869.
Life. By Sir Theodore Martin. 2nd edn. London.
1884.
Macaulay,
Lord. Life and letters. Sir G. O. Trevelyan. 2 vols. London. 1876. Molesworth,
Sir W. Life. By Mrs M. G. Fawcett. London. 1901.
Selected Speeches. Ed. by H. E. Egerton.
London. 1903.
Murray,
Sir C. M. Memoir. London. 1898.
Northcote,
Sir Stafford [Lord Iddesleigh]. Life, letters, and diaries. By A. Lang. London.
1890.
Norton,
Lord [C. B. Adderley]. Life and letters. W. S. Childe-Pemberton.
2 vols. London. 1908,
.’almerston,
Viscount. Life. By Lord Dalling. 3 vols. London. 1870-4.
Life and correspondence. By the Hon. E.
Ashley. 2 vols. London. 1874.
Panmure
Papers, the. Edited by Sir G. Douglas and Sir G. Dalhousie Ramsay.
2 vols. London. 1908.
Peel,
Sir R. Life. By J. R. Thursfield. London. 1891.
Life. By Lord Rosebery. London. 1899.
Prince
Consort, the. Life. By Sir Theodore Martin. 6 vols. London. 1876. Reeve, Henry.
Memoirs. Ed. (Sir) J. K. Laughton. 2 vols. London. 1898. Roebuck, John Arthur.
Autobiography and letters. Ed. R. E. Leader. London.
1897.
Rumbold,
Sir Horace. Recollections of a Diplomatist. 2 vols. London. 1902. Russell, Lord
J. (Earl Russell). Life and letters. By Sir Spencer Walpole. 2 vols. London.
1891.
Life. By Stuart J. Reid. London. 1906.
Salisbury,
Marquis of. Life. By H. D. Traill. London. 1890.
Shaftesbury,
Earl of. Life. By E. Hodder. London. 1887.
Sherbrooke,
Viscount. Life and letters. By A. P. Martin. 2 vols. London. 1893. Victoria, H.
M. Queen. A biography. By Sidney Lee. London. 1902. Wakefield, E. Gibbon. Life.
By R. Garnett. London. 1898.
Wellington,
Duke of. Life. By Sir H. Maxwell. 2 vols. London. 1899. Westbury, Lord. Life.
By T. A. Nash. 2 vols. London. 1888.
[iSee
also Bibliographies to Chapters XXV, XXVI, XXK//.J
I.
CONTEMPORARY SOURCES.
A. Official Documents, Publications, bto.
1. Secret.
The
secret archives found in the Tuileries after the Revolution are printed in
Revue retrospective (33 numbers, March to September, 1848).
Papiers et correspondance de la famille imperiale (also found in the
Tuileries).
2 vols. Paris. 1870.
2. Official.
Le Moniteur; Le Bulletin des Lois; Messages Prdsidentiels in (Euvres de
Napoldon III. 4vols. Paris. 1876-80; La Gazette des Tribunaux, and Le Droit
(Judicial, etc.); Les Archives Parlementaires (1789-1860). In course of
publication. (Vol. 110 (1905) only reaches the year 1837.)
Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete sur 1’insurreCtion du 23 juin et les
evenemente du 19 mai 1848 3 vols. Paris. 1848.
Haute Cour de Versailles: attentat du 13 juin 1849.
Proces du Complot de Lyon. 1851.
Circulates, notes et instructions du second Empire (1851-70). Paris.
1872.
8.
Special Collections of Parliamentary Speeches, etc.
Berryer, P. A. Discours parlementaires. 5 vols. Paris. 1872-4.
Falloux, A. F. P. de. Discours et melanges politiques. 2 vols. Paris.
1882. Faucher, L£on. Correspondance et vie parlementaire. Vol. ii. Paris. 1867. Favre, Jules. Discours
parlementaires. 2 vols. Paris. 1881.
Grevy, Jules. Discours politiques et judiciaires. 2 vols. Paris. 1882.
Guizot, F. P. G. L’histoil-e parlementaire de France (1815-48); recueil
des discours de G. 5 vols. Paris. 1863.
Lamartine, Alphonse de. La politique de L. (Choix de Discours) par L. de
Ronchaud.
2 vols. 'Paris. 1878.
Ledru-Rollin, A. A. Discours politiques et ecrits divers. 2 vols. Paris.
1879. Montalembert, Vicomte de. Discours. 3 vols. Paris. 1861.
Thiers, L. A. Discours parlementaires. 16 vols. Paris. 1879-89.
4. Periodicals, Newspapers, and Reviews.
Annuaire historique universel, de Lesur, oontinu^ par Fouquier, etc.
Paris. 1841-60. 10 vols.
Newspapers exhibiting dynastic tendencies: le Journal des Debats (right
centre), le Constitutionnel (Thiers), le Siecle (Odilon Barrot), la Presse
(Emile de Girardin), le Courier Fran^ais, le Globe.
Republican: le National (Armand Marrast), le Journal du Peuple replaced
in 1843 by la Re'forme.
Catholic or Legitimist: l’Univers (Montalembert and L. Veuillot), la
Quoti- dienne, le Drapeau blanc.
Bonapartist: le Pays, la Patrie.
Texier, E. Histoire des journaux, et Bingraphie des joumalistes, con-
tenant l’histoire de chaque journal. Paris. 1890.
Reviews: Revue des Deux Mondes (contains numerous contemporary
articles); Revue Britannique; 1© CorresponJant; Revue de la Resolution de 1848,
from 1904.
B. Letters and Memoirs.
Andebrand, P. Souvenirs de la tribune des Journalistes de 1848 a 1852.
Paris. 1867.
Barante, Baron de. Souvenirs (1782-1866). 8 vols. Paris. 1890-1901.
Barrot, Odilon. Memoires. 4 vols. Paris. 1875.
Bauchart, Q. Etudes et souvenirs sur la Seconde Republique et l’Empire.
2 vols. Paris. 1901.
Blanc, Louis. Histoire de la Revolution de 1848. 2nd edn. Paris. 1870.
La Revolution de fevrier au Luxembourg. Paris.
1849.
Broglie, Due de. Souvenirs (1781-1870). 4 vols. Paris. 1886.
Camp, Maxime du. Souvenirs de l’armee en 1848. Paris. 1902.
Cassaguac, Granier de. Souvenirs du Second Empire. 3 vols. Paris. 1879.
Castellane, Marshal de. Journal. 2nd edn. 6 vols. Paris. 1896.
Caussidiere, M. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1849.
Commissaire, S. Memoires et Souvenirs. 2 vols. Lyons and Paris. 1888.
Cuvillier-Fleury, A. A. Journal intime et correspondance. 2
vols. Paris. 1900-3. Doudan, X. Melanges et lettres. 4 vols. Paris. 1876-7.
Fagan,
L. Life of Sir Anthony Panizzi. London. 1879. [Contains letters of Thiers and
Palmerston.]
Falloux, A. F. P. de. Memoires d’un royaliste. 2 vols. Paris. 1888.
Faucher, L. Biographic et Correspondance (Vie Parlementaire). Paris.
1876. Greville, C. Memoirs. Part n. 3 vols. London. 1886. French translation by
M. de Boud. Paris. 1889.
Guizot, F. P. G. Lettres k sa famille et a ses amis, recueillies par Mme
de Witt. Paris. 1884.
Memoires pour servir a l’histoire de mon
temps. 9 vols. Paris. 1858-68.
Hadard, M. Memoires de Leonard ancien garfon mafon. Paris. 1896.
Heine, H. Lutfece (correspondance adressee de 1840-3 a un journal
allemand).
Paris.
1853. For the German text see Werke, vols. ix, x. Hamburg. 1875. Hugo, Victor. Choses vues. Paris. 1900.
Histoire d’un Crime. Paris. 1877-8.
Lamartine, A. de. Trois mois au pouvoir. Paris. 1848.
Histoire de la Revolution de 1848. 4th edn.
Paris. 1859.
Manpas, C. E. de. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1884.
Melun, Vicomte de. Memoires. Paris. 1891.
Montalembert, Vicomte de. Correspondance de Montalembert et de l’abbe
Texier (1838-59). Paris. 1899.
Montalivet, M. C. de. Fragments et souvenirs (1810-48). 2 vols. Paris.
1899. Pages, Duport. Les journees de juin. 2nd edn. Paris. 1848.
Pages, Garnier. Histoire de la Revolution de 1848. 2nd edn. Paris. 1866.
Persigny, Due de. Memoires. Paris. 1896.
Proudhon, P. J. Confessions d’un revolutionnaire. Paris. 1891.
Regnault, E. Histoire du gouvernement provisoire. Paris. 1850.
Ste Aulaire, Comte de. Memoires inedits du Cte de Ste Aulaire. Quoted in
Duvergier de Hauranne, Hist, du gouv. pari, en France, and Thureau-Dangin,
Hist, de la Monarchic de Juillet.
Sand, George. Correspondance. 6 vols. Paris. 1882-4.
Histoire de ma vie. 20 vols. Paris.
1854-6.
Senior,
Nassau. Conversations with M. Thiers, M. Guizot, etc. 2 vols. London. 1878.
Thomas,
Simile. Histoire des ateliers nationaux. Paris. 1848.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Correspondance et nouvelle correspondance
inedite. 3 vols.
Paris. 1861-8.
Souvenirs (publids par le Cte de T.). Paris.
1893.
Vdron, L. D. Nouveaux memoires d’un bourgeois de Paris. 6
vols. Paris. 1853-5. Victoria, Queen. Letters (1837-61). Edd. A. C. Benson and
Visct Esher. 3 vols. London. 1907. French translation by J. Bardoux. 3 vols.
Paris. 1907.
II. SECONDARY.
A. Politioal Histories—dealing with the whole or a part op the Period.
Capeiigue, J. B. H. R. Histoire de l’Europe depuis l’evdnement de
Louis-Philippe.
10 vols. Paris. 1845.
Castille, H. Histoire de la Deuxieme Republique. 4 vols. Paris. 1854-5.
Delord, Taxile. Histoire du Second Empire. Vol. i. Paris. 1870.
Gorce, P. de la. Histoire de la Deuxieme Republique fran^aise. 2 vols.
1887. Histoire du Second Empire. Vol. i. 1894.
Hildebrand, K. Geschichte Frankreichs von der Thronbesteigung Louis
Philippe.
2 vols. (Gesch.
d. europ. Staaten.) Gotha. 1877-9.
Nouvios, V. de. Histoire du regne de Louis Philippe Ier. 4
vols. Paris. 1861. Pierre, V. Histoire de la Republique de 1848. 2 vols.
1873-8.
Regnault, Elias. Histoire de huit ans. 3 vols. Paris. 1852.
Renard, J. La Republique de 1848-52 dans la collection de l’Histoire
Socialiste. Paris. 1905.
Spuller, E. Histoire parlementaire de la Deuxieme Republique. Paris. 1893. Stein, L. Geschichte der socialen Bewegung in
Frankreich. Paris. 1850.
Stern, Daniel (Comtesse d’Agout). Histoire
de la Revolution de 1848. 2 vols. Paris. 1850.
Tchernoff, I. Le parti rdpublicain au Coup d’etat. Paris. 1906.
Associations et Societes Secretes sous la
Deuxieme Republique. Paris. 1905.
Tenot, 111. Etudes Historiques sur le Coup d’etat. Nouvelle edition.
Paris.
1880.
Thureau-Dangin, P. Histoire de la Monarchic de Juillet 7 vols. Paris.
1884-92. [Of more general histories the following may be noted :
Bourgeois, E. Manuel historique de politique etrangere. Tomes n, m.
Pari*.
1892.
Dareste, A. E. C. Histoire de France. Tomes vn-ix. Paris. 1865-79.
Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l’Europe. Tomes i, n. Paris. 1891. Gervinus, G. G. Geschichte des neunzehnten
Jahrhunderts seit den Wiener Vertragen. 8
vols. Leipzig. 1855-6.]
B. Biographies,
eto.
Audebrand, P. Nos rdvolutionnairea. Paris. 1885.
Blanc, Louis. I. Tchernoff. Paris. 1904.
Blanqui, L. A. G. Geffroy. L’Enferme (Blanqui). Paris. 1897.
Bugeaud, Marshal. H. d’ldeville. Le marechal B., d’apres sa
correspondance intime, et documents inedits (1784-1849). 3 vols. Paris. 1881-3.
Guizot. J. de Crozals. Paris. 1893.
A. Bardoux. Paris. 1894.
Lacordaire. P. Chocarne. Lacordaire. 2 vols. Paris. 1880.
M. de Moutrond. Etudes historiques et
biographiques sur le P. L. Paris.
1881.
Ledru-Rollin, A. A. B. Courmeaux. Paris. 1885.
Louis-Philippe. de Flers. Louis-Philippe, vie anecdotique (1773-1850).
Paris.
1891.
Montalembert. P. Lecanuet. M. d’apres sa correspondance et son journal,
3 vols. Paris. 1895-1901.
Victo de Meaux. Montalembert.
Paris. 1897.
M. Un moine au XIX' siecle : le P. Lacordaire.
Paris.
1881.
Napoleon
III. Thirria. Napoleon III avant l’Empire. 2 vols. Paris. 1899.
Vermorel. Les Hommes de 1848. Paris. 1869.
Les Hommes de 1851. Paris. 1869.
Reran sat, C. de. P. Duvergier de Hauranne. M. de R£musat, Revue des
Deux Mondes, 15 Nov. 1875.
Thiers. J. d’Arcy. Notes inedites sur M. T.: l’homme prive, l’homme
politique. Paris. 1888.
A. Laya. Etudes historiques sur la vie de M.
T. Histoire de quinze ans
(1830-46). 2 vols. Paris. 1846.
E. Levort. Paris. 1892.
C. de Mazade. Cinquante annees d’histoire
contemporaine. Paris. 1884.
P. de Remusat. Paris. 1889.
C. Speol/ll Works.
1. Politics and the Church.
Castille, Hipp. Les homines et les moeurs en France sous le regne de
Louis Philippe. Paris. 1853.
Debidour, A. Histoire des rapports de l’Eglise et de l’Etat en France.
Paris. 1898. Duvergier de Hauranne, P. Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire
en France, 1814-18. 10 vols. Paris. 1872.
Haussonville, J. O. B. de Citron Cte de. Histoire de la politique
exterieure du gouvernement francais (1830—48). 2 vols. Paris. 1850.
Leroy-Beaulieu, A. Les catholiques libe'raux, de 1830 a nos jours.
Paris. 1885. Michel, H. La loi Talloux. 1 vol. Paris. 1906.
Montalivet, Cto de. Rien! Dix-huit annees de gouvernement
parlementaire. Paris. 1864. _
Le roi Louis-Philippe: Liste civile. Nouvelle
edition. Paris. 1861.
Pierre E. Histoire des assemblies politiques en France. Paris. 1877.
Riancey, H. L. Carnusat de. Histoire critique et legislative de l’instruction
publique et de la liberte d’enseignement en France. Paris. 1844.
Tchernoff, I. Le parti republicain sous la Monarchie de Juillet. Paris.
1901. Weill G. Histoire du parti republicain en France, de 1814 k 1870. Paris.
1900. ’ Les Elections legislatives
depuis 1789. Paris. 1895.
2. Finance.
Annnaire Statistique. Paris. 1905. (zxin* vol.)
Audiffretj L. G. de. Systeme financier de la France. 3rd edn. Paris.
1863-70.
Calmon, Antoine and Calmon-Maison. Histoire des finances de la Monarchic
de Juillet. 4 vols. Paris. 1895-9.
Statistique gene'rale de la France. 2® serie. Vol. xvi. 1870.
* 3. Commerce, Trade and
Manufactures.
Audiganne, A. L’Industrie fran^aise apres la Revolution de F£vrier.
Paris. 1849.
Les populations ouvrieres et les industries
dans le mouvement social de la
France. Paris. 1854.
Blanquij A. Des classes ouvrieres en France pendant l’annee 1848. Paris.
1849.
Catineau-Laroche, P. M. S. La France et l’Angleterre comparees sous le
rapport des industries agricole, manufacturiere et commerciale. Paris. 1844.
Chevallier, Michel. Essai de politique industrielle, eouvenira de
voyage: France, Belgique, Allemagne, etc. Paris. 1843.
Ernest-Charles, J. Les chemins de fer en France sous le regne de Louis
Philippe. Paris. 1896.
Geraudo, Baron de. Des progres de l’industrie consideres dans leurs
rapports avec la moralite de la classe ouvriere. Paris. 1841.
Laboulaye, C. La de'mocratie industrielle. Etudes sur 1’organisation de
l’industrie franfaise. Paris. 1848.
Levasseur, E. Histoire des classes ouvrieres en France depuis 1789. 2
vols. Paris. 1867.
Matagrin. Le Rachat des chemins de fer en 1848 (Revue Socialiste, Oct.,
Nov., 1848).
Tableau decennal du commerce de la France avec ses colonies et les
puissances etrangeres, publie par 1'Administration des Douanes
(1827-36,1837-46,1847-56). 6 vols. Paris. 1838, 1848, 1858.
4. Colonies.
Beaulieu, P. Leroy. De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes. 3
vols. Paris. 1902.
Deschamps, L. Histoire de la question coloniale en France. Paris. 1891.
Jurien de la Graviere, Admiral. Souvenirs de la navigation a voiles...le
protectorat franfais a Tahiti, etc. Paris. 1865.
Lalanne, E. La France aux colonies au XIX" siecle. Paris. 1893.
Leblond, M. Ar. Leconte de Lisle a la Reunion. Paris. 1906.
Rousset, C. Le commencement d’une conquete: l’Algerie de 1830 k 1840. Con-
quete de l’Algerie (1841-57). 4 vols. Paris. 1887-9.
The
English Blue Books of the period bearing upon colonial subjects should be also
consulted.
[See
also Bibliographies to Chapters X, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XXI.]
CHAPTERS III, VI, VII, and XV.
(1) GERMANY
AND THE AUSTRIAN MONARCHY. (1840 TO 1862.)
(See
also Bibliography to Chapter XVI; as to Schleswig-Holstein see also Bibl. to
Chapter XXIV; for relations with Italy cf. Bibl. to Chapters IV and XIV, and
for those with the Church of Borne Bibl. to Chapter XXV.)
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL
AND GENERAL INFORMATION.
The
most exhaustive bibliography of this as of all other periods of German history
is Dahlmann-Waitz’ Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte, of which the 7th
edition, Leipzig, 1906, is edited by E. Brandenburg. This invaluahle handbook
furnishes full information with regard to printed documents as well as to
collective and special historical works. See also V. Loewe, Biicherkunde der deutschen Geschichte, 2nd edn., Berlin,
1905; and compare Allgemeine Bibliographic fiir Dentschland, Leipzig, 1836-92
(continued from 1893 under the title: Wochent- liches Verzeichniss etc.).
For
Hungarian books and documents those in command of the Magyar language should
consult the Review of Hungarian Books, published by the Library of the
Hungarian National Museum in yearly vols., Budapest, 1895-1906, and various
other publications of the H. N. M. See also The Future of Austria-Hungary. By
Scotus Viator. London. 1907.
The
stenographical reports of the Frankfort Parliament, its precursor and
offshoots, of the Austrian and Hungarian Beichstage, and of the Prussian and
other territorial Diets, are extant and can in most cases be consulted without
difficulty in the Libraries of the several capital and other chief towns ; the
most important of these are mentioned in their proper places in the ensuing
Bibliography. The shorthand reports of the proceedings of the Prussian Chambers
are complete from the beginning, with all other matters ordered to be printed
by the Chambers.
As
covering the whole field of political science, C. W. von Rotteck and C.
Welcker’s Staatslexicon, oder Encyclopaedie der Staatswissenschaften, new edn.,
12 vols., Altona, 1846-8, summarises the necessary preliminary information on
German legal and political history; for the revolutionary period may be
consulted P. Roth and M. Merck, Quellensammlung zum Deutschen offentlichen
Recht seit 1848, 2 vols.,, Erlangen, 1850-2, which reaches to the end of May,
1849.
Much
valuable historical information, in a condensed form, together with useful
bibliographical references, is to be obtained from W. Herbst’s Encyclopaedie
der neueren Geschichte (5 vols., Gotha, 1880-90).
Most
of the numerous and in general admirable articles on important episodes of
German history in the period of the Revolution and the Reaction, printed in Die
Gegenwart, 12 vols., Leipzig, 1848-56, are cited in their places.
The
most complete ethnographical survey of the peoples forming’ the Austrian Empire
of the period covered by these chapters isDie Volker (Esterreich-Ungams. 12
vols. Vienna and Teschen. 1881-3.
Vols. |
1-4. |
Schober, K., Bendel, J., Schwicker, J. H., Egger, J.
Deutschen. |
Die |
— |
5. |
Hunfalvy,
P. Die Magyaren. |
|
— |
6. |
Slavici,
J. Die Rumanen. |
|
— |
7. |
Wolf, G., Goldbaum, W. Die Semiten. v |
|
— |
8-11. |
Vlach, J., Helfert, J. A. v., Szujski, J., Suman, J.,
Star6, Stefanovid, T., Czirbusz, G. Die Slaven. |
J., |
— |
12. |
Schwicker, J. H. Die Zigeuner. |
|
Among
collective biographical works the Allgemeine Deutsche Biograpliie (Leipzig,
1875 etc.) will of course be found preeminently useful; and it may be convenient
to mention here, among the more important articles contained in it referring to
the period covered by these chapters, especially those on Arnim-Boytzenburg,
Count Adolf Heinrich, by C. Rossler; Arnim, Baron H. A. von, by K. Wippermann;
Beckerath, H. von, by W. Oncken; Blum, R., by Eelking; Bruck, Baron K. L. von,
by von Sommaruga; Bunsen, C. K. J. Baron von, by R. Pauli; Christian, Duke of
Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg, by K. Lorentzen; Dahlmann, F. C.
D., by A. Springer; Droste-Vischering, C. A., Abp. of Trier, by L. Ennen;
Ernest Augustus, King of Hanover, by F. Frensdorff; Fischer, H., by K. Wipper-
mann; Ficquelmont, Count C. L. F., by Felgel; Frederick William I, Elector of
Hesse, by K. Wippermann; Frederick William IV, King of Prussia, by L. Ranke;
Geissel, Cardinal J. von, by L. Ennen ; Gerlach, Ludwig von, by K. Wippermann;
Gervinus, G. G., by A. Thorbecke; Hansemann, D. J. L., by F. Bamberg;
Hassenpflug, H. D., by K. Wippermann; Hergenbahn, A. H., by K. Wippermann;
Jacoby, J. J., by K. Wippermann; John, Archduke of Austria, by A. Schlossar;
Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, F., by Sommaruga; Louis I, King of Bavaria, by T. Heigel;
Marx, Karl, by G. Gross; Maximilian II, King of Bavaria, by T. Heigel;
Mittermaier, K. J. A., by Marquardsen; Mettemich, Prince Clemens, by P.
Bailleu; Peucker, General E. von, by K. Wippermann; Pfordten, Baron L. K. H. v.
d., by K. Wippermann; Rabenhorst, B. von, by “P.”; Radowitz, J. von, by R. von
Liliencron; Rodbertus, J. K., by M. Wirth; Schlick, Count F. H., by “S. C. H.”;
Haynau, F. W. K. E. von, by K. Wippermann; Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu, by
von Zeissberg; Sophia, Archduchess of Austria, by C. Wolfsgrliber; Stephen
Victor, Archduke of Austria, Palatine of Hungary, by Schlitter; Stiive, J. K.
B., by G. Stiive; Vincke, Georg von, by H. von Petersdorff; Wagener, H., by H.
von Petersdorff; Waldeck, B., by A. Stern; Welcker, K. T., by von Weech;
William I, Emperor (sections 1-4), by E. Marcks; William I, King of Wurtemberg,
by E. Schneider; WUlisen, General K. W. von, by B. Poten; Windisch-Gratz, A. C.
F., Prinz von, by “L. W.”; Wrangel, Count F. von, by
H. Poten; Ernest II, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha,
by M. Berbig; Gagern, H. von, by G. Kaufmann; Harkort, F. W., by O. Schell;
Kleist-Retzow, H. von, by H. von Petersdorff.
See
also the articles in Biographisches Jahrbuch und deutscher Nekrolog...hrsg. von
A. Bettelheim, Berlin, 1896 etc., and especially those on Bennigsen, R. von, by
H. Oncken; Delbruck, R. von, by K. Helferich;
Oldenburg, Grand Duke Peter of, by P. Kollmann.
Brief
biographical notices of natives of any part of the Austrian Empire (including
Hungary, Bohemia etc.) down to 1850 will be found in C. von Wurzbach’s
Biographisches Lexicon des Kaiserthums (Esterreich (60 vols., Vienna,
1856-91), of which the bibliographical references form by no means the least
valuable element.
No
digest or survey appears to be extant of the German periodical literature of
this age, to which the reader could be with advantage referred. Among the
political
journals,
of the times the following may perhaps he singled out by reason of their large
circulation or intrinsic importance as political organs. They are arranged
according to their places of publication:
Augsburg:
Allgemeine Zeitung (originally published at Tubingen; then at Stuttgart and
Tubingen; finally at Munich). 1798-1908. (Now continued as a weekly paper.)
Heyck,
E. Die Allgemeine Zeitung 1798-1898. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen Presse. Munich. 1898.
Berlin: Allgemeine Staatszeitung; from 1843 Allgemeine Preussische Zeitung;
from 1848 Preussischer Staats-A; ■. -eiger; from 1851 Kon. Preussischer
Staats- Anzeiger. [Official Journal.]
Berliner Borsenzeitung.
Berliner Tageblatt.
Kladderadatsch. From 1848. [Liberal comic paper.]
Konigl. privilegirte Berliner Zeitung von Staats- u. gelehrten Sachen. Im
Verlage Vossischer Erben. From 1816. [Popularly known as the Vossische Zeitung.
The
Liberal organ of the Berlin bourgeoisie.] Militar-Wochenblatt. From 1816, [Army
organ.]
National-Zeitung. From 1848. [Liberal.]
Neue Preussische (Kreuz) Zeitung. From 1848. [Conservative.] Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung. [Official and semi-official.]
Post,
die.
Preussisches
Wochenblatt. Berlin. 1850-5. [Represents the views of the then Prince of
Prussia.]
Protestantische Kirchenzeitung fur d. evangelische Deutschland. Berlin.
1854r-96
(now Prot. Monatshefte). [Church organ.]
Volkszeitung. [Democratic.]
Bremen: Weser-Zeitung. From Jan. 1, 1844. [Liberal.]
Brunswick: Braunschweigische Landeszeitung.
Budapest: Kossuth Hirlapja. 1848-9. ? Nemzeti Politikai Hirlapja. 1848.
Cologne: Kolnische Zeitung. From 1794 under the name of Postamtszeitung, in
succession to an official print, and soon afterwards as Kolner Zeitung. [Liberal.] Du Mont Schauberg, M. Kolnische Zeitung,
1802-1902. [Privately printed.] Vorwarts. [Social Democratic.]
Elberfeld: Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung.
Frankfort: Frankfurter Zeitung.
Venedey, J. Die Wage. Deutsche Reichstagsschau. 8 numbers. Frankfort.
1848-9.
Hamburg: Staats- n. gelehrte Zeitung d. hamburgischen unpartheyischen
Corres- pondenten. From 1802. [With an evening paper,
the Borsenhalle.] [Conservative.]
Hamburger
Nachrichten. From February 29, 1792.
[Liberal.]
Der Freischutz. From 1817.to 1848. [Democratic.]
Hanover:
Hannoversche Zeitung. From 1840.
[Liberal.]
Hannoverischer Courier.
Heidelberg: Deutsche Zeitung. From July 1847—December 1850. Maunheim,
Heidelberg and Frankfort. 1847-50. [National.]
Kiel: Neue Kieler Blatter. 1843-7.
Konigsberg: Konigsberger Hartung’sche Zeitung.
Preussische Provinzialblatter. From 1842-5 under the title: Archiv fur
vater- landische Interessen, oder P. P. From 1846-66 under the title: Neue
Preussische Provinzialblatter. 3 series in 35 vols.
Leipzig: Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (formerly, from 1837-43: Leipziger
Allgemeine Zeitung). 1843-79.
Die
Grenzboten. Edited successively by I. Kurnada; G. Freytag and J. Schmidt; M.
Busch; G. Freytag. From 1842.
Die
Reform. . Edited by A. Reage and H. R. Oppenheim. 1848. lllustrirte Zeitung. From 1843.
Munich: Leuchtkugeln. Randzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Gegenwart. Vols.
i- vii. 1848-51.
Stettin: Ostsee-Zeitung.
Stuttgart: Schwabischer Merkur.
Eulenspiegel. 1848-9.
Vienna:
Die Constitution. Edited by L. Hiifner. (1848.)
Der
Freimiithige. Edited by M. Mahler and J. Tuvorn. (1848.) CEsten-eichische militarische Zeitschrift. (Originally: Neue
militarische Zeitschrift.) 1818-49.
Neue Freie Presse, die.
Wiener Gassen-Zeitung. Zur Belehrung des Volkes geschrieben von Terzky.
1848.
See Helfert, J. A. Frhr. von. Die Wiener Joumalistik im Jahre 1848. Vienna.
1877.
Weimar:
Weimarische Zeitung. (Originally under the title: Oppositions-Blatt, oder W.
Z.)
The
ephemeral pamphlet, broadsheet, squib, and libel literature of the age, of
which large collections exist, cannot be laid under contribution for the
present bibliography.
I. GENERAL, INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF GERMAN
FEDERAL SYSTEMS AND NATIONAL ENDEAVOURS.
A. Covering the whole period or more than one part of it.
1. Histories.
Altmann, W. Ausgewahlte Urkunden zur Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte seit
1806. 2 parts. Berlin. 1898.
Biedermann, K. Dreissig Jahre Deutscher Geschichte. Von der Thronbesteigung
Friedrich Wilhelms IV bis zur Aufrichtung d. neuen Deutschen Kaisertums. 4th
edn. 2 vols. Breslau. 1896.
Bryce,
J. The Holy Roman Empire. 4th edn. Supplementary Chapter: The new German
Empire. London. 1873.
Fischer, K. Die Nation und der Bundestag. Em Beitrag zur deutschen
Geschichte. Leipzig. 1880.
Kaltenborn, C. von. Geschichte der Deutschen Bundesverhaltnisse und
Einheits- bestrebungen von 1806-66. 2 vols. Berlin. 1867.
Kampe, F. F. Das Wesen des Deutschkatholicismus mit besonderer Riicksicht
auf sein Verhaltniss zur Politik. Tubingen. 1850.
Geschichte der religiosen Bewegungen der
neueren Zeit. 4 vols. Leipzig.
1862-60.
Kaufmann, G. Politische Geschichte Deutschlauds im 19. Jahrhundert. (Vol.
iv of Das 19. Jahrhundert, ed. by P. Schleuther.) Berlin. 1900.
Kliipfel, K. Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbestrebungen bis zu ihrer
Erfiillung. Vol. i: 1848-66. Berlin. 1872. [Very useful.}
Meinecke, F. Weltbiirgertum und Nationalstaat. Studien zur Genesis des
deutschen Nationalstaates. Munich and Berlin. 1908. [See esp. Bk. ii : Der Preussische Nationalstaat u.
der Deutsche Nationalstaat; a survey showing great research and acumen.]
Prutz, R. E. Zehn Jahre. Geschichte der neuesten Zeit, 1840-50. Leipzig.
1850-6.
Schulze, H. Einleitung in das deutsche Staatsrecht; mit besonderer Beriick-
sichtigung d. J. 1866 u. d. Griindung d. Norddeutschen Bundes. New
edn. Leipzig. 1867. [Contains a useful preliminary summary.]
Sybel,
H. von. Die Begrtindung des Deutschen Reiches durch Wilhelm I.
Vols. i-m. Munich and Leipzig. 1890. Engl. Tr. by L. M.
Perrin and
G. Bradford. New York. 1890. [The standard
history of the period.] Treitschke, H.
von. Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Vol. v (1840-8). 2nd edn. Leipzig.
1894.
Bundesstaat u. Einheitsstaat. In Histor. u.
polit. Aufsatze. Vol. i. Leipzig.
1865. New edn., 1903.
Das konstitutionelle Konigthum in Deutschland.
In Historische und
politische Aufsatze. Vol. m. Leipzig. 1903.
Zachariae, H. A. Die Deutschen Verfassungsgesetze der Gegenwart. Gottingen.
1855. With Continuations, 1858 and 1862. : ...
Zollverein, der deutsche, in seiner historischen Entwickelung (to 1853).
Die Gegenwart. Vol. xi. Leipzig. 1855.
Zwiedeneck-Sudenhorst, H. von. Deutsche Geschichte von der Auflosung d.
alten bis zur Errichtung d. neuen Kaiserreichs. Vol. u
(1815-49); Vol. hi (1849-70).
Stuttgart. 1903-5.
2. Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters,
Speeches, etc.
Arndt, E. M. Schriften fur und an seine lieben Deutschen. 3 vols. Leipzig.
1845. Beseler, G. Erlebtes und Erstrebtes. Berlin. 1884.
Beust F. F. Graf von. Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten. Erinnerungen u. Auf-
zeichnungen. 2 vols. Stuttgart. 1887. Engl. Tr. by Baron
H. de Worms, under the title : Memoirs of F. F. Count von Beust, written hy
himself. 2 vols. London. 1887.
Biedermann, K. Mein Leben und ein Stuck Zeitgeschichte. 2 vols. Breslau.
1886-7.
Funfzig Jahre im Dienste des nationalen
Gedankens. Aufsatze u. Reden.
2nd edn. Breslau. 1889.
Buchner, W. Ferdinand Freiligrath. Ein Dichterleben in Briefen. 2 vols.
' Lahr. 1882.
Euler, C. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn. (Enlarged
from H. A. Prohle.) Stuttgart.
1881.
Freytag, G. Karl Mathy. See VI. B.
Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben. Leipzig. 1887.
(Sammtliche Werke. i.)
Gervinus, G. G. Leben. Von ihm selbst, 1860. Leipzig. 1895.
. Gervinus u. seine politischen Uberzeugungen.
Ein biographischer Beitrag.
Leipzig. 18-53. '
_
Gutzkow, K. Riickblirl<e auf mein Leben. Berlin. 1876.
Hartmann. J. von. Lebenserinnerungen, Briefe u. Aufsatze. 2 vols. Berlin.
1882.
Erinnerungen eines deutschen Offiziers,
1848-71. 3rd edn 2 vols.
Wiesbaden. 1890.
Lenz, M. H. von Treitschke. Berlin.
1896. ^ n . „
Martin,
(Sir) Theodore. The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort. Vol. u (1848-54). Loudon. 1876.
Marx, K. Revolution und Kontrerevolution in Deutschland. Stuttgart.
1896. Transl. by K. Kautsky, ed. by E. Marx-Aveling, from the original
published in the New York Daily Tribune in 1851 and 1852.
Nippold, F. Aus dem Briefwechsel zwischen d. Prinzen Albert u. Bunsen.
Deutsche Revue, xxin, 1.
Schmidt, Julian. Heinrich von Gagern. Preuss. Jahrb. June, 1880.
Springer, A. F. C. Dahlmann. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1870-2.
Stockmar.—Denkwiirdigkeiten a. d. Papieren d. Frhrn. Chr. von Stockmar.
Hrsgbn. von E. Frhrn. von Stockmar. Brunswick.
1872. English Tr. : Memoirs of Baron Stockmar. By his son, Baron E. von
Stockmar. Transl. by G. A. M. Edited by F. Max Muller. 2 vols. London. 1872. (Vol. n.)
Treitschke, H. von. F. C. Dahlmann. In Histor. u. polit. Aufsatze. Vol. u
Leipzig. 1865. New edn., 1903.
Vogt, C Aus meinem Leben. Stuttgart. 1896.
Ward,
J. Experiences ot a Diplomatist: being Recollections of Germany, founded on
Diaries kept during the years 1840 to 1870 London. 1872.
William I.—Denkschrift des Prinzen von Preussen (Kaiser Wilhelm’s I) fiber
die Deutsche Frage. Mitgeth. von H. von Sybel. Histor. Zeitschr. u:.
B. Fhom 1840 to 1848.
1. Histories. •
Bauer, B. Vollatandige Geschichte der Parteikampfe in Deutschland wahrend
der Jahre 1842-6. 3 vols. Charlottenburg. 1847.
Below, G. von Zur Geschichte der Konstitutionellen Partei im vormarzlichen
Deutschland. (Diss.) Tubingen. 1903.
Jurgens, K. Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Verfassungswerkes 1848-9. 2 parts
in
3 vols. Brunswick and Hanover. 1850-7.
Ronge,
Johannes. Sein Leben und Wirken. 3rd edn. 1845.
Kaufmann, G. Treitschke’s Urteil fiber Johannes Ronge. Historlsche
Zeitschrift, Vol. xcix (rii, 3, 3).
Sala, Baron. Geschichte des polnischen Aufstandes (1846). '
Vienna. 1867.
2. Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters,
etc.
Albert,
Prince of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (Prince Consort of Great Britain). See Leiningen.
Gorres, J. Die Wallfehrt nach Trier. Ratisbon. 1845.
Leiningen, Prince Charles of, and Prince, Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.—Die
Denkschriften des Fiirsten von Leiningen und des Prinzen Albert fiber. die
deutsche Frage, 1847. Hrsgbn., von F. Nippold. Aus dem Bunsen’schen
Familienarchiv, ii. Deutsche Revue, xxn, 3.
Ronge, J. An meine Glaubensgenossen u. Mitbiirger. Altenburg. 1845.
Seuffert, J. A. Die deutsche Verfasaungsreform. Patriotische Reden u.
Betrach- tungen. Repr. from Allgemeine Zeitung, with
additions. Munich. 1848.
C. From 1848 to 1862.
1. Histories.
Droysen, J. G. Die Verhandlungen des Verfassungs-Anschusses der deutschen
Nationalversammlung. Hrsgbn. von J. G. D. Part I. Leipzig.
1849. [No more published.]
Erfurt Parliament, the.—Stenographischer Bericht liber die Verhandlungen d.
Deutschen Parlamentes zu Erfurt. Erfurt. 1850.
Vorparlament, the Frankfort.—Offizieller Bericht uher die Verhandlungen zur
Griindung eines deutschen Parlaments 1848. ■ (Vorparlament, Committee of
50, Diet of the Confederation.) Verhandlungen des Deutschen Parlaments No. 2.
Frankfort. 1848.
Fischer, O. Dr L. Hannibal Fischer u. die Auflosung der deutschen Flotte,
1862-3. Mit Benutzung der hinterlassenen Papiere H. Fischer’s. Histor.
Zeitschr. imv.
Frankfort Parlament, the.—Stenographischer Bericht iiher die Verhandlungen
d. Deutschen Konstituierenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt a. M. Hrsgbn.
von A. Wigard. 9 vols. Frankfort. 1848-9. Complete Index, by the same. Ib.
1850.
Verhandlungen der Deutschen
verfassungsgehenden Reichsversammlung zu
Frankfurt a. M. Hrsgbn. von K. D. Hassler. 6 vols.
Frankfort. 1848-9. Die Verhandlungen des Verfassungsausschusses
der Deutschen Nationalversammlung. Hrsgbn. von J. G. Droysen. Part I. Leipzig.
1849. Hansemann, D. Die Deutsche Verfassung vom 28. Marz 1849, mit Anmerkungen.
7th edn. Berlin. 1849.
Klopp, O. Die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes. Mit allgemein fasslichen
Erlauterungen. Nebst der deutschen Reichsverfassung. Osnabriick. 1849.
Reichsgesetzblatt. Stuck 1-17, September 29, 1848—May 6, 1849. Frankfort.
1848-9.
Union, the.—Aktenstiicke betr. das Bundniss vom 26. Mai u. die Deutsche
Ver- fassungsangelegenheit. 5 numbers in 2 vols. Berlin. 1849-51.
Bar, M. Die deutsche Flotte 1848-62. Leipzig. 1898.
Blum, H. Die Deutsche Revolution. Florence. 1897.
Canitz und Dallwitz, C. W. B. Freiherr von. Denkscbriften. Aus dem Nachlass
hrsgbn. 2 vols. Berlin. 1888.
Riickblick auf die Entwicklung d. Deutschen
Angelegenheiten im J.
1849. Berlin.
1850.
Deutschland seit der Auflosung der Nationalversammlung bis zur Mitte d.
Jahres 1855. Die Gegenwart. Vol. xi. Leipzig. 1855.
Dresdener Conferenzen, die. Mit Urkunden. Berlin. 1851.
Droysen, J. G. Beitrage zur neuesten Deutschen Geschichte. Brunswick. 1849.
Duncker, M. Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Reichsversammlung in Frankfurt.
Berlin. 1849.
Eisenmann, G. Die Parteyen d. Teutschen Reichsversammlung, ihre Programme,
Statuten u. Mitglieder-Verzeichnisse. Erlangen. 1848.
Fischer, F. Das Ende der deutschen Nationalversammlung. Preuss. Jahrb.
xxxn. Flotte, die deutsche, von ihrer Griindung bis zu ihrer Auflosung. Die
Gegenwart.
Vol. x. Leipzig. 1855.
Funfzigerausschuss, der. Die Gegenwart. Vol. iv. Leipzig.
1850.
Haym, R. Die deutsche Nationalversammlung bis zu den Septemberereignissen;
von den Septemberereignissen bis zur Kaiserwahl; von der Kaiserwahl bis zu
ihrem Untergange. 3 parts in 1 vol. Frankfort und Berlin. 1848-50. Jochmus, A.
von. Beitrag zur aktenmassigen Darstellung d. Deutschen Reichs- ministeriums
von 1849 unter Vorsitz d. Fiirsten August zu Wittgenstein- Berleburg. In
Gesammelte Schriften, hrsgbn. von G. M. Thomas. Vol. hi. Berlin.
1883.
Jurgens, C. Zur Geschichte des deutschen Verfassungswerkes, 1848-9. Parts I
and II. 1. Brunswick. 1850.
Laube, H. Das erste Deutsche Parlament. 3 vols. Leipzig. 1849.
Lenz, M. Deutschland’s Entwicklung und das Frankfurter Parlament. Repr.
from Beil, to Allg. Zeitung, No. 119 (May 28, 1898). Munich. 1898.
Mfiller, H. Das deutsche Parlament und der Konig von
Preussen. Frankfort. 1849. National versammlung, die deutsche. Part I: Vom
Zusammentritt der Versammlung bis zur Erwahlung d. Reichsverwesers. Die
Gegenwart. Vol. v. Leipzig. 1850. Part II: Von der Erwablung d Reichsverwesers
bis zum Frankfurter Septemberaufstand. Ib. Vol. vn. Leipzig. 1852. Part III.
Vom Frankfurter Septemberaufstande bis zur Auflosung des Rumpiparlamentes zu
Stuttgart. Ib. Vol. ix. Leipzig. 1864. _
Rochau, A. L. von. Grundsatze der Realpolitik angewendet auf die
Staatlichen Zustande Deutschlands. 2 vols. Stuttgart and Heidelberg. 1853-69.
Vol. i. New edn. Stuttgart. 1859.
Salomon, F. Die deutschen Parteiprogramme. Heft I: von
1844-71. Quellen- sammlung zur deutschen Geschichte. Leipzig und Berlin. 1907.
[For 1848 only.] _
Socialismus, der, in Deutschland. Die Gegenwart. Vol. vti. Leipzig. 1852. Springer, A.
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1870-2. (Vol.
n for the History of the Frankfort Parliament.) .
Vogel, W. Studien zur Geschichte des Frankfurter Parlaments bis znm Marz
1849. Wurzburg. 1881.
Vorparlament, das deutsche. Die Gegenwart. Vol. n. Leipzig. 1849.
2. Contemporary
and other Memoirs, Letters, etc.
Arndt, E. M.—Brandis, C. G. Briefe von E. M. Arndt a. d. Frankfurter
Parlament. Deutsche Rundschau, lxxxi.
Biedermann, K. Erinnerungen a. d. Paulskirche. Leipzig. 1849.
Bulle, G. Das erste Jahr in Frankfurt. In Johann Smidt, ein Gedenkbnch.
Bremen. 1873.
Deutsche Frage, die, und die deutschen Mittel- und Kleinstaaten. Karlsruhe.
1859. Deym, F. X. Graf. F. Graf Deym u. die oesterreichische Frage in der
Paulskirche. Leipzig. 1892.
Diezel, G. Die Frage der deutschen Zukunft. Zweifel und Losungsversuche,
dem deutschen Volke vorgelegt. Stuttgart. 1854.
Haym, R. Aus meinem Leben. Erinnerungen a. d. Nachlass hrsgbn. Berlin.
1901.
Johann, Erzherzog von Oesterreich, Reichsverweser von
Deutschland. Briefwechsel, 1850-9. In Gesammelte Schriften von A von Jochmus,
vol. rv. Berlin. 1884. Die Gegenwart. Vol. i. Leipzig. 1848.
Rachfahl, F. Oesterreich und Preussen im Marz 1848. Aktenmassige
Darstellung des Potsdam-Dresdener Kongressprojektes. Hist. Vierteljahrsschrift,
vi, vn. Raumer, F. von. Lebenserinnerungen und Briefwechsel. 2 vols. Leipzig.
1862.
Briefe aus Frankfurt und Paris, 1848-9. 2
parts. Leipzig. 1849.
Reichensperger, P. Erlebnisse eines alten Parlamentariers im
Revolutionsjahre
1848. Berlin.
1882.
Riimelin, G. Aus der Paulskirche. Berichte an den Schwabischen Merlcur a.
d. J.
1848 u. 49. Hrsgbn. von H. R. Schafer. Stuttgart. 1892.
Samwer, K. Die Dresdener Konferenzen. Mit Urkunden. Berlin. 1851. Simson,
B. von. Eduard von Simson. Leipzig. 1901.
Stahl, F. J. Die deutsche Reichsverfassung. Berlin. 1849.
Wangenheim, C. A. von. Das Dreikanigsbiindniss vom 26. Mai 1849 u. die
Radowitzische Politik in Vergleichung mit dem Fiinfkonigsbundnisse vom J.
1814r-5, nebst zahlreichen Mitteilungen a. d. nicht veroffentlichten Verhand-
lungen der Deutschen Bmidesversammlung. Hrsgbn. von A. Michaelis. Stuttgart.
1851.
ZoUverein.—Die Resultate der Berathungen der Regierungs-Kommission in
Frankfurt a. M. 1848-9 zur Herstellung der Deutschen Zolleinheit. Halle.
1851.
II. THE AUSTRIAN MONARCHY.
A. The Monarchy as a whole and the German Provinces in particular.
1. Whole period, or more than one part of it.
a. Histories.
Hock, C. von. Die Verhandlungen iiber ein oesterreich.-deutsches
Zollbiindniss,
1849-64. Oesterreich. Revue, Jahrg. 1904-6.
Staatsgrundgesetze der oesterreichischen Monarchie. Sammlung aller die
Reichs- verfassung u. die Landesverfassungen betr. Gesetze, Verordnungen, Hand-
scbreiben u. sonstigen Erlasse. Vienna. 1861. [Very useful.]
Friedjung, H. Oesterreich von 1848 bis 1860. Vol. i. Die Jahre der
Revolution u. der Reform, 1848-61. 2nd edn.
Stuttgart and Berlin. 1908. [An excellent summary of the history of the
Austrian monarchy, more especially valuable for the account of its internal
politics, based largely upon the use of Bach’s papers.]
Kolmer, G. Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich. Vol. i. (From 1848.)
Vienna. 1902.
Krones, F. Geschichte der Neuzeit Oesterreichs vom 18. Jahrh. bis auf die
Gegenwart. Berlin. 1879.
Leger, L. Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie depuis les origines jusqu’a
l’annee 1878. Paris. 1879.
Mamroth, K. Die Entwickelung d. Oesterreichisch-Deutschen
Handelsbeziehungen vom Entstehen der Zolleinigungsbestrebungen bis zum Ende der
ausschliess- lichen Zollbegunstigungen (1819-65). Berlin. 1887.
Oesterreichische Monarchie, die, in Bezug auf ihre materiellen Krafte und
okonomi- scben Verhaltnisse. Die Gegenwart. Vol. xi. Leipzig. 1855.
Rogge, W. Oesterreich von Vilagos bis zur Gegenwart. 3 vols. Leipzig and
Vienna. 1872-3.
Springer, A. Geschichte Oesterreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden 1809.
(Staaten- gesch. d. neuesten Zeit.) Vols. i and ii. Leipzig. 1863-5.
b.
Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters, etc.
Arneth,
A. von. Johann Freiherr von Wessenberg. Ein oesterreich.
Staatsmann d.
19. Jahrh. 2 vols. Vienna. 1898.
Bauemfeld, E. von. Aus Bauernfeld’s Tagebiichern. Hrsgbn. von C. Glossy.
2 vols. Vienna.
1895-6.
Beer, A. Kiibeck und Metternich. Vienua. 1897.
Czdrnig, Carl Freiherr von. Oesterreichs Neugestaltung, 1848-58. Stuttgart.
1858.
Frobel, J. Ein Lebenslauf. (Selbstbiographie.) 2 vols. Stuttgart. 1890-1.
Meyer, B. Ritter von. Erlebnisse. 2 vols. Vienna and Budapest. 1873-5.
Prokesch-Osten.—Aus den Briefen des Grafen von Prokesch-Osten, K. K. Bot.
schafters u. Feldzeugmeisters, 1849-55. Vienna. 1896.
Schmerling, A., Ritter von.—Lemmermeyer, F. Aus Scbmerling’s Leben.
Erinner- ungen mit Benutzung hinterlassener Papiere derselben. Deutsche Revue,
xxn, 3. Springer, A. Aus meinem Leben. Mit Beitragen von G. Freytag u. H.
Janitschek. Berlin. 1892.
Vitzthum von Eckstadt, K. F. Graf. Berlin und Wien in den Jahren 1845-52.
Politische Privatbriefe. Mit einem Vorwort von F. Muller. 2nd edn. Stuttgart.
1886.
Welden, L. von. Episoden aus meinem Leben. Graz. 1853.
Wessenberg, J. P. Frhr. von. Briefe aus den Jahren 1848 bis 58 an
Isfordink- Kostnitz. 2 parts. Leipzig. 1877
2. From 1840 to 1848. a.
Histories.
Chodzko, J. L.. Les massacres de Galicie,et Krakowie confisqu£e par
l’Autriche en
1846. Paris.
1861.
Schmidt, A. Zeitgenossische Geschichten. n. Oesterreich, 1830-48. Berlin. 1859.
Stern, A. L’idee d’une representation nationale de l’Autriche, conyue
par le prince de Mettemich. Revue Historique, xxxi, 2.
(July and August, 1886.)
Stiles,
W. H. Austria in 1848-9. 2 vols. New York. 1852.
b. Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters,
etc.
(Andrian-Warhurg, Frhr. von.) Oesterreich und dessen
Zukunft. Leipzig. 1841. Mazade, C. de. Un chancelier de
l’ancien regime. Le regne^ diplomatique de Mettemich. Paris. 1889. , - ;
Mettemich, Prince Clemens. Aus Mettemich’s nachg. Papieren. Geordnet u. zusammengestellt von A. von
Klinkowstrom. Hrsgbn. von Furst R. Mettemich. 8 vols. Vienna. 1880-4. French
edn. 8 vols. Paris. 1880-4. [The English edn., in 5 vols., only reaches 1837.] -
Schmidt-Weissenfels, E. Furst Mettemich. Geschichte seines Lebens n. seiner
Zeit. 2 vols. Prague. 1860. '
1 3. From 1848 to 1851.
a. Histories.
Allgemeines Reichs-Gesetz- und Regierungshlatt fur das Kaiserthum
Oesterreich.
Vienna.
1860-2. Continued as Reichs-Gesetzblatt etc. (In progress.) Reichstag, Austrian.—Verhandlungen des oesterreich.
Reichstages, nach der stenographischen Aufnahme. 4
vols. Vienna. 1848. (Vol. xv, not published till after dissolution of the
Reichstag.)
Protokolle des Verfassungs-Anschusses im oesterreich.
Reichstage 1848-9.
Hrsgbn. u. eingel. von A. Springer. Leipzig. 1886.
Verhandlungen des oesterreich. Reichstages
nach der stenographischen
Aufnahme. 4 vols. Vienna. 1848.
Angeli, M. von. Wien nach 1848. A. d. Nachlasse hrsgbn. von H. Friedjuns'. Vienna
and Leipzig. 1905.
Auerbach,
Berthold. Narrative of events in Vienna (Sept.-Nov. 1848). English translation. London. 1849.
Bach, M. Geschichte der Wiener Revolution 1848. Vienna. 1899.
Hartig, Co.unt. Genesis der Revolution in Oesterreich im
J. 1848. 3rd edn Leipzig. 1851. Engl. Tr. in Coxe, W.
History of the House of Austria' Continuation. 3rd edn. London. 1907. *
Helfert, J. A. Frhr. von. Aufzeichnungen n. Erinnerungen aus jungen Jahren
Im Wiener Konstituierenden Reichstag 1848. Vienna. 1904.
Geschichte der oesterreich. Revolution, im
Zusammenhange mit der mittel-
europaischen Bewegung der Jahre 1848-9. Vol. i. Bis zur oesterreich
Verfassung vom 25. April 1848. Freiburg- i. B. and
Vienna. 1907. [One of the Appendices is the text of the Constitution of April,
1848 ]
Helfert, J. A. Frhr. von. Geschichte Oesterreichs vom Ausgange d. Wiener
Oktober-Aufetandes 1848. Vols. i-iv. Leipzig and Prague. 1869-86.
Revolution und Reaktion im Spatjahr 1848.
Prague. 1870.
Die Wiener Journalistik im J. 1848. Vienna.
1877.
Langenau, F. Frhr. von. Zur Thronentsagung Kaiser Ferdinands. Deutsche
Revue, xm.
Latour, Count.—Ergebnisse der von dem K. K. Militargerichte gefuhrten
Unter- suchung wider die Morder des Grafen Baillet de Latour. Vienna. 1850.
Marzkatastrophe, die, in Oesterreich. Die Gegenwart. Vol. v. Leipzig. 1850.
Oesterreich sait der Marzrevolution bis zur Eroffnung des Reichstags. Die
Gegenwart. Vol. x. Leipzig. 1855.
Oesterreich seit der Oktoberrievolution bis zur Auflosung des Reichstages.
[March 4,
1849.] Die Gegenwart. Vol. x. Leipzig. 1855.
Oesterreich seit der Vcrleihung der Marzverfassung bis zu ihrer Aufhebun;
[December 31, 1851.] Die Gegenwart. Vol. xi. Leipzig. 1855.
Pillersdorf, Franz von. Die Gegenwart. Vol. iv. Leipzig. 1850.
Schuselka, F. Das Revolutionsjahr. Vienna. 1850.
Zenker, E. V. Die Wiener Revolution 1848 in ihren sozialen Voraussetzungen
u. Beziehungen. \ ienna. 1897.
6. Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters,
etc.
Ameth,
A. Ritter von. Anton von Schmerling. Episoden
aus seinem Leben, 1835,
1848, 1849.
Vienna and Leipzig. 1895.
Auerbach, B. Tagebuch aus Wien. Breslau. 1849.
Ficquelmont, Count C. L. F. Aufklarungen uber die Zeit vom 20. Marz bis zum
4. Mai 1848. 2nd edn. Leipzig. 1850.
Deutschland, Oesterreich u. Preussen. Vienna.
1851.
Frobel, J. Briefe fiber die Wiener Oktoberrevolution, mit Notizen uber die
letzten Tage Robert Blum’s. Frankfort. 1849.
— Wien,
Deutschland und Europa. 1848. [Against absorption of German Austria in
Germany.]
Hager, J. Als Oesterreich zerfiel, 1848. Vienna. 1907.
[Memoirs of a contemporary Viennese.]
Hiibner, A. Graf von. Ein Jahr meines Lebens, 1848-9. Leipzig. 1891.
Kolowrat-Krakowsky, L. Graf. Meine Erinnerungen a. d. Jahren 1848-9.
Hrsgbn. von seinem Sohne. 2 parts. Vienna. 1905.
Pillersdorf, F. von. Handschriftlicher Nachlass. Vienna. 1863.
CCF. v. P.,” Riickblick auf die
politische Bewegung in Oesterreich in den
Jahren 1848 ii. 1849. 2nd edn. Vienna. Engl. Tr. by
G. Gaskell: Austria in 1848-9: the political movement. London. 1850.
Windisch-Gratz, Fiirst. Eine Lebens-Skizze. A. d. Papieren eines
Zeitgenossen der Sturmjahre 1848 u. 1849. Berlin. 1886.
4. From 1851 to 1862.
a. Histories.
Beer, A. Furst Schwarzenberg’s Deutsche Politik his zu den Dresdener
Konferen- zen. Hist. Taschenbuch. Leipzig. 1891.
Friedjung, Heinrich. Der Krimkrieg und die oesterreichische Politik.
Stuttgart.
1906.
Schiff, W. Oesterreichs Agrarpolitik seit der
Grundentlastung. Vol. I. Tubingen. 1899.
,
:
b. Contemporary
and other Memoirs, Letters, etc.
Berger, A. F. Felix, Fiirst zu Schwarzenberg. Leipzig. 1853.
Daniels, E. Oesterreich als deutscher Einheitstaat unter der Reaktion.
Preuss. Jahrbiicher, oxxxn, 3. Berlin. June, 1908. [Review of Friedjung, H.
Oesterreich von 1848 bis I860.]
E8tv8s, Baron J. Die Garantien der Macht und Einheit Oesterreichs. Leipzig.
1859.
Hiibner, le Comte A. de. Neuf ans de souvenirs d’un ambassadeur, 1851-9.
Paris.
1904.
Palackjf, F. Oesterreich’a Staatsidee. Prague. 1860.
Wolfsgruber, C. Kardinal Rauscher. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1888.
B. Bohemia.
See
also Bibliography XXII, Sect. 4.
Denis, E. La Boheme depuis la Montagne-Blanche. Vol. ii. Paris. 1903. Germanisirung oder Czechisirung? Ein Beitrag
zur Nationalitatenfrage in Bohmen.
Leipzig and Heidelberg. 1861.
Helfert, J. A. Frhr. von. Der Prager Juni-Aufstand 1848. Prague. 1897.
C. Hungary
1. Whole Period, and before 1848.
Bodnar,
S. Eotvcfe and Kemeny. Budapest. 1905.
[In Hungarian.]
Deak, Franz. Einleitung in das ungarische Staatsrecht. Pesth. 1865.
Konyi, Manos. Deak Ferencz beszedei. Speeches
of Franz Deak. 6 vols.
Budapest. 1903.
Eisenmann, L. Le compromis Austro-Hongrois. Paris.
1904. [Valuable for the retrospect of the internal history of Austria and
Hungary from 1848.]
EStvSs, Baron J. Die Reform in Ungam Leipzig. 1846.
Ferencin,
Z. Life of Francis Deak. Publications of the Hungarian Academy.
3 vols. Budapest. 1907. [In Hungarian.]
Life of Baron Joseph E8tv8s. Budapest. 1903.
[In Hungarian.]
Life of Petofi. 3 vols. Budapest. 1896. [In Hungarian.]
Frey, A. Ludwig Kossuth und Ungam’s neueste Geschichte. 2
vols. Mannheim.
1849.
Horvath,
M. Twenty-five years of Hungarian History, 1823-48. 3rd edn. 3 vols. Budapest.
1898. [In Hungarian.]
Fiinfundzwanzig Jahre aus der Geschichte Ungarns. (German
Tr.) Leipzig
1867.
Kossuth,
L. Works of. Vols. v-ix. Budapest. 1895-1901. [In Hungarian.]
Select Speeches of Kossuth. Condensed and
abridged, with K.’s express
sanction,
by F. W. Newman. London. 1853. [With appendices on Kossuth’s resignation etc.]
Ungam’s Wiinsche. Leipzig. 1843.
[O’Brien, Mrs F.] Francis Deak, Hungarian statesman. A
memoir. With a Preface by (Sir) Mountstuart E. Grant Duff. London. 1880.
Paget,
J. Hungary and Transylvania. 2 vols. London. 1839.
Pulszky,
Franz. Meine Zeit und mein Leben. 4
vols. Pressburg. 1880-3.
Szilagyi,
D. The Speeches of E. L. Fayer. Vol. I. Budapest. 1906. [In Hungarian.] ,
Ungarn vor der Marzrevolution. Die Gegenwart. Vol. v. Leipzig. 1860.
Vay, Baron Louis. The Life of. Budapest. 1899. [In
Hungarian.]
Voinsvich,
G. Baron Joseph EStvfis. (Crowned hjr Hungarian Academy.) Budapest.
1903. [In Hungarian.]
2. 1848-1849. '
Bech,
Baroness von. Memoirs of the War of Independence, by a Lady. Misholcz.
1901. [In Hungarian.] .
Bernstein,
B. The Jews and the War of Independence. Budapest. 1898. [In Hungarian.]
Breit,
J. Military History of the War of Independence. 3 vols. Budapest. 1898. [In Hungarian.]
Chownitz, J. F. J. Geschichte der ungarischen Revolution, 1848-9. 2
vols. Stuttgart. 1849.
Correspondence
relative to the affairs of Hungary. Presented to both Houses of Parliament,
August 16, 1860. No. 179. [As to Palmerston’s refusal to intervene.]
Czetz.
Bern’s Feldzug in Siebenbiirgen. Hamburg.
1860.
(Geibel, H. or W. Frhr. von Ramming von Riedkircher.) Der Feldzug in Ungarn
u. Siebenbiirgen im Sommer d. J. 1849. Budapest. 1860.
Gorgei, A. von. Mein Leben und Wirken in Ungarn. 2
vols. Leipzig. 1862.
English
Tr. 2 vols. London. 1862.
Gracza,
T. History of the War for Independence in 1848-9. 6 vols. Budapest.
1894-8.
[In Hungarian.]
Hamvay,
E. General John Damjanich. Budapest. 1904. [In Hungarian.]
The Thirteen Martyrs of Arad. Budapest. 1899. [In Hungarian.]
Haupter, die, der ungarischen Revolution. Die Gegenwart. Vol. ix. Leipzig.
1864.
[Personal sketches.]
Horvath,
M. (Bishop of Csanad). Fiinfundzwanzig
Jahre aus der Geschichte Ungarns, von 1823-48. Tr. from the
Hungarian by J. Novelli. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1867.
— History of the War of Independence, 1848-9.
2nd edn. 3 vols. Budapest. [In Hungarian.]
Iranyi, D. and Chassin, C. L. Histoire politique de la Revolution de
Hongrie,
1847-9.
2 vols. Paris, 1869-60.
K£ry,
F. History of the Hungarian War of, Independence in daily chronicles.
Vol.
i. Budapest. 1899. [In Hungarian.]
Klapka,
G. Memoirs of the War of Independence translated into English by Otto
Wenckstein. London. 2 vols. 1850.
Aus meinen Erinnerungen. Tr. from the
Hungarian by the author. Zurich,
Budapest
and Vienna. 1887- Kmety, G. Arthur Gorgei’s Leben und Wirken in Ungarn. London.
1863. tlocziczka, F. Die Wintercampagne des Graf Schlick’schen Armeecorps.
Olmiitz.
1860.
Pulszky,
Theresa. Memoirs of a Hungarian Lady. With a Historical Introduction by Francis
Pulszky, and appendices. (Details of the Hungarian Emigration at Widdin etc.) 2
vols. London. 1860.
Russian Intervention.—Bericht liber die Kriegsoperationen d. russischen
Truppen gegen die ungarischen Rebellen. Nach offiziellen Quellen
zusammengestellt von H. v. N. Berlin. 1861.
Rustow, F. W. Geschichte des ungarischen Insurrectionskrieges. 2 vols.
Zurich. 1861.
Schonhals, Baron C. von. Biographic des K. K. Feldzeugmeisters Julius
Frhrn. von Haynau, von einem seiner WafFengefahrten gezeichnet. 2nd
edn. Graz. 1853. Schlesinger, M. The War in Hungary. Transl. by J. E. Taylor. Edited by F. Pulszky. 2 vols. London. 1850.
Stephan Victor, Erzherzog von Osterreich, sein Leben, Wirken, und sein Tod.
Wiesbaden, 1868.
Szalay, L. Diplomatische Actenstucke zur Beleuchtung der
ungarischen Gesandt- schaft in Deutschland. Zurich. 1849.
[Hungarian embassy to Frankfort, May, 1848.] ,
<
Szemere,
B. Graf Ludwig Batthyany; Arthur Gorgey; Ludwig Kossuth. Politische Charakterbilder a. d-. ungarischen
Freiheitskriegfe. Hamburg. 1852.
Politische Charakterskizzen. in. Hamburg.
1853. [Against Kossuth.]
Szilagyi, D. Die letzten Tage der ungarischen Revolution. Budapest.
1850. Thaly, Col. S. The Fortress of Konrarom (Conrom) during the War of
Independence. Engl, transl. London. 1852.
■'
Transylvanian campaign 1848-9. Der Winterfeldzug des Revolutionskrieges in
Siebenbiirgen. Von einem oesterreich. Veteranen. Leipzig. 1861.
Ungarische Revolution, die, im Jahre 1848. Die Gegenwart. Vol. v. Leipzig.
1850. Ungarische Revolution, die, im Jahre 1849. Die Gegenwart. Vol. vi.
Leipzig. 1851. “Wacquant, Anatole [Rittmeister von Strobl]. Die ungarische Donauarmee
1848-9. Breslau. 1890.
Welden, Feldzeugen F. L. Frhr. von. Epiaoden aus meinem
Leben. Graz. 1853. Windischgratz, Prince A. C. F. zu. Der Winterfeldzug 1848-9
in Ungarn unter dem Oberkommando d. F. M. Fiirsten zu W. Im Auftrage S. D.
iiach offiziellen Quellen bearbeitet u. hrsgbn. Vienna. 1851. ■ ■
Windischgratz, General L. von. Beitrag zur Gesch. d. Krieges in Ungam
1848-9. In Mittheilungen d. K. K. Kriegsarchives, Jahrg.
1894. Vienna. [In defence of W.’s last Hungarian campaign.]
Wisocki,
General. Memoirs. Extriicts in Die Grenzboten. Leipzig, 1860. n. [As to the
relations between the Poles and the Hungarians, Bern, Dembinski, etc.]
3. After 1849.
Beksics,
Gustav. I Ferenz Josef es kora (Francis Joseph I and his Age). In History of
the Hungarian People (A magyar neuzet tortenete. Edited by Alexander Szilagyi.
Budapest, 1898). ■
Kossuth,
L. Meine Schriften aus der Emigration. Pressburg. 1880 etc.
(Meyer, B. von?) Ruckblick auf die jiingste Entwicklungsperiode Ungarns. Vienna.
1857.
Newman,
F. W. Reminiscences of two Exiles (Kossuth and Pulszky). London
1888.
(Szechenyi, Count Stephen.) Ein Blick auf den anonymen Ruckblick. London.
1859. Published auonymously.
Szemere,
B. Letters to Richard Cobden (deals with Hungary under Bach).
D. Other Lands.
Hirtenfeld,
J. Ban Jellacid. Biographische
Skizze. Vienna. 1861.
Illyria.—Geschichte des lllyrismus. Nebst einem Vorworte von W. Wachsmuth.
Leipzig. 1849. ■
Jellachich, Joseph Freiherr von. Die Gegenwart. Vol. i. Leipzig. 1848.
Jorga, N. Geschichte des rumanischen Volkes. 2 vols. Gotha. 1905.
Ostrow, R. von. Der Bauernkrieg vom J. 1846 in Galizien. Vienna. 1869.
Pejakovid, S. Aktenstiicke zur Gesch. des Kroatisch-slavoniachen Landtages
u. der nationalen Bewegung vom J. 1848. Appendix: Die wichtigsten Landtags*
Akten vom J. 1861 etc. Vienna. 1861,
Petter, F. Dalmatien. 2 vols. Gotha. 1857.
Siidslawen, die, und ihr Eingreifen in die oesteri'eichische Bewegung. Die
Gegenwart. Vol. viii. Leipzig.
1853.
IIL
PRUSSIA.
A. Whole
period, or more than one part of it.
1. Histories.
Ministerial-Blatt fur die gesammte inuere Verwaltung des Konigl. prenss.
Staates. Hrsgbn. im Bureau d. Ministerium d. Inneren. Berlin. 1840 etc.
Bernstein, A. Revolutions- u. Reaktionsgeschichte Preussens u. Deutschlands
von den Marztagen bis zur neuesten Zeit. 3 vols. Berlin. 1882-4.
Eberty, F. Geschichte des preussisohen Staats 1411(-187l). 7 vols. Breslau.
1867-73.
Konigsberg in seiner politisch-socialen Entwickelung d. letzten
Jahrzehende. Die Gegenwart. Vol. iv. Leipzig 1850.
Nippold, F. Der Aufenthalt des Prinzen von Preussen in England. 1844 u.
1848.
Deutsche Revue, xxii-xxiii.
Petersdorff, H. von. Konig Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Stuttgart.
1900. [Impartially written and useful.]
Ranke, L. von. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Allgeneine Deutsche Biographic. Vol
vn. Leipzig. 1878. (Sammtl. Werke, u, ui.)
Kaufmann, G. Ranke und die Beurteilung Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Histor
Zeitschrift, lxxxviii (19).
Zur Geschichte Deutschlands und Frankreichs im
19. Jahrhundert. Sammt-
liche Werke. Vols. xlix, l. Leipzig.
1887. [Contains the correspondence of Frederick William IV with Bunsen.]
Richter, A. L. Konig Friedrich Wilhelm IV u. die Verfossung der
evangelisuhen Kirche. Berlin. 1861.
2. Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters,
etc.
Below,
G. von. Aus der Zeit Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Briefwechsel des
Generals Gustav von Below. Deutsche Rundschau, xxvm. Jahrg, 1901.
Bernhardi, T. von. Aus dem Leben T. von Bernhardi’s. Vol. it (1854-7,) Vol.
m. (1857-60.) Leipzig. 1893-4.
Bismarck, Prince Otto von. Gedanken und Erinnerungen. 2 vols. and Appendix.
Stuttgart. 1898-1901.
Bismarck-Briefe, 1836-73. Hrsgbn. von H. Kohl.
7th edn. Bielefeld. 1898.
Furst Bismarck als Redner.Vollstandige
Sammlung der parlamentarischen
Reden Bismarcks seit 1847; mit Einleitungen von W. Bohm u. A. Dove. 16
vols. Berlin and Stuttgart. 1885-91.
Die pojitischen Reden des Fiirsten Bismarck.
Historisch-kritische Gesammt-
ausgabe, hesorgt von H. Kohl. 14 vols. Stuttgart. 1892-1904.
Bismarck’s Ansprachen 1848-97. Hrsgbn. von H.
von Poschinger. 2 vols.
Stuttgart. 1895-8.
Bunsen, C. K. J. Freiherr von.—A Memoir of Baron Bunsen. Drawn
chiefly from family papers by his widow. 2 vols. London. 1868-9. German edn.
under the title: Bunsen, C. K. J. Freiherr von. Aus seinen Briefen n. nach
eigener Erfahrung geschildert von seiner Wittwe. Deutsche Ausgabe, vermehrt von
F. Nippold. 3 vols. Leipzig. 1868-71.
Delbriick, R. von. Lebenserinnerungen. 1817-67. 2 vols. Berlin. 1906.
Duncker, M. Johann Gustav Droysen. Preuss. Jahrh. August, 1884.
Fischer, F. Radowitz, seine politischen Anschauungen u. sein Einfluss auf
Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Histor. Taschenbuch. Leipzig. 1874.
Frederick William IV.—Vollstandige Sammlung der Reden S. M. des Konigs
Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Hrsgbn. von J. Killisch. 6th edn. Berlin. 1861.
Frensdorff, C. J. von Radowitz. Leipzig. 1860.
Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Reden, Proklamationen etc. 1848-52. Berlin. 1851.
Geissel, Cardinal.—Johannes von Geissel, Cardinal und Erzbischof von Koln.
Sybel’s Histor. Zeitschr. 1874. 1.
Gelzer, E. Bunsen als Staatsmann und Schriftsteller. Gotha. 1861.
Gerlach, Leopold von, General-Adjutant K. Friedrich Wilhelms IV.
Denkwurdig- keiten aus s. Leben. Nach seinen Aufzeichnungen hrsgbn. von s.
Tochter.
2 vols. Berlin. 1891-2. [These invaluable
Memoirs cover the entire'period of the King’s reign.)
Gerlach, Ernst Ludwig von. Aufzeichnungen ans seinem Leben und Wirken.
1795-1877. Hrsgbn. von Jakob von Gerlach. 2 vols. Schwerin. 1903. [The inner
history of Prussian Conservatism.]
Hassel, P. Joseph Maria von Radowitz. Vol. i (to 1848). Berlin. 1905.
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen> Prinz Kraft zu. Aus meinem Leben. Vols. i-in. Berlin.
1897-1906.
Meerheimb, F. von. Graf von Wrangel, Preuss. General-Feldmarschall. Berlin.
1877.
Meinecke, F. Das Leben des General-Feldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen. Vol.
n.
1814-48. Stuttgart. 1899.
Natzmer, General O. von. Unter den Hohenzollern. Denkwiirdigkeiten a. d.
Leben d. Gen. O. von N. Aus der Zeit Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Gotha. 1888-9.
Petersdorff, H. von. Graf Albrecht von Alvensleben-Erxleben. Histor.
Zeitschr. o. Munich and Berlin. 1908.
Kleist-Retzow. Ein Lehensbild. Stuttgart and
Berlin. 1907.
Poschinger, H. von. Ein Achtundvierziger. Lothar Bucher’s Leben und Werke.
3 vols. Berlin.
1890-4.
Radowitz, Joseph von. Die Gegenwart. Vol. iv. Leipzig. 1850. [To latter
part of 1849.]
Gesprache aus der Gegenwart iiber Staat und
Kirche. 4th edn. Stuttgart. 1851.
Neue Gesprache etc. Stuttgart. 1851.
Reden und Betrachtungen. Gesammelte Schrifter.
Vol. ii. Berlin. 1852.
(Contains: Deutschland und Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Hamburg. 1848.) Ranke, L.
von. Zur eigenen Lebensgeschichte. Hrsgbn. von A. Dove. Leipzig.
1890. (Sammtl. Werke, mi, uv.)
Raumer, K. von. Sein Leben, von ihm selbst erzahlt. Stuttgart. 1866.
Reumont; A. von. Aus Konig Friedrich Wilhelms IV gesunden und kranken
Tagen. Leipzig. 1885.
Roon, Count A. von. Denkwiirdigkeiten. 5th edn. Breslau. 1905.
Varnhagen von Ense, K. A. Tagebiicher. 14 vols. Leipzig, Zurich, Hamburg.
1861-70. '
Wagener, H. Die Politik Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Berlin. 1883.
Erlebtes. Meine Memoiren aus der Zeit von 1848
bis 1866, und von 1873 bis
jetzt.
Part i. Berlin. 1883.
B. From 1840 to 1848.
1. Bistories.
Combined Diet.—Bleich, E. Der erste Vereinigte Landtag in Berlin, 1847.
Hrsgbn. unter Aufsicht d. Vorstehers d. G'entral-Bureaus im Ministerium des
Innern u. d. Bureaus d. vereinigten Landtages. 4 vols. Berlin. 1847.
Bauer, C. F. Verhandlungen des vereinigten
Landtages von 1847, des
vereinigten Ausschusses u. des vereinigten Landtages von 1848. Nach
Materien geordnet. Berlin. 1848.
Reden u. Redner des ersten vereinigten
Freussischen Landtags. Hrsgbn.
von R. Haym. Berlin. 1847-8.
Verhandlungen des am 11. April 1847 in Berlin
eroffneten vereinigten
Landtags. 3 parts. Konigsberg. 1847.
Verhandlungen des zum 2. April 1848
zusammenberufenen vereinigten
Landtages, zusammengest. von E. Bleich. Berlin. 1848.
Constitution, the Prussian.—Verhandlungen d. Versammlung zur Vereinharung
d. Freussischen Staats-Verfassung, zusammengest. von E. Bleich. 2 vols. Berlin.
1848-9.
Protokolle der v. d. Versammlung zur
Vereinharung d. Freussischen Ver-
fassungernanntgewesenenVerfassungs-Kommission,gesammelt von K.G. Rauer.
Berlin. 1849.
Frederick William IV.—Materialien zur Regierungsgeschichte F. W. IV. (1840-4).
3 numbers. Konigsberg. 1888.
Shorthand
Reports of the debates of the Assembly summoned for discussing the settlement
of the Prussian State Constitution appeared as Supplements to the Freussische
Staatsanzeiger, and were collected in 3 vols. Berlin. 1848.
Voigts-Rhetz, C. von. Aktenmassige Darstellung der Folnischen Insurrektion,
1848. Posen. 1848.
Willisen, General W. von. Akten und Bemerkungen iiher meine Sendung nach
Posen, 1848. Berlin. 1849.
Biedermann, K. Geschichte des ersten Freussischen Reichstags. Leipzig. 1847.
Falksen, F. Die liberale Bewegung in Konigsberg (1840-8). Breslau. 1888.
2. Contemporary
and other Memoirs, Letters, etc.
Diest, G. von. Meine Erlebnisse im J. 1848 u. die Stellung d.
Staatsministers von Bodelschwingh vor u. am 18. Marz 1848. Berlin. 1898.
Gervinus, G. Die Preussische Verfassung und das Patent vom 3 Febr. 1847.
Mannheim. 1847.
Hassel, T. J. M. von Radowitz. Vol. i.
(1797-1848.) Berlin. 1905.
Jacoby, J. J. Preussen im Jahre 1845. 2nd
edn. Belle-Vue, near Constance. 1845.
Rechtferdgung meiner Schrift; Preussen im
Jahre 1845. Bergen. 1846.
( ) Vier
Fragen, beantwortet von einem Ostpreussen. Mannheim. 1841.
Stimme treuer Unterthanen Sr. Maj. des Konigs von Preussen, veranlasst
durch die Flugschrift “ Vier Fragen,” etc. Marienwerder. 1841.
Schon, A. von. Woher und wohin ? 1841. New edn. Gumbinnen. 1869. Vincke,
Frhr. C. von. fiber die Bewegungen in den Jahren 1847 u. 8. Unge- druckte
Briefe, hrsgbn. von G. von Below. Deutsche Revue, xxvii. 3. July,
1902.
C. From 1848 to 1851.
1. Histories.
Berlin Conference of Princes.—Der Deutsche Fiirstenkongress zu Berlin im
Mai 1850. Aktenstiicke und Betrachtungen. With Appendix: Die Konferenz-
Protokolle. Berlin. 1850.
Combined Committee of Estates.—Verhandlungen des im J. 1848 zusammenberufenen
vereinigten standischen Ausschusses; zusammengestellt von £. Bleich. 4 vols. in
3. Berlin. 1848.
Constitution of 1850.—Die Verfassungsurkunde fur den Preuss. Staat von
1850. Nebst Erganzungs- und Ausfiihrungsgesetzen. Hrsgbn. von L. v. Ronne. 3rd
edn. Berlin. 1859. Von C. Schwartz. 2nd edn. Breslau. 1899. Von A. Arndt. 5th
edn. Berlin. 1904.
Berlin in der Bewegung von 1848. Die Gegenwart. Vol. n. Leipzig. 1849.
Bernstein, A. Die Marz-Tage. Geschichtliche Skizze. Berlin. 1873.
Busch, W. Die Berliner Marztage von 1848. Munich and Leipzig. 1899.
Droysen, J. G. Beitrage zur neuesten Geschichte. Brunswick.
1849. [Valuable as illustrating Prusso-German situation in spring of 1848.]
(Duncker, M.) Vier Monate auswartiger Politik. Berlin. 1857.
( , and Samwer,
K.) Vier Wochen auswartiger Politik. Berlin. 1857.
Fischer, F. Preussen am Abschlusse d. ersten Halfte d. 19. Jahrhunderts.
Riickblicke auf d. J. 1849. Berlin. 1876.
Frenzel, K. Die Berliner Marztage. Deutsche Rundschau, xciv.
Gneist, R. Berliner Zustande. Politische Skizzen a. d. Zeit vom 18. Marz
1848 bis 18. Marz 1849. Berlin. 1849.
Koser, R. Friedrich Wilhelm IV am Vorabend der Marzrevolution. Histor.
Zeitschr. lxxxiii.
1899.
Kunz, H. Die kriegerischen Ereignisse im Grossherzogtum Posen April u. Mai
1848. Berlin.
1899.
Lenz, Max. 1848. Preussische Jahrb. xoi.
Marzrevolution, die, in Preussen. Die Gegenwart. Vol. iv. Leipzig. 1850.
Nippold, F. Die aktive Teilname des Prinzen von Preussen in der Deutschen
Politik, 1850. Aus dem Bunsen’schen Familiararchiv. Deutsche Revue, xxrv.
Oncken, H. Zur Genesis der preuss. Revolution. Forschungen zur brandenburg.
u. preuss. Gesch.
xm, 147.
Oppenheim, H. B. B. F. L. Waldeck, der Ffihrer der Preussischen Demokratie.
New edn. Berlin. 1880.
Perthes, O. Beitrage zur Geschichte der Marztage 1848. Preussische
Jahrbucher.
LXIII.
Pichler, A. Das Sturmjahr. Erinnerungen a. d. Marz- und Oktobertagen 1848.
Berlin. 1903.
Preussen seit 1849 bis Ende 1850. Die Gegenwart. Vol. vir. Leipzig. 1852.
Preussen seit Ende 1850 bis Mai 1851. Die Gegenwart. Vol. ix. Leipzig. 1854.
Preussen zur Zeit seiner Nationalversammlung. Die Gegenwart. Vol. rv. Leipzig.
1850.
Rachfahl, F. Deutschland, Konig Friedrich Wilhelm IV und die Berliner Marzrevolution.
Halle. 1901.
Schleinitz.—Aus den Papieren der Familie von Schleinitz. Mit einer
Vorbemerkung von F. von Zobeltitz. Berlin. 1905.
[Contains details as to the flight of the Prince of Prussia.]
Stahr, A. Die Preussische Revolution. 2nd edn. 2 vols. Oldenburg. 1849.
Steinmann, F. Geschichte der Revolution in Preussen. Berlin. 1860.
[Contains interesting personal experiences.]
Stem, A. Zur Geschichte der Preussischen Verfassungsfrage. Syhel’s
Historische Zeitschrift. 1882. 6.
Sybel, H. von. Aus den Berliner Marztagen 1848. Vortrage u. Abhandlungen.
(Historische Bibliothek, m.) Munich. 1897.
Waldeck, B. F. L. Der Waldeck’sche Prozess. Authentischer Bericht etc. 2nd
edn. Berlin.
1849.
Wolff,
A. Berliner Revolutionschronik. 3 vols. Berlin. 1849-64.
2. Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters,
etc.
Arnim-Boitzenburg, A. H. Count von. Die deutsche Zentralgewalt und
Preussen. August, 1848. [Against the dissolution of Prussia
into a handful of provinces.]
Bergengrun, A. David Hansemann. Berlin. 1901.
Brandenburg, E. Konig Friedrich Wilhelm’s IV Briefwechsel mit Lndolf
Camphausen. Berlin. 1906.
Caspary, A. Ludolf Camphausen’s Leben. Stuttgart. 1902.
Hansemann, D. Das Preussische und Deutsche Verfassungswerk. Mit Riicksicht
auf mein politisches Wirken. Berlin. 1850.
Liiders, Th. Von Willisen und seine Zeit. Stuttgart. 1851.
Radowitz, J. von. Deutschland und Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Hamburg. 1848.
Ranke, L. von. Politische Denkschriften a. d. Jahren 1848-61. Leipzig.
1887. (Sammtliche Werke, xlix, l.) [Intended for the eye of Frederick William IV.]
Rothan,
G. Souvenirs diplomatiques: La mission de M. de Persigny a Berlin en
1850. Revue des Deux Mondes,
xcm.
Sybel, H. von. Graf Brandenburg in Warschau. Historische Zeitschrift. lviii.
Unruh, H. V. von. Erfahrungen a. d. letzten drei Jahren. Magdeburg. 1851.
Erinnerungen a. d. Leben von. Hrsgbn. von H.
v. Poschinger. Stuttgart.
1895.
Skizzen zu Preussen’s neuester Geschichte.
Magdeburg. 1849.
Willisen, General W. Frhr. von. Akten u. Bemerkungen iiber meine Sendung
nach dem Grossherzogthum Posen 1848. Berlin and Kiel. 1849-50.
D. From 1851 to 1862.
1. Histories.
Preussen’s auswartige Politik 1850-8. Unveroffentl. Dokumente a. d.
Nachlasse des Ministerprasidenten Otto Frhr. von Manteuffel. Hrsgbn. v. H. von
Poschinger. 3 vols. Berlin. 1902.
Preussen im Bundestag, 1851-9. Dokumente der K. Prenss. Bundestags-Gesandt-
schaft. Hrsgbn. von H. von Poschinger. 4 parts. Publ. a. d. Preuss. Staats-
archiven, xn, xiv, xv and xxiii. Leipzig. 1882-4.
Oncken, W. Das Zeitalter Kaiser Wilhelms I. Leipzig. 1905.
Preussen nach seinen statistischen Verhaltnissen seit d. Jahre 1849. Die
Gegenwart. VoL xu. Leipzig. 1856.
2. Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters,
etc.
Bismarck, Prince.—Briefe Bismarcks an Leopold von Gerlach. Hrsgbn. von H.
Kohl. Berlin. 1896.
— Briefwechsel
des Generals Leopold von Gerlach mit dem Bundestags-Gesandten Otto von
Bismarck. Berlin. 1893.
Meinecke, F. Gerlach und Bismarck. Histor. Zeitschr. lxxii.
Bunsen, Frhr. C. K. J. von. Die Zeichen der Zeit. Briefe etc. 2 vols.
Leipzig.
1855. [On
religious policy.]
Stahl, F. J. Wider Bunsen. Berlin. 1866.
Harkort, F. W. Burger- und Bauernbrief. 2nd edn. 2
parts in I vol. Brunswick and Elberfeld.
1851-2.
Manteuffel^ Frhr. O. von. Unter Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Denkwurdigkeiten des
Ministers Otto Frhrn. von Manteuffel (1848-58). Hrsgbn. v. H. von Posch’nger.
3 vols. Berlin.
1900-1.
Marcks, £. Kaiser Wilhelm I. Leipzig. 1897.
Stahl, F. J. Parlamentarische Reden. Hrsgbn. u. mit einleitenden
Bemerkungen versehen von J. P. M. Treuherz. Berlin. [1855.]
Siebzehn Parlamentarische Reden u. drei
Vortrage. Berlin. 1862.
IV. SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
A. Histories.
Verhandlungen der Danischen u. Holsteinischen Stande fiber die Erhfolge.
Schleswig. 1845.
Laiipnburgische Landesberichte. Hrsgbn. von H. Biernatzki. Altona. 1846 and
1847.
Bericht iiber die Verhandlungen der vereinigten Schleswig-Holsteinischen
Standes- versammlung. Kiel. 1848.
Protokolle der Konstituierenden Schleswig-Holsteinischen Landesversammlung.
Kiel. 1848. Schleswig. 1848-9. Kiel. 1849-50. (With Appendices.) Protokolle
der Verhandlungen der Schleswig-Holsteinischen Landesversammlung.
Kiel.
1850-1. (With Appendices of documents.)
Schleiden, R. Aktenstiicke zur neuesten Schleswig-Holsteinischen
Geschichte.
3 numbers.
Leipzig. 1851-2.
Schleswig-Holstein.—Aktenstiicke zur Deutsch-Danischen Frage. In Das
Staats- archiv, hrsgbn. von L. K. Aegidi u. A. Klauhold. Hamburg. 1863.
Urkundenbuch zur Gesch. der Holstein-Lauenburgischen Angelegenheit um Deutschen
Bunde in d. Jahren 1851-8. Frankfort. 1858.
Urkundenbuch zur Deutsch-Danischen Angelegenheit, 1857-61. Hamburg. 1862.
Votum des K. bayerischen Bundestagsgesandten Frhrn. von der Pfordten iiber d.
Erbfolge in Schleswig-Holstein. Brunswick.
1864. [Contains a useful bibliography of the Succession question.]
Gosch,
C. A. Denmark and Germany since 1815. London. 1862. [A full survey, in the
Danish interest.]
Lorentzen, A. Der Londoner Vertrag vom 8. Mai 1852. 2nd edn. Leipzig. 1864.
Moltke, Count H. von. Geschichte des Krieges gegen Danemark 1848-9. Kriegs-
geschichtliche Arbeiten. Part i.
Berlin. 1893.
Schleswig-Holstein bis zur Erhebung im J. 1848. Die Gegenwart. Vol. n.
Leipzig.
1849.
's Erhebung
im Fruhjahre 1848. Die Gegenwart. Vol. m. Leipzig. 1849.
seit seiner Erhebung im J. 1848. Part i: Vom
Gefechte bei Bau bis
zum Waffenstillstande von Malmoe. Part n: Vom Waffenstillstande von Malmoe
bis zur Ausfiihrung d. Waffenstillstande vom 10. Juli 1849. Die Gegenwart. Vol.
v. Leipzig. 1850.
Thudiehum, F. Verfassungs^eachichte Schleswig-IIolsteins 1806-52. Tubingen.
1871.
Treitschke, H. von. Das Gefecht von Eckernforde. Histor. u. polit. Aufsatze.
Vol.
iv. Leipzig. 1894.
Twiss,
Sir Travers. On the relations of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to the
Crown of Denmark and the Germanic Confederation, and on the treaty- engagements
of the Great European Powers in reference thereto. London. 1848.
B. Contemporary and other Memoirs, Letters, etc.
Beseler,
W. Zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Sache im August 1856. Brunswick.
1856. (And other pamphlets on S.-H. affairs,
1857-9.)
Bunsen, Frhr. C. K. J. von. Memoir on the
constitutional rights of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented to
Viscount Palmerston by Chevalier Bunsen on the 8th of April, 1848; with a P. S.
of the 15th of April. Publ., with M. de Gruner’s essay on the Danish Question
and all the official documents, by Otto von Wenkstein. London. 1848.
Droysen, J. G. and Samwer, K. Die Herzogthumer Schleswig-Holstein u. das
Konigreich Danemark. Aktenmassige Geschichte der danischen Politik seit d. J.
1806. Hamburg. 1850.
Fock, O. Schleswig-Holsteinische Erinnerungen, besonders a. d. Jahren
1848-51. Leipzig. 1863.
Friedrich, Prinz von Schleswig-Holstein-Noer. Aufzeichnungen a. d. Jahren
1848-50. Zurich. 1861.
Holmfeld, Baron C. Dorckinck. Essai historique sur la question de la
Succession du Royaume de Danemark, et analyse du droit quant aux Duches de
Schlesvig et de Holstein. Copenhagen.
1844.
Michelsen, A. T. L. Polemische Erorterung fiber die Schleswig-Holsteinische
Staats-Succession. Leipzig. 1844.
Zweite Polemische Erorterung etc. Leipzig.
1846.
Moller, F. Erinnerungsblatter an die Schleswig-Holsteinischen Feldzuge von
184&61. Altona. 1888.
Neue Kieler Blatter. Hrsgbn. von H. Carstens und K. Lorentzeo- Kiel.
1843-7.
Samvtr, K. Die Staatserbfolge der Herzogthiimer Schleswig-Holstein
und zuge- horigen Lande. Hamburg. 1844. •
Samver, K. F. L. Die Erhebung Schleswig-Holsteins 24. Marz 1848. Aufzeichnungen
aus dem Nachlass. Wiesbaden. 1898.
Schleiden, R. Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners. Vol. iii: Schleswig- Holstein’s erste Erhebung, 1848-9. Vol. iv: Schleswig-Holstein
im ersten Kriegsjahre 1849-64. Wiesbaden. 1891—4.
Schleswig.—OntheQuestion of Languages intheDuchy of Schleswig. A
memorandum translated from the German. London. 1861. [Exposes the Danish practices.]
(Wachsmuth, W.) Uber den Verkauf der Herzogl. Augustenburgischen Familien-
Guter, 1852. Kiel. 1864.
V. OTHER STATES
A. Anhalt.
Anhaltischen Herzogthumer, die. Part i. Anhalt-Bernburg. Die Gegenwart.
Vol. iv. Part ii. Anhalt-Dessau
und Anhalt-Kothen. Ib. Vol. v.
Leipzig.
1850.
B. Baden.
Rosin, H. Textausgabe der Badischen Verfassung u. ihrer
Nebengesetze. Freiburg
i.__________ B.
1887.
Baden vor den Ereignissen in 1848. Die Gegenwart. Vol. n. Leipzig. 1849.
Baden im Friihjahre 1848. Die Gegenwart. Vol. m. Leipzig. 1849.
Bekk, J. B. Die Bewegung in Baden. Mannheim. 1850. (Supplement, 1852.)
Fenner von Fenneberg, F. Zur Geschichte der Rheinpfalzischen Revolution u. des
Badischen Aufstandes. 2nd edn. Zurich 1850.
Hausser, L. Denkwiirdigkeiten zur Geschichte der Badischen Revolution.
Heidelberg. 1851.
Hecker, F. Die Erhebung des Volkes in Baden fur die Deutsche Republik. Basel.
1848.
Dahlinger,
C. W. The German Revolution 1849: being an account of the final struggle in
Baden. New York and London. 1903.
Freytag, G. Karl Mathy. Geschichte seines Lebens. 2nd edn. Leipzig. 1872.
Hausrath, A. Ein Prophet der Volkspartei (G, Herwegh). Preuss. Jahrb. June,
1887.
Mathy, Karl. Aus dem Nachlass. Briefe 1846-8. Hrsgbn. von L. Mathy.
Leipzig. 1898.
Muller, L. Die politische Sturm- u. Drangperiode Badens. 2 vols. Mannheim.
1905-7.
Pfalzisch-badische Krieg, der, v. J. 1849. Die Gegenwart. Vol. v. Leipzig.
1850. Revolution, die, in Baden, von dem Septemberaufstande 1848 bis zum Ende
der Catastrophe von 1849. Die Gegenwart. Vol. in. Leipzig. 1849.
Sigel, T. Denkwiirdigkeiten aus den Jahren 1848-9. Hrsgbn. von W. Bios.
Mannheim. 1902.
Treitschke, H. von. Karl Mathy. In Historische u. politische Aufsatze. 3rd
edn. Vol. i. Leipzig. 1903.
Voss, W. von. Der Feldzug in Baden, 1849. Berlin. 1903.
Weech, F. von. Geschichte der badischen Verfassung. Nach
amtlichen Quellen. Karlsruhe. 1868. [Covers the period 1818-68; but is chiefly
concerned with 1814-31.]
Badische Geschichte. Karlsruhe. 1890. [The
events of the last period
are
treated briefly, but clearly.]
C. Bavaria.
Pozl, J. Sammlung der bayerischen Verfassungs-Gesetze. Eingeleitet u.
hrsgbn.
v. T. P. Munich. 1852. [Covers the period 1818-52.]
Regierungs-Blatt fur das Kijnigreich Bayern. Munich. 1826-74.
Verfassungs-Urkunde des Kgrch. Bayern, nebst den auf die Verfassung bez. sonst.
Gesetzen. Hrsgbn. von R. Piloty. Munich. 1894.
Baiern n. sein Konig Ludwig I. Die Gegenwart. Vol. i. Leipzig. 1848.
Baiern unter den Ubergangsministerien von 1847-9. Part I: Vom Sturze Abels
bis zu K. Ludwigs Thronentsagung. Die Gegenwart. Vol. vn. Part II: Vom
Regierungsantritt K. Maximilians II bis zum Ministerium Pfordten. Ib. Vol. x.
Leipzig. 1852-5.
Bamberger, L. Erlebnisse a. d. Pfalzer Erhebung Mai u. Juni 1849. In Gesam-
melte Schriften. Vol. in.
Bayerns Beruf. i. [In favour of Bavaria cooperating with Prussia.] Munich.
1861. Fester, R. Ein Jahrhundert Bayrisch-Wittelsbachischer Geschichte,
1799-1899. Erlangen. 1899.
Fournier, A. Aus den Tagen der Lola Montez. Neue Deutsche Rundschau. 1901.
Lola Montez. Ein geheimer Bericht uber Bayern
1847. Deutsche Revue,
xxvii, 3.
Heigel, K. T. Ludwig I, Konig von Bayern. 2nd edn. Leipzig. 1888.
Kirche u. Staat in Bayern unter dem Minister Abel u. seinen Nachfolgern. Schaffhausen.
1849. [Account, from the Catholic point of view, of the anti- Ultramontane and
anti-Lola Montez agitations and of some of the pamphlets.] Lorenz, O. Konig Ludwig I von Bayern. In Drei Bucher
Geschichte und Politik.
2nd edn. Berlin. 1879.
Robell, L. von. Unter den vier ersten Konigen Bayerns. Nach Briefen und
eigenen Erinnerungen. Munich. 1894.
Solti, J. M. Max der Zweite, Konig von Bayern. Munich. 1865.
D. Brunswick.
Braunschweig, d. Herzog'S urn, in seiner neueren politischen und
wirthschaftlichen Entwickelung. Die Gegenwart. Vol. xn. Leipzig. 1856.
E. Free Towns.
Bremen, die freie Stadt, in ihrer politischen u. culturgeschichtlichen
Entwickelung.
Die Gegenwart. Vol. vm. Leipzig. 1853.
Duckwitz, A. Denkwiirdigkeiten aus meinem offentlichen Leben von 1841-66.
Ein Beitrag zur Bremischen u. Deutschen Geschichte. Bremen. 1877. Hamburg’s
Verfassungskampfe wahrend der letzten zehn Jahre. Die Gegenwart Vol. ix.
Leipzig. 1854.
Lammers, A. Biirgermeister Smidt. Preuss. Jahrb. xxxii. December 1873. Liibeck in seinen neuen und neuesten Zustanden. Die
Gegenwart. Vol. vm. Leipzig. 1853.
Oldenberg, F. J. H. Wichem. 2 vols. Hamburg. 1882-7.
Staat u. Stadt Frankfurt. Die Gegenwart. Vol. v. Leipzig. 1850.
[The rising of September, 1848.]
F. Hanover.
Frensdorff,
F. C. B. Stiive. In Preuss.
Jahrbiicher, xxx-xxxn.
Hannover, das Kijnigreich, in seinen offentlichen Zustanden. Die Gegenwart.
Vol. x. Leipzig. 1855.
Hassell, W. von. Geschichte des Konigreichs Hannover, 1813-66. 2 parts in
3 vols. Bremen.
1897-1901.
Meier, F. von. Hannoversche Verfassungs- und VerwaltungsgescNchte
1680-1866.
2 vols. Leipzig. 1898-9.
Oppermann, H. A. Zur Geschichte des Konigreichs Hannover von 1832-60.
2 vols. Leipzig. 1860-2.
Stiive, J. C. B. and Detmold, J. H. Briefwechsel, 1848-50. Hrsgbn. von G.
Stiive, mit Einl. von G. Kaufmann. (Quellen u. Darstellungen zur Gesch. Nieder-
sachsens, xm.) Hanover. 1903.
Stiive, G. Johann Carl Bertram Stiive, nach Briefen u. persdnlichen
Erinnerungen.
2
vols. Hanover. 1900.
Wilkinson,
C. A. Reminiscences of the Court and times of King Ernest of Hanover. 2 vols.
London. 1886. German tr. by H. Verauns. Brunswick.
.
1902.
G. Hesse.
1. Hesse-Cassel.
Kurhessisches Urkundenbuch. Eine Zusammenstellung d. wichtigsten u. inter-
essentesten Schriftstiicke in der Kurhessischen Verfassungsangelegenheit.
Frankfort. 1861.
Gerland, O. 1810-60. Zwei Menschenalter Kurhessischer Geschichte nach den
Erinnerungen d. Generalmajors Gerland. Cassel. 1892.
Grafe, H. Der Verfassungskampf in Kurhessen. Leipzig. 1861.
Sybel, H. von. Hans Daniel Hassenpflug. Vortrage u. Abhandlungen (Hist.
Bibl.). Munich. 1897.
2. Hesse-Darmstadt.
Mainzer Vorgange, die, in J. 1848. Die Gegenwart. Vol.
x. Leipzig. 1848.
H. The Mecklenburgs.
Hirschfeld, L. von. Friedrich Franz II, Grossherzog von
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, und seine Vorfahren. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1891.
Mecklenburg i. d. Jahren 1848-61. Die Gegenwart. Vol. vx. Leipzig. 1861.
Werner, A. Die politischen Bewegongen in Mecklenburg und der ausserordent- liche
Landtag im Friihjahr 1848. Berlin. 1907.
I. Saxony (Albertine).
Verfassungsgesetze des KonigT. Sachsen. Hrsgbn. von O. E. Walter. Leipzig.
1876. Von V. Fricker. Leipzig. 1896.
Beust, F. F. Graf von. See above, I, A, 2.
Blum,
H. Robert Blum. Leipzig. 1878.
Bucher, A. Aus Dresden’s Maitagen vor 60 Jahren. Dresden 1850.
Frey, A. Zur Erinnerung an einen Todten: R. Blum als Mensch,
Schriftsteller, und Politiker. Mannheim. 1849.
Freytag, G. See above, I, A, 2.
Friesen, R. Frhr. von. Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben. 2 vols. Dresden.
1880.
Beust, Count F. F. von. Erinnerungen zu Erinnerungen. Leipzig. 1881.
Rossler, C. Gustav Freytag. Preuss. Jahrb. September, 1886.
Sachsen, das Kgrch., von der Einfuhrung der constitutionellen
Regierungsform bis zum Riicktritt des Marzministeriums. Die Gegenwart. Vol. v.
Vom Riicktritt des Marzministeriums bis zum Schluss des Landtags von 1849-50.
Ib. Vol. vi. Leipzig. 1860-1.
Witzleben, C. D. von. Heinrich Anton von Zeschau. Leipzig. 1874.
J. Saxony (Ernestine).
Ernst II, Herzog von Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha und Freytag, G. Briefwechsel,
1863-93. Hrsgbn. von E. Tempeltey. Leipzig. 1904.
Aus meinem Leben und aus meiner Zeit. 3 vols. Berlin.
1887-9.
Edition
in one volume, ib. 1892. Engl. Tr. by P. Andreae. 4 vols. London.
1888-90.
Stichling,
G. T. E. Ch. Frhr. von Gersdorff,
Weimarischer Staatsminister. Weimar.
1863.
_
Thuringen. Die Gegenwart. Vol. x. Leipzig. 1855.
K. WuRTEMBERO.
Gaupp, R. Die Verfassunarpurkunde des Konigr. Wiirttemberg. 2nd edn. Stuttgart.
1887.
Marzministerium, das, in Wiirtemberg. Die Gegenwart. Vol. vi. Leipzig.
1851. Pflugk-Hartung, J. von. Das Wiirttembergische Ministerium Linden. Histor.
Taschenbuch. Leipzig. 1888. [The Reaction, from
I860.]
Wiirtemberg, das Konigreich, bis zum Marz 1848. Die Gegenwart. Vol. iv. Leipzig.
1850.
L. Other States.
Riehl, W. H. Nassauische Chronik d. Jahres 1848. Wiesbaden. 1849.
[Revolution in Nassau.]
Nassau’s politische und sociale Zustande. Die Gegenwart. Vol. v. Leipzig.
1850.
[The Revolution of March, 1848.]
Oldenburg, das Grossherzogthum, in seinen offentlichen Zustanden. Die Gegenwart.
Vol. ix. Leipzig. 1854.
Pleitner, E. Oldenburg im 19. Jahrhundert. 2 vols. Oldenburg. 1900-1.
(2) GERMAN LITERATURE. (1840-70.)
L Bibliography.
Bartels, A. Handbuch zur Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur. Leipzig.
1906. Goedeke, K. Grundriss zur Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung. 2nd
edu. Ed. by
E. Goetze. VoL vm. Dresden. 1905. (Especially
Vol. ix, in coarse of publication.)
Meyer, R. M. Grundriss der neuern deutschen Litteraturgeschichte. Berlin.
1902, 21908.
Nollen,
J. S. A chronology and practical bibliography of Modem German literature. Chicago. 1903.
Jahresberichte fur neuere deutsche Litteraturgeschichte. (Since 1890.) Vol.
i.
Stuttgart. 1892. Vol. xvi (Year 1905). Berlin.
1908.
For
many important German periodicals containing valuable bibliographies and
critical notices see K. Breul, A handy bibliographical guide to the study of
the German language and literature. London. 1895. (Chapter I.)
II. Histories.
Baechtold, J. Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur in der Schweiz.
Frauenfeld.
logo
Bartels, A. Die deutsche Dichtung der Gegenwart. Die
Alton und die Jungen. Leipzig. 1897. 6th edn. 1904. .
Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur. 2 vols.
Leipzig. 1905.
Biese, A. Deutsche Literaturgeschichte. 2 vols. Munich. 1907-8.
Engel, E. Geschichte der deutschen Literatur. 2
vols. Leipzig. 1906.
Fran
eke, K. A history of German literature as determined by social forces. 6th edn. New York. 1903.
Krauss, R. Schwabische Litteraturgeschichte. 2 vols. Freiburg i. B. 1897-9.
Meyer, R. Die deutsche Litteratur des 19. Jahrhunderts. 3rd edn. Berlin.
1906.
Nagl, J. W, and Zeidler, J. Deutsch-osterreichische Litteraturgeschichte. Vol.
i. Vienna. 1899. (Vol. ii not yet
completed.)
Robertson,
J. G. A history of German literature. Edinburgh. 1902.
Schmidt, J. Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur von Leihnitz bis auf unsere
Zeit. 6 vols. New edn. Berlin. 1896.
Stem, A. Die deutsche Nationallitteratur vom Tode Goethes bis zur
Gegenwart. 5th edn. Marburg. 1905. [Excellent as a first introduction.]
Vogt, F. and Koch, M. Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur. 2nd edn. Leipzig
and Vienna. 1904. (The modern portion is by M. Koch.)
See also articles in F. Bornmiiller’s Biographisches Schriftsteller-Lexikon
der Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1882; F. Brummer, Lexikon der deutschen Dichter und
Prosaisten des xix Jahrhunderts, 5th edn., 2 vols., Leipzig, s.a. (revised to
January 1901); and especially the articles in the Allgemeine Deutsche
Biographic, ed. by R. von Liliencron and F. X. von Wegele, Leipzig, 1875 sqq.
III. Collected
Essays on the Period.
Bemays, M. Schriften zur Kritik und Litteraturgeschichte. 4 vols.
Stuttgart, Leipzig and Berlin. 1895-9.
Franzos, K. E. Die Geschichte des Erstlingswerks. Berlin. [1894.]
Freytag, G. Aufsatze zur Geschichte, Literatur und Kunst. Leipzig. 1888.
Sauer, A. Gesammelte Reden und Aufsatze zur Geschichte der Literatur in
Oster- reich und Deutschland. Vienna and Leipzig. 1903.
Scherer, W. Kleine Schriften zur neueren Litteratur, Kunst and Zeitgeschichte.
Ed. by E. Schmidt. Berlin. 1893.
Schmidt, E. Charakteristiken. Berlin, i. 1886, 31905. n. 1901.
Stem, A. Zur Literatur der Gegenwart. Bilder und Studien. Leipzig. 1880.
Studien zur Litteratur der Gegenwart. 2nd edn.
Dresden and Leipzig.
1898. Neue Folge.
Ib. 1904.
IV. Portraits and Handwritings.
Konnecke, G. Bilderatlas zur Geschichte der deutschen National-litteratur.
Eine Erganzung zu jeder deutschen Litteraturgeschichte. Nach den Quellen bear-
beitet. 2nd edn. Marburg. 1895.
Good
portraits are also contained in the works of Vogt and Koch, and of Engel, and
in the two series of Stern’s Studien.
V. Collected Works op Particular Authors.
Alexis, W. Gesammelte Werke. 20 vols. Berlin. 1874 ff. In this edn.:
Vaterlandische Romane. 8 vols. Berlin. 1884.
Auerbach, B. Samtliche Schwarzwalder Dorfgeschichten. 10 vols. Stuttgart.
1871.
Samtliche Romane. 12 vols. Stuttgart. 1871-2.
Schriften. 18 vols. Stuttgart. 1883-95.
Borne, L. Gesammelte Schriften. 12 vols. 2nd edn. Hamburg. 1868.
Droste, Annette v. Gesammelte Schriften. 3 vols. Stuttgart. 2nd edn. 1898.
FreiligTath, F. Gesammelte Dichtungen. 6 vols. 6th edn. Stuttgart. 1898.
Freytag, G. Gesammelte Werke. 22 vols. Leipzig. 1886-8.
Geibel, E. Gesammelte Werke. 8 vols. Stuttgart. 1883.
Greif, M. Gesammelte Werke. 3 vols. Leipzig. 1895-6.
Grillparzer, F. Sammtliche Werke. 5th edn. 20 vols. Stuttgart. 1892-4.
Groth, K. Gesammelte Werke. 4 vols. Kiel and Leipzig. 1893.
Gutzkow, K. Gesammelte Werke. 12 vols. Jena. 1873-8.
Dramatische Werke. 20 vols. Jena. 1871-2.
Hebhel, F. Samtliche Werke. Historisch-kritische Gesamt-Ausgabe, ed. by R.
M. Werner, i. Works. 12 vols. ii. Diaries., 4 vols. in. Letters, 6 vols. Berlin. 1901 sqq.
[The chief works are published in several cheap editions.]
Heine, H. Sammtliche Werke. Ed. by E. Elster. 7 vols. Leipzig. 1887-90.
Heyse, P. Gesammelte Werke. 29 vols. Berlin. 1897-9.
Jordan,
W. (No edn. of collected works. See Bartels, Handbuch (1906), p. 573.) Keller, G. Gesammelte Werke. 10 vols. Berlin. 1889-90.
Nachgelassene Schriften und Dichtungen. Berlin.
1893.
Kinkel,
G. (No edn. of collected works. See
Bartels, Handbuch (1906), p. 578.) Laube, H. Sammtliche Schriften. 16 vols.
Weimar. 1875-82.
Lenau, N. Sammtliche Werke. Ed. A. Grun. 4 vols. Stuttgart. 1855. Lewald,
Fanny. Gesammelte Werke. 12 vols. Berlin. 1871-4.
Ludwig, O. Gesammelte Schriften. Edd. A. Stern and E. Schmidt. 6
vols.
Leipzig.
1891. (Since 1896 several cheap editions.)
Morike, E. Gesammelte Schriften. 4 vols. Stuttgart.
1878-89.
Raabe,
W. (No edn. of collected works. See
Bartels, Handbuch (1906), pp. 603-4.) Reuter, Fr. Werke. Critical
edn. by W. Seelmann. 7 vols. Leipzig and Vienna, s.a. [1905-6].
Riehl, W. H. von. Gesammelte Geschichten und Novellen. Stuttgart. 1898 ff.
Scheffel, J. V. von. Gesammelte Werke. Ed. with an introd. by Joh. Proelss.
6 vols. Stuttgart. 1907.
Spielhagen, Fr. Samtliche Romane. 22 vols. Leipzig. 1895. Neue Folge. 6
vols. Leipzig. 1902.
Storm, Th. Sammtliche Werke. 8 vols. Brunswick. 1898.
VI. Criticism.
Biese, A. Lyrische Dichtung und neuere deutsche Lyriker. Berlin. 1896.
Bulthaupt, H. Dramaturgie des Schauspiels. Vol. iii
: Grillparzer; Hebbel;
Ludwig; Gutakow; Laube. 3rd edn. Oldenburg and Leipzig. 1891. Friedmann, S.
Das deutsche Drama des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in seinen Hauptvertretern. 2
vols. Leipzig. 1902.
Gaster, B. Die deutsche Lyrik in den letzten fiinfzig Jahren.
Wolfenbiittel.
1905.
Hoffmann von Fallersleben. Unsere volkstiimlichen Lieder. 4th
edn., by K. H.
Prahl.
Leipzig. 1900.
Mielke, H. Der deutsche Roman des xix Jahrhunderts. 3rd edn. Berlin. 1898.
Witkowski, G. Das deutsche Drama des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in seiner
Entwickelung dargestellt. Leipzig. 1904.
Grillparzer, F.—Ehrhard, A. and Necker, M. F. G. Sein Leben und seine Werke.
Munich. 1902.
Mahrenholtz, R. F. G. Sein Leben und Schaffen.
Leipzig. 1890.
Poliak, G. F. G. and the Austrian Drama. New York. 1908.
urrillparzp.r, F.—Sittenberger, H. F G. Sein Leben und Wirken. Berlin. 1904
Hebbel, F. Bartels, A F. H. Leipzig. 1899.
Kuh, E. Biographic Friedrich Hebbels. Vienna.
1877.
Keller, G. Baechtold, J. G. K.s Leben. Seine Briefe und Tagebiicher.
Berlin. 1892-6. Supplement: Kellei'-Bibliogvaphie. Berlin. 1897. Edition
without diaries etc. Berlin. 1898.
Koster, A. G. K. Seven Lectures. 2nd edn.
Leipzig. 1907.
Ludwig, O. A. Stern. O. L. Ein Dichterleben. 2nd edn. Leipzig.
1906.
L
HUNGARIAN SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES.
(All
these works are in Hungarian, except where otherwise noted.)
A. Bibliooraphical
Works.
Ancient
Hungarian Library. Vol. i. Ed. by C. Szabo. (Printed Hungarian works,
1531-1711.) Vol. ii. Ed.
by C. Szabo. (Works published in Hungary, but not in the Hungarian language,
between 1473 and 1711.) Vol. m. Ed. by C. Szabo and B. Hellebrant. (Works of
Hungarian writers published outside Hungary, between 1480 and 1711.)
Egyetemes
Philologiai Kozlony (Journal of Philology). Budapest. [Publishes annually a
systematic list of all works that have appeared in the preceding year.]
Petrik,
G. Bibliography of Hungarian Literature between 1712 and 1875.
Bibliography of Hungarian Literature,
1885-1900.
Riszlingstein,
A. Bibliography of Hungarian Literature, 1876-85.
B. Collected
Works op Authors.
Szinnyel,
J., sen. Lives and Works of Hungarian writers. Budapest. [The Hungarian
equivalent of the Diet, of National Biography.] (In progress.) Toldy, F. Mauual
of Hungarian Poetry. 2nd edn. 5 vols. Budapest. 1876. German edition. Budapest
and Vienna. 1878.
C. Works op General Criticism and Literary History.
Bayer,
J. A History of Hungarian Theatres. Budapest. 1887.
History of the Hungarian Drama. Budapest.
1897.
Beothy-Badics.
A History of Hungarian Literature. Budapest. 1907. 3rd edn. 2 vols. [Iuitiated
by Zsolt Beothy as Editor-in-chief; with F. Badics as responsible editor. The
contributors include the leading authorities on Hungarian literature and
history.]
Beothy,
Z. Historical Sketch of the National Literature of the Hungarians. 2 vols.
Budapest. 1903. 8th edn.
Prose Fiction in older Hungarian Literature. 2
vols. Budapest. 1886.
Aesthetic Sketch of Hungarian Literature.
Budapest. 1896.
Riedl,
F. The main tendencies of Hungarian Literature. Budapest. 1896.
Toldy,
F. History of Hungarian National Literature. Budapest. 1878. 4th edn.
German
translation, hy M. Kolbenheyer. Budapest. 1865.
History of Hungarian Poetry. Budapest. 1867.
2nd edn. German translation, by G. Steinacker. Budapest. 1863.
D. Monographs.
Arany,
John. By F. Riedl. 3rd edn. Budapest. 1904.
3erzsenyi,
Daniel. Biography of, hy J. Vaczy. Budapest. 1895.
Csokonai.
Life of, hy Z. Ferenczi. Budapest. 1907.
Eotvos,
Baron Joseph. By Z. Ferenczi. Budapest. 1903.
Fay,
Andrew. Biography of, hy F. Badics. Budapest. 1890.
Katona
and his “Bank Ban.” By P. Gyulai. 2nd edn. Budapest. 1907. Kisfaludy, Charles,
and his Works. By J. Banoczi. 2 vols. Budapest. 1882-3. Madach, Imre. Life and
Poetry of, by M. Palagyi. Budapest. 1900.
PetSfi,
Alexander. Biography of, by Z. Ferenczi. 3 vols. Budapest. 1896. Revai,
Nicholas. Life of, by B. Csaplar. 4 vols. Budapest. 1881.
V8r6smarty.
Biography of, by P. Gyulai. 5th edn. Budapest. 1900.
H. FOREIGN AUTHORITIES AND WORKS.
A. English.
Miscellaneous.
Riedl,
F. A History of Hungarian Literature. London. 1906.
Yolland,
A. B. Petofi (1823-4). A Literary Study. Budapest. 1906. In Hnngarian: An
English Study of Petffi. Budapest. 1904.
Translations.
Butler,
E. D. Hungarian Poems and Fables. London. 1877.
John Arany; the Legend of the Wondrous Hunt,
with a few miscellaneous
pieces
of folk-songs. London. 1881.
Loew,
W. N. Gems from Petofi and other Hungarian Poets. New York. 1881. Magyar
Poetry. New York. 1899.
Pulszky,
Francis and Terez. Tales and Traductions of Hungary. 3 vols. London.
1851.
Translations
have appeared in English of most of the famous novels of Maurice Jokai, of
several by Mikszath (including St Peter’s Umbrella), and of Baron Josika’s
’Neath the Hoof of the Tartar. A smaller number of works have been translated
into French ; while many of the works of the above authors, as well as of
E6tvSs, Petofi etc., have been rendered in German.
B. German and French.
Fischer, A. PetSfi’s Leben und Werke. Leipzig.
1889.
Kont T. La Hongrie litte'raire et scientifique. Paris. 1896.
' Histoire de la
litterature hongroise. Budapest and Paris. 1900. German
edition:
Leipzig. 1906.
^tude sur l’influence de la literature
fra^aise en Hongrie. Pans. 1902.
Nemenyi. Das moderne Ungarn. Berlin. 1883.
Polignac, M. de. Notes sur la literature hongroifie. Paris. 1900. _
Riedl F. Die ungarische Litteratur. Kultur der Gegenwart. Part i. Section
9. Schwicker, J. H. Geschichte der ungarischen Litteratur. Leipzig. 1889.
Ujfalvy, C. La Hongrie, son histoire, sa langue et sa litterature. Paris. 1872.
Ungarische Revue. Budapest and Leipzig. 1881-95.
CHAPTERS IV, XIV, and XIX, 1 and 2.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
No
comprehensive bibliography of recent Italian history exists. For the epoch of
the Risorgimento, we have nothing beyond a Library Catalogue. The partial
bibliographies contained in sundry histories of the period, only indicate the
documents, etc., from which the information in the text was derived. Bolton
King’s History of Italian Unity has a good specimen of a systematic
bibliography of this kind.
Much
general assistance is supplied by:
1. Occasional bibliographies on special
subjects in the Rivista Storica Italians edited by Costanzo Rinaudo from 1884
onwards.
2. Annuario Bibliografico della Storia d’
Italia, published for the quarterly Studi Storici edited by Amedeo Crivellucci.
Pisa, 1902-3.
3. A general bibliography of the history of
the Risorgimento, now in preparation by Mr H. Nelson Gay, whose library at Rome
is the richest known in the literature of this subject.
The
catalogues of Museums of the Italian Revival will be found very useful for
consultation, not to speak of smaller collections elsewhere; amid much that is
worthless there are many interesting relics, rare publications, and important
documents. These museums exist, or are in course of formation, in Turin,
Milan, Venice, Vicenza, Bologna, Ferrara, Forli, Modena, Reggio, Florence,
Perugia, Macerata, Palermo, etc. The Royal Palace at Turin also possesses a
museum, a library, and an archive room devoted specially to the Risorgimento.
Among the most important and most scientifically arranged of these Catalogues
are:
The
Illustrated Catalogue of books, documents, and objects exhibited by the
Provinces of Emilia and Romagna in the Temple of the Italian Revival (Provincial
Exhibition of Bologna, 1888); by R. Belluzzi and V. Fiorini.
Books
and documents, as catalogued for V. Fiorini. 2 vols. 1890-7.
The
Catalogue of works bearing on the History of the Italian Revival, compiled by
Ernesto Masi. Rome. (Forzani and Co.) 1907. Printed for private circulation
only.
A
Catalogue—intended rather for general culture—is now being compiled for the
Andrea Ponti Historical Library, branches of which have been established in
Ravenna and other Italian towns by the Countess Maria Pasolini, nee Ponti.
II. GENERAL HISTORIES.
Bolton
King. A History of Italian Unity; 1814 to 1871. 2 vols. London. 1899. Cantu, C.
Dell’ indipendenza Italiana Cronistoria. 3 vols. Turin. 1872-7. Coppi, A.
Annali d’ Italia dal 1750. Vols. vm-xi. Florence. 1859-62.
Farini,
L. C. Storia d’ Italia del 1814 sino ai nostri giorni. 2 vols. Turin. 1854-9. Ghiron,
I. Annali d’ Italia. 3 vols. Milan. 1888-90.
Grovi, A. Storia della Rivoluzione Italiana durante il periodo delle
riforme.
Florence.
1893. 11 Risorgimento ltaliano. Milan. 1904.
Gualterio,
F. A. Gli ultimi Rivolgimenti Italiani. Memorie storiche con document inediti.
4 vols. Florence. 1850.
Ranalli,
F. Le Istorie Italiane del 1846 al 1853. 4 vols. Florence. 1855. Thayer, W. R.
The Dawn of Italian Independence. Italy from the Congress of Vienna 1814 to the
fall of Venice 1849. 2 vols. Boston and New York. 1894. Tivaroni, C. Storia
critica del Risorgimento ltaliano. 9 vols. Turin. 1888-97.
III. ITALY, 1846-9.
A. Contemporary Authorities.
Bianchi,
N. Storia documentata della Diplomazia Europea in Italia dall’ anno
1814 all’ anno 1861. 8 vols. Turin. 1865-72.
Carte
segrete e Atti Ufficiali della Polizia Austriaca in Italia dal 4 Giugno 1814 al
22 Marzo 1848. 3 vols. Capolago. 1851-2.
Correspondence
respecting the affairs of Italy, 1846-9, presented to both Houses of Parliament
by command of Her Majesty. 4 parts. London. 1849. Correspondence respecting the
affairs of Naples and Sicily, 1848-9.
Documenti riguardanti il Govemo degli Austro-Estensi in Modena (1814-59)
pubbli- cati per ordine del Dittatore delle Provincie Modenesi. 2 vols. Modena.
1860. Gennarelli, Achille. I lutti dello Stato Romano e 1’ awenire della Corte
di Roma.
Contains
documents of 1806 to 1859. Florence. 1860.
Govemo
Pontificio, il, e lo Stato Romano. Documenti preceduti da una esposizione
storica e raccolti per decreto del Governo delle Romagne dal Cav. Achille
Gennarelli. 2 vols. Prato. 1860.
B. Secondary Works.
1. Histories.
Beauregard,
Costa de. Prologue d’une Regne—La jeunesse du Roi
Charles-Albert. Paris. 1885.
Epilogue d’un regne—Milan, Novare, et
Oporto—Les Demieres Annees du
Roi Charles-Albert. Paris. 1890.
Bianchi, N. Storia della Monarchia Piemontese 1773-1861. 3 vols. Turin.
1877-85.
Bourgeois, E. and Clermont, E. Rome et Napoleon III—Etude sur les
Origines et la Chute du Second Empire, 1849-70. Preface by G. Monod. Paris.
1907. Cesare, Raffaelle de. Una famiglia di patriotti—Ricordi di due
Rivoluzioni in Calabria. Rome. 1889.
Farini, L. C. Lo Stato Romano (1815-50). 4 vols.
Translated under the direction of W. E. Gladstone. Turin. 1850-3. _
Giovagnoli,
R. Ciceruacchio e Don Pirlone. Ricordi Storici della Rivoluzione Romana dal
1846 al 1849. Rome. 1894.
——
Pellegrino Rossi e la Rivoluzione Romana. Rome.
1898
La Farina, G. Istoria Documentata della Rivoluzione Sicilians. 2 vols.
Capolago.
1851.
Luzio, A. Le Cinque Giornate di Milano nelle Narrazioni di fonte
austriaea (in Biblioteca Storica dal Risorgimento Italiano). Rome.
1899.
Masi,
E. II segreto del Re Carlo Alberto. Bologna. 1891.
Massari,
G. I Casi di Napoli dal 20 Gennaio 1848 in poi. 2nd edition. Trani. 1893.
Nelson-Gay, H. Relazioni fra gli Stati Uniti e 1’ Italia 1847-71. Turin. 1907.
Nisco, N. Ferdinando II e il suo regno. Naples.
1893.
Ottolini, V. La Rivoluzione Lombarda del 1848-9. Milan. 1887.
Oudinot, Marechal. Gaston Steigler. Paris. 1872.
Pinelli, Ferdinando. Storia Militare del Piemonte. 3 vols. Turin. 1855.
Saffi, A. Storia di Roma. In Vols. n and hi of Ricordi e
Scritti. Florence. 1892-9. Spada, G. Storia della
rivoluzione di Roma e della Ristaurazione del Governo Poutiiicio dal 1 Giugno
1846 al 5 Luglio 1849. 4 vols. Florence. 1862-9. Torre, F. Memorie Storiche
sull’ intervento Francese in Roma. 3 vols. Turin.
1851.
Trevelyan,
G. M. Garibaldi’s Defence of the Roman Republic. London. 1907. Zobi, A. Storia Civile della Toscana. Vols.
iv and v. Florence. 1850.
2. Memoirs, Letters and Biographies, partly
contemporary.
Alfieri, Cesare. D. Berti. Rome. 1877.
Amari, Carteggio di Michele. A. d’ Ancona. 2
vols. Turin. 1896.
Azeglio,
Count Massimo di. I miei Ricordi. 2 vols. Florence. 1867.
Lettere a sua moglie, Luisa Blondel. Ed. G.
Carcano. Milan. 1870.
Correspondance politique avec Rendu. Paris.
1866.
Capponi, Gino. Lettere di G. C. e di altri a lui. 6 vols. Ed. A.
Carraresi. Florence. 1882-90. •
Correnti, Cesare. Nella vita e nelle opere. T. Massarani. Rome. 1890
Dabormida, Giuseppe, General. L. Chiala, La vita e i tempi del Generate G. D.
—Regno
di Carlo Alberto, 1848-9. Turin. 1896.
Fattiboni,
Z. Memorie Storico-Biograficlie al padre suo dedicate. 3 vols. Cesena. 1885-6.
Filangieri,
Carlo. Fieschi Ravaschieri Filangieri, II Generate Carlo Filangieri, Principe
di Satriano e Duca di Taormina. Milan. 1902.
Garibaldi,
Giuseppe. Memorie Autobiografiche. Florence. 1880. English Translation. 3
vols. With Supplement by J. W. Mario. London. 1889. Giacomelli, A. Reminiscenze
della mia Vita politica 1848-53. Florence. 1893. Gioberti, Vincenzo. D. Bati,
Di Vincenzo Gioberti riformatore, politico e ministro. Florence. 1881.
Opere, Ricordi biografici e carteggio. 3 vols.
Turin. 1863.
Giusti,
Giuseppe. F. Martini, Memorie inedite di G. G., 1845-9. Milan. 1890.
Gregorovius, Ferdinand. Diary of. Ed. F. Althaus, translated. London. 1907.
Hiibner, Count A. Une annee de ma vie. Paris.
1891.
Leopold II, Gran Duca di Toscana, e i suoi tempi. G. Baldasseroni.
Florence. 1871.
Maffei, Countess. R. Barbiera, II Salotto della Contessa Maffei e la
Societa Milanese, 1834-86. Milan. 1895.
Manin, Daniel. Documents et pieces authentiques laisses par. Planat de
la Faye.
2 vols. Paris. 1860.
Margarita, Solaro della. Memorandum
Storico,-Politico. Turin. 1861.
Mazzini,
Giuseppe. Life. By Bolton King. London. 1902.
Scritti editi ed inediti. Imola. 1906 sqq.
Mazzini,
Giuseppe. Life and Writings of G. M. 6 vols. London. 1864-70.
Essays. Translated hy T. Okey. London. 1894.
Minghetti,
M. Miei Ricordi. 3 vols. Rome. 1888-90.
Montanelli,
G. Memorie sull’ Italia e specialmente sulla Toscana dal 1814 al
1850. 2nd edition. 2 vols. Rome. 1853.
Panizzi,
Antonio. Lettere ad Antonio Panizzi di uomini illustri e di amici Italiani,
1823-70. Ed. L. Fagan. Florence. 1870. t’asini, Valentino. Bonghi, R. La vita e
i tempi di V. P. Florence. 1867.
Pasolini, G. Memorie raccolte di suo figlio, Conte Pier Desiderio Pasolini.
Imola. 1881.
Radetzky, Field-Marshal. Briefe des Feldmarshalls Radetzy (1847-57). Ed.
B. Duhr. Vienna. 1892.
Vita. Lazio, A. Bergamo. 1901.
Rosmini, A. Serbati. Commentario della Missione a Roma 1848-9. Turin.
1881. Settemhrini, Luigi. Ricordanze della mia vita. Preface by F. De Sanctis.
2 vols. Naples. 1898.
Taharrini, M. Vita e ricordi di Italiani Illustri del secolo xix.
Florence. 1884. Visconti-Venosta, G. Ricordi di Gioventu. Cose vedute o sapute.
Milan. 1904.
IV. ITALY, 1849-70.
A. Documents, Official ok Semi-Official.
Atti del Parlamento Subalpino. Turin. 1849-61.
Atti del Parlamento Italiano. Turin. 1861-70.
Bollati di St Pierre, F. E. Fasti Legislativi e Parlamentari. 2
vols. Milan. 1863-5.
B. Histories.
1. Work* principally on military and naval
affairs or the political events immediately connected with them.
Abba, G. C. Da Quarto al Voltumo. Bologna. 1898.
Adamoli, G. Da S. Martino a Mentana. Milan. 1892.
Cadoma, R. La liberazione di Roma nell’ anno 1870. Turin. 1898.
Chiala, L. L’ alleanza di Crimea. Rome.
1879.
Ancora un po’ piu di luce sugli eventi
politici e militari dell’ anno 1866.
Florence. 1892.
Garibaldi, Giuseppe. Guerzoni. Florence. 1889-91.
Guerrini come ci awiammo a Lissa. Turin. (In
course of publication.)
La Marmora, A. Un po’ piu di luce sugli eventi politici e militari dell’
anno 1866.
Florence. 1873.
Maurigi, R. Aspromonte. Turin. 1862.
Persano, C. Diario private politico militare nella campagne navale degli
anni 1860-1. Turin. 1880.
Pesci,
U. Come siamo entrati in Roma. Preface by Carducci. Milan. 1896. Pollio, A.
Custoza, 1866. Turin. 1902.
2. Works on particular political events and
personages.
Azeglio,
Count Massimo di. Bianchi, La Politica del C. M. d’A. [1848-59]. Turin. 1884.
Bolle, C. Geschichte des zweiten Kaiserreiches und des Konigreichea
Italien. Allg. Gesch. in Einzeld. Berlin. 1878. Italian
translation by A. Savelli. Milan. (In course of publication.)
Cesare,
Raffaelle de. Roma e lo Stato del Pape dal ritorno di Pio IX. 2 vols. Rome.
1907.
La Fine d’ un Regno. 2 vols. Citta di
Castello. 1900.
Corsi,
C. Venticinque Anni in Italia. (1844-69.) 2 vols. Turin. 1896.
Dina,
Giacomo. G. D. e 1’ opera sua nella vicende del Risorgimento. 3
vols. Turin. 1896-9.
Gioberti,
Vincenzo. Del Rinnovamento Civile d’ Italia. 2 vols. Turin. 1851. Guardione, F.
II dominio del’ Borboni in Sicilia dal 1830-61. 2 ,vola. Palermo. 1901.
Luzio, A. II Martiri di Belfiore e il loro processo. 2
vols. Milan. 1903.
Masi,
E. Nell’ Ottocento. Milan. 1905.
Mazzini,
Giuseppe. Life, by Bolton King. London. 1902.
Muller.
Politica Segreta Italiana. Turin. 1891.
Pantaleoni,
D. L’ idea italiana nella soppressione del potere temporale dei Papi. Turin.
1884.
Passaglia,
C. Petizione di nove mila sacerdoti Italian! a S. S. Pio IX. Turin. 1862.
Rubieri, E. Storia intima della Toscana. (1869-60.) Prato. 1861.
Turiello,
P. Governo e Governati. Bologna. 1890.
Victor
Emanuele II. King of Italy. Cappelletti, Storia di V. E. II e del sno regno. 3
vols. Rome. 1893.
Massari, La vita e il regno di V. E. II, primo re d’ Italia. 2 vols.
Milan.
C. Memoirs, Letters, Biographies, chiefly
contemporary.
Azeglio, Countess Constance di. Souvenirs de. Rome. 1884.
Count Massimo di. Lettere di, al Marchese
Emanuele d’ Azeglio. Edited by
Biancbi.
Turin. 1883-4.
Bertani,
Agostino, e i suoi tempi. By J. W. Mario. 2 vols. Florence. 1888. Bixio, Nino G. Guerzoni, Vita. Florence. 1876.
Castelli, Michel Angelo. Ricordi. (1847-78.) Turin. 1888.
Carteggio Politico. 2 vols. Turin. 1890-1.
Cavour, Count Camillo di. Artoni and Blanc, II conte de C. in
Parlamento. Florence. 1868.
II Conte di Cavour. Castelli, Ricordi. Turin.
1886.
Lettere edite ed inedite di; Chiala. 6 vols.
Turin. 1863-71.
Die Erhebung Italiens im xix Jabrhundert. J. F. X. Kraus. Mainz. 1902.
Le comte de C. De La Reire. Paris. 1863.
Cavour. H. von Treitschke, Histor. u. polit. Aufsatze.
6th edn. Vol. u.
Leipzig.
1886. Italian translation. Florence. 1873.
Life. E. Cadogan. London. 1907.
See also, as to his youth: Villari; Studies,
Critical and Historical, pp. 119-41.
London. 1907.
Corsini, Laiatico. Storia di quattro ore. Lettera. Florence. 1889.
Garibaldi, Giuseppe. Autobiografia. 2 vols.
Florence. 1888. [English translation.
3 vols. London. 1889.]
Govone,
il Generale Giuseppe. Ricordi. Edited by U. Govone. Turin. 1902.
French
edition, enlarged. Paris. 1906.
Guiccioli, Alessandra. Quintino Sella. 2 vols. Rovigo. 1888.
Lanza, Giovanni. Tavallini, La vita e i tempi di G. L. 2 vols. Turin.
1882. Minghetti, Settembre. La Converzione di. Bologna. 1899.
Nigra, C. Ricordi Diplomatici. In Nuova Antologia. March. 1896.
Ricasoli, Baron Bettino. Tabarrini and Gotti, Lettere e documenti del B.
R. 10 vols. Florence. 1878.
V. ITALIAN LITERATURE.
A. General.
Ancona,
A. di and Bacci, O. Manuale della letteratura italiana. Vol. v. Florence.
1906.
Bulle, O. Die italienische Einheitsidee in ihrer literarischen Entwickelung
von Parini bis Manzoni. Berlin. 1893.
Manzoni, G. L’ ottocento. Milan. 1901.
Sanctis, F. de. La letteratura italiana nel xix secolo. Ed. B. Croce.
Naples. 1897- Vita Italiana, la, nel Risorgimento (1846-61), Conferenze
fiorentine. Florence. 1900-1.
Zanella, G. Storia della letteratura italiana dalla meta del 700 ai
nostri giomi. Milan. 1880.
Della letteratura italiana nell’ ultimo
secolo. Citta di Castello. 1885.
B. Special.
Aleardi,
Aleardo. La vita e i canti di. G. Rosso. Fossano. 1900.
Amari,
Michele. Carteggio letterario e politico. Collected by A. D’Ancona, with
biographical and literary preface. Turin. 1896.
Azeglio, Count Massimo di. Bibliografia di M. d’ A. A. Vismara. Milan.
1878.
Un homme d’etat spirituel et chevaleresque. C.
Dejob. Paris. 1894.
Capponi, Gino. G. C., i suoi tempi e i suoi amici. Taharrini, M.
Florence. 1879. Carducci, G. Vita di. G. Chiarini. Florence. 1907.
Carrer, Luigi. Della vita e delle opere di. G. B. Crovato. Lanciano.
1899. Costetti, G. II teatro italiano nel 1800. Rocca San Casciano. 1900.
Ferrari,
Paolo. V. Ferrari. Milan. 1899.
Fusinato,
A. Studio biografico-critico. C. Cimegotto. Verona and Padua. 1898. Gioberti Vincenzo, Rosmini e. G. Gentile. Pisa.
1898.
Gioda, C. Per V. Gioberti nel primo centenario
della sua nascita. Nuova
Antologia, April 1, 1901.
Spaventa, B. La filosofia del Gioberti.
Naples. 1863.
Giusti, Giuseppe. Epistolario. Ed. F. Martini.
Florence. 1905.
Guadagnoli,
A. Poesie. With preface by F. Tribolati. Florence.
1888.
E la Toscana dei suoi tempi. G.
Stiavelli. Turin. 1907.
Mameli,
G. Poesie. With introduction by G. Mazzini. Genoa. 1850. Mercantini, L. Canti.
With introduction by J. Mestica. Milan. 1885. Niccolini, G. B. Gargiolli, Ed.
C. Opere edite e inedite. Milan.
1863-80.
Vanucci, A. Ricordi della vita e delle opere
di G. B. N. Florence. 1866.
Nievo,
Ippolito, II poeta soldato. D. Mantovani. Milan. 1900.
Poerio,
A. Poesie. With introduction by M. D’Ayala. Florence. 1852.
Prati, Giovanni. Poesie Scelte. With preface
by F. Martini. Florence. 1892.
— Studio biografico. Carlo Giordano. Turin. 1907.
V. Crescini. Padua. 1898.
E. (j. P. Nencioni. Saggi critici di
letteratura italiana. Florence. 1898.
Rossetti, Gabriele. Vita. Z. Benelli. Florence. 1898.
Poesie. Ed. G. Carducci. Florence. 1861.
Sanctis, Francesco de, e la critica letteraria. P. Ferrieri. Milan.
1888.
E la critica in Italia. In Pasquale Villari,
Scritti Vari. Bologna. 1894.
Tommaseo, N. G. Biodego. Discorsi e profili letterari. Milan.
1903.
Poesie. With preface by G. Manni. Florence. 1902.
Zanella, Giacomo, e la sua fama. A. Fogazzaro. Nuova Antologia, Nov. 1,
1893. Poesie. With
preface by F. Lampertico. Florence. 1894.
THE SWISS CONFEDERATION (1815-74).
L CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
A. Bibliographies.
Bibliographie d. Schweizerischen Landeskunde, issued by the
Zentralkommission fur Schweiz. Landeskunde. Bern ; 1893, etc. (In progress.)
Brandstetter, j. L. Repertorium iiher die in Zeit- und Sammelschriften
(181290) enthaltenen Aufsatze und Mitteilungen Schweizergeschichtlichen
Inhaltes, Basel. 1892; Continued by H. Barth
(1891-1900). Basel. 1906.
Coolidge,
W. A. B. Swiss Travel and Swiss Guide-Books. London. 1889.
B. Documents.
Abschiede der eidgenossiscben Tagsatzungen. 35 years. 1814-48.
Fetscherin, W. Repertorium der Abschiede, 1814-48. 2 vols. Bern. 1874r-6.
Amtliche Sammlung der Bundesgesetze und Verordnungen. 11 vols. Bern.
1850-74.
Bericht (Allgemeiner) des eidgeri. Oberbefehlshabers iiber die Bewaflnung
und den Feldzug von 1847. Bern and Zurich. 1848.
Bericht (Beleuchtender) iiber den Entwurf der Bundesverfassung vom 8.
April,
1848.
Bundesblatt der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft. Bern. 1849, etc.
Davall, E. Les troupes fran^aises internees en Suisse en 1871. Rapport
officiel. Berne. 1873.
Protokoll iiber die Verhandlungen der mit der Revision des Bundesvertrages
von
1815 beauftragten
Kommission. Bern. 1848.
Protokoll fiber die Verhandlungen der eidgen. Rathe betreffend Revision der
Bundesverfassung, 1873-4. Bern. 1877.
Rapport du procureur general de la Confederation sur l’insurrection
royaliste des
2, 3, et 4 sfeptembre, 1856,
dans le Canton de Neuchatel.
Relation officielle des evenements du septembre, 1856, dans le Canton de
Neuchatel. The collections of the Laws of the various
Cantons should also be consulted. They have appeared under different titles,
such as Sammlung der Gesetze, Amtliche Sammlung, Offizielle Sammlung, Recueil
des Lois, Bollettino officiate, etc.
C. Swiss Memoirs, etc.
Bluntschli, J. C. Denkwiirdigkeiten aus meinem Leben. 3 vols. Nordlingen. 1884 Dufour, G. H. La Campagne du Sonderbund et les
evenements de 1856. Neuchatel and
Geneva. 1876. In German: Basel. 1876.
Elgger, F. von. Der Kanton Luzern und seine Bundesgenossen im Kampf gegen
den Radikalismus. Schaffhausen. 1850.
Frey-Hero see, F. Autobiographic. Vol. xm of Argovia., Aarau. 1882;
Kern, J. C. Souvenirs politiquea, 1838-83. Bern. 1887.
Meyer, Bernhard, Ritter von. Erlebnisse. 2 vols. Vienna. 1875.
Meyer von Knonau, L. Lebenserinnerungen, 1769-1841. Frauenfeld. 1883.
Ochsenbein, U. Zweiter Bericht iiber den Kampf der luzemischen Fliichtlinge und
ihrer Freunde am 31. Marz und 1. April, 1845. Bern. 1845.
Peyer im Hof, J. F. Aus den Anfangen des neuen Bundes. Frauenfeld. 1900.
PfyfFer, Kasimir. Sammlung kleiner Schriften, nebst Erinnerungen aus seinem
Leben. Zurich. 1866.
Scherr, Thomas. Meine Bestrebungen und Schicksale wahrend meines
Aufenthaltes im Kanton Zurich. St Gall. 1840.
Segesser, P. A. von. 45 Jahre im luzemischen Staatsdienst, 1841-87. Bern.
1887.
Sammlung kleiner Schriften. 3 vols. Bern.
1877-9.
Siegwart-Muller, C. Der Kampf zwischen Recht und Gewalt in der Schweiz.
Eidgenossenschaft. 3 vols. Altdorf. 1863-6.
D. Non-Swiss Authorities.
Bunsen, Ch. J. von. Memoirs of; chiefly from Family
Papers. By his Widow. 2 vols. London. 1868. German transl. by F. Nippold. 3
vols. Leipzig. 1868-71.“
Correspondence
relative to the Affairs of Switzerland, 1847-8. (Blue-book.)
London.
1848.
Frobel,
Julius. Em Lebenslauf. 2 vols. Stuttgart. 1890.
Grote,
G. Seven Letters on the Recent Politics of Switzerland. London. 1876. Guizot,
F. P. G. Memoires. Vol. vm. Leipzig and Brussels. 1867.
Lane-Poole,
Stanley. Life of Stratford Canning. Vol. i,
pp. 222-84. London.
1888.
Miigge,
Th. Die Schweiz und ihre Zustande. Hanover.
1847.
Rumbold,
Sir Horace. Further Recollections of a Diplomatist. London. 1903. Wit, T. F., genannt v. Dorring. Fragmente
aus meinem Leben und meiner Zeit.
4 vols. Brunswick. 1827-30.
II. SECONDARY WORKS.
A. Swiss Historical
Periodicals, eto.
Argovia. Aarau, from 1860. Basler Jahrbuch. Basel, from 1879. Berner Tas-
chenbuch. Bern, from 1852. Bibliotheque Universelle de Geneve. Lausanne, from
1816. Politisches Jahrbuch der Schweizer. Eidgenossenschaft.
Edited by C. Hilty. Bern, from 1886. Revue Historique Vaudoise. Lausanne, from
1893. Sammlung
Bernischer Biographien. Bern, from 1884. Zeitschrift ftir Schweiz. Statistik.
Bern, from 1865. Ziircher Taschenbuch. Zurich, from 1878.
B. Collective Works op Reference.
Hasler, F. and H., and Hartmann, A. Gallerie beriihmter Schweizer der
Neuzeit. Baden. 1868-71.
Helvetia. Denkwurdigkeiten der 22 Freistaaten der Schweiz.
Eidgenossenschaft.
8 vols. Aarau. 1823-33. ■
Montet, A. de. Dictionnaire biographique des Genevois, et des Vaudois,
qui se sont distingues. 2 vols. Lausanne. 1878.
Secretan, E. Galerie Suisse. Biographies Nationales. 3 vols. Lausanne. 1873-80.
C. General Histories.
Baumgartner, G. J. Die Schweiz in ihrer Kampfen und Umgestaltungen von 1830
bis 1850. 4 vols. Zurich. 1853-66.
Curti, T. Geschichte der Schweiz im 19ten Jahrhundert. Neuchatel. (1902.)
Dandliker, K. Geschichte der Schweiz. Vol. in. 3rd edition. Zurich. 1904
Feddersen, P. Geschichte der Schweiz. Regeneration, 1830-48. Zurich. 1867.
Frey, E. ■ Die Kriegsthaten der Schweizer. Neuchatel. (1905.)
Gavard, A. Histoire de la Suisse au 19eme Siecle. Chaux-de-Fonds. (1898.)
Henne-Am llhyn, O. Geschichte des Schweizervolkes. Vol. in. Leipzig. 1878. Muyden, B. van. La Suisse sous le Pacte de 1815.
2 vols. Lausanne. 1890-2. Schweizer, P. Geschichte der
Schweizerischen Neutralitat. Frauenfeld. 1895. Seippel, P. La Suisse au 19eme
Siecle. 3 vols. Lausanne. 1899-1900. The same in German. Bern. 1899-1900.
Tillier, A. von. Geschichte der Eidgenossenschaft wahrend der sogen.
Restaura- tionsepoche, 1814-30. 3 vols. Bern and Zurich. 1848-50.
Geschichte der Eidgenossenschaft wahretid der
Zeit des sogeheissenen Fort-
schritts, 1830-46. 3 vols. Bern. 1854-5.
D. Special Histories.
Bloesch, E. Geschichte der Schweizerischen-refbrmierten Kirchen. 2 vols. Bern.
1898-9.
Bude, E. de. Les Bonaparte en Suisse. Geneva. 1905.
Dandliker, K. Der Ustertag. Zurich. 1881.
Duffield,
W. B. The War of the Sonderbund. English Historical Review. Vol. x, pp. 675 et
sqq. London. 1895.
Feiss, J. Das Wehrwesen der Schweiz. Zurich. 1880.
Finsler, G. Kirchliche Statistik der reformierten Schweiz. Zurich. 1854.
Fleiner, F. Die Grundung des Schweizerischen Bundesstaates. Basel. 1898.
Heusler, A. Die Trennung des Eantons Basel. 2 vols. Basel. 1839.
Luginbiihl, R. Die Neuenhurger Frage. Schweizerisches Jahrbuch. Zurich.
1906. Meyer, J. Geschichte der Genfer Konvention. Berlin.
1901.
Pevster,
J. W. de. Secession in Switzerland and in the United States compared.
Catskill (Vermont). 1864.
Pieth, F. Die Mission Justus v. Gruners in der Schweiz, 1816-9. Coire. 1899. Rilliet de Constant, L. Le Valais de 1840-4. Lausanne. 1844.
Stem, A. Zur Geschichte des Sondei-hunds. Sybel’s Historische Zeitschrift.
Munich. 1879.
Sutermeister, W. Mettemich und die Schweiz. Bern. 1896. ,
Vautrey, L. Histoire de la Persecution religieuse dans le Jura Bernois,
1873-6.
! 2 vols. Paris. 1877.
E. Politioal Biographies.
Bloesch, Ed. und 30 Jahre Bernischer Geschichte. Von E. Bloesch. Bern.
1872. Dufour, General G. H. Vie; par Ed. Sayous. Geneva. 1884.
Das Buch von. Von Senn-Barbieux. Zurich. 1897.
Escher, Alfred. Das Denkmal. Zurich.
1890.
Fazy, James, sa vie et son oeuvre. Par H. Fazy.
Geneva. 1887.
Fischer,
Em. Fr. von, Schultheiss in Bern, Lebensnachrichten tiber,
von K. L. F.
von Fischer. Bern. 1874.
Furrer, Jonas. Leben; von A. Isler. Winterthur. 1907.
Heer, J. Leben ; von G. Heer. 2 vols. Zurich. 1884-5.
Herzog, General K. J. Leben; von F. C. Bluntschli. Zurich. 1895.
Keller, Augustin. Ein Lebensbild; von J. Hunziker. Aarau. 1883.
Linth, Hans Konrad Eacher von der} von J. Hottinger. Zurich. 1852. Mermillod, Le Cardinal; par J. T. de Belloc. Fribourg. 1892.
Miiller-Friedherg, Carl. Lebensbild ; von J. Dierauer. St Gallen. 1884.
Piaget, Alexis Marie, et la Republique Neuchateloise (1848-o8). 2 vols.
Neuchatel. 1888-95.
Reinhard, Hans von. Zurich. 1838. .
Rochemont, C. Pictet de. Correspondance; par Edm. Pictet. Geneva. 1892.
Volmar, F. Die Bundesrate der Schweiz. Eidgenossenschaft. Zurich- 1903.
Wattenwyl, Niklaus Rudolf von. Erinnerungen an Em. von Fischer. Bern.
1867.
Welti, Emil. Lehen; von J. Weber. Aarau. 1903.
Wyss, David von. Leben der heiden Biirgermeister D. von W., von Fr. von
Wyss.
2 vols. Zurich. 1884.
F. Constitutional Works.
Blumer, J. J. Handhuch des Schweizer, Bundesstaatsrechtes. 2 vols.
Schaffhausen.
1863-4. 2nd edition. Basel. 1877-87.
Curti, T. Geschichte -der Schweiz. Volksgesetzgebung. Bern. 1882.
- Die
Schweizerischen Volksrechte, 1848-1900., Bern. 1900- (French transl. Paris.
1905.)
Deploige, S. The Referendum in Switzerland. Engl, transl. London. 1898.
Dubs, J. Das offentliche Recht der Schweizer. Eidgenossenschaft. 2 vols.
Zurich. 1877-8.
Fleiner, F. Staat und Bischofswahl im Bisthum Basel. Leipzig. 1897.
Gareis, C. and Zorn, P. Staat und Kirche in der Schweiz. 2 vols. Zurich.
1877-8.
Hilty, C. Die Bundesvnrfassungen der Schweiz. Eidgenossenschaft. Bern.
1891.
Vorlesungen fiber die Politik der Eidgenossen.
Bern. 1875.
Huber, E. System und Geschichte des Schweizer. Privatrechtes. 4 vols. BaseL
1886-93.
Kaiser, S. and Strickier, J. Geschichte und Texte der Bundesverfassungen
der Schweiz. Eidgenossenschaft. Bern. 1901.
Kothing, M. Die Bisthumsverhandlungen der Schweizerisch-konstanzischen Dio-
zesanstande von 1803-62. Schwyz. 1863.
Lloyd,
H. D. and Hobson, J. A. A Sovereign People. London. 1908.
Meyer, J. Geschichte des Schweiz. Bundesrechtes. Vol. ii. Winterthur. 1875. Riittimann, J. Das
nordamerikanische Bundestaatsrecht verglichen mit den poli- tischen
Einrichtungen der Schweiz. 2 vols. Zurich. 1867-76.
Salis, L. R. von. Die Entwickelung der Kultusfreiheit in der Schweiz.
Basel.
1894. .
Schollenberger, J. Grundriss des Staats- und Verwaltungsrechtes der
Schweiz. Kantone. 3 vols. Zurich. 1890-1900.
Das Bundesstaatsrecht der Schweiz. Geschichte
uud System. Berlin. 1902.
Stooss, Carl. Die Grundziige des Schweiz. Strafrechts. 2 vols. Basel.
1892-3. Straub, H. Verfassung des eidgendss. Standes Zurich vom 18. April,
1869. Winterthur. 1902.
Vincent, J. M. Government in Switzerland. New York and
London. 1900.
G.
Agriculture, Trade, Manufactures, Railways, etc.
Bachelin, A. L’Horlogerie Neuchateloise. Neuchatel. 1888.
Bavier, S. Die Strassen der Schweiz. Zurich. 1878.
Bohmert, V. Arbeiterverhaltnisse und Fabrikeinrichtungen in der Schweiz. 2
vols. Zurich. 1873.
Biirkli-Meyer, A. Geschichte der Ziircher Seidenindustrie. Zurich. 1884.
Furrer, A. Volkswirthscbafts-Lexikon der Schweiz 4 vols. Bern. 1885-92.
Geering, T. and Hotz, R. Wirthschaftskunde der Schweiz. Zurich. 1901. (French
transl. Zurich. 1903.)
Geiser, K. Geschichte des Armenwesens im Kanton Bern. Bern. 1894.
Gonzenbach, A. von. Darstellung der Handelsverhaltnisse mit Frankreich. Bern.
1842.
Die Handelsverhaltnisse zwischen der Schweiz
und dem Deutschen Zollverein.
Luzern. 1843.
Herold, R. Der Schweizerische Bund und die Eisenbahnen bis zur Jahrhundert-
wende. Stuttgart and Berlin. 1902.
Huber, A. Die Entwickelung des eidgenoss. Zollwesens bis 1848. Bern. 1890.
Hunziker, F. Das Schweizerische Eisenbahnnetz in seinen Anfangen und seiner
Entwickelung. (Programme of the Kantonsschule.) Zurich. 1877. Jenny-Triimpy, A.
Handel und Industrie des Kantons Glarus. 2 vols. Glarus.
1899-1903.
Kramer, A. Die Landwirthschaft im Schweiz. Flachlande. Frauenfeld. 1897.
Lehmann, H. Die Aargauische Strohindustrie. Aarau. 1897.
Feyer, G. Geschichte des Reisens in der Schweiz. Basel. 1885.
Reichesberg, N. Handworterbuch der Schweiz. Volkswirthschaft. Bern. 1903 et
sqq. {In progress.)
Schanz, G. Die Steuem der Schweiz. 5 vols. Stuttgart. 1890.
Wartmann, H. Atlas uber die Entwickelung von Industrie und Handel in der
Schweiz, 1770-1870. Winterthur. 1873.
Industrie und Handel der Schweiz im 19ten
Jahrhundert. Bern. 1902.
H. Miscellaneous, Literature, Art,
eto.
Bachtold, J. Gottfried Keller; sein Leben, seine Briefe und Tagebiicher. 3
vols. Berlin. 1892-6. Supplement: Keller-Bibliographie. Berlin., 1897. Edition
without Diaries, etc. Berlin. 1898.
Brun, C. Schweizerisches Kunstler-Lexikon. Frauenfeld. 1905 et sqq.
Clement, C. Gleyre. £tude biographique et critique. Paris.
1885.
Le'opold Robert. Paris. 1874.
Frey,
A. Conrad Ferdinand Meyer. Stuttgart. 1900.
Arnold Bocklin. Stuttgart. 1903.
Godet, P. Histoire litteraire de la Suisse Franchise. 2nd edn. Neuchatel.
1895. Koster, A. Gottfried Keller. (Seven
Lectures.) 2nd edn. Leipzig. 1907. Rambert, E. Alexandre Vinet. Lausanne. 1875.
Alexandre Calame, sa vie et son oeuvre. Paris.
1884.
Rossel, V. Histoire litteraire de la Suisse Romande. 2 vols. Geneva. 1889-91. Schweizerpresse, die. Hrg. vom
Verein der Schweiz Presse. Bern. 1896.
Weber, R. Die poetische Nationalliteratur der Deutschen Schweiz. 4 vols
Glarus
1866-76.
Wolf, R. Biographien zur Kulturgeschichte der Schweiz. 4
vols. Zurich. 1858-61. Geschichte der Vermessungen in der Schweiz. Zurich.
1879.
CHAPTERS IX. 1 and XXII. 1, 8, 4.
RUSSIA AND THE SLAVONIC NATIONAL MOVEMENTS.
I.
RUSSIA FROM 1825 to 1881.
A.
Bibliography; Periodicals, eto.
Ikonnikof,
V. S. Sketch of a Russian Historical Bibliography. Kief. 1891-2. (Russian.)
Russian
Antiquity. (Periodical.) St Petersburg. 1870 and onwards. (Russian.)
Archive. (Periodical.) Moscow. 1863 and
onwards. (Russian.)
Biographical Dictionary. St Petersburg.
1896 sqq. (Inprogress.) (Russian.)
Encyclopaedic Dictionary. St Petersburg.
1897. (Russian.)
Complete
collection of the Russian Laws. St Petersburg. 1839 and 1857. (Russian.)
Collection
of the Russian Historical Society. St Petersburg. 1867 sqq. (Russian.)
B. Nicholas I.
1. Foreign
Policy.
Bemhardi, T. V. Unter Nicholas und Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Leipzig.
1893. Tatistchef. Foreign Policy of Nicholas I. St Petersburg. 1887. (Russian.)
Thouvenelj L. Nicolas I et Napole'on III. (1852-4.) Paris. 1891.
2. Domestic and Educational.
Bludof,
Count. Last hours of Tsar Nicholas I. St Petersburg. 1855. (Russian.) Crehange, G. Histoire de la Russie. 2nd edn. Paris.
1896.
Custine, Marquis de. La Russie en 1839. Paris. 1843.
Engelhardt.
A sketch of the History of the Russian Censorship, in connection with ■
the development of the Press. 1703-1903. St Petersburg. 1904. (Russian.)
Gregorovich. Emperor Nicholas in the Holy Synod. Russian Archive, 1869. (Russian.)
Haxthausen, Baron A. von. Russische Studien. 2 vols. Hanover.
1847. Engl.
transl.
R. Farie. London. 1856.
Korkuyef.
The Russian Fleet under Nicholas I. Naval Magazine, 1896. (Russian.) Lacroix. Histoire de la vie et du regne de Nicolas I. Paris. 1864-75.
Lalayef.
Emperor Nicholas I the Founder of the Russian SchooL St Petersburg.
1896. (Russian.)
Rambaud, A. Histoire de la Russie. Paris. 1884.
Schiemann, T. Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I. Berlin. Vol.
i.
1904. {In progress.)
Schilder,
N. N. Nicholas I, his life and reign. 2
vols. St Petersburg. 1903. (Russian.)
Schnitzler, J. H. Histoire intime de la Russie sous Alexandre I et
Nicolas I. Paris. 1847.
Yarosh.
Emperor Nicholas I. Harkoff. 1890. (Russian.)
a
Financial and Economic.
Baranowsky, T. Geschichte der Russischen Fabrik. Berlin.
1900.
Bloch,
J. The Finances of Russia in the 19th Century. Vols. i-iv. St Petersburg.
1882. (Russian.) French edn. Paris. 1899.
Brzjesky.
The Russian National Debt. St Petersburg. 1884. (Russian.) Savelyef. Historical
Outline of the Engineering Administration under Nicholas I.
St Petersburg. 1897. (Russian.)
Skalkovsky, K. A. Les Ministres de finance de la Russie, 1802-90. Trans,
from Russian. Paris. 1891.
G. Alexander II.
1. Foreign Affiiirs in Europe.
Annuaire diplomatique de l’Empire de Russie, 1861-81.
Beust, Franz Ferdinand, Graf von. Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten.
Erinnerungen und Aufzeichnungen. 2 vols.
Stuttgart. 1887.
Engl. Transl. by Baron de Worms. 2 vols.
London. 1887.
Bismarckbriefe, 1844-70. Bielefeld and Leipzig. 1880.
Danilevski. Russia and Europe. 5th edn. St
Petersburg. 1895. (Russian.) Gorchakoff, Prince. Materials collected in memory
of the 25 years spent by Prince Gorchakoff at the Foreign Office, 1856-81. St Petersburg. 1881. (Russian.) Souvenirs et correspondance du Prince
Emile de Sayn-Wittgenstein Berlebourg. Paris. 1888.
[See
also Bibliographies to Chapters I, X, XL For Polish affairs see II B below.}
2. Asiatic Policy including Alaska).
Alaska.
By W. H. Dali and others. London. 1902.
Vol. xxvin, in Bancroft’s History of Pacific
States. New York. 1882-90.
Bariatinsky,
Field Marshal Prince A. Zisserman. Moscow. 1890. (Russian.) Curzon, Lord, of
Kedleston, G. N. Persia and the Persian Question. London. 1892.
Russia in Central Asia. London. 1889.
Drage,
G. Russian Affairs. London. 1904.
Martens,
T. T. Russia and England in Central Asia. St Petersburg. 1879. (Russian.)
Masheieff.
Historical sketch of Turkestan and the advance of the Russians therein.
St
Petersburg. 1890. (Russian.)
Morny,
Due de. Extrait des Me'moires. Une ambassade en Russie. Paris.
1892. Muravieff-Amursky, Count; Barsukoff. Moscow. 1891. (Russian.)
Skrine,
F. H. B. and Ross, E. D. The Heart of Asia. London. 1899.
Yadrinzev
Petri. Sibirien. Jena. 1886.
3. Domestic.
Alexander
II. Social Movements in his time (1855-81). Anonymous. Paris.
1905. (Russian.)
Beaulieu, Leroy. Un homme d’etat Eusse contemporain. Paris. 1883.
L’Empire des Tsars, 3 vols. Paris.
1883-9.
Bogdanovich.
History of the reign of the Emperor Alexander I and Russia in his times. St Petersburg. 1871. (Russian.) irugge n, von der. Das
heutige Russland. Leipzig. 1902.
Djanschef.
The Epoch of the Great Reforms. Moscow. 1893.
Drage,
G. Russian Affairs. London. 1904.
Foreign Reports of Royal Commission on Labour.
Russia, vol. x, 1894,
c. 7063, xiv.
Eckhardt, J. Von Nikolaus I zu Alexander III. Leipzig.
1881.
Fisher,
Y. R. Finland and the Tsar, 1809-99. London. 1899.
Grimm, A. von. Alexandra Feodorovna, Kaiserin von Russland. Leipzig. 1866. Kovalevsky. Regime economique de la Russie. Paris.
1898.
Milyukov.
Studies in the History of Russian Civilisation. St Petersburg. 1899.
(Russian.)
German edn. 1901.
Pares,
Bernard. Russia and Reform. London. 1907-
Russia
on the eve of the 19th Century. (Anonymous.)
Berlin. 1901. (Russian.) Schmeidler, W. F. C. Das Russische Reich unter
Alexander II. Berlin. 1878. Schnitzler, J. H. La mission de
l’Empereur Alexandre II et le General Rostoftsof. Paris. 1860.
Les institutions de la Russie depuis les
reformes de l’Empereur Alexandre II.
Paris. 1866.
Schulze Gaevemitz. Volkswirtschaftliche Studien aus Russland. Leipzig.
1899. Svarkoff. Social Movement in Russia (1700-1895). St Petersburg. 1905. (Russian.) Thun, Count. Geschichte
der revolutionaren Bewegungen in Ru&dand. Leipzig.
1883.
Viazemsky.
Complete Works of. St Petersburg. 1882. (Russian.)
Wallace,
Sir Donald Mackenzie. Russia. 2 vols. London. 1877 and 1905. Zhukhovsky. Works.
St Petersburg. 1885. (Russian.)
4. Economic, Social and Agricultural.
Bloch,
J. The influence of railways on the economic condition of Russia.
St
Petersburg. 1882. (Russian.) French edn. Paris. 1899.
Emancipation
of the private serfs in Russia, materials for the history of the.
Berlin. 1861-2. (Russian.)
Hehn, V. De moribus Ruthenorum. Stuttgart.
1892.
Hodsky.
Land and the Agriculturist. St Petersburg. 1891. (Russian.) Nicolai-on. Die Volkswirtschaft in Russland nach der
Bauem-Emancipation. Munich. 1899.
Pobedonostseff, K. P. Historical Researches and Essays. St
Petersburg. 1876. (Russian.)
Semyoffsky.
The emancipation of the Peasants in the reign of Alexander II,
1889-92. (Russian.)
Simkovitch. Die Feldgemeinschaft in Russland. Jena.
1898.
System
of Land Tenure in various countries. Published by the Cobden Club. London.
Wirtschewsky. Russlands Handel- Zoll- und Industrie Politik. Berlin. 1905.
D. Russian
Literature.
1. Histories.
Bruckner, A. Geschichte der Russischen Literatur. Leipzig.
1905;
Polevoy,
P. History of Russian Literature in Biographies and Sketches. 2 vols.
1903. (Russian.)
Pypin,
A. N. History of Russian literature. 4 vols. 1889. (Russian.) Reinholdt, A. von. Geschichte der Russischen Literatur. Leipzig.
1885-6. Skabitchefsky. History of Russian Literature. 4th edn. 1900. (Russian.)
Wiener, L. Anthology of Russian Literature from the earliest period to the
present. New York. 1904.
.
2. Critical Studies.
Arseniev,
K. K. Critical Studies of .Russian Literature. 2 vols. 1888. (Russian.)
Birnkof, Pavel. Leo Tolstoy, his life and work. London. 1906.
Chernischevsky,
N. G. Critical' Studies. St Petersburg. 1893. (Russian.) Haumant, lllmile. Frau Tourgenief. La vie et 1’oeuvre. Paris. 1906.
Kropotkin, Prince. Ideals and'Realities in Russian Literature. London.
1905. Lourie. La psychologie des Romanciers Russes du 19me siecle.
Paris. 1905. Merejkowski, D. Tolstoy et Dostoievski. La personne et 1’oeuvre. Paris.
1903. Panin. Lectures on Russian literature. Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenieff, Tolstoy.
New York. 1889.
Pypin,
A. N. Characteristics of Russian Literary Opinion, 1820-50. St Petersburg.
1890. (Russian.) '
Strannik,
Ivan. La Pensee Russe contemporaine. Paris. 1903.
Turner,
C. E. Studies in Russian Literature. (Gogol, Pushkin, etc.) London. 1907. Vogue, Vicomte de. La Roman Russe. Paris. 1886.
Waliszewski, K. Literature Russe. Paris. 1900.
English transl. in Heinemann’s Literatures of the World. London. 1900.
II. NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN BOHEMIA AND POLAND,
1815-70.
A. Bohemia.
Arbes,
J. Persecution of the Bohemian nation, 1869-73. Prague. 1896. (Bohemian.)
Dobrowsky, Josef. Briefwechsel zwischen D. und Kopitar, 1808-28. St
Petersburg. 1885.
Havlicek,
Karel. Political works. Prague. 1901. (Bohemian.)
Havlicek and our politics. Hejret, H. Pilsen. 1903. (Bohemian.)
Life, Tuma, K. Kuttenberg. 1883.
(Bohemian.)
Jungmann,
J. Sketch of his life. Jedlicka. Otakar, Prague. 1871. (Bohemian.) Lutzowi
Count. Bohemian Literature. (Literatures of the World.) London. 1907.
Menger, M. Der bohmische Ausgleich. Stuttgart. 1891.
Neklan, A. Die bohmische Frage. Dresden.
1895.
Palafiky, Frantisek. Correspondence Prague. 1898. (Bohemian.)
Leben. Von J. Dobrowski, etc. Prague. 1827.
PalaJk^’s politisches Vermachtnis. Prague.
1892.
Masaryk, T. G. PalaSkf s Idee des bohmischen
Volkes. Prague. 1898.
Life of. By Vaclav Reznicek. Prague. 1897. (Bohemian.)
Vrba, R. Die Palacky-Feier und ihre Widersacher. Prague. 1899.
B. Poland.
1. Materials, Documents, etc.
Correspondence
relating to the affairs of Poland. (Blue Book.)
London. 1863. Documents sur les affaires de Pologne. (Yellow
Book.) Paris. 1863.
Materials
for the history of the Rising of 1863-4. Lemberg. 1888-90. (Polish.)
2. General and Special Histories.
Angeli, M. von. Altes Eisen. Revolution in Polen 1863-4. Stuttgart. 1900.
Berg, H. von. Memoirs of, on the Polish
Conspiracies and Revolts (1831-62).
Moscow.
1873. (Russian.)
Denis, E. La Boheme. Vol. ii. Paris. 1903.
Dzieduszycki, J. Der Patriotismus in Polen. Krakau. 1884.
Grzegorzewski,
S. Personal recollections of the Insurrection of 1863. Lemberg.
1903. (Polish.)
Hoesick,
F. Stanislaw Tarnowski. Warsaw. 1906. {Polish.)
Katkoff,
and his historical services. Lyubimoff. St Petersburg. 1889.
Collection of articles on the Polish Question,
1863. Moscow. 1887.
(Russian.)
Kozmian, S. Das Jahr 1863. Vienna. 1896.
Lelewel, J. Betrachtungen iiber den politischen Zustand des ehemaligen
Polens. Brussels. 1845.
Correspondence with Connt Titus Dzialynski.
Posen. 1884. (Polish.)
Letters. Posen. 1878-9. (Polish.)
Limanowski,
B. History of the Polish Democracy in the post-partitional period.
Zurich. 1901. (Polish.)
Massow, W. von. Die Polen-Not im deutschen Osten. Berlin.
1903.
Moszynski,
J. Austro-Polish politics in connexion with the political views of A.
Wielopolski. Cracow. 1884. (Polish.)
Pypin, A. N. Histoire des litteratures slaves. Traduit par E. Denis. Paris.
1881. Sidorov, A. A. The Polish Insurrection of 1863. St Petersburg. 1903.
(Russian.) Smolka, S. The policy of Lubecki before the November Insurrection.
Cracow. 1907. (Polish.)
Poles, Czechs and Germans. Cracow. 1898.
(Polish.)
Smolka,
Frantiszek. His life and public career by Karol, Widmann. Lemberg.
1884. (Polish.) German edn., abridged. Vienna.
1887.
Tarnowski,
S. Political studies. Cracow. 1895. (Polish.)
Trotha,
T. W. von. Der polnische Anfstand 1863.
Berlin. 1895.
Verdy de Vernois, J. A. F. W'. von. Im Hauptquartier des Russischen Armee
in Polen, 1863. Berlin. 1895.
German edition, abridged. Vienna. 1887.
Wielopolski, Marquis Alexander. Lettre d’un Gentilhomme Polonais sur les
massacres de Galicie adressee au Prince de Mettemich. Paris.
1846.
Literary and political testament. Posen. 1880.
(Polish.)
Life. Lisicki, H. Cracow. 1878-9. (Polish.)
French edn. (abridged).
Vienna.
1880.
Wielopolski,
Zygmunt. Lettre adressee a M. le Comte Stanislas Tarnowski [defending Alexander
Wielopolski’s policy 1861-3], Cracow. 1880. Worynski, E. The Poles and the
Ruthenians. Cracow. 1903. (Polish.) Zamoyski, Andrzej, My transitions. Cracow. 1906. (Polish.) .
Le Comte A. Z. et le Marquis Wielopolski. C.
de Mazade. Paris. 1863.
III. THE LEVANT, FROM 1830 to 1871.
A. Bibliographies. ,
Bengescfl, G. Essai d’une notice Bibliographique sur la Question
d’Orient (1821-97).
Brussels and Paris. 1897.
Bibliographic Franco-Roumaine. Brussels.
1895.
B. Published Documents.
1. English State Papers, etc.
British
and Foreign State Papers. Vols. xvii-uai. Edited by Sir E. Hertslet.
London.
1832-77-
Parliamentary
Papers.
Correspondence
respecting the demands made upon the Greek Government. London. Feb. 22, 1850. ,
Correspondence
respecting Mr Finlay’s claim upon the Greek Government. London. April, 1850.
Further
correspondence respecting the demands made upon the Greek Government. London.
May 17, 1850.
Further
correspondence respecting the demands made upon the Greek Government. London.
May 27, 1850.
Further
correspondence respecting the demands made upon the Greek Government. London.
June 14, 1850.
Further
correspondence respecting the demands made upon the Greek Government. London.
June 18, 1850.
Further
correspondence respecting the demands made upon the Greek Government. London.
June 24, 1850.
Correspondence
respecting the mixed Commission appointed to investigate the claims of M.
Pacifico. London. August 7, 1851.
Correspondence
relating to the election of Prince William of Denmark as King of Greece, and to
the state of the country. London. 1863.
Papers
relating to Greece. London. 1863.
Correspondence
relative to the affairs of Greece. London. 1865.
Correspondence
respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece,
1868-9. London. 1869.
Papers
respecting the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. London. 1867.
Correspondence
relating to the bombardment of Belgrade in June, 1862. London. 1863.
Further
paper respecting the bombardment of Belgrade. London. 1863.
Correspondence
respecting affairs in Servia. London. 1867.
2. French State Papers, Documents,
etc.
Recueil de documents diplomatiques sur la question d’Orient en 1840.
Paris. 1840.
Recueil de pieces officielles sur les affaires d’Orient. Paris. 1840.
Affaires etrangeres. Documents diplomatiques (1861), p. 74. Paris. 1862.
pp. 93, 98-108. Paris. 1863.
(1864), pp. 73, 77, 84, 91. Paris. 1865.
p. 71. Paris. 1866.
viii, pp. 131, 271; x, pp. 117, 129, 151. Paris. 1867.
xi, pp. 73, 87, 127, 139, 141; xn, pp. 1, 136,
144, 151,
166, 185, 197, 238; xiii, p. 47. Paris. 1869.
3. Roumanian Documents.
Actes et Documents relatifs a l’histoire de la regeneration de la
Roumanie. Publics par D. A. Sturdza, etc. Vols. I, ix (1391-1859). Bucharest.
1900. (In progress.)
Charles 1. Roi de Roumanie (1866-75). Actes, Documents etc. par D. A. Sturdza.
Bucharest. 1899.
Documente privitore la l3toria Romariilor. L. de Hurmuzaki. Vol. vi
(1750-1818).
Bucharest.
1896. Vol. x (1763-1844). Bucharest. 1897.
Supplemental
volumes i-vi ’(1518-1849). Bucharest. 1886-95.
C. Secondary Works.
1. General (including History of Turkey and
Balkans as a whole).
Abd-ur-Rahman
Sheref. Tarikh-i-devlet-i-osmanie. 2 vols. Constantinople. 1900. Bamberg, F. Geschichte der Oriental]schen
Angelegenheit im Zeitraume des Pariser und des Berliner Friedens. (Allg. Gesch.
in Eingelbert.) iv, 5. Berlin.
1892.
Eliot, Sir C. Turkey in Europe. London. 1907.
Forsyth,
W. The Slavonic Provinces South of the Danube in their relation to the Ottoman
Porte. London. 1876.
Halil
Ganem. Les Sultans Ottomans. 2 vols. Paris. 1902.
Jochmus.
Journey into Balkans (1847). Journal Royal Geog. Soc. London. 1854. Laveleye, E. La peninsule des Balkans. 2 vols. Brussels. 1886.
Engl, trans. London. 1887.
Lyde,
A. W. and Mockler-Ferryman, A. F. Military Geography of the Balkans. London.
1905.
Miller,
W. The Balkans. “Story of the Nations.” London. 1899.
Stratford
de Redcliffe, Viscount. Life. By S. Lane Poole. 2 vols. London. 1888.
2. Special; Works dealing with the separate
Balkan States, etc.
Bulgaria.
Jirecek, C. J. Das Fiirstenthum Bulgarien. Prague. 1891.
Geschichte der Bulgaren. Prague. 1876.
Kanitz, F. La Bulgarie danubienne. Etudes de voyage, 1860-80. Paris.
1881.
German edition. 3 vols. Leipzig.
1875-9'.
Mach, R. von. The Bulgarian Exarchate. Eng. trans.
London and Neuchatel.
1907.
Greece.
About,
E. La Grece contemporaine [published 1854]. 8th edn. Paris. 1888. Finlay, G.
History of Greece. Vol. vni. London. 1864.
Jebb,
Sir R. C. Two lectures on Modern Greece. London. 1901.
Sergeant,
L. Greece in the nineteenth century. London. 1897.
Montenegro, Bosnia, etc.
Coquelle, P. Histoire de Montenegro et Bosnie depuis les origines.
Paris. 1895. Sommieres, Vialla de. Voyage historique et politique en
Montenegro. Paris. 1820. English edition. London. 1820.
La France au Montenegro d’apres V. de S. et H.
Delarue. Recits de voyages
publies et completes par Cyrille (Baron Adolphe d’Avril). Paris.
1876.
Roumania.
Bioesco,
Prince Georges. Roumanie; D’Adrinople & Balta Liman (1829-49).
Correspondance et Documents 1843-56 2 vols. Paris.
1893-4.
Charles,
King of Roumania. Erinnerungen. In
Deutsche Revue, 1894. French translation in Indepen dance de Roumanie.
Bucharest 1894. Eng. adaptation. By Sidney Whitman. London. 1899.
Eliade, P. Histoire de l’esprit public en Roumanie an xixme
siecle. Paris. 1905. Fisher, E. Die Herkunft der Rumanen. Bamberg. 1904.
Hurmuzaki, E. von. Fragmente zur Geschichte der Rumanen [description in
eighteenth century]. Vol. v. Bucharest. 1885.
Mano, J. O. L’ union des Principautes roumaines. Paris. 1900.
Napoleon 111 et les Principautes roumaines. Anon.
[Armand Levy?] Paris.
1858.
Samuelson,
J. Roumania Past and Present. London. 1882. ’
Xenopol, A. Histoire des Roumains jusqu’a 1859. (Abridgment
from larger Roumanian work in 6 vols.) Jassy.
1889. Paris. 1896.
Servia.
Coquelle, P., Le Royaume de Serbie. Paris. 1894.
Cuniherti, Lt.-Col. F. La Serbia e la dinastia degli Obrenovich
(1804-93). Turin.
1893.
Mijatovich,
Chedo (late Servian Ambassador in England). Servia and the Servians.
London. 1908.
Rachitch, V. Le Royaume de Serbie. Paris. 1901.
NAPOLEON
III. THE LIBERAL EMPIRE.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Catalogue
of the History of France from the Bibliotheque Nationale, Series LB62
to LBW, and Series LC2 for periodical publications.
Briere, G., Caron, P., and Maistre, H. Repertoire methodique de
l’histoire modeme et contemporaine. Paris. 1898. (Published in yearly volumes.)
Caron, P. BibliogTaphie des travaux publies de I860 a 1897 sur l’histoire de
France depuis 1789. (Published in
parts from 1907 onwards.) .
Stammhammer, J. Bibliographie des Sozialismus und Kommunismus. 2
vols. Jena. 1893-1900.
II. MANUSCRIPTS.
The
several collections specified by Charles Schmidt in his note (Vol. ix., p. 787
of this History) on the manuscript material available for the history of the
First Empire would also serve for the Second, but for the faict that the latter
period is too recent to admit, in all cases, of the inspection of documents. A
definite rule of the Archives Nationales allows the inspection of those documents
only which date back at least 50 years. C. Schmidt, Les Sources de l’Histoire
de France depuis 1789, aux Archives Nationales (Paris, 1907), is a complete
guide to the various collections of documents, and to the method of consulting
them. For the period of the Second Empire Series BB80 is the most
important. It contains the documents which relate to the “ mixed commissions ”
(bound volumes or indexed registers), BB30/398 and following
numbers; and especially the political reports of the procureurs geniraux
(BB—390) arranged by districts. Rouher as Minister of Justice, by ,a circular
dated November 24, 1849, requested the procureurs geniraux to furnish, on the
first of each month, “ reports containing a reasoned estimate of the moral and
political condition of the departments...as well as shqrt accounts of such
political events as had happened.” By a circular of January 31, 1853, these
reports were to be furnished at half-yearly intervals only. The serifes in each
department is nearly complete, except that there is in almost all cases a gap
between December 1851 and February 1852. Drawn up as they were with the help of
the procttreur of each arrondissement, they furnish valuable information,
especially for the' period during which they were issued month by month,
concerning the activity of the political parties and the modifications
undergone by them, and also on economic subjects (harvests, famines, industrial
prosperity), and the moral condition of the people. On the subject of these
documents see an interesting communication by Seignobos to the Socie'te
d’histoire modeme in Bulletin, 6th year, No. 49, June, 1907.
III. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
A. Laws; Regulations; Official Documents.
Annales du Sdnat et du Corps legislatif. 1860 sqq.
Annales de l’Assemblee nationale. 1871 sqq.
Bulletin des lois.
Gazette des tribunaux.
Moniteur
universel (Official Journal of the Empire till 1869).
Journal officiel (from 1869).
La Censure sous Napoleon III. . Rapports inedits et in-extenso sur la
censure dramatique (1852-66). Paris. 1892.
Enquete sur le 18 mars. 3 vols. (i, Rapports; n, Dispositions; hi, Documents
publies par la Commission d’enquete parlementaire.) Paris.
1872.
B. JouKNALSj ETC.
(The
organs whose dates are not indicated may be consulted for the whole
duration
of the Empire.)
(a) Imperalist.
Le Constitutionnel; La Patrie; Le Pays; La France (from August 8, 1862);
L’Epoque (from March 9, 1865); L’Etendard (June 27, 1866—April 26, 1869); Revue
Contemporaine; Revue Europeenne (February 1, 1859—December 1, 1861).
(b) Legitimist.
La Gazette de France; L’Union.
(c) Orleanist.
Journal des Ddbats; Revue des Deux Mondes.
(d)
Independent (democratic or liberal).
La
Presse; Le Courrier du Dimanche (from 1857); L’Opinion Nationale (from
September 1, 1859); La Liberte (from July 16, 1865); Le Figaro (from November
16, 1866).
(e)
Moderate Republican.
Le
Steele; Le Charivari; Le Temps (from April 25, 1861); L’Avenir National (from
January 10, 1865); L’^lecteur, afterwards l’Electeur Libre (January 25,
1868—March
31, 1871); La Cloche (August 15, 1868—December 21, 1872).
(/)
Republican, Radical, and Socialist.
La
Lanterne (May 30—October 17, 1868); Le Reveil (July 2, 1868—January 22>
1871); Le Rappel (from May 4, 1869); La Marseillaise (December 19, 1869
July 25, 1870); La Phare de la Loire (published at Nautes); La Gironde
(published at Bordeaux).
(g) Journals of the Commune.
For a list and account of these see F. Maillard, "Les joumaux
pendant le Siege
et la Commune. Paris. 1871.
(A) Ultramontane.
L’Univers
(until its suppression on January 29,1860); Le Monde (from February 18, 1860);
L’Ami de la Religion (daily from March 16, 1869—June 16, 1862); Le
Correspondant.
Annuaire Historique (formerly Annuaire de Lesur). 1862-61; Annuaire des
Deux-Mondes. 1862-67.
C. Speeohes ; Letters ; Memoirs.
Berryer, Antoine. Discours parlementaires. 6 vols. Paris. 1872-5.
Favre, Jules. Discours parlementaires. 4 vols. Paris. 1881.
Ferry, Jules. Discours et opinions. 2 vols. Paris. 1893-4.
Gambetta, Leon. Discours et plaidoyers politiques. 9 vols. Paris.
1881-6. Grevy, Jules. Discours politiques et judiciaires. 2 vols. Paris. 1888.
Picard, Ernest. Discours parlementaires. 3 vols. Paris. 1886-90.
Thiers, Adolphe. Discours parlementaires. 16 vols. Paris. 1889.
Clamageron, J. J. Correspondance (1849-1902). Paris. 1906.
Guizot, F. P. G. Lettres a sa famille et a ses amis. Paris. 1884.
Merimee, Prosper. Lettres a une inconnue. 2 vols. Paris. 1873.
Lettres A Panizzi. 2 vols. Paris. 1881.
Papiers et correspondance de la famille imperials. 2 vols. Beauvais. 1871-2.
Papiers sauves des Tuileries (published by R. Halt). Paris. 1871.
Proudhon, P. J. Correspondance. 14 vols. Paris. 1874-6.
Quinet, Edgar. Lettres d’exil. 4 vols.
1884-6.
Sand,
George. Correspondance. 6 vols. Paris.
1882-4.
Veuillot, L. Correspondance. 7 vols. Paris. 1884-92.
Alton-She'e, Comte E. de. Mes memoires. 2. vols. Paris. 1868-9.
Barante, Baron de. Souvenirs. Vol. vrn. Paris. 1901.
Barrot, Odilon. Memoires. 4 vols. Paris. 1876-6.
Beslay, C. Mes souvenirs. Neuchatel. 1873.
Boichot, J. B. Souvenirs d’un prisonnier d’etat. Brussels. 1867. _
Cassagnac, A. Granier de. Souvenirs du second Empire. 3 vols. Paris.
1879-82. Castellane, Marechal de. Journal. 6 vols. Paris. 1895-6.
Delescluze, C. De Paris a Cayenne. Paris. 1869.
Duruy, V. Notes et souvenirs (1811-94). 2 vols. Paris. 1901.
Falloux, Comte de. Memoires d’un royaliste. 2 vols. Paris. 1888.
Fleury, General Comte. Souvenirs (1837-67). 2 vols. Paris. 1897.
Haussmann, Baron G. E. Memoires. 4 vols. Paris. 1890. .....
Hubner, Graf J. A. von. Neun Jahre der Erinnerungen eines oesterreichischen
Botschafters in Paris (1851-9). 2 vols.
Berlin. 1904. ^
Maupas, C. E. de. Memoires sur le second Empire. 2 yola Paris. 1884-6.
Persigny, Fialin, Due da Memoires. Paris. 1899.
Pessard, H. Mes petits papiers. 2 vols. Paris. 1887-8. ,
Quentin-Bauchart. ^tude et souvenirs sur la deuxieme republique et le
second Empire. 1848-70. Paris. 1901.
Randon, Marechal. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1875-7.
Rochefort, Henri. Les aventures de ma vie. 6 vols. Fans. 1896.
Scheurer-Kestner, A. Souvenirs de jeunesse. Paris.
1905.
Senior,
N. W. Conversations with M. Thiers, M. Guizot, and other distinguished persons.
2 vols. London. 1878.
Thiers, A. Notes et souvenirs. Paris. 1903.
Un Anglais a Paris. Notes et souvenirs. Traduit de l’anglais par J.
Herce.
Paris. 2 vols. 1893-4.
Viel-Castel, H. de. Me'moires sur le regne de Napoleon III. 6 vols. Bern.
1881-4.
.
,
IV. SECONDARY WORKS.
A. General.
Abbott,
J. S. C. History of Napoleon III, Emperor of the French. Boston. 1873. Beaumont-Vassy, Viscomte E. de. Histoire intime du second
Empire. Paris. 1874. Bulle, C. Geschichte des zweiten
Kaiserreichs und des Konigreichs Italien (Allgem. Gesch. in Einzeldarst.) Berlin. 1890.
Jassagnac, A. Granier de. Histoire de Louis-Philippe, de la Revolution
de fevrier, et du retablissement de l’Empire. Paris. 1857.
Darimon, A. Histoire d’un parti. Les Cinq sous l’Empire (1857-60).
Paris. 1885. L’opposition liberate sous l’Empi.re (1860-3). 1886. Le tiers
parti sous l’Empire (1863-6). 1887. Les irreconciliables sous l’Empire
(1867-9). 1888. Les Cent seize et le ministere du 2 janvier (1869^70). Paris.
1889.
Delord, Taxile. Histoire du second Empire. 6 vols. Paris. 1868-76.
Ebeling, A. Napoleon III und sein Hof (1851-70). 3 vols. Cologne.
1891-4. Fraser, W. Napoleon III. London. 1896.
Hanotaux, G. Histoire de la France contemporaine. Vols. i and n. Paris. 1903-4.
Jerrold, Blanchard. Life of Napoleon III. 4 vols. London. 1874-82.
La
Gorce, P. de. Histoire du second Empire. 7 vols. Paris.
1894-1905.
Ollivier,
Emile. L’Empire liberal. 12 vols. (in course of publication). Paris.
1895 et sqq. .
Zevort, E. Histoire de la Troisieme Rdpublique. Tome
i. Paris. 1895.
B. Special.
(1) Family and Court.
Beauregard, Comte D. de. 6tude et revue de l’histoire de l’Empereur
Napoleon III.
, Nice. 1903.
Bouchot, H. Les elegances du second Empire. Paris. 1896.
Chambrier, J. de. La cour et la socie'te du second Empire. 2 vols.
Paris. 1902-6. Conegliano, Due de. La maison de l’Empereul-. Paris.
1897.
Lano, P. de. La secret d’un Empire, i—La cour de Napoleon III. n—L’Empereur.
in—L’lmperatrice Eugenie. 3 vols. Paris. 1891-3.
Saint-Amand, Imbert de. Les femmes des Tuileries. La cour du second
Empire. Paris. 1898.
(2) Institutions.
Ancoc, L. Le Conseil d’etat avant et depuis 1789. Paris. 1876.
Berton, H. L’evolution constitutionnelle du second Empire. Paris. 1900.
Monnet, E. Histoire de l’administration provinciate, departementale et
conununale en France. Paris. 1885.
Nervo, Baron de. Les finances de la France de 1852 a 1860. 5 vols.
Paris. 1861. Pelatant, L. De l’organisation de la police. Dijon. 1899.
Trochu, Jules. L’armee franfaise en 1867. Paris. 1867.
(3) Religious Affairs.
Bourgeois* E, and Clermont, E. Rome et Napoleon III. Paris. 1907.
Debidour, A. Histoire des rapports de l’Eglise et de l’Etat en France de
1789 a
1870. Paris. 1898.
Durand-Morimbeau, H. La question romaine de 1865 a 1870. Paris. 1901. ,
Lecj uet, Pere. Montalembert. Vol. in. L’^glise et le second Empire
(1850-70).
Paris. 1902.
Meaux, Vicomte de. Montalembert. Paris. 1897.
Montalembert, Comte C. de. Les Interets catholiques au xixe
siecle. Paris. 1852. Ollivier, O. E. L’^glise et l’^tat au concile du Vatican.
2 vols. Paris, 1879. Piolet, J. B. Les missions catholiques franfaises au xix°
siecle. 6 vols. Paris. 1903. Salomon, M. Monseigneur Dupanloup. Paris. 1904. .
VeuiUot, E. Louis Veuillot. 3 vols. Paris. 1901-4.
(4) Foreign Policy.
Bourgeois, E. Manuel historique de politique £trangere. Vol. in: Le
temps present. Paris. 1905.
Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l’Europe de 1814 a 1878. Vol. n:
La Revolution. Paris. 1891.
Gaulot, P. Un reve d’Empire: l’empire de Maximilien; fin d’empire. 2
vols.
Paris. 1898. .
Grabinski, Comte J. Un ami de Napoleon III. Le Comte Arese et la
politique italienne sous le second Empire. Paris. 1897.
Gramont, Due de. La France et la Prusse avant la guerre. Paris. 1872.
Harcourt, B. de. Les quatre ministeres de M. Drouin de Lhuys. Paris. 1882.
Leonardon, H. Prim. Paris. 1901.
Rothan, G. Souvenirs diplomatiques. L’Europe et l’avenement du second
Empire. Paris. 1890. .
La Prusse et son roi pendant la guerre de
Crimee. Paris. 1888.
L’affaire du Luxembourg. Le prelude de la
guerre de 1870. Paris. 1882.
L’Allemagne et 1’Italie, 1870-1. 2 vols.
Paris. 1884-5.
Thonvenel, L. Pages de l’histoire du second Empire. Paris. 1903.
Trois annees de la Question d’Orient (1856-9).
Paris. 1897.
Le secret de l’Empereur (1860-3). 2 vols.
Paris. 1889.
Valfrey, J. Histoire de la diplomatie de la defense nationale. 3 vols.
Paris. 1871-3.
(5) Economic Development.
Enqnete de 1860 sur l’etat de l’industrie en France. 8 vols. Paris.
1B61-2. Enquete de 1870 sur le regime economique de la France. Resume
analytique par Cocq, Paul et Benard, . Paris. 1872. .
Rapport sur l’Exposition universelle de 1867. Paris.. 1869.
Rapports des deleguls des ouvriers parisiens a, l’Exposition de Londrea
en 1862. Paris. 1862—4.
Rapports des delegations ouvrieres a l’Exposition de 1867. 2 vols.
Paris. 1869. Statistique industrielle de 1861-5. Paris. 1873.
Statistique agricole decennale de la France. Paris. 1862.
Audiganne, A. Les populations ouvrieres et les industries de France. 2
vols. Paris. 1860.
Bournon, F. Paris, histoire, monuments, administration. Paris. 1888.
Compagnon, A. Les classes laborieuses. Paris. 1858.
Corbon, C. A. Le secret du peuple de Paris. Paris. 1863.
Esterno, Comte de. Privileges de l’ancien regime et du nouveau. 2 vols.
Paris.
1867-8.
Levasseur, E. Histoire des classes ouvrieres en France, depuis 1789.
Tome n (nouvelle edition, corrigee). Paris. 1904.
Picard, A. Traite des chemins de fer. 4 vols. Paris. 1887.
Reybaud, L. Rapport sur la condition des ouvriers qui vivent de la soie.
Paris.
1859.
Le coton. Paris. 1863.
La laine. Paris. 1867.
Rist, C. La duree du travail dans l’indnstrie franfaise de 1820 k 1870.
Revue d’^conomie politique. 1897.
Simon, Jules. L’ouvriere. Paris. 1861.
L’ouvrier de hnit ans. Paris. 1867.
Wolowski, L. Le. liberte commerciale et; les resultats des traites de
commerce de
1860. Paris. 1868.
(6) The Republican Party and the Socialist
Movement.
Jaures, J.. Histoire socialise, VoL z. Le second Empire, by A. Thomas.
Paris.
1907.
Tchemoff, I. Le parti republicain an coup d’etat et sous le second
Empire. Paris.
1906.
Weill, G. Histoire du parti republicain en France, de 1814 a 1870.
Paris. 1900. Histoire du mouvement social en France
(1852-1902). Paris. 1905.
Geffroy, G. L’Enferme. Paris. 1897. [Biography of Blanqui.]
Ranc, A., Grousset, P., Castagnary, J. A., and Sarcey, F. Le bilan de
l’annee
1868. Paris. 1869.
Reinach, J. Joseph-Leon Gambetta. 2nd edn. Paris. 1884.
Saint-Ferreol, A. Les proscrits franfais en Belgique. 2
vols. Brussels. 1870. S£che, Leon. Jules Simon.
Paris. 1887.
Simon, Jules. La politique radicale. Paris. 1868.
Faure, E., and Fontaine. Le peuple et la place publique. Paris. 1869.
Fribourg, E. L’association Internationale des travailleurs. Paris. 1871.
Guillaume, J. L’lnternationale. Souvenirs et documents. 3
vols. (two published). Paris. 1906-7.
Nettlau.
Michel Bakunin. (In German. One of the fifty copies printed is at Paris, in the
library of the Musee Social.)
Richard, A. Les debuts du parti socialiste firan^ais. Revue politique et
parlementaire, 10 Jan., 1897. Les propagateurs de l’lntemationale en France.
Revue socialiste, 15 June, 1896.
Testut, O. L’lntemationale. Lyons. 1871.
Le livre bleu de l’lntemationale. Paris. 1872.
Tolain, H. Quelques -verites sur les elections de Paris. (31
mai, 1863 ) Paris.
1864.
(7) The Government of National Defence.
Duret, T. Histoire de 1870 a 1873. 2 vols. Paris. 1901.
Favre, Jules. Gouvemement de la Defense nationale. 3 vols. Paris. 1873.
Simon, Jules. Souvenirs du 4 septembre. 2 vols. Paris. 1874.
Trochu, General. L’Empire et la defense de Paris; pour la verite et la
justice. Paris. 1874.
(8) The Commune.
Allemane, J. Memoires d’un Communard. Paris. 1906.
Arnould, A. Histoire populaire et parlementaire de la Commune. 3 vols.
Brussels. 1873.
Bourgin, G. Histoire de la Commune. Paris. 1907.
Claretie, J. Histoire de la Revolution de 1870-1. 5 vols. Paris, s. d.
Da Costa, Gaston. La Commune vecue. 3 vols. Paris. 1903-5.
Ducamp, M. Les convulsions de Paris. 4 vols. Paris. 1878.
FiauXj L. Histoire de la Guerre civile de 1871. Paris. 1879.
Jaures, J. Histoire socialiste. Vol. xi. La guerre franco-allemande et
la Commune, by J. Jaures, and L. Dubreuilh. Paris. 1908.
Lanjalley, P. and Corriez, P. Histoire de la Revolution du 18 mars.
Brussels. 1871.
Malon, B. La troisieme defaite du proletariat fran^ais. Neuchatel. 1871.
Marx, Karl. La Commune de Paris. 1901. (French edition of “ La guerre
civile en France"; address of the Conseil general de l’lnternationale in
June 1871.) Pelletan, C. La semaine de mai. • Paris. 1880.
(9) National Assembly.
Chaudordv, Comte de. La France k la suite de la guerre de 1870-1. Paris.
1873. Marcere, Emile de. L’Assemblee nationale de 1871. Paris. 1904.
Simon, Jules. Le gouvemement de M. Thiers. 2 vols. Paris. 1879.
Thiers, A. Occupation et liberation du territoire, 1871-3. 2 vols.
Paris. 1903.
V. ICONOGRAPHY.
Dayot, A. Le second Empire. Paris. 1900.
La commune. Paris. 1902.
I. PRINCIPAL WORKS AND COLLECTED EDITIONS.
[For
Bibliographies see II below.]
Arnold,
Matthew. Works. 15 vols. London. 1903.
Bronte,
Charlotte, Emily and Anne. Life and Works of E. Gaskell. 7 vols. London.
1872-3.
Browning,
Elizaheth Barrett. Poetical Works. 2 vols. London. 1897.
Robert. Poetical Works. , 2 vols. London.
1902.
Carlyle,
Thomas. Works. 31 vols. London. 1897-1901.
Clough, A. H.
Poetical and Prose Remains; with Selections from his Letters and a Memoir.
Edited hy his Wife. 2 vols. London. 1869.
Dickens,
Charles. Works. Introd. hy G. Gissing. '24 vols. London. 1899-1901. Eliot,
George. Works. 20 vols. Edinburgh. 1878-80.
FitzGerald,
Edward. Works. Variorum edition. 7 vols. London. 1907. Froude, J. A. History of
England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Armada. 12 vols. London.
1893.
Short Studies on great Subjects. 5 vols.
London. 1907.
Gaskell,
Elizabeth C. Works. Knutsford edition. Introductions by A. W. Ward. London.
1906.
Hood, Thomas.
Works. Edited by his Son and Daughter. 10 vols. London.
1869-73.
Keble, John.
The Christian Year. London. 1906.
Kinglake, A.
W. Eothen. Notes by W. Lock. London. 1896.
The
Invasion of the Crimea. 9 vols. Edinburgh. 1877-88.
Kingsley,
Rev. Charles. Life and Works. 19 vols. London. 1901.
Lytton, Earl
of (E. Bulwer-Lytton), 1st Lord. Works. 30 vols. London. 1897. Macaulay, Lord
(T. Babington Macaulay). Works. 12 vols. London. 1898. Mangan, J. C. Selected
Poems. With study by L. I. Guiney. Boston. 1897. Meredith, George. Works. 17
vols. London. 1897-8.
Morris,
William. The Defence of Guenevere. London. 1903.
The Earthly Paradise; Sigurd the Volsung.
London. 1896.
Napier, Sir
W. F. P. History of the War in the Peninsula. 6 vols. London. 1851.
Newman, J. H.
Tracts for the Times [with others]. London. 1833-41.
Apologia pro Vita Sua. London. 1873.
Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. London.
1881.
O’Shaughnessy,
A. An Epic of Women. London. 1870.
Lays of France. London. 1872.
Reade,
Charles. The Cloister and the Hearth. London. 1902.
Rossetti,
Christina. Poetical Works; with Memoir and Notes by W. M. Rossetti. London.
1904.
D. G. Collected Works. Edited by W. M.
Rossetti. 2 vols. London. 1886.
Ruskin, John.
Works. Variorum edition. 33 vols. London. 1903 sqq. Swinburne, A. C. Poems and
Tragedies. 11 vols. London. 1905.
Tabley, Lord
de (John Leicester Warren). Collected Poems. London. 1903. Taylor, Sir Henry.
Works. 5 vols. London. 1877-8.
Tennyson,
Lord (Alfred Tennyson). The Annotated Works of Lord Tennyson.
9 vols.
London. (In progress.)
Thackeray, W.
M. Works, with biographical Introductions, by his Daughter, Annie Richmond
Ritchie. 13 vols. London. 1897-1900.
Webster,
Augusta. Portraits. London. 1893.
Selected Poems. London. 1893.
II. BIOGRAPHIES AND LETTERS.
Arnold,
Matthew. Letters, 1848-88. Collected and arranged hy G. W. E. Russell.
2 vols. London. 1895.
Bibliography. By T. B. Smart. London. 1892.
Blackwood,
William, and his Sons, their Magazine and Friends. By Margaret
O. W. Oliphant. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1897.
Browning,
Robert. Life and Letters. By Mrs Sutherland Orr. London. 1899.
Letters of R. Browning and E. B. Barrett. 2
vols. London. 1899.
Edward Berdoe. The Browning Cyclopaedia.
London. 1902.
Carleton,
William. Being his Autobiography and Letters, and continuation by D. J.
O’Donoghue. 2 vols. London. 1896.
Carlyle,
Thomas. Reminiscences. Edited by C. E. Norton. 2 vols. London. 1887.
Life. By J: A. Froude. 4 vols. London. 1890.
Mr Froude and Carlyle. By David Wilson.
London. 1898.
The Correspondence of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph
Waldo Emerson. Edited
by C. E.
Norton. 2 vols. Boston. 1883.
Correspondence of Goethe and T. C. Ed. C. E.
Norton. London. 1887.
Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle.
Prepared for publication
by T.
Carlyle, edited by J. A. Froude. 3 vols. London. 1883.
Bibliography. By R. H. Shepherd. London. 1881.
Dickens,
Charles. Life. By John Forster. 3 vols. London. 1872-4.
Letters. 3 vols. London. 1880-2.
Bibliography. By R. H. Shepherd. London. 1880.
Eliot,
George. Letters and Journals. Ed. by J. W. Cross. 3 vols. London. 1885.
FitzGerald, Edward. Letters and Literary Remains. Edited by W. A. Wright.
3 vols. London. 1889.
Fox,
Caroline. Memories of old Friends. Edited by H. N. Pym. London. 1882. Froude,
J. A. Life. By Herbert Paul. London. 1905.
Hood, Thomas.
Memorials. By his Daughter. 2 vols. London. 1860.
Hunt, Leigh.
Autobiography. London. 1885.
Kingsley,
Charles. Letters and Memories of his Life. Edited by his Wife. 2 vols. London.
1877.
Literary
Anecdotes of the Nineteenth Century. Edited by W. R. Nicoll and T. J. Wise. 2
vols. London. 1895-6.
Macaulay,
Lord. Life and Letters. By Sir G. O. Trevelyan. London. 1895. Morris, William.
Life. By J. W. Mackail. 2 vols. London. 1901.
Bibliography. Ed. Scott-Temple. London. 1897.
Murray, John.
Memoir and Correspondence, with an Account of the Origin and Progress of the
House, 1768—1843. 2 vols. London. 1891.
Newman, J. H.
Letters and Correspondence of J. H. Newman during his Life in the English
Church. With a brief Autobiography. Edited by Anne Mozley.
2 vols. London. 1891.
. Life. By R. H. Hutton. London. 1891.
Pre-Raphaelite
Diaries and Letters (1835-53). Ed. W. M. Rossetti. London. 1900. Pugin, A. W.
N. Contrasts. London. 1841;.
r- The true Principles of Pointed or
Christian Architecture. London. 1841.
Punch, the
History of. By M. H. Spielmann. London. 1895.
Reade,
Charles. A Memoir. By C. L. Reade and Compton Reade. 2 vols. London. 1887.
Rossetti, Di
G. Family-Letters. Ed. W. M. Rossetti. 2 vols. London. 1895.
Letters of, to W. Allingham, 1854-70. Ed. G.
B. Hill. London. 1897.
Recollections of D. G. Rossetti. By Hall
Caine. London. 1882.
D. G. Rossetti, a Record and a Study. By W.
Sharp. London. 1882.
Ruskin, John.
Life. By W. G. Collingwood. London. 1900.
Bibliography. • By T. J. Wise. London.
1889-93.
— from 1834-81. 5th edn. London. 1882.
Taylor, Sir
Henry. Autobiography. 2 vols. London. 1885.
Tennyson,
Lord (Alfred Tennyson). Memoir. By Hallam, 2nd Lord Tennyson.
2 vols. London. 1897.
Thackeray, W.
M. Life. By L. Melville. 2 vols. London. 1899.
Bibliography,. By R. H. Shepherd. London.
1880.
Trollope,
Anthony i Autobiography. 2 vols. London. 1883.
III. CRITICISM.
Bagehot, W.
Literary Studies. With Memoir by R. H. Hutton. 2 vols. London. 1879. . .
Beers, H. A A
History of English Romanticism in the Nineteenth Century.
London. 1902.
Brimley,.
George, Essays, London. 1881.
Brooke,
Stopford A. Tennyson: his Art and Relation to modern Life. London. 1894. The Poetry of Robert Browning. London. 1902.
Four Victoria Poets, Arnold, Clough, Rossetti,
William Morris. London.
1908.
Cook, E. T.
Studies in Ruskin. Orpington. 1890.
Cross, W. L.
The Development,of the English Novel. New York. 1899.
English Men
of Letters. Volumes on authors of this period. London. (In progress.)
Gissing, G.
Charles Dickens: a critical Study. London. 1898.
Great
Writers. Volumes on authors of the period. With bibliographies by J. P.
Anderson. London. (In progress.)
Harrison, F.
Studies in Early Victorian Literature. London. 1895.
Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill and other literary
Estimates. London. 1899.
Jones, H.
Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher. Glasgow. 1896. Saintsbury,
G. History of Nineteenth Century Literature. London. 1896.
History of Criticism, vol. m. Edinburgh. 1904.
Scherer, E.
Essays on English Literature. Eng. translation. London. 1891. Stedman, E. C. Victorian
Poets. London. 1887.
Stephen, Sir
Leslie. Hours in a Library. 3 vols. London. 1892,
Studies of a Biographer. 4 vols. London.
1898-1902.
Taine,
Hippolyte. History of English Literature, vol. u. London. 1873.
Walker, H.
The Age of Tennyson. London. 1897.
The greater Victorian Poets. London. 1895.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND WORKS OF REFERENCE.
Dahlmann-Waitz. Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte. 7th edn. 1906.
Hrsgbn. von E. Brandenburg. Mit Erganzungsheften. Leipzig. 1907.
Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft. (From 1878.) Berlin. 1880 sqq.
Bibliographic der deutschen Geschichte in der Deutschen Zeitschrift fur
Geschichtswissenschaft. Leipzig. 1889 sqq.
II. GENERAL
GERMAN HISTORY, 1862-71.
A. Documents, etc.
Abeken, H. Ein schlichtes Leben in bewegter Zeit. Berlin. 1898.
Bamberger, L. Erinnerungen. Hrsgbn. von P. Nathan. Berlin. 1899. Bemhardi,
T. von. Aus dem Leben Theodor von Bernhardis. Berlin. 1893-1901. Beust, F. F.
Count von. Aus drei Vierteljahrhunderten. 2 vols. Stuttgart.
1887. Engl. Tr.: Memoirs of Count von Beust.
Tr.' by Baron H. de Worms. 2 vols. London.
1887.
Bismarck, Prince. Regesten zu einer wissenschaftlichen Biographic des
ersten Deutschen Reichskanzlers. Leipzig. 1891-2.
Die politischen Reden des Fursten Bismarck.
Historisch-kritische Gesamt-
ausgabe besorgt von H. Kohl. Stuttgart. 1892-1904.
Fiirst B. als Redner. Vollstandige Sammlung
der parlamentarischen Reden
Bismarcks seit 1877 mit Einleitungen und Erlauterungen von W. Bohms und
A. Dove. Berlin,
Stuttgart 1896-1901.
Gedanken und Erinnerungen. Stuttgart. 1905.
R. v. Kendell, Furst und Furstin Bismarck.
Erinnerungen. Berlin and
Stuttgart. 1901.
M. Busch. Graf Bismarck u. seine Leute wahrend
des Krieges mit Frankreich.
5th edn.
Leipzig. 1878. Engl. Tr.: Bismarck. Some secret pages of history. London. 1898.
Bismarck-Jahrbuch, herausgeg. von H. Kohl. Berlin. 1897-9.
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Kraft, Prinz zu. Aus meinem Leben. Dresden. 1904.
Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, Chlodwig, Furst zu. Denkwurdigkeiten. 2 vols.
Stuttgart. 1906. English Tr. London. 1906.
Kohl, H. Dreissig Jahre Preussisch-Deutschen Geschichte 1858-88 in
amtlichen Kundgebnngen. Giessen. 1888.
Moltke, Field Marshal Count von. Moltkes militarische Werke, hrsgbn. vom
Grossen Generalstabe. Berlin. 1892 sqq.
Poschinger, H. von. Fiirst Bismarck und die Parlamentarier. Breslau.
1894-5.
Fiirst Bismarck und die Diplomaten. Hamburg.
1900.
Roon, Count von. Denkwiirdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls,
Kriegsministers Graf Roon. Breslau. 1905.
Schulthess, H. Europaischer Geschichtskalender. Nordlingen and Munich. 1861
sqq. Unsere Zeit. Leipzig. 1857-91.
Staats-Archiv, das. Sammlung offizieller Urkunden zur Geschichte der
Gegenwart.
Hamburg and Leipzig. 1861 sqq.
Tiedemann, C. von. Aus sieben Jahrzehnten. Leipzig. 1905.
William I, King of Prussia and German Emperor. Kaiser und Konig Wilhelm I.
Reden, Proklamationen, Kriegsberichte u. s. w. von Ubemahme der Regent- schaft
bis zur Eroffnung des ersten deutschen Reichstags. Berlin. 1879.
Wilhelms des Grossen Briefe, Reden und
Schrifben. Hrsgbn. von E. Berner.
Berlin. 1900.
B. Narrative and General Works.
Biedermann, K. Dreissig Jahre Deutscher Geschichte (1840-70). Breslau.
1896. Bismarck. M. Lenz, Geschichte Bismarcks. Leipzig. 1902.
C. Heyck, Bismarck. Bielefeld. 1907.
T. Matter, Bismarck et son temps. Paris. 1905.
H. Blum, Fiirst Bismarck und seine Zeit.
Munich. 1895.
P. Klein-Hattingen, Bismarck und seine Welt.
Berlin. 1902-7.
Bulle, C. Geschichte des zweiten Kaiserreichs und des Konigreichs Italian. Berlin.
1890.
Denis, E. La
fondation de l’Empire Allemand. Paris. 1906.
Frederick
III, King of Prussia and German Emperor. M.
Philippson, Friedrich III als Kronprinz und Kaiser. Berlin. 1895.
M. Philippson, Das Leben Kaiser Friedrichs
III. Wiesbaden. 1900.
M. v. Poschinger, Kaiser Friedrich. Berlin. 1898-1900.
Gorce, P. de la. Histoire du second Empire. Paris. 1897-1905.
Kauffmann, G. Politische Geschichte Deutschlands im 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin.
1900.
Maurenbrecher, W. Griindung des Deutschen Reiches 1859-71. Leipzig.
1892. Moltke, Field Marshal Count von. M. Fahns,
Feldmarschall Moltke. Berlin.
1900.
N. Bigge, Feldmarschall Graf Moltke. Munich. 1900.
Seignobos, C. Histoire politique de l'Europe contemporaine, 1817-96. Paris. 1897.
Sybel, Heinrich von. Die Begriindung des deutschen Reichs durch Wilhelm I.
5th revised edn. 7 vols. Munich and Leipzig. 1889-94. Popular edn.
1901.
Vogt, W. Welt- und Zeitgeschichte, 1862-90. Heidelberg.
1892.
William I,
King of Prussia and German Emperor. L. Hahn,
Wilhelm, der erste Kaiser des neuen Deutschen Reichs. Berlin. 1888.
Marcks, E. Kaiser Wilhelm I. Leipzig. 1905.
W. Oncken, Unser Heldenkaiser. Berlin. 1898.
L. Schneider, Aus dem Leben Kaiser Wilhelms.
Berlin. 1888.
H. v. Petersdortf, Kaiserin Augusta. Leipzig.
1900.
iwiedeneck-Siidenhorst, F. von. Deutsche Geschichte von der Auflosung des
alten bis zur Griindung des neuen Reiches. (Bibl. deutscher Geschichte.) 3
vols. Stuttgart. 1897-1905.
III. INTERNAL POLICY OF PRUSSIA, 1862-6.
Die innere Politik der Preussischen Regierung von 1862-6. Sammlung der
amtlichen Kundgebungen und halbamtlichen Aeusserungen. Berlin. 1866. Gneist, R.
von. Die Militarvorlage von 1892 und der Preussische Verfossungs- konflikt von
1862-6. Berlin. 1893.
Perthes, O. Aeusserungen des Kriegsministers von Roon fiber die Berufung
Bismarcks ins Ministerium, 1862. Historische Zeitschrift, 73.
IV. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1862-6.
[See
also Bibliographies to Chapters X and XVII, XIV, XIX, Sect. 1, B, X>.]
A. Documents
and Contemporary Memoirs.
Aktenstucke zum Wiener Friedensvertrage von 30. Okt. 1864. Kiel. 1865.
Bapst, G. Der Donnerschlag von Sadovra. Deutsche Revue, 29, 30.
Benedetti, Count V. Ma mission en Prusse. Paris. 1871.
Blumenthal, Field Marshal Count von. Tagehucher aus den Jahren 1866 und
1870-1. Stuttgart. 1902.
Boyen, Hermann von. Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Generaladjutanten Kaiser
Wilhelms I. H. v. Boyen. Hrsgbn. v. W. von Tumpling. Berlin. 1898. Delbrfick,
H. Der Deutsch-Danische Krieg, 1864. Hrsgbn. vom Grossen General- stabe.
Berlin. 1886-7- In Duppel und Alsen, Erinnerungen, Aufsatze, Reden. Berlin.
1905.
Delbriick, R. v. Lebenserinnerungen, 1817-67. Berlin. 1905.
Feldzug, der, von 1866 in Deutschland. Redigiert von der kriegsgesch.
Abteilung des Grossen Generalstabes. Berlin. 1868.
Frankenberg, Count F. von. Kriegstagebiicher 1866 und 1870-1. Stuttgart.
1896. .
Friedjung, H. Benedeks nachgelassene Papiere. Dresden. 1904. ,
Frobel, J. Ein Lebenslauf. Stuttgart, 1890-1.
Govone, U. II generale Giuseppe Govone. Torino. 1902. German /ersiou by K.
von Bruchhausen. Berlin: 1903.
Hahn, L. Zwei Jahre Preussisch-Deutscher Politik 1866-7. Berlin. 1868.
Hanover and Prussia. Offizieller Bericht uber d. Kriegsereignisse zw. Hannover
und Preussen 1866. Vienna. 1867.
Hansen, J. A travers la diplomatic (1864-7). Paris. 1875.
Les coulisses de la diplomatic (1864-79). Paris. 1880.
Henrici. Lebenserinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners. Stuttgart and
Leipzig.
1897.
Jansen, K. Schleswig-Holsteins Befreiung. Hrsgbn. von K Samwer. Wiesbaden.
1897. , _ .
Kolmer, G. Parlament und Verfassung in Osterreich. Vienna. 1902-5.
Kiihne. Kritische und unkritische Wanderungen iiber die Gefechtsfelder der
Preussischen Armeen in Bohmen. Berlin. 1870 sqq.
La Marmora, General Alfonso. Un po’ piu di luce sugli eventi politici e
militari dell’ anno 1866. Firenze. 1873.
German Transl. Mainz. 1873.
Loe, Freiherr W. von. Erinnerungen aus meinem Berufsleben. Stuttgart and
Leipzig. 1906.
“Memor, A.” (Due de Gramont). L’Allemagne nouvelle. Paris. 1879. Operationen, die, des 8. Deutschen
Bundes-Korps im Feldzuge des Jahres 1866.
Nach authentischen Quellen. Darmstadt and Leipzig. 1869.
Osterreichs Kampfe im Jahre 1866. Bearbeitet durch k. k.
Generalstabs-Bureau fur Kriegsgeschichte. Vienna. 1867-9.
Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein. Der Gang d. Preuss. Politik in d.
Schleswig- Holsteinischen Angelegenheit (1862-5). Berlin. 1865.
Reventera, Graf. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten in St Petersburg. Deutsche
Revue, 28, 29.
Rechberg und Bismarck, Deutsche Revue, 28. .
Saxon Army. Der Anteil des k. sachsischen Armee-Korps am Feldzuge 1866.
Bearb. vom Generalstabe. Dresden, 1869.
Stosch, Albrecht von. Denkwurdigkeiten, Stuttgart, 1903.
Vitzthum von Eckstadt, Count C. F. von. London, Gastein und Sadowa. 1864-6.
Stuttgart. 1889.
B. General and Special Works.
Busch, W. Der Kampf um den Frieden im Hauptquartier zu Nikolsburg 1866.
Histor. Zeitschrift, 92.
Delbriick, H. Langensalze und Vogel v. Falckenstein. In Delbriick,
Erinnerungen, Aufsatze, Reden. Berlin. 1901.
Friedjung, H. Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland, 1859-66.
Stuttgart. 1904.
Hoenig, F. Die Entscheidungskampfe des Mainfeldzuges an der Frankischen
Saale. Berlin. 1895.
Eanngiesser, O. Geschichte des Krieges von 1866. Basel. 1892.
Kozmian, S. von. Das Jahr 1863. Polen und die europaische Diplomatic,
Vienna. 1896.
Kurz, H. Der Feldzug der Mainarmee i. J. 1866. Berlin. 1890.
Lehmann, M. Der Krieg in Westdeutschland. Historische Zeitschrift, 22.
Lenz, M. Konig Wilhelm und Bismarck in Gastein 1863. Deutsche Rundschau,
Nov. and Dec. 1906.
Nikolsburg. Deutsche Rundschau. 1899.
Lettow-Vorbeck, O. v. Geschichte des Krieges von 1866. Berlin. 1896-1902. Matter, T. La Prusse et la revolution de Pologne en
1863. Annales des sciences politiques. Paris. 1905.
Olmiitz.—Die kritischen Tage von Olmiitz im Juli 1866. Vienna. 1903.
Schlichting, von. Moltke und Benedek. Berlin. 1900.
Schmitt, R. Die Gefechte bei Trautenau. Gotha. 1892.
Thimme, F. Wilhelm I, Bismarck und der Ursprung des Annexionsgedankens
1866. Histor.
Zeitschrift, 89.
Wengen, Fr. v. der. Geschichte der Kriegsereignisse zwischen Preussen und
Hannover. Gotha.
1885-6.
V. THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1866-70.
A. Souroes,
Documents, eto.
Bray-Steinburg, Graf Otto von. Denkwurdigkeiten. Leipzig. 1901.
Freydorf, R. von. Aus Briefen und Tagebiichem eines Deutschen Ministers.
Deutsche Revue, 8, 29. Annalen des Deutschen Reichs, 38.
Glaser, J. C. Archiv des Norddeutschen Bundes. Sammlung aller Gesetze, Ver-
trage und Aktenstiicke. Berlin. 1867,
Hirth, G. Annalen des Norddeutschen Bundes und des Deutschen Zollvereins
fur Gesetzgebung. Berlin. 1868-70.
Koller, A. Archiv des Norddeutsohen Bundes und des Zollvereins. Berlin*
1868-72.
B. General Works.
Binding, K. Die Grundung des Norddeutschen Bundes. Leipzig. 1889.
Matschoss, A. Die Luxemburger Frage. Breslau. 1902.
Salzer, E. Furst Chlodwig Hohenlohe Schillingsfurst und die Deutsche Frage.
Histor. Vierteljahrsschrift. 1907.
Thudichum, F. Verfassungsrecht des Norddeutschen Bundes und des deutschen
Zollvereins. Tubingen.
1869.
VI. THE WAR OF 1870-1.
. [See also
Bibliography to Chapter XXI.]
A. Doouments
and Contemporary Accounts.
Charles, King of Roumania. Aus dem Leben Konig Karls von Rumanien. Auf-
zeichnungen eines Augenzeugen. 4 vols. Stuttgart. 1894-1900. In Briefe und
Nachrichten fiber die Hohenzollemsche Thronkandidatur. Vol. n.
Deutscli-franzosische Krieg, der, 1870-1. Redigiert von der
knegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung des Grossen Generalstabs. 2 parts in 5 vols. 1872-81.
Gramont, Due de. La France et la Prusse avant la guerre. Paris. 1872.
Hahn, L. Der Krieg Deutschlands gegen Frankreich und die Grfindung des
Deutschen Kaiserreiches. Die Deutsche Politik 1867-71. In Aktengtucke, amtliche
und halhamtliche Aeusserungen. Berlin. 1871.
Lebrun. Souvenirs militaires 1866-70; preliminaires de la guerre; mes
missions 4 Vienne et en Belgique. Paris. 1895. German
translation by O. Busse. Leipzig. 1896.
Loftus, Lord
A. Diplomatic reminiscences. Two Series. 1862-79. 2 vols. London.
1894.
Lorenz,
Ottokar. Kaiser Wilhelm I und die Begriindung des Reichs. Jena. 1902.
Nigra, C. Ricordi diplomatici 1870. Nuova histologia, 56.
Sonvenirs diplomatiques 1870. Biblioth.
univers. 65.
Rothau, G. Les origines de la guerre de 1870. La politique fran^aise en
1866. Paris. 1879.
Souvenirs diplomatiques. L’affaire du
Luxembourg. Le prelude de la
guerre. Paris. 1882.
Souvenirs diplomatiques. La France et sa
politique exte'rieure en 1867.
2 vols. 1887.
Souvenirs diplomatiques. L’Allemagne et l’ltalie
1870-1. 2 vols. Paris.
1884-5. 3rd edn. 1889.
Stoffel, Baron C. Rapports militaires, ecrits de Berlin 1866-70. Paris. 1871.
B. Narrative and General Works.
Baldamus, A. Der Ursprung des deutsch-franzosischen Krieges nach einer Dar-
stellung Bismarcks. Neue Jahrbficher ffir das klassische Altertum. 1906. Blume,
W. von. Die Beschiessung von Paris und die Ursachen ihrer Verzogerung.
Berlin. 1899.
Blumenthal vor Paris. Preuss. Jahrbficher,
115.
Busch W. Die Beziehungen Frankreichs zu Ostreich und Italien zwischen den
liiegen von 1866 u. 1870-1. (University Programme.) Tubingen. 1900.
Das Deutsche grosse Hauptquartier und die
Bekampfung von Paris.
Stuttgart. 1904.
Die Verhandlungen fiber Reichsgrfindung und
Kaisertum. Tubingen. 1906.
Busch, W. Die Kampfe um Reichsverfassung und Kaisertum. Tubingen. 1906.
Daniels, E. Roon und Moltke vor Paris. Preuss. Jahrbucher^ 121.
Delbriick, H. Der Ursprung des Krieges v. 1870. Preuss.
Jahrbucher, 70. (See also 79.) ...
DaS Geheimnis der NapoieonischeL Politik.
Preuss. Jahrh. 82; and in
Erinnerungen, etc. Cf. Pr. Jahrb. 111..
— Die
Beschiessung von Paris. Erinnerungen, No. 974.
Eigenbrodt, A. Bismarck u. d. Kronprinz in der Kaiserfrage. Cassel. 1901.
Engel. Die Mobilmachung im Elsass 1870. Jahrb. fur d. deutsche Armee, 1908.
Fischer, S. Konig Wilhelm I und die Beschiessung von Paris. Leipzig. 1902.
See also die Grenzboten. 1902.
Hoenig, F. Vier und zwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie, entwickelt und
erlautert an den Schlachten von Gravelotte und St Privat am 17. Aug. 1870.
Berlin. 1891. 3rd edn. 1897.
Jakob, K, Bismarck und die Erwerbung Elsass-Lothringens 1870-1. Strassburg.
1905.
Kobell, L. von. Wilhelm I u. Ludwig II. Deutsche Revue, 22, 2.
Konig Ludwig II und Furst Bismarck 1870.
Leipzig. 1899.
Kiintzel, G. Thiers und Bismarck. Kardinal Bernis. Bonn. 1905.
Lehmann, G. Die Mobilmachung von 1870-1. Berlin.
1905.
Leonardon, H. Prim et la candidature Hohenzollern. Revue Historique, 74. Lorenz, O. Der Kronprinz, Furst Bismarck und d.
Kaiserfrage. Preuss. Jahrb. 109.
Moltke, H. Count von. Geschichte des deutsch-franz. Krieges 1870-1. In
Kriegs- gesch. Arbeiten, Vol. hi. Berlin. 1891.
Muret, P. La question des alliances en 1869 et 1870. Rev. d’hist. mod.
et contemp. 8.
Rogneni. La triple alliance de 1870. Nouv. Revue, 1906.
Schultze, W. Die Thronkandidatur Hohenzollern und Graf Bismarck. Halle.
1902.
Taine, H. Die offentl. Meinung in Deutschland u. d. Friedensbedingungen vom
7.
Oktober 1870. Stiidien z. Krit. u. G. 1897.
Tessier, T. Le plan de l’archiduc Albert et le projet de triple-alliance
austro- franco-italienne 1870. Caen. 1903.
Toeche-Mittler, T. Die Kaiserproklamation in Versailles 18. Jan. 1871.
Berlin.
1898. Also in
Beiheft zum Milit. Wochenblatt 1896. Supplement. 1897. Wagner, A. Elsass und
Lothringen und ihre Wiedergewinnung fiir Deutschland. Leipzig 1870.
[For
general purposes see also Bibliographies to Chapters XVII\ XIX;
XXI \ XXII, 1; XXIII ■, XXIV.] ■
I. GENERAL WORKS.
Albert, P. La litterature fran^aise au xix siecle. Paris. 1882.
Bourget, P. Bssais de psychologie contemporaine. Paris. 1904.
—^— Sociologie et litterature. Paris. 1904. •
Brunetiere, F. Evolution de la poesie lyrique au xix* siecle. 2 vols.
Paris. 1893-5.
Le roman naturaliste. Paris. 1884.
Doumic, R. Essai sur le theatre contemporain. Paris. 1898.
Faguet, E. Le xixe siecle. Paris. 1887.
Gautier, T. Histoire du romantisme. Paris. 1859.
Lanson, G. Histoire de la litterature fran^aise. Paris. 1898.
Lemaitre, J. Impressions de theatre. 10 vols. Paris. 1888 et sq.
Petit de Julleville, L. Histoire de la langue et de la litterature
fran^aise.
Vols. vn, viii. Paris. 1899.
Sainte-Beuve, C. A. Portraits contemporain; 5 vols. Paris. 1870-1.
Gauseries du lundi. 15 vols. Paris. 1857-62.
Nouveaux lundis. 10 vols. Paris. 1863-72.
Taine, H. Essais de critique et d’histoire. Paris. 1866-94.
Zola, iL Les romanciers naturalistes. Paris. 1881.
Le roman experimental. Paris. 1880.
H. SPECIAL STUDIES OF DIFFERENT AUTHORS.
Balzac, Honore de. E. Scherer. Etudes sur la litterature contemporaine.
Vol. rv.
Paris. 1885.
Spoelbach de Lovenjoul. Paris. 1886.
Saudelaire, Charles. F. Brunetiere. La statne de B. Revue des Deux
Mondes.
Paris. 1 Sept. 1892.
Vie, par T. Gautier. Paris. 1868.
Sainte-Beuve. Causeries du lundi. Vol. ix.
Paris. 1851.
Cousin, Victor. J. Simon. Paris. 1887.
Feuillet, Octave. Anatole France. La Vie litteraire. Vol. in. Paris.
1889.
Sainte-Beuve. Nouveaux lundis. Vol. v. Paris.
1870.
Flaubert, Gustave. A. France. La Vie litteraire. Vol. n. Paris. 1889.
Gautier, Theophile. E. Bergerat. Paris. 1879.
M. du Camp. Paris. 1890.
Sainte-Beuve. Nouveaux lundis. Vol.
vi. Paris. 1870.
Hugo, Victor.
E. Bire. 5 vols. Paris. 1869-93.
L. Mabilleran. Paris. 1893.
Sainte-Beuve. Premiers lundis. Vols. z-ra.
Paris. 1879.
Portraits contemporains.
Vols. i, xi. Paris. 1846.
Leconte de Lisle, C. M. P. Bourget. Essais de psychologie contemporaine
Paris. 1904.
F. Brunetiere. Evolution de la poesie lyrique.
Paris. 1895.
J. Lemaitre. Les Contemporains. Vol. zi.
Paris. 1887.
Merim^e, Prosper. A. Filon. Paris. 1894.
Musset, A. de. Sainte-Beuve. Causeries du lundi. Vols. i, xrn. Paris.
1851. Biographie. P. de Musset. Paris. 1877.
fitude par Arvede Barine. Les Grands £crivains
Fra^ais. Paris. 1893.
Renan, E. J. Darmesteter. Revue Bleue. Paris. 14, 21 Oct. 1893.
S. Remack. Revue archeologique. Paris. Jan.
1893.
Sand, George.
E. Caro. Paris. 1887.
Sainte-Beuve. Portraits contemporains. Paris.
1846.
Stendhal. E. Faguet. Revue des Deux Mondes. Paris.
February 1892.
—— E. Rod.
Paris. 1892.
Taine, H. A. de Margerie. Paris. 1894.
-— G. Monod. Renan, Taine, Michelet. Paris. 1894.
Thierry, A. Voeuvre de. F. Brunetiere in Revue des Deux Mondes. November
15,
1895.
Vigny, A. de.. M. Paleologue. Paris. 1892.
III. DRAMA, ART, CRITICISM, ETC.
Larroumet, G. JStudes de litterature et d’art. Paris. 1896.
Lenient, C. La Comedie en France au xix6 siecle. 2 vols.
Paris. 1898. Nicolardot, L. Confession <ie Sainte-Beuve. Paris. 1882.
Sainte-Beuve, C. A. Correspondance. 3 vols. Paris. 1877-80.
Sarcey, F.' Quarante Ans de Theatre. Bibliotheque des annales politiques
et litteraires. Vols. iv-vi.
Paris. 1902.
SPAIN
AND PORTUGAL. (1845-71.)
L SPAIN.
A. Bibliographies.
Hartzenbusch, E. Apnntes para un catalogo de periodicos madrilefios;...
Madrid. 1894.
Torres Campos, M. Bibliografia contemporanea del derecho y de la
politica.
2 vols. Madrid. 1883-98.
B. Published
Documents.
Catalogo de cuentas de la Administration publica, en los aflos de 1744 a
1856, existentes en el Archivo General Central. In the
Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos. Madrid. (Inprogress.)
Constituciones de Espafla. 2 vols. Madrid. 1886.
Constitution de la Monarquia Espanola. Madrid. 1857.
Constitution de la Nation Espanola, votada definitivamente por las
Cortes Con- stituyentes en 10 de junio de 1869. Madrid. 1869.
Dalmas y Olivart, R. Coleccion de Tratados ecc. celebrados desde el
reinado de Isabel II. 2 vols. Madrid. 1890-9.
Derecho parlamentario espanol. 2 vols. Madrid. 1885.
Diario de las sesiones de Cortes. (1845-71.) 50 vols. Madrid.
Documentos relativos a las negociaciones seguidas con la Santa Sede
desde el 10 de diciembre de 1854 hasta el dia. Madrid. 1855.
Documentos diplomaticos sobre el casamiento de S. M. Dona Isabel II, y
el de S. A. S. la Infanta Dona Luisa Fernanda. Madrid. 1847.’
Janer, F. Tratados de Espana (1842 a 1846). Madrid. 1869.
Leyes provisionales del matrimonio y del registro civil, y disposiciones
dictadas para la ejecucion de la primera. Edicidn oficial. Madrid. 1870.
Leyes sobre abolicidn de la pena de argolla; efectos civiles de la
interdiction : reversion al estado de los oficios de la fe publica, enagenados
de la corona y provision de las notarias. Leyes provisionales sobre reforma del
procedimiento, en lo criminal; establecimiento del recenso de casacidn, en lo
criminal; reforma de casacidn, en lo civil; ejercicio de la gratia de indulta. Edicidn
oficial. Madrid. 1870.
Muro
Martinez, J. Constituciones de Espana. 2 vols. Madrid. 1881.
C. Biographies.
Amadeus, King
of Spain. Whitehouse, H. R. New York. 1897.
Ame'dee de Savoie, Roi d’Espagne. Grabinski,
Count G. Paris. 1901.
Canovas del
Castillo. “El Solitario” y su tiempo. Madrid. 1883.
Life of. Creux, V. C. Paris. 1897.
Pons y Umbert, A. Madrid. 1901.
Castelar,
Emilio. Dario, R. Madrid. 1899.
Gonzalez-Araco, M. Su vida y su muerte. Madrid.
1900.
Grimaldi, A. L." E. Semblanza moral,
intelectual y polftica. Cadiz. 1868.
Sandoval, F. de. Coup d’oeil sur sa vie. Paris.
1886.
Luis, Count
of San, Sartorius, L. J. Historia periodistica, parlamentaria y ministerial
completa y detallada del Excmo. Sr. L. J. S.
Madrid. 1850.
Montemolin, el Conde de. Centurion, L. A. de. Historia de la vida
publica y privada de D. Carlos de Borbon y de Braganza. Madrid. 1848.
Novaliches, Marques de, Pavia y Lacy, M. Biografia del Sr. D. M. P. y L.
publicada en 1861, continuada hasta 1867 y aumentada hasta... 1875 por diversos
autores. Madrid. 1875.
Oldzaga. Fernandez de los Rios, A. Estudio politico y biografico. Madrid.
1863.
Palmerston,
Lord. Life of. Bulwer, Henry, Lord Dalling. 2 vols. London. 1870-4.
Prim, Juan, le general. Par Blairet, L. Paris. 1868.
Gimenez y Guited, F. Historia militar y
polftica del Excmo. Sr. D. Juan
Prim...continuada desde 1860 hasta sn muerte por D. Justo de la Fuente.
3 vols. Barcelona and Madrid. 1871.
Leonardon, H. Paris. 1901.
Orellana, F. J. (Historia del general Prim...)
2 vols. Barcelona. 1871-2.
Ruiz Zorilla, M. R, D. E. M. Historia de Ruiz Zorilla. Madrid.
1885.
D. Memoirs
and Travels.
Adolphus, J.
L. Letters from Spain in 1856 and 1857. London. 1858.
Alarcon, P. A. de. Diario de un testigo de la guerra en Africa. Madrid.
1859.
Alcala Galiano, A. Recuerdos de un anciano. Madrid. 1878.
Antioche, Comte de. Deux diplomates: le Comte Raczynsky et Donoso
Cortes. Depeches
et correspondance, 1848-53. Paris. 1881.
Biller, C.
Briefe aus Paris und Spanien, 1864-70. Dresden. 1901.
Borrow,
George. The Bible in Spain. London. 1843. [Covering the period
1835-40.]
Cibrario, G.
A. L. Lettere scritte in un viaggio di Spagna e Portogallo nel mdcccxlix. Turin. 1856.
Echegaray, J. Recuerdos. In La Espafia Moderna. Madrid. (In progress.)
Fernandez de Cordova, F., Marques de Mendigorrfa. Expedicion espanola a
Italia en 1849. Madrid. 1882.
Mis memorias intimas. 3 vols. Madrid. 1886-9.
Ford, R.
Handbook for travellers in Spain. London. 1845. [Resided in Spain during
1830-3.]
Garaude, A. de. L’Espagne en 1851. Paris. 1862.
Garcia Ruiz, E. Historias. 2 vols. Madrid. 1877.
Gautier, Th. Voyage en Espagne (Tra los Montes). Paris.
1843. [The journey began in 1840.]
Hay, J.
Castilian Days. Boston. 1871.
Hoskins, G.
A. Spain as it is. 2 vols. London. 1851.
Korner, G. Aus Spanien. Frankfort. 1867.
Latour, A. de. Etudes sur l’Espagne. Paris. 1855.
Latour, A. de. Espagne. Traditions, moeurs et litterature. Paris. 1869.
Lauser, W. Aus Spaniens Gegenwart. Leipzig. 1872.
Malengreau, A. Voyage en Espagne et coup d’oeil sur l’etat social, politique
et material de ce pays. Brussels. 1866.
Mesonero Romanos, R. de. Memorias de un setentdn. Madrid. 1881.
Miraflores, Marquis de. Mi vida politica. Madrid. 1866.
Memorias. 2 vols. Madrid. 1873.
Nunez de Arce, G. Miscelanea literaria. (Containing Recuerdos de la
guerra de Africa.) Barcelona. 1886.
Paul y Angulo, J. Memorias fntimas de un pronunciamiento. Madrid. 1869.
Los Asesinos del general Prim y la politica en
Espana. Paris. 1886.
Quinet, E. Mes vacances en Espagne. Paris. 1846.
Rasch, G. Vom spanischen Revolutionsschauplatze. Spanische Zustande,
Charak- teristiken und Geschichte. Vienna. 1869.
Regnault, H.
G. A. Correspondance. Paris. 1872.
Thombury, G.
W. Life in Spain: Past and Present. 2 vols.
London. 1869. Valero de Tornos, J. Cronicas retrospectivas. Recuerdos de la
segunda mitad del siglo xix por un portero del observatorio. Con un prdlogo de
Jacinto Octavio Picon. Madrid. 1901.
Villalba Hervas, M. Recuerdos de cinco lustros, 1848-63. Con un prologo
de Don Rafael Maria de Lahra. Madrid. 1896.
De Alcolea a Sagunto, 1868-74. Madrid. 1899.
Warren, J. E.
Notes of an attache in Spain in 1860. London.
1851.
Werthem, Freiherr von. General von Versen. Berlin. 1898.
Wolff, (Sir) H. Drummond. Madrilenia; or Pictures of Spanish
Life. London. 1851.
Wylie, J. A.
Dayhreak in Spain, or Sketches of Spain and its new Reformation.
London. 1872.
Yriarte, C. La societe espagnole. Paris.
1861.
Ziegler, A. Reise in Spanien. 'Mit Beriicksichtigung der
national-okonomischen Interessen. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1852.
Zorrilla, J. Recuerdos del tiempo viejo. 2 vols. Madrid. 1880-3.
E. General Histories and Treatises.
Aguilar, F. de A. El Pase Regio. Madrid.
1875. ,
Baumgarten, H. Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der franzosischen
Revolution bis auf unsere Tage. (Staatengesch. d. neuesten Zeit.) 3 vols.
Leipzig. 1865. Becker, J. Espana y Marruecos. Relaciones
diplomatics durante el siglo xix. Madrid. 1903.
Blasco Ibanez, V. Historia de la Revolucion Espy?ok 1808-74. Barcelona.
1890. Borrego, A. Organizacidn de los partidos. Madrid. 1855.
Espana y la Revolucidn. Madrid. 1856.
El Partido Conservador. Madrid. 1857.
Estudios parlamentarios. Madrid. 1875.
La Revolucion, la interinidad, y el
advenimiento de la Restauracion.
Madrid. 1875.
Historia de la Revolucidn. Madrid. 1877.
Historia de las Cortes durante el siglo xix. 2
vols. Madrid.
1885-6.
(In
progress.)
Bravo
Murillo, J. Opusculos. 5 vols. Madrid. 1863-5.
Burgos, J.
de. Anales del reinado de Da. Isabel II. 6 vols. Madrid. 1850-1. Calvo Marcos,
M. Regimen parlamentario en Espafia. Madrid. 1883.
Cardenas, F. de. Historia de la propiedad territorial en Espana. Madrid.
1873.
Castelar, E. Discursos parlamentarios y politicos. 4 vols. Madrid. 1885.
Castillo y Ayensa, J. Histoi-ia cri'tica de las negociaciones con Roma desde la
muerte de Fernando VII. Madrid. 1859.
Cherbuliez, V. L’Espagne politique, 1868-73. Paris. 1874.
Diercks, G. Gescl chte Spaniens. 2 vols. Berlin. 1895-6.
Domenech, E. Histoire du Mexique, Juarez et Maximilieu.... 3 vols.
Paris. 1868.
Donoso Cortes, J. F., Marques de Valdegamas. Obras...ordenadas y
precedidas de una noticia biografica por Don Gavino Tejado. 6 vols. Madrid.
1854.
Fabid, A. M. Ensayo de la legislaci6n espanola en sus estados de
Ultramar. Madrid. 1896.
Fuente, V. de la. Historia de las sociedades secretas antiguas y
modernas en Espana.
3 vols. Lugo. 1870-1.
Historia eclesiastica de Espana. 2 vols. Madrid. 1873-5.
Garrido, F. La Espana contemporanea. 2 vols. Madrid. 1865-7.
Goury du Roslan, J. Essai sur l’histoire economique de l’Espagne. Paris.
1887. Giiell y Rente, J. Paralelo entre las reinas catdlicas Dona Isabel I y
Dona Isabel II. Paris. 1858.
Guyot, Y. L’Evolution politique et sociale d’Espagne. Paris. 1899.
Hubbard, G. Histoire contemporaine de l’Espagne. 6 vols. Paris. 1869-83.
Iglesia y Carnicero, E. de la. Resena histdrica de la Guardia Civil. Madrid.
1898.
La Espana del siglo xix. 3 vols. Madrid. 1886-8.
Lafuente, M. Historia de Espana continuada por J. Valera, A. Borrego, y
A. Pirala. Barcelona.
1889. [Though his name appears on the title-page, Valera did not contribute to
this work.]
Latimer, E.
W. Spain in the nineteenth century. Chicago. 1898.
Lauser, VV. Geschichte Spaniens von dem Sturz Isabellas (1868—75). Leipzig. 1877.
Lopez de Mendoza, A., Conde de Robres. Historia de las gnerras civiles
en Espana desde la muerte del Senor Don Carlos II. Saragossa. 1882.
Marichalar, A. and Manrique, C. Historia de la legislacion. Madrid.
1861-3. Martos, C. Historia de la revolucion del ano 1854. Madrid. 1892.
Mazade, Ch. de. Les revolutions de l’Espagne contemporaine. Paris. 1869.
Mexico. Le general Prim, le Senat, les Cortes et la presse espagnole dans la
question du Mexique. Paris. 1863.
Miraflores, Marques de. La reforma en 1852. Madrid. 1852.
La obra de Castillo y Ayensa sobre
negociaciones con Roma. Madrid. 1859.
Participacidn de los partidos en los sucesos
de Espana en el siglo xix.
Madrid. 1863.
Reforma de la Constitucidn de 1845. Madrid.
1864.
Los siete primeros anos de Isabel II. 4 vols.
Madrid. 1863-73.
Morel, H. Isabelle II reine d’Espagne. Paris. 1868.
Muniz, R. Apuntes sobre la revolucion de 1868. 2 vols. Madrid. 1884-6.
Narracion militar de la guerra Carlista, 1869-76. 14 vols. Madrid. 1883-9.
Ollivier, ^inile. L’Empire liberal. Vol. v. Paris. 1900.
Olozaga, S. Estudios de elocuencia, politica, jurisprudencia, historia y
moral. Madrid. 1864.
Pinedra y Cevallos, A. de. Casamientos regios de la Casa de Borbon en
Espana, 1701—1879. Madrid. 1881.
Quadrado, J. M. Ensayos politicos y literarios. 3 vols. Palma. 1893-4.
Reynald, H. Histoire de l’Espagne depuis la mort de Charles II. Paris.
1873. Rico y Amat, J. Historia politica y parlamentaria de Espana. 3
vols. Madrid. 1860-1.
Rodriguez
Solis, E. Historia del partido republicano espafiol. Madrid. 1893. Rubid, C. Historia filosofica de la revolucion de 1868. Madrid.
1869.
Santillan, R. Memoria de las reformas hechas en el sistema de impuestos
de Espana,
1845-54.
Madrid. 1888.
Strobel, E.
H. The Spanish Revolution, 1868-75. London. 1898.
Teste, L. L’Espagne contemporaine. Paris. 1872.
Wallis, S. T.
Spain : her institutions, politics and public men. Boston. 1853. Webster, W. Spain. London. 1882.
II. PORTUGAL.
A. Biblioqraphy.
Figaniere, J. C. de. Bibliographia Historica Portugueza. Lisbon. 1850.
B. Documents.
Codigo Civil
Portuguez, anotado por J. D. Ferreira. 5 vols. Lisbon and Coimbra.
1870-7.
Diario das Cortes Geraes e Extraordinarias da Na^ao Portugueza
(1845-71). 50 vols. Lisbon.
Documentos para a historia das Cortes Geraes da Na^ao Portugueza.
Lisbon.
1889-91. (In progress.)
Ferreira Borges de Castro, Viscount J. Collefao dos actos publicos
celebrados entre a coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 ate ao
presente. Lisbon. 1856.
Interven^ao Estrangeira, ou documentos historicos sobre a intervencao
armada da Fran9a, Hespanha e Inglaterra nos negocios internos de Portugal no
anno de
1847. Oporto. 1848.
Saldanha de Oliveira Daun, J. C. de, Duke of Saldanha. Requerimento e
correspondent do Duque de Saldanha com o Ministro da Guerra [Count de Thomar]
por occasiao de ser demittido do officio de Mordomo Mor da Caza Real. Lisbon.
1850.
Correspondencia, 1826-62. 2 vols. Lisbon.
1904-5.
Santarem, F. A., Vizconde de. Quadro elementar das relates politicas e
diplomaticas.
18 vols. Paris. 1842-62.
Tavares de Medeiros, J. J. Das Staatsrecht Portugal’s. 1892.
Thomar, Conde de. A letter from Count Thomar to the
Duke of Saldanha. London. 1851.
C. Biographies.
Bandeira, Marquez Sa da. Soriano, J. P. da Luz. (Vida do Marquez Sa da
Bandeira.) 2 vols. Lisbon. 1887-8.
Cabral, Antonio Bernardo da Costa. Almeida e Araujo Correa de Lacerda,
J. M.
de. (Apontes contemporaneos.) 2 vols. Lisbon. 1844^50.
Carvalho, Jose da Silva. Vianna, A. Documentos para a historia
contemporanea.
Jose da Silva Carvalho e o seu tempo. 3 vols. Lisbon. 1891-4.
Don Luis 1“. Piel de Troismonts, C. Paris. 1866.
Palmella, Duke of. Lopes de Mendonya, A. P. (Noticia historica do Duque
de Palmella.) Lisbon. 1859. saldanha, Duke of. Smith, J. A., Marquez de Camota.
Memoirs
of the Duke of Saldanha with selections from his correspondence. 2 vols.
London. 1880.
D. Travels
and Memoirs.
Brandao Cro
de Castro Ferreri, A. De Lisboa a Mozambique. Lisboa. 1884. Brandes, H. K.
Ausflug nach Portugal im Sommer 1863. Lemgo and Detmold. 1864.
Cibrario, G.
A. L. Ricordi d’ una missione in Portogallo al re Carlo Alberto. Turin. 1850.
Fernandez de los Rios, A. Mi Mision en Portugal. Paris and Lisbon. 1877.
Mazade, Ch. de. Le Portugal sous le roi dom Luis. In the Revue des Deux Mondes,
July 1, 1864, vol. lh, pp.
189—223.
Merson, O. Voyage dans les provinces du nord dn Portugal. In the Tour du
Monde, 1“ semestre, 1861, vol. n, pp. 273—320.
Moller, P. Resa i Afrika, genom Angola, Ovampo och Damaraland. Stockholm.
1899.
Owen, H. Here
and there in Portugal. London. 1856.
Wortley, Lady
E. Stuart. A visit to Portugal and Madeira. London. 1854.
E. General
History and Treatises.
Andrade Corvo, J. de. Estudos sobre ae provinciae ultramarinas. 4 vols.
Lisbon. 1883-7.
Bonanza, J. Historia da Luzitania. Lisbon. 1887. (In progress,)
Bouchot, J. Histoire du Portugal. Paris. 1854.
Carvalho Soveral, A. de. Breve estudo sobre a ilia de Mozambique.
Oporto. 1887. Delannoy, C. L’Angola et la colonisation portugaise. Brussels.
1895. Drummond, H. Nyassaland. London. 1890.
Franca, B. da. Subsidios para a historia de Macau. Lisbon. 1888.
Giedroyc, Prince R. Resume de l’histoire du Portugal au xixe
siecle. Paris. 1875. Gremiaux, C. Possessions portugaises dans l’extreme
orient. Paris. 1883. Iseghem, A. van. Les lies
portugaises de l’Afrique. Brussels. 1897.
Kutscbera, M. Macau, der erste Stiitzpunkt europaischen Handels in China. Vienna. 1900.
Le Grand, M. Le Portugal. Notice historique au point de vue dn
developpement de ses relations avec la France. Fecamp. 1895.
MacSwiney de Mashanglass, Marquis de. Le Portugal et le Saint-Siege. 2 pts. Paris. 1881-9.
Minutoli, J. von. Portugal und seine Colonien. 2 vols. Stuttgart. 1855. Oliveira Martins, J. P. Historia de Portugal. 2 vols. 6th edn.
Lisbon. 1906.
Portugal contemporaneo. 2 vols. 2nd edn.
Lisbon. 1895.
Portugal em Africa. Oporto. 1891.
Pinheiro
Chagas, M. As Colonias portuguezas no seculo xix. Lisbon. 1890. Pinto, F. A.
Angola e Congo. Lisbon. 1888.
Pinto Leal, B. de. Portugal antigo e modemo. 7 vols. Lisbon. 1873-7.
Quenthal, A. de. Portugal perante a revoluzao de Hespanha. ConsiderazSes
sobre o futuro da politica portugueza no ponto de vista da democracia iberica.
Lisbon. 1868.
Salisbury, W.
A. Portugal and its people. Lisbon. 1893.
Santo Luiz, Cardinal F. de. Os Portuguezes na Africa,
Asia, America e Oceania.
Lisbon. 1890. .
Ternant, V. de. Les colonies portugaises. Paris. 1890.
Theal, G. M.
The Portuguese in South Africa. London. 1896.
Worsfold, W.
B. Portuguese Nyassaland. London. 1899.
[Whitehead,
J.] An Essay on the resources of Portugal, and especially as to her relations
with foreign countries. Sent to B. Oliveira, Esq. London. 1853.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Baldamus, E. Litteratur des deutsch-franzosischen Krieges, 1870-1. Leipzig. 1871.
Palat, Commandant. Bibliographie generate de la Guerre de 1870-1. Paris.
1896.
[The most
complete bibliography which has yet appeared.]
Schulz, M. A.
Bibliographie de la guerre franco-allemande. Paris. 1886.
See also G.
Hooper. Sedan, the downfall of the Second Empire. London. 1887 ; Col. P.
Maurice. War. London. 1891; and a valuable list of German works on the campaign
is in the Militarische Katalog published by Mittler, Berlin.
II. MANUSCRIPTS.
Almost all
the available original documents dealing with the campaign have been
catalogued, and the greater part are stored in the Military History Section of
the Great General Staff at Berlin, and in the Historical Section of the Staff
of the Army at Paris. Access to these documents (on which the official
histories of the War are largely based) can only be obtained through diplomatic
channels, and is granted very sparingly.
The German
Great General Staff has, in its official history, and in a number of monographs
on phases of the campaign, published the gist of the greater part of the
documents in its charge, and the French Staff is now in process of doing the
same. In either case the documents published have, as is natural, been
carefully selected, and the point of view presented is the official one.
III. WORKS BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, AND
PUBLISHED OFFICIALLY OR SEMI-OFFICIALLY.
Bulletin officiel du ministere de l’interieur, delegation de Tours et de
Bordeaux. Poitiers.
1871.
Clarke, Major
F. C. H. The Franco-German War, 1870-1. Translated from the German official
account. 5 vols. London. 1881-4. (Published by the Intelligence Department of
the War Office.)
Deutsch-franzosische Krieg, der, 1870-1, bearbeitet von der
kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung des Grossen Generalstabes. 5 vols. Berlin. 1872-82.
Enquete parlementaire sur les actes du Gouvernement de la Defense
Nationale. Paris.
1872.
Hale, Colonel
Lonsdale. Analytical Index to the above. London. 1890.
Guerre, la, de 1870-1 re'dige'e a la Section Historique de l’Etat Major
de l’Armee. 14 vols. and 3 vols. of Maps. Paris. 1901-2.
Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften. Herausgegeben von grossen Generalstabe,
Abteilung fur Kriegsgeschichte:—
Heft 2. Aus dem kriegsgeschichtlichen Nachlasse S. K. Hoheit des Prinzen
August v. Preussen. Der Ueberfall von Fontenay zur Moselle am 22. Jan.
1871. Berlin. 1883.
Heft 4. Die Tatigkeit d. Belagerungs-Artillerie v. Paris in Kriege 1870-1.
2nd edn. Berlin. 1895.
Heft 7. Die Tatigkeit der Deutschen Artillerie in der Schlacht bei Loigny- Poupry
am 2. Dezember 1870. Berlin. 1886.
Heft 11. Infanteriedienst bei Kavallerie Divisionen, inbesondere die
Tatigkeit der in den Monaten September, Oktober, u. November der 4. 5. und 6.
Kavallerie Division zugeteilten bayerischen Infanterie. Der Vorposten- dienst
b. d. I. bayerischen Armee-Korps in den dem Kommando des Generals der
Infanterie Frhr von und zu der Thann-Rathsamhausen unter- stellten Preussischen
Truppenteilen in der Zeit von d. ersten Einnahme von Orleans bis zum Treffen
von Coulmiers, 12. Okt. bis 8. Nov., 1870. Die Starkeverhaltnisse im
deutschfranzosischen Kriege, 1870-1, his zum Sturze des Kaiserreicbes. Berlin.
1889.
Heft 14. Der Rechtsabmarsch der 1. Armee unter General v. Goeben auf St
Quentin im Januar 1871. Die Verfolgung der franzosischen Loire- Armee nach der
Schlacht bei Le Mans durch das Detachment des Generals v. Schmidt, 13.—17.
Januar 1871. Berlin. 1891.
Heft 16. Die Festung Langres wahrend des Krieges 1870-1. Berlin. 1893. Heft
17. Truppenfahrzeuge, Kolonnen, und Trains bei den Bewegungen der l. u. ii. deutschen Armee his zu den
Schlachten westlich Metz. Berlin.
1896.
Heft 18. Das General-Kommando des 3. Armee-korps bei Spicheren und
Vionville. Berlin. 1895.
Heft 19. Konig Wilhelm auf seinen Kriegszuge durch Frankreich von Mainz bis
Sedan. Berlin. 1897.
Heft 20 and 21. Die Operationen gegen Vinoyim Sept. 1870. Berlin. 1897.
Heft 25. Der Kampf der 38. Inf.-Brigade u. des linken deutschen Fliigels in der
Schlacht bei Vionville—Mars la Tour am 16. Aug. 1870. Berlin. 1898.
Moltke, Count von. Militarische Werke. Herausgegeben vom Grossen
Generalstabe. Abteilung fur Kriegsgeschichte. Gruppe i. Die
Militarische-Korrespondenz.
3. Teil. Aus den
Dienstschriften des Krieges 1870-1. 1. Abt. Der Krieg bis zur Schlacht bei
Sedan. Berlin. 1896. 2. Abt. 3. Sept. 1870—27 Jan.
1871. Berlin.
1896. 3. Abt. Waffenstillstand und Friede. Berlin. 1897. Gruppe in.
Kriegsgeschichtliche Arbeiten. 2. Teil. Kritische Aufsatze zur Geschichte der
Feldziige von 1809,1859,1864,1866, und 1870-1. Berlin. 1899.
Parliamentary
Papers respecting the War between France and Germany. London. 1870.
Proces Bazaine, le. Paris. 1873.
Recueil de Documents sur les exactions, vols, et cruautes des Armies
Prussiennes en France. Bordeaux. 1871.
IV. WORKS BY CONTEMPORARIES WHO TOOK A PROMINENT
PART IN THE EVENTS OF THE WAR.
Arago, E. L’hotel de Ville au 4 septembre et pendant le siege. Paris.
1874.
Bazaine, Marshal. Episodes de la Guerre de 1870 et le blocus de Metz.
Madrid. 1883.
Rapport sommaire sur les operations de 1’Armee
du Rhin du 13 aout au
29 octobre 1870. Geneva. 1870.
— L’Armde du Rhin. Paris. 1872.
Benedetti, Count. Ma mission en Prusse, Paris. 1871.
Blumenthal, Field-Marshal Count von. Tagebuch fur 1866 und 1870-1. Berlin.
1902. Translated by Major A. D. Gillespie Addison.
Berlin. 1903.
Chanzy,
General. Campagne de 1870-1. La deuxieme Armee de la Loire.
Paris. 1871.
Ducrot, General. La journee de Sedan. Paris. 1871.
Defense de Paris 1870-1. Paris. 1875.
Faidherbe, General L. Campagne de 1’Armee du Nord en 1870-1. Paris.
1871. Failly, General de. Operations et Marches du 5* corps, jusqu’au 31 aout.
Paris.
1871.
Favre, J. Le Gouvernement de la defense nationale 1871-2. 2 vols. Paris.
1871-2. Freycinet, C. de. La Guerre en Provence, pendant le siege de Paris.
Paris. 1892. Frossard, General. Operations du deuxieme corps de l’Armee du Rhin
dans la campagne de 1870. Paris. 1872.
Goltz, General C. Freiherr von der. Die Operationen der u. Armee vom
Beginne des Krieges bis zur Kapitulation von Metz. Dargestellt nach den Operations-
akten des Oberkommandos der n. Armee. Berlin. 1874.
— Die Operationen
der n. Armee an der Loire. Dargestellt nach den Operationsakten des
Oberkommandos der n. Armee. Berlin. 1875.
L4on Gambetta und seine Armeen. Berlin. 1877.
Gramont, Due de. France et la Prusse avant la Guerre. Paris. 1872.
Lebrun, General. Bazeilles-Sedan: Guerre de 1870-1. Paris. 1891.
Souvenirs militaires 1866-70. Preliminaires de
la Guerre. Paris. 1895.
Moltke, Count von. Geschichte des deutsch-franzosischen Krieges von 1870-1.
Berlin.
1894. Translation: revised by A. Forbes with a map, notes, and orders of
battle. The Franco-German War of 1870-1. London. 1893. Motte-Rouge, General de
La. Un mois de commandement au 15° corps. Paris. 1889.
Ollivier, E. L’Empire Liberal. Vols. xi and xii. Paris. 1907.
Paladines, General d’Aurelle de. Campagne de 1870-1. La premiere Arm^e
de la Loire. Paris. 1871.
Palikao, General Comte de, Cousin de Montauban. Un ministere de la
Guerre de vingt-quatre jours. Paris. N. D.
Rochereau, Colonel Denfert. Histoire de la defense de Belfort. Paris.
1871. Sheridan, General P. H. From Gravelotte to Sedan. New York. 1888.
Stoffel, Colonel Baron. La depeche du 20 aout 1870, du Marechal Bazaine
au Marechal de MacMahon. Paris. 1873.
Rapports militaires ecrits de Berlin 1866-70.
Paris. 1871.
Trochu, General. Le siege de Paris. Paris. 1896.
Uhrich, General. Documents relatifs au siege de Strassbourg. Paris. 1872.
Verdy du Vernois, General von. Im Grossen Hauptquartier 1870-1. Berlin.
1895.
Eng. translation. Wolseley
Series. London. 1897.
Vinoy,
General. Campagne de 1870-1. Siege de Paris. Operations du 13me
corps et de la 3m" Armee. Paris. 1872.
Wartensleben, Count H. von. Die Operationen der Siid-Armee im Januar und
Februar 1871. Nach den Kriegsakten des Oberkommandos dargestellt. Berlin.
1872. Eng.
Translation of the above by Col. C. H. von Wright. London. 1872. Die
Operationen der 1. Armee unter General von Manteuffel (von der Kapitulation
von Metz bis zum Fall von Peronne). Dargestellt nach den Operationsakten des
Oberkommandos 1. der Armee. Berlin. 1872. Eng. Translation of the above by Col.
C. H. von Wright. London. 1873.
Wimpffen,
General de. Sedan. Paris. 1871.
V. OTHER WORKS.
(A) The
Campaign as a Whole.
Baratier, A. L’intendance militaire pendant la guerre de 1870-1. Paris.
1871. Bonie, General T. Campagne de 1870. La Cavalerie Fran^aise. Paris.
1871. Translation by Lieut. C. F. Thomson: The French Cavalry in 1870, with its
tactical results. London. 1875.
Bonnet, F. Guerre Franco-Allemande, resum£ et commentaires de l’ouvrage
du Grand ^tat-Major Prussien. 3 vols. Paris.
1883.
Budde, Lieutenant H. Die Franzosischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege 1870-1. Berlin. 1877.
Causes qui ont amen£ les desastres de l’Armde fran^aise dans la campagne
de 1870. Brussels. 1870.
Derrecagaix, Colonel V. Histoire de la guerre de 1870. Paris. 1886.
Engel, Ernst. Die Verluste der Deutschen Armeen an Offizieren und
Mannschaften im Kriege gegen Frankreich. Berlin. 1872.
Goetze, A. Die Tatigkeit der deutschen Ingenieure und technischen Truppen
im deutsch-franzosischen Kriege 1870-1. 2 vols.
Berlin. 1873. Translation by Col. G. Graham, V.C.: Operations of the German
Engineers and “ Technical troops ” during the Franco-German War of 1870-1.
London. 1875.
Hozier,
Captain H. The Franco-Prussian War. 7 vols. London. N.D.
Jacqmin, F. Les chemins de fer pendant la guerre de 1870-1. Paris. 1874.
Kunz, Major. Die deutsche Reiterei in den Schlachten und Gefechten des
Krieges von 1870-1. Berlin. 1895.
Pflugk-Hartung, J. von (Editor). Krieg und Sieg. Leipzig. 1896.
Translated and edited by Major-General (Sir) J. F. Maurice, under the title:
The Franco- German War, 1870-1. London. 1900.
Rousset, Commander. Histoire g&i£rale de la Guerre Franco-Allemande
1870-1.
6 vols. Paris.
1896.
Tauera, Capt., Steinbeck, Dr J. and Pressentin, Botho von. Der Krieg von
1870-1.
7 vols. Nordlingen. 1888.
Telegraphes, Les, et les postes pendant la guerre de 1870-1. Paris. 1883. Widdern, G. C. von. Der Deutsch-franzosische
Krieg 1870-1. Der Krieg an den riickwartigen Verbindungen der deutschen Heere
und der Etappendienst. 5 parts. Berlin. 1893-7.
(B) The
Politioal Sitdation pbioh to the Outbreak of the War.
Busch, M. Graf Bismarck und seine Leute wahrend des Krieges in Frankreich. Leipzig.
1889.
Gladstone, W.
E. Life by J. Morley. Vol. i., Book vi., Chapter rv. London. 1905. Granville,
Earl. Life by Lord E. FitzMaurice. Vol. n., Chapter ii. London. 1905. Grecourt, Marquis de. Des relations de
la France avec l’Allemagne sous Napoleon III. Brussels. 1870.
Hansen, J. Les coulisses de la diplomatic, quinze ans k l’etranger
1864-79. Paris. N.D.
Lebautcourt, P. Histoire de la guerre de 1870-1. Les origines. Paris.
1901. Napoleon III. Oeuvres posthumes autographes et in£dits de. Collectionn£s
et publies par le Comte de la Chapelle. London. N.D.
Papiers et correspondance de la famille
imp&iale. 2 vols. Paris. 1872.
Ollivier, fimile. Articles in Correspondant, June 10, 25; and Revue des
Deux Mondes, June 1908. Paris.
Rothan, G. Souvenirs diplomatiques. Les origines de la guerre de 1870.
Paris. 1879.
Rothan, G. L’aifaire du Luxembourg, la prelude de la Guerre de 1870. Paris.
1882. Who is responsible for the War? Reprint from The Times. London. 1871.
(C) The First
Part op the War to the Battle op Sedan and the Capitulation of Metz.
Boguslawski, General von. Neue Studieniiber die Schlachthei Worth. Berlin. 1892. Bonnal, General H. Froesch wilier. Paris. 1899.
Duquet, A. Froesch wilier, Chalons, Sedan. Paris. 1880.
Guerre de 1870-1. Les grandes batailles de
Metz. Paris. 1887-
Fay, General C. Journal d’un Officier de 1’Armee du Rhin. Paris.
1871.
Hale, Colonel
L. Tactical Studies of the battles of Colombey and Vionville. London. 1877.
Henderson,
Major G. F. R. The battle of Spicheren. London.
1891.
Hoenig, Major F. Vier und zwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategic entwickelt
und erlkutert an den Schlachten von Gravelotte und St. Privat am 18. Aug. 1870.
Berlin. 1897.
Die Wahrheit fiber die Schlacht von
Vionville—Mars la Tour auf dem linken
Flfigel. Berlin. 1899.
Hoffbauer, Major E. Die deutschen Artillerie in der Schlachten und Treffen
des deutsch-franzosischen Krieges 1870-1. 3 vols.
Berlin. 1876.
Hooper, G.
The Campaign of Sedan, the downfall of the Second Empire 1870.
London. 1887.
Kunz;, Major H. Die Schlacht bei Worth. Berlin. 1895.
Die Schlacht von Noisseville am 31. Aug. und
1. Sept. 1870. Berlin. 1892.
Pelet-Narbonne, General von. Die Reiterei der ersten und zweiten deutschen
Armee in den Tagen vom 7-15. Aug. 1870. Berlin. 1899.
frost, A. Le blocus de Metz en 1870. Paris. 1898.
Schnell, A. Die Operationen der i. Armee unter General von Steinmetz vom
Beginne des Krieges bis zur Kapitulation von Metz. Berlin. 1872.
(D) Works dealing with the Second Part of the War
from the Battle of Sedan to the conclusion of Peace.
Blume, Major W. Feldzug 1870-1. Die Operationen der deutschen Heere von der
Schlacht bei Sedan bis zum Ende des Krieges. Berlin. 1872.
Translated by Major E. M. Jones. London. 1872.
Bordone,
General. Garibaldi et 1’Armee des Vosges. Paris. 1871.
Campagne du Nord en 1870-1. Histoire de la defense nationale dans le
Nord de la France. Paris. 1886.
Duqnet, A. Guerre de 1870-1. Second echec du Bourget et perte d’Avron.
Paris.
1896.
Guerre de 1870. La capitulation et 1’entree
des Allemands. Paris. 1899.
Genevois, H. Les demieres cartouches. Villersexel—Hericourt—Pontarlier.
Paris. 1893.
Guionic, Commandant G. De Bourges a Villersexel. Paris.
1905.
Hale, Colonel
L. The People’s War in France. London. 1904.
Hoenig, Major F. Der Volkskrieg an der Loire. 6 vols. Berlin. 1897.
Kunz, Major H. Der Feldzug der ersten deutschen Armee in Norden und
Nordwesten Frankreichs. 2 vols. Berlin. 1901.
Lehautcourt, P, Campagne de la Loire en 1870-1, Coulmiere et Orle'ans.
Paris.
1893.
Siege de Paris. Buzenval. La Capitulation.
Paris. 1898.
Campagne de la Loire en 1870-1. Josnes,
Vendome et Le Mans.
Wolowski, L. Campagne de 1870-1, Corps franc des Vosges. (Armee de
l’est.) Paris. 1871.
HOLLAND AND BELGIUM. (1840-70.)
I. KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND).
A. History of
the period.
Bruyne, J. A. Geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd. S vols. Schiedam.
1889-1906.
Een halve eeuw, 1848-98. Nederland onder de regeering van Koning Willem III
en het regentschap van Koningin Emma door Nederlanders beschreven onder
redactie van F. H. Ritter. 2 vols. Amsterdam. 1898.
Handelingen van de Regeering en de Staten General over de herziening der
Grondwet. 3 vols. The Hague. 1842-3. 4 vols. ib. 1848-9.
Kemper, J. de Bosch. Staatkundige geschiedenis van Nederland na 1830. Met
letterkundige aanteekeningen en onuitgegevene stukken. 5 vols. Amsterdam.
1873-82.
Keppers, G. L. De regeering van Koning Willem III. Groningen. 1887. Lipman,
S. P. Nederlandsch constitutioneel archief van alle koninklijke aanspraken en
parlementaire addressen 1813-63. 2 vols. Amsterdam. 1846-64.
Nuyens, W. J. F. Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk van 1815 tot op
onze dagen. 4 vols. Amsterdam. 1883-6.
Rengers, W. J. van Walderen. Schets eener parliamentaire geschiedenis van
Nederland sedert 1849. 2 vols. The Hague. 1889.
Thorbecke, J. R. Parlementaire redevoeringen 1840-66. 6 vols. Deventer.
1856-70. '
Vreede, G. W. Een 20 jarige strijd. Volledige verzameling zijner vertoogen
over ’slands in- en uitwendigen toestand. 1848-68. Utrecht. 1869.
B. Biographical and General.
Brink, J. ten. Geschiedenis der Noord-Nederlandsche letteren in de xix0
eeuw.
Amsterdam. 1888.
Buys, J. T. De Nederlandsche Staatschuld sedert 1814. Haarlem. 1857. Chantepie de la Saussaye, D. La crise religieuse en
Hollande. Leyden. 1860. Curtius, Dirk Donker. Dirk Donker Curtius, Ministre
d’etat Neerlandaise. The Hague. 1870.
Eendegeest, G. van. Over de droogmaking van het Haarlemmer meer. Vol. I.
Leiden. 1842. Vol. n. The Hague. 1853. Vol. in. Amsterdam. 1860.
Esquiros, A. La Nierlande et la vie Hollandaise. 2 vols. Paris. 1859.
Fruin, J. A. De Nederlandsche Wetboeken tot op 1 Jan. 1876. Utrecht. 1881. Heemskerk Az, J. De Practijk onzer Grondwet. Utrecht. 1881.
Laveleye, E. de. Etudes d’economie rurale. La Neerlande. Paris. 1865.
Nippold, F. Die Romische Kirche im Konigreich der Niederlande. Leipzig.
1877.
Prinsterer, Groen van. De antirevolutionaire staatsleer van Mr Groen van
Prinsterer. D. Koordera. Utrecht. 1886.
Groen van Prinsterer en zijn tijd. By G. J. de
Vos. Dordrecht. 1886.
Rijkj J. C. Het bestuur der marine gedurende de jaren 1842-9. Amsterdam.
1853.
Sophie, Reine de Hollande. Revue des Deux Mondes. By
E. Renan. 1877,
xxi, 952. Thorbecke, J. R. Herinneringen aan Mr J. R. Thorbecke. Arnhem. 1872.
William II, King of Holland. Leven van Koning Willem II. By J. J, Abbink.
Amsterdam. 1849.
Het leven van Willem II. Bosscha, J.
Amsterdam. 1871.
William III,
King of Holland. Guillaume III, Roi de Hollande. By
F. Lolie'e. Nouv. Rev. 1890, 612.
C. The
Dutch Indies.
Deventer, M.
L. van. Geschiedenia der Nederlanders op Java. 2 vols. Haarlem.
1887.
Friedman, S. Niederlandische Ost- und West-Indien. Munich. 1860.
Gerlach, A. J. A. Nederlandiache Oost-Indie. The Hague.
1874.
Hoerell, W.
R. von. Parlementaire redevoeringen over Koloniale belangen.
4 vols.
Batavia. 1865.
Meinsma, J. J. Geschiedenis van de Ned. Oost indiache
bezittingen. 2 vols.
The Hague. 1872-5.
Perelaer, M. T. H. Nederlandiache Indie. 4 vols. Leyden. 1881-3.
Piccardt, R. A S. Geschiedenia van het cultuurstelsel in Ned. Indie.
Amsterdam.
1873.
Pierson, N. G. Het Cultuuratelael. Amsterdam. 1868.
Rees, W. A. van. De Bandjeimaainche krijg van 1859-63. Arnhem. 1865.
Staatsblad voor Nederlandiache Indie van 1816-80. 46 vols. The Hague and
Batavia. 1839-81.
Verslag van het beheer en der Staat der Nederl. bezittingen in Oost- en
West-Indie en ter Kust van Guinea. 44 vols. The Hague. 1849-96.
H. KINGDOM OF BELGIUM.
A. History
of the period.
Bruijssel, E. van. Histoire du commerce et de la marine en Belgique. 3
vols.
Brussels. 1861-5.
Ciiiquante ana de la liberty. 4 vola. Brussels. 1880.
Conscience, H. Geschiedenia van Belgie. 3 vols. Antwerp. 1859.
Decker, P. de. 16 ans, 1830-45. Brussels. 1845.
Dujardin-Baumetz. Histoire graphique de l’industrie houillere en
Belgique. Paris.
1888.
Goethals, F. V. Histoire des sciences et des arts en Belgique. 4 vols.
Brussels. 1840-4.
Hymans, L. La Belgique contemporaine. Mons. 1880.
Histoire parlementaire de la Belgique.
1831-80. 6 vols. Brussels. 1878—80.
Juste T. Les Fondateurs de la Monarchie Beige. 22 vols. Brussels.
1868-78.
3 Histoire de la
Belgique depuis les temps primitifs jusqu’a la fin du regne de
Leopold 1“. 3 vols. Brussels. 1878.
Scheler, A. Annuaire statistique et historique beige. 5 vols. Brussels.
1855-9. Thonissen, J. J. La Belgique sous le regne de Leopold I". Louvain.
1862.
958
B. Biographical
and General.
Bertrand. Histoire de la Democratic et du Socialisms en Belgique depuis
1860. Brussels. 1906.
Conscience, Hendrik. Zijn leven en zijne werken. By P. de Mont. Haarlem.
1883.
Frere-Orban, W. La Belgique et le Vatican. 3 vols. Brussels. 1880-1.
Les Jesuitesj l’enseignement et la Convention
d’Anvers. Liege. 1854.
Flandin, & Institutions Politiques de l'Europe Contemporaine.
Belgique.
Tome i, pp. 160-307. Paris. 1907.
Giron, A. Droit Publique de la Belgique. Brussels. 1884.
Droit Administratif. 2 vols. Brussels. 1881.
Goblet, General A. J. Memoires historiques. 2 vols. Brussels. 1864.
Guillery, J. Les Societes commerciales en Belgique. 3 vols. Brussels. 1883. Huet, C. Busken. Het Land van
Rubens. Belgische reisherinneringen. Amsterdam.
1879. English translation. London. 1888.
Joly, V. V. Les Beaux Arts en Belgique de 1848 a 1857. Brussels. 1857.
Lauer, M. Entwickelung und Gestaltung der Belgischen Volksschulwesen. Berlin. 1885.
Laveleye, E. de. Le parti clerical en Belgique. Paris. 1874.
Lebeau, J. La Belgique depuis 1847. Brussels. 1852.
Souvenirs personnels. Brussels. 1883.
Leopold I, Roi des Beiges, d'a,pres des doc. ined. 1793-1865. 2 vols.
Brussels.
1868. .
Leopold I et Leopold II, leur vie et leur regne. By T. Juste. Brussels.
1872. Nothomb, J. B. Essa. historique et politique, sur la revolution beige. 3
vols.
Brussels. 1876.
Patria Belgica 3 vols. Brussels. 1873.
Rogier, Charleg; d’apres des doc. ined. By E. Descailles. 4 vols.
Brussels. 1895. Thonissen, J. J.. La Constitution Beige annotee. Brussels.
1879.
Wilmotte, M. La Belgique, morale et politique, 1830-90. Brussels. 1902.
Woeste, C. Vingt ans de polemique. 2 vols.
Brussels. 1885.
III. LUXEMBURG.
Coster, J. Geschichte der FeSturig Luxemburg. Seit ihrer Entstehnng bis zum
Londener Tractaat von 1867. Luxemburg. . 1869..
Eyschen, P. Das Staatsrecht d. G. H. Luxemburg. Freiburg. 1890. Being vol.
iv of H. Marquardsen’s Handbuch des offentlichen RechtS.
Grovig, N. Luxemburg, Land und Volk. Luxemburg.
1867.
Prat, C. F. Histoire d’Arlori et de la province de Luxembourg. 2 vols.
Arlon.
1873-4. ’
Publications de la section historique de l’lnstitut de Luxembourg. 42
Vols. Luxemburg. 1846-94.
Ruppert, P. Les lois et reglements sur l’organisation politique,
judiciaire et administrative du Grand Duch^ de Luxembourg. Luxemburg. 1885.
Schotter, J. Geschichte des Luxemburger Landes. Luxemburg. 1882.
Tandel, E. Les communes luxemhourgeoises, 6 vols. Arlon.
1889-92.
I. SWEDEN AND NORWAY.
A. Biblioorapbioai.
Information.
Reference may
be made to the bibliographies annually published in the periodicals issued by the
several Historical Societies of Sweden and Norway, and to the following works:
Annerstedt, C. Forteckning ofver skrifter rorande Karl XIV Johan, utkomna
mellan aren 1880-93. (Carl Johan Forbundets handlingar.) Stockholm.
1885-93.
Klemming, G. E. (editor). Samtida Skrifter rorande Sveriges forh&llande
till fremmande magter 1483-1874. With Supplements, edited by C.
Snoilsky and J. A. Almquist. Stockholm. 1881-3, 1892, 1901.
Setterwall,
K. Svensk historisk bibliografi, 1875-1900. (Skrifter utgifna af svenska
historiska foreningen, 2.) Stockholm. 1907.
Svederus, G.
Forteckning pi kallskrifter anvandbara for Carl XIV’s historia. Upsala. 1875.
Westrin, Th.
Forteckning ofver i Riksarkivet forvarade urkunder rorande Sveriges konungahus
(1562-1872). Meddelanden fr&n Svenska Riksarkivet. Stockholm.
1897.
Only a small
portion of the Suedo-Norwegian state papers and material necessary to the
biography of statesmen has as yet been published. Access to archives more than
fifty years old is usually permitted. The newspapers, particularly in Norway
(especially the Norske Nationalblad, Statsborger, Gransker, Patrouille), supply
valuable historical material.
B. Historical
Works.
Aasen, I. Det
norske Folkesprogs Grammatik. Christiania. 1848.
Adlersparre,
K. A. (J. A. Sandels, editor.) Anteckningar om bortg&ngne samtida.
3 vols. Stockholm. 1859-63.
Agardh, C. A.
Forsok till en statsekonomisk statistik ofver Sverige. 4 vols.
Carlstad and
Stockholm. 1852-63.
Alin, O. Karl
Johan och hans tid. 1828-44. 3 vols. Upsala and Stockholm. 1881-93. VoL ii also published under title Karl XIV
Johan och rikets stander.
1840-1.
B. von Schinkel’s Minnen ur Sveriges nyare
historia. Vol.
xii. Ed. by
O. Alin. Stockholm.
1881.
Sattet for riksaktens antagande, 1815. Hist.
Tidskr. Stockholm. 1887.
Den svensk-norska unionen, 2 vols. Stockholm.
1889-91.
Bai-court;
A. de. Une Mission en Suede et en Danemark, 1844. Le
Correspondant. Paris. 1893.
Bergstrand, W. (“ Marcellus.”) Bidrag
till den skandinaviska uniooens historia efter 1814. Stockholm.
1885.
Boethius, S.
J. (editor). Fr4n Karl XIV Johans dagar. Historiska
anteckningar af Presidenten Georg Ulfsparre. Stockholm. 1907.
B. von Schinkel’s Minnen ur Sveriges uyare
historia. Suppl.
by S. J. Boethius.
3 vols. Upsala. 1880-3.
Bonde, C. C.
(editor). Hedvig Elisabeth Charlottas dagbok. Stockholm. (In progress.)
Broch, O. J.
Statistisk Arbog for Norge. Christiania. 1868.
Clason, S.
Historisk redogorelse for unionsfrdgans tidigare skeden. Stockholm.
1898.
Crusenstolpe,
M. J. Karl Johan och svenskarne. 4 parts. Stockholm. 1845-6.
Stamfadrens antecedentia. (Historiska
personligheter, u.) Stockholm. 1863.
Dalman, W. F.
Ndgra anteckningar fr&n v&ra st&ndsriksdagar. Stockholm.
1874-9.
Daumont, A.
Resa i Sverige, 1830. Stockholm. 1834. French translation. Paris.
1834.
Eden, N. Kielerfreden och unionen. Upsala. 1894. German translation by
F. Amheim.
Leipzig. 1894.
Edholm, E. Fr&n Carl XVs dagar. Stockholm. 1906.
Erdmann, N. August Blanche och hans samtid. Stockholm. 1892.
F&hraeus, O. J. Skildringar ur det offentliga lifvet. Stockholm.
1880.
Falsen, C. M.
Norges Historic. 4 vols. Christiania. 1823-4.
Geer, L. de. Minnen. 2 vols. Stockholm. 1892.
Grosse, K. Karl XIV Johan von Schweden in seinem offentlichen und
Privatleben und Wirken. Leipzig and Meissen. 1844.
Hagerup, E. Dagbog fra Storthinget. Christiania. 1824.
Hellstenius, J. A. C. Karl Johan och hans tid 1817-22. B. von Schinkel’s
Minnen ur Sveriges nyare historia. Vol. x. Stockholm. 1868.
Karl Johan och hans tid 1823-8. B. von
Schinkel’s Minnen ur Sveriges
nyare
historia. Vol. xi. Stockholm. 1872.
Hildebrand,
E. (editor). Sveriges historia intill tjugonde seklet. Vol. v (1809-1900) by S.
Clason and A. Rydfors. Stockholm. (In the press.)
Hojer, N.
Norsk nationel historieskrifning. Hist. Tidskr. Stockholm. 1887. Holmberg, C. Carl XV som enskild man, konung och konstnar.
Stockholm.
1890-1.
Holst, P. C.
Efterladte Optegnelser om sit Liv og sin Samtid. Christiania. 1876. Kjellen, R. Unionen s&dan den skapades och
s&dan den blifvit. (1) Den ursprung- liga unionen. (2) Unionens historia
(1814^91). (3) Den nuvarande unionen. Stockholm. 1893-4.
Koht, H. Die Stellung Norwegens und Schwedens im deutsch-danischen
Konflikt, zumal wahrend der Jahre 1863 und 1864. (Videnskabs-Selskabets
Skrifter.) Christiania. 1907.
Laing, S.
Journal of a Residence in Norway (1834-6). London. 1851.
Lehmann, O. Norge og Normaendene. Copenhagen. 1865.
Ljungberg, C. E. Om Sveriges materiella utveckling under de senaste irtiondena.
Stockholm. 1866.
Motzfeldt, P. Statsraad Peter Motzfeldts Dagbog fra det overordentlige
Storthing 1814. Ed. L. M. B. Aubert. Christiania. 1882.
Breve og Optegnelser. Ed. K. Motzfeldt.
Copenhagen. 1888.
Munch, P. A.
Det norske Folks Historie. Christiania. 1852-63.
Nerman, G.
Gota-kanals historia frin aldsta tider till v&ra dagar. 3 vols. Stockholm.
1896-7.
Nielsen, Y.
Grev Herman Wedel Jarlsberg og hans samtid, 1779-1840. 2 vols. Christiania.
1886-92.
Aktstykker om Bodosagen. Christiania. 1899-1900.
Grev Sandels statholderskab. Christiania.
1873.
Diplomatiske Aktstykker vedkommende Norges
Opgjor med Danmark, 1818-9.
Christiania.
1889.
Grev von Platens Statholderskab, 1827-9.
Christiania. 1875.
Stormagtemes Forhold til Norge og Sverige,
1815-9. Christiania. 1886.
NoHensvai, G.
Svensk konst och svenska konstnarer i nittonde Sxhundradet.
Stockholm.
1891-2.
Overland, O.
A. Norges historie, 1814-92. Christiania. 1903.
Pavels, C.
Dagbogen for 1817-22. Edited by L. Daae for the Norsk Historisk Forening.
Christiania. 1892-1900.
Reflexioner
ofver v&r tryckande ekonomiska stallning inom riket och dess upphjalpande.
Stockholm. 1815.
Reuterskiold,
C. A. Till belysning af den svensk-norska unionsforfattningen och dess tidigare
utvecklingshistoria. Stockholm. 1893.
Rogberg, C. Karl Johan och hans tid 1814-7. B. von Schinkel’s Minnen ur
Sveriges nyare historia. Vol. ix. Stockholm. 1864.
Rydin, H. L. Unionen och konungens sanktionsratt i norska grundlagsfr£gor.
Stockholm.
1883.
Sars, J. E.
Norges politiske historie, 1815-85. Christiania. 1904.
Save, T.
Sveriges historia fran aldsta tid till vara dagar. Vol. vi. Stockholm. 1881.
Schefer, C. Bernadotte roi. Paris. 1899. Swedish translation, by
A. Bergstrom: Stockholm. 1900.
Karl XV, Konig von Schweden und Norwegen.
Deutsche Revue. Berlin.
1900.
Sjogren, O. Karl Johan och skandinaviska halfon under unionens
anknytningstid.
Stockholm. 1906.
Karl August Grevesmohlen. Stockholm. 1882.
Stang, F. Systematisk Fremstilling af Norges constitutionelle eller
grundlovbestemte Ret. Christiania. 1833.
Svederus, G. Konung Carl XIV Johans historia. Stockholm. 1877-8.
Sverges och Norges traktater med frammande makter. Ed. C. Sandegren. Stockholm.
Touchard-Lafosse, G. Histoire de Charles XIV. 3 vols. Paris.
1838.
Vogt,
J. H. Optegnelser om sit Liv og sin Embedsvirksomhed, 1847-58. Christiania.
1894-5.
,
Welhaven, J. S. Norges Daemring. Christiania. 1834.
(Wergeland,
N.) En sandfaerdig Beretning om Danmarks politiske Forbrydelser imod Norge. (Published
anonymously.) 1816.
II. DENMARK.
A.
Bibliographical Information. ■
Besides the
periodicals issued by the Historical Societies of Denmark and of
Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburg, the Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft
(Berlin) and the Danske Magazin will furnish valuable information. See also the
following collective works:
Danske
Traktater efter 1800. (Issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.) 4 vols.
Copenhagen. 1847-85. '
Danske Samlinger for Historie, Topographie, Personal- og Literatur-historie.
12 vols. Copenhagen. 1866-79.
B. Historical
Works. ■ 1
Aarsberetninger fra det Kongelige Geheimearchiy. 7 vols. , Copenhagen. 1852-83. Allen, C. F. Histoire de Danemark depuis
les temps les plus recules jusqu’a nos jours.
Trans, by E.
Beauvois. 2 vols. Copenhagen. 1878. (With bibliography.) Andrae, P. Andrae-Hall
oyerfor den politiske Situation i Efteraaret 1863. Copenhagen.
Bajer, F. Det
skandinaviske Neutralitetssystem eller Historiens Moral af Nordens Neutralitet
under Krim.krigen. Copenhagen. 1901.
Barfod, H. P.
B. H.M. Kong Christian IX. 2 vols. Copenhagen. 1888-1906. Biehl, C. D. Breve om
Kong Christian VII. Copenhagen.
Bricka, C.
F., Steenstrup, J., and Laursen, L. Dansk biografisk Lexikon.
19 vols.
Copenhagen. 1906..
Clausen, H. N. Optegnelser af mit Levneds og min .TTids Historie.
Copenhagen.
.
Clausen, J. Skandinavisme historisk fremstillet. Copenhagen. 1900.
Daae, L. Stemningen i Danmark og Norge i Anledning af og naermest efter
Adskillelsen. (Vidar.) Christiania. 1887.
Dansk-tydske Krig, den, i Aarene 1848-50. Edited by the
General Staff. 3 volsi. Nyborg. 1885.
Deutsch-Danische Krieg, der, 1864. Published by the General Staff. 2 vols.
Berlin.
1887. '
Ernst II Herzog von Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha. Aus meinem Leben und aus meiner
Zeit. Berlin. 1887.
Frolich, Werner. Vor vierzig Jahren. Schilderung der geschichtlichen
Ereignisse in den Jahren 1863-4. Flensburg. 1904.
Graae, G. Fr. A. Mellem Krigene (1851—64). Efterladte Optegnelser og Bz-eve.
Copenhagen. 1887.
Hiort-Lorenzen, H. R. Frederik VI og Bevatgelsea i Holsten 1830. Sonder-
jydske Aarboger. 1901.
Holten, C. ,F. von. Erinnerungen aus der Zeit Friedrichs VI, Christians
VIII, und Friedrichs VII. Stuttgart. 1900.
Jorgensen, A. D. Danmarks Riges Historie. Vol. vi. 1814-1900. Copenhagen.
1896, etc.
; Historiske afhandlinger. 4 vols.
Copenhagen. 1898-1900.
Lovenstern,
Baron G. H. von, and others. Letters of. Zur
Geschichte der Jahre . 1839-47. Zeitung fiir Schleswig-Hplsteinsche Geschichte.
xxxv. 1905. Mouritsen, S. N. Vor Forfatnings Historie fra 1849 til 1858.
Copenhagen. 1887. Paludan-Miiller, C. Udenrigsministeren Grev Knuths
Fremstilling af Danmarks Underhandlinger 1848 indtil Vaabenstilstanden i Malmo,
Historisk Tidsskrift. Copenhagen. 1876.
Rubin, M. Sundtoldens Aflosniiig. Historisk Tidsskrift. Copenhagen. 1905.
Thorsander, G. Dansk-tyska krigen 1848, 1849 och 1850. Stockholm. 1900.
Thorsoe, A. Den danske Stats politiske Historie fra 1800 til 1848. 2 vols.
Copenhagen. 1872-8. •
Kong Frederik den Syvendes Regering.
Copenhagen. 1882-4.
Thrige, S. B. Danmarks Historie i vort Aarhuudrede. Copenhagen. 1888.
Vaupell, O. Den danske Haers Hjstorie til Nutideu og den norske Haers Historie
til 1814. 2 vols. Copenhagen. 1872-9.
Weitemeyer, H. (editor). Danemark: Geschichte und Beschreibung, Litteratur
und Kunst, sociale und okonomische Verhaltnisse. Copenhagen. 1889.
Wilde, O. A. K. Fra Krigen 1848-9. Copenhagen. 1892
A. MEMOIRS.
Castelar,
Emilio. Old Rome and New Italy. Eng. translation. London. 1872. Hohenlohe,.
Prince. Memoirs of. Eng. Trans. 2 vols. London. 1907. Gregorovius, Ferdinand.
Diary of. Ed. F. Althaus. Eng. Trans. London. 1907. Mettemich, Prince. Memoirs
of. Vols. v-vin. English (London), French (Paris) and German (Vienna) editions.
1880.
(’asolini, Giuseppe. Memorie raccolte da suo figlio. Eng. Trans. London.
1885. Pomponio Leto [Marquis F. Nobili-Vitelleschi]. Otto mesi »
Roma durante il . Concilio Vaticano. Florence. 1873.
Quirinus.
Letters from Rome on the Council. Eng. Trans. London. 1870.
B. HISTORIES.
Acton, Lord. Zur Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils. Munich.
1872.
History of Freedom and other Essays. London.
1907.
Ashley, E.
Life of Lord Palmerston. Vol. in. London.
1880.
Friedrich, J. Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils. 4
vols. Bonn. 1887.
Luigi, Carlo
Farini. Lo Stato Romano. 4 vols. Trans, under direction of W. E. Gladstone.
London. 1852.
Maguire, J.
F. The Pontificate of Pius IX. London. 1870.
Nielsen, F.
History of the Papacy in the nineteenth century. 2 vols. Trans. London. 1906.
Nippohl, F.
The Papacy in'the nineteenth century. Trans. New York. 1900. O’Clery, K.
History of the Italian Revolution. London. 1875.
Sohm, Rudolf. Grundriss der Kirchengeschichte. Eng. Trans. London. 1900.
C. MISCELLANEOUS.
Beaulieu, Anatole Leroy. Les Catholiques liberaux. Paris. 1885.
Dollinger, J. J. I. von. Declarations and Letters on the
Vatican Council.
Eng. Trans. Edinburgh. 1891.
Leben von J. Friedrich. Munich. 1901.
La Papaute. Avec notes et documents par J.
Friedrich. French
Trans.
Paris. 1905.
Conversations of. By Louise von Kohell. Eng. Trans. London. 1892.
Fessler Joseph. Die wahre und die falsche Unfehlbarkeit der Papste...zur
Abwehr gegen Dr Schulte. 3rd edn. Wien, Gran, and Budapest.
1871. Eng. Trans. London. 1875.
Gioberti,
Vincenzo. Opere, Ricordi, etc. 3 vols. Turin. 1893.
Hergenrother,
Cardinal. Anti-Janus. Eng. Trans. London. 1871.
Catholic Church and Christian State. Eng.
Trans. London. 1873.
Janus [Acton
and Dollinger]. The Pope and the Council. Eng. Trans. London.
1869.
Schrader, S., S. J. Der Papst und die modernen Ideen. Vienna. 1865.
Schulte, J. F. von. Die Macht der romiachen Papste fiber Fiirsten. Prag.
1871.
D. ENGLISH
RELIGIOUS HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY, MORE ESPECIALLY THE OXFORD MOVEMENT.
'
' I
(See
also, for Italian religious affairs, Bibliographies IV, VI, XIX; for Scotch
religious affairs, Bibliographies I, XI, XII, u. d; for French religious
affairs, Bibliographies
II, V, u. o. i, X, XVII, n. b. 3.)
Acton, Lord,
and his Circle. Ed. Abbot Gasquet. London. 1906.
Benn, A. W.
History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century. 2 vols. London. 1907.
Blomfield, C.
J., Bishop. Memoirs of. By his son. 2 vols. London. 1863. Church, R. W., Dean.
The Oxford Movement. London. 1891.
Life and Letters. London. 1894.
Hook, W. F.,
Dean. Life and Letters. 2 vols. London. 1878.
Jowett, B.
Life and Letters. Edd. E. Abbott and L. Campbell. 2 vols. London.
1897.
Kingsley,
Charles. Letters and Memories of his life. Ed. by his wife. 2 vols. London.
Manning,
Cardinal. Life by E. S. Purcell. 2 vols. London. 1900.
F. de Pressense. Paris. 1897. ■
Martineau, J.
Life and Letters. J. Drummond. London. 1902.
Maurice,
Frederic Denison. Life. By his son, F. Maurice. 2 vols. London. 1884. Mozley,
J. B. Letters. Ed. by his sister. London. 1885.
T. Reminiscences, chiefly of Oriel College and
the Oxford Movement.
, 2 vols.
London. 1882.
Newman, J. H.
Cardinal. The Anglican career of. E. A. Abbott. 2 vols.
London. 1892.
Life by R. H. Hutton. London. 1890.
Letters and Correspondence. Ed. by A. Mozley.
2 vols. London. 1898.
Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. London. 1870.
Tracts for the Times. London. 1833-41.
Essay on Development of Christian
Doctrine. London. 1878.
Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent.
London. 1881.
Apologia pro vita sua. London. 1878.
Pattison,
Mark. Memoirs. London. 1885.
Pusey, E. B.
Life. By H. P. Siddon. 4 vols. London. 1893-7.
Rigg, J. H.
Oxford High Anglicanism. London. 1895.
Robertson, F.
W. Life and Letters. Ed. Stopford A. Brooke.. London. 1884. Stanley, A. P.,
Dean. Life and Correspondence; 2 vols. London. 1893.
Tait, A. C.,
Archbishop. Life. By R. J. Davidson and W. Benham. 2 vols. London. 1891.
Ward, W. G.
W. G. Ward and the Oxford Movement. By Wilfrid Ward. London. 1889.
W. G. Ward and the Catholic Revival. By
Wilfrid Ward. London. 1893.
Wilberforce,
S., Bishop. Life. By A. R. Ash well. London. 1888.
Wiseman,
Cardinal. Life and Times. By Wilfrid Ward. 2 vols. London. 1897.
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN. (1815-69.)
I. MANUSCRIPTS.
Broughton
Papers. Additional mss. 36456-36484,
British Museum.
Diaries,
Minutes and Correspondences of the Marquis of Dalhousie, and of the ninth Earl
of Dalhousie, the property of the Earl of Dalhousie.
Records of
the East India Company and the Government of India, at the India Office,
Whitehall.
II. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Parliamentary
Papers relating to the East Indies, 1814-5 to 1868-9. [The mere catalogue of
these fills nearly 150 pages of print in an Index compiled by the Parliamentary
branch of the Record Department of the India Office, Dec. 1902; but the most
important subject-matters of these papers are given below.]
selections
from the records of the Government of India, and Governments of Bombay and
Madras. See Catalogue of Imperial Library, Calcutta, 1901. [These printed
records are voluminous and important.]
A. Period 1815-23.
Elphinstone,
Mountstuart. Selected minutes, etc. G. W. Forrest. London. 1884.
Hastings,
Marquis of. Papers on his Indian administration. Printed under resolution of
the Court of East India Proprietors of March 3, 1824. 4 vols.
Private journal of. Ed. the Marchioness of
Bute. 2 vols. London. 1858.
Metcalfe, Sir
Charles T. (afterwards Lord Metcalfe). Papers relating to transactions of
Messrs Palmer & Co. with the Government of the Nizam. London. 1824.
Selection from the papers of. Sir J. W. Kaye.
London., 1855.
Oudh Papers,
1808-15, similarly printed under Resolution of June 23, 1824.
B. Period 1823-44.
Parliamentary
Papers 1823-8: Burmese War, Carnatic debts (25 Reports), Infanticide, Burning
of Hindu widows, Tanjore debts (5 Reports), State of Slavery in the Territories
under the Company’s rule, and Criminal Justice in the East Indies.
Parliamentary
Papers between 1828-35, relative to Immolation of Hindoo widows, official
salaries, affairs of the East India Company, Select Committee Report 1831,
Constitution of the Indian Governments, Slavery in India, Agra Presidency, and
Tanjore Commission.
Parliamentary
Papers between 1836-44, relating to Treaties with Sindh, Kabul, Persia,
Bahawalpur, Afghanistan, Afghan War, Slavery, Persia, Law Commissioners,
Gwalior, and Satara.
Lord
Colchester’s Indian administration of Lord Ellenborough (Letters). London.
1874.
C. Period 1844—62.
Canning,
Lord. Letters of, in the Life of the Second Earl Granville, by Lord Edmond
Fitzmaurice. 3rd edn. London. 1905.
Hardinge,
Viscount. The War in India, Despatches of Lt.-General Lord Hardinge. London.
1846. , j
Parliamentary
Papers 1844-8, relative to North-West frontier hostilities and treaties with
Lahore and Jummoo, Lahore, and Mails.
Do. 1849-56:
list in appendix, page 421, vol. n of Lee Warner’s Life of Dalhousie.
Do. 1857-62,
relative to Oude, Indian Mutiny, Persian War, Army, Annexation, Finance,
Government of India, Reorganisation of Indian army. Education, Discontent among
the local European troops, Councils of India, Civil Service.
D. Period 1862-9.
Parliamentary
Papers relating to Home accounts of the Government of India, Amalgamation of
the Indian and Royal Armies, Moral and Material Progress Report, Substantive
law for India, Police force, Abyssinian War, Statistical abstract 1840-65,
Railways in India, and Failure of the Bank of Bombay.
III. SECONDARY WORKS.
A. General.
Calcutta
Review. See Index of first 50 volumes. Calcutta. 1873.
Gazetteer,
the Imperial of India. The Indian Empire. 4 vols. Oxford. 1907-8. Gazetteers,
the Provincial of India. Calcutta, Bombay, Madras.
Hunter, Sir
William W. The Indian Empire. 3rd edn. London. 1892.
Ilbert, Sir
Courtenay. The Government of India. Oxford. 1907.
Lee Warner,
Sir William. Protected Princes of India. London. 1894.
Lyall, Sir
Alfred. British dominion in India. 3rd edn. London. 1905. Marshman, John Clark.
The history of India. 3 vols. London. 1867.
Mazeliere. Essai sur revolution de la civilisation indienne. 11
tomes. Paris. 1903. Meredith Townsend, George Earton. Annals of Indian
administration. Serampore and Calcutta. 1856-75.
Mill, James;
H. H. Wilson. History of British India. London. 1858.
B. Particulah.
(i) Period 1815-r23.
Canning,
George. Speeches on Indian Affairs in vol. iv, pp. 77-111, 310-29, of
G. C.’s Speeches. Edited by R. Therry. London.
1836.
Elphinstone,
Mountstuart. Life, by Sir T. E. ColebroOke. 2 vols. London. 1884. Hastings,
Marquis of. Summary of Indian Administration of. London. 1824.
Narrative of
transactions under the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, 1813-8. By
Henry T. Prinsep. London. 1825.
(ii) Period 1823-44.
Amherst,
Earl. A. T. Ritchie and R. Evans. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1894. Auckland,
Earl of. Capt. L. J. Trotter. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1893.
and Lord Ellenborough. A Bengal
civilian. London. 1845.
Bentinck,
Lord William. D. C. Boulger. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1892. Ellenborough,
Lord. Anonymous. London. 1844.
Zeta. Reply to above. London. 1846.
Heber, R
Journey from Calcutta to Bombay, 1824-5. 2 vols. London. 1828. Jenkins, Capt.
F. Report on the territories of Najpore. Calcutta. 1827.
Nott,
Major-General Sir. W. Memoirs by J. H. Stocqueler. London. 1854. Pollock, Sir
George. Life, by C. R. Low. London. 1873.
(iii) Period 1844-62.
Campbell,
Colin. Archibald Forbes. (English Men of Action.) London. 1895. Canning, Lord.
Sir H. SI Cunningham. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1891.
Dalhousie and. The Duke of Argyll, from the
Edinburgh Review of January
and April,
1863. London. 1865.
Coley, James.
Journal of the Sutlej Campaign of 1845-6. London. 1856. Dalhousie, Marquess of.
Sir W. W. Hunter. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1890.
Sir W. Lee Warner. (With letters and minutes.)
2 vols. London. 1904.
Gough,
Viscount. Life and campaigns, by R. S. Rait. 3 vols. Westminster. 1903.
Hardinge, Charles Viscount. Life, by Viscount Hardinge. (Rulers of India.)
Oxford. 1891.
Havelock, Sir
Henry. Memoirs. Ed. J. C. Marshman. London. 1860.
Kaye, Sir J.
W. History of the Sepoy War, 1857-8. London. 1872-6.
Lawrence, Sir
Henry. Life, by Major-General Sir Herbert B. Edwardes and Herman Merivale.
London. 1872.
Malleson,
Colonel G. B. The decisive battles of India. London. 1883.
History of the Indian Mutiny. London.
1878-80.
Napier, Sir
Charles. Life, by William Napier Bruce. London. 1885.
j Sir W. F. History of General Sir
Charles Napier’s administration of Sind.
London. 1858.
The conquest of Sind. London. 1845.
Norman,
Field-Marshal Sir Henry. Life [with many documents], by Sir William Lee Warner.
2 vols. London. 1908.
Outram,
Lieut.-General Sir James. Campaign in India, 1857-8. London. 1860.
Life. Capt. Lionel J. Trotter. Edinburgh.
1903.
Rice-Holmes,
T. History of the Indian Mutiny. London. 1904.
Four Famous Soldiers. London. 1889. [The
biography of Sir Charles
Napier
contains an account of the conquest of Sind from firsthand sources.] Sleeman,
Col. W. H. Journey through Oude, 1849-50. London. 1858. Trevelyan, Sir G. O.
Cawnpore. London and Cambridge. 1865.
(iv) Period 1862-9.
Elgin,
James, Eighth Earl of. Letters and Journal. T. Walrond. London. 1872. Life. G. M. Wrong. London. 1905.
Lawrence,
John, Lord. Life. Sir C. Aitchison. (Rulers of India.) Oxford. 1892.
Life. R. Bosworth Smith. 2 vols. 4th edn.
London. 1883.
Life. Sir Richard Temple; (English Men of
Action.) London. 1889.
GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES. (1815-70.) (1) HOME POLICY TOWARDS THE COLONIES.
I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.
Almost all
South African papers and records of importance from 1793 to 1831 have been
copied by G. M. Theal (see under (3) below). The Colonial Office Records
relating to other Colonies are not accessible after 1830. Those of Canada—Co.
182-4 in the Record Office—have, however, much value as explaining the working
of Canadian Representative Government in the twenties.
II. WORKS DEALING CHIEFLY WITH THE ATTITUDE OF
THE HOME GOVERNMENT TO THE COLONIES.
Adderley, Sir
C. B. (Lord Norton). Review of the Colonial Policy of Lord J. Russell’s
Administration. By Earl Grey. London. 1869.
Letter to Mr Disraeli on the present relations
of England with the Colonies.
London. 1861.
Life. By W. S. Childe-Pemberton. 2 vols.
London. 1908.
Beer, G. L.
British Colonial Policy (1754-65). New York. 1907.
Bell, S. S.
Colonial Administration of Great Britain. London. 1859.
Blachford,
Frederic Rogers, Lord. [Permanent Under Secretary for the Colonies.] Letters
of. Ed. G. E. Marindin. London. 1896.
Bowen, Sir G.
F. Thirty Years of Colonial Government. Ed. S. L. Poole. 2 vols. London. 1889.
[Chap. v contains the best extant summary of the position of Colonial
Governors.]
Bradshaw, F.
Self-Government in Canada. London. 1903.
Buller,
Charles. Responsible Government. London. 1840.
Capetown, Report
of Public Meeting at, 24 August 1841, to petition the Home Government for a
representative legislative assembly. Capetown. 1841. Colonial Military
'Expenditure, Select Committee on. Parliamentary Paper 423. London. 1861.
Dilke, Sir C.
W. Greater Britain [published 1868]. 8th edn. London. 1885. Durham, Earl of.
Report on Canada (published 1839). New edn. London. 1902. Egerton, H. E. and
Grant, W. L. Canadian Constitutional History. London. 1907.
A
Short History of British Colonial Policy. London. 1897.
Elgin, J. B.,
Earl of. Life. By G. M. Wrong. London. 1902. (Pp. 21-88.)
Papers and Letters. Ed. T. Walrond. London.
1872. (Pp. 31-175.)
Emigration.
Copies of Extracts from Correspondence on, of Colonial Secretary and Governors
in N. America and Australia. London. 1833.
Fletcher, R.
England and her Colonies. London. 1857.
Grey, Henry,
3rd Earl. Colonial Policy of Lord J. Russell’s Administration.
(First
published 1852.) 2nd edn. 2 vols. London. 1853.
Hammond, J.
L. Le B. The Political Ideas of Charles James Fox, Colonies and Dependencies.
London. 1903. Chap. vm.
Holland, B.
Imperium et Libertas. London. 1901.
Jenkyns, Sir
Henry. British Rule and Jurisdiction beyond Seas. Ed. Sir Courtenay llbert.
Oxford. 1902.
Lewis, Sir
George Cornewall. Essay on the Government of Dependencies [first published
1841], Oxford. 1891.
Lucas, C. P.
Introduction to a historical geography of the British Colonies.
Oxford. 1888
sqq.
Macfie, R. A.
Papers and letters on Colonial Questions. London. 1871. Matthews, John (of
Toronto). A Colonist on the Colonial Question. London. 1872. Merivale, H.
[Permanent Under Secretary to Colonies.] Lectures on Colonization and Colonies
[given at Oxford 1839-41]. London. 1861.
Metcalfe [Sir
Charles, afterwards Lord]. Papers. Ed. J. W. Kaye. Pt in.
Colonial
Despatches. Pp. 321 et sqq. London. 1855.
Mill, James.
Article “ Colony.” Reprinted from Supplement to Encyclopaedia Britannica.
London. 1833.
Mills, A.
Colonial Constitutions. London. 1856.
Systematic Colonisation. Loudon. 1847.
Molesworth, Sir
William. Speech July 26, 1848. Colonial Expenditure and Government. London.
1848.
Selected Speeches of Sir W. M. on Colonial
Policy. Ed. H. E. Egerton.
London. 1903.
[See also under (3) IG 6 below.\
Life, by Mrs M. G. Fawcett. London. 1901.
Morley, J.
(Viscount Morley of Blackburn). Life of W. E. Gladstone. Vol. x.
London. 1905.
(Book hi. Chap. m.)
Roebuck, J.
A. Colonies of England: a plan for the Government of some portion of our
Colonial possessions. London. 1849.
Autobiography and Letters. Ed. R. E. Leader.
London. 1897.
Smith,
Goldwin. The Empire. Letters in “Daily News,” 1862-3. Oxford and London. 1863.
Taylor, Sir
H. [Permanent Under Secretary to Colonies.] Correspondence. London. 1888. pp.
196-200, 421 sqq.
Autobiography: vol. I. Chaps, vm, ix, xv; II.
i, n, iv, xvn, xix. London.
1885. _
Todd, A.
Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies. 2nd edn. London.
1894.
Wakefield,
Edward Gibhon. The Art of Colonization. London. 1849.
Walpole, Sir
Spencer. History of England (1815-56). Vol. vi, pp. 326-79. London. 1890.
III. WORKS DEALING CHIEFLY WITH ECONOMIC POLICY
TOWARDS THE COLONIES.
Craik, G. L.
Annals of Commerce. 3 vols. London. 1844.
Davidson, J.
Commercial Federation and Colonial Trade Policy. London. 1900. Fuchs, C. J. Die Handelspolitik Englands und seiner Kolonien.
Leipzig.
1893.
*Eng. translation by C. H. M. Archibald.
London. 1905.
Hirst F. W.
Free Trade and the Manchester School [includes many characteristic utterances
of Free Traders on Colonial subjects]. London and New York. 1903. Huskisson, W.
Extracts from Various Speeches, pp. 110-2,196-208, 230-8, 261-70, 304-361,
423-6, vol. ii; pp. 1-55, 77-136,
247-8, 353-68, 470-4, 595-612, vol. iii.
Speeches. London. 1831.
McCulloch, J.
R. Statistical Account of the British Empire. 2nd edn. 2 vols. London. 1839.
Navigation
Laws. Reports of the Committees on. London. 1847—8.
Colonial Governors’ Correspondence on effect
of. Accounts and Papers.
Vol. xxi.
London. 1847-8.
(Northcote,
Sir S. H. [Earl of Iddesleigh].) A short review of the History of the
Navigation Laws. [Puhlished anonymously.] London. 1849.
Petty de
Thozee, C. The'ories de la Colonisation au xixme siecle. ’
Academiedes Sciences. Vol. lx. Brussels.
1902.
Zimmermann, A. Die Europaischen Kolonien. Berlin. 1896.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Uarrisse, H. Notes pour servir a l’histoire, a la cartographie de la
Nouvelle-France et des pays adjacents (1545-1700). Paris. 1872.
Morgan, H. J.
Bibliotheca Canadiensis: Manual of Canadian Literature. Ottawa.
1867. ;
II. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
A. Documents.
A general
statistical abstract exhibiting' the comparative state and progress of
Education in Upper Canada during the years 1842 to 1853 inclusive. Compiled
from returns in the Educational Department. Toronto. 1854.
A Statement
of the satisfactory results which have attended Emigration to Upper Canada from
the establishment of the Canada Company, until the present period; comprising
statistical tables...with a general map of the province. London. 1841.
British North
America. Reports of Progress with a Preliminary and General Report on the
Aesihboine and Saskatchewan Exploring Expeditions. By
H. Y. Hind. London. 1860.
Doughty, A.
G. and Shortt, Adam. Documents relating to Parliamentary History of Canada
(1754r-91). Ottawa. 1907.
Durham, Earl
of. Report on the Affairs of British North America. London. 1839. New Edition,
with Introductory Note. London. 1902. ■
Emigration.
Copies of Extracts from Correspondence on, of Colonial Secretary and Governors
in North America and Australia. London. 1833.
Hodgins, J.
G. Documentary History of Education in Upper Canada. Vols. i-iv -1860. (In progress.) Toronto.
1894-1906.
Houston, W.
Documents Illustrative of the Canadian Constitution. Toronto.
1891.
Statutes of
the Province of Canada, passed in the 20th (21st, etc.) year of the reign of
Queen Victoria, etc. Toronto. l857 sqq.
Statutes of
the Province of Canada, passed in the session held in the twenty-ninth and
thirtieth years of the reign of Queen Victoria, etc. Ottawa. 1866.
The Civil
Code of Lower Canada, together with a synopsis of changes in that law... a
concordance with the Code Napoleon and Code de Commerce...and a complete index
by T. McCurd. Montreal. 1867.
The
Consolidated Statutes of Canada. Proclaimed and published under the authority
of the Act 22 Viet. cap. 29, a.d. 1859.
Toronto. 1859.
The Revised
Acts and Ordinances of Lower Canada. Published by authority, under the
superintendence of the Commissioners for revising the said Acts and Ordinances.
Montreal. 1846.
A Review of
Publications relating to Canada is published yearly by the University of
Toronto : present editor, G. M. Wrong.
B. Contemporary
Whitings.
Buller,
Charles. Responsible Government. London. 1840.
Elgin, James
Bruce, Eighth Earl. Letters and Journals. Chaps, m-iv. Ed.
T. Walrond.
London. 1872.
Gray, J. H-.
Confederation of Canada. Toronto. 1872.
Howe,
Hon. J. Speeches and Letters. Boston. 1858. .
MacMullen, J.
The History of Canada from its First Discovery to the Present Time.
Philadelphia. 1869.
Marshall, C.
Canadian Dominion. London. 1871.
Melbourne,
Viscount. Papers. Edited by Lloyd C. Sanders. 2nd edn. London. 1890.
Metcalfe.
(Sir Charles, afterwards Lord). Papers. Ed. J. W. Kayo. London. 1855.
Morgan, H. J.
Sketches of celebrated Canadians, and persons connected with Canada, from the
earliest period down to the present. Quebec (printed) and London. 1862.
Rolph,
Thomas. (Canadian Colonization Agent.) Emigration and Colonization [chiefly
relating to Canada]. London. 1844.
Sydenham,
Charles Poulett, Lord. Life and Administration. By G. P. Scrope.
London. 1843.
Turcotte, L. Le Canada sous l’Union. Quebec. 1871.
■ Debates on Confederation.
Quebec. 1865.
III. LATER AUTHORITIES.
A. General
Histories.
Bourinot, Sir
J. G. Constitutional History of Canada. Montreal. 1888.
Canada. (Story of the Nations.) New York.
1897.
Canada under British Rule, 1760-1900.
Cambridge. 1900.
Bradshaw, F.
Self-Government in Canada. London. 1903.
Bryce, G. A
Short History of the Canadian People. London. 1887.
Canada’s
Intellectual Strength and Weakness. [Anon.] Montreal. 1893. Clement, W. H.
History of Canada. Toronto. 1897.
Dent, J. C.
The Last Forty Years: Canada since the Union of 1841. Toronto. 1883.
Egerton, H.
E. A Short History of British Colonial Policy. London. 1897.
an(j
w. L. Grant. Canadian Constitutional History. London. 1907.
Garran R. R.
The Coming Commonwealth. Part n. Chapter n. The Dominion of Canada. Sydney.
1897.
Greswell W.
P. History of the Dominion of Canada. Oxford. 1890.
Outlines of British Colonization. Chapter iv.
London. 1893.
Holland B.
Imperium et Libertas. Part n. Canada. Chapters in-v. London.
1901.
Hopkins,
J. C. The Story of the Dominion. Four Hundred Years in the Annals of Half a
Continent. Toronto. 1901. .
Jose, A. W.
The Growth of the Empire. A Hand-book to the History of Greater Britain.
Chapter in. British Canada. Appendices A and B. London. 1901. Kingsford, W. The
History of Canada. Vol. x. 1836-41. Toronto. 1898. Munro, J. E. C. The
Constitution of Canada. Cambridge. 1889.
Osborn, E. B.
Greater Canada. London. 1900.
Parkin, G. R.
The Great Dominion. Studies in Canada. London. 1895. Roberts, C. G. D. History
of Canada. London. 1898.
Siegfried, A.
Canada: Les Deux Races. Paris. 1906.
Smith,
Goldwin. Canada and the Canadian Question. London. 1891.
Todd,
Alpheus. Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies. Second edition.
London. 1894.
Watkin, Sir
E. W., Bart. Canada and the States. Recollections, 1851-86. London. 1887.
B. Special
Histories.
Begg, A. History
of the North-West. Toronto. 1894.
History of British Columbia. Toronto. 1894.
Bryce, G.
Manitoba—its Infancy, Growth, and Present Position. London. 1882. Campbell, D.
History of Prince Edward Island. Charlotte Town. 1875.
Christie, R.
History of Lower Canada. 6 vols. Montreal. 1866.
Dawson, S. E.
Canada and Newfoundland. Montreal. 1897.
The St Lawrence Basin and its Borderlands. Montreal. 1905.
Douvray, H. D. La Litterature Anglo-Canadienne. Paris. 1908.
Gunn, Hon. D.
History of Manitoba. Ottawa. 1880.
Hatton, J.
and Harvey, M. Newfoundland, its History and Presen Condition. London. 1883.
Isham, C. The
Fishery Question. Origin, History, and Present Situation. With a short
Bibliography. New York. 1887.
Mercier, Hon.
H. General Sketch of the Province of Quebec. Quebec. 1889. Pemberton, J. D.
Vancouver Island and British Columbia. London. 1850. Prowse, G. W. History of
Newfoundland. London. 1895.
Ricci, J. H.
de. The Fisheries Dispute and Annexation of Canada. London. 1888. Stewart,
George. Canada under the Earl of Dufferin. London. 1878.
Willson,
Beckles. The Great Company (Hudson’s Bay Company). London. 1900. Hudson’s Bay Company Reports. London. 1857.
C. Biographies.
Bourinot, Sir
J. G. Life of Lord Elgin. Toronto. 1905.
Celles, A. D. de. Life of Sir Georges Etienne Cartier.
Makers of Canada Series. Toronto. 1905.
Dawson, Sir
W. J. Fifty Years’ Work in Canada, Scientific and Educational.
Edited by
Rankine Dawson. London. 1901.
Hannay, J.
Life and Times of Sir Leonard Tilley. St John’s, Newfoundland.
1897.
Hincks, Sir
F. Reminiscences. Montreal. 1884.
Hodgins, J.
G. Life of Egerton Ryerson, LL.D. Toronto. 1883.
Hopkins, J.
C. Life and Work of Sir John Thompson. Toronto. 1895.
Lewis, J.
Life of the Hon. George Brown. Toronto. 1906.
Lindsay, C.
Life of W. Lyon Mackenzie. Toronto. 1863.
Lyall, Sir A.
Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava. 2 vols. London. 1905. Mackenzie, A.
Life and Speeches of the Hon. George Brown. Toronto. 1882.
Pope, J.
Memoirs of the Right Hon. Sir John A. Macdonald. Ottawa and London. 1894.
Reid, Stuart
J. Life and Letters of the First Earl of Durham, 1792—1840.
2 vols.
London. 1896.
Walpole, Sir
Spencer. Life of Lord John Russell. 2 vols. London. 1889. Willson, B. Life of
Lord Strathcona. London. 1902.
Wrong, G. M.
The Earl of Elgin. London. 1905.
I. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
A. Bibliographies,
etc.
Fairhridge,
C. A. and Noble, J. Catalogue of Books relating to South Africa. Capetown.
1886.
'
“F. G. S.”
Catalogue of the Collection of Books formed by the late Charles Allen
Fairbridge and preserved at Sea Point, Cape Colony. Privately printed.
Edinburgh. 1904.
Hollway, H.
C. S. Bibliography of books relating to South Africa, transactions of the South
African Philosophical Society. Vol. x. Part 2. Capetown. 1898.
Theal, G. M.
History of South Africa, 1846-60. London. 1904. [Excellent critical
bibliography for the period from 1795.]
History of the Boers in South Africa. London.
1887. [Lists of authorities.]
B. Parliamentary
Papers and other Official Documents.
Basutos.
The Report and evidence of the commission on their native laws and customs.
Capetown. 1873. ,
Basutoland
Records (1833-61). Official documents, Travellers’ Accounts, etc. Ed. G. M.
Theal. 2 vols. Capetown. 1883.
Cape
Colony. Records of the, from Feb. 1793 to April 1831. Copied for the Cape
Government from the Manuscript Documents in the Public Record Office, London,
by G. M. Theal. 36 vols. London. 1897-1905. [The author states that no paper of
even the slightest importance has been omitted in this collection.] ,
Griquas.
Evidence taken at Bloemhof before the Commissioners appointed to investigate
the claims of the South African Republic, Captain N. Waterboer and certain
other native chiefs to portions of the territory on the Vaal river now known as
the diamond fields. Capetown. 1871. [Materials for history, of Griquas.
1815-71.]
Hintza.
Copy of minutes of proceedings of the court of inquiry held at Fort
Willshire...to investigate and report upon the circumstances of the fate of the
Caffer Chief Hintza. Capetown. 1837. ,
,
Natal, the
Annals of. (1495-1845.) Ed. J. Bird. 2 vols. Pietermaritzburg. 1888.
Ordinances, proclamations etc. relating to.
Capetown. 1848.
Native
Affairs Commission. Proceedings of, and evidence taken by, the. Grahams- town. 1865.
Parliamentary
Papers. A complete list of the British Parliamentary Papers relating to South
Africa, 1815-70, may be found in Messrs P. S. King’s “ Catalogue of
Parliamentary Papers 1801-1900,” under the heads Cape of iGood Hope; South
African Repuhlic; Basutoland; Natal. For a selected list for the whole period
from 179-5, see Theal, “ History of South Africa, .1846-60,” pp. 424-6.
Pottinger, Sir H. Despatch 154 ofj to Earl Grey. Capetown. 1848.
Schlachter’s
Nek. The Rebellion of ,1815. A, complete collection of all the Papers connected
therewith. Ed. hy H. C. V. Leibbrandt. Capetown. 1902. South Eastern Africa,
Records of. Vol. ix. Ed. G. M. Theal. London. 1903. [Contains official
correspondence concerning Delagoa Bay, etc. 1823-5.]
C. Books,
Pamphlets, etc.
(1) General.
Bird, W.
State of the Cape of Good Hope in 1822. London. 1823.
Boyce, W. B.
Notes on South African Affairs from 1834 to 1836. Grahamstown. 1838.
Bunbury,
Charles J. F. Journal of a residence at the Cape of Good Hope. London. 1848.
Burchell,
W. J. Travels in the interior of Southern Africa. 2 vols. London.
1822-4. .
Chase, J. C.
The Cape of Good Hope and the Eastern Province. London. 1843. Donkin, Sir
Rufane. Letter to Earl Bathurst dated 6th April, 1827. London. 1827.
t
Observations hy Lieutenant-Colonel Bird on Sir R. D.’s letter to Earl Bathurst.
Capetown.
1827.
Cursory remarks on a letter from Sir R, D. to
Earl Bathurst. Capetown.
1827.
Fairbairn, J.
Paper explaining the cause of Lord Bathurst’s last interference with the press
at the Cape of Good Hope. London. 1827.
Grant, P. W.
Considerations on the state of the colonial currency and foreign exchanges at
the Cape of Good Hope. Capetown. 1825.
Grey, Henry,
3rd Earl. The colonial policy of Lord John Russell’s administration.
2 vols.
London. 1853.
Holden, W. C.
History of the Colony of Natal, South Africa. Appendix containing a hrief
history of the Orange Free State. London. 1855.
Meeuant, L.
H. Sixty years ago or reminiscences of the struggle for the freedom of the
press in South Africa. Capetown. 1885.
Memorials of
the British Settlers of South Africa. By the editor of the Grahamstown Journal.
Grahamstown. 1844.
Pringle, T.
Narrative of a residence in South Africa. London. 1836.
Reports of
the committee and sub-committee of the society for the relief of distressed
settlers in South Africa. Capetown. 1823-4.
Stockenstrom,
Sir A., The autobiography of. Edited by C. W. Hutton. Capetown. 1887.
Thompson, G.
Travels and adventures in Southern Africa. London. 1827.
(2) The Slavery Question.
Annual
Reports of the Cape of pood Hope philanthropic society for aiding deserving
slaves and slave children to purchase their freedom. Capetown. 1828-33. Chase,
J. C. Practical considerations on the exact position of the slave question.
Capetown. 1831.
Miller, T.
Considerations on the exact position of the slave question. Capetown. 1831.
Verslag der gehoudene bijeerekomst op Maandag den l7den September, 1832.
Capetown.
1832. ,
Wright, W.
Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope. London. 1831.
(3) Condition of natives: missionary work.
Arbousset, T. and Daumar, F. Relation d’un voyage d’exploration au
nordest de la colonie du Cap de Bonne-Esperance. Paris. 1842.
Eng. trans. Capetown. 1846. London. 1882.
Campbell, J.
Travels in South Africa. London. 1815.
Travels in South Africa. 2 vols. London. 1822.
Casalis, E.
The Basutos. London. 1861.
Cumining, R.
G. Five years’ adventures in the far interior of South Africa. London. 1873.
Gardiner, A.
Narrative of a journey to the Zulu country. London. 1836.
Grout, L. Zululand,
or Life among the Zulu-Kafirs of Natal. London. 1864 (?). Isaacs, N. Travels
and adventures in Eastern Africa. London. 1836.
Livingstone,
David. A popular account of missionary travels and researches in South Africa.
London. 1861.
Moffat, R.
Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa. London. 1842. Philip, J.
Researches in South Africa. 2 vols. London. 1828.
Smith, A.
Report of an exploring expedition into the interior of South Africa as • far as
the Limpopo river. London. 1836.
(4) The Kaffir Wars.
Abstract of
proceedings of the board of relief for the destitute (1834-5) appointed at
Grahamstown. Capetown. 1836.
Alexander, J.
E. Narrative of a voyage...and of a campaign in Kaffirland...in 1835.
2 vols.
London. 1837- Case of the colonists...in reference to the Kaffir invasions of
1836 and 1846. By the editor of the Grahamstown Journal. Grahamstown. 1846.
Godlonton, R.
A narrative of the irruption of the Kafir hordes...1834^5. Grahamstown. 1836.
Introductory
remarks to a narrative of the irruption of the Kafir hordes...1834-5.
By the editor
of the Grahamstown Journal. Grahamstown. 1835-6.
“Justus.” The
Wrongs of the Caffre nation. London. 1837.
Kay, S. A
succinct account of the.Kaffer’s case...in a letter to T. Fowell Buxton, Esq.,
M.P. etc. etc. London. 1857.
Report of the
central board of relief for destitute sufferers by the Kaffir War in 1846.
Grahamstown.
1847.
Stockenstrom,
A. Narration of transactions connected with the Kaffir War of 1846 and 1847.
Grahamstown. 1848.
Ward,
Harriet. Five Years in Kaffirland, with sketches of the late war in that
country. London. 1848.
(5) The Emigrant Boers; the Republics.
Bezuidenhout,
D. P. The Pioneer's Narrative (1838), v. Annals of Natal (sup. I, B).1
Cloete, H. The History of the Great Boer Trek. London,
1899.
Delegorgue, A. Voyage dans l’Afrique Australe notamment dans le
territoire de Natal...durant les annees 1838-44. Paris. 1847.
Harris, W. C.
The wild sports of Southern Africa, being the narration of a hunting expedition
through the territories of the chief Moselekatse. London. 1852.
Molesworth,
Sir W. Materials for a Speech in defence of the policy of abandoning the Orange
River Territory. Privately printed. London. 1854. [Important for home policy.]
Pretorius, W.
J. Narrative, 1834-9, «. Annals of Natal (sup. I, B).
Stuart, J. De Hollandsche Afrikanen en hunne republiek in Zuid Afrika. Amsterdam.
1854.
D. Newspapers
and Journals.
The
Government Gazette (continuous from August 1800). The South African Commercial
Advertiser; The South African Chronicle and Mercantile Advertiser; The
Colonist, 1827-8; The Grahamstown Journal; De Zuid Afrikaan; Het Nederduitsch
Zuid-Afrikaansch Tijdschrift, 1824-42; The South African Journal, 1824; The
South African Quarterly Journal, 1829-31, 1833-5; The Cape of Good Hope
Literary Gazette, 1831-3; The Diamond News and Griqualand West Government
Gazette (see especially Judge Stockenstrom’s judgment, March 16, 1876).
II. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.
A. General.
Cappon, J.
Britain’s Title in South Africa. 2nd edn. London. 1902. [A criticism of Theal’s
history.]
Gresswell, W.
P. Geography of South Africa south of the Zamhesi. Oxford. 1892.
Lucas, C. P.
History of South Africa. Clarendon Press. 1899.
Noble, J.
South Africa, past and present. London. 1877.
Illustrated Official Handbook. History, etc.
of the Cape of Good Hope and
South Africa.
London and Capetown. 1893.
Theal, G. M.
History of South Africa 1795-1828, 1828-46, 1846-60. Republics and Native
Territories, 1854-72. London. 1903, 1904, 1904, 1900.
History of the Boers in South Africa. London.
1887.
Progress of South Africa in the Century.
London. 1902.
South Africa. (Story of the Nations.) 5th edn.
London. 1899.
Voigt,
J. C. Fifty years of the Republic in South Africa (1795-1845). London.
1899. .
Wilmot, A.
Manual of South African History. London. 1901.
B. Special.
Campbell, C.
T. British South Africa. London. 1897. [A very full account of the early days
of the Albany settlement.]
Colquhoun, A.
R. Africander Land. London. 1906.
Grey, Sir
George. Life, by W. L Rees. 2 vols. London. 1893.
Henderson, G. C. Adelaide. 1907.
Hewitt, J. A.
Sketches of English Church History in South Africa from 1795 to
1848. Capetown.
1887.
Hofstede, H. J. Geschiedenis van den Oranje-Vrijstaat. The
Hague. 1876.
Keltie, J. S.
Partition of Africa. London. 1893.
Kidd, Dudley.
Kafir Socialism. London. 1907.
The Essential Kafir. London. 1904.
M’Carter, J.
The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa. Edinburgh. 1869. Molteno, Sir J.,
Premier of the Cape. Life and Times. By P. A. Molteno.
2 vols. London. 1900.
Newman, W. A.
Biographical Memoir of John Montagu. London. 183S. Russell, W. L. Natal, the
Land and its Story. 3rd edn. London. 1894.
Smith, Sir
Harry. Life and Letters. By G. C. Moore-Smith. London. 1901. Southey, Sir
Richard. Life and Times of. By Sir A. Wilmot. London. 1904. Stow, G. W. Edited
by G. M. Theal. The Native races of South Africa. London. 1905. [Deals
especially with Bushmen, Griquas and Betshuana in early part of this period.]
I. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
A. Manuscripts.
For
bibliographical purposes see Australasian Bibliography: a catalogue of books in
the Free Public Library, Sydney, relating to or published in Australasia.
3 parts. Sydney. 1893. The Governors’
despatches, departmental correspondence, letters from individuals
(Miscellaneous A to Z), sessional papers, and certified Acts are preserved in
the Record Office; copies of instructions to Governors and out letters in the
Colonial Office, ms. material
later than 1802 can only be seen if a permit (which may be extended to 1830) is
obtained from the Colonial Office. All important material prior to 1812 is
published in Historical Records of New South Wales. 7 vols. Sydney. 1893-1901.
B. Documents
and Official Papers.
(1) Published and presented to Parliament of
United Kingdom.
Three Reports
of the Commissioner of Inquiry, J. T. Bigge, into the State of New South Wales:
(1) General report, 1822. (2) Report on Agriculture and Trade, 1823. (3) Report
on judicial establishments, 1823.
Report from
the Select Committee:
(а) Of the H. of C. on the system of
transportation. 2 vols. 1837, 1838.
(б) Of the H. of L. on the state of the islands
of New Zealand. 1838.
(c) Of the H. of C. on the colonisation of New
Zealand. 1840.
(d) Of the H. of C. on the state of the colony of
New Zealand. 1844. Important Reports etc. of the Legislative Council (New South
Wales) or of Committees thereof are copied in Parliamentary Papers, 1837-8,
no. 389; 1840, no. 612; 1841, nos. 241, 308; 1844, no. 505; 1846, no. 418;
1847-8, nos. 986, 994; 1850, no. 1220. Emigration. Copies of Extracts from the
Correspondence between the Colonial Secretary and the Governors of the British
Colonies in N. America and Australia. London. 1833.
(A) Official.
(2) Published in Australasia.
Debates in
the Legislative Council, New South Wales, (a) On Immigration, 1840,
(b) On the division of territory and on Crown
lands, 1840, (c), On the Constitution Bill. 1853.
Parliamentary
Debates, or Hansard’s of (a) New Zealand, 1867 sqq., (b) Queensland, 1864
sqq., (c) South Australia, 1857 sqq., (d) Victoria, 1857 sqq. Statistical
Registers of (a) New South Wales, 1857 sqq., (b) Queensland, 1859—68,
(c) South Australia, 1861-2 sqq., (d) Victoria,
1874 sqq.
Statistics of
(a) New Zealand, 1853 sqq., (6) Queensland, 1869 sqq., (c) Tasmania,
1857 sqq., (d) Victoria, 1857-73.
Victoria,
Yearbook of. By H. H. Hayter. Melbourne. 1874 sqq.
New Zealand,
Handbook of. By Sir J. Vogel. London. 1875.
The above are
published annually in the capitals of the respective colonies, except the last
named.
(B) Unofficial.
(1) Almanacs and Calendars.
Adelaide.
Royal South Australian Almanac. 1839 sqq.
Auckland.
Chapman’s New Zealand Almanac. 1860 sqq.
Brisbane.
Pugh’s (Moreton Bay or) Queensland Almanac. 1859 sqq.
Hobart.
Walch’s Tasmanian Almanac. 1862 sqq.
For the
periods 1824-40 and 1846-62, see Fenton, History of Tasmania, p. 457. London.
Gordon and Gotch’s (Australian or) Australasian Handbook and Almanac. 1870 sqq.
Sydney.
Australasian Pocket Almanac. 1821. Ford Waugh or Cox’s Australian Almanac. 20
vols. 1851-70. •
(2) Newspapers.
Brisbane
(formerly Moreton Bay) Courier. Brisbane. 1846 sqq.
Herald, the
(formerly The Port Phillip or Melbourne Herald). Melbourne. 1840 sqq.
Launceston Examiner (formerly Advertiser etc.). Launceston. 1829 sqq.
South
Australian Register. Adelaide. 1837 sqq.
Sydney
(Morning) Herald. Sydney. 1831 sqq.
For the
period 1803-31 see J. H. Heaton, Australian Dictionary of Dates. London. 1879.
Pt n. pp. 172-6.
(3) Wholly (or partly) Autobiographical.
Bonwick, J.
An Octogenarian’s Reminiscences. London. 1902.
Bowen, Sir G.
F. Thirty Years of Colonial Government [Queensland, New Zealand, Victoria,
etc., includes valuable Documents]. Ed. S. L. Poole. 2 vols London
1889.
Duffy, Sir C.
G. My Life in two Hemispheres. Vol. n. London. 1898.
Fenton,
James. Bush Life in Tasmania. London. 1891.
Fox, Sir W.
The War in New Zealand. London. 1866.
Gorst, Sir J.
E. The Maori King. London. 1864.
Grey, Henry,
3rd Earl. Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell’s Administration.
2 vols. 2nd
edn. London. 1853.
Gudgeon, T.
G. Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand. London. 1879. Parkes, Sir H. Fifty
years in the making of Australian history. Vol. n. London. 1892.
Wakefield,
Edward Gibbon. New outline of a plan of a proposed Colony (South Australia).
London. 1834.
The Art of Colonization. London. 1849.
Wakefield,
Edward Jemingham. Adventure in New Zealand from 1839 to 1844. Vol. ii. London. 1845.
The Founders of Canterbury. [Contains
letters of Gibbon Wakefield to J. R.
Godley.]
Christchurch, New Zealand. 1868.
Whately,
Richard, Archbishop. Thoughts on Secondary Punishment with Appendix on
Transportation to New South Wales and observations on Colonization. London.
1832.
Whitmore, Sir
G. The Last Maori War. London. 1902.
Original
Journals, etc. of their expeditions have been published by Burke, Cunningham,
Eyre, Forrest, Gregory, Hume, Kennedy, Leichhardt, Mitchell, Oxley, Stuart,
Sturt and Wills.
II. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.
A. General.
(1) Official.
Epitome of
Official History of New South Wales. Sydney. 1883.
Official
Yearbooks are annually published for New South Wales, New Zealand, and
Victoria, and nearly annually for Western Australia, an official Yearbook for
Queensland was published in 1901, an official Record and an official Handbook
for Tasmania were published in 1892 and 1894 respectively, and Statistical
Registers for New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia,
and statistics of New Zealand, Queensland and Tasmania are annually published
in the capital of the respective colony. E. Greville’s annual Yearbook of
Australia, with special •ssues for the different colonies, is private, though
based on official information.
(2) Unofficial.
Bonwick, J.
Port Phillip Settlement. London. 1883.
Coghlan, T.
A. Statistical Summary of the seven colonies of Australasia. Sydney.
1902. [Contains the history of each colony.]
Fenton, J.
History of Tasmania. Hobart. 1884.
Gonner, E. C.
K. Settlement of Australasia. English Historical Review, n, pp. 625 sqq.
London. 1887.
Hodder, E.
History of South Australia. Vol. ii. London.
1893.
BLeeves, W.
P. The Long White Cloud [New Zealand]. London. 1898.
Rogers, J. D.
Historical Geography of Australasia. Oxford. 1907.
Rusden, G. W.
History of Australia. Vol. iu.
London. 1883.
History of New Zealand. Vol. in. London. 1883.
Turner, H. G.
History of the colony of Victoria. Vol. u. London. 1904.
B. Special.
(1) Histories.
Doerkes-Boppard. Verfassungsgeschichte der Australischen Kolonien und des
“Commonwealth of Australia.” Historische Bibliothek. Bd. xvi.
Munich
u. Berlin. 1903.
Finniss, R.
T. Constitutional History of South Australia, 1836-57. London. 1891. Hocken, T.
M. Contributions to the early history of New Zealand. Settlement of Otago.
London. 1898.
Hogan, J. F.
Gladstone Colony. London. 1898.
Jenks, E.
Government of Victoria. London. 1891.
The Australasian Colonies till 1893.
Cambridge. 1895.
Labilliere,
F. P. Early History of the colony of Victoria. Vol. n. London. 1878. Lang, J.
I). Historical and statistical account of New South Wales. Vol. ii. London. 4 editions. 1834, 1837,
1852, 1876.
Phillipsland. Edinburgh. 1847.
Cooksland. London. 1847.
Moore, H. H.
Constitution and Commonwealth of Australia. London. 1902. Russell, H. S.
Genesis of Queensland. Sydney. 1888.
Wentworth, W.
C. Statistical Account of the British Settlements in Australasia.
Vol. ii. London. 1824.
Westgarth, W.
Half a century of Australasian Progress. London. 1889.
(2) Biographies, etc.
The following
are works of reference:
Blair, D. Cyclopaedia
of Australasia. Melbourne. 1881; Heaton, J. Henniker. Australian Dictionary of
Dates and Men of the Time. London. 1879; Hutchinson, Australasian
Encyclopaedia. Edited by G. C. Levey. London. 1892; Mennell, P. Dictionary of
Australasian Biography (1855-92). London.
1892.
Angus, G. F.,
Father and Founder of South Australia. Life, by E. Hodder. London. 1891.
Gisborne, W.
New Zealand Rulers and Statesmen. London. 1886.
Grey, Sir
George. Life. By G. C. Henderson. London. 1907.
Life and Times. By W. L. Rees. Vol. n. London.
1892.
Gudgeon, T.
G. Defenders of New Zealand. Auckland. 1887.
Lowe, Robert
(Viscount Sherbrooke). Life and Letters. By A. P. Martin. 2 vols.
London. 1893.
Parkes, Sir
H. Life, by C. E. Lyne. London. 1897.
Rees, W. L.
Life and Times of Sir G. Grey. Vol. ii. London.
1892.
Wakefield,
Edward Gibbon. Life, by R. Garnett. London. 1898.
et sa doctrine de la colonisation
syste'matique. By A. Siegfried. Paris.
1904.
(3) Social and topographical works.
A Year in Tasmania.
By the author of “Five Years in the Levant." Hobart.
1854.
Boxall, G. E.
Story of the Australian Bushrangers. London. 1899.
Favenc, E.
History of Australian Explorations based on official and private papers and
issued under auspices of various Australian Governments. Sydney. 1888. Gregory,
J. W. Geography of Australasia and New Zealand. 2nd edni London.
1907.
Hochstetter, F. von. Neu-Seeland. Stuttgart. 1863.
Maning, F. E. Old New Zealand. Auckland. 1863.
Meredith, Mrs
L. A. My home in Tasmania. London. 1852.
Petrie, C. C.
Tom Petrie’s Reminiscences of early Queensland. Brisbane. 1904. Strzelecki, P.
E. de. Physical Description of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land. London.
1854.
Trollope, A.
Australia and New Zealand. Vol. n. London. 1873.
I. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES; MSS., ETC.
Correspondence
in the Record Office relating to Sir H. Pottinger’s Mission to China.
Foreign
Office Confidential Print from 1839 to 1871.
II. PUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.
Hansard.
Parliamentary Dehates. Vol. liii.
3rd Series. London. 1840. Parliamentary Papers relating to China from 1821 to
1870.
Royal
Commission on Opium. Vols. vi, vn. London. 1895.
United States
Senate Executive Documents. Washington. ; 1839-59.
Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States. Washington. 1861-8.
Foreign
Relations of the United States. Washington.
1870.
III. MEMOIRS, LETTERS, TRAVELS,
ETC.
Auher, P.
China, an Outline of its Government, etc. London. 1834.
Brandt, M. von. Drei und dreissig Jahre in Ostasien. Leipzig. 1901.
Cordier, H. Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances
Occidentales, Vol. i. Paris. 1901.
Davis, Sir J.
F. China. New edn. London. 1857.
Elgin, Earl.
L. Oliphant. The Earl of E.’s Mission. London. 1859.
Ellis, Sir
Henry. Journal of proceedings oi the late Embassy to China. London. 1817.
Gaillard, le P. Louis. Nankin Port Ouvert. Shanghai. 1901.
Gros, Baron. Livre Jaune. Paris. 1864.
Hue, le Pere. Christianisme en Chine. Paris.
1857-8.
Lane-Poole,
S. Life of Sir Harry Parkes. Vol. i. London. 1894.
Lenormant, C.
Articles in “Le Correspondant” for 1846.
Loch, H. B.
Personal Narrative. 3rd edn. 1901.
Sargent, A.
J. Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy. London. 1907. Taylor, Sir Henry.
Autobiography. London. 1885. (Vol. i. Appendix. Charles Elliot’s Mission to
China.)
Willson,
Beckles. Ledger and Sword. London. 1903.
Wilson,
Andrew. The Ever Victorious Army. Edinburgh and London. 1868.
I. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES.
Foreign
Office Confidential Print, 1863-71, partly .reproduced in Parliamentary Papers
of the period.
II. PUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.
United States
Senate Executive Documents, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States;
Foreign Relations of United States Senate. (See also (1) China above.)
III. ORIGINAL JAPANESE WORKS.
(A) Untranslated.
Bakn-matsn
Shi. History of the Fall of'the Shognnate. By Kobayashi Shojiro.
Tokio.
1907. .
I-Shin
Shi-rio. Materials for the History of the New Regime. 30 parts. Tokio. No date.
Kai-koku
Ki-gen. Collection of Documents relating to the Opening of the Country.
By Katsu Awa.
Tokio. 1891.
Kai-koku
Shi-matsu. Life and Times of Ii Kamon no Kami. By Shimada SamurcS. Tokio. 1888.
Tokugawa
Bakufu Jidai-Shi. History of the Tokugawa Shoguns. By Ikeda Koyen. Tokio. 1907.
(B) Translated.
Japan
1863-64, or Genji Yume Monogatari. Translated by Sir E. M. Satow. Reprint.
Tokio. 1906.
Kinse
Shiriaku. A history of Japan from 1863 to 1869. Translated by Sir E. M. Satow.
Revised edn. by S. Watanabe. Tokio. 1906.
IV. OTHER WORKS, GENERAL AND SPECIAL.
Adams, F. O.
History of Japan. London. 1876.
Key, J. H. C. Die Politik der Niederlande in ihren
Beziehungen zu Japan. Oldenburg. 1866.
8 ^
Callahan,
J. M. America: Relations in the Pacific and the Far East, 1784-1900 (In Johns
Hopkins University Studies. Series xix. Nos. 1-3.)
'
Greene, Rev.
D. C. Correspondence between William II of Holland and the Shogun of Japan. In
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan. Vol. xxxiv Pt. 4. Yokohama. 1907.
Griffis, W.
E. The Mikado's Empire. New York. 1876 and subsequent editions.
lownsend Harris. New York and Boston. 1896.
Parkes, Sir
Harry. Life. F. V. Dickins. Vol. 11. London. 1894.
OF
LEADING EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.
1740 France
secures treaty right to custody of Holy Places near Jerusalem. 1779 First
Kaffir War of Dutch settlers in South Africa.
1791 Constitutional Act for Canada.
1792 March. First Cechish national manifesto in
Austria.
1798 Establishment of the Helvetian Republic.
Bentham's
Emancipate your Colonies.
1799 Russo-American Company formed to trade in
Alaska.
1803
Napoleon’s Act of Mediation reorganises Switzerland.
1809 Grand
Duchy of Finland finally annexed to Russia.
“Form of
Government” or Constitution in Sweden.
1814 OeMenschlager’s Helge.
Restoration
of the Order of Jesuits.
Fundamental
Law or Constitution of Norway.
Norway united
with Sweden.
1815 June. Germanic Confederation constituted.
August 7.
Federal Pact of Zurich.
November 20.
Act of Mediation guarantees Swiss independence.
Mksakt
determines relations of Sweden and Norway.
Schlachter’s
Nek (Cape Colony).
1816 Bank of Norway founded.
March. Raid
of Pindaris into British province of Madras.
1816-23
Marquis of Hastings Governor-General of Bengal.
1817 Bank of New South Wales incorporated.
The Porte
grants autonomy to Servia.
Oct.-Dec.
Successful British campaigns in India.
1818 Charles XIV (Bernadotte) King of Norway and
Sweden.
National Bank
of Denmark founded.
Extensive
British annexations of territory in India.
1819 Count Joseph de Maistre’s Du
Pape.
1819-21 5000
British immigrants settle in South Africa.
1819-23
Bigge’s commission of enquiry and Act of Government for Australia.
1820 Mill’s Essay on Government.
1821-44 Brock
Finance Minister of Russia.
1823 July 14. Swiss Oonclusum refuses right of
asylum to foreign refugees.
1823-6
First Burmese War.
1824 Jan Kollar’s Slavy Dcera.
1825-6
Revision of Navigation Laws in England by Huskisson.
1826 February 14. British Treaty with King of
Ava—annexation of Annam, etc. English settlements in West and North Australia.
First railway
opened between Stockton and Darlington.
1827 Keble’s Christian Year.
April 14.
Capodistrias President of Greece.
1828 Corn Law in England adopts Sliding Scale
principle.
Rigorous
Press censorship introduced in Russia.
Russian
Treaty with Persia.
Hottentots
and Whites placed on an equality in Cape Colony.
1828-35 Lord
William Bentinck Governor-General of Bengal.
1829 Treaty of Adrianople gives Caucasus to Russia.
1830 Victor Hugo’s Hemani.
November.
Milosh Obrenovitch recognised as hereditary Prince of Servia. 1830-1
Disturbances in Switzerland. Democratic reform of Cantonal Constitutions.
1830-3 Cultuurstelsel introduced in Dutch Indies.
Beginnings of
French colonisation in Algeria.
1830-44 Zollverein extended to all important German
States except Austria.
1831 September. Russians enter Warsaw, end of
constitutional Poland. October 9. Assassination of Capodistrias.
1831-2 Rtylement or Constitution proclaimed in
Moldavia and Wallachia.
1832 March 17. Siebnerkonkordat of Swiss Liberal
Cantons.
November 14.
Six Swiss Catholic Cantons found League of Samen. European recognition of
Kingdom of Greece.
Issue of Svod
or Code of Laws in Russia.
1832-42 70,000 immigrants in New South Wales.
1833 February. King Otho lands in Greece.
July 14.
Keble’s sermon National Apostasy begins the “ Oxford Movement.” New Charter Act
for East India Company.
Abolition of
Slavery in British Colonies.
1834 Welhaven’s Norway’s Twilight.
1834-5 Sixth
Kaffir War.
1836-9
Elliot’s mission to China.
1836-40 Great Trek in South Africa: 10,000 Boers
leave British territory.
1837 Communal self-government established in Norway.
New Zealand
Association formed.
June.
Separation of England and Hanover. ‘
1837-8 Rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada.
1838 English Chartists publish the “ Charter.”
Earl of
Durham Governor-General of Canada.
December 16.
Boers defeat Zulu King Dingan in Natal.
ii
24. Prince Milosh of Servia delegates his powers to a Council.
1838-9 First Afghan War.
1839 Louis Napoleon Bonaparte’s Les Tdees
NapoUoniennes.
February 11.
Lord Durham’s Report on Canada.
April. Final
recognition of independence of Belgium.
November 3.
Sultan Abd-ul-Mejid issues the Tanzimat.
Religious
persecution in Russia and forcible conversion of Uniatea.
French
conquests in Algeria.
Beginnings of
state control of education in England.
1840 Schneckenburger’s
Die Wacht am Rhein.
Accession of
Frederick William IV of Prussia.
Act of Union
unites Upper and Lower Canada.
Transportation
to New South Wales reduced.
1841 Sir George Comewall Lewis’ Government of
Dependencies.
February.
Newman’s Tract No. 90.
,,
Nassau Senior’s Report on Condition of Hand Ij>om Weavers. August. Sir
Robert Peel Prime Minister of England.
1841-2
Relaxation of Press censorship in Prussia.
Laws
ameliorating condition of serfs passed in Russia.
1842 January. Destruction of British army in
Afghanistan.
February 7.
Guizot’s Railway Scheme in France carried.
July 13.
Death of Duke of Orleans. Regency Act in France.
August 29.
Treaty of Nanking. British annexation of Hongkong. September 21. British armies
under Pollock and Nott enter Cabul. October 15. The Nation (organ of “Young
Ireland”) appears.
November.
Treaty of the Hague between Holland and Belgium.
The Amur
Darya brought under Russian influence.
1842-3 Free
Kirk secession from Established Church in Scotland.
War between
England and Natal Boers.
1842-5
Peel revives Income Tax and systematises English tariff.
1843 Carlyle’s Past and Present.
Ruskin’s
Modem Painters, vol. i.
Gioberti’s
Primato.
February.
British annexation of Sind.
May. British
annexation of Natal.
Imposition of
differential dues between British Colonies prohibited. Commercial treaties
between England and China.
Sept.-Oct.
Agitation for Repeal. Arrest of O’Connell.
1844 Lelewel’s Considerations on the History of
Poland.
March 30.
King Otho assents to new Greek Constitution.
May. Narvaez’
oligarchic amendment of Spanish Constitution of 1837- Graham’s Factory Act in
England.
“Bandiera”
incident in Italy.
United States
and France conclude commercial treaties with China. ■"“Nicholas I
discusses Eastern Question with Lord Aberdeen.
1844-5 Peel’s Bank Charter Act.
1845 Gioberti’s Prolegomeni al Primato.
Maynooth
Grant.
--Customs
union between Moldavia and Wallachia.
October.
Potato Famine in Ireland.
December.
Peel resigns, but returns to office pledged to carry Free Trade. Newman leaves
the English for the Roman Catholic Church.
1845-6
First Sikh War. #
1845-53 Sir George Grey Governor of New Zealand.
1846 January. Massimo d’Azeglio’s I Casi di Romagna.
Liberal
Ministry in Baden.
June 14.
Great Liberal meeting at Brussels demands Reform.
„
26. Abrogation of Duties on Corn Bill passed in England (colonial and foreign
Corn placed on same footing).
29. Peel
resigns. Russell Prime Minister. Grey Colonial Secretary. Oregon boundary
dispute between United States and England settled.
„ The aims of
the Swiss Sonderbund made public.
July 16. Pius
IX publishes his Amnesty.
September 17.
Germanic Confederation reserves rights in Schleswig-
Holstein. . .
October 10.
French marriages of Queen Isabel of Spain and her sister.
Revolution of
peasants in Galicia.
1846-7 Continued distress in Ireland and great
emigrations to America.
Acute
distress in Holland and Belgium.
1846-9
Final Repeal of Navigation Acts in England.
1847 Gioberti’s Gesuita Modemo.
Settembrini’s Protesta del popolo delle due Sicilie.
Lamartine’s Histoire des Girondins.
1847 February 3. Frederick William IV summons the
Combined Diets in Prussia.
,,
“Lolamontane ” riots in Bavaria (till February, 1848).
March 10.
Pius IX appoints an Advisory Council.
April 4.
Pacifico incident at Athens.
May.
Political disturbances in Wiirtemberg.
,, Banquet at
Ma^on to Lamartine.
July 17.
Austrian troops occupy Ferrara.
,, 20. The
Swiss Federal Diet decrees dissolution of the Sonderbund. October 10. Meeting
of German Liberals at Heppenheim.
November
4r-26. Swiss Federal troops defeat the army of the Sonderbund. Nicholai
Muravieff Governor-General of Eastern Siberia.
1847-54
Lord Elgin Governor-General of Canada.
1848 Massimo d’Azeglio’s Lutti
della Lombardia.
Macaulay’s
History of England, vol. i.
January
12-27. Successful insurrection in Palermo.
„ 20. Death
of Christian VIII of Denmark, accession of Frederick VII. Draft Constitution
for uniting Schleswig-Holstein with Denmark.
February 3.
Sir Harry Smith establishes Orange River Sovereignty.
,,
10. Pius IX’s allocution, beginning “ God bless Italy ! ”
„ 17.
Promulgation of Statute by Grand Duke of Tuscany.
,, 22.
Disturbances in France about the Political Banquets.
„ „ Austria
proclaims martial law in Lombardo-Venetia.
,, 23. Guizot
announces his resignation to the French Chamber.
„ ,, Erection
of barricades and riots in Paris.
,, 24.
Louis-Philippe abdicates. The Republic proclaimed. Provisional Government of
Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin.
,, 27.
National Workshops in Paris.
March 1.
Grand Duke of Baden grants reforms.
„ „ Appeal of
Frankfort Diet to German nation.
,, 5. Heidelberg Liberal committee demands Vorparlament.
„ ,, Charles
Albert of Sardinia and Piedmont promulgates Statuto (Constitution).
,, 6. Lewis I
summons meeting of the Bavarian Estates.
,, 7.
Lamartine’s circular to the Powers defines the attitude of the French Republic
in foreign policy.
„ 10. Pius IX
appoints a Liberal Ministry in Rome.
,, 12-3.
Vienna rises in successful insurrection.
,, 13-5.
Riots and disturbance in Berlin.
,, 14.
Resignation and flight of Metternich from Austria.
„
„ Pius IX grants a Constitution to the Papal States.
,, 15.
Imperial Manifesto grants Constitution to Austrian dominions. » » Address from
Hungarian Parliament demanding responsible Ministry conveyed to Vienna by the
Palatine (Archduke Stephen).
>i
„ “The People’s Charter” granted by the Palatine’s Council at Budapest.
,, 16.
Demonstration of 100,000 workmen in Paris.
„ „ Frederick
Augustus, King of Saxony, appoints a Liberal Ministry. „ „ Estates of Baden
summoned by the Grand Duke.
„ 17. Emperor
Ferdinand concedes demands of Palatine. Count Batthyany chosen President of the
Ministry, which, under influence of Kossuth, carries “March and April Laws.”
»
» William II of Holland appoints a Commission to reform Constitution.
1848 March 18. Frederick William IV of Prussia
summons Combined Diets, and abolishes Censorship of the Press. Insurrection in
Berlin.
,, 18-22.
Cinque Oiomate in Milan, which the Austrians evacuate.
Troops
withdrawn from Berlin, Liberal Ministry appointed. Lewis I of Bavaria abdicates
in favour of Maximilian II, Liberal regime begins.
Ernest
Augustus of Hanover appoints a Liberal Ministry. Frederick William IV of
Prussia retires to Potsdam.
Manin expels
the Austrians from Venice and proclaims Republic. Charles Albert of Piedmont
declares war on Austria.
Belgian
troops disperse French revolutionaries at Risquons-Tout. Vorparlament meets at
Frankfort.
Publication
of new Press laws arouses great opposition in Vienna. Meeting of Combined Diet
in Prussia.
General
Durando induces Papal troops to declare for cooperation with Charles Albert;
the Pope ratifies his action.
Deputation of
Serb Nationalists to Hungarian Parliament. Danish troops suppress insurrection
in Schleswig-Holstein. Failure of O’Connor’s great Chartist demonstration in
London. Hungarian Parliament dissolved (reassembles July 2).
Germanic Diet
acknowledges Provisional Government in Schleswig- Holstein.
Austria
declines to submit unconditionally to the Frankfort National Assemhly.
Austrian
Constitution published hy Emperor Ferdinand. “Dahlmann’s Constitution” laid
before Germanic Diet.
. Count
Stadion suppresses rising in Galicia.
Extraordinary
Diet of Mecklenburg-Schwerin declares equality of electoral rights.
Pius IX’s
Encyclical declares against the War.
Prussians
under Wrangel take Fridericia from the Danes. Convention of Bardo. Polish
revolutionists at Posen agree to surrender to Prussians.
Risings in
Spain. Narvaez dismisses Bulwer (British ambassador). First meeting of
Frankfort National Assembly.
Count Hoyos
dissolves Central Political Committee at Vienna. Mob demonstration in favour of
Poland in Constituent Assembly at Paris dispersed by the National Guard.
Riots at
Naples. End of Constitutional rigime.
Meeting at
Agram demands Constitutional Rights of Croatia. Emperor Ferdinand I flies from
Vienna to Innsbruck.
Prussian
Constituent Assembly meets.
Victory of
Piedmontese over Austrians at Goito.
June. Slav
Congress opens in Prague.
„ 10.
Radetzky recaptures Vicenza.
)}
13-7. Fighting in Prague. Victory of Windischgratz.
„ 14. Prince
Bibesco of Wallachia, forced to accept a Revolutionary Constitution, resigns
and quits country.
,, 21.
National Workshops abolished by decree of French Government. „ 23-6. Sanguinary
riots in Paris. French Government appoints Cavaignac Dictator, who restores
order.
„ 29.
Archduke John of Austria chosen Reichsverweser at Frankfort. July 8.
Appointment of ultra-Liberal Ministry at Vienna.
„
9. Jellaci6 supported by Diet of Croatia.
93 |
19. |
99 |
20. |
>9 |
>9 |
99 |
22. |
99 |
» |
99 |
>i |
99 |
30. |
99 |
31. |
April |
1. |
99 |
2. |
99 |
8. |
99 |
» |
99 |
9. |
99 |
10. |
99 |
11. |
99 |
12. |
99 |
21. |
99 |
25. |
99 |
» |
99 |
25-6. |
99 |
26. |
99 |
29. |
May |
2. |
99 |
5. |
„
7-17. |
|
» |
13. |
>> |
99 |
» |
15. |
» |
» |
» |
9> |
» |
17. |
>> |
22. |
» |
30. |
1848 July 11. Repression begins in France.
Government decrees restrict liberty of Press and right of public meeting.
Hungarian
Parliament votes for war against Croatia. Reichsverweser enters Frankfort and
appoints responsible Ministry.
Reichstag
of the Austrian dominions meets at Vienna. Radetzky defeats the Piedmontese at
Custozza.
Union of
Piedmont, Parma, Modena, and Venice declared. Radetzky recaptures Milan.
Emperor
Ferdinand I returns to Schdnbrunn.
He revokes
the extraordinary powers of Palatine of Hungary. Truce of Malmoe between
Prussia and Denmark.
Battle of
Boomplatz. Sir Harry Smith defeats Boers. Jellacid reinstated Bonus of Croatia.
Land law in
favour of peasants passes Austrian Reichstag. Swiss Diet adopts Constitution
increasing the Federal Power. The Frankfort Assembly ratifies Truce of Malmoe.
Jellacid
invades Hungary from Croatia. .
9. Murder of
Auerswald and Lichnowsky at Frankfort. Budapest mob murder Lamberg, appointed
Commander-in- chief in Hungary by Austrian Government.
Oct. 7.
Jellacid driven back towards Croatia.
Austrian
Government declares war on Hungary.
Second Vienna
Revolution.
Flight of the
Emperor Ferdinand to Olmiitz.
Austrian
Reichstag summoned to meet at Kremsier. Bombardment of Vienna by Windischgratz.
Jellacic
repulses a H ungarian force attempting to relieve Vienna. Arrests begin in
Vienna. Schwarzenberg Ministry appointed. Reactionary Prussian Ministry under
Count Brandenburg. New Fundamental Law accepted by William II of Holland.
Execution of Robert Blum.
Assassination
of Rossi. Flight of Pius IX to Gaeta. Abdication of Emperor Ferdinand I of
Austria in favour of Francis Joseph I [made public December 20],
Prussian
Assembly dissolved, and a Prussian Constitution promulgated by royal edict.
Gagem becomes
head of the Reichsministerium.
Sixty-four
outbreaks of serfs in Russia during this year.
Portuguese
occupy Angola.
1848-56
Lord Dalhousie Governor-General of India.
1849 January 5. Windischgratz occupies Budapest.
Hungarian
troops under Gorgei declare their adhesion to
King
Ferdinand’s Constitution and to monarchy.
Frederick
William IV negotiates with Frankfort Assembly. He confirms new Prussian
Constitution.
Pius IX
appeals to the Powers. Republic proclaimed at Rome.
Battle of
Gujarat, Dalhousie annexes Punjab.
March.
Thorbecke forms a Ministry in Holland pledged to extensive reforms.
„
4-7. Schwarzenberg publishes a Constitution by imperial edict, and dissolves
Austrian Reichstag. '
s)
19« Hungarian Ij :1a*-tion of Independence. Kossuth c(
responsible Governor-President. ”
July |
11. |
33 |
» |
33 |
» |
33 |
22. |
33 |
25. |
33 |
27. |
August |
6. |
33 |
12. |
33 |
22. |
33 |
26. |
33 |
29. |
September
4. |
|
33 |
7. |
33 |
12. |
33 |
16. |
33 |
17. |
33 |
18-! |
33 |
28. |
33 |
29—< |
October |
3. |
„
6-7. |
|
33 |
17. |
33 |
22. |
33 |
26. |
33 |
30. |
November
1. |
|
33 |
3) |
33 |
8. |
33 |
9. |
33 |
18. |
December
2. |
6.
18.
6.
23.
February 6. „
7-9.
21.
1849 March 23. Radetzky defeats Charles Albert of
Piedmont at Novara.
„ 28.
Frankfort Assembly suspend relations with Austria, and elect the King of
Prussia German Emperor.
April 4.
Twenty-eight German States accept Frankfort resolutions.
„ 11.
Leopold, Grand Duke of Tuscany, restored to power by plebiscite.
„ 14.
Hungarian Republic, and deposition of Francis Joseph, proclaimed. „ 28. Saxon
Lower Chamber dissolved.
,, 30.
Garibaldi repulses Oudinot and a French force from Rome.
May 1.
Convention of Balta Liman between Turkey and Russia arranges for suppression of
revolution in Moldavia and Wallachia.
,, 3.
Bombardment of Budapest begins.
„ 5. Fall of
Palermo and end of Sicilian Revolution.
„ 7. Prussian
troops suppress insurrection in Saxony.
,, 13.
Insurrection in Baden.
,, 18.
Kossuth issues Hungarian protest against Russian interference.
„ 21. Gorgei
recaptures Budapest.
,, ,,
Interview of Francis Joseph I and Nicholas I at Warsaw.
,, 25.
National Assembly migrates from Frankfort to Stuttgart.
,, ,,
Austrians enter Florence.
,, 26.
Dreikonigsbiindniss (Prussia, Saxony, Hanover) concluded.
,, 30.
Present electoral law of three grades introduced into Prussia. May-June. Fall
of Brescia. Haynau’s reign of terror.
June 6.
Kossuth reenters Budapest and prorogues Hungarian Parliament.
,, 6-16.
National Assembly at Stuttgart sets up Regency of Empire and deposes
Beiehsverweser.
„ 25-30.
Prussian troops suppress insurrection in Baden.
,, 30.
Garibaldi evacuates Rome.
July 3.
Gorgei repulses Haynau from Acs.
,, 15. White
terror in Rome.
„ 18.
Austrians recapture Budapest.
„ 31. Bern
and Hungarians defeated at Segesvar.
August 9.
Haynau defeats southern Hungarian army at Temesvar.
,, 11-13.
Kossuth hands over his powers to Gorgei, who negotiates the surrender of
Hungarian troops at Vilagos.
,, 24. Negotiations
for surrender of Venice begin.
„ 27. Manin
goes into exile, Austrian triumph in Italy.
October 5.
Council of Prussia’s “Union” votes for a National Assembly.
Saxony and
Hanover practically withdraw from the “ Union.” „ 6. Thirteen Hungarian generals
executed at Arad.
„ Execution
of 114 civilians in Hungary, including Louis Batthyany. Muravieff Amurski
builds fort of Petropavlovsk in Kamschatka.
1850 Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood edit The Germ.
January 9.
Piedmontese Parliament approves tue peace with Austria. February. Siccardi Laws
in Piedmont.
,, 22.
Hanover formally secedes from the “ Union.”
March 15.
Falloux’ Education Act.
June 9.
Political clubs and public meetings forbidden in France.
July. Recall
of Haynau from Hungary.
,, 2. Peace
signed between Denmark and Prussia.
Pj-rtember.
Dissolution of Diet in Hesse-Cassel on refusal to vote Budget.
„ ;
12. Revival of the old Germanic Diet.
Oct. 11-Nov.
6. Troops sent by Bavaria and Prussia to Hesse-Cassel. November 15. End of the
Union.
„ 29. Olmiitz
Punctation.
1850 December 23. Dresden Conferences open.
Brack's
uniform tariff between Hungary and Austria.
Constitutional
Act of Australia.
**1850-1
Louis Napoleon renews French claim to custody of the Holy Places. Thorbecke
democratises local and provincial government of Holland.
1850-64 “Taiping” Rebellion in China.
1851 Gioberti’s Binnovamento Civile it Italia.
April.
Beichsrath, or Imperial Council of State, established in Austria.
„ Revolution
of Saldanha in Portugal, Acto Additional.
May 16. Old Germanic
Confederation completely restored.
,, ,, Secret
alliance of Austria and Prussia.
June 13.
Close of “Don Pacifico” incident.
July 19-Aug.
10. French Legislative Assembly rejects project for constitutional revision,
and is prorogued.
August.
Kossuth leaves Turkey, and goes to England and America. October. Spanish
Concordat with Pope.
December 1-8.
Coup d’etat of Louis Napoleon. Assembly dissolved.
,, 13.
Schwarzenberg abolishes Austrian Constitution.
„ 21. Louis
Napoleon empowered (by plebiscite) to draw up new French Constitution.
Submarine
telegraph laid between Dover and Calais.
Great
Exhibition in London.
Abrogation of
equal electoral rights in Mecklenburg-Schwerin.
1851-2 Restoration of Catholic hierarchy in
England and Holland.
1851-8
Muravieff’s campaigns in the Amur district.
1852 Montaiembert’s Des inUrets
Catholiques au XIX”* siecle.
January 17.
Sand River Convention grants independence to Transvaal. Jan.-Feb. French
Constitution promulgated (Jan. 14) by Louis Napoleon, followed by period of
severe repression and proscription.
Jan. 28-May
10. Frederick VII of Denmark reoccupies Schleswig-Holstein. April. “ April
Movement ” in Holland.
May 6. Grand
Duke abolishes the Constitution of Tuscany.
November
2-21. Senatusconsultum proclaims Louis Napoleon hereditary Emperor of the
French, which is ratified by plebiscite. ,, 4. Cavour becomes Prime Minister of
Piedmont.
December 7. “
Mantuan Trials,” ending in execution of Enrico Tazzoli and other conspirators.
,, 10. Credit
fonder of France established.
Constitution
Act for New Zealand.
Second
Burmese War, and British annexation of Pegu (Dec. 20).
Draining of
Lake of Haarlem by Dutch Government.
1853 Settlement of Clergy Reserves Question, Canada.
Transportation
of convicts to Australia finally abandoned.
Gladstone’s
first Budget.
-'January.
Nicholas I reopens the Eastern Question to Sir Hamilton Seymour.
— „ 20. Defeat of Turks. Montenegrin
independence acknowledged. —May 22. Prince Menshikoff withdraws from
Constantinople.
July 8.
Commodore Perry and an American squadron visit Yedo. -October. Hospodars of
Moldavia and Wallachia retire to Vienna.
■* ,,
Sultan demands that Russia shall evacuate Moldo-Wallachia. —November 30.
Russian fleet destroys Turkish squadron at Sinope.
1854 February 23. Convention of Bloemfontein.
British recognise independ
ence of
Orange Free State.
•*&pril.
Crimean War begins.
1854 July. Revolution in Spain, Ministry of
Espartero.
—September
20. Franco-British forces defeat Russians at the Alma and advance on
Sevastopol.
^October 25.
Allies victorious at Balaklava, and (Nov. 5) at Inkerman. December 8.
Proclamation of dogma of “ Immaculate Conception.” Elgin’s Reciprocity Treaty
between Canada and the United States.
1854-5
Beginnings of gold-rush in Australia.
1854-6
Abolition of slavery in various Portuguese settlements.
De Lesseps
secures concessions from Said Pasha for Suez Canal.
1854-7
"Piraeus occupied by Franco-British troops.
1854-8
Treaties provide for opening of Japanese Ports and establishment of diplomatic
relations with European Powers.
1854-9 Sir George Grey Governor of Cape Colony.
1855 January. Resignation of Aberdeen. Palmerston
Premier.
,, 25.
Piedmont joins France and England against Russia.
'''■March.
Peace conference between Russia and Allies opened at Vienna.
April 28. New
military law in France.
^August 16.
Piedmontese win the victory of Chernaya over the Russians.
,, 18.
Austrian Concordat with Rome (revoked 1867).
''September.
French capture Malakhoff redoubt at Sevastopol.
1855-60 Bruck Minister of Finance for Austria.
1856 ''March 6. Treaty of Paris ends Crimean War.
British
annexation of Oudh.
Constitution
granted to Luxemburg.
1857 February 20. Parliament condemns Palmerston’s
Chinese policy. (A dis
solution
gives him a large majority.)
May 10.
Outbreak of Indian Mutiny at Mirat.
,, 26.
Napoleon negotiates Treaty of Peace between Switzerland and King of Prussia,
who abandons all claims to Neuchatel.
June 9, Bank
of France given special privileges.
,, 27. Nana
Sahib’s massacre at Cawnpore.
August.
Garibaldi founds the “National Society.”
,, Moltke
becomes head of Prussian General Staff.
September
14—21. Delhi taken by assault.
November 22.
Final relief of Lucknow.
December
28-9. Occupation of Canton by a Franco-British force. Portuguese settle a white
colony at Mozambique.
Denmark
abolishes Sound Dues.
Grondwet
or Constitution of Potchefstroom.
1858 Szechenyi’s Survey of the anonymous Retrospect.
January 14.
Orsini attempts to assassinate Napoleon III.
March 21.
British capture Lucknow.
July 21-2.
Conference of Cavour and Napoleon III at Plombieres. November 1. Lord Canning
first Viceroy of India, amnesty issued.
Treaty of
Aigun. China surrenders left bank of Amur to Russia.
Jews enabled
to sit in the English Parliament.
1859 Darwin’s Origin of Species.
Meredith’s
Ordeal of Richard Feverel.
January 10.
Treaty between France and Piedmont.
*■* „
Moldavia and Wallachia form personal union under Couza.
April 19.
France and Piedmont declare war against Austria.
June 24.
Victory of Napoleon III at Solferino.
July 8.
Armistice of Villafranca.
Aug.-Sept.
Tuscany and the Duchies declare for union with Piedmont,
1859 December 22. La Gueronnicre’s pamphlet, The
Pope and the Congress. Rood appointed
War Minister by the Regent the Prince of Prussia. Juarez President of Mexico.
Rise
of Volunteer movement in England.
1859-61
Issue of Indian Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, and Penal Code.
1860 January. Cobden’s Commercial Treaty with
France.
March.
Union of Tuscany and the Emilia with Piedmont.
,,
24. Treaty of Turin cedes Nice and Savoy to Napoleon III.
May
11-27. Garibaldi and the “Thousand” ’and in Sicily and take Palermo. „ 31.
Formation of National Bank of Russia.
August
22-September 7. Garibaldi lands on Italian mainland, and enters Naples.
October
12. Garibaldi’s victory at the Volturno.
,,
13. Victor Emmanuel II invades the Kingdom of Naples.
,,
20. “The October Charter” proposed for Hungary.
,,
21-2. Naples and Sicily declare for-union with Piedmont.
,,
25. Meeting of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel at Caianello. November 4. The
Marches and Umbria declare for union with Piedmont.
,,
24. Decrees permit free discussion to French Assemblies. Slavery abolished in
Dutch East Indies.
1861 February 13. Fall of Gaeta.
,,
19. Manifesto proclaims emancipation of Russian Serfs.
March.
Russia grants concessions to Poland.
,,
17. The Kingdom of Italy proclaimed by the first Italian Parliament. October
31. France, England, and Spain unite to collect debts from Mexico. December.
Settlement of “Trent” affair between England and United States. ,, 14. Death of
Albert, Prince Consort of England.
1862 July. Confederate privateer Alabama leaves the
Mersey.
August
29. Garibaldi defeated and captured at Aspromonte.
September.
Bismarck becomes President of the Prussian Ministry. October 22. Provisional
Government in Greece deposes King Otho. Swedish communes receive
self-government.
1863 January 21. Revolution in Poland begins.
June.
French enter Mexico.
,,
5. Prince William of Denmark recognised as George, King of Greece. November.
Death of Frederick VII of Denmark. Schleswig-Holstein declares for Duke of
Augustenburg.
Opening
of the Scheldt to Belgian commerce.
1863-72
Maori Wars.
1864 February 1. Austro-Prussian forces occupy
Schleswig Holstein.
May
25. Law passed permitting the rights of combination in France. August. Dispute
as to Schleswig-Holstein begins between Austria and Prussia. October 10.
Convention meets at Quebec to discuss Federation.
September
15. Napoleon Ill’s convention with Victor Emmanuel promises evacuation of Rome.
November
20. Reform of Russian Law Courts.
December
8. Papal Encyclical and Syllabus published.
Peasants
freed from serfdom and made landowners in Poland.
Elective
local Councils introduced into Russia.
Signature
of Geneva Convention.
1865 February. Deak’s pamphlet anticipates the
Ausgleich.
December
10. Death of Leopold I of Belgium.
Sir
Harry Parkes British Minister in Japan.
1866 Atlantic Cable successfully laid.
1866 February. Habeas Corpus Act suspended in
Ireland.
April
8. Italy and Prussia sign treaty of offensive and defensive alliance.
,,
20. Prince Charles of Hohenzollern elected Prince of Roumania. May 6. Italy
refuses to abandon Prussia in return for cession of Venetia. » 20. Battle of
Irgai. Romanovsky takes Khozhend.
June
24. Italians defeated by Austrians at Custozza.
July
3. Prussian victory over Austrians at Koniggratz (Sadowa),
>•
„ 12. New Constitution for Roumania voted by its Assembly.
” 20-
Austrian naval victory over Italians off Lissa.
,,
23. Mob-disturbance in Hyde Park, London.
August
12. Treaty of Prague between Prussia and Austria.
October
3. Treaty of Vienna between Italy and Austria.
„
22. Plebiscite in Venetia declares for union with Italy.
December.
Rome evacuated by French garrisons. (Reoccupied 1867.)
,,
Conference In London as to Federation of Canada.
1866—7
Referendum and Initiative adopted by many Swiss Cantons.
1866-8
Last Ministry of Narvaez in Spain.
1867 D’Azeglio’s I Miei Ricordi.
February.
Disraeli’s Reform of the Franchise Bill.
March.
French evacuate Mexico.
^
}> 3. Withdrawal of Turkish garrisons from Servia.
»
29. British North America Act.
May.
Conference in London and treaty for neutralisation of Luxemburg.
,,
Execution of Emperor Maximilian by Juarez in Mexico.
October
18. Russia sells Alaska to United States.
November
3. De Failly and the French repulse Garibaldi from Mentana.
„
8. Mikado resumes full governmental power in Japan.
Rattazzi
confiscates church property in Italy.
Russia
annexes Turkestan.
Ausgleich
between Austria and Hungary.
Croatia
granted Home Rule.
Formation
of North German Confederation.
1868 May 11. Liberty of Press cancelled in France.
September.
Prim’s revolution in Spain. Deposition of Queen Isabel. Church rates abolished
in England.
Russia
annexes Bokhara.
1868-9 Civil War in Japan. Triumph of the Mikado.
1869 Danilevsky’s Russia and Europe.
"“February
6. Greece obliged to accept Turkish ultimatum.
December
28. Ollivier Ministry takes office in France.
Suez
Canal opened.
Commercial
Treaty between Portugal and the Transvaal.
1869-70 Hudson’s Bay Territory transferred to the
Dominion.
Louis
Riel’s Red River Rebellion in Canada.
Discovery
of diamonds at Dutoitspan and Bulfontein.
Imperial
garrisons withdrawn from New Zealand and Australia.
Meeting
of Oecumenical Council at Rome.
1870 March 23. Constitutional Government established
in France.
April
23. French plebiscite approves of Liberal reforms since 1860.
July
2. Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern’s candidature to Spanish crown announced.
,,
12-5. Negotiations between France and Prussia as to this candidature.
,,
19. War declared by France against Prussia.
,,
„ Dogma of Papal Infallibility voted.
1870 August 3-6. Battles of Weissenburg and Worth.
Battle
of Spicheren.
Battles
of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour.
Battle
of Gravelotte.
1.
Battle of Sedan.
Revolution
and Proclamation of Republic in Paris. Investment of Paris begins.
Italian
army enters Rome.
Plebiscite
at Rome declares for union with Italy.
Germans
take Metz.
French
recapture Orleans.
Amadeo,
Duke of Aosta, accepts throne of Spain.
.
4. Germans recapture Orleans.
Death
of Prim.
1871 January 18. King of Prussia proclaimed Emperor
of Germany in Versailles.
Last
sortie from Paris fails. Armistice signed by Bismarck and Favre.
Bourbaki’s
troops disarmed in Switzerland.
French
Assembly at Bordeaux declares for a Republican Government, and (March 1)
ratifies the Prussian terms of peace.
London
conference abrogates Black Sea clauses of Treaty of Paris.
Disputes
between Commune and Versailles Assembly begin. „ Disturbances in the French
provinces.
April
10-May 28. Hostilities at Paris between Commune and Versailles Assembly. Order
restored after great slaughter. Numerous arrests and sentences.
August
31. New Constitution of France (Rivet-Vitet Law) proclaimed. Basutoland annexed
to Cape Colony.
1872 Responsible Government given to Cape Colony.
1873 March. Russia annexes Khiva.
1874 April 19. New Federal Constitution for
Switzerland becomes law.
1877
Carducci’s Odi Barbate.